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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 22

1930-39

793.94/5601-5800
Oct. 1932-Jan. 1933



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5601

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/575 FOR Despatch #-

FROM China (-) DATED Sept.30,1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Paper entitled "NOTE TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT -Sept.16,1932:"
This document concludes by stating that Chinese Govern-
ment holds Japanese Government responsible for all
its aggressive acts beginning with the attack on
Shenyang Sept.18,1931, and culminating in its
recognition of the puppet organization on Sept.15,
1932.

793.94/5601

frg

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5602

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 894.00-P.R./58 FOR #145

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Oct. 4, 1932
~~xxx~~ NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Japan's relations with Nanking and Shanghai, during the
month of September, 1932.

798.94/5602

dew

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(d) Japan's relations with Hankin and Shanghai.



There is little known concerning the negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Hankin Government during the month. The Japanese War Office reported early in the month that a movement would soon be initiated for the independence of North China from the rest of the country. The Chinese Minister to Japan interviewed General Araki, the Japanese War Minister, on September 10th. It was reported that they had a "friendly" conversation on Sino-Japanese relations in which both expressed regret at the extreme aggravation of the situation. A few days later it was reported that Mr. Miyoshi, the Japanese Minister to China, who was in Shanghai, had been requested by the Hankin authorities to postpone the presentation of his credentials. However, it was reported that they were presented on September 28th and that Mr. Miyoshi had suddenly decided to return to Japan immediately. Some political circles interpret these moves as an indication that certain factions in China have decided to "cooperate" with the Japanese.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 11 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MANCHURIA SITUATION

October 8, 1932.



Possibilities in Reference to
an International Conference.

It is the impression of the undersigned that agitation in various quarters for the calling of a conference of the powers party to the Nine Power Treaty has been increasing, is increasing and will increase. In all probability, unless some other step is taken which ^{otherwise} disposes of that agitation, the American Government will be forced sooner or later to say yes or no to a formal request from one or more foreign governments (most likely, the Chinese Government) that this Government issue invitations to such a conference.

The Chinese Government had under serious consideration immediately prior to the recognition by Japan of "Manchoukuo" the idea of definitely asking the American Government at that time to make such a move. The Chinese Legation here twice inquired at this Division whether such a request by the Chinese Government would be embarrassing to the American Government; and officers of this Division, in reply to those inquiries, expressed the view (with explanation) that such a request at that time by the Chinese Government would be inopportune. Thereafter, the Chinese Government contented itself with

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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sending a comparatively lengthy note calling attention to facts in the situation and suggesting that the powers should give the matter their attention. We have this morning the information that Tang Shao-yi has cabled the President asking that the President summon immediately a conference of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. It is altogether likely that agitation in that direction will continue. And it is by no means unlikely that the League, after some consideration of the Lytton Report and perhaps the adoption of a resolution or two, will turn to the idea of suggesting a conference under the Nine Power Treaty - in which case it would be "up to" the American Government ^{either to refuse or} to issue the invitations.

However, all that may be, there is considerable warrant for the view that only through the holding of an international conference and with emphasis upon the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty as well as the provisions of the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg-Briand Pact will it be possible for the powers to act effectively toward arriving at a solution of the Manchuria problem as it now stands.

Unless the American Government is prepared to let its course be determined by the course of events and ^{is} ~~wishes~~ ^{willing} to have devolve upon it the necessity, if and when, of dealing with a definite request that it call a conference under

- 3 -

under the Nine Power Treaty, this Government should endeavor so to shape the course of events as to preclude such a development.

One possible alternative course has already been suggested by this Division: namely, that the suggestion be caused to be made at Geneva that there be held an international conference (which might be called by the League) at which all the nations of the world, including the members of the League and the United States and Russia, be represented.

8 Oct. 4
This Division's memorandum on that subject is attached.*

FE:SKH:CLS
m.w.

* [Memo on Manchurian Situation:
Action upon the Lytton Report]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 4, 1932.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Action upon the Lytton Report

The Lytton Report disposes of various smoke screens behind which certain officials of certain European foreign offices have so far been able to hide. The most effective of such screens has been their contention that "we do not know the facts" and, in connection therewith, "this assumption could not be used as a premise because 'it couldn't be proved'". In regard to a good many matters, the Lytton Commission has made lengthy statements of fact and categorical statements of conclusion. Although there are a great many things that cannot be "proved", to that plea it can now be answered: "True, it cannot be proved, but here is what the Lytton Commission found and here is what the Lytton Commission affirms".

The Lytton Commission has affirmed that the action begun by Japan on the night of September 18, 1931, was not justifiable on the ground of self-defense; that no independent^{ce} movement had been heard of before September, 1931; that the creation of the so-called state of "Manchoukuo" has been brought about by Japanese action and that the vast majority of the population of Manchuria

have

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have no enthusiasm for the new "state" (under Japanese control); that Japan's action has involved breach of treaty obligations; etc.

The problem henceforth is that of action by the various nations whose rights, obligations, interests and concern are involved; that is to say, the whole world. Fifty-seven states (including China and Japan) have rights and obligations by virtue of the Covenant of the League; fourteen states (including China, Japan and the United States) have rights and obligations by virtue of the Nine-Power Treaty; and more than sixty states (including China, Japan, the United States and Russia) have rights and obligations by virtue of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

It is highly desirable that the whole world be brought into line and into action in defense of rights and interests which are common to all in connection with the problem of peace. It may be expected that Japan's efforts will continue to be directed toward prevention of the establishing of a united front in disapproval of and objection to the course which she has followed and the position which she has in this matter attained. On behalf of the peace machinery, those efforts should be combatted and counter-efforts should be directed toward
the

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the establishing of a united front. Meanwhile, there must be taken an initiative. Direction in this matter should originate in Geneva, that is, with the League. The Covenant of the League is the one among the "peace treaties" which provides machinery. The fact that the United States is not a member of the League unquestionably adds to the difficulty, in this connection, of prompt and effective effort by the League. The American Government unquestionably has shown more solicitude with regard to the peace machinery than have, so far, the two Governments which are most powerful within the League -- the British and the French Governments. Unless some step can be taken which will enable those states within the League whose ideas are in line with the ideas of the American Government to capitalize the concurrence of view between themselves and the United States which does exist, there will remain danger that the influence of states within the League whose views differ from those of the United States will be decisive.

The countries which have greatest interest in the Far East are China, Japan, Great Britain, France, the United States and Russia. Two of these countries, the United States and Russia, are not members of the League. For the purposes of any conference which undertakes seriously to consider the Manchuria problem, it would be highly advantageous to have those two countries officially and fully represented.

These

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These considerations lead to the thought that, in the case which is soon going to be taken up at Geneva and which might conveniently be regarded, by analogy, as "World vs. Japan", the chance of the world's winning its case will be much less if the world has to rely on the efforts of the League powers only, the United States and Russia not appearing in the forum, than it would be if the League powers and Russia and the United States were all represented in what would be a world conference.

Query: Might it not be possible for the Council of the League to arrange to assemble at Geneva a world conference to take up the question of the present Far Eastern crisis? If they were to do this, they could as a matter of course issue invitations to the Russian and the American Governments to send representatives to participate in such a conference. Representatives of all of the League states will be present in Geneva in November. It would be an easy matter (administratively) to round out the world representation by calling for representatives from the few other states; and, on the basis of that representation, to hold a conference of all states.

The question will of course be raised: what government should initiate such a proposal. It is believed that if the principle of this suggestion were approved, that question could readily be taken care of.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 27, 1932.

Mr. Secretary:

As cabled reports to Japan of your Pittsburgh address may place a false emphasis on certain parts of the address, you may wish to send the attached telegram to the Ambassador at Tokyo.

FE:MMH:KC

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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Washington,

October 27, 1932.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
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TOKYO (JAPAN).

123
 On October 26 I made an address at Pittsburgh before the Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Pittsburgh area on the subject QUOTE The Work of the United States Government in the Promotion of Peace during the Past Three Years UNQUOTE. In the address I mentioned five lines along which the present administration has been working and referred to what the administration has accomplished in each line. The fifth line to which I referred related to the great multilateral treaties which have been adopted since the World War in the hope of minimizing and preventing all war in the future. In this part of my address I mentioned the Kellogg-Briand Pact, including a very brief reference to the situation in the Far East. Less than one page of the eight typewritten pages of the address contained any reference to that situation which was referred to as follows:

QUOTE These views (in regard to the Kellogg-Briand Pact) have been expressed by our Government in step after step relating to the recent troubles in the Far East; and

Enciphered by EK

Sent by operator M., 19

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Instr. to Tokyo enclosing copy of speech 10/28/32

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and the policy of this Government, announced in its note of January 7th last, not to recognize the fruits of aggression obtained by a violation of the Treaty, has been formally approved in a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations as the proper policy for all the nations which are members of that League. It has also more recently been adopted by all of the nineteen neutral nations of this hemisphere in respect to the quarrel between Bolivia and Paraguay as the proper policy for the nations of these continents. And, so far as formal and general adoption can thus make it, it has become a recognized principle of international law and practice.

The attitude which your Government has taken towards the Kellogg Pact in these proceedings has had at least two other results. In the first place, it has tended to strengthen the sanctity of treaties. If, when the trouble broke out in Manchuria, we had turned away our heads, irreparable damage would have been done not only to the standing of the Kellogg Pact but also to every other one of the great peace treaties of the world. But

Enciphered by man

Sent by operator M., 19

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

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when the United States showed that the sanctity of the Kellogg Treaty was of keen interest and importance to us, and when our view was followed by the rest of the world, a new breath of vigor and of life was infused into the vitality of all such treaties and their obligations."

In the second place, the action which has taken place among the nations of the world in respect to the troubles in Manchuria has marked a new milestone in the development of actual international cooperation when war threatens the world. In the new international world created by these treaties, the basic idea is that war anywhere is of concern everywhere. The necessary resulting process of this has been shown by the events of the past year to be a consultation between the nations of the world and a call to public opinion to exert itself. The nations of the world have consulted together as to the threat to peace even in far-off Manchuria. They have consulted as to the means to avoid the breach or to moderate and appease it. As a part of this effort to ascertain the true facts involved in the fog of mutual recrimination and intelligently to inform public opinion,

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

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a neutral investigating commission has, with the consent of both the disputant nations, been sent to the seat of the quarrel and is about to present the result of its findings in the nations members of the League of Nations assembled in Geneva UNQUOTE.

A copy of the full text of the address is being sent you by mail.

Stinson
a. j. k.

OF
 OCT 27 1952.

AKW

FE:MMH:EJL

FE *HA*

M. M. H.
a. j. k.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 25, 1932

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN MORNING NEWSPAPERS
OF THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1932, WHICH DO NOT AP-
PEAR ON THE STREETS BEFORE 8:30 P.M., EASTERN
STANDARD TIME, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1932.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM
OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY L. STIMSON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH
FOR THE PITTSBURGH AREA, AT PITTSBURGH, ON
OCTOBER 26, 1932.

THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE
PROMOTION OF PEACE DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS

I am happy to have the privilege of addressing this great gathering of the Methodist Episcopal Church on the subject of the work which the American Government has been doing during the past three years in the cause of peace. That, of course, is only one of the objectives towards which the work of the Department of State is directed, but it is the fundamental objective and the one towards which our main efforts are constantly directed. All of the social, commercial, and other relations of the members of the family of nations are dependent upon the existence among them of conditions of amity and good will; and, therefore, the efforts of the foreign ministries of each of those nations are fundamentally and constantly concerned with promoting such relations.

I am also particularly glad to have as my audience a group of the clergy and religious people of this country, and particularly of this great active and vigorous church. The English-speaking nations of the world have contributed largely during the past century to the motive power for the various movements towards international betterment and the eradication of old evils, such as the movement to abolish the slave trade; to bring education, both religious and secular, to backward nations; to support and extend the movement for the solution of international controversies by peaceful methods; and of late years, for the restriction and elimination of the evils of armaments. In each of those English-speaking nations it has been the churches and religious men and women of the nation that have furnished the dynamic energy of the movement. And today the work of the President of the United States and of his Secretary of State depends regularly upon those elements of the nation for support in overcoming the obstacles which lie in their path in these efforts. Those obstacles during the past three years have been extremely serious. Therefore, in opening what I have to say about the record of our work, and in order that you may grasp the nature of the task and the real extent of what has been accomplished, I wish briefly to enumerate for you the obstacles and opposition against which it has been accomplished.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In the first place, this terrible and world-wide depression in business and commerce has resulted in unrest and violence in many nations. In nearly half the countries of the world there have been revolutions, successful or unsuccessful; and in the great majority of the nations, governments have either been overturned or have been tottering on the verge of overthrow. You may not have realized that when the officials of a government are unstable in their positions, they are often tempted to indulge in threats or demonstrations against neighboring nations in order to keep themselves in office. Yet that is the fact. It is rather difficult for a weak government to be fair and just towards its neighbors. There is always the temptation to resort to some demonstration of false patriotism to rally behind it popular support. Even among strong governments this present period of disillusion and discouragement has produced a growth of isolationist feeling and nationalistic sentiment. Ambitious rulers in many parts of the world are tempted to secure themselves in office or gain additional power by threats of attack upon the rights and interests of their neighboring nations. This has made it a particularly difficult time for the cultivation of international good will.

Even in our own country, you have doubtless been able to notice that we have not been free from some of these excesses of nationalistic feeling. There has never been a time when our political demagogues thought it more worth while to declaim, for example, against the expected machinations of foreign debtors. Never has our yellow press been more extreme in criticising even the most necessary steps towards international cooperation.

And yet, my friends, peace in the world can not come without the efforts of all the nations in the world to achieve a common purpose. That means a joint endeavor; that means cooperation. And such a purpose can not be achieved unless we are ready to walk towards that goal at least in step with them. We can not achieve good will on this earth between the nations unless we are ready to do our share in avoiding provocation, to banish unfounded suspicions from our minds, and to endeavor in all our dealings with our neighbors, whether commercial, political, or social, to walk with a desire to do justice in our hearts.

Ever since I assumed the duties of my present office, three years and a half ago, I have been working by the side of a President whose chief preoccupation in the conduct of foreign relations has been to promote this great cause of peace. He believes, and I believe, that peace is for the interests of the United States not only on moral grounds but on material grounds. We feel that no nation in the world has been provided by Providence with such a secure position from which to promote the cause of good relations among the nations of the world, or is so deeply interested from the aspect of both its moral and material welfare in the existence of peace. From our secure position in the New Hemisphere, surrounded only by friendly nations whose proximity has never given us cause for anxiety, we have an assured base from which the influence of America may be exerted, without fear throughout the world, towards the establishment of better world relations.

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From this base of secured position, Mr. Hoover's administration has been working along various lines, each of which has been intended to reach the same ultimate goal. I shall try to give you this evening a hasty sketch of those various paths and something of what we have accomplished in our progress along them. In the time which I have, it necessarily must be cursory and imperfect.

I. In the first place the maintenance of peace is fundamentally dependent upon the cultivation of a common understanding among the various nations. Hostility and enmity arise more commonly out of a failure to understand each other's aims or position than from almost any other cause. The stranger has traditionally been considered an enemy ever since the Romans used the same word for each. But the modern world, by its development of easy travel and systems of communication, is daily making it more possible to cultivate this common understanding. Two foreign ministers, or secretaries of state, have a much better chance of reaching an agreement when they can pick up the telephone or make a personal visit and talk directly with each other than when their communication is limited to written messages sent through envoys.

Mr. Hoover appreciated this fully and signalized his understanding of it by making a trip which was a unique precedent in American history. You will remember that immediately after his election and before his inauguration, he visited most of the countries of South America. In that way he established personal contact with those peoples and their rulers; he gained a face-to-face knowledge of their problems and conditions; and he was able to appraise the work being done by our ministers and agents, and to form his own estimates for future development. The effect of his trip has been shown again and again by both his own better understanding of the problems of that continent and the many evidences of appreciation which have come to us.

The same method of direct contact has been carried out so far as possible during the subsequent years of his administration. The Presidents of Mexico, Colombia and Panama, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada, the President of the Council of Ministers of France, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy have all made personal visits to Washington and talked over their problems face to face with us here. Three times I, myself, at the President's direction, have visited Europe and have formed contacts with my colleagues in corresponding positions in European countries--contacts which have been of inestimable value to me in understanding their problems. I stress this direct method of international intercourse not only because I believe it to be vitally important, but because it marks a virtually new chapter in the methods of American foreign relations.

II. Closely akin to these steps have been those which we have taken to remove historic sources of friction between us and some of our neighbors, notably our Latin American neighbors. We are withdrawing our Marines from Nicaragua and Haiti as rapidly as possible and are winding up, I am glad to say successfully, the problems which caused those Marines to be landed there many years ago. Very early in 1929, during an insurrection in Mexico, we showed our friendship to that country by giving to the Mexican Government all the help which, under international law, was permissible. And I am glad to say that

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largely owing to that step and the cordial relations with the Mexican Government which were established by Ambassador Morrow, the newspapers of Mexico now currently state that their national relations with us have never been sounder.

These acts of our Government are merely typical of a continuous and consistent policy towards our Southern neighbors, and the favorable effect of this policy has been widespread and fundamental, and evidence of it has come from every quarter and in many ways. It is shown, for example, by the way in which they do not hesitate to turn to us for help in soothing sore spots which exist among themselves. For instance, the conference held in Washington in 1930 to deal with the disputed boundary between Guatemala and Honduras, resulted in the appointment of a special tribunal presided over by our own Chief Justice, Mr. Hughes. This tribunal has been at work all summer. Another example is the long and patient efforts of our Government, in connection with four other countries, Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, and Uruguay, to settle the difficult and persistent controversy between Paraguay and Bolivia in the Chaco. In all these matters our chief concern is for the preservation of sound and friendly international relations and the eradication of friction which may lead to the use of force and to war.

III. There is also being gradually built up in the world a great system of machinery intended to promote peace in more formal ways by direct agreements between the different nations. Under this head come particularly the treaties and agreements which directly provide for removing the causes of war and for the settlement of international quarrels and disputes by peaceful and judicial methods, and the treaties which are intended to prevent the provocation of war which may come through excessive and competitive armaments.

We have taken a vigorous course in promoting all of these forms of treaties. In the first place, we have signed and ratified, within the past three years and a half, twenty-eight treaties of arbitration and conciliation. We have also negotiated many treaties stabilizing and adjusting our foreign relations in the form of treaties of commerce, extradition, and foreign residence. We have signed the treaty for the World Court and have urged its ratification before the United States Senate. We believe that by joining that Court we would not only facilitate the quick and easy settlement of many irritating and troublesome controversies, but that we would also give a great assurance to the other nations of the world of our devotion to the cause of peace, which has been somewhat shaken by the length of time it has taken to get us into the Court, an institution for the original suggestion of which our country was more responsible than any other country of the world.

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But I want to refer to two particular classes of treaties in which we have made great progress.

IV. The first of these classes consists of treaties limiting and reducing the size of armaments, the so-called treaties of disarmament. They form a very important class of the peace machinery of the world, because the suspicion and rivalry which comes out of competition between the different nations in the building of armaments is one of the most fertile sources out of which war may arise. If you have ever had the misfortune to visit a community where everybody was carrying arms, as I have, you will know what I mean. Casualties are constantly happening. One man pulls and shoots because he thinks the other man is going to. The first step towards law and order is always to get hold of the pistols.

Now that is just the object intended to be accomplished between nations by an agreement reducing and limiting arms. It moreover, stops the rivalry, which in turn breeds suspicion and ill will, and which in turn leads to an outbreak. Except for our Navy the United States is not really an armed nation. While our Army is a most excellent nucleus of defense and a means for training our citizen soldiery in case any great emergency should arise, it is far too small to excite any apprehension on the part of our neighbors. By the London Naval Treaty of 1930 we reached an agreement with the two other large naval powers, Great Britain and Japan, by which a limitation was placed upon every class of vessels in our respective fleets. The first step had been taken eight years before in the Washington Treaty, where an agreement was reached as to capital ships. But that proved only partially effective because competition afterwards grew up in cruisers and other vessels which led to suspicion and ill will. At London in 1930 after long efforts we finally succeeded in getting an agreement which settled and restricted the size of the entire fleets of the three great naval powers of the world. That marked an event in disarmament which was unprecedented. For instance, it wiped out all of the petty irritation, suspicion, and rivalry which had for five or six years been growing up between us and Great Britain, and it inaugurated an era of good will and confidence between our two countries which has made all of our relations easy ever since. When that treaty was ratified by the United States Senate by a vote of fifty-eight to nine, after all the fight which some of our militaristic citizens and press could put up against it, more was done for the cause of peaceful settlements in this country than anything which had been done for a long time. For, it showed that the moral standards of this country call for fair and just dealings with other nations and not for an aggressive show of force.

The success of the three great naval powers in reaching an agreement in the London Treaty has furthermore led to hope and encouragement for the success of the great General Disarmament Conference which was afterwards called in Geneva and which is now under way. This is a much more gigantic problem because it includes all of the nations of the world with all of their different problems and relations and rivalries and suspicions, as well as all of the classes of weapons with which they may fight. That Conference met last February and for the first five months of its debates made slight progress beyond uncovering the concrete difficulties and obstacles which must be overcome to reach a successful conclusion. Inasmuch as we had already limited our Navy and as our Army, as I have already said, was not a menace or a cause of anxiety to anyone, the chief problems of the Conference and the responsibility for their solution necessarily rested upon the shoulders of the other nations. We have, however, made important suggestions designed to help toward ultimate success.

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To begin with, we have pointed out the importance of putting a limit on the power of offense by limiting or abolishing weapons which belong purely to the offensive class. If that idea can be carried out, it would tend to make it impossible for any nation to surprise another nation with a knockout blow at the beginning of hostilities. It would tend to discourage sudden aggressive action in the world. It would promote security and peace by strengthening defense among nations at the cost of offense.

Secondly, when the deliberations of the other nations seemed to be getting into a stalemate, our government came forward last June with the Hoover proposal. This cut through all the maze of technicalities which had been raised and submitted the proposal that all nations should agree upon a cut of substantially one-third in existing armaments. His offer came like a breath of fresh air to the atmosphere of the Conference and revived the hopes which had been waning. Today the various delegations are engaged in working over the details of his proposal, and there has been manifested a growing spirit of hope that along his line a great beneficent result may finally be accomplished by the Conference.

V. The other class of treaties to which I wish especially to refer are the great multilateral treaties which have been adopted since the World War in the hope of minimizing and preventing all war in the future. There have been two of these treaties. One of them is the Covenant of the League of Nations, which has been adopted by most of the other nations of the world but to which we are not a party; and the other is the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. To this last we are not only a party, but it was originated by my predecessor as Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, in conjunction with Mr. Briand, the then Foreign Minister of France. It has also been executed by practically all of the nations of the world. The nations which signed the Treaty renounce war as an instrument of national policy and agree that the settlement of all disputes and conflicts of whatever nature among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. It is a great treaty, a great simple concept, carrying with it the chief hopes of the world for a new and better era. And I regard the work which this administration has been privileged to do in the interpretation and carrying forward of this Treaty as perhaps the chief work which we have accomplished in the cause of peace.

When we came into office the Treaty had not yet come into force. The ceremony of proclamation took place at Washington on the 24th day of July, 1929. The Treaty at that time was, of course, entirely untested and there were many critics in the world, as there always are, who were ready to believe the worst. In the first place, some of them said that it was not a covenant at all, but simply a group of voluntary declarations made by the various nations which had signed it, expressing their pious intentions for the future for which nobody could call them to account or hold them responsible. It was said that each signatory was to be the sole judge of its own behavior. There was, however, nothing in the Treaty to warrant such a destructive interpretation, but everything to the contrary. And we went to work from the very beginning to show what the Treaty meant to us and what we should contend that it necessarily meant to everyone else.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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When Mr. MacDonald, the Prime Minister of Great Britain came over here and visited Mr. Hoover at the Rapidan on October 9, 1929, those two gentlemen made public an historic statement as to their views of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. They said, speaking for the United States and Great Britain:

"Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge."

From that time onward, on every occasion which seemed to bring into action the covenants of this great Treaty, our Government has made it clear what our views were and what we should expect; and I think I can say that those views are now becoming the views of the entire world. We have made it clear that in our opinion the declaration in the Treaty carries with it the duty of performance. We have made it clear that it necessarily alters the whole attitude of the world towards war; that, whereas during the centuries hitherto war has been one of the natural functions of government, giving rise to legal rights and obligations, hereafter among the signers of this Treaty, war will be an illegal thing;—a disease instead of a normal state function; that, whereas hitherto a breach of the peace between two nations has been nobody's business but their own, now under the Treaty it has become the rightful concern of the whole world, because practically the whole world has signed the Treaty; and that this being so, whenever a breach of the Treaty is threatened by approaching hostilities, it implies a duty of consultation among the other parties in order that public opinion may be mobilized against the impending disaster of war.

(as regards to the Kellogg-Briand Pact)

These views have been expressed by our Government in step after step relating to the recent troubles in the Far East; and the policy of this Government, announced in its note of January 7th last, not to recognize the fruits of aggression obtained by a violation of the Treaty, has been formally approved in a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations as the proper policy for all the nations which are members of that League. It has also more recently been adopted by all of the nineteen neutral nations of this hemisphere in respect to the quarrel between Bolivia and Paraguay as the proper policy for the nations of these continents. And, so far as formal and general adoption can thus make it, it has become a recognized principle of international law and practice.

The attitude which your Government has taken towards the Kellogg Pact in these proceedings has had at least two other results. In the first place, it has tended to strengthen the sanctity of treaties. If, when the trouble broke out in Manchuria, we had turned away our heads, irreparable damage would have been done not only to the standing of the Kellogg Pact but also to every other one of the great peace treaties of the world. But when the United States showed that the sanctity of the Kellogg Treaty was of keen interest and importance to us, and when our view was followed by the rest of the world, a new breath of vigor and of life was infused into the vitality of all such treaties and their obligations.

In the second place, the action which has taken place among the nations of the world in respect to the troubles in Manchuria has marked a new milestone in the development of actual international cooperation when war threatens the world. In the new international world created by these treaties, the basic idea is

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that war anywhere is of concern everywhere. The necessary resulting process of this has been shown by the events of the past year to be a consultation between the nations of the world and a call to public opinion to exert itself. The nations of the world have consulted together as to the threat to peace even in far-off Manchuria. They have consulted as to the means to avoid the breach or to moderate and appease it. As a part of this effort to ascertain the true facts involved in the fog of mutual recrimination and intelligently to inform public opinion, a neutral investigating commission has, with the consent of both the disputant nations, been sent to the seat of the quarrel and is about to present the result of its findings to the nations members of the League of Nations assembled in Geneva.

These are all new and important landmarks in the realm of international controversy. They evidence a new orientation of the world attitude towards war. They make it clear that after centuries of effort based upon other and more backward theories, the world is now moving forward upon these new lines.

We have a right to take courage in the light of such events. For ourselves, we believe that eventually the reign of peace will come. There will be among nations in respect to public war, war between nations, the same development that has been seen in individual communities in respect to private combat between individual men. We do not delude ourselves as to the difficulty of the road that lies before us nor as to the obstacles and trials which stand in our way. We are well aware that it will require the utmost patience and faith. We know that all such developments in human organization are extremely slow. We realize that it took centuries to eliminate ordeal by battle in the settlement of the individual quarrels of individual men. But we are unshakably confident that the same process is on its way among the nations and will eventually arrive. And during the brief term in which we have been invested with the heavy responsibility of guiding the foreign policy of this country, we have tried to act in that faith.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 31 1932.

No. 126

To the American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's telegram No. 173, October 27, 1932, 4 p. m., and encloses herewith for the information of the Ambassador at Tokyo a copy of the address made by the Secretary at Pittsburgh before the Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Pittsburgh area on the subject "The Work of the United States Government in the Promotion of Peace during the Past Three Years".

793.94/5603B

Enclosure:
 Address made by the
 Secretary of State
 at Pittsburgh on
 October 26, 1932.

A true copy of
 the signed original
[Signature]

7/11/71

OCT 28 1932. PM

FE:MMH:REK
 10/28/32

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m.w.h.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5604

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00-P.R.Amoy/61 FOR +

FROM Amoy (Franklin) DATED Oct. 4, 1932
~~XXX~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: the celebration of "National Disaster Day", September 18th,
in Amoy.

793.94/5604

dew

1021
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1932.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~4444~~ *Mr. Lamont*
Mr. Lamont, in the attached letter under date October 6, 1932, comments almost exclusively upon that part of the Secretary's letter of October 1, 1932, wherein it was mentioned that financial and industrial leaders in Europe, particularly in Great Britain, appear to be working harder on the problem of developing a market for their goods in China than are at this time similar leaders in the United States. With this statement Mr. Lamont agrees and by way of explanation states that for almost a century British enterprise has specialized in trade with China; has sent to the Far East the cream of its young manhood; and has always had the full support of the British Government. The United States, on the other hand, has developed its trade with China along specialized lines only; has been inadequately represented; and, as a result of the unfortunate outcome of the Hukuang Railway Loan (now in default since 1925 in spite of all that the State Department, the Consortium and other diplomatic representatives have been able to do) "the record of American bankers in the issuance of Chinese Government loans constitutes a one hundred per cent failure, estimated by the public in terms of default"

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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and that under existing conditions "no self-respecting banker could afford to recommend a Chinese Government bond to his clients". Mr. Lamont further states his opinion that with but one exception American banks which have entered the Far Eastern field, especially in China, have lost practically all of the capital which they put into their Chinese branches. Mr. Lamont concludes by stating "The point is that whereas European men of affairs, especially British, have had such a long period of extensive dealing with China for many generations that, despite recent losses they are, generally speaking, still to the good, while American experience has been almost completely one of default and loss".

A study of Mr. Lamont's letter leads me to the opinion that he expects no reply thereto and that no useful purpose would be served in discussing with him by letter those statements of his which appear to be open to argument.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE AMERICAN GROUP
OF THE CHINA CONSORTIUM

MANAGING COMMITTEE

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
October 6, 1932

RECEIVED
OCT 10 1932
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please accept my thanks for your kind letter of October 1st enclosing your careful and just appraisal of Sir Charles' presentation of the Far Eastern situation. I note that, aside from what interpretations may be given to existing circumstances, you are not opposed in principle to Sir Charles' suggestion as to possible League action in behalf of China; assuming that China requests such action. I agree with you that the likelihood of any such suggestion emanating from China is now pretty remote. I should not be particularly apprehensive of any League functionaries taking action that would be inimical to American trade interests, in the event that some League supervision were invited, but that of course is an academic question for the moment.

I note that phrase in your letter which indicates that European countries are devoting more time and thought to matters of commerce with China than business men in America are doing. That is perfectly true, and similar statement is made to us from time to time from various directions. But as to the attitude of American business toward the Far East, I do not think that it is difficult to analyze or to understand. For almost a century past British enterprise, spreading out from a small island to all quarters of the globe, included China in its early purview. It established a trade tradition with the Far East, especially with China, that has been maintained ever since. In establishing such a tradition British trade was always able to count upon the complete support of its Government, rendered possibly at times rather crudely. It also had the advantage that, with the constant urge to find honorable employment on the part of educated and well-to-do young Englishmen, the practice sprang up of sending such capable men out by the thousands to the Far East for residence and active participation in business over a period of years. It was this sort of custom which sent men like Sir Charles Addis (and many others of his stamp) out there for



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Hon. Henry L. Stimson

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October 6, 1932

many years; with a resulting continuing interest in the detailed commercial and banking operations of internal China, which America has never had.

It has been only with the development of certain classes of industry particularly successful in America that our business interests out there have grown to any considerable degree. Concerns like the Standard Oil Company, International General Electric, certain motor car companies, have very properly been moved to establish business in China and to send out adequate representatives. The number of such representatives, however, has always been so limited that really the chief knowledge the American public still has of China is derived from the reports of our missionaries, and from the press reports of civil strife.

As to financial cooperation in furthering the interests of American trade in China through the use of investment capital, a beginning was made through the American participation in the old Consortium, the only loan ever issued under the auspices of the American Group being the Hukuang Railways Loan which has now been in default since 1925. That loan, as you of course know, rested for the security of 50% of the loan service upon the salt revenues of certain provinces, and for the balance upon the proceeds of likin. The revenues allocated for the service were more than adequate to take care of the requirements. Provision was also made, in the event of the abolition of likin, that other revenues satisfactory to the lenders would be substituted. The default beginning in 1925 was due not to the then insufficiency of the revenues pledged, but to the unwillingness of the Chinese Government to make them available for the purpose for which they were allocated. That part of the pledged revenues which was under some measure of foreign control, viz. the salt revenues, continued to be applied in accordance with the terms of the pledge.

It is unnecessary to refer to the repeated efforts which have been made by the American Group and other members of the Consortium, assisted by the good offices of the State Department and other diplomatic representatives, to obtain China's compliance with the terms of pledge. Therefore, while the default arose not from lack of foresight in the security arranged to cover the loan service but from an unwillingness on the part of the Chinese Government to respect its own obligations, the fact is that the record of American bankers in the issuance of Chinese Government loans constitutes a clear 100% failure, estimated by the public in terms of default. This does not lead American bankers, nor American investors, to make many new ventures in China, especially in the face of the civil strife now prevailing. In fact, no self-respecting banker could afford to recommend a Chinese Government bond to his clients unless some method, not now in sight, could be devised to insure China's compliance with an obligation to utilize specified revenues for an agreed purpose. The cooperation on the part of the League might be helpful in this respect, having

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Hon. Henry L. Stimson

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October 6, 1932


in mind the fact that so far as I know the only pledged revenue which is being used for the purpose for which it was appropriated is the revenue collected under foreign supervision and control, viz. the customs and salt revenues.

There was one other phase of American banking enterprise in China to which allusion may properly be made. Shortly after the end of the Great War a number of American banking institutions interested themselves on a considerable scale in Far Eastern affairs, especially in China, and established branches at points like Shanghai, Peking, etc. The American banks in question were quite ignorant of the practices and methods prevailing in the Far East, and with the collapse which came in commodity values in 1920/21, these American bankers suffered deplorable losses. I never had a search made, but my guess is, with the exception of one case, these American banks lost practically all of the capital which they put into their Chinese branches.

I have taken the trouble to dictate the foregoing, because of that phrase in your letter to which I have alluded. The point is that whereas European men of affairs, especially British, have had such a long period of extensive dealing with China for many generations, that, despite recent losses they are, generally speaking, still to the good, while American experience has been almost completely one of default and loss.

With great respect, and thanking you once more for your letter to me, I am

Sincerely yours,



Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 27 1932

No. 923

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's instruction No. 905 of October 15, 1932, transmitting copies of certain documents in regard to the question of "assistance" to China, including a copy of the Department's letter of October 1, 1932, to Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, there is enclosed herewith for your strictly confidential information a copy of Mr. Lamont's letter of October 6, 1932, in reply thereto.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Gastle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 From Mr. Thomas W.
 Lamont, dated
 October 6, 1932.

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Oct. 26 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 8, 1932.

~~SECRET~~
Tokyo's despatch No. 170 of October 21, 1932, gives "extremely nebulous" reasons for suspicions that Japan is considering plans with regard to North China.

(1) The Japanese army is finding the pacification of Manchuria more difficult and expensive than anticipated. A Japanese army officer stated that in order to control the rebels effectively the army would have to double its forces in Manchuria. So the Japanese would welcome some realignment of influences which would check the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria and render unnecessary large-scale military operations.

(2) Japanese plans against Jehol apparently have been abandoned for the present at least, which indicates that the Japanese have decided to accomplish their purposes in North China by means other than military.

(3) The "Manchoukuo" representative in Tokyo recently stated that he

would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

would not be surprised to see Pu-yi Emperor of North China, including Manchuria, while the Chinese in Changchun are reported by a news man to be openly discussing the amalgamation of "Manchoukuo" and North China.

(4) It is reported that Matsuoka has been instructed to suggest to the League that no action be taken at present but that developments be observed for a year or two. Perhaps the Japanese are trying to gain time in order to engineer some realignment in North China.

The Military Attaché recently heard from a source believed to be well-informed that Ariyoshi, Minister to China, went to Nanking to look into the possibilities of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, desired by the conservative element in Japan so that Chiang can put down Communists and unite China, with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang traveling abroad, and is now in Peiping investigating the possibilities of bringing about an independent North

China,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

China, which the Japanese army desires, with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang traveling abroad. Upon Ariyoshi's return to Tokyo the Japanese Government may decide on its line of action. They may postpone action until they know definitely what the League will do.

LES: EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECD
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, October 21, 1932.


No. 170.

Subject: Japanese Forces in North China.

NOV 5 32

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/LS 793.94/5606



Copy in F.E.
Copy to Minister Wilson
at Geneva - Feb - Nov 1932.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

The Embassy has vaguely suspected for some weeks past that the Japanese Army or Government has something new on the tapis concerning North China, Mongolia and possibly Manchuria, but in the absence of any definite facts or even of logical surmises it has hesitated to convey its suspicions to the Department.

The reasons for the suspicions are themselves extremely nebulous, but for the Department's information
are

288 11 NOV

- 2 -

are listed as follows:

1. The Japanese Army is finding the pacification of Manchuria a much more difficult and expensive task than was expected. The Embassy has learned from observers that very little of Manchuria is now under the effective control of the Japanese or "Manchukuo" officials, the Chinese volunteers and rebels having acquired control of practically all of the country except the railway zones and towns on or near the railways. The Japanese are unable even to guard the railways adequately, and the only line able to operate regularly is the original South Manchuria Railway, from Changchun to Dairen and Antung. Parts of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Mukden-Kirin Railway are not operating at all, while trains run on other lines only in the daytime. A Japanese Army officer stated that, in order to control the rebels effectively, the Army would have to double its forces in Manchuria, at very heavy expense. Under these circumstances the Japanese would doubtless welcome some realignment of influences which would check the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria and render unnecessary any large-scale military operations.

2. The Japanese at one time were undoubtedly preparing for a drive into Jehol and possibly into Hopei, having concentrated troops at Chinchow and having found the excuse in the person of the captured Ishimoto. The Army officials in Tokyo announced publicly that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was going to travel abroad very soon. But without giving any reasons the whole scheme was abandoned, for the present

at

- 3 -

at least. No further move is being made against Jehol, Ichimoto has been forgotten, and Marshal Chang remains in Peiping. It seems probable that the Japanese have decided to accomplish their purposes in North China by some means other than military operations.

3. Mr. Bao Kuen-chen, the diplomatic representative of "Manchukuo" in Tokyo, recently remarked to a foreign newspaper representative that "he would not be surprised to see Pu Yi become Emperor of North China, including Manchuria". The Chinese in Changchun, according to another correspondent, are openly discussing the amalgamation of "Manchukuo" with North China.

4. The Japanese Foreign Office is reported to have instructed Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, one of the delegates to the meeting of the League Assembly which is to discuss the Lytton Report, to suggest to the Assembly that the League take no action at present but instead to observe developments in Manchuria for a year or two. As it seems improbable, from present indications, that there will be any considerable improvement in conditions in Manchuria in that time, it is possible that the Japanese are trying to gain time in order to engineer some realignment of influences in North China, Mongolia and Manchuria.

The Embassy has been unable until recently to obtain any definite facts upon which to base a surmise as to the probable outcome of the above factors. The Military Attaché of the Embassy, however, recently obtained some information,

from

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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from a source believed to be well informed, which may throw some light on the question. The Military Attaché's memorandum of the statements made by his source of information is as follows:

" With reference to the movements of Mr. Ariyoshi (the Japanese Minister to China), there are two plans on foot. The Japanese Army, working through reserve officers, wants to bring about an independent North China and to send Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang traveling abroad. A more conservative element in Japan desires to support Chiang Kai-shek so that he can put down the communists and unite China, including North China, while Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang travels abroad. Mr. Ariyoshi went to Nanking to look into the possibilities of the second plan and is now in Peiping investigating the possibilities of the first plan. Upon his return to Tokyo the Japanese Government may decide on its line of action. Of course, they may postpone action until they know definitely what the League will do."

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

800.

ERD:r

In Quintuplicate to the Department
Copy to Legation, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.00 p.R. Foochow/57 FOR Despt #203(116 to Legn.)

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Oct. 4, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 000

793.94/5607

REGARDING: Chinese - Japanese relations as viewed from Foochow in Sept. 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

III - THE SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION.

1. General.

793.94
September 18, 1932, the first anniversary of the Manchuria incident, passed off quietly. Still the atmosphere was tense throughout the day. Strict martial law was maintained, and the police and garrison forces were on duty in full force. Two airplanes were sent up from Amoy as an added precaution.

In compliance with the Central Government's instruction, a five-minute's silence was observed at eleven o'clock. The 19th Route Army held a memorial meeting at the Recreation Ground. The Provincial Government did not allow the students and men holding public office to attend this meeting. In order to

avoid

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00-P.R. Shanghai/50 FOR #7339 to Leg'n.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Oct. 6, 1932
~~XXXX~~ NAME 1-1187

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations in Shanghai during September, 1932.

dew

793.94/5608

5808

104
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7339

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, October 6, 1932.

Subject: Political Report for September, 1932.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

In compliance with the Legation's circular instruction No. 201 of November 17, 1927, I have the honor to submit the following resumé of political events in the Shanghai consular district for the month of September, 1932:

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:

The month under review was marked by a number of local Sino-Japanese incidents of minor importance, and also in national affairs, by the Japanese recognition of Manchukuo on September 15th, the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria on September 18th, and finally by the Customs break between China and Manchukuo on September 25th. In spite of all these, however, the local situation, as far as an expected clash between the Japanese and Chinese in Shanghai was concerned, perceptibly eased off during the month and the
beginning

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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beginning of October finds the people generally not nearly so pessimistic regarding the possibility of another Shanghai incident as they had been at the beginning of the previous month.

The activities of the "Bloody Group for the Extermination of Traitors," to which reference has been made in previous reports, continued during the month. On the evening of August 30th a bomb was thrown from a passing motor car into a clock store on Nanking Road. Considerable damage was done but no one was injured. On September 7th a hand grenade was placed in a shop on the Boulevard des deux Republiques, but fortunately it failed to explode. On September 16th another bomb was thrown into a Chinese shop on Nanking Road, and on September 19th a cloth store on Rue Petiot was bombed. In each case warning letters had previously been sent to the shops in question by the "Bloody Group" warning the proprietors against dealing in Japanese goods. No arrests appear to have been made in any of these cases although the perpetrators acted in a very bold manner. On September 22nd a notice was posted on various walls, purporting to come from this group, stating that from that time on they would cease to send warning letters to Chinese merchants dealing in Japanese goods but would, after due investigation, adopt drastic measures. Since that time, however, there have been no reports of bombing outrages.

A clash between Japanese marines and a Chinese mob on Nanking Road on the evening of September 2nd was

narrowly

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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narrowly averted by the intervention of Settlement police. This was referred to in this office's political report for August.

During the first week in September a notification was issued, through the Chinese press, by a federation purporting to have been formed by some seventy Chinese trading guilds pledging themselves to the severance of economic relations with Japan and soliciting the support of the entire nation to that end. This organization, which is known as the "Federation in Support of the Covenant of the League of Nations," stated that it based its action on Article 16 of the League Covenant which provides for economic sanctions against an aggressor nation. A communication was addressed to this Consulate General by the Committee of the Federation stating that it would welcome, and assist to the best of its ability, the merchants of friendly powers in introducing the goods of their respective countries. The Federation held a meeting on September 4th and elected an executive committee composed of thirty-five members, including such well known persons as Chu Ching-lan (朱慶瀾), Field Director of the Flood Relief Commission, and Wang Hsiao-lan (王曉籟), Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. It also elected an organization committee composed of thirty-one members, including Dr. P. W. Kuo (郭秉文), Director of the Foreign Trade Council, Fang Chu-peh (方叔伯), former Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Hu Shu-hua (胡庶華), former Commissioner of Industries for Kiangsu Province, and Mr. Francis Zia (謝福生), a local journalist.

It

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 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It will be recalled that in August the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce had identified itself with the anti-Japanese boycott movement. This action on the part of the Chinese Chamber was severely condemned by the British Chamber of Commerce in its journal issued during September which points out that:

"The serious financial situation in which so many Chinese firms now find themselves is, to no small extent, due to the extreme character of the boycott activities of last winter, which did more to undermine the economic structure of this community than anything else. A boycott is like a boomerang - it returns to the one by whom it is launched. In sponsoring and supporting the Boycott Associations and the methods employed by them, the Chinese Chamber is doing a distinct dis-service to the community by which it is supported and it is hoped that its Committee will have the vision to see the detrimental effect that intimidation must have on the economic welfare of the country, and the will and strength to act in support of law and order and those whose duty it is to maintain the same. By doing so the Chinese Chamber will maintain its dignity and regain the prestige which its acts during the past twelve months have sadly undermined."

Contrary to previous expectations, the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan on September 15th and the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of Mukden on September 18th passed off in Shanghai without disturbances of a serious nature. Numerous precautions had been taken to guard against such disturbances. This subject has already been covered in this Consulate General's despatch No. 7322, dated September 23, 1932.

According to press reports, following the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan a telegram was despatched to the Nanking Government by various trade union organizations

in

-5-

in Shanghai, asking that General Cheng Tao-pin (蔣作賓), Chinese Minister to Tokyo, be recalled at once and that Mr. Ariyoshi, the new Japanese Minister to China, be refused recognition. It was pointed out in the telegram that Japan's action in Manchuria was merely a repetition of what she had already done in Korea. The Shanghai General Labor Union, together with the National Association of Commerce, the Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, the Shanghai Bankers' Association, and the Native Bankers' Association, are also reported to have despatched telegrams to Geneva urging that sanctions be enforced against Japan for violating Chinese territory and administrative integrity in extending diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo.

There were only two cases reported during the month of attempted seizure of Japanese goods, and in neither case does it appear that the seizure was attempted by any organized body. On September 21st a coolie transporting four bales of Japanese goods was stopped on Yates Road by unknown persons. The coolie immediately left, whereupon a crowd collected but was dispersed by a party of police who conveyed the goods to the police station. A similar incident took place on Bubbling Well Road in which several bystanders, after examining a truck load of piece goods, began shouting "Japanese goods." This attracted a crowd, some of whom seized the goods and attacked the persons accompanying them. Police arrived on the scene and made several

arrests.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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arrests. The accused were brought up in the District
Court and sentenced to eight months imprisonment
for attempted robbery.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5609

SEE 893.00/12188 FOR Communication #

5209

FROM China () DATED Oct. 14, 1932

TO

NAME

1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Chinese-Japanese conflict. Statement of Mr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Finance that China would certainly resist the Japanese with military force if they should invade Jehol. He is of the opinion that China is in for very serious trouble with the Japanese.

fp

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00-P.R.Canton/59 FOR #147 to Leg'n.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Oct. 11, 1932
NAME 1-1137

REGARDING: speech of Mr. Tsou Lu urging resistance to Japan.

dew

793.94/5610

5810

(4) Attitude towards Japan.

Mr. Tsou Lu, Chancellor of Sun Yat Sen University and member of the South West Political Council, made an address at the Weekly Memorial Meeting on September 9th urging

resistance

- 4 -

resistance to Japan. After pointing out that the Revolution had its origin in the defeat suffered by the Manchu Government at the hands of Japan in 1895, since Sun Yat-sen then became inspired by the idea that China could not improve her international status so long as the Manchu dynasty remained in control of the Government, he declared that, while the Government then at least had the courage to fight Japan, today Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei are advocating a policy of non-resistance and permit Japan to occupy Manchuria. He urged that true patriots and disciples of Dr. Sun should emulate his revolutionary spirit and rise against Japan.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 16, 1932

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1253, November 16, 5 p. m.

Following from American Consul General, Harbin, November 15, noon:

One. Japanese military authorities confirm reports that heavy Japanese reenforcements being moved from Dairen and other parts South Manchuria to western front where severe fighting has been discontinued for the time being, *Probably heavy Japanese losses*, need of reenforcements, and it is believed that General Su will soon come to terms.

Two. Reliably reported by pressmen that Soviet authority treating shortly Ko Matsubara's delegation at Dairia where visitors found no Soviet aeroplanes and only a few score Soviet troops. So far no representative General Su has conferred with delegation.

Three. Some fighting occurred between insurgent and Japanese forces near Shuangchengpu, Ninguta, Mulin and Echo where it is believed Japanese suffered more heavily than, Japanese



F/H/S

793.94/5611

DEC 4 1932

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#1253 from Peiping via N.R.,
Nov. 16, 5 p. m.

Japanese military who admit fighting *(*) resumed.*

Four. Reports from various reliable sources indicate construction work on the railway between Keshan and Hailun rapidly being completed.

Five. Press reports **large** body insurgents concentrating near Anta city.

Six. Situation at Harbin appears to be *quieter on account* ~~(?) still insisted~~ *of* increased arrests bad characters by Russian members of the police. Soviet Consul General opposes increasing Russians on the force, that they would still more persecute Soviet citizens".

JOHNSON

(*) apparent omission.

WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

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 Department of State

1933 JAN - 8 - PM 1:23

Washington, 6
 January 8, 1933.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 PLAIN

VIA NAVAL RADIO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

3

Although the Department has approved the Legation sending by naval radio the text of important press reports, the Department feels that inasmuch as many of these reports are necessarily submitted without verification and as much of their contents appears almost simultaneously in the American press, it would be helpful if the Legation could in the majority of cases use these news reports together with such other information as may be available to prepare its own radio report of developments. In cases where the Legation feels that press items are so important that they should be brought without delay to the attention of the Department, the Department suggests that the Legation send the item immediately by naval radio and thereafter send a supplementary report giving the results of the Legation's investigation.

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J.E. J. M.H.
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JAN. 6, 1933.

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS:

OCTOBER 17, 1932.



CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION IN MORNING NEWSPAPERS OF
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1932, WHICH DO NOT APPEAR ON
THE STREETS BEFORE 10:00 P.M., EASTERN STANDARD
TIME, OCTOBER 18, 1932. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY
PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

POLICY AND ACTION IN RELATION TO
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Address to be delivered at
The Institute of International Affairs,
The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia,
October 18, 1932,

By STANLEY K. HORNBECK
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Until comparatively recent times, it was possible for two
nations to come to blows and attempt to settle their disputes
by force without substantially disturbing other nations. For
some time, however, that process has been growing more and
more difficult and today it may be said to be practically
impossible.

Armed conflict between nations no longer involves merely
the armed forces that may be engaged against each other; it
involves whole populations, and, involving the whole popula-
tions, resources and activities of the belligerent nations,
it disturbs and inconveniences other peoples whose rights
and interests are connected with those of the belligerent
peoples by ties of residence, of trade, of communication, of
finance, et cetera.

Men and women of every country travel, reside and do
business in or with other countries. The nations of the
world are bound up with one another by networks of cables,
radio stations, railway lines, shipping lines, postal services,
and a fabric of interrelated treaties which regulate their
contacts and their ties. Disturb this fabric at any point
and you produce disturbances throughout its entirety.

The course of events in the Far East during the past
year, and the interest and the solicitous concern which have
been manifested all over the world in relation to those
events are conclusively illustrative of the proposition that
there can no longer occur in any part of the world a breach
of the peace involving use of force between two nations which
will not inevitably affect other nations. As soon as use
of

793.94/5612

DEC 19 1932

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-2-

of force begins, normal activities and relationships are interfered with. The interference affects communications, transportation, trade, banking, et cetera. It occasions inconvenience and expense. It causes apprehension with regard to security not only of property but even of life. It disarranges psychological as well as physical processes. It upsets calculations, arouses suspicions, tends to accentuate sympathies and antipathies, distorts political perspectives and adversely affects political processes. It disturbs the peace, the community whose peace is disturbed being that of the family of nations. It therefore is objectionable to the community of nations, just as a breach of the peace is objectionable to the population of any municipal community.

In any such situation there are likely to be two sets of issues: one, the antecedent and ensuing issues between the disputants; the other, consequent and resultant issues between one or both of the disputants and the community. Such has been the case in the current dispute, as it has developed since September 18, 1931, between China and Japan. China and Japan each had grievances against the other. They had various rights and obligations in reference to each other. Each and both of them, however, had also rights and obligations in reference to other countries. And other countries had rights and obligations in reference to each and to both of them.

Suddenly, as between China and Japan, the element of resort to force was introduced. Immediately, rights and interests of other nations and the regular and legitimate activities of nationals of other countries were adversely affected. Not only was there a breach of the peace, but there arose the possibility that there might be nation-wide hostilities between the disputant countries. Within less than six months one of the world's most important ports, a great center of international residence and trade, was thrown into confusion and danger by intensive military operations. There developed apprehension of a possibility of war between one of the disputants and other countries not parties to the immediate dispute.

The World War forced upon the nations a keen realization of the expensiveness and the far-reaching adverse effects of war. The aftermath has confirmed and emphasized that realization. Some at least of the nations have become convinced that the net cost to the world of war is out of proportion to any possible gains that may accrue to the world from attempts to settle disputes by that process. Such nations feel that the time has come when all nations must, for their individual and collective security, realize that there exists a general interest and a general concern in which the right of the whole group and therefore of any of its members, to object to disturbances of the peace and above all to exert themselves to prevent war is inherent.

Hence the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919, the Nine-Power Treaty and other treaties concluded at Washington in 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris of 1928.

To

-3-

To understand the position which the American Government has taken and the course which it has pursued in relation to the current Sino-Japanese dispute, we must view its position and course of action against that background.

Turning to the Far East, -- we find a region in which political changes have been taking place with great rapidity. During the past two or three generations, however, the countries of the Far East have become members of the Family of Nations; they have been accorded the rights and have accepted the obligations in international law which go with that membership. These countries along with the countries of the Occident took part in the Great War, participated in the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, and have since participated in the world's principal conferences and become parties to the world's principal multilateral agreements.

Now two of these countries between which there are disagreements and reciprocal grievances of long standing come to blows. Between these two, the antecedent issues are primarily of their own making and concern. Bearing upon these issues, those two countries have various agreements of their own -- over the terms and provisions and interpretations of which they disagree. But, from the moment when resort is had to force, there begin events and there come about developments in course and in consequence of which established rights and legitimate interests of other nations are involved and are adversely affected. The resort to force itself raises a question of commitments made in multilateral treaties. The whole thing constitutes a breach of the peace. Such being the case, the situation is, both in law and in fact, a matter of rightful and inevitable concern to the whole community of nations.

Incidentally, the modern multilateral treaty is the world's nearest approximation, in the present imperfect stage of the evolution of international political organization, to the legislative process.

To the Covenant of the League, 57 States are party. To the Nine-Power Treaty, 14 Powers, including the United States, are party. To the Pact of Paris, 62 States, including the United States and Russia, are party. To all three, China and Japan are party. Each of these agreements is an international Act intended to contribute to the maintenance of peace. As nearly all of the States of the world are parties to at least two of them and Japan and China to all three, each and every member of the Family of Nations had and has definite and prescribed rights which are affected by the resort, in the dispute between these two members, to measures of force.

There was and is legal warrant for action, in defense of the common and collective right to peace, by each and all of the Powers. The Covenant of the League is, however, the only one of the "peace treaties" which provides machinery. That machinery can be invoked in such a situation almost at once.

Upon

1054

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Upon receipt of the first reports of the events at Mukden on the night of September 18, the whole world assumed an attitude of watchful inquiry. It is not practicable for governments to take definite positions with regard to confused situations or to act before they are in possession of adequate knowledge of the facts. At an early date, various governments took steps to procure adequate information.

Both of the disputant countries were members of the League of Nations. The League possessed a Covenant which is intended to prevent breaches of the peace or to regulate situations in which such occurred. The Council of the League was in session. One at least of the disputants chose to appeal to the Council; both of them chose to explain to the Council what was going on; and the Council chose to assume and assert jurisdiction. The American Government made known to the League and to the world that in relation to such efforts as the League might make on behalf of peace it would, as far as possible, and retaining independence of judgment with regard to action taken or proposed, reenforce the League's efforts with its efforts -- there being a common objective, that of maintaining peace.

When it became evident that developments in the Manchuria situation were adversely affecting American rights and interests -- including rights resting upon or rising out of provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party -- the American Government began to remonstrate. When it became evident that the Council of the League was preparing to discuss the possibility of invoking a treaty to which the United States is a party (the Pact of Paris), the American Government, upon invitation, sent a representative to participate, on behalf of the United States, in the discussion of that subject.

In consequence of this discussion of the applicability of the Pact of Paris and the practicability of invoking it, seven Governments reminded the Chinese and the Japanese Governments of the provisions of that Pact and of their signatures thereto. The American Government was one of the seven -- the others being: the French, the British, the German, the Italian, the Spanish and the Norwegian Governments.

When discussion of that subject was ended, the American representative withdrew, and the Council went on with its consideration, under the provisions of the Covenant of the League, of questions involving the rights and obligations of the League and of the two disputant members of the League.

At the end of September, the Council had adopted unanimously a resolution calling upon China and Japan to refrain from aggravating the situation and to do all in their power to restore normal relations. In December, the Council passed a resolution, noting that China and Japan had undertaken "to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting" and providing for the creation of a "commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which affecting

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ing international relations threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends." The American Government forthwith publicly expressed its approval of this resolution.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the League, of States members of the League and of the American Government, the hostilities between Japanese and Chinese armed forces continued. Finally, after Japanese armed forces had extended their control throughout South Manchuria, the American Government, on January 7, 1932, sent to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments identical notes in which it stated:

"The American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it can not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

On February 23, in an open letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Senator Borah), the Secretary of State (Mr. Stimson), referring to this action, said: "If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position [be] taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived."

Subsequently, on March 11, a similar decision was reached by the Assembly of the League of Nations, at a meeting in which fifty nations were represented. On that occasion, the Assembly adopted a resolution in which it declared: "it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

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With the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations it may be assumed that this audience is familiar. How many of us, however, have read and forgotten the statement of purposes carried in the Preamble:

"THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

"In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security

"by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

"by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations,

"by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and

"by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

"Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."

By the provisions of the Covenant, especially those of Articles 11, 15 and 16, any war or threat of war is declared a matter of concern to all members of the League; there is established a procedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes; and there are prescribed "sanctions of pacific settlement".

With the work of the Washington Conference and the agreements which it produced, especially the Nine-Power Treaty, it may also be assumed that this audience is familiar.

By way, however, of orientation, it may be worth while to recall briefly certain points with regard to that Conference and its product. For that purpose we cannot do better than to turn to the words of one of the responsible statesmen who participated in the Conference itself. At the Conference, at the Sixth Plenary Session (the last Session), on February 4, 1922, Mr. Arthur Balfour, principal British delegate, made a lengthy statement in review of the work of the Conference. In the course of this statement, Mr. Balfour said:

" . . . All those who either from the financial or the moral side of the question looked with horror upon this competitive building in armaments, now feel that by the labors of this Conference, by the spirit it has shown, by the decisions to which it has come, a new era has really begun for the whole world, but more than anywhere else for that part of the world in which the great maritime Powers are most intimately and deeply concerned.

"Now

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"Now, if you think for a moment, you will see how closely all the infinitely varied labors that we have undertaken, combine to produce the great results that we are happy to proclaim today. . . .

" . . . I firmly believe that though difficulties may arise in the future, they may be solved by reference to the results of this Conference. Here it is that the nations have endeavored to lay deep and solid the foundations of honest dealings between one another and between themselves and the Chinese Empire;

" . . . I regard the Chinese problem as the first stage. I regard the quadruple arrangement as the second stage; while the third stage of this great policy is the diminution of fleets, and the cessation of rival building between the great maritime Powers. These are all interconnected. The effect of one cannot be estimated unless the effect of all the others is taken into account. Thus we come to the crown and summit of the great work -- I mean the scheme for securing the diminution of armaments, and with the diminution of armaments a corresponding diminution in the likelihood of armaments being ever required." (Balfour: Febr. 4, 1922)

After the Conference, President Harding appeared before the Senate and, in person, presented for the Senate's consideration the treaties which had been submitted to him by Secretary of State Hughes.

In the course of his address, President Harding said: (on February 10, 1922):

"But, though the treaty recommended by the Congress marks the beginning of a naval holiday and that limitation of naval armament which accords with a world aspiration, the particular justification of this progressive and highly gratifying step was the settlement of the international problems of the Pacific, attended by new understandings in place of menacing disagreements, and established sureties instead of uncertainties which easily might lead to conflict. . . .

"As a simple matter of fact, all of the agreements, except those dealing directly with the limitation of armament, take the place of various multi-power treaties, arrangements or understandings, formal or informal, expressed or implied, relating to matters in the Pacific Ocean, in which all the powers signatory were essentially, if not equally, concerned. The new agreements serve to put an end to contradictions, to remove ambiguities, and establish clear understandings.

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"The treaties submitted, seven in number, are --

The covenant of limitation to naval armament between our republic, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.

The treaty between the same powers in relation to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.

The treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the Pacific.

A declaration accompanying the four-power treaty reserving American rights in mandated territory.

An agreement supplementary to the four-power treaty defining the application of the term 'insular possession and insular dominions' as relating to Japan.

A treaty between the nine powers in the conference relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China.

A treaty between the nine powers relating to Chinese customs tariff.

....."

(President Harding, February 10, 1922)

The spirit and purpose of the Nine-Power Treaty are indicated in its Article I in which,

"The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

In its Article VII, this Treaty provides:

"The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between

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the Contracting Powers concerned."

It also may be assumed that this audience is familiar with the provisions of the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg-Briand Treaty). Those who wish to understand the extent to which the nations of the world are formally committed on the subject of peace should make sure that they know and understand what is stated in the Preamble and what is multilaterally declared in the declaration in Article I, and what is multilaterally pledged in Article II of that Treaty.

The Preamble reads:

"Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:"

Article I reads:

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

Article II reads:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The course of action of the United States with regard to this whole situation has been strictly in line not only with the traditional principles of American foreign policy, but with the American Government's conception of the spirit and the letter of the various multilateral agreements

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into which the nations of the world have entered during the years since the World War for the purpose, first, of preventing developments which will lead to international friction and, second, of providing ways and means for handling by pacific procedures situations in which friction has developed.

The American Government is convinced that the nations of the world desire peace. It has taken into consideration the fact that the League of Nations has machinery especially created for the purpose of maintaining peace. It believes that, although the United States is not a member of the League and although the American Government cannot involve the United States in the functioning of the legal machinery of the League, there is no reason why, when two or more political entities have a common objective, they should not and may not cooperate in formulating and carrying out measures designed for the attainment of that common objective.

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The American Government has taken into consideration the fact that in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, to which fourteen Powers are now parties, the signatory powers mutually agreed not upon principles of policy which were novel but upon principles of policy which had been subjects of discussion during several preceding decades and some of which had already been adopted in bilateral agreements. The American Government conceives that the provisions of that Treaty envisaged and expressed the practical interest, not alone of China, but also of Japan, of the United States and of the other nations which became its signatories. That Treaty is expressive of the traditional policy toward China of the United States. Furthermore, it is in line with what had been the policy of the United States toward Japan in an earlier period before Japan attained her full majority as a strong power in the family of nations. The American Government has believed and still believes that due regard for the spirit and the letter of that Treaty should go far toward safeguarding the rightful interests in the Far East of all of the signatory nations -- in fact, of all the nations concerned. Among those interests not the least, in its view, is peace.

The American Government has kept in mind the circumstances under which and the purposes for which the Washington Conference was called, and the fact that in the light of those circumstances and toward making possible the attainment of a common objective there were concluded at that Conference not alone this Treaty but a number of other treaties, agreements and resolutions.

In that connection and in relation to these matters, very important statements of fact and of exposition were made by the Secretary of State in his letter of February 23, 1932 to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In this letter, after pointing out the antecedents of the Nine-Power Treaty and the circumstances under which it was concluded, Mr. Stimson said:

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This Treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this Treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The Treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed -- and the whole history of the development of the 'Open Door' policy reveals that faith -- that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

"In

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"In its report to the President announcing this Treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, said:

'It is believed that through this Treaty the "Open Door" in China has at last been made a fact.'

"

"It must be remembered also that this Treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety.

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Having thus accurately recalled and placed in proper perspective the purposes and products of the Washington Conference, Mr. Stimson pointed out the relationship between the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, as follows:

"Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force."
(Stimson: Letter to Borah)

In an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, in New York, on August 8, Mr. Stimson expounded the American Government's conception of the relationship between the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris.

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"Finally there came the Great War, dragging into its maelstrom almost the entire civilized world; tangible proof was given of the impossibility of confining modern war within any narrow limits; and it became evident to the most casual observer that if this evolution were permitted to continue, war, perhaps the next war, would drag down and utterly destroy our civilization.

"Before this war was over it began to be called 'a war to end war', and at the Peace Conference at Versailles

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Versailles the victorious nations entered into a covenant which sought to reduce the possibility of war to its lowest terms. The League of Nations Covenant did not undertake entirely to prescribe wars between nations. It left unrestricted a zone in which such wars might occur without reprobation. Furthermore, it provided under certain circumstances for the use of force by the community of nations against a wrongdoer as a sanction. It created a community group of nations pledged to restrict war and equipped with machinery for that purpose.

"Nine years later, in 1928, came the still more sweeping step of the Pact of Paris, the Briand-Kellogg Pact. In this treaty substantially all the nations of the world united in a covenant in which they renounced war altogether as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another and agreed that the settlement of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature among them should never be sought except by pacific means.

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"The change of attitude on the part of world public opinion towards former customs and doctrines, which is evidenced by these two treaties, is so revolutionary that it is not surprising that the progress has outstripped the landmarks and orientation of many observers. The treaties signalize a revolution in human thought, but they are not the result of impulse or thoughtless sentiment. At bottom they are the growth of necessity, the product of a consciousness that unless some such step were taken modern civilization would be doomed. Under its present organization the world simply could not go on recognizing war, with its constantly growing destructiveness, as one of the normal instrumentalities of human life. Human organization has become too complex, too fragile, to be subjected to the hazards of the new agencies of destruction turned loose under the sanction of international law. So the entire central point from which the problem was viewed was changed. War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing.

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" . . . On its face it is a treaty containing definite promises. In its preamble it expressly refers to the 'benefits furnished by this treaty,' and states that any signatory power violating its promise shall be denied those benefits.

"

"The Briand-Kellogg Pact provides for no sanctions of force. It does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force in case the Pact is violated. Instead it rests upon the sanction of public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions of the world. Any other course, through the possibility of entangling the signatories in international politics, would have confused the broad, simple aim of the treaty and prevented the development of that public opinion upon which it most surely relies. Public opinion is the sanction which lies behind all international intercourse in time of peace. Its efficacy depends upon the will of the people of the world to make it effective. If they desire to make it effective, it will be irresistible. Those critics who scoff at it have not accurately appraised the evolution in world opinion since the World War.

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"Thus the power of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty can not be adequately appraised unless it is assumed that behind it rests the combined weight of the opinion of the entire world united by a deliberate covenant which gives to each nation the right to express its moral judgment.

"In October, 1929, President Hoover joined with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in a joint statement at the Rapidan in which they declared:

'Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.'

That declaration marked an epoch.

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"That the Pact thus necessarily carries with it the implication of consultation has perhaps not been fully appreciated by its well-wishers who have been so anxious that it be implemented by a formal provision for consultation. But with the clarification which has been given to its significance by the developments of the last three years, and the vitality with which it has been imbued by the positive construction put upon it, the misgivings of those well-wishers should be put at rest. That the American people subscribe to this view is made clear by the fact that each of the platforms recently adopted by the two great party conventions at Chicago contains planks endorsing the principle of consultation.

"I believe that this view of the Briand-Kellogg Pact which I have discussed will become one of the great and permanent policies of our nation. It is founded upon conceptions of law and ideals of peace which are among the most cherished faiths of the American people. It is a policy which combines the readiness to cooperate for peace and justice in the world, which Americans have always manifested, while at the same time it preserves the independence of judgment and the flexibility of action upon which our people have always insisted. I believe that this policy must strike a chord of sympathy in the conscience of all other nations. We all feel that the lessons taught by the World War must not be forgotten. The determination to abolish war which emerged from that calamity must not be relaxed. These aspirations of the world are expressed in the great peace treaty which I have described. It is only by continued vigilance that this treaty can be built into an effective living reality. The American people are serious in their support and evaluation of the treaty. They will not fail to do their share in this endeavor."

(Stimson: Pact of Paris)

Concerning the basis and the broad outlines of the course which the American Government has followed in relation to this situation, and in appraisal of the results to date, Mr. Stimson said in an address before the Union League Club at Philadelphia, on October 1:

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"From the beginning, American policy and commerce have been closely and creditably connected with the development of the great nations of China and Japan. . . . The rapid advance of the Japanese people in modern civilization and in the development of their political and social institutions has been viewed with gratification by the people of this country as an earnest of a future influence of enlightenment and stability in the Orient.

"China also has rapidly developed, although her progress is at present torn and delayed by disastrous civil wars. For over thirty years our Government has been one of the sponsors of a policy towards China known as the 'Policy of the Open Door'. That policy, based upon the far-sighted vision of John Hay, rests upon two principles: first, equality of opportunity among all nations dealing with China; and, secondly, as necessary to that equality, the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. Applied to China, the 'Open Door' means simply fair play for China's national development as being also the best and

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and most enlightened policy for the rest of the world in trading with her. In 1922 this policy was crystallized in the Nine Power Treaty between this country and the other nations most interested in China's trade.

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"To the great concern of the American people and Government, during the past year there has arisen in Manchuria a crisis in the relations between China and Japan threatening the peace of that part of the world and, in consequence, the peaceful pursuits of all nations, including ourselves, in that region. This was not only a blow at our commercial interests; but, of even greater importance to the world, it constituted a deadly threat to the authority of the great peace treaties which after the World War had been conceived by the nations of the world in a supreme effort to prevent a recurrence of such a disaster. China and Japan were both parties to these treaties.

"The problem which confronted Mr. Hoover's government was serious and far-reaching. On the one hand, it was to support our historic Policy of the Open Door, so vital to our commercial interests, and, on the other, to throw our influence with that of the other nations of the world to save these peace treaties from a loss of prestige which might be fatal. This is not an appropriate occasion to rehearse the steps which have been taken. Mr. Hoover met this problem with intelligence and sympathy but with a firmness resulting from a deep conviction of the importance of the issues at stake. His policy was framed with strict impartiality to the parties to the controversy and with great patience and understanding, but nevertheless with unwavering devotion to both our own immediate interests and the broader principles involved. Thus far the success of that policy can be measured by the unanimous alignment of all the neutral governments and substantially all the public opinion of the world behind the so-called 'non-recognition' policy announced by this Government's note of January 7, 1932."

(Stimson: Philadelphia, Oct. 1, 1932)

The American Government has deemed it no part of its function to sit in judgment with regard to the antecedent issues of the controversy between the two disputants. It has maintained an attitude of impartiality. Its efforts have been directed toward the maintenance of American rights and interests. These rights and interests arise in part out of treaties and agreements to which the United States is party, but they rest basically on the foundation of the general or common interest and concern of all nations in the problem of maintaining and preserving peace.

The American Government has considered it proper and desirable and advisable to act in cooperation or concert with other powers or agencies whose principal objective in this situation is identical with ours. It has followed a line of action based firmly on the principle of respect for the fundamental rights and interests of all of the powers concerned.

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concerned. It has refused to entertain any thought of hostility toward either of the disputants or toward any other power or powers that have interests in the Far East. It believes that only by solicitude and respect on the part of each of the powers concerned for the rights and interests of all of the others concerned can there be achieved a solution of the major problems of Far Eastern relations which will give promise of enduring.

The American Government conceives that the problem of maintaining peace is a common or world problem and is therefore a proper concern of each, of any and of all of the nations. It maintains, moreover, that the right of each and of all of the nations to manifest concern and to express to others its views when there is impending or has occurred a breach of the peace has been expressly established by common consent, assent and contract written into solemn international, multilateral treaties.

With these principles and conceptions in mind, the American Government has followed and continues to follow in reference to the problems which have arisen out of this situation a policy directed toward preventing, restricting or minimizing hostilities; it has endeavored to cooperate with other governments and international agencies whose policies and action have been directed toward the same ends; it has sought to function not as a judge or as a prosecutor but as the responsible agent of a great nation which is an active member of a community in which all of the members are entitled, nay, even obligated to exert themselves in support and defense of the right of the community to enjoy conditions of security and peace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 19, 1932.

~~SECRET~~

As reported in Geneva's despatch No. 406 Political of November 8, 1932, Mr. Rodriguez, head of the Latin-American Liaison Bureau of the League Secretariat, stated in a conversation with Mr. Gilbert that:

(1) The South and Central American nations unanimously condemned Japanese policy in Manchuria and would be in favor of reducing any rights or advantages which Japan might attempt to obtain as the fruits of its aggression;

(2) Latin-American countries not only supported the position of the American Government but regretted that the latter had not taken an even stronger stand;

(3) It was believed in Latin-American circles in Geneva that if the League should take up the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute it would be possible to set up precedents which would strengthen the League's position vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese question

and

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and that it would weaken Japan's position by requiring her to take part in deliberations relating to an analogous situation;



(4) Latin-American circles seemed to think that Washington was restraining their governments from bringing the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute before the League.

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


No. 406 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Geneva, Switzerland, November 8, 1932.



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SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict. - Attitude of
the Latin-American States.



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I have the honor to report that recently, during the course of a conversation with Mr.C.Rodriguez (Panama), head of the Latin-American Liaison Bureau of the League Secretariat, he broached the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict and offered certain comments on the general position of the Latin-American states with reference to this question. I am aware, of course, that the Department, through our missions in Latin-America, is doubtless fully informed of the feeling in those countries and the policies of their respective governments. Nevertheless, as Mr.Rodriguez is continually in touch with Latin-Americans in Geneva and enjoys a large measure of confidence among them, his comments on their reaction as a group, and particularly on the status of certain of their representatives here, may be of interest to the Department.

Mr.Rodriguez opened his remarks by expressing his personal satisfaction with the position which the United States

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States had taken in the Sino-Japanese conflict, which, he stated, was universally supported by the Latin-American states. He added that the countries of South and Central America were unanimous in their condemnation of the Japanese policy in Manchuria and that their desire in this matter was to uphold the principles of the League Covenant which weak states perceived as a charter for their protection from stronger states and as an instrument of international justice. This, of course, is in harmony with the declarations of the various Latin-American representatives delivered from time to time throughout the course of the deliberations of the Council and the Assembly on this question and is in essence the same position as that taken by practically all the small states which have pronounced themselves on the matter.

With reference to the Lytton Report, Mr. Rodriguez said he was certain that the chief Latin-American representatives would be in favor of reducing as far as possible any rights or advantages which Japan might attempt to obtain as the fruits of her aggression. In this connection, he referred again to the position taken by the United States and in particular to the Secretary's note of January 7 enunciating the principle of the non-recognition of advantages obtained through a violation of the Pact of Paris, and stated that the Latin-American countries approved unqualifiedly the maintenance of that principle. He intimated further that they not only gave their moral support to the position of the United States, but were disappointed that

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that the American Government had not taken an even stronger stand throughout the course of the negotiations for the settlement of the conflict. This again is, of course, in harmony with the views of the small states in general who, having relatively slight responsibilities in the matter, and slight interests involved, are inclined to regard the situation from a theoretical rather than from a realistic viewpoint. I may add that naturally, as in the case of any League state taking a position in Geneva especially regarding a matter which does not directly concern it, such a position is often adopted in line with some phase of its own national policy with the thought that such a policy may receive support by a general acceptance, through the establishment of pertinent precedents, of the principles involved. To what extent the Latin-American states may be so motivated in this instance I leave to the consideration of the Department.

In this connection, I desire to call the Department's attention to certain factors relating to Latin-American representation at Geneva which have a bearing on the Sino-Japanese conflict. As indicated in the Consulate's despatch No. 330 Political, ^{793.94 Commission / 499} of October 20, 1932, there are four Latin-American countries on the Committee of Nineteen: Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama by virtue of being members of the Council, and Colombia through election by the Assembly. Guatemala and Panama, it is presumed, will continue to be represented by Matos and

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and Garay respectively. Mexico has not yet announced the designation of a representative. (Consulate's despatch No. 397, November 2, 1932). Colombia continues to be represented by Mr. A.Y. Restrepo, the Colombian Permanent Delegate to the League, who resides at Geneva.

In the course of his conversation Rodriguez commented on some of the outstanding personalities among the Latin-American representatives, with special reference to their rôle in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He mentioned in particular Restrepo and Agüero y Bethancourt, the Cuban Minister to Germany and Austria and chief Cuban Delegate to the League Assembly. Restrepo, he stated, is universally respected and esteemed by Latin-Americans here and on that account is frequently chosen to act as their spokesman in matters concerning which they wish to take a common stand as a group. It was doubtless as a result of Latin-American confidence in Restrepo that Colombia was elected by the Assembly last year as a member of the Committee of Nineteen. As a consequence of this situation, Colombia's position in the Committee may be considered as of more importance than that of the majority of the small states on the Committee, in view of the fact that Restrepo represents not only his own country, but virtually also a group of other countries situated in the same part of the world and having a similar outlook. It is generally believed that Restrepo will take occasion to present his views and will play somewhat of a prominent rôle in the deliberations of the Committee.

Agüero

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Aguero also is held in high esteem by the Latin-American representatives and from time to time acts as their common spokesman in important matters before the Assembly. Cuba, however, is not a member of the Committee of Nineteen.

In view of Madariaga's prominence among the representatives of the small states on the Council, and his vigilant and energetic defence of League principles, I took occasion to enquire of Rodriguez whether the attitude of the Latin American countries toward Spain, viewed from a political standpoint, had undergone any change since the establishment of the Spanish Republic. He replied that although it was true that Spain has been converted from a monarchy aspiring to the position of a great power to a republic content with playing the rôle of a leader among the small powers, no change whatever had taken place in the Latin-American attitude towards the acceptance of Spanish leadership. He repeated what he has frequently said in previous years, that the Latin-American countries, although proud of their Spanish origin and culture, preferred to act as a separate group independent of European influence and would particularly resent any attempt on the part of Spain to assume the rôle of leader among them or the special champion of their rights. Thus it happens, in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict, that although they are in agreement with Madariaga's views and consequently would listen with interest to anything he might have to say, just as they would in the case of the representative of another state in similar circumstances, they do not look to Madariaga for leadership

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leadership and will offer him no encouragement in that direction.

I wish to add, with respect to what Rodriguez had to say concerning the various points discussed in this despatch, that it reflects the policy of the Latin-American states in Geneva insofar as I have been able to observe it.

In Latin-American circles in Geneva there is also at the present time considerable discussion respecting the relationship between the Sino-Japanese situation and the Bolivia-Paraguay dispute along the lines which I described in my despatch No. 392 Political of October 29, 1962, paragraph "13". There is current an expression of opinion that the Bolivia-Paraguay affair should be taken up with the League not only because of its inherent character but also because of its bearing on the Sino-Japanese problem. It is felt that precedents could be quickly set in the handling of the Bolivia-Paraguay matter which would greatly strengthen the League's position vis-à-vis the Sino-Japanese question and in particular that it would materially weaken Japan's position which is seen as in opposition to carrying out her undertakings to the League, should she have to take part as a member of the Council in deliberations of a like nature in an entirely separate but analogous situation.

As to the attitude of the Latin-American representatives here respecting the bringing of the Bolivian-


Paraguayan

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Paraguayan dispute into the League in the light of the merits of that situation per se, I desire to report that the expressions of pertinent opinion on this matter on the part of such representatives are to favor such action. They are moreover inclined to let it be understood that it is chiefly the influence of Washington which prevents their respective governments carrying out such a policy. To what extent they actually reflect the positions of their governments or to what extent they are influenced in this matter by League considerations is naturally difficult for me to judge.

Respectfully yours,


Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Original and Four Copies to Department of State.
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

November 7, 1932.

RE:


Mr. Hornbeck:

Dear Stanley:

I am attaching two memoranda prepared by Ostroumoff who, as you know, was formerly Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway. While I do not think that you will find much of interest in these memoranda, I thought that you might like to glance through them in view of their authorship. The last part, pages 7-11, of the memorandum with regard to the solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict, appears to me to be the most interesting part of the two articles.

Robert F. Kelley.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM WITH REGARD TO THE
SOLUTION OF THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

PCR

After the study of collected materials and records, the causes of the Sino-Japanese conflict as well as the responsibility for starting it should be clear to the League Commission.

The analysis of intentions of both parties would make it clear whether the members of the League of Nations could agree to such and such pursuits of each party.

As a result of it, the League Commission should come to a decision, that would not only be just to both parties, but will be also taking into consideration the vital necessities of both countries; and will bring about a lasting peace between China and Japan.

793.94 In conclusion, the commission should suggest to the League possible compromises and how to apply them.

Notwithstanding the wish of the League of Nations to limit the sphere of the conflict, the seizure of whole Manchuria was effected.

From a local incident, although of a serious character, the conflict has assumed dimensions of world importance, through such actions as:- Intermediary military actions in Tientsin and Shanghai, seizure of the Chinese Eastern and Peking-Mukden railways and of the city of Harbin, complications with U.S.S.R., seizure of customs and postal service, and menace to the world trade.

Such an infringement of the universal peace is particularly unsufferable when created by a party, belonging to the League of Nations.

Turning to the explanation of the systematically stated positions, it is necessary to point out the weak positions of Japan and China in the present conflict, which, when clearly stated, would help to

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reach an agreement, a compromise, satisfactory to both parties.

WEAK POSITIONS OF JAPAN.

I. The infringement of international obligations, provisions of Washington Conference, signed by Japan, Kellogg's pact, and peaceful provisions of the League of Nations. In other words, infringement of the right, by force. Loss of the world confidence.

II. Economic weakness. Insufficiency of the gold stock, its exhaustion by the strain of preceding years. Economic crisis at home. Enormous sums necessary to help the rural population in Japan.

Loss of the trade market in China and unfavourable trade balance. Unproductive enormous expenditures for military operations in Manchuria.

Fall of the Yen on the world market and consequent shrinkage of the Japanese credit.

Impossibility of getting anything out of Manchuria before the peace is restored.

WEAK POSITIONS OF CHINA.

I. Lack of National unity. Lack of an experienced and strong government. Inability to have other powers help China. Absence of any definite plan of resisting the Japanese in Manchuria. Influence of personal interests; intention to throw all blame upon Marshall Chang-Hsue Liang.

II. Economic ruin and critical financial situation. Lack of strong army and unwillingness to form one.

Inability to inform the world public of the true state of affairs, and unwillingness to stand the expenditure for same.

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Impossibility of obtaining considerable economic profits from Manchuria, without first investing capital, which is lacking.

General weight of economic burden.

Unwise intention of some parties in Japan to seize Manchuria, which might lead to a revolution, instead of coming to an economic and political agreement which would be of a greater benefit to Japan.



As to the general picture of the conflict and circumstances, surrounding its beginning and development, the Commission is now in possession of the material necessary for the report for the League of Nations.

However, it is much harder to formulate the actual intentions, past and present, of the parties concerned, as, to an extent they both, but particularly Japan, have been screening their real intentions. This was done in order to make the League face accomplished facts, without evoking too strong an opposition.

In order to find a solution satisfactory to both parties and effecting a complete reconciliation, one should not be afraid to state their real claims arising from necessity, claims, not yet officially recognized.

Below is a summary of Japanese demands, before the conflict and now.

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BEFORE THE CONFLICT.

Japan had insisted on special rights and priveleges in Manchuria:-

I. Construction of several rail-ways to secure quick transportation of troops in Manchuria in case of a conflict with U.S.S.R., and to form a rear line base in case of a conflict with U.S.A.

II. Creation of opportunities for emigrants from Japan and Korea, where there is a considerable surplus of population.

III. Development of natural resources of Manchuria, by investing capital with Japanese initiative.

NOW.

Japan wants to make vassal countries of Manchuria and Mongolia, with the view of their future annexation, as was the case with Korea.

I. To possess Manchuria and Mongolia for military purposes; fortification of the mainland to act as a rear line base and a source of supplies in case of a war.

II. To be in complete possession of the territory (exceeding Japan four times) so as to provide for the emigration of the surplus population at home, at present and particularly in future.

III. To develop the natural resources of Manchuria and Mongolia according to a Governmental programme. This, to compensate the expenses suffered in connection with the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia and to compensate for future losses of the Japanese Government and people and to provide for their needs and for their general enrichment.

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IV. Obtaining by concessions or some other means the control of the minerals in Manchuria.

V. Utilization of Manchurian market for the consumption of Japanese goods.

IV. Seizure of all natural resources of Manchuria.

V. Having established the vassal countries of Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan intends to monopolize their markets for their goods, as though they were her colonies.

China, however, having possessed Manchuria and Mongolia for several hundred years during the Monarchy, also considers them a part of the Chinese Republic. Foreign powers have often declared their wish of guarding the integrity and indivisibility of China.

Of recent years the promise to observe the integrity was given when the Treaty of Washington was signed by the Powers, and among them by Japan.

Consequently, China contended:-

BEFORE THE CONFLICT.

I. Manchuria and Mongolia are unseparable parts of the Chinese Republic, even during the periods of civil wars, particularly with regard to foreign policy.

Manchurian authorities guarding the sovereignty of China and its prestige, although they have followed Japanese orientation, tried to resist the aggressive expansion of Japan in Manchuria.

AFTER THE CONFLICT.

I. China desires the return of the pre-conflict position, but, undoubtedly, will be prepared to satisfy many economic demands of Japan, which it had declined previously to the conflict, and which it considered to be excessive.

The fundamental demand of China is that the so-called state of Manchukuo, created by Japan, be liquidated and Manchuria and Mon-

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They stopped the construction of several railway lines, necessary for Japan, that were being built on loans from Japanese capitalists, on account of the protest of the population and complete commercial disadvantage of the lines.

A programme of building a railway system with their own means was worked out.

By giving the Japanese subjects the rights for purchasing and renting lands in Manchuria, China tried to organize the transportation of surplus population to Manchuria from the South, and from Shantung where population is so thick as to cause starvation.

Having formerly left to Japan the ^exploitation of big industrial enterprises in Manchuria, particularly in the coal industry, China during the last year began to develop the natural resources of Manchuria with her own means and initiative.

China, of course, patronized industrial enterprises of her sub-

golia acknowledged as parts of China.

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jects.

Trying to pay back Chinese Eastern Railway and its rolling stock, as agreed with U.S.S.R., joint owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway, China wished that the South Manchurian Railway would not extend its influence and function beyond the limits as set down in the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, when the Southern line of Chinese Eastern Railway was given to Japan and became the South Manchurian Railway.

From the above summary of the intentions of the parties, before the Conflict and now, it is seen that Japan has considerably increased her demands during this period, while China is prepared to satisfy many demands of Japan which formerly she would not, and wished to avoid the renewal of the conflict in future.

Turning to the consideration of demands, past and present, and analysing them not only from the point of view of the international right, but also taking into account the vital interests of Japan, we come to the following conclusions.

WHAT JAPAN NEEDS.

I. To have Manchuria united strategically with Japan, in case of war with some other country.

THESE DEMANDS COULD BE SATISFIED AS FOLLOWS-

I. By conclusion of a special agreement between Japan and China which would guarantee Japan sup-

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II. Japan needs some means of transportation of troops into the interior of Manchuria; this is why it has always insisted on controlling railways.

III. Privileges for immigrants from Japan and Korea to take care of the excess of population there.

Japan first intends to send the Koreans to clear the fields, and thus prepare the way for the Japanese immigrants.

port if necessity of defence arises, i.e. establishment of joint Defensive Union.

II. By permitting Japan to construct the necessary railways and other means of communication on wise, mutually profitable terms of exploitation.

III. Practically speaking, the immigration of the excess of population into Manchuria and Mongolia cannot menace the Chinese population. The experience of many years shows experimentally that the Japanese "en masse" cannot sustain the climatic and living conditions in the two territories. Therefore, the Chinese can consent to extend facilities for the immigration of the excess of Japanese population into Manchuria and Mongolia, so long as it does not exceed a certain proportion to the Chinese population.

The experts of the League of Nations could help to work out the details of a rational agreement which would guard the interests of both parties, and would evolve such a scheme of peopling the territories as to

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IV. Japan should receive from Manchuria the vital food products for the population and raw materials for the industry.

avoid the trouble between the Japanese and the Chinese inhabitants.
IV. By reaching agreements for a long term, which would be most satisfactory to Japan, it would be possible to reach a reconciliation in the most satisfactory way used among nations.

To avoid the boycott and other trouble between the two peoples, the Chinese Government could secure the required raw materials and foodstuffs from the Chinese population and turn them over to Japan.

Having reached the military, commercial and customs agreements, all intentions of seizing the natural resources of Manchuria and Mongolia could be put aside.

As to the exploitation of mines, forests and industrial development in Manchuria and Mongolia, the policy of "open doors" declared, among others, by Japan herself, should be realized by the Chinese Government by working out sound laws, which would guarantee to all nations freedom of work and safety.

V. Japan should to guaranteed with a market for her products.

V. Japan must realize that Manchuria with her population of 30,000,000

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people, even if monopoly is established for Japanese goods, would not be as big a market as China itself presents with 450,000,000 people. Consequently a commercial treaty would be of more value to Japan than the seizure of Manchuria and Mongolia.

VI. Japan must guard the South-Manchurian Railway, and administer her concessions and rented territories. A system of management of the territories of Manchuria and Mongolia by China must be evolved such as to end troubles, mutual accusals and motives for conflicts.

VI. With regard to the mutual accusal of both parties in insincerity, infringement of agreements, etc., the projects of the settlement of the conflict submitted by the parties could be studied by the experts of the League of Nations, and, if acceptable, guaranteed by the League. The parties should consent to lay their demands, without covering them with declarations of sovereignty and without masking their real intentions with declarations of defending life and property of their subjects.

The parties do not seem to be able to come to an agreement by themselves:- one of them believes in her military strength and ambitions, while the other, being much weaker in military respects, wishes to refer the matter for solution to the League of Nations.

Since this conflict touches the interests of other nations and is a menace to the world peace, the League of Nations should undertake

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the role of intercessor and force the parties by moral action and, if necessary by other means, to start negotiations.

In the case of a serious disagreement of the parties, the League of Nations could help to reach a mutual understanding, as has been done in Shanghai, with the help of the Ministers of Four Powers, or to accept for itself the role of an arbiter and to find a solution, similar to the one outlined here.

The success of such a solution will undoubtedly depend upon the wish of the members of the League of Nations to end the Conflict. Even a most powerful country ^{would} ~~will~~ not risk to go against the decision of the whole world, particularly if it satisfies the vital needs of the disputing parties. The short-sightedness of politicians of such and such a party must finally yield to irresistible economic laws.

Having pointed out the methods of solution of the Conflict, the League Commission will bring its work to an end and will pronounce the first difficult words, the conflict to be finally settled by the League itself.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SINO - JAPANESE CONFLICT.

It is already over a year that the world has been watching with apprehension the events in the Far East, in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict. In view of the recent recognition of Manchukuo by Japan and of the coming publication of the report of the Investigating Commission of the League of Nations about the conflict between Japan and China, it is deemed opportune to make now a short review of the events since the beginning of the conflict.

At first, it seemed to most people that the military actions started by Japan during the night of September 18th, 1931, in Mukden, as well as landing of Japanese marines during the same night at the Chinese port of Newchwang are but of local and temporary character. This opinion was strengthened by the declaration of Japanese military authorities, that the above mentioned military activities were undertaken to prevent the execution of a plot by Chinese to blow up a portion of the South Manchurian Railway. Of course, it was strange and hard to understand that to prevent such a plot, it was necessary to seize two Chinese ^{arsenals} ~~military~~ in Mukden and burn one of them, to demolish by bombardment Chinese military barracks, several miles away, to place under arrest all Chinese military and civil authorities in the Capital of Manchuria and to disarm its police. It was strange that it was necessary to land Japanese marines in Newchwang^w which is several scores of miles away from Mukden, and, finally, to seize all railway stations around the capital.

It was strange that the Chinese troops retreated without resisting, and, as was declared by the Chinese military leaders, were disarmed by the Chinese authorities themselves because of some tension existing as a result of the Captain Nakamura incident. The Chinese leaders declared that they ordered the troops to return all arms to the

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Arsenals, so as to prevent the possibility of an armed skirmish.

Thus, the arms and large stocks of other military equipment, as well as the military airport were now in possession of the Japanese army. The Chinese troops were thus taken unawares due to the peaceful intentions of Marshall Chang Hsue Liang, and were forced to retreat.

Japanese military authorities in Manchuria declared that the military activities were undertaken to protect the lives and property of Japanese residents there, and to stand by the rights of Japan, given her by pacts with China. The military activities, they assured, will not spread, provided China does not start actions imperilling Japanese interests, which would necessitate Japan to take further steps for her security.

China immediately despatched protests to Japan and the League of Nations against the Japanese assault and her infringement of obligations as a member of the League of Nations and a signatory to Kellogg's pact.

At the following session of the League of Nations China accused Japan of effecting seizure of Mukden and landing marines in Newchuang by taking advantage of the presence of Japanese troops in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway (stationed there for its protection). She claimed that she did not in any way provoke the above outbreak of military hostilities. Further, that Japan started a systematic invasion of Manchuria, spreading North and South from Mukden along the railway lines.

The Japanese representatives at the League objected to all attempts and resolutions of the League to at least limit the zone of the conflict and effect the cessation of military activities.

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The Japanese held that the League of Nations does not know and, therefore, cannot understand the circumstances in Manchuria, where China is constantly provoking Japan.

In the meantime, the events at Mukden were followed by an open campaign of conquest of Kirin, Taonan, Tsitsihar, Harbin and other governmental and military centres, where there were troops of the Manchurian army.

Having seized an administrative centre, the Japanese military commanders, invariably changed the higher military and civil officials, appointing such Chinese as were willing to serve the Japanese interests. All this was frequently done with force. On the approach of the Japanese army, for fear or personal gains, some of the officials declared themselves friendly to Japan and enemies of China.

In some parts, as for instance, in the province of Tsitsihar, the Japanese and traitors' forces met with armed resistance and the campaign lasted for weeks and even months.

Along with the successful campaign in the North, the Japanese troops were also advancing South, towards the Great Wall, which is on the border of Manchuria and Inner China. There, the Japanese advanced along the Peking-Mukden Railway and its branches, financed and built jointly by the British and the Chinese; the British interests in it still being considerable. Therefore, the progress of Japanese troops in this direction was somewhat slower, particularly because after the first air raids and bombardments by the Japanese of the town of Chin-chow and of other points along the railway, the Great Powers sent their observers to Chin-chow and all along the Peking-Mukden railway. However, in spite of the official reports of foreign observers, that Chinese troops have no intentions

- 4 -

of attacking the Japanese troops, the latter under the pretext of freeing the district of bandits, kept on advancing along the Peking-Mukden Railway, and, by the first of January 1932, have completely pushed out the Chinese Army and took control of all provinces of Manchuria, right up to the Great Wall.

About that time an attempt of a "coup d'état" was organized at Tientsin, during which the Japanese effected the departure from Tientisin of the Ex-Emperor Pu-Yi, who had been residing there on the Japanese Concession.

The next event of importance was the January bombardment and destruction of the Chapei District in Shanghai, where, as in the case of Tsitsihar province, the Japanese met with a determined resistance of the Chinese army. The time of cessation of hostilities at Shanghai coincided with the arrival there of the Investigating Commission of the League of Nations, under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton and with General McCoy, as a representative of U.S.A.

By this time, the process of seizure of Manchuria was completed and Pu-Yi, taken by the Japanese from Tient~~sin~~in, was delivered to Chang-Ch~~an~~an, and there at a meeting of the new officials of the Manchurian provinces was elected the Head of the newly formed independent state of Manchukuo.

Although, this was effected, of course, without asking the will of the people of Manchuria, it was announced that the post of the Head Executive was accepted by Pu~~Yi~~Yi, on request of 30,000,000 people, or the whole population of Manchuria.

The Japanese military commanders hurried that through so that by the time the Investigating Commission arrived at Mancuria,

- 5 -

it would have to consider the formation of the new state of Manchukuo as a fact and not as a possibility.

In fact, when the Commission, having visited Tokio and Nanking, was prepared to leave Peking for the scene of the Manchurian events, to study the real circumstances of the beginning and the development of the conflict, it had to deal with the officials of the new state of Manchukuo, backed by the commander of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, General Honjo, and numerous Japanese advisers.

The work of the Commission was greatly hampered by the officials of Manchukuo. Difficulties arose in connection with entrance into the new state of the Commission's Chinese adviser, Dr. Wellington Koo, with letting commission's train across the border, near the Great Wall, with control over those who had intentions of reporting to the Commission, etc. All these difficulties presented an obstacle in the work of the Commission, have often interrupted it and have even menaced successful completion of its task.

It is only thanks to the exceptional perseverance of the members of the Commission, headed by Lord Lytton, that the investigation of the dispute was completed. The Commission has visited Nanking, twice -Tokio, and twice - Peking, where their work was finished, just before September.

The Commission's report was received in Geneva on 22nd of September and has been just published.

However, not waiting for the publication of the report, Japan, made an official recognition of the Government of Manchukuo.

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created by her, and entered with the new state into a military agreement.

The haste of the above act of Japan is explained by two causes:- namely, a) hope to influence a change in the recommendations of the Commission, were the latter to uphold the sovereignty of China over Manchuria, b) intention to make the League of Nations face a completed fact, the method used by Japan throughout the conflict. This haste helped to realize the plans of Japan, in spite of all obstacles.

The character of declarations of government officials of Japan, has, all this time, been provoking patience of the League's Commission, the League itself, and Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Washington and Kellogg's pact.

At the same time a powerful propaganda is carried on in Japan preparing the population for a war, against any country which disagreeing with Japan's policy in Manchuria, might be on Japan's way.

Japanese press states that in the extreme case Japan might resign her membership in the League of Nations and will thus have her hands free.

In the same press, it is being discussed whether or not the Powers, particularly U.S.^A., can influence Japan, by economic boycott, to the extent of changing her policy. It is contended that U.S.A. is so interested economically, with her large investments, and is so anxious to preserve the existing trade, that it will not risk exercising any economic pressure on Japan.

Thus, Japan does not wish to stand by obligations of a member of the League of Nations on equal footing with China. She

- 7 -

is not willing to have her conflict with China referred to the League for solution. Japan's consent last year to have an Investigating Commission appointed by the League was prompted by the desire to delay the actual intervention of the League into the Conflict, until the seizure has been accomplished, as now it is, with the official recognition of Manchukuo by Japan.

However, now that the conflict has been thoroughly investigated by the Commission, with the participation of representatives and experts of various countries, including U.S.A. (who is not a member of the League), the League must find a just and practical solution of the dispute and effect a reconciliation of the belligerents.

The League of Nations must effect a solution of the conflict, even if one of the sides, not expecting a solution favourable to itself, would object ^{to} ~~as~~ League's intervention.

As a matter of fact, a consent for League's intervention is ~~given~~ by every member of the League, when joining the League. Certain limitations of the above in the Constitution of the League, have no weight in this case, in view of the seriousness of this conflict as a manace to the world peace.

The decision of the League must be founded not only on the letter and the formality of pacts, but also on the practical interests of the parties concerned, so as to insure a lasting peace.

For her own benefit and for preservation of her national prestige among the civilized nations of the world, Japan must drop her policy of concealing her aggressive program with continuous declarations of protecting her subjects' lives and property, and standing by her rights, and sincerely state her real needs, which ~~have prompt~~ ^{d-be}

- 8 -

have prompted her to start the Manchurian conflict.

After the League of Nations has formulated the main points of the peaceful settlement, the two parties should enter into direct negotiations under control and with cooperation of the League, to settle the details of the agreement.

If one of the parties refuses to accept League's settlement of the conflict, then the League of Nations, as well as the Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Washington and Kellogg's pact, must force, by exercising economic and political pressure, the party which would prove an obstacle for the preservation of peace and the abolition of brutal force as a factor of international relations, to accept League's decision.

If the conflict were allowed to continue, it would inevitably develop into a war, into which would be drawn other countries who have interests in China and along the Pacific Coast.

The great War has caused such great havoc and sufferings that it is not for consideration of League's prestige, but for self-preservation that all humanity must cooperate to the utmost with League's efforts to solve the Sino-Japanese conflict.

It is time to act, or else it might be too late.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

cib

Peiping via NR

Dated November 20, 1932.

Read 6:58 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 21 1932
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1932
Department of State

1262, November 20, midnight.

Legation's 1253, November 16, 5 p.m.

Following telegram has been sent American Consul General
at Harbin:

"November 17, 11 a.m.

One. Soviet sources are responsible for report which
I believe correct that General Su refuses to negotiate with
Japanese-Manchukuo delegation now at Matsievskaya.

Two. Japanese military will no doubt take action
against him when sufficient troops arrive at Nonni River.
Press reports that General Su's anti-Manchukuo troops are
falling back to the Hingan mountain range where there is
Chinese Eastern Railway tunnel but this is not confirmed
by local Japanese military.

Three. Soviet officials claim their role simply one
of offering facilities to negotiate to Japanese Manchukuo and
anti-Manchukuo sides and that they are otherwise not
interested in negotiations except they desire not to have
fighting near the Siberian border.

Four. Japan-Manchukuo forces repulse attacks
insurgents

F/HS

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NOV 22 1932

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


cib # 1262 from Peiping, November 20, 1932.

insurgents near Fuchin 13th ^{and at} ~~in Swatow~~ Sansing 15th. Losses
small."

JOHNSON

OX



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.01 Manchuria/628 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Stimson) DATED Nov. 17, 1932.
TO Secretary NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Manchurian situation.
Secretary explained to the Minister of the
Irish Free State his views on the -- .

hs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 23, 1932.

~~CONF.~~
~~SECRET~~

U. S. C. Smith

Tokyo's despatch No. 187 of
November 5, 1932, encloses
Mr. Neville's report of his recent
trip to Peiping. It should be
read in full.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, November 5, 1932.

No. 187.

Subject: Mr. Neville's report on his return from
a recent visit to Peiping.



NOV 21 1932



F/H S

793.94/5616



Copy to delegate,
General Disarm-
ament Conference.
Nov. 23, 1932.

Adl
HS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r :

In the belief that the observations and impressions
of a visitor concerning the situation in North China will
1/ be of value to the Department, I enclose herewith a copy of
the report made to me by Mr. Neville, Counselor of the
Embassy, on returning from his recent trip to Peiping.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:
Copy of Mr. Neville's
Report,
Copy to Peiping.
123.

JCG:r

NOV 30 1932

FILED

793.94
note
893-102 Peiping

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 187
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.



Sir:

As directed in the Department's telegram No. 166 of September 30, 6 p.m., I proceeded to Peiping, leaving Tokyo on the evening of October 2, and arriving in Peiping on the evening of October 8. I left Peiping on October 28, and returned to Tokyo on November 2. I stopped over night at Tientsin on my way to and from Peiping, and had an opportunity while there to talk with the Consul General and the officers of the 15th Infantry, U.S.A., who are stationed there in accordance with the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. While in Peiping I had opportunity to consult with the Minister and his staff as well as a number of our consular officers in China, including Mr. Vincent who has recently been transferred to Dairen from Nanking.

I found considerable apprehension that the Japanese were contemplating major operations of a military character in the Peiping area. This apparently was due to two reasons. One was that the Japanese were determined to get rid of Chang Hsueh-liang, who has been the dominant figure in North China since the bulk of his forces have been driven from Manchuria. It is said that the Japanese believe that he is at the back of most of the "Volunteer Forces" and anti-"Manchukuo" bands that have recently caused the Japanese so

much

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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much difficulty in their attempts to pacify the Northeastern Provinces. This would make it imperative for the Japanese to eliminate him completely from the advantageous position he occupies in Peiping. The other reason given was that it was the intention of the Japanese to include the Jehol region in the "State of Manchukuo". This would require a large military force, assuming that the people of that province would be either unwilling or unable, on account of Chang's military, to cast their political lot with the new "State". The best method of subduing the Jehol region, I was informed, was from the south, as the area to the north was so mountainous and cut up that any large body of troops would find great difficulty in operating there, while invasion from the south could be effected with comparatively little difficulty through the pass just to the north of Peiping.

It was this belief that led the legations in Peiping to urge or rather to suggest that some steps be taken to assure the neutrality of the Peiping area in case of invasion by the Japanese. I was asked by the Minister to express my views in regard to the matter. I stated that in my judgment there was little or no prospect of major Japanese military activity in that region (the Peiping area) in the immediate future. At the same time, I did not believe, I stated, that the General Staff could be induced

- 3 -

induced to make any statement on the subject, as anything relating to war plans has always been considered highly confidential. The Minister reported this to the Department. I presume that a copy of the telegram was sent to you by the Legation.

I gathered the impression from my talks with the Minister and others that the feeling of tension and of active ill will against the Japanese was much less acute than it had been earlier in the year. That is not to say that it has died out. It still exists and is decidedly a factor to be reckoned with. At the same time there appears to be little danger of an outbreak such as was feared at Tientsin some months ago. I cannot escape the feeling that a good deal of the distrust and ill will which the Japanese have incurred is not due entirely to their political activities, or even to the Manchurian situation. Much of it appears to be nothing but a question of manners. For example, the Japanese troops, both those at Tientsin and the small Legation guard at Peiping, are in the habit of carrying out their drills and marches at all hours of the day and night, and with little consideration for the convenience or susceptibilities of other nationalities. The guard at Peiping is under the control of the commanding officer at Tientsin and not that of the Minister, while the command at Tientsin is directed from Tokyo. This arrangement, while perfectly natural from the Japanese standpoint, is different from that of the other Powers, and places the Japanese Minister in a peculiar

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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peculiar position with his colleagues and with the Chinese civil officials. During the past year both foreigners and Chinese got the impression that the Japanese army units in the North China region(outside of Manchuria) were unnecessarily evident. They conducted all sorts of drills and night marches in places where their treaty right to do so was, to say the least, open to question, and irritated local opinion. This behavior, it seems, was the result of general orders to improve or institute certain types of instruction in the army. They made no allowances for the troops in China, and the Japanese troops appeared in full war panoply at times when a desire to improve international relations would have led most people to show more discretion. I am informed that recently there has been a decided improvement in this respect.

This behavior, coupled with the activities in Manchuria, led many thinking people to believe that almost any sort of invasion could be expected from Japan, and undoubtedly explains much of the agitation for action which the Ministers in China have urged upon their Governments. They felt that it was necessary to get the Powers to do something before the whole of China was overrun by the Japanese. This idea is not as strong as it was, and I found a large measure of opinion to the effect that no really useful international action

- 5 -

action could be taken at the moment. The Lytton Commission had at least this merit; it has staved off action, and has given the world something to talk about. That in itself is a benefit, and as the report is accompanied by a large quantity of factual matter, anyone who reads it will be likely to become acquainted with the problem. There appears to be no prospect of hasty or ill considered action in consequence.

I found that our despatches were greatly appreciated by the Legation. The Minister told me that they were very useful to him and wished in every way to cooperate with the Embassy in furnishing us with copies of the Legation reports. Many of these, of course, have little or no political significance. The work there is to a high degree what might be termed protection work. This is of no interest to us. The political situation does not readily lend itself to analysis in China at the present time. I told the Minister that the Embassy would be glad to receive whatever he thought might be of interest, but that naturally he must be the judge of that. I think that copies of official despatches sent to the Legation might well be supplemented from time to time by informal correspondence.


I feel that my visit to Peiping was decidedly of value, and I am grateful to you and to the Department for giving me the opportunity to make it.

Yours respectfully,

Edwin L. Neville.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In Reply **Refer** (CP1438) UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
To No. U. S. S. HOUSTON, Flagship.



Hankow, China,
27 September, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander in Chief, ASIATIC FLEET.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

1. The following extract is taken from an intelligence report submitted by the Commanding Officer of the American Legation Guard at Peiping, China:

"On August 24, one of the officers of the American Legation sent a report to the Commandant of the American Legation Guard, protesting against repeated actions of the Japanese soldiers in entering his private compound.

This officer states that on Monday, 22 August, two Japanese soldiers, in combat equipment, with steel helmets and rifles with fixed bayonets, entered the Customs Compound where he resides. They took position at his gate, where they remained for some minutes, simulating rapid-fire at some object on the street outside. A non-commissioned officer joined them about fifteen minutes later, a short time after which the party retired. They were apparently taking part in a maneuver held between the Japanese and the ex-Austrian Legation. During the course of the incident, all three uttered loud and war-like cries and rushed about among the shrubbery and flower beds at the entrance of the officer's house.

The officer further states that an incident similar in all respects occurred on July 2, but was not reported, since nothing of the kind had happened before, and there was no reason to believe that it would become a practice, nor did the officer desire to appear critical of a foreign guard.

In view of the repetition, however, protest was submitted on the following grounds: The officer's house is in a private compound, rented from the Chinese Maritime Customs, and is in no way connected with the Japanese Guard; the practice

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Confidential File

(J)800(CF1438)

27 September, 1932.

Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

of dashing around corners with fixed bayonets in confined premises, where children are at play, is dangerous; and finally, the appearance and demeanor of these soldiers, and the noise attendant upon these evolutions, were annoying to the officer's family and alarming to his servants.

The American Commandant, accompanied by his Adjutant, called on the Japanese Commandant on August 26. A Japanese captain officiated as interpreter during the conference. The American Commandant explained that his call was of a most informal nature, and that he hoped it would be received as such by the Japanese Commandant. He further stated that much more agreeable relations could be established by calls of this nature than by the writing of official letters. He then explained in detail the incident of the preceding paragraphs. After reading the report to the Japanese Commandant, the American Commandant explained that he was well aware of the fact that it was necessary to train troops and simulate as near as possible the conditions that would be met in actual warfare, but he did not think it necessary for the troops of the various foreign guards stationed in Peiping to enter the private compounds of foreigners and Chinese, for in doing so it frightened wives, children, and the servants, and caused much unfavorable talk at the various clubs. The American Commandant went on to say that he thought it best to confine training to the glacis' and their immediate vicinity.

The Japanese Commandant stated that he thanked the American Commandant for advising him of the incident and stated that he would immediately conduct an investigation, and was quite sure it would not happen again. He also stated that the officers of the Japanese Guard had orders not to enter the compounds of foreigners, and that upon completion of his investigation, he would advise the American Commandant.

The American Commandant stated that he had been informed that the Japanese had inquired as to when the American Marines, now at the International Rifle Range, would complete their training, and that the Japanese desired to use the American range. He advised the Japanese Commandant that the marines would complete their training on or about October 1, 1932, and that after that period the American Commandant

(J)800 (CF1438)

27 September, 1932.

Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

would be very pleased to have the Japanese troops conduct maneuvers on their range. With reference to the camp site used by the marines, the Japanese Commandant was advised that a rental of \$600 a year was paid by the American Guard to the Chinese owner. The Japanese Commandant stated that he did not desire to use the camp site, and that his men would camp on their own range. The American Commandant advised him that it would be perfectly alright for the Japanese to use the American Range. There being nothing further to discuss, the American Commandant thanked the Commandant of the Japanese for his courtesy in regards to the activities of the Japanese Guard, and departed.

On August 29, The British Commandant called on the Adjutant of the American Legation Guard and stated that he had been called to the British Legation by his Minister and upon his arrival, was informed of the following incident. On Saturday, August 27, a British sergeant and a British subject; who is here in connection with the installation of a new radio set, both in civilian clothes; were walking down Water Street, and just prior to arriving at the Japanese Guard noticed the sentry or guard standing on the walk with his rifle across the pavement. The sergeant called the other's attention to it and said, "Just before we reach him, he will pull it in so we can pass." But much to their surprise, the sentry did not do so, instead made a signal for them to march around him - which they did.

The British Minister asked his Commandant to take this matter up personally with the Commandant of the Japanese Guard, stating that he did not care to make an official report, but he considered the pavements as public thoroughfares and should not be blocked by the troops of the various guards.

The British Commandant phoned the Japanese Guard, saying that he would be coming over to see the Japanese Commandant, and was informed that the Commandant was sick, but that the second in command, a captain, would be very glad to see him and that another captain would be present to act as interpreter.

Upon his arrival at the Japanese Legation, the British Commandant left his ricksha to find the second

(J)800 (CFL438)

27 September, 1932.

Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

in command, and while waiting for his orderly, noticed that a sentry was trying to make his ricksha boy leave the compound. The British Commandant signalled him and then told him that the ricksha was his. The sentry, however, paid no attention to the Commandant, for he continued to pull the ricksha about and strike the coolie. The British Commandant then went over to the ricksha and got in and signalled for the boy to pull into the driveway, when, much to the officer's surprise, another sentry appeared who grabbed the Commandant's sleeve and tried to pull him out of the ricksha.

Just at this moment, the captain whom the Commandant was to see, appeared, and the entire affair was explained to him. The Japanese said that the two men were carrying out their orders. The British Commandant insisted that his ricksha be allowed to remain standing, saying that the Japanese received no such treatment when calling at his guard. His demand was finally very reluctantly carried out.

They then entered the Officer's Mess, where the entire business was taken up - in regards to the incident on Saturday, the British Commandant was informed that the sentry was complying with his orders, that on one or two occasions their sentries had been interfered with. The British Commandant told him that the walk was considered a public place and that one of the men was a very good sergeant and certainly would not have interfered with the guard. The captain replied that the sentry was also a very good man and was only obeying his instructions.

In regards to the ricksha affairs, the captain stated that the men were young and not much more than recruits, and their orders stated that rickshas would not remain in the compound.

On August 30, the Japanese Commandant, accompanied by his Adjutant, called on the American Commandant, apologizing for his soldiers entering the compound of one of the officers of the American Legation, on 22 August, and gave his assurances that such an occurrence would not happen again. After about three minutes conversation the Japanese Commandant departed.

In a conversation between the British and Japanese Commandants, in the office of the British Com-

27 September, 1932.

(J)800(OP1438)

Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

mandant, on 30 August, the Japanese Commandant in the presence of the British Commandant and his adjutant, make the following statements:

"That there could be no peace in North China while the Chinese army was occupying positions inside the borders of the New State (i.e. Jehol) as, owing to their presence, arms and men could be sent into Manchukuo. In order to rid the borders of Manchukuo of these troops it would be necessary to crush the Young Marshal if he did not depart voluntarily."

The Japanese Commandant also stated that it was quite possible that the Manchukuo would demand that all Chinese troops be withdrawn south of the Yellow River and the country so vacated be policed by Chinese police and Manchukuo troops.

Upon the British Commandant's pointing out that Manchukuo troops would hardly be capable of carrying out this task the Japanese Commandant stated that he considered Japanese troops and aeroplanes might be as easily lent to assist in this as hired to take part in cinema films. He went on then to say that since America was selling aeroplanes to China, there was no reason that Japan should not lend or hire aeroplanes and men to Manchukuo. Nor did the Japanese Commandant see any reason why Japan should not influence Manchukuo to establish the Young Emperor in Peiping, and eventually as the ruler over the whole of China; thus making China a better place for foreigners to live and trade in.

The Japanese Commandant blamed the Kuomintang Government for the present situation in China as he alleged it to be a puppet of Soviet Russia, and less desirable than the new state supported by Japan.

He persisted in the point that in the event of trouble being likely in Peiping a great deal of good might be done by a demonstration in the manner of a combined march of all the Legation Guards of Peiping through the streets with bugles sounding and bands

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

(J)800 (CF1438)

27 September, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Activities of the Japanese Legation Guard
at Peiping, China.

playing. He also went on to state that he considered the defense of the Legation Quarter would quite possibly be better carried out by active operations in the city than by a passive defense of manning the walls of the Quarter."

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M. M. TAYLOR.



THIS COPY FOR STATE DEPARTMENT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 693.00 P. R. Hankow/68 FOR Despatch # 237.

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED October 17, 1932.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***



REGARDING:

Anti-Japanese movement in Wuhan became stronger
during month of September, 1932.

hs

793.94/5618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P. R./59 FOR Despatch # 174

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED November 1, 1932
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***



REGARDING:

Circumstantial evidence from various sources supports the opinion that the Japanese are still determined to get Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang away from Peiping and China.

hs

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793.94

(d) Japanese policy in North China. *

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Although nothing definite is known circumstantial evidence from various sources supports the opinion that the Japanese are still determined to get Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang away from Peiping and China. They consider him the principal obstacle to the furtherance of their policy there. That that policy is is more difficult to state though it is believed that it envisages a new independent state in North China which will include Manchuria. The Japanese may try to bring this about by giving strong support to General Chiang Kai-shek in his endeavors to put down the communists or they may on some provocation invade Jehol and through that province march on Peiping and occupy North China. Responsible Japanese officials have stated that if the Young Marshal keeps quiet there will be no question of Japanese troops going to Peiping. ** Mr. Bao Kuan-chen, the diplomatic representative of "Manchukuo" in

Tokyo



Embassy's despatch No. 170 of October 21, 1932.
** Embassy's telegram No. 259, October 16-4 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Nanking/56 FOR Disp. #356

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Oct. 17, 1932

-70

NAME



#375 to Legation - Oct. 15, 1932.

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Full report on present status of --.

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793.94/5620

5620

793.94

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

(1) Sino-Japanese Relations.

The signing of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo on September 15 prompted the National Government to despatch an official protest to Tokyo. It stigmatized the act of extending recognition to the puppet regime before the publication of the Lytton report as a challenge to the authority of the League and accused Japan of "wrongs of the first magnitude" in its violation of


- 1) the fundamental principles of International Law;
- 2) Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations;
- 3) the Pact of Paris;
- 4) the 9-Power Treaty;
- 5) its pledge to withdraw troops into the Railway Zone;
- 6) injunctions of the League not to aggravate the situation.

On



- 3 -

On September 28, the KUOMIN NEWS AGENCY reported that the Waichiaoapu had received a reply from the Japanese Government on the previous day which contended that Japanese military actions had been taken in self defense, that Manchukuo was the outcome of a spontaneous independence movement on the part of Manchurians, and that "as regards recognition, Japan is free to do as it pleases and has not violated the 9 Power Treaty, the Covenant of the League or any other international treaty". The news report remarked in conclusion that "the reply being so outrageous in its barefaced distortion of universally recognized facts- it is stated that the Government is not likely to waste time over any further rebuttal."



In addition to the protest to Tokyo, on September 18, the Chinese Government addressed identic notes to the signatories of the 9 Power Pact, "inviting attention to the serious situation precipitated on September 15." It declared that since September 18, 1931, not a day had passed without Japan aggravating its wrong by one act or another and that undeniable facts showed that the bogus government in Manchuria was a product of and a tool of Japanese military aggression. Therefore the 9-Power Pact had been violated and "the Chinese Government communicates its full and frank views with the request that such measures be taken as will properly and effectually deal with the state of affairs brought about by Japanese acts of aggression in China."

The anniversary of the attack on Mukden passed without any major incidents in Nanking. Flags were flown at half mast, places of amusement were closed and speeches were

delivered

- 4 -



delivered by Party workers. Yeh Chu-tsang (葉楚傖) and Chu Cheng (居正) spoke at the Kuomintang Headquarters and declared that "we must never forget this mortal wound and must pledge ourselves to wipe out this humiliation and strive for the recovery of Manchuria". The Party issued a manifesto "that there is no other course but to mobilize our internal resources and struggle with the aggressor." A Japanese consular policeman was arrested, and turned over to the Japanese authorities, for intruding into a closed meeting, and a bomb was exploded on the premises of a suspected traitor merchant, the Great Eastern Pharmacy. The extra Japanese guards who had been stationed on the Osaka Shosen Kaisha hulk were withdrawn on September 19.

During September the local anti-Japanese Association encountered difficulties which threatened its dissolution. On September 28, the day after the Waichiaopu, at the instance of the Nanking office of the Legation, had forced the release of some American property which had been mistakenly confiscated for Japanese products, the members of the standing committee resigned en bloc "on account of their inability to enforce the punishment regulations and on account of the financial difficulties of the Association". The boycott fervor seemed to diminish in spite of artificial stimuli designed to intensify it. A novel stimulus recently observed was a legend stamped on a Bank of China note which stated that "anyone who uses this money to buy enemy goods is not a man".

On September 3 the Foreign Office by note called the attention of the Powers to the fact that the Japanese seizure of Salt funds in Manchuria prejudiced the ability of China to meet its loan obligations and on September 23rd Mr. T. V.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Soong answered the Manchukuo statement that China was a foreign country as far as tariffs were concerned, by declaring Chinese customs houses in Manchukuo closed and duties which should have been collected there should be collected south of the Great Wall.

On September 25th KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY reported that the Ministry of Communications had ordered the severance of telegraphic communications with Manchukuo and had entered into negotiations with the R. C. A. for a blockade of radio messages. REUTERS corrected this report by explaining that the Ministry of Communications had ordered that the Chinese telegraph administration should no longer relay telegraphic messages from Manchukuo through Chinese stations to foreign countries, inasmuch as Manchukuo collected all charges from the sender and refused to remit its share to the relay office which was forced to pay from its funds all charges of the trans-oceanic cable company.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 28 1932
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 30 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

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**THE NINE-POWER TREATY
— AND —
THE KELLOGG-BRIAND TREATY**

(Review of Secretary Stimson's Position)

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By

SHUTARO (YOSHIDA) TOMIMAS, M. A.,

Formerly William B. Cutting Travelling Fellow in
International Law, Columbia University.
Author of "Open-Door Policy and Territorial Integrity
of China"

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SECRETARY STIMSON ON THE NINE-POWER TREATY.

In the still pending Chino-Japanese crisis, the Nine-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference has become, after ten years of obscurity, the subject of discussions between the Governments of Japan and the United States. The creation of a new state of Manchukuo under the fostering care of Japan amidst the Far Eastern chaos and her final recognition on September 15th has become the cause of apprehension on the part of the American Government which regards that such a consummation is nothing short of a flagrant violation, on the part of the Japanese Government, of the Chinese territorial integrity clause of the Nine-Power Treaty. Here, again, at this stage, the Chinese-Japanese Question assumes the dignity of becoming the American-Japanese Question, as in the case of the Shantung controversy in 1919-21. In view of the fact that in a few days the League of Nations at Geneva, acting on the Lytton Report which was made public on October 2nd., tries to match its wits on the Chinese puzzle, it is fair to predict that the position of the American Government, as advocated by Mr. Stimson, its Secretary of State, will become the bone of contention in the diplomatic world. Secretary Stimson's arguments on the case were first expounded in his lengthy letter to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, on February 24th., which were subsequently reiterated in his speeches, before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on August 9th., to the members of the Union League in Philadelphia on October 1st., and again before the Council of Methodist Church in Pittsburg on October 26th. The last speech on the subject was recently styled by the spokesman of the Foreign Office in Tokio, who had been of late blunt enough, as "the same old story" and Secretary Stimson's accusations of Japan as having "lost their sting through frequent reiteration." It will be the attempt of the present writer to examine the merits and demerits of Secretary Stimson's arguments of the Nine-Power Treaty as set forth in the Stimson-Borah note and his successive reiterations in the light of actual political relations in the Far Eastern Question.

On January 7, 1932, the American Government notified both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that "It cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, commonly known as the open door policy." Nine days later, on January 16th., Foreign Minister Yoshizawa, in his reply to the American Government stated the position of the Japanese Government on the Nine-Power Treaty: "It may be added that treaties

which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then; but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does to-day. This can not affect the binding character of the stipulations of treaties; but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist." Again, on February 21st., the Japanese Foreign Minister, in his statement published in the United States through the Associated Press, remarked on this subject: "This defect in the Washington treaty, it seems to me, is that it envisaged China not as it was but as the powers thought it ought to be. This has deprived that instrument of much of its value, to face the fact is the first requisite of statesmanship." It was heralded both in Japan and the United States that the position taken by the Japanese Government aimed to intimate the necessity of the revision of the Nine-Power Treaty. Thereupon, Secretary Stimson, after a lengthy conference with Senator Borah on the previous night wrote on February 24 a letter to the Senator on the position of the American Government as above referred to.

At the outset of his letter, Secretary Stimson states:

"This treaty, as you, of course, know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the 'open door' policy toward China. That policy, enunciated by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire."

This is the most extraordinary statement ever made by any Secretary of State of the United States, ignoring, as it does, the historical facts which resulted from actual political conditions existing at the time of Hay. Therefore, it merits an examination before proceeding to the Nine-Power Treaty. First, what Hay tried and succeeded with in his Open-Door Policy of September 6, 1899 was the American recognition of "spheres of interest" and "leases" of the powers in China (Clause I of the Hay Note) in return for the international recognition of equal treatment to the American trade in China (Clauses 2 and 3). In other words, Hay "predicated," "to borrow Secretary Stimson's own expression, as it will be seen later, Chinese territorial integrity or rather dis-integrity "upon" the freedom of American trade. Further, historical researches into Hay's communication to the British Government on December 6, 1899 will reveal that he gave the American sanction to the Chinese territorial dis-integrity not only of the past but also of the future. Secondly, in the circular note of July 3, 1900, Hay came out this time with his idea of "Chinese territorial and administrative entity." However, before the ink of his note dried, he, pressed by "the American Navy," schemed to occupy the coast of China at Samshah Inlet, north of Fuchow opposite Formosa. In order to accomplish his

designs, he first approached Viscount Aoki for the consent of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Foreign Minister lost no time to courteously but pitilessly chide Hay for his duplicity. Thus, at the elucidation of his own principles made by Aoki, Hay had to witness his scheme fall short of realization. Students of Chinese affairs should realize from their study of the official documents of that time how much Hay's fame depended on Aoki. Mr. Chih Meng, the Chinese author of the "China Speaks", recently turned out to be the foremost "glorifier" of the American policy when he said: "The Open Door is undoubtedly a monumental document of American statesmanship, next to the Declaration of Independence in its international import. It is a forerunner of the League of Nations Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact." Intoxicated with such extravagant flattery, it is rather natural that the American publicists are apt to be reluctant to face their disillusionment in reality. Nevertheless, those documents together with W. W. Rockhill's "Memorandum" of August 28, 1899, which became the basis of Hay's Open Door Policy are preserved in the archives of the State Department. Today, they are buried in dust like the forehead of an old Buddha in an ancient temple in Japan, with but few solitary homages paid by such rare scholars as Dennet and Dennis during thirty odd years of their hermitage. For the sake of the orientation of the American Oriental policy, one might be tempted to advise Colonel Stimson and Chairman Borah to take a trip upstairs one afternoon and give a little air to those venerable documents.

With these historical facts, above enumerated, how can Secretary Stimson make such an assertion as Hay's policy "brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China?" As a matter of fact, John Hay, by his international recognition policy of "spheres of interest" as well as his own designs in China, encouraged the Russian ambition in Manchuria, the aftermath of which constituted the background of the Far Eastern Question of our own time. Here, the question naturally arises: Does such an assertion on the part of Secretary Stimson betray his ignorance of the significance of Hay's work in American diplomacy, or does he vainly attempt to beguile the American public with a deliberate mis-interpretation? Did the United States shed a drop of American blood for the sake of China's open-door and territorial integrity at any time of the Far Eastern crisis, while she has always been prone to shed nothing but "crocodile tears," as Senator Hitchcock aptly remarked in his Democratic rebuttal of Republican attacks on Japan during the summer months of 1919? Whatever it may be, to the present writer, it appears that the case of the United States in the Open-Door Policy lies mainly in her "glorification," incessantly made with paper declarations, of the work of Hay, while the case of Japan was based primarily on her national sacrifices in blood and treasure in her herculean struggles with Russia, which brought the territorial integrity of China to a reality as a by-product of the Russo-Japanese War. These two divergent viewpoints held steadfastly by both the Japanese and the Americans with regard to this fundamental

question constitute the stumbling block between Japan and the United States for their intelligent approach to the solution of the Chinese Question of to-day.

From the perusal of the foregoing, it is clearly understood that the real significance of two policies of Hay—not to speak of the integrity of Hay himself—was hardly grasped by any of the American publicists for more than twenty years. In the Washington Conference, none of the American Delegates, whose Far Eastern knowledge and experience were remote compared to those of any Delegates of the other powers participating in deliberation, appeared to be an exception. Moreover, the distorted notions with regard to Hay's unhappy legacies were made the guiding spirit of the work of the Conference and the result was immediate, as shall be reviewed presently.

As Secretary Stimson quotes in his letter, the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty consists of four clauses which will be taken up in sequence:

The first clause of the first article provides:

"(I) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

The word "respect" signifies "*to consider worthy of esteem, to regard or treat with honor, deference, or the like*", to quote Webster. It is needless to add that no one can be made either morally or legally to "respect" what does not exist. In China, the untrammelled exercise of the Chinese sovereignty has been non-existent both in her internal and external affairs for many decades. That this condition is still prevalent even today is pointed out fully in the first chapter of the Lytton Report, as well as in the recent publication of the White Book by the Japanese Government. The Chinese themselves know this and no one can make them "respect" what they have not—with the natural consequence of a chronic state of endless civil wars among them. The case is the same in the field of external affairs of China—with the occasional encroachment of her sovereignty by the powers. Thus, the sheer fact that the powers had at the time of the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty (and have at present), first, right of "extra-territoriality" in China, because they did not (and do not) "consider" the Chinese "administrative integrity" "*worthy of esteem*", and, secondly, they had (and have at present) their numerous foreign "concessions" and "settlements" in seventy five "treaty ports" in China, because they did not (and do not) "regard" the Chinese "territorial integrity" "*with honor*", indicates beyond peradventure that they did not (and do not) "respect" China's "sovereignty", if not "independence". Therefore, paradoxical as it may seem, from the very outset "the Contracting Powers other than China agreed to respect" what they did not (and do not) actually "respect"! The reading of the first chapter of the Report of the Lytton Commission, together with its "suggestions to facilitate a final solution" in the tenth chapter in which it states, "A declaration by the Government of China constituting

a special administration for the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) in terms recommended by the Advisory Conference" is most significant. This signifies no less than the unequivocal admission by the Lytton Commission, which although cynically styled in a Tokio paper as having made "a journal of fortnight journey through Manchuria", of the non-existence of at least the "administrative integrity of China".

It should be mentioned in this connection that in the Washington Conference China was very reluctant to be a party to any agreement which the powers enter into among themselves either concerning China, or with regard to their status in China. Particularly, the first clause of the first article was abhorrent to the three young Chinese Delegates who had been imbued with the American political theories derived from their American education. Their reason was two-fold: first, they considered it was beneath the dignity of China to have her territorial and administrative integrity respected by other powers, thereby allowing an unsavoury admission that China could not stand on her own feet in the family of nations; secondly, they knew without mistake that the status of the powers in China ran counter to the high-resounding aim of the clause, as has been already pointed out, thereby giving an unfavourable impression that China acquiesced in the hypocrisy of the powers. Thus, for a time they refused to commit themselves to such obnoxious stipulations. However, chiefly by the ardent persuasions on the part of the American Delegation, and further because of their apprehension of being left in the cold, they finally agreed to be a party to the Nine-Power Treaty with the clause in question attached thereto. The compromise effected under these circumstances, therefore, begins the first article with the phrase: "The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree . . .". This will explain the insistent demands and nation-wide agitations for the restoration of all the prerogatives of China's sovereignty which were carried out by the Chinese since the close of the Conference in 1922.

At this juncture, a reference should be made to the presence of the Japanese forces both in Manchuria and Shanghai, which, Secretary Stimson appears to think, or, at least, is endeavouring to make it appear to the American public, constitutes the flagrant violation, on the part of the Japanese Government, of the first clause of the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty, above quoted. That such was not the case was repeatedly declared by the Japanese Government in its communications to the League of Nations, as well as to the United States. As has been already pointed out, the quasi-sovereignty of China, which the Chinese themselves did not "respect", could not make them "respect" China's international commitments to Japan, the United States and Great Britain, who fell by turns, the victims to the chaotic conditions in China since the Washington Conference. In the Conference, this was "envisaged" by most of the Delegates of the Nine-Power Treaty powers with the exception of those of China and the United States. At the open and deliberate violations of Japanese rights under the Nine-Power Treaty, as well as other treaties for ten years since the Conference, "protection of lives

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and properties of the Japanese subjects" became responsible for Japan's presence in China to-day, just as Secretary Stimson is well aware, those of American citizens brought the presence of the American Expeditionary Forces in Mexico in the summer of 1916 until they wiped out the last vestige of General Villa and his bandit-cohorts.

Even at the risk of making a digression, it should be mentioned that in all the diplomatic discussions of controversies arising between Japan and the United States the Japanese insist that the Americans should become retrospective in order to be more enlightened, particularly when the latter attempts to come to the affairs of the Far East. Therefore, it is with a mixture of sentiments that the Japanese, in their effort for elucidation, come to cite an American example as an object lesson to the Americans. "The Government of the United States expects, however," stated Secretary Kellogg, Secretary Stimson's immediate predecessor, in his communication to the Chinese Government on January 26, 1927, "that the people of China and their leaders will recognize the right of American citizens in China to protection for life and property. . . . In the event that the Chinese authorities are unable to afford such protection it is of course the fundamental duty of the United States to protect the lives and property of its citizens. It is with the possible necessity for this in view that American naval forces are now in Chinese waters." In less than two months, on March 24th. of the same year, the Nationalists' Army of China pillaged the American Consulate in Nanking and massacred one American and maltreated a few others. American naval forces in the harbour immediately went into action on the pre-arranged signals from the Consulate and bombarded the city in retaliation. There was no "Contracting Power" of the Nine-Power Treaty with the "respect" clause which raised even a finger at the United States and also Great Britain which acted in the same fashion under exigencies. As a matter of fact, their actions were nothing but another case of the time-honoured procedure of the powers in China whenever the Chinese could not "respect" the sovereignty of their own country with an unflinching consequence of lives and property of foreigners being put in jeopardy. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government with the conciliatory policy of its Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, refrained from taking a concerted action with these two powers against China, although its Consulate and nationals were subjected to unspeakable brutality and humiliation. On the other hand, it exhibited its wisdom in refraining from making any statement which might be construed as a reflection on the actions taken by the United States and Great Britain. In the present Chino-Japanese crisis, Japan's position in executing "the fundamental duty", to use Secretary Kellogg's phrase, is not a whit different from the American position four years ago. There is no denying that Japan's action is carried on a larger scale and for a longer duration which has created some apprehension in the United States. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that a tremendous amount of Japan's interests is at stake in the present case. Further, the claim of the Japanese that the question of "the

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first life-line of their national existence" is involved in this conflict can be better appreciated by the Americans when they become retrospective in world politics and reflect on the significance of their popular slogan of "Manifest Destiny" in the heyday of American "Westward Expansion" not only into the American Continent but also over the Pacific Ocean.

The argument, advanced by Secretary Stimson, of the "respect" clause of the first article is tantamount to the denial to Japan, while both the United States and Great Britain can act in China, as they did in 1927, of her sovereign right of "self-defense", which is "the first law of nations as individuals" as Senator Borah quoted the words of Theodore Woolsey in his "Report" of the State Foreign Relation Committee on the Kellogg-Briand Treaty on January 15, 1929. In other words, Secretary Stimson's view on world politics appears to be so conveniently circumvented that the United States can have a free hand for the protection of her interests both in Mexico and China on one hand, while, on the other, Japan's hand should be put in irons for the same purpose in China. This coincides with the popular notion that the Monroe Doctrine—whether it is "a shibboleth" or otherwise—can be the American doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, while it can not be the Japanese doctrine in the Asiatic Continent. It may be a capital idea for American consumption but it loses its weight the moment when Secretary Stimson attempts to convince the Japanese of its significance on the other side of the Pacific. As a matter of fact, neither with the "respect" clause of the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty nor even with the Kellogg-Briand Treaty which the present writer dealt with in a separate paper, did Japan sign away her right of "self-defense" in the exercise of which she is, as Secretary Kellogg assured her, "free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions". What Foreign Minister Yoshizawa remarked in his reply to President Boncour of the Council of the League of Nations with regard to the Article 10 of the Covenant on February 23rd., can be applied to the "respect" clause under discussion. He said: "It is a very proper provision; but it does not exclude self-defense nor does it make China a 'chartered libertine', free to attack other countries without their having any right to repel the attack". Statesmanship in Washington should recognize the position Japan is taking. It is within the bounds of propriety to make a prediction that she will not recede a step from her position even if it brings about in the end "grave consequences" in the relations between Japan and the United States or any combination of powers, because the argument of Secretary Stimson is ipso facto the denial of her national existence and her acquiescence spells disaster to what she has accomplished after great national sacrifices for the last forty years. That she does not dare to compromise on this matter has already been voiced by the various leaders of Japan. The coming decision of the League of Nations on the recent Lytton Report will furnish the occasion for Japan to demonstrate what General Muto, Supreme Military and Diplomatic Representative in Manchukuo declared on October 3rd.: "Neither

the League of Nations nor any other power can change our determination to pursue our established aim in Manchuria."

What should be mentioned in this connection is that Messrs. Stimson and Borah's chief preoccupation is centered on the possible outcome of the new state, "Manchukuo", which was, on February 25th., born under the fostering care of Japan, and recognized finally by Japan in the Protocol of September 15, 1932. This technique of world politics of setting up puppet governments under exigencies, was invariably applied by the United States in her expansion in Hawaii, the Philippines and Panama. Therefore, it is rather natural that the guilty American mind is apt to view Japan's action in Manchuria in no other light than what was gleaned from the device so effectively employed by the United States. Whether Japan will follow American foot-prints of annexation of those three territories or whether she will incorporate the new Manchurian State in the great federation of the Japanese Empire as the United States did in the case of the "Republic of Texas" or still whether she will remain forever "an honest broker" with nothing but an altruistic motive of establishing "a land of paradise" for all the people of the world, the future alone will tell. As far as the present indications go, the fact that Japan is playing the rôle of the "honest broker" can be seen from the statement of the Japanese Government on the occasion of her recognition of Manchukuo on September 15, 1932, which states: "On several occasions, the Japanese Government have declared that they harbor no territorial designs in Manchuria, and the preamble of the Protocol reaffirms that both Contracting Powers will mutually respect each other's territorial rights."

In his reply to Secretary Stimson's protest of January 7th., as quoted at the outset of this paper, former Foreign Minister Yoshizawa, on January 16 stated: "Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and organizing themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when deserted by the existing officials". Unlike the usual pleading and apologetic tone of diplomatic notes emanating from the Foreign Office in former years, as illustrated by Ambassador Hanihara's note on the immigration question on April 10, 1924, with the exception of that dangerous phrase, "grave consequences", which brought about the dramatic explosion in the Senate on April 14th.—the present writer prophesied it three days before the moment when he glanced at the fatal note in the "Evening Star" (Washington) in the afternoon of April 11th.—that of recent date is concise, direct and illuminating, if not brilliant. This reply sets at naught not only the argument of Secretary Stimson of January 7th., but also that of his subordinate, Under-Secretary of State Castle, who enunciated, on May 4th., what he termed to "glorify" the "Hoover Doctrine" of American non-recognition of territorial acquisition through violation of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty.

As far as the "Contracting Powers", including the United States, are concerned, it is not incumbent upon them to defend, under the "respect" clause, Chinese territory either legally,

for which they are not under obligation or physically, which is, as has been shown of late, a matter of impracticability, if not impossibility, without Japan's consent. Since the disintegration of Chinese territory took place in the form of independence of outlying provinces—the instance is not infrequent in China—Japan can legally exonerate herself from an attempt of accusation launched by Secretary Stimson and his American Government. Count Uchida, present Foreign Minister, made the defense of the Japanese Government on this case when he spoke before the Diet on August 25th, as follows:

"Manchukuo has come into being, as I have already remarked, as a result of all separatist movements within China herself. Consequently, the view expressed in certain quarters that the recognition by Japan of the new state, thus created, would constitute a violation of the stipulations of the Nine-Power Treaty, is in my opinion incomprehensible. The Nine-Power Treaty does not forbid all separatist movements in China, or debar the Chinese in any part of the country from setting up of their free will an independent state. Hence, should Japan extend recognition to the existing government of Manchukuo, founded by the will of the people of Manchuria, she would not thereby, as a signatory Power to the Nine-Power Treaty, violate in any way the stipulations of that Treaty."

In the meantime, the new state of "Manchukuo" appears to be one of the strongest new-states ever established under like circumstances, because Japan is resolved to identify not only her interests but also her national existence with those of her child-neighbor. This will be understood beyond any doubt by reading the second article of the Protocol of September 15, 1932, signed by General Muto, Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo and Prime Minister Chenghsio-Hsu of Manchukuo, which states:

"Japan and Manchukuo, recognizing that any threat to the territory or to the peace and order either of the High Contracting Parties constitutes at the same time a threat to the safety and existence of the other, agree to co-operate in the maintenance of their national security; it being understood that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in Manchukuo."

This new defensive alliance between Japan and Manchukuo can be applied to any offending third party, whether it be China, Russia or the United States. As for the United States, it should be recalled here, Japan receded from her position in the American Continent at the time of the California Land Law Legislation of May 19, 1913 with her tacit national determination as well as understanding that she would not allow the United States unduly to meddle in the Chinese Question, at whatever cost it might entail. After the Washington Conference where Japan compromised herself and which brought her the present crisis, it will be too much for the United States to expect Japan to recede at her

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door once more. Once, President Roosevelt remarked with his characteristic foresight and courage to comprehend the future that he did not believe in the United States "taking any position anywhere unless we can make good". "As regards Manchuria", he continued, "if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are averse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war." Thus, to-day, the question of territorial integrity is entirely left to the hands of China herself, just as the same question of British Dominion in 1776, Spanish Dominion in 1898 and Colombia in 1903, in the face of the American, the Cuban and the Panaman independence, respectively, was left to the hands of the Britishers, the Spaniards and the Colombians. In the meantime, the sympathy of the Japanese whose most conciliatory Chinese policy for ten years after the Washington Conference was rebuffed at every turn by the Chinese, goes freely to the new state, just as that of the French went to the Americans and that of the Americans to the Cubans and the Panamanians. With regard to the delay in the recognition of Manchukuo by the United States, Japan should not be too impatient. The American Nation which recognized its own illegitimate child of Panama in the brief span of ten days will naturally indulge itself in years of gossip and scandals of the other child.

Appropos to the discussion of the "respect" clause of the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty, it is a queer sight in world politics of to-day to witness the United States, posing as a self-constituted saviour of China, attempt to attack, with disingenuous pretexts derived from erroneous interpretation of treaties, in verbal bombardments, Japan and the Japanese who fought two wars and secured territorial integrity to China. In real politics, however, students of Far Eastern Question should not lose sight of the two important attitudes, American and Japanese, which will exercise no small influence in shaping future events not only in China but on the Pacific in general: first, the growing apprehension of the United States at the prospect of enhancement of Japan's prestige in world politics after she secured a firm hold on enormous natural resources in Manchuria, as was voiced by Dr. Schurman, former American diplomat in China and Germany, in his speech at the University of California on March 31st.; secondly, the realization and diffusion, among the Japanese, of the significance of the obstruction policy of the United States with which they have been confronted time and again since the close of the Russo-Japanese War. The demand for Asia's Monroe Doctrine by Japan is at once the outburst of this Japanese attitude and is no other than Japan's invocation of the cis-Pacific principle for the United States which is parallel to the cis-Atlantic principle embraced in the original Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

Next, comes the second clause of the first article:

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

Coming out from the Washington Conference, all the participating powers as well as Japan, by keeping themselves aloof

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gave China the greatest opportunity in the life of a nation for setting her house in order. The position of the Japanese Government, as exemplified by Secretary Stimson's quotation of the words of Baron Shidehara, was: "No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny". However, the Chinese mind was too repugnant to grasp its significance and China remained too sectionalized to effect "an effective and stable government" within. Chronic civil strifes waged by "Christian" and un-Christian Generals, whose ambition was more concerned about their personal gains than the welfare of their nation, let this golden opportunity of ten years slip by. Today, the actual condition is that the authority of the Nationalist Government does not extend over more than four neighbouring provinces near the capital of Nanking. Friends of China in Japan as well as in the United States will see before long that this was her capital misfortune in modern time. History will record that this was one of the greatest blunders she has ever committed in her international life.

Be whatever it may, does it occur to the astute mind of Secretary Stimson, as an interpreter of this clause, the question whether or not China has exhibited any effort on her part for the realization of its specified object of "developing and maintaining for herself an effective and stable government" during the last ten years since the close of the Washington Conference? Students of Chinese affairs will agree with the closing and sympathetic paragraph of the Secretary's letter, in which he said: "We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her (Chinese) statesmen in the development of her country and her country and its government. . . . We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development". No one has the audacity to question the necessity of the time-element for a nation-building. However, the most important question is not the time-element but the human-element for a nation-building. Does the human-element of the Chinese, exhibited in their external as well as internal affairs during the time-element of ten years from Washington to Manchuria heartens Secretary Stimson's conviction of the Chinese nation-building? Did twenty eight Delegates (including three Chinese) who penned their names to the Nine-Power Treaty desire to witness what has been taking place in China for the past ten years, as promoting "a policy designed to stabilize the conditions in the Far East", as the Preamble states? In the words of the Lytton Report (Chapter II), depicting the most recent conditions in China, "Nepotism, corruption and maladministration continue to be the unavoidable consequences of this state of affairs," but this "was not peculiar to Manchuria, as similar or even worse conditions existed in other parts of China." Unless totally blinded to what has been taking place in China for the past decade, the Secretary should be convinced of the fact that China has failed "to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government" when she has been provided "the fullest and most unembarrassed

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opportunity" by the "Contracting Powers", as stated at the beginning of the discussion of this clause.

Mr. Jerome D. Greene, student of Far Eastern Question for many years, who had an excellent opportunity of observing the Chino-Japanese problems at the theatre of conflicts in Manchuria last fall, delivered his address, "The United States and the Situation in the Far East", before the World Affairs Institute in New York on March 23, 1932. He remarked on the subject under discussion as follows:

"The second fault which I have to find with the Secretary of State is the implication of his letter to Senator Borah that just because the Nine-Power Treaty was entered into in plain view of China's chaotic condition and in order to protect her integrity by abstaining from any interference with it during her efforts towards internal order, there could be no limit to the patience and self-restraint imposed upon an aggrieved neighbor, and no limit to the amount of injury to be suffered by that neighbor without retaliation. Mr. Stimson's doctrine of indefinite patience is indefensible in principle, however open to examination may be Japan's own construction of the amount and duration of her grievances."

Japan being, as her former Foreign Minister cautioned the Council of the League of Nations in his statement of February 23, "naturally and necessarily in a far better position to appreciate the facts than any other distant power can possibly be", cannot accept the Secretary's non-limit theory under this clause. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of the Japanese Government recognizes not only China's failure in but also her incapacity for living up to the provision of the second clause of the first article. The unavoidable consequence was, as the first chapter of the Lytton Report pointed out that Japan "has suffered more than any other power from the lawless conditions described in this chapter." It is a small wonder that Japan, confronted with the situation just quoted above and convinced of her interpretation after prolonged study with rare zeal and application which characterized the Foreign Office since the unfortunate blunder committed by its Ambassador in the use of the phrase, "grave consequences", came out, on January 16th. and February 21st., boldly to point out to the Government of the United States that the application of the Nine-Power Treaty may be modified in material respects, as was quoted at the beginning of this paper.

The third clause reads as follows:

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China."

The intrinsic value of the third clause lies in its practical application to both commercial activities and industrial enterprises of the powers in China. Therefore, this should be read

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collaterally with the following and fourth clause. The pious expressions announced in this clause, and the rest of all the clauses and articles of the Nine-Power Treaty, which were reiterated by Secretary Stimson in his speeches in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh on October 1st and 26th, respectively, are nothing but those expressions embraced in the various treaties and agreements among the powers dealing with the Chinese questions since the time of John Hay. When China adopted the policy of boycott against Japan in 1930, and after (as against Great Britain in 1927) in violation of her obligation-clauses of this Treaty, as shall presently be dealt with, did the contracting parties, including the United States, raise a voice for upholding the stipulated aim of the above-clause? What kind of "their influence" did they "use"? On the contrary, there is no denying that all remained complacent at the struggles in which Japan engaged for "the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry" in China. World politics did not fail to see each contracting party adopt the policy of "fishing in the troubled sea", by extending its commercial activities in Chinese markets lost to Japan, but failed to observe even a ripple in the complacency of Secretary Stimson, not to speak of his writing an essay on the Nine-Power Treaty.

The fourth clause states:

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

On October 21, 1911, the Bethlehem Steel Corporation (American) entered into an agreement with the Chinese Government that the latter would purchase from the former "all the necessary materials for the naval vessels it might construct". It was reported also that the American corporation would build a naval base for the Chinese Government at Samsah—the very spot Hay had his wistful eyes on ten years before. This report aroused great apprehension in Japan. Hence, the sixth clause of Group 5 of the Twenty-One Demands severed to the Chinese Government, dealing with Fukien Province had, as its chief aim, the protection of Japan's position from the recurrence of American inroads on the Chinese coast across Formosa. Although this Bethlehem agreement was withheld from publication in the Conference, it was generally admitted that it contained the clauses that contradict the purport of the fourth article of the Nine-Power Treaty. However, only one year after the conclusion of the Treaty, the American Government, with Secretary Hughes, then Secretary of State, as he was when writing the Open Door Treaty in the Washington Conference, addressed to the Ministers of the Nine-Power Treaty powers in Peking a memorandum, officially endorsing it by "reserving the eventual right of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation under the contract of Oct. 21, 1911."

Further, the fact that before the Washington Conference most of the more important concessions the powers got from

China carried with them the provisions of monopoly, can be shown by another citation of an American example. On February 10, 1914, the Chinese Government granted the Standard Oil Company of New York the right to exploit certain Chinese oil fields. The American Company obtained from the Chinese Government the agreement not to allow any other foreign individual or corporation "to produce petroleum or any of its products in the said districts" for sixty years. The fourth article of the agreement provides the Chinese Government "not to give monopoly of petroleum territories to any other foreigners" and to grant "no concessions whatever for petroleum-bearing properties in China . . . to other foreigners." Again, even after the Conference the American Government not only endorsed the concession of monopoly of the pre-Washington Conference consummation, as was above cited in the case of Secretary Hughes, but also allowed the American Corporation to extract from the Chinese Government "special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states", to quote, as Secretary Stimson did, the fourth clause of the first article of the Nine-Power Treaty. As late as the spring of 1929, and in spite of the clause under discussion, the American Aviation Exploration Company obtained a monopoly of air mail enterprise in China in an agreement which provides in part: "The Chinese Company herewith grants to the American Company the exclusive right with regard to the air mail enterprise on the three trunk lines as well as on other projected lines . . . It also agrees not to grant to any company or individual the right to run parallel or competitive lines in the future". As this agreement was consummated on April 20 of the first year of the present Hoover Administration, and in view of the fact that Mr. Stimson had to travel from the Philippine Islands to become the Master of the State Department in Washington on March 28th, it appears that the first Chinese act of Secretary Stimson was no other than his "countenancing action inimical to the security of such (friendly) states". Further, on July 1, 1929, the Nationalist Government in Nanking announced the conclusion of a contract with a British company for rebuilding the Chinese Navy, together with the training of the Chinese officers in England. It was suggested that the agreement included not only "a monopolistic provision for the supply of naval materials, but also for construction of a navy yard at Samsah Inlet and a dockyard at Manee near Fuchow".

Thus, as was briefly reviewed above, the first article which Secretary Stimson quoted as an essential part of the Nine-Power Treaty contains the clauses, first, which are too pious to be put into practical application by the present state of international morality of the powers who penned this treaty in Washington, as pointed out in the discussion of clauses 1, 3 and 4, and secondly, which were nullified by China's both failure in and inability to live up to, or rather her violation of, the provisions, as shown in the discussion of clauses 2 and 3. Viewed from the retrospective of ten years, therefore, Secretary Stimson's quotation of Secretary Hughes' belief "that through this treaty the 'Open Door' in China has at last been made a fact" proved to be a dubious fact.

If there is any significance to be mentioned of the Nine-Power Treaty, it is the inclusion, for the first time, of China's obligations with regard to the Open Door Policy. The third article with two clauses, which begins with "with a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations", is the restatement of the third and the fourth clauses of the first article. The last paragraph of the third article, together with the fifth article, were inserted chiefly at the insistence of the British and the Japanese Delegates who had knowledge of actual conditions in Chinese politics and reads as follows:

"China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from government and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present treaty or not."

In 1922, the very year in which the above clause of the Nine-Power Treaty was signed, the Peking-Hankow Railway made discriminative charges against foreign goods carried on that line. The contracting powers of the Washington Conference called informally the attention of the Chinese authority to China's obligation under the Treaty without avail. Finally, on December 28, 1922, the members of the Diplomatic Corps (including the American) in Peking, after careful consultation, delegated their Dean to lodge a formal protest to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which it replied one year later, on December 22, 1923. To the bewilderment of the powers, the Chinese Government advanced a novel theory of interpretation of the fifth article by insisting that it applied solely (1) to the powers dealing with China and (2) to China in her dealing with them or their nationals, but (3) not to China in her dealing with the Chinese. In other words, China can discriminate against the foreigners in favour of the Chinese on her railways in China! Again, on April 8, 1924, the Diplomatic Corps in Peking protested to the Chinese Government which turned a deaf ear and by this time discriminative rates were extended on the Peking-Mukden and the Tientsin-Pukow Railways. Further, in 1929, the Chinese Ministry of Railways, under the leadership of Sun Soo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and a Columbia graduate, formulated the "Revised Rates" which became effective on January 1, 1930. In the "Revised Classification," "Foreign Goods" were so defined as to include goods produced in China with foreign capital or under foreign management. This is no less than a wholesale discrimination against not only foreign goods but also foreign capital and management in China. For instance, cotton cloth made in China with foreign capital or under foreign management, classed as (2), is charged five cents per picul, while the same fabric, produced with Chinese capital under Chinese management, classed as (4), is charged three cents per picul. Thereupon, on March 19, 1930, the Japanese Government called the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that the discriminative freight rates constituted a flagrant violation of the fifth article of the Nine-Power Treaty. Again, in a protest of

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June 18, 1930, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, after consultation with his colleagues, went so far as to say that such discriminatory treatment would impair the friendly relations between China and the other powers. The Chinese Government in its reply of October 21, 1930, reiterated the same arguments of December 22, 1923. Instead of abiding itself by what, two years later, Secretary Stimson extolled in his recent speech in Philadelphia on October 1, 1932, "Our historic policy of the open door, so vital to our commercial interests", the Chinese Government further extended its discrimination on the Tsingtao Tsinanfu Railway.

Therefore, a study of recent diplomatic correspondence exchanged between China and the United States on the subject should convince Secretary Stimson of the futility of the application of the principle of "open door", because of China's insistent refusal to abide by her obligation clause of the fifth article. Ironical as it may seem, this is the story of the Chinese open door, at once thanks to the leadership, and much to the discomfort, of American statesmanship. However, this is primarily due to the lack of American understanding of Chinese affairs when the Washington Conference met, as has already been pointed out elsewhere. It should be borne in mind that after the Conference the two dominant forces in the Far Eastern Question fought vis a vis for ten years which culminated in the Manchurian Incident of 1931-32. Japan's conciliatory policy in the spirit of the Washington Conference on one hand and on the other, China's new foreign policy founded on the repudiation philosophy of the Soviet Government, as Secretary Stimson, when Governor General of the Philippine Islands, observed at a closer range from Manila in the years of 1927-29. In the act of exploiting the Chinese, Russia set her base of operation not in Manchuria where the Japanese kept a constant vigilance but in Cantung, the back door of China, which became the hot bed of Dr. San Yat-Sen's revolutionary schemes. Therefore, it is not too much to say that history ordained Russia, whom the United States ostracized from the Washington Conference, to do much to undo the work of the Conference in the course of ten years.

It should also be noted in this connection that it was most unfortunate for the successful execution of the Washington Conference that the "Board of Reference for the Far Eastern Question" fell short of its realization. It was designed under "Resolution Number Three", "to provide a procedure for dealing with questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions of the third and the fifth articles of the treaty". The reason generally attributed to the hesitancy of China for establishing the "Board" soon after the Conference was that it was beneath her dignity to have such machinery for examining the execution of the Treaty. Whatever it may be, the last opportunity for the creation of the "Board" offered itself in the "Special Conference on Chinese Customs" which convened at Peking in 1926. However, it met an abortive end when, at the approach of the anti-Government forces, General Taun, Provisional Chief Executive, took to flight and with him the Chinese

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delegates disappeared one by one from the Conference. The consequence was that the "Resolution" has never been carried out to this day. Such an agency, if established and maintained, could have acted as a sort of clearing house which would have liquidated all the disputes, arising from the execution of these two articles. The necessity of establishing such an organization in adjusting China's relations with Japan as "a further safeguard" for the future is recommended to the Council of the League of Nations by the Lytton Commission in the tenth chapter of its Report. Nevertheless, viewed from the retrospective of what has already been discussed with regards to the discriminative rates of all "foreign goods" on Chinese national railways, the Chinese Government appeared from the start not to have inclined to be a defendant exposed before such a "Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid Articles may be referred for investigation and report".

For several years past, as was discussed above and as Secretary Stimson is well aware, conditions were created by the deliberate designs of the Chinese Government, under which the effectual application of "the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of" Japan became out of the question. Secretary Stimson, who became an author of interrelation of Nine-Power Treaty and Naval Treaty, very conveniently omitted China's obligation clauses in the former. Does he try to advance a new theory in the interpretation of the Treaty that the first, the third and the fifth articles are not "interrelated and interdependent"? The Preamble of the Treaty states the contracting parties "resolved to conclude a treaty", "desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity". Does he not know that the outstanding historical fact in the making of the Nine-Power Treaty was the apprehension on the part of the Japanese and the British Delegates which compelled them to exact, as was previously stated, from the Chinese Delegates China's pledge to her obligation-clauses of the treaty? Does he mean to maintain that the same treaty signifies to Japan "a covenant of self-denial" and to China, an aggressive repudiation, with impunity, of her international commitments solemnly pledged by her in the Washington Conference? Can the "equilibrium" of his interpretation of the Treaty be sustained? Whatever theory he might advance, Japan does not dare to tolerate for a moment such an inference that Japan and China, as signatories, can not face the Nine-Power Treaty "upon the basis of equality". To the simple Japanese mind, Secretary Stimson's argument is just as bewildering and amusing as to witness a white pigeon and a brown rabbit, popping out from Thurston's black box of magic.

As a mere matter of reflection, it has already been mentioned of the American attitude with regard to the first clause of Hay's Open Door Policy, which was conveniently set in abeyance. This American practice of partial interpretation of a treaty appears to be followed by Secretary Stimson in the present case

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with something of religious devotion. This method of treaty-interpretation is also, to no small degree, akin to the Chinese method of making "Unequal Treaties" out of all the existing treaties between China and the powers. Be whatever it may, from the practical standpoint of politics, it would have been a graceful act on the part of the Secretary if he had not ignored the third and the fifth articles with China's obligation clauses, as he did, in his letter to Senator Borah and the Japanese Government, two addresses, real and otherwise, although the latter had the knowledge of them long before he had ever heard of them.

At this juncture, mention should be made of the mistake, if not blunder, committed by the American Government in the present Chino-Japanese troubles. At the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria, the United States should have immediately set in operation the seventh article of the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides:

"Whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned."

Instead of taking the initiative for calling a conference after "full and frank communication", the United States remained in "watchful waiting" too long. Finally, after much hesitation, she went far away to Geneva to enter the League of Nations from its back door. By so doing, she willingly, if not deliberately, abandoned the vantage position of leadership accorded to her at the time of the Washington Conference.

Again, although, in a speech in the Lincoln Hall in Philadelphia on October 1st, Secretary Stimson declared in his defense of the policy of President Hoover: "His policy was framed with strict impartiality to the parties to the controversy and with great patience and understanding", it was highly questionable whether such was the case. The careful survey of the whole course of action taken by the American Government reveals the fact that it does not verify his assertion. The "Atlanta Constitution", which had repudiated time and again the policy of America's "meddling" in the Far Eastern affairs, had this to say on the question in its editorial dated July 13th:

"The far eastern policy of the United States government, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the far eastern division of the department of state, is to maintain 'an attitude of impartiality as between the disputant countries and to act in co-operation or concert with other powers concerned'.

"This country would have been in a much better position now had its diplomacy followed this line of action during the recent Sino-Japanese clashes in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Instead our state department busied itself in sending protests, notes, warnings and

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diplomatic communications of all kinds, addressed to the Japanese government. Far from acting in concert with the other great powers having interests in the far east, the United States sent many of its notes after Great Britain and France had flatly refused to concur in them.

"As a result of this meddling in a situation that was none of our business we have incurred the thinly concealed animosity of the Japanese government."

Furthermore, the position taken by the Government of the United States, as announced by Secretary Stimson, is not conducive to the solution of the problem. He says, "It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the cause of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved", while Mr. Yoshizawa, former Japanese Foreign Minister, is extolling: "To face the fact is the first requisite of statesmanship". Today, doesn't the advance copy of the Lytton Report—the work of the Commission for "an examination of the issues between China and Japan, which were referred to the Council (of the League of Nations), including their causes, development and status at the time of inquiry"—appear to Secretary Stimson something like the repudiation of his own policy of evading the actual facts? There is no denying that his attitude, refusing to face the actual causes which brought two nations into belligerency, together with his method of treaty-interpretation, as above mentioned, retarded the progress of practical settlement and restoration of peace in the Far East.

The discussion of the Nine-Power Treaty should not be dismissed without touching on Secretary Stimson's assertion with regard to the "interrelation" and "interdependence" of Nine-Power Treaty and Naval Treaty, which is nothing short of the height of absurdity. Any keen observer who watched these treaties in the making in Washington during the winter of 1921-22 or any serious student who, today, digs into the various documents since published by the various powers which participated in it, knows that his attempt is not far from that of a man, hitching a horse-wagon to a submarine-chaser. He writes: "The willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty". The Nine-Power Treaty was nothing but the restatement of various treaties already existing among the powers at that time. The only improvement of importance was the inclusion of China, making herself obligatory, for the first time, for its stipulations, as has been pointed out elsewhere. There was no quality attached to it to be utilized for bargaining purposes, either in or after its making. This was the reason why the Treaty, which needed little more than the labor required for its drafting, became the first fruit of the Conference. It was consummated on December 10, 1921, five days before the first session of the "Committee of Fifteen on Naval Limitation" started its initial work. With regard to the American "surrender" of

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battleship construction and fortification of Guam and the Philippines, Japan also "surrendered", leaving her outposts without fortification and abandoning further construction of battleships.

Thus, for a time, both Japan and the United States were employing "eye-for-eye" and "tooth-for-tooth" tactics. Should any "deal" have been made later, it was accomplished by interrelating and interdepending the fortifications and the battleship construction on one hand, and on the other, by predicated these two questions on the Four-Power Treaty, of December 13, which guaranteed the status quo of their insular possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, but not by predicated the Naval Treaty on the Nine-Power Treaty. There is no denying that there was a persistent rumor that China might be traded in for the benefit of the United States. "Through the Conference", as Buell remarked, "there was a danger that the powers would recognize the 'special interests' of Japan in Manchuria and elsewhere in return for her accession to the Naval Agreement". The present writer, who observed the work of the Conference at close range, failed to perceive any evidence which could justify such an apprehension—not to speak of such an inference as the United States being traded in for the benefit of China. As a matter of fact, the success of the Washington Conference itself "was predicated upon", to borrow the expression of Secretary Stimson himself, Japan's acquiescence in accepting the battleship ratio of 10-10-6, which figures were printed in the size of a horseshoe in the front pages of all newspapers in Japan, as well as in the United States, for over a month as he should be well aware. The day after the publication of his letter to Senator Borah, a Tokio dispatch quoted a Foreign Office spokesman as doubting with reason, the Secretary's integrity of understanding the significance of the Washington Conference.

Nevertheless, "one can not discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty", Secretary Stimson insisted, "without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent". Should this curious logic of interrelation theory of these two treaties, as advanced by the Secretary, have the unsavory inference for the return of competition of armaments among the powers, Japan will consider it more as an argument which augurs ill for the United States than as a "veiled threat" directed against her. It is, however, within the virtue of propriety to attempt a prophecy that the people of the United States would not tolerate the recurrence of the conditions which make null and void that part of the splendid achievement of the Conference. Further, as to the "veiled threat", if Secretary Stimson meant to intimidate Japan by the supercilious logic of his interrelation theory, he is utterly mistaken. Students of international politics still have a fresh memory today that the "threat" engineered by the American Senate on the Shantung Question, from the summer of 1919 to the fall of 1921 when the Washington Conference met, had a telling effect on Japan. It was then a zero hour for Japan's prestige in world politics for various reasons

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which do not necessitate enumeration at this time. Today, however, Japan is the last power to take a verbal bombardment for a physical one.

It should be added here that Vice-Admiral Nomura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet off Shanghai last spring, was credited to have made a casual remark in New York a few years ago to the effect that the Japanese Navy, under the existing conditions, could be compared favorably with the American Navy. The layman can not deny such a statement from this expert when he takes cognizance of the fact that every inch on the Japanese battleships is utilized for maximum efficiency of action. Moreover, under Japan's interpretation of the Naval Treaty of Washington Conference, it is the obligation as well as the privilege of every contracting party to build its naval armaments to the maximum of treaty-limit in order to maintain the ratio of the treaty. The failure to do this on the part of the United States, whatever the causes may be, makes almost nugatory both the letter and the spirit of its stipulations, thereby allowing at the same time unfair criticism against Japan in the United States. Therefore, the gesture recently made in and around the Congress for building the American fleet up to the treaty-limit with an outlay of something like \$1,000,000,000 will be welcomed not only by the American Big Navy Group but also by the well-wishers of American-Japanese relations on both sides of the Pacific.

As if to give a direct reply to the implication of the "interrelation" theory above discussed, Japan's position was voiced in no uncertain terms by no other person than General Sadao Araki, Minister of the Army, although two months after the publication of Secretary Stimson's letter. On April 22nd, the strong man of the hour in Japan delivered his speech before the Kokuhonsha Patriotic Society in Osaka, which was interpreted in the United States as "blunt warning to the powers to keep hands off Manchuria". He remarked in a proverbial Rooseveltian fashion as follows:

"It is time the Japanese made up their minds to co-operate wholeheartedly with the new regime in Manchuria for the establishment of a great civilization in the Far East. The League of Nations or Soviet Russia may attempt to frustrate our efforts, since both object to our activities in that region, but they won't be permitted to turn us from our course. It is unnecessary for us to heed what they may say about us."

More often than not, such an utterance has been attributed abroad to the hermitical minds of the militarists, but the plain truth is, more often than not, that it has been the voice of the unity of the Japanese Nation under such exigencies—the strongest asset of Japan which made her what she is today. "A certain country", the General continued, unlike himself and quite diplomatically, "is talking about applying the Nine-Power Treaty in Manchuria. Japan will resolutely oppose such an attempt". No doubt, by "a certain country", the United States is meant. This statement indicates that Japan is not in a mood to heed such a "veiled

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threat". As for the Nine-Power Treaty which General Araki referred to, it is highly questionable whether Secretary Stimson can ferret out any stipulations in it, as expounded in the foregoing, which can be applied with intelligence to the present case of Manchuria against Japan.

JAPAN'S POSITION.

Up to this point, an effort was made for the examination of Secretary Stimson's position with regard to the Nine-Power Treaty. It would not be entirely out of place to inquire briefly, in this connection, into Japan's position in her relations with China after the Washington Conference in order to have a clear view of the present Sino-Japanese controversy, which will be discussed on the Lytton Report in the Council of the League of Nations in a few days.

One day early in the fall of 1921, the present writer was told by a Japanese correspondent who was sent to Washington to cover the then approaching Conference, a little story which gives an insight into the recent policy of Japan toward China. He had an interview with Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador, in the office of the old Embassy on N Street on that day. The Ambassador, rigid minded, but extraordinarily facile in the art of writing English—it was rumored that the drafting of the Four-Power Treaty was attributed to him as much as, if not more, to both Messrs. Balfour and Hughes—was amusing himself by reading over his own article appearing in "Life" on the curtailment of ladies' skirts and that of the naval armaments, then in vogue, which he had previously penned at the request of its publisher. After a few moments, he turned from the pages of comic pictures of life and entered into serious discussion with the correspondent of the various problems affecting China before the Conference. The former said to the latter that he had spent his whole life in a diplomatic career and attained the position he then occupied. He told his friend that he had no ambition either for the superior office or for the higher honour. But, in the Conference then approaching and after, he averred that he would devote all his power and all the prestige he could command for the restoration of better relations between Japan and China. Here, he dedicated his life at the altar of the Sino-Japanese reconciliation and friendship—this was the birth of "Shidehara Gaiko" or "Shidehara Diplomacy", which was much heralded in the Far Eastern politics for several years until his fall at the close of last year after the Manchurian crisis.

In the Conference, the author of "Shidehara Diplomacy" and his colleagues of the Japanese Delegation exhibited an extremely conciliatory attitude both in the naval and Chinese questions. Whether it was prompted by the rising tide of "Liberalism" at home or by the "threat" of verbal bombardments of the Senate, or by the combination of these two, it was difficult to judge at that time. To an onlooker outside the closed chamber of the Conference, however, it was easy to perceive that it was the

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zero hour of both Japan's prestige and diplomacy. In the Chinese Question, in particular, it was apprehended at certain stages of the Conference that Japan was vomiting in Washington in 1921-22 all what she ate in Peking in 1915.

In the healthy atmosphere which was ushered into Japan with the spread of "Liberalism" throughout the country during and after the Great War, there developed a new and enlightened idea among the people, which changed their attitude towards China. The Foreign Office could not escape from the general tide of "Liberalism". It was reported at this time that a group of young officials in the service perceived the wisdom of cultivating friendly relations with China as a foundation of Japan's foreign policy. In conciliation and in co-operation, they saw the light of co-existence of Japan and China, as sister-nations of the Far East. The late Minister Saburi, whose tragic death was deeply mourned by his friends in the United States as well as at home, belonged to this group. So do the former Minister Shigematsu and the former Consul General Murai at Shanghai. Thus, after the Washington Conference, Japan faced China with the change not only of mind but of heart—so changed that the two years (April, 1927-July, 1929) of the Tanaka Cabinet, whose questionable "positive" policy towards China failed to arouse the enthusiasm of the people. It is still common knowledge of the world that the conduct of the Japanese Delegates in the various international conferences held in China as the aftermath of the Washington Conference was guided chiefly by her sincere desire for conciliation with her neighbour. This attitude of friendship and neighbourliness on the part of Japan was put forward with renewed vigour and determination when Baron Shidehara became the Master of the Gaimusho in 1924. During his incumbency as Foreign Minister, which extended over five years (The first, in the Kato-Wakatsuki Cabinets, June, 1924-April, 1927, and the second, in the Hamaguchi-Wakatsuki Cabinets, July, 1929-December, 1931), he applied the policy towards China that became known by his name.

Unfortunately, his efforts, however upright and honourable, were pitilessly rebuffed by China at every turn. It appeared in the end that the more conciliation the Japanese Government exhibited, the more arrogant the Chinese Government became. To the minds of the Chinese as well as to their Government, as was pointed out elsewhere, the "Shidehara Gaiko" was no other than an indication of the decline of Japan's prestige in world politics. Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, M. P., former Vice-President of the South Manchuria Railway and, at present, Special Ambassador to the League of Nations, who will defend the case of Japan in the present Sino-Japanese controversies before the Council which will meet in session at Geneva on the 21st of November, wrote his book, "Disturbances in the Far East" (in Japanese) a few days before the incident of the 18th of September, last year. After discussing the question of "Parallel Lines", built and being built by the Mukden Government in violation of the provisions of the Peking Treaty of December 22, 1905, and after denouncing

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in vigorous terms the "Shidehara Gaiko", he predicted that if these conditions were allowed to continue, the day would come before long when the unprecedented work of the development of Manchuria by the South Manchuria Railway would become a thing of the past. Therefore, it should be pointed out that in the Sino-Japanese relations, this marked the period of the struggles of ten years enacted in the case of the "Shidehara Gaiko" vs. the "Revolutionary Diplomacy of China".

Shidehara did not make an error when he steadfastly maintained that two and two make four. In his insistence, he produced first his own two and expected the other party to come out with his two. But, he did not realize that the second two would never come his way, unless there was a fair spirit of reciprocity from the other party. Where he erred was not in his mathematical calculation, but in his psychological valuation of the other party. Thus, after exhausting every just means and failing to do justice to his policy, Shidehara would have gladly compromised with himself, if he could make two and one make four. Inspired by the so-called high ideals of American policy towards China, which he sensed during his sojourn in the United States, particularly in his associations with Hughes and others, Shidehara returned home to put his theory into practice. Unfortunately, however, his attempt proved utter disillusionment. After all, he was another case of the "returned student", as they put it in the East.

This is not the place to enumerate what achievements Japan made in Manchuria during the last quarter of a century as a "pathfinder" and as a "civilizing agent", which became, together with the phrase "whiteman's burden", the watchwords of the Americans in the heyday of their expansion in the Philippines and elsewhere. Nor is this the place to recount the grievances Japan sustained from the aggressive policy of repudiation of all the status quo in China. Suffice it to say, however, in the whole history of world politics there has been no nation who receded from her position as many as three times after her as many victories, as Japan did in Manchuria in 1895 and 1905, and in Kiao-chow in 1915. Nor can one find any world power of today who, as an "Empire Builder", affords a safe harbour to the great hordes of immigration of over a million souls annually, as Japan does in Manchuria for the Chinese, in the face of obstruction-policy of the Chinese Government, which brought about as many as three hundred controversies between Japan and China during the last several years, which cases are still pending unsolved.

The disillusionment caused by the unanswered love of Baron Shidehara toward China, as above described, became the apprehension on the part of the Japanese Nation for its future security in one "eternal triangle" of Japan, China and Russia, not to speak of the other "triangle" of Japan, China and the United States. The Lytton Report which is severely denounced in Japan, chiefly because it disapproves the creation of the new state of Manchukuo, is, to a fair-minded critic, with that exception, on the whole, a fair piece of work executed by the Commis-

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sion under the leadership of Lord Lytton. It deals clearly and without mistake with the point in question twice in the ninth chapter. What it describes again in the second chapter is no less than the real picture of the apprehension of Japan created by the juxtaposition of the three powers in the Far East. It states: "The likelihood of an alliance between the Communist doctrines in the north and the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Kuomintang in the south made the desire to impose between the two a Manchuria which should be free from both increasingly felt in Japan. Japanese misgivings have been still further increased in the last few years by the predominant influence acquired by the U. S. S. R. in Outer Mongolia and the growth of communism in China." Amidst the national anxiety of Japan thus caused, and by the spread of the Chinese boycott, and other unhappy incidents, the case of brutal murder of Captain Nakamura and his party by the officers and men of the Third Regiment of the Reclamation Army took place in Eastern Mongolia in the middle of July, last year. The news created a great stir throughout Japan and the people realized the seriousness of the situation. The prompt and repeated protests lodged by the Japanese Government brought nothing but evasions and procrastinations from the Chinese Government. In the middle of August, Dr. Wang, Chinese Foreign Minister, made a statement to the newspaper correspondents in Nanking that the Nakamura case was a sheer machination advanced by the Japanese Army to further its own end. This accusation on the part of the Chinese Foreign Minister stirred up even the officials of the Japanese Foreign Office. It was reported in Japan at that time that a group of Japanese army officers with the rank of captaincy proposed to take a few hundred soldiers with them to Mongolia with the object of capturing the murderers of their brother officer—if necessary, after the renunciation of their nationality. The Nakamura case is as much significant as the incident of the South Manchuria Railway on the fatal night of September 18th, 1931, which Mr. K. K. Kawakami, the veteran American-Japanese publicist, alluded to "Remember the Maine". On August 28th, in anticipating Japan's recognition of the new state of Manchukuo, Count Uchida, Foreign Minister, delivered a speech before the Diet, in which he stated:

"For over twenty years Japan continued to exercise the greatest patience and moderation, in the hope that some day China might soberly undertake the task of rehabilitating her fortunes and playing her proper role in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. China failed, however, to show any sincere desire to reciprocate our good will and kindly sentiments, but increased more than ever in her arrogance and intolerance. Our Government took pains time and again to point out to China the danger she was running in trying too far the patience of the Japanese people. But China did not heed our warnings. The Incident of September 18 occurred in Manchuria, the very region regarded as the first bulwark of Japan, at the precise moment when the feeling of our people had been wrought up to the highest pitch by re-

peated provocations. We had no alternative other than to resort to measures of self-defense."

This is an honest plea for the grievances sustained by the wronged nation. This is another sad story of Japan and China. Therefore, with genuine apologies to Secretary Stimson for inserting "by China" in parenthesis, Japan as well as the present writer have a wholehearted concurrence with his sentiments couched in these words:

"We believe that this situation would have been avoided, had these covenants been faithfully observed (by China) and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them (by China) would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of these treaties and their nationals."

THE KELLOGG-BRIAND TREATY.

Among the many "protests, notes, warning and diplomatic communications of all kinds addressed to the Japanese Government" by the American Government in the Sino-Japanese crisis, the most important which has a bearing on the subject of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty is the one dated January 7, 1932. The note was written by Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State, in anticipation, first, of Japan's attempt at consolidating her position amidst the Manchurian crisis and, secondly, of the possible creation of a new state under Japan's tutelage and, thirdly, in the hope of counteracting, if feasible, such eventualities. In the last sense, therefore, the nature and significance of this note to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty is analogous to those of the American protest of May 16, 1915, to the Twenty-One Demands, lodged against the Japanese Government during the Sino-Japanese negotiations. The ultimate object of the note was not so much to check the rapid progress of events at that time as to wait for an opportune moment in the future for an examination of the conditions, thus created, as in the case of the American note of 1915 in the Washington Conference. Therefore, it is a sort of diplomatic *ballon d'essai* and as such it should be, as already has been, kept flying by the American Government on every possible occasion. Secretary Stimson has the tenacity as well as the audacity to do so, even though, to the Japanese ear, his frequent reiteration, has long become "the same old story".

The American note, in question, points out in substance as follows:

"That it (the American Government) does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States are parties."

In the United States, this note was summed up as the "American policy of non-recognition of territorial acquisition through force", in Manchuria, as if Japan annexed the territory in question. As soon as this communication was published, there appeared many American publicists who, as in the case of the enunciation of the Open Door Policy, "glorified" it as the "Hoover Doctrine" or the "Stimson Doctrine". When, on March 11, some fifty odd League of Nations nations played the fiddle for the non-member and sang in chorus: "it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which will be brought about by means contrary to the covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris," other "glorifiers" hailed it as an institution of a "new International Law". These views were reiterated by Secretary Stimson himself in his speeches in New York (August 8th.), Philadelphia (October 1st.) and Pittsburg (October 26th.). The reply of the Japanese Govern-

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ment to such wild talks was made by Mr. Yoshizawa, former Foreign Minister, in his note of January 16 in answer to the American protest of nine days before in these words:

"They (the Japanese Government) take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters . . . which might be brought about by means contrary to the treaty of August 27, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise."

Does not this terse rebuttal cause Secretary Stimson to take its insinuation "with a grain of salt"? As far as the present writer is aware, this question—so far as the Japanese Government is concerned—stands, where it stood then, today when the Council of the League of Nations begins its work to solve the Sino-Japanese controversies in Geneva on Monday, November 21, 1932.

On February 24th, again, Secretary Stimson wrote his letter on the Far Eastern Question to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. That this Stimson note, although sent from one end to the other of Pennsylvania Avenue, has the Foreign Office in Tokio as its real and ultimate destination can not be denied. The leaders in the Senate hailed this communication as such and as the document which is another restatement of American policy in China. Inasmuch as Secretary Stimson conferred with Senator Borah at considerable length on the previous night, and in view of the nature of this communication with regards to the American position in China, one might suggest that this letter is the product of co-work of its sender and its addressee.

With regards to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, Secretary Stimson states in his letter just referred to as follows:

"Regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties (Kellogg-Briand Treaty and Nine-Power Treaty), and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed, such a situation could not have arisen."

Before going any further, it is necessary to cite here the text of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, with great pomp and ceremony and hailed as a harbinger of a "New Era of the Outlawry of War" in the family of nations. It states:

Article I.

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

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Article II.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

By a casual reading of the text of the Treaty and the citation of Secretary Stimson's statements, it appears as if, in the eyes of the American Government, Japan is a flagrant violator, par excellence, of the sacred treaty solemnly pledged by all the nations of the world, since open warfare has been existent between Japan and China. However, before jumping to such a superficial conclusion, it is well to inquire into the history of negotiations between Japan and the United States, which took place before the consummation of the said Treaty. Only with historical retrospect, can one attain the true significance of the Treaty. In his communication of May 26, 1928, to Mr. MacVeagh, American Ambassador at Tokio, which is the response to the American proposal of the Treaty on April 13, Baron Tanaka, who held the portfolios of Premier and Foreign Minister, pointed out succinctly the Japanese position with regards to the American invitation to the Treaty when he stated:

"The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of agreements guaranteeing the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of Locarno."

In this note, the Foreign Minister raised and reserved, without mistake, the question of the right of "self-defense" of a sovereign state. On June 23, 1928, Secretary Kellogg made this point very clear in his reply to the Japanese Government by stating as follows:

"There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. The right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of Treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in defense."

With this assurance made by the Government of the United States on the question of "self-defense", and also with his reiteration that the understanding of the Japanese Government on the subject was "substantially the same as that entertained by the Government of the United States", Baron Tanaka made his final acceptance on July 20, 1928, when he stated that his Government was "happy to be able to give their full concurrence" to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. Thus, Japan reserved her right of "self-defense" in her notes exchanged during the negotiations with the American Government which concurred fully and freely with the views expounded by her Foreign Minister.

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On the other hand, the position of the Government of the United States on the question of "self-defense", which was stated in the Kellogg note above quoted, was again fortified by the "Report" of January 15, 1929, made by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, of which Senator Borah is Chairman. It reads:

"The committee reports the above treaty with the understanding that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same."

The position of the British Government as taken by its Foreign Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, was substantially the same as that of Japan. Its final acceptance was not made until satisfactory assurances on the right of "self-defense" were given by the American Government. As a matter of fact, this question was raised by practically all the nations when they were first approached by the United States. Furthermore, even between the two originators of the Pact of Paris, Briand and Kellogg, by whose names this Treaty is called, particularly in the United States, the question on the definition of "aggression" which is, to quote Secretary Kellogg, "the identical question (with 'self-defense') approached from the other side", became the subject of protracted discussions and thereby retarded the progress of their work for the first three months of that year.

It should be pointed out at this juncture, that the reason why the Japanese Government did not make its reservation to the Treaty on the question of "self-defense" was two-fold: first, its concurrence with the earnest desire of the American Government of avoiding such a reservation, which would jeopardize both the dignity and the intrinsic value of the Treaty; and secondly, its understanding that "the right (of 'self-defense') is inherent in every sovereign state". The American Senate which is famed for its work on "Reservations" and "Amendments" to the treaties failed on this occasion, despite the fact that the "Resolution" was presented by Senator Moses in the Senate. Its departure from the time-honored practice was also chiefly actuated by the same motives mentioned in the case of Japan, although it adopted its "Report", the least objectionable out of the four methods.

The fore-going will show beyond peradventure that Japan's (as well as America's) interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty does not exclude the exercise of her right of "self-defense", as Secretary Stimson should have realized by his careful reading of the insistence, repeatedly made by the Japanese Government to his immediate predecessor. In his careful study of the Treaty "Pact of Paris: a Gesture or Pledge?" in the "Foreign Affairs" (April, 1929), W. G. Wickersham remarked: "As construed by the British Government and by the United States, the new treaty is far from being 'an unqualified renunciation of war'." As a matter of fact,

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none of the fifteen Plenipotentiaries who assembled in Paris on August 27, 1928, and penned their names to this international document, signed away the right of their Sovereign States of "self-defense", which is "the first law of nations as of individuals", as Senator Borah quoted in his "Report" the words of Prof. Theodore Woolsey. In this world politics of today, to say that they did is just as unsophisticated as to claim that the Treaty was born without negotiations.

Baron Shidehara, after succeeding Baron Tanaka as Foreign Minister for the second time about one month before the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, steadfastly maintained his much heralded policy of reconciliation and friendship with China. However, unfortunately, he was rebuffed at every turn by the "Revolutionary Diplomacy of China", which was engineered by the leaders of the Nationalist Government at Nanking. Thus in the end, it appeared, that the more conciliation the Japanese Government exhibited, the more obstinate and arrogant the Chinese Government became. To the minds of the Chinese, the "Shidehara Gaiko" was no other than an indication of the decline of Japan's prestige in the Far East after the Washington Conference of 1921-22. With this brief introduction, what Baron Shidehara remarked in his note to Secretary Stimson should be taken as the best eulogy that anyone can with honesty bestow on his Chinese policy, as well as his defense of his policy and the position of the Japanese Government. The note dated September 24, 1931, is the statement of the Japanese Government in reply to the first American protest lodged two days before. He said in part:

"The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China and to promote the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals of China, for some years past, has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in regions of Manchuria and Mongolia in which Japan is interested in a special degree until an impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit. Amidst the atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of the South Manchurian Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight of September 18th. A crash between Japanese and Chinese then took place."

Senator Reed of Missouri, in his discussion in the Senate, defined the Kellogg-Briand Treaty as the "International Kiss". In the opinion of the present writer, the Japanese Government regards on that fateful night of last September Japan's relations with China developed beyond the confines of sentimental "gesture". Thus, Japan's action in China is based on her right of "self-

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defense" first, which she reserved during her negotiations; secondly, which she did not sign away with the signature of Count Uchida (present Foreign Minister) in Paris four years ago; and thirdly, in the exercise of which she "is free at all times and regardless of Treaty provisions", as the Father of The Treaty, Secretary Kellogg, himself assured her. Thus, the Japanese interpretation of the Treaty excludes its application to the present Chinese question. The free and untrammelled exercise of Japan's right of "self-defense" is beyond the pale of the Treaty. Therefore, Japan did not—and can not in the nature of things—violate the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. But, on the contrary, she, as a "pathfinder" and as a "civilizing agent", has been on the fair road to realization of the implied and ultimate aim of the Treaty, which is no other than international peace and stability among the nations, by her phenomenal achievements in Manchuria during the last quarter of a century. The day after the publication of the Stimson letter to Senator Borah, a Tokio despatch quoted a Foreign Office spokesman as doubting the Secretary's clearness of understanding the significance of the Treaty. Whatever disingenuous misinterpretations may be made of the Treaty, Japan's right endures, so long as she remains a Sovereign State. Upon this judgment, Japan stands before the world.

On February 23rd., Mr. Yoshizawa, former Japanese Foreign Minister, in his reply to M. Boncour, President of the Council of the League of Nations, vindicated the position of his Government. "Japan", he pointed out, "altogether repudiates the stigma which is attempted in some quarters to be attached to her, of favoring and desiring war. Her people yield to none in their detestation of war and its inevitable horrors. If efforts of the twelve powers should succeed in bringing about a pacific attitude on the part of China nowhere will more sincere delight be felt than in Japan." Again, addressing himself to the American public as well as the Government of the United States through the Associated Press on February 21st., he stated in part:

"Much less is it possible that this country (Japan) should repudiate the Briand-Kellogg Treaty for the outlawry of war. Had this treaty been duly observed there would have been no attack on the South Manchurian Railway, nor on the Japanese patrols at Shanghai."

This statement, to which the Stimson letter of three days later is a response, should be compared to that of the Secretary, quoted at the beginning of this paper. Both Japanese and American Foreign Ministers employ an identical argument of "What would have been" in the present Chino-Japanese controversy. However, the most important difference between the two has developed from the divergent view-points with regards to the question of status of belligerency existing between Japan and China. In the employment of this popular phraseology, the Japanese deals with its cause and the American with its effect. The natural consequence, therefore, is that the former insists that "We must have the facts", while the latter maintains that "It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy". As

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was pointed out the application of the Treaty to the present case is futile. However, conceding merely for the sake of argument, that its application is feasible, it can not be made with intelligence without the consideration of the cause which is the requisite of the effect. To attempt to ignore the cause in this case is just as futile as to interpret the Treaty by discarding the significance of its negotiations, as has been discussed. Mr. Yoshizawa, former Japanese Foreign Minister, in his statement, above referred to, extolled the necessity of realism in the Chinese Question, when he warned both the people and the Government of the United States with these words: "What is wanted rather is a frank recognition of the facts. . . . To face the fact is the first requisite of statesmanship."

In his discussion of the Treaty in the New Republic, March 23, 1932, Prof. Dewey had this to say: "There is nothing surprising in the fact that Japan has tried to fix the attention of the world on these matters of antecedent provocation. The fact that so many publicists have been misled into playing Japan's game only shows that the public's grasp on and belief in the Kellogg-Briand Pact is still lamentably superficial." How profound the American philosopher's grasp on and belief in the matter of the Pact and what "game" he is playing may not, of necessity, concern the Japanese mind so much as what Chief Justice Hughes, as a practical man of affairs, reminds it of. Former Secretary of State, dealing with "Latin-American Policy of the United States" before the Stafford Little Foundation at Princeton University on May 11, 1928, while his successor was busily engaged with the negotiations of the Treaty, declared as follows:

"On our part there is no disposition to forego our right to protect our nationals when their lives and property are imperilled because the sovereign power for the time being and in certain districts cannot be exercised and there is no government to afford protection. I venture to say that no President of the United States, and no Secretary of State, of any party, or of any political views, learning that the lives and property of our citizens were in immediate danger in such a case, would care to assume the personal responsibility of withholding the protection which he was in a position immediately to give. If he did, and the event accorded with the anticipation, he would be condemned throughout the land."

On August 8th, Secretary Stimson, confronted with the Manchurian crisis, made his review of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, as he believed "it will be appropriate, in the light of this three years' history, to take stock now of what the pact is, the direction in which it is developing and the part which we may hope that it eventually will play in the affairs of the world." It is not the intention of the present writer to review his speech at length here, as he did the Secretary's position on the Nine-Power Treaty. Suffice it to examine briefly, however, what he maintained on the subjects of the "world opinion" and the "sanction" of the Treaty, which are the

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most important points with regard to the present Sino-Japanese case laid before the Council of the League of Nations at present. Dealing with the first question he remarked as follows:

"When the American Government took responsibility of sending its note of January 7, last, it was a pioneer. It was appealing to a new common sentiment and to the provisions of a treaty as yet untested. Its own refusal to recognize the fruits of aggression might be of comparatively little moment to an aggressor.

But when the entire group of civilized nations took their stand besides the position of the American Government, the situation was revealed in its true sense. Moral disapproval, when it becomes the disapproval of the whole world, takes on a significance hitherto unknown in international law. For never before has international opinion been so organized and mobilized."

The eloquent and passionate plea of Secretary Stimson throughout his speech for the saneness in the conduct of the powers in their international relations, no one dares to question. Indeed, it is a typical American deliveration executed in a sublime idealism. His speech will not fail to become an inspiration for the "International Mind" of President Butler of Columbia University, who has a host of followers in Japan. Nevertheless, the hard-boiled and weather-beaten Japan, who has been exposed in the storms raised against her modest demands for "racial equality" when she faced vis a vis with the United States on the question of her emigration during the last quarter of a century, is in a better position than any other world power of today to comprehend what "the disapproval of the world" and "international opinion" are. Japan can fathom without difficulty the significance of the high idealism of Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State of the Government of the United States, which has steadfastly denied the "equal treatment" to her fellow-men within its borders on one hand and on the other has always clamoured for the "equal treatment" for its commodities in the Far Eastern Markets.

With regard to the second question of the sanction of the Treaty, Secretary Stimson expressed his opinion in the following words:

"The Briand-Kellogg pact provides for no sanction of force. It does not require any signatory to interfere with measures of force in case the pact is violated. Instead it rests upon the sanction of public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions of the world."

This opinion of Secretary Stimson was reiterated by himself in his more recent speeches made in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh on October 1st. and 26th., respectively. Again, criticizing Japan in his letter of February 24th., which was dealt with in the previous article, he pointed out the penalty of sanction when he said: "If a similar decision should be reached and a similar posi-

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tion taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action, which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation." If Secretary Stimson considers with honesty that such a form of sanction is effective for attaining his aim in world politics of today, students of politics will regard him rather as a moralist, if not a utopian, than as a diplomat. To say that such an empty sanction will save the day or to claim that the paper policy of Hay saved the Chinese territory is as much idle and futile as to say that the American Independence was achieved by merely posting "The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen States of America" on the wall on July 4, 1776, or to claim that the World War was won by the sheer publication of President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in evening papers. It is needless to add that the American Independence was the product of several years of bloody convulsion of the colonists on this side of the Atlantic, and the World War was won when the untold natural resources of the American Continent (including five millions of soldiers) was thrust on the side of the Allies. Therefore, it behooves the United States, whether the guidance of her foreign policy remains in the hands of Secretary Stimson or of a Democrat, to cut herself away from the insular and antiquated ideas of the Eighteenth Century based on the cis-Atlantic theory of the forefathers' time, and heed the frequent overtures recently made by the French Premiers, MM. Tardieu and Herriot, for the creation of international force of some sort, in order to put "teeth" into the Treaty, if she believes in the sanction and is, in earnest, for the preservation of world peace among the powers. That there will be no peace without sanction in world politics is not too much to be gainsaid. This can be seen from the recent state of affairs in the United States. The Eighteenth Amendment even with the dignity and force of the sanction of the National Government and all appurtenant to it, has been violated at every turn. Today, its enforcement is said to be almost out of the question and the "noble experiment" of four years ago is heard no more. Under these conditions, can Secretary Stimson believe that the powers without sanction are more law-abiding than the American citizens with sanction?

Before concluding his speech, Secretary Stimson referred to the attitude of the American people to the Treaty when he said: "I believe that this view of the Briand-Kellogg pact which I have discussed will become one of the great and permanent policies of our nation. It is founded upon the conceptions of law and ideals of peace which are among the most cherished faiths of the American people." As a rejoinder to the above remarks, Japan's opinion of the American attitude as well as her own attitude on the Sino-Japanese controversy in the Council at Geneva, where the discussions and considerations of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty will be resumed very shortly, were voiced by no other person than Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, M. P., Ambassador on a Special Mission to the League of Nations. Himself, a product of American educational institutions, Mr. Matsuoka, unlike most Japanese whose taciturnity has become proverbial, has both the virtue and the courage of

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being very frank in an American fashion in expressing his convictions. On November 6th., on his way to Geneva, he gave an interview to the press, in which he remarked:

"I have no intention to enter into the discussions in the League of Nations. My mission is simply to explain with sincerity the position of Japan. I am confident that the League of Nations will come to understand it. In case the League fails to change its attitude which it has maintained up to the present, it is my determination not to fail to walk out from the League. It is my conviction that the most important factor for the peace of the world today, is the reciprocal attitudes of both parties: the readiness on the part of Japan to listen to the opinion of the League of Nations on one hand and on the other the willingness on the part of the League to take with open mind what Japan says.

The attitude taken by the Japanese Government since the occurrence of the Manchurian incident can be judged by the following two points: first, the apprehension on the part of the United States that the establishment of Manchukuo is at once detrimental to American Far Eastern trade and violates the principle of the Open Door; secondly, the superficial idea of international justice held by the United States. With regard to the first point, my answer to the Americans is not to be too impatient, but calmly observe the progress of events in Manchuria. As to the second point, I venture to say that the popular conception of international justice held by the Americans—in their judgment, their own behavior is always right, but that of the others, is always wrong—is attributable primarily to their obstinacy and arrogance. I sincerely hope that they will reflect on this subject."

If the American mind is essentially single-tracked, the European mind is pre-eminently retrospective. It is very edifying to see the reaction of the latter on the Sino-Japanese crisis, particularly when the Council meets for its consideration for the second time in a few days. In his discussion of "Japan's Monroe Doctrine" in the "Pan-Europa" in the latter part of November, 1931, Dr. R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, exponent of the movement of "Pan-Europe", intimated that the Japanese Delegate to the League of Nations should have whispered, in the Council, to the ear of each Delegate with a wink in his eye—to the French Delegate, "Ruhr"; to the British, "Egypt"; to the American, "Nicaragua"; to the Italian "Corfu", and to the Polish, "Vilna". He further added that a citation of a passage from the Scripture, "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone", would have been sufficient to stop the protracted discussions in Geneva.

Apropos to this discussion, on September 24, last year, Senator Borah delivered a speech at the University of Idaho wherein he said: "Japan's action in Manchuria violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League of Nations' Covenant, the Versailles



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Treaty and every international law." The stalwart defender of American rights, who is Senator Borah, should have remembered the significance of the "Report", for which "adoption" he proceeded on his "own responsibility" in deference to the wishes of the State Department. A mild comment by W. H. Mallery, on Senator Borah's accusations of Japan, appeared in the "Foreign Affairs" (January, 1932) as follows: "Declarations of that nature coming from one in a position of high authority and setting forth views which might be considered abroad as representing American official opinion may well have been a deterring factor in leading Japan to reject formally to American participation in the League's study of the dispute". So far as the knowledge of the present writer goes, although the Senator's views have been sought with appreciation by the Japanese, since his gallant fight for China on the Shantung Question in the summer months of 1919, it is highly questionable whether his remarks can be any "factor" on the other side of the Pacific.

Before dismissing the subject, it is well to point out that most of the disputes between Japan and the United States during the last twenty-five years had their origin in the interpretation of treaties, of which the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894" was the first. It is earnestly hoped that, in the future, the approach to treaties will be made after careful study, not only of their provisions, but also of the circumstances under which they were produced.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75



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The Broader Issues
of
The Sino-Japanese Question



BY

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE

*Lately Chinese Minister to England and
Chinese Delegate to the League of Nations*

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With the Compliments of
THE CHINESE CULTURAL SOCIETY
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(An address given by Sao-Ke Alfred Sze before the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, November 10, 1932)



HAVE been greatly impressed by the extent to which, during recent years, the people of the United States have shown an increasing interest in international affairs. This, it seems to me, is a most excellent thing, and I know of no agencies better calculated to sustain and render informed this interest than the Institutes and Councils on Foreign Relations which have been established in this country. The Council which I am now addressing is certainly one of the most important of these agencies, and I am correspondingly pleased to have a place upon its programme.

The international situation upon which I shall speak is, as I hope to show, one of extreme gravity not only to the two parties immediately involved but to the United States and all the other countries of the world. I refer, of course, to the pending controversy between China and Japan.

This controversy, or, rather, congeries of controversies, assumed an acute form in September of last year by reason of the sudden military actions then taken by Japan upon the territory of China, and the continued aggravation of that situation by the additional acts of violence, and the increased areas of military occupation by Japanese troops since that time.

I feel that I am justified in assuming that an audience such as the one I am addressing is acquainted with the general phases of the development of the situation in the Far East during the last fourteen months—with the submission of the controversy to the League of Nations; with the efforts made by the Council and Assembly of the League to carry out the duties laid upon them by the Covenant of the League; with the several Resolutions which those bodies have adopted; and, finally with the appointment of the Lytton Commission, which has recently made a report, based upon investigations upon the spot, setting forth the conditions in China, and especially in Manchuria, as found by it, and presenting suggestions to the League as to the manner in which the relations between China and Japan may be placed upon a more satisfactory basis. This report, which is a unanimous one, will undoubtedly have a great persuasive force in the further deliberations of the Council and Assembly of the League which are soon to take place at Geneva. In this connection, it is appropriate that I should explain that both of the League bodies to which I have reference are now "seized" (as lawyers would say) of the whole Sino-Japanese controversy,—the Council under Articles Ten and Eleven of the Covenant of the League, and the Assembly under Article Fifteen of that instrument.



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I do not think that it will be proper for me to state my own views, definite though they are, as to what further action should be taken in the premises either by the League or by the United States. I think that I can best contribute to the programme of the Chicago Council by confining what I have to say to a review of some of the fundamental facts which lie back of the whole situation and to pointing out some of its features which render the problem which it presents one of extreme gravity, not simply to China and Japan, but also to the United States and to the other countries of the world.

For years prior to 1922, the relations between China and the other Powers had been unsatisfactory;—unsatisfactory to China by reason of the numerous treaty rights which the Powers possessed, or claimed, to exercise jurisdictional powers within China which China deemed to be in derogation of her sovereignty and of her administrative integrity;—unsatisfactory to the Powers by reason of the conflicts between their several, or individual, interests in the Far East. Especially, however, were the Western Powers, as well as China, concerned with what appeared to be the ambitions of Japan with respect to increasing her political influence in, and political control over, China.

In the Washington Conference of 1921-22 the attempt was made to place the Far Eastern situation upon a more definite and better basis. In this Conference, China did not obtain, by any means, all that she desired by way of release from the treaty limitations upon her freedom of sovereign action, but, so far as they went, the treaties then signed were calculated to improve conditions and to prepare the way for the ultimate satisfaction of China's demands. Of especial importance among the agreements then arrived at was the Nine-Power Treaty, signed by China, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Portugal, and since then adhered to by a number of other Powers.

By this important international covenant, not only was the so-called "Open Door" doctrine defined, and for the first time placed upon a formal treaty basis, but an undertaking was assumed by all the signatory Powers other than China "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

There can be no question that the necessity for such declarations as these chiefly arose from the apprehensions felt by the Western Powers as to the possible policies of Japan with reference to China—policies which had been so plainly indicated by the Twenty-One Demands which, in 1915, Japan had made upon China.

As to the general purpose and character of the Nine-Power Treaty, Lord Balfour, in his speech in the Conference, in which he summed up its general results, said:

"Here it is that the Nations have endeavored to lay deep and solid foundations of honest dealings between one another and between them-

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selves and the Chinese Empire; so that if any Nation hereafter deliberately separates itself from the collective action that we have here taken in Washington in this year of Grace it will stand condemned before the whole world."

It did not escape the attention of China or of the other Powers that, in the Conference and in the resulting Treaties and Resolutions which Japan was persuaded to sign, Japan refused to abandon, except in a very small measure, the political and jurisdictional rights in Manchuria which she claimed under the agreements which, in 1915, China had been forced to sign as the result of the Twenty-One Demands then made upon her by Japan.

These Demands, by reason of their character and of the manner in which they were made, aroused great indignation throughout the world, and Japanese statesmen themselves have never made any serious attempt to defend them upon moral grounds. Some of them have openly admitted their unethical character. We have indeed the Resolution introduced in the Japanese Parliament, in 1915, by Mr. Hara, later Premier of Japan, and supported by one hundred and thirty of the members of the Parliament, to the following effect:

"Resolved, That the negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; that they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between the two countries and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers; that they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire; and that, while far from being capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble."

The prediction with which this Resolution closed was a true one. Since that day there has been continued friction between China and Japan and now we have the situation which exists in Manchuria since September of last year.

The Treaties resulting from the Twenty-One Demands are directly involved in the present Sino-Japanese dispute since they furnish the only basis for most of the rights in Manchuria which Japan, during the past fourteen months, has claimed she has been defending. I feel, therefore, that I am justified in dwelling for a moment more upon the manner in which, and the circumstances under which, these Demands were made. I shall not ask you to accept my characterization of them, but will quote the words of Mr. E. T. Williams, who was for many years in the Foreign Service of the United States in China and was, a few years ago, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State at Washington. In the course of an address entitled "Treaty Obligations and Treaty Observance in Manchuria," delivered last April before the American Society of International Law, he said:

"As is pretty generally known now, the Twenty-One Demands, afterwards increased to twenty-four, were presented to China during the World War, when the eyes of men were turned toward Europe rather than the Far East. It was a time of peace between China and Japan,

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and the Demands were not made for the settlement of any outstanding questions, nor was any *quid pro quo* offered to China in exchange for the extremely valuable concessions that were demanded. They were presented in an unusual manner directly to the President [of China] without employing the ordinary channel of communication through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the President was warned not to disclose the demands to other Governments on the pain of serious consequences to China. . . . The demands thrust so unceremoniously upon China were in clear violation of Japan's pledges to respect the territorial integrity and administrative independence of China, and to maintain the policy of the "Open Door." In their original form they required Japan's consent before China granted to other nationals the right to construct railways or finance the construction of railways in Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, and also demanded that Japan's consent be obtained before any agreement should be made with any other Power for a loan secured upon the taxes in these two regions. They, moreover, required China to consult first with Japan if any political, financial, or military advisers or instructors should be wanted. Where there were many Japanese residing in China, Japan asked that the police be under joint administration of the two Governments. China was to be bound also to purchase a certain quantity of arms from Japan, or Japan was to be permitted to establish an arsenal in China under joint management. Many other privileges of great value and of an economic character were asked. After four months of discussion [I am still quoting from Mr. Williams], the tone of the Demands was softened, some were withdrawn, and the language of the treaties that were signed was made more diplomatic. But even in its final form the treaty relating to Manchuria was a serious encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty and administrative independence . . . and must not be forgotten that all the privileges granted were granted under duress, that no *quid pro quo* was offered, that they were extorted by a threat of war. An ultimatum was presented to China; she was allowed fifty-one hours in which to make up her mind, and two divisions of troops had already been landed, ostensibly to replace others whose time had not yet expired."

It is not to be wondered at that China, since 1915, has denied the "fundamental validity" of the agreements which she was then forced to sign; nor that the other Powers, with interests in the Far East, and especially the United States, should have been concerned with reference to them.

So disturbed was the United States that it sent an identic note to the Governments of China and Japan which has present significance in that it declared a doctrine of "non-recognition" which only recently has found broader and more emphatic statement by Secretary of State Stimson.

The identic note declared:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China

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and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or understanding which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China known as the Open Door Policy."

Secretary Stimson has recently broadened the foregoing non-recognition policy by adding the comprehensive words "situation de facto" to the words treaties or agreements, and by making the policy specifically applicable to violations of the Pact of Paris. The doctrine is, of course, made applicable to violations of the Nine-Power Treaty which was signed after the date when the original identic note was sent. In his identic note of January 7, 1932, to the Governments of China and Japan, Mr. Stimson says:

"In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Governments of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

As is no doubt known to all, the more than fifty Nations who are Members of the League of Nations, have, through a formal resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly of the League, recognized that upon them also lies the obligation to refuse to recognize the legal status or validity of situations, treaties or agreements brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris.

I have reviewed the foregoing facts since they exhibit the present situation in Manchuria in its proper perspective. They serve to show, in the first place, that the United States has for years been consistently convinced of the desirability, not simply to the United States but to all the other Powers concerned, of maintaining the sovereignty, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The United States has also shown that substantive meaning should be attached to the undertaking embodied in the Pact of Paris that all international disputes or conflicts between the Signatory Parties, of whatever nature or of whatever origin, shall be sought only by pacific means.

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I do not think that I shall be accused of making statements that lack adequate evidence to support them, if I assert that, by her acts since September of last year, Japan has not only broken her covenanted word as embodied in the Nine-Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, and the Covenant of the League of Nations, but also has had almost no regard for the assurances and undertakings which she has given to the Council and Assembly of the League in the course of their efforts to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problems presented to them by the Sino-Japanese situation. I might also add that the same may be said as to assurances which Japan has given directly to several of the greater Powers.

There will not be time for me to review the proceedings of the Council and the Assembly of the League, but I can summarize them in a few words.

On September 21, 1931, China submitted to the Council the situation in Manchuria which had been created by the acts of Japan beginning upon the night of September 18th.

On September 25th, the Japanese representative informed the Council (I quote) that "The Japanese Government has firmly pursued the object of preventing an extension of the incident and the aggravation of the situation. . . . The Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone [that is, the South Manchuria Railway area within which Japan claims a right to maintain a certain number of guards] and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting military occupation. The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feels confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude."

It was largely because the Council did, at this time, trust the sincerity of Japan that it contented itself with the Resolution of September 30th, five days later, which recorded the foregoing assurance and undertaking by Japan, together with that of China to assume responsibility for the safety of Japanese nationals and their property outside the railway zone, and called upon both parties (quoting), "to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings."

What has happened since then we all know. Instead of speedily withdrawing its troops, Japan has sent them hundreds of miles away from the scene of the original intervention, and has thus continually widened its area of operations until now it is in military occupation of all of Manchuria—an area equal in extent to the territory of France and Germany combined. It has expelled from that territory every vestige of Chinese civil authority; has brought about the establishment

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of the so-called State of Manchukuo which has declared its independence from China, has recognized that State; has entered into formal diplomatic relations with it and ratified a treaty with it according to which Manchukuo gives to Japan the unlimited right to maintain within its territories such troops and at such places as Japan may see fit. This recognition by Japan, hurriedly effected just before the report of the Lytton Commission was to be made public, was, of course, a direct affront to the League which, with the consent, indeed, at the suggestion of Japan, had appointed the Commission in order that it might make an investigation upon the spot of conditions in China generally, and in Manchuria in particular, and report its findings of fact and suggestions as a guidance for the future and final action of the League in the premises.

Thus, in result, we have a present situation in the Far East which presents the following ominous features:

Japan, for the time being, is in actual occupation and control of a vast area of the territory of China—a situation which for years all the other Powers, for weighty reasons of their own, have been endeavoring to prevent, and which they thought they had prevented when Japan was prevailed upon to join with them in signing the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922.

An anti-Japanese feeling upon the part of the Chinese has been created, which is dangerous in its intensity.

There is a conflict of interests between Japan and Russia. Should some incident lead to an open breach between the two countries, the resulting effects upon the international relations of all Europe might possibly be of the most serious character.

The efficacy of the instrumentalities which the world has laboriously built up for the peaceful settlement of international controversies—I refer especially to the League of Nations and the Paris Pact—are being subjected to a decisive test. If they fail to meet this test, the common desire of nations for security will be defeated, and, with it, all real likelihood of an international agreement for the reduction of the tremendous armaments, which, besides being themselves provocative of wars, now lay such a heavy burden of national expense upon an already financially overburdened world.

Finally, there is raised the supreme question whether solemnly and voluntarily contracted international agreements are to be regarded as of such binding force, that, when violated or threatened of violation by any Power, great or small, common steps will be taken to secure their observance. I speak of this as a supreme question because, if no real reliance can be laid upon such covenants, the very basis for confidence between States will be destroyed and all possibility of orderly and reciprocally beneficial relations between States defeated. If this happens there will be left to the political peoples of the world no choice but to view one another with suspicion and fear, and to arm themselves to the utmost of their abilities in order that, even if not themselves of aggres-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

sive minds, they may protect themselves from attacks against which they see no other way of guarding themselves.

It may be thought by some of you that, as a national of the State which is at present suffering from an armed attack, I am disposed to exaggerate the gravity to the other nations of the world of the present situation in the Far East. I shall, therefore, quote to you the publicly declared statements of publicists whose opinions cannot but carry great weight.

I think that it can be said that no writer on international affairs more clearly foresaw and predicted the outbreak of the Great War than did Mr. Wickham Steed. His opinion regarding the present precariousness of peace is, therefore, worth considering. In an article which appeared in the August issue of the "Contemporary Review" for this year, he says:

"At the moment I see only one quarter in which things appear to be moving steadily, almost inexorably towards war. This quarter is the Pacific Ocean where the conflict of policy, aspiration and interest between the United States and Japan, to say nothing of China and Russia, may have to be fought out unless Great Britain and France speedily make up their minds that it shall not be. This prospect of conflict fills me with the same kind of misgiving I felt, from the autumn of 1907 onwards, about the way things were going in Europe."

After referring to the failure of the Great Powers to take energetic measures in the face of Japan's actions in Manchuria, Mr. Steed says:

"I verily believe that the only means of averting war in the Pacific, with its incalculable repercussions throughout Asia and Europe, would be for Great Britain, France and the United States to join, even now, in making it clear to Japan that war, declared or undeclared, is no longer admissible as a means of promoting national interests, and that, unless she returns to observance of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, she will be ostracized accordingly."

Certainly there are few writers of greater repute in the field of international relations than Arnold J. Toynbee. Concluding an article that appeared in May of this year (Contemporary Review) he says:

"The issue raised by the Far Eastern crisis is tremendous. It is nothing less than a choice between salvaging the collective system or relapsing into an anarchy of competitive armaments and rival alliances which will assuredly spell the doom of 'The Great Society,'—that is, of civilization itself.

Sir Arthur Salter, who for years held high position in the Secretariat of the League, who has held high positions in the British Government, is doubtless known to many of you by his recent volume "Recovery." In an article entitled "China, Japan and the League of Nations" which appeared in March of this year, he says:

"Much more is at stake than the present issue in China and Japan, or the other issues directly involved in it. The whole collective system

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for the maintenance of peace, of which the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact are two principal pillars, has now come to the hour of fate. This is the first time that a first-class issue between two Great Powers has arisen since the post-war system has been established. If it fails now there is little ground for confidence that it will ever succeed. It is true that there are special difficulties, but there are also unusually favorable factors, which are scarcely likely to recur. . . . In this particular case America has a strong national interest in Japan being restrained, and restrained by collective action. In this instance all the interests involved in maintaining the prestige of Great Britain and the Western Powers in the East are concerned to see that Japan is not left in a position of unquestioned dominance, free to do what she will. In what other instance is it likely that those who are concerned in these interests would have so strong an inducement to support the collective action? In this case all who are concerned to maintain the British Empire, to retain our relations with the Dominions and to defend our Colonial possessions, have a similar interest. When is this likely to recur?"

There can be no question that all those who have hoped that the League of Nations would prove itself to be a strong and effective agency for the maintenance of world peace have been disappointed by its failure, during the last fourteen months, not merely to settle in a satisfactory manner the Sino-Japanese situation that was submitted to it more than a year ago, but even to prevent it from becoming progressively a more serious one. Some have sought to explain this failure by asserting that the problem with which the League has been confronted has been a peculiarly difficult one. I think that what Sir Arthur Salter points out in the paragraph I have read tends strongly to show that this has not been the case. To what Sir Arthur has said I might add the fourth fact that most cases of international controversy present such conflicting evidence as to the facts, or involve acts which do not make it clearly evident which of the parties to them have been at fault, and thus give reasonable grounds for differences of opinion, either as to the merits of the controversy or as to the applicability of specific provisions of the Covenant of the League. In the Sino-Japanese case, however, these complexities have not been present. I think that I am justified in saying that, from the very beginning, there has been a unanimous opinion upon the part of the representatives of the Powers upon the Council of the League that Japan has been grievously at fault. It is true that it has been recognized that the general situation in Manchuria that lay back of the outbreak of the September 18th of last year was a complicated and unsatisfactory one to Japan—certainly it was to China—but this international *Hinterland*, if I may so describe it, has not as yet been before the League. All that has thus far been before the League has been as to propriety of the acts of Japan since September 18th of last year, and, in the light of those acts, what shall be done to bring the controversy, in the form which it has assumed since September 18, 1931, to

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a just and, if possible, peaceful adjustment. Only when this is done can the League undertake, if requested so to do, to place the general international situation in the Far East upon a better basis. Looking, then, to the actual issue that has thus far been before the League, it is seen to be a comparatively simple and clearcut one. The only real difficulty that has confronted the League has been that it has been called upon to exert pressure upon a strong and self-willed Power.

In Justice to China I think that before I conclude what I have to say, I should emphasize the point that, from the beginning, China has cooperated with the League, and accepted and conformed her actions to the resolutions of the League, and this she has done when, in fact, she has felt that these resolutions have been by no means as strong as they should have been. Furthermore, China has, from the beginning, said that, when the situation created by the acts of Japan since September of last year is corrected, she, China, will be willing to have all pending controversies between herself and Japan settled by amicable and orderly means. Thus, on October 24, 1931, the following formal communication to the President of the Council was made by the Chinese representative:

"China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to 'a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations.' [These last seven words are taken from the Preamble of the Covenant.] The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfill all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article Thirteen of the Covenant. In pursuance of this purpose, the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded between China and the United States of America, or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between Members of the League."

China is willing to do its part in preventing the dire consequences to the world which may result if the present situation in the Far East is not wisely and courageously handled.

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An Address Given by Sao-Ke Alfred Sze Before the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of Chicago

November 10, 1932



T affords me genuine pleasure to be with you this evening and to have the opportunity of greeting you once more in person. It has been some time since I last had the pleasure of meeting the Chinese Community of Chicago. I come to you today, not only bringing to you my personal greetings, but also the greetings of the Chinese Communities of Great Britain. The Chinese of Great Britain have watched with deep interest and have greatly admired the intense concern of the Chinese Communities of America in the promotion of the welfare of China and their devotion and self-sacrifice for the just causes of our country.

When, at times, I have felt some dissatisfaction with the manner in which China has been faring, I immediately overcome this threatened discouragement by considering the fundamental respects in which undoubted progress is to be noted. Perhaps the chief of these reasons for encouragement is the steady growth of nationalism and true patriotism among the great body of the Chinese people. And nowhere has this growth been more evident than among the Chinese people, who whether as merchants, students or laborers, find themselves in various places throughout the world. Though separated for the time being from their native land, their interest in its welfare and their desire to promote that welfare to the extent of their powers has not lessened, but, upon the contrary, has tended to increase. One of the helps which I received during the trying months which I spent last fall and winter at Geneva and Paris, when presenting China's case to the Council of the League of Nations, was the large number of cables which I received from Chinese groups and organizations throughout the world. These messages came not only from large urban and commercial centers, but also from smaller and what may be termed out-of-the-way places. Indeed, I must confess that, so inadequate is my geographical knowledge, I had, in some cases, to consult an atlas in order to learn from just what point upon the globe the cables had come. These messages uniformly manifested not only the keen interest of their senders in the outcome of the contest that China was waging with Japan, but an eagerness individually to contribute, financially or otherwise, to a successful resistance by China to Japan's aggressions.

I recall vividly that ten years ago on returning home from the United States, I had a very interesting conversation with my cabin steward, a loyal son of the Province of Kwangtung, who told me that since 1915 he had made a vow that he would never land in Japanese ports and spend money there nor purchase any Japanese goods, so long as the Twenty-one Demands imposed upon China by Japan were not abrogated.

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This vow, he told me, he had faithfully kept for eight years and would continue to observe it. I found that my dining-room steward had made a similar vow and, indeed, I discovered that about 95% of the Chinese working on that steamer had made similar vows.

Since the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese on the night of September 18, 1931, I have met in England, Chinese from the West Indies, South America, etc., who volunteered to me the information that they had stopped purchasing, as well as selling, goods of Japanese origin.

That there has been this widespread growth of feeling by the Chinese throughout the world to have as little dealing as possible with the citizens of the country which is treating China in such an outrageous manner, is, of course, well known to you all, and I mention it only as an index to the spontaneous reaction of our people to any or all acts of injustice, from whatever quarter, directed against our native land.

Next week, the Lytton Report will be taken up by the Council of the League of Nations, and, later, in the special session of the Assembly of the League. The remarks of the President of the 13th Assembly of the League of Nations, recently held in Geneva, seem to indicate that the League, through the Assembly, will make certain suggestions for amicable settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy.

It is impossible to say what these proposals will be. So far as they are reasonable, we should entertain them, but so far as they may be such as do not meet China's just demand that her soil shall be freed from the presence of hostile military forces, and that Manchuria shall be restored to China's full sovereign control, these proposals must be resisted. In this resistance, if the necessity for it comes, the Chinese must act as a unity. Here there should be no disunion. Our representatives in their dealings not only with the League but with the individual Powers will have their hands greatly strengthened, if it can be made evident that the positions they assume have back of them the solid approval of the Chinese people. In addition to unity we must have a firm determination that our rights shall be respected. This will mean also patience,—a patience supported by the conviction that, if weakness and disunion be not shown, justice will prevail. The great American statesman, Henry Clay, once said that "encroachment can never be arrested by submission." We must not submit, even though it may mean, possibly, a long and painful period of resistance. I beg of you all, therefore, that you be not discouraged.

There are many who predict that, should Japan be dissatisfied with the proposals which the League makes, she will withdraw from the League if they are insisted upon. Whether or not this will prove to be true, I do not know, but this I will say, that already, by her acts, Japan has brought so much criticism upon and embarrassment to the League that the League will be well rid of her presence as a Member. Indeed, I am, perhaps, ready to go further than this, and to say that, if the League is duly regardful of its own best interests, it will declare that Japan has

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broken the Covenant, and follow this declaration with its logical consequence, as stated in the Covenant of the League itself, the expulsion of Japan from the League.

That such a policy by the League will be a well-advised one, will appear if we consider the situation in which the League will find itself, if Japan remains a Member. With Japan represented and with a vote in both the Council and Assembly of the League what confidence will any State in the world have that any of the obligations embodied in the Covenant of the League will be respected or enforced? What hope will a weaker nation have, when it appeals to the League for protection, that effective preventive or corrective pressure will be applied to the stronger and aggressive State?

Until the Japanese reform their present policies, abandon their present operations in China, make due compensation for the injuries they have done China, frankly confess their failure to live up to their obligations under international law, international treaties, and the Covenant of the League, I do not see how they can fail to be an element of weakness and disintegration within the League.

My feelings have led me to speak strongly, but my emotions are themselves strong. I believe, however, that I speak to an audience which is in full agreement with me.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 16, 1932.



Herewith some very interesting observations by Mr. Dooman on views and opinions in Great Britain with regard to Far Eastern (Manchuria) policy.



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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 14, 1932.

British Opinion with Respect to
the Far Eastern Situation.



The following discussion is intended to amplify the reports of the Embassy at London on the two extreme shades of British opinion with respect to the Far Eastern question, which have been somewhat modified during the past few weeks, particularly since the publication of the Lytton Report.

British liberal opinion is largely expressed through the press by the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (Liberal), the LONDON NEWS CHRONICLE (Liberal) and the DAILY HERALD (Labor). After the Shanghai incident and until this summer, these papers were agreed that the conflict had been allowed to reach grave proportions only because the great powers in the League had been unwilling to take a strong attitude against Japan, and that consequently no solution was possible until these powers served notice on Japan that failure to comply with the judgments of the League would lead to the use of sanctions provided by Article 16 of the Covenant.

The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN latterly has said very little about the use of economic and military sanctions and

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By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and is confining itself to advocating the view that Japan would yield to a strong and united front. The NEWS CHRONICLE, in which Sir Walter Layton, editor of the ECONOMIST, has an interest, and the HERALD, have not changed: they still favor the prosecution of a vigorous policy by the League and the application of sanctions if argument and persuasion prove ineffective. I believe, however, that the ^{former} GUARDIAN more accurately expresses the opinion of the average left-wing Englishman, who would now prefer to have the League take no action more drastic than to expel Japan from the League.

It will be remembered that during the Shanghai incident a group associated in the League of Nations Union, including Dr. Gilbert Murray, Sir Charles Addis, Sir Walter Layton, and Lord Cecil, were advocating the urgency of invoking Article 16 of the Covenant. In a recent conversation with Mr. Norman Davis, Lord Cecil indicated that he did not favor military sanctions and extreme economic sanctions, and appeared interested at that time in the view that the League, with the United States, should resort to some form of censure, such as the withdrawal of ambassadors from Tokyo or the expulsion of Japan from the League.

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- 3 -

The policies of the Conservative Party may change from time to time, but its title is as apposite and accurate as it ever was to describe those who disfavor changes and who have more faith in things which have been tested and found good than in something new and untried. Conservative opinion is also realistic, or materialistic if you prefer, and thus has no room for idealism until it is demonstrated to have capacity to yield good results.

As reported by the Embassy on various occasions, conservative opinion on the Far Eastern question is the result of a careful setting up of one group of considerations against another. These are, on the one side:

1. Doubt whether the peace machinery has been sufficiently perfected to assure that disputes involving the vital interests of nations can always be solved by pacific means.
2. Lack of confidence in the League as an organization, due to the suspicion that it is being manipulated by France to further French interests.
3. Reluctance to support the United States without an assurance that the United States would respond to British requests for support in future cases. In this relation the Shanghai incident of 1927^{*} is frequently recalled. * (When the American position of 1927 is under consideration, the British mistakes of 1925 and 1926 should always be kept in mind. See)

- 4 -

4. Disinclination to see Japanese influence in China removed, as Japan is the only power considered to be capable of resisting Russian influence. The Tories fear that the expulsion of Japan from Manchuria would open the way for the communization of China and eventually lead to the disaffection of India.

5. Anxiety whether successful removal of Japanese influence would not be followed by a Chinese attack on vested British interests.

On the other side are:

1. The fear that an imperialistic Japan would so menace the security of the British dominions in the Pacific as to impel them ^(these dominions) to take measures which would eventually lead to their disassociation from the British Empire and placing themselves under the aegis of the United States. sky

2. The fear that Japan's domination of Manchuria might be enlarged to extend over other parts of China and thus prejudice British commercial and economic interests.

3. Cooperation and concerted action with the United States on the Far Eastern situation would favorably affect not only certain questions, such as War Debts and Disarmament, outstanding between the two countries, but the entire body of their relations.

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- 5 -

I have enumerated these considerations as though they were alive only to the Conservatives. It goes without saying that those ^{arguments} which are operating on the side of adopting a positive policy with respect to the Far Eastern situation are, together with the argument that the League and the other parts of peace machinery must be maintained at all cost, the considerations which are paramount to the liberals. And, on the other hand, the liberals do not overlook what might be termed the negative considerations. The difference in the two points of view ^{lies in} ~~is~~ the degree of importance which either element attaches to the two sets of considerations. This difference arises out of the differences in the temperament of individuals, and in their response to tradition - differences which exist in every nation and are not peculiar to the British.

On March 22, Sir John Simon stated in the House of Commons that it was neither good law nor common sense to say that no part of China could secede, and that decision on the question as to whether the secession of Manchuria had been spontaneous or otherwise should be reserved until evidence has been collected by the Lytton Commission. The Commission having reported that the secession was not a spontaneous act of the people of Manchuria, the Conservatives who have attached, at least

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thus far, more importance to the reasons for a negative policy, realize that a solution along the lines suggested in Simon's statement is no longer possible.

The Conservatives at the present time are considering the question more in terms of finding a plan of settlement that will absolve Great Britain, as a member of the League, from applying the penal provisions of the Covenant, than in devising some method of forcing Japanese compliance, unlike the liberals who have anticipated the League's decisions and are concerned largely with the choice of a suitable punitive measure. The prevailing feeling is that time is all on the side of China and will eventually lead to the surrender by Japan of its intransigent position.

This view was expressed by Sir John Simon to Mr. Davis, and was emphasized to me by Sir Robert Vansittart on October 27. Sir Robert said that the Lytton Report had disclosed the share of responsibility which must be borne by China for the conflict, and that while the smaller nations would undoubtedly not attach much importance at Geneva to those features of the Report, Japan undoubtedly had much material in the Report for supporting its plea of provocation. If Japan, he continued, took the position at Geneva that it needed time to bring about changes necessary to conform with the League's



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League's principles, he thought it would be wise for the League not to suppress the relation to the dispute of such factors as the "recovery of rights" movement in China and the disorganization of that country, and to avoid setting before Japan conditions to be complied with instantly, which, he felt, would be rejected. He said that he was speaking unofficially and without knowledge of how Simon felt, but if the time should come to take some measure to coerce Japan, he thought the League should do so in the spirit of "more in sorrow than in anger".

The conclusion one reaches is that the course the British Government will follow is to shape its policy to respond to Japanese tactics at Geneva. If Japan gives reasonable evidence of desiring to conform to the principles formulated by the League, the British Government may be expected to use its influence on the side of conciliation and compromise. If, however, the attitude of Japan is that the independence of "Manchoukuo" is an accomplished fact, and that it will entertain no plan which predicates the withdrawal of recognition because the independence of Manchoukuo is an accomplished fact, I should expect to see the British Government prepared to take a position approaching that of the moderate liberals.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 16, 1932.


This memorandum, prepared by Mr. Dooman at my request, contains interesting and I think useful information with regard to persons responsible for the formulation and directing of British policy in regard to the Far East.



SKH/REK


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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 16 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



November 12, 1932.

Control of the British Policy with
Respect to the Far Eastern Situation.



The Far Eastern policy of the present British Government is actually in the hands of Mr. Baldwin, Lord Hailsham, Secretary for War, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary for India, who together with Mr. Ramsey MacDonald, Sir John Simon and Mr. J. H. Thomas, Secretary for the Dominion, form the Far Eastern Committee.

Of these, Eyres-Monsell is perhaps the least known in the United States. He is married to an American but has no contacts whatever with the various societies whose business it is to promote relations with the United States and is personally not known to anyone in the Embassy in London. He is, however, reputed to be an extreme Tory, a big navy advocate and to be the personification of reactionary ideas. Lord Hailsham will be remembered as having been the principal British delegate to the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Kyoto in 1929. He should know a great deal about the Far East but it must be remembered that he also is a Conservative, although perhaps not quite so extreme as Eyres-Monsell. These two, together with Mr. Baldwin and Samuel Hoare, who has been included in the Committee not

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only because of the possible effects of the Sino-Japanese dispute upon the British position in India but because he also is a Conservative, are believed to be the final authority in this matter. It is doubtful whether the others are able to effect any fundamental change in the policy which may be laid down by the Conservative element, although it must be obvious that they would have a voice in giving final shape to this policy from their respective personal viewpoints and from the circumstances with which each is best acquainted. Early this year, for example, when Mr. Stimson was endeavoring to reach a common point of view with the British Government through Sir John Simon, the Far Eastern Committee apparently did not consult Mr. MacDonald who was then in Scotland recuperating from an illness, as Mr. MacDonald later told Mr. Atherton that if he had known all the circumstances he would have given Mr. Stimson all the support he could command.

The following rather free characterizations of members of the Foreign Office who are dealing with the Far Eastern situation may be of interest.

Sir John Simon's controlling ambition is to become Prime Minister, which is of course a fairly large order for one who is still a Liberal in name at least. He proposes, as I see it, to reach this end by being the great conciliator, a role which permits him to employ to advantage his temperament and his unquestionable talents in this direction, and to gain at the same time the approval of the Tory back-benchers.

His

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His note on the German claim to equality in arms is an admirable exposure of his personal strategy. It pronounces sympathy for the claims of Germany and simultaneously marshals all the arguments of law to condemn this claim. It is thus a recommendation for conciliation between France and Germany and at the same time an effort to meet the Conservative opposition to relaxing control over Germany's armament. There has been of late some modification in the attitude of the Tories towards the Manchurian question, but it is still definitely short of the Liberal viewpoint; and I can not think that Sir John will take a position which incorporates the vigorous Liberal viewpoint so long as it would compel him to hazard his political future.

Sir Robert Van Sittart, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, is an intellectual exquisite. Those who knew him some years ago, when he was married to an American to whom he was greatly devoted, describe him as having been a man of very warm personality with a great capacity for friendship. They say that his wife's death in tragic circumstances completely changed his temperament: today his warmth is not conspicuous and one is impressed chiefly by his brilliance and cynicism. He follows Lord Tyrell as the spear-head of the francophil movement in the Foreign Office, and I believe that he approaches every important question from the direction of Anglo-French relationship. He does not give me the impression of being particularly interested

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interested in the Far Eastern situation in itself.

I have never seen Sir John Pratt who is, I believe, described as an adviser in the Far Eastern Department. And so far as I can recall Mr. Atherton has seen him only once since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese dispute, and that was on October 26 when Mr. Norman Davis conferred with Sir John Simon. Sir John Pratt was formerly in the British consular service in China, his last post being at Ningpo. He is not accessible and his opinions are not quoted by members of the Foreign Office, but it is believed by the Embassy that Sir John Pratt is the brains of the Foreign Office in matters relating to the Far East and that the Foreign Secretary leans very heavily on him for advice in matters of policy which do not involve British interests in other parts of the world.

Sir Victor Wellesley, the Assistant Secretary in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, is not impressive. He is heavy, physically and mentally. He is verbose, but after an interview one is never quite certain of what he said or meant. He is a member of a prominent Conservative family, and I should say that he, with Sir John Pratt, is the principal influence in the Foreign Office on the side of caution and of a negative policy.

Mr. Orde, Chief of the Far Eastern Department, has never been in the Far East. I am not quite certain how much voice he has in matters of policy. He once asked me what

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Foreign Secretary had said to Senator Reed on the occasion of the latter's visit when in London last September and whether he had indicated what his policy was, adding with a laugh "I am sure I don't know what it is". He impresses one, however, as having great ability and being quite straightforward. The Embassy in London relies very much on Orde as he does not talk except when he can talk with authority and to some purpose.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, November 8, 1932.


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English and Japanese Texts of Shanghai
Agreement.



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:



In compliance with the Department's instruction
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No. 900 of October 8, 1932, I have the honor to trans-

1/ mit herewith the signed original English copy of the
Agreement for the cessation of hostilities which was
signed in Shanghai on May 5, 1932, and which I signed
as a witness.

An authenticated copy of this document is being
retained in the files of this Legation.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

- 1: Signed original
English copy of
Agreement.

800.
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JAN 24 1933

ATTEND

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 24 1933

No. 982

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.



Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your No. 1812
 of November 8, 1932, transmitting the signed original
 English copy of the agreement for the cessation of
 hostilities, which was signed in Shanghai on May 5,
 1932, and which you signed as a witness.

The English signed original transmitted has been
 deposited in the archives of the Department of State.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARTICLE I.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932.

The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

ARTICLE II.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III.

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

ARTICLE IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex III to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V.


The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen hundred and thirty two.



Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.



Lieutenant-General.



Lieutenant-General.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

K. Ugeda

Lieutenant-General.

M. Tsurumaru

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary.

S. Shimada

Rear-Admiral.

K. Tashiro

Major-General.

In the presence of:

Hugh W. Rampton

H.B.M. Minister in China.

William T. Russell

American Minister in China.

Uuden

Ministre de France en Chine.

Valerio Polidoro

Chargé d'Affaires for Italy in China.

Representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the
negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly
of the League of Nations of March 4th, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

Reference the attached Postal Map of the Shanghai District scale 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow creek due south of Anting village north along the west bank of a creek immediately east of Anting village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north across a creek to a point four kilometres east of Shatow, and thence north-west up to and including Hu-pei-k'ou on the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Annex II.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked A., B., C. and D. They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Area 1 is shown on Map "A". It is agreed (i) that this area excludes Woosung Village; (ii) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on Map "B". It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the Northeast of the International race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on Map "C". It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village Ts'ao Chia Chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on Map "D". It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


Annex III.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely one civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorised to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



November 28, 1932.

FE

Dr. Hornbeck:

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I have not, so far as I recollect, decided to take the risk of leaving the solution of the Manchurian problem to the Great Powers in the League. I have only taken the position that parliamentary action on the Lytton Report by the League of Nations is a matter for that organization alone without the intrusion of outsiders. If out of that matter there should grow the suggestion of some further action by way of conciliation or otherwise of the trouble now existing in Manchuria, I see no reason why this Government should not take part in it if the matter was open to the action of any outside nation. I have already today taken this position answer to a question in the press conference.

H.L.S.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. Castle:

Herewith a thoughtful memorandum by Mr. Dooman pointing out risks that are run by leaving it to the Great Powers in the League, without guidance or suggestion from us, to formulate a course of action to be followed by the League in dealing with the Manchuria problem.

We have, of course, decided to take this risk. But it is worth our while to envisage clearly the character and possibilities of the risk as such.

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Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 23 1933
DIVISION OF
November 15, 1932
MANCHURIA SITUATION

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 23 1933
Department of State

Desirability of American participation
in plan of settlement.

8/14: You asked me to give my reasons for agreeing with
Mr. Norman Davis in the view that this Government should
participate in the formulation of the final settlement of
the Sino-Japanese conflict. This memorandum is intended
to bear only on the question raised by Mr. Davis, which
rises out of the assumption that the League will formu-
late a plan of settlement. It does not relate to the
desirability or undesirability of the League so doing.

1. Mr. Davis had arrived at this conclusion,
because he felt, after conversations with Sir John Simon
and others in England and presumably in France, that if
the Great Powers in the League were left to draft a
settlement, they would devise some formula which would
not harmonize with the principles advocated by the United
States in collaboration with the League.

2. As set forth in the memorandum submitted to you
on British opinion with respect to this question, it is
my belief that the British Government, particularly if
supported by France, will not abandon its efforts towards
conciliation

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MAY 23 1933

- 2 -



conciliation and compromise unless the attitude of Japan be such as to preclude any possibility of observing, even in respect of their form, the principles conditional to settlement. There exists in these circumstances (assuming always, of course, that this belief as to the attitude of the British Government is correct) a large measure of risk that the League may prefer to sponsor a settlement that would do no more than conserve the form of principles, rather than face the consequences of insisting upon the conservation of their substance.

3. The question as to whether or not it would be expedient to overlook any violation of the substance of the principles is obviously one which is beyond the scope of this discussion. If the decision is in the affirmative, Mr. Davis' concern may perhaps be unnecessary; but if the decision is to maintain the integrity of the principles, it would seem wise to guard against the possibility of the United States having to choose between a settlement that is unsatisfactory, and taking a position apart from the League. While realizing that the adoption by the League of the first eight, or perhaps nine, chapters of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry does not entail the adoption of

- 3 -



of the plan of settlement suggested in the last chapter, it is reasonable to assume that the possibilities of this suggestion, which bears the distinction of having been prepared by the Commission, will be explored before any other.

4. There can be no quarrel with the Commission's suggestion that the disputants should proceed to the negotiation of basic treaties and to the definition of the organic structure of an autonomous Manchuria. Without emphasizing the doubt which must arise as to the practicability of cooperation between the "substantial" number of Japanese advisers and other foreign advisers, I have no conviction that the substitution for the present régime of a régime of Japanese advisers would succeed in effecting the relinquishment by Japan of its possession of the real power. The probabilities are that the greater part of the authority, with the exception of the Customs, Post, and Salt Administrations, would remain in the hands of those now in power; and in view of the manner in which the League has dealt with this conflict, I think it would be a fair conjecture that the League, having brought about a settlement, would hesitate to reopen the dispute on a complaint - if and when made -

by

- 4 -

by non-Japanese advisers that the authority remained with the Japanese.



5. It is true that the Commission would have the League reaffirm China's sovereignty over Manchuria. But territorial integrity means nothing if it does not carry with it the unrestricted right of administration by the sovereign. China certainly should be permitted, without prejudice to its sovereign rights, to delegate the administration of Manchuria to foreigners, including Japanese; but what the Commission suggests is in effect the delegation of authority to those who have already seized it (i.e. to the Japanese).

6. The position in which the League would be placed in the event of the rejection by Japan of any plan of settlement which may be put forward should be anticipated. If Japan refuses to entertain any plan of settlement which presupposes the withdrawal by Japan of its recognition of "Manchoukuo", the contingency of a "break" between Japan and the League must be considered. In these circumstances would it not be preferable that the "break" should occur over a plan which conserves the principles involved rather than over one which is so palpably a compromise with the principles as to beguile neither China nor Japan?

KKO
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For consideration
Sgt


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PEIPING VIA NR



FROM Dated December 9, 1932.

Recd 2:55 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 9- 1932
Department of State

1300, December 9, 10 a.m.

Reuter reports from Tokyo eighth:

"Press despatch indicates possibility of operation in Jehol Province. Japanese garrisons Shanghai-kup and Suichung are reported to have inflicted heavy casualties on Chinese. Volunteer contingents are reported to be massing at other points of Jehol border well equipped with machine guns and anti-aircraft guns.

Chinese engineers are reported to be building military roads at strategic points. Volunteers whom the Japanese allege are acting under orders of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang are seemingly preparing for a prolonged conflict. They are reported to be determined to prevent materialization of Japanese plan to join Jehol to Manchukuo. According to messages received here from Shanghai-kup Japanese aircraft on December 7th twice bombed village of Changanpao. Port of Shanghai-kup supposed to be headquarters of volunteer inflicting heavy damage."

FOR THE MINISTER

JS CIB

ENGERT

F/HS

793.94/5626

793.94


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

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O.N.I. AND I.A.D.

MET




PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1932

Rec'd 5:45 a.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1311, December 10, 10 a. m.

Reuter report from Tokyo, ninth.

"Minister of War, General Araki, in an interview with Reuter today declared that serious developments in Province of Jehol and at town of Shanhaikwan are most unlikely (repeat unlikely).

General said that it would be temporarily necessary to guard western section of Chinese Eastern Railway but this would not require reinforcements from home. Araki added he hoped he would soon be able to replace these troops guarding the Chinese Eastern Railway with Manchukuo troops".

For the Minister,

CIB-WSB

ENGERT

DEC 13 1932

FTCARD

F/G 793.94/5627

793.94
note
861.77 C.E.

FEE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

mam

GRAY

FROM

TIENTSIN

Dated December 10, 1932

Rec'd 3:45 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

December 10, noon

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation

"December 10, 11 am. At 10 o'clock Thursday night

a Japanese armored train was fired upon, allegedly by Chinese troops or volunteers, at or near Shanhaikuan whereupon fire was returned from train which proceeded two miles this side of Shanhaikuan and shot up railway water tank after which train returned to Shanhaikuan station. Train still at station at eight o'clock this morning. Shanhaikuan quiet yesterday and last night. Understood efforts are being made at Shanhaikuan to settle incident by negotiations between Japanese and Chinese Commanders. Reported that shells variously reported from 3 to 30 in number were fired at Shanhaikuan by armored train. Also reported that Japanese demanded that Chinese Commander sign statement, that Chinese Commander declined to sign statement.

Repeated to Department".

CSB OX

LOCKHART



F/HS

793.94/5628

FILED

DEC 19 1932

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
mam

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING

Dated December 10, 1932

Rec'd 3:30 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

1315, December 10, noon

Legation's 1309, December 9, 10 am, 75626

Reliable information regarding incident at Shanhaikwan difficult to obtain. It appears that Japanese armored train and two passenger trains with Manchukuo troops arrived at Shanhaikwan during the night December 8th and 9th. Chinese claim armored train opened fire without provocation destroying water tower and several native huts in the town. Japanese claim the Chinese opened fire when armored train approached water tank to obtain water as it had repeatedly done before.

Apparently armored train is still at Shanhaikwan and it is reported that Japanese have broken into customs house there and destroyed records.

I have requested Fifteenth Infantry at Tientsin to endeavor to obtain report from its post at Chinwangtao.

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister.

OX

ENGERT

F/H/S

793.94/5629

DEC 19 1932

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/51 FOR Despatch # 8524.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED November 11, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

793.94/5630

REGARDING: Improvement in local Sino-Japanese situation
and the absence of local incidents causing
friction continued during the past month.
The newly appointed Japanese Minister to
China stated that in his opinion relations
between China and Japan were steadily im-
proving.

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-



SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:

793.94
The improvement in the local Sino-Japanese situation and the absence of local incidents causing friction, which were noted in this office's political report for September, continued during the past month. Mr. Ariyoshi, the newly appointed Japanese Minister to China, visited Peiping and in a press interview there is reported to have stated that in his opinion relations between China and Japan were steadily improving and that he foresaw no cause which was likely to deflect the present trend, as the interests of both countries were best served by peaceful conditions. He said that this applied also to Manchukuo, where the government has enough problems to keep it busy. Mr. Ariyoshi is also reported to have stated that he considered it most unlikely that any action would be taken at present to make Jehol a part of the new state of Manchukuo, and that boycott conditions had improved and he thought the general outlook was more promising than it had been for some time.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/612 FOR Tel. # 352, 11 am.

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED Dec. 7, 1932.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***



REGARDING: Representatives of the Irish Free State,
Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Norway spoke
on the Sino-Japanese conflict during
meeting of the Assembly yesterday.

hs

793.94/5631

5631

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GRAY

Geneva

Dated December 7, 1932

Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



352, December 7, 11 a. m.

During the meeting of the Assembly yesterday afternoon the representatives of the Irish Free State (Connolly), Czechoslovakia (Benes), Sweden (Unden) and Norway (Lange) spoke on the Sino-Japanese conflict. Although stating the problem in different terms and with varying degrees of emphasis they were practically unanimous in firmly laying down the following considerations:

(1) - The present dispute is of vital import to the future usefulness and even existence of the League of Nations.

(2) - The members of the League should take a courageous stand on League principles and insist on a settlement in harmony with the terms of the Covenant.

(3) - Every effort should be made to seek through conciliation a solution equitable to all interests concerned terminating the present conflict and removing as far as possible the causes of future antagonisms.

(4) -

1612

MET



2-#352 from Geneva, Dec. 7, 11 a. m.

(4) - The Assembly should definitely adopt the Lytton Report and seek a solution on the basis of the conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.

(5) - Japanese action in setting up the Manchukuo state was an infringement of the Covenant and other international obligations.

(6) - The members of the League should refuse to recognize Manchukuo.

(7) - The facts in the case show that Japanese operations in Manchuria and Shanghai could not be considered as legitimate self-defense.

(8) - Whatever provocation China might have afforded through propaganda and boycott the principle must be maintained that no member of the League has the right to be the judge in its own cause and resort to force. The plea of the Japanese representative that national sentiment in Japan did not permit external intervention in the question could not be accepted as valid, and the acceptance of such a precedent would undermine the whole structure of the League.

In addition to the foregoing, Unden expressed the view that since negotiations are continuing under military pressure in Manchuria, the Assembly must lay down definite

limits

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET



3-#352 from Geneva, Dec. 7, 11 a. m.

limits outside of which a settlement of the dispute could not be sought.

Lange briefly put the question as to whether "certain non-member States" interested in the conflict should not be asked to participate in the Assembly's efforts towards conciliation.

WSB-CSB

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 3/1717 Confidential File FOR Letter

FROM General Disarmament Davis in Italy () DATED Nov. 8, 1932
TO Conference, AMDEL NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Conversations with Mussolini and officials of Italian Foreign Office. *5632*

Discussion of Manchurian question and League's action .

ja

793.94/5632

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/665 FOR Tel.#1293-9 pm.

FROM China (Engert) DATED Dec.5,1932.
TO--- NAME 1-1127 ***



5633

REGARDING:

Japanese program in Manchuria: Informant claims to have learned that Tokyo's instructions to Chang are to carry out this program which will result in Puyi being installed at the Mukden Palace, if possible about January 1st., as Emperor Hsuan Tung of a Manchu Mongol Empire. Newly organized Menmeng Hsien Hui will assist in carrying out this program.

fpg

793.94/5633

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Chafco/67 FOR Despatch # - to Legation.

FROM Chafco (Webber) DATED November 1, 1938.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***



REGARDING: Current reports among the Chinese of Chafco
that Han Fu Chu has secret relations with
the Japanese.

hs

793.94/5634

- 3 -

(Laiyang is a walled city with a population of 30-40,000. It is located in the center of the fruit growing industry and is by motor road about 80 miles from Chafco.)

Japanese Relations with Han:

793.94
There are still persistent reports current among the Chinese of this city that Han Fu Chu has secret relations with the Japanese. Whether this is propaganda that is being spread from outside sources by the Kuomintang (which is reported to be hostile to Han) I am unable to state, nor have I been able to learn whether these reports are true or not. I merely report them on account of their being items of local political interest. It is obvious here that the relations between Han Fu Chu's representatives in Chafco and the Japanese are far more close and considerably more friendly than were those of Liu Chen Hien or any other of the militarists in control of this port during the past five years. In this connection, it is also noteworthy that Mr. W. Hunter (British), Deputy Commissioner of Customs at Lungkow, who visited Chafco on October 15th, informed me that Han's representatives there have had frequent conferences on board the Japanese naval vessels in the latter mentioned port.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tientsin/53 FOR Desp.#213

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Nov.2,1932
--TO-- NAME 1-1127 ...

#277 to Legation

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese Relations: Statements of Mr.Ari-
yoshi,new Japanese Minister,in connection with --
Comments on status of Sino-Japanese relations at
the present time.

frg

793.94/5635

JB35

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75

7813.94
Sino-Japanese Relations. The visit of the new Japanese Minister, Mr. Ariyoshi, to Peiping was of some interest and his views as reported in a Reuter telegram of October 19 and published here were read with much interest, especially that part in which Mr. Ariyoshi spoke in a rather conciliatory vein on Sino-Japanese relations. Although the reports concerning the restoration of a monarchical form of Government in North China emanated from Japanese sources, he deprecated any such reports and branded them as fanciful. Mr. Ariyoshi also spoke with some optimism concerning the boycott outlook and this note of optimism would seem to be warranted by the gradual improvement in the



-6-

the boycott situation in North China. The consensus of opinion hereabouts is that the boycott movement has lost so much of its force that it is no longer an important factor at Tientsin, notwithstanding intermittent activities on the part of the Iron and Blood Corps and other so-called patriotic societies. It is worthy of note that there were no bomb throwing incidents indulged in at Tientsin in the course of the month by any person or persons bent on the suppression of trade in Japanese goods and there was but little anti-Japanese propaganda. Japanese news releases on the other hand contained an unusually large amount of information in the course of the month on civil wars in China, notably those in Shantung and Szechuan. An alleged turning of Chiang Kai-shek towards Fascism through the medium of a "Blue Cloth" society and an attempt to influence public opinion on the Lytton Report were outstanding examples of Japanese propaganda seemingly designed to sustain Japan's cause in Europe and America. As an example of such propaganda, the NIPPON DEMPO (Japanese) on October 9, issued a statement under a Tokyo date line (October 8) purporting to give an interview with Mr. Frederick Moore, the well known Far Eastern correspondent of the American Newspaper Alliance which interview reads as follows:

"I think it is outrageous for the League Enquiry Commission to declare that Manchukuo was founded according to the instigation of Japan, as it is apparent that there were many who were rejoiced at the deprival of influence of Chang Hsueh-liang after the Manchurian incident.

I personally saw the energetic efforts of the Manchukuo Government, consequently I don't think

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

-10-

that Manchowkuo was founded merely by the Japanese assistance.

Japan could not expect sufficient compensation for her sacrifice. It is reasonable that Japan recognized Manchowkuo.

It is a futile argument for Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, to worry when all other first class American statesmen are not raising any opposition. Let all Far Eastern issues be entrusted to Japan. It is a dream of an idiot to anticipate an America-Japanese war."

Among other reports circulated by Japanese news agencies which were calculated to create misapprehension was one that Chang Hsueh-liang was receiving large quantities of ammunition from the United States and that he planned to establish a huge arsenal at Tungchow and to improve the flying field at Chinkun. Considerable space was devoted to reports that supplies, ammunition and foodstuffs were being sent by Chang to the so-called volunteers in Manchuria. Chang was repeatedly charged with being the real instigator of the unrest in that region.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 842.00 P.R./43 FOR desp. #1123

FROM Canada (Bohbricht) DATED Dec. 2, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Far Eastern Situation.

Summary of remarks of members of the
certain members of the House of Commons,
discussing the above matter.

fo

793.94/5636

On November 18th, Mr. J. S. Woodsworth, Labor member for Winnipeg North Centre, asked the following question of the Prime Minister:

"What, if any, is the policy of His Majesty's Government in Canada in regard to the situation in the Far East and to the Lytton report?"

Mr. Bennett replied that he did not think it desirable at this time to enter into a discussion of the question and, to support his view, quoted a statement of Sir John Simon's to the effect that no good purpose would be served by individual preliminary declarations. With respect to the Government's attitude toward the Lytton report he said:

"If I were to answer the question as to what is the policy of the government with respect to the Lytton report I would be anticipating what will be the attitude of the government after the assembly meets to consider it and gives this important question careful consideration. And as Sir John Simon pointed out, preliminary declarations prior to discussion, or prior to opportunity being afforded to listen to what is being said by others, if carried to its logical end would of course render the meeting of the assembly wholly unnecessary, because every member would then be confronted with a prior declaration--and the whole purpose of the gathering is to afford opportunities for discussion, for conference, for understanding in order that some way out may be found that will result in a permanent peace in that territory."

The Prime Minister also expressed his approval of Sir John Simon's statement that Great Britain would act not only side by side with other members of the League of Nations, but in the closest cooperation and good faith with the United States. He concluded:

"Were I to declare today an attitude which is in my mind with respect to some of these matters, it might not only become embarrassing, but might render the influence of this Dominion absolutely useless so far as the problem itself is concerned,

120

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

for my antecedent judgment would be upon facts which might be varied by reason of concessions made between powers, or by a new attitude being taken with respect to them."

The Prime Minister's attitude was warmly supported by the Conservative Montreal STAR which commented on his statement in these words:

"This Manchurian question is one on which Canada of all countries should not commit itself prematurely. It is a question in which we are concerned far more nearly than are most of the nations that will ultimately have to cast a vote in Geneva.

"Canada is interested because it is closely associated with two of the three Great Powers which are profoundly concerned in finding the right formula for the solution of the Manchurian problem. These three Powers are Great Britain, the United States and Russia. It would be silly to maintain that their interests in the affair are identical. British and American diplomats are striving hard to present to the world at least a plausible appearance of harmony over the situation; but every student of the problem knows that the British are much more sympathetic toward the Japanese contention than are the Americans. The Americans fear the expansion of Japan; the British ask chiefly that Eastern Asia be kept in some sort of order which will permit of and protect trade.

"It would be very foolish for our Parliament to go on record until it must. It would be criminally dangerous to do so until it has before it, not only all the facts, but the conclusions drawn from those facts by the experts of the British and American Governments. We should be the last, not the first, to speak. We have much at stake and practically no responsibility. As Mr. Bennett pointed out, Canada is a member neither of the League Council nor of the special Committee of Nineteen appointed to deal with this problem. It is no time for the Canadian Parliament to plunge in where the British Parliament hesitates to venture, on the advice of the British Foreign Minister."

On November 12th, Mr. I. M. Tokugawa, Japanese Minister to Canada, returned from a visit to the United States and in an interview with press reporters at Montreal gave a brief statement in regard to the far eastern situation. After outlining the Japanese position in Manchuria, Mr. Tokugawa is quoted as saying:

"Some capital has been made in the press of the world about the great advantages Japan must

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chasler NARS, Date 12-18-75

reap from its investments in Manchuria. It is said that any development must be of inestimable advantage to my country. That may be a partial truth, but it should be remembered that Manchuria will be competitors of ours. A cotton mill, for example, established in the new country would have the advantage of cheaper labor and materials and so would at once make its presence felt in Japan. So it looks as if Manchuria is not such an unmixed blessing.

"Again there is the matter of the Open Door policy, Japan is committed to respect this. We are already beginning to hear of the intention of Manchuria to buy in the open markets of the world such needs as they have for the improvement of the country, the building of roads and so on. Japan will compete with other countries to supply these things. Keep before you two facts and you will be able to understand more clearly the situation concerning Manchuria. Too great an investment in Manchuria is contrary to Japanese interests and fair competition is the best way to develop Manchuria. Neutrality of the country is good for all, and Japan has absolutely no territorial aspirations."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4Steering Committee/227 ^{Confidential File} FOR # 3122

FROM France (Marriner) DATED Nov. 29, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***



5637

REGARDING:

Herriot in conversation with Davis commented on the Manchurian situation. Davis states we need have no apprehension whatever about his attitude on Manchuria.

MM

793.94/5637

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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MET

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated December 12, 1932

Rec'd 11 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

December 12, 11 a. m.

My December 10, noon.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation: "December 12, 10 a. m.

My December 10, 11 a. m. Shanhaikuan incident was amicably adjusted Saturday and Japanese armored train was withdrawn from Shanhaikuan northward beyond the Wall. All quiet at Shanhaikuan. Repeated to Department".

WWC-CSB

LOCKHART



793.94

793.94/5638

DEC 19 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12211 FOR Tel.#1312-11am.

FROM China (Engert) DATED Dec.10.1932.
--TO-- NAME 1-1187 ***



5639

REGARDING: Proposal which will be made at meeting of Third plenary
Session Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang,
emphasizing necessity of resistance to Japan.

fps

793.94/5639

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72

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GRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated December 10, 1932.

Recd 12:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

1312, December 10, 11 a.m.

Reuter reports from Shanghai, 9th:

"General Po Wen Wei and Mr. Chang Chih Pen who went to Canton last week returned here today. Interviewed General Po stated that Canton members of Central Executive Committee had decided to bring up a proposal at forthcoming third plenary session of Kuomintang in Nanking emphasizing necessity of resistance to Japan and continuing the anti-bandit campaign.

General Po further said that owing to his high blood pressure Hu Han Min is not coming to attend the Central Executive Committee Conference and that General Chen Chi Tang is also not coming because his duties prevent but several others will go to Nanking shortly."

FOR THE MINISTER

CIB WP

ENGERT

Note
793.94

893.00/12211

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
note
123C353

State DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 9 1932
RECEIVED
NOT FULLY REFERRED
FOR CONSIDERATION.
President Herbert Hoover
The White House
Washington

Harbin China,
October 24, 1932

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 15 1932
Department of State

My dear Mr. President:

Your acceptance speech has just reached isolated Harbin, where the statement of your foreign policy, as quoted below, is enthusiastically approved.

"I have projected a new doctrine into international affairs, the doctrine that we do not and never will recognize title to possession of territory gained in violation of the peace pacts."

In my humble opinion this is an epoch making declaration.

When I was the guest of the venerable Dr. Tang Shao Yi in South China he expressed appreciation of your broad vision in the far East, while the harassed and helpless people of Manchuria regard you as their sincere friend.

I was an active speaker for the Queen's County New York Republican Committee during your campaign four years ago and made several speeches for you in Mr. Smith's native district. I only wish I could serve again in your re-election, of which I feel confident.

After living, traveling and studying for two years in China, from Canton to Peking, I am now residing with my brother, Mr. Culver B. Chamberlain, Consul in Harbin, who was concerned in the Mukden incident last January. That he holds no resentment is indicated by the little clipping which I take the liberty of enclosing.

Please accept my perhaps premature, but none the less assured congratulations upon your re-election.

Very respectfully yours,

Ida Hoyt Chamberlain

Ida Hoyt Chamberlain
(c/o American Consulate General)

Enclosure:
Clipping, as stated.

F/H.S.

793.94/5640

FILED

DEC 17 1932

123C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 16, 1932.

Geneva's despatch No. 438
Political, of December 6, 1932,
requests that 10 to 20 copies
of Mr. Hornbeck's address of
October 18 be forwarded for
distribution to officials in
Geneva.

The next pouch for Geneva
closes at 1 p.m. on Tuesday,
December 20.

74A
IES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 438 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, December 6, 1932.

December 20 1932. *72E*

793.94



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict. - Address delivered
by Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, October 18, 1932.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
mimeographed press release dated October 17, 1932,
embodying an address delivered by the Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State,
before the Institute of International Affairs, the
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia,
on October 18, 1932.

I wish to state that I have read this speech,
the title of which is "Policy and Action in Relation
to the Current Situation in the Far East" with great
interest. I feel furthermore that a useful purpose
would be served could this exposition of pertinent
American policy be placed in the hands of officials
in Geneva particularly interested in the questions
discussed. I therefore respectfully request that,
if the Department perceives no objection, I be fur-
nished

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DEC 20 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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nished with ten to twenty copies of this release for
employment along the lines which I have suggested.

Respectfully yours,



Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State,
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MMH

Asked SKH if he wished
me to send the copies of
his ~~own~~ speech under cover
of a personal letter,
and he replied -
'instruction'.

JES



SKH - Pouch
tomorrow
(Tues.) A.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 20 1932.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

With reference to your despatch No. 438 Political of December 6, 1932, requesting copies of the address delivered on October 18, 1932, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, at the Institute of International Affairs, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, on the subject "Policy and Action in Relation to the Current Situation in the Far East", there are forwarded herewith fifteen copies of PRESS RELEASES of October 22, 1932, which contains the text of the address. The Department's supply of the mimeographed text is exhausted.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.


Enclosure:
 15 copies of PRESS
 RELEASES of October
 22, 1932.

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PPLES:CLS
 12/19/32.

m.m.H.
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 28, 1932.

SKH:

It seems to me that it would be preferable for the Department to take no action on this despatch. ~~While~~ Although Mr. Cunningham is Chairman of the Joint Commission, we have avoided sending to the League copies of his reports in that capacity and it may be assumed that the other members of the Commission, whose governments are members of the League, will see that the League is kept informed.

With regard to dissolving the Commission, I rather wish that its dissolution were an accomplished fact. However, it is not and I fear that any initiative taken at this time toward dissolving the Commission may bring about renewed insistence by Japan that such projects as the Round Table Conference be given further consideration. As Mr. Cunningham's request for instructions on this point is addressed to the Minister, it seems preferable for the Department to take no action at this time.

MMH:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
December 24, 1932.

MAH:

Shanghai transmits herewith a copy of a review of the work of the Joint Commission set up under Article IV of the Sino-Japanese Agreement (Shanghai) of May 5, 1932. This report was prepared by Mr. E. A. Long, the Secretary of this Commission. As the substance of the information contained in this report was communicated to the Department by radio, I see no need for you to read it. Possibly, however, you may want to send a copy to Geneva and I suggest that a copy be sent with copies of other despatches which Mr. Salisbury sends to Geneva from time to time.

In his despatch to the Legation transmitting a copy of this report, Mr. Cunningham raises the question of the dissolution of the Commission. In my opinion, this is not a matter for the Department to decide upon--the Commission is a child of the League's. I do not think that the question ought to be raised and I suggest that we let the Minister handle the matter as Mr. Cunningham has addressed his request to him and not to the Department.

J.E.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 8622

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Shanghai, China, November 28, 1932.

793.94
nt 3

893.102 SUBJECT: The Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5, 1932.
Joint Commission.



I have the honor to enclose herewith a
copy of a self-explanatory despatch No. 7282
of this date, with its enclosures, from this
Consulate General to the American Legation on
the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,.

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

ESC NE
800

Enclosure:

1/- Despatch No. 7282 as stated with
enclosures.

In Triplicate to the Department

No copy to the Legation

2 Carbon Copies

Received *[Signature]*

Sam 782

F/G 793.94/5642

FILED
JAN 11 1933

No. 7383

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, November 28, 1932.

Subject: The Sino-Japanese Agreement of May
5, 1932. Joint Commission.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.



Sir:

1/-

I have the honor to transmit a review of the work of the Joint Commission covering the periods of May, June and July, 1932, prepared by Mr. E.A. Long, Secretary of the Joint Commission. This review should have been forwarded earlier but the information contained therein has been covered in various telegrams and despatches to the Minister. Therefore, this need be regarded as merely summar-

2/-

izing and placing into convenient form the work of this Commission. Attached to the report is a copy of the agreement.

This report covers the period of greatest activity of the Joint Commission. Many things of importance have occurred since, and will be accounted for in a further report by Mr. Long. The period covered practically concludes the evacuation of the Japanese military from this area. The Secretary's report is rather full and will probably be of greater historical rather than political value.

The

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The question of dissolving the Joint Commission has not been discussed with my associates but it is known that the Japanese civil delegates are sympathetic towards the continuance of the existing Commission for a further period because they feel that it serves to assure to Shanghai some measure of peace and security which was the purpose for which the Joint Commission was designed. It is scarcely clear regarding the dissolution of the Commission because Article II reads: "Pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions" and it is possible that the agreement contemplates that until "later arrangements" are made, the Joint Commission was to continue to exist. The Minister's instructions on this point would be appreciated. Unless the matter is brought up by a member of the Commission or instructions are received from you, I am inclined not to discuss the question on my own initiative. I do not know that any particular good can be accomplished by the continuance of the Commission indefinitely, but there is a possibility that it was the intention of the agreement to continue the Joint Commission for a longer period.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

ENC 11
A true copy of
800
1/11/72 signed ori-
Enclosures:

- 1/- Report on the Joint Commission
- 2/- Copy of agreement

In Quadruplicate to Legation

In Triplicate to Department

Copy to the Minister at Hanking

A

REVIEW

OF THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

(Covering the Period of the Japanese Evacuation
during the Months of May, June and July, 1932)

By E. A. Long, Secretary to the Commission.

The Joint Commission was created by virtue of Article IV of the Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5th, (copy attached), its function being to "watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Agreement," and to certify the mutual withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese forces. The Commission is composed of 12 members, one civil and one military representative of each of the following: the Chinese and Japanese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th.

The constitution and procedure of the Commission are defined in Annex III of the Agreement referred to.

By letters dated May 6, copies of which subsequently were deposited with the Secretary of the Commission, the following delegates were appointed:

Mr. O. K. Yui, Secretary of the City Government of Shanghai, to be Chinese Civil Delegate,
General Wen Ying-sing, Director of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau, to be Chinese Military Delegate,
Appointed by Wang Chiao Ming, Esq., (Mr. Wang Ching Wei), Chairman of the Executive Yuan, and H. E. Dr. Loo Wen Kan, Minister of Justice and concurrently Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Chinese Government.

Mr. K. Murai, Consul General for Japan at Shanghai, to be Japanese Civil Delegate,
Lt. Col. K. Harada, Acting Military Attaché to the Japanese Legation in China, to be Japanese Military Delegate,
Appointed by H. E. Mr. N. Shigemitsu, on behalf of the Japanese Government. In the same communication Mr. Shigemitsu added that until such time as Mr. Murai was well enough to be able to attend the meetings, Mr. K. Okazaki, Consul and Third Secretary of the Legation, would act in his place.

Mr.

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Mr. E. S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, to be the American Minister's Civil Representative,
Lt. Col. W. S. Drysdale, American Military Attaché to the American Legation in China, to be the American Minister's Military Representative,
Appointed by H. E. Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Minister to China.

Mr. J. F. Brennan, C.M.G., Consul General for Great Britain at Shanghai, to be the British Minister's Civil Representative,
Col. G. Badham-Thornhill, D.S.O., British Military Attaché to the British Legation, to be the British Minister's Military Representative,
Appointed by H. E. Sir Miles W. Lampson, Minister for Great Britain to China.

Mr. J. Meyrier, Consul General for France, to be the French Minister's Civil Representative,
Lt. Col. H. Bonavita, French Military Attaché to the French Legation to China, to be the French Military Representative,
Appointed by H. E. Mr. H. A. Wilden, French Minister to China.

Mr. G. Ros, Secretary to the Italian Legation to China, to be the Civil Representative of the Italian Chargé d'Affaires,
Lt. Col. E. Frattini, Italian Military Attaché, to be the Military Representative of the Italian Chargé d'Affaires,
Appointed by Count G. Ciano di Cortellazzo, Italian Chargé d'Affaires to China.

(Note: Certain changes were made in the personnel during the ensuing months. A revised list of members of the Commission is given on page 25.)

At the invitation of the British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, the above named neutral members of the Commission met with the Heads of Mission of the Participating Friendly Powers at the British Consulate General on May 6, 1932. At that meeting it was decided, inter alia, that the American Consul General, Mr. Cunningham, should convene a meeting of the Joint Commission at the American Consulate General on Saturday, May 7, at 9:30 a.m. Accordingly this was done and the first meeting of the Commission took place at the time stated, all the members being present. The following matters were determined at that meeting:

(A) On the proposal of Mr. Brennan, Consul General for Great Britain, seconded by Mr. Meyrier, Consul General for France, Mr. E. S. Cunningham, American Consul General was unanimously elected Chairman of the Joint Commission.

(B) Mr. E. A. Long, Secretary to the Consular Body,

was

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was appointed Secretary to the Joint Commission.

(C) At the suggestion of Mr. O. K. Yui, concurred in by Mr. Okazaki, it was agreed that the fee for the Secretary and expenses of the Commission, other than those for individual motor car hire, etc., should be borne jointly by China and Japan.

(D) The Japanese delegates announced that their programme of withdrawal was as follows:

1. During May 6th the principal units were withdrawn to the east of the lines connecting Setzelin, Yanghan, Taziang and Chenju. In order, however, to facilitate the work of the Joint Commission and giving due consideration to the transfer of the affected areas to Chinese police authorities, a battalion will remain in each of the following places in order to maintain peace and order. They are expected to remain only about three days, that is, until May 9th. At Liuho, there would be one battalion of infantry; at Kating, one battalion of infantry; at Nanziang, Headquarters of the regiment and a battalion of infantry; at Lotien, one battalion of infantry and one mountain gun company.

2. The second and later stages of withdrawal will be undertaken approximately in the following order and will be notified to the appropriate Chinese Authorities and to the Joint Commission through the Secretary, prior to their execution.

Second stage, to withdraw from Liuho, Kating, Nanziang, line within three days, that is about May 9th.

Third stage, to withdraw from Lotien.

Fourth stage, to withdraw Setzelin, Yanghan, Taziang and Chenju line.

(E) Mr. Okazaki personally accepted the suggestion that certain police, which were reported to be in Nanking at the time and to be in reality Peiping police, should be used to police the evacuated areas.

(F) Answering a query raised by Mr. Okazaki as to how the section in Article I reading "In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers", should be reconciled with the concluding paragraph of Annex II which reads: "The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above," the Chairman stated there appeared to him to be no conflict in the two sections mentioned and gave the following interpretation thereof: "Doubts regarding the cessation of hostilities were in the first place to be investigated by representa-

tives

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tives of the participating friendly Powers (members of the Joint Commission) but the entire Joint Commission were to decide whether or not such doubts were in fact justified and if so in what manner they might be removed."

The meeting concurred in this interpretation.

(G) It was decided that each individual and not each delegation should have one vote. Thus there would be 12 votes, the Chairman having a casting vote.

(H) The Chairman suggested that the evacuation of Japanese forces should be arranged directly between the principals, the assistance of the neutral members being invoked, if necessary. This was agreed to.

(I) It was decided to circulate provisional minutes of the meeting to be followed, after corrections (if any) had been made, by "approved minutes".

(J) The Chairman offered the Conference Room at the American Consulate General for all meetings of the Joint Commission or of members thereof.

After the meeting a photograph was taken of the Commission.

At 4:00 p.m. the same day, the Chinese and Japanese delegates met to discuss the details of their programme of withdrawal. (Note: A chronological table of the various withdrawals is given on page 25.)

The following is a chronological and sequential record of subsequent events.

1/ The Chinese delegates reported on May 8 that special police were in readiness and others were en-route, to police Liuho, Kiating, Nanziang and Lotien. They gave the names of appointees on the "Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas" and mentioned that each party would be accompanied by a competent interpreter.

2/ The Chinese delegate reported on May 9 the names of other appointees on the Evacuated Areas Commission, and mentioned that owing to unforeseen interruption of communication the parties sent to take over Kiating and Nanziang were unable to arrive at the designated places on time.

3/ The Japanese civil delegate, Mr. Okazaki, reported on May 9 that the military wires between Paoshan and Woosunchen were cut on the night of May 5 and those at Nanziang on the evening of the 6th, thus greatly inconveniencing the Japanese withdrawal; also that arms and

ammunition

-5-

ammunition were discovered nearby and that in consequence the Japanese Army was taking "precautionary measures for self protection".

4/ The Japanese civil delegates announced on May 9 a second and third withdrawal according to the following schedule; Second Withdrawal: The units at Liuho, Kating and Nanziang, will be withdrawn as from May 9th, at 1:00 p.m. Third Withdrawal: The unit at Lotien will be withdrawn as from noon, May 10th. (see following paragraphs)

5/ The Japanese civil delegate reported on May 10 that in the presence of the neutral military members of the Commission, Liuho was handed over to the Chinese representatives on May 9 and Kating to the local self-government association (in the absence of the duly accredited representatives) on the same day. He also reported that it was intended to transfer Nanziang to Chinese control on that day, but that no Chinese representatives arrived to take it over (see Nos. 2 and 6.)

6/ On May 10 (Circular No. 7) the Chinese civil delegate reported that the Chinese police commissioner appointed to take over Nanziang, arrived at a village named Chi-wang-miao, some four miles from Nanziang, at 8 a.m. on the 9th, where he left his party of Chinese police, in order to prevent misunderstanding. He then conferred with the Japanese Captain in charge of Nanziang and actually assumed control of the place in the afternoon.

7/ In the same communication the Chinese civil delegate reported that the Chinese had assumed control of Kiating on the afternoon of the 9th and of Lotien the same afternoon after the Japanese rear guards had withdrawn, which they had not done at the appointed hour, namely at noon.

8/ On May 10 (Circular No. 11) the Japanese civil delegate confirmed the withdrawals at Lotien (witnessed by the foreign military representatives) Nanziang and Kiating.

9/ On May 11 (Circular No. 12) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman that the Japanese Defence Guards would be withdrawn on May 14 from the Chapei area south of the railway and that the Chinese authorities would be permitted to inspect the area, beginning from May 14. He also asked that the Chinese delegate make concrete arrangements with the Japanese delegates and the Japanese Landing Party for the implementing of this transfer. Accordingly the Chairman convened a meeting on the afternoon of May 12 of representatives of these bodies, at which meeting the details of the transfer were discussed and agreed upon. At this meeting the Japanese side unexpectedly announced that the Japanese Government was withdrawing all its troops (i.e. the Army) from Shanghai,

which

-3-

which announcement was confirmed in a letter to the Chairman on May 13 (circular No. 15) in the following terms: "The Japanese Government, trusting to the working of the Agreement of May 5th, 1932 and the efforts of the Representatives of friendly Powers concerned in the establishment of peace and order in the Shanghai district, have ordered all the troops to withdraw from the locality and have decided to watch for the future development of the situation around Shanghai. (The army withdrawal was completed on May 31; see paragraph 35 herein)

10/ By letter to the Chairman dated May 12, (Circular No. 14) H. L., M. Wilden, the French Minister, announced that Commandant Barberot had been appointed as his representative on the Joint Commission to succeed Lt. Col. Bonavita.

11/ By letter dated May 16, (Circular No. 17) to the Chairman, Lt. Col. Drysdale announced that in accordance with the instruction of the American Minister he was handing over his duties as Military representative of Military representative of the American Minister on the Joint Commission to Lt. Robert H. Soule.

12/ On May 16, (Circular No. 18) the Chinese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman enclosing copies of communications which he had sent to the Japanese civil delegate supported by communications from the Chinese Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas, on the subject of the rendition of Chinese railway lines held by the Japanese forces. The Japanese side had offered to afford facilities to the Chinese side for the repair of these lines, but the Chinese side were pressing for complete rendition. (see paragraph 18 herein)

13/ By letter to the Chairman dated May 14, (Circular No. 19) the Japanese civil delegate reported that the Chinese side had been notified that the Japanese defence unit at Taziang would be withdrawn on May 18 and to arrange with the Japanese commander in that section regarding the transfer of control. (See paragraph 17)

14/ By letter to the Chairman dated May 17, (Circular No. 21) the Japanese civil delegate reported that the Japanese Defence units at Chenju were scheduled to be withdrawn on May 20; (see paragraph 16) that the Chinese side had been informed accordingly with the request that the Chinese Special Police take the necessary steps to take over control of the place. The Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman by letter dated May 23 (Circular No. 34) that this evacuation was completed at 11 a.m. on May 23, in the presence of the military members of the Joint Commission, with the exception of the French member. The Chinese civil delegate confirmed these statements by a written report issued the same day. (Circular No 35.)

15/ By letter dated May 17, (Circular No. 22) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman that the Chapei area south of the railway line was restored to the Special Chinese police, without hitch, on May 17.

16/ By letter dated May 17, (Circular No. 23) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman that the Chinese civil delegate had been informed that (1) the Japanese Defence Guard west of the railway line was expected to withdraw on May 19 at 11 a.m. (2) that the Japanese Defence Guards at Chenju would be withdrawn on May 23 at 2 p.m. instead of on May 20 at 1 p.m. as originally planned. Unforeseen circumstances had necessitated this change; (3) the Defence Guards of the Japanese Naval Landing Force of Chapei north of the railway would be withdrawn on May 23, at 2 p.m. The Chinese delegate was asked to make arrangements for this transfer not later than the day before the date fixed for the transfer. The Chinese civil delegate reported the last named evacuation on May 23 (Circular No. 25) but stated the Japanese forces continued to occupy the triangle designated in the Agreement (Area D).

17/ In another communication dated May 17 (Circular No. 24) from the Japanese civil delegate, the Chairman was informed that a letter had been addressed to the Chinese civil delegate stating that the Chinese police who assumed the patrolling of Taziang when the Japanese forces withdrew were not the so-called Special Police and asking that in future cases this function be performed by these Special Police. With regard to this matter, however, the Chairman was informed, on May 20, by telephone message to the Secretary, that the Chinese had sent a mixed force (part local and part Peking) of police to patrol the evacuated Kiangwan area. However, recognizing that it was expedient for the time being to have such mixed forces because the northern men do not understand the local dialect, the Japanese authorities were prepared to accept this arrangement for the time being.

18/ In a further communication dated May 17 (Circular No. 25) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman that a letter had been addressed to the Chinese civil delegate stating that the Japanese authorities concerned hoped to give favorable consideration to the Chinese wishes regarding the rendition of the railway lines, including the Woosung and Shanghai Railway and asking that the Chinese side communicate a "concrete programme so as to enable us to conform with your desires as much as possible."

19/ On May 18, (Circular No. 26) the Chairman of the Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Commission quoting a letter from the Shanghai

Nanking

Nanking Railway which complained that the Japanese forces had removed certain equipment including a number of engines and motors from the North Station and had damaged other railway property there. This communication was circulated for the information of members of the Joint Commission including the Japanese and Chinese delegations.

20/ The Chinese civil delegate wrote on May 18, (Circular No. 27) making similar representations to the Chairman. The Japanese civil delegate made the following preliminary comments, by telephone to the Secretary, regarding these complaints, his remarks being passed on to the Chairman: He said the property referred to might be divided into two classes, i.e., equipment belonging to the railway, and equipment belonging to the Chinese Army. With regard to the former the Japanese Naval Landing authorities were making investigation and were ready to accord satisfaction for any misappropriated property, proved to have been taken away, or which might be in Japanese possession. With regard to Chinese army property the armoured trains referred to having been burnt could not be returned. It remained for the Chinese to make a protest and/or claim if they so wished, in which case the Japanese would have an answer ready, based on points in International Law. The Japanese civil delegate subsequently informed the Secretary that the British Chinese Corporation had asked the Japanese Naval Landing Forces to protect its property at the North Station, as there had been a great deal of pilfering. To carry out this request, therefore, the Japanese units in withdrawing, carried away most of the equipment referred to, which was afterwards restored. Thus this question has been determined.

21/ By letter dated May 19, (Circular No. 28) from the Japanese civil delegate, the Chairman was informed that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in Kiangwan west of the railway line was completed on May 19 at 11:05 a.m. and that the withdrawal was witnessed by the military members of the Joint Commission. This was confirmed by a written report from the Chinese civil delegate which was issued the same day. (Circular No. 29).

22/ In a written report dated May 19 (Circular No. 29) the Chinese civil delegate stated that (1) the evacuation of Kiangwan prior to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chapei "entails considerable difficulty for the Chinese police, who are thus confronted with the problem of maintaining peace and order in an area isolated by Japanese forces". In reply to this statement the Japanese delegate caused the Chairman to be informed, by telephone message to the Secretary, that he had telephoned the Chinese civil delegate on May 18 offering to delay the evacuation of Kiangwan until the 23rd in which event Kiangwan, Chapei and Chenju could be evacuated at the same time. The Chinese civil delegate

after

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after consultation with his military authorities answered that he preferred to have the evacuation of Kiangwan proceed as originally planned. Accordingly the Japanese civil delegate submitted that, under the circumstances, the Chinese delegate had no cause for complaint. (2) The Japanese troops had evacuated the villages of Pengpu and Miaohong without giving warning to the Chinese side of the intention, in consequence of which the former place had been exposed to lawless elements for some time. The Japanese reply to this statement (at first communicated to the Chairman by telephone message to the Secretary and afterwards confirmed by letter dated May 23, Circular No. 38) was that no Japanese troops had been billeted at either Pengpu or Miaohang which had in fact never been occupied by Japanese troops. Hence there was no question of a Japanese evacuation; that the Japanese had at no time assumed the responsibility for peace and order in the entire area within their defence lines but had assisted in maintaining peace and order in those places which Japanese forces had occupied or had billeted troops; that it was the Japanese practice when they discovered there were no Chinese police at any place within their lines, to inform the local Chinese body of the fact with the request that a suitable police guard be arranged for.

23/ By letter dated May 20, (Circular No. 30) from the Japanese civil delegate the Chairman was informed that a letter had been addressed the same day to the Chinese civil delegate stating that the Japanese Army was planning to withdraw from Yangkahong, (Yanghong) and Sztzelin on May 24 at 11 a.m. and asking that arrangements be made with the Chinese special Police to take over these places. On May 24 (Circular No. 40) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman by letter that the transfer of affairs at Yanghong and Sztzelin was completed at 11 a.m. that day and that the military members of the Joint Commission had certified the transfer. The Chinese civil delegate confirmed this information the same day. (Circular No. 43)

24/ The Chinese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman of May 21 (Circular No. 32) stating that a small party of Japanese soldiers entered the village of Miaohong at 6 p.m. on May 20 and again at noon on the 21st firing their rifles at random and creating a panic there. He asked the Chairman's good offices in prevailing upon the Japanese side to refrain from such provocative acts in the future. Accordingly the Chairman wrote on May 23 to the Japanese civil delegate, (Circular No. 32B) enclosing a copy of the Chinese delegate's letter referred to, with the request that an investigation be made, and asking that, if the report proved to be true, such representations be made to the Japanese military authorities as would preclude a recurrence of such incidents. The Japanese civil delegate replied on May 24 (Circular No. 41) saying that an investigation had been made by the Headquarters of the Japanese army in Shanghai which reported subsequently that the complaint was unfounded; that since the withdrawal of Japanese units from the village of
Kiangwan

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Kiangwan on May 19, Japanese forces had been strictly forbidden to recross the Shanghai Woosung Railway line (beyond which Miaohong is situated, some miles distant) and that it seemed inconceivable that the Japanese soldiers billeted either in Yanghong or in the neighborhood of the Kiangwan Race Course should have entered the distant village of Miaohong. This reply was transmitted to the Chinese civil delegate by the Chairman on May 25. (Circular 42)

25/ By letter dated May 21 (Circular No. 33) from the Japanese civil delegate, the Chairman was informed that a communication had been sent to the Chinese civil delegate stating: (a) that Japanese troops were scheduled for withdrawal from the following places on May 25, at 11 a.m. and asking that arrangements be made for the Chinese special Police to take over the following places: Walled city of Paoshan; Woosung Forts, Baracks, Magazine Stores; Woosung-chen (the town, east side of the railway line, which was designated as the area not to be used by the Japanese Army). (b) that, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, the Japanese Army would for the time being make use of the localities assigned by the Agreement of May 5 for the billeting of troops. This information was communicated to the Chinese civil delegates by telephone, through the Secretary.

In a letter to the Chairman dated May 25, (Circular No. 44) the Japanese civil delegate announced that the transfer of control of Paoshanhsien took place at 11 a.m. and of Woosungchen and the neighborhood of the Woosung Forts at noon on May 25, in the presence of the military members of the Joint Commission. He added that as the duly accredited Chinese representatives did not appear at the appointed hour, the transfer was effected with their substitutes. On the same day May 25, the Chinese civil delegate reported the transfer of the above named places, but added that the Woosung Forts and Barracks were also taken over as well as the power magazine immediately outside of Paoshan City. (Circular No. 45.)

26/ On May 23 telephonic representations were made to the Chairman by the Chinese civil delegate to the effect that a Japanese military officer had told a Chinese military officer that the Japanese forces might evacuate places east of the Woosung Railway line at any time without notice. The Chinese civil delegate was much disturbed at this intelligence and wanted the Chairman's intercession. The Chairman caused representations to be made on the subject to the Japanese civil delegate, reminding him that at the Joint Commission meeting of May 7 the importance was stressed of not having any hiatus between a Japanese evacuation and the entry of the Chinese police. On May 24 the Japanese civil delegate caused the Chairman to be informed that assurances had been given to the Chinese civil delegate, through the Secretary, that no occupied Chinese territory would be evacuated by the Japanese forces without previous notice thereanent being given

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given. The Japanese civil delegate pointed out, in this connection, that not all the region east of the Woosung Railway line was occupied by Japanese forces, but only certain areas situated therein.

27/ The Chinese civil delegate forwarded to the Chairman, with a covering letter dated May 23, (Circular No. 36) asking for his good offices, a copy of two letters which he had addressed to the Japanese civil delegate on the same date, the one asking for Japanese assistance in tracing eight Chinese allegedly seized by Japanese marines on January 30 at their place of employment, the Tsiang Ya Tai Shop (街市) on Woosung Road who were reported to be missing still, and the other letter concerning certain furniture and other equipment allegedly taken away by Japanese troops on their withdrawal from the Anhwei Middle School in Chapei. The value of the property in question was stated to be \$40,000 Shanghai currency. The Chairman caused enquiries to be made of the Japanese civil delegate who replied by letter on May 26 (Circular No. 46) giving the substance of an answer which he had sent to the Chinese civil delegate in the premises. This reply was to the effect that the Headquarters of the Japanese Landing Party held a receipt from the Chief of the Police Battalion of the Bureau of Public Safety (the Chinese representative who assumed control of south Chapei after the Japanese evacuation) for all the articles which were in the Anhwei Middle School when it was occupied by the Japanese forces on March 5. The Japanese reply also branded as incorrect the Chinese allegation that the school was evacuated on May 14 as the document of transfer was signed at the mentioned school on May 23 in the presence of members of the Joint Commission. As regards the eight missing persons, the Japanese delegate gave it as his opinion that the question did not come within the purview of the Joint Commission and he had therefore referred the matter to the Japanese Consul General.

28/ On May 23 the Japanese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman (Circular No. 37) stating that the transfer of Chapei (north of the railway but not including east of the Hongkew Creek and the Japanese cemetery, that is, Area D.) was completed at 2 oclock May 23rd. He also stated that the following points were agreed upon at the time of the transfer: (a) The Japanese may station a guard of 25 each at the Toyota Spinning Mill and Tungwen College. (See paragraph 30 herein) The Japanese may go back and forth from their quarters by way of Chungshan Road for the sake of relief and shift. (See paragraph 30 herein). (b) In order to effect a speedy liason between the Japanese and Chinese authorities a special direct telephone wire is to be maintained.

29/ In a letter dated May 24, (Circular No. 39) Col. Badham Thornhill informed the Chairman that under instruction from H. B. M's Minister he was handing over his duties

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duties on the Joint Commission to Captain A. T. Wilson Brand who would succeed him as military representative of the Minister on that Commission.

(Circular No. 43)

30/ In a report dated May 24, the Chinese delegates announced that the Chinese delegation had taken note of the arrangement made between the Chinese "taking over" parties and the Japanese "handing over" parties whereby Japanese units would be permitted to go "back and forth" along Chungshan Road for the purpose of carrying relief to and from the Toyota Spinning Mill and Tungwen College pending eventual withdrawal of the remaining Japanese troops from the said places in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. The Japanese comment on this report is to the effect that as long as they had detachments at Tung Wen College and the Toyoda Cotton Mills, they would be allowed under agreement, to use the Chungshan Road to transport reliefs and supplies to these places, and that as these places are on extra-Settlement roads and the Japanese marines were stationed there before the incident of January 29, the Japanese were under no obligation to evacuate the same by the agreement of May 5th, 1932, nor have they given any commitment to do so.

31/ In a letter dated May 26 to the Chairman (Circular No. 46) the Japanese civil delegate commented on a complaint from the Chinese side which apparently had not been brought to the notice of the Chairman since there is no record of it. It related to a complaint from the Chinese Police Inspector of the 5th District that the Japanese marines stationed at the Japanese cemetery had been interfering with his authority. In refuting this charge the Japanese delegate stated there was a direct telephone service in operation between the Chinese police station in Chapei (the 5th District) and the Headquarters of the Japanese Landing Party (see paragraph 28 herein) and that arrangements had been made between the two parties to communicate with one another in the event of any untoward incident occurring but that no report had been made to the Japanese Headquarters concerning the alleged incident. Moreover the Japanese contended that none of their marines who were stationed in the cemetery could speak Chinese (This remark was made apparently because of a statement of the Chinese Police Inspector that he was spoken to in Chinese on matters which formed the subject of this complaint).

32/ At 4:30 p.m. on May 27, Mr. T. W. Kwok, who said he came on the instruction of the Chinese Foreign Office, called on the Chairman and informed him that the Chinese Government proposed to quarter two battalions of troops at Lunghwa and its vicinity immediately, the urgent reason for doing so being the impending arrival of May 30th which, with the days immediately following, is a time of tension during which disorders are likely to occur, (Note: Lunghwa is the Headquarters of the Shanghai and Woosung Garrison Commissioner and is situated to the south of Shanghai outside the zone in which the

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Sino-Japanese hostilities occurred. May 30th is the anniversary of the clash between Chinese students and the Shanghai Municipal Police in Nanking Road, International Settlement, on that day in 1925.) Mr. Kwok stated the Chinese Government did not consider that the moving of a small body of troops into Lunghwa would constitute a hostile act within the meaning of the term in the May 5 Agreement. Hence he had not informed the Japanese Authorities of this intention and was only informing the Chairman of it, as a matter of courtesy, for the information of the Joint Commission. Mr. Kwok added that the Japanese need have no apprehension regarding a menace to the flank of their forces because of the presence of the Chinese troops at Lunghwa as the French Concession and the International Settlement lay between the two forces.

The Chairman replied that it would be necessary for him to bring this proposal to the notice of the Japanese delegates and the other members of the Commission, but remarked that it would seem prudent for the Chinese authorities to meet the emergency with an adequate force of police rather than to have dual police/military control.

The next day, May 28, the Chairman convened an informal meeting between himself and the Japanese delegates, with the American military representative as an observer, a memorandum of the conversation with Mr. Kwok having been circulated in the meantime.

At that meeting the Japanese civil delegate stated that at the conferences of Ministers and of the military sub-committee which were held antecedent to the May 5th Agreement, particularly at a meeting of the military sub-committee of March 26, it was understood that no Chinese troops would be stationed in the areas south of the Soochow Creek. He maintained that not only the Agreement and its annexes but the concomitant discussions should be taken into consideration. However (he continued) the Japanese delegates, animated by a spirit of conciliation, preferred not to be too insistent on legal points and therefore wished to compromise. They would like to endorse the Chairman's suggestion that police instead of soldiers should be employed to suppress possible disturbances, but as it did not seem possible to obtain police at such short notice, the Japanese authorities were willing to concur in the installation of a limited number of Chinese troops at Lunghwa itself, such troops to be moved to any area of disturbance only after notification being given and permission obtained from the Chairman, who would in turn seek for the concurrence of the military representatives of the participating friendly Powers. Any troops which were so moved must be turned to Lunghwa immediately the emergency had passed. Lt. Soule read pertinent extracts from the minutes of military sub-committee meetings which seemed to support the view that the military representatives should determine if a state of emergency existed in any given locality.

Mr. Kwok

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Mr. Kwok was informed of the Japanese proposals the same afternoon, but he adhered to his position that the Chinese Government had the right to move troops as it thought fit in Chinese territory not covered by the Agreement, reiterating that he had communicated with the Chairman only as a matter of courtesy and adding the information that the troops or gendarmes to be stationed at Lunghwa would be brought from Hangchow so as to avoid any troop movement on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway. His efforts at bringing about a modus vivendi between the principals thus being frustrated, the Chairman convened a meeting of all the members of the Joint Commission to determine the question. The meeting was held on May 31, at which the Chairman, after presenting the issues expressed the opinion that the question before the meeting came within the scope of Article I and Annex I of the Agreement.

The Chinese civil delegate contended that the sending of two battalions of troops into Lunghwa for the purpose of maintaining peace and order could not reasonably be construed as a hostile act. Previous to the Sino-Japanese conflict, five battalions of troops had been stationed at Lunghwa but had been withdrawn at the commencement of hostilities. The local Chinese authorities had reliable information that communists and other lawless characters were planning disturbances and they had to have adequate forces to deal with any outbreak. He argued that the portion of the May 5 Agreement which provided that the Chinese troops "will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements" (Article II) meant the Chinese troops who were actually at the time in the positions mentioned in Annex I, and therefore it did not apply to Chinese troops generally. Hence there was no obligation on the Chinese to ask permission from anyone for troops movements south of the Soochow Creek, or even to notify anyone thereanent, except from considerations of courtesy.

After a general discussion which served to clarify the situation the Japanese delegates announced that they recognized the Chinese anxiety to preserve peace and order in the area mentioned and therefore they would not raise any objection to the stationing of a limited number of troops at Lunghwa. But if these troops were to be moved to positions outside of Lunghwa he would ask that the Chinese side inform the Chairman whenever they proposed to make such a movement. Responding, the Chinese civil delegate, agreed to notify the Chairman in such cases, purely as a matter of courtesy. The Chairman declared he would be happy to transmit such information to the Japanese civil delegate but stressed the importance of adequate notice being given to him of the mentioned troop movements so that he could communicate the information to those concerned in ample time before the event. The Chinese civil delegate promised this would be done.

In concluding the meeting the Chairman voiced the

high

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high gratification of the neutral members of the Commission that such a happy determination of the issue had been arrived at.

As germane to the agreement arrived at during this meeting, the Japanese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman on July 27 stating that the Chinese newspaper "Shun Pao" had reported a forthcoming outward movement of troops from Lunghwa and an inward movement of "reliefs". He asked if the Chairman had been notified of this movement and if not if he would cause enquiries to be made thereanent. Telephonic enquiries were made of the Chinese civil delegate who answered that the entire garrison at Lunghwa was being transferred to Pengpu, Anhwei Province. Later on the same day (July 28) he telephoned that the garrison would leave at 5 p.m. that day (presumably by the Shanghai Nanking Railway) and that the reliefs from Hangchow had already arrived at Lunghwa. This information was duly communicated to the Japanese side.

33/ The Chinese civil delegate reported on May 28, (circular No. 49) that: (1) by mutual understanding Chinese police today entered and resumed their official functions in the following areas: (A) The entire area east of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, north of the International Settlement, and west of the Whangpoo River, including the "Designated areas B and C" but excepting a small area as stated in paragraph (4). (B) The Wentsaopang area, east and west of the Woosung Railway, including Area A. (2) It is understood that the Japanese troops now remaining in the above said areas, will continue to withdraw in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. (3) It is mutually agreed between the Chinese police, and Japanese military authorities that neither side will interfere with the other's proper movements and functions. (4) With reference to Area "D" and the adjacent area east of the railway, west of the Shakingkang creek, and north of the Hongkew District, which are still occupied by Japanese marines, the Chinese Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas has been advised by the Japanese military authorities to take up the matter with the commander of Japanese marines in Shanghai. (5) Japanese troops today withdrew from their billets in the Yingziang Race Course area.

34/ The Chinese civil delegate reported on May 30, (Circular No. 50) that the workshops of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway at Changhwapang were taken over from the Japanese at 1:45 p.m. on that day, and that the question of damages and losses, if any, was left for further conversations between the Chinese and Japanese Authorities.

To the statement last mentioned the Japanese civil delegate replied in a letter to the Chinese civil delegate on June 3, (Circular No. 56) reading in part as follows: "According to the report, in my possession, I understand that the authorized Chinese representative promised the

Commander

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Commander of the Japanese Guard that the former would not demand any damages in the future, having recognized that the ground and materials within the workshops of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway, which were in use by the Japanese Army were completely protected."

The Chinese civil delegate responded in a letter to the Chairman dated June 20, (Circular No. 66) which stated that the managing Director of the Railway flatly denied any promise not to make any future demand for compensation for damages. He asserted, on the contrary, that a Mr. Davidson of the British-Chinese Corporation (which had advanced the loan for the building of the railway) was authority for the statement that General Shimimoto, the Japanese officer in command of that area had accepted responsibility for all damages caused to the workshops, which assurance had been duly communicated by the British-Chinese Corporation to the Japanese Consul General for purposes of record.

The Chinese civil delegate further stated that the Japanese commander obliged the Chinese railway representative to sign a paper in Japanese at the time of the transfer which he did allegedly under duress but coupled his act with a declaration that the question of compensation was one that concerned the higher authorities on both sides. He contended that this declaration was accepted by the Japanese.

35/ Under cover of a letter dated June 1 (Circular No. 52) to the Chairman the Chinese civil delegate enclosed a copy of his letter to the Japanese civil delegate of the same date in which attention is directed to the following points: (1) that Japanese marines have not yet withdrawn from the area east of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, west of the Shapingkang Creek, and north of the Hongkew District; (2) that as the result of the continued occupation of the said area by Japanese marines the City Government of Greater Shanghai has not been able to reinstate the various municipal services including policing, health, traffic, etc., necessary for the proper administration of the area; (3) that certain number of Japanese marines are still stationed in the Toyota Spinning Mills and Tung Wen College; (4) that ~~companies of Japanese~~ troops (Gendarmes) are remaining in the areas A, G, and D. The Chinese civil delegate maintained that the area mentioned in (1) was not within any of the four areas designated for the temporary billeting of Japanese troops pending withdrawal; that as regards (2) there was danger to public health due to the absence of a proper administration; that as regards (3) and (4) the status quo ante January 28 could not be said to have been restored until the areas mention in these paragraphs had been evacuated. In this connection the Chinese civil delegate pointed out that large numbers of Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Shanghai area and therefore there was no excuse for the continued occupation of these

regions

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regions by the Japanese forces.

The area referred to in (1) was also mentioned in Chinese civil delegate's report of May 28. (see paragraph 33 herein)

The Chinese civil delegate mentioned at that time that the Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas was taking the matter up with the Japanese marine authorities.

35/ By letter dated June 1 (Circular No. 54) the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chairman as follows: (1) The last units of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces, hitherto stationed in the Shanghai area, with the exception of a small number of gendarmes, completed their withdrawal yesterday. (2) A part of the Japanese Naval Landing Party is stationed in Area D as shown in the map appended to the Agreement of May 5th. (3) Chinese police constables, as from May 28th, have been detailed in the area to the east of the Shanghai-Woosung railway line. The compounds of Fu Tan University, the Chinese Naval Hospital (Kiangwan), the Railway workshops at Woosung, and San Yue Towel Factory (Yingzianghong), where Japanese military units had been stationed, were duly transferred to the Chinese side on May 30th.

36/ In commenting on the communication above referred to, the Chinese civil delegate in a letter to the Chairman dated June 3, (Circular No. 55) stated that Japanese Marines were not only stationed in Area D itself, but also beyond it. He seized the opportunity of reiterating what was said in his letter to the Japanese civil delegate of June 1 (see paragraph 34 herein) and remarked that the continued stationing of gendarmes in areas A and C could not but be taken as a failure on the part of the Japanese to fulfill the terms of the May 5 Agreement.

37/ On June 8 the Japanese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman (Circular 57) stating that, as all the Japanese military units had withdrawn from Shanghai leaving the defence duties of the Shanghai district solely with the Navy, Lt. Col. Harada, the Japanese military member of the Commission would be replaced from that day by Captain Faron T. Samejima, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Naval Landing Party.

38/ Lt. Soule addressed a letter to the Chairman of June 11 (Circular 59) saying that under instructions of the American Minister he was that day, handing over his duties on the Joint Commission to Lt. R. A. Boone, U.S.M.C., who would succeed him as the military representative of the Minister on that Commission.

39/ On June 12 at about 9:15 p.m. the Japanese civil delegate telephoned to the Secretary asking him to transmit the following information to the Chairman which was done immediately thereafter, by telephone.

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A Mr. Wang who was then connected with the Committee for the Re-establishment of Control of the Evacuated Areas had told Lt. Col. Harada that evening that the Chinese authorities proposed sending several regiments of troops from Hangchow (south of Shanghai) via the Shanghai-Nanking Railway to Anhwei Province for bandit suppression, which troops would depart from the North Station (Shanghai) during the course of the following day (June 13). The Japanese civil delegate contended that this projected troop movement would infringe the May 5 Agreement which, in his submission, precluded any troop movement North of the Soochow Creek "pending later arrangements" (Article II). He therefore wished the Chairman to convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to take place early the next day (June 13). The Japanese civil delegate also mentioned that there was a good motor road from Hangchow to Nanking which had been used by the Chinese for troop transportation during the recent Sino-Japanese conflict and asked that the Chinese authorities be urged to use this road for the contemplated troop movement first referred to.

These statements of the Japanese civil delegate were communicated to the Chinese civil delegate by telephone that same evening, who replied that he differed from the Japanese civil delegate's interpretation of the Agreement on the point referred to. Accordingly the Chairman convened a meeting which took place the next morning commencing at 10 o'clock, (June 13) a memorandum of the previous night's conversations having been circulated amongst members beforehand.

At the meeting the Chinese civil delegate confirmed that the troops in question were being transferred to Anhwei Province for bandit suppression and contended there was nothing in the Agreement which restricted or could restrict the free movement of Chinese forces in territory under Chinese control. He believed the whole question hinged on the interpretation of Article II of the Agreement. That Article provided that "the Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements". It was clear, in his submission, that the term "the Chinese troops" could only mean the Chinese troops who had been engaged in fighting the Japanese forces and who were in certain designated positions at the time the Agreement was signed. The negotiators at the conference in framing the Agreement undoubtedly had envisaged the positions which the Chinese troops were then occupying and therefore had defined those positions in annex I of the Agreement. Article II said that "the Chinese troops will remain in their present positions" and the Chinese civil delegate contended that the word "their" could only connote the Chinese forces actually occupying the positions mentioned at the time the negotiations were being conducted. He submitted that the proposed troop movement could not be construed as a threat to the Japanese forces but if there was any doubt in that respect the situation could be examined by the neutral

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members in term of the Agreement.

Responding the Japanese civil delegate stated that, in his submission, the Commission had the right and the duty of watching the carrying out of the Agreement, including of course Article II thereof. His contention was that the term "the Chinese troops" in that Article not ~~did~~ mean any particular Chinese troops but applied to Chinese troops generally. He mentioned a declaration which had been made by the Chinese negotiators at the time the Agreement was signed, to which the Chinese had attached great importance. It stated that nothing in the Agreement was to be construed as implying a permanent restriction on the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory. In his (the Japanese civil delegate's) view the significance of the Chinese delegates' insistence on this declaration lay in their fears that Article II would exclude not only the 19th Route Army and associated units from areas north of the Soochow Creek, but all other Chinese military forces as well. Hence, in his submission by declaring that there should not be any permanent restriction of Chinese troops in that region, the Chinese side had tacitly admitted that there would be a temporary restriction of all Chinese military forces "pending later arrangements". He maintained the clause in Article II that the "Chinese troops will remain in their present positions" meant that for the time being there would be no movement of Chinese troops in the areas mentioned. The Chinese civil delegate had assured them the proposed troop movement was without hostile intention, but he submitted that under Article II there should be no Chinese troop movement in the areas north of the Soochow Creek whether with or without hostile intention. Article I records the decision that the cessation of hostilities should be rendered definite and he contended that the intention of Article II coupled with Annex I undoubtedly is that the cessation of hostilities shall be assured by preventing the Chinese forces from crossing a certain line.

The Japanese and Chinese delegates withdrew to an adjoining room and in their absence neutral members debated the question before the meeting, reaching the following unanimous decision which was subsequently read by the Secretary to the Japanese and Chinese delegates: "The unanimous decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission on the matter brought before them, is that Article II of the May 5th Agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in Annex I of the Agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement (by either the Chinese or the Japanese side) in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event of any doubt arising the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission".

The Japanese civil delegate said he accepted the decision of the neutral members and hoped the Chinese delegates "would act accordingly". The Chinese civil delegates

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delegate said he would refer the decision mentioned to the Chinese Government for instruction.

At a personal interview with the Chairman on the morning of June 16 the Chinese civil delegate informed him that the Chinese Government could not accept the interpretation of Articles I and II of the May 5 Agreement as embodied in the decision of the neutral members of the Commission at the meeting of June 13. After consultation with the other neutral members, the Chairman instructed the Secretary to telephone to the Chinese civil delegate and to say that the statement of non-acceptance did not change the view of the neutral members with regard to their interpretation of Articles I and II contained in the decision alluded to and that if the Chinese authorities choose to disregard this decision they must do so at their own risk. This was done on the afternoon of June 16th.

On June 20 the Chinese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman (Circular No. 64) which repeated what he had communicated at the personal interview of June 16 and added that the "Chinese Government holds that the passage of Chinese troops through Shanghai, which formed the subject of discussion at the aforesaid meeting of the Joint Commission, does not in any sense constitute a violation of the provisions of the said Agreement." To this communication the Chairman replied by letter dated June 22, (Circular No. 65) which repeated what the Secretary had communicated to the Chinese civil delegate on the afternoon of June 16. The Japanese attitude, with regard to this declaration of the Chinese Government, was manifested in their determination to proceed on the assumption that the decision of June 13 was and would continue to be binding on the Chinese side.

Notwithstanding the decision at the meeting of June 13, the Japanese delegates made representations to Tokio and received permission to allow the Chinese 9th Division to pass through the Shanghai North Station on condition that proper notice was given of the time of arrival and of departure, the number and designation of the units and also on the understanding that this concession was not to form a precedent.

Under this arrangement troops belonging to the 9th division were allowed to pass through the so-called "prohibited area", not however without some difficulties developing, the Japanese contending that the Chinese side were not always complying with the pre-requisite conditions, and also that troops other than those belonging to the 9th Division had passed through the "prohibited area" without previous arrangement with the Japanese delegates or any notification being given to them. Japanese civil delegate addressed a strong protest to the Chinese civil delegate on this subject and sent a copy of it to the Chairman. (Circular No. 69) In conveying this protest he pointed out that the decision of June 13 was binding on

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the Chinese side by virtue of the majority vote clause contained in Annex III of the Agreement and asked that there be no further passage of troops through the "prohibited area" unless by arrangement made with and agreed to by, the Japanese side beforehand. The Japanese civil delegate followed up his protest by another letter to the Chairman dated June 25, (Circular No. 70) in which he remarked that permission was given for passage of the 9th Division through the prohibited area "in order to meet the desire of the neutral members of the Joint Commission and on expressed condition that should neither be construed as forming a prejudicial to decision of the neutral members of June 13th, and that the Chinese side should inform the Joint Commission of a detailed plan of transportation." He concluded by asking the Joint Commission to take the necessary steps to cause the Chinese side to observe the decision of June 13.

The Chinese civil delegate replied on June 25, (sending a copy of his reply to the Chairman. Circular No. 71) asserting that at a meeting between himself and the Japanese civil delegate on the afternoon of June 14, the Japanese civil delegate had informed him that "in spite of the decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission to the contrary, the Japanese Government would not object to the transportation of Chinese troops through the stipulated area, and the Japanese civil delegate requested him to give previous notice in the event of Chinese troops passing through the Shanghai Nanking Railway North Station."

Continuing he remarked that on the afternoon of the 18th the Japanese civil delegate was informed, as a matter of courtesy, that during the period between the 19th to the 25th of June some Chinese troops of the 14th Army would be transported to Nanking via Shanghai, and that should those troops pass through the Shanghai-Nanking Railway North Station, and in that event only, he would again let the Japanese civil delegate know - to which the Japanese civil delegate agreed.

Concluding the Chinese civil delegate said that since the Chinese troops passed through the Markham Road Station, no previous notice was therefore deemed necessary according to the understanding between the Chinese and Japanese delegates. However, upon receipt of the Japanese civil delegate's telephonic request on the 21st he agreed to furnish the Japanese side with previous notice concerning further passage of troops through the area in question even at points beyond the Shanghai-Nanking Railway North Station, as a matter of courtesy, which he did with the assurance from the Japanese civil delegate's assurance, in every instance, that it was "all right". The letter from the Japanese civil delegate, therefore, came as a surprise; and he felt obliged emphatically to declare that there had never

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been any breach of the Agreement of the Chinese side as alleged.

The Japanese civil delegate addressed a letter to the Chairman on July 1 (Circular 74) informing him that certain units of the Chinese 83rd Division had passed through the prohibited area on June 27 and 28, that the Chinese civil delegate had given him advance notice of these movements but in view of what he had said in his letters of June 22 and 25 to the Chinese civil delegate, he had refrained from expressing his agreement to the passage of these troops through the area mentioned.

40/ In a letter dated June 15 (Circular 61) the Japanese civil delegate communicated to the Chairman the contents of a letter which the former had addressed to the Chinese civil delegate informing him that the Japanese Naval Landing Party was prepared to withdraw from the area between the Woosung Shanghai Railway and North Szechuen Road in Northern Hongkew whenever the Chinese side found it convenient to take it over. The Chinese civil delegate confirmed that the transfer of this area was effected on June 17 at 10 a.m. (Circular No. 68)

41/ In a letter to the Chairman dated June 21, (Circular No. 67) Col. Frattini stated that under instructions of the Italian Charge d'Affaires, (who had been made Minister since the Joint Commission was created) he was handing over his duties as the military representative of the Italian Minister on the Joint Commission to Lt. A. Monfrini.

42/ In a letter dated June 28 to the Chairman (Circular No. 73) the Chinese civil delegate drew attention to the fact that Japanese marines were still stationed at certain mills at Wentsaopang (Woosung) on the Military Road (Kungdah Cotton Mill at Yangtzepoo) and in the Western district (Toyoda Cotton Mill on Jessfield Road); also that no move had been made towards the evacuation of Area D. He asked the Chairman's good offices in urging the Japanese delegates to evacuate these places in pursuance of Article III of the May 5 Agreement.

The Chairman caused enquiries to be made of the Japanese civil delegate and was informed that the Japanese would evacuate the mills at Woosung "in the near future". As a matter of fact they evacuated these mills on July 6, confirmation of it being sent by the Chinese civil delegate to the Chairman on July 7, (Circular No. 76) and by the Japanese civil delegate on July 8 (Circular No. 77). Negotiations were conducted directly between the Japanese and Chinese civil delegates regarding the evacuation of area "D" and on July 6 at 10 a.m. they met at the American Consulate General to further discuss the matter. Thereafter the Japanese delegates made representations to Tokio regarding this evacuation, a number of telegrams being exchanged. The Chinese civil delegate was informed by the Japanese civil delegate of these representations
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and was urged by the latter to "wait for a few days longer". However on July 13, the Chinese civil delegate addressed another letter to the Chairman on the subject of the evacuation of Area D, of the Kungdah and Toyoda Mills and the Tung Wen College (western district) expressing regret that the Japanese had not withdrawn from those places and asking that the Chairman convene a meeting of the Joint Commission to discuss the question. According to this request the Chairman invited members to meet on Friday, July 15 at 10 a.m., but on July 14 the Japanese civil delegate informed the Chinese civil delegate that the Japanese forces would evacuate Area D on Sunday, July 17. With the consent of both the Chinese and the Japanese delegations therefore the Chairman cancelled the projected meeting. The evacuation from area "D" was witnessed by the neutral military members and confirmed by Japanese civil delegate's letter of July 18 (Circular No. 83) and by Chinese civil delegate's report of July 18 (Circular No. 84)

As regards the continued stationing of Japanese naval units in the mills mentioned and at Tung Wen College the Japanese reiterated that they had a right to do so for the reasons previously given (see paragraphs 28 and 30 herein). As a matter of fact the detachment at Tung Wen College was withdrawn on June 6, but the Japanese civil delegate, writing informally to the Secretary concerning it, said that as the college is situated on an extra-Settlement Road, the Japanese delegation did not consider there was anything improper in the stationing of a Japanese detachment there nor was it, in their opinion, contrary to the May 5 Agreement. Accordingly they had not notified the withdrawal officially but it had been communicated verbally to the Chinese civil delegate.

43/ In a letter to the Chairman dated July 27, (Circular No. 85) the Japanese civil delegate drew attention to a report in the Chinese newspaper "Sun Pao" to the effect that the Chinese Division stationed at Lungghwa would be transferred to North Kiangsu and that another regiment (1,500 men) would be brought from Kashing to take its place.

The Japanese civil delegate enquired whether or not the Chairman had any knowledge of this reported troop movement, in accordance with the Chinese civil delegate's promise to inform the Chairman beforehand of any troop movement out of Lungghwa (see paragraph 32 herein).

Telephonic enquiries were made of the Chinese civil delegate and a copy of the Japanese civil delegate's letter was sent to him. He replied by telephone the same afternoon (July 27), saying that during the next day (July 28) the Lungghwa garrison would be sent to Pengpu (Anhui Province) and that a certain number of troops (exact number not known at the time) would be sent from Hangchow to replace them.

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It will be apparent from a perusal of the facts recited in the foregoing pages that the Japanese evacuation of occupied Chinese territory was, speaking generally, carried out as rapidly as circumstances permitted and with a large measure of goodwill on both sides. It is true that the Japanese were somewhat tardy in evacuating area D, but they advance a number of reasons in explanation of this circumstance, namely: (a) the several changes which occurred in the Japanese naval command and the necessity of acquainting each new naval commander with the details of the Japanese programme of evacuation and other necessary information (Note: after the withdrawal of the Japanese army, the Japanese Landing Party consisted of naval units, from which the detachment in area D was drawn) (b) the large number of Japanese residents in area D, who were apprehensive that the Chinese ebullition of feeling had had not yet subsided and that consequently they would be exposed to Chinese hostility if too rapid an evacuation occurred (c) the Japanese desire to make arrangements with the Chinese authorities for a drill and recreation ground for their naval forces. (They had been using ground in Area D for these purposes) (d) the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation for these forces which are nearly four times as numerous as they were before the conflict.

With the complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces from the Chinese territory occupied by them after January 28th, one of the principal functions of the Joint Commission has terminated. As regards the continuance of a Japanese garrison at the Toyoda and Kungdah cotton mill, the Japanese statement of their right to do so is contained in paragraphs 28 and 30 of this review.

That the evacuation proceeded with the celerity and smoothness it did is a testimonial to the forbearance and spirit of conciliation so abundantly manifested by both the Chinese and Japanese delegations, the unstinting labors of the neutral members of the Commission and in particular to the patient efforts, kindly guidance and persevering zeal of the Chairman, whose intercession undoubtedly averted many a threatened deadlock. The Chinese and Japanese delegations frequently, both by letter and orally, expressed their high appreciation of the work done by the Chairman and the other neutral members.

-25-

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVACUATIONS

May 9	From Kating
" "	" Nanziang
" "	" Lotien
" 10	" Luiho
" 17	" Southern Chapel
" "	" Taziang
" 19	" Kiangwan Village, west of Railway
" 23	" Chenju, North Station and northern Chapel
" 24	" Yanghang Village and Sztzelin Forts
" 25	" Paoshanhsien, Woosungchen, Woosung Forts and magazine Stores.
" 28	" Yingziang Race Course.
" 30	" Changhwapang Railway Workshops (Woosung) and Fu Ten University and all other outlying districts.
June 26	" Tung Wen College on Hungjao Road
July 6	" Woosung Mills
July 17	" Area "D".

*

(Note: These evacuations were all verified by the
Military members of the Commission, either by personal
attendance or from information received from thoroughly
reliable sources.)

A LIST OF MEMBERS ON THE JOINT COMMISSION ON JULY 30, 1932/

E. S. Cunningham, Esquire, American Civil Representative,
and Chairman.
O. K. Yui, Esquire, Chinese Civil Delegate,
K. Okazaki, Esquire, Japanese Civil Delegate,
Sir John Brenan, K.C.M.G., British Civil Representative,
J. Meyrier, Esquire, French Civil Representative,
G. Ros, Esquire, Italian Civil Representative,
General Wen Ying-sing, Chinese Military Delegate,
Captain Baron T. Samejima, Japanese Military Delegate,
Commandant Barberot, French Military Representative,
Captain A. T. Wilson Brand, British Military Representative,
Lt. R. A. Boone, American Military Representative,
Lt. A. Monfrini, Italian Military Representative.

ARTICLE I.

The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from May 5th, 1932. The forces of the two sides will so far as lies in their control cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

ARTICLE II.

The Chinese troops will remain in their present position pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex I to this Agreement.

ARTICLE III.

The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of January 28th, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex II to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV.

A Joint Commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this Commission will be as defined in Annex III to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V.

The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Japanese and Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubts as to the meaning or any differences of meaning between the Japanese and Chinese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.

Done

Done at Shanghai, this fifth day of May, nineteen
hundred and thirty-two.

(Signed) K. Wyeda,
Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) M. Shigemitsu,
Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary.
(Signed) S. Shimada,
Rear-Admiral.
(Signed) K. Tashiro,
Major-General.
(Signed) Quo Tai-chi,
Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
(Signed) 戴戟 Lieutenant-General.
(Signed) 黄强 Lieutenant-General.

In the presence of:

(Signed) Miles A. Lampson,
U.S. Minister in China.
(Signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister in
China.
(Signed) Willem,
Ministre de France en
Chine.
(Signed) Galeazzo Ciano,
Chargé d'Affaires for
Italy in China.

Representatives of the friendly Powers
assisting in the negotiations in
accordance with the Resolution of the
Assembly of the League of Nations of
March 4th, 1932.

Annex I.

The following are the positions of the Chinese troops
as provided in Article II of this Agreement.

Reference the attached Postal Map of the Shanghai
District scale 1/150,000.

From a point on the Soochow creek due south of Anting
village north along the west bank of a creek immediately
east of Anting village to Wang-hsien-ch'iao, thence north
across a creek to a point four kilometres east of Shatow,
and thence north-west up to and including Hu-peï-k'ou on
the Yangtze River.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the
positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint
Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the
participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

Annex II.

Annex II.

The following are the localities as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

The aforesaid localities are outlined on the attached maps marked A., B., C. & D. They are referred to as areas 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Area 1 is shown on Map "A". It is agreed (i) that this area excludes Woosung Village; (ii) that the Japanese will not interfere with the operation of the Shanghai-Woosung Railway or its workshops.

Area 2 is shown on Map "B". It is agreed that the Chinese cemetery about one mile more or less to the Northeast of the International race track is excluded from the area to be used by the Japanese troops.

Area 3 is shown on Map "C". It is agreed that this area excludes the Chinese village Ts'ao Chia Chai and the Sanyu Cloth Factory.

Area 4 is shown on Map "D". It is agreed that the area to be used includes the Japanese cemetery and eastward approaches thereto.

In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the localities in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission.

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated above will be commenced within one week of the coming into force of the Agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal.

The Joint Commission to be established under Article IV will make any necessary arrangements for the care and subsequent evacuation of any invalids or injured animals that cannot be withdrawn at the time of the evacuation. These may be detained at their positions together with the necessary medical personnel. The Chinese authorities will give protection to the above.

ANNEX III.

The Joint Commission will be composed of 12 members, namely One civilian and one military representative of each of the following: the Japanese and Chinese Governments, and the American, British, French and Italian Heads of Mission in China, being the representatives of the friendly Powers assisting in the negotiations in accordance with the Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of March 4th. The members of the Joint Commission will employ such numbers

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of assistants as they may from time to time find necessary in accordance with the decisions of the Commission. All matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman, having a casting vote. The Chairman will be elected by the Commission from amongst the members representing the participating friendly Powers.

The Commission will in accordance with its decisions watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three Articles mentioned above.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 20, 1932.

~~RCM:~~

~~MMR:~~

~~SKH:~~



In the attached despatch, Mr. Peck summarizes two conversation which he had on Sino-Japanese relations, one with Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation and the other with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I think that the despatch is worth reading in its entirety.

J.E.P.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blumstein NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-383

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, November 21, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Japanese and Chinese Views regarding
the Sino-Japanese Controversy.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 20 1932
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to report that I received on
the morning of November 18, 1932, a call from Mr.
Yakichiro Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation.
On the same day I called on Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Department may
be interested in a comparison of their respective
observations regarding the Sino-Japanese controversy.

In the course of our extended conversation, Mr.
Suma asked me a number of questions and expressed,
informally, certain views. What follows is a short
resume of the conversation which took place with
Mr. Suma:

Mr. Suma asked me what I knew about the report
which had appeared repeatedly in the papers recently
to the effect that there was a plan for the appointment
by the League of Nations of an International Commission

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MAR 13 1933

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to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy. I said that I knew nothing about it except what I had read in the newspapers; from press statements, it would appear that this plan was opposed by both Japan and China. Mr. Suma observed that the press reported that the Chinese Government would consent to an attempt along these lines to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy, if Soviet Russia and the United States were represented on the Commission and if the ultimate settlement did not infringe upon China's sovereignty. I observed that I had seen it stated that China would not consent to having Manchukuo represented on the Commission. I asked Mr. Suma whether he thought the Japanese Government would consent to the appointment of such a Commission and he replied that he thought the Japanese Government would consent if the duty assigned to the Commission were to be merely that of mediating and of bringing about direct negotiations between China and Japan, but that it would not consent if the Commission were to be empowered actually to dictate the terms of settlement. He remarked that his Government had repeatedly stated that it would not permit any third party to "meddle" in the controversy between Japan and China. I said that I had seen published statements of Count Uchida, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to that effect. Mr. Suma said that, so far as he knew, neither the Japanese nor Chinese Governments had received news regarding the proposed Commission from any official source and he asked me what I supposed was the origin



of

- 3 -

of the report. I said I thought I had seen it stated in the newspapers that the report emanated from the League Secretariat, and that perhaps it was a ballon d'essai on the part of the Secretariat, in an effort to prepare some concrete proposal for discussion by the League Council at its forthcoming meeting on November 21. Mr. Suma said that he thought this was the probable explanation.

Mr. Suma observed that there were among the officials of the Chinese Government some who advocated an attempt by China to recover Manchuria through force of arms. He thought there was one member of this faction in the immediate entourage of General Chiang Kai-shek himself. Mr. Suma said that, of course, General Chiang Kai-shek knew that hostilities between China and Japan would be impossible, from China's standpoint, and that on this account General Chiang was endeavoring to devise some other method of bringing to an end the controversy between China and Japan, without war, a method which he could present to the Chinese people with some prospect of uniting the country behind the plan and behind himself. I said that it would be very interesting to know what this plan was, but Mr. Suma had no idea of what it might be.

Mr. Suma asked me whether I thought the policy of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese controversy would change, now that the Democratic

Party

- 4 -

Party had replaced the Republican Party in the control of the Government. I said that I knew nothing about this, but I should imagine that there would be little change, if any. I said that in any matter of public policy involving treaties, or likely to eventuate in the concluding of a new treaty, the President and Secretary of State, who were in charge of the foreign relations of the United States, generally kept in close contact with the Senate, which had extensive power in the matter of treaties. I observed that the personnel of the Senate changed very slowly, one third being replaced every two years, and the Senate, therefore, did not rapidly or suddenly change its policies. For this reason it seemed unlikely that there would be any abrupt change in the policy of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese controversy.

Mr. Suma said that General Chiang Kai-shek and some other Chinese representatives knew that the policy of refusing to hold direct negotiations with Japan was disastrous for China. This refusal to negotiate had already resulted in "two incidents", viz., "the Shanghai incident" and the creation of Manchukuo, and might result in further "incidents" of the same sort, which General Chiang and some other Chinese leaders realized.

It was immediately after my conversation with Mr. Suma that I had occasion to call upon Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on matters of business. I took the opportunity to ask Dr. Lo

whether

- 5 -

whether he had seen Mr. Suma, with whom, as I knew, Dr. Lo was well acquainted, beginning with their association in Canton. Dr. Lo said that he had seen Mr. Suma and that Mr. Suma had asked him whether there was not some way in which the controversy between Japan and China could be brought to a friendly conclusion. Dr. Lo said that he replied that certainly there was a way, namely, for Japan to cease oppressing China. Dr. Lo said that he told Mr. Suma that the first thing for Japan to do was to withdraw its army from Manchuria. To this Mr. Suma replied that the Manchukuo Government had been created by the spontaneous action and will of the people of Manchuria and that China ought to accept the situation in Manchuria as a fait accompli. Dr. Lo said he told Mr. Suma not to come to him with any such nonsense. Dr. Lo assumed full responsibility for assuring Mr. Suma that if the Japanese army were to withdraw from Manchuria one morning, on the same day Mr. Pu Yi, Mr. Hsieh Chieh-shih, and the other officials of the Manchukuo Government would leave Manchuria by airplane, for trains would be too slow, in order to escape from the people of Manchuria. Dr. Lo said that he had admitted to Mr. Suma that the Chinese could not, at the present time, successfully wage war against Japan. He said that he had asked Mr. Suma why the Japanese Government did not continue to send warships and airplanes to bombard and bomb the Chinese people, since they could easily

kill

- 6 -

kill thousands, and there were plenty of Chinese who were willing to be bombed while fighting the Japanese. At the same time, Dr. Lo said to me, he had warned Mr. Suma that Japan could not continue to slaughter the Chinese indefinitely and that this policy of continuing to stir up and keep alive enmity of Japan's neighbor, China, would prove fatal to Japan. I asked Dr. Lo whether Mr. Suma had suggested any plan for bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and Dr. Lo replied that Mr. Suma had not suggested any plan, but he had declared that the present militarist spirit in Japan was the reason for the trouble and that this spirit could not be opposed or altered. Dr. Lo told me that several Japanese, in conversation with him, had placed on Japanese militarists the blame for Japan's present policy towards China and the estrangement between the two countries and had expressed regret for the policy and the estrangement.


Dr. Lo said that Mr. Suma had asked his opinion concerning the plan, mooted in the newspapers, for appointment by the League of Nations of an International Commission to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy. Dr. Lo said that he had replied that he had no official information regarding this plan and he had no comments to make regarding it.

Japan is widely proclaiming in the press that China is not an organized state, but merely a "geographical area". In this connection Mr. Suma's observations regarding recent Chinese political developments may be of interest.

Mr.

- 7 -

Mr. Suma said he had read in the Chinese press of the last day or two that the Government was to be brought back from Loyang to Nanking on December 1. I said that I had been told that the Central Political Council had passed a resolution to this effect on November 17. Mr. Suma asked me what I thought was the meaning of this. I said I thought that it was a mere formality, but probably the move was taken in preparation for the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party, which was scheduled to take place at Nanking on December 15, 1932. Mr. Suma said that there was a report in Chinese circles in Shanghai that General Chiang Kai-shek intended at the Plenary Session to bring about an apparent unification of all factions, especially of Canton with Nanking, in order to present a united China to the world. I asked Mr. Suma whether he thought that Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, would return to office after his trip to Europe. Mr. Suma said that it was his impression that Mr. Wang Ching-wei had definitely broken with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and with General Chiang Kai-shek and that it would be impossible for him to return to a post in the Government. He said that he understood that Mr. Wang, before he left for Europe, had threatened to expose many political secrets, which would have been disadvantageous for a number of leading Chinese statesmen, but that he had been persuaded not to



do

- 8 -

do so. I observed that there was a Chinese report current to the effect that the "Left Wing" i.e., Wang Ching-wei's faction, was to be eliminated in the reorganization of the Government which would take place during the Plenary Session. Mr. Suma said he had heard this and that, presumably, this would mean the departure of Mr. Ku Meng-yu, Minister of Railways, and of Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industries. On the other hand, Mr. Suma said, he understood that in addition to the two Ministers just named, there were in the neighborhood of one hundred followers of Mr. Wang Ching-wei who now held posts in the Government and that having been deprived of Mr. Wang Ching-wei's direct protection, through his departure for Europe, Mr. Wang had arranged that his followers should retain their posts, because this would contribute to the apparent unity of the country, and also because it would be useful for Mr. Wang and his party to have the two Ministers and the other office holders as their representatives in the Government.

Respectfully yours,



Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation and
American Consul General.

Copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.

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No
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 893.102 S/1257 FOR Despatch # 8620

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED November 23, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 470

REGARDING: Operations Plan A of the 4th Regiment,
U. S. Marines at Shanghai.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 11 1932

October 20, 1932.

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Subject: Neutralization of Peiping.

Reference: Peiping's telegram 1199, October 18, 1 p.m.;
London's despatch 412, October 11.

Minister Johnson telegraphs from Peiping that it is the collective view of the American and French Ministers and the British Chargé that a proposal to neutralize Peiping and its environs should, in order to have a chance of success, be proposed to the Chinese and Japanese Governments prior to the time when hostilities should become imminent. Postponement of the proposal until hostilities should become imminent would be too late to accomplish the desired result. The Minister reports a further collective view to the effect that even making the proposal prior to an immediate threat would not be successful.

The American, British and French representatives at Peiping, both civil and military, thus believe that the idea of bringing about a neutralization of Peiping and its environs is not practical.

Mr. Neville, Counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo, who is now at Peiping, reports that he is inclined to think that there is no immediate prospect of major Japanese military activities in the Peiping area.

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DEC 14 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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A memorandum (undated) from the British Foreign Office (London's despatch No. 412 of October 11, 1932) in reply to the Department's memorandum handed to the British Embassy on September 16 states that Sir John Simon concurs in the belief of the representatives at Peiping that the only course lies in joint representations at Tokyo and at Nanking for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, an undertaking from the Chinese and the Japanese Governments to respect the Legation quarter. Sir John is of the opinion that it would be undesirable to open discussions with either the Chinese or the Japanese Governments unless and until the danger of hostilities spreading south of the Great Wall has become actual and imminent.

In the light of the belief at Peiping and at London that the neutralization proposal is impractical, and of the views at Peiping that there is at present no indication of intent on the part of the Japanese to take action in the Peiping area, it is suggested that no further action be taken on this subject at this time.

MMH:EJL

M.H.
J.E.G.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


Mr. Castle December 1, 1932.

Herewith certain reflections,
by Mr. Dooman, on the subject of
French interest and possible
attitude on the subject of Man-
churia from point of view of
interest in the subject of
sanctity of treaties.

*If you feel it worth
while, please send on
to the Secretary*

THE UNDER SECRETARY
DEC 1 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SKH/REK



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 25, 1932.


MANCHURIA SITUATION AND ITS RELATION
TO THE VERSAILLES TREATY.

It was suggested that the following comment on the French interest in the Manchuria situation might be of interest.

The impression seems general in this country that one circumstance which would operate to secure French support for the American position is that the violation by Japan of the Nine-Power Treaty would encourage Germany to violate the Versailles Treaty.

When I was in Paris last autumn, I heard this viewpoint discussed, but only as an element of a wider problem. A large section of the French press was then referring to the importance of stressing the sanctity of all treaties and not only of the treaties which have been invoked in the Sino-Japanese conflict. It was clear that the violation by Japan of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Peace Pact would go far towards undermining their vigor, but what was of more interest to the French was whether Germany needed any preparatory work by Japan to violate the Versailles Treaty. If Germany would not dare to break the Versailles Treaty until Japan succeeded in breaking the Nine-Power Treaty and the Peace Pact without

receiving



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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receiving penalties, then obviously it would be in the French interest to take the most vigorous position possible against Japan. However, if Germany were bent on violating the Versailles Treaty without regard to whether Japan succeeded or failed, it was even more obvious that France should not allow any precedent being set up in the Sino-Japanese dispute which would impede France from taking measures against Germany.

There was, however, in the opinion of certain sections of the French press, an important point of difference in the hypothetical case of Germany above mentioned and the actual case of Japan. Japan had violated the Nine Power Treaty by resorting to an act of aggression within the territory of another country. On the other hand, the possibility of an invasion by Germany of France is more remote than, and must necessarily be preceded by, its rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty, which Treaty specifically provides that such rearmament shall be regarded as an hostile act against France and its former allies. Thus Germany could threaten French security by acts initiated and completed entirely within its own territory; and from this point of view there was no true analogy between Japan's violation of the Nine Power Treaty and Germany's hypothetical violation of the Versailles Treaty.

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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A further point which agitated the French was whether, in the latter eventuality, the world would construe the adhesion of France to the Peace Pact as a renunciation of its right to invoke the clauses of the Versailles Treaty relating to military sanctions, and whether world opinion, in the light of any precedent established in the Manchurian case, could be mobilized to restrain France from employing these sanctions.

In the light of these circumstances France was interested to know whether a nation, which had violated a treaty affecting the vital interests of another nation, should be protected by the Covenant and the Peace Pact against military measures which the latter nation might take to preserve those interests. The conviction of Japan on the charge of transgressing the Nine Power Treaty might indeed have some restraining influence on Germany, although Germany's claim to equality in armament and the threat of certain political organizations to repudiate the Versailles Treaty raise doubts on this point. If, however, China had violated treaties affecting Japan's vital interests, there was considerable feeling that this conclusion should be incorporated in some way in the final verdict against Japan, to the end that the right of France to act in preservation of its security might not be impaired.

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EHD:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONCILIATION VERSUS COERCION IN THE FAR EAST
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L. E. Smith me Key Delegation FE
12/28/32
J. L.
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The American Friends Service Committee, representing the Society of Friends (Quakers) in America, is deeply concerned over the terrible burden of suffering now resting upon the people of Japan and the people of China. We are conscious that we of the United States must bear our share of responsibility for the world-wide history of injustice, exploitation and conflict that has brought misery to those of all lands. In common with increasing groups throughout the world, we believe that the time has come in the evolution of mankind when international difficulties, however grave, can be adjusted by conciliation and co-operation.

Military action, boycotts, economic reprisals and other extreme forms of coercion between nations, threaten the very existence of modern civilization. We would constantly bear in mind that this civilization is founded upon an intricate and delicate adjustment of the interdependent life of all peoples. In the modern exchange of merchandise, of credit, of knowledge, of hopes and fears from one continent to another, the well-being of every people is inseparably linked with the common life of all.

The deep suffering in body and in soul which is now shared by millions of persons everywhere, is the product of the antagonisms that have interrupted this flow of co-operative enterprise. In rejecting the use of force and coercion in dealing with these antagonisms we are not left without an effective alternative. We believe that the spirit of persuasion, conciliation, and mutual understanding is the only power that is adequate for the solution of international conflicts. In reliance upon this power man allies himself with those spiritual forces that make this world a united family and give men courage to live on through seeming disaster. We dare to believe that this spirit of goodwill is present in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2.

all men in every land. It is our conviction, born of intuition and confirmed by experience, that man is essentially a co-operative rather than a combative creature, and that the history of civilization is the record of the growth in ever-widening circles of the spirit and method of co-operation. This process has resulted in our time in a world community, in which a growing sense of economic interdependence and spiritual unity has found expression through such political forms as the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty.

In the present Sino-Japanese conflict, we believe, specifically, that the type of procedure envisaged in Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which makes possible "the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world," offers a way out. Utilizing the spirit and machinery of this article, which provides for conference, without coercive sanctions, representatives of all interested nations, including the United States, could join in a friendly discussion and settlement of the issue involved. In solemn realization of the gravity of this situation, we would join in spiritual fellowship with men and women in all countries who will lend their influence to such a method of solution.

There is more at stake than the well-being of the peoples of the Far East. There is involved the peace of the world, the relief of vast human misery, the maintenance of co-operative agencies already achieved, and the fresh release of mutual confidence which alone can mend the torn fabric of our common life.

We appeal particularly to those men in positions of power in all lands to make themselves the courageous instruments of this high endeavor.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
 DEC 13 1932
 THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
 DIVISION OF DATED DECEMBER 7, 1932.
 DEC 7 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Low Chinese Legation
Dec. 7, 1932

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 7- 1932
 Department of State

According to reports from General Chang Hsueh-liang

SECRETARY OF STATE
 DEC 9 1932

learned:

1. The Japanese have instigated the people of Jehol to refuse to pay taxes and to declare their independence. The inhabitants of Chaoyangpao have already been affected and have severed their connection with the administration of Jehol.

2. With a view to influencing the deliberations at the League, the puppet government has formulated some twenty principles for the fabrication of public opinion with which principles to compel the individuals and public organizations to write to the League of Nations. It is learned that the bogus Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo has already received some three thousand of such letter.

3. The various bogus governmental commissioners have issued an order to the authorities of the various districts that in official documents only the Japanese language should be used and that the Japanese military authorities may have the power of directing the affairs of the districts.

4. The people have also been instructed to petition for the restoration of the monarchy under the bogus Chief Executive.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, December 7, 1932.

DEC 13 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Dated December 25, 1932

FROM Rec'd 12:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1386, December 25, 2 p. m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

"Chinese reports received here from the North state that Japanese and Manchukuo troops are making preparations for an attack on Jehol Province with the Capital Chengteh as their main objective. This report cannot yet be confirmed from independent sources but Chinese commanders in Jehol are being instructed to resist any attempted invasion".

JOHNSON

KLP

F/HS

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DEC 28 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE



SEE 761.93/1483 FOR Tel. #1325, 9am

FROM China (Engert) DATED Dec. 14, 1932
~~XXX~~ NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Reuter report from Nanking to the effect that Sino-Russian rapprochement is wise move on China's part as she will ultimately have to rely on herself rather than the League for settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

dew

793.94/5649

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MMT

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 14, 1932

Rec'd 4:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1325, December 14, 9 a. m.

Reuter report from Nanking 13th:

"Sino-Soviet rapprochement is hailed as very wise move by Chinese Government especially in view growing conviction that China will ultimately have to rely on herself rather than League for settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. It is believed that rapprochement will have important bearing on Far Eastern situation especially with regard to Manchuria".

Tokyo 13th:

"Declaring that resumption of relations between China and the Soviet is move unwelcome to Japanese Government spokesman remarked this afternoon 'Elements most disturbing to the peace of the world have now joined hands. Japan stands squarely against these forces. Question for the powers is whether they will allow forces of destruction to rule in the Orient or forces of consolidation. Restoration of Sino-Russian relations poses this issue squarely. Beside it the future of Manchuria is comparatively insignificant'".

WSB

For the Minister, ENGERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.9493/74 FOR Tel#-, 11AM

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Dec. 17, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Attempted bombing of Japanese Consul General's residence in
the British concession reported.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

GRAY

TIENTSIN Via N. R.

Dated December 17, 1932

Rec'd 1:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.



December 17, 11 am.

The following telegram has been sent to the
Legation:

"December 17, 10 a.m. A bomb was thrown at or
placed near the wall surrounding the Japanese Consul
General's residence in the British concession last
night at 8:40. Slight damage to wall and sidewalk
but none to residence. No arrests thus far.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ



PLAIN

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated December 29, 1932

Recd. 6.40 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 29 1932
Department of State

1397. December 29, 10 a.m.

Reuter from Tokyo twenty-eighth.

"Commenting on situation in Jehol the War Office spokesman today stated that a number of General Su Pongwen's troops are moving southwards through Manchuria in an attempt to link up with forces of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang but many of them have been intercepted and have surrendered to Japanese. Many others are said to be either freezing or starving to death. Japanese military authorities he says are still hopeful that Jehol situation will be settled peacefully but they express regrets that General Tang Yulin's attitude has recently become more dubious and consequently they fear that operations may be necessary before commencement of rainy season next June if peaceful settlement is not reached in meantime.

Confirming reports that Japanese military authorities are planning to increase their strength in Manchuria spokesman stated that present intention is to bring strength of Japanese forces in Manchuria to sixty

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

No. 1397 from Peiping

or sixty-five thousand during next two years at same time improving weapons to ~~reequip~~ troops of Manchuria. In spite of alarmists' reports of situation in Jehol and possible developments there Japanese War Office remains calm and continues to assert that as far as Japan is concerned no major operations there are contemplated in near future. Latest intelligence reaching the War Office indicates that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang has recently moved three brigades into Jehol two near Shanhaikua and one northward of Peiping. Nevertheless it is stated Japanese military authorities are not seriously perturbed though they are closely watching situation in case of possible developments."

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
DEC 13 1932
A CABLEGRAM (DIVISION OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DEC 13 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1932.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 13 1932
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEC 10 1932

94
Marshal Chang Asiao-liang wired on the 9th that at 10 P. M. of the 8th., a Japanese armored car stationed outside of Shanhaikwan suddenly advanced to the gateway of the Great Wall and fired four shots into the city, the shells exploding near the headquarters of the Brigade there stationed and the Department of Public Safety of the city. Later on, the Japanese armored car moved westward to the Shih-Ho Bridge and continued the shelling, firing more than ten shots. The damage done by this shelling is now under investigation.

At the time of the shelling, the Chinese troops stationed there, besides being ordered to be prepared for any eventuality, immediately communicated with the Japanese command inquiring about the situation and at the same time despatched a representative to negotiate with the command of the Japanese gendamerie. The Japanese asserted that the armored car belonged to their Eighth Division and that the shelling was the result of two facts: first, at the first shelling a few Chinese volunteers has been escaping into the city, and second, when the armored car advanced to the gateway of the Great Wall, the Chinese guards on duty on the parade grounds outside of the East Gate fired upon them so that the shelling was a return fire to the Chinese attack. The Chinese representative retorted that the Chinese command on the spot did not afford shelter to the escaped volunteers, that there was no firing from the Chinese, and that there were no Chinese guards on the parade ground. It was only after these facts had been categorically

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DEC 13 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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denied by the Chinese representative that the Japanese command promised to order the armored car to the railway station where it now remained. The Chinese troops were guarding diligently the movements and activities of the Japanese troops, but they did not return fire to Japanese attack at any time.

In the morning of the 9th., the commander of the Chinese guards negotiated with the Japanese commander, whereupon the later promised to arrange an interview at 2 P. M. of the 9th. during which the commanders of the two countries hopes to arrive at a solution of the conflict.

Chinese Legation, Washington
December 12, 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



December 21, 1932.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Relation of American Policy with
Japanese Feeling.

FEB 8 1933

DIVISION OF

F/HS

The following quotations from addresses would appear to summarize succinctly the policy which this Government has followed in the dispute between China and Japan:

"We have made it clear that in our opinion the declaration in the treaty (Kellogg Pact) carries with it the duty of performance. We have made it clear that it necessarily alters the whole attitude of the world towards war; that, whereas during the centuries hitherto war has been one of the natural functions of government, hereafter, among the signers of this treaty, war will be an illegal thing - a disease instead of a normal state function; that, whereas hitherto a breach of the peace between two nations has been nobody's business but their own, now, under the treaty, it has become the rightful concern of the whole world, because practically the whole world has signed the treaty; and that this being so, whenever a breach of the treaty is threatened by approaching hostilities, it implies a duty of consultation among the other parties in order that public opinion may be mobilized against the impending disaster of war." (Address of the Secretary before the Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Pittsburgh Area, October 26, 1932).

"The problem which confronted Mr. Hoover's government was serious and far-reaching. On the one hand, it was to support our historic Policy of the Open Door, so vital to our commercial interests, and, on the other, to throw our influence with that of the other nations of the world to save these peace treaties from a loss of prestige which might be fatal. This is not an appropriate occasion to rehearse the steps which have been taken. Mr. Hoover met this problem with intelligence and sympathy but with a firmness resulting from a deep conviction of the importance

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the issues at stake. His policy was framed with strict impartiality to the parties to the controversy and with great patience and understanding, but nevertheless with unwavering devotion to both our own immediate interests and the broader principles involved." (Address of the Secretary before the Union League Club at Philadelphia, October 1, 1932).

"The American Government has deemed it no part of its function to sit in judgment with regard to the antecedent issues of the controversy between the two disputants. It has maintained an attitude of impartiality. Its efforts have been directed toward the maintenance of American rights and interests. These rights and interests arise in part out of treaties and agreements to which the United States is party, but they rest basically on the foundation of the general or common interest and concern of all nations in the problems of maintaining and preserving peace." (Dr. Hornbeck's address at the Institute of International Affairs, Williamsburg, October 18, 1932).

It has been noted by several writers that the term "Sino-Japanese conflict" is a misnomer - that it is essentially a conflict between the United States and Japan. There is a large measure of truth in this observation. Both in China and Japan there existed the belief that the United States would, in the event of war breaking out between China and Japan, give China military support. For example, the comment of one Chinese paper on this Government's identic notes of January 7, 1932, that "it has the head of a dragon and the tail of a rat", betrayed the disappointment of the Chinese that the United States was not prepared to take any measure stronger than non-recognition of the fruits of aggression. If the Chinese labored under the belief that the United States would give them military support, it was inevitable

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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inevitable that this belief should be communicated to the Japanese. The fear that Japan would be obliged to measure swords with the United States of course found fertile ground for propagation in the suspicion, rising out of certain events of the past twenty-five years, that it was the settled policy of the United States to bring about the extirpation of Japan from Manchuria.

Members of this Government have declared that its policy has been determined by,

- (a) rights and obligations flowing from the Kellogg Pact, and
- (b) the maintenance of American rights and interests.

Certainly no complaint can be made about the correctitude of this attitude, particularly as it has been made plain that this Government does not conceive it to be its duty to pass judgment on the antecedent issues of the controversy. Nevertheless the gravamen of the charges made by the Japanese against the United States is that, by assuming the task of defending the peace machinery, the United States is in reality enlisting the support of the world in achieving its ultimate object of driving Japan out of Manchuria.

Once the conflict had broken out, it is obvious that, in view of the construction placed by this Government on

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Kellogg Pact, it had before it only two alternatives: one, to take the position which it did, and, the other, to allow itself to be deterred from taking this position by the probability that Japan would charge the United States with being actuated by ulterior motives. As has been stated by the writer on previous occasions, the grave defect in the Far Eastern policies of this Government since 1909 has been the failure, as opportunity offered, to remove the suspicion of the Japanese that it was not the purpose of this Government to cooperate with China in the elimination of legitimate Japanese rights in Manchuria. This is, however, the more remote issue, and one which cannot, in the existing circumstances, be dealt with until the immediate issue is disposed of.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



December 17th, 1932.
HISTORICAL ADVISOR
Saturday.

DEC 19 1932

DEPT. OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Sir:

As you are aware, the Sino-

Japanese situation has aroused wide-spread interest
in America, and this subject has been chosen for
inter-university debate this year at my college.

I am very interested in the
American attitude, and I would be very grateful for
whatever data you could give me that would best
explain the policy of your Department in this
respect.

Believe me, Sir,

Yours truly,

W. D. Humphrey

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 23 1932.

To the American Consul,
Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada.

The Secretary of State encloses a copy of a letter of December 17, 1932, from W. W. Humphrey, 185 London Street, Sherbrooke, in which Mr. Humphrey requests information regarding the Sino-Japanese situation.

If the Consul perceives no objection, he is requested to transmit to Mr. Humphrey the enclosed copies of Senate Document 55, Seventy-second Congress entitled "Conditions in Manchuria", of the address of the Secretary of State entitled "The Pact of Paris", of the letter of February 23, 1932, to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and of the Treaty regarding principles and policy to be followed in matters concerning China, which was signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. Mr. Humphrey may also be advised that the report on Manchuria of the Committee of Inquiry appointed by the League of Nations, which is known as the Lytton Report may be obtained for forty cents a copy from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, this city. The enclosed copies of price list 65 "Foreign Relations of the United States" and of the pamphlet "Publications of the Department of State" may be sent to Mr. Humphrey and his attention invited to the statement concerning

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

cerning the system of distributing the publications of
 the Department on page one of the latter pamphlet.

Enclosures:

From W. W. Humphrey.
 Publication Nos. 296 and 357.
 Conditions in Manchuria.
 Treaty Series 723.
 Price List 65.
 Publications of the Depart-
 ment of State.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

from Chinese Legation
TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM *Dec 13, 1932*
RECEIVED
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEIJING
DEC 19 1932
DATED DECEMBER 12, 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 13 1932
Department of State

94
Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang reported on the 11th that
Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo at Shanhaikwan wired on the 10th
stating that:

1. Conditions at Shanhaikwan remained as previously reported
although in the night of the ninth the Japanese armored car
fired seven shots. In the neighborhood of Wu-Yen-Cheng,
the Japanese troops repeatedly fired rifle shots while the
Chinese troops stationed there did not return fire.

2. On the ninth two Japanese warships came from the South
and two more were seen at Chingwangtao in the evening.

Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang reported on the same day
that Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo wired to him stating that:

1. At six A. M. of the 10th two Japanese aeroplanes arrived
at Shanhaikwan, flying low ostensibly for the purpose of
investigation.

2. At six-thirty A. M. on the same day over twenty Japanese
soldiers appeared in the neighborhood of Pa-Chiao-Pao, ad-
vancing toward Chiu-Men-Kou.

3. At nine A. M. on the same day Brigadier-General Ho-Chu-
Kuo despatched his chief-of-staff as his representative to con-
fer with the Japanese command, the Japanese forcing him to
acknowledge that the Chinese guards had fired upon the Ja-
panese armored car when it was proceeding toward Yu-Shan-Shui.
The Japanese threatened that otherwise they would give the
infantry and artillery units outside of the Great Wall free-
dom of action. The Chinese representative categorically

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DEC 19 1932

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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refused to acknowledge this allegation, so the negotiation was being held up .

After 5 P. M., the Chinese discovered that about a regiment of Japanese troops, composed of both infantry and artillery men, were constructing works along the Wu-Yen-Cheng --Man-Tou-Shan line outside of the Great Wall. Brigadier-General Ho immediately ordered two officers to advance their troops eastward to prepare against possible Japanese attacks.

At 7 P. M. certain Chinese officers conferred with the Japanese command, paving the way for a settlement of the case between Brigadier-General Ho and the Japanese command. At present, the Japanese and the Chinese troops were maintaining their present positions.

4. The shells fired in the night of the 8th resulted in damages at fourteen places of the City Wall and in wrecking several houses though no casualties had been reported.

5. On the 11th, a telephone ~~communication~~ communication with authorities at Shanhaikwan revealed that this affair between the Chinese and the Japanese had the prospect of being peacefully settled.


The Chinese Legation, Washington
 December 12, 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

from Chinese Legation
Dec. 13. 1932

A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED DECEMBER 16, 1932.



7-94

Report from Peiping stated that Japanese troops were again indulging in hostile activities and intrigues toward Jehol and Shanhaikwan. In the night of December 6, a Japanese armored train opened fire in the direction of Kuopeiyingtse.


Simultaneously, Japanese troops stationed around the Chinchow-Chaoyang line advanced by while the Chinese maintaining calm. General Tang Yu-Lin, Chairman of the Jehol Provincial Government, has instructed the Garrison Commander at these districts to keep close watch on possible developments.

793.94/5655

Despatches from Shanhaikwan stated that late in the night of the 8th., a Japanese armored train fired several volleys which created a panic among the Chinese inhabitants. The Japanese stopped fire only after Ho Chu-kuo, Garrison Commander at Shanhaikwan, protested to the Japanese commander.

Mongolian bandits, led by Japanese and disguised as Chinese, appeared at Lunghualin, Cyuan, Linan, Lintung, and Lupei.

Chinese Legation, Washington
December 10, 1932



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 14 1932
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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December 13, 1932.

CHINESE GOVERNMENT FINANCES

Mr. David Yui stated in the course of a conversation today that T. V. Soong had recently informed him that he expected to find it possible this year to balance China's budget.

SKH


Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 16 1932
Department of State

DEC 19 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 13, 1932.

Conversation.

Mr. David Yui, Prominent Chinese
Y.M.C.A. Leader,

and Mr. Hornbeck.



Present: Mr. Anching Kung, First Secretary
of the Chinese Legation,
Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Hamilton.

793.94

Following lunch Mr. David Yui said that he wished to inform Mr. Hornbeck that he (Mr. Yui) was in the United States partly for reasons of health and partly as the representative of the Shanghai Chinese Citizens Federation; that the Chinese Citizens Federation was composed of representative Chinese business, industrial and educational groups in Shanghai; that he held no Governmental position and was not in the United States on any official mission; that he was, however, not opposed to the present Chinese Government but had contacts with the prominent leaders in the Government, such as T. V. Soong and Chiang Kai-shek; that the Chinese people were very appreciative of the position and action taken by the Department of State and by Secretary Stimson in reference to the situation in the Far East; and that the Chinese people did not expect that the United States would assist China by going to war with Japan. Mr. Hornbeck remarked that he had been given to understand by various persons that China did construe the attitude taken by the United States to mean that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that the United States would go to war with Japan and he inquired whether Mr. Yui was certain in his own mind that China did not have any such expectations. Mr. Yui replied that so far as the Chinese people were concerned he was confident that they did not have any idea that the position and attitude taken by the United States meant that the United States would go to war with Japan. Mr. Yui stated that the Chinese people now realized that they could expect no real help from the League of Nations and that they must in the last analysis assume the responsibility for preventing Japan from effecting a permanent alienation of Chinese territory. Mr. Yui stated further that the method and procedure decided upon by the Shanghai Chinese Citizens Federation and by the Chinese people as a whole were (a) to continue and increase the effectiveness of the anti-Japanese boycott and (b) to assist the Chinese Volunteer Corps in its guerrilla opposition in Manchuria. Mr. Yui stated that the Shanghai Chinese Citizens Federation had recently made a survey of the present status of the anti-Japanese boycott; that the survey indicated that the boycott was only 50% effective in North China, 75% effective in the Yangtze Valley and Central China, and 90% effective in South China. He stated that efforts would be made to increase the effectiveness of the boycott but that it was desired that the Chinese Government should have no connection with the boycott but should leave it to the people. Mr. Yui continued
that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that the above represented the procedure and program which the Chinese people had in mind and that the Chinese people, while committed to that course of action, would of course welcome any suggestions from their friends. He inquired whether Mr. Hornbeck had any suggestions which he might feel in position to offer.

Mr. Hornbeck in reply referred to the very serious problems confronting almost every nation in the world and of the need of a sympathetic approach on the part of every Government in attempting to solve problems of its own which related to the affairs and needs of another Government and people. Referring to Mr. Yui's statement that the Chinese people could expect no help from the League of Nations, Mr. Hornbeck stated that in the present situation the point on which to concentrate attention is not how little the present agencies of peace may seem to accomplish but rather how much worse things might be had not those agencies of peace been at work. After discussing in very general terms the present world situation, Mr. Hornbeck stated that the only specific thing that he could say was that he personally thought that China had followed the right course in referring the matter at an early date to the League of Nations and in so conducting its course as not to cause an actual declaration of war by either party to the dispute. Mr. Hornbeck added that he personally hoped that China would be able to

continue

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

continue in the position which it had taken in those connections. In expressing that hope he stated that he realized how difficult it was for the Chinese Government to adhere to that position with certain factions clamoring for action along other lines.

mmh
MMH/REK

5/14/76

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. *159*

December 18 1932.

To the American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Ambassador at Tokyo a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on December 13, 1932, between Mr. David Yui, prominent Chinese Y.M.C.A. leader, and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria question.


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Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated December 13, 1932.

DEC 17 1932.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. *956*

December 18 1932.

To the American Minister,
 Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Minister at Peiping a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on December 13, 1932, between Mr. David Yui, prominent Chinese Y.M.C.A. leader, and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria question.

793.94/5656


Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated December 13, 1932.

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FE

W. H. W.



W. H. W.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 DEC 28 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conversation.

December 27, 1932.



Mr. Frank Lee, of the
 Chinese Legation.

Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Manchuria situation -- Jehol.

Mr. Lee inquired whether the Department had any new information with regard to Jehol. Mr. Hornbeck replied that we had a telegram quoting a Reuter despatch circulated in the Far East saying that military operations in the Jehol area were apparently impending; also that the newspapers this morning had had something on the subject; but that we had nothing official. Mr. Lee said that it looked as though such operations were likely soon to begin. He said that if the Japanese made an attack, China would resist and that it would be with regular forces as distinguished from irregulars. He said that it looked to him as though China and Japan are "drifting toward war" although it "may be that at no time will war be declared." The Chinese recognize, he said, that the Japanese may be able for the time being to defeat Chinese armed forces and to seize what they choose to seize, but in the long run the Chinese would wear them down. He said that he saw no reason to believe that economic factors in Japan would in

the

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JAN 10 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the appreciably near future "break" the Japanese. Only the test of force, as between China and Japan, would be conclusive. He said that the attitude of the Chinese on the subject of the boycott would almost surely cause the Japanese to intensify their military operations. That, in turn, would increase the will of the Chinese to resist and would result in increased activity of resistance on their part.


THE RECORDS OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1975

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EJ



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA N.R.

FROM Dated December 30, 1932

Recd. 6 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1407. December 30, 5 p.m.

Reuter from Tokyo today:

"Despatches from Harbin to Japanese press indicate that operations on eastern section of Chinese Eastern Railway have been commenced by the Japanese. Twelve thousand picked Japanese troops are reported to be advancing along railway to attack some ten thousand Kirin troops and volunteers majority of whom are located between Hailin and Suifenho and are holding the railway. These forces are commanded by General Ting Chao and General Li Tu. If Japanese succeed in defeating these men they claim that last remnants of insurgents and bandits in North Manchuria will be exterminated."

JOHNSON

JS

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



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JAN 4 1933

PTT,MD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
FEB 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FEB 13 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 28, 1932.

Conversation:

Mr. Debuchi, Japanese Ambassador; Division of
Mr. Dooman. FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FEB 13 1933
Department of State

793.74
note
7/11/44
C/O
C/O 7/11

As I have known Mr. Debuchi for many years and as we have always maintained fairly cordial relations with each other, particularly when Mr. Debuchi occupied various subordinate positions in the Foreign Office at Tokyo, I asked Mr. Debuchi whether he would receive me. He invited me to call on him at the Japanese Embassy on December 28 at four o'clock.

After a few remarks of a personal nature Mr. Debuchi asked me whether I could not bring forward a suggestion for the solution of the trouble between China and Japan. He said that his stay in Japan had convinced him of the impossibility of expecting any material concession from the Japanese people. "Any government", he added, "which would seriously consider a substantial withdrawal from the position which Japan has now taken would be overthrown in a moment." Even though he knew this to be a fact, he was nevertheless glad to have an opportunity to return to the United States, as he thought he would be now in a better position

F/H/S

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Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -



position to interpret Japan to the United States and the United States to Japan than someone like Mr. Matsuoka who knew only one side of the question and would be tempted to be too brusque. He despaired of being able to see any solution to the difficulty in the immediate future, and he would therefore apply himself to the task of improving the psychological atmosphere. He wondered, however, whether I had any suggestions to offer.

I said that the many years I had spent in Japan had enabled me to understand the Japanese people perhaps a little better than others who had not been in Japan or who had not resided in that country so long as I had; and it was for this reason that I felt constrained to say that, however sympathetic I might feel for the complaints which Japan had against China antecedent to the incident of last year, I did not believe that Japan was going to profit either materially or morally from the manner in which she had proceeded to settle her accounts with China. I reminded Mr. Debuchi that the intelligent classes in Japan were fully aware that Russia was not a cause for any serious anxiety and that, as Russia was not able and would not be able for many years to come to threaten Japan's security, the political importance of Manchuria to Japan is now very much smaller than it is made out by Japanese to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to be. There remain therefore only Japan's economic interests in Manchuria; and I could not see that they were of such importance as to warrant the enormous cost of the military operations and the cost of maintaining order in Manchuria for years to come. Nor did I think the economic interests, which might well have been conserved by other methods, sufficient compensation for the injury to Japan's honor and prestige.

Mr. Debuchi said that he agreed with everything I had said. However, he had just passed through Germany, and he was convinced that it would be a very long time before Germany would be able to threaten the security of France; yet when he passed over to France he found the entire nation obsessed with the idea of security against Germany. In the same way the intelligent classes in Japan realized that their country was perfectly safe so far as Russia is concerned, but that the masses of people, who had been indoctrinated with the idea of security against Russia, did not realize this fact, and that for this reason Manchuria would continue to have a political importance in the minds of the Japanese people. A state of mob psychology prevails in that country and not one of order and reason; and until normal conditions were reestablished he did not believe that it would be possible to rationalize with any good results.

- 4 -



I then asked Mr. Debuchi if the Japanese, who say with confidence that they will be able within a short space of time to place "Manchoukuo" on a firm foundation of popular support, would be prepared to abide by a neutral and impartial examination of the will of the people. I pointed out that the Chinese assert that the vast majority of the people in "Manchoukuo" have never withdrawn their allegiance from China; and it seemed to me that if both sides were confident of the justice of their contentions they would be willing to put their convictions to a test. Mr. Debuchi replied that he thought that this was a good suggestion in principle, but that China and Japan could never agree upon a suitable method of sounding out the will of the people in Manchuria, and that furthermore the Chinese were so lacking in political education and in personal morality that votes could be bought too cheaply and too freely to make a test of this type worth anything.

He said that unfortunately there were always objections to the many suggestions brought forward for a solution. So far as he could see the question could only be solved by the passage of time; and he was certain that within a few years Manchuria would become the paradise of the Far East. He hoped that until then the United States would

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for a few years
would "close its eyes and then give its decision". I said that he was laboring under a delusion if he thought that the American people would be tempted by material consideration, certainly by any material consideration which Manchuria could hold out, to disavow their allegiance to a principle. Mr. Debuchi protested that this was not at all what he had meant to imply. He hoped that the United States would stand fast by the doctrine of non-recognition, which he characterized as a very wise policy because it had averted the head-on collision which threatened last autumn. All he had meant was that the United States should close its eyes for a few years, after which it would have the necessary proof that Japan had acted wisely in severing the cord which tied Manchuria to the trouble-making Nanking Government.

As he saw it, the United States and Japan had accounts against each other; he thought that the wise thing to do would be to leave the accounts open for the time being and not to attempt a settlement immediately, as this would only create the risk of another head-on collision. He said that Japan had an account against the United States with regard to the exclusion law, which Japan charged was a violation of the principle of international amity and the spirit if not the letter of the commercial treaty

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

treaty between the United States and Japan. Japan, he thought very wisely, had left the account open because it did not affect its vital interests; and in the same way he thought that the United States should leave its account open with Japan over Manchuria as Manchuria did not affect the vital interests of the United States. He thought that in time a favorable opportunity would be found for the settlement of both of these questions.

As I was leaving, Mr. Debuchi said that he had been very much surprised by the practice of the Department in publishing in the FOREIGN RELATIONS records of conversations between the Secretary of State and foreign ambassadors. He thought that it was quite proper for the Department to publish official notes and even memoranda of conversations that had been approved by both parties; but he thought that it was hardly fair for the Department to publish records of conversations with foreign ambassadors until an opportunity had been had by each ambassador or chief of mission to see whether or not the record was accurate. He remarked that the last issue of the FOREIGN RELATIONS extended only up to the year 1918, but he said that someday perhaps his son might have to come to the State Department and protest against the records of conversations which Mr. Debuchi had had with Mr. Stinson and Mr. Castle.


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I concurred.
SKB
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

DE



Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94

1. January 2, 2:30 p.m.

Military Attache informs me that it is reported that firing between Chinese and Japanese forces of unknown strength began at Shanhaikwan at 11 a.m. today. Japanese have demanded withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Shanhaikwan. Chinese reinforcements passed through Tientsin last night bound for Shanhaikwan.

JOHNSON

JS

GRAY


FROM

PEIPING via N.R.

Dated January 2, 1933

Rec'd. 5 a.m.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



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
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JAN 4 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH



Secretary of State,

Washington.

2, January 2, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"December 31, 11 a.m. Railway officials have informed me that early this morning three echelons Japanese troops started for Mulinchan on East Line Railway, that nine or ten echelons will be sent and that military motor trucks are going East over land".

JOHNSON

RR

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PEIPING via N.R.

Dated January 2, 1933

FROM Rec'd. 5



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
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GRAY
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COPIES SENT TO
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Dated January 2, 1933

FROM Rec'd. 5 a.m.



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

URGENT. January 2, 2 p.m.

Following has been sent to the Legation.

"January 2, 1 p.m. Considerable tension between Chinese and Japanese at Shanhaikuan has arisen, firing having taken place last night. A clash, extent of which is not yet known, occurred this morning at about 11 o'clock, said to have been between Chinese soldiers and Manchukuo police. Reported, but not yet confirmed, Japanese have demanded withdrawal of all Chinese troops from Shanhaikuan. One train of Chinese soldiers and some artillery passed through Tientsin last night moving towards Shanhaikuan. For several days there has been growing concern over possibility of serious trouble at Shanhaikuan. General Ho returning there to assume immediate charge. Repeated to the Department".

LOCKHART

RR

F/HS


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
RR

GRAY
FROM
Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 2, 1933.

Recd. 12:55 P. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94

3, January 2, 10 P. M.

Information here (not yet confirmed) is that fighting has been proceeding intensively at Shanhaikwan since 1:30 this afternoon and that Japanese intend to serve ultimatum on Chang Hsueh Liang tonight that incident at Shanhaikwan must be settled to satisfaction of Japanese. Railway line reported cut by the Chinese this side of Shanhaikwan.

RR

JOHNSON

JAN 4 1933


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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WP



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping

Dated January 3, 1933

Rec'd 1:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

4, January 3, 1 p. m.

Nakayama of Japanese Legation informed press correspondents this morning that matter of clash at Shanhaikwan had been taken out of Legation's hands and was being handled by the Japanese Commandant at Tientsin who was issuing orders to Commandant of Legation guard here over Legation's head. That a letter was sent last night to Marshal Changhsueh Liang demanding that he accept responsibility for clash at Shanhaikwan and that situation was dangerous as Chinese were refusing to accept conciliatory gestures. Shanhaikwan reported bombed by the Japanese.

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- given to Jan 9/33
to Walter Rippmann

Reopen
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

December 30, 1932.

Mr. Klotz:

793.94

It is my understanding that you desire a statement of precedents for the action taken on January 7, 1932, when this Government notified China and Japan that it would not recognize any de facto situation resulting from acts of those Governments, or any treaty or agreement entered into by them in violation of the Nine Power Treaty or the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact impairing the rights of this Government or its citizens in China.

F/HS
793.94/5663-1/3

I

PROTEST OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
TO JAPAN'S TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ON CHINA IN
1915

In 1915 China and Japan concluded agreements, for the most part imposed upon the former by the latter, containing what is commonly referred to as Japan's twenty-one demands. The demands required, among other things, (1) that China assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may thereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and concessions which, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possessed in relation to the Province of Shantung; (2) that the Chinese Government should not cede or lease within the Province of Shantung or along its coast any territory or island to a third power; (3) that China should approach Japanese capitalists with respect to the building of a railway from Chefoo or Lung Kou to join the Kiaochou-Chinanfu Railway; (4) that the Chinese Government should open to trade and to residence by foreigners certain places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports; (5) that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway should be extended to ninety-nine years; (6) that Japanese subjects should have certain special rights in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; etc., etc.

The original demands of Japan were sent to China on January 18, 1915. Subsequently, the Japanese Government sent an ultimatum on May 7, at 3 p.m., requesting that the terms as then modified be accepted by 6 o'clock on May 9. On May 8 the Chinese Government replied accepting the demands in large measure.

The

-3-

The interests of the American Government in the "open door policy" in China, as well as its treaty rights in China, caused this Government to watch with especial interest the negotiations between China and Japan. On May 11, 1915, three days after the acceptance by China of the terms laid down in Japan's ultimatum, Secretary of State Bryan sent identical notes to the two Governments in the following form:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy." (1915 For. Rels. of the U.S., p. 146.)

The matter was the subject of further consideration at the Peace Conference in 1919, at which time both China and Japan, as members of the Allied and Associated Powers, demanded that the interests in China theretofore belonging to Germany should be surrendered to them. By the Treaty of Versailles, Articles 156, 157, and 158, the rights and concessions formerly held by Germany in Shantung were accorded to

Japan

13
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japan. The matter was reopened, however, at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments in 1922-23. After conversations between the Chinese and Japanese delegates to the Conference, in the presence of American and British "observers", an agreement relative to the Shantung question was reached, the terms of which were in large measure a negation of the Versailles settlement. (Conference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 200, et seq.; I Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, Ch. X, p. 288; II MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, 1216 et seq.)

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II

PROTEST BY GREAT BRITAIN AGAINST THE TREATY
OF SAN STEFANO OF 1878

On March 31, 1878, Russia and Turkey entered into a treaty at San Stefano by which the Sultan gave up all his European territory except Constantinople and its vicinity and Albania and recognized the independence of certain Balkan States. On April 1, 1878, the Government of Great Britain protested against this treaty on the ground that this settlement of the Balkan questions conflicted with the Treaty of Paris of 1856, signed at the conclusion of the Crimean War, and the Convention of London of 1871. The grounds of this protest were embodied in a circular instruction from the British Foreign Office to certain of its diplomatic mission, which contained the following passage:

"By the Declaration annexed to the first Protocol of the Conference held in London in 1871, the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, including Russia, recognized that 'it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement'. It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, without violating the spirit of this Declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognizance of the Powers of Articles in the new Treaty which are modifications of existing Treaty engagements, and inconsistent with them." (International Conventions and Third States, by Ronald F. Roxburgh, p. 35.)

Oppenheim

-6-

Oppenheim, in referring to this incident, has the following to say:

"Russia had concluded the preliminary Peace of San Stefano with defeated Turkey; Great Britain protested because the conditions of this peace were inconsistent with the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Convention of London of 1871, and Russia agreed to the meeting of the Congress of Berlin for the purpose of arranging matters. Had Russia persisted in carrying out the preliminary peace, Great Britain, as well as other signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris and the Convention of London, would doubtless have had a right of intervention."¹
(Oppenheim's Int. Law, 4th Ed. (McNair), Vol. 1, pp. 264-265.)

III

PROTESTS BY GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE AGAINST THE TREATY OF NOVEMBER 6, 1846, BETWEEN AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA

By the Treaty of May 3, 1815, between Austria, Prussia, and Russia the city of Cracow, ancient capital of the Kingdom of Poland, was made a free, independent and neutral city, under the protection of the three contracting parties. The Treaty was later incorporated in the final act of the Congress of Vienna.

During the Prussian insurrection of 1830-31 the town and territory of Cracow were temporarily occupied by the Russian forces; and in 1836 they were again occupied by

Austrian

¹ Another example is provided by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between the United States and Nicaragua of August 5, 1914, granting to the former an exclusive

option

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Austrian troops, under the sanction of the other two protecting powers. Wheaton, in his treatise on the Law of Nations (1845) states that:

* * * In the debate which took place in the house of commons on the 18th of March, 1836, on the motion of Sir Stratford Canning, it was stated by the minister of foreign affairs, Lord Palmerston, that he did not see any sufficient justification of the violent measures which had been adopted against Cracow, a state whose independence it was of as much importance that Great Britain should see was not causelessly and wantonly disturbed, as if the case were that of Prussia or any other powerful nation. In the more recent debate which took place on the 13th of March, 1840, Sir Stratford Canning observed, that the first occupation in 1830, took place under circumstances which though not giving, strictly speaking, the right to interfere, yet might still afford some shadow of excuse for the violation of the treaty of Vienna. The time of the former occupation was small, two months only; the second occupation had been continued for the last four years, notwithstanding the assurances which had been given that it should be temporary. It was not confined to the mere

suppression

option to construct another interoceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory, and a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, and ceding to the former Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island in the Caribbean Sea. The Republics of Costa Rica, San Salvador, and Honduras protested against this treaty on the ground that it violated treaty rights previously acquired by them. Costa Rica and San Salvador brought an action against Nicaragua before the Central American Court of Justice for the purpose of vindicating their rights, and the Court, on September 30, 1916, and March 9, 1917, pronounced judgment against Nicaragua, but, the United States of America not being a party to the litigation, the Court admitted its inability to declare the treaty null and void. * * *

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suppression of military authority in that city. Many civil and political changes had been made, and whilst the forms of a free constitution had been preserved, the supreme power was in fact exercised by the resident representatives of the three great powers. The constitution had been completely changed, the new functionaries had introduced the most arbitrary enactments, substituting their own act in the place of those of the constituted authorities. The police was placed under the controul of Austria, and every functionary was appointed by the conference itself. The whole system of free trade, which had previously existed, was discontinued. In his reply, Lord Palmerston stated, that the grounds, on which the three powers had justified the occupation, were deemed by the British government inconsistent with the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna, to which both France and Great Britain were parties. The British government had accordingly protested against it. But it was one thing to express an opinion, and another to adopt hostile proceedings to compel the three powers to undo what they had done; and there were particular local circumstances, which prevented Great Britain from enforcing her views, except by war; because Cracow was a place inaccessible to the direct action of that country.* * * The British government had, for some time past, endeavoured to urge upon Austria the necessity of withdrawing the occupation which had been established for temporary purposes only; and the answer which had been given was, that this recommendation would be adopted, and that the Austrian government was only waiting for some arrangements to be made with regard to the military force and for the result of certain pending trials. The Austrian government had assured the British government that no permanent occupation was intended, and the only question which remained between the two governments was one of time.¹ (pp. 443,445)

On November 6, 1846, Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to the annexation of Cracow by Austria. Great Britain

¹ Mirror of Parliament, 18 March, 1836. London Morning Chronicle, 14 July, 1840. The city of Cracow has been since evacuated by the Austrian troops.

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Britain and France protested against this as an infringement of the act of the Congress of Vienna, to which these two powers were parties and claimed the right to intervene.

IV

FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 1862-1867

In 1861 naval vessels of England, France, and Spain sailed for Vera Cruz, with the avowed intention of taking possession of the custom houses of two or three Mexican ports for the purpose of satisfying the claims of those Governments. Shortly after the arrival of the ships and the seizure of Vera Cruz the English and Spanish commanders became dissatisfied with the course of the French. The English and Spanish reached an agreement with Mexico with respect to the claims of their Governments and withdrew in April, 1862. Despite the fact that the three European powers had agreed to respect "the rights of the Mexican nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its government" the French, following the departure of the English and Spanish forces from Vera Cruz, presented an ultimatum demanding the payment of \$27,000,000, and soon thereafter began a march upon

Mexico

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Mexico City, which they entered in June, 1863. They set up a provisional government and named an assembly of notables, comp^oised almost exclusively of enemies of the constitutional government of Juarez. In July, 1863, the assembly met and resolved that an empire should be established, that the throne should be offered to Archduke Maximilian of Austria, and that if he should decline the Emperor of France should be asked to fill the vacancy. Maximilian accepted the crown on April 10, 1864, and on the same day a convention was entered into between France and the Imperial Government, by which the latter agreed to pay the French claims and the past and future costs of the intervention under certain conditions. France virtually guaranteed to Maximilian military protection. Maximilian entered the City of Mexico in June, 1864, as Maximilian I. The matter was the subject of extended diplomatic correspondence between this Government and the Government of France and on April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives passed without a dissenting vote a Joint Resolution that "the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico

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Mexico, and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical Government erected on the ruins of any republican Government in America under the auspices of any European Power." (Congressional Globe, Vol. 34, Pt. 2, 38th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 1408.)

On September 6, 1865, Secretary Seward sent an instruction to the American Minister at Paris in which he stated, among other things, that -

"We do not insist or claim that Mexico and the other States on the American continent shall adopt the political institutions to which we are so earnestly attached, but we do hold that the peoples of those countries are entitled to exercise the freedom of choosing and establishing institutions like our own if they are preferred. In no case can we in any way associate ourselves with efforts of any party or nation to deprive the people of Mexico of that privilege." (17 Instructions, France, p. 432, 435-436.)

In a later instruction, dated November 6, 1865, to the Minister at Paris, Secretary Seward stated that the President felt bound to adhere to the opinion just set forth, and added:

"The presence and operations of a French Army in Mexico, and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not on the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the United States. Nevertheless, the objection of the United States is still broader,

and

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and includes the authority itself which the French Army is thus maintaining. The authority is in direct antagonism to the policy of this Government and principle upon which it is founded. Every day's experience of its operations only adds some new confirmation of the justness of the views which this Government expressed at the time the attempt to institute that authority first became known. * * * They are not prepared to recognize or to pledge themselves hereafter to recognize any political institutions in Mexico, which are in opposition to the Republican Government with which we have so long and so constantly maintained relations of amity and friendship.
(467-468)

On November 29, 1865, the French Minister at Washington communicated to ^{Mr} ~~Minister~~ Seward a copy of a translation of a despatch ^{from} ~~to~~ the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the latter indicated that, ^{if} the United States would adopt toward the Mexican Government "an amicable attitude", France would be ready to agree upon the basis of an understanding with this Government. He asked to be assured that it was the intention of the United States "not to impede the consolidation of the new order of things founded in Mexico;" and of this he said the best guarantee would be the recognition of the Emperor Maximilian. Mr. Seward replied on December 6 that the condition which the Emperor suggested was impracticable. He stated that "the ~~real~~ cause of our national discontent ~~is that~~ the French Army, which

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which is now in Mexico, is invading a domestic Republican Government there, which was established by her people, and with whom the United States sympathize most profoundly, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it, and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States, as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions." (8 Notes, France, 175-176.)

In an instruction to the American Minister to France, dated December 16, 1865, Mr. Seward stated that it was the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points: first, that the United States earnestly desired to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Secondly, that this policy would be brought in imminent jeopardy unless France should desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico. (IV Moore's Int. Law Digest, p. 501.)

In a note dated February 12, 1866, to the French Minister at Washington, Secretary Seward stated, among other things, that -

"For

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"* * * For these reasons, it seems to this Government that, in supporting institutions thus established in derogation of the inalienable rights of the people of Mexico, the original purposes and objects of the French expedition, though they have not been, as a military demand of satisfaction, abandoned, nor lost out of view by the Emperor of the French, were nevertheless, let to fall into a condition in which they seem to have become subordinate to a political revolution, which certainly would have not occurred if France had not forcibly intervened, and which, judging from the genius and character of the Mexican people, would not now be maintained by them if that armed intervention should cease. The United States have not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico have spoken and have called into being or accepted the so-called Empire which it is insisted has been set up in their capital. The United States, as I have remarked on other occasions, are of opinion that such an acceptance could not have been freely procured or lawfully taken at any time in the presence of the French army of invasion. The withdrawal of the French forces is deemed necessary to allow such a proceeding to be taken by Mexico. Of course the Emperor of France is entitled to determine the aspect in which the Mexican situation ought to be regarded by him. Nevertheless, the view which I have thus presented is the one which this nation has accepted. It therefore recognizes, and must continue to recognize, in Mexico only the ancient Republic, and it can in no case consent to involve itself, either directly or indirectly, in relations with or recognition of the institution of the Prince Maximilian in Mexico.

It was later agreed that France should withdraw from Mexico. When the ^{time} came for the departure of the first detachment of the French Army, it was intimated that the Emperor had decided to postpone the withdrawal of all his troops until the spring of 1867. Mr. Seward
replied

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replied by cable, dated November 23, 1866, that the United States could not acquiesce in this plan (1) because the term "next spring" was vague and indefinite, (2) because there was no broader guarantee for the withdrawal of the whole force in the spring than there had been for the withdrawal of a part in November, and (3) because such delay would seriously conflict with the plans of the United States. The Emperor also proposed that a provisional government should be formed to the exclusion of both Maximilian and Juarez. This also was declined by Mr. Seward. The Emperor then gave up hope and in February, 1867, the French evacuated the City of Mexico and intervention came to an end. (IV Moore, pp 503-504.)

The foregoing do not purport to be the only instances of the character stated in the beginning of this memorandum, nor has all the data been checked from original sources. The memorandum has been prepared very hurriedly. The scope of the history involved in a single event is such that only brief reference could be made to important historical events, while many significant events were of necessity omitted. While the instances given may not be entirely analogous to the situation which you have in mind, you will of course appreciate that, after all, analogies in international relations are seldom, if ever, as close as might be desired.

Le-GHH:FGS



1
793.94156C3 1/3 11-9-39
493.11/16/4
to Mr. Haldeman
Japanese Military
Occupation of Manchuria

1. In a despatch of April 14, 1933, No. 2739, to the Am. Legation at Peking, it was reported that all outstanding claims of Czechoslovak interests against the Manchurian authorities arising out of the unsettled accounts of the former regime in the Three Eastern Provinces, as well as claims resulting from the disturbances attending the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, have been completely liquidated. [494.60 F - M-1]

2. Liquidation Commission; [excluded claims for lost property]
In a despatch of Dec. 6, 1933, from Am. Consul Gen. W.S. Myers, Mukden, to the Legation at Peking, [493.11/1817] it was stated that the Commission had completed its work; and that "the only Am. claims of those arising [p 4] local governmental Bureau" [p 6] Mr. H.C. Reed, Representative of Am. claimants, submitted the following report, showing names of claimants, ams. claimed & ams. received: [Enc. No 1]

2

In a despatch of August 16, 1933 -
from Am. Consul Gen. Myers, Mukden,
to the Legation at Peking, was
enclosed a list of "17 unheeded"
claims [p 1] ... been obtained. [p 2]

The list follows:

1. The Texas Co. China Ltd., looking at loss
on Sept. 30, 1931, - - - - - Musden \$780
- 2.
- 3.

See 495. 11/16 65- for announcement
of terms of claims settlement by
Com. for the Lig. of clv. Also
list of claims.

See 493. 11/16 39 for dope on
Tung Yung University & San Yu grain
store, also 1627 Le Uenue.

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Enc # 2
 H. J. G. 9/53
 W. H. G. 9/53

MEMORANDUM

December 31, 1932.

The following facts and observations may be useful in regard to the so-called non-recognition doctrine.

1. The text of the doctrine as announced in the January 7 note of the Secretary of State to the Governments of China and Japan is as follows:

"With the recent military operations about Chinchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it can not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

2. The

793.94/5663-2/3

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2. The text of Part I of the Resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, Japan and China abstaining from voting, reads as follows:

"The Assembly, considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to the dispute, more particularly as regards:

(one), the principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;

(two), the undertaking entered into by members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the members of the League;

(three), their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement;

Adopting the principles laid down by the President in office of the Council, Mr. Briand in his declaration of December 10th, 1931;

Recalling the fact that twelve members of the Council again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared 'that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the League of Nations.'

Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of

which

-3-

which 'the high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.'

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it,

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

3. There would seem to be no doubt as to the juridical propriety of the doctrine. When considered in relation to the Nine Power Treaty or Article 10 of the Covenant of the League, the non-recognition doctrine flows almost as a direct legal corollary to the obligations assumed by the parties to those treaties. In fact it might be claimed that a party to those treaties which recognized a state brought about under the conditions under which Manchukuo was established (as found by the Lytton Commission) had violated its own obligations under those treaties.

As far as the Kellogg Pact is concerned, the application of the non-recognition doctrine is entirely justified legally in view of the obligations assumed by the parties thereto and in case the situation which

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it is proposed not to recognize is a result of a clear breach. As to the doubt raised by President Lowell in his article in the April, 1932, issue of Foreign Affairs as to whether the Kellogg Pact is a treaty at all, Secretary Stimson has covered this very fully in his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on August 8.

4. The great practical value of the non-recognition doctrine lies in the fact that it offers a concrete principle around which can be concentrated the attention of the world to the situation and thus constitute a focal point for the mobilization of public opinion and the exertion of moral pressure. In the absence of the disposition on the part of any nation to go further at the present time than the exertion of moral pressure, universal disapprobation of the conduct of a violator of the Pact of Paris or any other relevant treaties is a moral weapon which can not be neglected and which may exert in the passage of time a very powerful effect. It is not too much to say that already this moral force has given evidence of its power as a factor in getting the Japanese troops out of Shanghai. It will be remembered that the official spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office was quoted as saying that one reason for the withdrawal was to avoid the odium which the rest of the world was

directing

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directing against Japan.

The non-recognition doctrine serves as a most effective agency for maintaining interest in and vitalizing the moral force thus exerted.

5. While not as important as the consideration above discussed, the non-recognition doctrine if applied by a substantial number of nations, may result in serious practical inconveniences to the nation against which it is applied. Thus for example, it is not likely that loans or other financial aid would be given by citizens of countries who have adopted the non-recognition policy to a nation against which it is directed. This result over a period of time will exert an influence of considerable importance.

6. The non-recognition doctrine does not necessarily mean that only a restoration of the status quo will cause its withdrawal. The essence of the doctrine is that the nations of the world have committed themselves to the principle that a violator of these important treaties shall not unjustly enrich himself or profit from his delinquency. Any solution of the immediate problem which satisfies the requirements of justice in the case would justify a removal of the ban.

7. It is, of course, true that the application of
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the doctrine, while it is being applied, may result in many inconveniences and will give rise to many practical problems of difficult character. These will have to be met as they arise in a practical way. The governments are accustomed to handling de facto situations and solving problems which arise in connection with them although authoritative recognition of the de facto situation is withheld.

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Enc 3
Letter Jan 9/33
to Root (Extract of speech given by Elihu Root, April 24,
1908. The American Journal of International
Law, 1908, Vol. 2, pp. 455-457).

"There is no civilized country now which is not sensitive to this general opinion, none that is willing to subject itself to the discredit of standing brutally on its power to deny to other countries the benefit of recognized rules of right conduct. The deference shown to this international public opinion is in due proportion to a nation's greatness and advance in civilization. The nearest approach to defiance will be found among the most isolated and least civilized of countries, whose ignorance of the world prevents the effect of the world's opinion; and in every such country internal disorder, oppression, poverty, and wretchedness mark the penalties which warn mankind that the laws established by civilization for the guidance of national conduct can not be ignored with impunity.

"National regard for international opinion is not caused by amour propre alone - not merely by desire for the approval and good opinion of mankind. Underlying the desire for approval and the aversion to general condemnation with nations as with the individual, there is a deep sense of interest, based partly upon the knowledge that mankind backs its opinions by its conduct and that nonconformity to the standard of nations means condemnation and isolation, and partly upon the knowledge that in the give and take of international affairs it is better for every nation to secure the protection of the law by complying with it than to forfeit the law's benefits by ignoring it.

"Beyond all this there is a consciousness that in the most important affairs of nations, in their political status, the success of their undertakings and their processes of development, there is an indefinite and almost mysterious influence exercised by the general opinion of the world regarding the nation's character and conduct. The greatest and strongest governments recognize this influence and act with reference to it. They dread the moral isolation created by general adverse opinion and the unfriendly feeling that accompanies it, and they desire general approval and the kindly feeling that goes with it.

"This is quite independent of any calculation upon a physical enforcement of the opinion of others. It is difficult to say just why such opinion is of importance, because it is always difficult to analyze the action of moral forces; but it remains true and is universally recognized that the nation which has with it the moral

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force of the world's approval is strong, and the nation which rests under the world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power.

"These are the considerations which determine the course of national conduct regarding the vast majority of questions to which are to be applied the rules of international law. The real sanction which enforces those rules is the injury which inevitably follows nonconformity to public opinion; while, for the occasional and violent or persistent lawbreaker, there always stands behind discussion the ultimate possibility of war, as the sheriff and the policeman await the occasional and comparatively rare violators of municipal law.

"Of course, the force of public opinion can be brought to bear only upon comparatively simple questions and clearly ascertained and understood rights. Upon complicated or doubtful questions, as to which judgment is difficult, each party to the controversy can maintain its position of refusing to yield to the other's arguments without incurring public condemnation. Upon this class of questions the growth of arbitration furnishes a new and additional opportunity for opinion to act; because, however complicated the question in dispute may be, the proposition that it should be submitted to an impartial tribunal is exceedingly simple, and the proposition that the award of such a tribunal shall be complied with is equally simple, and the nation which refuses to submit a question properly the subject of arbitration naturally invites condemnation.

"Manifestly, this power of international public opinion is exercised not so much by governments as by the people of each country whose opinions are interpreted in the press and determine the country's attitude towards the nation whose conduct is under consideration. International opinion is the consensus of individual opinion in the nations. The most certain way to promote obedience to the law of nations and to substitute the power of opinion for the power of armies and navies is, on the one hand, to foster that 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind' which found place in the great Declaration of 1776, and, on the other hand, to spread among the people of every country a just appreciation of international rights and duties and a knowledge of the principles and rules of international law to which national conduct ought to conform; so that the general opinion, whose approval or condemnation supplies the sanction for the law, may be sound and just and worthy of respect."

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Considering that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the League, above referred to, are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is one of the cornerstones of the peace organization of the world and under Article 2 of

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which 'the high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.'

Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which has been referred to it,

Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

3. There would seem to be no doubt as to the juridical propriety of the doctrine. When considered in relation to the Nine Power Treaty or Article 10 of the Covenant of the League, the non-recognition doctrine flows almost as a direct legal corollary to the obligations assumed by the parties to those treaties. In fact it might be claimed that a party to those treaties which recognized a state brought about under the conditions under which Manchukuo was established (as found by the Lytton Commission) had violated its own obligations under those treaties.

As far as the Kellogg Pact is concerned, the application of the non-recognition doctrine is entirely justified legally in view of the obligations assumed by the parties thereto and in case the situation which

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directing against Japan.

The non-recognition doctrine serves as a most effective agency for maintaining interest in and vitalizing the moral force thus exerted.

5. While not as important as the consideration above discussed, the non-recognition doctrine if applied by a substantial number of nations, may result in serious practical inconveniences to the nation against which it is applied. Thus for example, it is not likely that loans or other financial aid would be given by citizens of countries who have adopted the non-recognition policy to a nation against which it is directed. This result over a period of time will exert an influence of considerable importance.

6. The non-recognition doctrine does not necessarily mean that only a restoration of the status quo will cause its withdrawal. The essence of the doctrine is that the nations of the world have committed themselves to the principle that a violator of these important treaties shall not unjustly enrich himself or profit from his delinquency. Any solution of the immediate problem which satisfies the requirements of justice in the case would justify a removal of the ban.

7. It is, of course, true that the application of

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the doctrine, while it is being applied, may result in many inconveniences and will give rise to many practical problems of difficult character. These will have to be met as they arise in a practical way. The governments are accustomed to handling de facto situations and solving problems which arise in connection with them although authoritative recognition of the de facto situation is withheld.

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(Extract of speech given by Elihu Root, April 24, 1908. The American Journal of International Law, 1908, Vol. 2, pp. 455-457).

"There is no civilized country now which is not sensitive to this general opinion, none that is willing to subject itself to the discredit of standing brutally on its power to deny to other countries the benefit of recognized rules of right conduct. The deference shown to this international public opinion is in due proportion to a nation's greatness and advance in civilization. The nearest approach to defiance will be found among the most isolated and least civilized of countries, whose ignorance of the world prevents the effect of the world's opinion; and in every such country internal disorder, oppression, poverty, and wretchedness mark the penalties which warn mankind that the laws established by civilization for the guidance of national conduct can not be ignored with impunity.

"National regard for international opinion is not caused by amour propre alone - not merely by desire for the approval and good opinion of mankind. Underlying the desire for approval and the aversion to general condemnation with nations as with the individual, there is a deep sense of interest, based partly upon the knowledge that mankind backs its opinions by its conduct and that nonconformity to the standard of nations means condemnation and isolation, and partly upon the knowledge that in the give and take of international affairs it is better for every nation to secure the protection of the law by complying with it than to forfeit the law's benefits by ignoring it.

"Beyond all this there is a consciousness that in the most important affairs of nations, in their political status, the success of their undertakings and their processes of development, there is an indefinite and almost mysterious influence exercised by the general opinion of the world regarding the nation's character and conduct. The greatest and strongest governments recognize this influence and act with reference to it. They dread the moral isolation created by general adverse opinion and the unfriendly feeling that accompanies it, and they desire general approval and the kindly feeling that goes with it.

"This is quite independent of any calculation upon a physical enforcement of the opinion of others. It is difficult to say just why such opinion is of importance, because it is always difficult to analyze the action of moral forces; but it remains true and is universally recognized that the nation which has with it the moral

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force of the world's approval is strong, and the nation which rests under the world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power.

"These are the considerations which determine the course of national conduct regarding the vast majority of questions to which are to be applied the rules of international law. The real sanction which enforces those rules is the injury which inevitably follows nonconformity to public opinion; while, for the occasional and violent or persistent lawbreaker, there always stands behind discussion the ultimate possibility of war, as the sheriff and the policeman await the occasional and comparatively rare violators of municipal law.

"Of course, the force of public opinion can be brought to bear only upon comparatively simple questions and clearly ascertained and understood rights. Upon complicated or doubtful questions, as to which judgment is difficult, each party to the controversy can maintain its position of refusing to yield to the other's arguments without incurring public condemnation. Upon this class of questions the growth of arbitration furnishes a new and additional opportunity for opinion to act; because, however complicated the question in dispute may be, the proposition that it should be submitted to an impartial tribunal is exceedingly simple, and the proposition that the award of such a tribunal shall be complied with is equally simple, and the nation which refused to submit a question properly the subject of arbitration naturally invites condemnation.

"Manifestly, this power of international public opinion is exercised not so much by governments as by the people of each country whose opinions are interpreted in the press and determine the country's attitude towards the nation whose conduct is under consideration. International opinion is the consensus of individual opinion in the nations. The most certain way to promote obedience to the law of nations and to substitute the power of opinion for the power of armies and navies is, on the one hand, to foster that 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind' which found place in the great Declaration of 1776, and, on the other hand, to spread among the people of every country a just appreciation of international rights and duties and a knowledge of the principles and rules of international law to which national conduct ought to conform; so that the general opinion, whose approval or condemnation supplies the sanction for the law, may be sound and just and worthy of respect."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 31, 1932.

Dear Mr. Lippmann:

I understand the Secretary had a talk with you in New York yesterday. I am sending you certain data which you may be glad to have. It is as follows:

1. Copy of the Secretary's speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on August 8. You probably already have a copy of this.
2. Text of the resolution prepared by the Committee of Nineteen on December 15 for adoption by the Assembly. As you know before this resolution was presented to the Assembly, it was decided to consult with the Chinese and Japanese representatives in an effort to procure their assent. The Japanese have not given their assent and the matter has gone over until January. The text of this proposed resolution has never been made public and was given to us confidentially.
3. Text of "statement of reasons" which the Committee of Nineteen was to present to the Assembly together with the proposed resolution but which like the resolution has now been withheld. This also was given to us in confidence.
4. Text of a short resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 15 thanking the Commission of Inquiry for its work.

5. Text

Walter Lippmann, Esquire,
New York Herald Tribune,
New York, New York.

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5. Text of the resolution adopted by the Committee of Nineteen on December 19 adjourning its meetings until January 18.
6. Confidential report from Geneva to the Department of State of the proceedings of the last meeting of the Committee of Nineteen. This may be of interest to you. It is, of course, confidential.

With kindest regards,

Yours very sincerely,

Special Assistant to the Secretary.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6ma #2
 letter of Dec 31/32
 to World Pippman

December 15, 1932.

Draft resolution No. One.

The Assembly recognizing that according to the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant its first duty is to endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and that consequently it is not at present called upon to draw up a report stating the facts of the dispute and its recommendations in regard thereto;

Considering that by its resolution of March 11th, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute;

Affirms that in such a settlement the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty must be respected;

Decides to set up a committee whose duty will be to conduct, in conjunction with the parties, the negotiations with a view to a settlement, on the basis of the principles set out in chapter 9 of the report of the Commission of Inquiry and having regard to the suggestions made in chapter 10 of that report;

Appoints, to form that committee, the members of the League represented on the Special Committee of Nineteen;

Considering

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Considering it desirable that the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. should consent to take part in the negotiations, entrusts to the above-mentioned committee the duty of inviting the Governments of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. to take part in the negotiations;

Authorizes it to take such measures as it may deem necessary for the successful execution of its mission;

Requests the Committee to report progress before March 1st, 1933.

The Committee which has not power to fix in agreement with the two parties the time limit referred to in the Assembly resolution of July 1st, 1932; should the two parties fail to agree on the duration of such a time limit the Committee will, simultaneously with the presentation of its report, submit proposals to the Assembly on the subject.

The Assembly shall remain in session, and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure # 3
 HAN. of Dec 31/32
 to Walter Lippmann

December 15, 1932.

Herewith follows text of statement of reasons
 adopted this afternoon by Committee of Nineteen:

"The Assembly in its resolution of December 8th
 requested its Special Committee:

One. To study the report of the Commission of
 Inquiry, the observations of the parties, and the opinion
 and suggestions expressed in the Assembly, in whatever
 form they were submitted.

Two. To draw up proposals with a view to the
 settlement of the dispute brought before it under the
 Council resolution dated February 19, 1932.

Three. To submit these proposals to the Assembly
 at the earliest possible moment.

If the Committee had hoped that to lay before the
 Assembly a picture of events and an appreciation of the
 general situation, it will have found all the elements
 necessary for such a statement in the first eight
 chapters of the report of the Commission of Inquiry,
 which in its opinion constitute a balanced, impartial
 and complete statement of the principal facts.

But the time has not come for such a statement.
 In accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the
 Covenant,

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By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Covenant, the Assembly must first of all endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute by conciliation, and if such efforts are successful, it shall publish a statement giving such facts as it may deem appropriate. If it fails, it is its duty, in virtue of paragraph 4 of the same article, to make a statement of the facts of the dispute and recommendations in regard thereto.

So long as the efforts on the basis of Article 15 paragraph 3, are continued, a sense of the responsibilities placed on the Assembly in the various contingencies provided for in the Covenant obliges it to maintain a reserve. Hence the Committee has confined itself, in the draft resolution which it is today submitting to the Assembly, to making proposals with a view to conciliation.

By the Assembly's resolution of March 11th the Special Committee was instructed to endeavor to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties. Since on the other hand it is desirable that the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. should join in the efforts made in collaboration with the representatives of the parties, it is proposed that the governments of these two countries should be invited to take part in the negotiations.

In order

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In order to avoid misunderstandings and to make it plain that what is contemplated at the present stage with the cooperation of two countries not members of the League is solely the negotiation of a settlement by conciliation, the Special Committee suggests that it should be regarded for this purpose as a new committee responsible for conducting negotiations and should be authorized in this capacity to invite the governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to take part in its meetings.

The Negotiation Committee will have all the powers necessary for the execution of its mission. In particular it may consult experts. It may, if it thinks fit, delegate part of its powers to one or more sub-committees or to one or more particularly qualified persons.

The members of the Negotiations Committee will be guided as regards matters of law by parts one and two of the Assembly resolution of March 11, 1932, and as regards matters of fact by the findings set out in the first eight chapters of the report of the Commission of Inquiry. As regards the solutions to be considered, they will seek them on the basis of the principles set out in chapter nine of the report of the Commission of Inquiry and having regard to the suggestions made in chapter ten of the said report.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In this connection the Committee of Nineteen considers that, in the special circumstance which characterizes the dispute, a mere return to the conditions previous to September, 1931, would not suffice to ensure a durable settlement, and that the maintenance and recognition of the new regime in Manchuria could not be regarded as a solution."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure #4
letter of Dec. 31/32
W. Walter Rippmann

December 15, 1932.

Draft resolution No. Two.

The Assembly thanks the Commission of Inquiry appointed in virtue of the Council's resolution of December 10th, 1931, for the valuable assistance it has afforded to the League of Nations and declares that its report will stand as an example of conscientious and impartial work.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gusigian NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure #5
 letter of Dec 31
 to Walter Rippmann

December 19, 1932.

The following text was adopted by the drafting committee this afternoon and will be presented to the Committee of 19 tomorrow where it is anticipated no opposition will be met.

"In conformity with the mission entrusted to it by the Assembly's resolution of December 9th, 1932, the Committee of 19 drew up certain texts indicating generally the basis on which conciliation between the contending parties must be effected and the procedure to be followed with that object. These texts which took the form of two draft resolutions and a statement of reasons were brought to the knowledge of the parties through the chairman of the committee and the Secretary General. Both parties presented observations. The ensuing conversations will require a certain amount of time.

In these circumstances the Committee recognizing that it must continue its efforts to arrive at an agreement on so grave a question thought it expedient in order to allow the aforesaid conversations to be pursued to defer its meetings to January 16th at the latest.

The Committee decided not to publish the texts referred to above so long as conversations upon them are proceeding with the parties."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enc. #6
Letter of Dec 21/3 -
Walter H. Hoffman

December 20, 1932.

The following is a summary of memorandum from Sweetser with regard to today's concluding meeting of the Committee of 19.

The Secretary General reported recent negotiations he and the President of the drafting committee had carried on with the two parties to the dispute. Drummond stated Japanese delegation had presented its own preliminary views on the drafting committee's proposals which had been transmitted to Tokyo as the instructions which the delegation hoped would be given them. The Japanese delegation had been informed that these suggestions would surely be quite unacceptable to the Committee of 19 and that the drafting committee therefore would not present them to the Committee of 19. The Japanese had then indicated that this was not their last word and that they would ask for further instructions. The Secretary General hoped these would be more conciliatory.

The Chinese seemed generally to accept committee's texts but did not desire to commit themselves finally until learning whether the Japanese were in agreement.

The Turkish delegation asked for further details regarding the points of difficulty. Drummond then explained the Japanese objections as follows:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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One. Objections to two of ten principles in chapter nine regarding autonomy and demilitarization of Manchuria, and Chinese sovereignty.

Two. Objection to the description of first eight chapters as a clear and impartial exposition of the facts.

Three. Objection to the last paragraph in the "statement of reasons" regarding recognition.

Four. Objection to the invitation to the United States and Russia.

Five. Objections to various other questions of a formal procedural nature.

Drummond's explanations to the Turkish delegation continued to the effect that when the Japanese had presented these very important points of substance and had stated that they had suggested them to Tokyo as their instructions Drummond had informed the Japanese that the divergencies were so great between the Japanese point of view and that of the committee that any more delay along these lines was pardonable. The Japanese delegation had accordingly communicated to their government that the Committee of 19 were unprepared to yield in any way. Before, however, this second telegram could reach Tokyo a reply had come from the Japanese Government to the first telegram giving the Japanese delegation the original instructions for which they had asked. There had not been time for a reply to
the

-3-

the second telegram but the Secretary General hoped it might modify the Japanese Government's first decision which had been based entirely on the views of the Japanese delegation.

Regarding the Chinese there had been only a short telegram expressing disappointment mainly because the Nanking Government had hoped for a pronouncement of judgment instead of an attempt at conciliation. The Chinese delegation, however, understood the reasons therefor and were apparently prepared to accept the committee's texts without fundamental change.

In his statement in the Committee of 19 the Secretary General emphasized that if there had been any delay it was not at all due to the Chinese who would naturally want to wait until learning of Japanese acceptance in principle.

The President of the Committee of 19 then read the text of the agreement for adjournment as proposed by the drafting committee.

Lester, Ireland, emphasized that the Japanese were diametrically opposed to the committee on every point and that he thought it very important that if adjournment were agreed to it should be made very clear that this was one more demonstration of the League's constant purpose of being conciliatory.

Lange

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Lange, Norway, strongly supported this viewpoint.
Weissacker, Germany, emphasized the extreme desirability
for secrecy in order to allow for negotiation.

The various communiques and adjournment by Committee
of 19 were agreed upon.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

December 15, 1932.

Draft resolution No. One.

The Assembly recognizing that according to the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant its first duty is to endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and that consequently it is not at present called upon to draw up a report stating the facts of the dispute and its recommendations in regard thereto;

Considering that by its resolution of March 11th, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute;

Affirms that in such a settlement the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty must be respected;

Decides to set up a committee whose duty will be to conduct, in conjunction with the parties, the negotiations with a view to a settlement, on the basis of the principles set out in chapter 9 of the report of the Commission of Inquiry and having regard to the suggestions made in chapter 10 of that report;

Appoints, to form that committee, the members of the League represented on the Special Committee of Nineteen;

Considering

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Considering it desirable that the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. should consent to take part in the negotiations, entrusts to the above-mentioned committee the duty of inviting the Governments of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. to take part in the negotiations;

Authorizes it to take such measures as it may deem necessary for the successful execution of its mission;

Requests the Committee to report progress before March 1st, 1933.

The Committee which has not power to fix in agreement with the two parties the time limit referred to in the Assembly resolution of July 1st, 1932; should the two parties fail to agree on the duration of such a time limit the Committee will, simultaneously with the presentation of its report, submit proposals to the Assembly on the subject.

The Assembly shall remain in session, and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"The Assembly in its resolution of December 9th
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One. To study the report of the Commission of
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By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In this connection the Committee of Nineteen considers that, in the special circumstance which characterizes the dispute, a mere return to the conditions previous to September, 1931, would not suffice to ensure a durable settlement, and that the maintenance and recognition of the new regime in Manchuria could not be regarded as a solution."

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

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In these circumstances the Committee recognizing that it must continue its efforts to arrive at an agreement on so grave a question thought it expedient in order to allow the aforesaid conversations to be pursued to defer its meetings to January 16th at the latest.

The Committee decided not to publish the texts referred to above so long as conversations upon them are proceeding with the parties."

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The Chinese seemed generally to accept committee's texts but did not desire to commit themselves finally until learning whether the Japanese were in agreement.

The Turkish delegation asked for further details regarding the points of difficulty. Drummond then explained the Japanese objections as follows:

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One. Objections to two of ten principles in chapter nine regarding autonomy and demilitarization of Manchuria, and Chinese sovereignty.

Two. Objection to the description of first eight chapters as a clear and impartial exposition of the facts.

Three. Objection to the last paragraph in the "statement of reasons" regarding recognition.

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Drummond's explanations to the Turkish delegation continued to the effect that when the Japanese had presented these very important points of substance and had stated that they had suggested them to Tokyo as their instructions Drummond had informed the Japanese that the divergencies were so great between the Japanese point of view and that of the committee that any more delay along these lines was pardonable. The Japanese delegation had accordingly communicated to their government that the Committee of 19 were unprepared to yield in any way. Before, however, this second telegram could reach Tokyo a reply had come from the Japanese Government to the first telegram giving the Japanese delegation the original instructions for which they had asked. There had not been time for a reply to
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The President of the Committee of 19 then read the text of the agreement for adjournment as proposed by the drafting committee.

Lester, Ireland, emphasized that the Japanese were diametrically opposed to the committee on every point and that he thought it very important that if adjournment were agreed to it should be made very clear that this was one more demonstration of the League's constant purpose of being conciliatory.

Lange

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Weizsacker, Germany, emphasized the extreme desirability
for secrecy in order to allow for negotiation.

The various communiques and adjournment by Committee
of 19 were agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 9, 1933.

Dear Mr. Lippmann:

I enclose another copy of your letter from Allen Klots and the enclosures.

The New York TIMES today printed the text of the proposed League resolution which he enclosed to you as confidential. I also enclose a copy of a memorandum by the Legal Adviser, also one by Mr. Klots, and finally one by myself in regard to some of the points involved in the general issue of the non-recognition doctrine. I also enclose an extract of an address given by Elihu Root on April 24, 1908.

On reading President Lowell's speech this morning it seems to me a little muddy and disappointing for as clear a presentation as he ought to make. I covered most of his arguments in my enclosed memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES GRAFTON ROUGEMAN

Enclosures.

Walter Lippmann, Esquire,
 245 East 61st Street,
 New York, New York.

JGR HWC




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET



FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 3, 1933

Rec'd 8:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1, January 3, 7 p. m.

Newspaper extras report fighting between Japanese

and Chinese at Shanhaikwan last night and today and state
that the Japanese have occupied the walled city there.
Details are lacking, because in addition to the usual
censorship, which seems to be exceptionally severe, the
government offices are practically closed due to the New
Year holidays. No information as to the numbers of troops
or the units involved or the casualties is obtainable.
The news agencies report the issue of a communique by the
War Department to the effect that the Japanese have no
intention of taking military action south of the Great
Wall and that the Chinese have provoked the present trouble.
I understand that a statement issued by General Muto has
been cabled to the American press.

It is reported that the members of the Japanese Cab-
inet have been hurriedly recalled from their vacations for
an emergency meeting tomorrow morning. Repeated to Peiping.

RR-HPD

GREW

F/HS

793.94/5664

793.94
note
894.002

FILED

JAN 4 1933



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET



GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 3, 1933

Rec'd 8:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

January 3, 7 p. m.

Following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 3, 7 p. m. My January 3, 3 p. m. Japanese military headquarters at Tientsin announce that Shanhaikuan was occupied at 4 p. m. today and that Japanese troops now pursuing retreating Chinese forces. Repeated to Department".

WSR-KLP

LOCKHART

793.94/5665

F/HS

JAN 4 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.20225/6 FOR Despatch # 1337.

FROM Chile (Norweb) DATED Dec. 20, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Pamphlets on the Sino-Japanese crisis
distributed by the Japanese Legation
in Chile.

hs

793.94/5666
JLH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Santiago, Chile, December 20, 1932.

No. 1337

Subject: Distribution by Japanese Legation in Santiago of
Literature on Manchurian Situation.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1312, November 21, 1932,
reporting the activities of the Japanese Legation here in
disseminating pro-Japanese material in connection with the
Manchurian situation, I have the honor to report that the Japanese
Minister has widely distributed throughout Santiago the following
three pamphlets:

"Debunking the Open Door Policy," by George Brecken Ray

"An Address on Manchuria Its Past and Present and Reply to
Prof. Shunkei-Kan's Criticisms and Observations," by
Yosuke Katsushika, Kyoto, Japan, 1928;

"Current Comment on Events in China", containing articles
entitled, "The Sino-Japanese Crisis" Being a Reprint of
a Selection of Articles Appearing in "The Shanghai Evening
Post and Mercury," Oct. 1931-June 1932, by H.H.G. Woodhead, C.B.E.

These

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

These booklets came through the open mail with a slip on which was printed "With the compliments of the Japanese Minister." I understand that the Foreign Office, the entire Diplomatic Corps, the newspapers, universities and many of the schools have received copies of these publications in Spanish although I have not yet actually seen a copy other than in English. Apparently the radio is also being used to present the Japanese case. Last week a Professor of the University of Concepcion gave a talk on the Far Eastern situation distinctively favorable to the Japanese viewpoint.

Respectfully yours,

R. Henry Horweb,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

800-Manchuria.

RHH-2P

A true copy of
the original
28

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 3, 1933.

FE considered whether, on the basis of the attached telegram, any action should be taken in regard to the American army forces at Chinwangtao and it was decided that any action that seemed advisable and appropriate would be taken by the senior American army officer at Tientsin or by the American Minister and that no action by the Department was called for. Note was made of the fact that a copy of the telegram had been sent to MID of the War Department.

W.W.H.


MMH:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 3, 1933

Rec'd 11:25 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 3, 4 p. m.

Following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 3, 3 p. m. Latest advices from Chatwood military officer at Chinwangtao report Japanese have demanded removal of all Chinese troops to Changli. Japanese ships shelled Shanhaikuan between three and twelve o'clock today. Chinese troops moving down and it is feared Japanese may shell Chinwangtao as Japanese vessel is now there. Japanese women and children have been evacuated. Chinese armored train is at Chinwangtao near American army camp where there are about twenty men and one officer. The situation in Shanhaikuan-Chinwangtao area is very critical and it seems apparently Japanese are determined now to drive Chinese to a point this side of Lwanchow. Repeated to the Department".

WSB-KLP

LOCKHART

F/HS

793.94/5667

JAN 5 1933

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793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM Peiping

Dated January 3, 1933

Rec'd 9:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

5, January 3, 5 p. m.

One. General Tang aide to Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang,
has just called. He handed me a typewritten statement as
follows:

"January 1st: At half past nine in the evening some
Japanese plain clothes men opened fire in the direction of
Shanhaikwan city wall, after a few minutes some Japanese
soldiers threw a bomb at the Shanhaikwan station and simul-
taneously the Manchukuo police opened several tens of shots.
Our Shanhaikwan headquarters immediately sent over the Chief
of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs to question the Japanese
why the fire had been opened. In reply the Japanese argued
that we had fired upon them first producing the smashed win-
dow panes of their gendarmery quarter as an evidence; and at
the same time demanded us to ask Shanhaikwan residents to
leave and our defense corps at Nankwan (south gate of Shan-
haikwan) to withdraw. We refused entirely.

January 2nd: About ten o'clock in the morning two

Japanese



793.94/5668

FILED

AM 4 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#5 from Peiping, January 3, 1933,
5 p. m.

Japanese armoured trains fired again in the direction of Shanhaikwan city and about 200 soldiers climbed up the city wall by wooden ladders. Finally they failed getting into the city because for the sake of self-defense we resisted them with big swords and grenades.

About mid-noon three Japanese armored trains loaded with about 3,000 men and over 20 canons arrived at Shanhaikwan; and they attacked us seriously from Wouyenchen (outside of Shanhaikwan).

At three o'clock in the afternoon six Japanese bombing planes circled around the city throwing down many bombs; consequently many Chinese were slaughtered and wounded.

At midnight the firing still could be heard". He stated that fighting was still going on.

Two. French Minister and British Charge d'Affaires met with me this afternoon to discuss situation and we agreed that situation was serious but that until more was known it was too soon to reach any conclusions. All is quiet here and at Tientsin.

Three. British Charge d'Affaires informs me of receipt of telegram from Tokyo stating that British Military Attache was informed at General Staff headquarters that commanders-in-chief in Manchuria and Tientsin have been instructed to localize incident but that Japanese would have to consider

counter-measures

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#5 from Peiping, January 3, 1933,
5 p. m.

counter-measures if Chinese made further attacks.

Four. At a military conference at Tientsin last night Japanese commandant is reported to have stated that Japanese objectives were Jehol and Shanhaikwan. My estimate of the situation is that Japanese intend to occupy and hold Shanhaikwan in connection with efforts to occupy Jehol. Chinese are evidently determined to resist.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WSB-HPD


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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WP

FROM LAIN




Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 3:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



793.94

7, January 4, 10 a. m.
Reuter from Tokyo, third

"Declaring that clash at Shanhaikwan is outcome of decision reached at recent third plenary session of Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang in Nanking aiming to provoke Japan to fight and thereby compel League of Nations to act, the War Office in a statement to the press reviews recent developments in support of its contention. Statement asserts challenging attitude of Chinese troops finally culminated in Chinese Ninth Brigade firing on Japanese who were compelled to reply despite their anxiety to avoid any action liable to lead to misunderstandings with foreign troops stationed in Shanhaikwan area. Declaring that Japanese army will take no steps to aggravate situation unless compelled the War Office asserts that future developments depend entirely on attitude of China".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94/5669

FILED
JAN 5 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 1:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

8, January 4, 11 a. m.

My 4, January 3, 11 a. m.



I am informed this morning that Marshal Chang replied to Japanese letter stating in substance that he considered affair at Shanhaikwan a national emergency and not a local event and informed Japanese Commandant at Tientsin that other communications on the subject should be made direct to National Government at Nanking. Reply enumerates events as Chinese know them, claims Japanese must bear responsibility for initiating action.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94/5670

JAN 5 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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cib

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via NR

Dated January 4, 1933.

Recd 4:55 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.

9, January 4, noon.

Following from Mukden



"January 3, 4 p.m. Local Japanese official source explains the recent Shanhaikwan incidents as follows: On January first Japanese and Manchukuo Shanhaikwan garrisons were thrice bombed and shot at by Chinese troops. When in consequence the small Japanese force of about 100 advanced towards the south gate it was fired upon with resulting casualties including one lieutenant. The Japanese then occupied a part of the city. The next day two Japanese aeroplanes sent out for reconnoit^{er}ing only were subjected to Chinese fire and in retaliation dropped bombs on Chinese troops. No further incidents have been reported and Japanese officials here and at Hsinking profess to minimize the affair, anticipating that it can be liquidated locally. A Japanese press informant not so optimistic fears serious developments and reports considerable concentration of Japanese forces in the Chinchow area. Travellers passing through Shanhaikwan yesterday morning report delay and unusual excitement but no large

793.94/5671

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 9, January 4, 1933 from Peiping.

large military forces in evidence. Train service temporarily
suspended."


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM LAIN

COPIES SENT TO
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Peiping via N. R.


Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 3:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

10, January 4, 1 p. m.

Reuter from Nanking, third.



"News of events at Shanhaikwan has thrown capital into state of considerable excitement and although newspapers did not intend to publish today on account of the New Year holidays they are issuing extras giving prominence to reports from North China where it is feared events may lead to major operations. Although so far National Government has not protested to Japan a notification of developments at Shanhaikwan has already been sent to League of Nations. It is understood no definite action will be taken by the National Government until situation clears up. Meanwhile Government reiterates that its standing instructions to Chinese troops are to resist if Japanese forces attack Chinese positions".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94/5672


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP



GRAY
FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 3:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

January 4, 1 p. m.

My January 4, noon



The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 4, noon. My January 4, 11 a. m. Chinese Telephone Administration states telephone message received from its operator at Chinwangtao at 11:45 this morning reports bombardment of Chinwangtao by Japanese naval vessels has commenced. This report not yet confirmed from other sources.

Repeated to Department".

LOCKHART

CIB WP

JAN 5 1933

FILED

793.94/5673

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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GRAY




FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 1:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



January 4, 12 noon.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 4, 11 a. m. Two Japanese cruisers and two
destroyers arrived Chinwangtao this morning. British
light cruiser FOLKESTONE also arrived there and British
cruiser BRIGHTWATER due tomorrow morning. One train of
Chinese troops passed through Tientsin bound eastward
yesterday.

Repeated to Department".

LOCKHART

CIB WP

793.94/5674

JAN 5 1933


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP



FROM GRAY

Tientsin via W. R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 4:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



January 4, 3 p. m.

My January 4, 1 p. m.

Following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 4, 2 p. m. My January 4, noon. Bombardment referred to was nothing more than salute fired by Japanese naval vessel to British naval commander.

Repeated to Department".

LOCKHART

CIB WP

793.94/5675

JAN 5 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 5, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~WRL:~~
~~RCM:~~
~~LES:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~SGH:~~

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of December 8, 1932, encloses a copy of its despatch No. 701 to Peiping, reporting that, according to reliable information, the so-called Sino-Japanese "Mitsuya Agreement" of 1925, relating to the control of Korean malefactors on the Manchurian-Korean border, will be abrogated by the Japanese and "Manchoukuo" Governments within the next two weeks. At many times before September 18, 1931, the Japanese unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate abrogation. According to a Japanese consular officer, as negotiations had been started, it was considered advisable to carry them through. This contention, the Consul General regards as unconvincing and states that it is interesting to note that the Japanese are abrogating an agreement which modified their extraterritorial jurisdiction over Koreans at the same time that Japanese-controlled newspapers have been publishing many articles to the effect that Japan would soon abolish its extraterritorial rights in "Manchoukuo", while another interesting point is that the negotiations for abrogation were to

1384
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


- 2 -

have been secret and local Japanese officials are annoyed that news of its leaked out. The Consul General believes it possible that the Japanese Government desires, by abrogation of unfavorable agreements and conclusion of favorable ones, to be in an advantageous position in case there occurs an important change in the political situation of Manchuria.
The entire despatch, which discusses in detail the "Mitsuya Agreement", is interesting.

MA
RES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD



Handwritten initials and scribbles.

No. -----

793.94

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, December 8, 1932.

JAN 3 33

SUBJECT: Negotiations for the Abrogation
of the "Mitsuya Agreement."

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
TREATY DIVISION
WASHINGTON.
SIR: FEB 23 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Handwritten initials and signatures.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 4 - 1933
Department of State

F/H S
793.94/5676

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 701, to the Legation at Peiping,
China, dated December 7, 1932, on the above subject.

Handwritten initials and signature.

Respectfully yours,

Signature of M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

JAN 6 1933

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 701
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

Handwritten mark.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 701.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, December 7, 1932.

SUBJECT: Negotiations for the Abrogation
of the "Mitsuya Agreement."

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

With reference to the unnumbered despatch
793.94/1581, 1583
from this office dated August 4, 1925, and
entitled "Agreement between Mukden Authorities
and Japanese to Control Lawless Elements along
Manchurian-Korean Border", I have the honor to
report that according to reliable information
this agreement - the so-called "Mitsuya Agreement" -
will be abrogated by the Japanese and Manchoukuo
Governments within the next two weeks. In the
despatch to which I have referred it was reported
that as a result of conferences held between the
Chief of Police of the Korean Government and the
Japanese Consul General at Mukden on the one side,
and the Chief of Police of Fengtien Province and
the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Feng-
tien Government on the other, an agreement concern-
ing the control of Korean malefactors on the Man-
churian-Korean border had been concluded.

In

- 2 -

In the "Mitsuya Agreement" it was agreed according to the Lytton Report, "that in Eastern Fengtien Province, the Chinese would suppress 'the Korean societies' and turn over 'Koreans of bad character' to the Japanese on the latter's request." It is regretted that this office has not a copy of the text of the agreement.

A representative of the local Japanese Consulate General in reply to an informal request informed a member of my staff that the text of the agreement was "kept secret". However, the same official stated that the agreement was a simple document consisting of two or three articles. The only important provision is that the Chinese police might arrest and detain "Koreans of bad character" who crossed the Manchurian-Korean border. The agreement did not provide for the arrest or detention by the Korean police of Chinese who crossed the border and entered Korea. It is presumed that the agreement is kept secret because it is more unfavorable than is generally realized to Japan.

According to a Japanese consular official who has participated in the negotiations for the abrogation of the agreement, ever since it came into existence the agreement was troublesome to the Japanese and a cause of friction between the Japanese Government and the Chinese authorities in Manchuria. The Chinese police contended that under the "Mitsuya Agreement" they were authorized to arrest and detain Koreans in any part of Manchuria. On the other hand
the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the Japanese insisted that the agreement applied only to the Chientao area. In addition they claim that under cover of the agreement the Chinese police had persecuted peaceful and law-abiding Koreans.

From the same source it has been learned that this local agreement was concluded without the knowledge of the Foreign Office in Tokyo. As a result Mr. Funatsu, then Consul General at Mukden, was removed from his post. Mr. Mitsuya, whose name is most frequently mentioned in connection with the agreement, was Chief of the Police Department of the Government of Chosen when the agreement was signed.

Soon after the Foreign Office in Tokyo learned of the existence of the agreement, efforts to abrogate it were begun. Many times before September 18, 1931 the Japanese unsuccessfully attempted to conduct negotiations for this purpose with the local Chinese authorities.

The Japanese consular official to whom I have referred also stated that with the establishment of Manchoukuo the question of the agreement became unimportant, but because negotiations for abolishing it had been started, it was considered advisable to carry them through to a successful conclusion. Therefore, the negotiations have been amicably concluded and a document merely confirming that the "Mitsuya Agreement" had been abolished will be signed by Mr. Mitani, Chief of the Police Bureau
of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of Fengtien Province, on behalf of Manchoukuo, and Mr. Ikeda, Chief of the Police Department of the Government of Chosen, as soon as Mr. Mitani, who is slightly indisposed, has sufficiently recovered. If Mr. Ikeda is unable to be in Mukden at the time, Mr. Morishima, Acting Consul General of Japan at Mukden, will sign instead.

The contention, that Japan and Manchoukuo will abolish the agreement merely because the Japanese, before Manchoukuo came into existence, had attempted to negotiate the abrogation of the agreement with the Chinese authorities, is considered unconvincing. It is interesting that the Japanese are abrogating an agreement which modified their extraterritorial jurisdiction over Koreans at the same time that newspapers controlled by Japanese have been publishing many articles stating that Japan would soon abolish its extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo. Another interesting point is that the negotiations, for the purpose of abrogating the agreement were, according to the Japanese official I have mentioned, to be conducted secretly and, consequently, the local Japanese authorities were annoyed when the news leaked out.

It is possible that the Japanese Government while it has the opportunity is endeavoring to abrogate unfavorable treaties and other agreements and to conclude favorable ones with a view to being in an as advantageous position as possible if an important change in the political situation in Manchuria should occur.

Respectfully

139
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Respectfully yours,

M. C. Myers,
American Consul General

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
One copy to Consulate General, Seoul.

800
MH:mhp

A true copy of
the signed original.
[Signature]

139
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Tokio

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (C)

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

2, January 4, 2 p. m.



(GRAY) My No. 1, January 3, 7 p. m. Peiping's

No. 5, January 3, 5 p. m.

Referring to the incident of January 2 at Shan-
haikwan, Japanese war office stated to Military Attache:

"On January 1st local Chinese commander agreed
that Japanese outposts could occupy certain important
positions to enable them to give better protection from
bandits to certain vital points; on January 2 when troops
moved to position agreed upon they were fired on by
Chinese regulars; Japanese returned this fire; Japanese
casualties 5; Japanese former garrison at Shanhaikwan of
two companies has been increased; orders to stand by have
been issued to no Japanese divisions; second division now
in Korea en route Sendai continues its movement; following
movements of Chinese troops taking place on December 31,
third, sixteenth and nineteenth brigades into Jehol Prov-
ince and toward Shanhaikwan ninth brigade and sixty-third
cavalry brigades; no aggressive action will be taken by

Japanese



F/H S

793.94/5677

FILED

JAN 11 1933

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#2 from Tokio, Jan. 4, 2 p.m.

Japanese army unless forced into it by Chinese, in which case portions of nineteenth and twentieth divisions and marines will probably be used". (END GRAY)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. While the last clause of the foregoing official statement may reflect military opinion here at the moment, the military situation in Manchuria is so largely in the hands of General Huto and his advisers that I hesitate to predict developments. The Shanhaikwan affair may be a sporadic incident. On the other hand it may be a carefully calculated step prepared by the Japanese to afford a pretext for an advance into Jehol. As soon as the Russo-Chinese rapprochement took place the likelihood of such a movement increased. There are various military hypotheses for such a movement which the Military Attache has discussed in his reports to the War Department. For the present the Embassy is not disposed to accept either the Japanese or Chinese version of the Shanhaikwan affair at its face value until more conclusive evidence regarding the incident and the future intentions of the Japanese army is forthcoming.

Repeated to Peiping.

WSB-HPD

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tokio

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3, January 4, 2 p.m.

My No. 1, January 3, 7 p.m. Peiping's No. 5,
January 3, 5 p.m.

Referring to the incident of January 2 at Shan-
haikwan, Japanese war office stated to Military Attache:

"On January 1st local Chinese commander agreed that
Japanese outposts could occupy certain important positions
to enable them to give better protection from bandits to
certain vital points; on January 2 when troops moved to
position agreed upon they were fired on by Chinese
regulars; Japanese returned this fire; Japanese casualties 5;
Japanese former garrison at Shanhaikwan of two companies has
been increased; orders to stand by have been issued to no
Japanese divisions; second division now in Korea en route
Sendai continues its movement; following movements of
Chinese troops taking place on December 31, third,
sixteenth and nineteenth brigades into Jehol Province
and toward Shanhaikwan ninth brigade and sixty-third
cavalry brigades; no aggressive action will be taken by

Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese army unless forced into/^{it} by Chinese, in which case portions of nineteenth and twentieth divisions and marines will probably be used".

PARAPHRASE. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Military opinion in Tokyo at present may be reflected in the last clause of the paragraph above, but the Embassy finds it difficult to predict developments while the situation in Manchuria is so largely in the hands of General Muto. The affair at Shanhaikwan may be a carefully calculated step to afford the Japanese a pretext for a move into Jehol or it may be only a local development. The likelihood of a movement into Jehol increased as soon as the Sino-Russian rapprochement took place. The Military Attache has reported to the War Department the various factors relating to such a military movement. The Embassy is not disposed to accept, for the present, either the Chinese or Japanese version of the incident until there is more conclusive evidence regarding the incident and the future intentions of the Japanese army.


Peiping informed.

GREW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

11ET



FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Tokio

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 7:46 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4, January 4, 6 p. m.

My 2, January 4, 2 p.m.

Japanese General Staff at 3 p. m. today made following statement to Military Attache:

"Present strength Japanese garrison at Shanhaikwan is brigade headquarters and five companies" (foregoing not, repeat not, for publication).

General Staff continued: "If Chinese troops and volunteers in Jehol and to south of wall make no aggressive move there will be none on part of Kwantung army; on the other hand the Japanese are attacked at Shanhaikwan or along the Shanhaikwan-Mukden line the Kwantung army will be forced to take such measures as it sees fit".

Japanese casualties given as 8 killed, 31 wounded. Japanese estimate following Chinese troops in Jehol: 15,000 old Manchurian troops, 15,000 Peiping troops, 38,000 local volunteers, total 68,000.

There

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F/HS

793.94/5678

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#4 from Tokio, Jan. 4, 6 p. m.

There is no (repeat no) truth in the press statement that the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for five ambassadors including myself today and assured us that Japan desired to localize the incident. The British Ambassador discussed the situation casually with the Minister when calling on another matter.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

HPD-WMC


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY



FROM

Peiping via H.R.

Dated January 4, 1933

Rec'd 4:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



11, January 4, 2 p. m.

793.94
Following report of events at Shanhaikwan comes from officer in command Italian marines stationed in port commanding view of Shanhaikwan: January 2nd east gate attacked by Japanese, telephone communication to Chinwangtao interrupted, city bombed by the Japanese aeroplanes. 1,500 Japanese and 1,500 Manchukuo troops participated in attack. There were two armored Chinese trains near Shanhaikwan on the railway.

January 3rd at 10 o'clock in the morning Japanese warships bombarded town, Chinese replying weakly with machine gun fire. Number of Japanese forces including Manchukuo forces estimated at 5,000. Populace fleeing into the country. Bombardment continued until 1 a. m. Japanese using 75's in bombardment. At 1:15 Japanese bombardment began to subside, Chinese continued answering with machine guns. At 2:15 Japanese evacuated town through east gate which had been destroyed by fire which covered the radius of some 300 meters. At 3 a. m. town was completely quiet. Chinese troops retreating

in

JAN 5 1933

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F/H S

793.94/5679

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#11 from Peiping via N.R., Jan. 4,
2 p. m.

in the direction of Chilimatai. Japanese losses reported to be heavy, Chinese losses unknown. At 2:30 Japanese warships proceeded in the direction of Chinwangtao, Japanese commanded by General Suzuki. One Japanese aeroplane followed retreating Chinese troops. In giving the above Italian Charge d'Affaires explained that report was merely eye witness statement made by an officer with a view of the city.

Repeated to Tokyo, Nanking and Commander-in-Chief.

RR-WSB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

FROM

PLAIN



Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 4, 1932

rec'd 9:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

12, January 4, 2 p. m.

Legation's January 3, 11 a. m.



According to NIPPON DEMPO report from Tientsin January second following is translation of text of communication to Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang from General Nakamura:

"Some Chinese threw several bombs and fired with rifles on the detached office of the Japanese gendarmerie at Shanhaikwan, watch house of the Japanese at Shanhaikwan station and neighbor of the Manchukuo police corps after 9 p. m. January first. In taking into consideration situation of despatching many troops to Jehol on your part at present for purpose to incite the people to resort to hostile actions against Japan we are compelled to believe that above was premeditated measure of Chinese authorities. When Japanese troops arrived at Nammen in order to fulfill arrangements that were concluded between Japanese garrison at and your Shanhaikwan/troops at the same place your troops suddenly resorted to hostile action and fired on Japanese troops

which

F/H/S

793.94/5680

FILED

JAN 5 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#12 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 4, 2p. m.

which caused death one officer and two wounded.

Above was brought about due to unlawful and unfair
action of your troops wherefore it is indisputable that
your troops should be absolutely held responsible for it.
As Imperial Japanese Army we could not overlook the fact.
In case the above was ^{your} premeditated plan serious conse-
quences may be brought about in the whole of North China
for which the Imperial Japanese Army would not be respon-
sible and you should be absolutely responsible for it".

KLP-HPD

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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


Peiping via N. R.
FROM Dated January 4, 1933.
Recd. 9:10 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

13, January 4, 4 P. M.

793.94
Reuter from Shanghai today



"Though no stir was caused in official circles by developments in North China, reports of Sino-Japanese hostilities ^{at} ~~in~~ Shanhaikwan engaged keen interest of Chinese community yesterday. In the case of two Chinese newspapers New Year holidays were broken yesterday afternoon when extra editions with banner heads appeared in streets. Situation was widely discussed at all public and social functions.

Tank Yu Jen, chief Secretary of Central Political Council who arrived here from Nanking yesterday, expresses view that object of Japanese military activities at Shanhaikwan is to take Jehol.

Sun Fo who will assume post of President of Legislative Yuan in Nanking in a few days ^{evinced} ~~evinced~~ no surprise at outbreak of hostilities.

C. C. Wu, formerly Chinese Minister to United States, says Japanese action is in accordance with

F/HS

793.94/5681

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

13 from Peiping January 4, 4 P. M.

programme of her military authorities. He ^{emphasizes} ~~emphasized~~
that most effective way for China to check further turn
in alarming developments is only through military force."

WVC HPD

JOHNSON

4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 12, 1933.

RCM:
WCH:
SKH:

In the attached despatch the Consul General at Shanghai summarizes press comment in China on the report that the War Department was asking for an increase in the regular army. I suggest that you read this despatch in its entirety.

J.E.J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8635

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, December 12, 1932.

Press Comment re Increase of
United States Regular Army.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 4- 1933

In connection with press reports emanating from Washington at the end of November, 1932, that recommendations had been made by the War Department for increasing the regular United States Army from 118,000 to 165,000 men, I have the honor to transmit herewith an article appearing in THE CHINA PRESS (American incorporated, Chinese owned) on December 4, 1932, by Mr. Hollington K. Tong, editor of that paper, in which he attempts to set forth the reasons why an increase in the army is asked for at a time when the various nations are attempting to come to an agreement regarding disarmament.

Mr. Tong believes that this recommendation is based on developments directly consequent upon Japan's military adventure in Manchuria and he quotes from statements made by General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States army, in support of his view.

F/HS

793.94/5682

JAN 16 1933

FILED

140

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

view. Mr. Tong refers to General MacArthur's trip to Poland and the Balkan States and states that one of the reports in circulation regarding the object of this visit was that General MacArthur was making a study of the possibility of the establishment of an American military and naval base on Kamchatka Peninsula, the most southerly point of which is only seven miles from the Japanese Kurile Islands.

Mr. Tong refers to the hostile feeling in Japan towards the United States since the announcement on January 7th last that the United States Government would not recognize any territorial gain acquired by force, and the statement in the Japanese press that war with the United States is inevitable. He mentions the so-called spy scare in Japan last autumn, and other incidents tending to show that Japan is not only extremely suspicious of Americans, but that Japan is engaged in espionage work in the Hawaiian Islands and elsewhere. He concludes by saying that the latest and possibly the most serious repercussion of the seizure of Manchuria by Japan is indicated by a vigorous demand that the strength of America's army be materially increased.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Article from THE CHINA PRESS
dated December 4, 1932.

PRJ MB
800

In Quintuplicate.
In Duplicate to Legation.
Copy to Minister at Nanking.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8635 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated
December 12, 1932, on the subject: "Press Comment re
Increase of United States Regular Army."

Article from THE CHINA PRESS (American incorporated,
Chinese owned) of December 4, 1932.

Hurley Demand For U.S. Army Reveals American Apprehension Over Far East

DEC 4 - 1932

China press

Increase Recommended By General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Chief Of Staff, Following Mystery Trip Through Europe; Writer Reviews Activities Which Have Left Japan Isolated

By Hollington K. Tong

Another repercussion of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was manifested Friday in the demand of United States Secretary of War Mr. Patrick Jay Hurley that the regular army should be increased from a total of 12,000 officers and 118,000 men to 14,000 officers and 165,000 men, with more pay and modern equipment.

What has caused this demand at a moment when the nations are striving more than ever to come to some agreement to disarm?

The answer is found by recalling some events of recent occurrence. Mr. Hurley early this year visited the Philippines, and gained personal knowledge of the danger in which the islands stood if the shield of American protection were prematurely withdrawn. A significant reference to this danger is made in Mr. Hurley's report to the President, but with this aspect of the matter, I am not concerned at the moment. It is the proposed increase in the size of the army that calls for immediate consideration.

possibility of the establishment of an American military and naval base on Kamchatka peninsula, which belongs to Russia. For a de jure recognition of the Soviet Union, as well as for the admission of Russian bonds on American exchanges and the authorization given to American banking institutions to discount Russian bills at normal rates, Soviet Russia was said to be prepared to consent to the establishment by the United States of a military base on Kamchatka, the most southern point of which is only seven miles from the Japanese Kurile Islands.

MacArthur Urges Increase

Mr. Hurley's demand is based on a recommendation made by General Douglas MacArthur, chief of staff of the United States Army, which in its turn is based upon developments directly consequent upon Japan's military adventure in Manchuria. Further echoes may soon be heard from other lands. Despite the disarmament conference at Geneva, a revival of competitive armaments among the nations of the world can now be visualized. The only alternative is an international joint movement to coerce Japan to respect the treaties and abandon her mad military adventure in China's northeastern provinces.

Treaties Held Untrustworthy

General MacArthur's explanation of the proposal discloses a fear that, in an effort to support her pretensions in Manchuria, Japan may further disregard every kind of peace instruments and even make war upon those nations which defend the sanctity of international engagements. He said: "The tense situation in the Far East has emphasized again the untrustworthiness of treaties as complete safeguards of international peace. This view is supported by the appreciation of the potentialities in the Sino-Japanese conflict for a widespread disaster which gave rise to a feeling of apprehension among portions of our population as to the adequacy of our defense structure."

The news of the suggested increase of the American land force was made public a few days ago in Washington D. C. General Mac Arthur privately expressed the belief that it would be better for all

Japan in Manchuria.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Russia and Poland and later of a similar pact between Russia and France appears to prove the failure of Japanese activities in that direction.

Feeling In Japan Hostile

Regardless of these rumors about complicated international reorientations, one fact stands out prominently when General MacArthur's recommendation for a 40 per cent increase in the enlisted strength of the American Army and public apprehension concerning the Far Eastern situation given by him as his reason for the recommendation are considered. That is the increasing hostile feelings in Japan towards the United States of America ever since Washington announced in its note of January 7 this year the Hoover doctrine, namely, the non-recognition of any territorial gain acquired by force.

Hurley Demand Reveals U.S. Fear In East

DEC 4 - 1932 *China Press*
(Continued from Page 9, Col. 8.)

to have blossomed forth into numerous branch offices and most of these branch offices are located

[illegible]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via NR

Dated January 5, 1933,

Recd 5 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.



JAN 5 1933

January 5, noon.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 5, 11 a.m. American army authorities at Chinwangtao report conditions quiet there this morning. Chinese are reopening stores.

General opinion Japanese that incident will be localized. Practically no troops on railway between Chinwangtao and Shanhai-kuan. Railway authorities report approximately 6,000 Japanese troops at Shanhai-kuan and 100 Japanese casualties in hospital. Chinese casualties variously estimated. There is a wide divergence between the Japanese and Chinese versions of the cause of the incident. No further movements of Chinese troops through Tientsin towards Chinwangtao.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

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F/HS

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JAN 9 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT *gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO

1933 JAN - 5 - PM 5:12

Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE January 5, 1933.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

58

ALLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

Department's 193, July 1, 6 p.m., first sentence.

Department assumes that Legation is keeping the
Embassy at Tokyo currently informed with ^{data} regard to
~~reports~~ of importance on the Shanhaikwan incident, such
as Tientsin's January 5, 11 a.m.

5683

Stinson

Sky

793.94/5683
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✓
BA
JAN 5 1933 PM

FE:MMH:EJL

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Enciphered by *OK*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

F/HS

793.94/5683

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM

PLAIN



Peiping via NR

Dated January 5, 1933.

Recd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

16, January 5, 4 p.m.

Reuter from Nan'ing today



"Foreign Office has sent another telegram to Chinese delegation at Geneva instructing them to report Shanhailwan incident to League Council and also fact that Japan is solely responsible for the affair. Foreign Office also has prepared declaration addressed to the powers which is expected to be issued tomorrow. Statement, it is understood, will emphasize fact that part played by Chinese troops at Shanhailwan was selfdefense and that responsibility for incident should rest with Japan. Vigorous protest to Japan has been prepared and will be delivered to Japanese Legation through the Japanese Consul at Nan'ing tomorrow."

JS CIB

JOHNSON

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500 C 112

F/HS

793.94/5684

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

PLAIN

FROM


Peiping via NR

Dated January 5, 1933.

Recd 2:30 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.



14, January 5, 9 a.m.

Reuter from Tokyo, fourth:

"Following conference between Foreign Office and War Office today instructions were sent to Japanese authorities in North China to negotiate with Marshal Chang Ksueh Liang's representative for purpose of settling and localizing Shanhaiwan affair. Japanese delegation in Geneva has been instructed to inform League Secretariat accordingly. With the fighting halted official circles appear hopeful that conflict can be localized. In the meantime minelayer TOMIWA at present at Sasebo has been ordered to proceed to Chinwangtao as precautionary measure."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5685

FILED

JAN 6 1933

793.94
note
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
GRAY

FROM

Peiping via HR

Dated January 5, 1933.

Recd 2:30 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington.



15, January 5, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"January 4, 11 a.m.

One. Entire east line Chinese Eastern Railway now occupied by Japanese troops which practically without meeting opposition reached Suifenho January third.

Two. Morishima,, Japanese Consul General, informed me that he reached agreement December 29th with local Soviet Consul General to the effect that Soviet Government would not object to Japanese troops going as far as Suifenho. Soviet Consulate General confirms this."

CIB JS

JOHNSON

JAN 6 1933

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F/HS

793.94/5686

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note
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM Tokio

Dated January 5, 1933

Rec'd 9:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



6, January 5, 8 p. m.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that instructions have been sent to the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria to localize the Shanhaikwan affair unless Chinese provocation renders further measures necessary.

Repeated to Peiping.

RR-WWO

GREW

793.94/5687

JAN 6 1933
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./60 FOR #218

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Dec. 9, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: relations with China.
No decided change in --.

1s

792.94

793.94/5688
1678

1 4 1

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(c) Japanese Relations with China Proper.

Japanese relations with China Proper during the month offer as little to record as do her relations with other countries. Mr. Ariyoshi, the Minister to China, made a
visit

- 8 -

visit to Tokyo to confer with the Foreign Minister and other Government leaders but the subject of his conversations has successfully been kept secret. The only indication has been the appearance of several apparently inspired newspaper articles reporting increased enthusiasm in North China for the restoration of the Empire under the rule of the present "Chief Executive of Manchukuo", Mr. Pu Yi.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 800.51 W 89/644 FOR despatch #248
FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Dec. 3, 1932.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Political relations between China and Japan.
Editorial appearing in the HANKOW HERALD on the "The
War Debt Issue, with reference to the Sino-Japanese
question. Transmits, -- Copy of despatch attached.

mc

793.94/5689
5189

14

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 248.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, December 8, 1932.

Subject: Editorial on War Debt.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to attach to this despatch an editorial entitled, "The War Debt Issue" which appeared in the HANKOW HERALD, issue of December 2, 1932.

The editorial, which is friendly in tone, is of some interest because of the circumstance that the editorial policy of the HANKOW HERALD is controlled by the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which owns the paper.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.


Enclosure:

Editorial entitled, "The War Debt Issue," appearing in the HANKOW HERALD, Hankow, dated December 2, 1932.

In quintuplicate to the Department of State;
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping;
One copy to the American Consulate General, Hankow.

CS1

WAA/MTE



The Hankow Herald, December 2, 1932.

The War Debt Issue

The war debt issue is now threatening to monopolize the attention of all Europe to the exclusion of the all important Manchurian question. As a result of the adamant attitude of the American government in refusing to grant the extensions of moratorium as requested by the European nations, hostile reactions were reported to be fomenting in Europe against America, particularly the larger debtors, like England and France. It is even suggested that this attitude of America to demand cash payment or default on the sums due her may alienate European nations in their stand toward the Manchurian question. In other words, the European countries will turn pro-Japanese and support Japanese claim in Manchuria if Uncle Sam does not let them go of the millions of dollars.

The American contention on the war debt question is based on common sense business principle which can hardly be refuted. Europe borrowed money to finance the War against the Central Powers from whom they extracted reparations and territories. The American government obtained the desired loans by issuing the liberty bonds. The interest and principal on these huge issues of bonds have to be met out of the government treasury. If the European debtors do not pay, the American government has to resort to increase of taxes in order to obtain money to meet the obligations under the liberty bonds. What the European nations want to do is to make the American tax payers pay for the cost of the War from which they did not gain materially; while the tax payers of the debtors are to go free although the War was fought principally for their own benefit.

The contentions of the European nations are based on the emergencies they are facing. The prolonged depression has rendered millions jobless and the tax burdens of the European nations have already reached the breaking point. But of these evils the United States is by no means free. Depression hits America probably harder than Great Britain or France. While the tax burden of Americans is comparatively lighter than that of the Englishmen or Frenchmen, but it is doubtful whether the American government can place additional tax on the

already hard hit citizens in order to raise money for the liberty bond obligations without creating serious domestic trouble.

It is an undeniable fact that the European nations are spending more money annually in arma-

ment than their obligations to the United States. Mr. Hoover, in presenting his plan of disarmament to the Conference at Geneva, has made it very plain that unless European nations agree to a general disarmament according to his plan, the United States would refuse to consider any modification or extension of the war debt. But his appeals fell in deaf ears and no genuine effort has been made toward disarmament.

Too much credulity should not be given to the rumoured change of policy in the Sino-Japanese dispute by European powers on account of the reported hostile reaction against America in her insistence on payment of debt due this month. America in backing China against the territorial and administrative aggression by Japan in Manchuria is not serving any selfish purpose. The dispute is a issue that affects the whole world. If the right should triumph over might, the world benefits, not alone China or America.

We do not think that international diplomacy of to-day has reached such high level of morality that selfish interest does not enter in the diplomatic undertakings. We also agree that there is chauvinism being displayed by politicians of Europe against the American attitude. But we must admit that the true meaning of the Sino-Japanese question has been understood by the European governments, if we consider the official and semi-official declarations of the European chancelleries, the press comments and the atmosphere of seriousness displayed by the delegates in Geneva toward the Manchurian issue.

It is indeed unfortunate that the war debt issue should be thrown in the midst of the Sino-Japanese discussion which should require the undivided attention of all the countries. As the debt issue is more urgent, because a high sum of money has to be paid before the 15th of this month and upon which the political fate of many European governments depends, it naturally engages the attention of the European statesmen. But no matter how large the sum is and what disturbance it may create on the political and financial stability, it involves no vital problem that affects the world peace in the years to come as the Sino-Japanese issue does. An injustice done in the war debt issue will mean the loss or gain of a few millions of dollars, but an injustice done in the case of Sino-Japanese dispute will do an irreparable harm and the world will suffer the consequences of losses of more than mere millions.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Hankow/66 FOR #245

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Nov. 18, 1932
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

793.94 / 5690
1691

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations.
Quiet during October. Trade reviving slowly in Hankow.
Further comment.

-16-

(e) Sino-Japanese Relations. October passed without any untoward occurrence at Hankow in Sino-Japanese relations. Japanese trade revived slowly so far as Hankow itself was concerned. In the interior of the district, however, and in such places as Shasi, Ichang, and Chungking Japanese trade remained absolutely dead. There seems to be a very definite relation between the absence of organized boycott activities and the presence of Japanese consular and naval representation.

In the interest of accurate observation, the temporary easing effect which the Sino-Japanese difficulties have had upon the position of Americans and Europeans in central China must be noted. The difficult position of the American, British, and other interested governments in the matter of extraterritoriality in China has naturally been relieved by the obvious circumstance that China cannot afford openly to denounce her own treaty obligations while she is frantically appealing to the United States and the League of Nations to compel observance by Japan of her treaty obligations. But in addition it is to be noted that there has been during the past year a pronounced moderation and restraint in the attitude of the Chinese authorities in this area towards foreigners and that this moderation and restraint are directly traceable to the feeling of the responsible Chinese authorities that they need the help of the American and European nations in dealing with Japanese aggression.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blue NARS, Date 12-18-75

-17-

In making this statement the writer has in mind principally the treaty ports in which American business interests are concentrated. It cannot be said that this restraint and moderation has extended to the attitude of military chiefs in the interior towards isolated mission interests.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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
FROM

Peiping via NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 5:06 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



23, January 6, 3 p.m.

Following from Captain Barrett Fifteenth Infantry
Chingwangtao, January 5, 6 p.m., received en clair
through Military Attache.

793.94
"We proceeding to Chinese front line at Liuchlaying
half way between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan. Line
extends to sea on right of railway on left to mountains.
Right flank held by Thirty First Regiment Third Cavalry
Brigade originally stationed at Yuikuanchen north of
Peitahc. Center held by 600 Twenty Seventh Regiment of
Ninth Brigade. Left unit reported as another cavalry
regiment Third Brigade. Twentieth Brigade reported in
support. Today inspected disposition of right flank
cavalry regiment and find have taken up temporary defense
without entrenchment. Due presence of Japanese warships
at Chinwangtao Chinese state will not attempt to hold right
flank if attacked. Intended to push on to Shanhaikwan but
were strongly advised by cavalry regimental commander not
to do so. No evidences of Japanese activity today.
Reported yesterday armored train made several trips to
point

F/HS

793.94/5691

RECORDED

JAN 9 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 23, January 6, 1933, from Peiping.

point 500 yards east of Chinese line where small railroad bridge has been temporarily put out of commission. En route to front lines passed refugees estimated at 2000 from Shanhaikwan and villages between here and that point. Tomorrow intend to cover center and left flank Chinese position. Eleven fifteen a.m. today desultory artillery fire estimated at five rounds seventy-fives heard on our left front. Barrett."

JOHNSON

CIB JS

7425

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

1933 JAN - 8 - PM 1: 24 Washington.

January 6, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

2 PM

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

4

Your 23, January 6, 3 p.m.

Department feels that you should suggest to Military
Attaché that such telegrams should not repeat not be sent
en clair.

Also, that under no circumstances should you relay
such telegrams in plain.

F/HS

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Shirum
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JAN 6 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

1933 JAN - 8 - PM 1: 40

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Sent by operator M. 19 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 1:58 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.

18, January 6, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

January 5, 5 p.m. The spokesman of the Kwantung

army stated that fighting ceased on the evening of January third and that Japanese and Chinese forces are guarding the east and west sides respectively on the Shih River the bridge over which was destroyed by the Chinese. He further reported concentration of 3 Chinese divisions in that vicinity.

The Kwantung army has taken charge of the operations at Shanhaikwan. Total Japanese casualties according to the spokesman are 15 killed, 99 wounded.

According to reliable source Kwantung army headquarters are anxious to localize the incident and to arrange a settlement of it with Ho Chu-Kuo who is reported to be in Chinwangtao. General Itagaki is believed to have left for Tientsin to secure adherence Tientsin Japanese Commander to above policy. A peaceful settlement would appear dependent upon attitude of the Chinese and the absence of further serious incidents."

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793.94/5692

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

cib



FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 1:58 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

20, January 6, 12 noon.

Reuter from Moscow, fifth.



"Soviet reaction to seizure of Shanhaikwan by Japanese is somewhat hostile partly due to Japanese refusal to sign pact of non-aggression. But Kremlin is relieved to learn that increase in Japanese army in Manchuria does not threaten Russian maritime provinces but North China.

Newspaper PRAVDA this morning devotes half of its front page to news of seizure of city. In its comments it says the seizure is part of Japan's imperialistic plans for advance into Jehol and North China and the consequences of this will be an acute sharpening of imperialistic conflicts between Japan and America on one hand and between Britain and Japan on the other on account of England's extensive interests in North China."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5693

JAN 9 1933

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761.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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Peiping via NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 1:58 a.m.




Secretary of State

Washington.

17, January 6, 9 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking, fifth



"Chinese newspapers indignantly denounce Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan and urge resistance against further aggression. Independent HSIN CHIN JIH PAO says that two facts emerge from this incident: Japanese aggression in China will continue until this country submits unconditionally to ^{Japan's} ~~Japanese~~ terms for settlement for Manchuria and other issues and, secondly, that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang does not desire to fight. Chinese protest in regard to the occupation of Shanhaikwan was sent to the Japanese Minister Ariyoshi late last night.

Wang Ching Wei now in Germany telegraphed to his friends expressing strong indignation over occupation of Shanhaikwan and saying it may expedite his return to China although he is still far from recovered."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5694

FILED

JAN 9 1933

793.94

14
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 1:58 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington.

21, January 6, 1 p.m.

Reuter from Canton, fifth



793.94
"Southwest Political Council was in session all day today discussing Shanhaikwan developments. It is believed that important resolutions were passed. Interviewed after conference Liu Chiwen, Mayor of Canton, declared Political Council had decided to give effective assistance but the resolutions could not be published as they were diplomatic secrets. Southwest Council is said to feel that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang is to be blamed for loss of Shanhaikwan and also if Nanking requires assistance from Canton to be willing to cooperate to safeguard national existence."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5695

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JAN 9 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
FROM

GRAY

Peiping via NR

Dated January 6, 1933.

Recd 1:58 a.m.



Secretary of State

Washington.

22, January 6- 2 p.m.

Your 1/5283 January 5, 5 p.m.

Tientsin's January 5, 11 a.m. repeated to Tokyo.



JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5696

JAN 8 1933
BILAND


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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1933


Rec'd 1:58 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

19, January 6, 11 a. m.

Reuter from Nanking fifth.



"Demanding withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanhaikwan, prevention of similar occurrences in future, punishment of Japanese officers and men responsible for disturbance and finally reserving right to claim reparation for damages are main features of Chinese protest despatched by Waichiaopu last night to Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister.

Chinese protest to Japan first narrates preliminary work of destruction done by Japanese gendarmes in their own quarters and Japanese distortion of facts concerning circumstances preceding their attack in attempt to evade responsibility for their unwarranted action. Note further states that operations of Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan were clearly carried out in execution of preconceived plan and were calculated to aggravate situation and contrary to promise repeatedly made by the Japanese delegates to the

F/HS

793.94/5697

FILED

JAN 10 1933

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#19 from Peiping via N.R.,
January 6, 11 a. m.

the League of Nations.

Chinese Government also issued this afternoon lengthy statement showing that Japanese operations at Shanhaikwan were premeditated and carried out in a most methodical manner."

JOHNSON

KLP-WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated January 6, 1933

Rec'd 7:37 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

URGENT.

26, January 26, 6 p. m.

British Charge d'Affaires informs me that yesterday evening he called at Japanese Legation and invited their attention to serious situation which had arisen in the neighborhood of Chinwangtao ^{with} attendant threat of serious clash between Chinese and Japanese and he expressed the hope that care would be exercised in view of danger to large British interests there. He made same communication through his representative at Nanking. He also informed Marshal Chang of action.

Today he received reply of Marshal Chang stating Japanese must be held responsible for any damage that might be done.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Marshal's representative informed British charge d'Affaires that the Marshal, under orders from Nanking, was mobilizing for the purpose of retaking Shanhaikwan.

RR-HPD

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/5698

FILED

JAN 11 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 6, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The American Minister was informed by the British Chargé d'Affaires that, on the evening of January 5, he called at the Japanese Legation and brought to the attention of the Japanese Legation the grave situation which had arisen in the vicinity of Chinwangtao and the accompanying threat of a serious Chinese-Japanese clash, and stated that he hoped that, because of the danger to large British interests at that place, care would be taken. The same communication was made by him through his Nanking representative. Marshal Chang also was informed by him of the action taken.

On January 6 Marshal Chang sent a reply to the British Chargé, in which he stated that, if any damage should be done, the Japanese must be held responsible for it.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. The British Chargé was informed by the representative of the Marshal that, by order from Nanking, the Marshal was mobilizing in order that he might take Shanhaikwan again.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.93/1498 FOR despatch #1735

FROM Italy (Garrett) DATED December 21, 1932.
TO NAME 1-1127

JK-991

793.94/5699

REGARDING:

Article from Genoa LAVORO of December 17, 1932, dealing with
resumption of diplomatic relations between Russia and China
and its effect upon Sino-Japanese relations.

do

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 DEC 30 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*From Legation
 Chinese Legation
 Dec. 30, 1932*

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 30 1932
 Department of State

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TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
 FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
 DATED DECEMBER 29, 1932.

SECRETARY OF STATE
 JAN 13 1933

Reports of General Tang Yu-Lin from Jehol re Japanese plan for occupation of Pei-Piao and other places in Jehol. The items of this plan are as follows:--

(1) The Japanese at Chao-Yang-Tze have been trying to bribe a few Chinese soldiers hoping to obtain from them confessions that they have kidnapped some Japanese, these confessions to be used as materials for future negotiations with China.

(2) Some Japanese soldiers were specially despatched to Han-Nin and its vicinity attempting to provoke the Chinese patrols there in order to create incidents which will be taken as pretexts for the occupation of Pei-Piao.

(3) The Japanese have been trying to bribe ignorant Mongolians, asking them to lay claim to the land around the mining districts as their private property, so that the Japanese may use the protection of the rights of these Mongolians as a pretext for their occupation of Pei-Piao.

(4) The Japanese have recruited some three hundred young Chinese in the vicinity of Chao-Yang-Tze in Jehol and have transported them to Yi Hsien in preparation for the campaign against Pei-Piao.

U.S. Legation, Washington
 Dec 29, 1932.

793.94/5700

143
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

194
DE UNDER SECRETARY

DEC 30 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED DECEMBER 29, 1932.

San Chuan Lytun
Dec. 30, 1932
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 30 1932

Department of State
Dec

Wire from Peiping states that the Japanese have been storing large quantities of provisions around Yu-Hsin, Jehol, (300 miles northeast of Peiping) and that they have been spending large sums of money trying to enlist Chinese people for resistance against Chinese forces.

Reports from Tao-Nan and Tung-Liao state that three thousand additional Japanese troops have arrived in preparation for a campaign toward Kai-Loo, Jehol, (250 miles northeast of Peiping).


Chinese Legation, Washington
December 29, 1932.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 3 1933


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



From Chinese Legation
Jan. 3. 1933



DATE: JANUARY 2, 1933.

Marshall Chang Hsiao-Jiang, wiring on January 2 from Peiping, reported that a telephone communication from Shanhaikwan revealed the following facts:

1. At 9:30 p. m. in the night of January 1 a few Japanese soldiers in civilian clothes appeared at the Southern gate of Shanhaikwan and fired several shots into the city.
2. In the same night a bomb was dropped by the Japanese sentry at the railway station of Shanhaikwan.
3. The police forces of the puppet government in the Three Eastern Provinces also fired more than ten shots around the same district.
4. Japanese military police on duty there assisted in the firing for a short time.

Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo immediately despatched a representative to enquire at the headquarters of the Japanese military police. The Japanese alleged that the Chinese forces had fired upon them, citing as proof several bomb holes in the headquarter itself. The Japanese authority then issued a warning demanding the residents of Shanhaikwan to evacuate the territory for fear of possible danger to them. This warning was to be answered by the Chinese within fifty minutes of its issuance.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, upon receipt of this report, has ordered the local Chinese authorities to negotiate with the Japanese hoping to localize the affair, although active preparations were being made for resistance against any possible attack. At the same time the Chinese are protesting to the Japanese in accordance with reasons. Whether this affair can be satisfactorily settled or not can not be known until January 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has ordered Marshall Chang to investigate as to which side opened fire and to try to localize the affair as much as possible. However, any condition which the Japanese may attach to the solution must first obtain the consent of the central government.

Chinese Legation, Washington,
 January 2, 1933.

73.94

F/H/S



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JAN 6 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*From Chinese Legation
Jan. 3. 1933*

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 3, 1933



A wire from Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang from Peking at midnight on January 2 reported a telephone communication with Shanhaikwan as follows:

After 10:00 a. m. on January 2, about one hundred Japanese soldiers, after being refused admittance by the Chinese to go into the city through the South Gate of Shanhaikwan, attempted to scale the city wall into the city. This attempt was successfully blocked by the Chinese guards on duty there. At noon of the same day three Japanese troop trains arrived at the railway station of Shanhaikwan, carrying with them over three thousand Japanese soldiers, more than twenty field guns, and six bombing planes. At 3:00 p. m. the Japanese began the bombardment of the city of Shanhaikwan. The battle is now still continuing.

Another wire from Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang on the same day transmitted a report from Regiment-Commander Shih Shih-An at 6:30 p. m. as follows:

Three Japanese troop trains arrived at the railway station in the afternoon of January 2, carrying with them more than three thousand infantry soldiers, more than twenty guns, eight aeroplanes and three armored cars. The Japanese immediately occupied the South railway station of Shanhaikwan and opened a fierce bombardment of the city, the aeroplanes in formation dropping bombs into the city. As a result of this bombardment, the city wall and the city tower were all being destroyed and many civilians were killed or wounded. The Japanese also used wooden ladders to scale the city wall but they were repulsed after a valiant defense by the Chinese. The battle is now still continuing.

The Chinese Legation, Washington
January 3, 1933.

793.94/5703

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 5 1933

SECRETARY OF STATE
 JAN 5 1933
 TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

From Chinese Legation
 1/5/33

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 5- 1933
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

JAN 6

DATED JANUARY 4, 1933

DIVISION OF

A telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Marshal

Chang Hsiao-Liang at Peiping, dated 2:00 a. m. January 4,
 states:--

F/HS

793.94/5704

During the last few days the Japanese, taking advantage
 of the fact that our troops are not yet fully concentrated at
 Shanhaikwan, proceeded to launch a fierce attack upon that
 city. Our forces there put up a most gallant defense against
 this onslaught but we are forced to withdraw from the city
 because we are greatly outnumbered and less well equipped
 and because reenforcements cannot be transported to the front
 in time to aid in the defense. At the present time, our
 troops are concentrating outside of the city and large re-
 enforcements are being rushed to the spot, all actively pre-
 paring to take battle against our foe.

Chinese Legation, Washington
 January 4, 1933.

193.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The War Department
(Military Intelligence
Division) concurs in
the estimate in first
and second paragraphs.




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

MET



GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1933

Rec'd 7:42 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 6, 2 p. m.

Following sent to the Legation, "January 6, 1 p. m.

Five battalions of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin yesterday moving eastward and two battalions this morning. It is known that local Japanese military authorities are becoming somewhat concerned over concentration of Chinese troops in Chinwangtao area. Japanese continue to state, however, that present operations will not spread beyond Shanhaikwan area unless Chinese provoke trouble. One Japanese destroyer has left Chinwangtao. It is becoming more evident that the Chinese troops put up a stubborn, even though short, resistance at Shanhaikwan. Eighty-four wounded Chinese soldiers passed through Tientsin last night en route to Peiping.

Although there is apparently a disposition on the part of the Japanese to localize the trouble and settle it by negotiation, the Chinese, so far as can be ^{observed} ~~seen~~, are taking no steps in that direction. Although both sides profess

F/HS

793.94/5705

FT/END
JAN 10 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R., Jan. 6,
2 p.m.

profess now to be maintaining only a defensive attitude,
the whole situation in North China is fraught with serious
possibilities and unless there is a sincere and earnest
desire on the part of both sides to prevent further hos-
tilities developments of far reaching importance are not
unlikely".

KLP-WWC

LOCKHART


(*) apparent omission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET



FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1933

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

24, January 6, 4 p.m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

"Leading articles in all Chinese papers this morning unanimously pay very high tribute to Chinese officers and soldiers and civilians killed when Shanghaiwan fell ~~to~~ Japanese. Such bravery and heroism CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, official organ of Government, declared is conclusive proof that there is hoped for rebirth of Chinese nation and Chinese glory, Paper severely condemns military leaders and officials who are adopting lukewarm attitude which paper considers as sign of degeneration of the Chinese race. Every Chinese citizen should feel happy and honored if he has an opportunity to die like Shanhaikwan heroes the paper concluded.

All public bodies here are holding mass meetings this afternoon to discuss what measures they should take in connection with the fall of Shanhaikwan".


KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

(*) apparent omission.

F/HS

793.94/5706




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JAN 9 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



Secretary of State,
Washington.

28, January 6, 9 p. m.

Reuter from Tokyo today

"Less than a battalion of infantry plus a detachment of artillery were the only troops of Kwantung army participating in Shanhaikwan affair declares military spokesman here. He added that contrary to press reports none of the troops had yet withdrawn as they were remaining facing Chinese troops across a river just westward of the city pending clarification of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's intentions. Although no formal armistice had been reached spokesman declared that all fighting has stopped and he expressed belief that there will be no fresh outbreak".

KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1933

Rec'd 9:05 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 6 - 1933

Department of State

F/H/S


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JAN 9 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED N.I. AND M.I.

MET



FROM


PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 6, 1933

Rec'd 10:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



27, January 6, 8 p. m.

Reuter from Canton today:

"Southwest Political Council, as result of its long discussion of Shanhaikwan affair yesterday, today telegraphed to Chinese Delegation in Geneva urging it to communicate to League a demand for immediate effective measures to be taken to check Japanese aggression otherwise very grave developments will take place for which League must be held responsible".

KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/5708

FILED

JAN 9 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
 JAN 6 1933
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 CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

January 5, 1933
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 6-1933
 Department of State
Copies to Peking and Tokyo
1/10/33 FE (REK)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 FEB 1 1933
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 2261

DEC
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F/H/S

793.94/5709

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
 AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI

Far East Situation.

The Japanese Ambassador came in with the remark that he regretted that his presence seemed to coincide with a new outbreak of war. He said that he was without instructions from his Government but that from the information he received this affair at Shanhaikwan was a local incident, provoked by a minor outbreak of Chinese against the Japanese there, and that when the Japanese who had sought permission to bring troops in to stabilize the situation approached the Gate of the City they were shot at and a Lieutenant and several soldiers killed. He said that the news he got from Ambassador Muto, who is also General, indicated that some troops of the Japanese had now been withdrawn and there was reason to be hoped that unless there was further provocation in Jehol by Chang Hsueh-liang the matter would be controlled. He said that in any event Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall.

793.94

894.014

7 4 4 8

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

Wall. I reminded the Ambassador that a year ago he had told me Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. He became flustered and said that that was so but the situation had changed greatly. At any rate, he could now assure me that they had no such ambitions in North China. He said further that in Japan he thought that matters were progressing; that Saito was getting better control, and he regarded this incident at Shanhaikwan as a test incident as to whether the military elements still remained in control or whether the civil government had regained its position.

594.20
1201
711.95
" I reminded the Ambassador that just before he went away he told me that the Japanese Government was in the control of a group of younger officers, none of them of a higher rank than a Lieutenant-Colonel, and I said to him that he must recognize that as long as that situation lasted I could not regard Japan as a normal Government and must make my own conclusions as to information coming from her. He said he remembered that situation but he found that when he got back to Japan it had somewhat changed and that Saito was getting into better control and that, as he expressed it, this incident at Shanhaikwan he regarded as a test of whether that was so."

But

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

893.01 *Manchukuo*
500.0.001
711.0012 *Manchukuo*
711.94
794.00
But he said he must in all frankness tell me that no Japanese Cabinet which advocated a compromise of the Manchukuo question could survive in Japan; that must be regarded as a closed incident. I told the Ambassador that in that case I could see, on my part, no other course than for Japan to get out of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. I went over the situation of the basic policy of this Government and the rest of the world and Europe, arising out of the Great War which had brought us to the conclusion that another war might destroy our civilization and which had made us determined to support the peace machinery which would render such a recurrence impossible. We recognized that Japan had a right to live her own way, provided she did not break treaties which she had made, and that if she was determined to lead a life differently from what we were determined to do I saw no other way but for her to withdraw from the associations and treaties which we proposed to abide by.

H.L.S.

S HLS:CBS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 1933

No. 990

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5709

793.94/5709

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5,
 1933.

S. H. K.



JAN 31 1933 PM 7
 793.94/5709

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CR
THE UNDER SECRETARY



Will you ask the Secretary
whether he wants this to go. I can
see no harm in it personally and it
may be well for the Sec to know the
type with which the Secretary talked
with the Japanese Ambassador

W.H.G.

SKH

File
Cattle

I doubt
advisability
of sending

SKH

SKH - I want
you to pass
on whether
these should
go. I think
O.K. H.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

February 1 1933

No. 190

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsumi Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5,
 1933.

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal

*S
HRE* (Secretary directed that
 this be sent to Tokyo).

JAN 31 1933

FE:MMH:REK
 1/10/33

FE *skt*

793.94/5709

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

January 4, 1933.

RECEIVED
JAN 6 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Mr. Debuchi, the Japanese
Ambassador.
Mr. Hornbeck.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 5 1933

Subject: The Shanhaikwan Incident.

Mr. Hornbeck made a courtesy call, of fifteen minutes,
on the Japanese Ambassador.

In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador
gave an account, which he said he had received from the
Japanese Foreign Office, of the Shanhaikwan incident. He
then said that the Japanese Cabinet had met and had de-
cided that action in consequence of this incident should
be strictly localized, and that they had issued instruc-
tions accordingly. This, he said, included instructions
by the military authorities. He said that he had not
received instructions to inform the Department of State,
but that he wished that we know this and requested that
Mr. Hornbeck report it to the Secretary of State. In
reply to a question by Mr. Hornbeck, the Ambassador next
said that it was not the intention at present to proceed
with military operations against Jehol -- unless the Chi-
nese made it necessary. He said that the Japanese did
not

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note
894.014
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F/HS

793.94/5710

JAN 7 1933
Confidential File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

not intend to proceed against Tientsin or Peiping.
He went on to say that in the past he had frequently
given the Department, through no fault of his own,
misinformation, but that he was confident in this
instance of the accuracy of what he was saying.

(NOTE: It is stated in the NEW YORK TIMES of
this morning that the Ambassador "plans to call on
Secretary Stimson tomorrow and give him the Tokyo
Government's version of the fighting at Shanhaikwan.")
i.e. Jan. 5J See 793.94/5709

SECRET

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

Jan. 5, 1936
JAN 18 1936
Assistant Secretary of State
JAN 18 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. WHITE
THE SECRETARY
RECEIVED
JAN 6 1933
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JAN 14 1933
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
JAN 7 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Copy to Legation, Bern
Copy to Embassy, Berlin
F-10-33
File No. REG-
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
F/HS
793.94/5711

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, HERR FRIEDRICH W. VON
PRITWITZ UND GAFFRON.

793.94
mt
500 A15a4
Far East. - General Situation.

The German Ambassador came in to make inquiries - first, about the Far East. I told him that while I had a good deal of information it was of such an imperfect and conflicting character that I could not make any prophecy as to what was about to happen at Shanhaikwan and Jehol. I said that, nevertheless, since the publication of the Lytton Report I was sitting very comfortably because I felt that when the representatives of five nations were able to agree unanimously upon a report which so completely corroborated the information and views of this Government, it would be likely to have an immense influence upon the situation in the end.

The Ambassador then asked me about the situation in general, including disarmament. I told him I had nothing to say about details but that, in regard to the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

the general situation, the policy of this Government was founded upon such a solid foundation that I felt certain we would progress through in the end. I then sketched out to him what these foundations were. First, the admitted condition in the world today where civilization had developed in the industrialized countries into such a fragile condition of interdependence and the methods of war had developed so greatly in power and destructiveness that it was now becoming clear to everyone that unless we succeeded in limiting and preventing wars some future war would probably destroy our entire civilization. He told me he heartily agreed. I said I recognized the fact that this situation applied more strongly to the White Race and industrialized communities and that methods which were appropriate to them might be ineffective and inappropriate yet to nations of a less developed civilization, like the semi-Indians of Bolivia and Paraguay; that it was unfortunate the peace machinery which the world was developing did not apply with equal appropriateness to these more backward nations but it was the only machinery which we had and my policy was to do my best to make it effective and to prevent it

from

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

from being destroyed. To this, the Ambassador also signified his hearty concurrence.

In reply to a further question about details as to the disarmament conference, I told him I was encouraged by Germany's return to the conference and I thought that the spirit there was more hopeful, very largely due to the admirable work done by M. Herriot and that of Baron von Neurath.

H.L.S.

H[enry] L. S[immon]

S HLS:CB8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 13 1933

No. 813

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only

The Honorable

Frederic M. Sackett,

American Ambassador,

Berlin.

Sir:

I enclose herewith a memorandum of conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the German Ambassador, touching upon the problem of disarmament.

Very truly yours,

E. L. STIMSON

793.94/5711

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum.

793.94/5711

RE: MKE
 WE: RES:MLD
 1-10-33

Routine
 Jan. 11, 1933 3PM

A copy of the
 Inal. orig.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 15 1933

No. 2136

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
American Minister,
Berne.

Sir:

I enclose herewith a memorandum of conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the German Ambassador, touching upon the Manchurian problem and disarmament.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum.

793.94/5711

793.94/5711

Res. *PM* 1-11-33
WE: RES: AS
1-11-33
SPC

Routine
CR
Jan. 11, 1933 PM
ML

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HK



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 976

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the German Ambassador, Herr Friedrich W. von Prittwitz und Gaffron, in regard to the Far East and the situation in general. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. SIMMONS

793.94/5711


793.94/5711

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5,
 1933.

Jan. 18 1933.

FE:MMH:REK
 1/14/33

FE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 176

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the German Ambassador, Herr Friedrich W. von Prittwitz und Gaffron, in regard to the Far East and the situation in general. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,


H. L. STYMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5,
 1933.

CR ROUTINE
 Jan. 18 1933.
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
793.94/5711

146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

January 5, 1933.



Copies to Tokyo, Peking,
Brussels and Geneva
1/9/33 FE (CRK)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL MAY.

Manchuria.


The Belgian Ambassador came to ask questions. First,
he asked about the recent events in Manchuria at
Shanhaikwan. I told him that my information was not
sufficiently complete to enable me to prophesy. He
asked me what we were going to do. I replied that the
past statements of the American Government on that
subject were so clear as to render it, in my opinion,
unnecessary to answer the question; that we were going
straight ahead on the same policy which we had announced.
He told me that last summer he had had a conversation
with a representative of the National City Bank who had
just come from Manchuria, and who had told him that in,
I think, six months the Japanese would be in Peking and
Tientsin; that while this was an astonishing statement
they seemed to be nearer there than he, the Ambassador,
had anticipated. I said I made no prophecies but I
reminded

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793.94/5712

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FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

reminded him that a year ago the Japanese had started in the same way to go up the Yangtse Valley but had not remained there. He reiterated that the actions of the Japanese were unbelievable. I said I did not wish to characterize their actions, but he must remember that the situation in Tokyo was different from that in any other civilized capital, with which I was acquainted, in that the entire government was stated to be in the hands of a group of young army officers; that this was the statement not only of every observer but was admitted by the representatives of the Tokyo Government. I said that in such a situation it was impossible to forecast results.

H.L.S.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 13 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 171

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, in regard to Manchuria. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5712

793.94/5712

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5, 1933.

JAN 11, 1933

FE:MMH:REK
 1/9/33

FE
 M.M.H.

WE 1-10-33
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 90

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

January 16 1933

No. 697

The Honorable

Hugh S. Gibson,

American Ambassador,

Brussels.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, in regard to Manchuria. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

B. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5, 1933.

WJ
 JAN 11, 1933

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 1/9/33

WJ
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 13 1936

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 967

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, in regard to Manchuria. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5, 1933.

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 JAN 11, 1936

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 13 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 5, 1933, with the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, in regard to Manchuria.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 5, 1933.

793.94/5712

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 7, 1933

Rec'd 5:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 7, 1 p. m.

Following sent to the Legation:

"January 7, noon. American army authorities at Chinwangtao report authoritative information that Japanese and Chinese military authorities, through intervention ~~intimate~~ of British naval authorities, have agreed to enter into negotiations for settlement of the Shanhaikuan incident. General Ho has agreed in writing to meet the Japanese for this purpose.

I communicated a warning yesterday to the members of the American mission at Changli, approximately fifteen in number, to withdraw to Tientsin if there is any threat of trouble at Changli.

Conditions continue quiet at Tientsin but there is still considerable uneasiness among Chinese population.

Repeated to Department".

LOCKHART

CIB WP

F/HS

793.94/5713

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
JAN 9 1933

793-94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP



Secretary of State,
Washington.

29, January 7, 9 a. m.

Your 3, January 6, 9 a. m.

Department's instructions will be complied with.

The Legation has been careful to select only press reports which it either knew to be accurate or had reasonable grounds for believing to be accurate. This has enabled it to convey much important information to the Department in plain which would have had to be coded if sent in the form of reports from the Legation itself.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

PLAIN
FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 7, 1933

Rec'd 2:10 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 7 - 1933
Department of State

Del. to Peiping
Jan. 13, 1933

F/HS

793.94/5714

JAN 10 1933

FILED

793.94
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO

1933 JAN - 13 - PM 4:40

Washington, *13*
January 13, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

6P

F/HS

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China)

12
793.94/5714

Your 29, January 7, 9 a.m.

The Department appreciates the point made in regard to the forwarding by naval radio of the texts of important press reports. The Department desires only to ensure that the Legation exercise thought and discriminating care in selecting only such of those reports or of portions thereof as it either knows to be or has reasonable grounds for believing to be accurate and likely to be of value to the Department and that, when the Legation sends such reports, it carry through by giving, in cases where there is warrant, its comments and, later, further messages in confirmation or denial or amendment.

793.94/5714

Stinson
Wg

FE:JEU/VDM *FE*
7.22.11
214

Enciphered by *[Signature]*
Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *[Signature]*

Jan. 13, 1933. PM

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-128

74

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 10, 1933.

~~EMD:~~
~~WRL:~~
~~RCM:~~
~~FEJ:~~
~~MBH:~~
SKH:

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of December 13, 1932, reports that the "Mitsuya Agreement", regarding the control of Koreans along the border, was abrogated on December 12. Mitani (Japanese), Chief of the Police Bureau of Fengtien Province, signed on behalf of "Manchoukuo", while the Japanese Acting Consul General at Mukden signed for Japan. Confidentially the Consulate General was informed by a Japanese official that publicity would be delayed a day because, for lack of time, Mitani had signed before obtaining the permission of the "Manchoukuo" Government. "With a smile" the Japanese consular official said that permission to sign the document would be obtained from the "Manchoukuo" Government in a few hours, which the Consul General regards as another illustration of the impotency of the "Manchoukuo" Government.

KL
LES:CLS

747

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, China, December 13, 1932.

SUBJECT: Abrogation of the Mitsuya Agreement.

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 2 - 1933
THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

AM REC'D
STATE DEPT
MAR 2 1933
SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 7 - 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5715

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 704 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 12, 1932, on the above subject.

M
Full
cm

Respectfully yours,

TREATY DIVISION
MAR 6 - 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 704
to the Legation at Peiping.

MAR 7 1933

FILED

800/710
HTW

4 Carbon Copies
Received *2-2-71*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 704.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, December 12, 1932.

SUBJECT: Abrogation of the Mitsuya Agreement.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/5676

With reference to my despatch No. 701, December 7, 1932, "Negotiations for the Abrogation of the 'Mitsuya Agreement'", I have the honor to report that the document abrogating this agreement was signed this morning. According to a Japanese consular official from whom the preceding information was obtained, Mr. Mitani, Chief of the Police Bureau of Fengtian Province, signed on behalf of Manchoukuc and Mr. Morishima, Acting Consul General at Mukden, for Japan.

The Japanese official who told a member of my staff that the document abrogating the agreement had been signed requested that the information be considered as confidential until to-morrow. He explained that arrangements for the signing of the document had been hastily concluded this morning because Mr. Morishima was leaving for Harbin, his new post, this afternoon. Mr. Mitani, he added, because of the lack of time did not secure the permission

Confidential

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


Confidential
permission of the Manchoukuo Government before
affixing his signature. With a smile the Japanese
official said that permission to sign the document
would be obtained from the Manchoukuo Government
this afternoon and that newspaper correspondents
would be informed of the abrogation of the "Mitsuya
Agreement" to-morrow. These circumstances, although
probably unimportant, are reported as another illus-
tration of the impotency of the Manchoukuo Govern-
ment.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
One copy to Consulate General, Seoul.

800/710
MH:mhp



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 10 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 9, 1933.

SKH



Referring to the attached telegram from Minister Johnson in regard to mediation in the present Sino-Japanese conflict at and around Shanhaikwan, I see no particular objection to the views and suggestion set forth in paragraphs four and five thereof, although I am somewhat hesitant, as the League is already seized with the question, to say that we should join in any mediation movement in which the League does not take the lead.

However, the point of this memo is not so much to express my opinion on those views and suggestion as to suggest a possible practical plan whereby further friction can be prevented IF the Japanese authorities in "Manchoukuo" and in Tokyo really want to prevent further friction in this area. The plan is this:

The League should propose to Japan and China that a small strip, paralleling the Great Wall and including Shanhaikwan, possibly one or two miles wide, should be set aside as a neutral zone, into which no Chinese or Japanese troops shall enter, to be policed by the troops of the powers, except Japan,

O But see p. 2.

7 4 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901 which Protocol authorizes those powers to maintain troops along the Peiping-Mukden Railway to Shanhaikwan.

Handwritten: C. [unclear] SW
Personally, I do not believe that the Japanese want to prevent friction and, for that reason, I do not believe that this plan or any other can accomplish any good purpose. However, if there are those that believe that Japan does want to prevent friction in this area I feel that the plan suggested is the only practical one.

Handwritten: J.E.F.

The "Manchukuo" state
needs Japan for its rounding
out — + the Japanese
will try to take it, sooner
or later — probably sooner.

Handwritten: SK4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

man

PEIPING

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (a)

Dated January 7, 1933

FROM

Rec'd 1:05 pm

Secretary of State

Washington


31, January 7, 7 pm.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. The French Minister, the British Charge, the
Secretary in charge of the Italian Legation and I have been
considering in the light of the serious situation which has
arisen at Shanhaikwan the question of mediation. We have
been led to this (in spite of the fact that neither side
thus far appears to desire mediation) by the knowledge that
the question is made acute because of the movement of Chi-
nese reenforcements to the Tanshan area.

Two. There is difficulty on the one hand that Japanese
operations are being directed from Chinchow under instruction
of General Muto at Changchun. On the other hand Chang Hsueh
Liang will probably take no responsibility without sanction
of Nanking. We are furthermore alive to the fact that in
any mediation that might be undertaken it is impossible for
us to undertake any commitments which would involve our
forces as police for any neutral zone or of offering any
guarantees to either side.

Three. Such information as is available to us here in-
dicates that the only settlement which could satisfy the
Japanese



F/G 793.94/5716

JUN 24 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #31 from Peiping

Japanese would be the elimination of Chinese military from the Shanhaikwan area and the maintenance of Japanese rights under the Boxer protocol (i.e., right to station troops along line of railway) and (b) the Chinese, the reoccupation by them of Shanhaikwan and recognition of their undisputed right to dispose of their forces where they please inside the wall and probably in Jehol. The objectives are admittedly well nigh irreconcilable but if extension of operations is to be avoided we feel that in spite thereof some attempt along the lines of the following paragraph offers only chance of possible solution.

Four. Our view is that any mediation without full consent of highest authorities on both sides is to be depreciated? depreciated and mediation if attempted should be under the auspices of great powers acting in concert if not of the League itself. Main object should be to bring both parties together with representatives of major powers or powers designated by the League participating as at Shanghai with restricted aim of localizing affair and preventing extension of military operations.

Five. We venture, therefore, to suggest to our respective governments that the offer of our good offices for purposes outlined above be made to the governments at Tokyo and Nanking.

Six. Above mentioned colleagues are sending messages along above lines to their respective governments.

Repeated to Tokyo for information.

CSB

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138 Cable was sent in Chinese
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect CONFIDENTIAL to anyone
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT
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Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1933 JAN - 9 - PM 2:31

Washington,

January 9, 1933.

AMLEGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 31, January 7, 7 p.m.

The Japanese Ambassador here affirms with emphatic assurance that the Japanese cabinet has given instruction that there be no further hostilities on Japanese initiative and that this situation will be a QUOTE test UNQUOTE case proving their authority and good faith.

Department regards efforts of conciliation as unlikely to succeed unless the initial move theretoward comes from Japanese and Chinese.

British material interests are preponderant along the railway line and at Tientsin. British Minister for Foreign Affairs has been the most ardent champion at Geneva of the principle and the possibility of conciliation.

In view of these and other considerations, the Department, while ready to join in any effort at conciliation which may offer even the slightest possibility of success, feels that the onus of leadership in exploring the possibilities, in so far as action may possibly be taken by the powers other than Japan and China is concerned, should be

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

F/HS
793.94/5716

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

let devolve upon the British. The Department will there-
 fore await such approach, if any, as may be made to this
 Government by the British Government.

You should inform your British colleague that this,
 is our attitude and state that you are ready to cooperate,
 in discussion and that your Government will stand ready
 to consider sympathetically any definite proposal from
 the British Government for action of a character in
 which that Government may place confidence and for the
 initiation of which it or the League of Nations, of
 which it is a member and in which it takes a leading
 position, may be willing to assume the responsibility.

Castell
as is

Jan. 9, 1934

WVX

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

1934 JAN - 9 - PM 3:34

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by

FE
SKH
ZMF

RECEIVED

Sent by operator M. 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Paraphrase sent to
ONI & M.I.D.*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *Jan. 10, 1933*

rh

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (a)

PEIPING

FROM

Dated Jan. 8, 1933

Rec'd. 8.22 am

793.94
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 - 1933

Department of State

32, January 8, noon.

The following has been received from Chinwangtao:

Arrived Chinwangtao on the night of the fifth and
called on General Ho Chu Kuo at his headquarters north
of Chinwangtao this morning. He had us lunch with him
and was very cordial. The forces under his command
include the ninth, the twentieth, independent brigades
here; nineteenth brigade in Jehol, and fifteenth brigade
from Kalgan on the way, and the fifteenth field artillery
regiment of the seventh brigade at Peikuan. General Ho
stated that he has been approached by the Japanese here
for negotiation on board a British warship with a view
to treating the Shanhaikwan incident as a local affair
which would seem to indicate that they do not desire to
advance farther. He referred the request to Peiping
but has received no reply to date. General Ho plans
to retain the status quo. He will not attempt to re-
take Shanhaikwan but will resist to the last, any
Japanese attempt to advance on his present line, which

runs

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FT/END

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 32, January 8, noon, from Peiping

runs north and south about midway between Shanhaikwan and Chinwangtao. In the fighting at Shanhaikwan, the Japanese made effective use of tanks and completely wiped out a battalion of the six hundred twenty-sixth regiment which fought a delaying action to permit evacuation of other troops and local population. The battalion commander and three company commanders are reported killed and one wounded. The railroad hospital at Shanhaikwan is reported by the Peiping-Mukden Railroad people to contain about a hundred Japanese casualties. Fire of naval vessels was effective in Shanhaikwan. General Ho believed that attack on Shanhaikwan is consequential to dispatch of the nineteenth brigade into Jehol. Rumors of third cavalry brigade raid beyond the Great Wall and bombardment of Chinwangtao are false. We expect to go to Shanhaikwan today, arrangements having been made with the local Japanese garrison commander who is to notify the Japanese at Shanhaikwan of our arrival. There is one Japanese cruiser and one destroyer at Chinwangtao and two British ships. Signed Gluckman.

Repeated to Tokyo, to Nanking by mail.

JOHNSON

HPD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 8, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

A telegram to the following effect has been received from Captain Gluckman, U.S.A., from Chinwangtao:

I reached Chinwangtao late on January 5 and this morning (8th) proceeded to the headquarters of General Ho Chu-kuo north of here, where I called on the General. He invited us to lunch and was very amiable. His command consists of the 9th, the 20th and the independent brigades in Chinwangtao; the Kalgan 15th brigade now en route to this front; the 19th brigade in Jehol; and the 15th regiment of the 7th brigade of field artillery/at Peiyuan. The General made the statement that the Japanese here asked him to meet them on a British war vessel with a view to negotiating for a local settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair. This development is interpreted (by Captain Gluckman) as indicating an unwillingness on the part of the Japanese to advance further. General Ho referred the Japanese proposal to Peiping, but had not yet had an answer. General Ho's idea is to maintain the present status, neither attempting to retake Shanhaikwan nor, in the event of a Japanese advance, falling back from his line, which he is determined to hold to the last. Ho's line runs north and south about half-way between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan.

The

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese made effective use of tanks in the Shanhaikwan fighting, completely destroying a battalion of the 626th regiment, which remained fighting to allow a general evacuation of the local population and of the other troops. The commander of this battalion and three company commanders are said to have been killed. One company commander also was wounded. Officials of the Peiping-Mukden Railway report that their hospital at Shanhaikwan is treating about 100 Japanese casualties.

The naval shelling of Shanhaikwan was effective.

It is General Ho's opinion that the Japanese attack on Shanhaikwan was the result of the despatch to Jehol of the 19th brigade. The reports of a raid beyond the Great Wall by the 3rd brigade of cavalry and of the bombardment of Chinwangtao are untrue.

We are planning to proceed to Shanhaikwan today, having made necessary arrangements with the commander of the local Japanese garrison, who will give notice of our visit to the Japanese at Shanhaikwan. One Japanese cruiser, one Japanese destroyer and two British warships are now moored off Chinwangtao.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 10 1933

To the American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period December 13, 1932, to January 8, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:

Two copies of digest
 of telegrams.

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M.M.H.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
DECEMBER 13, 1932, to JANUARY 8, 1933.

893.01 Manchuria/719

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (December 20) that official information has been received from the Japanese Ministry of War to the effect that the Sixth Division, which is composed of crack shock troops and considered one of the best in the Japanese army, is now en route to Manchuria to replace the Second Division.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 2) that on the night of January 1 firing took place between Chinese and Japanese at Shanhaikwan and that on the morning of January 2 there was a clash, said to have been between Chinese soldiers and "Manchoukuo" police. On the night of January 1 a train of Chinese soldiers and some artillery passed through Tientsin moving towards Shanhaikwan.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 3) that latest information from an American military officer at Chinwangtao (about 10 miles from Shanhaikwan) is that the Japanese have demanded the removal of all Chinese troops to Changli (about 25 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan); that on January 3 Japanese ships shelled
 Shanhaikwan

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Shanhaikwan; and that Japanese women and children have been evacuated from Chinwangtao.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (January 3) that Japanese official sources in Mukden state that, on January 1, Japanese and "Manchoukuo" garrisons at Shanhaikwan were bombed three times and shot at by Chinese troops; that when the Japanese force of about 100 men advanced towards the south gate it was fired upon but later occupied a part of the city; that, on January 2, two Japanese reconnoitering planes, being subjected to Chinese fire, retaliated by dropping bombs on Chinese troops. The Consul General states that Japanese officials at Mukden minimize the affair and anticipate that it can be settled locally.

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 3) that a member of the Japanese Legation informed press correspondents on January 3 that the matter of the clash at Shanhaikwan was being handled by the Japanese Commandant at Tientsin who was issuing orders to the Commandant of the Japanese Legation guard at Peiping; that a letter was sent on January 2 to General Chang Hsueh-liang demanding that he accept responsibility for the clash; and that the situation was dangerous.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 3) that the Japanese military headquarters at Tientsin announced that Shanhaikwan was occupied at four p.m. on January 3 and that Japanese troops were pursuing retreating Chinese forces.

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 3) that an aide to General Chang Hsueh-liang has just handed to him a statement to the following effect:

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On the evening of January 1, Japanese plain clothes men fired in the direction of the Shanhaikwan city wall, Japanese soldiers threw a bomb at the Shanhaikwan station and the "Manchoukuo" police fired a number of shots. Upon being asked by the Chinese why the fire had been opened, the Japanese argued that the Chinese had fired first. At the same time the Japanese demanded that the residents of Shanhaikwan be asked to leave and that the Chinese defense corps at the south gate of the city withdraw. The Chinese refused to comply with the demands. On the morning of January 2, two Japanese armored trains fired towards Shanhaikwan and about 200 soldiers attempted to scale the city wall by wooden ladders but failed because the Chinese resisted in self-defense. In the afternoon three Japanese armored trains loaded with 3,000 men and 20 cannons arrived and launched a serious attack from outside the city of Shanhaikwan. Six Japanese bombing planes bombed the city, wounding and killing many Chinese.

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 4) that he is informed that General Chang Hsueh-liang has replied to the Japanese letter to the effect that he considered the Shanhaikwan affair a national emergency and not a local event; that other communications on the subject should be made direct to the National Government at Nanking; and that the Japanese must bear the responsibility for initiating action.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 4) that two Japanese cruisers and two destroyers arrived at Chinwangtao on January 4 and that on January 3 one train of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin bound eastward.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (January 4) that the Japanese War Office has made statements to the following effect

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effect:

On January 1, the Chinese commander at Shanhaikwan agreed to allow Japanese outposts to occupy certain important positions in order that they might afford better protection from bandits. On January 2, when the Japanese troops moved to the position agreed upon they were fired upon by Chinese regulars. The Japanese returned the fire, suffering five casualties. The Japanese former garrison at Shanhaikwan has been increased. On December 31, three Chinese brigades moved into Jehol Province and two brigades moved towards Shanhaikwan. Japan will take no aggressive action unless forced into it by the Chinese.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (January 4) that the Japanese General Staff stated on January 4 that the Kwantung army will make no aggressive move unless attacked at Shanhaikwan or along the Shanhaikwan-Mukden railway in which case it will be forced to take such measures as it sees fit. The Ambassador states that according to Japanese estimates there are 68,000 Chinese troops in Jehol Province.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (January 4) that Japanese troops, which almost without opposition reached Suifenho (eastern Kirin Province on Siberian border) on January 3, now occupy the entire eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Consul General states that on December 29 the Japanese and Soviet Consuls General reached an agreement to the effect that the Soviet Government would not object to Japanese troops going as far as Suifenho.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 5) that American army authorities at Chinwangtao report that conditions are quiet there and that Chinese are reopening their stores. There are practically no troops on the

railway

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railway between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan. The railway authorities report approximately 6,000 Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan and 100 Japanese casualties in the hospital. There are no further movements of Chinese troops through Tientsin towards Chinwangtao.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (January 5) that the spokesman of the Kwantung army states that fighting at Shanhaikwan ceased on the evening of January 3; that Japanese and Chinese forces are guarding the east and west sides, respectively, of the Shih River; that three Chinese divisions are concentrated in that vicinity; and that the total Japanese casualties are 15 killed and 99 wounded.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (January 5) that he was authoritatively informed on January 5 that the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria have been instructed to localize the Shanhaikwan affair unless Chinese provocation makes further measures necessary.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 6) that within the past twenty-four hours seven battalions of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin moving eastward and that one Japanese destroyer has left Chinwangtao. The Consul General states that although the Japanese military authorities are somewhat concerned over the concentration of Chinese troops in the Chinwangtao area they declare that unless the Chinese provoke trouble the present operations will not extend beyond the Shanhaikwan area.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 7) that authoritative information has been received from Chinwangtao that the Japanese and Chinese military authorities have agreed to enter into negotiations for the settlement

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settlement of the Shanhaikwan incident. The Consul General states that conditions are quiet at Tientsin but that there is considerable uneasiness among the Chinese population.

793.94/5717

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 8) that an American army officer, who is now at Chinwangtao, states that General Ho Chu-kuo, whose headquarters are north of Chinwangtao, informed him that he (General Ho) was approached on board a British warship by the Japanese with a view to localizing the Shanhaikwan incident; and that he referred the request to Peiping but has received no reply as yet. The officer reports further that during the fighting at Shanhaikwan the Japanese used tanks and wiped out a battalion of Chinese troops; that the fire of Japanese naval vessels at Shanhaikwan was effective; and that there are now at Chinwangtao one Japanese cruiser and one destroyer; also two British ships.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 800.51 W 89 France/804 FOR memorandum

State Department
 FROM Under Secretary (Castle) DATED Jan. 3, 1933
 TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

5718

REGARDING: Memorandum of a conversation between
 Mr. Castle and the French Ambassador.
 Ambassador asked concerning news from
 China and was informed that there was
 nothing except confirmation of press reports
 as to the taking of Shanhaikwan. Comments
 made regarding action of the Chinese.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 9 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 6. 1933

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 6 - 1933
 Department of State

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A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 5, 1933.

793.94

SECRETARY OF STATE
 JAN 6 1933

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793.94/5719

With reference to the current reports that General Nakamura, commanding officer of the Japanese troops at Tientsin, had sent a letter through Colonel Aibara to General Chang Hsueh-Liang charging the Chinese troops with the responsibility for the clash at Shanhaikwan, it is now learned that General Chang had sent him a reply disproving his allegations by exhibiting facts. General Chang further declared in his answer that ^{the} sudden and well-prepared attack as staged by the Japanese on Shanhaikwan clearly shows the premeditated nature of the Japanese action and therefore the responsibility for the occurrence should rest entirely with the Japanese.

Chinese Legation, Washington
 January 5, 1933.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
JAN 6 1933
DIVISION OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 6 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



*From Chinese Legation
Jan. 6. 1933*



TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING- 1933

DATED JANUARY 4, 1933.

793.94

A telegram from Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang at 4:00 p. m. January 3 was transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a telegraphic report from Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo sent at 12:00 p. m. January 2, giving the full details of the beginning of the present clash between the Chinese and the Japanese forces at Shanhaikwan.

In the night of January 1, the Japanese command at Shanhaikwan, before they proceeded with their onslaught upon the city, ordered their military police to destroy the entrance to their headquarters and to drop several bombs in the vicinity. Police forces of the puppet government in the Three Eastern Provinces were ordered to fire several rifle shots around the districts in which they were stationed. Marshal Chang then immediately despatched one of his secretaries to inquire at the Japanese headquarters. The Japanese replied that they had no detailed information about the incident and they asked the Chinese residents to make an investigation themselves. The Japanese also issued the warning that, for fear of any possible danger on the Chinese residents, they should be ordered to evacuate the city. This warning was to be answered by the Chinese within fifty minutes.

At 12:00 a. m. the Japanese authorities proposed four conditions:--

- (1) The South Gate of the city of Shanhaikwan was to be policed by the Japanese.
- (2) The Chinese should withdraw their troops from the South Gate.
- (3) The Chinese should withdraw their policemen and police guards from the South Gate.
- (4) The Chinese should withdraw the guards on the city wall.

These conditions were to be answered by the Chinese immediately or else the Japanese would proceed to attack.

Later on, the Japanese demanded that the Chinese should grant them admittance through the South Gate and that the city wall at the south side of the city should be policed by the Japanese. The Chinese absolutely refused to concede to these conditions and proceeded to order the troops to take their mapped-out positions for defense. Meanwhile, the Japanese troops disarmed the police guards outside of the South Gate and a Chinese official was placed under detention. The two sides were now maintaining their respective positions.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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At 8:00 a. m. of January 2, three Japanese troop trains arrived from the front carrying with them about three thousand infantry and artillery soldiers. A Japanese armored car also arrived at the Shanhaikwan railway station and began to bombard the city at about 10:00 a. m. Their bombardment was assisted by bombing planes which dropped many bombs into the city.

The Chinese immediately returned fire in self-defense and up to the present (4:00 p. m., January 3) the Japanese had fired about three hundred shells and had dropped more than ten bombs. There were casualties on both sides but each maintained its respective position.

Marshal Chang wired again at 11:00 p. m. January 3, transmitting a telegraphic report from Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo on January 3 that the Japanese were reinforcing their troops at Shanhaikwan and two battleships arrived at Shanhaikwan. At 10:00 a. m. on the 3rd a fierce battle was on when the Japanese forces concentrated their attack upon the South Gate of Shanhaikwan with heavy artillery and bombardment from land and sea. As a result of this bombardment, the South Gate was completely destroyed and the city was set in flames.

Simultaneous with this bombardment some Japanese soldiers were attacking the city and were attempting to scale the city wall with ladders. The Chinese made a valiant defense against this attack and casualties on the Japanese side were extremely heavy. At about 11:00 a. m. the Japanese retreated after they had been repulsed by the Chinese.

The Chinese forces were in excellent spirit and were ordered by the command to be always prepared to resist any future attack by the Japanese.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 4, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the military admit that more than two Japanese divisions supported by special units, all available airplanes and 31,000 "Manchukuo" troops among which there are many Japanese, will comprise the attacking force which is expected to begin operations soon in Jehol Province. The Consul General reports further that very little opposition is expected in the northeast; that the Japanese military are eager to surround and inflict a severe defeat on General Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars; and that a part of the Kwantung army headquarters will be moved to Mukden or Chinchow. The Japanese military assert that developments at Geneva will not affect their plans. The Consul General adds that insurgents have become active in the Tungpian area (east of Mukden).

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 21) that the spokesman of the military headquarters admits that Japanese troops have crossed the border into Jehol and are proceeding towards Pehpiao (about 50 miles northwest of Chinchow). The Consul General reports further that, according to reliable information, skirmishes have occurred in the vicinity of Nanling and Kailu; that a large number of Japanese troops left Mukden for Shanhaikwan on February 20 and 21; and that recently many motor trucks, hundreds of carts and 2,000 coolies have been commandeered and have left Mukden over the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway. 793.94/5720

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 23) that the Japanese military state that approximately 18,000 Chinese volunteers with their commander surrendered at Lupei (about 130 miles northwest of Mukden) and joined the "Manchukuo" army.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 6 1933
 DEPT. OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
 JAN 6 1933
 TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 6, 1933

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 6 - 1933
 Department of State

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
 DATED JANUARY 4, 1933.

Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang, in a telegram at 2:00 a. m.
 January 4 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transmitted a re-
 port of Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo of January 3 as follows:
 According to a report from Shanhaikwan, Japanese bombing
 planes launched a large-scale assault upon the city of Shanhai-
 kwan. The aerial attack was made in active co-operation with
 armored cars, heavy artillery and battleships and was concen-
 trated on the district around the South Gate of the city. As
 a result of this bombardment, the city was set on fire, inflict-
 ing immense damages upon the city. In addition, under cover of
 artillery fire, Japanese tanks opened a fierce attack upon the
 South Gate. The Chinese forces put up a stubborn defense against
 this onslaught but were forced to yield ground because of the
 total destruction of the city wall and the defensive works built
 upon it. This battle was one of the most bitterly contested
 battles, with heavy casualties on both sides. Our position is
 now in the west of the city of Shanhaikwan and our troops are
 now engaging in a fierce battle with the Japanese. Our position
 remains as before and large reinforcements are being transported
 to the front.

Chinese Legation, Washington
 January 4, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 6 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKIN

DATED JANUARY 5, 1933.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 6 - 1933
 Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
 JAN 6 1933

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in receipt of a telegram from Peiping to the following effect:

British, French and American Legations all have observers at the battle front at Shanhaikwan. From their reports, the Legations are of the consensus opinion that the question as to who fired the first shot at Shanhaikwan is of no consequence. The fact is that the Japanese troops are on the offensive on Chinese soil which is a sufficient provocation in itself. On flimsy excuses, they employed the most powerful modern engine of war in a concentrated and ruthless bombardment of an innocent city and are now in occupation of foreign soil. At Geneva, the Chinese delegate should refuse to listen to the question as to who fired the first shot. The fact is that the fierce bombardment directed against Shanhaikwan, a Chinese city, was started by the Japanese with superior force and arms. The responsibility is on them entirely. All the Legations are reporting this fact to their respective governments.


Chinese Legation, Washington
 January 5, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DATE: DECEMBER 22, 1932.

After reviewing before the Third Plenary Session of the

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Central Executive Committee the events following the pre-meditated Japanese invasion of the Three Eastern Provinces and the cruel and murderous oppressive measures inflicted upon the people there by the Japanese military, Minister Lo Wen-Yan emphatically reiterated the importance for the Chinese Government of resolutely adhering to the following fundamental principles:

First, China will never agree to any solution of the present situation which takes into account the puppet organization in the Three Eastern Provinces established, maintained and controlled by Japanese military forces;

Second, China is confident that any reasonable proposal for the settlement of the present situation will be necessarily compatible with the letter and the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty as well as with China's sovereign power and will also effectively secure ever-lasting peace in the Far East.

Dr. Lo concluded that under the existing world conditions, the present question is not one of pure diplomacy. China must concentrate her national energy and work unitedly for the most effective way of resisting her aggressor. Dr. Lo finally voiced his conviction that in the light of world history, a policy of militaristic aggression will be doomed to failure.

Chinese Legation, Washington
 December 22, 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 7, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 19 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Shanhaikwan and Jehol

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 3 - 1933
Department of State

F/H/S

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MAR 7 1933

FILED

Confidential File

793.94

Putting together everything that I have been able to read and hear in relation to the Shanhaikwan "incident" and its implications and possible immediate consequences, I am driven to the conclusion, by way of estimate, that further hostilities, on a considerably enlarged scale, either toward Jehol or toward Tientsin or both are altogether likely in the near future.

The weight of evidence is in support of the Chinese claim that the Shanhaikwan incident was deliberately staged and provoked by the Japanese. Whatever may be the fact in that connection, the initial happenings were not such as to have warranted on their own merits the subsequent action of the Japanese armed forces (both army and navy) in the destruction and occupation of the city of Shanhaikwan. And, military operations having taken the course which they did, there no longer derives from the earlier events warrant for the drastic demands which the Japanese are reported to be making of the Chinese as a basis for "localization" of the incident.

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By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The seizure and retention of Shanhaikwan by Japanese forces, coupled with the demand that this be regarded and be treated as a "local incident", may be contemplated in perspective if it be compared with the occupation of an inner doorway in a residential building coupled with the suggestion that the residents regard that as a "local incident" (or the fastening of a clamp on a man's finger with the suggestion that he consider that a local incident).

The affirmation that Japan has no territorial or political ambitions in regard to North China must be taken for what it may be worth in the light of similar affirmations a year ago with regard to her lack of ambitions with regard to Manchuria.

The affirmation that Japan has no intention for the present of engaging in further hostilities either in the direction of Jehol or to the southward "unless the Chinese make it necessary" is equivalent to serving ^{that} notice/in the event of any military movements by the Chinese in North China (on their own soil) Japan will engage in such further movements on her part as she may see fit.

The military moves, the diplomatic statements, and the press stories of the Japanese during the past week
are,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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are, in combination, closely analogous to those which at a number of stages during events of the past fifteen months have immediately preceded new and enlarged military operations by the Japanese army in Manchuria (and at Shanghai).

The Chinese public is now more than ever aroused and more than ever clamoring for armed "resistance" to Japanese "aggression". The Chinese are, by the fact that Chinese soldiers have stood up against Japanese soldiers, again encouraged to believe that Chinese armies may be able to put up a thoroughly good fight. It is to be expected that the tension will increase, ^{that} the efforts of Chang Hsueh-liang to strengthen the Chinese military forces in Jehol Province will continue, and ^{at} there may occur almost anywhere and at almost any time an "incident" which will jar off of the Japanese shoulder the chip which the Japanese authorities have placed on that shoulder by virtue of the attitude which they have assumed and the statements which they have been making since the initial occurrence in the Shanhaikwan incident.

The available evidences and the logic of the situation point to the conclusion that it is definitely Japan's intention to occupy Jehol at the earliest convenient moment and that she is maneuvering to draw the

Chinese

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Chinese into a position such that it may be made to appear that the Chinese have taken the offensive and thereby brought on the hostilities in consequence of which Japan's military action toward that end will have been taken. It may even be that the Japanese are trying so completely to provoke the Chinese as to bring on a general state of war between the two countries.

II. There may possibly, however, be another sequence and eventuality. Mr. Debuchi is so insistent in his affirmation that the Japanese cabinet has given orders that this incident shall be "localized" and that the Japanese military operations shall not be extended, and he affirms so confidently that this is a "test" case, -- it is conceivable that the Tokyo authorities have definitely decided that, their forces having seized Shanhaikwan and thus possessed themselves of a strategic doorway from which they can threaten Tientsin and Peiping, they will in fact make of this a "test" case, will make their affirmations and abide by them -- thereby demonstrating to the world that the cabinet having given its word, the situation stands as declared by it, this being in turn evidence that the cabinet has regained authority and is in control.

(NOTE:

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(NOTE: One of the latest press items with regard to this whole subject is that which appears in a press despatch by the Associated Press, from Changchun, Manchuria, (Saturday) January 7, printed in the BALTIMORE SUN of January 7, in which there appears a paragraph as follows:

"It will be easy to bring up adequate reinforcements to cope with any situation, the Japanese officials said. They declared that the Chinese had trapped them into occupying Shanhaikwan in order to compromise Japan and make the world believe that the Japanese intended to march on Peiping and Tientsin.")

III. It

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III. It is, of course, impossible to make with absolute confidence any prediction in regard to such a situation. Even with the possibilities outlined in section II above in mind, my expectation runs along the lines of I above. If it be the fact that the Japanese strategy is based on the idea outlined in II above, and if the situation should work out along that line and no further hostilities eventuate, it may be expected that the Japanese would endeavor to capitalize that course of events in their future efforts to placate world opinion and restore confidence in their word; but one such instance in which the pledges of self-denial given by their diplomatic voice were respected by their military arm would not by itself suffice to prove anything with regard to a shift in the seat of actual authority or a restoration of the equilibrium among the constitutionally constituted agencies of policy and administration in Japan; it would be merely one bit of evidence pointing in that direction.


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FE:SKH/ZMF

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MID
G-2 Report



CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 16 2-6574-372
239
WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan
January 5--9, 1933

793.94
In compliance with instructions from the Military Attache of the American Legation at Peiping, I left Peiping for Chinwangtao on the 8:25 a.m. express train January 5th, accompanied by Lt. Colonel Chang Wei-pin of the Chinese Army (graduate Infantry School class 1928) representing Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. We arrived at Tangshan at about 2 p.m. where we had to transfer to a local train for Chinwangtao. Near Tangshan we passed a local train with a car containing about 80 sick and wounded Chinese soldiers. At Tangshan were sidetracked trains with the 15th Brigade from Kalgan and three batteries of the 15th Field Artillery of the 1st Brigade at Peiyuan (North Barracks, Peiping). The men were in open cars. The trains were to move eastward shortly, the men to detrain west of Chinwangtao and march to stations.

We arrived at Chinwangtao at eight-thirty in the evening. Train lights were extinguished as we approached Chinwangtao station due to presence of Japanese warships off Chinwangtao. The city was under martial law and no transportation was available, not even rickshas. After arranging through Colonel Chang and the local garrison commander (a battalion commander of the 625th Regiment 9th Brigade) to notify Major General Ho Chu-kuo of our arrival and request an interview, we went to the Kailan Mining Administration rest house on foot with coolies carrying the bed rolls the two miles distance. There I met Lieutenant Moore of the 15th Infantry, in command at Camp Burrows, who kindly invited us to stay at his quarters. We arrived at Camp Burrows at midnight and met Captains Barrett and Rote who had been sent down from Tientsin to investigate conditions.

I was notified that General Ho would see me the next morning. Accordingly the morning of January 6th I went to his headquarters accompanied by Colonel Chang, Captains Barrett and Rote, and Lieut. Moore. General Ho, whom I had met previously at Shanhaikwan, was very cordial and candid and had us stay to lunch. His headquarters was at Hai Yang, about 7 1/2 miles north of Chinwangtao. General Ho was in good spirits and said he was glad to be out of Shanhaikwan where conditions had been so uncertain and troublesome for many months that he lived in daily apprehension of trouble to come.

General Ho stated that his forces included two independent (infantry) brigades, the 9th and the 20th of Chinwangtao and Lanhsien areas, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade of Chinwangtao area, the 15th Field Artillery Regiment of the 7th Field Artillery Brigade (Peiyuan), the 19th Independent Brigade at Jehol, and the 15th Brigade (from Kalgan) on the way. He further stated that at the present time the situation is stabilized at least temporarily, that he would maintain the status quo and would not attack the Japanese or attempt to retake Shanhaikwan but would hold his present line against further Japanese advance at all costs even though his rear is menaced by the presence of the Japanese warships at Chinwangtao. According to General Ho, the

From M/A, China

Report No. 8477

January 9, 1932

F/H/S

793.94/5723-2/3

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

C-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan

attack on Shanhaikwan was consequent to the dispatch of the 19th Brigade to Lingyuan, Jehol, and he did not expect the resumption of Japanese attacks or westward advance. He stated that he had been approached by the Japanese naval commanders through Mr. Chilton, the manager of the KMA, and the O.C. of the British warships (the Bridgewater and the Folkestone) for opening of negotiations aboard the British ship with a view to settlement of the Shanhaikwan incident as a local affair. General Ho said he referred the proposal to Peiping and had no reply as yet (2 p.m. January 6th). Mr. Chilton, when interviewed on the subject later, stated to us (Captains Barrett, Rote and me) that he had merely told the Japanese that he could get in touch with General Ho whenever the Japanese desired him to do so but that the Japanese had not done that to date (5 p.m. January 6th). He further stated that he did not desire to have anything to do with the negotiations, being merely a civilian and a business man. Personally I believe that he had been asked by the Japanese to act as an intermediary and had consented to do so because of his anxiety for the safety of the extensive holdings of the Kailan mines, which being on the Chinwangtao waterfront would doubtless suffer should hostilities develop. Mr. Chilton terminated our interview by reason of previous engagement when two British naval officers, commanders of the ships at Chinwangtao, arrived at his office, and drove off with them to the Chinese city at Chinwangtao. I have every reason to believe that they went to arrange for an interview with General Ho.

On the afternoon of January 6th, after return from General Ho's headquarters, Captains Barrett, Rote and I called on the Japanese garrison commander (Lieut. Samaiya) at Chinwangtao. Captain Rote, a former Japanese language student, interpreted. I showed to Lieut. Samaiya the cards of introduction to Major General Suzuki, commanding the Japanese forces at Shanhaikwan, and to Major Ochiai, the Japanese garrison commander at Shanhaikwan, given me by Lieut. Colonel Nagatsu, the Japanese Military Attache at Peiping, and requested permission to go to Shanhaikwan. Lt. Samaiya said we could go and that he would notify the Japanese headquarters at Shanhaikwan of our arrival.

Accordingly, on the morning of January 7th we (Captains Barrett and Rote, Lt. Moore and Lt. Dewar-Durie, from the office of the British Military Attache, Peiping, who asked to accompany us, and I) drove through the Chinese lines toward Shanhaikwan, the road obstacles of felled trees in the Chinese lines being obligingly removed for us by the local commanders because of the deeply ditched roads.

The Chinese front line pits run north and south through the villages Hungwantien-Liuchiattien about three miles west of the west gate of Shanhaikwan, and consist of shallow individual rifle pits. No trench system is laid out. At Hungwantien, where we passed through the line, the rifle pits are poorly sited in low ground with no field of fire to speak of, and villages in

with

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan

front which would offer excellent cover to the enemy. It is evident that this line is merely a line of observation and that the line of resistance runs generally north and south through their second line along the narrow gauge railway from Chinwangtao to Sifuchiatien. Trenches comparatively well sited were being constructed by peasant and military labor in the vicinity of Tunglihuang, just east of the narrow railway. Units of the 20th Brigade in reserve were engaged in the construction. The right of the outpost line is held by the 41st Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade; the center by the 827th Infantry, 9th Independent Brigade; and the left by the 40th Regiment of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. The 20th Brigade is in reserve. It may be stated that both positions would be practically untenable in the event of an attack being flanked by the fire of the Japanese naval vessels off Chinwangtao. Most of the line is also under direct observation from the high hollow steel wireless masts of the Japanese radio station at Chinwangtao. In the event of an attack which would come from east and south, the Chinese would be forced to retreat northward to the hills. The general appearance of the 9th Brigade and the cavalry, judged by Chinese standards, is good; the discipline in the 20th Brigade is bad. Two soldiers of that unit were executed on January 7th by General Ho's orders.

At the west suburb gate of Shanhaikwan we were passed through the sand-bag-barricaded gate without challenge, our appearance evidently having been reported by a sentry on top of the wall. The Japanese sergeant notified his company commander and later escorted us to the Japanese headquarters which is in the former headquarters of the 9th Brigade (General Ho Chu-kuo's residence). Here we were given General Suzuki's own car and driven to the Japanese garrison post south of the station where we called on General Suzuki, commanding the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division. General Suzuki was entertaining guests at luncheon and we did not wait for him as we desired to return to Chinwangtao before dark. We interviewed his Chief of Staff and Major Oshiai, the post commander. They stated that they were willing to treat the incident as a local affair and that their navy was now negotiating to that effect. They further stated that the Japanese command had no intention of further advance unless provoked by an overt act on the part of the Chinese.

We then returned to Shanhaikwan proper, stopping at the railway station where about a hundred native carts and two vans of ammunition were being unloaded from a train, which came from outside the wall in possible readiness for a further advance. Near the south gate where the fighting occurred we left the car and proceeded on foot. The fire of the Japanese artillery and naval guns was very accurate, the south gate being battered by shell fire. No material damage was done to the walls but the tower over the gate was shot up. The shots and overs were not over a hundred yards off and only in the near vicinity

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan

of the north and south of the gate were the houses battered by shell fire and burned, elsewhere the damage was inconsequential. Practically all the fighting occurred at this gate and the 3rd Battalion of the 626th Regiment of the 9th Brigade, which held this gate, was practically wiped out. The casualties in that unit were well over 300, the battalion commander and three company commanders being killed and the fourth wounded. The iron gate was knocked down by Japanese tanks (Renault Whippets 1917 model, of which we saw one) and entrance effected. The Japanese casualties were about 100 and were at the railroad hospital. The casualties among the civil population were light. We saw no evidences of air bombing. Every house in the streets had a Japanese or Manchoukuo flag hanging out and the population went about apparently unmolested. Many of the stores had reopened ("business as usual") and in the shelled areas rubbish was being removed by the inhabitants. The inhabitants were reluctant to answer questions although we were unaccompanied by Japanese.

The Japanese have no outposts outside the wall of Shanhaikwan and their forces consist of the 4th reinforced Brigade of the 8th Division at Chinchow and number (my estimate) about 2500 men in addition to the local garrison of about 300. It does not consist of the entire brigade as units must have been left as garrisons outside the wall on account of danger from volunteers. While in Shanhaikwan we heard several artillery shots from outside the Great Wall.

The Japanese impressed me as being business-like, efficient and had the bearing of seasoned campaigners. They went about their business ably and silently and were absolutely incurious about us, a marked contrast to the Chinese. The men all were warmly dressed in excellent physical condition, clean, and amply supplied with equipment and munitions and ambulances. It was noticeable that of the hastily constructed sandbag barricades along the main street leading west a large proportion had automatic rifle embrasures. We had not been challenged at all, and were allowed to pass out of the city without comment or even a side glance.

We passed through the Chinese lines without any incident and returned to Chinwangtao just before dark Saturday January 9th. The situation having been stabilized for the time being at least, Captains Barret, Rote and I decided to return to Tientsin and left on the 6 a.m. train Sunday, arriving at Tientsin at about 2:30 p.m. From Tientsin I at once called up the Military Attache and having outlined the situation received permission to return to Peiping. Accordingly I left by the first available train at 4 p.m., the morning train having been discontinued for the time being and the local train late.

The Chinese troops observed were warmly dressed in padded coats and breeches. They are sadly deficient in modern equipment, relying mainly on the rifle. Very few automatic rifles are available to the companies. They seemed amply supplied with ammunition. Many houses and villages in the front line zone were abandoned by their inhabitants. Those who

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan

remained were very reluctant to work at trench construction, the men running away on arrival of military detachments and hiding in fields and gullies.

During the rail journey from Chinwangtao to Tientsin I entered a carriage ahead of ours where eighteen wounded were loaded on at Peitaiho, bound for Peiping. They were from the 3rd Battalion of the 626th Infantry and had all escaped from Shanhaikwan by dropping over the east wall and circling northwest. Two of the men were badly wounded and one was lying on a stretcher which had been placed on the floor upside down, the soldier in a thin coat resting on the cold floor of an unheated car with only a thickness of canvas between his body and the floor. The man's wound had gangrened, the odor being unmistakable. Other cases were less severe, mostly leg, thigh and arm wounds. The men were all dull and did not seem to suffer, their capacity to bear pain being remarkable. They had been extremely poorly bandaged and in some cases the wounds were tied up in filthy rags or leggings. There was no attendant of any kind with them and they had not been fed. Colonel Chang purchased them food from the diner which they all ate with relish. Colonel Chang accompanied them to Peiping and at my suggestion wired Tientsin from Tangshan for a doctor to meet them at Tientsin, and to the military hospital in Peiping to arrange to meet them with transportation. These men were not an impressive lot and one could not but feel sorry for them. They did not know what it was all about. However they are reported to have fought well against great odds and modern equipment.

Needless to say, the rumors as to occupation, shelling or bombardment of Chinwangtao are false, as is the tale of the 3rd Brigade making a cavalry raid outside the Great Wall.

Should the fighting be resumed it is certain that regardless of his overwhelming superiority in numbers in the Chinwangtao area, General Ho's forces have not the slightest chance against the compact, well organized Japanese forces of soldiers led by professional and able officers. They impressed me as a capable, well oiled machine, efficient in teamwork and striking hard and fast.

In conclusion I may remark that everywhere from general to private there is a very friendly feeling towards Americans, and when challenged in the Chinese lines upon reply that we were Americans the utmost consideration was shown us, one soldier even saying "tsamen shih lien kuo" - "we are allies".

Arendt Gluckman
Captain, Infantry

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Conditions at Shanhaikwan

COMMENTS BY M/A: This report is not intended as a digest report. It is forwarded as being of interest as an accurate and detailed description of the present military situation in the vicinity of Shanhaikwan. This situation is obviously subject to rapid change but may be considered as a preliminary phase of developments pending in Jehol and North China that may conceivably involve the eventual employment of greatly increased military forces.

**W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache**

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

MET

GRAY

FROM Tientán via N.R.

Dated January 9, 1933

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 9, 3 p.m.


Following has been sent to the Legation:

"January 9, 2 p.m. Situation at Shanhaikwan and along the railway remains unchanged. According to an American army officer who returned today from Shanhaikwan, Japanese staff officer there stated that incident will be localized and that there will be no advance on the part of the Japanese "unless provoked by some overt act on the part of the Chinese". The negotiations to settle the affair locally are proceeding between the Chinese and Japanese authorities but whether any progress is being made is not known. Considerable quantities of ammunition and supplies from beyond the Wall are being unloaded at the railway station at Shanhaikwan. But little military activity noticeable on the railways between here and Chinwangtao. Conditions are quiet at Changli. Some of missionaries resident there are in Peiping, and others Changli at least for the present with promise to withdraw if danger should arise.

Repeated to Department:

WSB-KLP

LOCKHART



F/HS

793.94/5724

FILED

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with
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEET

Tokio

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

Dated January 9, 1933

Rec'd. 7:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

9, January 9, 7 p. m.

Recent troop concentration in the Shanhaikwan area
indicate that further activity may be anticipated there
in the near future. Details of military situation have
been sent to War Department by Military Attache.

At the press conference this morning at the Foreign
Office I understand that the spokesman referred to the
understanding upon which Tientsin was returned to Chinese
control in 1902, (See foreign relations 1902 pp 198 ff)
and intimated that the Japanese might find it necessary
to demand strict compliance with its military terms on
the part of the Chinese. This taken in connection with
the military situation referred to above would indicate
that the Japanese may contemplate further action. Repeated
to Peiping.

WMC-RR

GREW



F/HS

793.94/5725

JAN 11 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

FROM

Dated January 9, 1933

Rec'd 4:38 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

34, January 9, noon.
CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Tientsin's January 7, noon; my 32, January 8, noon.

Situation today is as follows: all quiet Chinwangtao, Tientsin and Peiping. Information here indicates Japanese anxious to negotiate locally with Chinese for purpose of localizing affair at Shanhaikwan. General Ho understood to have expressed willingness to negotiate but awaiting authorization from higher authorities which thus far has not (repeat not), so far as our information goes, been given. Chinese holding line between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan on Tashihho and apparently determined to resist any attempt by Japanese to move south. Chinese are moving troops into area between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan. I am now trying confirm reports that larger movements are in process or contemplated.

It was reported here last night that Chang Hsueh Liang contemplated meeting Chiang Kai Shek at some place on railway between here and Hankow within next 48 hours. Appearances indicate Chinese are determined to resist in Jehol.

Repeated to Tokyo.

RR-WWC

JOHNSON

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID Jan. 10, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 - 1933
Department of State

F/H/S

793.94/5726

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JAN 11 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 10 1933

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 9, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The Minister reports that on January 9, the situation was as follows: At Chinwangtao, Peiping and Tientsin everything was quiet. From information received at Peiping it appears that the Japanese are anxious to localize the Shanhaikwan affair by negotiating locally with Chinese. It is understood that General Ho has expressed willingness to enter into negotiations but is waiting for authorization from higher officials; as yet, this authorization has not been given, according to the information given to the Minister. The Chinese are holding their line on Tashihho between Shanhaikwan and Chinwangtao and are evidently determined to resist any attempted movement southward by the Japanese. Troops are being moved by the Chinese into the area between Shanhaikwan and Tientsin. The American Minister is now attempting to confirm reports that there are in process, or contemplated, greater movements.

On the night of January 8 it was reported in Peiping that Chang Hsueh-liang proposed to meet Chiang Kai-shek within the following 48 hours somewhere on the railway between Hankow and Peiping. It appears that in Jehol the Chinese will make a determined resistance.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated January 9, 1933

8:35 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 - 1933

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

35, January 9, 6 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent Tokyo.

January 9, 6 p.m. Methodist Mission informs Legation
that Mission property at Shanhaikwan has been occupied,
presumably by Japanese. Mission desires to send represen-
tative to Shanhaikwan from Changli to investigate. I am
loath to permit this in view of present conditions. Will
Embassy endeavor to obtain information?

Repeated to the Department.

KLP-HPD

JOHNSON

JAN 11 1933

FTT:AND

F/HS

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393.1163-m 56 / 44

793.94
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393.1163 M 56
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

FROM

Dated January 9, 1933

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

36, January 9, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 31, ⁵⁷¹⁶ January 7, 7 p. m.; and my 34, ⁵⁷²⁶ January 9, noon;
and Tientsin's January 9, 2 p.m. /5724

My information is that although Japanese are anxious to localize affair, local Chinese authorities are unable to negotiate in view of attitude in South where there is a determination to resist further attack. Military Attache this afternoon confirms movement of large number of troops from Honan in the direction of Tientsin-Shanhaikwan area. My information is that general Shang Chen will be put in command in the field.

Crux of matter lies in province of Jehol. Japanese are committed to elimination of Chinese authorities in Jehol. Chinese appear determined to make resistance there. Further conflict therefore seems certain.

Unofficial local Chinese are beginning to consider question of responsibility of powers party of Boxer ^{protocol} of 1901 should one of those powers use military force authorized by the protocol for defense of Legation and for maintenance



F/HS

793.94/5728

FILED

JUN 23 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#36 from Peiping, Jan. 9, 7 p. m.

maintenance of communication between Peiping and the sea for the purpose of making an attack on Chinese forces. They point out that present situation is one involving China and Japan and not involving internal Chinese disturbances.

With French Minister, British Charge d'Affaires, and Secretary in charge Italian Legation, I discussed this question this afternoon. We agreed that until question came to us officially we could take no official action. We agreed, however, that we should inform our respective governments that question was being discussed in unofficial circles and that there is likelihood that it may be brought to our official attention sooner or later, and that we should be prepared.

I suggest Department consider what attitude the American Government will take. The American Government maintains a guard for its Legation; it maintains an expeditionary unit at Tientsin to cooperate with the other powers in maintaining communications between Peiping and the sea. Chinese may charge that Japan party to Boxer protocol is abusing its rights by using railroad and armed forces maintained under the protocol for the purpose of threatening Chinese rear.

Repeated to Tokyo.
WSB-KLP
(*) apparent omission.



JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 10, 1933.



Subject: Status of Foreign Military Forces under
Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Reference: Peiping's Telegram No. 36, January 9, 7 p. m.

F/H S

1. The Final Protocol for the settlement of the disturbances of 1900, signed on September 7, 1901, by representatives of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the United States and China, provides in part as follows:

F. W. 793.94/5728

"Article VII.-The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which may be made defensible.

"The limits of this quarter have been fixed as follows on the annexed plan (Annex No. 14):

* * * * *

"In the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defense of its legation."

* * * * *

"Article IX.-The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers in the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the powers are:

"Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chun-liang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan."

The

- 2 -

The Boxer Protocol therefore gives each of the Protocol powers the right (a) to maintain a legation guard at Peiping and (b) to occupy certain points between Peiping and the sea for the purpose of maintaining open communication between Peiping and the sea.

2. The Boxer Protocol was signed as the result of Chinese internal disturbances. It may therefore be argued that the provisions of the Protocol apply only in cases of internal Chinese disturbances. On the other hand there is some ground (although in the opinion of the writer not a strong ground) for contending that the provisions of the Protocol, while drawn up as the result of internal Chinese disturbances, were designed to safeguard the legations at Peiping in so far as possible from any type of disturbance that might prevent the legations from having open communication with the sea.

3. In the event that serious hostilities between China and Japan develop in the Peiping-Tientsin area, it is of course possible that (a) China may attempt to cut the railway between Peiping and the sea in order to prevent the movement of Japanese troops; (b) Japan may use her Legation Guard at Peiping as a base for operations against the Chinese; and (c) Japan may use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between Peiping and the sea and ~~use~~ use those troops to conduct operations against the Chinese. ~~It~~ It hardly seems probable that Japan would attempt
to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

to cut the railway between Peiping and the sea but in case either Japan or China should cut the railway, it is believed that the United States and the ~~(other)~~ Protocol powers other than Japan should not make any representations on the basis of the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. Any representations that might be made should be on the general basis of this Government's desire that its Legation and its nationals at Peiping and at Tientsin be accorded due protection. It seems desirable that the United States not abandon any right that it may possess under the Boxer Protocol which would tend to insure the safety of the American Legation and other American interests in the Peiping-Tientsin area. Consequently it is believed that the United States should take no action, in advance of actual or very imminent developments, to indicate either to the Chinese or to the Japanese what attitude this Government would take in reference to a possible situation involving in some measure the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. At the same time if there should develop in the Peiping-Tientsin area a situation in which either China or Japan should cut the railway, it would appear inadvisable for the United States to attempt to invoke the provisions of the Boxer Protocol which can hardly be said to have contemplated a situation where China and one of the Protocol powers would be engaged in hostilities.

In case Japan should use her Legation Guard at Peiping as a base for operations against the Chinese, such action

would

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

would ~~seem to~~ jeopardize the safety of the Legation Quarter as such and of the other legations maintained there, and the United States and other powers would, it would seem, be justified in making representations to Japan.

In case Japan should use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between Peiping and the sea and ~~use~~ use those troops to conduct operations against the Chinese, it is believed that the United States and the other Protocol powers would be justified in making announcement that in their opinion Japan's action could not in any way be based on the provisions of the Protocol.

4. As Minister Johnson reports that to date only "unofficial local Chinese" are giving consideration to the question of the responsibility of the powers party to the Boxer Protocol should one of those powers use military force authorized by the Protocol for the purpose of making an attack on Chinese forces, as the whole situation is still a hypothetical one in which it is almost impossible to predict what may happen or all the possibilities, and as no useful purpose would be served by making any advance decision in the matter, it is suggested that the Department take no action at present in regard to the incoming telegram.

MMH/REK

m.m.h.

4/21/72

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 10 1933

Department of State

FROM

MET

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 10, 1933

Rec'd 7 a. m.

F/HS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT, tenth telegram
The following has been sent to the Legation:

793.94
"January 10, 4 p. m. Approximately 2,500 Chinese troops disembarked a few miles west of Tientsin last night although now said to be moving overland towards Chinwangtao. There are other indications of approaching troop movements in this vicinity. Americans returning today from Chinwangtao report General Ho as having about 15,000 troops in that vicinity. Chinese and Japanese troops are about one and one-half to two miles apart at a point between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan but Chinese front line is thinly manned. Troops in considerable number are moving up the Peiping-Hankow Railway near Peiping. An unconfirmed report is current that negotiations for settlement of Shanhaikwan affair have been transferred to Japanese and Chinese authorities at Tientsin. Very conflicting reports are in circulation regarding alleged negotiations.

Repeated to the Department".

WSB-RR

LOCKHART


793.94/5729

FILED

JAN 11 1933

152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



A CABLEGRAM



Chinmoye
I-5-33

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED JANUARY 5, 1933.

193.94
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note of vigorous protest to Japan last night. The note first narrates the preliminary work of destruction as done by Japanese gendarmes in their own quarters and then the distortion of the facts concerning the circumstances preceeding the attack in an attempt to evade responsibility for their unwarranted action.

The note further states that the operation of the Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan are clearly the execution of a pre-conceived plan calculated to aggravate the situation and contrary to the promises repeatedly made by the Japanese delegates to the League of Nations.

In conclusion, the note demands the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in the future, and the punishment of those Japanese disturbances. It further reserves the right of the Chinese government to claim reparations for the damages sustained by the Chinese.


Chinese Legation, Washington
January 5, 1933.

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JAN 9 1933

F/HS

793.94/5730

7521
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



From Chinese Legation
1/7/33



FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ¹⁹³³PEKING

99574
DATED JANUARY 5, 1933 SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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The note further states that the operations of the Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan are clearly the execution of a pre-conceived plan calculated to aggravate the situation and contrary to the promise repeatedly made by the Japanese delegates to the League of Nations.

In conclusion, the note demands the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in the future, and the punishment of those Japanese disturbances. It further reserves the right of the Chinese government to claim reparations for the damages sustained by the Chinese.

Chinese Legation, Washington

January 5, 1933.

0526

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 9 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN

A CABLEGRAM

RECEIVED

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

JAN 9 - 1933

DATED JANUARY 5, 1933.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



795.14
 With regard to the Japanese surprise attack on and occupation of Shanhaikwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement late in the night of January 4, 1933:

Before commencing their attack upon Shanhaikwan, the Japanese gendarmes first blew up the doors of their headquarters and then scattered some hand grenades elsewhere in the neighborhood with the intention of fabricating a defensive case. Then, at 9:30 p. m. January 1, 1933, Japanese plain-clothes soldiers closed in upon the South Gate of Shanhaikwan and opened fire with rifles. At the same time, Japanese soldiers at the railway station began to throw bombs all around while Japanese gendarmes also started action with their rifles. The Chinese military authorities stationed in the district immediately repaired to the headquarters of the Japanese gendarmes and enquired for the cause of the trouble. The Japanese gendarmerie not only failed to give a satisfactory explanation for the disturbance besides the customary excuse that they were being shot at by Chinese soldiers and that they were acting in self-defense but also brought up a set of most unreasonable demands which the Chinese authorities on the spot could only reject.

The Japanese gendarmes thereupon proceeded to disarm the Chinese policemen stationed outside of the South Gate and at the same time placed Commanding officer Mr. Ma under detention. At 8:00 in the morning of January 2, three train loads of Japanese artillery and infantry were brought up from Chien-Wei, a point to the north of Shanhaikwan, numbering more than 3,000 men in total. Meanwhile, three Japanese armored trains that had been previously stationed there moved onto and occupied the Nan-Kwan railway station and Li-Chia-Kou, Wu-Yen-Chen and Wu-Chia-Lin--three other points on the railway line. From these positions the Japanese opened fire on Shanhaikwan. Simultaneously Japanese aeroplanes bombed the city from the air. Many Chinese civilians were killed in the city and great damage was done to the city wall. Chinese garrison forces at last were compelled to return fire in self-defense and owing to their stubborn resistance the Japanese failed in their first attempt to carry the city.

More Japanese reinforcements were then brought up and two Japanese warships came to their assistance from the sea. At 10:00 a. m. on January 3, the Japanese made a concerted attack with their land, naval and air forces, concentrating fire on the city of Lin-Yu. Heavy field pieces supported by naval artillery finally reduced the South Gate to ruins, besides setting many houses on fire. Under the cover of continuous

795.94/5731

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
barrage, Japanese tanks advanced on the South Gate and finally broke through at 3:00 p. m. on the same day. In the face of the enemy's overwhelming superiority both in number and in equipment, the Chinese troops, fighting as hard as they could, were finally compelled to fall back to points outside of the city wall.

the
 That/attack and the occupation of Shanhaikwan by the Japanese military forces are premeditated action is most evident. The blow-up of doors of their own headquarters before commencing the attack and the subsequent charge that the Chinese started the hostilities are old tricks which had been habitually resorted to by the Japanese military and familiar to the whole world. Furthermore, the fact that the attack took place at the time when the whole world is out celebrating the New Year and when the League of Nations is also in adjournment proves conclusively that the Japanese military purposely selected this particular moment to carry out their premeditated plan.

The League of Nations in successive sessions had adopted Resolutions against any further aggravation of the situation and these Resolutions had been assented to by the Japanese government. But, in spite of these Resolutions as well as their own undertakings, the Japanese had been constantly extending the sphere of their military aggressions in China. They now took possession by a surprise attack of the most strategic points south of the Great Wall bordering the Three North-Eastern Provinces whence they are in a position to descend upon Tientsin, Peiping and Jehol at any moment they like--and eventuality fraught with even more grave consequences. The Chinese government, therefore, is of the opinion that the League of Nations should lose no time in taking the most effective measures to check the Japanese action while, in the meantime, the Chinese military forces will continue to resist to the best of their ability any further aggression on the part of the Japanese troops.

Chinese Legation, Washington
 January 5, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 5, 1933.

793.94
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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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That ^{the} attack and the occupation of Shanhaikwan by the Japanese military forces are premeditated action is most evident. The blow-up of the doors of their own headquarters before commencing the attack and the subsequent charge that the Chinese started the hostilities are old tricks which had been habitually resorted to by the Japanese military and familiar to the whole world. Furthermore, the fact that the attack took place at the time when the whole world is out celebrating the New Year and when the League of Nations is also in adjournment proves conclusively that the Japanese military purposely selected this particular moment to carry out their premeditated plan.

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Chinese Legation, Washington,
 January 5, 1933.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Nanking

Dated January 10, 1933

Rec'd 9 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

#5

January 10, 5 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 10 1933

Department of State

(GRAY) The political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

has just handed me a memorandum which I think, is being addressed to all the remaining signatory powers to the protocol of 1901. The translation supplied with the Chinese text reads as follows:

"January 10. The Chinese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government to the fact that, taking unlawful advantage of the special privileges under the protocol of 1901, to which the United States is a signatory party, Japanese troops have attacked and occupied the city of Shanhaikwan, slaughtered thousands of peaceful Chinese citizens and inflicted considerable damage to property in and around that place, and are further concentrating in large numbers near Shanhaikwan and along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. Under these circumstances, the Chinese Government is constrained to declare that it cannot assume responsibility for any situation, in law or in fact, which may result from the exercise, by the Chinese defensive forces

793.94/5732

FILED

JUN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MENT

2-#-- from Nanking, Jan. 10, 5 p. m.

forces of the legitimate right of resisting the aggressive actions of the Japanese troops. (END GRAY)

The Vice Minister said that the Chinese Government signatory wished to make informally to the powers to the 1901 protocol the suggestion that they make some sort of representation to the Japanese Government to dissuade it from abusing privileges it might seek to claim under the provisions of the protocol. He stated incidentally that Chinese troops had been massed along the railway to oppose any further advance of the Japanese forces.

Repeated to the Department.

PECK

WWC-RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 10, 1933



MANCHURIA SITUATION

North China Problems.
Boxer Protocol.



F/HS

F.W. 793.94/5732

Reference: Nanking's January 10, 5⁵⁷³² p.m. and
Peiping's 36, 5⁵⁷²⁸ January 9, 7 p.m.

793.94
note
793.00

The question of Chinese troop movements along the line of the Peiping-Mukden railway, between Peiping and Shanhaikwan; the question of possible Japanese military moves; the question of security at Tientsin and at Peiping; the question of keeping open communications between Peiping and the sea; and the question of the applicability of the provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 are involved.

The Chinese Government affirms that the Japanese have, in taking Shanhaikwan, taken "unlawful advantage of the special privileges under the Protocol of 1901." It is believed that the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan has not been effected through or based upon provisions of the Protocol: their action, such as it has been, would have been the same had there been no such Protocol. The Chinese Government declares that

"it

JUN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"it cannot assume responsibility for any situation, in law or in fact, which may result from the exercise, by the Chinese defensive forces, of the legitimate right of resisting the aggressive actions of the Japanese troops." It is believed that this amounts to and should be regarded as a declaration on the part of the Chinese that they intend to move troops freely in North China and do not intend to let the existence and provisions of the Boxer Protocol stand in the way of their doing so. This declaration must be read in the light of a recent Japanese statement that Japan might be compelled to invoke the provisions of the Boxer Protocol. It is believed that nothing in the Boxer Protocol limits the right of the Chinese to move their troops or to use the railway for that purpose; although some provisions of the Protocol do establish some restrictions with regard to the use which they may make of their troops and do prohibit their introducing them into certain areas.

The Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested informally that the powers "make some sort of representation to the Japanese Government to dissuade it from abusing privileges it might seek to claim under the provisions of the Protocol". It is believed that, although there are certain rights which the powers may claim

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

claim under the Protocol, the rights which they may legitimately claim are laid down with adequate clearness in the terms of the Protocol and that any attempt on the part of Japan or any other of the powers to claim, on the basis of the Protocol, rights or privileges more extensive than those that are expressly laid down might properly be interpreted as an abuse. In such event, the claim of right by such power would be unwarranted and should not be admitted. However, the powers can scarcely assume in advance of the fact that such an abuse is going to be made. Nor are they prepared to prevent such an abuse if Japan intends to make it. What they could do in advance is to resolve each on its own part and perhaps agree among themselves that they would not look with tolerance upon such an abuse and would decline to accept reference to the provisions of the Protocol as affording legal warrant.

Shorn of technicalities and placed in proper perspective, the provisions of the Boxer Protocol in so far as the matter of maintaining open communication between Peiping and the sea is concerned should be regarded as the legal basis for the maintenance of foreign armed forces at the points at which they are located

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefin NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

in North China; the mission of those armed forces at present should be regarded not as that of maintaining a constantly open highway between Peiping and the sea but as that of providing special police protection for the lives and property of foreign nationals, including the legations, in the areas to which their presence relates and, in case of emergency calling for evacuation, providing an armed escort to the sea; it should not be regarded as a rightful or a practicable function for those forces to interfere with the normal and legitimate movements of Chinese armed forces. The Boxer Protocol was brought into being for the purpose of safeguarding the rights and interests of foreigners in general, not for the purpose of regulating or restricting the activities of Chinese armed forces, either on the defensive or on the offensive, in connection with the prosecution of hostilities in a quarrel between China and a foreign power; it certainly was not designed for the purpose of giving a foreign power some peculiar advantages, on Chinese soil, in a military contest in which it might engage with China.

There are attached memoranda which give details and discuss contingencies which may arise.

It

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

It is believed that the powers should give no encouragement to any effort on the part of Japan to take advantage of provisions of the Protocol for the strengthening of Japan's position, either political or military, in North China; and "in case Japan should use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between Peiping and the sea and use those troops to conduct operations against the Chinese, it is believed that the United States and the other Protocol powers would be justified in making announcement that in their opinion Japan's action could not in any way be based on the provisions of the Protocol."

793.94/5728

No memorandum attached.

MM

m.m.H.


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FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP



GRAY
FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping

Dated January 11, 1933

Rec'd 1:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



38, January 11, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 10, noon. According to information emanating from military headquarters Japanese planes on January 7th or 8th bombarded the Chinese troops concentrated in Jehol province approximately fifty kilometres north of Suichung. Details of the incident are not known. The Japanese Fourth Cavalry Brigade has been transferred to Suichung".

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/G 793.94/5733

JAN 12 1933

PTT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

London

Dated January 10, 1933

Secretary of State
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 11 1933

Department of State

#6.
January 10, 7

With reference to Peiping reports that the question of mediation by the powers, with the object of localizing the Shanhaikwan affair, has been discussed by the American, French, Italian and British Legations, following are two concluding paragraphs of memorandum handed to me at the Foreign Office today:

"His Majesty's Government believe that the Japanese Government are already desirous of minimizing the Shanhaikwan affair and of avoiding any further military operations at present. On the Chinese side an indication of possible readiness to come to a local agreement is afforded by the desire shown by the Chinese General Ho to meet the Japanese military or naval authorities on neutral ground on board His Majesty's Ship FOLKESTONE now at Chinwangtao. Chances therefore seem to exist of an agreement to localize the trouble being reached without outside intervention, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo believes that such an agreement

agreement

K.

F/G 793.94/5734

FILED

JAN 14 1933

793.94
note
793.94/119

2l. to London Jan. 12, 1933
2l. to Peiping Jan. 24, 1933
10, 1933

Re'd 3:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 11 1933
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#6, from London, Jan. 10, 7 p. m.

agreement is more likely to be reached without such intervention. If it cannot be reached in this manner, it will probably be owing to fundamental difficulties which could only be removed by advising the Chinese to remove their troops to a distance from Jehol.

In the circumstances His Majesty's Government are disposed to take no action in the sense contemplated by the representatives in Peiping, but to await the meeting of the committee of nineteen at Geneva next week by whom the question of mediation can if necessary be considered".

WSB-CSB

ATHERTON

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

1933 JAN - 13 - PM 5:40 Washington, D.C.
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF RECORDS
 COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
 B

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (England)

13 Your No. 6, January 10, 7 p.m.

One. Upon receipt of your telegram under reference, the Department informed the Minister at Peiping briefly of the attitude of the British Government and stated that it assumed that the Minister's British colleague could inform him more fully with regard thereto.

Two. With regard to the course of action suggested by the diplomatic representatives at Peiping, the Department on January 9 informed the Minister at Peiping inter alia that it would await an approach from the British Government and that the Minister should so inform his British colleague stating that we were ready to cooperate in discussion and to consider sympathetically any definite proposal from the British Government for action of a character in which that Government might place confidence and for the initiation of which it or the League of Nations might be willing to assume the responsibility.

Three.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

FILE

F/H/S

793.94/5734

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

-2 -

Three. As the Department assumes that the British,
 Chargé at Peiping has informed his Government of the
 Department's attitude, there would appear to be no
 repeat no need for you to make reply to the Foreign
 Office memorandum, although you may wish to ~~explain~~ ^{make a}
~~the matter orally.~~ ^{statement as per paragraph}
^{two above, orally.}

Stinson

ALG

793.94/5734

FE: JEJ/VIDM

no m/v
 FE
SEP

45
 5
 JAN. 13 1983 PM

MM

Enciphered by 2/2

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

January 10, 1933.

6P

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94/5716

Department's 6, January 9, 3 p.m.

Department has received from London a telegram dated January 10 quoting concluding paragraphs of a memorandum handed Atherton by British Foreign Office, of which last sentence states that in the circumstances British Government is disposed to refrain from action in the sense contemplated by representatives at Peiping and instead to await the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen at Geneva next week.

Department assumes that your British colleague can inform you more fully with regard to this.

Castle
Gerry

793.94/5734

CR
Jan. 10, 1933. PM

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

F/HS

793.94/5734

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 11, 1933

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 11 1933

Department of State

January 11, 4 p.m.

The following has been sent to the Legation:

"January 11, 3 p.m. Three trains of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin early this morning to Lanchow and troops from five trains detrained at a point 13 miles west of Tientsin and moved northwestward last night.

There is noticeable evidence of growing uneasiness in Chinese circles incident no doubt to continued troop movement.

Japanese Admiral at Chinwangtao, according to a report to American military authorities there, has informed British naval authorities that negotiations for a settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair have passed from him to higher authority.

Repeated to Department".

WSB-RR

LOCKHART

F/G

793.94/5735

JAN 12 1933

FILED

793.94
note

793.941 9

154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

FROM Dated January 12, 1933

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT

January 12, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the
Legation.

"January 12, 3 p. m. Chinese troop trains moved
eastward through Tientsin last night at intervals of
about two hours. Regular passenger traffic is subject to
considerable delay."

Japanese claim that Chiumenkou, a pass in the wall
a short distance north of Shanhaikwan which the
Japanese feared would be used by Chang Hsueh-Liang as a
gateway for regular troops and vanguard into Manchukuo
territory, was occupied by Japanese troops on January
Chinese deny loss of Chiumenkou.

Chinwangtao is quieter today after several days of
tension due to an attack by Chinese soldiers and civilians
on Japanese chief of police in civilian dress which
incident came near causing a serious outbreak of trouble
and which was apparently averted by Chinese making
apologies.

Repeated to Department."

CIB-JS

LOCKHART

F/HS

793.94/5736


16

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


THE UNDER SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
DECEMBER 29, 1932.

*sent to Tokyo
12/30/32*

*RECEIVED
JAN 4 1933*



F/HS

793.94/5737

The Ambassador came in to report his return to the United States. He said that when he left here he expected to come back; that when he got to Japan he found the situation was different from what he had supposed and the feeling was strong that his diplomacy had been weak and that he thought he might not be returned to Washington. He said that he had made some twenty speeches, none of them reported in the press, in which he had been able, he thought, to explain to some extent at least, the attitude of the American Government and that the result of this had been that his Government decided to send him back. He said that there had been many unnecessary misunderstandings and asked me in that connection whether I knew how the story started that at the time of the Shanghai trouble there was danger that the Japanese might take Hong Kong. I said that I did not. He said that Baron Harada told him that the whole thing had come from the Belgian Ambassador, Bassompierre, who had picked up his psuedo information in "queer places". (The Belgian Ambassador has a way of going to dance halls

in

RECEIVED
JAN 13 1933

154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

- 2 -

in Tokyo, where he meets all sorts and conditions of people. He is a gossip by nature and does not carefully sift the information that comes to him.) Mr. Debuchi said that the Belgian Ambassador thereupon passed on this absurd story to the British Ambassador, who in turn cabled it to the Foreign Office. Sir John Simon then told Mr. Stimson about it in Geneva.

I made no comment on this story except to say that I thought it was very interesting.

The Ambassador said that he hoped to come in shortly to have a long talk with me about the present conditions in Japan.

WRC

WRC:GMH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 4 1968

No. 163

F/HS

793.94/5737

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on December 29th with the Japanese Ambassador concerning Mr. Debuchi's return to the United States; also regarding the report which was circulated at the time of the Shanghai incident to the effect that the Japanese might take Hong Kong.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.]

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of December 29th.

U AC/AB

FE 11/11

5/11



VF
 JAN 2 1968

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RALPH P. LOZIER
SECOND MISSOURI DISTRICT


HOME ADDRESS:
CARROLLTON, MISSOURI

RALPH LOZIER, JR.
SECRETARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

Jan. 3, 1933.



January 9 1933



Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

I am in receipt of a letter from one of
my constituents desiring all available information
relating to the Japanese-Shanghai adventure.

Kindly send me such data as is available
for distribution and also the report made by
investigating committee and the League of Nations.
Are the discussions in the League of Nations
Assembly available for free distribution?

Yours very truly,

Ralph P. Lozier
M. C.

RFL:R

1

JAN 10 1933

FILED

0549

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huelsken NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 9 1933

In reply refer to
HA

The Honorable

Ralph F. Lozier,

House of Representatives.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 3, 1933, in which you request on behalf of one of your constituents information "relating to the Japanese-Shanghai adventure".

There are enclosed herewith copies of the following "Press Releases" which contain information relative to the situation at Shanghai:

Weekly Issue No. 123, Saturday, February 6, 1932, Publication No. 283.

Weekly Issue No. 126, Saturday, February 27, 1932, Publication No. 295.

There are also enclosed copies of addresses by the Secretary of State entitled "The Past of Paris" and "The Work of the United States Government in the Promotion of Peace during the Past Three Years" in which Far Eastern affairs are discussed and of the Treaty of February 6, 1922 regarding principles and policies to be followed

F/HS

793.94/5738

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

followed in matters concerning China.

Information regarding the situation at Shanghai is contained in the Lytton Report, which is distributed by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, this city, under the title "Manchuria: Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations". Copies of this publication may be obtained from that office for forty cents each. The Department of State does not have any copies available for distribution. It is suggested with respect to information regarding discussions in the Assembly of the League of Nations that your constituent may care to address his request to the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, which is the authorized distributor in this country of the publications of the League of Nations.

Very truly yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State

Enclosures:

Press Releases, Weekly Issue No.
 123, Saturday, February 6,
 1932, Publication No. 283.
 Press Releases, Weekly Issue No.
 126, Saturday, February 27,
 1932, Publication No. 295.
 The Pact of Paris.
 The Work of the United States
 Government in the Promotion
 of Peace during the Past
 Three Years.
 Treaty Series No. 723.

JAN 9 1933
 HA:ERP:JAA
 WWS

FE
 m.m.H.

D

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quelefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/725 FOR Tel. # 37.4 pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 10, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Chinese circles in Nanking viewing with
utter pessimism approaching session of
Committee of Nineteen in view of the
Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan and
promise of serious developments in Jehol.

hs

793.94/5739

155
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

78
PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated January 10, 1933.

Recd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

37, January 10, 4 p.m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

Note
793.94
"Recalling that Committee of Nineteen originally intended to keep its draft resolution strictly secret until agreement had been obtained from China and Japan Chinese circles here express opinions that publication of resolution on January 8 indicates that League has virtually abandoned its last hope of conciliation. Chinese observers emphasize that since there exists no basis for conciliation between China and Japan the League should immediately proceed under paragraph four of Article Fifteen of League Covenant."

793.94 Commission/725
With Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan and promise of serious developments in Jehol all Chinese circles in Nanking are viewing with utter pessimism approaching session of Committee of Nineteen. Chinese press is daily printing articles and statements reflecting on efficacy of the League and urging prolonged resistance as sole means of dealing with Japanese aggression."

CIB JS

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~IRH~~
~~PTC~~
~~DA~~
~~AM~~
~~SAX~~
EHD:
MCH:

THE UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 30, 1933.

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 15 1933
NOTED

The Hague's despatch No. 56 December 30, 1932, reports that the Dutch Minister for the Colonies recently expressed the hope that the Philippines would not be given their independence as such action would have an unfortunate effect on colonial populations in the Far East and on the foreign policy of Japan. He also said that Japan only can save the Orient from bolshevism, which is a potential menace to European colonies in the Orient.

A translation of an article on the Philippine Islands, which appeared in the organ of the Catholic party, is enclosed, according to which the granting of independence would be a step further toward the isolation of Europe and America. The latter part of the despatch quotes from an article by O. M. Green, former editor of the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, with regard to communism in China.

134
LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hague, Netherlands,
December 30, 1932.

No. 204

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW WITH THE MINISTER FOR THE COLONIES
REGARDING PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, THE MANCHU-
RIAN QUESTION, AND THE MENACE OF BOLSHIEVISM
IN THE ORIENT.





AM RECD

F/H/S

793.94/57AC

793.94
6116.01

*Blumenthal has been sent
Confidential report*
AW



The Honorable **MAR 9-1933**
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 204, of November
28, 1931, I have the honor to report that in a conversa-
tion which I had with the Minister for the Colonies a
few days ago he again expressed the hope that the Philip-
pine Islands would not be given their independence. He
feared the effect of such action on the colonial popula-
tions in the Far East and on the foreign policy of Japan.

Confi-
dential

There is transmitted herewith a translation of an
article on the Philippine Islands published in the MAASBODE
(the...

FEB 13 1933

FILED

- 2 -

(the organ of the Catholic Party) in its issue of the twenty-second instant. I call particular attention to the following paragraph:

"It is, however, not for the Philipinos alone that the matter is of the utmost importance. For the entire Far East it is a step further in the direction of the isolation of Europe and America. British India, the Dutch East Indies, Japan, China - the same action can be observed everywhere: The demand of the peoples that they shall be considered as having attained their majority and that confidence be shown in their power to carry out good and profitable self-government."

It may be added that in its platform for the Parliamentary elections to be held next June the Social Democratic Labor Party demands "development for self-government of the overseas areas, under native leadership, as a transition to independence."

Confidential

(Mr. de Graaff also spoke of the Manchurian question, expressing views similar to those reported in my No. 204. He said, "Japan is the only power that can save the Orient from Bolshevism, which is a potential menace to the Dutch East Indies and still more to Singapore and the Malay States as well as French Indo-China. 3149

"I have read in the December number of the Fortnightly Review an interesting article about the Red Scourge in China. The communications of the author correspond in substance with the information I have received about that international danger from one of our foremost specialists in Chinese affairs, Dr. de Kat Angelino, who assisted the Lytton Committee in its inquiries in Manchuria and who had, I presume...

- 3 -

presume, an important part in the composition of the
'three closely written pages' of Lord Lytton's report
mentioned in the first lines of Mr. Green's article."

In my despatch No. 322 of April 2, 1932, I reported
that Dr. de Kat Angelino had been placed at the disposal
of the League of Nations Commission for Manchuria, that
he was an expert in the language and history of China,
and that his knowledge of China and its political condi-
tions is extensive. In 1921 he was attached to the Neth-
erland delegation at the Washington Conference and from
1925 to 1926 he represented the Netherlands at the Customs
Conference in Peking. He is the author of "State Policy
and Government Administration in Netherland India".

That part of the Lytton Report which Dr. de Kat An-
gelino is supposed to have had an important part in pre-
paring is referred to as follows in Mr. Green's article:

"Three closely written pages - a large pro-
portion of a report which had to cover such wide
ground - are exclusively devoted to the genesis
and present extent of the Red movement, and to
the Government's almost insuperable difficulties
in overcoming it; and it is abundantly clear from
the Report and from various remarks of Lord Lyt-
ton's since he came home, that no settlement in
Manchuria can be satisfactory unless accompanied
by settlement in China. Communism is for China
the most formidable part of the task of internal
reconstruction. After twenty years of experiment
in every sort of administration, the final issue
before China to-day is, Communism or Nationalism?
And victory for the Communists would mean half
Eastern Asia under the Red Flag. The West is for
the most part entirely unconscious of the enormity
of the danger."

In view of the importance which Mr. de Graaff, who
resided many years at Batavia as a member of the Civil

Service...

- 4 -

Service, attaches to Mr. Green's article I quote also the following excerpts:

"That the Third International is in constant touch with the Chinese Communist Party is unquestionable. There are some eight hundred Chinese students in the 'Sun Yat-sen Chinese Workers' University' and the 'Stalin Eastern Workers' Communist University' at Moscow (both liberally endowed by the Bolshevik Government) and from them a steady stream of native agitators is poured into the Far East. The Comintern maintains an agency in Shanghai, as does the Pacific Workers' Union, another Communist organization.....

"Hitherto the Communists have been staved off from the biggest towns. But if they captured a seaport, through which they might get arms and munitions from Russia, Nanking's days might well be numbered.

"The gravity of the situation is immensely increased by the fact that Mongolia is virtually a Russian province. Its allegiance to China had been growing ever weaker since the Manchus' downfall, and, after a series of adventures too long to detail, it set up a People's Revolutionary Government in 1921 and called in Russia, who has since reorganized it as the Socialist Soviet Republic of Mongolia, affiliated to the Soviet Union, with a Mongolian Red Army officered by Russians. The base that this will give the Bolsheviks for propaganda in North China is obvious. China has protested, but in vain, Russia maintaining that Mongolia is free to do as she pleases. That the growth of Communism in China and the fear of its linking up with the Mongol Reds and the strong Russian influence in north Manchuria is a big factor in Japan's stubbornness, cannot be doubted. Lord Lytton clearly feels as much, and admits that the fact is no small exouse for Japan. Her dread of 'dangerous thoughts', otherwise Communism, transcends everything, and there are many Japanese who believe that Communism in China will win.....

"No amount of persuasiveness alone will bring peace in China. Tangible, practical measures alone will serve, and they are urgently needed. For 'Communism v. Nationalism' is an issue not for the Chinese only, but for all the world."

Mr....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Mr. O. M. Green is a well known former editor of
the North China Daily News.

Respectfully yours,



Laurits S. Swenson.

File No. 801.44
710

Enclosure:
Article from MAASBODE

In quintuplicate

LSS:EKD

4 Carbon Copies
Received

2871

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE TO DESPATCH NO. 581

Translation of article
appearing in the MAASBODE,
(Organ of the Catholic Party)
of Rotterdam, in its issue
of the twenty-second instant.

American Legation,
The Hague, Netherlands.

PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

Will the seven thousand islands with the thirteen million inhabitants and bearing the collective name of "The Philippines" at last secure their independence, even though it be but a test independence lasting for a period of eight or twelve years, according to whether the proposal of the House of Representatives or that of the Senate is accepted. At present the Bill regarding this matter is in the hands of the two Houses of the American Congress, after which it is expected that President Hoover will, as in the early part of this year, exercise his veto which will open up the many possibilities of conflict offered by the Constitution between the President and Congress. The reasons which caused the Government, some months ago, to oppose any declaration of independence of the Philippines are known. The Secretary of State gave as principal reason that America's influence and prestige in the Far East would be struck an irreparable blow. He said further that the economic, political and social consequences might, in the end, lead to the annexation of the Islands by one of the Pacific Powers, as a result of which America would be placed in an inferior position in a Pacific conflict. The same point of view will probably remain of effect because of the turn the Sino-Japanese conflict has taken and because the very remarkable attitude of Russia on two fronts may be full of surprises for the open-door policy so frantically maintained by America in Eastern Asia.

The Philipinos may certainly lay claim to independence. President Wilson solemnly promised independence in 1916; in his last Message he said that the conditions for granting sovereignty to the Philippines actually existed. President Wilson, however, as in so many other questions, i.e. the League of Nations, was unable to get Congress to back him up. An investigatory commission sent to the Islands returned with entirely different findings upon essential points. American imperialism triumphed over President Wilson's more democratic views.

Since then the question of the independence of the Philippines has not disappeared from the Congressional agenda. It is again being discussed now that the economic crisis has burdened America with fourteen million unem-

ployed...

- 2 -

unemployed and has made the great masses averse to importations from foreign countries. Philippine products enter the United States free of duty. Moreover, a free and independent Philippine nation would be subject to the American immigration laws and during the last four or five years two hundred thousand Philipinos left for the Continent as emigrants.

These social and economic objections have all the more weight because the Philippines already enjoy considerable autonomy; the only thing is that the American Governor General has a decisive right of veto and order is maintained by American occupation. Hence the tie is weak, the population rebellious, and the country has no sovereignty. More especially, however, the American sugar producers consider they would be injured in their most important interests; the tropical climate of the Philippines lends itself admirably to an extraordinarily rich production of sugar and copra. Sugar, however, enters America free and that is a source of great anxiety to the American producers; the latter have no more ardent desire than to rid themselves of their troublesome competitor. The best course would be to grant the Philippines their independence and their sugar imports would then be subject to duty. An English newspaper says that for the Philippines independence would be the rope by which they would hang their own prosperity.

Will independence be granted? This is still doubted in international political circles. At all events it cannot be believed that America could give up its huge naval base, which makes possible a direct aim at the heart of the Japanese Empire before the great Pacific conflict has been settled. In any case the action now being conducted in Congress is one of the few important matters in the history of the Philippines. Congress is risking a new and bitter conflict with the Government to get rid of a great colonial possession - a conflict between social-economic and political-imperialist motives.

It is, however, not for the Philipinos alone that the matter is of the utmost importance. For the entire Far East it is a step further in the direction of the isolation of Europe and America. British India, the Dutch East Indies, Japan, China - the same action can be observed everywhere: the demand of the peoples that they shall be considered as having attained their majority and that confidence be shown in their power to carry out good and profitable self-government.

In this respect the Philippines are probably in the most favorable position. They are even now still Catholic and Spanish. They have schools and universities. The country has a culture of its own which, despite the domination of American Free Masonry, could not be destroyed. For even though America has given the Philippines a certain material prosperity, in the spiritual sphere its influence has been destructive. Catholic Missionaries can confirm this.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 710.11/1770 FOR letter

FROM International Catholic (E.L.Curran) DATED Nov. 23, 1932
TO Truth Society NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING:

Defense of Japan's actions in Manchuria:-
Protest against the pamphlet by Kinta Arai, Japanese diplomat, in -.

plc


793.94/5741

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib



FROM


GRAY

Tientsin via NR

Dated January 13, 1933.

Recd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



January 13, 1 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 13, noon. Nine Chinese troop trains passed through Tientsin moving eastward yesterday. It is possible to make a fair estimate of the number of troops moved so far as some of the trains contain field artillery and general equipment. There was a further movement last night but exact number of trains not yet known. Unconfirmed reports are current that 11 troop trains are en route north on the Tientsin Pukow line. It is known that many of the troops that have passed Tientsin are destined to Lwanchow and points this side.

Conditions were quiet at Chinwangtao this morning.
Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

CIB JS

F/HS

793.94/5742

FILED

JAN 14 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 18, 1933.

~~MEMO:~~
~~SKM:~~

In the attached despatch Mr. Peck reports his compliance with the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 11, January 13, 5 p.m. (attached) directing that Mr. T. V. Soong be informed that the Department doubted whether a new statement on the initiative of the American Government would at that time be appropriate or serve any useful purpose.

I suggest that you read Mr. Peck's despatch but not the memorandum of conversation transmitted therewith.

FEJ.

156
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 30 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR-409

Please F.W.

tel. 45 from
Peiping Jan. 13, 1933

[Signature]

793.94/5743

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


January 13, 1933.

Rec. Secretary

In connection with this telegram, in which T. V. Soong asks for "a strong reaffirmation" of this Government's previous statements of attitude, please see memorandum of conversation with Alfred Sze, of this morning, attached.

FE is drafting a telegram to Johnson.

SKH



FE:SKH/ZMF

*2l. 45' from Piping Jan. 13, 1933
11:00 am.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib
This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be- PEIPING
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM Dated January 13, 1933.

Recd 1:19 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



45, January 13, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 376, November 21, 8 p.m.

Following telegram has been received from Peck:

"January 12, 10 a.m. Soong, Acting President of
the Executive Yuan, yesterday asked me to convey to you
his request that you inform the Department that the Chinese
Government would find it extremely helpful during the
present crisis arising from Japanese invasion at
Shanhaikwan and subsequent events if the American Government
would find it possible to issue a strong reaffirmation of
its previous statements. He said that recent statements
by Simon and others were evasive and indicative of growing
timidity. Soong reasserted the unaltered determination
of the Chinese Government to resist further Japanese
encroachments whether in Jehol, North China or Central
China. The Chinese Government believes that isolated acts
of aggression are possible anywhere because of the Japanese
lack of control and the irresponsibility of Japanese
officers. He observed that even at Nanking some naval
officer



FE/H
H

F/H/S

793.94/5743

JAN 2 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 45, January 13, 1933, from Peiping.

officer might involve his Government in another incident."

I have instructed Peck to inform Soong that while I shall communicate his message to Washington I do not expect compliance there in view of clarity with which present administration has set forth its views.

JOHNSON

JS CIB

0568

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

RECEIVED

Washington,

January 13, 1933.

1933 JAN -13- PM 4:10

AMLEGATION, COMMUNICATIONS
 PEIPING (China).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 RECEIVED
 This is a confidential communication.
 It is not to be distributed outside
 the Department of State.
 A

F/HS

793.94/5743

\\ Your 45, January 13, 11 a. m.

Alfred Sze has twice approached the Department on this subject, and officers of the Department have replied tentatively that in view of the clarity and definiteness with which this Government has on many occasions set forth its views there seems no repeat no warrant for doubt with regard to our attitude, and, because of various factors in the situation, it may reasonably be doubted whether a new public statement on our own initiative at this time would be appropriate or serve any useful purpose. The Department is keeping in close touch with Sze.

Please instruct Peck to make reply orally to Soong along the above lines.

793.94/5743

M.M.H.
 FE:MMH:REK

FE

JAN 13 1933 PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.


U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL



FROM


Gray.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 13, 1933.

Received 6.52 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



47, January 13, 5 P. M.

793.94

Conditions Peiping-Tientsin Chinwangtao remain quiet. Chinese soldiers fired on two Italian sailors attempting to pass through lines at Chinwangtao, by arrangement have apologized. Chinese troops continue to pour into area Tientsin-Tongshan-Chinwangtao arriving by Peiping-Hankow Railway and proceeding Peiping-Tientsin Railway.

Hallett Abend informed me this morning that Japanese commandant at Tientsin in interview with him yesterday stated that Japanese had no intention to advance but that they could not remain oblivious to threat of continued movement of Chinese troops and might be forced to occupy Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

WSB HPD


JOHNSON

F/G

793.94/5744

1C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 13, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

The Peiping-Suiyuan Railway referred to in the last paragraph of the attached telegram is marked in blue on the attached map.

If the Japanese should attempt to occupy this railway they will first have to occupy that portion of the Peiping-Mukden Railway between Tientsin and Peiping.

The Peiping-Suiyuan Railway is entirely within China Proper and, if the Japanese attempt to occupy it, they will be carrying on military operations considerably ~~beyond~~ south of the borders of "Manchoukuo", even granting that Jehol is a part of "Manchoukuo". The occupation, however, of this railway, together with the stretch of the Peiping-Mukden Railway between Tientsin and Peiping would give the Japanese an excellent defense line to keep the Chinese from making raids into "Manchoukuo" territory or from assisting the Chinese volunteers in that territory.

793.94/5744

JEJ/VDM

J.E.J.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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FILED

JAN 20 1983


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EAST CHINA AND ADJACENT REGIONS



M.I.D., G.S., U.S.A., 1926. MAP No. 126.

ENGINEER REPRODUCTION PLANT, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C. 7301
1927



757

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Copies sent to
Paris, Tokyo
and Beijing
1/6/33*

not sent to field
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1/13/33
THE UNDER SECRETARY

out to the field with... should go with... indicate possible approval
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, January 5, 1933. *HK*

I should not say what comment of our own... At present I hesitate to say by which
Memorandum of conversation with the French Ambassador,
January 5th.




The French Ambassador came in to talk to me in the most confidential fashion about the situation in the Far East. He reminded me that he had told me sometime ago about a conference he had had with Colonel Kobayashi, who had been trained by the French General Staff; he had a great deal to do in the Saar in engineering matters and had been attached to the Japanese Delegation at Geneva. He reminded me that when he had told of this conversation it was to tell of the proposition that Kobayashi had made for an alliance between France and Japan. His answer had been that this was entirely out of the question, that France would certainly not consider any such thing; that it did not sympathize with what Japan had been doing in Manchuria and also that France could see no reason to ally itself with Japan at the cost of gaining the enmity of the other great powers of the world. What he did not tell me at the time was a very tentative suggestion

793.94

note

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493 6/2



F/G

793.94/5745

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

2

suggestion he had made in Paris to Kobayashi. He said that he sympathized to a great extent with the Japanese feeling that China was not a unified nation and that there was no reason why Manchuria should be, or pretend to be, under the domination of Nanking. He said, of course, there were from time to time alliances between Nanking and the different provinces and, through the Kuomintang, some kind of loose cooperation, but that at any time in China the Cantonese might gain control or any other group which developed sufficient power. He said that, in his opinion, there was a certain feeling of Chinese nationality, but that this feeling was not as strong as were the local loyalties of the different groups; that, in other words, China was really far more a federation of semi independent groups than it was a nation. It seemed to him, he said, that this was merely facing facts without any glossing over.

After going over all this at great length with Colonel Kobayashi he said that he had been wondering whether it might not be possible for the Chinese to hold a conference of the different groups, Nanking, Canton, Szechuan, Yunⁿan, etc., the purpose of this conference

1574
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

3

conference to be first an absolute agreement not to fight for another year or two or three years and eventually to form some kind of loosely federated state wherein the local loyalties might be maintained and the unity of China also maintained. Manchuria is and always must be economically a part of China; it cannot exist without trade and communication with the rest of China. If such a conference were held, therefore, Manchuria would be included in these different more or less autonomous units to take its part in the conference with the others. He said that at the time Kobayashi was very much interested in the idea, but in no way committed himself. The Ambassador said he had heard nothing more of it since last summer.

This morning there came to the Embassy Colonel Kobayashi, who is passing through Washington on his way to Tokyo, with the Military Attaché Tanaka. Both these men, Claudel says, are attached to the General Staff and represent the military party. He is convinced that Debuchi knew nothing whatever of their call on him and points out with the greatest emphasis that Debuchi must know nothing of it. Kobayashi immediately

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

4

mediately brought up the conversation of last summer with the suggestions the Ambassador had made. He said that he had been in constant communication with his Government along these lines and that he felt strongly that Japan would be exceedingly sympathetic to this idea if it could be brought about. Claudel said this seemed to him a very striking fact; the thread of possibility is very tenuous, but on the other hand he felt that if some such suggestion could have the sympathy of other nations it might gradually work out into something practical; he feels that the Chinese face would be saved through the fact that Manchukuo's asking to be included in the suggested conference would thus admit itself to be Chinese; that Japan would also save its face in that Manchukuo, in taking part in this conference, would do so as a practically independent group just as Canton is a good deal of the time practically independent of Nanking. . He said that, of course, the whole idea was difficult to grasp from the occidental point of view, but that it was just the kind of thing that the oriental mind might play

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

5


play around and work out into something practicable. He said he wanted to speak to me about it because if such an idea was not repugnant to the American Government, if the American Government would act with sympathy toward it when and if the question actually arose, it would have a great effect both in China and in Japan.

Colonel Kobayashi is returning immediately to Tokyo and is going to correspond steadily with the Ambassador. There is, of course, nothing to do at the moment about this, but he was anxious immediately to put the suggestion in our minds.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~THE~~ SECRETARY



January 12, 1933.

*Copies to Tokyo
Peking and Geneva
1/24/33 FE (R6X)*

January 30 1933

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Japanese Ambassador reminded me that he had informed me on his last visit that the trouble at Shanhaikwan would be localized. He said he now came to confirm it. There had been no further aggression there during the week. I asked him what about the press reports of large movements in Jehol. He said he thought that was very much exaggerated; that during the present bitter winter weather no such movements were probable, and he hoped therefore that the press reports were untrue. The Ambassador said further that the movements of insurgents in the neighborhood of Pogradichnaya on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been dealt with effectively and that now the Chinese Eastern Railway and all the other railways in Manchuria were in regular operation; that the Japanese estimates of the number of insurgents in Manchuria had been originally two hundred thousand and that now they were reduced to

forty

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/5746

F/HS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

forty thousand. I told him that I was surprised at his figures because my information was that the number of insurgents in Manchuria against Japanese domination was thirty million.

500.0111
893.01
Manchuria

The Ambassador then changed the subject to the coming meeting at Geneva on the 16th, and asked me whether I had any advice to give to his Government. I told him that unfortunately I could not take the position of advising the Japanese Government on what it should do and that if I should, I feared they would not follow it. He said of course there was one thing that must be regarded as not susceptible of compromise--that was the recognition of Manchukuo; that was a matter of principle which could not be compromised. Then I said: "You take the position which is equivalent, I suppose, to requesting that the fifty other nations of the world should compromise their principles."

As he went out the door I said to the Ambassador in all seriousness I would advise him not to inform his Government that the American Government was likely to change the position which it had taken deliberately as a matter of principle in these matters. He said there was no danger of his doing so; that when he was in Japan many people

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

people came to him and said that they supposed that when the new American Administration came in on March 4th, that Administration's policy towards Manchuria would be changed; that he had always replied to them that that was not so--that the policy of the note of January 7th and of our attitude towards the peace treaties was a policy which was in general favor throughout the United States and represented all parties.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 30 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 189

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 12, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

R. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum
 dated January 12,
 1933.

793.94/5746



Jan. 26 1933

FE:MMH:REK
 1/24/33

FE

Jan. 25 1933

793.94/5746

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 988

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 12, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5746

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 12,
 1933.



FE:MMH:REK
 1/24/33

FE

Jan. 25 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on January 12, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. TIMMONS

793.94/5746

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 12,
 1933.



FE:MMH:REK
 1/24/33

FE

Jan. 25 1933

158
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

GRAY

FROM TIENTSIN via N.R.

Dated January 14, 1933

Rec'd. 2:50

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 14 1933

Department of State

793.94
Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT, January 14, 1 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation;
"January 14, noon.

Since early yesterday morning twelve trains of troops, equipment, and supplies have moved eastward through Tientsin. Some of these troops have been moved in open coal cars in bitterly cold weather, only slightly above zero. Twelve empty trains have moved westward in past eighteen hours, destination said to be Fengtai. Estimates of the daily movement of troops vary from 4000 to 8000.

Repeated to the Department."

LOCKHART

KLP RR

FE
F/G 793.94/5747

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

A portion of the telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated January 14, 1933.

FROM

Rec'd 5:37 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

11, January 14, 2 p. m.

(GRAY) Certain Japanese newspapers yesterday


published telegrams from Nanking to the effect that the United States has arranged to loan the Nanking Government 20,000,000 yuan for warlike preparations against Japan; also that China has arranged for a supply of arms and for economic assistance from the United States in a war with Japan and furthermore has an understanding with the Soviets for mutual defense. The telegrams do not give any indications of the interests who will supply the alleged loans. Today a Japanese newspaper states that Japan will warn the United States, Germany and other countries against supplying arms to China under present circumstances, as such action may lead to the outbreak of a world war. (END GRAY).

Please instruct if the Department deems it advisable to take notice of these somewhat inflammatory statements in case they continue. If any official comment is to be made I believe it would have most effect here if released to the press in Washington.

Repeated to Peiping.


KLP-RR

GREW



FE

JAN 14 1933



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 14 1933

Department of State

F/G

793.94/5748

793.94
893.113
893.51
711.93
711.94

JAN 18 1933

FILED

058F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

1933 JAN - 14 - PM 1:38

Washington,

January 14, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

2 Your 11, January 14, 2 p.m.

A press report to the effect that an understanding had been reached between the United States and China with regard to the supply of arms and munitions to China in the event of war with Japan was brought to the Department's attention yesterday. The Department yesterday issued orally to the press an emphatic denial that there is any understanding or any agreement of this nature between the United States and China and informed the press that there could be no repeat no possible basis in fact for the report.

The report above mentioned did not repeat not include mention of an alleged arrangement of a loan to the Nanking Government of twenty million yuan. For such a report there is equally no repeat no basis in fact. If in your opinion further denial would be advisable please inform the Department.

FE:LES:CLS

FE

793.94/5748

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

F/HS

793.94/5748

Stinson

HCH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 17, 1933.

~~EHD:~~

~~WCH:~~

SKH:

Paris's despatch No. 3223 of
January 5, 1933, discusses the
French attitude toward Japan
and should be read.

130
LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, January 5, 1933

No. 3223

Subject: Sino-Japanese
Conflict

793.94
note
751.94



F/HS

793.94/5749

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

A recrudescence of rumors regarding a Franco-Japanese understanding whereby the two powers pledge each other mutual support ushered in the new year but met with a prompt denial from the Foreign Office. The Socialists apparently launched the suggestion for the purpose of "smoking out" the Paul-Boncour government on its Far Eastern policy. Thus they contended that the "backboneless" attitude shown by the Laval, Tardieu and Herriot governments towards the conflict in Manchuria had served to abet the designs of Japan. They referred to negotiations

which

Copy sent by
Commercial Office (A-C/O)
To

Peiping
Tokyo
1/20/33
O/n

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JAN 21 1933

K

- 2 -

which they said had been progressing between the two governments and between French and Japanese financial and industrial interests and let it be understood that an agreement had been reached not of a formal nature but of the pre war entente variety.

As a consequence through the POPULAIRE they called on the Paul-Boncour government to make its position plain - to state openly whether it intended to continue the Franco-Japanese agreement, whether it proposed to encourage French finance and industry to pursue further conversations with Japan's representatives.

The Government replied immediately in a communiqué addressed to the press which stated, "There is no secret treaty binding France and Japan and no proposal along those lines is under consideration at the Foreign Office."

Moreover, in releasing the communiqué a governmental spokesman - said to have been M. Pierre Cot, the Undersecretary of State - explained that though France's relations with Japan were "very clear and cordial" and the Government was making an effort to assure a closer collaboration between the two countries there was no pact. Indeed statements to the contrary should be attributed to "international trouble makers."

This exchange coming coincidentally with the

advance

- 3 -

advance of Japanese troops in Jehol provoked widespread comment in the press with the extreme Left urging the government to strengthen the hand of the League of Nations and the Right and Center taking the fatalistic view point that Japan was in Manchuria to stay, that it needed Manchuria as an outlet for its industries and excess population and finally that it would be folly for the Western powers to fly in the face of Japanese determination.

The TEMPS, for instance, took great pains to point out in its leading editorial of December 31 that Japan was prepared to consolidate its dominion over Manchuria, a province with which it had close and vital political and economic ties.

"The boycott practised by the Chinese has ruined the prosperity of the Empire of the Rising Sun," the TEMPS explained; "as a consequence Manchuria has become an indispensable field for Japanese expansion. That is what makes it impossible to solve the problem by recourse to the general formulae advanced by the League of Nations and renders recourse to direct negotiation between Nankin and Tokio imperative for the pacific solution of the problem outstanding between the two neighboring countries which have such enormous common interests and therefore should reach an understanding if they desire a durable peace in the Far East."

This "durable peace" which is to result from "direct negotiation" should however be based on a formal recognition of the doctrine of the open door, the TEMPS in conclusion insisted.

Leon Blum, Socialist leader, demanded in LE POPULAIRE a diplomatic break with Japan. The fate

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Queffelec NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of the post war system identified with the League of Nations, of American collaboration with Europe, the Disarmament Conference, confidence, security were at stake, he said. It was far better to have a mutilated League of Nations with Japan out of it than a dishonoured League with Japan in it.

The Radical Socialist viewpoint was set forth in the REPUBLIQUE which summoned the members of the League of Nations to take immediate and effective action to stop Japan's further invasion of Chinese territory. This paper reminded the nations of Europe that a similar aggression might take place at any moment at their door step and that if the League failed in the present crisis it would fail later. Therefore the REPUBLIQUE recommended immediate economic and financial sanctions through the League of Nations. However the main body of the French press sympathized openly and avowedly with the Japanese.

As Pertinax explained in L'ECHO DE PARIS, order could be brought about in Manchuria only when the Chinese military forces in Jehol were dispersed. Japan could not tolerate an affront to its prestige in the Far East by a military Tu-Chun supported by Canton revolutionaries. Therefore while the League continued to discuss abstract principles Japan would solve its problems realistically in its own fashion.

Pertinax and the other Nationalist writers did not deceive themselves as to the repercussion of the Japanese action on the Geneva deliberations. He admitted frankly that the reopening of the meetings in


Geneva

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Geneva would be the signal for the rupture of Japan
with the League.

Respectfully yours,



Walter E. Edge

In quintuplicate

710.

RTP/cg

759
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


January 10, 1933.

✓
The Boxer Protocol of 1901, Article IX, provides that "The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers to occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea." The Article lists twelve points.

In case there is in effect an agreement whereby the Japanese, for instance, may occupy only certain of the points specified, it may be important for the Department to have record of that fact as it would appear that any attempt by the Japanese to occupy points other than those allocated to them under the agreement would constitute a violation of the agreement, provided that Japan cited the Boxer Protocol as the basis of her right to occupy those points.

MMH/VDM
m.w.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

1933 JAN - 13 - PM 5:14 Washington,
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
 This document is
 classified as CONFIDENTIAL
 and is not to be
 released to anyone
 without proper
 authority.
 B

January 13, 1933.
 7P

AMLEGATION,
 PEIPING (China).

13
 Please report the date and the important provisions
 of any agreement now in effect between the Boxer Protocol
 powers in reference to occupation by them of points listed
 in Boxer Protocol, Article 9, indicating what points may,
 according to any such agreement, be occupied by each
 power. If necessary, consult Tientsin.

Department is giving consideration to
 your telegram relating to problems in
 this connection.

Stinson
 alk

793.94

FE:MMH/VIM

FE
 793.94

Jan. 13, 1933, PM
 793.94

Enciphered by W
 Sent by operator M., 1933
 Index Bu.—No. 30

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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1-138

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 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

January 13, 1933.

68

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

10

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY.

I desire that you have a talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, along the following line:

I have had inquiries from a number of sources expressive of desire to know what is the American Government's present attitude with regard to the Chinese-Japanese situation. Also, press reports from Geneva state that an impression exists or is being cultivated that the American Government has lost effective interest in the matter. These facts suggest the existence of doubt, which, although it surprises me, should, if it exists, be removed.

Toward removing any such doubt, I would say first of all: This Government's view regarding the jurisdiction of the League and the support which the American Government should and did give was declared during the first week of October, 1931; our position toward subsequent developments in the Far East was declared emphatically and unequivocally in our identic notes of January 7, 1932 to China and Japan. Our views with regard to the status and the applicability of various treaties and the problem of peace were set forth

Enciphered by H.S.

Sent by operator M., 19

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793.94/5749 B

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

in my letter to Senator Borah and various public utterances
 which I have made and which the President has made. The
 position of this Government as thus set forth has not
 repeat not changed and I have reason to believe will not
 repeat not be altered by the next administration.

The report of the Lytton Commission has confirmed our
 estimate of the facts and of principles to which the nations
 should give consideration. That report has been regarded
 in this country as an evidence of progress in the develop-
 ment of peace machinery. The American Government and people
 have been watching to see what the League will do with it.

It is my estimate that there is at present no repeat
 no warrant for further hope that efforts at conciliation
 may have in the near future any chance of success. The
 Japanese affirm that they intend to make no repeat no
 concessions from the positions which they have taken, both
 physical and political. They even ask that the world close
 its eyes and turn its back for an indefinite period and
 leave it to them to work out the situation in the Far East
 — in their own way. They thus establish a clear-cut issue
 between themselves and the world. Disregard of this issue
 by the world would tend to nullify the whole effort which

Enciphered by H.S.

Sent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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- 3 -

Washington,

has been made since the World War to establish the principle of world interest and provide machinery for settling international disputes by pacific means. The issue at this moment is whether Japan shall be permitted not only to impose her will in the Far East by force but, in connection with so doing, to achieve a diplomatic victory over the whole world, especially the League of Nations. The world cannot repeat not put an end to the hostilities between Japan and China, nor can it cause them to begin at once negotiations for a peaceful settlement; but the League could, if it so chose, on the basis of the report of the Lytton Commission and in the light of its own Covenant, take a stand as regards facts and principles.

What the League may decide to do will of course be determined in considerable measure by the position taken by the French and the British Governments. There therefore rests upon those Governments a great responsibility.

The attitude of the American Government is well known. We remain prepared to give support, acting independently and through our diplomatic representatives, to such decisions and action as we may deem wisely to have been taken

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

by the League
 (Leave 509)
 Indicator (Leave 4)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PLAIN

- 4 -

Washington,

by the League.)

It would be very helpful to me to know what are the views of the French Government. I am instructing you to express my views frankly as above, with the request that they be kept confidential, and to request on my behalf an expression of the French Government's views, which I of course would keep confidential. I am likewise asking, at London, for an indication of the views of the British Government.

In what you may say to the Foreign Office, you should include, in substance, all of the above, and you should stress the point that I am not repeat not seeking to press upon the French Government my views, with which I feel that it is already thoroughly familiar, but am seeking to ensure against any doubt or misunderstanding and to obtain light with regard to its views. In order to make this very informal you may prefer to let Marriner take it up with a junior member of the Foreign Office. You should in any case leave no written memorandum.

Shinson

WJ

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

Jan. 18, 1953. M

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 1-128

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated January 16, 1933

Rec'd 6:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 16, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 16, 3 p. m. Sixteen trains of miscellaneous troops, equipment and supplies moved eastward through Tientsin over the week end and one train of troops moved westward. Regular traffic between Tientsin and Peiping greatly delayed as well as east of Tientsin. Conditions quiet at Chinwangtao today. Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

CIB WP

F/HS

793.94/5750

793.94
note
893.77

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1933
Department of State

JAN 24 1933



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM Peiping
Dated January 15, 1933,
Recd. 12:55 a m



Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94
note

893.01 Manchuria
861.77 C.E.

51, January 15, 10 a m.
Following from Consulate General at Harbin January
13, 4 p m.

"One. Japanese military mission confirms capture
Tungning by Japanese and continued military operation
against scattered Chinese forces near the Kirin Russian
frontier.

Two. General Ting Chao allegedly negotiating for
allogiance of his forces to Manchukuo.

Three. Through traffic restored on the Chinese Eastern
Railway between Harbin, Pogranchnia and Vladivostok on
January 12th. Entire Chinese Eastern system now open to
traffic."

WSB

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/5751

FILED
JAN 17 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated January 16, 1933

Rec'd 12: 53 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

52, January 16, 9 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 15, 10 a. m. Although the concentration
of Japanese troops along Jehol border was denied by official
spokesman here yesterday, it has been learned from a reliable
source that the Fourth Division was moving southward from
North Manchuria via Taonan. Indications are that preparations
for Jehol drive are being hastened and that it will probably
begin early in February.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

*Paraphrase sent to
ONI & MID
Jan. 16, 1933*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5752

793-94

JAN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 18 1933

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
P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram dated January 16, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Under date January 15 the American Consul General at Mukden reported that although a denial was made by an official spokesman at Mukden on January 14 that Japanese troops were concentrating along the Jehol border, information has been received from a trustworthy source that the Fourth Division was moving from North Manchuria by way of Taonan to the south. It is probable that a Jehol drive will begin in the early part of February, as it is indicated that preparations for such a drive are being hastened.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 16, 1933

Rec'd 4:05 a. m.

F/HS

793.94/5753

Secretary of State,
Washington.

53, January 16, 2 p. m.

Reuter from Shanghai, fifteenth.

"In a manifesto addressed to the people of China

the so-called Soviet Government of China says that Chinese Red armies are willing to fight with Government troops against Japanese invasion provided the advance of Government forces against Soviet districts is immediately stopped, the people are granted democratic rights and armed volunteer detachments created to struggle for the defense of the independence and unity of China. Manifesto declares that Japan aims at complete dismemberment and subjugation of whole of China. Statement is signed by General Mao Tseh Tung, Chairman of the Provisional Soviet Government of China, and Chiu Peh Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Workers' and Peasants' Red armies".

JOHNSON


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Good Russian phonology!

JAN 21 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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This message must be
carefully paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to any one (a)

Paris,

Dated January 15, 1933,

Recd. 6:44 p m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

20, January 15, 8 p m.
CONFIDENTIAL. Your 10, January 13, 6 p m.

In order to avoid mistaken ideas as to the possi-
ble purpose of a visit to the Prime Minister at this time
and primarily to hasten matters before the departure of
the French representative for Geneva tonight, Harriner
saw Cot, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, this after-
noon. Cot intends to proceed to Geneva the end of the
week to represent France on the committee of 19. In the
meantime Massigli who leaves tonight will sit and Cot will
inform him at once of the tenor of your ideas.

Cot expressed himself as very well pleased to have
this reaffirmation of the American position which he said
was fully in accord with the French position as it has
been stated by Paul Boncour. He felt it to be absolute-
ly necessary that the League should put itself on re-
cord in the sense of the Lytton report, although he
could conceive no possibility of military sanctions in

Manchuria

F/HS

793.94/5754

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JAN 21 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

page 2, #20 from Paris

Manchuria. His only fear was the attitude of the English who he said would be greatly influenced by the knowledge of your point of view.

Cot promised to inform Paul Boncour immediately of the substance of this confidential conversation and to let him know that I am ready to talk with him at any time if he had questions to ask or any thing to add to what Cot told Marriner.

As Sir John Simon left London this noon for Paris en route to Geneva tonight, I informed Tyrrell of the substance of your teletype and of the French indication of sympathy for your point of view which he will advise Simon.

E D G E

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM PEIPING
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated January 13, 1933.

Recd 5:42 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

46, January 13, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY
10 793.94 5732

Nanking's January 13, 5 p.m., regarding Boxer

protocol. Spanish Minister, French Minister, Italian
Minister, British Charge d'Affaires and I discussed this
note, agreed that as Chinese asked nothing there was
nothing for us to do but to await instructions from our
respective governments.

Other colleagues to be furnished informal suggestion
contained in Peck's last paragraph.

JOHNSON

CIB JS

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JUN 24 1933

Confidential File

793.94
note
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JAN 13 1933
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 13 1933
Department of State

File
22. to Peiping
Jan. 14, 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 14, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

This question has been
with us for some days, and
FE feels that it is very
desirable to have the proposed
outgoing telegram go forward
as soon as possible.

5408
I approve. I think Mr. Castle
should see it before it goes
SKH/VDM
1425

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Collect

Charge Department

Charge

TELEGRAM SENT

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 Department of State

1933 JAN - 14 - PM 8:27 Washington,

January 14, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China)

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

16 *Confidential* 793.94/5732 *in confidence* 5728
 Nanking's January 10, 5 p. m. and your 36, January 9,
 493.11/1664
 7 p.m. and 46, January 13, 4 p. m.

FOR YOUR SPECIFIC GUIDANCE.

One. As the memorandum mentioned in Nanking's January 10, 5 p.m. asks nothing, the Department therefore views it as a Chinese declaration, made for purposes of record which requires no repeat no reply. If Peck is pressed for a reply, there would be no objection to his informing the Chinese authorities orally of the above view.

Two. From the last paragraph of your 46, January 13, 4 p. m. it would seem that the informal suggestion contained in the last paragraph of Nanking's January 10, 5 p. m., namely that the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901 attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government from abusing its privileges under that Protocol, was not repeat not made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the other interested legations. With regard to that suggestion, the Department is informing the Chinese Legation orally that it believes that the circumstances of the Japanese

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1-138

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793.94/5755

Confidential File

793.94

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793.1029

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

1-138
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PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

occupation of Shanhaikwan flow from factors of the conflict between China and Japan and not repeat not from provisions of the Boxer Protocol and that, if developments should involve the provisions of that Protocol, this Government would give consideration to those developments as the necessity arises and in the light of this Government's rights and obligations thereunder.

FOR YOUR GENERAL GUIDANCE.

Three. As the Department views the situation as it is developing, the question of the applicability of provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the provisions of the QUOTE Conditions for Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin UNQUOTE of July 15, 1902, may become involved and also, growing out of these provisions, such questions as (a) keeping open communications between Peiping and the sea, (b) Chinese troop movements along the line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, (c) possible Japanese military moves along that railway and elsewhere south of the Great Wall, and (d) the security of foreign lives and property at Tientsin and at Peiping. In connection with the applicability of

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

- 3 -

Washington,

the provisions of the QUOTE Conditions for the Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin UNQUOTE, the Department desires repeat desires that you constantly keep in mind the fact that, although these QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE contain some provisions that may logically be held to flow from the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, the American Government was ^{never formally} ~~not~~ a party to those QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE, S-1044

Four. With regard to the Boxer Protocol, to which the American Government is a ^{signatory} ~~party~~, Articles Seven and Nine thereof are the provisions of possible applicability in the present situation. These Articles provide for the exclusive use and control of the Legation Quarter at Peiping by the legations; for the maintenance by each Power of a guard in that Quarter for the defense of its legation; and for the occupancy of certain points between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, to be determined by an agreement between the signatory powers for the maintenance of open communication between Peiping and the sea. The purpose of stationing a military guard at Peiping and along the railway, shorn of technicalities and placed in proper perspective, was to safeguard foreign lives and property.

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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- 4 -

Washington,

especially the legations, against attacks by Chinese repeat Chinese forces. The mission of ~~that~~ ^{our} force ^S should be regarded essentially as that of providing special ^{in situ} protection ~~for~~ the lives and property of foreign nationals, including the legations, and, in case of emergency calling for evacuation, making available an armed escort to the sea. It should not repeat not be regarded as a rightful or a practicable function of ~~that~~ ^{these} ~~forces~~ ^{guard} to regulate or hamper the legitimate activities of Chinese armed forces, either on the defensive or on the offensive, in connection with the prosecution of hostilities in a quarrel between China and a foreign power. Furthermore, the provisions of the Protocol were certainly not repeat not designed for the purpose of giving a foreign power some peculiar advantage on Chinese soil in a military contest in which it might engage with China.

Five. In case Japan should use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between Peiping and the sea and use those troops or her guard at Peiping to conduct operations against the Chinese, it is believed that the United States and

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the other Protocol powers would be justified in making announcement that in their opinion Japan's action could not repeat not in any way be based on the provisions of the Protocol and/or in making representations to Japan. Whether the Japanese authorities heed or disregard these representations, we and the other signatory powers, if hostilities continue, would be confronted with the task of protecting our nationals in the area of hostilities as best we could--a matter which will have to be worked out by the military commanders on the spot. It is likely, however, that if the Japanese make a determined military movement south of the Great Wall, participation in that movement by the comparatively small Japanese Protocol force would be merely a minor incident in a major campaign of armed invasion of Chinese soil, justification for which under the provisions of the Protocol or the QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE the Japanese would hardly claim except for purposes of camouflage and/or propaganda.

Six. With regard to the QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE, to which the American Government is not repeat not a party, there are found therein certain provisions which go beyond those found in the Boxer Protocol, namely, undertakings by

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

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the Chinese Government (a) not repeat not to station
 or march any troops within twenty Chinese Li of Tientsin,
 (b) nor to move troops within a two-mile zone on either
 side of the railway between Peiping and Shanhaikwan,
 (c) nor to establish maritime defenses at the mouth of
 the Peiho, at Chinwangtao and at Shanhaikwan. In so
 far as the Department is as yet officially informed,
 the Japanese Government, which was a ^{signatory} party to these
 QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE, has not repeat not invoked
 them, although there have been some press reports to
 the effect that it might ^{do so.} These reports, however,
 appear to confuse these QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE with
 the provisions of the Boxer Protocol as such. If the
 Japanese Government should attempt to invoke these
 QUOTE Conditions UNQUOTE in the present hostilities, the
 Department, regardless of the attitude which may be
 taken by the other signatory powers, namely, France,
 Great Britain and Italy, ^{doubts whether we would be} ~~would not repeat not be~~ prepared
 to join in an attempt to restrict Chinese troop movements
 on the basis of the provisions referred to.

Seven. In the situation as outlined above, the
 Department feels that the Minister and his interested

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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colleagues should be giving consideration to the question of the kind and degree of protection that might under the circumstances be afforded the lives and property of their respective nationals in case the present hostilities extend to Tientsin and Peiping. The Department realizes the difficulties involved in working out in advance a definite plan. There are, however, two aspects under which the question might be considered: first, the consideration of the possibility of a neutralization plan, which, however, the interested Ministers and Military Attachés at Peiping and the British Government, when the matter was under discussion last autumn, did not repeat ^{regard} not ~~consider~~ at that time as practicable and, second, the consideration of such means as the military commanders at Tientsin and Peiping may ^{deem} ~~consider~~ desirable and practicable for the protection of American lives either in situ or by evacuation.

Eight. With regard to a neutralization plan, the Department was inclined last autumn to favor such a plan. ~~the Chinese then appeared to favor it~~ That view was, however, entertained before hostilities reached their present stage. Now, in so far as the Department is informed, the Chinese appear determined to resist in

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Collect
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 OR

Department of State

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the Tientsin and Peiping areas further Japanese encroachments upon Chinese soil. A neutralization plan would require that the Chinese withdraw their troops from this area. If there could be any assurance that the Japanese also would withdraw from this area, such a plan might be suggested by friendly, interested powers without giving ground for a feeling that the plan would be discriminatory. At the present stage of developments, the demilitarization of the Peiping-Tientsin area would appear ^{an impediment to} ~~hampering to~~ the Chinese if they should desire to attempt to prevent the Japanese from entering Jehol, because they would then be forced to march their troops a long distance overland to enter Jehol from the west. The Department is not repeat not, therefore, for the moment, prepared to advocate such a plan, although it would not repeat not be opposed to assisting in the inauguration of such a plan if the Chinese are agreeable to it or if the other interested powers wish to propose it as ^{a thought} ~~the~~ plan best designed to protect foreign interests. HKA

Nine. With regard to the protection of foreign lives in situ or by evacuation, the Department feels that the military commanders both at Peiping and Tientsin should

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

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 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

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be giving this matter their ^{careful} ~~close~~ attention, keeping
 in close touch with the Diplomatic Body at Peiping and
 the Consular Body at Tientsin.

Ten. The French Government has approached the
 Department through the French Ambassador here with
 regard to the questions involved, and the Department
 is informing the French Ambassador substantially in
 accord with the above.

Eleven. In the light of the above, the Department
 desires that you continue to consult with your interested
 colleagues, attempting to devise such arrangements as may
 seem desirable and practicable to meet the situation as
 it develops and keeping the Department informed promptly
 of developments.

Thurston

g.e.f.
 FE:JEJ/VDM

FE

SPKHA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

0617

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 15 1933

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegraphic instruction from the Department of State to the American Minister at Peiping, of date January 14, 1933, reads substantially as follows:

Your 36, January 9, 7 p.m. and 46, January 13, 4 p.m., and Nanking's January 10, 5 p.m.

One. The Department views as a Chinese declaration, which requires no reply, having been made for purposes of record, the memorandum mentioned in Nanking's telegram of January 10, 5 p.m. wherein the Chinese Government declares that it cannot assume responsibility for any situation which may result from the exercise of the legitimate right to resist aggressive actions of Japanese troops. There would be no objection to the Consul General at Nanking orally informing the Chinese authorities of the above view if he is pressed for a reply.

Two. It would seem, from the last paragraph of your January 13, 4 p.m., that the suggestion contained in the last paragraph of Nanking's January 10, 5 p.m. was not made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the other interested Legations. With regard to that suggestion, namely, that the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901 attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government from abusing its privileges under that

Protocol,

0618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Protocol, the Department is informing the Chinese Legation orally that it believes that the circumstances of Japan's occupation of Shanhaikwan do not flow from provisions of the Boxer Protocol but from factors of the conflict between China and Japan and that this Government would give consideration to any developments that should involve the provisions of that Protocol in the light of this Government's rights and obligations thereunder and as the necessity arises.

Three. In the light of the situation as it is developing the Department holds the following views: the provisions of the "Conditions for Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin" of July 15, 1902, and the question of the applicability of the provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 may become involved and also, growing out of these provisions such questions as (a) keeping communications open between the sea and Peiping, (b) the movements of Chinese troops between Peiping and Shanhaikwan along the line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, (c) possible military moves of the Japanese south of the Great Wall and along that railway, and (d) the security, at Tientsin and Peiping, of foreign property and lives. Referring to the applicability of the provisions of the "Conditions for the Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin"

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Tientsin" you should constantly keep in mind the fact that the American Government was never formally a party to those "Conditions" although these "Conditions" contain some provisions that may logically be held to flow from the provisions of the Boxer Protocol.

Four. Articles Seven and Nine of the Boxer Protocol, to which the American Government is a signatory, are in the present situation the provisions of possible applicability. These Articles provide for the maintenance by each power of a guard in the Legation Quarter at Peiping for the defense of its Legation; for the exclusive use and control of the Legation Quarter at Peiping by the Legations; and for the occupancy of certain points, to be determined by an agreement between the signatory powers, between Peiping and Shanhaikwan, for the maintenance of open communication between the sea and Peiping. Shorn of technicalities and placed in proper perspective, the purpose of stationing a military guard along the railway and at Peiping is to safeguard foreign property and lives, especially the Legations, against Chinese attacks. Essentially the mission of our forces should be regarded as that of providing special protection in the locale for the property

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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property and lives of foreign nationals, including the legations, and making available an armed escort to the sea in case of emergency calling for evacuation. The provisions of the Protocol were certainly not designed for the purpose of giving a foreign power some peculiar advantage on Chinese soil in a military contest in which it might engage with China. It should not be regarded as a practicable and rightful function of these forces to hamper the legitimate activities of Chinese armed forces either on the offensive or on the defensive.

Five. It is believed that the United States and the other Protocol powers would be justified in making announcement that in their opinion the action of Japan could not be based in any way on the provisions of the Protocol and/or in making representations to Japan, in case Japan should use her right under the Boxer Protocol to station Japanese troops at various points between the sea and Peiping and use her guard at Peiping or those troops to conduct operations against the Chinese. If hostilities continue, we and the other signatory powers would be confronted with the task of protecting our nationals in the area of hostilities as best we could—a matter which will have to be worked out on the spot by our military commanders, whether the Japanese authorities heed or disregard these representations. If

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Japanese make a determined military movement south of the Great Wall, it is likely that participation in that movement by the comparatively small Japanese Protocol force would be merely a minor incident in a major campaign of armed invasion of Chinese soil, justification for which the Japanese would hardly claim under the provisions of the Protocol or the "Conditions" except for purposes of propaganda and/or camouflage.

Six. Concerning the "Conditions", to which the Government of the United States is not formally a party, they contain certain provisions which go beyond those found in the Boxer Protocol, as follows: undertakings by the Chinese Government (a) not to move troops between Peiping and Shanhaikwan within a two-mile zone on either side of the railway, (b) nor to march or station any troops within twenty Chinese Li of Tientsin, (c) nor at the mouth of the Peiho, at Chinwangtao and at Shanhaikwan to establish maritime defenses. The Japanese Government, which was a signatory to those "Conditions", in so far as the Department has as yet been officially informed, has not invoked them (although there have been some press reports to the effect that it might do so). However, these reports appear to confuse the provisions of the Boxer Protocol as such with these "Conditions". The
 Department,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department, regardless of the attitude which may be taken by the other signatory powers, namely, France, Great Britain and Italy, doubts whether we would be prepared to join in an attempt to restrict Chinese troop movements on the basis of the provisions referred to if the Japanese Government should attempt to invoke these "Conditions" in the present hostilities.

Seven. The Department feels that, in the situation as outlined above, the Minister and his interested colleagues should be giving consideration to the question of the degree and kind of protection that might be afforded under the circumstances, in case the present hostilities are extended to Peiping and Tientsin, the property and lives of their respective nationals. The difficulties involved in working out a definite plan in advance are realized by the Department. However, the question might be considered under two aspects: First, the consideration of the possibility of a neutralization plan which, however, the military attachés at Peiping, the British Government and the interested Ministers at Peiping did not regard as practicable last autumn when the matter was under discussion and, second, the consideration of such means as may be deemed desirable and practicable for the protection of American lives

either

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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either by evacuation or in the locale by the military commanders at Peiping and Tientsin.

Eight. The Department was inclined last autumn to favor a neutralization plan. However, that view was entertained before hostilities reached their present stage. The Chinese appear determined to resist in the Tientsin and Peiping areas further Japanese encroachments upon Chinese soil, according to the information received by the Department. A neutralization plan would require that the Chinese withdraw their troops from this area. Such a plan might be suggested by friendly, interested powers without giving ground for a feeling that the plan would be discriminatory if there could be any assurance that the Japanese also would withdraw from this area. If the Chinese should desire to attempt to prevent the Japanese from entering Jehol, the demilitarization of the Peiping-Tientsin area would appear an impediment to the Chinese at the present stage of developments because, to enter Jehol from the west, they would then be forced to march their troops a long distance overland. For the moment, therefore, the Department is not prepared to advocate such a plan, although it would not be opposed to assisting in the inauguration of such a plan if the other interested powers wish to propose it as a plan thought best designed to protect foreign interests or if the Chinese are agreeable to it.

Nine.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Nine. The Department is of the opinion that the military commanders both at Tientsin and Peiping should be giving careful attention to the matter of protection of foreign lives in the locale or by evacuation, keeping in close touch with the Consular Body at Tientsin and with the Diplomatic Body at Peiping.

Ten. Having been approached by the French Ambassador here on behalf of his Government concerning the questions involved, the Department is informing the French Ambassador substantially in accord with the foregoing.

Eleven. The Department desires that in the light of the foregoing you continue to consult with your interested colleagues, keeping the Department promptly informed of developments. You should attempt to devise such arrangements as may seem practicable and desirable to meet the situation as it develops.

m.m.k

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated January 16, 1933

Rec'd 7:17 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

55, January 16, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Department's telegram 16, January 14, 9 p. m.

I do not interpret phrase "in situ" in paragraphs
four and seven as meaning protection of outlying and
isolated American life or property where located.

Please instruct.

JOHNSON

KLP

F/H/S

793.94/5756



JUN 24 1933

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Confidential File

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Collect
Charge Department
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Department of State

Charge to
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1933 JAN 18 PM 5:12

Washington,

January 16, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF RECORDS
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
should be paraphrased before
transmitted to anyone.
a

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 55, January 16, 7 p.m.

That interpretation is correct. The expression
QUOTE in situ UNQUOTE is used in general reference to
location within the areas referred to in the Protocol
of 1901.

Shinson
WZ

793.94 / 5756

JAN 16 1933 PM

FE:SKH:EJL

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

F/H S

793.94/5756

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated January 16, 1933

Rec'd 6:44 a. m.

Secretary of State

Washington

54, January 16, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Liu Chung Cheh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,

called. He stated he was in Peiping to maintain liaison
between Nanking and Chang Hsueh Liang and ^{to maintain} ~~(*)~~ in contact
with the Legations as Nanking realized ministers could not
go to Nanking at this time. He stated that Suma of the
Japanese Legation at Shanghai had called on Wu Tieh Cheng
to say that Japanese Foreign Office and military were
agreed that nothing should be done to aggravate situation
and to express the hope that Chinese would refrain from
moving forces in the direction of Shanhaikwan. Liu stated
Nanking's reply was that Japanese had taken initiative at
Shanhaikwan thereby aggravating situation. Nanking
expressed the hope that Japanese would withdraw from Shan-
haikwan voluntarily.

RR-WWC

JOHNSON

(*) apparent omission.

F/HS

793.94/5757

793.94

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 13 1933
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
January 17, 1933.

SKH: ~~SKH~~

Minister Johnson gives us herein (his 56, January 16, 9 p.m.) more information than we have had with regard to the actual assignment of positions along the Peiping-Mukden Railway for keeping the Railway open between Peiping and the Sea.

Also, we have confirmation of the fact that no American forces are at present stationed outside of Tientsin and Peiping except the small caretaking detachment near Chinwangtao.

In the last paragraph of his telegram Minister Johnson states that he will bring "confidentially" to the attention of Colonel Burt at Tientsin the substance of the appropriate paragraphs of the Department's telegram No. 16, January 14, 9 p.m. I see no objection to this as we suggested that the military commanders might be giving consideration to the present situation. /5755

The present plan for combined action by the various foreign forces in the Peiping-Tientsin areas, to which Minister

Johnson

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Johnson refers (the plan is attached), does not require, in my opinion, any further study on the part of the Department but I suggest that you read the three contingencies (on page 1 of this plan - tagged) under which the plan might be invoked, as none of these contingencies relate to such a situation as now exists in the Tientsin-Peiping areas.

See
893.0146/149 conf-

J.S.J.
JEJ:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

PEIPING

Dated January 16, 1933.

Recd 1:37 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State

Washington.

56, January 16, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 13, January 13, 7 p.m. and 16,
January 14, 9 p.m. / 5755

One. Present plan for combined action by foreign
corps of the occupation of North China dated December 22,
1930, was forwarded with Legation's despatch No. 848,
March 6, 1931.

(BEGIN GRAY) Two. Pursuant to diplomatic body
resolution printed page 318, Macmurry's Treaties, Volume
One, and after withdrawal of the Germans following sectors
were assigned various powers:

"Great Britain: from Peiping to west end of Yangtsun
Railroad bridge over the Peiho 68 miles, France from west
end above bridge to the north end of bridge, consisting of
one span 200 feet and four spans thirty feet, over the
Chinglungwanho, four miles north of Peifang Railway Station
57.5 miles; America: from north end of above bridge to the
west distant signal of Tongshan Railroad Station 53.5 miles
(formerly German sector), from above limit to the west
distant

Paraphrase
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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

in confidence

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 17 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5758

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793.94
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JAN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 56, January 16, 1933, from Peiping.

distant signal Lanchou Railroad Station 33.5 miles. Japan: from west distant signal Lanchou Railroad Station to Great Wall at Shanhaikwan 61 miles. Italian: at Peiping, Tientsin and Shanhaikwan." In this connection however please read paragraph 5 of combined plan referred to above which limits extension of plan only as far as Tangku until forces are of sufficient strength to extend the line between Tientsin, Tangku and Shanhaikwan. (END GRAY)

Three. Although the above are the sectors assigned American and British forces do not at present occupy sections allotted to them. The French maintain detachments at Tangku, Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan and exercise a mild form of surveillance at Tientsin East Station. The Italians have a few men at Tangku and a caretaking detachment at Shanhaikwan. Americans maintain a caretaking detachment at summer camp near Chinwangtao. I am informed that it has always been and it is now considered to be the right of any of participating troops to extend, reduce or abandon altogether military control of the sectors allotted. The Japanese continue to exercise their protocol rights within a portion of the sectors originally allotted.

Four. I shall bring confidentially to the attention of Colonel Burt at Tientsin the substance of appropriate paragraphs of Department's telegram 16 under acknowledgment.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

0632

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~JAN 22 1933~~

FEB 15 1933

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram from the American Minister at Peiping of date January 16, 1933, reads substantially as follows:

The Department's 13, January 13, 7 p.m., and 16, January 14, 9 p.m.

One. There was forwarded to the Department with the Legation's despatch No. 848 of March 6, 1931, a copy of the existing plan dated December 22, 1930, for combined action on the part of the foreign forces in north China.

Two. Pursuant to diplomatic body resolution printed page 318, MacMurray's Treaties, Volume One, and after withdrawal of the Germans following sectors were assigned various powers:

"Great Britain: from Peiping to west end of Yangtsun Railroad bridge over the Peiho 68 miles. France: from west end above bridge to the north end of bridge, consisting of one span 200 feet and four spans thirty feet, over the Chinglungwanho, four miles north of Peifang Railway Station 57.5 miles. America: from north end of above bridge to the west distant signal of Tongshan Railroad Station 53.5 miles (formerly German sector), from above limit to the west distant signal Lanchou Railroad Station 33.5 miles. Japan: from west distant signal Lanchou Railroad Station to Great Wall at Shanhaikwan 61 miles. Italian: at Peiping, Tientsin and Shanhaikwan." In this connection however please read

paragraph

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

paragraph 5 of combined plan referred to above which limits extension of plan only as far as Tangku until forces are of sufficient strength to extend the line between Tientsin, Tangku and Shanhaikwan.

Three. The American and British forces do not at the present time occupy the sectors allotted to them under that plan. There are at Tangku, Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan French detachments; the French also exercise surveillance at the Tientsin East Station. There are a few Italians at Tangku and a detachment of caretakers at Shanhaikwan. An American caretaking detachment is also maintained at a summer camp near Chinwangtao. The Legation understands that it has always been and is still considered to be the right of any of the foreign contingents participating in the plan to extend, reduce or abandon altogether military control of their sectors. Within a portion of those sectors originally allotted to Japan, the forces of that power continue to exercise protocol rights.

Four. I shall inform Colonel Burt at Tientsin confidentially of appropriate paragraphs of the Department's 16, January 14, 9 p.m.

J.E.G.
M.M.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 19, 1933.

~~END~~

~~RCM~~

~~JES~~

~~MMS~~

~~37H~~

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of December 15, 1932, encloses a copy of its despatch No. 705 to Peiping, with regard to the incident of a Japanese armored train at Shanhaikwan on December 8. It adds little new to despatches on this subject already received.

¹⁶⁴
JES:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, China, December 15, 1932.

SUBJECT: Shanhaikuan Incident of December
8, 1932.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

JAN 16 33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 17 1933

Department of State

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 705 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 13, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 705
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

JAN 27 1933

FILED

F/HS
793.94/5759

163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 705.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, December 13, 1932.

SUBJECT: Shanhaikuan Incident of December
8, 1932.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent articles in the PEKING-TIENTSIN TIMES, THE MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS, and other newspapers concerning the exchange of shots between a Japanese armored train and Chinese soldiers near or at the Shanhaikuan station during the night of December 8-9, 1932. As the Legation is aware, conflicting versions of the clash have appeared in the newspapers. For the purpose of obtaining additional light on the affair, a member of my staff made informal inquiries during a conversation with a Japanese consular official on December 12, 1932. He was informed that the local Japanese Consulate General had not received an official report on the incident from the Japanese Consulate at Chinchow, but that the following information had been obtained from other sources:

A Japanese armored train, a unit of the 8th Division with headquarters at Chinchow, was patrolling the railway between Chinchow and Shanhaikuan on the night of December 8th.

To

- 2 -

To obtain fuel and water the train went to the Shanhaikuan station. While at the station it was subjected to machine gun fire by Chinese soldiers. The Japanese soldiers on the train returned the fire. The engagement began at 10:10 p.m. on the 8th and was terminated when the train ceased firing at 3 a.m. on the 9th. No casualties have been reported.

Japanese residents of Shanhaikuan were withdrawn to safety and a regiment from Chinchow was sent to the scene.

In reply to a specific inquiry, the Japanese official said that the station at Shanhaikuan, but not the town, is considered to be on Manchoukuo territory. He pointed out that Manchoukuo Customs officials are on duty at the station. He also said that he did not know whether or not Japanese armored trains have previously proceeded inside the Great Wall to the station to procure fuel and water. When it was suggested that armored trains would probably in the future go to some place outside the Wall to obtain fuel and water because the military obviously desired to avoid clashes with the Chinese who police the town of Shanhaikuan, he replied that he personally thought that Japanese armored trains would continue to go to Shanhaikuan.

It was obvious that the official I have referred to took the incident lightly. In his opinion there is no chance that the affair might lead to a serious conflict. However, he did not know whether or not the regiment sent from Chinchow to reenforce the Japanese garrison at Shanhaikuan, which is under the command of headquarters at Tientsin, had been withdrawn.

This incident, unimportant in itself, is reported because it is another indication of the possibility
that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


that the Japanese military are not adverse to having occasional minor clashes occur in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan, in order that they may have pretexts when they decide to invade Jehol. In this connection it will be recalled that there was a clash early in October between Chinese and Manchoukuo patrols in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan. In that engagement a Japanese member of the Manchoukuo patrol was killed.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MH:mhp



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

GRAY

FROM

Tokio

Dated January 17, 1933

Received 5:57 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

14. January 17, 4 p. m.

My 11, January 14, 2 p. m. and the Department's

2, January 14, 1 p. m. 5748



As certain inquiries had been made of the Embassy I issued yesterday morning a statement to the Japanese news agencies repeating almost verbatim the Department's public denial of the press report from Nanking regarding an alleged arrangement whereby the United States is to supply funds and munitions to the Nanking Government. At almost the same time the Japanese War Office issued a statement that the United States is supplying automobiles and airplanes to China through merchants at Shanghai and that Germany is supplying munitions through merchants at Tientsin. This was published subsequently to my denial of the other report. It appears now that the two foregoing statements were telegraphed to the United States simultaneously by the news agencies and this morning I was informed by a newspaper correspondent that in the United States it was taken that my denial referred to the War Office statement, whereas in fact it clearly referred to the Nanking press

793.94/5760

FILED

JAN 18 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

EJ

2-#14 from Tokio, Jan. 17, 4 p.m.

press report. The Japanese newspapers last night published the War Office statement but did not publish the Embassy's denial of the Nanking press report; there is therefore no confusion of the two statements here.

Repeated to Peiping.

RR-WSB

GREW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 17, 1933

Rec'd 6:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 17, 3 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the
Legation:

"January 17, 2 p. m. There has been a pronounced reduction in troop movements through Tientsin within past 24 hours, only four trains, mostly composed of supplies and equipment, having passed through last night. A responsible railroad official estimates the number of Chinese troops in Lwanchow-Changli area as about 60,000. Everything is quiet at Chinwangtao today. There appears to be under way a fresh propaganda drive designed to persuade Chang Hsueh Liang either to ^{resign} ~~negotiate~~ or to curb his military activities.

Repeated to Department".

RR-WSB

LOCKHART

JUN 23 1933
PTT

F/HS

793.94/5761

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 20 1933

To the American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period January 9 to January 18, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:
 Two copies of digest
 of telegrams.

793.94/5761


29C.
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✓
 Jan. 20, 1933

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m.m.f.



M m.f.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
JANUARY 9 to JANUARY 18, 1933.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (January 10) that on January 7 and 8, according to information from military headquarters, Japanese airplanes bombarded Chinese troops concentrated in Jehol Province about 70 miles north of Shanhaikwan and that the Japanese Fourth Cavalry Brigade has been transferred to that vicinity.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 10) that on January 9 about 2,500 Chinese troops disembarked a few miles west of Tientsin and are said now to be moving overland toward Chinwangtao; that Americans returning from Chinwangtao state that General Ho Chu-kuo has about 15,000 troops in that vicinity; and that troops in considerable numbers are moving up the Peiping-Hankow Railway near Peiping.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 11) that on January 10 Chinese troops from five trains detrained about 13 miles west of Tientsin and moved northwestward and that on January 11 three trains of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin en route to Lwanchow (about 50 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan).

The Consul General at Harbin reports (January 11) that the Japanese now possess the coal mines at Mulin and at Mishan (southeast and east of Harbin, respectively, near the Siberian border); that on January 8 the garrison at Suifenho (southeast of Harbin on the Siberian border) took the oath of allegiance to "Manchoukuo"; and that Japanese operations are continuing in the vicinity of Tungningping (about 30 miles south of Suifenho).

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 12) that on the night of January 11 Chinese troop trains moved eastward through Tientsin at intervals of about two hours and that Chinwangtao is quieter after several tense days due to an attack by Chinese soldiers and civilians on the Japanese chief of police in civilian dress, an incident in which serious trouble was apparently averted by the Chinese making apologies.

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 13) that conditions at Peiping, Tientsin and Chinwangtao remain quiet; that Chinese troops are pouring into the area between Tientsin and Chinwangtao, arriving via the Peiping-Hankow Railway and proceeding via the Peiping-Tientsin Railway; and that on January 12 the Japanese commandant at Tientsin informed an American press correspondent that the Japanese did not intend to advance but that they could not ignore the continued movement of Chinese troops and might be forced to occupy the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 13) that on January 12 nine Chinese troop trains passed through Tientsin moving east and that there was a further movement at night, the exact number unknown. The Consul General adds that on January 13 conditions were quiet at Chinwangtao.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (January 13) that the Japanese military mission confirms reports of the capture of Tungning (a short distance south of Suifenho) by Japanese and of continued military operations against scattered Chinese forces near the Kirin-Siberian border. The Consul General adds that on January 12 through traffic was restored on the Chinese Eastern Railway between Harbin, Suifenho and Vladivostok and that the entire eastern system is now open to traffic

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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traffic.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 14) that since the early morning of January 13 twelve trains of troops, equipment and supplies have moved eastward through Tientsin. The Consul General adds that estimates of the daily movement of troops vary from 4,000 to 8,000.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 16) that over the weekend 16 trains of troops, equipment and supplies moved eastward through Tientsin and one train of troops moved westward. The Consul General adds that conditions were quiet at Chinwangtao on January 16. 793.94/5761

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 17) that since midday of January 16 there has been a decided reduction in troop movements through Tientsin, only four trains, filled for the most part with supplies and equipment, having passed through during the night of January 16; that a responsible railroad official estimates that there are about 60,000 Chinese troops in the area from 25 to 45 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan; and that on January 17 everything was quiet at Chinwangtao.

EGC:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 18, 1933.

~~END:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~JEL:~~
~~WEL:~~
~~WEL:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 1867 of December 14, 1932, encloses reports from two American army officers with regard to the Shanhaikwan incident of December 8 when a Japanese armored train fired a number of shots into a water tower near the station and into the town. Observers seem to believe that the Japanese were to blame for the incident, perhaps an excuse to keep an armored train at Shanhaikwan or to cover up some movement intended to be made toward Jehol or some other locality. The Japanese claim that the armored train was first fired on by Chinese troops with machine guns.

LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, December 14, 1932.

No. 1867

Subject: Shanhaikuan Incident Caused by
Japanese Armored Train.

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JAN 16 33

COPIES SENT TO
ON L AND M. I. D.



F/H/S

793.94/5762

JAN 30 1933

FILED

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegrams No. 1309
of December 9, 10 a.m., and No. 1315 of December 10,
12 noon, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the
completion of the Department's files regarding the re-
1/ cent Shanhaikuan incident, a copy of a report from the
intelligence officer of the Fifteenth Infantry, U.S.
Army Troops, Tientsin, dated December 9, 1932, and a re-
2/ port from the officer stationed at Chinwangtao (near
Shanhaikuan) dated December 10, 1932, both of which were
furnished

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huebner NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


furnished to the Legation at my request.

Although there is some difference of opinion as to the origin of the incident, it has been established that a Japanese armored train came south of the Great Wall late on December 8th and, without apparent provocation, fired a number of shots into a water tower near the station of Shanhaikuan and several shots into the town itself.

It looked for a time very much as if the Japanese military were seeking an excuse for pouring troops into the Lwan River region, possibly preparatory to an invasion of Jehol. However, the Chinese troops refused to be drawn into any engagement, and after some parleying between the local Chinese and Japanese commanders the whole incident was settled without bloodshed.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. van H. Engel,
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

- 1: Copy of report dated
December 9, 1932.
- 2: Copy of report dated
December 10, 1932.

800.

CVHE/js.

1641
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. ARMY TROOPS IN CHINA
Tientsin, China
Office of the Intelligence
Officer

December 9, 1932.

Subject: Entry of Japanese Armored Train within
the Wall at Shanhaikuan.

To: The Commanding Officer.

1. In connection with the enclosed letter from Headquarters, Imperial Japanese Forces in China, Mr. Steel, Traffic Manager of the Pei-ning (Peking-Mukden) Railroad, informed me this afternoon that after the alleged firing on the train by the Chinese, the armored train proceeded within the Wall into Shanhaikuan station, and from thence came on further in the direction of Chinwangtao to a point about a mile from Shanhaikuan where there is a bridge over a river and a large water tower. The Japanese then, Mr. Steele reports, fired through the bottom of the tank, letting out all the water. As this tank supplies water not only for the locomotives, but for all the shops at Shanhaikuan, Mr. Steele states that the operation of the road will be considerably interfered with until the tank can be repaired.

2. Mr. Steele also states that traffic in and out of Shanhaikuan is considerably hindered by the presence of the armored train at the station, but that he hopes to have trains running at least approximately on schedule by tomorrow.

3. At Japanese headquarters I was informed that the firing on the train was due to a misunderstanding and that they do not consider the incident will have any serious results. According to Mr. Steele, the Japanese in Shanhaikuan have informed General Ho Chu-kuo, in command of Chinese forces in that area, that if he will sign a statement to the effect that the Chinese opened fire on the train first, they will consider the incident closed, but Ho Chu-kuo, so Mr. Steele says, is unwilling to do this and the matter is still under discussion.

4. Mr. Steele seems apprehensive lest the Japanese are seeking to create a pretext for an advance within the Wall. Major Wards, the British Intelligence Officer, who understands the Japanese very well, does not think so, and I am of the same opinion. I think the most that the Japanese are seeking at the present time is an excuse to keep an armored train at Shanhaikuan.

5. The railway officials inform me that two troop trains have been ordered for the transportation of Chinese

troops

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

troops from Peking to Luanchow, but that so far no troops have been moved. If the movement is confined to two train loads, it can have little significance. There is always a chance, however, that the Japanese may have got wind of troop movements in the direction of Shanhaikuan and created the armored car incident as a threatening gesture.

6. Major Wards tells me that the Japanese recently stated to him that they were contemplating active operations against the Volunteers in the area to the northwest of Chinchow and that they feared possibly these Volunteers might retreat into Jehol, in which event it might be necessary to pursue them. Major Wards thinks this statement may presage a Japanese advance into Jehol, probably by way of the railway line running from Chinchow to Chaoyang.

David D. Barrett,
Captain, 15th Infantry,
S-2.

Copied: JS
Compared with: AB.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HEADQUARTERS

Imperial Japanese Forces in China.

Tientsin

Tientsin, December 9, 1932.

Sir:

I beg to inform you that an armoured train belonging to the Japanese 8th Division, which was helping as usual the bandit suppression campaign of the Japanese garrison at Chienso, outside the Great Wall, was suddenly fired on by the Chinese troops with their machine guns on December 8th, 1932, at 10.10 P.M., at a point near the Great Wall when it was arriving there on its way to S.H.K. to get a supply of coal and water.

The armoured train was compelled to return fire but stopped to do so after a while and it is now stopping at the S.H.K. station. Should the Chinese troops not take any further action the situation is not considered to be aggravated in the future. Any further particulars will be given to your staff officer when he calls upon these Headquarters.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ H. Kikuchi, Colonel
Chief of Staff.

Colonel R. J. Burt,
CMDg. U.S. Army Troops in China,
Tientsin.

Copied: JS.
Compared with: AB.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HEADQUARTERS CAMP BURROWES,
CHINGWANGTAO, CHINA.

2
Serial No. 1867
Despatch No.

December 10, 1932.

Subject: Investigation of Disturbance at Shanhaikuan,
December 8th to 10th.

To: Commanding Officer, USATC, American Barracks,
Tientsin, China.

1. In regard to the recent disturbance at Shanhaikuan I went to Shanhaikuan on Dec. 10th and saw the following people:

- a. Major Ochia, in charge of Japanese Troops in Shanhaikuan.
- b. Major Mura, on a special mission from Japanese Headquarters in Tientsin.
- c. General Ho, in command of Chinese troops in Shanhaikuan.
- d. Mr. Newmarsh and Mr. Cauley, Railroad officials at Shanhaikuan.

2. Major Ochia made the following statement: That on December 8 at about 10 p.m. as a Japanese armored train was going toward Shanhaikuan for coal and water and while a short distance outside the wall, it was fired on by machine guns and was forced to return the fire in self defense, that a few of the shots accidentally fell into the city. That the firing into the water tower was accidental. That it was Chinese volunteers and soldiers who fired at the armored train. That he had been asked by General Ho to straighten the matter out and that he had called a conference where it would all be fixed up. That it was quite customary for Japanese armored trains to get coal and water at Shanhaikuan.

3. I then went to the conference and made an appointment to see General Ho at 3 P.M. At the conference there were about 15 Japanese officers and General Ho. Some of the Japanese officers were wearing the coats and fur caps of the Manchoukuo Army. One of the officers was from Tientsin, three were stationed at Shanhaikuan, the rest had apparently come in from outside the Wall.

4. Before the conference started Major Mura told me about the same thing as was told by Major Ochia.

5. There was at the conference a Colonel of the Japanese Army. He said that his train had been fired on just outside the wall. I asked where his regiment was and he said, "Outside the Wall". I asked him how far outside and received no answer.

6. Also at this conference I saw the "gendarme" who got on the troop train going down to the K.M.A. wharf bound for the Republic; this time he was in uniform with first lieutenant bars on his shoulders.

- 2 -

7. The one thing which struck me most about this conference was the almost Sunday School picnic attitude of all concerned including General Ho.

8. I talked to General Ho for nearly an hour. He said that his troops never went outside the wall, that none of his troops fired any shots and that he had been unable to learn of the presence outside the wall of any volunteer forces who might have fired the shots. That there were no volunteers inside the wall, but that apparently all the Japanese firing had been directed into the city. That no one was hurt but that two buildings had been damaged by shell fire, about one pounder size shells. That he believed it to be just a "Show" being put on by the Japanese, but for what reason he did not know. He was positive that it was all over and that for the time being everything would be quiet.

9. I believe that the most unbiased and accurate account of what happened came from Mr. Newmark and Mr. Cauley, railroad officials at Shanhaikuan. They state that on December 8, they were on the station platform seeing that the train, which arrives in Tientsin at six in the morning, got off on time, 9:55. That this train pulled out and they started to leave when down the track from outside the wall they saw a train coming. That this train went right on past the station, past every signal and disappeared up the track toward Tientsin. That as it passed they saw that it was an armored train and that shortly after it passed the station they heard rifle and small cannon firing. That they heard no firing previous to this. That this train was gone up the track for an hour and then came back to the station. They then learned that members of this train had fired 7 shells through the railroad water tank about one mile outside the town. The holes in the tank were from two inches to four inches in diameter. While the armored train was up the track two passenger trains each partly armored came into the station, each train had perhaps 50 Manchoukuo soldiers on it and some White Russian Police and Japanese Officers. That these trains stopped opposite the station and remained there in spite of all efforts to get them to move. That some time during the night of the 9th two more armored trains came in the yards at Shanhaikuan and they also refused to move. They said that it was not customary for armored trains and troop trains to get coal and water at Shanhaikuan. They are of the opinion that it is a "Show" being put on by the Japs to cover up some movement they intend to make toward Jehol or some other locality and at the same time throw a scare into the Chinese.

10. I examined the armored trains from the station platform, they consist of flat cars at each end loaded with sandbags, two complete armored cars with swinging turrets mounting something about the size of a one pounder, an armored engine and a box car, in which they had a kit-

chen

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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chen and bunks. The two passenger trains are partly armored with sheet steel and could carry a regiment with some crowding.

In this connection Mr. Cauley stated that the train service from Mukden since the 8th has been very irregular as though there was considerable movement on the RR which interfered greatly with regular trains. It is believed that the troops from the passenger trains are in the next station outside the wall.

11. On December 9th all trains stopped and started at Chinwangtao, on December 10th normal service had been resumed with great difficulty. At 4 p.m. on the 10th the three armored trains and two passenger trains were still at Shanhaikuan station. They were to leave at 5 p.m. according to Major Ochia.

/s/ Rothwell H Brown
1st Lieut., 15th Infantry.

Copied: JS.
Compared with WP.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
January 27, 1933.

Return to
FE/14

~~FROM:~~
~~TO:~~

To note.

~~SUB:~~

I suggest that you read this despatch from Minister Johnson and certain passages of the enclosures which I have marked.

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


LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, December 20, 1932.


No. 1880

Subject: Memoranda of Conversations in
Nanking regarding Sino-Japan-
ese Relations.



JAN 16 33

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1/6/ I have the honor to transmit herewith memoranda
of six conversations, as listed below, which I had in
Nanking with various Chinese government officials, and
more especially with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, between December 5 and December 16,
1932.

From these conversations it is apparent that the
Chinese Government is anxious that the United States
should take a more active part in the Sino-Japanese
controversy

F/H/S

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
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- 2 -

controversy, either by giving its whole-hearted support to the efforts of the League of Nations or by initiating action under the Nine-Power Treaty. The Foreign Minister said, among other things, that China's views on the Resolution of the Committee of Nineteen would be largely influenced by the American Government's attitude toward the invitation to it to participate.

The Department's attention is invited to Dr. Lo Wen-kan's statement on December 7th that he considered himself "a director of volunteers" in Manchuria, and that as China realized that the League could do little or nothing "they would have to go on fighting". And on December 10th he enlarged upon that point by saying that even though "the League had no means of forcing Japan to leave Manchuria", China was entitled to the moral backing which a judgment in Geneva would give her. China would attend to the execution of the judgment herself, and although it might take a long time she would never give up.

Respectfully yours,


Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1/	Memorandum of conversation December 5, 1932.
2/	" " " " 6, "
3/	" " " " 7, "
4/	" " " " 10, "
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1880

Conversation.

Nanking, December 5, 1932.

Mr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Dispute.

In the course of an informal call upon Mr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the question of the proceedings before the League in the Sino-Japanese dispute was mentioned. Mr. Hsu Mo expressed the hope that the United States would prod the League to do its duty.

I stated that it seemed to me that it was unnecessary for the League to wait upon the United States in dealing with the question that was now before it, inasmuch as the American Secretary of State had left no doubt by his speeches and his statements of the attitude of the United States towards this question.

Mr. Hsu Mo expressed the opinion that the American Government's attitude had been helpful but negative.

I replied that the American Government's attitude could hardly be anything but negative, as the question was a League question, for which adequate machinery and adequate understandings existed; that the American Government had made clear its policy, so that the League was free now to act with full knowledge of the attitude

of the

-2-

of the American Government, and that it would now be the studied preoccupation of the American Government to refrain from any action or word that might serve to divert interest from the League and its uninterrupted consideration of and settlement of the case before it.

Mr. Hsu Mo recalled that the Chinese Government had addressed notes to the Powers party to the Nine-Power Treaty, to which no reply had been sent by the American Government.

I stated that it seemed to me hardly the time for those governments party to the Nine-Power Treaty to take any action in regard to the matter in view of the fact that the whole question was, in a sense, sub judice of the League.

I said that I was not impressed by arguments that the League should "pass the buck" to the Powers party to the Nine-Power Treaty, as no machinery existed for the transfer of such a question, and that in any case the responsibility of the League was just as great if not greater than any responsibility resting on the group of Powers party to the treaties of Washington.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister.

NTJ:epg

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2
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1880

Conversation.

Nanking, December 6, 1932.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Dispute - Proceedings
at Geneva.

During an informal call upon Dr. Lo at his house, I asked him if there was any news about Geneva. He said there was little news other than that the Assembly was meeting and that China was presenting her case; it was difficult to know how the matter will come out, but China was prepared for the worst; the Japanese might drive General Su back into the hills, but that would not settle the matter, for the guerilla warfare could continue; he thought the League rather inclined to wait upon the United States; expressed the hope that the American Government would support the League.

I stated that it seemed to me that the League had no reason to wait on the United States; the American Government's policy in regard to the question in dispute must be well-known to the League, as it was to everyone else, as the American Secretary of State had been very clear-cut in his statements of American policy.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister.

NTJ:epg

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33
 1880

Conversation.

Nanking, December 7, 1932.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

In the course of a long after-dinner conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter made a statement indicating that he was considerably taken down by the defeat of General Su. He said that he had had a telegram from General Su which confirmed the defeat. Lo remarked that he had interested himself all along in the volunteer movement. He described himself as a director of volunteers (all of this in confidence). He said that they would have to go on fighting; time was with the Chinese in this matter; he realized that the League could do little or nothing in the face of Japanese armed opposition. Perhaps in two or three years the Japanese might be ready for some kind of a settlement. He stated that while he could not make such a remark in his office he wanted to tell me that the Japanese attack on China had been a blessing in disguise; they had done more to wake Chinese leadership to the necessity of unification and the absurdity of their personal quarreling than anything else. It had been a good lesson to the Kuomintang party men with their foolish slogan. He said

that

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that he was trying to impress upon his fellows the need for China to drop such childish methods and to work sincerely and without cease for the improvement of her courts and her establishments, for he believed quite sincerely that with the establishment of good constitutions such questions as extraterritoriality and foreign concessions would settle themselves.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister.

NTJ:epg

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4
1880⁴

Conversation.

Nanking, December 10, 1932.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Dispute.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, called this evening, and for two hours we discussed conditions in China and the dispute relating to Manchuria. Dr. Lo was considerably cast down by the defeat of General Su Ping-wen, but did not believe that he had been handed over to the Japanese, as was claimed in Japanese press reports. Dr. Lo was somewhat bitter over the attitude taken by Sir John Simon in the course of the Assembly debate of the Manchurian matter. He said that Ingram, the British Chargé, had been to see him, and that he had stated to Ingram his surprise and feeling of disappointment, and that Ingram, apparently on instructions from home, explained to him Sir John's attitude as being entirely motivated by a desire to do what he could to bring about the conciliation between the parties which all devoutly wished to occur. Lo explained it as his opinion that Simon was playing politics among the larger Powers.

Lo produced a telegram from Alfred Sze to the effect that Stimson appeared to be much wrought up by Simon's speech.

Lo commented bitterly upon Simon's statement that he wished to be neutral as between the parties, saying that
in this

-2-

in this matter the attitude of neutrality was hardly justifiable in view of the Report of the League's own Commission sent to investigate the matter. China had done everything to support the League and to uphold its prestige. Japan was the aggressor. He used the following simile to illustrate his meaning, saying: "I meet a man in the road and he beats me. I take my complaint to the Court. It may be impossible for me to obtain execution upon my attacker, but I have the right to obtain a judgment from the Court. Will the Court condemn me because I cursed the man after he had attacked me? Am I to be denied even the satisfaction of a curse?"

Lo commented upon Sir John's remark that he was merely anxious to perform the same service to China and Japan which Sir Miles Lampson, in cooperation with the Powers, had performed at Shanghai, as an honest broker attempting to bring agreement between the parties. Lo pointed out that there was no parallel between the situation which had prevailed at Shanghai and the situation which prevailed between China and Japan in Manchuria. In the Shanghai case he had used his best efforts to persuade the Chinese to yield in order that China might retain the friendship of the foreign Powers who had such large interest in the International Settlement there. He had labored to persuade the Chinese that they should

do

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do nothing to violate or harm the International Settlement, and the agreement, to which Sir John Simon referred, was the result, but Manchuria was different. Foreign interests were small, China had lost everything in Manchuria; her territory, lives, property, homes, and now they would fight. He realized that China was not strong enough to push Japan out of Manchuria, but she was strong enough to make trouble for Japan in Manchuria, and as long as he held office and as long as he had any voice wherewith to influence the policy of the government, he would do everything in his power to make trouble for the Japanese in Manchuria.

At Geneva, all he asked was a judgment in the matter between China and Japan.

I pointed out to Dr. Lo that the question at Geneva could be divided into two parts. One part concerned itself with the occupation of Manchuria by Japan. I said that this question was one that concerned Japan and China alone. The other part concerned itself with the future of the entire treaty edifice which had been erected for the purpose of providing machinery for the composition and settlement of controversies between the nations. This was a question which concerned all of the nations of the world. As regarded the first question,

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question, it was apparent that those now dominating the counsels of Japan would resist by force any effort to oust Japan from the position which it had attained in Manchuria. The League had no police or military force with which to accomplish this purpose, and it seemed to me that the Chinese were too weak to accomplish it themselves. Doubtless, for this reason, conciliation seemed to the leaders in Europe to be the only thing which they could hope for.

Dr. Lo stated that he realized that the League had no means of forcing Japan to leave Manchuria. However, China had a right to judgment. He had no fear as to what the decision would be as to between China and Japan. With her judgment China would then do what she liked to force Japan to leave Manchuria. It might take a long time, but China would never give up. Never would he counsel in favor of any action which would result in consent by China to the separation of Manchuria from China. The League could expect no help from China toward such an end.

Dr. Lo again said that all China asked was her judgment. She wanted the moral backing that the decision of the League would give. They could not expect the League to execute the judgment. China was prepared to take her chances. She had nothing to lose, while Japan had everything to lose, friends, credit, "face", prestige, etc.

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etc.

Confucius had said, "When a man loses all his friends, he must die." In the long run, Japan could not win. She had lost the friendship of the world and the market in China she had lost also. It would be China's policy to continue to make trouble for Japan in Manchuria. Japan could not last as long as China. It would cost Japan too much. It was costing China nothing, for she had lost everything already.

Lo concluded by repeating that there could be no conciliation as long as Japan remained in Manchuria, for he would never consent to any settlement which would legalize Japan's position there.

I asked Dr. Lo what, in his opinion, the Orient contributed towards the preservation of the peace edifice which was also involved in this question. I outlined to him the history of this peace edifice, beginning with the League and including the Washington Treaties of 1922, which were intended to aid China during the difficult period which the Chinese people were now passing through, and which ended with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. I pointed out that this path had been uninterrupted without check so far as I knew, except when the United States Government endeavored to obtain the adherence of non-signatory Powers to the

treaty

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treaty concerning Principles and Policies, which was intended to aid China, it had met opposition on the part of the Chinese Government of that date, with the result that it had never obtained those adherences, so far as I knew, and now the Sino-Japanese dispute threatened this treaty situation.

Dr. Lo stated that he thought he should frankly say that he could see no way in which China could contribute toward the building up and preservation of this treaty edifice of peace. China lacked leaders, she lacked men of experience. Her leadership was half-baked. However, in the fire of the Shanghai incident, he had seemed to feel that there was some steel still left in the Chinese makeup, and this had given him hope. Some day the leader will arise, that Tseng Kuo Fan demanded by these modern days, who, through sheer strength and decisiveness of character and honesty of motive, would so inspire the people that he would lead them to unity. He realized that the loss of Manchuria and the attacks of the Japanese had in a sense been a blessing in disguise. More than anything else it had inspired in the people a sense of the essential wrongness of their constant internal bickering. It had awakened youth to a realization of the essential weakness and wrongness of the policy of the hot-headed Kuomintang leaders, which

had been

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had been a policy of destruction rather than construction. There was too much "down with" and too little "up with" in their policy and propaganda and, as a result, they had lost the opportunity which the Washington Treaties were intended to give them. He had frankly to admit this. China must go back to the virtues of the past. She must find in the sanctions of the philosophy and ethics of her ancient civilization the strength^{upon which} to build the leadership which would carry her through this period of disorganization into a period of stability and strength. China could therefore in this time contribute little to the efforts of the world to build up the machinery of peace. Chinese conceptions of international peace were based on a political teaching different from that which had grown up with Nationalism in Europe. Chinese conceptions of international peace were based upon the "Ta T'ung" - The Great Whole - of international brotherhood. He quoted the phrase from Confucius, to the effect that "All within the Four Seas are brothers."

As regards the contribution which Japan might make to world peace, he felt that this would be negligible. He was convinced that September 18th (1931) had marked the zenith of Japan's rise to power and influence in the world, and that now she was declining and would continue

to decline.

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to decline. He again pointed out that Japan was losing friends and influence and that her economic situation was bad. He stated that one could hardly have expected anything better from a nation which had borrowed the materialities of Western civilization and had left the spirituality of the West untouched.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister.

NTJ:epg

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5
1880 5

Conversation.

Nanking, December 13, 1932.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek;
Mr. T. V. Soong, Acting President, Executive
Yuan;
Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

I called on Chiang Kai-shek today by appointment and found him looking somewhat thin and with a harder, older look about the face. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, was with him when I arrived. Mr. Soong looked tired and for part of the conversation sat with his head bowed. Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived later.

When General Chiang entered the room he at once began the interview by asking me what information I had from Washington. I said that I had no immediate information from Washington. He wondered what Washington's attitude was towards the present posture of affairs at Geneva, where the Manchurian question had been referred to the Committee of Nineteen. I said that, while I had no immediate information from Washington in regard to this question, my personal belief was that Washington felt that this question was peculiarly the responsibility of the League and that Washington would not wish to say or do anything which might retard action by the League or

encourage

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encourage the League to shift its responsibility to others. I said that Washington doubtless felt that American policy in regard to the question had been most clearly set forth in the letter which the Secretary of State had addressed to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on February 27^(?) 1932, ^{by} his several speeches on the subject, more particularly the one of August 8, 1932, at New York, before the Council on Foreign Relations, and that the essential point in this policy was the one to refuse to recognize any condition brought about by activities contrary to the Nine-Power Treaty or the terms of the Kellogg Pact outlawing war, and that the League, insofar as it was interested in American policy, would have no difficulty knowing what that policy was.

General Chiang asked what the attitude of the United States would be toward an invitation from the League to participate in the deliberations of the Committee of Nineteen. I said that here again I was without any official information, but that I assumed that our attitude would be receptive provided the terms under which the matter was to be considered by the Committee of Nineteen were not in conflict with our own announced policy in regard to the matter, and that I believed that through our representative at Geneva we were watching with great interest and care the trend of discussion there, and that we would

give very

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give very careful consideration to any invitation that was extended to us and to the terms of reference for the consideration of the question which might be decided upon by the Committee of Nineteen.

At this point Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived, and explained his lateness by saying that he had been detained at his office by the British Chargé. From the account which Dr. Lo gave of his conversation with the British Chargé, I gathered that the British Chargé had been directed to call upon Lo for the purpose of persuading him not to be too hostile to the British attitude in favor of conciliation between the parties as outlined in Sir John Simon's speech at the meeting of the Assembly. I gathered further that Mr. Ingram was endeavoring to persuade Dr. Lo to accept the British proposal on the understanding that the resolution governing terms of reference would reaffirm the League's resolution of March 11, 1932. Apparently Dr. Lo informed the British Chargé that China was prepared to accept conciliation only on the conditions laid down by the Chinese representative at Geneva, and he referred to a statement which he had given to the press on the 11th instant in which he had stated "China will never agree to any solution of the present situation which

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which takes into account the puppet organization of Manchuria, established, maintained, and controlled by Japanese military force. China is confident that any reasonable solution of the situation must necessarily be compatible with the letter and spirit of the Covenant of the League, the Briand Pact, and the Washington Treaty, as well as China's sovereign power, and must also effectively secure enduring peace in the Far East." Lo's recital of his interview with the British Charge met with evident approval of General Chiang and Mr. T. V. Soong. I told General Chiang that I did not believe there would be any change in the Far Eastern policy of the United States with a change of administration, as both Parties had endorsed the Department's policy in their pre-election Platforms.

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON
American Minister.

NTJ:epg

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6
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1880

Conversation.

Nanking, December 16, 1932.

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Dispute.

During a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he read to me the text of the resolution adopted by the Committee of Nineteen, which reaffirms the Geneva resolution of March 11th and calls for settlement in accordance with the Nine-Power Treaties and the Pact of Paris; directs the Committee of Nineteen to meet for the purpose of restoring the possibility of conciliation between the two parties to the dispute in accordance with Chapter 9 of the Lytton Report; directs the committee to endeavor to obtain the participation of the United States and Soviet Russia; limits consideration by the committee of means of conciliation to March 1st and complete settlement to July 1st. The above is from memory.

I asked Dr. Lo whether this resolution was acceptable to China. He said that the acceptance of this resolution involved an important decision which he would have to discuss with his colleagues in the government and it would probably take two days before that decision could be made. He thought that at least one of the considerations which would govern China in deciding whether she would accept the resolution or

not

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not would be the attitude of the United States toward the invitation to participate.

As I was leaving the room Dr. Lo drew me back and said that there was another matter, namely, the attitude of Russia. He thought Russia's attitude towards participation might be governed by the attitude of the United States toward Soviet Russia. He wondered if I had any information on that subject. I told Dr. Lo that I did not believe that there could be any change in the policy of the United States towards Soviet Russia before March 4th and that I had no information as to how the new administration might react on that question.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 18, 1933

FROM
Rec'd 8:21 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

60, January 18, 11 a. m.

133.94
Reuter from Canton, seventeenth, reports that Southwest Political Council sent strong telegram to National Government and Kuomintang urging positive action to deal with Japanese invasion:

"In case the National Government still does not realize danger of situation thereby bringing disaster to the nation and people the southwest will be compelled to unite the comrades of the various provinces and people of entire country in order to take over the task of resisting Japanese aggression.

When Shanhaikwan incident broke out we telegraphed to you expressing our views and urging resistance. Although we have received a reply we have not been informed as to whether Central Government has adopted definite resistance plans. Since fall of Shanhaikwan Japanese troops have been pushing their aggression with increasing vigor hence the nation wide plan for resistance to invasion.

Dr. W. W. Yen, Dr. Wellington Koo and Mr. Quo Taichi also have telegraphically urged armed resistance. Consequently it is clear that both within the country and

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PLAIN

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 13 1933
Department of State

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- 2 - No. 60 from Peiping

and abroad there is strong determination to deal with Japanese invasion by force. Judging by present League situation resistance is only method to preserve national existence. Now Jehol is threatened with invasion and Peiping and Tientsin are in a critical position. If North China is involved in military operations entire country will be in peril. It is imperative that you quickly declare definite policy of resistance and also rush pay, food and ammunition to troops at the front now facing the enemy in order to allay anxiety of the people and the righteous opinion of the world".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM Tokyo



Dated January 18, 1933

Re: 12:07 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



16, January 18, noon

Jiji extra announces that the League of Nations has abandoned hope of solving Sino-Japanese dispute and has started preparations to apply paragraph four of Article fifteen of Covenant. The newspaper adds that the application of paragraph four is due to "America's new move started a day or two ago".

GREW

WP CIB

793.94
note
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F/HS

793.94/5765

FILED
JAN 20 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be Tokyo
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. (A)

Dated January 18, 1933

FROM Rec'd 4:32 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

17, January 18, 1 p. m.

My 14, January 17, 4 p. m.

With reference to the announcement of the Japanese War Office that the "United States" is supplying automobiles and aeroplanes to China, the United Press correspondent in Tokyo asked the War Office to explain whether by the "United States" they referred to the United States Government or to American commercial firms. The War Office spokesman stated that they referred to American commercial firms but on the 16th he issued the statement to the Japanese press to the effect that the "United States" was supplying China through private firms in Shanghai, conveying the impression that these were governmental transactions conducted under cover of private firms and adding that the material was being purchased by Chang Hsueh Liang.

The Embassy believes that the War Office is doing this deliberately for the purpose of arousing public sentiment in favor of the army's request for large additional



F/H S

793.94/5766

FILED
JAN 23 1933

793.94
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893.24

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 17 from Tokyo

additional sums in the next budget.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CIB WP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated January

Recd 6:25 a.m.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 20 1933

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 13 1933

Department of State

793.94/5767

Secretary of State

Washington.

18, January 18, 2 p.m.

My 14, January 17, 4 p.m. / 5760

793.94
note
862.113

This morning several Japanese newspapers published a letter from the German Embassy in Tokyo denying that Germany is supplying arms and munitions to China, pointing out that Germany is not permitted to manufacture any arms except revolvers, and suggesting that the rumor may have originated in the fact that an order from Chinese sources for arms has been received by a German firm in China which acts as representative of an arms factory "in a certain country adjoining Germany." It also denies the report that 27 German military officers are employed by China.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CIB WP



JAN 21 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



January 13, 1933.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, DR. AUGUSTO ROSSO.

To present credentials.

The new Italian Ambassador came in and presented his credentials. After that, he asked me if I had anything to say on the subject of the recent four-power conference in the Far East on the subject of Shanhaikwan. I told him that my mind was open on the subject but I had not taken any part in it because we had made our position sufficiently clear I thought in the past. I said I thought Japan knew very well what the position of this Government was on the subject of such occurrence as seemed to have happened at Shanhaikwan and in the absence of some special reason I had not taken it up.

H.L.S.

S HLS:HHR

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FILED

JAN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JANUARY 24 1933

No. 983

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your personal and confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of the conversation which I had with the Italian Ambassador on January 13, 1933, when he came in to present his credentials.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of conversation,
 January 13, 1933.

793.94/5768

WE:JOG:EFB
 1/19/33

Routine

JAN 21, 1933

FE
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793.94/5768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 182

January 24 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your personal and confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of the conversation which I had with the Italian Ambassador on January 13, 1933, when he came in to present his credentials.

Very truly yours,

K. L. STANLEY

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of conversation,
 January 13, 1933.

793.94/5768

WE:JCG:EFB
 1/19/33

JAN 21 1933

FEB 1933



793.94/5768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 24 1933

No. 839

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

John W. Garrett,
 American Ambassador,
 Rome.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your personal and confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of the conversation which I had with the Italian Ambassador on January 13, 1933, when he came in to present his credentials.

Very truly yours,

E. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of conversation,
 January 13, 1933.

793.94/5768

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A true copy of
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 10 1933

Department of State

January 9, 1933.

Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Raymond Bousquet,
 Second Secretary of the French Embassy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 JAN 18 1933

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/HS

793.94/5769

*Copies to Tokyo,
 Paris, Peiping,
 Geneva 1/10/33*

793.94

note

793.77

793.0146

Mr. Bousquet came to see me with a telegram from his Government, which stated that the Chinese appeared to be moving troops in very large numbers to the zone in the vicinity of Shanhaikwan, that this movement might seriously interfere with the operations of the railroad between Tientsin and Peiping. The French Government wanted to know whether if this should happen the United States troops would be willing to associate themselves with the other international troops in keeping the railroad open. I told Mr. Bousquet that it seemed obvious that it would be all to the advantage of the Chinese troops to keep the railroad open themselves and that, after all, they were in Chinese territory. He said this was quite true, but that, nevertheless, we could not tell what the make-up of the troops would be, that it might be a mixture of regular troops and bandits and that there might be pretty extensive destruction of the railroad property. I told Mr. Bousquet that, of course, I could not answer his question off hand, that the whole situation

RECEIVED
 JAN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

2

situation was very complicated, that I knew the international troops stationed there in connection with the Boxer Protocol were supposed to keep open certain of the property between Peiping and Tientsin in case of internal disorder, but that if there should be a movement of Japanese troops from Shanhaikwan, one could hardly speak of the resulting trouble as "internal disorder" and that it would be, therefore, necessary to consider very seriously what action, if any, should be taken. I told Mr. Bousquet that it was obvious that the French Government was making no particular proposal in this case and that all I could say to him was that if the other Governments or any one of them having troops in the region should make us a very definite proposition with regard to maintaining the situation, we would, of course, consider that proposition sympathetically. I said it stood to reason I could not assure him of our agreement in advance since it might seem to us that the proposition made was thoroughly unwise. Mr. Bousquet said that he quite understood, that he felt the message from his Government was largely an intimation of the fact that there

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

3

there might be trouble necessitating international
action.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WIE

JANUARY 16 1963

No.

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 9th with Mr. Raymond Bousquet, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of January 9th.

U

VC/AB

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A true copy of
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JAN 16 1963

F/HS
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE

January 16 1933

No. 1507

F/HS

793.94/5769

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Walter E. Edge,

American Ambassador,

Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 9th with Mr. Raymond Bousquet, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of January 9th.

U VC/AB

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JAN 16, 1933

A true copy of
 the signed original
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 18 1958

No. 179

F/HS

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

793.94/5769

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 9th with Mr. Raymond Bousquet, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. B. Castle, Jr.]

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 9th.

U VC/AB

M.H.
FE

A true copy of the signed original.

165-1255

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1972

No. 978

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

F/HS

793.94/5769

The Honorable
Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 9th with Mr. Raymond Bousquet, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation
of January 9th.

U ^{1c} _{VO/AB}

^{m.w.H.}
_{FE}
_{SK}

[Handwritten signature]

JAN 16 1972

A true copy of
the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 10 1972

No. 978

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

F/HS

793.94/5769

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 9th with Mr. Raymond Bousquet, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. E. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:


Copy of memorandum of conversation
 of January 9th.

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JAN 16 1972

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


Copies sent to Peking, Tokyo, Geneva & Brussels

January 6, 1933.
 The Belgian Ambassador,
 Mr. Paul May.

Mr. Hornbeck.



Subject: Manchuria Situation and Possible Action.



793.94
 note
 793.94 Commission

At a party yesterday afternoon I encountered the Belgian Ambassador. The Ambassador at once referred to the late news from the Far East and made the observation that there seemed to be nothing that the world could do about the matter. Inasmuch as, on every occasion when we meet, the Ambassador makes some reference to the Manchuria situation, I felt warranted this time in expressing certain views: I said that there was presumably nothing which the world could do with regard to a particular incident or ~~any~~ development such as the Shanhaikwan hostilities, but that there was a great deal which the world might do with regard to the situation in general. The Ambassador inquired what I had in mind. I said that the world could go on record with regard to attitude and principles; the position of the United States with regard to the whole matter had been made clear; now, the League of Nations is confronted

JAN 20 1933
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 793.94/5770

169
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

fronted with the question of what attitude it will take and what declaration of principles, if any, it may choose to make. I said that it was obvious that the world is not in position to employ measures of force for the coercion^{ing} of the disputants and the regulating of the dispute in the Far East, but that the world could go on record with an opinion in regard to the situation: the success or failure of the peace movement must depend on public opinion; to be effective, public opinion must be widespread and must be expressed; the states members of the League could, if they chose, express an opinion; the League sent out a commission, that commission did its work faithfully and well and presented a unanimous report; the League could, if its members chose, make use of that report by signifying their confidence in its findings of fact and indicating that they look with favor upon the principles laid down by the commissioners in its Chapter IX; if they so acted, they would be adding to the force of world public opinion; if they failed so to act, they would be subtracting from that force and would be undermining the potential effectiveness of their own Covenant and the other peace treaties. I said that I was of course expressing nothing but a
personal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

personal opinion but I felt that it was an opinion widely held by thinking people in this country and that, regardless of political considerations which might or might not stand in the way of or even prevent such action by the world, I did not see how anyone viewing the problem could fail to envisage those possibilities and consequences. The Ambassador said that he thought that view sound.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

No. 698

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Hugh S. Gibson,
American Ambassador,
Brussels.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 6, 1933,
between the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, and an officer
of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria situation and
possible action.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. E. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 6, 1933.



FE:MMH:REK
1/7/33

FE

m.m.h.

WE PM
JH

F/HS

793.94/5770

JAN 16, 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

No.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:


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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 6, 1933.



JAN 16 9 1933

FE:MMH:REK
 1/7/33

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

No. 178

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
 a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 6, 1933,
 between the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, and an officer
 of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria situation and
 possible action.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. H. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 6, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/5770

JAN 16 1933

FE:MMH:REK
 1/7/33

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WEPK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 10 1933

No. *977*

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 6, 1933, between the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Paul May, and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria situation and possible action.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. B. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 6, 1933.



SN 427
 JAN 16, 1933.

FE:MMH:REK
 1/7/33

SKA
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m.m.H.

PM
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 793.94/5770

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Handwritten initials and marks

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 14 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 7, 1933.

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Katsuji Debuchi.
Mr. Hornbeck.

RECEIVED
JANUARY 16 1933

JAN 11 1933

Copies to Tokyo, Peking and Kharbin
1/12/33
FE (REK)

F/H/S

793.94/5771

RECEIVED
JAN 16 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Subject: Manchuria Situation, Shanhaikwan
Situation in Japan, Etc.

File

993.017

(NOTE: At the request of the Japanese Ambassador, I called on the Ambassador at his Embassy yesterday afternoon. The conversation covered a period of nearly two hours. In the course thereof, the Ambassador repeated a number of things which he had said to me on previous occasions since his return and made points which he has made in his conversations with the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary, as recorded in their memoranda of conversations. I shall, therefore, not attempt to make an extensive record of this conversation.)

The outstanding item among the numerous points which the Ambassador brought into the conversation was his insistence that the Shanhaikwan affair was a more or less accidental local "incident", that Japanese higher authorities had not given orders for or directed the activities of the Japanese armed forces in connection therewith, and that, subsequent to the taking of Shanhaikwan,

FILED

JAN 20 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

haikwan, the Japanese cabinet had met and has issued strict orders that further hostilities in that neighborhood are not to be engaged in upon Japanese initiative.

As the Japanese Ambassador has repeatedly urged that he desires the utmost reciprocal frankness in our conversations and wishes that I assist him as far as I possibly and properly may toward an understanding of American reactions and views, I took occasion in connection with the Ambassador's statements in relation to the whole Shanhaikwan matter to suggest that we try to envisage the situation as it might appear to two men from Mars. The Ambassador took up with that idea and we discussed the matter from point of view of what might be assumed to be the reaction not only of disinterested observers but of official observers and the man in the street in, first, Japan, second, China, and third, Occidental countries -- especially the United States.

At two or three points in the course of the conversation, the Ambassador affirmed that the Japanese cabinet is now in control. He said that the Shanhaikwan incident had occurred without the cabinet's authorization, but that subsequently the cabinet had issued strict orders and its orders would be obeyed. He said that this was a "test" case and that from what happens in connection with it we would have proof of his affirmation that the cabinet is in control.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The Ambassador gave an account at considerable length of improvements in the economic as well as in the political situation in Japan. He stressed the fact that the munitions factories are working at full blast (he said "twenty-four hours a day"), thus giving employment both at the plants and in the field of household industries where there is production relating indirectly to the fabrication of munitions.

The Ambassador said a good deal about Japanese psychology in connection with the problem of "security". He spoke of earthquakes and their effect, of need of foodstuffs and its effect, of disorders in China and pressure from Russia.

Finally, the Ambassador said that there was another subject which he wished to take up, in continuation, at a later meeting which he hoped would take place next week: he wished to talk about the subject of the "Manchoukuo" state and Japan's recognition thereof; he wished to say for the moment that no matter what else happened, Japan could not recede from the position which she had taken on the subject of Manchoukuo.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No. 123

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.


The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the Ambassador at Tokyo a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 7, 1933, between the Japanese Ambassador and an officer of the Department, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 7, 1933.

JAN 18, 1963

FE:MMH:REK
1/11/33

FE



SKH

F/HS

793.94/5771

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 18 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No. 970

To the American Minister,
 Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the Minister at Peiping a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 7, 1933, between the Japanese Ambassador and an officer of the Department, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated January 7, 1933.

JAN 18, 1933

FE:MMH:REK
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the Consul at Geneva a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 7, 1933, between the Japanese Ambassador and an officer of the Department, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 7, 1933.

JAN 15, 1933.

FE:MMH:REK
1/11/33

FE
M.D.



SKH

F/HS
793.94/5771

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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GRAY

TIENTSIN

FROM


Dated Jan. 19, 1933

Rec'd. 5.40 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 19, 4 pm



The following telegram has been sent to the Legation.

"January 19, 3 pm. Chinese troop movements through Tientsin eastward have been very small for past two days. Reports from Chinwangtao however state that Chinese continue to strengthen their lines in that vicinity.

Chinese newspapers state that Colonel Dohihara, the well known Japanese special agent, has arrived in Tientsin and that a special representative of the war office at Tokyo of high rank has also arrived at Tientsin. The purpose of their visit is not known. Repeated to the Department.

LOCKHART

WSB

793.94/5772

JAN 21 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


Conversation.

January 6, 1933.

Mr. H. S. Liang, secretary
to Dr. David Yui.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Manchuria Situation



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NANKING 1/14/33 FE (R&K)
JANUARY 18 1933

RECEIVED

JAN 11 1933

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/H/S

793.94/5773

At the end of our conversation with regard to Dr. Yui, Mr. Liang said that Dr. Yui had on the day before his call on the Secretary been under a great deal of emotional stress in consequence of the news of developments in China -- especially the Shanhaikwan incident. He said that the people in China are greatly agitated over the present situation and are discussing with intensity questions of possible policy and possible action. He said that there is at Shanghai discussion of the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations with Japan. He said that Dr. Yui would like to have my view with regard to the possible effects of such a move.

I said that I felt that it was impossible for me to express a view in connection with such a question. I had already explained to Dr. Yui the reasons why it seems to me inadvisable, in fact impossible, for me

to

JAN 20 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

to attempt, either unofficially or officially, to offer anything in the nature of advice as to what China should or should not do in connection with a question of her relations with a third country. For those reasons, I must refrain from replying to that inquiry. However, I could and would offer a personal opinion with regard to a matter of Chinese domestic politics: it seemed to me that one of the fundamental causes of China's internal and external political weakness lies in the fact that the Chinese people create unnecessary difficulties for their own Government and place undue obstacles in the way of effective functioning by that Government. I elaborated this statement with some illustrations. I said that it is absolutely necessary for any nation at any time to accord a considerable amount of power and discretion to the régime which is in authority and which is responsible for the conduct of its affairs. No government can be all wise; but any government may be assumed to be doing its utmost to conceive and promote the interests of the nation. The people should be cautious about efforts to force the hands of the administration or to compel it to do things which it regards as unwise. The relative im-

portance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

portance of various questions and problems must always be considered and the essential thing at any particular moment is to do the wisest possible thing with regard to the immediately most important problem. I then repeated that I could not and would not attempt to give advice but could urge that the Chinese people give evidence of the possession of a great virtue which they are credited with possessing, that of patience, and that they do their utmost to contribute to the advance^{ment} of a principle in which all the world is interested, that of peace.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 13 1933

No. 923

To the American Minister,
Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Minister at Peiping a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 6, 1933, between Mr. H. S. Liang, secretary to Dr. David Yui, and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria situation.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 6,
1933.

JAN 14, 1933.

FE:MMH:REK
1/14/33

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F/HS

793.94/5773

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

To the American Consul General,
Nanking, China.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information
of the Consul General at Nanking a copy of a memorandum
of a conversation on January 6, 1933, between Mr. H. S.
Liang, secretary to Dr. David Yui, and an officer of the
Department, in regard to the Manchuria situation.

F/HS

793.94/5773

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 6,
1933.

JAN 14, 1933.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Conversation.

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Katsuiji Debuchi.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Manchuria Situation.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

F/HS

793.94/5774

At his request, I called on the Japanese Ambassador.
The conversation lasted for nearly two hours.

The Ambassador went over various points that had been discussed in previous conversations. He said that he now had "good news" from North Manchuria: at Suifen (on the eastern frontier) 2,000 Chinese had surrendered to the Japanese, and now the Japanese have the railway running from Harbin eastward to that point. Also, the Japanese are getting things in order between Harbin and Manchuli, so that soon the whole railway line of the Chinese Eastern will be peacefully in operation.

The Ambassador said that he was confident that the Japanese military would not make moves that would involve Tientsin and Peiping.

The Ambassador said that he greatly appreciated having these frank discussions and he would welcome any criticism

of
JAN 20 1933

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*Copies sent to
Peiping, Tokyo
& Geneva.
Jan. 14, 1933*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of Japan's activities or constructive suggestions with regard to settlement. Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt it would not be appropriate for him to undertake to make criticisms, but that he could say that he felt very great regret that Japan had chosen to follow and was continuing to follow a course which her military leaders have mapped out. With regard to constructive suggestions, the one great thing which the world has been suggesting ever since September 18, 1931, was that pacific measures rather than forceful measures be employed for the achieving of a settlement. At that point the Ambassador said that the situation had developed beyond any original expectation on Japan's part; and Mr. Hornbeck then added the comment that at each step the Japanese military had assisted in the development of the situation. The Ambassador said that that was true.

The Ambassador then referred to the date set for the resumption of discussions at Geneva. He said that he would like very much to know what was going to be the attitude of the American Government. Mr. Hornbeck said that he felt that the American Government had at an early stage made known its attitude and that at no time during the past twelve months had there been any change in its position; what seemed to him more important for the
moment

- 3 -

moment was the question what is to be Japan's attitude and position. The Ambassador said that Japan could not in any respect recede from the position which she has acquired in Manchuria and the policy which she has announced in regard thereto: Japan has recognized "Manchoukuo" and it is necessary that she support and maintain that state. If the world would take adequate cognizance of that fact and leave it to Japan to work out the situation in Manchuria, Japan would be perfectly ready to be conciliatory about other matters. Mr. Hornbeck asked whether that would not amount to saying that if the world would assent to Japan's having all that she wants, Japan would be ready to be conciliatory about things with regard to which there remains nothing to be discussed. The Ambassador laughed and said that that was about what it amounted to.

The Ambassador then referred to the non-recognition doctrine and said that it had been an irritant to the Japanese people and was regarded by them as an evidence of the desire of the American Government to align the powers in opposition to Japan's efforts. Mr. Hornbeck said that the American Government had no desire at any time gratuitously to give Japan occasion or cause for
irritation,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

irritation, but that it must be remembered that Japan had given the whole world a great deal of provocation. Throughout this whole matter there had been a contest in which there had been on one side Japan and on the other not the United States but the rest of the world, including the United States. It must be remembered that the other great powers had been carrying on their part of the contest for the most part through the League of which they are members; while the acts of the United States had had to be its own acts. It must be taken into account that the United States had at no time officially or expressly condemned Japan, that we had made no threats, that we had as a matter of fact at some points exercised a restraining influence against hastily considered positive action; and that what the non-recognition doctrine amounts to is that we declare that if and where situations and agreements are brought about by unlawful means we do not intend to give them by any acts of ours the seal of legality.

At that point the Ambassador said again that he would like to know what was going to be the attitude of the American Government when the League resumes its discussions. Mr. Hornbeck said that he believed that
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

the Ambassador fully understood what has been and what must be the American Government's view and that he saw no reason for any conjecture that its view might have changed, but, the American Government is not a party to the discussions at Geneva and the Japanese Government is a party to those discussions: the important question is that of the attitude in which the Japanese Government may approach the renewal thereof. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government could make no change -- because public opinion in Japan would not permit it. Mr. Hornbeck said that, without desiring to press the point too hard, he thought that the Ambassador must realize that the impression in the United States is that the people in authority in Japan have created the problem as it now stands in connection with Manchuria and have also created the public opinion which now exists in Japan in support of it. If such is the case, and if the Japanese Government now rests a plea of non possumus on the basis of public opinion in Japan, the whole thing simply means that the Japanese Government is saying "cannot" when it means "will not". The Ambassador said that, however the matter may be looked at, the Japanese Government cannot make any change in the position which it has taken. He then went on to say

- 6 -

say that he wished that the world would close its eyes and turn its back and keep still, give Japan a chance to work the thing out in her own way, let her demonstrate the wisdom and success of her policy of restoring order in Manchuria and developing that area; Japan would make Manchuria prosperous; trade with Manchuria would increase; the United States would profit by it; in particular, there would be an increase in demand for American cotton and probably a demand for machinery and industrial supplies; the population of Manchuria would increase rapidly; the world would have reason to be pleased. Mr. Hornbeck said that the suggestion that the world close its eyes and turn its back amounted to asking the League of Nations to forget the Covenant, the whole world to forget the multilateral treaties; everybody to forget the efforts which have been made during recent years to substitute new methods for old in connection with the settling of international disputes; and for all the nations to leave it to one nation to set the standards, according to its own lights, of conduct in the family of nations. He said that he regretted, as he believed would all friends of Japan in this country, that Japanese thought should be traveling along that line; and that he still hoped, as
do

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

do many observers in many parts of the world, that Japan would yet approach this problem, perhaps in the forthcoming meeting of the League, in an attitude considerate at least of the views, the desires and the interests of the other nations of the world.

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 925

JANUARY 19 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 10,
1933, between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria
situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/5774

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 10,
1933.

JAN 14, 1933.

FE:MMH:REK
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A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 16 1933

No. 174

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 10,
1933, between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria
situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 10,
1933.

JAN 14, 1933.

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793.94/5774

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 10 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on January 10,
1933, between the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
and an officer of the Department, in regard to the Manchuria
situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/5774

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated January 10,
1933.

JAN 14, 1933

FE:MMH:REK
1/14/33

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 20, 1933.

~~MMH:~~
~~SMH:~~

Paris's despatch No. 3241 of January 10, 1933, gives the attitude of the French press and certain leaders toward the Manchuria situation. The despatch should be read in full.

~~MMH:~~
LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, January 10, 1933


No. 3241

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict

793.94

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 26 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



JAN 20 1933



F/H/S

793.94/5775

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 23 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Sir:

I have the honor to report:

The Japanese threat to invade the province of Jehol following close on the incident at Shanhaikwan forms the subject of a heated debate in the French press, all newspapers to the Left of L'ERE NOUVELLE, the governmental organ, taking the view that France should support stern measures against Japan while from L'ERE NOUVELLE right the press is insistent that Japan should be left a relatively free hand in Manchuria.

L'ERE NOUVELLE, which M. Paul-Boncour after

M.

JAN 20 1933

FILED

- 2 -

M. Herriot regularly uses as a governmental organ, hedges its editorial comments about with reservations: Japan was provoked into its recent attack by Chinese irregulars, it says. But at the same time it regrets that further military action was necessary now when the League of Nations is deliberating. The League should take some immediate action, it declares, although coincidentally it holds that any effective action is problematical as long as the League has no force or weapons at its command. The decision of the League of Nations should be respected because the French policy is founded on the Covenant, L'ERE NOUVELLE insists but quickly adds, Japan and China are very far away, therefore allowances should be made for the non-European nature of the problem.

In short, L'ERE NOUVELLE has no clearly defined policy. It wants France to do something but it is not sure what. It wishes the League machinery to turn but it is not sure in which direction. And this vacillation of the governmental paper has become strikingly more evident since M. Paul-Boncour replaced M. Herriot at the Foreign Office. At least in M. Herriot's time L'ERE NOUVELLE wrote of the sanctity of contracts and the necessity for collaboration between France, Great Britain and the United States.

The

- 3 -

The Socialist POPULAIRE on the other hand and its immediate neighbor the Young Radical LA REPUBLIQUE have become increasingly rigid in their demands for action on the part of the French Government.

Leon Blum who has a following of 132 deputies in the Chamber favors a public warning from France to Japan that no further advance into Jehol will be tolerated, this to be followed by a declaration that Japan is an aggressor which has violated the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact and therefore France will not recognize any fait accompli resulting from the aggression and will associate itself with any pacific sanction which the League of Nations recommends shall be taken against the Japanese Empire.

This enunciation of a "peace policy" will crystallize the world opinion to which Secretary Stimson referred in his speech of last August, M. Blum believes and, according to the Socialist leader, will build up a world block against further Japanese expansion on Chinese territory.

LA REPUBLIQUE, organ of the Young Radicals who claim 60 Chamber votes within the Radical Socialist party and count M. Pierre Cot, the new Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as one of their members, likewise advocates action without further delay to "restrain the law-breaker". LA REPUBLIQUE too would have the government state its policy publicly. It would also like to see M. Paul-Boncour heading a movement for an economic boycott against Japan through the League of Nations.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

In general however, LA REPUBLIQUE's appeal against Japan is on humanitarian grounds or for the reason that the League of Nations will cease to have any meaning if Japan is permitted to go ahead with its warlike operations while the collective system of post-war treaties and agreements abjuring war as an instrument of national policy will be reduced to a scrap of paper.

To the right of L'ERE NOUVELLE the press presents a solid front faithful to the principle that no move should be made which will antagonize Japan and thus force it to abandon Geneva.

LE TEMPS which endeavors to reflect the permanent - Berthelot - tradition in matters of foreign policy is supremely anxious for the Committee of Nineteen to find a formula which will reduce the Far Eastern conflict to a direct negotiation between Japan and China and at the same time keep Japan in the League of Nations. LE TEMPS attributes the events in Manchuria to the "chaos which is the profound and permanent cause of the political trouble" in China while it declares that the only feasible solution of the problem which presents itself so far is a "compromise between the principles which govern the League of Nations and existing realities". Furthermore, LE TEMPS is opposed to "hasty or ill considered actions" and hopes that the Government will refuse to allow itself to be swept off its feet by some of its more radical adherents.

To

- 5 -

To the right of LE TEMPS the press comment takes the form either of a vehement defense of Japan or an attack on the League of Nations.

Newspapers like the ECHO DE PARIS (Pertinax), FIGARO and L'AMI DU PEUPLE (both Coty), L'ORDRE of Emile Buré, L'AVENIR, the MATIN and even the Dupuy papers, EXCELSIOR and PETIT PARISIEN all contain articles on the Far Eastern situation which may be summarized as follows:

They contend that Geneva and the world at large have formed an unreal conception of China and its "so called Government"; they claim that the theory that a handful of westernized intellectuals of revolutionary leanings in South China will bring order out of chaos in the country as a whole is false, misleading and should rapidly be dispelled; the Chinese people, they say, are nowise fitted for self government and in their present state of development are a prey for anarchy and bolshevism; from this they conclude that the intervention of Japan is necessary as a barrier against Bolshevism and for the general welfare of humanity.

These Nationalist newspapers also turn their fire on the League of Nations, especially its Secrétariat. They state that it has become the headquarters of a group of pacifist "intellectuals" who have no true knowledge of world politics or international realities and as a consequence constitute a danger to every

self

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

self respecting state. The Far Eastern crisis, they claim, should be settled outside the League; the League should limit its activity to the attempt to conciliate the Japanese and Chinese policies in a way that will enable Japan to retain its League membership without losing face.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:



Theodore Marriner
Counselor of Embassy

In quintuplicate.

COPY TO E. I. C.

710. X

RTP/cg

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 26, 1933.

~~EMD:~~
~~MA:~~

Warrington Dawson's report No. 1162 of January 6, 1933, reports that Dr. A. Legendre wrote in FIGARO of January 4, 1933, on the disunion and indiscipline of Chinese military forces and chaotic conditions in China in general, and that the threat of Chinese mobilization may be used to blackmail the League of Nations. The Foreign Editor of LE TEMPS stated on December 31, 1932, that present circumstances in China, Soviet Russia, the United States, and the League, are favorable for Japan to fulfill "its essential aspirations".

~~MA~~
LES:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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
Paris, January 6, 1933

793.94
note
793.01 Manchuria

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1162)




JAN 10 1933



F/HS

793.94/5776



To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D.
1162, dated January 6, 1933.

JAN 31 1933

WD/DG

WD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, January 6, 1933

Serial No. W. D. 1162

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Opinions of Dr. Legendre and
Roland de Mares on the Far Eastern
Situation

Writing in FIGARO of January 4, 1933, Dr. A. Legendre discussed what he called "The Blackmail of a General Mobilization in China." In his opinion although the Chinese mercenaries who are so dreaded by the people because of their acts of outlawry may amount to some two million men scattered over the entire Chinese territory, it would be ridiculous to consider them as veritable armies since discipline is unknown among them, there is a complete lack of training, and they are unarmed as far as modern requirements go. Furthermore, there is no possible understanding among the various contingents, quite the contrary, a deep antagonism generally reigns among their chiefs who are sworn enemies.

"In

-2-

"In a word," he remarks, "in China there are neither financial resources nor a national army, and anarchy, solidly organized under a feudal system, is devouring the very substance of the people. A war against Japan, even as a stroke of madness, would be impossible as far as Nanking is concerned. The other toukiun, Chang-Che-Tang first of all, would profit by it to extend their field of territorial action and especially to get rid of Chang-Kai-Chek, whose feoff is coveted by all because the League of Nations has recognized and protected him. But the Soviet Chinese Government is most dangerous of all, its Red Army would quickly fall on Nanking, converging from the North and from the South, and would soon occupy new provinces.

The threat of Chinese mobilization may therefore be used to blackmail the League of Nations which however should now at last realize that Nanking does not represent China but only one toukiun and its clan.

In LE TEMPS of December 31, 1932 and January 5, 1933, Roland de Marès, the Foreign Editor, expressed his views.

On December 31st he discussed particularly the situation relative to Manchuria, stating that under pressure of the events in Manchuria, the military elements in Japan had recovered very great influence in the Empire of the Rising Sun, their authoritative regime being so

popular

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popular that it would if necessary receive the support of the people in order to take effective action. He expressed in conclusion the hope that Japan should understand that its best chance of success lies in abstention from placing itself in definite opposition with the Powers also having interests in the Far East.

On January 5th, Roland de Mares took up the question of the Sino-Japanese conflict, concluding as follows:

"Without discussing the rights which Japan derives from treaties, nor the favor of responsibility which may devolve from the fact that the latter country lives in a state of disorder and anarchy, it is necessary to note that the military action of the Japanese is open to discussion. At the present stage of evolution reached by the world, principles are not always in agreement with realities which are governed, for certain people residing far afield, by imperative political and economic necessities. Japan is at present subjected to such necessities. It knows that China can do nothing for itself, that Soviet Russia is for a long time to come reduced to a total helplessness militarily, that the suspension of government power paralyses the United States, and that the European Powers are in the grip of their own difficulties which prevent them from embarking upon

any

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any distinct adventure. The temptation is therefore strong for Japan to fulfil, by favor of present circumstances, its essential aspirations. "

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

✓
Enclosures:

Article from LE TEMPS of December 31, 1932.
Article from FIGARO of January 4, 1933.
Article from LE TEMPS of January 5, 1933.

In quintuplicate

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Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. II62 of January 6, 1933
From AMERICAN EMBASSY at Paris
Extract From " LE TEMPS " of December 31, 1932

EN EXTREME-ORIENT

Les graves préoccupations que donnent en ce moment les difficultés auxquelles on se heurte pour résoudre les grands problèmes d'intérêt général, comme celui des dettes et celui du désarmement, et les crises politiques que connaissent la plupart des pays européens ne doivent pas nous faire perdre de vue les développements de la situation dans l'Orient lointain. L'évolution qui s'accomplit en Chine et au Japon ne saurait être indifférente pour le monde occidental alors que ces puissances sont étroitement associées à l'effort général de coopération internationale et que toutes les nations civilisées sont hautement intéressées au maintien de la paix et au retour à la prospérité des pays d'Extrême-Orient. La politique d'autorité qui prévaut au Japon et l'impuissance où se débat le gouvernement chinois en face d'un immense pays livré au désordre et à l'anarchie offrent un contraste frappant. Tout porte à penser que l'esprit et les méthodes de Tokio auront pour effet, en raison même de l'esprit et des méthodes de Nankin, de préciser d'une manière décisive, au cours de 1933, la situation nouvelle créée en Extrême-Orient par le conflit sino-japonais.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler, en effet, que, sous la pression des événements de Mandchourie, les milieux militaires, ont repris une influence considérable dans l'empire du Soleil-Levant. Il est tout à fait significatif que ces jours derniers, à la veille de la rentrée de la Diète, un nouveau parti auquel on reconnaît des tendances fascistes s'est constitué sous la présidence de M. Kenza Adachi, qui fut un des membres les plus influents du Minseito, c'est-à-dire du parti libéral, et que ce nouveau parti a rallié dès le premier jour 33 députés, formant ainsi un groupe dont l'action peut être importante aux heures difficiles. La politique de ce parti à tendance fasciste procède de l'idée qu'on ne peut refuser au Japon de se développer légitimement par suite des erreurs commises sur le terrain international, et qu'il n'est pas possible que la nation japonaise soit victime de ce qu'on appelle une « injustice sociale ». Développant le programme de son parti, M. Kenza Adachi a exposé la nécessité, à son avis, d'un contrôle national économique basé sur une étroite entente du Japon et du Mandchoukouo, ce qui n'exclut pas, dans son esprit, de bonnes et confiantes relations avec les autres puissances, y compris la Chine. Le président du nouveau parti préconise le remplacement du gouvernement parlementaire actuel par un conseil d'Etat national, composé de simples secrétaires d'Etat et uniquement responsable devant l'empereur. Ce régime autoritaire serait soutenu par une puissante organisation populaire, capable, au besoin, d'une action efficace. Ce n'est là qu'une indication des tendances

qui s'affirment actuellement au Japon en réaction des difficultés que créent la lutte des partis et les méthodes parlementaires, mais cette indication est assez nette. Déjà les élections pour la Diète qui eurent lieu au mois de février avaient accusé une forte avance du parti conservateur Seiyukai, qui enleva 301 sièges contre 140 au parti Minseito, 5 au parti populaire et 11 aux indépendants. Mais le cabinet de droite, présidé par M. Inukai, issu de ces élections, dut être remanié dès le mois de mars, à la suite de la démission de M. Nakahashi, ministre de l'intérieur. En réalité, dès ce moment on constatait une forte réaction à la fois contre les méthodes parlementaires et contre les grandes influences capitalistes, sous prétexte que les premières paralysent l'action gouvernementale et que les secondes font obstacle aux remèdes immédiats et efficaces à apporter à la crise financière et économique dont le peuple japonais souffre durement. L'attentat, commis par des officiers, dont le président du conseil, M. Inukai, fut victime le 15 mai — attentat qui suivait une tentative criminelle contre l'empereur et l'assassinat de l'ancien ministre des finances, M. Inoué — révéla l'existence d'un mouvement terroriste visant l'oligarchie financière et les privilèges de classes, tout en se réclamant du nationalisme le plus ardent et en exigeant le rétablissement de la puissance impériale.

Toujours est-il que le cabinet d'union nationale qui fut formé au mois de mai sous la présidence de l'amiral Saito tint compte dans une certaine mesure des aspirations profondes de la nation ; mais, avec la meilleure volonté du monde, il ne pouvait supprimer les véritables causes de la crise qui trouble si dangereusement la vie de l'empire. Il dut faire face aux mêmes difficultés financières et économiques que celles qui usèrent rapidement les précédents cabinets. Il n'y a pas d'autre remède à cette situation que celui qui consiste à trouver des débouchés pour la main-d'œuvre nipponne et pour les produits de l'industrie nationale, et ces débouchés, le Japon ne peut les trouver que sur le vaste marché chinois. La véritable raison du conflit sino-japonais est là : d'une part, le boycottage de ses produits par les Chinois a ruiné la prospérité de l'empire du Soleil-Levant, et, d'autre part, la Mandchourie est devenue indispensable à l'expansion nipponne. C'est ce qui fait que le différend est impossible à résoudre par les formules générales de la Société des nations, et que ce n'est que de pourparlers directs entre Nankin et Tokio qu'on peut attendre l'apaisement nécessaire entre deux pays voisins ayant d'immenses intérêts communs et qui doivent concilier leurs vues s'ils veulent fonder la paix durable en Extrême-Orient.

Après le puissant effort qu'il vient de faire

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pour consolider sa position en Mandchourie. — effort que l'influence militaire, prépondérante à Tokio, entend soutenir jusqu'au bout, — il est bien certain que le Japon ne sacrifiera rien de ce qu'il a acquis. Il serait plutôt résolu à se retirer de la Société des nations que de se résigner à abandonner ce qu'il a conquis. Sa communauté économique avec l'Etat de Mandchourie, lequel est d'ailleurs une simple création japonaise, fait le fond de toute la politique de Tokio. On retrouve cette préoccupation essentielle chez les libéraux et les conservateurs comme chez les éléments les plus actifs du nouveau parti à tendance fasciste. On peut le discuter et le regretter à un point de vue général, mais c'est un fait dont on est bien obligé de tenir compte. L'évolution de l'esprit public japonais en faveur d'un régime autoritaire, l'espoir que l'on met dans le rétablissement dans sa force première de la puissance impériale comme suprême sauvegarde de l'intérêt national, sont des signes des temps auxquels il ne faut pas se tromper. En face de l'anarchie chinoise, cette évolution de la politique japonaise assure à l'empire du Soleil-Levant un avantage certain. Il faut souhaiter que le Japon comprenne que la meilleure chance de succès pour lui réside dans le fait de ne pas se mettre en opposition irréductible avec les puissances ayant des intérêts dans l'Orient lointain, et de faire la démonstration que son action est compatible avec le principe de la porte ouverte en Mandchourie comme partout ailleurs en Chine.

Enclosure N° 2 to Special Report N° W.D. II62 of January 6, 1933
From AMERICAN EMBASSY at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of January 4, 1933

LE CHANTAGE D'UNE MOBILISATION GENERALE EN CHINE

4/1
Par le D^r A. LEGENDRE

Le 27 décembre dernier, on signale de Genève que la délégation chinoise à la S. D. N. vient de communiquer à celle-ci un télégramme de Tchen Tche Tang, toukiun de Canton, ainsi conçu : « Le Japon occupe la Mandchourie et a l'intention de l'annexer comme la Corée. Aussi je viens de prier le gouvernement de Nankin de mobiliser ses armées ; quant aux miennes, les ordres sont déjà donnés. Toutefois, je demande à la S. D. N. de tenter un dernier effort pour que nos provinces nous soient rendues. Sinon, il ne restera au gouvernement chinois qu'une seule ressource : ordonner la mobilisation générale et faire face à l'ennemi dans un combat à mort. »

Quel homme ! va se dire le bon Français, un Gengis Khan en herbe, ce Chinois. Gare à nous ! Or, si cette déclaration du toukiun Tchen sonne haut, elle ne sonne pas moins faux. Elle est même d'un comique achevé pour celui qui sait, connaît ces guerriers d'opérette, leurs moyens d'action, et surtout la terrible situation de la Chine sans l'ombre d'un pouvoir central capable d'imposer sa volonté à une horde de féodaux qui exploitent chacun leur fief. Comme on le voit, ce n'est pas le gouvernement de Nankin qui parle, celui reconnu si mal à propos par les puissances, mais le gouvernement de Canton, sécessionniste d'ailleurs, et représenté par le toukiun Tchen Tche Tang dont l'autorité ne dépasse point les frontières de la seule province du Kwang-Toung sur les dix-huit qui forment la Chine. Mais ce foudre de guerre possède-t-il vraiment une armée ? Non : quelques maigres divisions seulement de mercenaires et de brigands, mal équipés, dont les opérations militaires se réduisent à des luttes, rarement sanglantes, contre d'autres bandes. D'ailleurs, ces troupes minables, généralement mal vêtues et vivant dans un climat très tempéré, seraient vite décimées par le froid arctique de la Mandchourie. Toute opération militaire est même interdite désormais dans la Chine du nord jusqu'au printemps, en raison de ce froid qui oscille entre 25 et 40 degrés au-dessous de zéro. D'ailleurs, Tchen Tche Tang

ne songe nullement, *n'a jamais songé* à partir en guerre : il a esquissé un geste qu'il juge d'importance, il s'est campé face à l'ennemi, en vrai Tartarin chinois, si supérieur à celui de Tarascon. Et ainsi Tchang acquiert une superbe « face » devant la Chine et devant l'univers entier. Quelle gloire ! Et quel bon tour il joue au clan de Nankin, à ce clan qu'il méprise et jalouse. D'ailleurs, celui-ci, seul avec Tchang Kai Chek possède, comme toukiun, des forces importantes de 500.000 à 600.000 reîtres dont quelques divisions seulement sont dressées à l'européenne par des officiers allemands.

Bref, si les troupes chinoises de mercenaires, de pillards si redoutés du peuple, représentent un total impressionnant : 2 millions d'hommes environ dispersés sur tout l'immense territoire, il serait absurde de considérer ces formations, même rassemblées, comme de véritables armées. Elles n'ont rien des formations modernes comme discipline, entraînement et surtout armement. Elles ne sauraient tenir un moment contre des forces organisées comme celles du Japon ou d'une nation européenne. D'ailleurs, il ne peut être question de voir ces forces se grouper sous un chef unique, se concentrer pour une campagne quelconque ; elles n'ont rien de national, elles appartiennent aux toukiun qui les enrôlent et les paient. Ces diverses armées ne sont en rien destinées à protéger la Chine contre une attaque extérieure, mais simplement à fournir aux toukiun les moyens de défendre leur fief. Il n'existe donc aucun lien entre ces armées de reîtres, aucun objectif commun, même pas de l'ordre patriotique, l'idée de patrie étant si vague en Chine.

Aussi, pas d'entente, d'union possible entre ces contingents : au contraire, un antagonisme profond les divise puisque leurs chefs sont ennemis jurés et se battent entre eux à toute occasion pour le partage des dépouilles opimes du pays.

Mais supposons que la Chine dispose à ce moment d'une véritable armée nationale : mais elle serait dans l'impossibilité de l'équiper, de l'armer à la moderne puisque le Trésor est vide et que les masses ruinées par le Kouo Ming Tang sont à bout de souffle. Aussi ce que demande ce pauvre peuple de Chine, *c'est non la guerre, mais du riz et un minimum de sécurité contre reîtres et bandits*. Aller se battre pour la Mandchourie ? Mais le Mandchou ne fait pas partie de la famille chinoise : ce n'est qu'un étranger. Ainsi pense la masse du peuple.

Bref, en Chine, ni armée nationale, ni ressources financières, et l'anarchie

solidement établie sous une féodalité qui dévore la substance même du pays. Partir en guerre contre le Japon, même tenter un coup de folie est impossible pour Nankin. Les autres toukiun, Tchang Tche Tang le premier, en profiteraient pour élargir leur champ d'exploitation du pays et se débarrasser surtout de Tchang Kai Chek dont tous convoitent le fief, parce que la S. D. N. l'a reconnu et le protège.

Mais il y a plus dangereux encore que ces toukiun : c'est le gouvernement soviétique chinois, l'armée rouge qui se jetterait vite sur Nankin et, débordant au nord comme au sud, aurait vite fait d'occuper de nouvelles provinces.

« La Chine va mobiliser, la Chine s'en va-t'en guerre », clame Tchen Tche Tang, dictateur de Canton ; c'est là la drôlerie du jour, la lourde fatéité d'un toukiun qui veut faire perdre la face à son ennemi, Tchang Kai Chek, dont il a su la collusion avec le Japon, l'an dernier, au sujet de la Mandchourie. Mais lui aussi fut coupable du même péché en 1931, pour une autre raison : faire reconnaître par le Japon l'indépendance de Canton.

Il l'a oublié. La faute de Nankin, c'est de subir la pression de Tchen et de tenter à Genève un vrai chantage à la guerre.

« La Chine va mobiliser », quel coup pour cette pauvre S. D. N. ! Une nouvelle grande guerre ! C'est qu'elle y croit ! Ainsi qu'à une grande démocratie jeune ! Elle a une foi si robuste dans ce clan de Nankin qui finira par faire d'elle la risée de toute l'Asie, si non de l'Europe. Il faudrait en finir : il faudrait que la S. D. N. cessât de prendre au sérieux une délégation qui représente non la Chine, mais seulement un toukiun et son clan.

**Enclosure N° 3 to Special Report N° W.D. II62 of January 6, 1933
From AMERICAN EMBASSY at Paris
Extract From " LE TEMPS " of January 5, 1933**

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

La crise sino-japonaise prend un nouveau développement du fait des graves événements qui se sont produits le 1^{er} janvier à Chan-Hai-Kouan. On peut même considérer que lorsque le Comité des dix-neuf se réunira à Genève, le 16 janvier, pour continuer ses efforts de conciliation en vue d'un règlement du conflit mandchou, il va se trouver devant une situation absolument nouvelle, qui compliquera sérieusement sa tâche déjà si délicate. La crise sino-japonaise n'a cessé depuis plus d'un an de nous réserver des surprises de cette nature. Chaque fois que l'on entrevoit la possibilité d'une solution par un honnête compromis, quelque incident nouveau la fait rebondir et lui découvre des aspects troublants qu'aucune diplomatie ne pouvait raisonnablement prévoir.

Que s'est-il passé exactement à Chan-Hai-Kouan ? Il est difficile de le préciser au milieu des informations absolument contradictoires, suivant qu'elles sont de source japonaise ou de source chinoise, qui nous parviennent d'Extrême-Orient. La version de Tokio rejette toute la responsabilité sur des éléments chinois de l'armée du maréchal Tchang Sue Liang, qui, se rendant dans le Jehol, auraient ouvert le feu, à la gare de Chan-Hai-Kouan, sur un poste japonais, tuant un officier et quatre soldats nippons. De plus, les troupes japonaises, envoyées sur les lieux, auraient été attaquées par les Chinois. La version de Nankin prétend, au contraire, que des Japonais en civil auraient ouvert le feu sur les Chinois, sans provocation de la part de ceux-ci, tandis que des gendarmes nippons tiraient sur le quartier général chinois. Toujours est-il qu'une véritable bataille s'en est suivie, des renforts étant survenus de part et d'autre. L'artillerie entra en jeu des deux côtés, les troupes japonaises étant soutenues par le feu de plusieurs navires de guerre qui avaient pris position en face de Chan-Hai-Kouan. Aux dernières nouvelles, la ville a beaucoup souffert et les Japonais l'ont occupée hier à midi, après avoir rejeté les troupes chinoises vers le sud et vers l'ouest.

Sans se prononcer pour l'instant sur les responsabilités qui sont à l'origine de cette affaire, et que les informations que l'on possède à cette heure ne permettent pas de fixer en toute certitude, il faut regretter que l'incident ait pris tout de suite le caractère d'une opération militaire d'une certaine envergure. La gravité du conflit réside dans la position même de Chan-Hai-Kouan, sur le littoral de la mer Jaune, presque en face de Dairen, anciennement Dalny, dont les Nippons ont fait une base importante. Le développement du port de Chan-Hai-Kouan peut constituer une sérieuse menace pour les intérêts économiques du Japon à Dairen. D'autre part, situé au pied de la Grande-Muraille, à environ 300 kilomètres de

Pékin, Chan-Hai-Kouan commande un des principaux accès au territoire de Jehol, lequel est compris dans la zone neutralisée entre les forces chinoises et les forces nippones à la suite des opérations de Mandchourie. Le fait que le maréchal Tchang Sue Liang a concentré des troupes dans cette région porte Tokio à soutenir que les Chinois ont violé la zone neutre. Quant aux Japonais, en vertu du traité de 1900, conclu à la suite de la révolte des Boxers, ils ont le droit de maintenir aux abords de Chan-Hai-Kouan certaines troupes, parmi d'autres forces internationales, pour protéger le chemin de fer de Pékin à Chan-Hai-Kouan.

Il semble bien que le maréchal Tchang Sue Liang, fils de Tchang Tso Lin, qui fut le grand dictateur mandchou, ne se console point d'avoir perdu la maîtrise de la Mandchourie et qu'il s'obstine dans une action militaire de nature à inquiéter le Mandchoukouo et, par conséquent, le Japon qui s'affirme en protecteur déclaré du nouvel Etat. Le commandement nippon l'avait prévenu, paraît-il, que toute activité militaire de sa part en direction du territoire de Jehol provoquerait une réaction immédiate des troupes du mikado. Les événements de Chan-Hai-Kouan confirment de façon tragique cet avertissement. S'il est exact que le gouvernement de Nankin a donné au maréchal Tchang Sue Liang des instructions pour soutenir une lutte sans merci contre toute avance des Nippons, les opérations actuelles pourraient prendre un grand développement et l'on aurait à redouter, dans ce cas, une véritable guerre sino-japonaise. Mais tout dépend, en somme, des intentions réelles du cabinet de Tokio. Il ne faut accueillir qu'avec beaucoup de réserve les informations suivant lesquelles les Japonais partant de Chan-Hai-Kouan se proposeraient de marcher sur Pékin et de réunir en fait la Chine septentrionale à l'Etat de Mandchourie. Une telle politique exigerait un énorme effort militaire et entraînerait des complications internationales que l'empire du Soleil-Levant a intérêt à éviter dans toute la mesure du possible. Pour autant qu'on puisse le discerner à la lumière des événements actuels, le Japon cherche surtout pour le moment à consolider le Mandchoukouo et à élargir le nouvel Etat en y incorporant le Jehol, qui fut toujours un territoire jouissant d'une certaine autonomie en bordure immédiate de la Mandchourie proprement dite. Même avec ce but limité, l'action du Japon ne laisse pas, d'ailleurs, de créer de graves préoccupations.

Ces préoccupations se traduisent déjà dans les commentaires d'une partie de la presse internationale, surtout de la presse britannique libérale, réclamant la convocation immédiate du Comité des dix-neuf et exigeant que la Société des nations adopte une attitude énergique à l'égard du Japon. Ce qui importe surtout en présence des nouveaux développements de la crise sino-japonaise, c'est de garder tout

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

son sang-froid et de ne pas improviser une politique qui serait de nature à engager la Société des Nations dans une aventure sans issue, étant donné qu'on sait qu'elle ne dispose pas des forces nécessaires pour imposer ses décisions. Le seul résultat d'une telle attitude serait de rendre inévitable le retrait du Japon de l'institution de Genève, éventualité que l'on n'envisage déjà que trop volontiers à Tokio. Rendre par là à l'empire du Soleil-Levant toute entière liberté d'action, ce ne serait pas faciliter, il faut en convenir, la solution pacifique du conflit. Alors que l'on voit les Etats-Unis, intéressés plus que n'importe quelle autre puissance à la situation en Extrême-Orient, faire preuve d'une grande prudence et se contenter de rappeler qu'ils ne reconnaîtront aucune modification territoriale réalisée par la force, ce n'est pas le moment pour la Société des Nations de prendre des initiatives trop hardies qui peuvent conduire on ne sait où.

Sans discuter les droits que le Japon tient des traités ni la part de responsabilité qui incombe à la Chine du fait que ce pays vit dans le désordre et l'anarchie, il faut constater pourtant que l'action militaire des Nippons prête à discussion. Au stade d'évolution où est parvenu le monde, les principes ne s'accordent malheureusement pas toujours avec les réalités, qui sont commandées, celles-ci, pour certains peuples lointains, par d'impérieuses nécessités politiques et économiques. Le Japon subit actuellement de telles nécessités; il sait que la Chine ne peut rien par elle-même, que la Russie soviétique est réduite pour longtemps encore à une totale impuissance militaire, que la carence du pouvoir paralyse les Etats-Unis, que les puissances européennes sont aux prises avec leurs propres difficultés, qui leur interdisent toute aventure lointaine. La tentation est forte pour lui de réaliser à la faveur des circonstances ses aspirations essentielles.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 20, 1933

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

January 20, 4 p.m.



The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 20, 3 p.m. Three trains of Chinese troops have passed through Tientsin to Lwanchow since yesterday, of which one at least, and perhaps the other two also, was from Shantung.

The presence of Colonel Dohihara in Tientsin as reported by newspapers has not yet been confirmed. While conditions continue to be quiet at Tientsin, there is still considerable anxiety among Chinese population.

Repeated to Department.
WWC-WSB

LOCKHART

793.94/5777

JAN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5778
778

SEE 793.94 Commission/750 FOR Tel. # 12,5 p.m.

FROM Mexico (Clark) DATED Jan. 18, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Mexican Policy toward Japan in regards to Sino-Japanese
dispute, as stated to League of Nations.

esp

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.93/65 FOR memorandum

State Department
FROM Far Eastern Affairs (Hornback) DATED April 6, 1932
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Discussion of British policy and interests in China
in connection with present relations between China
and Japan.

fc

793.94/5779
5779

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/739^{Confidential file} FOR Tel. # 10,11 pm

FROM Great Britain (Mellon) DATED January 16, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: British Government believes that an offer
of mediation of the Shanhaikwan affair
by the powers for the purpose of localizing
it is not immediately desirable.

hs

793.94/5780
5780

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.9311/513 FOR Memo

FROM State Department (Hornbeck) DATED Dec. 20, 1932
Division of Far NAME 1-1127 ***
 TO Eastern Affairs

REGARDING: Military movements by China and Japan: memorandum of
 conversation between Mr. Frank Lee and Mr. Hornbeck
 regarding --

793.94/5781

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/738 FOR Tel. # 8, 9 pm

FROM Great Britain (Mellon) DATED January 13, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sir John Simon feels that no attempt at mediation
of the Shanhaikwan situation should be offered
without the full consent of both the Japanese
and Chinese.

793.94/5782
1762

7 4 1
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E
NE

WP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

London

Dated January 13, 1933

Rec'd 8:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

8, January 13, 9 p. m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

*Note
500.C.11
793.94*

This evening, after reading a memorandum based on
your telephone conversation with Atherton, Simon stated
he was very glad to have such a message from you and also
your assurance that there was no reason to anticipate any
change in the policy of the American Government, and he
asked me to let you know he felt the policies of the two
governments would run side by side. He added that he had
no regrets the methods of conciliation had been tried but
he was of your opinion that these methods had apparently
now failed and that in his own mind it was clear that
next week the League must take another step, set forth in
paragraph four of Article 15. The Assembly, in his opinion,
should proceed to adopt the first eight chapters of the
Lytton Report, and also set forth as the League's princi-
ples of settlement those conditions indicated in Chapters
9 and 10. Simon said also this was the view which he,

as

793.94 Commission/738

- 2 - No. 8 from London

as Foreign Secretary, was presenting to his Government.

Simon then read us portions of his speech of December 7 and stated that immediately after he had delivered it he sent for both the Japanese and the Chinese delegates at Geneva and informed them that he had made a speech in the hope that what he had said would inaugurate a policy of conciliation but that he did not want them to misunderstand the position of the British Government as in any way having changed if the policy of conciliation failed. Sir John likewise stated he telegraphed Findley at that time to explain this to Uchida.

As regards Shanhaikwan, Sir John feels no attempt at mediation should be offered without the full consent of both the Japanese and Chinese. He stated his hesitation to consider any theory for foreign troops to patrol this district as a neutral area since it is entirely uncertain when they might ever be withdrawn. Simon added as Foreign Office opinion, that this Japanese action was rather a local action around Shanhaikwan to control the approach to Jehol rather than a push on to Tientsin and Peiping which would put Japan in direct conflict with all the Treaty Powers and their rights.

Simon said that recent conversations with Matsudaira led him to believe Japanese attitude was a little less aggressive.

Simon asked that anything I telegraphed this evening
might

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 - No. 8 from London

might not be considered as his final considered reply to the memorandum, which, before Sunday evening, he will convey to this Embassy for transmission to Washington.

Simon now intends to leave for Geneva some time Sunday.

MELLON

FW

075

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 23, 1933.

In A MEMORIAL ON WORLD PEACE to the Churches of the United States from the Sixth Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, a stand is taken against the cynical view that war is inevitable and that the best way to achieve peace is to prepare for war. It is felt that we face a major crisis and that those in positions of responsibility should know what the people ask and demand.

It is believed that war is not only contrary to the spirit of Christ and a repudiation of Him but is a menace to civilization and that the agencies of the churches should never again be used in preparation for war but should be used in the promotion of peace. Citizenship should not be conditioned upon the willingness to bear arms or to take part as a war combatant contrary to conscience and applicants for citizenship should not be required to make pledges that conflict with the spirit and intent of the Pact of Paris. Civilian educational institutions should not make military instruction compulsory and changes are recommended in the laws so that citizenship shall not be conditioned upon the willingness to bear arms.

Hearty support is given to any definite program for reduction of armaments and the nations should agree to put an end to their armaments for aggression. An international agreement limiting military budgets should be adopted and a Permanent Disarmament Commission established

175

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

lished.

Mere renunciation of war is not enough. Nations must fulfill their obligations as signatories to peace treaties. The principle of international consultation and the purpose of this Government to make the Paris Pact fundamental in its foreign relations is endorsed and the policy of withholding recognition of "any situation, treaty or agreement" brought about in violation of the Pact is considered a significant advance in the development of American foreign policy. It is believed that measures should be adopted to withhold war materials and financial credits from treaty-breaking states. It is hoped that the forthcoming World Economic Conference will deal with all the economic issues.

Cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute is approved without qualification. The Lytton Report is considered a new milestone in international relations and points the way towards the restoration of peace between China and Japan. Our Government's pledges with regard to the Philippines should be fulfilled.

The action taken in upholding the moral integrity of the Peace Pact in connection with the Chaco controversy is commended and the interpretation now being placed upon the Monroe Doctrine by the United States is approved.

In view of the stress placed by the church upon the **oneness** of the human family and the interdependence of the nations, the solution of the war debt problem is of vital interest to the churches. Changed conditions
in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Guske NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

in the world necessitate a reconsideration by the United States of the debt-refunding settlements and it is believed essential that there be a revision downward of the debts to the United States accompanied by general measures for the reduction of armaments.

Favorable and immediate action on the World Court issue is urged.

The private traffic in arms, credits, and sinews of war should be brought under rigid control.

The churches are urged to use their full power in educating and guiding the rank and file of their membership towards principles of peace.

E.g.c.

793.94/5783

EGC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLE ADDRESS: FEDCIL

TELEPHONE: GRAMERCY 5-3476

Commission on
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOODWILL

of the

FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA
(INCORPORATED)

105 EAST 22nd STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

HON. ALANSON B. HOUGHTON, CHAIRMAN
HON. GEO. W. WICKERSHAM }
PRES. MARY E. WOOLLEY } VICE-CHAIRMAN
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
January 18, 1933
JAN 19 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

BISHOP FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, PRESIDENT
FRANK H. MANN, TREASURER
REV. SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT, GENERAL SECRETARY
REV. ROY B. GUILD, ASSOC. GENERAL SECRETARY

RECEIVED

JAN 19 1933

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY



The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In view of your recent reaffirmation of the "non-recognition" policy announced in your identic notes to China and Japan on January 7, 1932, I desire to report for your information the action taken by the Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America at Indianapolis, December 7, 1932, which reads as follows:

"The policy of withholding recognition of 'any situation, treaty or agreement' brought about in violation of the Pact is a significant advance in the development of American foreign policy which should be given the most careful study."

In order that you may see the context of this sentence I am enclosing the entire action on international questions which we have published under the title "A Memorial on World Peace", on the third page of which you will find the sentence quoted.

It was my great privilege last week to hear the Honorable Norman H. Davis speak on the work of the Disarmament Conference and on the prospects for the future. That address was highly illuminating and encouraging. We who for years have been seeking to promote the cause of enduring world peace are looking forward with great hope to substantial results to be achieved by the Conference.

May I say that I am among those who feel that we are greatly indebted to you and to President Hoover for appointing on the American delegation one so eminently fitted for that important task as Mr. Davis manifestly is, and also for the constructive policies which our American delegation has been authorized to adopt and to push?

With all good wishes, and praying for large results in international relations during the remaining weeks of your special responsibilities, I am

Respectfully and sincerely yours,

Sidney L. Gulick
Secretary

F/H/S

793.94/5783

JAN 28 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

one-half billion dollars annually on armaments. This situation is neither statesmanlike nor Christian.

We give most hearty support to any definite program for reduction, such as the proposal of the United States government which calls for a reduction of all armaments by approximately one-third, including the abolition of the so-called weapons of offense. We believe that for the sake of world justice and peace the nations which defined weapons of aggression when disarming Germany should accept for themselves the implications of that decision. They should agree to put an end to their armaments for aggression. Such an agreement, we believe, would insure the success of the Disarmament Conference, bring about enormous economies, and instantly promote confidence and goodwill among the nations. An international agreement limiting military budgets should be adopted and a Permanent Disarmament Commission established, through which continuous progress in the reduction of armaments may be achieved. We appeal to our people and to our government to press for such a program with utmost vigor. We pray that all nations may unite in this program.

2. International Cooperation.

Armaments, however, are fundamentally due to the disease of war. The only real cure for this disease is the effective use of the agencies and machinery for peace. Mere renunciation is not enough. Nations must actually fulfill their obligations as signatories to peace pacts and treaties.

We therefore approve the principle of international consultation, as stated by Secretary of State Stimson, and hold, with him, that the Pact of Paris carries an implied and inevitable obligation for consultation among the signatory powers whenever war threatens. The policy of withholding recognition of "any situation, treaty or agreement" brought about in violation of the Pact is a significant advance in the development of American foreign policy which should be given the most careful study. We cordially endorse the purpose of our government to make the Pact fundamental in its foreign relations and a basic principle in the law of nations. We believe, further, that governments should adopt measures to withhold war materials and financial credits from treaty-breaking states and that a pledge to do this might well be formally incorporated in the law of the nations.

We rejoice that the United States is to be represented at the forthcoming World Economic Conference.

We hope that this Conference will boldly deal with *all* the economic issues that are causing international difficulty, suspicion, and hostility. As the economic causes of international friction are removed, the danger of war becomes increasingly remote and the possibility of drastic reductions of armaments correspondingly great.

3. The Far East.

We pray for peace in the Far East. The larger interests of both Japan and China can best be served, we are convinced, through the consistent observance of the spirit of the Peace Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy meets with our unqualified approval and should, we believe, be continued.

The Report of the Lytton Commission, we believe, is a new milestone in the development of international relations. The recommendations embodied in this report point the way, in our opinion, toward the restoration of amicable relations between China and Japan. We appeal to our Christian brethren in these two countries to continue to press for a pacific solution of these momentous issues.

We urge our citizens to exert themselves for the fulfillment of the pledges made by our government with respect to the Philippines. Our relations with the people of these Islands should be determined not by policies of economic self-interest but rather by considerations of justice and international goodwill.

4. Relations with Latin America

We heartily commend the action of the nineteen American nations, including the United States, in upholding the moral integrity of the Peace Pact in connection with the Chaco controversy between Bolivia and Paraguay. As churches we welcome the announcement that they will not recognize territorial gains won by force of arms.

We approve the interpretation now being placed upon the Monroe Doctrine by the United States government, whereby intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American republics is specifically disavowed.

We rejoice in the improvement of the relations between the United States and the Caribbean and Central American republics. We rejoice in the fact that the military forces of the United States

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

are being withdrawn from those areas. We urge that this policy of military evacuation be continued until the nations in question enjoy the full sovereignty of statehood.

5. The Problem of the War Debts.

The world-wide economic depression and world-wide unemployment have forced the European nations to give up their claims for reparations and have opened up the question of the payment of the intergovernmental war debts to the United States.

In our approach to this question, our primary interest, as Christians, is to set free in the life of the nations the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation to which the Christian Gospel summons us and which is the supreme need of the world today. In the present world turmoil and distress the Christian Church must lay especial stress upon its teachings of the oneness of the human family and the interdependence of the nations. True patriotism will seek the well-being of one's own nation through that of mankind as a whole. The solution of the war debt problems, therefore, is a matter of vital interest to the churches. It involves principles of right and justice and vitally affects the welfare of millions now living and the destiny of millions yet unborn.

Approaching the problem in this spirit, we believe that the changed capacity of the debtor nations to pay, due to the lowered price of goods, to the rise in the value of gold, and to artificial barriers to trade and transfer payments, renders necessary a reconsideration by the United States of the debt-funding settlements.

What the nations urgently need today is the restoration of hope, mutual confidence, and the revival of the currents of trade and industry. For this, we believe that a revision downward of the debts to the United States is essential. This new settlement should be accompanied by general measures by the various nations for the reduction of armaments.

6. American Membership in the World Court.

For ten years the question of American adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice has been before the nation and the Senate. The desire of the churches and of a vast number of the citizens has been abundantly clear. The Presidents and Secretaries of State throughout

this period have urged prompt and favorable action by the Senate. The House of Representatives, by a very large majority, has expressed its approval. In the Senate a majority has uniformly been in favor of such action.

We urgently press upon the Senate the imperative need of immediate and favorable action on the World Court issue. We support acceptance of the Root Protocol which thirty-eight nations have ratified.

7. Private Manufacture of Military Weapons.

We believe, in the language of the League Covenant, that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections." It is obvious that the world cannot be effectively organized for peace until this private traffic in arms, credits, and sinews of war has been brought under strict control.

Sound public policy requires peace-loving nations to forbid their nationals to engage in international traffic in military implements. We believe that the disarmament treaty to be negotiated at Geneva should provide for the rigid control of this traffic and that the United States should find a constitutional way to participate in such control.

Conclusion

The churches alone cannot establish world peace. But it cannot be established without them. We, therefore, call upon the churches to utilize their full power in educating and guiding the rank and file of their membership. Their general will to peace needs to be transformed into a powerful, informed, and determined agency for bringing to bear on national policies the ideals and spirit of the Prince of Peace.

0758

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Excerpt from the Revised Social Ideals of the Churches

Adopted December, 1932

International Relations

International relations are entering on a new stage, in which the nations have condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and have renounced it as an instrument of national policy, agreeing that the settlement of all their disputes shall be sought only by pacific means. The churches give their intelligent and hearty support to these ideals and pledges of governments, and have an obligation to help make them effective.

Whatever justification for war may have been alleged in time past, the present and discernible future belong to peace. The nations may now know and understand one another. Means of communication have so increased that isolation and national provincialism are not only absurdities but are fraught with danger. Cultural, social, and commercial interests constantly cross national boundaries. International coöperation is easier and more necessary than in earlier times. New barriers are created from time to time, but they are no longer beyond human analysis and control. International jealousies and frictions now occur in the light of day, subject to scrutiny of competent criticism. Methods of reconciling differences and promoting coöperation have been devised and are now in frequent use. They must become the universal practice.

The war system is inconsistent with all Christian ideals. In war, mercy, righteousness, justice, truthfulness, self-control, coöperation, are abandoned or practiced only toward friends. Religion should no longer sanction war. While works of spiritual ministry and relief of human suffering are at all times the duty of the Church, the institutions of religion should never again be used as agencies of warfare. The social ideal, based upon the brotherhood of man and the sacredness of personality, should be consistently applied in international as in other human relations. Religious bodies should henceforth use their utmost influence in the support of such programs and policies as will make for justice, goodwill, and peace between nations. They should oppose compulsory military training in educational institutions and should support aggressively national and international policies of peace and disarmament. The churches should minister spiritual comfort and sympathy to those who in obedience to the dictates of conscience refuse to participate in war.

We are clearly in the process of building a more closely knit world-society on the effectiveness of which must depend the final abolition of war and of costly economic rivalries and conflicts. The larger interests and solidarity of nations are involved in its progress. To accomplish these great objectives requires the coöperation not of governments alone but of the social institutions of nations, including the churches. International friendship and coöperation with the churches of other lands should become an inseparable part of the program of religious work in the United States.

A Memorial on World Peace

TO THE CHURCHES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE SIXTH QUADRENNIAL MEETING OF THE
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST
IN AMERICA

December, 1932

- I. Ideals, Attitudes, and Convictions
- II. The Practical Application of Christian Ideals to Concrete International Problems
 1. Reduction of Armaments.
 2. International Cooperation.
 3. The Far East.
 4. Relations with Latin America.
 5. The Problem of the War Debts.
 6. American Membership in the World Court.
 7. Private Manufacture of Military Weapons.

Department of International
Justice and Goodwill
of the
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America
105 East 22nd Street, New York

A MEMORIAL ON WORLD PEACE

TO THE CHURCHES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE SIXTH QUADRENNIAL MEETING OF THE
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST
IN AMERICA:

The nations, still staggering under the crushing disasters of the last war, face a major crisis. Military expenditures have assumed shocking proportions. A virtual state of war between China and Japan has continued for many months. In the Far East and elsewhere the peace pacts have so far failed to secure the results confidently expected. A skeptical world is heaping its contempt upon the treaties for the renunciation of war. War is again being declared inevitable. Peace treaties are denounced as scraps of paper. The best way to achieve peace, it is insisted, is to prepare for war. Against these cynical views we take our stand. We seek a warless world. The circumstances of the hour constitute a challenge to renewed endeavor.

Shall we still go on preparing for war with its wholesale slaughter of the world's most precious treasures—our youth? Shall we complacently allow our children to be made targets for machine guns and our cities victims of the most deadly poison gases that science can devise? Grim spectres lurk behind the World Disarmament Conference. Shall we passively await its fateful decisions? Or shall we, before it is too late, let those in positions of responsibility know what we, the people, ask and demand? The final decision rests with the people.

During the past few years practically all of our constituent bodies have issued significant declarations on war and peace. At this time it is fitting that we summarize the declarations set forth by our constituent bodies and indicate how they seem to us to apply in a practical way to some of the concrete issues now before our nation and the world.

I. Ideals, Attitudes and Convictions*

We believe that war is contrary to the spirit of Christ and incompatible with the Gospel of Love and Brotherhood which we profess. It is the most colossal and ruinous social sin that afflicts humanity. The methods used and the passions aroused by war outrage Christ's conception of a Kingdom of God in which men shall trust, love, forgive, and

*All the important affirmations, sentences, and phrases in the section, "Ideals, Attitudes, and Convictions," are taken practically verbatim from one or another of the recent utterances of various Protestant church bodies.

help one another. We see in war's cruelties, made more terrible and devastating by modern scientific progress, not only a menace to civilization, but also a repudiation of the Prince of Peace.

We hold that the agencies of our churches should never again be used in preparation for war, but *should* be used in the promotion of peace. The Church of Christ, as an institution, should not become an instrument for the fostering of international suspicion and hatred. It should not sanction war nor bless it. To support war is to deny the Gospel we profess to believe.

God alone is Lord of the conscience. We hold, therefore, that citizenship should not be conditioned upon the willingness to bear arms, contrary to conscience, or to take part as a war combatant, in contradiction to moral convictions. We believe that to base citizenship upon such a test is not only unjust to the individual, but contrary to public welfare and in conflict with the ideals of a nation into whose very structure the principle of political and religious liberty has been built. Our country needs citizens who unswervingly follow the dictates of conscience, making allegiance to God the supreme guide to life and conduct. Since sixty-two nations have, in the Pact of Paris, renounced war and pledged themselves to seek only the methods of peace in the settlement of their controversies, applicants for citizenship should not be required to make pledges that conflict with the spirit and intent of this Pact. We recommend such changes in the present laws of the land that citizenship shall not be conditioned upon the willingness to bear arms. Civilian educational institutions should not make military instruction compulsory.

The State should not create the dilemma of loyalty to country or to Christ. Should such a dilemma arise, we follow Christ.

II. The Practical Application of Christian Ideals to Concrete International Problems

1. Reduction of Armaments.

The success of the World Disarmament Conference, which reconvenes next month, hangs in the balance. The failure of the Conference thus far to provide for the drastic reduction of military establishments is gravely disappointing. Despite the unparalleled economic disaster which has overtaken the world the nations are spending four and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 26 1933

In reply refer to
 FE - 793.94/5783

My dear Doctor Gulick:

The Secretary of State desires that I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 18, 1933, reporting with regard to action taken by the Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America on December 7, 1932, and enclosing a pamphlet giving the entire action of the meeting on international questions.

Your letter and its enclosure have been read with interest and the Secretary of State is glad to have this expression of the views of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

Sincerely yours,

SK
 Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

The Reverend Sidney L. Gulick,

Secretary, Commission on International
 Justice and Goodwill of the Federal
 Council of the Churches of Christ in
 America,

105 East 22nd Street,

New York, New York.

g.c.
 FE:EGC:REK
 1/24/33

m.m.
 FE

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal.

793.94/5783

JAN 26, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via NR

Dated January 21, 1933.

Recd 4:40 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

January 21, 1 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 21, noon. Tuan Chih Jui, ex-Anfu leader who has erroneously been charged in some quarters with leading a movement against Chang Hsueh Liang, left last night by train for Nanking. He was seen off at the station by a number of leading officials including the Mayor and Chief of the Public Safety Bureau.

According to information obtained by an American army officer who interviewed the Chinese commander at Shumenchai, no fighting ^{has taken place} there or at any of the other neighboring passes through the Wall north or northwest of Shanhaikwan. Commander stated positively that no Japanese troops have passed to this side of the Wall in that vicinity except at Shanhaikwan.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

CIB WP

F/ESP

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FILED

JAN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 26, 1933.

EDD:
MTH:

Sherbrooke's despatch No.
289 of January 17, 1933, reports
the delivery of certain documents
with regard to the Manchuria
situation in accordance with the
Department's instruction.

731
LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 289.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, January 17, 1933.

SUBJECT: Delivery to Mr. W. W. Humphrey, of Sherbrooke,
of certain publications of the Department
relating to the Sino-Japanese situation.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's special instruction of December 23, 1932, Division FA, without file number, with which there was enclosed a copy of a letter dated December 17, 1932, received by the Department from Mr. W. W. Humphrey, of Sherbrooke, in which Mr. Humphrey requested that data relating to the American attitude in the Sino-Japanese situation be sent to him for use in inter-university debates in which his college is to participate this year.

The Department forwarded certain publications as enclosures in the instruction under reference and directed that these be delivered to Mr. Humphrey, if no objection to this being done was perceived. It also directed that he be advised of the information contained in the instruction as to the sources from which copies of certain other publications might be obtained and the cost of such publications.

The Department is respectfully informed that the above-mentioned instruction and enclosures were received at this Consulate on December 24, 1932, and on the same day I called in person on Mr. Humphrey at his home in this city and advised him of their receipt.

It was

F/HS

793.94/5785

JAN 20 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 2 -

It was learned by me that Mr. Humphrey graduated from the University of Bishop's College, Lennoxville, Quebec, in June, 1931, at which time he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts. He has since been engaged in the study of law in the offices of a Sherbrooke law firm, but nevertheless has maintained his interest in debating and is assisting the debaters who will represent his college this year. The data which he requested from the Department of State were desired for the use of Mr. Bruce Munro, a member of the Junior Class at the University of Bishop's College, who is the son of the former Industrial Commissioner of Sherbrooke.

Inasmuch as no objection was perceived by me to the delivery to Mr. Humphrey of the publications sent by the Department, he was invited to call at the Consulate to receive them. This he did on January 6, 1933.

Mr. Humphrey asks that I convey to the Department his sincere thanks for its courteous attention to his request and his appreciation of the publications which it has sent to him. Mr. Munro likewise has asked that his thanks and appreciation be transmitted to the Department.

Respectfully yours,


Herndon W. Goforth,
American Consul.

WVG/gd
700

0765

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
~~CONFIDENTIAL CODE~~
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

RECEIVED
Department of State
This cable was sent
It is not to be carried
1933 JAN - 18 PM 5:25 Washington.
January 18, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94
20

Confidential

Referring to recent press reports that the American Government has recently made approaches to foreign governments in regard to the Manchuria situation, the Department wishes to emphasize for your information that the action taken by the Department consisted in instructing two American diplomatic missions to reply to ^{Express} ~~specific~~ inquiries and requests received from ~~the~~ officials of foreign governments, and in directing a third mission to make to ^{an} ~~the~~ appropriate foreign official ^a ~~statements~~ along the lines made at the other two places. ^{These} ~~All~~ communications were made ~~orally~~ and informally; their substance was that our opinion and attitude are in no repeat no way changed. Stress was laid on the fact that this Government cannot repeat cannot undertake to give guidance to the League and that the League must make its own decisions.

Press reports are misleading.

Repeat to Tokyo as Dept's #7, Jan 18, 1933

Stinson
LH

FE:MMH:REK

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 24, 1935.

U/
Mr. Castle.

S:
Mr. Secretary.

I think that you will wish to
note the sections that I have marked
in the attached pamphlet which sets
forth action taken on December 7 by
the Quadrennial Meeting of the
Federal Council of the Churches of
Christ in America.

MMH/REK

0767

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

1933 JAN - 18 - PM 12:36

Washington,
January 18, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

5

According to the American press President-elect
Roosevelt on January 17 wrote out, in reply to a question,
a statement reading as follows:

QUOTE Any statement relating to any particular
foreign situation must, of course, come from the Secretary
of State of the United States.

I am, however, wholly willing to make it clear that
American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of
international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which
all relations between nations must rest UNQUOTE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

1933 JAN - 18 - PM 1:30

JAN. 18 1933

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

0768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Gray
1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

1933 JAN - 18 - PM 12:36

Washington,

January 18, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

19

According to the American press President-elect
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international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which
all relations between nations must rest UNQUOTE.

FE:MMH:REK

JAN 18 1933

FE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1933 JAN - 18 - PM 1:30

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated January 23, 1933.

Recd 5:34 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

28, January 23, 5 p.m.

Japanese War Office informed Military Attache today
as follows concerning present distribution of Chinese
troops:

Between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, five infantry and
two cavalry brigades; in southeastern Jehol, four infantry
brigades, moving from Peiping toward city of Jehol, two
infantry brigades and three artillery brigades; moving
from Kalgan toward city of Jehol, two cavalry brigades;
several other brigades moving from South northward toward
Peiping and Tientsin.

GREW

JS CIB



F/HS

793.94/5786

793.94

JAN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated January 22, 1933.

Recd 11:38 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

71, January 22, 3 p.m.

Reuter from Nanking, twenty-first:

"Questioned this evening concerning Marshal Tuan Chijui's sudden departure from Tientsin for the South a Government spokesman stated that the former chief executive of the old Peking Government had lived in retirement in Tientsin for years, but following the Mukden incident rumors had been widely circulated alleging that he was secretly negotiating with Japanese for starting trouble in Peking and Tientsin area. After the Shanhaikwan fighting Marshal Tuan decided to leave Tientsin thereby definitely setting at rest such rumors. Spokesman added that Marshal Tuan would probably stay at Tsingtao or Shanghai."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/5787

793.94
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated January 23, 1933.

Recd 2:44 a.m.


Secretary of State
Washington.

75, January 23, 1 p.m.

All quiet Shanhaikwan, Tientsin and Peiping. Officer
sent last week reports from Chinwangtao on the 20th that
all is quiet at Shihmenchai, Lwanchow and Chinwangtao.
Chinese Commander at Shihmenchai informed him that
Manchukuo forces comprise majority of troops between him
and the Wall. So far as he knew no Japanese had stepped
inside the Wall except at Shanhaikwan.

JOHNSON

JS CIB



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793.94/5788

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JAN 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 23, 1933, from the American
Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Tientsin, Peiping and Shanhaikwan are quiet. According
to a report on January 20 from Chinwangtao by an officer
sent there last week, Lwanchow, Chinwangtao and Shihmenchai
are quiet. He was informed by the Chinese Commander at
Shihmenchai that the majority of the troops between him and
the Great Wall are made up of "Manchoukuo" forces. Except
at Shanhaikwan, so far as he knew no Japanese had come inside
the Wall.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via NR

Dated January 23, 1933.

Recd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

72, January 23, 10 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking, twenty-second:

"In commenting today on Count Uchida's speech Lo

Wen Kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that in so far as speech dealt with Japan's Manchurian adventure it gave further conclusive proof that Japan was far from having awakened from her dream of military conquest and territorial aggrandizement. Foreign Minister points out that several months have passed since Count Uchida made his first important speech on Far Eastern crisis but apparently there was no abatement in his open defense of the authority of League of Nations, sanctity of international agreements or validity of all ordinary principles of international law.

Lo stressed that Count Uchida in his speech demonstrated possibility of further expansion of so-called Manchukuo and even openly declared that it was determination of the Japanese to invade Jehol. Lo says he considers that there is no need to waste any more words on Japanese preposterous trumpets as they have been answered



F/HS

793.94/5789

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JAN 24 1933

793.94
note
893.01 Manchuria

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 72, from Peiping, January 23, 1933.

answered very conclusively not only by Chinese Government but by Lytton Commission. Reiterating the Chinese stand the Foreign Minister declared 'so far as China is concerned her position is very clear. The so-called Manchukuo created and maintained by Japan must go and China must reassert her sovereign power over the three eastern provinces. There can be neither conciliation nor reconciliation nor any prospect of a settlement until and unless Japan's puppet regime is declared illegal and is discontinued.'

JOHNSON

JS CIB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

MET



GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated January 23, 1933

Rec'd 5:58 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT. January 23, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"January 23, 3 p. m.

Within last 48 hours 7 trains of Chinese troops have moved eastward through Tientsin as have several trains of supplies and munitions. All of the above are believed to belong to 32nd army and to have ^{come from} ~~remained~~ off Peiping Railway. No change at Chinwangtao. Repeated to Department".

WSB-RR

LOCKHART

F/H/S

793.94/5790

793.94

JAN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 27, 1933.

EDP:
LMEI:
CZII:

Berlin's despatch No. 2119 of January 9, 1933, reports German press reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict. The conservative press is concerned chiefly with the economic aspect while the remainder of the press is alarmed at the possibility of further warlike international complications, the moderate press stressing the impotence of the League and the Social Democratic and Communist press being decidedly anti-Japanese.

The more interesting comments: The VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG of January 3 (pp. 3-4) states that the major powers will not back up America until she pays them for Japanese isolation with political compensations and that the Franco-American tension contributed to this condition. The Social Democratic VORWAERTS of January 4 (p. 5) states that Germany, at Geneva, was always anxious to agree with England on the Far Eastern conflict, while England was always for retreating before Japan's threats, and that German diplomacy did not seem to realize that it was in the interest of that country to side with the smaller neutral nations.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, January 9, 1933


No. 2119

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.
German Press Reaction Ther



F/HS

793.94/5791



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Sino-Japanese armed clash at Shanhaikwan evoked considerable comment from the German press. While the press of the Right was concerned chiefly at the economic aspect of this conflict, the remainder of the press expressed alarm that Japan might seize Jehol and so create a situation involving the threat of further and general warlike international complications. The moderate press stressed the impotence

FILED
FEB 3 - 1933

1 of

-2-

of the League at the present juncture. The Social Democratic and Communist press was decidedly anti-Japanese in its tone.

The chauvinist BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG of January 3 remarked that in view of her economic interests in the Far East, Germany could only wish that peace should be maintained or reestablished. The French munition factories were filling large orders for Japan as well as for the Chinese Communists, while those in Czechoslovakia and Belgium were also working for China.

The moderate Right DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of January 4 also stressed the disturbance of economic interests by the Sino-Japanese conflict, and added that the Chinese had been made to suffer as no one else beside the Germans had been. China's real mistake had consisted in not providing for armed repulsion of her enemies, and in relying on the League instead. Japan had been encouraged by the weakness of the League and it appeared that she aimed at destroying the Chinese Empire in its present form.

On January 4, the Centrist GERMANIA found that if Japan restricted herself in the present case to an isolated punitive act, it would be regrettable but not of far-reaching effect; the case, however, would be different if, on a similar pretext to that

at

-3-

at Shanghai, Japan were to occupy the important North-Eastern Chinese district, including the former capital Peking and the international settlement at Tientsin. While no resistance was to be expected from the Soviets, in view of their recent rapprochement with Japan, the other major Powers would probably call a halt on Japan, as was the case at Shanghai. Although the Manchurian problem was a peculiar one, which could not be settled simply according to the text of existing treaties, any Japanese attack on China proper would constitute a most serious matter for the world in which there could be no "Geneva compromise."

The moderate Left BERLINER BOERSEN COURIER of January 4 said that the battle in the East was also a battle over Geneva. Especially the Socialistic Parties of many countries were urging their governments to do something and to encourage the League. However, the League could do nothing in the East and even an attempt to do something would, instead of helping the Chinese, only disturb the balance of power in the Western world. It did not make a very heroic impression for the League to be afraid to give evidence of its lack of power but, in view of the situation, the renunciation of an attempt was better than unavoidable failure.

According to the moderate Left VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG (January 3), the Japanese felt very secure, as

hitherto

-4-

hitherto Geneva had not aroused itself to energetic action. The major Powers were not to be brought out of their reserve and would not permit themselves to be won over to America's policy until America should be prepared to pay for Japan's isolation with political compensations. The Franco-American tension had only contributed to this state of affairs. America alone was not in a position at present to cope with Japan. The conflict in the Far East would doubtless influence European politics.

The moderate Left BERLINER TAGEBLATT of January 4 thought it best not to interfere until the actual facts were known. While the Nanking Government asserted that it would protect the national interests, it probably knew that these could not be furthered by war with Japan.

It was comparatively immaterial - at least for the Japanese - whether the Chinese or the Japanese had furnished the occasion for the trouble at Shan-haikwan, was the opinion of the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG of January 4. It was evident that if the Chinese did not comply with Japan's wishes, further steps would be taken - the purely Chinese Province of Jehol would be occupied and perhaps also Peking, the plan possibly being to establish the rule of the present President of Manchukuo throughout North China under Japanese protection. Japan had long announced that the Province of Jehol really belonged to Manchuria.

On

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

On January 7, this newspaper remarked that while the Japanese asserted that the foreign press did not do them justice, the fact was that their claim to be acting in self-defence in China was not well founded. It was evident that the power in Japan had shifted from the civil to the military authorities, and it should be admitted that the conflict with China was merely a question of power. The Japanese advance into purely Chinese territory brought the conflict into a new phase, and there was danger of the separation of North China from the rest of the country. This would mean open war. War in the Far East, under the circumstances, meant a threat of war to the world. If Minister of War Araki had little hope that the League would succeed in allaying the conflict, it was his duty to do everything to bring about direct negotiations between Japan and China. If Japan was striving for hegemony in the Far East and a sort of Monroe Doctrine - "Asia for the Asiatics" - she should take pains to prove to the world that she would really be the protector of law and order which, at the present moment, no one could concede to be the case.

The Social Democratic VORWAERTS of January 4 remarked that the Wilhelmstrasse always took the attitude that there was no occasion for Germany to compromise herself in any direction. At Geneva, Germany was always anxious to agree with England

on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

on the Far Eastern conflict, while England was always for retreating before Japan's threats. "What does it matter to the German people whether international treaties are broken in East Asia and a peaceable people is violated? Only avoid taking the initiative - that is the leading thought of German diplomacy in this conflict, which is spreading more and more, and threatens to develop into a new world conflagration!" German diplomacy did not seem to realize that it was in the interest of the country to side with the smaller neutral nations which at Geneva had recently advocated energetic action against Japan. The adjournment of the League in December, for which England was chiefly responsible, had encouraged Japan to undertake her present action.

The Communist ROTE FAHNE of January 4 saw in the Japanese attack a new step forward in the fight of the imperialistic robbers to partition China and to prepare for action against the Soviets. This sheet asserted that not only France, Czechoslovakia and England, but Germany as well, supplied Japan with arms. The warships of American imperialism rode at anchor in the Gulf of Liautung, and there was danger of an open conflict between the American and Japanese rivals which would lead to a world war.

Respectfully yours,

Frederic M. Sackett

Frederic M. Sackett.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

710

WWS-HCF:EM

X

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

PEIPING

Dated January 24, 1933.

Recd 2:11 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

80, January 24, 11 a.m.

My 79, January 23, 7 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR THE SECRETARY.

It is extremely difficult at this moment to determine exactly what is in the wind but local Chinese near Young Marshal are encouraging newspaper correspondents to believe direct negotiations are probable; that they may come later on as a result of discouragement at Geneva. There is suggestion that negotiations might perhaps involve relinquishment by Japan of announced intention to move on Jehol in consideration of change of administration here and recognition by China of the independence of Manchukuo.



(GRAY). Young Marshal expects today and it is probable that some announcement may be made tomorrow.

JS CIB

JOHNSON

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FILED
JAN 23 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 24 1933

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 24, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The American Minister states that at present it is very hard to find out exactly what is in the offing but newspaper correspondents are being encouraged by local Chinese close to Chang Hsueh-liang to believe that direct negotiations are likely to occur; that, as a result of discouragement at Geneva, such negotiations may come at a later date. In consideration of a change of the administration at Peiping and recognition of the independence of "Manchoukuo" by China, there is suggestion that perhaps negotiations might involve the relinquishment of the announced plan of Japan to move on Jehol.

The Young Marshal is expected today and it is probable that some announcement may be made tomorrow.

178
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 31, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~BOM:~~
~~JES:~~
~~MSH:~~
~~SKP:~~

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of December 27, 1932, encloses a copy of its despatch No. 714 to Peiping, forwarding a copy of a memorandum of interviews with a Japanese official who denied the news reports that Chaoyang had been bombed by a Japanese plane. This official stated that he did not anticipate (December 24) an outbreak of serious hostilities in the Jehol-Shanhaikwan area, that the Japanese army is hardly in a position at present for a campaign in Jehol because of employment of troops elsewhere, that the activities of the Volunteers are entirely instigated by Chang Hsueh-liang, whereas the Nanking Government has taken steps to restrain them, that T'ang Yu-lin's recent attitude has been very satisfactory, that the present bandit suppression drive in the Antung area was distinctly more difficult than preceding drives in other areas, as the bandits have no chance there for escape, and that the report of the practical annihilation of a section of the Japanese infantry north of Antung was correct.

JES
JES:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, December 27, 1932.

JAN 23 1933

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Interviews with Japanese Official regarding Jehol Situation and Bandit Suppression Operations.

COPIES SENT TO

THE HONORABLE O.N.I. AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1933

Department of State

30 I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 714 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated December 24, 1932, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FEB 2 1936

2181

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 714
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

178
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 714

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, Manchuria, December 24, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Interviews with
Japanese Official regarding
Jehol Situation and Bandit
Suppression Operations.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:


I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum
of interviews with a Japanese official regarding bandit
suppression operations and the Jehol situation which
were had recently by a member of this office staff.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Memorandum as stated.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.



800
ASG:HTW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 714 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, dated December 24, 1932, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "Memorandum of Interviews with Japanese Official regarding Jehol Situation and Bandit Suppression Operations."

MEMORANDUM

Interviews with Japanese Official regarding Bandit Suppression Operations and the Jehol Situation.

During the course of conversations which I had yesterday and today with a Japanese official, the latter vouchsafed the following information in reply to my inquiries regarding bandit suppression operations and the Jehol situation:

Recent newspaper accounts of the bombing of Chaoyang and the shooting down of a Japanese plane are, according to his information, incorrect. There are, however, some 20,000 Volunteers in the vicinity of Chaoyang who have been increasingly active in making raids; and during the past week Japanese planes have cooperated with infantry troops operating against bandit forces near Shanhaikuan and near Peipiao. But these planes have not, he understands, dropped bombs on Chaoyang nor other towns.

In spite of the increased activity of the Volunteers in the Jehol-Shanhaikuan area, there is, in his opinion, no reason to anticipate the outbreak of serious hostilities in that region. The Japanese troops at Shanhaikuan have received no important reinforcements, the garrison at Shanhaikuan amounting to one division as hitherto. Furthermore, the Japanese Army is for the present hardly in position to undertake a campaign in Jehol in view of the employment of its troops elsewhere.

The activities of the Volunteers are entirely instigated by Chang Hsueh-liang. The Nanking Government not only has refrained from encouraging them, but has even taken steps to restrain them. The recent attitude of T'ang Yu-lin has been very satisfactory from the Japanese and "Manchoukuo" point of view.

The present bandit suppression drive in the Antung area is proving distinctly more difficult than the preceding drives in other areas. This time the bandits are as a rule putting up considerable fight, due chiefly to the fact that they are surrounded with no chance to escape as in former drives; and consequently the casualties are unusually heavy on both sides. The press story of heavy fighting near Tsemuchuang (柞木莊), north of

Antung

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


Antung, and the practical annihilation of a section of Japanese infantry is correct.

In spite of the difficulties encountered, it is hoped that the present drive will be successfully concluded in a few days. The next bandit campaign on the program will probably be in the area confined by the railways connecting Mukden, Tahushan, Tungliac and Ssupingkai, following which a drive in the lower Liaohsi area may be very likely be made.

The report of a recent serious instance of bandit treachery at a point along the Mukden-Hailung railroad is true. Details of the incident were as follows: A few days ago a group of about 600 bandits informed the Manchoukuo garrison commander at Panshih of their desire to lay down their arms and become peaceful citizens. As usual to celebrate the occasion, an appropriate ceremony was arranged, to which were invited a battalion of Japanese troops. When the latter appeared on the ground the bandits suddenly attacked them. Very heavy fighting ensued, in the course of which the Japanese suffered about 25 and the bandits about 300 casualties.

A. S. Chase,
American Consul.

American Consulate General,
Mukden, Manchuria,
December 24, 1932.

A true copy of
the signed original.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 23 1933

Department of State

A note has been received by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom from the Chinese Government calling attention to an alleged abuse by the Japanese in their action at Shanghai of the special privileges accorded them under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

His Majesty's Government consider that it would be desirable that the Powers signatory of the Boxer Protocol should represent in a friendly manner to the Japanese Government their anxiety that the régime set up by this Protocol, in which they are directly interested, should be observed independently of any consideration arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Sir Ronald Lindsay is instructed to ascertain the views of the United States Government and to inform them at the same time that instructions have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to speak in the above sense to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as his French, United States, Italian, Spanish, Belgian and Netherlands colleagues have been similarly instructed.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
January 23rd, 1933.

JAN 24 1933

F/HS

793.94/5794

793.94
note
793.00

Handled to Mr.
by Mr. [unclear]
[unclear] 23-24
[unclear]

FE/4
DCR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Washington,
 January 24, 1933.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (England)

21 Your 6, Jan. 10, 7 p.m. /5734 A-1 and Department's 13, Jan. 13, 7 p.m.
 One. The Department has received an aide-memoire

under date January 23 from the British Embassy stating
 (a) that His Majesty's Government has received a note from
 the Chinese Government inviting attention to an alleged
 abuse by the Japanese in their action at Shanhaikwan of the
 special privileges accorded them under the Boxer Protocol
 of 1901 and (b) that His Majesty's Government consider
 that it would be desirable for the powers signatory to
 that Protocol to make representations in a friendly
 manner to the Japanese Government expressing their
 anxiety that the régime set up by this Protocol should
 be observed independent of any consideration arising out
 of the Sino-Japanese conflict; and inquiring with regard
 to the views of this Government. The aide-memoire concludes
 with a statement that the British Ambassador at Tokyo
 already has instructions to speak to the Japanese Minister
 for Foreign Affairs in the above sense as soon as his
 American, French, Italian, Spanish, Belgian and
 Netherlands colleagues have been similarly instructed.

Two. The Department is replying today to the British

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

F/HS
 793.94/5794

793.94/5794
 note
 793.00

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Ambassador here substantially as follows:

(Begin Gray) QUOTE Referring to the British Embassy's side-memoire of January 23 the Department, while desiring that the American Government act in cooperation as far as possible and practicable with the other powers concerned, would welcome, before expressing its views with regard to this proposed action, specific information with regard to the alleged abuse by the Japanese in their action at Shanhaikwan of the special privileges accorded them under the Protocol of 1901. The Department would welcome some indication of the British Government's views with regard to the objective to be sought in the making of such representations, some exposition of the British Government's ideas with regard to what should be the substance and composition of the proposed friendly representations, if and when made, and the British Government's estimate of the likelihood that such representations would be of any advantageous effect. UNQUOTE (End Gray)

Three. A memorandum ^{similar in purport to the note} ~~but not repeat not a note similar~~ ^{British} to that referred to in the Embassy's side-memoire was received by the American Minister at Peiping from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 10. The Department under date January 14 instructed the Minister that, as this

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

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Washington,

- 3 -

memorandum asks nothing, the Department views it as a Chinese declaration, made for the purpose of record, and that, therefore, it requires no repeat no reply. The Minister was also instructed that the Department had no repeat no objection to the Counselor at Nanking informing the Chinese authorities orally of that view.

Four. At the time the Chinese memorandum referred to was handed to a representative ^{at Nanking} of the Legation, ~~_____~~ an officer of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informally and orally suggested that the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol of 1901 should attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government from abusing its privileges under that Protocol. With regard to that suggestion, the Department orally informed the Chinese Legation here that in its opinion the circumstances of the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan flowed from factors in the conflict between China and Japan and not repeat not from provisions of the Protocol of 1901 and that, if developments should involve provisions of that Protocol, the American Government would give consideration to those developments as the necessity arose and in the light of this Government's rights and obligations thereunder.

Five. The Department has no repeat no very definite
 Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

information that the Japanese have actually taken abusive advantage of their position under the Protocol of 1901. To the Department it would seem advisable to refrain from making representations, whether to the Japanese or to the Chinese or to both, until there shall have occurred or shall be imminent developments clearly and indisputably involving or threatening to involve provisions of the Protocol or of arrangements thereunder. To raise the question on general grounds or on the basis of a disputable allegation would, in the opinion of the Department, give the Japanese an opportunity to make a denial and/or to reply with a suggestion that the other signatory powers make representations to China requesting that China observe the letter of certain provisions of or under the Protocol which the Department feels it would be unfortunate to have invoked under existing circumstances.

Six. You should discuss this matter with the Foreign Office in the above sense, *keeping in mind the telegrams under reference and* expressly asking for information as requested in the Department's aide-memoire. *f.e.f.*

FE:JES/VDM

FE

Enciphered by *f.e.f.*

JAN. 24 1933 PM

Sent by operator *M.*

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Referring to the British Embassy's aide-memoire of January 23 expressing views of the British Government with regard to the possible desirability of making representations in a friendly manner to the Japanese Government expressive of anxiety in connection with alleged abuses of privileges at Shanhaikwan, --

The Department, while desiring that the American Government act in cooperation as far as possible and practicable with the other powers concerned, would welcome, before expressing its views with regard to this proposed action, specific information with regard to the alleged abuse by the Japanese in their action at Shanhaikwan of the special privileges accorded them under the Protocol of 1901. The Department would welcome some indication of the British Government's views with regard to the objective to be sought in the making of such representations, some exposition of the British Government's ideas with regard to what should be the substance and composition of the proposed friendly representations, if and when made, and the British Government's estimate of the likelihood that such representations would be of any advantageous effect.

Department of State,

Washington, January 24, 1933.

793.94/5794

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

F/HS

793.94/5794

FE/A

Handed to
Mr. Thompson
2-24-33
SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 7 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 13 1933

January 7, 1933.

DIVISION OF

CONVERSATIONS AND RECORDS

Mr. Anching Kung, Chinese Charge
and Mr. Hornbeck.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

Subject: Rumors from China with Regard to Possible
Withdrawal of China from League of Nations
and Breaking of Diplomatic Relations with
Japan.

793.94
note
500C 801

Mr. Kung telephoned me this morning and stated that
he has received a cable from the Nanking Government stating
that rumors which have appeared in the press to the effect
that China is considering the possibility of withdrawing
from the League of Nations and the possibility of breaking
off diplomatic relations with Japan are altogether unfounded.


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FILED
JAN 18 1933

SKH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Handed to Mr. Castle by
Mr. Bourgeois I-13-33.

Secy

[the Chinese]

FE
DCR
FE/4

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs asks the Ambassador whether the Chinese Government has sent to the American Government a memorandum requesting for himself the right to deal with any situation arising from an abusive interpretation by the Japanese of the rights which the international troops are enjoying from the dispositions of the 1901 Protocol and from the exchange of notes of the 15-18 July 1902.

According to the point of view of the French Government, it is only to ensure the liberty of communication between Peking and the Sea and to avoid a contact between the Chinese and foreign troops that these agreements have entrusted the guard of the railway to the international troops and have forbidden the Chinese troops from approaching less than two miles from the railroad tracks and less than 20 lis from Tientsin.

The French Government would like to know whether the American Government will not consider it necessary that the signatory Powers of those agreements safeguard the regime instituted in 1902 by making known to the Japanese Government their wish that the dispositions of such agreements be observed, notwithstanding any consideration concerning the present conflict.

F/H/S

793.94/5796

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

On the other hand, the French Government would like to know whether, in case the Japanese troops would make an advance on Peking, the American Government would be ready to give its approval to a proposal examined last September by the various Ministers in China and which provides for a neutralisation of the City or of the diplomatic quarters.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 16, 1933.

U:
Mr. Castle:

There is attached hereto an informal memorandum to assist you in replying to Mr. Bousquet's informal memorandum handed to you on January 13, which is also attached.

You might care to hand Mr. Bousquet the original of this memorandum, retaining the blue copy for our files.

not

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 16 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

J. E. J.
EJ/VDM

0800

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Original handed to Mr. Bousquet
of the French Embassy Jan. 17,
1933.

W.R.C.

FE/HA

With regard to the inquiry whether the Chinese Government has sent to the American Government a memorandum disclaiming responsibility for any situation which may result from the exercise by the Chinese defensive forces of their legitimate right to resist aggressive action by Japanese troops taking advantage of their special privileges under the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the Department was informed on January 10, 1933, by the American Minister at Peiping that such a memorandum had been received. The Department on January 14, informed the Minister that it views this memorandum as a declaration by the Chinese Government made for the purpose of record and that, therefore, the declaration required no reply.

With regard to the statement giving the view of the French Government as to the purpose of the pertinent provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and the "Conditions for the Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin" of July 15, 1902, namely, that these provisions were designed to insure open communications between Peiping and the sea and to avoid contact between Chinese and foreign troops, the Department is in substantial accord with that view. With regard, however, to the "Conditions" referred to, the Department desires to point out that the American Government was not formally a party to these "Conditions";

and,

F/H

793.94/5796

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and, although the American Government has on occasion cooperated with the powers signatory to those "Conditions", in the spirit thereof, the Department feels that, in consequence of developments in China during the period since these agreements were concluded, and in the light of acquiescence by the powers on various occasions in activities by Chinese military forces in disregard of the letter of certain features of those provisions, and in view of existing circumstances in general, it can no longer with warrant be regarded as the mission of the foreign armed forces in China to maintain a constantly open highway of communications between Peiping and the sea, their mission now being rather that of special protection to the nationals and property of the Protocol powers and readiness to afford an armed escort in case at any time a policy of evacuation were decided upon.

With regard to the inquiry whether the American Government would not consider it necessary that the powers signatory to the documents referred to make known to the Japanese Government that the régime instituted by the provisions of those documents should be observed, the view of the Department is that, if Japan should take advantage of her rights under these provisions to conduct operations against Chinese forces, the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol and to the "Conditions" would be justified

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

justified in making an announcement that, in their opinion, Japan's action could not in any way with warrant be based on the provisions of the Protocol and the "Conditions" and/or in making representations to Japan in the premises. The Department doubts whether the Japanese Government, if it is determined to make further invasion of Chinese territory, would pay any attention to such a demarche by the interested Protocol powers, but the Department does not feel that this should deter the powers from making an announcement of their views or a reservation of their rights.

With regard to the inquiry whether the American Government would be ready to give approval to the plan studied last September by the interested Ministers at Peiping for a neutralization of the Peiping and Tientsin areas, the Department, although it does not view this idea with as much favor as it did last autumn, would not be opposed to assisting in the proposal of such a plan if the Chinese, to a portion of whose territory it would relate, were to indicate a desire on their part for such an arrangement and/or if the other interested powers were to suggest it as a plan thought best designed to protect foreign interests in the present emergency.

FE:JEN/VDM
1-16-33

FE

Original handed to
Mr. Bingham
Jan 17, 1933.
JLH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

*Paraphrase sent
to ONI + MID*

FROM PEIPING

Dated January 25, 1933.

Recd 3:26 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 25 1933
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State
Washington.

File
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 25 1933
Department of State

85, January 25, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 80, January 24, 11 a.m. / 5792

Nanking reports Young Marshal remaining Nanking temporarily. Local situation remains obscure. I find it difficult to understand motives inspiring statements to newspaper correspondents regarding direct negotiations as I have seen nothing in present situation which would lead me to believe that it has changed sufficiently to enable Nanking Government to enter into direct negotiations in the face of public feeling in the South.

Mukden reports under date of January 23, 4 p.m.

"From that source groups of two or three hundred Japanese soldiers are arriving in South Manchuria according to reliable information almost every day. From the same source it has been learned that part of the Sixth Division has been concentrated at Chengchiatun ostensibly for an anti-bandit drive and that new conscripts for all units in Manchuria, amounting in some cases to half

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- # 85, from Peiping, January 25, 1933.

half the strength of the units, are expected to arrive in Manchuria about February 1st."

I have asked Mukden to confirm reports here of evidence in Manchuria of relinquishment of Japan's intention to invade Jehol.

Tientsin's January 23, 3 p.m., indicates continued Chinese troop movements.

It is of course possible that Japan may have been angling for direct negotiations through Tuan Chi Jui offering Jehol as a bait. I am persuaded however that public opinion is still at such ~~delirious~~ pitch that it would be dangerous for Chinese leaders to admit defeat and accept Japanese terms. Censors have prevented any displaying of these reports here but have passed telegrams to the United States and Europe where I understand they have been much played up.

JOHNSON

CIB JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 26 1933

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 25, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

According to a report from Nanking Chang Hsueh-liang is staying temporarily at Nanking. The situation at Peiping is still obscure. The Minister states that he finds it hard to understand the causes which inspire statements to newspaper correspondents concerning direct negotiations as he has not seen anything in the situation as it is at present which would cause him to believe that it has changed enough to enable the Government at Nanking, in view of the public attitude in the South, to enter into direct negotiations.

On January 23 Mukden reported that according to reliable information, nearly every day Japanese soldiers in groups of two or three hundred arrive in South Manchuria. It has also been learned that a section of the Sixth Division has been concentrated, apparently for an anti-bandit drive, at Chengchiatun and that new recruits for all groups in Manchuria, in some cases amounting to half the strength of the units, are expected to reach Manchuria in about a week.

A report from Tientsin under date January 23 points to continued troop movements by the Chinese.

The Minister states that it is of course possible that Japan, by offering Jehol as a lure, may have been aiming for direct negotiations through Tuan Chi-jui. The Minister adds, however, that he believes that it would be unsafe for the

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chinese leaders to admit defeat and to accept the terms of the Japanese as public opinion is still at a high pitch. The display of these reports at Peiping has been prevented by censors but the latter have passed telegrams to the United States and Europe where, the Minister understands, much has been made of them.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 25, 1933

Rec'd 5:42 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

89, January 25, 4 p. m.

My 85, January 25, noon.

Marshal Chang believed to have returned yesterday.

JOHNSON

RR

HPD

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 25 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94 / 5798

793.94

FILED

JAN 27 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated January 26, 1933.

Recd 1:32 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

92, January 26, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"January 25, noon. All available information
indicates that drive on Jehol has not been canceled but
that preparations therefor are not yet completed.
February or early part of March is regarded in well
informed circles as the best season for the drive. It is
understood that major disposition of troops at vantage
points has already taken place.

(BEGIN GRAY) Seven heavy bombers bombarded volunteers
in the vicinity of Kailu on the twenty-third. On the
same day bandit clearing operations started in the
Liaohsi area southwest of Mukden in which Manchukuo
troops reenforced with Japanese units are being used."

CIB JS

JOHNSON

FILED

JAN 30 1933

F/H/S

793.94/5799

793.94

note

793 01 Mukden

FE

Paraphrase sent to
ONIR MID

FROM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 28 1933

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated January 26, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

American Consul General at Mukden reports January 25, noon, as follows:

Drive on Jehol has not been cancelled according to all information available, but preparations for it are not yet in order. It is considered in well informed circles that the best season for the drive will be in February or the early part of March. Major disposition of troops at vantage points has already taken place, it is reported.

Seven heavy bombers bombarded volunteers in the vicinity of Kailu on the twenty-third. On the same day bandit clearing operations started in Liaohsi area southwest of Mukden in which Manchukuo troops reenforced with Japanese units are being used.

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February

To the American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period January 19 to January 31, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:
 Two copies of digest
 of telegrams.

793.94/5799

793.94/5799

FE:EQC:KC

1/31/33

FE

1933



Handwritten signature

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
January 19 to January 31, 1933.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 19) that during the preceding two days Chinese troop movements through Tientsin eastward have been very small, but reports from Chinwangtao state that the Chinese continue to strengthen their lines in that vicinity.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 20) that since January 19, three trains of Chinese troops, one, and perhaps the other two also, from Shantung, passed through Tientsin to Lwanchow (about 45 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan) and that, although conditions are quiet at Tientsin, there is still considerable anxiety among the Chinese population.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 21) that according to information obtained by an American army officer from the Chinese commander at Shihmenchai, no fighting has taken place there or at any of the other neighboring passes through the Great Wall north or northwest of Shanhaikwan. The Consul General adds that the Chinese commander stated positively that no Japanese troops have passed south of the Wall in that vicinity except at Shanhaikwan.

The Minister at Peiping reports (January 23) that at Peiping, Tientsin and Shanhaikwan all is quiet; that reports from Chinwangtao on January 20 indicate that all is quiet there, at Lwanchow and at Shihmenchai. According to the Chinese commander at Shihmenchai, "Manchoukuo" forces comprise the majority of troops between him and the Great Wall.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Consul General at Tientsin reports (January 23) that within the past 48 hours seven trains of Chinese troops and several trains of supplies and munitions have moved eastward through Tientsin and that there is no change at Chinwangtao.

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The Consul General at Mukden reports (January 25) that on January 23, seven heavy bombers bombarded volunteers near Kailu (about 125 miles northwest of Mukden) and operations by "Manchoukuo" troops, reinforced by Japanese, began to clear bandits from the Liaohsi area southwest of Mukden.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY

JAN 9 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 14 1933

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 7, 1933.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 9 - 1933

Department of State


793.94
MARSHAL Chang Hsiao-Liang sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 7, the gist of which is as follows:

The treachery which attended the occurrences at Shan-haikwan shows clearly that the Japanese were executing a pre-conceived and well perfected plan of military aggression and territorial aggrandizement in China. The occurrences, therefore, cannot be regarded as a local affair and have no possibility of being locally settled.

The Japanese, while carrying out their plan of military aggression, also tried to spread the rumor that they were willing to negotiate peace. The fact is that they have not been able to concentrate their reinforcements at the front and that they intended to slow up the Chinese preparation for defense. Moreover, the Japanese have repeatedly attempted to stir up ill feeling among the Chinese and at the same time tried to blindfold the eyes of the world. In reality, the rumor now being spread by the Japanese with regard to their intention to negotiate peace with China has no foundation in fact.

Now that we have discovered their treacherous schemes, we feel confident that we will not fall into their trap. We are laying out our defense according to our original plans and will resist any further aggression by the Japanese.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 7, 1933.



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JAN 16 1933

MICROCOPY

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