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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS

BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 23

1930-39

793.94/5801-6100
Jan.-Mar. 1933

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON: 1975

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
Class 2. Extradition.
Class 3. Protection of Interests.
Class 4. Claims.
Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 9, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 9 - 1933
Department of State

A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 9, 1933.

793.94

Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang, in an interview given to Chinese and foreign correspondents, declared:

"Since international peace efforts appear to have ceased to be effective, I see no way to maintain peace and protect China except through sacrificing our lives and blood."

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 9, 1933.

793.94/5801
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1085/1144

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE JAN 17 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY JAN 10 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 10, 1933.

~~Mr. Castle:~~

~~Mr. Secretary:~~

SECRETARY OF STATE JAN 12 1933

793.94

As the situation appears now, in the Far East on the one hand and in the Occident on the other, I am inclined to believe that Chang Hsueh-liang's estimate is, in so far as the "protection of China" is concerned, correct. With regard to "maintaining peace" as between China and Japan, the peace was broken on September 18, 1931 and to all intents except those of the technicalities of international law it has been in process of complete disruption ever since. There is at this moment no question of its "maintenance", the real question being that of preserving what there is left of it (and later of restoring it). It is my opinion that, at this stage, nothing short of a threat by the world (or some two or three major powers) of intervention by the use of some form of force would offer any likely chance of preventing a substantial increase in the near future of the intensity of the hostilities which have been in progress between Japan and China during the past fifteen months.

FILED JAN 16 1933

FE:SKH/ZMF

F/HS 793.94/5802

0002

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

from Chinese Legation
Jan. 11, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 11 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 12 1933
DIVISION OF

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 11 1933
Department of State

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

DATED JANUARY 10, 1933

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

F/HS
793.94/5803

Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang, in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported as follows:

According to a telegraphic report from General Yu Hsueh- Chung on January 9, General Yu met the English acting Counsul in a dinner party on the previous day during which the English Counsul expressed the hope that the Shanhaikwan affair could be peacefully settled and that the settlement could be fashioned after that of Shanghai, that is, under the good offices of England, the United States, France and Italy. General Yu thanked him for his kind efforts and expressed the opinion that no attempt at a settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair could be made unless the Japanese consented to a return of the status quo ante.

General Ho Chu-Kuo reported on January 8 that an English and a Japanese naval commander offered their good offices for the settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair and wished to get our view of the situation.

Commander Tien at Tientsin reported that Colonel Nakamura, the Japanese officer now stationed at Tientsin, had been appointed by the Japanese government to take full charge of the negotiation with China.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking replied to Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang saying that the Shanhaikwan affair, being only one aspect of a threefold problem, is totally different from the Shanghai affair and cannot be locally settled. The Ministry immediately sent Vice-Minister Liu Chung-Chieh to Peiping to confer with Marshal Chang. Marshal Chiang Kai-Sheik and Finance Minister T. V. Soong concurred with the principle stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister Soong, moreover, had announced, under the name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the Shanhaikwan affair cannot be settled locally.

FILED
JAN 26 1933

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 10, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 11 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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JAN 13 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 11 1933
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

from Chinese Legation
Jan. 11. 1933

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CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 10, 1933

Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an interview to-day, categorically denied the Tokyo report that in accordance with Chinese proposals negotiations will open shortly for a settlement of the Shanghaikwan affair and that General Ho Chu-Kuo will represent Marshal Chang Hsiao-Liang in this coming negotiation.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 10, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/5804

FILED

JAN 28 1933

0004

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 13 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 14 1933
Department of State

Rec'd from Chinese Legation
I-12-33

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 12, 1933.

793.94

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegraphic report from Tokyo dated January 12 as follows:

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 13 1933

Noticing that their occupation of Shanhaikwan and their aggression against Chumen did not produce any noticeable reaction in other countries, the Japanese War Department made public on January 11 an interview to the effect that Jehol is the territory of the puppet government in the Three Eastern Provinces, that any move in Jehol will be considered as an aggressive and disturbing measure against the puppet government which calls for suppression in self-defense, and that no other nation will be allowed to interfere with these defensive measures.

These allegations prove conclusively that Japan has definite designs upon Jehol.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 12, 1933.

F/HS
793.94/5805
FILED
JAN 14 1933

0005

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 16, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 16 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1933
Department of State

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 15, 1933

793.94

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 17 1933

The Chinese Consul-General at Khabarovsk, U.S.S.R., reported by wire to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as follows:

The Japanese have occupied Hulin. General Li Tu and General Wang Teh-Lin, with a train of more than three thousand troops, have retreated into Soviet territory.

The rumor that General Ting Chao has surrendered to the Japanese has no foundation in fact.

The rumor that the commanding officers of Japan and China have entered into direct negotiation for a settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair is again Japanese propaganda, attempting to create the impression that they are willing to localize the affair in order that the world may excuse her from her militaristic activities at Shanhaikwan. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, with the concurrence of Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek and Finance Minister T. V. Soong, had announced the principle on January 10 that the Shanhaikwan affair was only one aspect of a threefold problem, totally different from the Shanghai affair, and could not be locally settled.)

The Chinese Legation, Washington
January 15, 1933.

F/HS
793.94/5806

0006

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 18, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 19 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 18 1933
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 24 1933
NOTED

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 17, 1933

See p. 2

A telegram from Peiping reported that the Japanese attacked Shihmen Fort on January 15 but were repulsed by the Chinese and had to retreat toward Loo-Tze-Shu. The Chinese were garrisoning at Ying-Wu-Shan (the Parrot Mountain).

A telegram from Chengteh (Jehol City) reported that on January 14 eight Japanese aeroplanes arrived at Shah-Wa, carrying with them over forty bombs and causing many casualties. Again, on January 15, a Japanese aeroplane, carrying four bombs, reconnoitered over Shah-Wa. The Chinese command had ordered the troops under General Feng Chan-hai, now stationed at Shah-Wa, to be prepared for a Japanese attack on Suidoo and Fuhsin.

A telegram from Tientsin reported that the Japanese Army had despatched Colonel Umezu to Tientsin to confer with General Nakamura on military matters. It was also reported that a group of Japanese good-for-nothings and spies had arrived at the Japanese Concession at Tientsin and were holding secret meetings in various hotels.

A telegram from Shanghai reported that, according to reliable information, the Japanese Chief-of-Staff and the War Department, after a conference, had decided to postpone their attack on Jehol to the early part of March. This postponement

F/HS
793.94/5807
JAN 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

was due to the bitterly cold weather and the mountainous terrace of Jehol. It was also learned that the Japanese expected disturbances to occur in the Peiping-Tientsin area simultaneous with their occupation of Shanhaikwan on January 1. Quite unexpectedly, no disturbance occurred in these cities and they were still planning an uprising in Tientsin.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 18, 1933

0008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 21 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 21 1933
NOTED

793.94

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 20, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1933
Department of State

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TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 19, 1933.

A telegram from Peiping reported that the situation at Shanhaikwan remains unchanged after the Japanese occupation. It was also reported that the Chinese mobilization against the Japanese in the battle of Shanhaikwan was unprecedentedly efficient, a fact which bears testimony to the great enthusiasm with which the Chinese forces met their foe. After they entered the city of Shanhaikwan, the Japanese soldiers proceeded to commit every outrage that is conceivable, which includes, among others, the robbing of the city, the violation of women, and the killing of more than twenty Chinese policemen by machine gun in a most horrible manner.

A telegram from Shanghai reported that, according to reliable information, the Japanese are now actively preparing for their invasion of Jehol and that the time chosen for that invasion seems to be in the early part of March. Their plan of invasion has already been decided upon, with the troops of the puppet government as advanced guards and with Japanese soldiers reinforcing them. The Japanese, moreover, are still engaged in their secret design upon Peiping and Tientsin, hoping to stir up disturbances there to facilitate their invasion of Jehol.

A telegram from Chengteh (Jehol City) reported that the situation there has been very tense after the Japanese aerial attack upon Kailu. Three Japanese aeroplanes were

F/HS
793.94/5808

0009

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

seen reconnoitering over Kailu at 11:00 a. m., January 16, investigating the Chinese lines of defense. This was followed by another aeroplane which dropped several bombs into the eastern section of the city, killing some five or six civilians and some ten beasts of burden. Later on, another Japanese aeroplane was seen circling over Ching-Chia-Dien, a town to the east of Kailu, investigating Chinese defensive works. It was also learned that Japanese aeroplanes had been reconnoitering over the city of Peipiao and its vicinity, occasionally dropping bombs into the city. Large units of Japanese soldiers have been massed at Tungliao in preparation for an assault upon Kailu.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 20, 1933.

0010

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
1/23/33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 23 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 23 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 22, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 24 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Foreign Minister Lo Wen-kan made the following statement today:

So far as Count Uchida's speech dealt with Japan's Manchurian adventure, it gave another conclusive proof that Japan was yet far from having awakened from her dream of military conquest and territorial aggrandizement.

793.94
893.01
Manchuria

Several months had elapsed since Count Uchida made his first important speech on the Far Eastern situation last August but apparently there was no abatement in the Japanese Foreign Minister's open defiance of the authority of the League of Nations, of the sanctity of international agreements, and of the validity of all the ordinary principles of international law. Count Uchida again dwelt upon the theme of "Manchukuo", attempting not only to justify its existence but also to demonstrate the possibility of its further expansion. He even openly declared Japan's determination to invade Jehol.

There was no need to waste any more words on Japan's preposterous arguments for they had been answered very conclusively not only by the Chinese Government but by the Lytton Commission as well.

"So far as China is concerned, her position is very clear. 'Manchukuo', created and maintained by Japan, must go and China must reassert her sovereign power over the

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0011

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Three Eastern Provinces. There can be no conciliation nor reconciliation nor any prospect of settlement until and unless Japan's puppet regime is declared illegal and discontinued."

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 22, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 28, 1933.

~~Mr. Castle~~:
~~Mr. Secretary~~:

This is a memorandum taking position contra permitting the United States to be drawn in (or pushed in) as a "go-between" toward effecting a settlement between Japan and China of their controversy.

SKH:CLS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 28 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 30 1933
NOTED

0013

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 30 1933 Department of State

January 26, 1933.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Reference Peiping's 94, January 26, 1 p.m. (attached).

SECRETARY OF STATE JAN 30 1933 NOTED

793.94/5810

note 793.94119

Mr. Johnson's (a) opinion that an effort will be made to direct attention to the United States as the possible third party which might become the "go-between" in the effort to bring China and Japan into negotiations and his (b) surmise that it may be Soviet Russia that the Chinese have in mind for that rôle suggest the desirability that we give consideration to the question: What should be our attitude toward an effort which may be made to draw us in or to induce us to volunteer in a "go-between" capacity?

It is the belief of the undersigned that, from point of view of serving the interests of the United States and contributing in fact to the cause of peace, the action taken by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 in bringing about peace negotiations between Japan and Russia at Portsmouth and in influencing the course of those negotiations has resulted in more of harm than of good. President Roosevelt, ~~secretly~~ when asked by the Japanese to do so, proposed that hostilities be suspended and negotiations be begun, and he brought pressure to bear upon

F/HS F.W. 793.94/5810

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0014

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

upon a reluctant Russia, at a moment when Japan was almost exhausted and the Russians felt that they were just beginning to be ready to fight. The Russians have ever since felt resentment over the matter. During the Portsmouth negotiations, President Roosevelt brought pressure to bear on the Japanese to give up the demand which they were making for an indemnity. Japan's rulers ~~have ever since~~ later represented to the Japanese people that the United States had cheated them out of an indemnity to which they were entitled. Thus, ~~ever since~~ the Japanese people were given one basis for resentment ~~also have been resentful~~ against the United States. The conclusion of peace at that time and under those circumstances rendered Manchuria an area in which, instead of one foreign sphere of interest (Russian) as before, there were thereafter two foreign spheres of interest (the Russian in the north and the Japanese in the south); and it involved a new concession on the part of an unwilling China, in the form of a confirmation by China (in the Treaty of Peking of December, 1905) of the transfers which had been made of rights, titles and privileges by Russia to Japan. The consequences have not been satisfactory. The treaties of 1905 settled nothing, but they paved the way for such developments as Japan's "twenty-one demands" upon China in 1915, her assault upon China as prosecuted during the past sixteen months, the present situation, and much

more

0015

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

more trouble yet to come. Had the military contest between Japan and Russia been permitted to continue, the issues might have remained matters of concern to the three Asiatic powers. In consequence of the interference of President Roosevelt and the conditions and provisions of the treaties which were thereby brought about, the issues have become world issues, Japan has become a world power, and the United States is confronted today with the presence on the other side of the Pacific Ocean of a maritime power strong enough to be a substantial commercial competitor, a political rival, and, in consequence of many factors, a potential military antagonist.

It is believed that our attitude toward any suggestion that the United States assume the rôle of a "go-between" or mediator in connection with the present controversy between Japan and China should be one of great caution. There is not possible at present any lasting solution of the Manchuria problem. The problem will ultimately be solved by the play and interplay of forces between and among the three most concerned Asiatic states, China, Japan and Russia. No artificial settlement which might be devised and might conceivably be accepted (with mental reservations) by the Chinese and the Japanese within the next few months or years could possibly be lasting. Any such settlement would have to

be

0016

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

be made at the expense of China. It would have to be a settlement in which Japan is given less than she demands. The net result would be dissatisfaction with it on the part both of China and of Japan. Both of those countries would feel the opposite of gratitude toward the go-between.

Moreover, the United States has the reputation in Japan of being unduly friendly to China and hostile to Japan. In the event of a settlement being arrived at which is particularly disappointing to the Japanese, there would be the feeling on the part of the Japanese that the United States had tipped the scales in China's favor.

~~Indeed,~~ It may be doubted whether the Japanese would without great reluctance assent to the assumption by the United States of the position of go-between. In case they should assent, the fact of their doing so would need to be regarded as implying that they have lost confidence in their power to put through the program upon which they have embarked and that they, in extremity, feel that we, if placed in a position of trust, would go out of our way to see that concessions are made to them (just as President Roosevelt did at the time of the Portsmouth negotiations).

It is believed that we should prepare to anticipate events as far as possible by diverting thought, in connection

0017

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

nection with the question of a possible go-between, from the United States toward some other country. That country might, as Mr. Johnson seems to think, be Russia. For a number of reasons, it might well be Great Britain.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

0018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated January 26, 1933

Rec'd 5:09 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 30 1933
NOTED

94, January 26, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 85, January 25, noon. Y. D. Shen, director of publicity for the Young Marshal, informed the United Press correspondent last night that Tuan Chi Jue was given peace proposals by responsible Japanese presumably military at Tientsin before he left for Nanking and that Tuan asked Chiang Kai Shek whether he would receive the proposals. Chiang invited Tuan to go to Nanking. Chang Hsueh Liang joined Chiang and Tuan at Nanking and as a result of discussion there it was decided,

(a) - That China must await results of deliberations of the League Committee of Nineteen before attempting to find some other solution.

(b) - China will not withdraw from League as China cannot expect more than League has and is doing and China would lose rather than gain by such a move.

(c) - Some third nation may act as go-between to inaugurate negotiations and then there would be no hampering of legalities nor control by covenants and treaties.

(d) -

0019

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#94 from Peiping, Jan. 26, 1 p.m.

(d) - Perhaps if some third power were to come forward to act as a go-between China would accept the bid.

Two. Publicity bureau of Nanking Foreign Office telegraphed Peiping United Press correspondent denial that direct peace negotiations were under consideration.

Three. It is my opinion that an effort will be made to direct attention to the United States as the possible third party upon whom the Chinese Government can fasten the responsibility of inaugurating direct conversations for it is admitted that no Chinese authority dare entertain such a proposal on his own responsibility in the face of popular reaction to admission of diplomatic and military failure and there has been a tendency here and abroad to think of the United States as the natural heir of the League's failure. I am inclined to the opinion, however, that Soviet Russia may be the power that they have ultimately in mind as the Soviets are not bound by the Covenant of the League, are not committed to any announced policy and are in an excellent position to play the part of go-between as they have much to gain by reaching profitable arrangements with both sides.

WSB-KLP JOHNSON

0020

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Dated January 26, 1933

Rec'd 5:09 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 28 1933
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 26 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

94, January 26, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94/5797

My 85, January 25, noon. Y. D. Shen, director of publicity for the Young Marshal, informed the United Press correspondent last night that Tuan Chi Jue was given peace proposals by responsible Japanese presumably military at Tientsin before he left for Nanking and that Tuan asked Chiang Kai Shek whether he would receive the proposals. Chiang invited Tuan to go to Nanking. Chang Hsueh Liang joined Chiang and Tuan at Nanking and as a result of discussion there it was decided,

(a) - That China must await results of deliberations of the League Committee of Nineteen before attempting to find some other solution.

(b) - China will not withdraw from League as China cannot expect more than League has and is doing and China would lose rather than gain by such a move.

(c) - Some third nation may act as go-between to inaugurate negotiations and then there would be no hampering of legalities nor control by covenants and treaties.

(d) -

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JAN 31 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#94 from Peiping, Jan. 26, 1 p.m.

(d) - Perhaps if some third power were to come forward to act as a go-between China would accept the bid.

Two. Publicity bureau of Nanking Foreign Office telegraphed Peiping United Press correspondent denial that direct peace negotiations were under consideration.

Three. It is my opinion that an effort will be made to direct attention to the United States as the possible third party upon whom the Chinese Government can fasten the responsibility of inaugurating direct conversations for it is admitted that no Chinese authority dare entertain such a proposal on his own responsibility in the face of popular reaction to admission of diplomatic and military failure and there has been a tendency here and abroad to think of the United States as the natural heir of the League's failure. I am inclined to the opinion, however, that Soviet Russia may be the power that they have ultimately in mind as the Soviets are not bound by the Covenant of the League, are not committed to any announced policy and are in an excellent position to play the part of go-between as they have much to gain by reaching profitable arrangements with both sides.

WSB-KLP JOHNSON

0022

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5811

SEE 893.00 P. R. Nanking/58 FOR Despatch #D- 406.

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED December 21, 1932.
TO NAME

1-1127 ard

5811

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese relations.
Minister Soong invited the diplomatic representatives of the U. S., Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to his home on November 25th and formally denied to them the rumor that China intends to initiate direct negotiations with Japan.

hs

0023

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

2. Relations with Japan.

On November 25 T. V. Soong invited the diplomatic representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to his home and formally denied to them the rumor that China intends to initiate direct negotiations with Japan. He emphatically stated that it was up to the League to decide not only the future of the Three Eastern Provinces, but also to protect the principle of the sanctity of treaties and the existence of the League itself.

On November 11 the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS commented on the Japanese observations on the Lytton report. It said that "no clever doubling of words could palliate the facts that Japan has violated the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty, and that Japan's militarism has dealt a severe blow to modern civilization". It refuted the Japanese argument that Manchuria is not naturally or necessarily part of China by asserting that Manchuria has been part and parcel of China since the dawn of history and has always been recognized as such,

even

0024

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5812

SEE 893.00/12274 FOR Tel. # 79, 7 pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 23, 1933.
TO NAME

REGARDING:
Visit of Young Marshal and Tuan Chi Jui to Nanking being interpreted as indicating probability of initiation of direct negotiations with the Japanese.

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Peiping

Dated January 23, 1933.

Recd. 10:20 A. M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

893.00/12274

79, January 23, 7 P. M.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY.

My telegram No. 78, January 23, 4 P. M.

note
793.94

United Press representative tells me that information tonight from those near Young Marshal is that visit of Young Marshal and Tuan Chi Jui to Nanking may be interpreted as indicating probability of initiation of direct negotiations with the Japanese. Japanese Legation spokesman confirmed this to correspondent indicating that one of the conditions contingent to direct negotiations would be a change of administration here. Supposition is that Tuan will be chief negotiator. Chang Hsueh Liang expected to return tomorrow 24th.

RR WSB

JOHNSON

0026

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM London

Dated January 26, 1933.

Recd. 3:05 P. M.

793.94/5828

Tel. to London Feb 1, 1933

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 27 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED JAN 27 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94 Note 793.00

18, January 26, 5 P. M.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. In the absence of Sir 793.94/5794 John Simon I discussed informally Department's 21, January 24, 5 P. M., with Foreign Office division chief. I was informed that similar aides memoire to that referred to had been presented by British diplomatic missions to all those governments to whom the Chinese Government had handed their note in question but that so far the British Government had received no replies. Foreign Office informed me that they had as yet no definite information as to what had happened at Shanhaikwan or any facts tending to prove that Japan had abused her position under the more or less indeterminate scope of the protocols of 1901. The objective sought however in these proposed representations was to indicate to Tokyo the treaty powers continuing attitude in regard to the protocol of 1901 and to convey more or less warning as to the foreign powers interests in North China directly involved thereunder.

I then

F/HS

793.94/5813

FILED JUN 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I then briefly expressed the Department's position and also referred to that portion of Simon's note on this subject (see Embassy's 10, January 16, 11 a.m.) 793.94 Communism/739 giving his interpretation of the Shanhaikwan incident. Foreign Office expressed itself as appreciating the Department's queries and position set forth in its telegram 21, January 24, 5 p.m., and particularly the argument outlined in last sentence of paragraph five.

I venture, for the Department's strictly confidential information, to state my personal impression that it was with French concurrence in the proposal and under instigation from the city that British missions were instructed to deliver this aide memoire under the approval of Simon himself, with only lukewarm, if indeed any support from the permanent officials of the Foreign Office dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. I gathered Foreign Office opinion favored such added protection as British interests in Northern China might gain from the proposed representations to the Japanese, but tacitly admitted the strength of the point of view set forth in the last sentence of paragraph four and consequently were skeptical of the reaction in Tokyo of any representations made there in compliance with section B, paragraph one of your telegram.

MELLON

WSB

RR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 2, 1933.

~~EHD~~:
MMH:

Istanbul's despatch No. 298 of January 6, 1933, reports that a French owned and subsidized newspaper in Istanbul had published statements completely espousing the Japanese cause in the Shanhaikwan-Jehol questions.

~~EHD~~:KC

0029

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, January 6, 1933.

No. 298

SUBJECT: Pro-Japanese stand by French Istanbul newspaper.

793.94

AM FCDO
JAN 6 33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 27 1933
Department of State

F/HS
793.94/5814

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

It may be of interest to the Department to learn that the French owned and subsidized afternoon Istanbul newspaper, STAMBOUL, has today come out completely espousing the Japanese cause as opposed to the Chinese in the matter of the bombardment of Shanhaikwan in the province of Jehol, Manchuria, (copy enclosed). For some days the STAMBOUL has been leaning toward the Japanese, but this is the first time that they have so openly declared themselves. The other local papers frankly state that the Japanese side of the matter which they

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FEB 23 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

they today publish was handed to them by the Japanese Military Attaché in Istanbul, but Mr. Pierre le Goff, editor of the STAMBOUL, is not so frank.

Respectfully yours,

Charles H. Sherrill

CHARLES H. SHERRILL.

Enclosure:

1. Clipping from STAMBOUL, January 6, 1933.

COPY SENT E. I. C. PARIS

891
CHS:FM

0031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 298
dated January 6, 1933 from the Embassy at Istanbul.

Clipping from STAMBOUL, January 6, 1933.

Le conflit en Extrême-Orient

Stamboul 1/6/1933

Nouvel avertissement du Japon

(Dépêche particulière)

Genève, 5.— M. Sawada, directeur du bureau du Japon à la S. D. N. adressa au secretaire général une communication où il porta à sa connaissance la mobilisation des troupes de Chang-Sue-Liang vers le Jehol. Les autorités japonaises de Peiping considérant que l'invasion de cette province constitue une grave menace pour l'existence du Mantchouko, pouvant amener des conséquences très sérieuses, essayèrent de persuader le général de cesser son mouvement. La communication donne des détails complémentaires sur l'incident de Changhai-Kouan où des bombes furent jetées et des coups de feu tirés par les Chinois, puis sur le règlement pacifique de l'incident par une réunion des autorités. Or peu de temps après un détachement japonais se rendant à Mankouan fut reçu à coups de fusils et de grenades et eut un lieutenant et 2 hommes tués. Les Japonais ont alors été obligés de répondre et d'occuper Changhai-Kouan le 3 janvier à 14 heures. Le rapport termine ainsi ;

« L'incident se produisit à la suite d'une provocation chinoise qui allait compromettre la situation internationale du Japon étant donné qu'il s'est déroulé en connexion avec l'invasion du Jehol par les troupes chinoises. »

A Changhai on proteste

(Dépêche particulière)

Genève, 5.— Sur demande du docteur Yen, chef de la délégation chinoise le secrétaire général de la S. D. N. transmit au comité des „ 19 " la communication suivante :

« J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre le télégramme que je viens de recevoir des principales organisations publiques de Changhai pour communication » (Voici le télégramme) ;

« Le Japon concentre des troupes à la frontière du Jehol. La S. D. N. n'ayant pris aucune mesure défensive concernant le conflit sino-japonais, un nouvel atermoiement de la S D.N. rendrait inefficace tout le plan pouvant être arrêté ultérieurement en vue d'un règlement équitable. Conséquemment nous adressons un appel à la S.D.N. la priant de prendre immédiatement des mesures effectives pour éviter une nouvelle aggravation de la situation. » (Signé : Association des Chambres de commerce de Changhai, Association des banquiers de Changhai, Association des agents de change de Changhai).

Dans la vallée du Jéhol

Le Jéhol que les Chinois et les Japonais appellent Ching-Gli Ho est un fleuve qui prend sa source dans la région peu élevée (300 mètres au dessus du niveau de la mer) du Chi Laotu-Chan-Ling, en Mandchourie. Il passe sur le territoire chinois, descend dans la vallée du Hopei-Cheng, le grand jardin de la Chine et faisant une courbe gracieuse va se marier à la mer près du Lan Ho, sur le golfe du Pétchili sur un point qui en ligne droite rejoint Port-Arthur dit aujourd'hui Lu chun.

Il délimite ainsi la province dont Changhai-Kouan est la ville principale que certains reprochent au Japon d'avoir occupée.

Mais ce reproche est il mérité ? Poser la question c'est ouvrir le débat «sur le fond» comme on dit au Palais et il n'y a pas lieu de le faire aujourd'hui. Il suffira de remarquer que cette question complexe des événements en Extrême Orient est en somme une question de sécurité.

Quatre cents millions de Chinois sont travaillés par le communisme et les premiers résultats de cette activité on a pu les constater dans diverses directions.

Or le Japon entend à n'importe quel prix endiguer le flot qui grossit en Chine et qui est susceptible de déferler sur toute l'Asie.

Ce jour-là, dans une certaine mesure, la prophétie du reclus de Doorn sur le «péril jaune», se trouverait en voie de réalisation.

Le Japon dans son action est donc le défenseur de l'ordre en Asie et par répercussion en Europe et en Amérique. Envisagée de ce seul point de vue, l'action japonaise, incontestablement mérite l'approbation.

0032

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 27, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

Paris's despatch No. 3256 of January 16, 1933, reports "a flurry in the Chamber on Friday, January 13, which was quickly smothered by the Government", with regard to the Far Eastern situation.

Paris's despatch No. 3257 of January 16, 1933, gives press comment on this discussion in the Chamber, and on the last page reports a visit of two Japanese army officers on Humbert de Wendel of the Steel Trust.

I think you will wish to read these two despatches in full.

CLS:CLS

0033

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, January 16, 1933

No. 3256

Subject: Sino Japanese Conflict

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RECD JAN 26 33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 27 1933
Department of State

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 2 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/HS
793.94/5815

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report:

A flurry in the Chamber on Friday, January 13, which was quickly smothered by the Government gives the only recent public indication of the governmental and legislative attitude towards the Far Eastern problem.

In reply to the requests for interpellation made by the Socialists Henry Fontanier and Marius Moutet and the Communist Péri, M. Paul-Boncour, speaking as Foreign Minister for his Government declared vaguely that France in the Far Eastern conflict would "stand for justice and be governed by the right".

"It .....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

> "It would be difficult and highly improper for the Government before a session of the League of Nations to state in advance its opinion on a case which must be judged by the League of Nations itself," he said. "If however the Chamber wishes to know the attitude of the French Government in this long drawn out procedure looking to the solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict, I can state that it will stand for justice and be governed by the right".
>
> "In this connection France will uphold at the Disarmament Conference the necessity of organizing the league of Nations in such a way that it will be capable of having its decision respected. But even in its present state the Council of the League of Nations has done useful work notably in the Greco-Bulgare conflict and even in the Sino-Japanese affair during the attack on Shanghai the League of Nations stopped the belligerants in time."

Referring specifically to French policy in the Far East M. Paul-Boncour remarked:

> "French policy in the Far East will continue to extend justice and right to the Japanese whose friendship it (France) continues to value and China which is making a gruelling effort to found free institutions."

At the close of his speech the Premier cried dramatically:

> "The pact; nothing but the pact; the whole pact!"

The full text of M. Paul Boncour's statement with translation is enclosed.

The debate on Far Eastern policy was launched by M. Henry Fontanier speaking for the Socialist party. M. Fontanier supported by M. Leon Blum, M. Pierre Renaudel and Jean Longuet, the Socialist leaders, and seconded by M. Marius Moutet of the same party, demanded an immediate hearing on the Manchurian affair and in fact prompt minatory action by the

Government .....

0035

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Government.

M. Fontanier reasoned that some public indication of the feeling aroused in France by the Japanese aggression in Manchuria was necessary on the eve of the deliberations in Geneva - that is if the deliberations were to lead to anything concrete. To justify his request the Socialist deputy reviewed the recent events in the Far East and concluded that a state of war in reality existed today in that part of the world - "a war of conquest and spoils". He called attention to the Lytton Commission, cited the invasion of Jehol and stated that these acts involved a clear violation of the treaties solemnly incorporated in the law of nations since 1919 including the League Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war and the Washington treaties.

Continuing M. Fontanier stressed that the future of the League of Nations was at stake. The world would soon find out whether the League was prepared to do its duty or was anxious to become an accomplice of an aggression. The failure of the League to act would mean the death of the League of Nations. A League which refuses to say which party to a dispute is right and which is wrong has ceased to be a League. Moreover should the League disappear it would drag down with it the Disarmament Conference. The next step would be war in the Far East.

M. de Tastes, a deputy of the Left Republican group which includes MM. Flandin and Piétri among

its .....

0036

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

its members, briefly approved the demand for an immediate discussion of the Far Eastern problem apparently for the purpose of opposing to the Socialist theme a statement that China was "a geographical expression not an organized state" and indeed in the running exchange which followed he attempted to show that Nankin controls five or six provinces at the outset, that there was no Chinese Government in the usual sense of the word, that China had violated all its international obligations long before Japan embarked on the Manchurian campaign and in conclusion demanded to know whether the Government intended to respect the Franco-Japanese arrangement of June 10, 1907.

The Communist Péri also asked for an immediate consideration of the Far Eastern question and compared the French and Soviet Russian policies to the disadvantage of the former.

M. Ernest Outrey of the Radical Left also favored an immediate debate though indicating his belief that there was much to be said for both the Japanese and Chinese cases while M. Marius Moutet, closing the discussion, seconded his Socialist colleague, M. Fontanier, and deplored that the United States and Russia would not be present when the Far Eastern problem was presented for solution to the League Council.

M. Paul-Boncour with the support of the majority

of .....

0037

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of the Chamber smothered the debate and postponed any further discussion of Far Eastern affairs sine die.

The JOURNAL OFFICIEL of Saturday, January 14, giving an account of the exchange in the Chamber is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge

Enclosures: (in duplicate)

No. 1 - JOURNAL OFFICIEL of January 14, 1933

No. 2 - Translation of M. Paul-Boncour's statement during the debate, full account of which is given in the above JOURNAL OFFICIEL.

In quintuplicate.

COPY to E.I.C.
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0038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 3256
of January 16, 1933,
from the Embassy - Paris

J'ai reçu de M. Lebas une demande d'interpellation sur le mandat donné par le Gouvernement à son délégué à la conférence préparatoire pour la réduction des heures de travail et sur sa position à l'égard de la limitation légale de la durée hebdomadaire du travail à quarante heures.

La date du débat sera fixée ultérieurement.

— 7 —

AJOURNEMENT DE LA FIXATION DE LA DATE DE PLUSIEURS INTERPELLATIONS

M. le président. La Chambre est actuellement saisie de demandes d'interpellation:

La première, de MM. Henry Fontanier et Marius Moutet, sur les événements d'Extrême-Orient et notamment sur ceux dont la Mandchourie est le théâtre;

La seconde, de M. Gabriel Péri, sur les événements d'Extrême-Orient et les relations franco-japonaises;

La troisième, de M. de Tastes, sur la politique française en Extrême-Orient.

Les honorables membres demandent à la Chambre de fixer maintenant la date de la discussion de leurs interpellations.

Quel jour le Gouvernement propose-t-il ?

M. Paul-Boncour, *président du conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères.* Le Gouvernement entend proposer une date qui ne peut être qu'incertaine; dans sa pensée — la Chambre sera juge — il subordonne cette date aux travaux qui vont justement commencer à Genève lundi prochain et qui auront trait au différend sino-japonais.

Nous serons beaucoup plus en mesure de vous fournir des explications après ces travaux qu'avant. Mais il m'est impossible de vous dire quand ces travaux seront terminés.

M. le président. La parole est à M. Fontanier.

M. Henry Fontanier. Messieurs, je ne suis naturellement pas de l'avis du Gouvernement au sujet de la date de la discussion de mon interpellation.

Je crois nécessaire que la Chambre se prononce immédiatement, avant la réunion du conseil de la Société des nations qui doit avoir lieu la semaine prochaine, afin que nous ne nous trouvions pas, dans quelque temps, en présence du fait accompli.

Je vais, très rapidement — d'ailleurs, le règlement ne m'accorde pas beaucoup de temps — exposer les raisons pour lesquelles nous désirons que ces interpellations soient discutées aujourd'hui même.

Messieurs, la plupart des faits dont j'ai à parler sont connus de vous. D'ailleurs, l'an dernier, au mois de février, MM. Moutet, Guernut et Doriot avaient déposé des demandes d'interpellation visant les mêmes événements; mais la majorité n'avait pas été très soucieuse d'entendre leurs explications et le Gouvernement avait été moins soucieux encore d'en donner.

Je pense que, la majorité ayant changé et le Gouvernement n'étant plus le même, la majorité nouvelle et le nouveau Gouvernement auront une autre attitude. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche.*)

Je ne vais rappeler que quelques faits essentiels.

Vous savez, messieurs, que, depuis le mois de septembre 1931, il existe en Extrême-Orient, et en Mandchourie particulièrement, un véritable état de guerre.

M. Léon Blum. Très bien!

M. Henry Fontanier. Sous couleur d'opérations de police, un membre de la Société des nations, le Japon, poursuit contre un autre membre de la Société des nations, la Chine, une véritable guerre de conquête et de spoliation. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche.*)

Sous prétexte de rétablir l'ordre en Mandchourie, un ordre qui ne me paraissait pas très troublé, on a commencé l'occupation systématique de cette région.

Ceux de mes collègues qui ont lu le rapport de la commission Lytton reconnaîtront que je m'exprime d'une façon très modérée et que je ne fais que reproduire les conclusions de cette commission.

Ces conclusions sont que le Japon a pris différents prétextes pour intervenir. Tantôt c'est une explosion sur une voie ferrée, explosion si insignifiante que, sans que la voie ait été réparée, l'express de Pékin à Moukden a pu passer, quelques minutes après, sans aucun accident. Ailleurs, ce sont les actes de prétendus bandits qui ont justifié les opérations militaires. C'est l'attaque de Shanghaï. C'est l'occupation progressive de toute la Mandchourie. C'est enfin, au mois de mars 1932, la proclamation de l'indépendance de la Mandchourie, autrement dit le démembrement de la Chine.

On pouvait croire que cette affaire était terminée. Mais les journaux, depuis deux ou trois jours, nous montrent que, si les opérations japonaises avaient subi un temps d'arrêt, elles n'étaient pas closes définitivement.

En effet, nous avons appris, ces jours-ci, le bombardement et l'occupation d'une ville qui a été en partie détruite. Et aujourd'hui les journaux publient une note qui a un caractère officiel, puisqu'elle émane du ministère de la guerre de Tokio, et dans laquelle il est indiqué que le Japon se propose de conquérir une province voisine de la Mandchourie, le Jehol, afin d'assurer les frontières de la Mandchourie.

Ce sont là des raisonnements que nous connaissons tous. Nous savons ce que signifient ces nécessités militaires. Elles n'ont d'autre objet que de fournir un prétexte à une conquête nouvelle. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche.*)

Tels sont les faits. Ils constituent une violation complète, évidente, des traités les plus solennels rédigés et signés depuis 1919. L'acte d'agression contre la Mandchourie et la Chine est une violation du pacte de la Société des nations et, en même temps, une violation du pacte Briand-Kellogg, qui exclut la guerre comme moyen d'action politique.

La proclamation de l'indépendance de la Mandchourie est contraire à la convention de Washington, que le Japon a lui-même signée. Elle est un acte contre lequel protestent non seulement les Chinois, mais encore les habitants de la Mandchourie. (*Très bien! très bien! à l'extrême gauche.*)

La commission Lytton a fait à ce sujet une enquête dont les conclusions sont les suivantes: la proclamation de l'indépendance a été l'œuvre du gouvernement japonais; le gouvernement nouveau est un instrument entre les mains des Japonais; la proclamation de l'indépendance n'est pas le moins du monde le résultat d'un mouvement national, elle ne répond ... lement aux aspirations de vingt-huit a... trente de la population de ce pays, s... comprend 28 millions de Chinois sur... millions d'habitants.

Ainsi, messieurs, les traités les plus ... lennels sont violés par une puissa... membre de la Société des nations.

Devant ces événements, quelle a été l... titude de la Société des nations?

L'an dernier, interpellant sur cette qu... tion, M. Guernut disait que l'attitude ... la Société des nations avait été timide. ... ajoutait même qu'elle avait été pusi... nime.

Quand on lit le rapport de la com... Lytton et les comptes rendus des ... de la Société des nations, on a ... ment la conviction que M. Guernu... pas exagéré, qu'au contraire il a ... ployé le terme le plus modéré.

Il faut se rendre compte de la grav... la situation. Il faut bien reconnaître ... la Société des nations essaye de se dé... à ses responsabilités, et c'est extrême... grave.

C'est le premier grand conflit que ... Société des nations ait à résoudre de... qu'elle existe.

Elle en a résolu d'autres, mais qu... so... vaient entre des nations d'importa... da... condaire. Vous vous souvenez tous... gleme... intervenu il y a quelq... nées, et qui a été évoqué plusieur... cette tribune, du conflit gréco-bulg...

Mais le conflit gréco-bulgare étant ... peu d'importance, comparé au conflit ... tuel qui oppose la Chine au Japon.

Aujourd'hui, l'un des Etats les plus ... sants de la Société des nations ... cause. Il s'agit de savoir si la Société ... nations va remplir son devoir ou se fa... la complice des actes que je viens d'in... quer. (*Très bien! très bien! à l'extr... gauche.*)

Il convient de savoir aujourd'hui ... Société des nations va manifester ... rence complète.

La carence de la Société des natio... serait, il faut bien dire le mot, la ... de la Société des nations, pratiquer... sinon théoriquement. (*Applaudisseme... l'extrême gauche et sur divers ban...*

Il n'y aura plus de Société des na... si, dans un cas comme celui-ci, elle n'... pas capable de dire où est le droit ni de ... prendre la défense du peuple attaqué. (*Ap... plaudissements sur les mêmes bancs.*)

Ce sera la disparition de cet élément de sécurité que pouvait constituer dans le monde la Société des nations et, avec la disparition de cet élément de sécurité, ce sera l'échec à peu près certain de la conférence du désarmement.

Ce sera probablement la guerre en Extrême-Orient. Et qui peut dire que la guerre en Extrême-Orient ne s'étendra pas plus loin, que d'autres Etats, la Russie ou les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord, n'y prendront pas part?

C'est sur ces points que nous appelons l'attention de la Chambre et que nous voudrions obtenir du Gouvernement des explications extrêmement nettes.

Nous ne demandons pas à M. le président du conseil de nous faire connaître le détail des négociations ni de nous dire d'une façon complète dans quel sens il pourra intervenir au sein des différents conseils qui auront lieu à Genève. Nous lui demandons simplement d'affirmer ici de la façon la plus claire, la plus énergique, la moins équivoque sa volonté de défendre le pacte. Et s'il ne nous donne pas ces ...

0039

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76 factions, s'il ne nous apporte pas ces
aisements, nous demandons la discus-
question immédiate de l'interpellation. (*Ap-*
audissements à l'extrême gauche.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Mou-

M. Marius Moutet. Je cède mon tour de
role à M. de Tastes.

M. le président. La parole est à M. de
stes.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Messieurs, je vou-
rais que M. le président du conseil accep-
ât une date prochaine pour l'interpella-
ion que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui soumet-
e.

Si M. le président du conseil n'y voyait
s d'inconvénient, nous pourrions dis-
ter cette question immédiatement. Je
rends compte que la réunion du 19,
Genève, doit présenter des difficultés
graves à résoudre. Je ne demande pas à
. le président du conseil de nous répon-
dre d'avance sur toutes les questions qui
seront posées, mais je lui demande tout au
moins quelle est actuellement la politique
générale de la France en Extrême-Orient.

M. Fontanier déplorait, et il avait rai-
n, que la Société des nations se trouve
ns l'impossibilité de résoudre le con-
sino-japonais.

Je ne vois pas très bien, en effet, com-
ent la Société des nations pourrait y par-
nir, et je vais vous dire pourquoi.

Le problème est insoluble, parce que le
acte même qui est à la base de l'organi-
tion de Genève ne s'applique qu'aux na-
ons organisées. Or, de nation organisée,
le conflit sino-japonais, j'en vois
e : le Japon, capable d'assurer ses vo-
ntés dans les territoires que son gouver-
ement administre.

M. Pierre Renaudel. Il est surtout capa-
d'assurer une agression.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Quant à la Chine,
-il possible de la considérer comme un
s organisé ?

M. Jean Longuet. C'est pourquoi on a
roit de l'envahir ?

M. Lionel de Tastes. Ce que je dis ré-
à une observation de M. Fontanier,
a regretté de voir la Société des na-
s incapable de rien faire dans le con-
sino-japonais. J'essaie d'indiquer ce
je crois être la raison de cette im-
ssance.

M. Chasseigne. A d'autres moments,
and on attaque des gouvernements dits
rangers, le Gouvernement français ré-
pond.

M. le président du conseil. Je répondrai.

M. Chasseigne. Nous l'espérons bien.

M. Lionel de Tastes. En vertu de quel
titre le gouvernement chinois administre-
t-il la Chine ? Est-ce que les quelques in-
tellectuels de Canton, dont nous avons vu
d'ailleurs à Genève des exemplaires remar-
quables, auraient aujourd'hui la prétention
de représenter légalement la Chine ?

Tout le talent de M. Sze ou de M. Wel-
ngton Koo ne pourra créer un titre au
ouvernement de Nankin.

M. Jean Longuet. La Chine est tout en-
re contre le Japon.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Cinq ou six provin-
es obéissent aujourd'hui à Nankin. Le
gouvernement de Nankin aurait-il la pré-
tention de représenter les hommes de Can-
ton, les hommes du Sé-Tchouen, ou ceux
du Yunnan ? Le gouvernement de Nankin
aurait-il la prétention de pouvoir comman-
der à l'ensemble de la Chine ?

Vous savez bien que ce n'est pas exact.
Vous savez bien que les gouvernements
chinois — à l'époque des Mandchous, la
situation était la même — n'ont jamais été
capables d'assurer ni la sécurité, ni la
tranquillité sur leur territoire.

En face, vous trouvez une nation, le
Japon, qui, en Corée d'abord, en Mand-
chourie ensuite, a fait des efforts que per-
sonne ne peut méconnaître.

M. Jean Longuet. En tuant les femmes et
les enfants !

M. Lionel de Tastes. Ce pays pauvre
et ravagé par le banditisme a été trans-
formé dans des conditions remarquables.
(*Interruptions à l'extrême gauche.*)

Lisez donc le rapport Lytton.

M. le président. J'ai insisté pour qu'on
écoute M. Fontanier en silence. Je demande
qu'il en soit de même pour M. de Tastes.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Oui, messieurs, le
Japon a accompli en Mandchourie une œu-
vre des plus remarquables. Le Japon a
créé là-bas des lignes de chemins de fer,
a fait naître de grandes cités dans lesquel-
les il a dépensé des centaines de millions
pour l'hygiène.

M. Jean Longuet. Et le rapport Lytton,
qu'est-ce que vous en faites ?

M. Lionel de Tastes. Je ne dis rien qui ne
soit exact. Si je n'étais tenu de ne parler
que cinq minutes, je vous donnerais des
chiffres indiscutables.

Le Japon se trouve dans la situation où
se sont trouvées d'autres nations, des na-
tions européennes.

M. Léon Blum. Hélas !

M. Lionel de Tastes. Vous me parlez,
messieurs, d'un gouvernement chinois.
Oubliez-vous ce détail curieux qu'aujour-
d'hui, alors que le gouvernement chinois
est à Nankin, les ambassadeurs et les mi-
nistres des grandes puissances sont à
Pékin,...

M. Ramette. C'est précisément ce que les
Chinois ne veulent pas !

M. Lionel de Tastes. ...à l'abri de fortifi-
cations puissantes, entourés de troupes
qui les défendent ? Cela ne prouve-t-il pas
que la sécurité n'est peut-être pas com-
plète dans la République chinoise ?

J'ai entendu dire, ces jours derniers,
que des instructions nouvelles avaient été
données à notre ambassadeur à Tokio. J'ai
même lu dans le *Populaire* de M. Léon
Blum l'invitation adressée à M. le prési-
dent du conseil d'avoir à transformer no-
tre politique à l'égard du Japon et d'avoir
à faire preuve d'énergie pour imposer à
ce grand pays l'abandon de sa propre poli-
tique.

Comme je ne doute pas que M. le prési-
dent du conseil, malgré son schisme ré-
cent, n'ait conservé avec M. Léon Blum
un contact très étroit,...

M. le président du conseil. Et très affec-
tueux, oui ! (*Applaudissements à l'extrême
gauche.*)

M. Lionel de Tastes. ...je me demande
s'il est disposé à suivre ces conseils.

S'il les suivait, ce serait une grave par-
tie qu'il engagerait.

Il me semble, en effet, que la France a
pris quelques engagements vis-à-vis du
Japon et que, notamment, en 1907, l'arran-
gement franco-japonais a réglé en Ex-
trême-Orient les relations de la France et
du Japon.

De quoi, aujourd'hui, se plaint le Japon ?
(*Interruptions et rires à l'extrême gau-
che.*)

M. Jean Longuet. Ce sont les agresseurs
qui se plaignent !

M. Lionel de Tastes. De quoi, aujour-
d'hui, se plaint le Japon ? Il se plaint de
ce fait que la Chine se refuse à respecter
les traités.

Le Japon a tout de même, en Chine,
des droits que n'a pas méconnus le traité
de 1922, droits qu'il tenait auparavant du
traité de Portsmouth et qui ont été confir-
més par le traité de 1915. Ce sont là des
traités qui ont leur valeur.

Le Japon se plaint aujourd'hui du refus
des Chinois d'exécuter les clauses de ces
traités. Ce n'est pas l'heure de vous rap-
peler les innombrables provocations chi-
noises, Les Japonais en sont arrivés à être
obligés de défendre, les armes à la main,
leurs nationaux de Mandchourie comme
ceux de Shang-Haï. Le long du chemin de
fer sud-mandchourien, les Japonais n'ont-
ils pas été obligés d'accumuler des garni-
sons uniquement pour protéger les per-
sonnes et les biens ? (*Interruptions à l'ex-
trême gauche.*)

M. Jean Longuet. Les Japonais sont les
victimes !

M. Lionel de Tastes. Les sarcasmes sont
faciles. Ils ne prouvent rien.

Dans le Sud de la Chine, où il y avait
des concessions japonaises, où se trou-
vaient des citoyens japonais, le Gouverne-
ment japonais n'a-t-il pas été obligé de
faire partir ses ressortissants pour les
soustraire aux agressions chinoises, qui
n'épargnaient même pas les femmes et les
enfants ? (*Très bien ! très bien ! au centre
et à droite.*)

Je demande donc à M. le président du
conseil s'il a l'intention de rompre avec
la politique passée.

Nous n'avons pas tellement d'amis dans
le monde, c'est assez l'habitude chez
nous de le déplorer.

Or, nous avons en Extrême-Orient, de-
puis longtemps, un ami sûr, qui a oublié
assez rapidement l'affront de 1895. Nous
n'avions pas cependant, à cette époque,
pris à son égard une attitude bien aima-
ble ! Dans le passé, le Japon a toujours
eu vis-à-vis de la France l'attitude la plus
loyale, la plus correcte. Il est resté le vé-
ritable gendarme de la paix en Extrême-
Orient. (*Interruptions et rires à l'extrême
gauche.*)

Il est regrettable qu'il ne soit pas pos-
sible d'émettre une opinion à cette tri-
bune sans qu'immédiatement une partie
de l'Assemblée proteste. (*Applaudisse-
ments au centre et à droite.*)

J'entends bien que vous avez le droit
de prétendre que, dans toute cette affaire,
c'est le Japon qui est l'agresseur.

M. Jean Longuet. C'est évident.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Je prétends, moi,
qu'il n'en est rien. Le Japon défend son
existence, il a raison de le faire. (*Interrup-
tions à l'extrême gauche.*)

M. Cayrel. C'est le Japon qui a com-
mencé !

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 3256
of January 16, 1933,
from the Embassy - Paris

M. Lionel de Tastes. Avez-vous protesté lorsque, au Maroc, nos troupes se sont emparées du Tafilalet ? Je dis, moi, qu'elles avaient raison de le faire puisqu'elles défendaient la vie et la sécurité des indigènes déjà placés sous notre protection. (*Très bien! très bien! au centre et à droite.*)

M. Albert Rivière. La situation n'est pas la même pour le Japon.

M. Lionel de Tastes. C'est exactement la même chose.

M. Jean Longuet. On peut aller loin avec cette théorie-là.

M. Lionel de Tastes. On ne peut pas dire qu'un certain nombre de régions de la Chine soient beaucoup plus sûres que le Tafilalet.

Je sais, monsieur le président du conseil, que vous êtes toujours très prudent et j'espère qu'à Genève, vous ne vous laisserez pas trop tenter par certaines sollicitations trop intéressées à lancer la Chine dans un conflit. Vous savez d'où viennent les millions, je pourrais presque dire les milliards, distribués depuis quelques années aux généraux chinois et notamment à Tchan-Kai-Sek.

Il ne faut pas toujours crier haro sur le bandit japonais. Il est assez d'usage, dans ce Parlement, de ne pas s'en priver. Avant tout, il faut se libérer de la mystique qui règne à Genève. Vous connaîtrez alors de façon réaliste le problème tel qu'il est posé.

Actuellement, il est impossible de méconnaître que le Japon défend la vie et les biens de ses nationaux. Je suppose que, dans sa situation, il n'est pas une grande puissance qui n'agirait de même. Faut-il encore rappeler 1900 ? Je vous demande d'avoir, envers le Japon, une attitude juste et je vous demande de ne pas oublier que, le 10 juin 1907, la France a pris l'engagement formel d'appuyer ce pays dans toutes les régions de la Chine où il lutterait pour l'ordre et la sécurité. (*Rires à l'extrême gauche.*)

C'est dans le traité de 1907, et vos ricanements n'y changeront rien.

M. Marius Moutet. Il y a aussi le traité de Washington, par lequel le Japon s'est engagé à respecter l'intégrité de la Chine.

M. Lionel de Tastes. Le traité de Washington n'a jamais infirmé le traité de 1907.

En terminant, je demande de nouveau à M. le président du conseil s'il entend conserver intact l'arrangement franco-japonais du 10 juin 1907. Pense-t-il, comme M. Moutet a l'air de le croire, que le traité de Washington ait fait disparaître les obligations réciproques de la France et du Japon en Extrême-Orient ?

J'attends votre réponse, monsieur le président du conseil. La question posée est trop grave pour que la réponse se fasse attendre. (*Applaudissements au centre et à droite.*)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Péri.

M. Péri. Messieurs, j'avais déposé ma demande d'interpellation, lorsque sont parvenues à Paris les premières informations concernant le raid japonais sur la ville de Chan-Haï-Kouan.

Depuis, la situation dans cette partie particulièrement inquiète du monde s'est aggravée de jour en jour.

Aujourd'hui, la ville chinoise de Chan-Haï-Kouan, qui comptait 50.000 habitants, n'est plus qu'un amas de ruines, parmi lesquelles gisent les cadavres de 2.000 victimes chinoises.

J'observe que, pour justifier cette opération, le Japon donne des motifs qui rappellent très exactement ceux qu'il alléguait au moment de l'affaire de Moukden, après le 18 septembre 1931. Or, ces raisons sont celles qui ont été reconnues et dénoncées comme mensongères par les enquêteurs de la commission Lytton.

Bien plus, l'affaire de Chan-Haï-Kouan, préparée de longue date, ainsi que l'établissent les révélations de la presse anglo-saxonne, s'annonce comme le début d'une deuxième étape de l'entreprise de conquête, à laquelle se livre depuis plus d'un an, en Extrême-Orient, l'impérialisme japonais.

Il s'est installé, d'abord, en Mandchourie. Aujourd'hui, au nom de sa sécurité, car lui aussi a une doctrine de sa sécurité, il prétend conquérir le Jehol, dont la capitale ne se trouve qu'à 200 milles de Pékin et d'où son armée pourrait, d'un bond, s'élancer vers l'ancienne capitale chinoise.

Dans quelques jours, la commission des dix-neuf, à laquelle la Société des nations a remis le dossier de l'affaire, doit se réunir à Genève. Nous voulons savoir quel est le mandat confié à cette occasion aux représentants de la France.

Je suppose qu'il ne suffira pas, pour définir la politique française, de répondre : « Le pacte, tout le pacte, rien que le pacte. » Depuis un an, c'est le langage qu'on tient à propos des affaires d'Extrême-Orient, et nous savons aujourd'hui, ce qu'ont produit là-bas les stipulations du pacte sur lesquelles on prétend, par ailleurs, construire une organisation de la sécurité et de la paix. Il est même incorrect de parler, à l'heure présente, de la timidité ou de l'impuissance de la Société des nations. Ce qu'il faut enregistrer en présence des résultats acquis, c'est que, depuis plus d'un an, le mécanisme de Genève a permis et a sanctionné la conquête, par le Japon, d'une région grande comme la France et l'Italie réunies.

Il y a quelque temps, la commission des dix-neuf refusait de faire sien le blâme, d'ailleurs bien timide et bien inopérant, contenu dans les chapitres 9 et 10 du rapport de la commission Lytton, et elle décidait de s'ajourner sans prendre une résolution quelconque. Cet ajournement se produisait à la suite d'une intervention des grandes puissances soucieuses de ne pas entraver le Japon dans son entreprise de conquête.

Parmi ces grandes puissances se trouvait la France et, à côté d'elle, la Grande-Bretagne, ce qui nous permet d'apprécier à sa juste valeur cette politique de l'entente franco-britannique qu'on célèbre si souvent comme portant en elle une garantie de paix universelle.

Les résultats de l'ajournement ne se sont pas fait atteindre. Quelques jours après, Chan-Haï-Kouan était bombardé et le Jehol était envahi.

C'est ainsi que les choses se passent depuis plus d'un an.

Or, depuis plus d'un an, dans son entreprise de conquête, le Japon se flatte de bénéficier de l'appui de la diplomatie française.

M. Marius Moutet. Et russe.

M. Péri. Monsieur Moutet, nous demandons à la Chambre de fixer une date pour ce débat, précisément pour avoir la possibilité de confronter en Extrême-Orient la politique que pratique le Gouvernement français et celle qu'observe l'Union des républiques soviétiques. (*Très bien! très bien! à l'extrême gauche communiste.*)

Nous serions même particulièrement heureux qu'un débat s'instituât sur ce point.

M. Marius Moutet. Me permettez-vous une observation ?...

M. Péri. Oui.

M. Marius Moutet. Je fais simplement allusion au discours que M. Matsuoka prononçait à l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations, le 8 décembre 1932. Il disait :

« La Russie des Soviets a compris la question de la Mandchourie. Elle a compris notre situation et notre action, et s'est abstenue de toute immixtion dans les affaires de Mandchourie. Il y a six mois, on constatait qu'il n'y avait aucun espoir quelconque d'amener le peuple japonais à conclure un traité de non-agression avec la Russie; mais je peux déclarer maintenant, du haut de cette tribune, qu'il y a de sérieux espoirs d'arriver à un tel accord. »

Je sais que, d'un autre côté, on a signé un pacte du même ordre avec la même Chine. Mais ce n'est peut-être pas en s'appuyant sur les deux tableaux qu'on fera régner la paix.

M. Péri. La politique de non-intervention est évidemment la politique de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, et cette politique est même dans cette partie névralgique du monde la garantie de paix la plus efficace.

Quant à M. Matsuoka, ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon, c'est un personnage dont j'ai lu à la tribune les propos provocateurs et qui, interviewé par un journal des Russes blancs à Paris, déclarait :

« J'ai signifié aux Soviets que le Japon n'hésiterait pas à violer leurs frontières le jour où, pour des raisons de propagande communiste ou en invoquant le boycottage économique, nous aurons besoin de pousser plus avant nos projets de conquête. »

Il s'agit, on le voit, de la part du Japon, de l'exécution de ce plan d'expansion développé autrefois par le président du conseil japonais le baron Tanaka; ce plan dont on a contesté la véracité au moment où nous en avons fait état pour la première fois, mais dont tous les articles et toutes les stipulations sont appliqués méthodiquement depuis un an.

J'ai lu, il y a quelques jours, dans un journal français, cette recommandation: « Il est indispensable de ne pas entraver le Japon dans son entreprise, sans quoi le Japon quitterait la Société des nations, et ce retrait compromettrait l'issue de la conférence du désarmement. »

Ainsi donc, pour sauver de la débâcle la conférence du désarmement, il faudrait protéger et encourager ceux qui mettent la Chine à feu et à sang.

Je veux savoir quelle est, sur ce point, la doctrine du Gouvernement. J'entends insister également sur la question qui a été posée avant moi à cette tribune au sujet de l'arrangement franco-japonais de 1907. Qui ou non, cet arrangement est-il

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toujours en vigueur? Oui ou non, la France se considère-t-elle toujours comme l'alliée du Japon?. Si le Japon s'enorgueillit à tort de l'appui français, il faut le dire. Mais il faut que ce désaveu soit formulé d'une façon claire et précise. Il faut qu'on nous indique si la doctrine du gouvernement français est celle qui consiste à considérer le Japon comme le gendarme de l'ordre capitaliste en Extrême-Orient. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche communiste.*)

Depuis plus d'un an que la guerre dure, il n'y a eu, pendant cette période, qu'un moment d'accalmie, de trêve. C'est lorsque, au mois de juin dernier, le Japon, à la veille de déclencher une nouvelle attaque, vit son dessein interrompu par la mutinerie de ses soldats.

Cet épisode nous indique quel est le bon moyen et la méthode efficace pour arrêter la guerre. (*Mouvements divers.*)

En un mot, sur l'extension d'une conflagration armée qui menace d'embraser tout l'Extrême-Orient, sur les responsabilités lourdes qu'assume dans cette affaire notre politique française, sur un conflit dont le développement menace les frontières de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, nous entendons obtenir des explications aussi claires que possible du Gouvernement. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche communiste.*)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Outrey.

M. Ernest Outrey. Mes chers collègues, je serai très bref. J'interviens, en effet, uniquement pour insister auprès du Gouvernement avec tous ceux de mes collègues qui ont parlé avant moi, afin que s'institue ici un vaste débat sur les événements d'Extrême-Orient.

Ces événements, il faut bien le dire, sont, en effet, d'une gravité exceptionnelle et risquent d'avoir des répercussions redoutables dans le Pacifique.

Nous en avons eu connaissance, certes, mais uniquement par de laconiques télégrammes parvenus d'Extrême-Orient et par de vagues commentaires de nos journaux d'informations. Mais vous pensez bien que j'ai eu moi-même par ailleurs des renseignements beaucoup plus complets et, je dois ajouter, des plus angoissants.

Il faut reconnaître, en effet, que nous assistons, depuis quelques années, à un véritable démembrement de la Chine.

J'ai écouté avec beaucoup d'attention votre collègue communiste, M. Péri. C'est d'ailleurs, parce que je savais qu'il allait parler, que je me suis moi-même fait inscrire dans ce débat.

Il nous a parlé de la Mandchourie et de la mainmise du Japon sur ce vaste pays. Mais ce n'est pas seulement la Mandchourie dont la Chine est privée aujourd'hui. Hier, c'était la Mongolie qui lui était arrachée. Et qui donc a mis la main sur cette province chinoise, sinon la Russie?

M. Jacques Doriot. Et sur l'Indochine? (*Mouvements divers.*)

M. Ernest Outrey. Qui donc aussi s'est emparé du Turkestan chinois, si ce n'est le gouvernement de Moscou?

Tous ces événements produisent naturellement, quand on en a connaissance, une certaine émotion en Europe, et en particulier en France. Mais y resterons-nous indifférents et n'avons-nous pas le devoir de nous en émouvoir davantage, étant donnée la situation de notre pays dans le Pacifique? Je pense que ce serait là méconnaître notre devoir.

Je me réserve donc d'intervenir à la tribune le jour où un grand débat s'ouvrira à ce sujet, et je souhaite qu'il s'institue un jour assez prochain.

Je ne veux pas ici soulever de polémiques et vous pouvez me rendre cette justice qu'il n'y a rien dans mes paroles qui puisse provoquer des interruptions ou des protestations de la part de mes collègues de la gauche de l'Assemblée.

Je ne peux pas oublier, cependant, ce qui s'est passé sur les frontières de notre grande Indochine: à Long-Tchéou, où un de nos consuls a été tué, où un autre a été séquestré et privé de nourriture pendant plusieurs jours.

Je ne peux pas oublier non plus la bombe de Canton, lancée sur le plus haut représentant de la France en Indochine, le gouverneur général Merlin.

Ces incidents, il faudra bien en parler cependant, lorsqu'on ouvrira le grand débat que je demande.

Ne croyez pas, toutefois, messieurs, que je parlerai seulement dans le sens qu'a indiqué M. de Tastes, il y a un instant.

Il y a beaucoup à dire, je le reconnais, en faveur non seulement du Japon mais aussi de la Chine. Il importe que le Parlement français soit exactement et complètement renseigné à ce sujet. Nous devons donc aborder l'examen de cette grave question en écartant tout parti-pris étant donnée son importance.

L'an dernier, les événements de Shanghaï ont été profondément émouvants. Il y a eu contre cette ville une véritable expédition japonaise.

M. Péri. Elle a, du reste, échoué lamentablement.

M. Ernest Outrey. Plus de cinquante navires de guerre étaient mouillés devant cette énorme cité.

Savez-vous la population que représente, en effet, Shanghaï? Notre concession compte 250.000 habitants. La concession internationale, à côté, 750.000 habitants. Plus loin, la ville chinoise a 1.500.000 habitants. Il s'agissait donc là d'une ville de 2.500.000 habitants. Il s'y est passé des faits d'une gravité inouïe, qu'il faudra bien cependant un jour porter à la connaissance de la Chambre, non pas pour prendre parti pour les Chinois contre les Japonais ou inversement, mais pour préciser uniquement l'attitude qu'ils imposent et les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

La Chine est une grande nation qu'on peut juger beaucoup plus exactement en Indochine qu'en Europe, car nous nous rendons mieux compte là-bas de son importance et de sa puissance commerciale.

Nous devons donc respecter la Chine et nous efforcer de la faire respecter, et nous ne devons pas la laisser démembrer, pas plus par la république des soviets que par le gouvernement japonais.

Voilà ce qui devra être dit au sein du Parlement français et le point de vue que nous devrons nous efforcer de faire triompher à Genève.

M. Jean Longuet. Il faut dire cela à M. de Tastes.

M. Ernest Outrey. Un débat important s'impose donc, non pas, je le répète, pour prendre parti pour tel ou tel peuple, mais simplement pour défendre les idées de droit et de justice.

M. le président. La parole est à M. le président du conseil.

M. le président du conseil. Messieurs, je ne me prononce pas sur l'opportunité du grand débat auquel nous conviait à l'instant M. Outrey, mais je crois que vous estimerez comme moi que, s'il peut avoir son utilité, il aurait, à la minute présente et à la veille du jour où va se réunir de nouveau, à Genève, le comité des dix-neuf, émanation de l'Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des nations, pour le règlement du conflit sino-japonais, des inconvénients faciles à apercevoir.

Autant il est légitime et nécessaire, conforme au contrôle parlementaire que, s'agissant de conférences internationales où les gouvernements vont porter, à Genève, les vœux mêmes de leurs pays, la Chambre se prononce et sache d'avance dans quel sens s'exercera leur action, autant je la prie de considérer que, dans le cas présent, la Société des nations est saisie en vertu d'articles précis du pacte.

Sans doute, ces articles, qui la saisissent et dont vous connaissez le numérotage, ne lui confient-ils pas encore une mission de juge. Mais ils l'obligent à mettre en œuvre une procédure de conciliation qui prépare le moment où elle aura, peut-être, à se prononcer sur le fond et à dire, des deux nations en cause, laquelle a tort et laquelle a raison, laquelle est agresseur et laquelle attaquée.

Dans ces conditions, il serait difficile autant qu'inconvenant qu'avant même de participer à une nouvelle session où des faits nouveaux, hélas! assez graves, vont être apportés, faits sur lesquels je n'ai présentement d'autres informations que celles que vous avez vous-mêmes et qui proviennent des nouvelles souvent contradictoires des journaux, le Gouvernement fût appelé à dire par avance quel sera son sentiment sur des faits qu'il doit juger après avoir obtenu les précisions impartiales qu'il appartient à la Société des nations de fournir.

Par conséquent, la Chambre estimera — sa sagesse m'en est un sûr garant — que ce n'est pas aujourd'hui le jour d'instituer ce débat de grande ampleur que souhaitait, tout à l'heure, M. Outrey.

Si, pourtant, comme il est naturel, vous désirez connaître la ligne générale, l'attitude du Gouvernement français, au cours de cette procédure déjà longue qui s'est déroulée autour du conflit sino-japonais, je n'ai aucune difficulté à tracer cette ligne. Et je n'aurai, monsieur de Tastes, aucune difficulté non plus à lier le moment présent au moment d'hier, car c'est le même homme qui a représenté la France depuis que cette procédure se déroule.

Mais je ne sache pas, permettez-moi de vous le dire, que, ni hier ni aujourd'hui, l'attitude de la France à Genève, dans un conflit évoqué en vertu de l'article 11, d'abord, de l'article 15, ensuite, puisse s'inspirer, en quoi que ce soit, de telle ou telle politique dans une partie du monde.

La France a coutume dans ces conjonctures de se déterminer d'après la justice et d'après le droit. (*Applaudissements.*)

J'entends que la tâche à laquelle elle s'est si complètement associée depuis plus d'une année n'a été ni aussi rapide, ni aussi fructueuse que beaucoup d'entre vous et, je le dis en toute liberté, moi-même, l'eussions souhaité.

Je demande néanmoins à M. Fontanier et, bien entendu — bien que je croie qu'il n'accédera pas à ma requête — à M. Péri qui a beaucoup noirci son pessimisme, de ne pas méconnaître les efforts utiles de la

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 3256
of January 16, 1933,
from the Embassy - Paris

Société des nations et la part infiniment honorable prise par la France, sous ses divers Gouvernements, à ces efforts utiles. (*Très bien ! très bien!*)

Oh, j'entends bien — et c'est là le reproche habituel qu'on peut faire et qu'on fait à la Société des nations — qu'elle ne témoigne pas dans ces sortes de conflits d'une rapidité et d'une efficacité suffisantes.

Retenons, messieurs, cette constatation. Peut-être cela vous incitera-t-il à approuver le Gouvernement français, quand, à la reprise de la conférence du désarmement, il soutiendra, avec l'énergie que vous pouvez supposer, l'organisation, au sein de la Société des nations, d'un régime de sanctions, capable de faire valoir et respecter les décisions rendues. (*Applaudissements à gauche et à l'extrême gauche.*)

Mais même dans son état actuel, et malgré son insuffisance actuelle, gardons-nous, messieurs, dans le conflit sino-japonais, comme dans les autres, de sous-estimer la valeur et l'efficacité de la Société des nations.

Oui, on souligne ce qu'elle n'a pas fait, mais on oublie de vérifier ce que seraient devenus certains conflits, même médiocres en apparence, s'ils avaient pu se dérouler comme autrefois et sans l'intervention de la Société des nations.

Vous parliez, monsieur Fontanier du règlement du conflit gréco-bulgare. On a beaucoup parlé de ce règlement, comme si la Société des nations n'avait à son actif qu'une affaire, qu'un procès gagné, comme ces avocats sans cause qui remettent, sans cesse, sous les yeux du public leur unique dossier. Ce n'est pas exact. Elle en a réglé bien d'autres qui n'ont pas fait de bruit. Et précisément, ils n'ont pas fait de bruit parce qu'ils ont été arrêtés dans leur germe. Et qui vous dit — ceux qui ont assisté à ces règlements le savent bien — qu'en Haute-Silésie, à Dantzig et dans d'autres endroits, tous ces petits litiges, tous ces petits conflits, toutes ces causes presque quotidiennes d'irritation n'auraient pas pris un aspect autrement inquiétant si le conseil de la Société des nations ne les avait pas réglés ? (*Très bien! très bien*)

M. Henry Fontanier. Je ne le nie pas.

M. le président du conseil. Le conflit gréco-bulgare, monsieur Fontanier, s'est déroulé dans une partie de l'Europe où l'on sait fort bien que les différences, en apparence les plus insignifiantes, peuvent parfois prendre un développement qui incendie toute l'Europe.

Par conséquent, félicitons-nous que dans toutes ces conjonctures, la Société des nations ait joué son rôle et l'ait joué utilement. (*Applaudissements.*)

Dans l'affaire sino-japonaise, si elle n'a pas hélas — je le dis nettement, je n'ai pas l'habitude de me payer de mots — fait tout ce que nous aurions souhaité, n'oublions pas que, tout de même, en certaines circonstances, elle a joué son rôle. Tenez, je songe notamment à cette bataille de Changhaï dont parlait M. Outrey, à cette bataille que j'ai vécue jour par jour comme président du conseil de la Société des nations. La Société des nations, par son effort, si elle n'a pu arrêter, au début, la tuerie, a tout de même fini par arrêter une bataille qui avait pris — vous aviez raison de le dire — un développement, une ampleur qui vraiment justifient le mot que j'employais tout à l'heure.

Ce jour-là, la Société des nations est vraiment apparue comme je voudrais qu'elle apparaisse, c'est-à-dire comme une force capable d'arrêter des belligérants en train de s'entretuer.

L'affaire de Mandchourie a été autrement compliquée. J'ai analysé à plusieurs reprises à la Société des nations — je me garderai de renouveler cette analyse aujourd'hui, alors qu'il ne s'agit que de la fixation de la date — comment il ne fallait pas sous-estimer les efforts de la Société. Le conflit, en effet, se présentait dans des conditions toutes particulières et par l'éloignement et par les conditions toutes spéciales de la Mandchourie.

Je ne reprendrai pas à mon compte, bien au contraire, ce que disait tout à l'heure M. de Tastes de l'état de la Chine.

Certes, j'en sais les troubles et les désordres. Je sais aussi que ces troubles et ces désordres accompagnent une grande transformation à laquelle mon cœur de Français, fidèle aux traditions de la France et de la Révolution française, ne peut pas rester insensible. (*Applaudissements à gauche, à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs au centre.*)

Je ne pense pas que notre politique en Extrême-Orient, politique à laquelle il n'y a rien de changé, notre amitié incontestable pour le Japon, puissent exercer un rôle quelconque dans le sentiment de la France, en face d'un conflit où elle a uniquement à dire, je le répète — je m'excuse de le répéter autant, mais c'est l'idée centrale de mes quelques paroles — la justice et le droit. (*Applaudissements.*)

Oui, la situation est toute spéciale en Mandchourie, du fait des traités qui ont autorisé le Japon à s'y établir. Mais ici, laissez-moi vous dire, monsieur de Tastes, qu'il n'y a pas un traité au monde qui puisse influer sur la décision de la France, quand elle siège au conseil de la Société des nations! C'est impossible.

Si, lorsqu'un pays siège comme un juge, au conseil de la Société des nations, il pouvait être influencé par les traités passés avec une autre puissance il n'y aurait plus de justice possible, il n'y aurait plus de Société des nations possible. (*Applaudissements.*)

La France a le désir, très légitime, de demeurer, à l'égard du Japon, dans les termes amicaux qu'elle entretient et qu'elle continuera d'entretenir. Elle connaît le rôle joué par le Japon en Extrême-Orient, mais elle rend hommage aussi à l'effort douloureux, tumultueux, sympathique dans l'ensemble, que fait la Chine pour se créer des institutions libres. (*Applaudissements à gauche, à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs au centre.*)

Elle se doit, au nom de la Société des nations, d'apporter, dans ce conflit qui dure et qui s'aggrave, car je partage là-dessus toutes les inquiétudes qui se sont manifestées, d'abord les paroles d'apaisement — elles ont été prononcées — les efforts de conciliation — ils se sont poursuivis — et si le jour devait venir — j'espère qu'il ne viendra pas — mais je vais répéter le mot, monsieur Péri, car c'est toute notre politique, c'est celle du Gouvernement, c'est la mienne, c'est celle à laquelle nous resterons irréductiblement fidèles: le pacte, rien que le pacte et tout le pacte. (*Applaudissements à gauche, à l'extrême gauche et au centre.*)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Moutet.

M. Marius Moutet. Monsieur le président du conseil, quand mon ami M. Fontanier et moi, au nom du groupe socialiste, avons déposé notre demande d'interpellation, c'était pour vous faire part de notre double inquiétude.

Nous craignons que les temporisations successives de la Société des nations, la placent chaque jour devant un fait accompli plus grave, n'aboutissent à une faillite définitive et même que cette faillite ne fût d'ores et déjà enregistrée, par le seul fait qu'à l'heure où toute une série de puissances ont signé cette déclaration que la guerre est un crime, il ne se trouve pas une seule capable de la faire cesser.

Je me rends donc bien compte de la situation difficile de la France dans un tel conflit. Vous allez siéger dans une Société des nations d'où sont absentes deux des puissances qui ont le plus d'intérêts en Extrême-Orient: les Etats-Unis et la Russie.

L'attitude de l'une comme de l'autre de ces puissances ne nous paraît pas, hélas, de nature à fortifier la position de la Société des nations, non pas tant en raison de leur absence qu'à cause de leurs actes ou de leur défaut d'actes.

M. Romier, dans une conférence faite au retour d'un voyage aux Etats-Unis, indiqua que l'un des griefs de l'opinion publique américaine à notre endroit était que nous paraissons prendre parti pour le Japon dans cette affaire. J'ai cependant l'impression que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'a pas fait un seul acte qui fût de nature à fortifier la position de la Société des nations dans l'application du pacte, et spécialement dans le développement de l'article 16 du pacte, c'est-à-dire l'institution éventuelle de sanctions.

La Russie des Soviets se réfugie derrière son pacifisme absolu.

Sa politique de non-intervention lui attire les sympathies de M. Matsuoka, déclarant « que le cœur du Japon a été touché par l'attitude de la Russie des Soviets », au moment même où la Chine, désespérant de l'action de la Société des nations, nous a fait, en signant le pacte de non-agression, un geste qui signifie : « Puisque je ne trouve pas d'appui auprès de vous, j'en chercherai ailleurs. »

Quant à l'Angleterre, avec laquelle nous paraissons d'accord, son attitude ne semble pas non plus s'être précisée vis-à-vis d'une nation à laquelle l'a liée, pendant longtemps, un traité d'alliance particulièrement étroit.

Ainsi, monsieur le président du conseil, nous comprenons qu'il ne soit pas facile de vous demander de prendre l'attitude résolue d'un homme qui est l'ennemi de la guerre, non seulement parce qu'il la hait de toute son âme, mais parce qu'en proclamant sa haine il dit le droit, c'est-à-dire qu'il affirme la fidélité à la signature qu'il a donnée au pacte Briand-Kellogg, comme au pacte de la Société des nations, comme au traité de Washington par lequel les neuf puissances se sont engagées à respecter l'intégrité de la Chine.

Et de quelle Chine, monsieur de Tastes ? De celle qui a signé le traité de Washington, de celle dont le Japon reconnaissait en 1915, la souveraineté sur la Mandchourie, puisqu'il signait avec elle à cette époque un traité pour obtenir d'elle les droits particuliers au nom desquels il prétend poursuivre aujourd'hui son action dans ce territoire.

Messieurs, nous nous trouvons devant un des conflits les plus graves qui menacent le monde. Ce n'est pas seulement la

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question de l'existence de la Société des nations qui est en cause. Le monde, tel ... nous voudrions qu'il fût, ne nous emie pas de le voir tel qu'il est. La me qui pèse lourdement sur lui, c'est n dépit des signatures et des pactes, oïsme des uns et des autres empêche éaliser ce qui est l'aspiration de tous: ét des conflits sanglants, effroyables, ne époque où le monde entier souffre e crise dont l'atmosphère de guerre n grande partie responsable. (*Applauements à l'extrême gauche.*)

est dans la mesure où vos efforts à ociété des nations, auront abouti à ar- ces conflits, à faire respecter des tés qui ne doivent pas être des chifs de papier, que vous aurez contribué redressement du monde.

Je comprends que, pour un pays comme nôtre, il soit profondément douloureux de se trouver dans cette situation vis-à-vis ne grande nation comme le Japon, conlaquelle nous n'avons aucune raison ostilité. (*Très bien! très bien! à l'extrême gauche.*)

Nous ne pouvons avoir envers elle que sentiments d'amitié, mais nous sommes bien obligés de lui dire:

« Nous ne vous comprenons pas. Vous éguez vos intérêts vitaux. N'avez-vous ue la guerre pour les faire respecter, à ne époque où il semble que le premier te de la création d'un monde nouveau ive être la substitution des procédures iciaires à la raison du plus fort? Vous étendez avoir des droits? Il existe une océdure d'arbitrage. Pourquoi vous y isez-vous? Les responsabilités, nous les chercherons. Mais, pour faire admettre os droits, ne connaissez-vous que le recours à la force? »

Voilà le langage que nous devons lui tenir. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs.*)

Quant à nous, nous disons fermement Gouvernement que nous ne voulons reaître que les solutions de droit.

ous nous avez dit, monsieur le présit du conseil: « Le pacte, tout le pacte. » ous avons le sentiment que vous sauen convaincre non pas seulement le Ja, mais toutes les grandes puissances, votre effort qui ne doit pas seulement sur les discussions d'une Assemqui doit être un effort permanent rçant sur chacun de ceux qui paraisse réfugier dans un égoïsme fâcheux ace de ce qu'ils reconnaissent eux- es comme un crime.

est pour vous aider dans cet effort, sieur le président du conseil, que s avons voulu ce débat.

ous demandons que notre interpellation oiste, afin que, lorsque vous reviendrez Genève, nous puissions vous questionr. Nous avons voulu que vous y partiez, compagné de l'espoir unanime de ce ys qu'il ne sera pas déçu dans sa oyance au droit.

Ce pays a vécu pour elle. Tant de ses fils sont morts pour créer un monde nouveau que le Gouvernement français ne méconnaîtra pas l'idéal pour lequel ils sont tombés. Il ne contresignera pas une faillite de la Société des nations, au bout de laquelle, il n'y aurait, hélas, que des désastres plus grands encore et des ruines amoncelées. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs.*)

M. le président. Il n'y a pas d'opposition l'ajournement de la fixation de la date des interpellations de MM. Fontanier, Moutet et de Tastes?...

Il en est ainsi ordonné.

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FIXATION DE LA DATE D'UNE INTERPELLATION

M. le président. Dans sa séance du 22 décembre, la Chambre a décidé qu'elle fixerait ultérieurement la date de la discussion de l'interpellation de M. Alcide Delmont, sur les conditions dans lesquelles vient d'être instituée dans l'Afrique occidentale française une législation douanière qui ne constitue qu'une mesure fragmentaire et inefficace, et sur la politique d'ensemble que le Gouvernement entend suivre à l'égard de cette colonie, dans des circonstances qui commandent la solidarité des économies métropolitaine et coloniale.

Je crois savoir que le Gouvernement et l'honorable interpellateur sont d'accord pour fixer la date de la discussion de cette interpellation au 27 janvier.

Il n'y a pas d'opposition?...

Il en est ainsi ordonné.

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RENVOI A DES COMMISSIONS POUR AVIS

M. le président. La commission des finances demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur:

1° Le rapport de la précédente législature (repris le 11 juillet conformément à l'article 36 du règlement) concernant les propositions de résolution: 1° de M. Félix Gouin et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à faire accorder la carte de poudrier aux anciens militaires mobilisés dans les poudreries nationales; 2° de M. Félix Gouin et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à faire accorder la carte de poudrier aux mobilisés des poudreries nationales et à leur reconnaître la qualité de victimes de la guerre (n° 515);

2° La proposition de loi de M. Clamamus et plusieurs de ses collègues, tendant à l'application du 3e alinéa de l'article 4 de la loi des retraites du 21 mars 1928 dans les établissements de l'Etat (manufactures des tabacs et allumettes) (n° 576);

3° La proposition de résolution de M. Alfred Wallach concernant une modification à apporter au régime de la taxe d'importation perçue sur les marchandises en provenance de Suisse (n° 672);

4° Le rapport de la précédente législature (repris le 22 décembre 1932, conformément à l'article 36 du règlement) concernant la proposition de loi de M. Piquemal et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à instituer une indemnité de loyer en faveur des chômeurs (n° 1116);

5° La proposition de loi de M. Albert Sérol tendant à modifier l'article 95 de la loi du 31 mars 1931 relatif aux contremaîtres des écoles nationales professionnelles et des écoles pratiques de commerce et d'industrie (n° rap. 1177).

Conformément à l'article 32 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission des finances demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur:

1° La proposition de résolution de M. Paul Courrent ayant pour objet de procurer aux résiniers, victimes de l'effondrement des cours de la résine et de ses dérivés, un salaire suffisamment rémunérateur pour assurer leur existence (n° 689);

2° La proposition de loi de M. Pierre Dignac, tendant à la création d'une caisse de compensation destinée à compléter les salaires insuffisants des travailleurs des forêts landaises (n° 944).

Conformément à l'article 32 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission de l'agriculture, d'accord avec la commission des finances, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur la proposition de loi de M. Join-Lambert, tendant à modifier la législation relative aux évaluations des valeurs locatives des propriétés non bâties servant au calcul de la contribution foncière et de l'impôt sur les bénéfices agricoles (n° 942).

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission du commerce et de l'industrie, d'accord avec la commission des boissons, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur:

1° Le projet de loi tendant à l'approbation de l'avenant au « *modus vivendi* » commercial franco-portugais du 4 mars 1925, signé le 12 juillet 1932 (n° 573);

2° Le projet de loi tendant à autoriser sous certaines conditions le coupage des vins portugais importés avec des vins français (n° 574).

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission de l'Algérie, des colonies et des protectorats, d'accord avec la commission du commerce et de l'industrie, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur la proposition de résolution de M. Henri Tasso et plusieurs de ses collègues, tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à organiser à Marseille, en 1936, une exposition coloniale nationale (n° 800. — Rapport 1223).

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission de la marine marchande, d'accord avec la commission des finances, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur le projet de loi portant modification de l'article 8 de la loi du 28 mars 1928 sur les droits de quai. (N° 806.)

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission de la marine marchande, d'accord avec la commission des finances, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur le projet de loi ouvrant au ministre de la marine marchande, sur l'exercice 1932, un crédit supplémentaire pour l'exécution de la convention du 21 avril 1927 et portant annulation de crédits au titre de la subvention pour le service maritime: le Havre—New-York. (N° 1157.)

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

La commission des mines et de la force motrice, d'accord avec la commission de l'agriculture, demande à être appelée à donner son avis sur:

1° La proposition de résolution de M. Paul Courrent, ayant pour objet de procurer aux résiniers, victimes de l'effondrement des cours de la résine et de ses dérivés, un salaire suffisamment rémunérateur pour assurer leur existence. (N° 689);

2° La proposition de loi de M. Pierre Dignac, tendant à la création d'une caisse de compensation destinée à compléter les salaires insuffisants des travailleurs des forêts landaises. (N° 944.)

Conformément à l'article 31 du règlement, le renvoi est prononcé pour avis.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 3256
of January 16, 1933
from the Embassy - Paris

Remarks of M. Paul-Boncour in the Chamber,
Friday, January 13, 1933

Gentlemen:

I am not expressing an opinion as to the opportuneness of the great debate to which M. Outrey invited us just now, but I think you will consider, as I do, that, although it might be useful it would have at the present moment - just before the day when the Committee of the Nineteen (issue of the Extraordinary Assembly of the League of Nations) is going to reconvene at Geneva in order to settle the Sino-Japanese conflict - a very evident disadvantage.

As it is legitimate and necessary, in conformity with parliamentary control, that, with respect to international conferences to which the Governments are about to transmit in Geneva the wishes of their countries, the Chamber should decide and know beforehand in what way its action will be exercised, so I beg it to consider, that in the present instance the question is before the League of Nations by virtue of precise articles of the Pact.

Nou doubt these articles which the League has before it - you know the numbers - do not make the League a judge. But they oblige it to launch a conciliation procedure preparatory to the time when it will have to consider the substance of the matter and say to the two nations in question which is wrong and which is right, which is the aggressor and which is attacked.

Under these circumstances, it would be difficult and unseemly if, before even taking part in a new session where new facts (sufficiently grave, alas!) are going to be made

known .....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

known - facts on which I have at present no other information than that which you yourselves have and which originates from the often contradictory news of the daily papers - the Government should be called on to say in advance what its sentiments will be in respect to acts that it must judge after having obtained the impartial and precise details which it pertains to the League of Nations to furnish.

Consequently, the Chamber will consider that this is not the day to initiate the very full debate which M. Outrey asked for just now. Of that the Chamber's habitual prudence is asure guarantee.

If, however, as is natural, you wish to know the general lines of policy, the attitude of the French Government, in the course of this already long procedure governing the Sino-Japanese conflict, I shall have no difficulty in tracing this line. And neither shall have, Monsieur de Tastes, any difficulty in establishing the liaison between the present and past for the same man has represented France since the procedure commenced.

But allow me to tell you, I do not believe that the attitude of France at Geneva in respect to a conflict first of all evoked by virtue of Article 11 then by virtue of Article 15 was inspired in any way whatsoever - yesterday or today - by this or that policy in any part of the world. France in these circumstances is accustomed to take a decision in accordance with justice and right.

I agree that the task with which she has so completely associated herself for over a year has not been characterized by that speed and fruitfulness that many of you and - I say quite frankly - I myself would have wished.

Nevertheless I ask M. Fontanier and of course - although

I .....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I do not think he will grant my request - M. Peri, who has given his pessimism a very black touch, not to slight the useful efforts of the League of Nations and the infinitely honorable part taken by France, under its different governments in these useful efforts.

Oh! I well understand - this is the customary reproach and is, that can be, made to the League of Nations - that in this kind of conflict the League does not prove to be sufficiently rapid and efficacious.

Let us remember this fact, Gentlemen. Perhaps it may induce you to approve the policy of the French Government when, on the reconvening of the Disarmament Conference, it will uphold, you can imagine with what energy, the necessity of endowing the League of Nations with powers sufficient to enable it to enforce its decisions and make them respected.

But even in its present state, and in spite of its present inadequacy let us take care, Gentlemen, in the Sino-Japanese as in other conflicts, not to under-estimate the value and efficiency of the League of Nations.

You were speaking, Monsieur Fontanier, of the settlement of the Greco-Bulgare conflict. This settlement has been much spoken of - as if the League of Nations had only one affair to its credit, one suit only gained, like those lawyers without a brief who continually place before the eyes of the public their sole dossier. This is not the case. It has settled many others which have not been discussed. And they have not been talked of precisely because they have been nipped in the bud, and how do you know (those who have assisted at these settlements know this well) in Upper Silesia, Danzig, and in other places, all these little disputes, all these petty conflicts, all these daily causes of irritation, would not have taken

another .....

0047

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

another and more disturbing aspect had not the League of Nations settled them?

The Greco-Bulgare conflict, M. Fontanier, developed in a part of Europe where it is well known apparently the most insignificant ~~de~~ differences can sometimes develop in such a way as to inflame the whole of Europe. Consequently, let us congratulate ourselves that in all these crises, the League of Nations has played its part and has played it usefully.

In the Sino-Japanese affair, if it has not, alas! - I say this frankly, I am not in the habit of cajoling myself with words - done all that we would have wished, let us not forget that, all the same, in certain circumstances, it has played its part. I am thinking in particular of that Shanghai battle to which M. Outrey referred, of that battle, which, as President of the Council of the League of Nations, preoccupied me day by day. The League of Nations, by its effort, even though it could not stop the slaughter at the commencement, finished by ending a battle whidh - you were right in saying so - had developed and extended in such a way as to justify the word I used just now. That day the League of Nations really appeared as I would wish it to appear; that is to say like a force capable of arresting the belligerants occupied in killing each other.

The Manchurian affair was more complicated. I have many times shown before the League of Nations - I will refrain from doing so again today when it is only a question of determining a date - how necessary it was not to under-estimate the efforts of the League. The conflict, in effect, is taking place under very peculiar circumstances, both on account of the distance and of the

very .....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

very special conditions of Manchuria.

I shall not admit for my part - quite the contrary - what M. de Tastes said just now about the state of China. Certainly I am aware of the disturbances and disorders. I am also aware that these disturbances and disorders are the accompaniment of a great transformation to which my heart, as a Frenchman, faithful to the traditions of France and of the French Revolution, cannot remain indifferent.

I do not think that our policy in the Far East, a policy which has not modified our incontestable friendship for Japan, can exercise any influence whatsoever over the sentiment of France in face of a conflict where she has only to say * I apologize for repeating this so often but it is the central idea of my few words - justice and right.

Yes, the situation in Manchuria is altogether special, from the fact of the treaties which authorized Japan to establish herself there. But here, allow me to tell you M. de Tastes, there is no treaty in the world which can influence the decision of France when she sits on the council of the League of Nations! That is impossible.

If, when a country sits as Judge on the Council of the League of Nations, it could be influenced by treaties made with another power, justice would be no longer possible, the League of Nations would no longer possible.

France has the very legitimate desire to remain, in regard to Japan, on the friendly terms she is maintaining and which she will continue to maintain. She knows the role Japan has played in the Far East, but she also renders homage to the painful, tumultuous and, on the whole, sympathetic effort which China is making in order to create for herself free institutions.

She .....

0049

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

She owes it to herself, in the name of the League of Nations, to bring into this conflict which is continuing and becoming worse - for on this point I share all the anxiety that has been manifested - first of all words of appeasement - they have been pronounced - efforts for conciliation - they are being continued - and, if the day should come - I hope that it will not come - but I am going to repeat the word, M. Péri, for it is our whole policy, it is the policy of the Government, it is mine, it is the policy to which we shall remain faithful; the Pact, nothing but the Pact and the whole Pact.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, January 16, 1933.

No. 3257

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict

FE
WE

F/HS

793.94/5816

793.94

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FEB 3 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 27 1933 Department of State

JAN 26 33

FILED FEB 2 - 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 3256, of January 16, 1933, describing the recent discussion on Far Eastern affairs in the Chamber and to summarize the subsequent press comment.

Leon Blum in the POPULAIRE of January 14 virtually stamped with his approval M. Paul-Boncour's explanation that a discussion of this issue would profit little as long as the League sitting as a court - with France as one of the judges had not pronounced sentence. Couching his editorial in astonishingly

mild .....

0051

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mild and friendly language the Socialist leader merely warned that the League Council was expected to do its duty; he then desisted from all further attack on the Government.

An anonymous Socialist editorialist however reminded the Government on January 15 that the Socialist Internationale regarded Japan as an aggressor and therefore would expect concrete action at Geneva.

M. Edouard Herriot in the ERE NOUVELLE of January 13 also approved M. Paul-Boncour's handling of the Far Eastern problem, using this situation as one of several illustrations of the necessity for close collaboration between the United States, France and Great Britain.

The Nationalist press meanwhile (aside from news reports from the Far East) virtually ignored the Sino-Japanese question. True the MATIN on January 13 sought to show that the Soviet Russians had seized the Chinese province lying between Mongolia and Thibet without protest from the United States or other world powers while Pertinax in an article in the ECHO DE PARIS of January 16 endeavored to demonstrate that Japan "in the manner of Cavour" had charted a course in the Far East which it could not change and concluded that the issue of the conversations in Geneva would be an innocuous resolution based on Article 15 paragraph 4 of the Covenant.

In .....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In this general connection the LIBERTE of January 16 reported that a Japanese military mission headed by Colonel Muraki and Major Kachima had been "touring the battlefields". The first stop, according to the press account, was Metz.

Hayange, a suburb of Metz, it will be recalled, is the home and headquarters of the de Wendel family and as a consequence of the Steel Trust. Several American correspondents who made inquiries in official circles regarding the strange visit of Japanese officers to the battlefront including Metz in mid-Winter were able to confirm that the officers "paid their respects" on M. Humbert de Wendel and lunched at his Château.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge

Walter E. Edge

In quintuplicate

COPY to E.I.C.

710

RTP/cg

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 27, 1933.

~~FEP~~
~~EHD~~:
~~MMH~~:
~~SKH~~:

London's despatch No. 611 of January 11, 1933, forwards a copy of the memorandum supplied by the Foreign Office on January 10 with regard to the question of mediation by the powers for the purpose of localizing the Shanhaikwan affair, the gist of which has already been received by telegraph.

~~AEB~~:CLS

0054

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 611

London, January 11, 1933.

SUBJECT: The Shanhaikuan Affair.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 2 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

PM RECD
DEPT OF STATE
JAN 26 33
DIV OF COMMUNICATIONS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 27 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5817

793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

793.94 | 5734

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 6, January 10, 7 p. m., 1933, with reference to a report from Peking that the question of mediation by the Powers, with the object of localizing the Shanhaikuan affair, has been discussed by the American, French, Italian and British Legations, and to forward herewith a copy of the memorandum upon which the Embassy's telegram under reference was based, which was handed to me at the Foreign Office on January 10.

Respectfully yours,

Ray Atherton
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

Foreign Office Memorandum,
dated January 10, 1933.

FILED
JUN 24 1933

RA/ER

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 611, January 11, 1933.

COPY.

MEMORANDUM.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking reports that the question of mediation by the Powers with the object of localising the Shanhaikuan affair has been discussed between the United States and French Ministers, and the Italian and British Chargé d'Affaires. They recognize great difficulties, but nevertheless seem to feel that if an extension of the operations is to be avoided some attempt at mediation by the great Powers if not by the League itself, should be made in order to bring the Chinese and Japanese into contact with each other with the participation of representatives of major Powers designated by the League, with the restricted aim of localising the affair, and preventing an extension of military operations.

His Majesty's Government believe that the Japanese are already desirous of minimising the Shanhaikuan affair and of avoiding any further military operations at present. On the Chinese side an indication of possible readiness to come to a local agreement is afforded by the desire shown by the Chinese General Ho to meet the Japanese military or naval authorities on neutral ground on board H.M.S. Folkestone, now at Chinwangtao. Chances therefore seem to exist of an agreement to localise the trouble being reached without outside intervention, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo believes that such an agreement is more likely to be reached without such intervention. If it cannot be reached in this manner, it will probably be owing to fundamental difficulties which could only be removed by advising the Chinese to remove their troops to a distance from Jehol.

In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government are disposed

to/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to take no action in the sense contemplated by the representatives in Peking, but to await the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen at Geneva next week by whom the question of mediation can, if necessary, be considered.

Foreign Office,

10th January, 1933.

0057

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED UNDER SECRETARY JAN 24 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 13, 1933.

COMMENT ON VIEWS EXPRESSED BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN REGARD TO CHINA, IN CONVERSATION OF JANUARY 5.

with Mr. Castle 793.94/5745

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED JAN 27 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE JAN 28 1933 NOTED

It is true that China is not unified politically, that is, it has not the strong and effective machinery of national political organization which we are accustomed to finding in an Occidental state. But, the Chinese nation is essentially unified socially and economically, and the facts are such that it is impossible to take a map and draw upon it boundaries indicating definite lines of political cleavage, separation or distinction. By blood, by language and by culture in general, the majority of the people in any of the major areas which might be selected for purposes of analysis and comparison are Chinese and any boundary which might be drawn between such an area and the adjoining areas would be as artificial as (if not more than) certain similar boundaries which might be drawn on the map of France or of Germany or even of the United States.

China as a whole is a very unwieldy entity, for purposes of a unified political organization and administration, by virtue of territorial bulk and population

FILED JAN 31 1933

F/HS 793.94/5818 Confidential File

0058

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tion number. (NOTE: So, however, are the United States and Russia.) In spite of this unwieldiness, the temper of modern China is pointed directly toward the development of a political entity wherein all of China would continue to be one nation. It may be that China will develop along the lines of a federation of semi-independent groups but it must be emphasized that any such development, if it occurs and if it is to be lasting, must proceed from natural causes within China itself. Any attempt by outside powers to assist in a movement which might be viewed by the Chinese as an attempt to encourage the idea of creating within China semi-independent groups would almost certainly be opposed by the Chinese and would therefore not be successful. Any attempt by the powers to assist China should take, it is believed, the form of assisting China to develop a stronger central government (this is, it will be remembered, the view of the Lytton Commission).

There →

0059

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

There appears to be some possible merit, however, in the idea that the Manchuria question might possibly be solved by an arrangement wherein "Manchoukuo" would take part in a conference of all the various areas or regions of China. The essential factors in bringing about such a conference, it would seem, would be (a) that the Chinese themselves initiate it and (b) that Japan, through some act of its own, do something to remove the very strong anti-Japanese agitation in China. So long as that agitation continues, it appears highly improbable that Chinese public opinion would permit the holding of a conference where one of the regional groups ("Manchoukuo") continues definitely marked out as a Japanese sphere of operation and a sphere within which Japanese armed forces maintain physical and political control.

SKH

FE:SKH, ZMF

0060

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Copies sent to Geneva, Brussels, Tokyo - Beijing 1/20/33

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 21 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED JAN 26 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE JAN 21 1933 NOTED

January 18, 1933.

Memorandum of conversation with the Belgian Ambassador, January 18th.

793.94 note

793.94 Conv.

The Belgian Ambassador called to find out what was actually going on so far as the Far Eastern situation was concerned. He referred to the various newspaper reports and I told him that they were all based on the fact that there seemed to be a misunderstanding on the part of European nations as to our attitude, that in answer to inquiries we had been compelled to make it very plain that our attitude had in no way changed and that the policy of this Government was unlikely to change during the next Administration. The Ambassador said he took for granted that the Secretary had got Roosevelt's agreement to this. I told him that I felt Mr. Roosevelt's public statement had made it very clear that he intended to continue the policy. I pointed out to the Ambassador that we had, of course, not been telling the League what to do as certain newspapers had intimated, since the Lytton Report was a report to the League and clearly we had no right to advise the League as

F/HS

793.94/5819

FILED JAN 30 1933

0061

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

as to how to act on its own report.

The Ambassador said that, after a talk with the Secretary some two weeks ago, he had written a full account of the conversation and sent it to Hymans, in which he had made it very clear that America's stand remained what it had been for many months. He seemed very much disturbed for fear that Hymans had not received this report before going to Geneva. I told him that, of course, I knew nothing about that, but that, in any case, M. Hymans, who had told Mr. Gibson there were many rumors as to a change in our policy, had been informed by Mr. Hugh Wilson as to the facts. The Ambassador said that he thought he fully understood the situation.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

0062

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No. 183

January 25 1938

793.94/5819

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the Belgian Ambassador concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

C

U VC/AB FE

M.M.H.

WE: MH

PM

CR

JAN 24 1938 PM

JAN 24, 1938

0063

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No. 984

793.94/5819

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the Belgian Ambassador concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

0064

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No. 701

January 26 1948

793.94/5819

The Honorable

Hugh Gibson,

American Ambassador,

Brussels.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the Belgian Ambassador concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

WE: WAF PM

JAN 24 1948

0065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 21 1938

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY

No.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,

American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

793.94/5819

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the Belgian Ambassador concerning the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

JAN 24 1938 PM

0066

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Statement made to Adjutant Sym. of the Chinese Legation. I-16-33

793.94

In connection with the Shanhaikwan incident, China's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to the American Consul General at Nanking on January 10 a memorandum, texts of which it is believed were also handed to representatives of the other signatories of the Protocol of 1901, calling attention to events at Shanhaikwan and making reference to the Protocol of 1901. The Vice Minister stated that the Chinese Government wished to make to the signatories of the Protocol the suggestion that they make representations to the Japanese Government to dissuade it from abuse of privileges which it might attempt to claim under the provisions of the Protocol. In connection with this matter, note has been taken of the statements in the memorandum and the statement made informally by the Vice Minister. In so far as the Shanhaikwan incident is concerned, it is the view of the Department that the events at Shanhaikwan must be regarded as incidents of the conflict between China and Japan and do not flow from or rest on provisions of the Protocol of 1901. If there take place developments which involve the provisions of that Protocol, consideration will be given to those developments in the light of the rights and obligations for which provision is made therein.

793.94/5819A

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
1/23/33

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 22 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 23 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 24 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 20, 1933.

A telegram from Peiping reported severe fightings on the border of Jehol during the last few days. A fierce battle is expected around the Chinese New Year which begins on January 26. The Japanese are now busily constructing defensive works at Shihho, Chumen, and along the Great Wall. This fact clearly shows that these works will be used to stop Chinese advances and counter-attacks when they launch their attack on Jehol.

A telegram from Tientsin reported that the Japanese are planning to take Jehol within twenty-five days. Chang Ching-hui of the bogus government will be the commander-in-chief of this campaign against Jehol. Three lines of offensive are planned, one on Shanhaikwan, one on Fusin, and one on Kailu. The attack on Kailu will be accompanied by a large scale aerial bombardment. The Chinese Volunteer forces under General Feng Chan-hai clashed in a series of terrific battles with the Seventh Division of the Japanese Kwangtung Army during the last few days. The forces under Li Hai-ching and Liu Kwei-tang, both Chinese Volunteer commanders, went to reinforce General Feng's forces. The fighting at Nanling has stopped, inflicting severe damages on Chaoyang and San-Pao-Ying-Tze with almost all the houses of the inhabitants destroyed.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 21, 1933.

793.94/5820

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 24. 1933

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1933
Department of State

SUMMARY OF TWO CABLEGRAMS

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 24, 1933

793.94

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received two telegrams from Marshal Chang Hsiao-liang, dated January 17 and 22 respectively, reporting that Brigadier-General Ho Chu-Kuo had received two overtures from the English Naval Commander and the manager of the Kai-Luan Coal Mine, an Englishman, offering to bring the Chinese and the Japanese military commands now at Shanhaikwan together to negotiate peace under the good office of the English. On one occasion it was known that the English Naval Commander was acting under orders from London while on the other occasion upon the request of the Japanese.

Brigadier-General Ho, on both occasions, declared that any negotiations between China and Japan should be entered into through the Central Government at Nanking and that no negotiation for a settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair could be undertaken until the Japanese had withdrawn from Shanhaikwan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, upon receipt of these reports, immediately instructed Brigadier-General Ho that he should not enter into any negotiation with the Japanese, directly or under the good office of the English, because the Chinese Government had declared on January 24 that the Shanhaikwan affair is integrally related to the whole issue of Japanese invasion of the Three Eastern Provinces and therefore cannot be settled as a local affair.

Chinese Legation, Washington January 24, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 25 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/HS
793.94/5821

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JAN 26 1933

0069

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From Chinese Legation
1/25/33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 25 1933
Department of State

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A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

793.94 DATED JANUARY 24, 1933

F/HS
793.94/5822

The following is the translation of the note sent by Foreign Minister Lo Wen-kan on January 22 replying to the note of Mr. Ariyoshi of January 11:

"With reference to your note of January 11 concerning the Shanhaikwan affair, I have the honor to inform you that, in the interest of veracity the Chinese Government has made another investigation of the circumstances surrounding it and has found them to be truly as follows:

"'In the morning of January 1, the Japanese forces were reported making warlike preparations and troop movements were observed on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway beyond Shanhaikwan. At 1:00 p. m. on the same day, explosions and rifle shots were heard beyond the South Gate. They were found to have originated from the Japanese soldiers themselves. Afterwards, they began to fire on the Chinese sentinels posted outside of the South Gate, thereupon they were later withdrawn into the city. The Japanese soldiers then pressed in further and opened fire at the city gate. At this point the Chinese garrison sent its Staff Secretary, Mr. Chen, to the headquarters of the Japanese forces to inquire into the cause of the disturbances. Instead of giving a satisfactory reply, the Japanese actually charged the Chinese soldiers with the responsibility for the trouble. In the night of the same day, Japanese soldiers advanced onto the South Gate while Japanese armored and troop trains stood by

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

outside the railway station. At 2:00 a. m. the next morning, the Japanese headquarters presented a set of unreasonable demands of which immediate acceptance was required under threat of an attack in case of non-compliance. These demands were rejected. In the meantime, Japanese soldiers had already placed Mr. Ma, the chief police officer of the Bureau of Publice Safefy at the South Gate, under detention. At 10:00 a. m. the Japanese began their concerted attack with land, naval and air forces. In the afternoon of January 3, they occupied the city of Shanhaikwan. These are the facts of the case and there was no agreement of any kind between the Chinese and the Japanese troops.'

"On the basis of the facts as outlined above, it can readily be gathered that the initial explosions and rifle shots were undoubtedly of Japanese origin. It is also unquestionably clear that there is nothing whatever to justify or support the allegation that an agreement had existed between the local Chinese garrison and the Japanese forces.

"It is to be noted that the city of Shanhaikwan is not an open trade port and, in principle, the Japanese nationals have no right to reside there. Even granting that the Japanese nationals, in disregard of treaty provisions, have taken up residence in that city, the matter of protection should only be the concern of local Chinese authorities. It is not for the Japanese military to usurp or interfere with the exercise of such rights. Moreover, by misusing the so-called jurisdiction as a pretext to mass large numbers of troops and attack

0071

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese territory, Japan has irrevocably placed herself beyond right and reason.

"In short, the attack on and the occupation of the city of Shanhaikwan beginning with the deliberate work of destruction by the Japanese troops themselves and followed by false accusations of provocation on the part of the Chinese soldiers in order to disguise the pre-conceived nature of their plan only revealed the customary Japanese tricks which have become well-known to the world. All responsibility appertaining to this affair, therefore, should be borne entirely by the Japanese.

"With further reference to your note under reply, I have the honor to point out that the assertions made therein can hardly be admitted as facts. Besides, Japanese troops, since their occupation of Shanhaikwan, have subsequently attacked the Chinese forces at Chiumenkow and Shimentsai, thus threatening the safety and peace hitherto prevailing inside the Great Wall. They have, in addition, often paraded and carried out manoeuvres in the densely populated sections in Peiping and elsewhere. All such actions constitute violations of the principles of international law and the provisions of the international treaties to which reference has repeatedly been made by the Chinese Government. Even in regard to the engagements contained in the Protocol signed by China and the powers in 1901, Japan has spared no effort to disregard and violate them. In view of these circumstances, the Chinese Government is constrained to take this opportunity to file a further protest.

"Finally, I have the honor to request Your Excellency to communicate to your Government requesting immediate action in

0072

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

respect to the points contained in the last paragraph of my note of January 4, namely; the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from the occupied areas at and near Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in the future, and the punishment of those who started the trouble; and also in respect to the unlawful activities of the Japanese soldiers stationed in Peiping and elsewhere which your Government should take steps to restrain."

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 25, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation 1/26/33

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 25 1933
Department of State

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A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 25, 1933

793.94

The Chinese Legation has this morning received the following telegram from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking:

Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphatically denied the press reports that the Chinese Government contemplated entering into direct negotiations with Japan. It was pointed out that the whole Sino-Japanese dispute being now adjudicated at Geneva, direct negotiations were clearly out of the question. Chinese authorities considered the current rumors as emanating from Japanese sources.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 25, 1933

F/HS 793.94/5823

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 26, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 26 1933
Department of State

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED JANUARY 25, 1933

793.94

Mr. Tuan Chi-jui, on his arrival at Nanking, announced that he is in active support of the Government's policies toward Japan. The rumor that the Nanking Government ~~was~~ is using Mr. Tuan to negotiate peace with Japan has entirely no foundation in fact and is apparently emanated from Japanese sources. The rumor now current in Peiping and Teintsin that the Chinese are willing to negotiate directly with the Japanese is also propaganda spread by the Japanese.

FE/HS
793.94/5824

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 25, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JS

Plain

FROM PEIPING via N. R.

Dated January 29, 1933

Rec'd , 6 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 7
DIVISION OF
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.94

97, January 29, 9 [illegible].

Reuter reports following interview with Marshal Tuan Chi Jui, Shanghai, twenty eighth:

"'There is no room for compromise. China is unable to start negotiation with Japan unless Japan first restores Manchuria which she occupied by military force.' Marshal went on to say that at this time when nation was passing through unprecedented crisis every Chinese citizen must do his duty to protect nation against aggression. It was necessary to abandon differences of opinion when fate of country was at stake.

Referring to his visit to Nanking Marshal Tuan said it had no special purpose and no political significance. He saw General Chiang Kai Shek because General Chiang was an old student of his. It was true that he contributed his views on the existing situation but only in his capacity as private citizen. 'But what I did was only to contribute my views. Whether they will be adopted is the Government's business.' Marshal categorically

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FEB 1 1933

793.94/5825

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

categorically denied current reports that he went to Nanking specially to offer advice on anti-Japanese campaign and that he favored direct Sino-Japanese negotiations. 'All such reports are unfounded and they are pure Japanese press fabrications aiming at misleading the public.!"

JOHNSON

JS

0077

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated January 30, 1933.

Recd 4:37 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 31 1933
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94 note 893.01 Manchuria

98, January 30, 9 a.m.

Following from Consul General Mukden:

"January 28, 4 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL. Information from an official source is to the effect that Tang Yulin's adherence to new regime has been secured and that little serious resistance to occupation of Jehol Province is anticipated. His troops concentrated in Northeastern Jehol are expected to retire before advancing Manchukuo troops followed by Japanese units as are the Chinese regulars reported to be south of Chaoyangchihfeng Road. Recent heavy aeroplane bombardments along the border was mainly for purpose of destroying morale of enemy forces. Japanese are said to be anxious to avoid a serious clash with Chinese regulars because of repercussions.

It is planned to announce the installment of Manchukuo administration in Jehol on March first, the anniversary of founding of Manchukuo, and the appointment of the new governor already selected. However, the Japanese are prepared for any eventuality in case plans miscarry."

(BEGIN GRAY) Please see in this connection Legation's

F/HS 793.94/5826

FEB 2 - 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/5797

Legation's 97, January 29, 9 a.m., and 85, January 25, noon.

Situation described in above message seems reasonable and would logically explain present developments.

By mail to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PARAPHRASE

JAN 31 1933

Telegram dated January 30, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

On January 28 the American Consul General at Mukden reported that information had been received from an official source to the effect that the adherence of Tang Yu-lin to the new regime has been obtained and that there is anticipated but slight opposition to the occupation of the Province of Jehol. It is expected that the troops of Tang Yu-lin, which are concentrated in Northeastern Jehol, will retire before the oncoming "Manchoukuo" troops which are followed by units of the Japanese, as will the Chinese regulars who are south of the Chaoyangchihfeng Road according to reports. The main purpose of recent severe airplane bombardments on the border was to destroy the morale of the opposing troops. Because of fear of repercussions it is reported that the Japanese are anxious to avoid a serious clash with the regular Chinese soldiers.

The anniversary of the founding of "Manchoukuo", March 1, is the date upon which it is planned to proclaim the installment in Jehol of the "Manchoukuo" administration, and to announce the appointment of the new governor who has already been chosen. Nevertheless, should their plans miscarry, the Japanese are prepared for anything that might happen.

The American Minister adds that the situation described seems to afford a logical explanation of developments and to be reasonable.

0080

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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WP

PL..IN

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 30, 1933

Rec'd 2:00 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 30 1933
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
note
893.00

99, January 30, 10 a. m.

Reuter from Canton, twenty-ninth:

"There is considerable speculation here regarding activities of various military leaders gathering in this city. Chinese reports state that as outcome of a conference the generals have decided on general scheme of resisting Japanese invasion and exterminating the Reds.

Reports are freely in circulation that Southwest authorities are contemplating the organization of a highest national defense council. Chinese press quotes General Tsai Tingkai Commander of famous Nineteenth Route Army and Pacification Commissioner of Fukien as having remarked that Southwest has already adopted resistance program but that parts of military preparations cannot be divulged".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/HS 793.94/5827

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FEB 1 - 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 30 1933 Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY JAN 28 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 1 1933

AIDE-MEMOIRE

In reply to the State Department's enquiries in their Aide-Memoire of January 24th Sir Ronald Lindsay is instructed to communicate the following explanations regarding the proposed representations to the Japanese Government on the subject of the alleged abuses of privileges at Shanhaikwan.

The interpretation of the Protocol is no doubt open to argument, and proof that the Japanese have been actually guilty of abuse is lacking. Prima facie, however, the occupation of a Chinese town by Protocol troops not for the purpose of keeping open communication between Peking and the sea, which was the sole object of the Protocol, looks like an abuse. The object of the representations in the terms outlined in the Embassy's Aide-Memoire of January 23rd, which would be made orally and would not involve passing judgment on the action taken so far by the Japanese, would be to remind them that other Powers are interested in the maintenance of the Protocol and to avert the possibility of its being abused and of an opening being given to the Chinese to argue that it had been torn up with the acquiescence of the other signatories. Effect on the Japanese is a matter of speculation, but it does not appear to His Majesty's Government that any harm would result, and the above object would be achieved at any rate in part.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
January 28th, 1933.

793.94/5828

FILED JUN 1 1933

0082

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE/H

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Except Quoted Part

Department of State

Washington,
February 1, 1933.

6f

This cable was sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

F/HS

793.94/5828

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (England)

24 Confidential /5794

/5813

Department's 21, January 24, 5 p.m. and your 18, January 26, 5 p.m.

One. The Department under date January 28 received an aide-memoire from the British Embassy elucidating the views of the British Government with regard to the queries raised in the Department's aide-memoire of January 24.

Two. The Department today handed to a member of the British Embassy an aide-memoire under date January 31 expressing appreciation for having been informed, both in Washington and in London, of the British Government's views on this important matter and stating as follows:

(Gray) QUOTE The Department, having given serious thought both to the proposition raised in the British Embassy's aide-memoire of January 23, 1933, and to the elucidation thereof communicated in the aide-memoire under reference, feels that action at this time on the part of the

COPY FOR FILE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

American Government either in relation to the alleged abuses by Japan at Shanhaikwan of privileges under the Protocol of 1901 or in relation to the general question of the rights and obligations of the signatory powers, arising out of or under the Protocol, would be likely to do more harm than good. Also, the Department feels that any useful purpose which might be served by action at this time in connection with this matter might be served to greater advantage through representations made by the British Ambassador in Tokyo than by any joint or separate representations in which the American Government participated.

The Department wishes, however, to assure the British Government, as it has already assured the Chinese Legation here, that, if future developments should more specifically than at present involve the provisions of the Protocol of 1901, the American Government would expect to give consideration to those developments as the necessity arose and in the light of this Government's rights and obligations thereunder. UNQUOTE.

(Endray)

~~895.94/5940~~ ~~5954~~

Enciphered by ~~EE.~~ FEJ/VDM FE

Sent by operator ~~_____~~ *M.,* _____, *19*_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

In connection with the communication of this aide memoire, the statement was made on behalf of the Department that, whatever the merits of the project, the Department still entertaining doubts in regard thereto, it was felt that any effort along the lines thereof which the British Government might wish to make, with or without the cooperation of several of the other powers mentioned, would have a better chance of serving a useful purpose in the absence of American participation than with it, in view of the persistent sensitiveness, real or artificially stimulated, of the Japanese to suggestions from the United States. It was stated that we wish to cooperate wherever it appears to us that a useful purpose will be served by our doing so.

793.94/5828

FE:JEJ/VDM/cls FE

S Hinson

Feb.1 1935

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1—138

0085

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

PEIPING

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

FROM

Dated January 30, 1933

Recd. 5 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 30 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

100. January 30, 11 a.m.

793.94

Following from Nanking:

793.94/5792 793.94/5797

"January 29, 10 a.m. Your 80 and 85 to the Department.

One. I questioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs January 28, 5 p.m., about newspaper reports that either Tuan or the Young Marshal might have suggested to the Government that negotiations be opened with Japan. Lo said these reports were sent out by Japan and were completely unfounded. He referred to published interviews of Tuan all of which have advocated continued military resistance. Lo said Tuan had come to Shanghai for safety becuase he feared the Japanese would kidnap him or seek to utilize him otherwise.

Two. Lo said the determination of the Chinese Government and people to resist Japan is unchanged but he insisted that Japan is beginning to be apprehensive and is trying every method to undermine China's spirit of resistance. He professed indignation at the seeming desire of a subordinate to assist these efforts, for instance, through offer of local mediation at Shanhaikwan."

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793.94/5829

FILED
FEB 2 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 100 from Peiping

If reports concerning direct negotiations were sent out by Japan it seems to me peculiar that at the time they were given currency by people near the Young Marshal here and during his absence, American newspaper correspondents were apparently convinced that something of the sort was in the wind and told me that these came voluntarily and primarily from the Chinese and not from the Japanese although all know that the Japanese are anxious to conduct negotiations. One explanation may be that Chang Hsueh Liang's followers desired by this means to eliminate Tuan Chi Jue from the picture as a possible go-between.

By mail to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAN 31 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated January 30, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

On January 29 the American Consul General at Nanking reported that, on January 28, he questioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning newspaper reports that the suggestion that negotiations be started with Japan might have been made to the Government by either Chang Hsueh-liang or Tuan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that these reports were entirely without foundation and that Japan had sent out the reports. He called attention to interviews with Tuan which had been published and all of which have favored the continuance of military resistance. Lo also stated that Tuan had come to Shanghai for safety for the reason that he was afraid that he would be kidnapped by the Japanese or that the Japanese would, in other ways, seek to use him.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Chinese Government and the people are still determined to resist Japan but he was insistent that Japan is beginning to be fearful and is attempting to undermine the Chinese spirit of resistance by all methods. He expressed indignation at the apparent wish of a subordinate to aid these attempts, for example, through an offer at Shanhaikwan of local mediation.

The American Minister states that if Japan had sent out reports in regard to direct negotiations it seemed

peculiar

0088

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

peculiar to him that at the time when they were given currency by those close to Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping and while he was away, American newspaper correspondents were evidently satisfied that something of the kind was in the offing and they told the Minister that, though everybody knows that the Japanese desire to conduct negotiations, these reports came spontaneously and in the first place from the Chinese and not from the Japanese. The Minister adds that one explanation may be that the elimination in this manner of Tuan Chi-jui as a possible intermediary was desired by the followers of the Young Marshal.

0089

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 26, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 26 1933
Department of State

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 25, 1933

It was reported from Peiping that, at noon of January 22, six Japanese aeroplanes reconnoitered over Kailu for over two hours and bombed the city from the air. As a result of this bombardment, many shops and hotels along the main street were seriously damaged, in addition to the destruction of some forty to fifty houses. Nineteen regular soldiers, two firemen, and over a hundred civilians were the victims. The number of those wounded is extremely high although an exact estimate is not now available.

An investigation of the bombs that failed to explode shows that each one of them is marked with the words "additional weight", stands several feet high, and weighs over two hundred pounds.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 25, 1933

F/HS
793.94/5830

0090

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PRIVATE OFFICE

THE BURLINGTON HOTEL

380 ROOMS FIREPROOF

VERMONT AVENUE AT THOMAS CIRCLE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 20 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Jan. 13, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1933
Department of State

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Far Eastern Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Ack'd Jan. 18

January 20 1933

Dear Dr. Hornbeck,

For your confidential information I am sending you herewith copy of a cable dispatch which we have just received from Shanghai.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

H. S. Liang

F/HS

793.94/5831

793.94

FILED
JAN 20 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

YUI LIANG BURLINGTON HOTEL WASHINGTON DC

BOTH SIDES (CHINA AND JAPAN) ARE CONCENTRATING FROCES FOR BIG FIGHTING. SPIRIT AMONG CHINESE SOLDIERS IS HIGH AND RESOLUTE. UNPRECEDENTED HARMONY EXISTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS. JAPANESE PLAN IS TO CUT OFF JEHOL FROM CHINA AND MAKE VOLUNTEERS' POSITION UNTENABLE AND THEN BEGIN THEIR "PACIFICATION" PROGRAM IN MANCHURIA.

SHANGHAI CITIZENS FEDERATION

0092

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 18, 1933.

Dear Mr. Liang:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of January 13, 1933, enclosing a copy of a cablegram which you have received from the Shanghai Citizens Federation.

Yours sincerely,

S K Hornbeck

793.94/5831

Mr. H. S. Liang,
The Burlington Hotel,
Vermont Avenue at Thomas Circle,
Washington, D. C.

EGC:EJL

JAN 20, 1933

M.M.H.

H.S.L.

0093

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Division of Far Eastern Affairs
JAN 21 1933
Department of State

January 18, 1933.

Copies sent to Geneva, Berlin, Tokyo - Peiping 1/25/33

January 28 1933

Memorandum of conversation with the German Ambassador, January 18th.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 30 1933
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 21 1933
NOTED

January 28 1933

793.94
no Ia

The German Ambassador called without any particular purpose except to seek information. He was anxious particularly to know the truth of the various newspaper reports about our intervention with the League concerning the Far East. I explained the situation to him and told him that we had answered questions raised abroad as to whether our policy had changed, that it had become necessary to make it clear that there was no change and in all probability there would be no change under the next Administration. The Ambassador said that he thought he understood and added that he knew the League would be relieved to have this fresh statement from us and that this, along with the recent actions of the Japanese, would probably stiffen the various members of the Committee.

He asked me about disarmament, but I told him there was nothing particularly new, that, of course, the

return

500 A15 a 4

F/HS
793.94/5832

0094

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

return of Germany had given new feeling of optimism, that I thought everyone believed that it was essential for the conference to reach some conclusion. I told him I hoped the German demands would not be so great as to destroy this feeling of optimism. He said he realized, particularly in connection with the whole Far Eastern situation, that there must be progress along peaceful lines wherever it could be reached.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 28 1938

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the German Ambassador concerning (1) newspaper reports speculating on United States intervention in conjunction with the League in the Far Eastern situation and (2) developments in disarmament negotiations.

Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, jr.

1 enclosure:
Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

GE
JAN 20 1938 PM
JAN 28, 1938

A true copy of the signed original.

793.94/5832

0096

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 981

January 23 1933

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the German Ambassador concerning (1) newspaper reports speculating on United States intervention in conjunction with the League in the Far Eastern situation and (2) developments in disarmament negotiations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

793.94/5832

JAN 28, 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

0097

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 181

January 28 1933

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the German Ambassador concerning (1) newspaper reports speculating on United States intervention in conjunction with the League in the Far Eastern situation and (2) developments in disarmament negotiations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Wm. R. Castle, jr.

793.94/5832

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

JAN 28 1933 PM

JAN 28, 1933

A true copy of the signed original

0098

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 817

January 28 1933

793.94/5832

Alfred W. Kliefoth, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Berlin.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on January 18th with the German Ambassador concerning (1) newspaper reports speculating on United States intervention in conjunction with the League in the Far Eastern situation and (2) developments in disarmament negotiations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of January 18th.

U VC/AB FE

MMH

CR

JAN 20 1933 PM

JAN 28, 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

0099

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 2, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~RCM:~~
~~JEJ:~~
~~MMF:~~
SKH:

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of December 31, 1932, encloses a copy of its despatch No. 715 to Peiping reporting that, according to an American press correspondent, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army stated that the Japanese did not contemplate undertaking a campaign in Jehol at present, though developments might necessitate a change in plans. Mr. Myers thinks the Japanese have been taken by surprise by the outburst of activity in Jehol by China; perhaps the Chinese knew that the Japanese planned several anti-bandit drives in Manchuria and were unable to concentrate adequate forces for Jehol. When these bandit drives are finished it is expected that operations against Jehol will be begun.

LES:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
DEPT OF STATE

No. ---.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, December 31, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

JAN 30 33

SUBJECT: Jehol Situation.

793.94 note 893.01 Manchuria

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 30 1933 Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAN 30 1933

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the information of the Department a copy of my 1/- despatch No. 715 of today's date to the Legation at Peiping regarding the situation in Jehol.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/- Despatch No. 715.

FEB 9 1933

4 Carbon Copies Received JM
1 copy detached for note H.S. 1/30/33.

F/HS 793.94/5833

0101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 715

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, December 31, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

SUBJECT: Jehol Situation.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,

Sir:

793.94/5793

Referring to my despatch No. 714 dated December 24, 1932, forwarding a memorandum in regard to interviews with a Japanese official on the subject of the Jehol situation and bandit suppression operations, I have the honor to report additional information concerning the Japanese attitude toward alleged recent developments in Jehol province.

An American press correspondent who interviewed Lieutenant General Koiso, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, at Hsinking yesterday informed me that the General exhibited considerable concern over the situation in that province. The General stated that the Japanese did not contemplate undertaking a campaign in that quarter at present but intimated that developments might necessitate a change in their plans. He claimed that they had detailed information regarding the movement of

Chinese

0102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese reenforcements and munitions into Jehol province and mentioned that both men and ammunition had been sent to the border districts.

According to all available information, I am of the opinion that the Japanese have been taken by surprise by this sudden outburst of activity in Jehol on the part of the Chinese and that they are not ready to launch the long talked of drive against that province. It is not improbable that the Chinese know that they plan several anti-bandit drives in Manchuria and consequently are not in a position to concentrate adequate forces along the Jehol-Fengtien border. As soon as these contemplated drives are completed or before if conditions on the Jehol border become serious, it is expected that military operations will be initiated for the purpose of bringing Jehol within the fold of Manchoukuo. At present, according to information received from a Japanese official this morning, there is no indication that drastic action will be taken in the near future. As indicating that such action is contemplated it may be mentioned that this official stated a few days ago that there will be no drive against Jehol for some time as the Japanese military will be kept busy in Manchuria for two or three months more.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original

0103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:mhp

A true copy of the signed original.

0104

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 31 1933
DIVISION OF

WP

PLAIN

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 31, 1933

Rec'd 4:45 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

103, January 31, 10 a. m.

793.71

Legation's 99, January 5827 thirtieth, 10 a. m.

Reuter from Canton, thirtieth:

"Military conference which has been in session here during last few days is being wound up. General Huang Shao Shiung, Minister of Interior in the National Government, departed for Hong Kong this afternoon en route for Nanking. He is carrying with him plans of resisting Japanese invasion drawn up at the Canton Conference which will be submitted to the Nanking Government for approval. Interviewed General Chang Yen, one of the commanders who participated in conference, stated that conference has decided that Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien should each despatch portions of their provincial troops to the North to resist Japanese invasion. The whole of famous Nineteenth Route Army may be sent north or at least ten regiments".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/HS 793.94/5834

0105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-412

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, January 6, 1933.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JAN 30 33

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy. Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concerning Shanhaikuan Incident.

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 3 1933

Copies to F.E.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the information of the Department a copy of a press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, dated January 5, 1933, in regard to the Shanhaikuan incident, which was sent to the Nanking Office of the American Legation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 7 p.m. on January 5, 1933.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of Press Release.

In quintuplicate.
Copy to the Legation.

800

RLS:MCL

F/HS

793.94/5835

FILED
FEB 6 1933

0106

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-412 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated January 6, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy. Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concerning Shanhaikuan Incident".

Press Release sent to the American Legation, Nanking, by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

January 5, 1933,

7 p.m.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a strong note of protest to the Japanese Legation late in the night of January 4 with regard to the Japanese attack and occupation of Shanhaikwan. The Note first narrates the preliminary work of destruction as done by Japanese gendarmes in their own quarters and then the distortion of facts concerning the circumstances preceding the attack in an attempt to evade responsibility for their unwarranted action.

The Note further states that the operations of the Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan are clearly the execution of a preconceived plan calculated to aggravate the situation and contrary to the promise repeatedly made by Japanese delegates to the League of Nations.

In conclusion, the Note demands the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in the future, and the punishment of those Japanese who started the disturbance. It further reserves the right of the Chinese Government to claim reparation for the damages sustained by the Chinese.

At

0107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a long statement clearly showing that the Japanese operations at Shanhaikwan are premeditated and carried out in the most methodical manner. The statement reads as follows:

Before commencing their attack on Shanhaikwan the Japanese gendarmes first blew up the doors of their headquarters and then scattered hand grenades elsewhere in the neighbourhood with the intention of fabricating a defensive case. Then at 9.30 p.m. on January 1, 1933, Japanese plainclothes soldiers closed in upon the south gate of Shanhaikwan and opened fire with their rifles. At the same time, Japanese soldiers at the railway station began to throw bombs all around, while Japanese gendarmes also started action with their rifles. Chinese military authorities stationed in the district immediately repaired to the headquarters of the Japanese gendarmes and enquired for the cause of the trouble. The Japanese gendarmerie not only failed to give a satisfactory explanation for the disturbance beside the customary excuse that they were being shot at by Chinese soldiers and that they were acting in self-defense, but also brought up a set of most unreasonable demands. which the Chinese authorities on the spot could only reject.

The Japanese gendarmes thereupon proceeded to disarm Chinese policemen stationed outside the south gate and at the same time placed the commanding officer, Mr. Ma, under detention. At 8 o'clock in the morning

of

0108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of January 2, three train loads of Japanese artillery and infantry were brought up from Chienwei, a point to the north of Shanhaikwan, numbering more than 3,000 men in total. Meanwhile, the three Japanese armoured trains that had been previously stationed there moved onto and occupied the Nankwan railway station, and Lichiakou, Wuyenchen and Wuchialin, three other points on the railway line. From these positions the Japanese opened fire on Shanhaikwan. Simultaneously Japanese aeroplanes bombed the city from the air. Many Chinese civilians were killed in the city and great damage was done to the city wall. The Chinese garrison forces were at last compelled to return fire in self-defence and, owing to their stubborn resistance the Japanese failed in their first attempt to carry the city.

More Japanese reinforcements were then brought up and two Japanese warships came to their assistance from the sea. At 10 a.m. on January 3, the Japanese made a concerted attack with their land, naval and air forces, concentrating fire on the city of Linyu. Heavy field pieces supported by naval artillery finally reduced the south gate to ruins, besides setting many houses on fire. Under the cover of continuous barrage, Japanese tanks advanced on the south gate and finally broke through at 3 p.m. on the same day. In the face of the enemy's overwhelming superiority both in numbers and in equipment, the Chinese troops, fighting as hard as they could, were finally compelled to fall back to points outside the city wall.

That

0109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

That the attack and occupation of Shanhaikwan by the Japanese military forces are premeditated action is most evident. The blow-up of the doors of their own headquarters before commencing the attack and the subsequent charge that the Chinese started the hostilities are old tricks habitually resorted by the Japanese military, and familiar to the whole world. Furthermore, the fact that the attack took place at a time when the whole world was cut celebrating the new year and when the League of Nations was also in adjournment proves conclusively that the Japanese military purposely selected this particular moment to carry out their premeditated plan.

The League of Nations, in successive sessions, had adopted resolutions against any further aggravation of the situation, and these resolutions had been assented to by the Japanese Government. But in spite of these resolutions as well as their own undertakings, the Japanese have been constantly extending the sphere of their military aggressions in China. They now took possession by a surprise attack of the most strategic point south of the Great Wall bordering the Three Northeastern Provinces, from whence they are in a position to descend upon Tientsin, Peiping, and Jehol any moment they like, an eventuality fraught with even more grave consequences. The Chinese Government, therefore, is of the opnion that the League of Nations should lose no time in taking the most effective measures to check the Japanese action while, in the meantime, the Chinese military forces will continue to resist, to the best of their ability, any further aggression on the part of the Japanese troops.

0110

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5836

SEE 393.1163 M 56/47 FOR Tel. # 90, 5 pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 25,1933.
TO NAME

REGARDING: Shanhaikwan garrison commander states he is taking every feasible measure for the protection of mission property.

hs

0111

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

KLP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 25, 1933

Rec'd. 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

90, January 25, 5 p.m.

Legation's 35, January 9, 6 p.m., and Tokyo's January 10, 3 p.m. in reply thereto.

On January 10th Japanese troops evacuated mission property other than boys' school where furniture was destroyed and used for fuel and certain class rooms were used for shelters. Matter was reported without comment to the Japanese Legation on the 11th and it replied that matter was at once referred to Japanese military authorities through consular authorities at Tientsin. On the 18th mission reported reoccupations of girls' school and continued demolition of furniture in occupied boys' school. Report was at once transmitted to Japanese Legation which, in reply dated 24th, admitted temporary use of property as barracks with resultant slight damage which Japanese military are quite willing to compensate for; also that Shanhaikwan garrison commander states he is taking every feasible measure

393.1163 M59/47

Note 793.94

0112

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

measure for the protection of mission property.

Two. Mission last night received telegraphic report that Shanhaikwan property had been evacuated.

Copy to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WWC

RR

0113

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5837

SEE 893.00/12275 FOR Tel. # 87, 2 pm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 25, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 OPO

5837

REGARDING:

Activities which are being carried on by the National Government at Nanking indicate preparation for some decisive action in connection with the Sino-Japanese situation.

hs

0114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KLP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (a)

Peiping

Dated January 25, 1933

Rec'd. 5:50 a.m.

76

Secretary of State,

Washington.

87, January 25, 2 p.m.

(GRAY) Following from Nanking, "January 24, 3 p.m.

One. Among indications that the Government is planning some decisive action are the following:

The different railways, acting under instructions, are laying in operating supplies sufficient for three months; further salary reductions have been decided upon which will probably limit all salaries to a maximum of $30 monthly. The motive of this fresh economy is popularly reported to be accumulation of money for military purposes. Marshal Chang temporarily remains in Nanking. His plane returned to Peiping today with Yang, the President of the Central Military Academy, and Pao, formerly representative of Chang, resident in Nanking. (END GRAY)

Two. Large supplies of aviation gasoline have been ordered by the Government for immediate delivery to points on the Lunghai Railway and other important centers."

JOHNSON

HPD
WSB

893.00/12275

Note 793.94

0115

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.L-441

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, December 24, 1932.

793.94
793.94/5838

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1933
Department of State

Sir:

This Consulate General has already invited the attention of the Legation to two divergent policies now advocated by Chinese political leaders bearing upon measures which should be taken to meet the crisis arising from Japan's aggressive action against China. One school of thought, prominently represented by Cantonese leaders in particular, urges that immediate military measures be taken to recover possession of Manchuria, while the other school urges that immediate war with Japan would be disastrous and that the best interests of China would be served by organizing and strengthening the country politically so that open opposition to Japan, when undertaken, may have a prospect of success.

General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, recognized as being the dominant political figure in China at the present time, is the principal exponent of the second, or more conservative, policy. 1/ There is enclosed herewith a copy of a KUO MIN news release dated Nanking, December 15, entitled "Outspoken Address by General Chiang Kai-shek". The address,

which

F/HS
793.94/5838
FEB 2 - 1933

0116

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

which was delivered before the National Civil Affairs Conference on December 14, as summarized in translation by KUO MIN, has as its theme "We must first set our own house in order before we can successfully resist outside aggressions". In this line of argument General Chiang may have an ulterior motive, which does not appear on the surface. It is probable that he agrees with the view expressed to the writer on an earlier occasion by Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that a powerful stimulus is required to overcome the inertia and disruptive tendency so characteristic of the Chinese people in the face of their need for political organization, and that this stimulus is to be found in the necessity of opposing "foreign imperialism". General Chiang shows a determination to utilize this stimulus to the fullest extent in goading the leaders and the people of China into the suppression of their internal antagonisms and into sincere and united effort to transform China into an efficiently organized state.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of KUO MIN news release, as described.

In quintuplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.

800

WRP:MCL

A true copy of the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Legation No.L-441 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 24, 1932.

NATIONAL CIVIL AFFAIRS CONFERENCE

Outspoken Address by General Chiang Kai-shek

Nanking, Dec. 15. -- "We must first set our own house in order before we can successfully resist outside aggressions."

This is the theme of an outspoken address made by General Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Military Affairs Commission, at the 5th general meeting of the Second National Civil Affairs Conference held yesterday morning under the chairmanship of General Huang Shao hsiung, Minister of Interior.

He declared that for the past few years, China had been harassed by Communist banditry within and foreign aggression from without. In consequence, the foundation of the nation had been shaken.

Few realize, however, that corruption and inefficiency in our domestic administration constituted one of the principal causes of these domestic and foreign troubles, he emphasized.

"Unless we exert ourselves to improve our domestic administration," General Chiang declared, "we would be inviting more foreign aggressions and thereby hastening our extinction as a sovereign State."

In this connection, he appealed to the entire nation to exert themselves for the building up of a sound and efficient civil administration the realization of which, he pointed out, would not only enable us to overcome foreign aggression, but would also usher in a new era for China.

In

0118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In support of his beliefs, General Chiang told the conference his own experience in the suppression of Red banditry.

He pointed out that the success of his campaign in Hupeh was due not so much to military efforts as to political and economic measures. He said that at the beginning, he resorted only to military operations. As the results were disappointing, he began to introduce political measures in conjunction with military. And he has since been convinced that the political measures have proved far more efficacious than the military in removing the Red menace in Hupeh province.

He expressed the conviction that though China might be inferior in the matter of armaments, she could sucessfully withstand any outside aggressions, if she had a sound and efficient civil administration.

He urged all the provincial and municipal authorities, which were represented at the conference, to devote their efforts to this worthy task. He predicted that if sustained efforts be made for five successive years, a new and re-vitalized China will be built up. He pointed out that all such apparently unimportant matters as police, land tenure, registration of households, communications, etc., if successfully attended to, would prove more effective than any other means in building up a strong and united China.

Unless our domestic administration is improved, we would not be able to resist the Japanese aggressions, even if we had an army ten times our present size, he declared.

After

0119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

After emphasizing that the duties of the various civil authorities represented at the Conference are many times more important than those of any military man, General Chiang said that the first step in bringing about reform must be the eradication of such pernicious habits on the part of civil officials, as dilatoriness, corruption, dishonesty, selfishness, perfunctory performance of duties, and evasion of responsibility.

He concluded by reminding members of the conference of the importance of their duties and by urging them to address themselves to their task with more zeal and conscientiousness. - Kuo Min.

0120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 4, 1933.

EHD:
MEH:

Berlin's despatch No. 2139 of January 21, 1933, reports German press comment on the Manchuria situation. In part of the press the similarity of the plight of helpless China and of unarmed Germany was indicated. On the other hand, the writer of the despatch points out that while German industrialists are in favor of China, being interested in the Chinese market, ultra militaristic circles do not conceal their admiration and sympathy for the Japanese whom they regard as the "Prussians of the East". The Centrist GERMANIA of January 18 wonders if Japan's claim that Manchuria is necessary for protection of Korea may not subsequently be extended to other territories for the protection of Manchuria. The VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG of January 19 thinks Japan may have to occupy Peiping and Tientsin to protect Jehol. The VORWAERTS of January 10 was extremely hostile to Japan.

HES:CLS

0121

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, January 21, 1933.

No. 2139

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict,
German Press Reaction Thereto.

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS FEB 8 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY FEB 8 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 1- 1933 Department of State

File 793.94/5839

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

793.94/5791

In continuation of despatch No. 2119 of January 9, 1933, I have the honor to report that the German press continues to follow the Sino-Japanese conflict with interest. While the Centrist GERMANIA conceded Japan's need of Manchuria, it shared the apprehension, expressed in other quarters as well, that the occupation of Jehol in order to protect Manchuria might be followed by the occupation of other territory in order to protect Jehol. The weakness of the League in coping with the Far Eastern problem was deplored. A Social Democratic Reichstag interpellation was introduced

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

troduced, demanding that the German Government insist at Geneva on the carrying out of the recommendations of the Lytton Report. The similarity of the plight of helpless China and of unarmed Germany was indicated in part of the press. On the other hand, it may be pointed out that while German industrialists are in favor of China, being interested in the Chinese market, ultra militaristic circles do not conceal their admiration and sympathy for the Japanese whom they regard as the "Prussians of the East," while the Chinese are considered hangdogs. In this connection it is worthy of note that the former Chinese Minister of Economics, Tung, who is visiting Germany, has been received with open arms by the German industrialists.

The Nazi ANGRIFF (January 12) remarked that the Manchurian conflict had developed into a real war, and added that "the manner in which China is now throwing its youth to the front, insufficiently armed, seems like a sad foreboding for Germany." This journal, quoting the English TSINGTAU TIMES as eulogizing, on the eighteenth anniversary of the fall of Tsingtau, the former German administration there, drew the conclusion that this was further proof of the falseness of the assertion of Germany's inability to colonize, which had been advanced as a reason for depriving Germany of her African colonies.

The Centrist GERMANIA (January 18) asserted that it had repeatedly admitted that Japan had been

right

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

right in claiming that it needed Manchuria, and that a special international arrangement was in order in this case. The question, therefore, was whether the latest Japanese measures were merely intended to make the Japanese position in Manchuria secure or whether they represented the initiation of an attack against China proper. Japan had motivated the occupation of Manchuria by asserting the necessity of protecting Korea, and she might now similarly be inclined to create a sphere of influence around Manchuria as a result of which not only the Northern Chinese provinces, but the Russian Amur provinces as well, would be in danger of coming under Japanese influence - thus conjuring up the danger of war in the East. However, China, owing to internal disorder and the absence of a modern army, was unable to wage war with Japan; Soviet Russia would still be occupied for years with the upbuilding of her industry and could also not carry on war with Japan on a distant field; and America, just like the major Eurpoean powers, was suffering so severely under the economic crisis that the possibility of active interference in the East was practically non-existent. In view of the lack of cooperation between Hoover and Roosevelt, energetic American steps could not be expected before March 4.

The moderate Left VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG (January 19) remarked that if Japan had to conquer Manchuria in order to protect the South Manchurian Railway, and to occupy Jehol in order to protect Manchuria, Japanese

troops

0124

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

troops might soon have to occupy Peking and Tientsin in order to protect Jehol. The League was confronted with the problem either of having to adopt a resolution unfavorable to Japan, which would result in the latter's withdrawal from the League, or of furling its sails. The Manchurian conflict had shown that the major powers did not have the strength and, in some cases, the will to oppose Japan energetically. Now that Japan had recognized the weakness of the Geneva organization, it was too late to interfere. America's interpretation of the Kellogg Pact, according to which she refused to recognize territorial gains achieved by force, represented a cautious but firm position in the Sino-Japanese problem. It was improbable that Washington would be prepared to take a more active attitude as it did not feel strong enough to come into conflict with Tokio.

The VORWAERTS, the organ of the Social Democratic Party, took an attitude extremely hostile to Japan. On January 10, it featured on its front page the interpellation introduced the day before by the Party's Reichstag Group, enquiring whether the Government was prepared to take the standpoint that through her warlike action against China, and the creation of the "artificial" state of Manchukuo, Japan had violated the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact, and to demand of Japan at Geneva the immediate and unconditional recognition and execution of the recommendations of the Lytton Report, under pain of the immediate breaking off of dip-

lomatic

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lomatic and commercial relations by all the signatories of the League Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact. The VORWAERTS added that there could be no doubt that, unless international action were soon to deter Japanese imperialism, a world war was imminent. England and America were chiefly to blame, but the German Foreign Office also had its share of the responsibility for the failure of the League.

1/ The attached cartoon, from the Social Democratic VORWAERTS of January 12, shows Japanese soldiers advancing in full action against China, while a Japanese General is made to say: "We expressly remark that we are not carrying on war."

Respectfully yours,

Alfred W. Kliefoth

Alfred W. Kliefoth,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
1. Cartoon.

Copy to E.I.C.,Paris.
710
WWS-HCF:EM

0126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 1

VORWAERTS of January 12,1932.

Japan



Wir bemerken ausdrücklich, daß wir keinen Krieg führen.

0127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 3, 1933.

EHD:
MMH:

Warrington Dawson's report No. 1170 of January 20, 1933, forwards a copy of an article by Andre Duboscq in LE TEMPS of January 17 in which he states that third parties ought to urge the Chinese to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese.

EAS:CLS

0128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, January 20, 1933

JAN 31 33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 1- 1933
Department of State

F/G 793.94/5840

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1170)

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1170, dated January 20, 1933.

FILED
FEB 6 - 1933

WD/DG

0129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, January 20, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1170

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Views of André Duboscq on Intervention Between Chinese and Japanese

André Duboscq discussed in LE TEMPS of January 17, 1933 what he called "Third Parties Between the Chinese and the Japanese." He considers that other peoples in their dealings with these two races react in respect to "the sensitiveness of the masses" far more than to reflexes of deliberate intelligence. He explains in this way the surprise that is often felt among European nations at developments in the Far East. Notably anxiety is felt today owing to the fact that almost no hope subsists for seeing developments in the Far East checked by action in Geneva. It would seem that the latest conflict between Japan and China can be settled only between the two parties themselves. Nevertheless, in Duboscq's

opinion

0130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

opinion it would be a wise action for third parties to urge the Chinese to enter direct negotiations with the Japanese without being compelled by the latter to do so. It would be of little importance whether these third parties belong to the League of Nations and base their action on the Lytton Report, or whether they independently represented one Power or another. But he does not think that such intervention is indispensable for a definitive settlement of the conflict and he is indeed inclined to believe that the best policy would consist in an adjournment of the entire problem, gaining time as one can in the meanwhile.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosure:
Article from LE TEMPS of January 17, 1933.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

0131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 1 to Special Report N° W.D. 1170 of January 20, 1933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " LE TEMPS " of January 17, 1933

Questions extérieures

LES TIERS ENTRE CHINOIS ET JAPONAIS

Les questions d'Extrême-Orient sont passées devant l'opinion à un rang qu'elles n'occupaient pas il n'y a pas si longtemps. Une preuve entre autres en est dans ces fluctuations du sentiment public que l'on remarque, depuis un an et plus, à l'endroit des deux peuples jaunes intéressés dans le conflit actuel. Tantôt ce sentiment est nettement favorable aux Chinois, tantôt il l'est moins, tantôt il incline vers les Japonais. Cela démontre une fois de plus, soit dit en passant, combien la sensibilité des masses intervient dans les jugements qu'elles portent en politique, et combien s'illusionnent ceux qui croient pouvoir prévoir leurs réactions en ne tablant que sur leur intelligence.

Depuis quelques jours, exactement depuis l'affaire de Chan-Haï-Kouan, cette localité pittoresque située au pied de la Grande Muraille de Chine, et où, chaque été, les étrangers qui résident dans le nord de la Chine vont prendre des bains de mer, depuis que les Japonais l'ont transformée en champ de bataille, l'opinion de ceux-là mêmes qui voyaient précédemment en eux les organisateurs de l'ordre dans une Chine à vau-l'eau, s'est sensiblement modifiée.

L'attaque de Chan-Haï-Kouan, c'était, après l'affaire de Mondchourie, l'affaire du Jehol qui commençait, cette affaire dont il avait du reste été parlé au milieu de 1932, mais qui, à la suite de certaines critiques venues de l'étranger et sévères pour le Japon, était retombée dans l'ombre; c'était du moins la preuve que le Japon ne retirait rien de ce qu'il avait dit à cette époque: le Jehol fait corps avec la Mandchourie, et, conformément à son accord avec le Mandchoukouo, l'empire du Soleil-Levant se considère comme tenu de le défendre contre toute invasion des armées d'une puissance quelconque. Or devant la concentration de troupes chinoises opérée par Tchang Sue Liang et après avertissement des autorités japonaises à ce dernier, il était fatal que le déclic japonais se produisît, et il se produisit. Mais l'opinion publique, dont la sensibilité latente s'émousse sur un objet déterminé aussi vite qu'elle s'aiguise, avait oublié les premiers propos tenus sur le Jehol et fut une fois de plus surprise quand l'événement eut lieu.

De nouveau les Japonais eurent à se défendre contre les intentions qu'à tort ou à raison on leur prêtait généreusement, et on les entendit déclarer *urbi et orbi* qu'ils ne songeaient nullement à marcher sur Tien-Tsin et Pékin et à faire main basse sur la Chine du nord.

Nous n'essayerons pas pour le moment de faire le point et de peser le pour et le contre d'une opinion que nous connaissons de longue date, puisque nous nous y sommes arrêté dans *l'Evolution de la Chine* en 1921 ; nous y reviendrons s'il le faut ultérieurement, mais nous voulons seulement à présent souligner la tournure très nette qu'a prise le sentiment public à l'égard du Japon, en face des événements d'hier.

Que le Jehol avec ses 217,000 kilomètres carrés et ses 6 millions et demi d'habitants fasse partie intégrante de la Mandchourie, qu'il soit au contraire, comme on l'apprenait autrefois, région de la Mongolie intérieure, rattachée d'abord à la province du Tchili, puis constituée par décret du 6 juillet 1914 en unité administrative indépendante en même temps que d'autres régions voisines, ce n'est guère cela qui préoccupe l'opinion, nous ajouterions volontiers: pas même le sort qui dans les circonstances actuelles attend cette terre lointaine au nom sonore comme un appel ou une réclame; ce qui l'inquiète c'est l'engrenage éventuel des faits, la conséquence que peut avoir la présence de troupes japonaises dans cette région montagneuse qui domine la province où se trouve Pékin. Autrement dit, elle redoute soudain les complications internationales dont la menace lui semble plus précise qu'hier; elle sent très bien qu'un objectif tel que Pékin est autre chose qu'un objectif tel que Jehol, voire même Moukden. Elle s'inquiète d'autant plus qu'elle a aujourd'hui perdu tout espoir de voir Genève arrêter les événements d'Extrême-Orient, et qu'elle ne compte plus que sur les parties elles-mêmes intéressées directement au conflit pour le régler ou du moins le faire cesser effectivement entre elles.

Aucun progrès à cet égard ne semble avoir été fait depuis le début de l'affaire, malgré les espoirs qu'on avait pu concevoir lors de la publication du rapport Lytton. On entend beaucoup, depuis quelque temps, parler de la force d'inertie de la Chine. Sans doute la force d'inertie est toujours redoutable, quand les circonstances l'autorisent et qu'elle est habilement maniée; mais l'inertie n'est pas nécessairement une force. Il paraît évident que tant que durera le litige, — un litige qui s'accompagne d'opérations militaires qui ressemblent singulièrement à une guerre, — les Japonais seront tentés d'aller de l'avant ; les circonstances actuelles leur laissent les mains libres, et le danger que constitue leur avance n'en est que plus réel. Sans doute les difficultés pour eux peuvent être grandes, peuvent devenir plus grandes encore. La Chine le sait, la Chine, qui se tient pour moins anarchique que nous ne l'imaginons avec notre conception européenne du fonctionnement normal des Etats. Oui, la masse chinoise est là avec son désordre, qui est peut-être son ordre à elle, et, comme au cours des millénaires, elle attend, confiante et patiente, son heure à elle. Il y a beau temps que nous avons renoncé, pour notre part, à chercher, à souhaiter même du décisif et du définitif en ce monde de l'imprécis et de l' « à peu près », *tch'a pou touo*, la fameuse expression qui revient sans cesse dans le langage des Chinois et qui synthétise pour ainsi dire la psychologie de ce peuple.

Cependant, et à ne considérer que le moment présent, engager les Chinois à entrer directement en négociations avec les Japonais sans y être contraints par ces derniers, mais sur les suggestions de tiers, est selon nous faire œuvre prudente. Que les tiers appartiennent à la Société des nations et s'appuient sur le rapport Lytton, ou qu'en dehors d'elle ils représentent telle ou telle puissance, il importe peu.

Mais, précisément parce que nous savons toute la différence qu'il y a entre les Orientaux et nous, nous ne croyons pas indispensable un règlement définitif du conflit. La temporisation, la remise à plus tard du règlement est pour nous presque aussi souhaitable. Nous l'avons déjà dit ici, et nous n'hésitons pas à le redire. Outre que le temps, ce grand maître, calmera les esprits, il montrera jusqu'où se justifient les points de vue officiels des deux parties ou, ce qui revient au même, jusqu'à quel point la prétention du Mandchoukouo à être indépendant est raisonnable; démonstration qui écarte d'ailleurs toute discussion entre Chinois et Japonais sur leurs points de vue particuliers dans l'affaire. Toutefois, il serait tenu compte de cette épreuve, qui par la force des choses serait pour les Chinois et les Japonais d'une si claire évidence, pour fixer, après un laps de temps à déterminer, les intérêts des uns et des autres.

ANDRÉ DUBOSCQ.

0132

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5841

SEE 893.00/12281 FOR Despatch #L-434 to Legation.

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED December 21, 1932.

TO NAME

REGARDING:

Resolution passed by the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee providing for the concentration of troops in Jehol and North China.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.L-434

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, December 21, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of December 20, 9 a.m. transmitting a report that the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party, now in session, on December 19 passed a resolution providing for the concentration of troops in Jehol and North China, the extending of Government assistance to the "Volunteers" in Manchuria, and for open leadership by the National Government and the Nationalist Party of the anti-Japanese boycott.

The information contained in the telegram in reference was given to me over the telephone in the evening of December 19, by a Chinese newspaper reporter, who said that he had received it from one of the Southern delegates to the Plenary Session. The Legation will recollect that the resolution in question was described in a Reuter message dated Nanking, December 16, published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS

of

0134

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of December 17, and that a second Reuter message, dated Nanking, December 17, was published in the same newspaper on December 18 stating that the resolution was not sponsored by Mr. T. V. Soong, Dr. Sun Fo and various other important leaders, but was merely passed by them as one of the proposals admissible for debate. My informant was unable to tell me what changes had been made in the resolution before it was passed.

Very fortunately, Colonel W. S. Drysdale, U.S.A., Military Attaché, had an opportunity to introduce the subject of this resolution into conversations held by him with Mr. T. V. Soong and Dr. C. C. Wu on the afternoon and evening of December 19. After his conversations it still remained a matter of doubt whether or not a resolution in the general sense reported by Reuter, as described above, was passed. Both Mr. Soong and Dr. Wu were extremely non-committal on this point. Colonel Drysdale's conclusion was that some such resolution was discussed and may have been passed. Colonel Drysdale kindly gave this office a Memorandum
1/ of his two conversations and a copy thereof is enclosed.

It is interesting to note that Dr. C. C. Wu, a Cantonese, told Colonel Drysdale that he had sponsored the resolution and that Mr. Soong said that he opposed it. This alinement concurs with the observation I had the honor to make in my despatch to the Legation of December 16, 1932, to the effect that the Canton delegates have come to Nanking insisting upon the suppression of "Communist banditry" and resistance to

Japanese

0135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japanese opposition, whereas General Chiang Kai-shek insists that these tasks are of less importance than the unification of the country. Mr. Soong's attitude may be taken as identical with that of General Chiang.

The attitude of the Cantonese faction as indicated by Mr. Eugene Chen when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs in January, 1932, by the resistance of the 19th Route Army at Shanghai in February, and by remarks repeatedly made to me by Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, seems to be that armed opposition to Japan would be the best policy, since this would bring into play China's reputedly enormous staying powers, while Japan's inevitable success at first would prove of comparatively short duration and would exhaust Japan. If we may draw a conclusion from statements made by General Chiang and Mr. T. V. Soong, it is that these two leaders feel that open war between China and Japan would afford Japan an opportunity to confirm through a dictated treaty the fruits of her aggression, while, in the process, China's financial credit and even the structure of her Government would be ruined. It may not be too figurative to say that the Cantonese envisage resistance to Japan by the Chinese people as a race, while, the other view point regards the contest as resistance by a Governmental machine which might be irreparably ruined in the process.

For convenience of reference there are attached

2,3 hereto copies of the two Reuter messages to which

reference

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

reference has been made.

It is requested that a copy of this despatch be handed to Colonel Drysdale.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1/ Copy of Colonel Drysdale's Memorandum, dated 20, 1932.

2/ Copy of Reuter message dated Nanking, December 16.

3/ Copy of Reuter message dated Nanking, December 17.

6 copies to the American Legation.
No copy to the Department.

800
WRP:MCL

A true copy of the signed original. MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Legation No.L-434 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 21, 1932.

MEMORANDUM

Confidential.

December 20, 1932.

Subject: Reported Stiffening of the National Government's Opposition to Japan.

With respect to reports that at a recent meeting of the Plenary session a resolution was passed authorizing the employment of Chinese Government troops in Jehol Province, Government assistance to the "Volunteers" in Manchuria and Government direction to the boycott of "enemy goods", the following is submitted:

Late in the afternoon of December 19th, during a private conversation, I asked Mr. T. V. Soong if the newspaper report that a resolution advocating Government direction of the anti-Japanese boycott had been passed was correct. Mr. Soong replied that such a resolution, if passed, would certainly result in Japan declaring war, that China was not at present prepared for war, and that as the result of a successful war Japan might demand and actually acquire Manchuria. His reply made the impression that such a resolution had been proposed and debated, that he personally had opposed the resolution, and that the resolution had failed to pass.

During the evening of December 19, while in a private conversation with Dr. C. C. Wu, I questioned

Dr. Wu

0138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. Wu concerning the authenticity of a press report that a resolution authorizing Government direction to the anti-Japanese boycott had been passed. Dr. Wu, usually extremely uncommunicative, replied that he had sponsored such a resolution, but he evaded a direct answer as to whether such a resolution had been passed.

My conclusions are that a resolution authorizing Government direction to the boycott, Government support to the volunteer activities, and the employment of Government troops in the province of Jehol, was in fact admitted in debate at the Plenary Session and voted upon during December 19, that during the debate Mr. T. V. Soong opposed the resolution and that Dr. C. C. Wu and numerous of his supporters advocated its passage.

I am of the opinion that the resolution as originally proposed failed to pass, but that there will be, or might already have been, efforts made to modify the original resolution, so as to make it less likely to cause a declaration of war by Japan, and that some resolution, so modified, either has been or is likely to be passed, with instructions that its passage be kept secret.

There is no doubt that there is strong and active support among the members of the present session, for the passage of some resolution making more drastic China's direct opposition to Japan's policy in Manchuria.

W.S.D./ECH:MCL

0139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Legation No.I-434 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 21, 1932.

(Published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, Shanghai December 17, 1932.)

RESOLUTION OF DEFIANCE

Sensational Proposal at Plenary Session

HIGHLY SPONSORED

Active Policy Against Japan

Nanking, Dec. 16.

A sensational proposal urging the concentration of troops to recover Manchuria if an opportunity arises, demanding the direction by the Kuomintang and the Government of a nation-wide boycott against "enemy" goods, and condemning the dilatoriness of the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute has been submitted to the third plenary session of the Central Executive Committee by seven prominent leaders.

The sponsors of the resolution, which was officially published this afternoon, are:--Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance; Mr. Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; General Wu Te-chen, Mayor of Greater Shanghai; Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industry; Dr. C. C. Wu, formerly Minister to the United States; General Chang Hui-chang, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the national air force; and Admiral Chen Chek, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Canton Navy.

Three Provisions

The resolution provides:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. That Chinese troops should be concentrated in the Jehol, Chahar and Chihli area with instructions to resist if "enemy troops" invade Chinese territory; and, if an opportunity arises, to enter Manchuria in an attempt to recover the "lost territory";

2. That both the Kuomintang and the Government should afford the utmost assistance, both spiritual and material, to the Manchurian troops and Volunteers in Manchuria; and

3. That the Kuomintang and the Government should direct the entire nation in a boycott of "enemy goods."

The resolution says that since September 18, 1931, when the Japanese occupied Mukden, the Chinese Government has appealed to the League of Nations, but the League itself has little power as it depends entirely on the support of the bigger nations.

Dur to trade questions and matters connected with disarmament, the resolution continues, both Britain and France, though on principle in sympathy with China, hesitate to take any step that may cause offence to the Japanese.

League's Ineffectiveness

The League, it adds, has accomplished little except organising a commission of inquiry. After the commission has submitted a report to the Council, the matter was referred to the Assembly, which again referred the question to the Committee of 19. Aside from vague utterances at its meetings, the League has made no progress towards a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute and is now not even mentioning its previous resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in Manchuria to within the South Manchuria Railway zone.

0141

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The proposal goes on to say that concerning the attitude of America, in view of the latter's own interests in the Far East that country has taken a comparatively positive attitude, but until Governor Roosevelt assumes office next March, America is not likely to adopt a stronger stand.

Whether Governor Roosevelt follows Colonel Stimson's policy or not, however, the proposal states, it is safe to say that it is a hopeless illusion to expect America to take effective measures to oppose the Japanese.

Furthermore, when China's territory has been invaded by foreigners it is up to the Chinese themselves to defend their interests and it is shameful to hope for outside assistance.

Hoped for Developments

The League, it goes on, is now establishing a Conciliation Committee. Its purpose is merely to play for time, thereby hoping to achieve a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute through one of the three following possibilities:-

1. China, due to her own weakness through internal disorder, may accept Japan's terms.

2. Japan, due to economic bankruptcy or through the overthrow of the militarist regime, may eventually make concessions.

3. Both the Chinese and Japanese Governments may agree to a compromise solution.

The proposal then suggests that the Chinese Government should continue its fixed foreign policy of leaving the matter of the present dispute in the hands of the League of Nations, for "although the League is powerless it is the world's best broadcasting instrument."

Meanwhile

0142

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Meanwhile the Chinese must follow the example of the 19th Route Army and the 5th Army Corpos, who put up such a gallant resistance to the Japanese military invasion at Shanghai early this year.

Deathblow to Military

"We must rush with all speed relief and supplies to the Chinese troops and Volunteers who are now resisting the Japanese in "Manchuria."

"Prolonged resistance by the Volunteers in Manchuria will deal a deathblow to the Japanese military authorities."

It then refers again to the boycott and says that if the Chinese nation unites in an intensified boycott of Japan the Japanese nation will soon realise its follies.

Answering the charge made in certain quarters that if the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang encourage and direct the Volunteer and the boycott activities this will give the Japanese material for accusation against the Chinese at Geneva, the proposal declares that the Lytton Report already states that the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang are encouraging the boycott movement and the Chinese Delegation at Geneva has admitted this at the League sessions. Furthermore, the Japanese have openly invaded Chinese territory and slaughtered her nationals so the proposal asks in conclusion "why cannot we take measures of resistance which are comparatively much milder in form that the Japanese aggression?"--Reuter.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.3 to despatch to the Legation No.1-434 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated December 21, 1932.

(Published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, Shanghai, December 18, 1932.)

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Sponsorship of Defiance Resolution Denied

MANY PROPOSALS UP FOR EXAMINATION

Nanking, Dec. 17.

In connection with yesterday's report stating that the Finance Minister, Mr. T. V. Soong, Mr. Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, General Wu Te-chen, Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industry, Dr. C. C. Wu, former Minister to the United States, General Chang Hui-chang and Admiral Chen Chek had sponsored a proposal before the present session of the Central Executive Committee asking for the concentration of troops in North China to resist further aggression, the direction of a boycott by the Government and Party, and deprecating the League of Nations. Reuter learns on high authority today that the report is erroneous.

The proposaldid not emanate from and was not sponsored by the government leaders mentioned, but was merely passed by them as one of the proposals admissable for debate at the present session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and was therefore admitted on the agenda of the session.

It will be remembered that Mr. Soong has been asked to convene the newly-appointed Foreign Affairs Commission of the Central Executive Committee, which held its first meeting last night.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94-Commission/766 FOR Desp.#472 Pol.

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED Jan.18.1933
NAME

TO ~~---~~

1—1127 OFO

S&A

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Conflict: Transmitting Documents Issued during the Period January 1 to January 15, 1933, inclusive.

fpg

793.94/5842

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

472 Political.

DUPLICATE

Geneva, Switzerland, January 18, 1933.

Sino-Japanese Conflict. - Transmitting Documents Issued during the Period January 1 to January 15, inclusive.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch No. 484 Political dated January 4, 1933 forwarding certain documents relating to the appeal of the Chinese Government under the Covenant of the
1/ League of Nations and to transmit herewith additional documents issued during the period January 1 to January 15, inclusive. The documents enclosed make the set forwarded to the Department complete up to the date of the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen on January 16.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:
1/ documents as per attached list.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State.
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

HPL/GdeW.

A true copy of the signed original.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 472 Pol. of
Jan. 18 1933

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

enclosed with

Despatch No.472, Political,

of January 18,1933.

Document No. C.17.1933.VII

" " A.(Extr.).Com.Spec./1.1933.

" " A.(Extr.).1.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).2.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).3.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).4.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).5.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).6.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).7.1933.VII.

" " A.(Extr.).8.1933.VII.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5843

SEE 893.00/12278 FOR Tel. # 95, 10 am.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 28, 1933.
NAME

TO

REGARDING: General Chiang has recently been in Nanking to receive Marshal Tuan Chi Jui, former Chief Executive who visited the Capital from Tientsin to discuss the Japanese situation.

hs

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JS

PLAIN

PEIPING

Dated January 28, 1933

Rec'd 2:30a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

95, January 28, 10 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

"General Chiang Kai Shek left Nanking this evening in gunboat for Nanchang in Kiangsi personally to direct further operations against the communists in that region. General Chiang has recently been in Nanking to receive Marshal Tuan Chi Jui, former chief executive, who visited the Capital from Tientsin to discuss Sino Japanese situation."

JOHNSON

JS

893.00/12278

Note
793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

m.m.H.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation. January 13, 1933.

Dr. Alfred Sze

Mr. Hornbeck

793.94

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 13 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 13 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Manchuria Situation:

Chinese Suggestion that American Government make Public Declaration of its Present Attitude.

793.94/5844

Dr. Sze called and wanted to know whether, now that the Secretary has returned, I could give him any indication of developments in connection with the telegram (of which he had given me a paraphrase copy) from Dr. W. W. Yen suggesting the desirability that the American Government make a declaration of attitude.

I said that the matter had been given consideration but that as yet no conclusive decision had been arrived at. The considerations contra which I had mentioned when he first came to me about the matter were considerations of weight and it was problematical whether a statement on our part might not do more harm than good. Surely our attitude could not with warrant be regarded as doubtful.

At that point, Dr. Sze mentioned an article in this morning's NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE by John T. Whitaker from Geneva (I find this article in the TRIBUNE of January 13, under

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

under date line Geneva January 12, headline: "League Ready To Surrender On Far East"), in which Whitaker says that the diplomats who shape Geneva policy are agreed that conciliation is hopeless and have drafted a formula for concluding the League of Nations' consideration of the controversy and that French and British quarters are justifying abandonment of the non-recognition policy on the score of lack of indication of the position of the United States. I said that I had not seen the article but that I doubted whether that kind of a conclusion would be reached by the League. Dr. Sze said that he wished very much that I could give him some message of encouragement to send to Nanking. I said that all that I could say for the moment was that my own view at this moment of the possibilities at Geneva was optimistic rather than pessimistic; but that, if it became possible for me to say more, I would promptly call him up.

Important VL
Copy of Whitaker article attached

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE - JANUARY 13, 1933.

LeagueReady To Surrender On Far East

No Conciliation Possible, Diplomats Hold inDraft Proposing to Liquidate 16-Month Futile Debate

Stimson Doctrine Is Facing Attack

Japan Is Satisfied Over Escaping Censure and China Prone to Accept

Developments in the Far Eastern situation follow:

League of Nations, admitting failure to conciliate Japan and China, prepared to wind up debate with a compromise formula neither condemning Japanese aggression nor barring recognition to Manchukuo.

Skirmishes continued in Jehol Province as intense cold prevented major fighting; Chinese charged Japanese were making Manchukuo army bear brunt of invasion; 130,000 Chinese troops were reported in Jehol.

Paris financial agency reported $8,000,000 contract between European munition firm and Japan to supply armaments sufficient for war on large scale; French munitions exports showed great increase.

League to End Debate

By John T. Whitaker

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

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GENEVA, Jan. 12.—Professing ignorance of the position of Washington, the diplomats who shape Geneva policies are agreed today that conciliation of the Manchurian conflict is hopeless, and have drafted a formula for concluding the League of Nations' consideration of the controversy between Japan and China with a final report by the Assembly. This is disclosed on high authority, and there is reason to believe that even the Chinese and Japanese have agreed to end the sixteen months' debate.

Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, is reported to be prepared, on the basis of this formula, to accept final action under Paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Covenant. The report called for by this paragraph will merely cite the recommendations of the Lytton report, it is planned, and by avoiding condemnation of Japan's actions will obviate the possibility of proceeding to the sanctions prescribed under Article 16.

Yosuke Matsuoka, Tokio's delegate, who returned last night from Italy, does not suggest that Japan will withdraw from the League if this formula is used. Dr. W. W. Yen, of China, welcomes a report, although, of course, he demands condemnation of Japan's actions. Paul Hymans, Belgian president of the Assembly, will arrive tomorrow to prepare for Monday's meeting of the Committee of Nineteen, and it is revealed authoritatively that, in offering the compromise formula, he is expected to ask that Monday's session convene the Assembly for Friday, unless Mr. Matsuoka renews the possibility of conciliation.

The report, which the Assembly will then ask the Committee of Nineteen to draft, will involve a sham battle around condemnation; but the real struggle, it is believed, will be over the Stimson policy of non-recognition of the fruits of aggression, that is, of the "independent" State of Manchukuo. Uncertainty as to America's position, of which the Europeans have made much at every critical juncture, is again being talked of as the League debate is expected to reach its climax. President-elect Roosevelt has given no indication either of his policy or of who will be his Secretary of State; and, following his conversations with Mr. Stimson, nothing has been cabled abroad about his views on Manchuria.

American Initiative Lacking

These observations are recited in British and French quarters to justify abandonment of the non-recognition policy. British circles add, moreover, that America's pledge against recognition was expressly limited to situations contrary to American interests. In the absence of a new American initiative, there is a tendency among the Europeans to shrug their shoulders and say: "Manchuria is an American problem—why shouldn't the League be done with cloaking the aims of American diplomacy?"

In ending its "endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute" under Paragraph 3 of Article 15, the Assembly would admit that it had exhausted the possibilities of conciliation, which became out of the question when Mr. Matsuoka burnt his bridges behind him by refusing to accept any proposals not including recognition of Manchukuo.

Unanimous Vote Needed

Paragraph 4, requiring "a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto," denies to China and Japan a vote on such report. The Assembly's majority vote, however, must include the unanimous concurrence of the other Council members, so that any report running the risk of involving sanctions can be killed by a single great power. Thus, there might be an agreement to condemn Japan's actions in the draft report, and then paralyzation of action by one dissenting vote—that of Italy, for example.

The formula drafted as a result of far-reaching negotiations during the holidays, however, would eliminate all possibility of sanctions by avoiding condemnation of Japan's actions. Article 16 prescribes an economic boycott and military sanctions on the ground that the aggressor "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all members of the League," but this will be a dead letter unless Japan is declared the aggressor. An Assembly report which does not condemn Japan's actions would wind up the dispute without providing an accusation of a Japanese "resort to war in disregard of its covenants"—the only basis on which Article 16 can be invoked.

Matsuoka Has Seen Mussolini

Mr. Matsuoka today declined to discuss the possibility of Italy's voting with Japan on Assembly decisions. He said that his pilgrimage to Rome, where he conferred with Premier Benito Mussolini, was not connected with League action.

The Japanese diplomat said he was impressed with the evidence that "Italian Fascism, despite occasional resorts to extreme disciplinary measures, always steers a middle course, satisfying the proletariat without abolishing either factory owners or the House of Savoy." He feels that Japan can learn much from Italian Fascism, and he himself has learned much from Il Duce, he said. The Italian press was right, he remarked, in quoting him as saying that "'Mussolini walks with God and lives close to God."

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 13 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 25, 1933.

The writer of the attached letter, Dr. Maurice William, is the author of "The Social Interpretation of History: A Refutation of the Marxian Economic Interpretation of History" written in 1921, and of "Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations" written in 1932.

With regard to the former work, Dr. James T. Shotwell in a pamphlet entitled "Sun Yat-sen and Maurice William" published in 1932 (attached hereto) writes as follows:

> " . . . Sun Yat-sen on the one hand had to fit Karl Marx with Bismarck and Lincoln, on the other hand, he had to face squarely the issue of communism in China. This fundamental problem came to a head in the final statement of Dr. Sun's philosophy which has become the ~~circular~~ Bible of the Chinese Republic, the Three Principles (San Min Chu I), a volume compiled from notes of lectures in 1924. Now, strange as it may seem, the solution which Dr. Sun accepted and incorporated in his text in the section of the third Principle, that of "Livelihood", was phrased by an American thinker whose work remains almost entirely unknown in his own country and whose contribution to China itself so

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far has been recognized only in a single reference of Dr. Sun in a one line footnote by the editor of Dr. Sun's text . . . .

"Dr. William supplied him with a conception of socialism which renounced the class war as historically and economically false, and in the text of the San Min Chu I whole passages of Dr. William's book were embodied en bloc. Socialism in Dr. William's eyes is in the emancipation of a single class by the achievement of justice for all . . . . Stated in these terms 'socialism' can be made to harmonize with nationalism and democracy (the other two of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles)."

The main enclosure in Dr. William's letter, which he submits as "new facts which this Government might find useful in relation to the Sino-Japanese issue", is a copyrighted letter dated November 19, 1932, and a supplement thereto dated December 5, 1932, written by himself to Professor Gies of Columbia University entitled "The Cause and Cure of the Sino-Japanese Conflict: New Evidence for the League of Nations."

The thesis developed in Dr. William's pamphlets is that the Sino-Japanese conflict is caused by a conflict of interpretations of Dr. Sun's third Principle of "Livelihood".

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. William finds that the ~~League~~ Lytton Commission Report considers ~~the~~ civil war at the bottom of the Sino-Japanese dispute, and accepts without question the Japanese allegation that their action in Manchuria is due to civil war in China While Dr. William does not question the Japanese excuse of civil war, he criticises Japan for having made neither an exhaustive study of the causes of Chinese civil war nor a peaceful effort to help China rid herself of civil war. He thinks civil war in China no more an excuse for separating Manchuria from China than an epidemic or plague in China would be.

Dr. William finds fault with the ~~League~~ Lytton Commission's position in the matter of civil wars in China, for he says it is both contradictory and vague and does not go deep enough into the causes. It gives as the main cause of dissension the tendency of the people to think in terms of family rather than in nation, and yet it is stated elsewhere in the Report that the people have become conscious of national unity. It leaves unexplained, he says, the causes of schism in the Kuomintang itself and of the weakening of the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun. Its scheme of temporary international cooperation in the reconstruction of China is vague and

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inconsistent, he points out. The Report, however, does give some important clues to the quest for causes of civil war in China, particularly that dealing with "the lack of hierarchical relations" in China, which Dr. William interprets as arising from the dispute over the successorship to Dr. Sun in leading the nation. Dr. Sun is thus the principal figure in the entire controversy and the present leaders of China, therefore, are the ideas of Dr. Sun; hence, the conflicting interpetations of Dr. Sun's ideas ~~for~~ are the fundamental cause of civil war in China. This thesis is then independently developed by the author.

It is pointed out that Left and Right schools of interpretation have grown up since Dr. Sun's death and that there can never be unity and peace as long as China remains half Left and half Right. It is shown how the two opposing schools of interpretation are the result of a conflict in Dr. Sun's own teachings. The first and second "Principles" (nationalism and democracy) are Marxian but the third "Principle" of livelihood is anti-Marxian. The explanation for this anomaly is found in the conversion of Dr. Sun, during the course of his Three People's Principles lectures, by the

teachings of Dr. William's book, "The

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Social Interpretation of History". It is then demonstrated how the conflict in China centers about the third Principle alone; and how Left and Right adherents of Sun are equally justified in their interpretation, inasmuch as Sun preached Left doctrines for twenty years but in the end handed down a Right version to his disciples. He died before he could explain this anomaly, which Dr. William attributes to Dr. Sun's intellectual greatness and courage in finally rejecting a social philosophy so long advocated, as did MacDonald, Snowden and Briand.

In view of the ~~influence~~ responsibility of Dr. William's book for ~~on Dr. Sun's teachings~~ in the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the contradictions, ~~in~~ which are the cause of civil war in China, Dr. William feels that it is mandatory upon him to leave nothing undone to aid in realizing peace in China. He therefore presents to the League of Nations his statement of the cause of China's civil war--conflicting interpretations of Dr. Sun's teachings--, which he hopes will prove useful in the search for a permanent solution of the Sino-Japanese problem.

Other enclosures are:

1. A letter to Madame Sun Yat-sen

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

appealing for a reexamination of Dr. Sun's "livelihood Principle" in order to determine and remove the cause of civil war among Dr. Sun's followers.

2. A statement addressed to all leaders of both factions of the Kuomintang appealing for the same reexamination.

3. Acknowledgments of No. 2 from Sun Fo, H. H. Kung and other Chinese leaders.

4. References to the National Anti-War League of China.

WRL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

File copy - Jan. 28, 1933

200 ~~130~~ West 57th Street
New York City

January 28 1933

January 19-1933.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington
D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
Division of JAN 20 1933
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
FEB 1- 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5845

My dear Colonel Stimson:

The enclosures are forwarded to you on the theory that no American in possession of new facts which his Government might find useful in relation to the Sino-Japanese issue, has a moral right to withhold them.

FILED
FEB 1 - 1933

Cordially yours
Maurice William

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 20 1933
Department of State

See 893.00/11445

711.93/285

793.94

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

January 27, 1933.

My dear Dr. William:

The Secretary of State desires that I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 19, 1933, enclosing a copy of your article entitled "The Cause and Cure of the Sino-Japanese Conflict: New Evidence for the League of Nations" and copies of certain correspondence exchanged with prominent Americans and Chinese in regard to developments in China, and that I express to you appreciation of your courtesy in making this material available to the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

793.94/5845

Dr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York, New York.

FE:WRL/VDM FE

JAN 28, 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

0160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy

Norman H. Davis
Forty-Eight Wall Street
New York

January 4, 1932.

Mr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York City,

Dear Mr. William:

I wish to thank you for your letter of December 30th with copies of the enclosures,

I have found this extremely interesting and I would welcome an opportunity sometime in the near future to have a talk with you about the Far Eastern question. It is, as Dr. Shotwell says, quite extraordinary that an American should have written a book which should have had so much influence upon Dr. Sun and upon the Chinese Revolution.

I intend to get a copy of your "Social Interpretation of History" and read it at the first opportunity, and also your "Sun Yat-Sen versus Communism."

If you have not already done so I would suggest that you write to Major General Frank R. McCoy in Washington, who was on the Lytton Commission, and send him copies of the same material which you sent to me. I am certain that he will be interested in it.

I think it would be wise to get this information into the hands of some of the members of the League of Nations who are dealing with this question.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Norman H. Davis

NHD/WG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Howard Mansfield
Lucius H. Beers
Henry De Forest Baldwin
Franklin B. Lord
Allan B. A. Bradley
Allen Evarts Foster
George De Forest Lord
Parker Mc Collester
Bernhard Knollenberg
Sherman Baldwin
John H. Vincent
James S. Hemingway
Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Franklin L. Partridge
Franklin Grady
Thaddeus G. Cowell

LORD, DAY & LORD

25 BROADWAY

NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS
LORDATTY

January 12, 1933

Dr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th St.,
New York City.

Dear Dr. William:

It is very kind of you to send me copies of the statements you have prepared relative to the Sino-Japanese controversy and the cause of the civil war in China. It is not often that the author of a book finds himself responsible for civil war and for international relations that shake the whole world. In dealing with public affairs, it is dangerous to omit an investigation of causes. You certainly have made out a strong case for the proposition that your book is an important cause of the present civil war in China. I think it of great importance that this should be understood.

Thanking you very much for giving me the opportunity of reading your statements and letters, I remain

Sincerely yours,

(signed) H de F. Baldwin

HdeFB:LG

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

YENCHING UNIVERSITY
PEIPING CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 24, 1932

Dr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York, N. Y.

My dear Dr. William:

The manuscript of your latest production reached me a few weeks ago, but as this happens to be about the busiest time of the year for me, I have been forced to delay the careful perusal of this material which it deserves. The time before the opening of our academic year and immediately following that event are always especially busy for an administrative officer, and this year I had to make a trip to Naking and Shanghai in the midst of this period.

I have now only been able to finish the manuscript and accompanying copies of correspondence, etc. You are unquestionably rendering a timely service in carrying the original influence upon Dr. Sun to this extension of the inquiry into his change of attitude. You are also quite right in attributing the division among his followers, in large measure at least, to misunderstanding of what it was he stood for in relation to communism, and some alternative to the philosophy of economic determinism. I have no special suggestions to make regarding the manuscript. Your work has been so thorough, and your appreciation of the issue so remarkably sensitive for one living at such a distance from this country, that there is very little to add. The one comment that I would make is that theoretical acceptance of Dr. Sun's views and loyalty to them as understood by his various followers is inevitably being to some extent superceded by the exigencies of new factors in the situation here, and the political groupings that are growing out of such changing conditions. This does not lessen at all the importance of the efforts you are rightly stressing, and his teachings will continue to be read and to mould the thinking of public-spirited Chinese for a long time to come.

In regard to the argument made by yourself in your letter to Dr. Shotwell, I am in full sympathy. One can scarcely overstate the desire of patriotic Chinese to have relations commercial and otherwise with America in preference to any other country, and the opportunity that we have, not only for generous and disinterested friendliness, applied to political reforms and progressive efforts of all kinds, but the natural benefits that would come to our own depleted foreign trade from such activities, or from projects undertaken with Chinese on a cooperative basis. I might remark that the trip referred to at the outset of this letter was in response to an invitation from Mr. T. V. Soong and the Minister of Railways to consult with them about the possibilities of such cooperation in developing automotive transportation in China.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With best wishes in this significant undertaking which has so unexpectedly opened up to you and you are so vigorously following up,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. LEIGHTON STUART

JLS C

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From Who is Who in America, 1932

Stuart, John Leighton, missionary; born of American parents at Hangchow, China, June 24th, 1876. Son of John Linton and Mary Louisa (Horton) S; A.B., and B. Litt;, Hampden-Sydney College Va., 1896. D.D. 1915; B.D., Union Theological Seminary of Virginia; Litt. D. Princeton, 1930. Ordained Presbyn. ministry; missionary in China since 1905; Prof. New Testament, Nanking Theological Seminary, 1908-1919; President, Yenching University, Peiping, since 1919; Trustee China Foundation for Promotion Education and Culture.

Author: Essentials of New Testament; Greek (in Chinese) 1916; Greek-Chinese-English Dictionary of the New Testament, 1918; Commentary on the Apocalypse (in Chinese) 1922.

Decorated 3d, Class Order of Chia Ho, Republic of China.

Address. Yenching University, Peiping, China.

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THE CAUSE AND CURE

Of The

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

New Evidence For The League Of Nations

submitted by

MAURICE WILLIAM

Author of SUN YAT-SEN VERSUS COMMUNISM:
New Evidence Establishing China's Right
To The Support Of Democratic Nations; 1932.

THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY:
A Refutation Of The Marxian Economic
Interpretation Of History; 1921

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1932

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
630 West 168th Street, New York
Department of Biological Chemistry

November 12, 1932

Dr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th St.,
New York City

Dear Dr. William:

The Lytton Commission has presented its Report. On November 21 the Council of the League of Nations will convene to receive and discuss this Report. World attention will be focussed upon these deliberations, for it is generally conceded by students of international affairs that not only the existence of the League of Nations but also the fate of civilization itself may be at stake. Clarence K. Streit, the New York Times correspondent at Geneva, seems to have sensed the momentousness of the situation. His cable to the Times opens with these significant words: "Lytton Data Held Key to World Fate; Geneva Tensely Awaits Action Which May Decide Peace or War for All of Us." (October 9, 1932).

The findings of the Lytton Commission are presumably receiving your close attention. Let me emphasize here some of the conclusions in that Report, which, by virtue of the part your book played in winning Nationalist China away from Communism, bring to you a new, a world, responsibility in international affairs, which you cannot delegate and therefore should not shirk. I quote from the Report:

> "It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion about them." (No italic in original.) (Chapter IX, page 126.)

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If your own researches, to which you have devoted the past five years, support these conclusions, do they not suggest also the corollary that in this critical hour the League of Nations has a claim not only on the opinions of its own Commission but on the opinions of "anyone" who may possess "an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background?" You cannot escape this responsibility, since you are not only in possession of an intimate knowledge of all the facts, but you have also played a decisive part in the creation of the historical background. Your duty is even more strikingly brought out in the following conclusion in the Lytton Report:

> "It is impossible not to realize that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China and the future to which it is tending." (Page 131). (No italic in original.)

This plainly indicates Japan's fear that China's future political development is tending toward Communism. Since this fear "lies at the heart of the problem for Japan," and since it has been established by such scholars as Professor James T. Shotwell, Professor John Dewey, Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, and many others, that toward the last months of his life Dr. Sun Yat-sen repudiated Communism in favor of your "Social Interpretation of History"--and that in response to Dr. Sun's mandate, modern China is basing her social, political, and economic program upon your anti-communist principles--are you not under obligation to supply to the League of Nations proof of modern China's anti-communist development? You would thus help the League to solve a major problem, the presence of which provided Japan's militarists with a plausible excuse for their activities against China.

I draw your attention to another important statement in the Report:

> "Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with

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the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. Those conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression." (Chapter 1, p. 13.) (No italic in original.)

The investigations of the Lytton Commission have disclosed that Chinese civil wars are no longer a local problem, but instead a menace to world peace and adverse to the return of world economic security. No doubt this fundamental discovery explains the Lytton Commission's extensive study of Chinese civil wars. Since your own volume "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" aims to point out the cause and suggest a cure for civil wars in China, and since eminent scholars have emphasized the responsibility you must assume for the part your "Social Interpretation of History" has played in precipitating the conflict between the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, how could you discharge your responsibility more fittingly than by placing at the service of the League of Nations your "intimate knowledge of all the facts" concerning the underlying causes of recent Chinese civil wars, which in turn led to the present conflict with Japan?

The League is seeking light upon a very complicated problem. With July 1914 in mind, let me urge you to see that no one in a position to shed light has a moral right to withhold it.

I should be glad to cooperate in an effort to bring to the attention of those most concerned the facts you may wish to present.

Yours cordially,

(Signed) William J. Gies

WJG:H

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200 West 57th Street,
New York, N. Y.

November 19, 1932.

Professor William J. Gies,
Columbia University,
New York City.

Dear Professor Gies:

Your letter of November 12th was read with a great deal of interest. You are assuredly right. The meeting of the Council of the League of Nations opening on the 21st of this month, may decide whether the nations of the world have learned to live in peace or will be destroyed in war.

The Lytton Commission has done a splendid piece of work. In presenting its findings it followed the fearless method of the research student whose sole concern is the soundness of the evidence upon which he must base his conclusions.

I too am greatly impressed by the keen insight shown by the Commission in discerning the fundamental part that civil wars have played in inciting the present trouble between China and Japan. The clarity of vision evinced by the Commission regarding the underlying cause of the conflict between China and Japan is strikingly revealed when a number of its observations are brought together. Here are a few:

> "It has been shown how seriously the rights and interests claimed by Japan have been affected by the weakness of the authority of the Central Government of China....the present political instability of China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world.....
> it is impossible not to realize that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China and the future to which it is tending.....
> The relations between China and Japan are those of war in disguise and the future is full of anxiety.

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> We have reported the circumstances which have created these conditions..... Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. These conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and, until remedied, will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression.... Serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun..... It (the Central Government) has been forced by recurrent civil wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by a billion dollars (silver) since 1927..... The danger of civil war must continue to exist so long as the Central Government lacks the material means to make its authority swiftly and permanently felt all over the country.... The recrudescence of civil war favored the growth of Communist influence in the period between 1928 and 1931.... Japan's anxiety to safeguard the life and property of her subjects in China caused her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war..... Such action was bitterly resented by China.... This issue however though affecting Japan to a greater extent than other Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue alone."
> (No italic in original)

These citations convincingly show that the Commission's conclusion - that China's Civil wars are at the bottom of the dispute between China and Japan - are the result of an exhaustive study of the subject. To what degree will these findings contribute to a solution of the problems which brought the Commission into being? Will it tend to expose and break down the validity of Japan's defense? Will it weaken Japan's case before the League? From the utterances of Japan's official spokesmen, the Japanese seem confident that, far from weakening her cause, the Commission's conclusions regarding China's civil wars will actually strengthen Japan's position before the League.

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Through her attack upon Shanghai and her schemings in Manchuria, Japan has very largely forfeited the good will of the world. Many regard her as an international outlaw. While fully aware of her unhappy position in the family of nations, the one and only excuse she has consistently offered in justification of her unprecedented actions is the persistence of civil wars in China.

A fair idea of the defense Japan proposes to offer is to be found in the address by Count Yasuya Uchida, Foreign Minister of Japan, delivered before the House of Peers, at the opening session of the Imperial Diet, August 25, 1932. Count Uchida spoke in part as follows:

> "It is an indisputable fact that the chaotic condition of China and the so-called revolutionary policy carried on by China under the enthralling influence of extravagant political dogma have been principally responsible for the unfortunate turn that international relations have taken of recent years in the Far East...it is admitted by those conversant with actual conditions in China that no remedy can be effected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed "machinery of peace"..... I regret to say that the growing disturbance in her (China'a) domestic administration coupled with rampant activities of Communist bandits throughout an extensive area in the Yangtze Valley and South China is casting a gloomy shadow on the path of the National Government..... Truly our deep sympathy is due the Chinese people who have to suffer under these troubled conditions. To allow such conditions to persist as they are, I am firmly convinced, will not only be deplorable for China herself but will constitute a constant danger of bringing about a serious menace to the rights and interests of foreign powers. On the contrary, the whole world will rejoice should China realize the gravity of the situation, cast aside her ill-advised foreign policy and adopt in earnest a constructive program of devotion to the task of internal readjustment. It goes without saying that Japan, always conscious of the general interests of the Far East, will spare no effort to afford all possible assistance to China." (New York Times - August 25, 1932)

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A further indication that the persistence of civil wars in China will constitute Japan's main defense before the League has been disclosed by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Chief of the delegation that is to represent Japan at the Geneva discussions of the Lytton Report: "If Chinese civil war had not led to a state of things in which national obligations were ignored we should have had no cause to interfere. But as in the last analysis, Chinese chaos is the cause of the trouble in Manchuria, a settlement which would leave the door open for the re-entry of the disturbing influences would be useless." (New York Times, November 6, 1932) (No italic in original)

Please note that these views are substantially those arrived at by the Lytton Commission and quoted in your letter. I repeat the quotation: "Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government have been the characteristics of China since 1911. These conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace." This is sweeping support for Japan's major contention that Chinese civil wars are a menace to world peace, and that in her effort to put a stop to civil wars she is really serving the cause of world peace.

It might be argued of course, that since the Report points out that "these conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact," and since none of the other nations has interfered in China's

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internal affairs, why should Japan? In extenuation we may confidently look for Japan to make the most of the following statement in the Report: "So far as Japan is China's nearest neighbor and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions described in this chapter." (No italic in original)

From the foregoing it would seem safe to assert that Japan's morale has been greatly heightened through the Commission's vindication of her contention that civil wars are responsible for the trouble between the two countries. Her improved position may easily lead Japan to take the offensive against the Commission and the League. The substance of her argument may follow some such line as this: "We have been charged with invasion and occupation without provocation, and we pointed to Chinese civil wars as a menace to our rights and interests which we were fully justified in defending. Your own investigations have now confirmed our claim as to the cause of the conflict between us. Your only remaining objection is to the method we adopted in dealing with the cause. Is it fair to criticize unless you can propose a more constructive means of dealing with the problem?" Japan will seek vindication for her strong-arm method of dealing with Chinese civil wars by attempting to show that the League is not qualified to deal with this problem, and that the remedies suggested by the Lytton Commission will fail to yield the desired results. This is the meaning of Count Uchida's statement: "It is admitted by those conversant with actual conditions in China that no remedy can be

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effected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed 'machinery of peace' ". (New York Times, August 25, 1932)

And this view is supported by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's chief delegate to Geneva, who expresses himself as follows: "I think our colleagues of the League should ask themselves if the peace machinery is quite perfect when it fails to provide a remedy for the encroachments and attacks we have suffered for many years, as a result of the warfare of rival Chinese military leaders... If the peace machinery had been capable of dealing with the internal situation of China there would have been no incident of the 18th of September and none of its distressing consequences....The anarchy into which China has fallen is the greatest question before the world today. The restoration of peace and order to China is humanity's greatest task in the twentieth century."
(New York Times, - November 6, 1932)

And so it has been made quite obvious that in the discussions at Geneva next week Japan will take advantage of every weak point in the proposals of the Lytton Commission, in order to justify her own method of dealing with "humanity's greatest task of the twentieth century."

Here, at last, is the real issue. It has been stated by Japan's official spokesmen. It pushes the issues between China and Japan into the background.

This is no longer a conflict between China and Japan; it is a conflict between the eighteenth and the twentieth

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century. Japan denies to the twentieth century the capacity to solve its problems in its own way. Only through the methods of the eighteenth century, implies Japan, can we solve the problems of the twentieth century. "The anarchy into which China has fallen is the greatest question before the world today;" says Mr. Matsuoka, but "no remedy can be effected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed the 'machinery of peace' " says Count Uchida. Hence, the machinery of war, the remedy of the eighteenth century, is the only solution "to humanity's greatest problem of the twentieth century!"

Upon what grounds does Japan justify her sweeping rejection of the methods of peace to which the twentieth century is dedicated? Has she exhausted every peaceful means of solving her problems with China, before resorting to the sword? If Japan is fully fortified with evidence showing that no means had been overlooked in an effort to achieve a peaceful solution of her dispute with China, such evidence would constitute complete vindication for the drastic methods to which she ultimately resorted. Naturally, I am not in a position to know whether Japan, in defending her case before the League, will produce such evidence, which of course would be conclusive and a complete triumph for Japan. Pending the presentation of such evidence before the League Council next Monday, I have only the views of Japan's spokesman to guide me.

In his statement in the New York Times of November 6, 1932, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka is quoted as saying: "Our recogni-

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tion of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder. My primary mission at the Assembly is to explain the situation.... If Chinese civil war had not led to a state of things in which national obligations were ignored, we should have had no cause to interfere. But as in the last analysis, Chinese chaos is the cause of the trouble in Manchuria, a settlement which would leave the door open for the re-entry of the disturbing influences, would be useless." (No italic in original) Now, here we have the heart of this grave international problem, as seen by Japan's own spokesman. Japan's recognition of Manchukuo was due, according to Mr. Matsuoka, to one fundamental cause, the continuance of civil wars in China. Thus the entire Sino-Japanese question once again, leads back to the same original source.

At this stage of our discussion, Mr. Matsuoka's opening words, quoted above, should be given due consideration. "Our recognition of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder. My primary mission at the Assembly is to explain the situation." We may therefore look for Mr. Matsuoka to "explain" to the League how Japan had arrived at the unqualified "conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder." Since it is Japan's contention that Chinese civil wars have been responsible for the en-

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tire trouble we can anticipate the form Mr. Matsuoka's explanation will take. He will no doubt undertake to prove (1) that Japan had made an exhaustive study of the underlying cause of Chinese civil wars and (2) she had made every peaceful effort to give the Chinese the benefit of her findings in order to assist in ridding their country of the curse of civil wars. How could it be otherwise? Assuming that instead of civil wars China had suffered from an epidemic of Bubonic Plague. Assuming further that the Chinese had lost control of the situation and that the disease threatened the lives and interests of Japanese living in Manchuria, how would Japan have dealt with this menace? Would she have applied to that dangerous condition the drastic measures she used in dealing with China's civil wars and then sent Mr. Matsuoka to Geneva, to "explain" to the League that "Our recognition of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchukuo from Chinese disorder?" (Plague?) Certainly not! It is safe to assume that Japan would instead have instructed her medical experts to make an exhaustive study of the cause for the spread of Bubonic Plague in China and to suggest a cure. The findings of the Japanese experts would no doubt have been offered to China in the hope that it might prove of aid in ridding that country of the menace of Bubonic Plague. Surely Mr. Matsuoka must understand that until he can produce the proof that Japan had spared no effort to find the cause and cure for Chinese civil wars, the world will be justified in making its own interpretation of the sincerity behind Japan's

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"conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder." "Disorder" must have a cause and until every effort to find and remove the cause had been exhausted, eighteenth century methods, as a short cut, will never be justified by twentieth century world opinion.

One wonders whether the Lytton Commission would not have been in a far stronger strategic position to meet the attacks of its Japanese critics had it taken Japan's strongest defense as its point of departure. From the citations already noted, it is safe to assume that in defending her actions before the League, Japan will seek to place the blame upon Chinese civil wars. Since the Commission also recognizes the vital part civil wars have played in this Sino-Japanese conflict, would not the Commission's position have been infinitely strengthened if she had by example shown Japan the twentieth century method of dealing with Chinese civil wars? This would have resulted in a much more intensive study of the cause and cure of Chinese civil wars than is to be found in the Report.

Moreover, a more comprehensive study would have been quite in the spirit of the Commission's mandate from the League Council. This is plain from the following quotations:
"The Council: . . .

Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends!"

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In introducing the resolution, the President, M. Briand, made the following declarations:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you, provides for action on two separate lines (1) to put an end to immediate threat to peace (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries...."

"Paragraph 5 provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded".....

The Commission's own understanding of its mandate was as follows: "(1) An examination of the issues between China and Japan which were referred to the Council including their causes development and status at the time of the inquiry; (2) A consideration of a possible solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute which would reconcile the fundamental interests of the two countries." (No italic in original)

"This conception of its mission determined the programme of its work." (pp. 10) (No italic in original)

These quotations seem to show that the Commission was aware that it was the intent of the Council that the Commission should concentrate upon causes and suggest how they might be removed. In other words, the test to which the Commission's Report is ultimately to be submitted has been determined in advance by the League Council itself; the degree to which the

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findings of the Commission will "facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries." (No italic in original)

With the Council's specific instructions to the Commission in mind, a brief study of Chapter I of the Report, "Outline of Recent Developments in China" may prove useful.

Following a clear summary of historical back-ground and of the conflicting forces in China, the Commission arrives at these conclusions:

> "From this summary description it appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful. The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers. Although there are, nowadays, a number of leaders who have risen above particularist sentiments, it is evident that a national outlook must be attained by a far greater number of citizens before real national unity can result." (page 17) (No italic in original)

Does the Commission intend this to represent its views as to the cause of Chinese civil wars? Since in no part of the Report can a more definite statement on this basic question be found, we must regard this as the final opinion of the Commission. And yet even these conclusions are to a large degree vitiated by the contradictory views presented on the very next page. I am referring to the paragraph on Nationalism which I quote in full:

> "The nationalism of modern China is a normal aspect of the period of political transition through which the country is passing. National sentiments and aspirations of a similar kind would be found in any country placed in the same position. But, in addition to the natural desire to be free from any outside control in a people that has become conscious of national unity, the influence of

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> the Kuomintang has introduced into the nationalism of China an additional and abnormal tinge of bitterness against all foreign influences, and has expanded its aims so as to include the liberation of all Asiatic people still subject to 'imperialistic oppression.' This is partly due to the slogans of its early communistic connection. Chinese nationalism today is also permeated by memories of former greatness, which it desires to revive. It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other not purely commercial rights exercised by a foreign agency in railway areas, of administrative rights in concessions and settlements, and of extra-territorial rights which imply that foreigners are not amenable to Chinese laws, law courts and taxation. Public opinion is strongly opposed to the continuance of those rights, which are regarded as national humiliation." (page 18)

Here we see that the Commission's conclusion on the cause of civil wars (on page 17) is this: "It appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful. The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers." But on page 18 this conclusion is discarded in the discussion of Nationalism, where we read: "The nationalism of modern China is a normal aspect of the period of political transition.....a people that has become conscious of national unity..... Chinese nationalism today is also permeated by memories of former greatness which it desires to revive....."

These obvious contradictions seem to bring out the discouraging fact that the Commission's search for the cause of Chinese civil wars has not brought forth the desired results.

The Commission's confusion and inability to comprehend and explain the recurrent conflicts in modern China is fur-

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ther proof that it has failed to grasp their underlying cause. Let us note some of the observations in the Report and see how much we are told as to their cause.

".....the Kuomintang Army....by the end of 1928, succeeded in producing a nominal unity for the first time in many years and a measure of actual unity which lasted for a time.....In 1927 a Central Government was established in Nanking. It was controlled by the party....The party was now ready to put into operation its schemes of political and economic reconstruction but was prevented from doing so by internal dissentions, the periodical revolt of various Generals with personal armies and the menace of Communism. In fact the Central Government had repeatedly to fight for its existence. For a time unity was maintained on the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved when powerful war lords concluded alliances amongst themselves and marched their armies against Nanking. Though they never succeeded in their object, they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that war against the Central Government was an act of rebellion. It was in their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and another one which happened to reside in the national capital and to be recognized as the Central Government by foreign Powers. This lack of hierarchical relations is all the more dangerous because serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun. The new schism has

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led to the estrangement of influential Southern leaders, who retired to Canton, where the local authorities and the local branch of the Kuomintang frequently act independently of the Central Government." (pp. 16-17)

The motive of the powerful war lords is implied but where is the explanation for the "serious dissensions in the Party itself which has weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun"? Where, too, is the explanation for "The new schism has led to the estrangement of influential Southern leaders, who retired to Canton, where the local authorities and the local branch of the Kuomintang frequently act independently of the Central Government"? It would seem that the one blanket explanation offered by the Commission for all recent activities in modern China is the one already noted: "The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers."

Now turn to the solution recommended by the Lytton Commission. Item 10 of "the general principles to which any satisfactory solution should conform" reads as follows:

"International Cooperation in Chinese Reconstruction: Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government

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in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen." (pp. 131)

It is most unfortunate that after nine months intensive study of a grave international problem the solution proposed by the Commission should be couched in terms so vague as to make it difficult to sense its meaning and [illegible]ical application. The Commission's solution calls for serious consideration. We are told that "the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world" and that "the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China" therefore, "the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen", but we are not told what form "temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China" must take in order to give China "a strong Central Government" so that it may effectively deal with "the present political instability in China". Does this mean an international military force placed at the service of the Central Government to be used against its opponents? If so, what would be the consequences? Would not the present divided opposition unite against the Central Government for betraying China into the hands of the "imperialists?" How long could a "strong Central Government" last under the fury of a united opposition? The Commission

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should be mindful of its own admonition to Japan regarding the stabilization of Manchuria! "Nor do we consider unreasonable her demand for the establishment of a stable Government which would be capable of maintaining the order necessary for the economic development of the country. But such conditions can only be securely and effectively guaranteed by an administration which is in conformity with the wishes of the population and which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally is it only in an atmosphere of external confidence and internal peace, very different from that now existing in the Far East, that the capital which is necessary for the rapid economic development of Manchuria will be forthcoming." (pp. 128) (No italic in original). Do not these sound convictions apply with equal force to China proper?

As to the suggestions of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen; what were those suggestions? In the introduction to his "The International Development of China" Dr. Sun says: "The confidence of the Chinese people must be secured in order to gain their cooperation and enthusiastic support.... foreign bankers entirely disregarded the will of the Chinese people and thought they could do everything with the Chinese Government alone... Had the foreign bankers gone in the right way of first securing the confidence of the Chinese people and then approaching the Government for a contract, many things might have been accomplished without a hitch! Therefore in this International Project we must pay more attention to the people's will than ever before."

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But if the Commission is thinking of economic and not military aid when it suggests "temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China" as "the final requisite for a satisfactory solution," what is to be understood by the term "temporary"? Does it imply five, twenty five or fifty years? Dr. Sun, upon whose suggestion the recommendation of the Commission is based had this to say: "The world has been greatly benefited by the development of America as an industrial and commercial nation, so a developed China with her four hundred millions of population will be another new world, in the economic sense. The nations which will take part in this development will reap immense advantages." (Introduction, "International Development of China", by Sun Yat-sen.)

We note that there was nothing "temporary" in Dr. Sun's suggestion. He was aware that American economic development from which the world greatly benefited was the result not of "temporary" but of prolonged international cooperation. Foreign capital investments in America were repaid only since the World War. China's greatest need is capital investments and this obviously cannot be of a "temporary" nature.

The Commission tells the League very frankly "Our work is finished" and yet Japan's sole justification for waging a "war in disguise" against China remains unchallenged. Japan claims all her disputes with China are due to civil wars and we have noted that the Lytton Report supports this claim. This is a distinct victory for Japan. World opinion which has been skeptical of Japan's excuses can no longer question them. Japan's position

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is thus made and must remain impregnable so long as her method of dealing with China's civil wars remain unchallenged. Here is where the Commission missed its supreme opportunity. Japan should have been challenged to justify her military methods by providing the evidence that she had made a sincere effort to study the cause of Chinese civil wars and that her rejection of a peaceful solution was the result of this study.

My investigations of the cause of recent Chinese civil wars suggest that Japan could not meet such a challenge. Should this prove true, how would it affect Japan's case before the League? If a study of the cause of civil wars in China should bring to light a peaceful remedy as the only practical and permanent means of unifying China, Japan's case would collapse. Manchukuo as an "independent" State would collapse. All of Japan's well-laid plans affecting China would collapse. The prestige of the League of Nations would be greatly enhanced, and the cause of international peace immeasurably advanced.

It would seem that with so much at stake we should be justified in undertaking an independent investigation of Japan's claim that China's civil wars cannot be solved by peaceful measures. Without a thorough investigation of their cause it would obviously be impossible to determine whether civil wars in China might yield to peaceful measures or whether Japan's method of the ~~sword~~ sword is the only solution.

The Lytton Commission's contribution to this vital question has already been noted and found inconclusive. Let us recall the Commission's own words: "The cause of this lack of cohesion is the

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tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers." (Page 17) How would the Commission explain Madam Sun Yat-sen's opposition to the Central Government? She certainly is not thinking in terms of family and locality. On the contrary she is ranged against her own family. Her family is divided into three opposing camps, Madam Sun to the extreme left, her brothers and sisters composing the rest of the Soong family at the extreme Right while Mr. Sun Fo is with the Cantonese faction. Manifestly, the family theory as the explanation of the cause of Chinese civil wars leaves much unaccounted for.

But the Report does contain a number of important clues which may prove helpful in our quest. "This lack of hierarchical relations is all the more dangerous," says the Report, "because serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr.Sun". (page 17) This seems to imply (1) that the serious dissensions in the Party are due to the dissentor's questioning of the Central Government's title to be the successors of Dr. Sun; (2) that the weakened title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun is in turn due to these dissensions. And so we learn that the principal figure in this entire controversy is Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Each faction lays claim to the title of being his unquestioned successors. Why? Of what possible advantage can it be to be regarded as the successor of a leader who died more than seven years ago?

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Considerable light is thrown on these questions by another paragraph in the Report: "It is provided in the Provisional Constitution of China, promulgated on June 1st, 1931, that 'the Three Principles of the People (by Dr. Sun Yat-sen) shall be the basic principles of education in the Republic of China.' The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution." (page 19)

This explanation helps to clarify the points raised by the former paragraph. Why the opposing factions should seek to inherit the cloak of Dr. Sun Yat-sen is becoming increasingly clear. Dr. Sun is the revered national leader. His ideas are taught in the schools and dominate the thought of the nation. In seeking popular support each faction aims to capitalize Dr. Sun's hold upon the people by claiming that it is the only true interpreter of Dr.Sun's ideas. Thus we see that the real leaders of present-day China are not those in control of the Central Government at Nanking, nor of the opposing faction at Canton, nor Madam Sun Yat-sen or Eugene Chen at Shanghai - the real leaders are the ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Were Dr. Sun alive we should, in view of these facts, turn to him as the one person best qualified to interpret his own ideas. Since Dr. Sun is no longer here, we are compelled to resort to the one alternative of studying the interpretations of his successors, as well as of those who question the Central Government's title to be the successors of Dr.Sun, in the hope that such a study will

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throw some light upon the possible cause of China's recent civil wars.

This will take a few days when I shall send you a second statement, in continuation of this one.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Maurice William

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200 West 57th Street,
New York, N. Y.

December 5, 1932.

Professor William J. Gies,
Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Professor Gies:

The supplementary statement mentioned in my letter of the 19th of November is presented below. Use it as you may wish for the promotion of peace and good will.

The Lytton Commission's study of China's internal problems disclosed the fact that "the (Nanking) Government has....been forced by recurrent civil wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by about a billion dollars (silver) since 1927." (page 18)

Dr. Sun died on March 12, 1925. Two years later saw the beginning of the "recurrent civil wars", which by 1932 cost the Nanking Government alone a billion dollars (silver). What these conflicts cost the opposing factions will perhaps never be known, but it is safe to assume that it was a very large sum. This financial waste, great as it is, by no means tells the whole, or even the worst part of the story of modern China. Who, for example, would undertake to say what the internecine wars of the past five years have cost in terms of human life? And yet herein lies the real tragedy of China's recent history.

Is it conceivable that a national conflict upon a major scale, which has persisted for more than five years and which exacted such a heavy toll in blood and treasure, can be entirely devoid of a discernible cause? Has the opposition to the Central

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Government developed without specifying any reasons for its opposition? Japan would have the world believe that conflicting interests of selfish war-lords is the sole explanation for Chinese civil wars. No evidence is provided in support of this sweeping accusation. The Lytton Commission, on the other hand, suggests that the conflict is due to traditional ties of family and of locality. Now let us see what we can learn from the Chinese themselves as to the underlying cause of the conflict.

We have been informed that China's Provisional Constitution requires that Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People" shall be "the basic principles of education in the Republic of China." Does not this extraordinary provision seem to suggest that the interpretations of the ideas presented by Dr. Sun in his "Three Principles of the People" may have furnished the basis for the conflict between the Central Government and those who question its title to be the successor of Dr. Sun?

Western students may disagree in their interpretations of Modern China; but when it comes to the question of the hold Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People" have upon the hearts and minds of modern China, there is little difference of opinion among them. The following quotation gives some idea of the part the "Three Principles" play in the life of modern China.

> "Since the Nationalists are in power, scarcely a day passes by without an official edict of the Government adding its stone to the grand edifice of the future nation, a nation to be built anew entirely upon the rock foundation of the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). If China 'awakens' -- so speak the Chinese themselves -- if she is convinced that she must

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develop her industries, her education, her administration, her Government -- in a word, everything -- she believes that all this is impossible unless it is based on the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). The password, the touchstone of everybody and of everything is in this 'ism', and this 'ism' alone. When there is question of incorporating into the Party those who yesterday were enemies or of planning reforms and mapping out the future, hardly any other question is asked but: "Are you in favor of or opposed to the Triple Demism?" (Three Principles of the People); Does that law, that plan conform to the Triple Demism?" (Three Principles of the People) Things have gone so far that sentences of death or of life imprisonment have been contemplated against all anti-revolutionists, meaning thereby all those who would be bold enough to hold a doctrine opposed to the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). (Pages 543-4, "The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen". An original translation of the Three Principles of the People from the Chinese into French and English by Paschal M. D'Elia, S. J.; 1931.

From the foregoing it would seem that we should focus our attention upon the interpretations of the "Three Principles of the People", if we would determine the basis for the opposition to the Central Government.

Madame Sun Yat-sen voiced the views of the opposition in the following language:

"Rest assured that no one considers the Nanking Government as representative of the Chinese people".*

"With the withdrawal of Borodin, his chief Chinese adherents withdrew from Hankow. Mme. Sun left for Shanghai and shortly for Moscow, declaring that with the stoppage of the agrarian and social revolution and the attacks being made on peasants and laborers, the revolution started by her husband had been betrayed and that there was nought but counter-revolution. In an impressive statement on the political situation issued in July (1927) she declared:

'To guide us in the Chinese revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies...twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of revolution that would change the status of

* Hallett Abend: Tortured China, Page 60.

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the Chinese peasant. Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If the leaders of the Party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers and the Party is no longer a revolutionary party.'" *

In support of the interpretations of the Central Government we have the views of Madame Sun Yat-sen's brother-in-law, General Chiang Kai-Shek: "Dr. Sun clearly explained that Chinese industry is still in its infancy and that Marxian methods of revolution cannot be applied in this country....In his lectures, Dr. Sun said that all nations differed in their conditions of economic development so that the problems concerning the people's livelihood must be solved in a different way...Such a clear statement should not be interpreted otherwise". ** The conflicting interpretations of these leaders are typical of the interpretations of the opposing factions.

General Chiang Kai-Shek seemed fully aware of the hopelessness of uniting China on the basis of interpretations of Dr. Sun's ideas. In his Statement of Resignation from the Post of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army of China, General Chiang said: "The people are overwhelmed with sorrow because in territory brought under the revolutionary banner there has been dissension and because while all professed devotion to the San Min principles (The Three Principles of the People) the followers of the Great Leader appear to separate themselves into two camps." ***

What is the lesson to be drawn from this discouraging picture? We cannot escape the conclusion that the interpretations

* Harley Farnsworth MacNair: China in Revolution, Page 123.
** Manifesto to the People: China Year Book, 1928; Page 1366.
*** China Year Book 1928; Page 1381.

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of his ideas as a means of promoting peace and unity among Dr. Sun's disciples have proved a hopeless failure. The seven years following Dr. Sun's death have developed two schools of opposing interpretations -- a Left and a Right school. Each seems able to support its own interpretation with copious quotations from Dr. Sun's teachings.

For the present, the proponents of Right interpretations are in control of the Nationalist Government, but so long as such influential figures as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen, and others are striving for the downfall of the Nationalist Government, civil wars will menace the peace of China. Who can say that the fortunes of war may not again bring the government under the control of the Left Wing and thus restore the Left program which dominated China between 1923 and 1927? It is plain that little is to be gained from blinking the fact that there can be no unity and peace so long as China remains half Left and half Right.

Much comfort is to be derived from the hope that both the Left and Right factions, contrary to the general belief, may be equally loyal to Dr. Sun. Such loyalty may well serve as the foundation for unity in China. For it seems safe to assume that were Dr. Sun here to clarify his position, both factions would prove their loyalty by following his instructions. It remains therefore for the living to take up the task death deprived Dr. Sun of the opportunity to complete.

It would seem that the first step in a program of constructive service for China should consist of an investigation of the claim made by the leaders of both factions that their

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interpretation is based upon Dr. Sun's own teachings. Can it be possible that Dr. Sun's book "The Three Principles of the People" contains evidence that could justify and support both Left and Right interpretations of his theories? An examination of Dr. Sun's volume cannot fail to disclose the astounding fact that the conflicting interpretations are directly traceable to Dr. Sun's own teaching. His lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy-- the first two segments of his Three Principles of the People-- are developed from the view point of a Left, a Marxian ideology. However, in the treatment of his Third Principle -- the Principle of Livelihood -- Dr. Sun seems to have made a complete right-about and presents the views of an anti-Marxian. It thus becomes clear that it was Dr. Sun's anomalous position - his Left and Right ideology - which gave rise to his Left and Right disciples, proving beyond peradventure that both groups are essentially honest, since their conflict springs from a desire to continue their loyalty to a departed leader.

How did Dr. Sun come to hold conflicting views is the natural question to suggest itself at this point. To find the answer we shall have to give due consideration to a matter of some importance but which, strangely enough, has been completely overlooked by most commentators. I refer to the fact that Dr. Sun, after giving his series of six lectures each on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, (which he delivered at weekly intervals between January 27 and April 26, 1924) for some

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mysterious reason discontinued his lectures. He did not give a single lecture on his Three Principles during the months of May, June and July, 1924. It was not until August 3, 1924, that he delivered the first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood. There must have been some explanation for Dr. Sun's sudden and strange silence. What was the explanation? Dr. Sun said in his preface, "....it now happens that the Kuomintang is being reorganized and our comrades are beginning to engage in a determined attack upon the minds of our people. They are in great need of the profound truths of "San Min Chu I" (The Three Principles of the People) ....as material for propaganda. So I delivered one lecture a week". Yet, in spite of the "great need", Dr. Sun discontinued his lectures and waited more than three months before delivering the first of the series on the Principle of Livelihood. Why? What was absorbing Dr. Sun's attention during those three months? The stated views of eminent scholars may help to shed light upon this question.

The following is quoted from "China in Revolution" by Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago:

> "Two facts related to the "San Min Chu I" have not received the attention they deserve; first, that a period of more than three months elapsed between the presentation of the two series of six lectures each on the Principle of the People's Nationalism and the Principle of the People's Sovereignty and the last four lectures on the Principle of the People's Livelihood; and second, that during this period a book entitled "The Social Interpretation of History" by an American scholar, Dr. Maurice William of New York City, fell into Dr. Sun's hand which profoundly affected his philosophy of history and revolution as presented in the analysis of the third principle." (Page 88)

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Dr. James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University; Director of Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, and member of the Research Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, writes as follows:

> "The reading of 'The Social Interpretation of History' by Dr. Sun Yat-sen may yet turn out to have been one of the most important single incidents in the history of modern Asia, for the consequences were immediate and far-reaching and have only just begun to show their full extent in the orientation of China. This may seem like an extravagant statement and yet it seems amply justified by a study of the facts in the case....In August, 1924, Dr. Sun gave the third of his Three Principles, that which deals with social reform, in the terms set forth by Dr. William." From an article entitled "Sun Yat-sen and Maurice William", Political Science Quarterly, March, 1932.

Dr. Jeremiah W. Jenks, Research Professor of Government, New York University; Honorary Economic Advisor, Nationalist Government of China, in a lecture on "Why China Repudiated Bolshevism", delivered at New York University on February 6, 1929, spoke in part as follows:

> "In the latter part of his book (The San Min Chu I), he (Sun) changed his views quite decidedly and that change was apparently brought about by there falling into his hands in some way (we do not know how) an American book written by Dr. Maurice William of New York City. It is entitled 'The Social Interpretation of History'. Dr. Sun read this book with a great deal of care and in the latter part of his own book he adopted Dr. William's principles. In many cases, he adopted them so completely that Dr. Sun's book is almost a transcript of William's."

Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior; Past Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations, said:

> "The interaction of mind upon mind shown by the effect of Mr. William's 'The Social Interpretation of History' upon Dr. Sun is dramatic if not epochal....The points in Mr. William's book found hospitable lodgment in his (Sun's) mind and, interpreted by him, they have become of great significance in the unfolding of the new China." From Foreword to "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" by Maurice William.

In a personal letter dated April 10, 1928, Dr. John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, wrote me as follows:

> "At a memorial meeting to him (Sun Yat-sen) last winter a year ago, where I spoke, I called attention to his use of your book....I congratulate you upon the growing public recognition of the book. I am always glad to bear witness to its value."

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Mr. L. T. Chen, Editor of the Frank W. Price English translation of the "San Min Chu I", wrote to Miss Mary van Kleeck of the Russell Sage Foundation, as follows:

> "I learned from a personal friend of Dr. Sun that the 'Social Interpretation of History' was a constant companion to him" (in the last months of Dr. Sun's life).

The facts presented by these scholars bring to mind two very interesting questions:

1. Is there any relation between Dr. Sun's study of the "Social Interpretation of History" and his conflicting views?

2. Is there any relation between Dr. Sun's study of "The Social Interpretation of History" and the conflict between his disciples?

We must go back to January, 1924, if we would trace the answers to these questions.

It should be recalled that Dr. Sun delivered his first lecture on the Principle of Nationalism on January 27, 1924. By April 26, he had completed the twelve lectures, six on the Principle of Nationalism and six on the Principle of Democracy. We have already noted that Dr. Sun did not lecture on his Three Principles during May, June and July. The delivery of his first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood was delayed until August 3, 1924. We have also noted that during those three months, Dr. Sun had evidently made an intensive study of "The Social Interpretation of History". But it cannot be claimed that Dr. Sun's study of "The Social Interpretation of History" was responsible for his conflicting views unless we can prove four major points:

1. There is no conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples regarding the correct interpretation of the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy because

2. There is no conflict between Dr. Sun's lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy and the views he held on these subjects during the preceding twenty years. These lectures were delivered <u>before</u> he studied the "Social Interpretation of History".

3. That the conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples centers <u>exclusively</u> around the correct interpretation of the lectures on the Principle of Livelihood because

4. Dr. Sun's lectures on the Principle of Livelihood <u>do</u> conflict with the views he held on this subject during the preceding twenty years. These lectures were delivered after Dr, Sun had made a study of "The Social Interpretation of History".

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How can we prove these four points? The only proof worthy of consideration is the testimony of leaders of both factions of Dr. Sun's followers. The first is that of Mme. Sun Yat-sen. She says:

> "It is the third principle, that of the Livelihood of the People, that is at stake at this time." (China in Revolution, by Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Page 123)
>
> "It is with regard to the third principle, the Principle of Livelihood, that the greatest trouble has arisen." (From the "Inner History of the Chinese Revolution", by T'and Leang-Li).
>
> "It is particularly on the third of Dr. Sun's Three Principles, namely, The Principle of Livelihood of the People that the cleavage between the two wings of the Kuomintang is most clearly brought out." (T.C.Woo, in "The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution").
>
> "Some say the Min-Sheng principle (Principle of Livelihood) which is that of socialization of social and economic organizations has the same theoretical basis as communism." (General Chiang Kai-Shek.)

These citations could easily be multiplied, but this is obviously not the place for an all inclusive statement. Enough has been quoted to establish through authoritative sources that the conflict between the opposing groups centers about the Principle of Livelihood. On the other hand, the literature of the conflicting groups fails to disclose any evidence of a conflict over the correct interpretation of the Principle of Nationalism or the Principle of Democracy.

Since the evidence seems to establish that the conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples centers exclusively around the Principle of Livelihood, an effort should be made to determine the nature of that conflict. What is the basis for the strife between Dr. Sun's followers and upon what grounds does each side justify its opposition to the other - an opposition which takes the form of civil war? Let us again turn to the testimony of those best qualified to throw light on these questions. Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago, in his "China in Revolution", presents Mme. Sun's position as follows:

> "With the withdrawal of Borodin, his chief Chinese adherents withdrew from Hankow. Mme. Sun left for Shanghai and shortly for Moscow, declaring that with the stoppage of the agrarian and social revolution and the attacks being made on peasants and laborers, the revolution started by her

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husband had been betrayed and that there was nought but counter-revolution. In an impressive statement on the political situation issued in July (1927), she declared:

'To guide us in the Chinese revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies.... twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of revolution that would change the status of the Chinese peasant. Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If the leaders of the Party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers and the Party is no longer a revolutionary party.' " (Page 123)

Professor Arthur N. Holcombe in his "Chinese Revolution" states:

"The leaders of the Left Wing contended that the success of the Northern Punitive Expedition made it possible to resume the original revolutionary program. No longer, they argued, should the needs of the workers and peasants be neglected upon the plea of military necessity. They demanded that the workers' and peasants' unions be revived and that the social revolution proceed along with the political."

The Foreign Policy Association reports as follows:

"The Reorganizationists comprise the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. They claim that Nanking has not sufficiently stressed Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle, that of the People's Livelihood, and therefore has neglected the interest of the workers and peasants. This charge is upheld by Mme. Sun Yat-sen....if the Left wing leaders are able to carve out a sphere of influence in south China, however, they will have the chance to put their interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's principles to the test of practice." (From News Bulletin, May 8, 1931)

The above states the position of Dr. Sun's Left disciples. What is the position of the Right Wing?

"Nanking declares itself to be the only real exponent of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party principles. It denounces one faction of its opponents as 'old style feudalists'; another clique it denounces as 'semi-communist', and still another is labelled 'reactionary'. It is noteworthy, however, that the opposing factions being called these hard names by Nanking have not changed their principles." (From "Tortured China" by Hallett Abend, Page 48.)

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General Chiang Kai-shek says:

> "Some say that the Min-sheng Principle (Principle of Livelihood), which is that of socialization of social and economic organizations has the same theoretical basis as Communism....The Principle of Min-sheng does not come from materialism. Dr. Sun clearly explained that Chinese history is still in its infancy and the Marxian methods of revolution cannot be applied in this country....(Manifesto to the People, April, 1927.)

C. C. Wu says:

> "We come now to the Third Principle, namely, Livelihood. As Dr. Sun has said, Livelihood is the centre of government, of economics and of all historical movements....A misconception which gained considerable currency at one time was that the economic principles of the Kuomintang were Communistic...." (The Nationalist Program for China.)

These conflicting interpretations of Dr. Sun's Principle of Livelihood are directly responsible for a state of confusion in which "every faction of the opposition declares its loyalty to the principles of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party; everyone of the armies fighting against Nanking is flying the Kuomintang Party flag and also the flag of the Nanking Government-the flag of China. The Party is hopelessly disrupted." (Hallett Abend, "Tortured China", Page 47), and this report is supported by Chiang Kai-shek who says:

> "The people are overwhelmed with sorrow because in territory brought under the revolutionary banner there has been dissension and because while all professed devotion to the San Min principles, the followers of the Great Leader appear to separate themselves into two camps." (Statement of Resignation from Post of Commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army of China, August 12, 1927.)

What is behind this tragic situation? Can it be possible that neither Mme. Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek has misrepresented Dr. Sun? Are their conflicting interpretations merely a reflection of Dr. Sun's own conflicting interpretations of his Principle of Livelihood? These questions can be answered only through an examination of some of Dr. Sun's own definitions of his Principle of Livelihood.

In his lecture delivered on April 13, 1924, Dr. Sun said:

> "After the Franco-German War, there were in the world not merely democratic but economic struggles. What was the outcome of the gradually receding democratic fever? Socialism. That 'ism' is what I advocate under the name of Principle of Livelihood."

And in an address delivered in June, 1921, Dr. Sun said:

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"The Principle of Livelihood is the socialism of the present day." (No italic in original)

These definitions support Mme. Sun's interpretation of the Principle of Livelihood, but refute Chiang Kai-shek's.

But on August 3, 1924, in his lecture on the Principle of Livelihood, Dr. Sun said:

> "Our Kuomintang has been advocating the Principle of Livelihood for over twenty years; we have not championed socialism but the Min-sheng principle." (page 382)

Plainly this refutes Sun's earlier definition (which, however, is still upheld by Mme. Sun) and gives full support to Chiang Kai-shek's interpretation.

How did Dr. Sun happen to hold conflicting definitions of his Principle of Livelihood is the next question that must be determined. We have just seen that in August, 1924, he said:

> "Our Kuomintang has been advocating the Principle of Livelihood for over twenty years."

Let us see if we can trace the origin of and the definition he gave to this principle during all those years. In "The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution", by T'ang Leang-Li, we find the following explanation of the origin of the Principle of Livelihood:

> "From London he (Sun) went to the Continent to get into touch with the leaders of the Opposition Parties, notably with the Labour and Socialist Parties, which were becoming a factor of some importance in the national politics of the different European states. The First International was dead, but a new Socialist International came into existence in 1889, and Sun came into contact with their leading members, such as Longuet and Lafargue, who also introduced him to the study of Marxism. (No italic in original)
>
> "During his sojourn in America and Europe, Sun came into contact with social contrasts and inequalities which made a deep impression upon him. In Europe especially Sun noticed the active struggle of the working classes to improve the conditions of their existence, and to bring the capitalistic order of society ultimately to an end. It became clear to him that, although the advanced Western countries were politically powerful and the people were nominally sovereign, the broad masses were far from happy. The problem of the liberation of the Chinese people, Sun realized, would be a more complicated question than the mere overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic. The political situation

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was not enough; it was only the first step towards the social and economic solution. The French Revolution of 1789 against monarchical authority ignored the problem of the distribution of wealth, and as a consequence, the establishment of a capitalist and plutocratic system of society was made possible. On the other extreme, Marxism gave an economic solution to the problem of capitalist exploitation, but ignored the vital principle of nationality. Finding either solution by itself unsatisfactory, Sun thus conceived the idea of the simultaneous settlement, by means of the revolution, of the questions of national independence, popular freedom and of the people's livelihood. To the lineal descendant of the T'ai-P'ing and the inheritor of the traditions of the secret societies the idea of a social revolution and of Socialism was nothing novel, far less something dreadful....In explaining the Third Principle, that of Livelihood, Sun Yat-sen adopts a frankly socialistic attitude.... 'We want the social revolution because we don't want a handful of rich people to monopolize the whole wealth of the country.'"* (No italic in original)

In a speech published in his "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionist", Dr. Sun confirms this pro-Marxian version of his Principle of Livelihood as follows:

"Our Party is revolutionary....When in the last years of the Tsing Dynasty, we were forced to establish ourselves in Tokyo, we determined the following as the fundamental principles of our party; Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism...." (No italic in original)

"We must firmly know and remember that so long as all three principles have not been carried into real life (even if one of them had been completely realized), there can be no stable conditions of existence." (No italic in original)

"The theory of socialism has become known in China comparatively recently. Its chief advocates usually limit their knowledge of this tendency to a few empty words without having any definite program. By long study, I have formed a concrete view of this question. The essence of socialism amounts to solving the problem of land and capital. Those who discuss the question of the brotherhood of peoples in America and Europe have in view only two problems-labor and capital; but European conditions are very different from our own. The thing is that in Europe and America all their misfortunes arise from an extremely unfair distribution of products, whereas in China there is general poverty, since there are no

* See "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionist", by Sun Yat-sen for a fuller presentation of Sun's pro-Marxian definition of the Principles of Livelihood.

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large capitalists. But this, of course, should not serve as the reason for not advocating socialism; this would be a great mistake. If we see mistakes in Europe and America, we are bound to correct them; disproportion in the distribution of products; both in America and Europe, are a bad example for us. Therefore, I agitate for socialism, the socialization of land and capital.... We must admit that the degree of sacrifice required for the social revolution will be higher than the political.... Now, the time is approaching to carry into effect our great Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism. Only by the transformation of all three principles into reality can our people live and develop freely."
(No italic in original)

Not only are the preceding quotations fair examples of Dr. Sun's original pro-Marxian version of the Principle of Livelihood, but they are typical of the version which he had consistently taught his followers from 1907 to April, 1924, at which time he reaffirmed his faith in his original version in the following clear statement:

"Socialism is similar to the Principles of the People's Livelihood which I have been advocating. When the people got hold of the theory of socialism they began to give up their eager fight for democratic rights and to struggle instead for economic rights. This war was a class struggle between the workers and the wealthy class. You all know of the great socialist Marx...."
(Principle of Democracy, Lecture IV, (No italic in original)

It should be recalled that Dr. Sun did not lecture on his Three Principles during May, June and July. It has already been suggested that he made a close study of 'The Social Interpretation of History" during those three months. His first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood was delivered on August 3, 1924. Does Dr. Sun in this lecture reaffirm his pro-Marxian definition of the Principle of Livelihood? After so thorough a drilling, covering nearly a score of years during which his disciples had the benefit of being trained by their master himself in every shade of its meaning, Dr. Sun's opening words introducing his lecture on the Principle of Livelihood were not what might have been expected. His audience must have been amazed to hear Dr. Sun say:

"The subject of my lecture today is Min-sheng Chu I, the Principle of the People's Livelihood. Min-sheng is a worn phrase in China. We talk about Kou-shin min sheng, national welfare and the People's Livelihood, but I fear that we pay only lip service to these words and have not really sought to understand them. I cannot see that they have held much meaning for us. But if in this day of scientific knowledge we will bring the phrase into the

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realm of scientific discussion and study its social and economic implications, we shall find that it takes on an immeasurable significance. I propose today a definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood." (No italic in original)

Now, since Min-sheng "is a worn phrase in China", --worn because Dr. Sun had been explaining and defining its meaning for almost twenty years-- why did he find it necessary to tell his disciples "I propose today a definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood"? Does it not seem clear from Dr. Sun's own language that what he proposed to give "today" was in fact a new definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood? He had evidently arrived at the conclusion that his old definition, which had satisfied him for twenty years, was unscientific and therefore should be discarded. So he proposes "in this day of scientific knowledge, we will bring the phrase (The Principle of Livelihood) into the realm of scientific discussion."

What could have caused Dr. Sun to discard his old definition as unscientific and to have proposed "Today" a new definition? Was the new definition based upon the old Marxian ideology or did it constitute a repudiation of the old ideology? Is their any relation between Dr. Sun's new definition of the Principle of Livelihood and the conflict between his Left and Right disciples? Many scholars have made a study of these questions and the following is quoted from their conclusions:

Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago, in his work on "China in Revolution" says:

"The lectures on the first and the second principles were delivered between January 27 and April 26,1924; those on the third principle were given between August 3 and August 24. In the first two series the ideology, as well as the criticism of the great powers, presents the viewpoint of a follower of Marx; in the third series, however, a definite change of view is indicated. In point after point he cites Marx only to criticize the latter's arguments and conclusions, and to advocate in their stead the theories which he had somewhat gropingly been developing for several years and which he found carefully and precisely formulated by the American thinker in the volume mentioned. In paragraph after paragraph Dr. Sun either quoted, almost word for word, or paraphrased, the arguments which he had found in "The Social Interpretation of History". He now repudiated in reality several of his own earlier theiroes, without, however, directly calling attention to the fact, and rejected Marx's materialistic conception of history, the necessity for the class struggle, and the theory of surplus values, substituting therefore the system of thought which he had recently discovered in Dr. William's work....The conflict of theory to be traced between parts of

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the earlier and the later writings of Dr. Sun accounts in part for the split between his adherents which followed his death....From the viewpoint of the Russians and the significance of the spread of their Communistic doctrines in China, the Kuomintang leader died not a moment too soon; it would have been better had he passed from the scene at the end of April, 1924. There would have been fewer grounds for controversy among his followers." - Pages 88-89 (No italic in original)

Dr. James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University; Director of Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in his article "Sun Yat-sen and Maurice William", published in the March, 1932 issue of Political Science Quarterly, says:

"Although in his earlier writings there were passages which might be interpreted as socialist in the orthodox sense, and at the moment he sorely needed the practical help which the Soviets were offering, yet questions of expediency were boldly set aside in the framing of his gospel of social reform. The American critic of Karl Marx and not Marx himself furnished the text in which he shaped his own individual thinking and so set the course of the new China definitely away from Communism....Some of the early associates of Sun Yat-sen do not accept any such interpretation of his thinking. To some of them at least the protest against exploitation by capitalism, both foreign and native, means that class warfare must still be made on Marxian terms. The division therefore between the Left wing of the republican movement in the Kuomintang and the middle class leadership of the government in Nanking finds its doctrinal center in the interpretation of those pages of Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle which were based upon or quoted from Dr. William's book. The important question for both present-day China and for future history is the interpretation of these passages. What effect did Dr. William's book have upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mind and how much is the Chinese Republic to base its social philosophy upon these passages alone?....There are few problems in the political thinking of today more important or more compelling than this one....It would be a mistake to conceive of it merely in terms of personalities. Behind both Dr. Sun and Dr. William lay two conditioning forces, China and America; as the England of the Industrial Revolution lay behind the philosophy of Marx. Viewed from this angle, the acceptance of William's text in the "San Min Chu I" is itself a justification of his theory of the social interpretation of history. That theory discovers the clue to the movements of politics, not in a class warfare of producers against

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> exploiters, but in the dominant need of the whole social body, that is to say, of the mass of the consumers....In his denial that the proletariat must emancipate itself by overturning the capitalistic state, Dr. William was giving expression to the experience of America where the emancipation is taking place within the State itself. This was also the process which Dr. Sun envisaged for China, and so the principle of "Livelihood" was definitely substituted for that of socialism or communism, which had been loosely used by Dr. Sun as synonyms for his Third Principle before he had read Dr. William's book. Viewed in this light we have not merely the meeting of two minds but of two civilizations; the American and the Chinese.... It would seem that the time has come to recognize the mediating work of Dr. William which Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself recognized in the "San Min Chu I". How great the service he rendered, only history will show." (No italic in original)

Dr. Jeremiah W. Jenks, Research Professor of Government, New York University; Honorary Economic Adviser, Nationalist Government of China, in a lecture on "Why China Repudiated Bolshevism", delivered at New York University on February 6, 1929, says:

> "In the latter (Principle of Livelihood) part of his book, Sun seems no longer to believe in the class-struggle.... If the country had gone Communist, it could not have counted on any foreign help beside that of Russia....There was a long struggle between these forces, but apparrently the anti-Communists have triumphed, due practically entirely to the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been intellectually convinced by Dr. William's book." (No italic in original)

Dr. Arthur W. Hummel, Chief, Division of Chinese Literature, Library of Congress, writes:

> "It is astonishing to see how a book like your "Social Interpretation of History" could so radically alter the views of a powerful leader on another continent. This needs to be recorded in detail for historical if no other reasons."

Dr. J. J. L. Dyvendak, Professor of Chinese, Leydon University, Holland in a personal letter to me, said:

> "It is certainly necessary to make more widely known how much of his ideas on the Third Principle Dr. Sun derived from your book, which is decidedly anti-Marxian. That in spite of the constructive element in the doctrine of the Three Principles, the general impression, as left by the first two parts, is that they are chiefly destructive and that in the propaganda this feature has certainly been much emphasized. Dr. Sun left these two

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sides of his teaching unreconciled, thereby laying the germ for conflict within his own party. Seeing how great the hold is, which his name and his doctrine have on the Chinese people, it is the more desirable to bring out and emphasize the constructive element in his teaching, which may counteract some of the harm done by the other."
(No italic in original)

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President, Yenching University, Peiping, writes:

"It is certainly curious that an American should have turned the whole current of political thought for the man whose writings at present are the bible of the dominant political party of this country....This volume, Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism, ought to have wide circulation in China and I trust will lead to a Chinese translation....I should like to add my own admiration of the interpretation you have given in refutation of that of Karl Marx and my delight that this should have come to the notice of a man whose writings are virtually molding the political thought of this country at so critical a time....You are unquestionably rendering a timely service in carrying the original influence upon Dr. Sun to this extension of the inquiry into his change of attitude. You are also quite right in attributing the division among his followers, in large measure at least, to misunderstanding of what it was he stood for in relation to communism, and some alternative to the philosophy of economic determinism. I have no special suggestions to make regarding the manuscript. Your work has been so thorough, and your appreciation of the issue so remarkably sensitive for one living at such a distance from this country, that there is very little to add.

Mr. Grover Clark, Consultant on Far Eastern Affairs, writes:

"I have just finished going over rather carefully your "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" and find it of very extraordinary significance. The earlier suggestions as to the part which your "Social Interpretation of History" played in changing Sun's thinking--which I had from the material which you were good enough to show me last winter--are very much more than confirmed and you give the only really convincing explanation of the contradiction in the "San Min Chu I" which I have seen. My thought of the turn against Communism has been that it was in large part due to objection to the methods and attitude of the Russians in China at the time."

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"These I still think had a very great deal to do with the final break in 1927-but there seems to be no doubt that the change which your book brought in Sun's ideas paved the way for that break and very definitely gave the anti-Communists the possibility of justifying the break out of the mouth of the founder of the Kuomintang. That was a contribution which you, through your "Social Interpretation of History", made to the development of China - a contribution of far-reaching importance."

"Sun took the Marxian slant in his earlier Three Principles' lectures and yours in the later ones. It would be interesting to know how far back into his thinking the Marxian point of view had its roots. In any case, your "Social Interpretation of History" had and is having a great deal of influence." (No italic in original)

To Summarize: Interpretations of Dr. Sun's social philosophy have not proved helpful in promoting peace and unity in China. Left interpretations are acclaimed by Dr. Sun's Left disciples, but only embitter the Right. Right interpretations are acclaimed by Dr. Sun's Right disciples but only embitter the Left. These conflicting interpretations are directly responsible for recent civil wars.

Instead of concentrating upon interpretations, something constructive might possibly be achieved from an effort to determine the underlying causes for Left and Right interpretations of Dr. Sun's teaching. Such an investigation, I believe, would establish that for nearly twenty years Dr. Sun had consistently taught a Left, revolutionary version of his Principle of Livelihood. His earlier disciples were given ample opportunity throughout all those years to become thoroughly saturated with Dr. Sun's original version. But in the last months of his life Dr. Sun repudiated this version (August, 1924) and in its stead accepted the one presented in the "Social Interpretation of History" and which is based upon diametrically opposite principles- evolution through harmony of interests between capital and labor as against revolution through

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conflict of interests. The name, Principle of Livelihood, was all that Dr. Sun salvaged from the original version which he now discarded. Naturally, this made for confusion. The Left wing can justify a Left version since this was the version Dr. Sun had consistently taught for twenty years. The Right wing can justify its Right version on the ground that this was Dr. Sun's final mandate to his disciples. The publication of his conflicting versions in the same volume, the "San Min Chu I", made for more confusion. Although Dr. Sun's lectures were not published in book form until after his death, his opposing views, which he had no opportunity to reconcile, laid him open to the unjust charge of mental instability.

Had Dr. Sun died after completing his lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and before he had made a study of "The Social Interpretation of History," there would have been no basis for the present conflict over the correct interpretation of the Principle of Livelihood. His original Left interpretation which had served him for nearly twenty years would have remained unchanged. Thus there would have been no confusion leading to civil war between Left and Right disciples. We would have seen a united China, united on the basis of Dr. Sun's unrepudiated Left version of his Principle of Livelihood. A united Left China would have meant a sovietized China, perhaps united with Russia against the democratic nations and for the World Revolution.

On the other hand, if Dr. Sun had lived long enough to revise his Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and his earlier Left version of his Principle of Livelihood, to conform with

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his final views, this reconciliation in Sun's ideas could not have failed to bring about the reconciliation of his Left and Right disciples who aim to apply Sun's ideas. Such revision would have paved the way for a united, peaceful, China dedicated to evolutionary progress through the methods of democracy.

But Dr. Sun is dead. His principles remained unreconciled. Dozens of volumes have been written in an effort to interpret Sun's views. They have failed of their purpose. They failed because they did not present a complete and therefore a true picture of Sun Yat-sen. Some presented his Left and some presented his Right side. These volumes are just propaganda. They take sides. No statement giving only one side of Sun's opposing views can hope to reconcile the opposing groups. The tragic proof of the hopeless failure of such attempts lies in the fact that both sides prefer to fall back upon the method which, to them, seems far more convincing, the method of the bullet.

What does this situation teach? It indicates that nothing is to be gained by disregarding facts. Sun's writings are a public record. We should state all the facts and seek to reconcile the opposing views in Sun's writings. Only by this means can we hope to reconcile the differences between the Left and Right wings and bring peace to distracted China. Dr. Sun's prestige could not suffer through a presentation of the unvarnished truth. On the contrary, a close study of his writings would enhance his prestige as an open-minded student, ready at all times to change his views as new facts indicated the need for revision. This rare trait in Dr. Sun is fully recognized and evaluated in Part I of "San Yat-sen Versus Communism".

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It is the existing confusion regarding his thinking which has caused some writers to ridicule Dr. Sun as a thinker and has led one writer to disparage his "San Min Chu I" as "social and political chop suey". Such unkind thrusts are not without their influence, and world opinion of Dr. Sun and of those who follow Dr. Sun is largely shaped by these superficial writings. But when the truth becomes more generally known, it will not redound to the credit of these writers. The public will learn that Dr. Sun's pro-Marxian views as presented in his lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and his anti-Marxian views as presented three months later in his lectures on the Principle of Livelihood, were assembled and published in the same volume only after his death. It is plain that the appearance of his conflicting views in the same volume is a matter over which Sun had no control and should not therefore be held against him. To cite the conflicting views in the "San Min Chu I" in justification of the charge that Dr. Sun was "mentally unstable" and inclined to "leap from philosophy to philosophy", is to betray an easy readiness to defame the character of a man who is no longer here to face his detractors.

Unquestionably, Dr. Sun did change from a pro-Marxian to an anti-Marxian position. But is that proof of "mental instability and intellectual immaturity"? Quite the contrary! Openly to renounce a philosophy he had accepted for over twenty years and to publicly proclaim his renunciation at a time when the success of his Party was wholly dependent upon Russian aid, called for qualities of greatness. Dr. Sun's courageous act established his place among the great men of our times.

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Other leaders had espoused Marxian for equally as many years and their experience too forced them ultimately to reject it as a philosophy and as a program. In France, Briand was an outstanding example. In England, MacDonald and Snowden have recently rejected the class struggle philosophy. In America, there are any number of high-minded men and women who before the World War held the pro-Marxian position originally advocated by Sun Yat-sen.

Would it be fair to accuse Briand, MacDonald, and Snowden of "mental instability and intellectual immaturity" because they had repudiated Marxism? Yet none of these had to take the risks Dr. Sun was compelled to take when he rejected Marxism.

Dr. Sun's repudiation of his earlier identification of his Principle of Livelihood with Marxian Socialism is not of itself responsible for the confusion regarding his position. It was his untimely death less than eight months following his repudiation which led to the general confusion. There can be no confusion regarding the position of Briand or MacDonald because both had been given an opportunity to explain their reasons for rejecting Marxism. But had these former Marxians died before explaining their position, the confusion which now centers about Sun's final views would also have arisen regarding their final views. Having repudiated their former Marxian position, it is clear that no amount of interpreting could possibly reconcile Briand and MacDonald's former pro-Marxian with their final, anti-Marxian views.

Dr. Sun's rejection of Marxism shortly before his death gave rise to civil war between his own followers. This unhappy result is due, as we have seen, to the fact that his earlier disciples

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remain true to his earlier revolutionary views, while his later disciples support his final views.

For four years I have been a silent but heart-sick observer of the tragic results flowing from this anomalous situation. Every year I saw renewed civil wars and the useless sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives. The Chinese Finance Minister reported in a public statement that eighty-seven percent of the income of the Nationalist Government had to be appropriated for military purposes because of civil wars. I read the harrowing details of the frightful flood which was one of the greatest disasters in all history, bringing suffering and death to untold millions. Every observer is aware that this ghastly toll was directly traceable to expenditures for civil wars, leaving no funds for the proper upkeep of dykes. Stunned by these cruel events, I came to realize that I must share the responsibility for every drop of blood shed through honest misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers.

By virtue of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in embracing the views presented in my "Social Interpretation of History" in the last months of his life, I have come to feel that it is mandatory that I discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun and to the Chinese people by leaving nothing undone which could aid in realizing Dr. Sun's dream of a united peaceful China to the attainment of which he gladly laid down his life.

I confidently predict that when the reason for the present misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers shall have been revealed and the misunderstanding removed, China will present a concrete demonstration of her extraordinary vitality and capacity

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for unity which will confound her enemies and arouse the admiration of her friends. Such a demonstration of latent power will be China's conclusive answer to those who contend that "for her own good China should be dismembered or controlled by foreign powers because her leaders are incapable of unity and her people lack the capacity for self-government."

The facts I have made an effort to present regarding the cause of recent Chinese civil wars are not a hidden secret. On the contrary, they have been cited from public records as freely available to Japanese as they are to any other students. Why Japan preferred to ignore them only Japan can explain. While she has shown little disposition to study the cause of Chinese civil wars she has, on the other hand, shown every disposition to place upon China all the blame for the present dispute. "I think our colleagues of the League should ask themselves" says Mr. Matsuoka, "if the peace machinery is quite perfect when it fails to provide a remedy for the encroachments and attacks we have suffered for many years as a result of the warfare of rival Chinese military leaders....If the peace machinery had been capable of dealing with the internal situation of China there would have been no incident of the 18th of September and none of its distressing consequences."

Thus does Mr. Matsuoka proclaim to the world Japan's utter helplessness in the ways of peace. For a peaceful "solution of the internal situation of China" Japan needs the aid of the "peace machinery"; but when it came to creating the incident of the 18th of September and its distressing consequences," Japan felt that her own machinery was "quite perfect" and therefore did not need to ask for outside aid!

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Should Japan ultimately decide to trace the history of China's recent civil wars she will discover that instead of being due to the selfish interests of rival war lords, as Japan would have the world believe, China's civil wars have but one explanation--they are the direct result of an extraordinary sense of loyalty to a departed leader--Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The literature of the Left and Right factions makes this very clear. Each faction stands by its own interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. The Chinese people love peace, but they regard disloyalty to their departed leader too high a price to pay for peace. Japan will have to study China if she really wants to aid in bringing permanent peace to that distracted country.

I have made an effort to comply with your request for a statement upon the cause and cure of Chinese civil wars. Lack of time made difficult the adequate preparation the importance of the subject demands. I venture the hope, however, that the data provided in this statement may prove useful to the League of Nations in her search for a permanent solution to the Sino-Japanese problem.

The Anti-Civil War League recently formed in Shanghai suggests itself as a practical medium through which the League of Nations might aid China in solving her civil war problem. An advisory Commission cooperating with the local Anti-Civil War League should prove an effective and practical agency to maintain contact with the situation.

Let me emphasize once again that the only permanent solution of the Sino-Japanese problem lies through a peaceful solution

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of China's civil wars. This in turn can result only from a clear understanding of their underlying cause. These convictions suggest the conclusion that behind the immediate problem confronting the League of Nations --the Sino-Japanese conflict -- is the fundamental problem of Chinese civil wars. A practical and permanent solution to these civil wars lies not in force but in the promotion of unity and peace through understanding. Can the League promote unity through understanding? The answer to this question is the key both to the future of the League of Nations and to international peace.

I should be happy to learn that America had been privileged to facilitate the quest for this key.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Maurice William

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

March 16, 1932

Mme. Sun Ching-ling
Shanghai, China

Dear Madame Sun:

The enclosed personal statement of my intellectual relations to your late and revered husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has been forwarded to a number of leaders of both factions of the Kuomintang. I feel, however, that I owe you a further word of explanation of my position.

If it be true that China's civil wars are due to conflicting interpretations of Dr. Sun's teachings, then those who are in a position to throw light upon this tragic situation are vested with a grave responsibility. By virtue of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in embracing the views presented in my Social Interpretation of History in the last months of his life, I have come to feel that it is mandatory that I discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun and to the Chinese people by leaving nothing undone which could aid in realizing Dr. Sun's dream of a united, peaceful China to the attainment of which he gladly laid down his life.

But Dr. Sun's loyal followers are not living in peace. On the contrary, they are at war, and not because either side is opposed to Dr. Sun's principles, but because of an honest disagreement as to the correct interpretation of his principles. How to remove the basis for this disagreement is the great problem which all who are loyal to Dr. Sun's memory must bend their energies to solve.

You, who were closest to Dr. Sun and therefore his immediate and logical successor, and I must share a sacred responsibility to Dr. Sun's memory. Our combined effort may largely determine whether a united, peaceful China, striving to promote the well-being of the Chinese masses, is to emerge ultimately as a fitting memorial to Dr. Sun's sacrifices in behalf of the Chinese nation. Every drop of blood innocently shed through misunderstanding is our common concern and combined responsibility. Dr. Sun's mandate precludes our taking anything for granted. Human life is too precious to be gambled with. Loyalty to Dr. Sun calls for a re-examination of his writings in order to make certain that from a commendable zeal to carry out his wishes, we do not place ourselves actually in opposition to his final instructions.

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Mme. Sun

May I therefore appeal to you, who have given such remarkable proof of your devotion to Dr. Sun's ideals, to re-examine Dr. Sun's final revision of his Principle of Livelihood in order to determine and, let us hope, remove the cause of the misunderstanding which has been responsible for the tragic civil wars between Dr. Sun's loyal followers?

The next page of China's history must be largely of your writing. Is it to be the history of conflict and blood or of unity, peace, and a prosperous China, fulfilling the dream of your illustrious husband? I know how deeply you feel your responsibility and I want you to believe that I stand prepared to render what aid lies within my power to enable China to reach the heights envisaged for her by your departed husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. I should be glad to have you suggest in what concrete form I could best discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun, to you, and to the Chinese nation.

With deep respect, I am,

Cordially yours,

MW:H (signed) Maurice William
Enc.

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March 16, 1932

This statement was addressed to all leaders
of both factions in the Kuomintang

It is my pleasure to forward to you, under separate cover, a copy of my new study, entitled "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations".

This volume is the result of four years intensive research. It is my hope that this work may prove helpful in two directions: (1) promote better understanding and good-will between China and America; (2) throw some light upon the possible causes underlying the strife between Left and Right factions which has stood in the way of peace and unity in China.

An effort to determine the extent of the relationship between my earlier work, "The Social Interpretation of History" and Dr. Sun's "Principle of Livelihood" called for a searching examination not only of all Dr. Sun's writings available in English, but also of the conflicting interpretations of his writings as found in the literature of the Left and Right groups. This investigation revealed a devotion and loyalty to a departed leader probably without parallel in history. The striking feature of the conflict is that neither side would be outdone by the other in whole-hearted loyalty to Dr. Sun. Each believes its own to be the only correct interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. Each seems ready to sacrifice unity, peace, home, life itself, from a sense of loyalty to a revered leader. This remarkable situation convinced me that foreign criticism of the leaders of the Left and Right Wings of the Kuomintang was unjust and based on ignorance. It became clear that civil wars in China are due not to conflicting interests of selfish war lords, but quite the contrary; they are directly traceable to self-sacrificing loyalty to a departed leader.

It is plain that were Dr. Sun alive today, there could be no civil war in China arising from conflicting interpretations of his teachings. I thus became aware that Dr. Sun's untimely passing has placed a heavy responsibility upon those who had a share in the formulation of his final views. He accepted the philosophy he had discovered in my "Social Interpretation of History" only eight months before his death. His sudden passing deprived him of an opportunity to reconcile his earlier with his final views. This resulted in his leaving two opposing schools of disciples; a Left school made up of those who accept the Left views held by Dr. Sun prior to August 1, 1924, and a Right school made up of those who accept the Right views held by Dr. Sun after August 1, 1924. Both are equally loyal to the teachings of their late leader.

For four years I have been a silent but heart-sick observer of the tragic results flowing from this anomalous situation. Every year I saw renewed civil wars and useless sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives. The Chinese Finance Minister reported in a public statement that eighty-seven percent of the income of the Nationalist Government had to be appropriated for military purposes because of civil wars. I read the harrowing details of the frightful flood which was one of the

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greatest disasters in all history, bringing suffering and death to untold millions. Every observer is aware that this ghastly toll was directly traceable to expenditures for civil wars, leaving no funds for the proper upkeep of dikes. Stunned by these cruel events, I came to realize that I must share the responsibility for every drop of blood shed through honest misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers.

Today, I am compelled to witness Japan's military attack upon a weakened China on the pretext that the opposing leaders are self-seeking militarists incapable of loyalty to country and with no desire to bring peace and unity to China. I am availing myself of every opportunity to refute Japan's unjust charges against China's leaders. In this connection, I quote the following from my reply to a personal letter received from Secretary of State Stimson:

> "If Japan would trace the history of China's recent civil wars, she would discover that instead of being due to the selfish interests of rival war lords, as Japan would have the world believe, China's civil wars have but one explanation--they are the direct result of an extraordinary sense of loyalty to a departed leader--Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The literature of the Left and Right factions in China makes this very clear. Each faction stands by its own interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. The Chinese people love peace, but they regard disloyalty to their departed leader too high a price to pay for peace. Japan will have to study China if she really wants to aid in bringing permanent peace to that distracted country."

China's critics are promoting an active propaganda aiming to turn world opinion against China. They point to civil wars which form so conspicuous a part of recent Chinese history and argue that these civil wars prove their contention that the Chinese people are incapable of unity and that the conflicting interests of self-seeking war lords is the sole explanation for constant civil wars in China.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to counteract this mischievous propaganda by presenting the facts as the Chinese understand them. The truth cannot fail to heighten the American people's respect for the spiritual qualities of the Chinese people, qualities which put loyalty above all personal and other considerations. A few of us in America are making an effort to call attention to and emphasize the realities as we understand them, for we recognize the value to both countries of a better understanding by the American people of China's actual difficulties.and problems.

I confidently predict that when the basis for the present misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers shall have been removed, China will present a concrete demonstration of her extraordinary vitality and capacity for unity, which will confound her enemies and arouse the admiration of her friends. Such a demonstration of latent power will be China's conclusive answer to those who contend that "for her own good, China should be dismembered or controlled by foreign powers because her leaders are incapable of unity and her people lack the capacity for self-government."

In the last analysis, therefore, unity based on understanding is

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China's fundamental problem. Should my recent study, "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations", prove of some help in promoting unity through understanding, I shall feel that I had, in some slight measure, proved worthy of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in accepting the philosophy presented in "The Social Interpretation of History", and, to some degree, had discharged the responsibility which fell to me as a result of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's untimely death.

If you can suggest any further service which I might render that would hasten the realization of Dr. Sun's dream of a united, peaceful, prosperous China, I should regard it a privilege to strive in so constructive, so inspiring a cause.

With fraternal greetings,

Cordially yours,

MW:H

(signed) Maurice William

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COPY

SUN FO
10 Rue Moliere
Shanghai, China

May 10, 1932

Dr. Maurice William,
130 West 57th Street,
New York City.

Dear Doctor William:

Mr. Sun has received your new study of Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism which he is reading with great interest. He has asked me to write you an acknowledgment and also to convey his thanks and appreciations for your interest and valuable efforts in attempting to bring about better understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. China is passing through a very critical period of its life history and she needs the understanding and sympathetic interest of the West especially of America.

In closing Mr. Sun wishes you success in your work and hope that your book will serve its intended purpose.

Yours truly,

(signed) Yui Ming
Secretary

NOTE: Mr. Sun Fo is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's only son; he has held many important positions in the Chinese Nationalist Government.

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383 Route de Sieyes

Shanghai

May 23rd, 1932

Mr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City

My dear Mr. William:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of March 15 as well as your thoughtfulness in sending me your new book entitled "Sun Yat-sen versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations", which I have read with unusual interest and admiration.

You may rest assured that I appreciated this work, since it is such an extensive study of the man with whom I had the privilege of associating my life work besides being related to him by marriage and of the ideals and principles which Humanity must uphold if it is to perpetuate!

I can not give you better advice than to ask you to continue your good work by writing and speaking on the very things which you enunciated in your admirable book so that the American public may have a more sympathetic understanding of my country and our leaders and pave the way for international co-operation and world peace!

Wishing you every success, I am

Sincerely yours,

(signed) H.H.Kung

NOTE: Dr. Kung is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's brother-in-law, Mrs. Kung being a sister of Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Kung had held important positions in the Chinese Government.

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18 Rue Ch. Galland

Geneva,

March 29, 1932

Dear Dr. William:

I beg to thank you for sending me your new book "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" and for the explanatory letter which accompanies it. I am sure your new work will help to bring about a better understanding between China and the U.S.A.

With assurances of my esteem.

Yours very truly,

(signed) W.W.Yen

Dr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City
U.S.A.

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1 Cleveland St.
Cambridge, Mass.
August 22, 1932

Dr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City

My dear Dr. William:

Being a faithful adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen for years, I have found a great comfort in reading your recently published book, "Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism". Many of my comrades, who are now in China, have early complained to me that Dr. Sun's principles are not very consistent, and that his Principle of Livelihood cannot lead to a permanent solution of the economic problems of the State. Some of them have already tacitly bolted the Kuomintang and intended to join the Communist Party, apparently with the belief that Marxism or Leninism is more "valid" than the Principle of Livelihood. The publication of your book is indeed very timely, and I will invite their attention to it. The value of your book convinces me that a translation of it into Chinese is not only servicable but also indispensable. I wonder if anyone has already undertaken the work. If not, I would like very much to do it, either alone or in collaboration with others, when your (or the publisher's?)authorization is granted.

As to the link between your earlier book and Dr. Sun's third principle, I wish to inform you that had the avoidable error not been made in the translation of your name from Chinese into English, Miss Mary van Kleeck's work would have been much more facilitated. The fact is that when Dr. Sun mentioned your name during his lectures, he did not say "Williams" but "Mr. William". The word (Chinese character) which sounds like "s", means "Mister" (or Mrs.), used when referring to a third person. This may be made a little clearer to you by the fact that the stenographer used the word (Chinese character), which has the same sound as (Chinese character), to denote "x" of "Marx". This frivolous point may not be worthy of your attention, but I doubt very much that Dr. Sun could make the mistake of saying"Williams" for "William" whose book had become his good companion. My conclusion in this matter is based on the Chinese text of "San Min Chu I".

I have some interesting observations on the significance of the Principle of Livelihood as well as on its connection with your "Social Interpretation of History", but I do not think I am warranted to make them here, because I am afraid that this letter itself will waste more of your valuable time than it deserves. Of course, I shall be very glad to write you more if you are patient enough to read my poor writing.

Before closing, may I briefly introduce myself to you? I am a graduate student in the Department of Government at Harvard. I came to this country in the summer of 1930 immediately after my graduation from a Chinese college in Tientsin, and am now interested in the constitutional system of your country.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Shu-chin Tsui

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FOREMOST CHINESE STRONGLY ENDORSE NEW ANTI-CIVIL WAR MOVEMENT

T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, Nationalist Government of China:

"Today, the Government, convinced that unification of China by force is neither possible nor desirable, seeks to solve local disputes by the exercise of the moral sanctions aided by the growing force of public opinion. The League Against Civil Wars which is composed of the sound elements of the nation is gaining rapidly in power and strength and will soon become an important factor in outlawing the use of military force to solve political problems." The China Weekly Review, November 12, 1932.

Dr. Hu Shih, From Address Delivered at the Inaugural Meeting of the Peiping Branch of the National Anti-Civil War League:

"If the Anti-Civil War League had been organized ten years earlier, China probably would not have been in such a sorry state as she is today. Lord Lytton calls the League of Nations the life-line of modern civilization. The Anti-Civil War League may be regarded as the life-line of modern China." The North China Hearld, November 9, 1932.

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From
THE LITERARY DIGEST (October 8, 1932)

CHINA'S ANTI-CIVIL-WAR LEAGUE

Bitter reproaches against the Chinese for their continual outbreaks of civil war will no longer be heard if China's National Anti-Civil-War League proves efficient.*

Five Hundred delegates representing 401 public bodies and 1,075 individuals of every walk of life lately sat at the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on a hot autumn day, to try to find a solution and ban civil war forever.*

These delegates came together of their own free will, "to use the ambiguous phrase," remarks the Shanghai China Critic, and they formed an association called the Anti-Civil-War League. It was in April that the idea was first announced by some one, and it was well received,*apparently, for two or three months later the League was formally inaugurated.

This weekly is convinced that the swift growth of the Anti-Civil-War movement into a permanent organization evidences the anti-war spirit of the Chinese public, and it proceeds:

"It is twenty-one years since the establishment of the Republic. But there has not been a single year in which some sort of warfare has not taken place.* For twenty-one years people For twenty-one years people suffered. But twenty-one years passed without producing any one daring enough to sound "the call to arms."

"There may have been journalists, authors, and cynics who made it a profession of theirs to denounce war; but a definite anti-war organization is the first of its kind.*

"Hence, cordial wishes for the League's success! Mr. Wu Ting-chang, chairman of the conference, in his address before the meeting sounded the key-note of the League. He declared that the League would devote itself exclusively to the Anti-Civil-War movement, and would not carry on any other movement or engage in any other activities.

"This is a note of relief. Far too often there have been organizations tinged with political affiliations. Let this be an independent league, voicing the opinions and ideas of the people, people as individuals and not as biased groups. Mr. Wu also stated that while the existence of an anti-war league was unnecessary in a country where conditions remain stable, the work of such a league was urgently required in China.* However, it is tentatively fixt by the League's draft regulations that the League shall function for five years only."

It is hoped, The China Critic explains, that by the end of that time conditions will be so stable in China, the existence

* Italics not in the original.

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of such an organization will be no longer needed. It is pointed out further that altho the league is designated an Anti-Civil-War League, its object is "to stop war without war, in other words, to prevent fighting through the application of peaceful measures." We read then:

"Here is the League of Nations in miniature form. However, while the idea of the League of Nations is worthy to be copied, let not the inconvenience and cumbersomeness of its functioning exist also in the miniature league. Dissension is something that can not be tolerated in an antidissension organization.

"As was said above, the Anti-Civil-War League is formed by individuals. May these individuals unite into a strong body so as to bring pressure to bear on those persons responsible for any civil war. Just how this League is to function remains to be seen."

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From China Press, August 27th, 1932.

Anti-Civil War Conference Begins Two-Day Session Here (Shanghai).

400 Delegates From All Parts of Nation to Discuss Means for Ridding China of Civil War.

"Charged with the important mission of eliminating further civil wars in the country, more than four hundred delegates, representing some two hundred public organizations throughout the nation, will meet today and tomorrow for a national anti-civil war conference to be held at the local Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

Much significance is being attached to the conference. It is the first time a national group has ever convened for the purpose of studying means for ridding China of internecine strife.

Movement Began Here (Shanghai).

The anti-civil war movement which has been an undercurrent in the popular mind, precipitated this spring when the four leading organizations in the country, namely, the National Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, the Shanghai Bankers Association, the Shanghai Native Bankers Association, took the lead by issuing a circular telegram calling the attention of the nation to the futility of civil war and urging the civil and military leaders to unite for a common purpose of internal peace.

Shortly after the inception of the organization this spring, the movement was brought to face an acid test in the naval conflict between General Chen Chi-tang and Admiral Chen Chak in Kwontung. The movement lost no time in taking up the challenge and sent General Chu Ching-lai, Mr. Cheng Li-ting, and Mr. Cha Liang-chao to Canton to persuade the opposing military leaders to adopt pacific measures in settling the dispute. The fact that the conflict was later settled short of serious armed clash was generally attributed to the efforts of the three peace envoys.

Will Take Pledge

This morning, the first item on the agenda of the conference will be the formal establishment of a National Anti-Civil war Federation, when all delegates will be required to make a solemn oath pledging their whole-hearted devotion and support to the peace movement....

More than one hundred proposals have been received so far at the office of the federation. One of the important items of business to be transacted this morning will be the foundation of a special committee to study and classify the proposals before their presentation at the mass meeting for general discussion....Throughout this after-

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noon and tomorrow the attention of the delegates will be engaged in discussing proposals by the special committee. These resolutions will be incorporated in a manifesto to be issued as a formal conclusion of the conference.

In order to have a permanent secretariat to look after the progress of the movement when the mass meeting of the Anti-Civil War Federation is not in session, there will be appointed a standing executive committee which will have its office in Shanghai.

'How to stop war without war, will be emphasized in the general discussion', declared Mr. K. H. Ling, secretary-general of the National Bankers Association. Mr. Ling expressed his regret that the conference is only to sit for two days, which he considered too short a period for matters of such great importance as the dimination of civil wars in the country."

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WHO'S WHO, 1931 (P. 2892)

Shotwell, James Thomson, B.A., Ph.D., L.L.D.; Commander of the Order of the Crown of Belgium; Commander of the Order of Saint Savior, Greece; Order of St. Sava III, Serbia; Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Professor of History in Columbia University in the City of New York since 1908:

Born 6th of August 1874; son of John B. Shotwell of Strathroy, Ontario, Canada, and Anna Thomson;

Married 1901, Margaret, daughter of Albert Harvey, M.D., of Wyoming, Ontario, Canada; two daughters.

Educ.; Strathroy Collegiate Institute; Toronto and Columbia Universities. Fellow of Columbia University 1899-1900, Lecturer in History, 1900-02; Instructor 1902-5; Adjunct-Professor, 1905-1908; L.L.D. Western University 1922, University of Toronto, 1926; Dartmouth College, 1926; McGill, 1927; Columbia, 1929.

Chairman, National Board for Historical Service, Washington, 1917; Chief of History Division, American Commission to negotiate Peace, Paris, 1918-19; American representative, Organizing Committee of International Labour Conference, London, 1919; American representative Union Academique International, 1919-1923; Member of the Council of the American Historical Association; Member of the Organizing Committee of the Institute of International Affairs; Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York; Associate Member, Belgian Academy of Science, Letters and Fine Arts; (American) President of the International Conference of Historical Sciences, Brussels, 1923;

Lecturer to the Nobel Institute, Christiania, 1923; Editor, Carnegie Endowment Economic and Social History of the War (150 vols.) since 1919.

Publications; In addition to articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Religious Revolution of Today; Intelligence and Politics; An Introduction to the History of History; The See of Peter; War as an Instrument of National Policy, 1929;

Contributor to the following volumes; The League of Nations Starts-- an outline by its Organizers; Labor as an International Problem; History of the Peace Conference (Institute of International Affairs), etc.;

Editor, Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies (5 vols.), 1915-21.

Address: Columbia University, New York City

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SUN YAT-SEN AND MAURICE WILLIAM

By
James T. Shotwell

Reprinted From Political Science Quarterly
Vol. XLVII, No. 1, March, 1932

New York
Published By The
Academy Of Political Science

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUN YAT-SEN AND MAURICE WILLIAM

The originality in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings, the unique peculiarity which marked them out from those of any other nation or revolutionary movement, lay in the fact that he combined into a single doctrine three principles which do not easily harmonize and yet represent the three dominant forces in the modern world. These are nationalism, democracy and a third principle which he termed "Livelihood". This is apparently not a good translation of the Chinese term, but comes nearest to it. The first two principles present no difficulties to the Western reader; but the third of the three interlocking principles of the Chinese revolution has no exact parallel in Western thinking and therefore no single term exactly covers it. In Sun Yat-sen's early writings he frequently identified it with socialism, because that was the nearest approach among Western nations to the social reform movement which he had in mind, namely a thoroughgoing protest against exploitation of the poor by the rich, of labor by capital. Now the chief contribution of Sun Yat-sen lay not in the analysis of each of these principles but in the synthesis which grouped them into a single doctrine. The Western nations had linked the first two together from the days of the American or the French revolution, but socialism came into the world as a revolt against nationalism. It was also a suspicious rival of nationalist democracy. The task of harmonizing these historically allied principles of nationalism and democracy with a principle apparently hostile to them and welding them all into a single trilogy was Sun Yat-sen's contribution to political thought of the modern world as well as the thought of China. It was, however, forced upon Sun Yat-sen by the situation of China itself. The building of factories and railways was as much a part of his program of the modernization of the country as the erection of a republican form of government or the recovery of full territorial rights from foreign nations. Indeed in his program drawn up just after the war, economics seems to prevail over political problems. He had the vision of China rapidly taking the leadership of the world of science and industry, avoiding the blunderings and mistakes from which Western nations have suffered in the course of their evolution. He looked for China, with its vastness of resources and of man-power, to become supreme in the modern age, leaving Europe ultimately far behind. It was a vast and magnificent faith, but it called for a solution of China's internal, social and economic problems along with its assertion of nationalist independence of the rest of the world. Now this internal question of social justice had been stated in the West in terms of socialistic doctrines which were not only contrary to the historical development of China, but were singularly foreign to Chinese ways of thinking. On the one hand, therefore, he had to fit in Karl Marx with Bismarck and Lincoln; on the other hand he had to face squarely the issue of communism in China.

This fundamental problem came to a head in the final statement of Dr. Sun's philosophy which has become the secular bible of the Chinese Republic, the Three Principles, or San Min Chu I, a volume compiled from notes of lectures delivered in the year 1924. Now, strange as it may seem, the solution which Dr. Sun accepted and incorporated in his text in the section on the third principle, that of "Livelihood", was phrased by an American thinker whose work remains almost entirely unknown in his own country and whose contribution to China itself has

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

so far been recognized only in a single reference of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a one-line footnote by the editor of Dr. Sun's text. Of all the strange chapters in the history of East and West there can be none stranger than this, that the founder of the Chinese republic and the spiritual leader of the new China found in the writing of an unknown American author so clear a statement of the solution of the hardest problem in his political philosophy that he made the American formulation his own. The book in question is The Social Interpretation of History and its author Dr. Maurice William of New York City. It was written just after the close of the world war and was known to few outside of the socialist circles in which Dr. William then moved and to which the book was addressed. One can hardly imagine anything less likely to appeal to the post-war reading public in America than an essay by a socialist criticizing Karl Marx's theory of the class war. Even inside the Socialist Party the author wrote as a mere private in the ranks, "a Jimmy Higgins" as he humorously called himself, who was, however, already a veteran in the socialist service, having been an active socialist for twenty-five years. Under the best of conditions his criticism of orthodox socialist theory would have little interest for the American public, but there was still less chance for it in the first years following the war when the socialist movement in America was at its lowest ebb and the shattered structure of the capitalist world seemed to have begun an almost miraculous reconstruction. In any case the essay remained obscure and relatively unknown even to students of the social sciences.

Somehow or other, however, it reached Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the critical year 1924 just as he was formulating his Three Principles in the lectures at Shanghai; and, with a quickness of perception which marks great leadership, Dr. Sun saw at once in the arguments of Dr. William a confirmation of his own innate tendencies with reference to socialism, for which he had hitherto found no statement in terms of logical and systematic reasoning. Dr. William supplied him with a conception of socialism which renounced the class war as historically and economically false, and in the text of the San Min Chu I whole passages of Dr. William's book were embodied en bloc. Dr. Sun himself gave credit to Dr. William for his use of his material although it was so embedded in the structure of Dr. Sun's text that it is only by a careful comparison of the two that one can realize the full extent of citation. A foot-note in the first edition of the English translation gave the reference wrongly to Mr. Whiting Williams. In the second edition, however, Mr. L. T. Chen, the editor, has corrected both text and footnote to give the credit to Dr. Maurice William, and is authority for the statement that Dr. Sun kept Dr. William's volume constantly with him from the time when he became acquainted with it. How the American treatise came into Dr. Sun's hands has not yet been explained; but he was a thorough scholar, well read in economics and politics and had a library richly stocked with the literature of these subjects. However it came about, the reading of The Social Interpretation of History by Dr. Sun Yat-sen may yet turn out to have been one of the most important single incidents in the history of Modern Asia, for the consequences were immediate and far-reaching and have only just begun to show their full extent in the orientation of China.

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This may seem like an extravagant statement and yet it seems amply justified by a study of the facts in the case. It would be equally true, whether the American treatise converted Sun Yat-sen from Marxian orthodox socialism to a denial of its fundamental principle, as some have claimed, or whether, as seems to me the case, it furnished him with a justification for his own doubts as to the theory of the class war, and offered him a better statement than he had yet worked out of the application of his own philosophy. In either case the fact remains that in August 1924 Dr. Sun gave the third of his Three Principles, that which deals with social reform, in the terms set forth by Dr. William. To catch the full importance of this we must recall that the first phase of the Chinese republican movement had, through no fault of its own, become deeply involved with Russia communism. The help which Dr. Sun had vainly sought from the capitalist nations came freely and efficiently from Moscow. It required more than an ordinary act of courage for the leader of the revolution at a time that was still critical to come out frankly and fearlessly in contradiction to the militant philosophy of the one section of the Western world which was ready to support whole-heartedly the movement for Chinese emancipation from Western exploitation. Nevertheless this was just what Dr. Sun did in the shaping of the doctrine for republican China. Although in his earlier writings there were passages which might be interpreted as socialist in the orthodox sense, and at the moment he sorely needed the practical help which the Soviets were offering, yet questions of expediency were boldly set aside in the framing of his gospel of social reform. The American critic of Karl Marx and not Marx himself furnished the text in which he shaped his own individual thinking and so set the course of the new China definitely away from communism.

This at least is the way it looks to anyone who studies both the situation in China in 1924 and the text of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. But the situation as it exists today is much more complicated than this historic incident, for some of the early associates of Sun Yat-sen do not accept any such interpretation of his thinking. To some of them at least the protest against exploitation by capitalism, both foreign and native, means that class warfare must still be made on Marxian terms. The division therefore between the left wing of the republican movement in the Kuomintang and the middle class leadership of the government in Nanking finds its doctrinal center in the interpretation of these few pages of Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle which were based upon or quoted from Dr. William's book. The important question for both present-day China and for future history is the interpretation of these few passages. What effect did Dr. William's book have upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mind and how much is the Chinese Republic to base its social philosophy upon these passages along? To attempt to answer these questions is to venture greatly, for the writing of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the record of his speeches have become almost like sacred books within a canon which impedes the acceptance of critical analysis. In addition, an oral tradition like that of early Christianity has already grown up among the disciples of the lost leader, in the light of which the texts are interpreted. Under these circumstances it is certainly taking risks for a mere outsider, familiar only with translations, to attempt the task of higher criticism. But while the

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Western student of Sun Yat-sen may fail to appreciate the bearings of Dr. Sun's philosophy upon Chinese habits of thought, he may on the other hand detect more readily the different strains of thought which are drawn from Western sources. There are few problems in the political thinking of today more important or more compelling than this one. It would be a mistake to conceive of it merely in terms of personalities. Behind both Dr. Sun and Dr. William lay two conditioning forces, China and America, as the England of the Industrial Revolution lay behind the philosophy of Marx. Viewed from this angle, the acceptance of William's text in the San Min Chu I is itself a justification of his theory of the social interpretation of history. That theory discovers the clue to the movements of politics, not in a class warfare of producers against exploiters, but in the dominant needs of the whole social body, that is to say, of the mass of the consumers. Socialism, in Dr. William's eyes, is not the emancipation of a single class but the achievement of social justice for all. The democratic state, therefore, is the proper home for social evolution; for it is by evolution and not by revolution that the old injustices will be got rid of. The process, as he sees it, is fundamentally political and cannot be left to economic forces alone. The consumers must unite politically and if they do, since they form the whole body politic, we shall "witness not a class struggle, not a civic war, nor one portion of the people against the other but a common united movement composed of every useful member of society using its organized power through the State against a class--the profit-making class" (page 195 of the Social Interpretation of History).

Now here was a statement, clear-cut and forceful, of a philosophy of social welfare as thoroughgoing and far-reaching as orthodox socialism but avoiding the revolutionary attack upon the state which played so large a part in Karl Marx's scheme. In his denial that the proletariat must emancipate itself by overturning the capitalistic state, Dr. William was giving expression to the experience of America, where the emancipation is taking place within the state itself. This was also the process which Dr. Sun envisaged for China, and so the principle of "Livelihood" was definitely substituted for that of socialism or communism, which had been loosely used by Dr. Sun as synonyms for his Third Principle before he had read Dr. William's book. Viewed in this light we have not merely the meeting of two minds but of two civilizations: the American and the Chinese. In both cases the consumer rather than the producer is the determining element. This, of course, would be news to many in America, where the capitalistic argument for protective tariffs has so completely subordinated the interests of the consumer to the producer. Nevertheless the fact remains that Dr. William's philosophy was another facet of that fundamental principle of which Mr. Henry Ford has been the most outstanding apostle in recent days, namely, that the motive force in society is the pressure exerted by the mass of those who would make their own the products of nature and industry, that is to say, the great consuming public. Whereas Karl Marx, writing from the environment of the new factories in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, concentrated his attention upon the workers whom the machines were displacing and made production the center of his philosophy, Dr. William turns the tables the other way round and concentrates upon the consumer. It is easy to see how such a reversion of the Karl Marx theory would appeal to

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a Chinese social reformer, for his main problem was to improve the lot of the mass of the Chinese people, a people upon the whole so pitiably poor and so continually exploited. The industrial workers, whose fate stirred the pity and indignation of Karl Marx, form only a very small fraction of the vast population of China. Even if, as Dr. Sun proposed, the industrial process should substantially repeat that of the West, nevertheless the basis of the social problem remained in his eyes the betterment of the great mass of the consumers.

Stated in these terms "socialism" can be made to harmonize with nationalism and democracy. The exploiter against whom one should be especially on guard is the same as nationalism recognized for its enemy, that is, the foreign capitalist, exploiting Chinese, whether laborers or consumers. Nationalism, therefore, is not a conservative doctrine opposed to the radical tendencies of socialism, as in the West, but fits in with Dr. William's brand of socialism which puts the accent on achieving justice for the whole social body instead of for the industrial worker alone through a class warfare.

Unfortunately this last phase of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thinking is not readily intelligible to those who think in the doctrinaire formulae of either nationalism or socialism. It is a comprehensive, unifying conception which finally stands out like a modern restatement of the old teaching of Confucius that mankind is one great family and the state itself a sort of family organization on a smaller scale. In such a conception there is no real place for the Marxian theory of a class war; but it can make its own the formulation of those socialist ideals of economic justice for the common man which have an equal appeal in America and China. It would seem that the time has come to recognize the mediating work of Dr. William, which Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself recognized in the San Min Chu I. How great the service which he rendered, only history will show.

James T. Shotwell

Columbia University

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

July 6th, 1932

Professor James T. Shotwell,
Carnegie Foundation for International Peace,
405 West 117th St.,
New York City

Dear Doctor Shotwell:

Three replies have been received from Chinese leaders. I enclose copies. You will note from the cordial tone of these letters that our fears of arousing controversy were quite groundless. This is true at any rate of those who were closest to Dr. Sun.

In my letter addressed to Chinese leaders, I voiced the hope that my new volume might prove helpful in two directions: (1) promote a better understanding between China and America: (2) throw some light upon the possible cause of the conflict between Dr. Sun's loyal followers and suggest a cure.

Mr. Sun Fo's expressions of appreciation of my "valuable efforts in attempting to bring about better understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings" indicate: (1) a recognition of my intellectual relationship to his father; (2) that the understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings constitute a major problem for China; (3) that Dr. Sun's disciples have failed to understand and correctly interpret Sun Yat-sen's teachings; (4) that he welcomes my aid in promoting a better understanding and interpretation of his father's teaching. Mr. Sun goes on to wish me success in my work and expresses the hope that my "book will serve its intended purpose."

Dr. Kung is even more cordial and bids me "to continue your good work by writing and speaking on the very things which you enunciated in your admirable book so that the American public may have a more sympathetic understanding of my country and our leaders and pave the way for international co-operation and world peace".

When I recall that for Dr. Sun's intimates, the facts revealed in my volume partake of the nature of "a bolt from the clear", and involve the acceptance of a stranger in their house, you will understand why I am filled with a sense of the deepest gratitude for so generous a welcome and why I should be possessed of a feeling of overwhelming responsibility.

Now that this Sino-American intellectual relationship has been so graciously acknowledged, should not this advantageous situation be made to count in the interest of both countries? "I claim that friendship is the greatest trade asset a nation can have," said Captain Robert Dollar. His ripe experience adds weight to his opinion. "All things being equal, price and quality acceptable, business goes to our friends", Mr. Wallace M. Alexander told the Nineteenth Convention of

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the National Foreign Trade Council at Honolulu last May. "The attitude of our government (continued Mr. Alexander), "the extent to which it assumes a spirit of friendship and cooperation will play a part, the importance of which cannot be overestimated, in assisting China to achieve the political stability so imperative to the expansion of international trade. I am sure you will agree with me when I say that the first and most important step in this direction is the creation of good-will."

And there can be no good-will without understanding. China has rejected Russian in favor of American principles as the basis for her political, social, and economic program. Could she have given more concrete evidence of her desire for American good-will? Can it honestly be said that America has given China the recognition and encouragement her momentous actions deserves?

Since China has chosen an American program, America alone is qualified to understand China's efforts to apply it. Sympathetic co-operation at this time would yield its reward in good-will which could not fail to take the concrete form so essential to the restoration of American prosperity.

This is not to be construed as a desire to exclude other countries from receiving their share of China's trade. International trade is the basis for international prosperity and to deprive a country of foreign markets would mean to deprive ourselves of a prosperous customer.

But European nations seem more alive to the possibilities of the Chinese market, than America. Germany is reported to have sent a trade delegation to investigate commercial and industrial possibilities in China. According to the New York Times, the delegation's object is "to increase trade between Germany and China and to investigate the possibility of German financial assistance and Sino German co-operation in the industrial development of China."

Great Britain is also taking steps to expand her trade with China. An editorial comment in the New York Times of May 29th, 1932, draws attention to "the formation by some of Great Britain's leading engineering firms of a joint enterprise for the promotion of Chinese industrial development. The associated companies represent a capitalization of £30,000,000. They are proceeding in the belief that the much-harassed country is winning through to stability and will soon be an active customer for railroads, bridges, power stations, harbor improvements, and factories."

But what is America doing to capitalize her good-will in China? I have been assured by those who know the methods of these countries that were I a Britisher or a German, either of those countries would have been quick to capitalize China's acceptance of a British or German social, political, and economic program. They would have sent, by this time, a good-will committee to co-operate with China in the practical application of that program.

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Prof. Shotwell-3

What a peaceful, united China could mean for America is perhaps best illustrated by the sale last year of 15,000,000 bushels of wheat to China.

The New York Times of September 7, 1931 reported: "WHEAT FOR CHINA AIDS NORTHWEST BUSINESS" * -- mills, railroads and shipping lines at the port cities will benefit. Huge shipments of flour and grain to China...are major factors in what appears to be an increase in business activity in the Pacific Northwest. Flour mills, labor and railroads will receive $3,000,000 for handling the export of 15,000,000 bushels of Farm Board wheat to China, half of it ground into 1,800,000 barrels of flour by Tacoma Seattle and Portland mills. The total milling cost of the flour is estimated at an excess of $1,250,000 most of it going to mill labor, much of which has been employed only on part time. With the usual domestic and other export trade handled by the mills, full-time operation of plants is expected for six months or more. The cost of moving the wheat from warehouse to mill and from mill to shipside, with other incidental expenses connected with loading, is estimated at $250,000 or more. The fourth item of benefit that will result from the movement of this vast volume of grain to the Orient is seen in the freight paid to the railroads to bring in new grain to take the place of the old wheat shipped across the Pacific. On a conservative basis, $1,500,000 in railroad costs will be involved in transportation from interior points to tidewater." Plainly, America has an important stake in the peace and stability of China.

re have been no indications that would lead one to believe that ica is fully alive to her possibilities. And yet, Mr. Grew, our sador to Japan, has recently stated: "Few if any problems conc ne American people more than the problem of the Far East."

ld that this were so! The grave domestic problems which toda America's chief concern are largely the penalty we must pay fo ack of concern in Far East problems. There can be no perm t solution to our domestic problems without a permanent solu n to Far Eastern as well as to European problems.

I am aware of course that there is nothing new in all this for you. Nevertheless, I am glad to get these thoughts "off my chest". Perhaps we ought to draw the attention of some business executives such as Mr. James A. Farrell, Chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, or Mr. Wallace Alexander to this Sino-American intellectual relationship. They might be glad to follow up its possibilities in the interest of both countries.

With kindest personal regards,

Cordially yours,

(signed) Maurice William

* Italics not in the original.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 28 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From Chinese Legation
Jan. 28, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1933
Department of State

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED JANUARY 27, 1933

It was reported by telegram from Peiping that on January 22 Commander Kun Chi-chow of the Fourth Route of the Chinese Volunteer Forces led an army of over a thousand troops in a fierce attack on Chaoyang. This attack was resisted by the Japanese but after a severe battle lasting for twenty-four hours, Commander Kun recaptured Chaogang at dawn of January 23. The casualties on the Japanese side were heavy, the Chinese having taken a toll of over thirty. The Chinese had also captured a large quantity of military supplies and provisions. The casualties on the Chinese side were estimated at about ten. The forces of Commander Kun are now proceeding toward Ichow and Chinchow.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 27, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

I-26

Mr. Castle
Mr. Secretary

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 28 1933
NOTED

This method of presenting a political Question is becoming more & more outrageous: quantity sans quality.

SKH

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
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Japan Chinese Legation
Jan. 26, 1933
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A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 26, 1933

The City of Kailu was the object of another heavy Japanese aerial bombardment on January 23. At 1:00 a. m. of that day, five Japanese bombing planes arrived and began bombing the city. This was followed by four other planes which arrived at 2:00 p. m. A total of from seventy to eighty bombs were dropped, inflicting tremendous damages upon the property and taking a heavy toll of soldiers and civilians.

A detailed investigation showed that the damages done consist of the following items:

(1) The premises of the Yu-Lung-Chuan concern, wrecking more than twenty houses, killing five members of the concern, wounding two, killing more than ten beasts of burden, and destroying a substantial part of the merchandise.

(2) The premises of the Yung-Ching-Chuan concern, wrecking five houses, killing five members of the concern, and one horse.

(3) Part of the headquarters of the Tan forces, killing three soldiers and wounding seven.

(4) Part of the premises of the local office of the Chung Kuo Hsing Yeh Bank, wrecking sixteen of its vaults.

(5) Part of the headquarters of the Committee for the reinforcement of Volunteer Forces, killing one corporal.

Together with these perished a total of from fifty to sixty civilians and their homes. Incendiary bombs caused fires

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From Chinese Legation

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A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 28, 1933

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A telegram from Chengteh (Jehol City) reported an engagement between the Chinese and the Japanese forces in Jehol. At 2:00 p. m. on January 27, twelve Japanese armored cars, protected by ten aeroplanes, launched an attack upon the front lines of the Chinese defense at Wang-Chia-Yen and Fong-Tao-Tai-Ying-Tze and on the right flank at Poh-Luh and Hwo-Shao-Miao. The Chinese forces under General Li Hai-ching, which constituted the right flank, retreated to Tah-Tuan, Chia-Tah-Ying-Tze and their vicinity. But the Ninth Brigade, which constituted the front defense line, stood up against this attack, repulsing the Japanese and killing more than ten soldiers. Due to the unsuccessful attack on the front line, the right flank of the Japanese forces also retreated. General Li's troops are now reoccupying their original positions.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 28, 1933

JAN 31 1933

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(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY) NO. 12

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE SPECIAL PRESS CONFERENCE, TUESDAY, JAN. 17, 1933, AT 6:00 P.M.

Because of stories which appeared in the newspapers this morning to the effect that the present Administration and President-elect Roosevelt were in complete agreement as regards the Far Eastern question and to the effect that the Secretary of State had recently reiterated our position in instructions to certain of our diplomatic missions abroad, the Secretary held this press conference PURELY FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION TO ANY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

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In the first place, the Secretary observed that there had been an immense amount of inevitable speculation which always comes whenever we keep silent as well as when we act. Mr. Stimson then said that he had told the correspondents at various times why he was keeping silent on the Lytton report which is a matter for the League. The Secretary did not want to run any risk of making the members of the League think that we were prodding them unnecessarily, a step which might have produced irritation. Nor did he want to give any occasion to the spokesman of the Foreign Office in Tokyo further to use his imagination. Furthermore, our position on the Manchurian question has been made so clear that it has not seemed necessary to say anything further concerning it. During the last few days we have done nothing in connection with the Manchurian question except to make clear that we have not varied an inch from the position which we took last Spring in regard to the difficulties between China and Japan. Mr. Stimson said that it had been necessary for him to repeat our stand whenever a new Ambassador came in, as they inevitably enquired regarding it. We have not made any promises or representations as to what the new administration will do except to say that we do not expect any change. This has been done through diplomatic channels only. The President-elect's statement today rather confirms the Secretary's impression that Mr. Roosevelt views this problem in the same light in which we have seen it.

Mr. Stimson continued by saying that he wished to make clear that any suggestions or inferences made by us as to what the League should do might cause a certain amount of trouble. In the first place, the Lytton Commission was a commission appointed by the League, and its report was made to the League, and it would not be proper therefore for us to suggest to the League what they should do with that report. Of course the correspondents do not have to be told that we would not be sorry to see the League reach the same conclusion that we have on such a good basis as the Lytton report. We have not made any secret here that we felt that the report was admirable and that the facts contained in it coincided with what our own people have reported to us during the past eighteen months. While there is this agreement, we have not said so because we did not desire to lead them on with such a statement.

Speaking legally or technically, the occupation of Shanhaikwan, or rather the announced intention of the Japanese to consolidate Jehol with the rest of Manchuria, does not raise

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any new situation because a great many people have claimed that Jehol was a part of Manchuria. If something should happen south of the Great Wall, however, a great many problems for everybody might arise, as the operations would then be wholly outside of Manchuria. British interests in the area around Tientsin and Peiping are much larger than those of any other nation, but a great many nations, including the United States, have interests in that area. Furthermore, soldiers of several powers are in that area under treaty which came after the Boxer Rebellion. Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy now have troops in that area. Mr. Stimson here said that he wanted the correspondents to understand that whatever we have said through diplomatic channels related solely to the reiteration of our stand, which everybody ought to know by this time. A great many people, however, have taken the passage of time as an excuse to make new enquiries for the purpose of creating a new story, when no new story exists.

The Secretary said that the correspondents were undoubtedly familiar with our interests in that part of the world. One is the preservation of the "Open Door" policy, which involves our commercial policy as well as those of other countries. That dates back before the time of John Hay, although his name is attached to it very deservedly because he crystallized it and got the other nations to agree with it. That policy is embodied in the Nine Power Treaty which was made some twenty-five years after John Hay had obtained agreement to the principle. Our other interest is the preservation of the treaties for the maintenance of peace and order which have come up since the Great War. One of these treaties, the Kellogg Pact, is of vital interest to us.

A correspondent here said that Geneva despatches published this morning said that the communications reiterating our stand had contained the word that this stood not only for the present Administration but also for the incoming one. The Secretary, in reply, said that such was probably their inference from what he had said. The correspondent then said that he had noticed from the Secretary's remarks that the foreign envoys in Washington had been told that he did not expect a change in our Far Eastern policy. Mr. Stimson replied to the effect that when he had reiterated our position through diplomatic channels he had said that our position had not changed and that he did not expect it would be changed. The correspondent then asked if this idea was contained in the instructions to our diplomatic missions. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. Asked then if he, in speaking of our position, had gone beyond the restatement of our non-recognition policy, the Secretary said that the non-recognition policy was only a fraction of the whole question. That policy was enunciated in our note of January 7, 1932, again in the letter to Senator Borah and again in the Secretary's speech of August 8, 1932.

A correspondent here asked if our policy remained as it was set forth in the communication to the Secretary General of the League on October 9, 1931, in which we said that we stood ready to reinforce action by the League. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said that the policy set forth in that communication still stands and that it had been repeated when necessary, but always reserving independence in judgment and always through diplomatic channels. Asked regarding our attitude toward the proposed conciliation commission, the Secre-

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tary said that we had not taken a position regarding it because we had not been invited to participate in any such commission. A correspondent here said that Count Uchida is reported to have sent instructions to the Japanese Delegation at Geneva to oppose the inclusion of non-members of the League in the conciliation commission. The correspondent continued by saying that while this action by Japan had been anticipated for some time, it is appearing in the afternoon newspapers of today. Mr. Stimson replied to the effect that he was not surprised at this action because he could perfectly well understand the position of a League member, particularly one whose conduct is under question, toward an enquiry which originated in the League and which the country concerned might desire to have confined to the League. The inclusion of non-members would constitute a different commission which would not be a commission of the League. Such action by Japan or by any other nation is perfectly understandable, and there is nothing whatever astonishing about it. A correspondent here said that it was his understanding that the constitution of a conciliation commission would necessarily require the consent of both parties to the dispute. The Secretary replied by saying that ordinarily that was so. A correspondent here observed that although the Secretary had said that he had merely restated our policy, this restatement, coming at this time, has raised all sorts of speculation. The correspondent continued by saying that it appeared to him that if the Committee of the League should not take a strong stand, the United States would exert an influence in a nice way to encourage them to take such a stand. In reply, the Secretary said that this idea reminded him of the story of a gentleman who was greatly admired by all, who used to have an office at 22nd Street and 4th Avenue, New York, when he was editor of the OUTLOOK. This gentleman used to say "If I come down in the center elevator of this building the press at once unanimously reports that it is a sign of my natural arrogant nature. If, on the other hand, I go down the hall and take the elevator at the side, they say unanimously that it is positive proof of my natural furtive disposition." Mr. Stimson then said that in this matter the United States is likely to be treated in the same way. This policy has been repeated because so many people have said that we had changed because we had not said anything during recent months. Now, that we have said something they will probably say that it is something great and new. Asked if this reiteration of our policy had been conveyed to any places other than London, Paris and Geneva, the Secretary replied in the negative and added that he had no doubt that our officials in other places would also get it.

In concluding the conference, Mr. Stimson told the correspondents that he did not care for himself but that he would say to his good friends, as he has always done before, that he hoped they would treat the matter in a constructive way which would help our country and would not in any way cause trouble.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 2 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI + MID

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated February 2, 1933

Rec'd 12:20 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 2 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

105, February 2, 9 a. m.

793.94

Following from Consul General Mukden: February 1, 4 p. m. According to confidential information believed trustworthy 19 troop trains will move from Chinchow to Suichung and Shanhaikwan February 2nd or 3rd.

All indications point to Jehol drive starting within a few days when military are expected to issue an official statement.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/HS 793.94/5850

FILED
FEB 8 - 1933

0251

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 2 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated February 2, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

On February 1 the Consul General at Mukden reported as follows: Nineteen troop trains will move to Suichung and Shanhaikwan from Chinchow about February second or third according to information received in confidence and considered reliable.

A drive on Jehol is anticipated within a few days when it is expected an official statement is to be issued by the military authorities.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 3, 1933.

~~WRL~~
~~SES~~
~~EHD:~~
~~MMT:~~
SKH

The Hague's despatch No. 574 of January 20, 1933, encloses confidentially a copy of an outline of a plan for the solution of the Manchuria situation prepared by Dr. de Kat Angelino for the Lytton Commission, to which it was submitted on January 2. The plan is to reconstruct China by international communications with special stress on railways guarded by international troops and the making of roads. He would make the return of Manchuria to China dependent on Chinese reconstruction, making the Manchuria question a part of the Chinese problem as a whole. Japan might agree, as the return to China of authority over Manchuria would depend on the progress of China, while Chinese leaders would be provided with a powerful stimulus to keep the peace and cooperate energetically with the League.

FDS
LES:CLS

De Kat Angelino's views as quoted in the dispatch & expressed in his memorandums are very interesting. Well worth careful study. EHD

I agree but have some doubts.

0253

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

V - 30

How about sending a carbon to London (Sir Cumming?). Also have him have Attaturk send it ——— + C. bring back to Dyt. ?

SKH

0254

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 574

The Hague, Netherlands,
January 20, 1933.

SUBJECT: THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE AND THE LYTTON COMMISSION'S REPORT.

PM RECD DEPT OF STATE FEB - 1 33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUL 7 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/HS 793.94/5851

CONFIDENTIAL

793.94 note
793.94 Commission

File (EPN) Copy in FE
Copy sent to Hugh Cumming
Am. Delegation
London
June 3, 1933

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 2 - 1933 Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

793.94 Commission/171

With reference to my despatch No. 322, of April 2, 1932, and to my despatch No. 561, of December 30, 1932, I have the honor to transmit herewith a confidential copy of an outline of a plan for the reconstruction of China by means of international cooperation and assistance and for dealing with the present impasse in the Sino-Japanese dispute regarding Manchuria.

793.94/5740

I have obtained this document from Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino...

FILED JUN 12 1933

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

de Kat Angelino, who prepared it for the Lytton Commission, to which it was submitted on the second instant.

It will be observed that Dr. de Kat Angelino considers an early solution of this problem absolutely necessary for the peace of the world. He expresses the opinion that "the interdependence of China's unification and Manchuria's reintegration as Chinese territory would provide the most powerful stimulus to cause China's leaders to keep peace and to cooperate energetically with the League." He adds: "The Japanese delegation could be approached and sounded out regarding a solution of the Manchurian question as a part of the Chinese problem as a whole. In case such a solution is found to be acceptable in principle to Japan, the Chinese might then be approached in the last place."

Dr. de Kat Angelino was invited last March by Lord Lytton to join the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Sino-Japanese dispute, chiefly as an expert counselor on the political phases of the investigation.

In an interview which I had with Dr. de Kat Angelino yesterday he stated that after having traveled for about six weeks with the Commission in Manchuria he had proceeded to Peking for the purpose of making preparatory studies from documents collected in Manchuria on the matter in dispute. Later on he accompanied the Commission to Geneva. In our conversation Dr. de Kat Angelino...

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Angelino referred to Japan's contention that the Sino-Japanese dispute is in reality due only to the chaotic conditions prevailing in China and that consequently any effort to solve the difficulty by various measures concerning Manchuria is simply dodging the issue, as it leaves China herself too much out of the picture. "I may tell you", he said, "that some of the Japanese delegates at Geneva admitted to me that the reconstruction of China as suggested in the Lytton Report was a fundamental idea, but they were not convinced that there was any serious intention to really reconstruct China, inasmuch as no concrete plan had ever been proposed."

With regard to Japan's action, Dr. de Kat Angelino said: "As a member of the League and a signatory to the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty Japan is in the wrong a hundred per cent; but I must add that the provocation had made the situation almost unbearable, for instance the boycott, the persecutions of the Koreans and the Japanese in Manchuria, and the violation of treaty rights.

"My opinion therefore is that a purely legalistic attitude on the part of the League at this juncture would be unwise. As I see it there is only one way out and that is to deal with the Manchurian problem not as an independent, isolated problem but as a part of the whole Chinese problem, including such questions as extraterritoriality, the status of foreigners, concessions and settlements, and the domestic problems of debts, civil war,

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and Communism.

"The United States would have to play the leading role in this reconstruction. China cannot restore law and order without international assistance with executive power back of it.

"Although I have been in close touch with developments in China for years, I was terrified on my recent visit at the spread of Communism in the country.

"In the event that conciliation fails at Geneva China may throw herself into the arms of Russia, and I do not consider Communism and revolution precluded even in Japan.

"I have done my utmost to impress the seriousness of the situation on the Commission and have stated frankly to them that they have not presented a concrete plan of reconstruction as they ought to do.

"I am satisfied that Japan's only purpose was to overthrow an ultrahostile government in Manchuria and to replace it with a friendly one. However, from my investigation I firmly believe that the Japanese blew up the railway and that they — not the Chinese — made the attack. Lord Lytton is of the same opinion. The French member, General Claudel, did not agree, holding that there had not been a preconcerted plan but that events had forced the Japanese to act as they did."

Respectfully yours,

Laurits S. Swenson.

File No. 710
Enclosure:
Copy of plan.
In quintuplicate
LSS:EKD

4 Carbon Copies
Received
JM
1 copy detached H/S
for note
2/2/33.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy.

ENCLOSURE NO: TO DESPATCH NO: 574

Confidential copy of an outline of a plan for the solution of the Manchurian question and the reconstruction of China by means of international cooperation and assistance, prepared by Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino for the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Sino-Japanese Dispute and handed to Mr. Swenson by the author.

American Legation,
The Hague, Netherlands,
January 20, 1933.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I. The discouraging attitude taken by the Japanese Government towards the attempts which so far have been made in the interest of conciliation is apparently to be ascribed to the fact that these attempts, necessarily, had to concentrate upon the military and political action taken by Japan, since September 18th 1931, in Manchuria. For, although it was this action that has brought the Sino-Japanese dispute to the official notice of the League, the dispute itself, nevertheless, according to Japanese opinion ought to be seen exclusively against the background of the continuous international friction and domestic unrest accompanying political and social transition in China. The Japanese feel that the Manchurian issue has arisen out of the unsatisfactory conditions existing all over China, and since they believe that an improvement of conditions in China is out of the question they insist on a solution of the Manchurian issue consisting in a permanent separation of Manchuria from China. The only way to cause the Japanese to change this attitude would,

therefore, ...

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therefore, be to convince them of the possibility of improvement and reconstruction in China.

It is, in fact, the Japanese view that the Sino-Japanese dispute, like the very grave Sino-British dispute of 1926-27, the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1929 and the perpetual state of tension between China and foreign Powers, is, fundamentally, the outcome of China's "revolutionary diplomacy", which, in its turn, results from an unfortunate discrepancy which exists, in China, between the nationalist aspiration to abolish the so-called unequal treaties and recover lost sovereign rights, and the national capacity to establish a stable Government capable of undertaking the pacification and reconstruction of the country and thus winning the confidence of the foreign Powers.

Taking into account the vastness of China's territory, the lack of adequate communications, and the fact that China has lost, with the imperial dynasty, the focal point of her millennia-old political and cultural unity, it is almost superfluous to remark that China will not be able to execute her superhuman task by her own unaided efforts. Outside assistance is necessary. If such assistance had been forthcoming before the Boxer-uprising or, later, after the establishment of the Republic, China's civil wars would probably never have occurred and the buying power of a peaceful and prosperous China might well have averted or, at least, have mitigated the present economic world crisis. If, on the other hand, international support is again delayed, the discrepancy between nationalist aspirations

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and national capacity will persist, and all the domestic and international evils inherent in the present situation will be aggravated. War with and over China, in that case, assuredly cannot be avoided.

In a word, now, that the Manchurian affair which is only one important aspect of the Chinese problem, has brought the situation in China to the notice of the League with more emphasis than ever before, the moment has come to consider whether the reconstruction of China has not become the foremost Far-Eastern problem to be solved with the help of the League. It would be possible, to mention only one instance, with such help, to end civil war in China within a short period and with comparatively modest means, thereby greatly diminishing the communist danger, and in addition, enabling the Treaty Powers to meet China's nationalist aspirations in the course of the following period of reconstruction.

II. Japan's difficulties in China and, especially, in Manchuria, may be classed in the same category as those of other Powers having exceptional rights or important interests in China. Japan decided to solve her Manchurian problem by force. But, according to Japanese opinion, her action and uncompromising attitude thereafter, are mainly to be attributed to her despair of China's capacity to establish a stable Government able and willing to respect the treaties and to protect foreign life and interests. Attempts at conciliation which place the reintegration of Manchuria as part of China in the foreground whereas the

unification, ...

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unification, pacification and reconstruction of China are mentioned only in the second or in the last place are, therefore, not likely to meet the Japanese stern demand that realities must be considered. If conciliation is still possible at all, recourse must be had to a concrete plan combining China's reconstruction, under the auspices of the League, and Manchuria's re-integration as Chinese territory, as complementary parts of one program which have to be executed simultaneously. In other words, Manchuria's re-integration becomes part of the reconstruction of China, and the solution of the Manchurian problem becomes part of the solution of the Chinese problem.

In order to solve the Manchurian question, this plan of reconstruction, would have to distinguish between the immediate re-affirmation of China's sovereignty over Manchuria and the gradual re-instatement of the actual exercise of China's authority in that territory. As the plan of reconstruction would cover all China, including Manchuria and Jehol, it would by its very scope and from the very outset amount, in itself, to a re-affirmation of China's sovereignty over Manchuria. It would, therefore, meet China's principal demand concerning the non-recognition of Manchoukuo and the re-affirmation of her sovereign rights over the lost territory. It would, thus, uphold the principles of the League and also of the Paris Pact as interpreted according to the recent Stimson doctrine.

It would, then, possess the advantages of the plan embodied in the Ten Principles laid down in the ninth

chapter .....

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chapter of the Lytton Report. In providing for simultaneous and interdependent action both in China and in Manchuria in a more definite way than is the case, according to Japanese opinion, in the Lytton Report, it would moreover establish a more explicit causal connection between the action considered under the tenth and under the preceding Principles of that Report. An apparent gap, which has been made the main target of the Japanese objections to the solution as suggested in those principles, would thereby be bridged.

To restate the main idea of the plan, as far as it concerns the Manchurian affair: China's reconstruction and the transfer of actual authority in Manchuria to China must be interdependent and proceed simultaneously, whereas the re-affirmation of China's sovereignty over Manchuria will be immediate. An immediate transfer of actual authority is impossible and is, on the part of China, not really expected. A delay of such transfer may appear to be of a rather exceptional nature, but is fully motivated in the light of the exceptional conditions prevailing in China. The plan starts, however, from the principle of China's sovereignty over Manchuria and possesses features which allow of actual transfer of authority to China in the near future and in an ever increasing degree. The plan has, for China, the additional advantage of not pre-judging the question as to the status ultimately to be given to Manchuria. In the case of China's reconstruction meeting with reasonable success, there is no single reason why the very high degree of autonomy as suggested in the Lytton Report should be given to Manchuria. .....

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Manchuria. In that event, the Manchurian provinces can very well be administered like all other ordinary Chinese provinces. This point will probably carry much weight with the Chinese Government, once its sovereignty over Manchuria is assured in principle, because Manchuria's status is a very grave question to China as it may constitute a precedent. It may be expected, however, that the principal reason, for China, to agree to this plan, will be seen in the prospect of immediate re-affirmation by all Powers, including Japan, of her sovereignty over Manchuria, and in the possibility to save, with international assistance, the country from complete perdition which is threatening.

III. As far as Japan is concerned, her principal objection would be met by a plan which recognises the interdependence of China's pacification and reconstruction, and the re-establishment of China's actual authority in Manchuria. Japan claims to have been instrumental in delivering the Manchurian population out of the hands of militarist despotism and to have a moral obligation to prevent the return of the earlier oppressive administration. Under the plan actual authority will revert to China according as reconstruction in China proceeds, so that Japan will be able to co-operate. The souplesse of the plan which does not pre-judge time or procedure of the transformation of Manchoukuo into ordinary Chinese provinces or into a more or less autonomous territory, would enable her to take an honourable part, in Manchuria,

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in the co-operation with China under the auspices of the League. Most of the reforms undertaken or considered by Manchoukuo can be retained under the plan and be continued, but future action will be different in this respect that it will be taken on behalf of the reconstruction of an integral part of China, not of Manchoukuo. Japan's national susceptibilities will be least hurt by such a plan and this is, at present, of the greatest importance with a view to making a plan of conciliation acceptable to Japanese public opinion. In accepting to co-operate with the League in the execution of the plan of reconstruction of China, including Manchuria, Japan would by implication recognise in principle the sovereignty of China over Manchuria. She would also implicitly agree to assist in the gradual transformation of the present Manchoukuo regime in accordance with the execution of the plan of China's reconstruction. Nothing more must or need be demanded of Japan. Agreement on the part of Japan will thereby be much facilitated, as incriminative statements regarding past actions, verdicts as to her guilt and formal resolutions as to the non-recognition of Manchoukuo will not be needed any longer in view of the scope and nature of the plan of reconstruction.

Should Japan, however, still refuse to co-operate, the League would plainly have exhausted all efforts. Japan would forfeit the sympathy of those who so far have shared some of her reasonable objections to the solutions suggested. Action taken by the League would, then, find the unreserved moral

support .....

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support of the world; it is needless to remark that this would be a great advantage.

IV. The plan of reconstruction aims at the pacification, unification and reconstruction of China. It must enable the National Government to become in reality the central authority obeyed by all military and civil authorities in the provinces and districts. In theory, such a plan should cover all the manifold and very complicated matters involved in the situation existing today in China. In practice, however, none such elaborate plan is necessary. Many problems will look after themselves if only the right start in the reconstruction of China is made. In this connection, the remark must be made that lack of communications is the most important cause of the difficulty confronting the central Government in its attempts to make its authority respected in the more distant provinces. Experience in other countries, and especially in Colonial territories, has proved also that the establishment of an adequate system of communications is the key to the solution of the problem of national reconstruction.

The League has already, in directing its principal efforts in assisting China towards the extension and improvement of China's system of communications, struck upon the right method. Under a plan of reconstruction worthy of the name much more will no doubt have to be done in this respect. The rehabilitation of existing railways and the building of some additional trunk lines will, for instance, have to be embodied in such a plan. But, a much more important part in China's system of communications will have to be played by the ordinary road

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which, now-a-days, is almost completely lacking in China. In this respect, the means to provide China with an adequate road-system are ready to hand. China possesses an immense reservoir of labour which, after the agricultural season is over, remains almost idle. Taxation in labour, wholly or partly taking the place of taxation in money, as is customary in economically backward parts of Colonial territories, would constitute the proper means to cover China in a few years, and with little cost, with a network of roads which would open up the whole country and could, at the same time, function as feeders of the existing railways and the new trunk lines yet to be built. Such extension of communications would transform the face of the country. Domestic production and commerce which, now-a-days, in large parts of China are almost limited within the narrow spheres of self-contained villages or sub-districts, would increase by leaps and bounds, and so would China's foreign trade. It is, moreover, as already stated above, by means of communications only that the unification of China can be accomplished, and that a Central Government can make its authority generally respected. However, an efficient organisation of this taxation in labour is necessary to avoid arbitrariness, hardship, wastage, and ill-directed road-building. As the League has already valuable experience in this respect, it may be trusted to be able to provide adequate direction and to improve gradually the organisation of systematic road-building.

An international loan, to be floated under the auspices of the League and with the guarantees of individual Governments, should furthermore be considered in order to improve

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the existing railways which have greatly deteriorated as a result of civil war, and to build some additional trunk lines. The loan agreement would have to contain stipulations regarding League control and supervision of expenditure under the loan and regarding adequate protection of the system of communications by a special corps of railway and road guards trained and controlled by officers appointed by and responsible to the League. The Chinese Customs Service and the Postal and Gabelle Services set up by it have shown that efficient organisations by a handful of men in this way is possible. The Peking Gendarmerie provides another instance. The railways and important highways would thus become truly national communications and would, at one stroke, have been placed outside the reach of the more or less independent local military commanders. In the most important provinces of China and, gradually, in all provinces, civil war would then become impossible.

The Central Government would simultaneously acquire definite controlling power over most or all provincial administrations and could set up a truly national Civil Service system. Disbandment of provincial armies, contemplated for many years, would then have become possible. Soldiers could be settled as agriculturists in sparsely populated parts of China's north-western provinces, Chinese Turkestan and Manchuria. With the disappearance of civil war, China's progress would be completely assured. Wealth would accumulate rapidly and reconstruction could soon be left to the Chinese nation itself. The difficulty consists in starting China on the right track. Once started she will soon

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be able to look after herself.

V. It must be evident from the foregoing remarks that League assistance in a plan to establish an extensive, efficient, and truly national system of communications in China will accomplish far more towards an all-round reconstruction of China than might appear at first sight. The beneficient effects thereof would, in fact, be felt in the remotest corners of the country, and would be noticeable in every field of China's national life. It will be evident also that gigantic loans are not needed to achieve this end. League organisation, control and supervision will be much more needed than mere financial assistance. The latter, however, is also necessary during the initial stage of the execution of the plan of reconstruction, while conversion of some loans bearing exceptionally high interest might perhaps be considered also. Financial assistance is, moreover, from a psychological point of view necessary because it would be a definite and concrete action convincing China of the sincere intentions of other nations to stand by her in her hour of distress, and proving to her the beneficial results of her confidence in the League and in international co-operation. Some concrete action is necessary to allay suspicions both in Japan and in China that reconstruction is only an empty phrase, and an international loan would be such an action. It would, moreover, avert the danger of China's intelligentsia turning, in despair, towards an alliance with communism as the last means to save the country.

The financial means to be placed at China's disposal would have to be spent largely in the purchase of materials

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to be furnished by the industry of the creditor countries. They would thus be instrumental in assisting these industries to a certain extent. A more important advantage of financial assistance in the building up of China's system of communications would consist in the rehabilitation of China's greatly deteriorated railways, while the protection thereof by League controlled guards would at once restore their earning power. Payments of interest and capital of railway loans which are long overdue could be resumed at once, and huge investments which appear now to be irretrievably lost could be recovered. China's credit would thereby be gradually restored. The floating of additional loans might thereupon become possible again without having recourse to special guarantees. China's buying power could, after some years of domestic peace and constructive endeavour, become a most important factor to all industrial countries of the world.

It is, however, not necessary to mention these and other results of the reconstruction of China, which can be easily imagined. The object of the foregoing remarks is rather to show why and in what form League assistance must be considered without delay, and what should be the starting point of a plan of reconstruction which, apart from its possible significance with regard to the solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute, is absolutely necessary in the interest of the Peace of the world.

VI. If Japan should agree to co-operate in the execution of such a plan covering all China, including Manchuria, the dispute would have been solved in principle because it would imply Japan's re-affirmation of China's sovereignty over Manchuria. .....

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Manchuria. China's acceptance would mean the end of the boycott in China and of guerilla warfare in Manchuria. The Japanese Army could, in that case, be withdrawn into the South Manchuria Railway Zone and League controlled railway and road guards would take their place in all other parts of Manchuria. Such foreign guards or other forces, Japanese or otherwise, as would function outside the S.M.R. Zone, would function as international organs on behalf of China and not of Manchukuo, which in this and other respects would gradually be transformed into Chinese provinces. In conclusion, the remark may be made that the interdependence of China's unification and Manchuria's reintegration as Chinese territory, to be laid down in the plan, would provide the most powerful stimulus to cause China's leaders to keep the peace and to co-operate energetically with the League.

The plan as described above is given in its mere outline, which may, however, be sufficient to consider whether it may be useful as an instrument to facilitate conciliation and to find an approach to some kind of compromise before the Committee of Nineteen meets again on January 16th, 1933. It might be advisable to ascertain whether international assistance to China, in the view of the statesmen of the Powers most interested, would be possible provided a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute could be found along this way. In the second place, the Japanese delegation could be approached and be sounded regarding a solution of the Manchurian question as part of the Chinese problem as a whole. If such a solution should be acceptable, in principle, to Japan, the Chinese delegation might be approached in the last place.

De K. A.

1/2/33.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

RUSH!

Index Bureau:

Please record and route with previous papers to the office indicated and add usual routings, if any.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 3, 1933.

FED:
MMH:

The attached mimeographed screed, apparently by a British Congregational Minister, is anti-Japanese ranting of the worst sort and need not be read nor acted upon.

EJL
EJL:CLS

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 1 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
FEB 2 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 2 - 1933
Department of State

FEB 1 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94

From William [illegible]ley,
Congregational Minister.
[illegible] Avenue Road,
Southend-on-Sea,
England.

21st January, 1933.

Re A League Challenge and World Drive to condemn, expel and boycott this recalcitrant Japanese Government as a Covenant-breaking, Shylock-exploiting, League-dishonouring, World-domineering, God-defying and Internationally-demoralizing Imperialism.

REVERED, CHRIST-TRUSTED, CHRIST-CHALLENGED, INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN AND COMPASS PEACE PROTAGONIST.

This Imperialistic Japanese Government is outrageously defying enlightened, disinterested, World Conscience/opinion:

First by its vast scale "Smash and Grab" kill and devastate activities in Manchuria and other parts of China, its insulting demands for apologies from Chinese citizens who resist these damnable covenant-breaking deeds, and its dictatorial reply this week to the latest formula suggested by the League's Committee of Nineteen.

Secondly by its Judas Iscariot detestable lip-loyalty to reason and law, the League and peace-machinery, while doing and justifying its infamous procedures during the last sixteen months.

Such Jingo Militarism is morally leprous and isolating, racially demoralising and grossly misrepresents the big majority of Japan's noblest-minded Statesmen, Womanhood, land and industrial workers. These know that for righting international disputes and conflicts, judicial and peace machinery infinitely excel mass-murdering and demoralising, destructive and pauperising warfare. Therefore, unless these feudal domineering Militarists promptly and radically rectify their spirit and policy, and make adequate reparations, it is most urgent and vitally important that all Member States of the League should quickly combine:

(1) To condemn and expel them from the League of Nations;
(2) To co-operate promptly and wholeheartedly with the United States and Russia to absolutely and resolutely refuse recognition of the puppet State of Manchukuo, in accordance with the League's past endorsement of MR. H. L. STIMSON'S EXCELLENT PROPOSAL AS STATES SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES;
(3) To boycott this execrable Imperialism by diplomatic, financial and economic Warless Sanctions, and by prohibiting their respective Nationals from supplying any armaments to covenant-violating, vulture-exploiting League-demoralizing, corrupt press and armament makers, like these ruthless Imperialists.

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It should never be forgotten that God's moral laws are eternal; that they apply equally to nations as to individuals; and that they cannot be broken with impunity by any Government or League of Nations. This was proved by the death of Egypt's firstborn and the shattering overthrow of Pharoah's exploiting and enslaving Imperialists at the Red Sea. That historic event has terrific implications for the bullying, fratricidal brigandage of this Japanese Government, and for all who condone or aid its hypocritical and lawless policy. The judgment parables and

Christ's "Inasmuch" declaration

of penalties for such injustice and cruelty are sternest warnings against this Japanese Imperialism,&that any nation or League that persists in tolerating them or in ignoring or defying International

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Covenants that embody God's laws of truth and righteousness, impartial justice and freedom, Golden Rule and Good Samaritan principles and procedures will eventually be Divinely Smitten with isolating, moral leprosy, crushing disasters and hopeless defeat.

These Japanese feudal Imperialists have behaved far worse than Pharoah's down-trampling and terrorising hosts. Therefore, they ought not only to be condemned but expelled also from the League of Nations for their evil deeds and intransigence, and then quickly and thoroughly boycotted, financially and economically and by stopping all armaments and supplies by the joint action of the League, the United States and Russia.

As Chief Representative and Spokesman for these lawless Imperialists to the League of Nations
Mr. Y. Matsuoka alleged
that these military operations had been carried out in self defence, to protect Japanese interests, to put down banditry, and establish law and order, efficient Government and prosperity in Manchuria. In doing these things they had been grievously misunderstood by the Nations of the world, and Japan was being isolated and crucified as Jesus had been. He declared also, that these militarists had only done what all the great Imperialist Powers of the West had done in past ages.

Many of Mr. Matsuoka's arguments and illustrations, however, might be used to justify and honour Judas Iscariot himself for his treachery and betrayal of Christ for Thirty Pieces of Silver, and his ambition for power and personal supremacy.

But the lawless Imperialisms of the Great Powers in the past were no more morally justified than those of Japan's domineering Imperialists, who were more outrageously wrong and demoralising. For, by
The Nine Power Treaty
Japan solemnly engaged to give China "The fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government." This treaty, this professedly good and loyal member of the League has most disgracefully violated. Further,
The Paris Peace Pact
has radically revolutionised international law in relation to War, and made it illegal throughout almost the whole World. By their voluntary adhesion to that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War and pacific settlement of all International controversies and conflicts, the Governments of 62 World Commonwealths, including Japan, have individually and collectively:-

(1) Condemned recourse to War for the settlement of International disputes.
(2) Renounced War as an instrument of National policy in their mutual relations, and
(3) Covenanted together that in any conflicts or controversies that may arise among them, whatever their origin, or whatever their nature may be, they will -
N E V E R
resort to any but pacific means for their solution or adjustment.

Mr. Matsuoka will never persuade any honourable, disinterested citizen outside a lunatic asylum, to believe that Japanese Imperialists have not damnably outraged the Paris Peace Pact that Germany was the first to sign.

China's chief Delegates and Spokesmen to the League of Nations Assembly were Dr. W. W. Yen, Dr. Wellington Koo and Mr. Quo Tai-Chi.

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These Christ-Centred Statesmen were highly distinguished by their exemplary patience and tact, conciliatory but courageous leadership. Their God-inspired speeches, excellent in spirit and substance, and admirable in their appeal to that which is divinest and best in men and Nations, were deeply moving, conscience-gripping, soul uplifting, and an honour to their great historic Commonwealth, the League of Nations Assembly and to humanity.

The address of Mr. Quo Tai-Chi in particular was in its closing paragraphs so divinely moving and conciliatory in its appeal that it made me think of Christ's last pathetic challenge to Judas Iscariot when He washed the traitor's feet in the Passover Chamber. Mr. Matsuoka, like Judas, however, made no worthy response to that appeal.

On Monday last, the 16th instant, that deservedly world-honoured Newspaper,

The Manchester Guardian,

proved irrefutably, as it has done many times before, that these Japanese Imperialists have repeatedly and flagrantly ignored or violated the Judicial, Arbitral Conference and conciliation and other peace Machinery of the League of Nations Covenants. It showed also that they were now striving domineeringly to set aside all parts of the excellent

Lytton Report

that were favourable to China; to exclude the United States and Russia from any part in the Settlement; to eliminate Members of the Nineteen Committee who could not be doped, intimidated or dominated by Japanese intrigue, and to get the League to stultify and dishonour itself by refusing to publish a record of facts with recommendations under paragraph 4 Article XV of the Covenant which provides that, "If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a Statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just in regard thereto."

The Japanese Stoat thus endeavoured to safeguard itself against the crafty and ferocious Chinese rabbit.

Now no Statesman, party, Nation or League that honoured International Covenants, could submit to this Japanese arrogance and domination without the treachery to Christ and humanity of men like Judas Iscariot, Pontius Pilate. Such disreputable persons or parties would be sternly condemned and expelled from God's Kingdom by all upright and honourable men. They would also be Divinely Smitten eventually with moral leprosy, isolation, and overwhelmed with disasters and hopeless despair.

God is not mocked.

Whatsoever such men or Nations sow, that also, they reap. They cannot gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles. Christ not only condemned and expelled Judas Iscariot from the fellowship of His followers, but the whole body of the Pharisees and Scribes, who, like Judas, paid lip service to justice and righteousness, but were inwardly viperous, and white-sepulchred hypocrites.

Ananias and Sapphira were also Divinely Smitten with death for lying, deceitfulness and blasphemy against God and man. If these persons who were guilty of such abominations and defiance of God's moral laws had been condoned and retained though impenitent and recalcitrant, in Christ's Kingdom of Grace and Truth, purity and righteousness, freedom and peace, that Kingdom would certainly have been hopelessly demoralized and corrupted from the beginning. It would have become a curse instead of a blessing to humanity, and been cast out in contempt and disgust as worthless salt, to be trodden under foot of men. If those leprous and deadly things were allowed in the League of Nations, they would certainly paralyse and ruin it. The League, therefore, should condemn and expel this

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Lawless aggressor, recalcitrant, unrepentant, covenant-breaking, world-outraging and God defying Japanese Government and any other like it. Further, it should promptly, and with whole-souled determination, co-operate with the United States and Russia, to so effectively boycott it, that it will resign or be utterly overthrown and for ever. Unless these things are done swiftly and thoroughly in the immediate future, the League Covenant, Kellogg Pact, Nine Power Treaty, Lytton Report and any honest and courageous proposals from the League's Nineteen Committee, will all become dishonoured scraps of paper. In that case,

World-wide calamities are sure to follow.

Outraged China, despairing of British justice and impartiality, and of the Leagues honour and good faith, may in self-defence become militaristic. Many Indian Congress leaders, losing faith in British truthfulness and fair play, the active soul force of truth, love, and non-violence, may become hostile and Terrorist. The United States, Russia and Ireland, becoming distrustful and disgusted with British policy and Japanese Imperialism at the Geneva Assembly, may become antagonistic and arm more heavily. That excellent Lausanne achievement may be blighted, and any good fruit that might result from the Ottawa Tariff Agreements, the Five Power Naval Congress, the World Disarmament and Economic Conferences and the League of Nations, may all become seriously demoralized and paralysed. Armament competition, secret diplomacy, and balances of Military power may be revived and accelerated. Democratic Governments may be strangled by conscription; World economic recovery and war debt adjustments may be tragically delayed. The Colour Bar, and complex "Clash of World Forces" may become appalling. In resentment of the weakness of British Foreign Policy in relation to International Disarmament and the Sino-Japanese crisis, China, India, Russia, The United States and the Irish Free State, representing a total population of over 1,000,000,000, may partially boycott British goods and

Increase our Unemployed by 2,000,000

in two or three years. The prestige and moral leadership of our Commonwealth of Nations would also be seriously jeopardised and suffer terribly for many decades.

Sir John Simon, therefore,

as representative of our British Government and Noblest Statesmanship, should at once challenge this Japanese policy of procrastination and delay, of brutality and bullying, treachery and divisive intrigue, by giving the Committee of Nineteen and the League Assembly, a clear and definite, courageous and Christ-honouring leadership along the lines stressed in this appeal, or others to the same effect. There are good signs that a vitalising movement has begun in our

British Dry Bones Foreign Policy.

Our Government, therefore, must not act the part of either Judas Iscariot or Pontius Pilate, but strive fearlessly and whole-heartedly to give prompt and fullest effect,

First, to the recent morally and politically incontrovertible declaration and challenge of

Sir John Simon

that "The Covenant of the League of Nations is our constitutional law .....it is our fundamental law .....We are not at liberty to disregard it. We are bound to sustain it."

Secondly, our Administration must insist on the vitally important point stressed by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in his excellent letter to the "Times" this week that:

> "unless it (the Lytton Report) is adopted and the parties to the dispute are called upon in accordance with its recommendations to enter into a conference upon the basis

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of its findings, the whole conception of the pacific settlement of international disputes will be gravely endangered."

Thirdly, it should "think hard" about the example of Japan's treachery to this country during the War, stressed so powerfully by Mr. Wickham Steed, in a most challenging and convincing article in the "Christian World" for 12th January, 1933.

Our British Ministry and its delegates to The League of Nations should do these things speedily. First, in whole-souled consecration to the highest loyalties, values and ideals. Second, to stop this sixteen months' deplorable policy of procrastination and drift. Third, to give practical and fullest effect to the overwhelming volume of informed and selfless world conscience and judgment. Fourth, to make the League Covenant, Kellogg Pact and Nine Power Treaty pre-eminently and permanently effective. Fifth, to promote the best interests of our British Commonwealth of Nations, and of all other States. Sixth, that Christ's Kingdom may come quickly and His Will be done on earth as it is in Heaven. Seventh, to assist the big majority of war-hating, noble-minded Golden Rule Japanese citizens to free themselves from the Military despotism of their present Imperialistic Government. Eighth, and that Great Britain may be able to say, as M. Paul Bonceur said in the French Chamber of Deputies last Friday (13th inst.)

"Our friendship for Japan cannot influence us in a conflict in which it is a question of being guided only by law and justice."

Our British Ministry should do that which is right in Christ's spirit and for His purposes, and that will in the end, prove to be the best and wisest. A World determination drive to boycott and defeat this outrageously recalcitrant Japanese Imperialism, would give the war-hating, honourable and peace-promoting citizens of Japan a golden opportunity and incentive to provide a worthier, a Covenant-keeping, League-vitalising and world-ennobling Ministry in the near future.

The Japanese Proletariat needs genuine sympathy and practical help. The report of the World Missionary Convention of 1910 stated that the most skilled workmen in Japan could only earn £19 a year, and out of that amount they had to pay £5 annually for Military purposes. Today, these sweated wage-earners are probably in a much worse position owing to the Chinese boycott; a 40 per cent decrease in the value of the yen, and the heavy cost of invading China's Sovereignty and territory. The arrest of 7,000 Japanese Communists during 1932 is indisputable evidence of the revolt of noblest-minded Japanese youth against the feudalistic, military despotism of Japan's doomed and damned Imperialistic Government.

Those heroic Japanese Women, who headed the Women's International Peace Drive at the London Naval Conference a few years ago were probably backed by a Two Million majority of their Japanese sisters, and by an equal majority of their men folk, including noblest-minded Statesmen and students, peasants and industrial workers.

Hundreds of thousands of these men and women are Christians and Socialists of high character and ability, patriotic and cosmopolitan in their thinking and action. Tens of thousands of them

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are devoted followers of their selfless

deservedly World-Honoured Leader, Kagawa.

He and others, like-minded, are not only Pentecostal Apostles, Evangelists and labour leaders, but Divinely inspired champions of Christ's Kingdom of grace and truth: of God's holy, all-loving Fatherhood, Worldwide Christian Brotherhood, a Warless future, and equal security for all nations, based, not on force and murderous Sanctions, but on those that are moral and rooted in Golden Rule and Good Samaritan Principles and purposes, practice and achievements. Their success in superseding the present Imperialistic Government by one more democratic and Christ-centred would mightily accelerate the establishment, in the near future, of an all-inclusive, democratised and Warless League of Nations, & that would include the United States and Russia, with highest guarantees for efficiency, International goodwill, co-operation, educational and constructive peace-machinery, and a League vitalized, Christ-beneficent and world-ennobling Family of Nations, rooted in love and truth, God's moral laws and impartial justice, righteousness and lasting world peace, with fullest publicity

With heartiest thanks and congratulations for your work for these God-inspired principles and procedures,

Believe me,
Christ-Judged World Peace Crusader,
Yours sincerely & co-operatively,
Jno Riley
WILLIAM RILEY,
Congregational Minister, and one
of the foundation workers of -

1. The League of Nations.
2. The League of Nations Union.
3. The Congregational Ministers' Pacifist Crusade.
4. The No More War Movement.
5. The War Resisters International.
6. The Anti-Militarist Ministers' & Clergymen's Association.

N.B. Practical service in words and deeds.

If this Manifesto commends itself to your conscience and judgment, will you kindly and promptly send a postcard or letter to the Secretaries of our National Free Church Council, Memorial Hall, Farringdon St., London, E.C.4, saying, "I approve Mr. Riley's counsel in relation to the Sino-Japanese crisis, and will support it in the form of a suitable resolution if one is submitted to the National Council when it meets at Sheffield next March, and oblige?

Please mail similar messages to the Premier at 10, Downing St., Whitehall, S.W., and to Sir John Simon, The Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W.1.

My heartiest best wishes and encouragements for yourself, friends and co-workers are as follows:-

Numbers VI, 24-26; Ephesians III, 14-21.
1 Corinthians I, 26-31; Revelations II, 26.

Kindly keep this letter for future use. It will, I am confident, greatly stimulate and strengthen you and your colleagues in the excellent work that you are undertaking, with, and for, our Lord Jesus Christ, the World's Peace-maker.

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Handed to Mr. Thorp of the British Embassy 2-1-33. Sick

DCR FE/7 file

February 1, 1933.

F/HS 793.94/5852 A

On January 23, the Department received from the British Embassy an aide memoire stating that the British Government considered that it would be desirable that the powers signatory of the Boxer Protocol should represent to the Japanese Government their anxiety that the regime set up by that Protocol should be observed, and suggesting cooperative effort on the part of the Ambassadors at Tokyo of Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, in the making of such representations.

On January 24, the Department gave to the British Embassy an aide memoire asking for further information from the British Government in regard to the facts underlying and the views which formed the basis of this proposal. On January 25, Karl H. Von Wiegand, of the Universal News Service, produced under a Geneva date line a story in which the first three paragraphs read as follows:

> "A bold British move, apparently calculated to make the United States the League of Nations' spearhead against Japan, has been virtually rejected by Washington, it was said in reliable quarters tonight.
>
> "With

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"With the League's efforts at conciliation stale-mated, London invited Washington to join Britain 'and other powers' in making stern representations to Tokio against Japan's Manchurian invasion and the new prospect of extending her domain in Jehol Province, it was said.

"The Washington State Department is reported to have thrown cold water on the British overture by replying it wants first to examine the incidents referred to in the British note."

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JAN 26 1933

From the New York American

U. S. REFUSES TO AID BRITISH IN JAPAN MOVE

Geneva Hears Washington Declined to Be Involved in Representations to Tokio

By KARL H. VON WIEGAND.

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GENEVA, Jan. 25.—A bold British move, apparently calculated to make the United States the League of Nations' spearhead against Japan, has been virtually rejected by Washington, it was said in reliable quarters tonight.

With the League's efforts at conciliation stale-mated, London invited Washington to join Britain "and other powers" in making stern representations to Tokio against Japan's Manchurian invasion and the new prospect of extending her domain in Jehol Province, it was said.

COLD TO BRITISH MOVE.

The Washington State Department is reported to have thrown cold water on the British overture by replying it wants first to examine the incidents referred to in the British note.

The committee of nine, appointed to present the Assembly with the facts in the Sino-Japanese quarrel, came to a deadlock today over the smaller powers' refusal to back down in their belief Japan must be sternly censured. The big powers, notably France and Britain, are for moderation.

RUMORS IMPRESS JAPAN.

The reported British represen-
ation to Washington is in keep-
ng with reports assiduously
pread through Geneva that
Vashington is "cracking the whip"
ver the league to force it into
ction against Japan. These re-
orts have impressed the Japa-
ese delegation.

TOKIO, Jan. 25 (AP).—The
Japanese cabinet is delaying its
decision on whether Japan shall
withdraw from the League of Na-
ions until the government learns
he exact recommendations for
settling the Sino-Japanese con-
lict to be made by the league as-
sembly's committee of nineteen

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

Referring to the British Embassy's aide-memoire of January 28, 1933, communicating to the Department certain explanations of the British Government with regard to the proposed representations to the Japanese Government on the subject of alleged abuses of privileges at Shanhaikwan under the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the Department appreciates the courtesy of having been informed, both in Washington and in London, of the British Government's views on this important matter.

The Department, having given serious thought both to the proposition raised in the British Embassy's aide-memoire of January 23, 1933, and to the elucidation thereof communicated in the aide-memoire under reference, feels that action at this time on the part of the American Government either in relation to the alleged abuses by Japan at Shanhaikwan of privileges under the Protocol of 1901 or in relation to the general question of the rights and obligations of the signatory powers, arising out of or under the Protocol, would be likely to do more harm than good. Also, the Department feels that any useful purpose which might be served by action at this time in connection with this matter might be served to greater advantage through representations

made

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made by the British Ambassador in Tokyo than by any joint or separate representations in which the American Government participated.

The Department wishes, however, to assure the British Government, as it has already assured the Chinese Legation here, that, if future developments should more specifically than at present involve the provisions of the Protocol of 1901, the American Government would expect to give consideration to those developments as the necessity arose and in the light of this Government's rights and obligations thereunder.

Department of State,
Washington,

793.94/5794

J.E.J.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5853

SEE 894.00 P. R./61 FOR Despatch # 243.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED January 4, 1933.
TO
NAME

1—1127 OFO

REGARDING: Shanhaikwan incident.
During the closing days of December the scene of activity shifted to the border of Jehol.

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During the closing days of December the scene of activity shifted to the border of Jehol. As early as December 10 the Japanese press published a despatch from Tientsin stating that the Chinese and Japanese troops had clashed at Shanhaikwan near the Great Wall on the border between Manchuria and China Proper. From that time onward there were frequent reports that General Chang Hsueh-liang was concentrating troops near this part of the border and

was

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was planning to launch a drive into Manchuria. On December 20 the Japanese War Ministry privately confirmed the rumor that the Sixth Division, composed of crack shock troops, was on its way to Manchuria to replace the Second Division.* On December 27 in announcing the reasons for increased military budget, the War Ministry announced that it would increase the Japanese forces in Manchuria. On December 24 the same office issued a statement denouncing the recent resolutions of the Kuomintang favoring hostile military operations against Japan from the direction of Jehol. The statement read in part: "The real intentions of the Kuomintang seem to be to instill a bitter enmity against Japan among the Chinese people..... Such an attempt on the part of China will prove a serious menac to the Far East ..... Some time ago Chinese politicians were working hard for a conflict between Japan and the United States, and these two peoples at that time seemed to entertain a somewhat uneasy feeling toward each other. But now all uneasiness is gone and the Japanese and American people see no danger in the way of their future relations.....It is most imperative at the present moment to dispose of the Kuomintang and its dangerous foreign policy as an urgent measure to make it possible to safeguard peace in the Far East".

In view of these signs of aggressiveness coming from both the Japanese and the Chinese, there was a definite feeling in Tokyo as the month ended that something was about to happen.

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* Embassy's telegram No. 286, December 20-6 p.m.

0286

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 1 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 1 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

From Chinese Legation
1/31/33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 31 1933
Department of State

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 31, 1933

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

It was learned from reliable sources that the reserve forces of the Eighth, the Tenth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Japanese Army, totalling some 30,000 soldiers, are now being ordered to proceed via Fusan and Seoul into the Three Eastern Provinces within one week for the attack upon Jehol.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 31, 1933

793.94/5854

FEB 4 - 1933
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0287

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

WP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B).

Tokyo

Dated February 3, 1933

Rec'd 12:44 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 9 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 3 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

34, February 3, noon.

793.94

893.00/12274

793.94/5792

Peiping's 79 and 80 just received by mail. Guarded remarks of Japanese General Staff officers here to Military Attache yesterday indicate that Japanese army hopes to reach arrangement regarding Jehol by negotiations of some kind.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CIB WP

793.94/5855

FILED
FEB 6 - 1933

0288

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 3 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated February 3, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

Discreet comments by officers of the Japanese General Staff at Tokyo to the American Military Attaché on February 2 indicate that it is hoped by the Japanese Army that, by negotiations of some sort, an arrangement concerning Jehol may be reached.

0289

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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WP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 3, 1933

Recd 1:10 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 3 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

112, February 3, 11 a. m.

793.94 note 893.23

According to information received from Commander Yangtze patrol the Eighty-eighth Division of about 8,000 men of Chiang Kai-Shek's best troops is being transferred from Hankow to Peiping.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

JUN 24 1933

F/HS 793.94/5856

0290

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

KLP

FROM

Tokyo

Dated February 3, 1933.

Rec'd. 4:18 a.m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one. (B)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 3 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 3 - 1933
Department of State

793.94
Mc
894.23

35, February 3, 2 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Military Attache reports as follows:

"This office estimates by February 15th Japanese regular troops on Asian mainland as follows: Manchuria 70,000 including 30,000 new levy, Korea at least 20,000, North China at least 2,400, total at least 92,000. Further estimate force now available for operation in Jehol and vicinity at least six mixed infantry brigades and two cavalry brigades, about 21,000, and if necessary this force can be doubled by March 1st from Asia mainland alone.

Information here indicates no immediate Japanese movement in force into Jehol".

GREW

KLP

WSB

FILED
FEB 6 - 1933

F/HS
793.94/5857

0291

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 8 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated February 3, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

The American Military Attaché reported that his office estimates that by the 15th of this month there will be on the mainland Japanese regular soldiers distributed in the following manner: Seventy thousand in Manchuria, including a new levy of thirty thousand; at least twenty thousand in Korea; in North China twenty-four hundred at least, making a total of ninety-two thousand at least. According to an additional estimate, the force which is at present available for activity in Jehol and environs is at least two brigades of cavalry and six brigades of mixed infantry, approximately 21,000, and this force could be doubled from the Asia mainland alone by the first of next month, if necessary.

No immediate move by the Japanese into Jehol in force is indicated by information available to the Military Attaché.

0292

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation file 4

Feb 1, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 1 - 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 1 - 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 1 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED JANUARY 31, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 2 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

General Ho Chu-kuo reported that Japanese troops were recently seen passing through Shanhaikwan although the exact number could not be known. But before the Japanese had withdrawn from Shanhaikwan, the fact that the city was occupied by the Japanese could not be denied, even though not a single Japanese soldier were stationed there.

A telegram from Kailu, dated January 26, reported that the Japanese did not attempt to make another attack on the city since they were severely repulsed by the Chinese defense on January 25. On the contrary, they had retreated to Tungliao, leaving only the troops of the bogus government to face the Chinese two or three miles away.

Chinese Legation, Washington
January 31, 1933

793.94

793.94/5858

FILED
FEB 4 - 1933

0293

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5859

SEE 893.0146/384 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Hornbeck) DATED January 9, 1933.
NAME

TO Division of Far Eastern Affairs

1—1127 5859

REGARDING:

Dr. Hornbeck expressed to Colonel Kilgore admiration of the excellent discipline and collective and individual self-restraint which has been shown by our armed forces under conditions of considerable provocation at various moments at various points in China.

hs

0292

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

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RECEIVED
JAN 31 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY) NO. 11

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1933

At the press conference this morning, Secretary Stimson said that he had no announcements to make.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Mr. Stimson observed that a varied and fantastic crop of rumors, which affect us, have been cropping up in the Japanese press. A denial has already been given to the correspondents in respect to one rumor which was to the effect that this Government had made a loan to China for war purposes. Today, furthermore, there appears to be a story in the NICHI NICHI to the effect that we have unofficially approached Japan regarding the establishment of a convention for the neutralization of the zone around the Philippine Islands in case independence should be granted to them--the zone apparently including the islands under Japan's ownership and mandate. Mr. Stimson then said that if we had made any such proposition to the Japanese, he had not heard of it and that he did not think we had.

A correspondent said there was another press report from Japan to the effect that we had loaned money to China and had sent noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army to instruct them in aviation. The correspondent continued by saying that these reports were confirmed in Tokyo by the Spokesman of the Foreign Office. The Secretary replied to the effect that this alleged confirmation of the report did not add to its verisimilitude. A correspondent then asked if we would be within our rights if we should make a loan to China for any purpose for which the Chinese might want to use the money. The correspondent continued by saying that the United States Government had loaned money to other governments. He then asked if we had loaned money to the Allies before we entered the World War. Mr. Stimson replied in the negative. The correspondent then asked if we would make such a loan if we should so desire. The Secretary, in reply, said that he doubted if we could. Mr. Stimson then added that the above was STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and was NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION. The correspondent then said that he was only asking for information and that he realized, of course, that there was no state of war in the Far East. He then added that the official Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office was kind enough to add to his statement that we were absolutely within our rights to make loans to the Chinese or to furnish them with munitions.

A correspondent said that the question regarding the formation of some sort of Conciliation Commission on the Manchurian situation, in which the United States might participate, seems to be bobbing up at Geneva. The Secretary, in reply, said that as a matter of fact, the question had not bobbed up in Geneva. The correspondent then said that it had bobbed up in the press. The Secretary, in reply, admitted that the story had appeared in the press. SPEAKING ENTIRELY FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES, the Secretary said that as far as he understood the matter the Committee had not made any new proposal whatever. There was, apparently, an erroneous report this morning from Japanese sources to the effect that the Committee had made a new suggestion. The Secretary added that he understood that the Japanese report was not true. The Committee's position

793.94/5860

FEB 1 1933

0295

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

is unchanged and our position certainly is unchanged. Mr. Stimson here cautioned the correspondents that the above is NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION. A correspondent said that he understood that the Committee is due to act today on the Lytton Report, or is supposed to take the matter up. Mr. Stimson replied to the effect that he was not quite sure about the matter, but that he thought that, while the Committee was supposed to meet today, a little doubt has been caused by reports to the effect that certain important members of the Committee had not yet returned to Geneva. The correspondent then observed that the Committee could not do anything but deal with the matter unless Japan and China agree to a basis of conciliation. The Secretary, in reply, said that the correspondent was apparently asking him for an interpretation of the Covenant of the League. Mr. Stimson continued by saying that the correspondent should read Article XV, Subdivisions 3 and 4, of the Covenant. A correspondent said that he presumed, from the Secretary's answers to previous questions, that there is no question pending now whether the United States will be invited to take part in the Conciliation Commission. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Stimson said that his impression, obtained from press despatches, was that the attempted conciliation, such as it had been, had failed. We, however, have not participated in any way at any time in the conciliation efforts of the League of Nations.

Reverting again to the matter of Philippine independence, a correspondent asked if any other countries had made known their attitude to the Department of State on the general question of stability in the Pacific and how this stability might be affected by the independence of the Philippines. The Secretary replied in the negative.

Observing that a news despatch from Paris this morning says that Mr. Theodore Marriner had talked with officials of the French Foreign Office regarding the Lytton Report, a correspondent asked if any instructions of any kind had been forwarded to our Embassy in Paris concerning the matter. In reply, the Secretary said that because of his general rule not to discuss conversations with foreign officials, he desired not to answer the question.

CUBA

Asked if the Department had contemplated any action regarding the censorship of American publications in Cuba, Mr. Stimson said that we had not protested so far, and that he had heard through press despatches that the censorship had been lifted. The correspondent then said that the particular case in point was the HAVANA-AMERICAN NEWS, which had filed a protest with the Embassy. The correspondent continued by saying that the Embassy in Habana had requested instructions from the Department as to the action it should take. The Secretary, in rpply, again said that the Department had taken no action whatever.

ARMS EMBARGO

A correspondent asked if the Secretary had seen the arms embargo resolution reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. The correspondent then asked if the Secretary would give him his interpretation of that resolution. Mr. Stimson replied

0298

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in the
/negative. The correspondent then said that he desired to know whether the Secretary interpreted the resolution to mean that the President could declare an embargo on arms shipments without the cooperation of other nations. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that he preferred not to go into the legal questions involved. He added that he had read the resolution which seems to allow a healthy amount of discretion to the President. The Secretary then said that the above was NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION.

NICARAGUA

Observing that the last contingent of Marines from Nicaragua reached Quantico yesterday, a correspondent asked if the Secretary had any reports dealing with the situation in Nicaragua since the Marines left. The Secretary replied in the negative. Asked then if the Department had received any reports to the effect that Honduran rebels had crossed the border into Nicaragua and joined forces with Sandino, the Secretary said that no reports to that effect had reached him, but that he had heard reports to the effect that Honduran rebels were rapidly being chased over the border into Nicaragua by Honduran troops.

M. J. McDermott.

0297

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return FE/14

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
February 3, 1933.

(C)

4 pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

793.94 note 793.00

14

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The British Foreign Office through the British Embassy here approached the Department recently with regard to the making in Tokyo by several powers of joint or separate representations to the Japanese Government with regard to China's allegation of abuse by Japan at Shanhaikwan of privileges under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. After an exchange of views back and forth, the Department has informed the British Foreign Office that it does not repeat not feel it advisable for it to join in such representations at this time, although any effort which the British Government might feel moved, in the premises, to make alone or with the other powers signatory to the Protocol would have the Department's good will.

The above is simply for your information. Department does not desire that you take any action in connection herewith. If approached on the subject by your British colleague you may inform him of the above and may state that the Department feels that any such action, if taken by the

793.94/5860 A

Enciphered by ----------

Sent by operator ---------- *M.*, ----------, *19*----, ----------

0298

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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PLAIN

British Government, would have enhanced chance of serving a useful purpose in the absence of American participation.

Stimson

JEJ
FE:SKH:CLS

FE

CR
Feb. 3 1933.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

0299

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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7

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP PLAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED DEC 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 6, 1933

Rec'd 2:55 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 6 - 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

121, February 6, 10 a. m.

Reuter from Nanking, fifth:

"After brief spell of anti-British ebullition as result of reports that Britain was pursuing pro-Japanese policy at Geneva the atmosphere is now showing noticeable change in direction of more calm and moderate view. This is attributed by observers to statements on British policy from London and also assurance from Sir Miles Lampson to Chinese leaders that there is no question of British partiality towards Japan.

Change of attitude is particularly noticeable in Chinese newspapers which recently have been boiling over with anti-British sentiment but it seems that excitement is now over. Chinese sources state that British policy regarding Manchuria has been clarified as result of meeting which Sir Miles has had with Lo Wen Kan. He has conferred with the Foreign Minister on six occasions since his arrival here".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94
741.94

F/HS 793.94/5861

FEB 7 1933 CIB

0300

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 14, 1933.

EHD:
MMH:

Rome's despatch No. 1778 of January 26, 1933, encloses the first editorial comment on the Manchuria situation which has appeared since November. This editorial is entitled "Washington's Attitude on the Sino-Japanese Conflict" and states that settlement along the lines upon which the United States is insisting is impossible without war. The writer seems to be in favor of application of sanctions against Japan.

LBS:CLS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 21 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

0301

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, January 26, 1933.

No. 1778.

Subject: Manchurian Situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 21 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94

FEB 8 33

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To ... U. S. A.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 9 - 1933
Department of State

F/HS 793.94/5862

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith an editorial from the Rome MESSAGGERO entitled "Washington's Attitude on the Sino-Japanese Conflict." In so far as the Embassy is aware, this is the first comment to appear in the Italian press with regard to the Manchurian question since the Embassy's despatch No. 1700 of December 1, 1932.

793.94 Commission/673

FILED
FEB 23 1933

The writer affirms that American public opinion evinces increased nervousness with respect to Japanese activities of late, which he attributes particularly to fear lest the Japanese will not be content with the

creation

0302

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of Manchukuo, including the province of Jehol (in which case he believes that the United States would go no further than to declare non-recognition, "letting political and economic obstructionism produce its own natural effects"), but might at any moment advance beyond the Great Wall to the south and threaten American interests in Tientsin. While the writer asserts that any conclusive settlement of the situation such as the United States apparently tends to insist upon, is impossible without resorting to war, and while his sympathies are manifestly with the Japanese as far as the Manchurian region is concerned, he considers that if the area of conflict were to spread further the results would be disastrous for the world in general. He accordingly urges Geneva to bestir itself and take positive action before it is too late. Such action, the writer apparently feels, should take the form of the application of sanctions envisaged in the League Pact.

Respectfully yours,

John W. Garrett.

Enclosures: Clipping and Translation.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

eh
800.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MESSAGGERO, Rome.
January 26, 1933. Page 1.

Despatch No. 1778.

Posizione di Washington
nella vertenza cino-giapponese

Può essere rilevato come, da qualche tempo a questa parte, un più intenso e fattivo interessamento americano alla vertenza cino-giapponese si vada manifestando.

Dopo il passo britannico a Tokio, che seguì l'occupazione giapponese di Shang Hai Kwan, il Dipartimento di Stato, pur senza accedere ad atti diretti di protesta, si richiamò infatti con maggiore energia al Patto Kellogg, riaffermando il principio politico del non riconoscimento di quanto, in Estremo Oriente, veniva dalla forza delle armi nipponiche effettuato, al di fuori e contro lo spirito del Patto stesso.

Ora, poichè il Giappone non accenna a deflettere dalla propria politica, sembra delinearsi a Washington una più netta tendenza a veder decisa l'ormai annosa vertenza di Estremo Oriente.

Ma non è, per caso, arbitrario ed aleatorio parlare di « decisioni »? Quando gli interessi in gioco sono non soltanto molteplici e vasti, ma profondamente radicati nel sentimento dei popoli in contrasto, che li ritengono essenziali al proprio ulteriore sviluppo economico e politico, ingenuo è credere in soluzioni definitive.

Se ad una soluzione tuttavia si arriverà, sarà di quelle che, nel mondo degli affari, usano per liquidare una situazione critica e riportarne le risultanze *a conto nuovo*.

La soluzione definitiva — destinata a durare un certo numero di anni — potrebbe aversi soltanto se si osasse di farla scaturire da quell'atto supremo che il patto Kellog ha messo al bando: ma chi, oggi, si assume la responsabilità di una guerra?

La guerra fa tanto orrore che, dal 1931 ad oggi, ha potuto bensì svolgersi, a traverso una serie ininterrotta di episodi, più o meno concatenati sui campi della Manciuria ed alle porte di Sciangai, ma non è mai stata apertamente, nè dichiarata nè confessata.

Da una parte si agisce, contro il brigantaggio e contro i perturbatori dell'ordine, in un paese che dichiara di essersi dato, volontariamente, un regime indipendente, consono ai propri bisogni, sociali, economici e politici: dall'altra si reagisce, a tutela di vantati diritti di integrità nazionale. E intanto, vicino e lontano, vi sono spettatori che vorrebbero intervenire e non osano; che oscillano fra interessi evidenti ed esigenze complesse; che hanno simpatie, ma non vogliono mostrarle; che hanno apprensioni, ma le tengono celate; che tergiversano, discutono, e stanno al riparo della Società delle Nazioni, la quale, come si sa, è l'organo ufficialmente investito della tutela della pace nel mondo.

Che cosa è dunque avvenuto perchè il nervosismo si sia accentuato negli Stati Uniti?

Questione complessa. I giapponesi han fatto sorgere, nelle estreme regioni dell'Asia, un nuovo Stato, il Manciukuò; gli hanno prestato una organizzazione che dobbiamo riconoscere non può essere che opera loro; gli hanno dato un governo, un esercito, una bandiera, una moneta, una dogana, una posta, una ferrovia, una flotta, una marina mercantile, una rete telegrafica, una rete telefonica, una radio, una stazione radiotrasmittente, una stazione radioricevente, una rete stradale, una rete di navigazione fluviale, una rete di navigazione aerea, una rete di navigazione costiera, una rete di navigazione oceanica, una rete di navigazione lacustre

0302

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1778 of January 26, 1933, from the Embassy at Rome.

MESSAGGERO, Rome,
January 26, 1933.

Washington's Attitude on the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
- Fabrizio Serra.

(Translation)

It may be remakred that for some time now American interest in the Sino-Japanese dispute has become keener and more objective.

After the British demarche at Tokio following the Japanese occupation of Shanghaikwan, the Department of State, in fact, without resorting to direct measures of protest, appealed more energetically to the Kellogg Pact, reaffirming the political principle of non-recognition of the situation in the Far East as created by the force of Japanese arms outside of and contrary to the spirit of the Pact.

Now, since Japan shows no indication of swerving from her policy, there appears to be a determination on the part of Washington to see the now ancient conflict in the Far East definitely settled.

But is it not, perchance, arbitrary and hazardous to speak of "conclusive settlements"? When the interests at stake are not only multiple and vast but also profoundly rooted in the feelings of the peoples in dispute, who consider them essential to their own further economic and political development, it is ingenuous to believe in conclusive settlements.

If

0305

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

If a settlement comes about, however, it will be of the type that in the business world is used to liquidate a critical situation and transfer the results thereof to a new account.

The conclusive settlement - destined to last a certain number of years - could be reached only if one dared to bring it about through that extreme act which the Kellogg Pact has outlawed: but who today would assume the responsibility of a war?

The thought of war produces such horror that since 1931, although it has indeed been waged through an uninterrupted series of more or less connected episodes on the fields of Manchuria and before the gates of Shanghai, it has never been openly either declared or confessed.

On the one hand there is action against brigandage and against disturbers of order in a country which declares that it has voluntarily given itself an independent regime consonant with its own social, economic, and political exigencies; on the other hand there is reaction for the protection of vaunted rights of national integrity. Meanwhile there are spectators both far and near who would like to intervene and dare not; who have sympathies but are unwilling to show them; who have apprehensions, but hide them; who waver between evident interests and complex necessities; who quibble, argue, and take refuge in the League of Nations, which, as is known, is the official organ for the preservation of world peace.

What

0306

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

What then has happened to increase the nervousness of the United States?

This is a complex question. The Japanese have created in the outermost regions of Asia a new state, Manchukuo; they have given it an organization which we must recognize as good, at least in contrast to the rather barbarous disorganization of so many vast provinces of the Chinese republic; they have also given it and continue to give it a strong helping hand - with a goodly number of their own troops, naturally - to guarantee order and integrity.

The new state may be menaced from two directions, north and south. But to the north agreements with the Soviet government have already eliminated, for the time being, any cause for anxiety; Red Russia evidently has no desire to compromise herself down there where the czars experiences so many bitter disappointments. To the south, on the other hand, no agreements were possible, since China refuses to yield and because her claims find more ready support and assistance; she must therefore be put out of the way while the world is still in a period of crisis and is prone to compromise.

For many other reasons, but chiefly for those given above, which Japan considers closely even if she does not mention them openly, the Japanese have thus opened the new year with an act of war.

Meanwhile

0307

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Meanwhile, in the Gulf of Pechili, at the point where the Great Wall descends the bare mountains of northern China and plunges into the sea, lies the city of Shanghai Kwan. Along the coast pass the railway which from Pekin penetrates Manchuria and the main lines connecting China proper with the provinces and ex-provinces lying to the north of the Great Wall. Shanghai Kwan dominates the bundle of communications and makes it possible for anyone possessing adequate forces to strangle them and impede traffic, particularly the transit of troops directed to the north to reestablish the former order of things or at least to disturb the present order.

The Japanese, who already enjoyed at Shanghai Kwan a long-standing police privilege, have taken advantage of the situation to organize a rapid military operation with armored trains, tanks, and airplanes, and have easily become absolute masters of this important locality. Thus they have to all practical purposes cut off from Pekin and Tientsin the province of Jehol which seems to belong to Mongolia and which nevertheless, situated as it is to the east of the great Cinghan range may be considered by reason of continuity of geographical characteristics as part of Manchuria.

The latter opinion, moreover, is shared by the Japanese, who are working to liberate the province from its present illegitimate occupants - the armed bands of the war-lord Changsuliang, at present subsidized by the Nanking Government - and to extend to it the imminent if not immediate benefits (and we say this without the least sarcasm) of the independent government

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of Manchukuo, Japan's ward.

Once Jehol were freed and more definite relations established with the U.S.S.R. the new state would have what it judges, due reservations made for contrary opinion on the part of other interested parties, its natural boundaries: Amur to the north, Ussuri and Korea to the east, the Yellow Sea and the Great Wall to the south, the Cinghan range to the west.

And that would be the end of the story. However, the United States refuses to recognize the accomplished fact: in China, she says - and by China she means Manchuria as well -, the principle of the open door must be respected, which principle the Japanese have violated by their activities that tend to create a privileged position in that region for themselves. And then the Japanese have violated the promise to respect China's integrity, have ignored the Kellogg Pact, and threaten to upset the balance of power in the Pacific.

These are grave considerations, nor are they all. It is true that the republican regime in China has thought it best to abandon the old capital of the Empire and to substitute Nanking for Pekin, it being much further south and therefore considerably distant from the not greatly appreciated position of that inconvenient and expansive neighbor and cousin who has so insolently taken possession of the more important doors of the Chinese house; but one cannot help fearing with good

reason

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reason that at any moment the Mikado's troops may come down the Paiho on an expedition of conclusive intimidation. And along the Peiho lies not only Pekin, the former imperial city, but also Tientsin, central ganglion of European and American business in the Orient.

Such an event cannot, must not, come about. Geneva must bestir itself and take action. But more is needed than the mild Committee of Nineteen: the sanctions provided by the Pact must be applied.

Something must therefore issue forth from all this confusion. The United States will not permit Japan to advance farther than the Great Wall. As far what has already happened and will still happen to the north is concerned, the United States apparently is unwilling to take any steps other than non-recognition, letting political and economic obstructionism produce its own natural effects. But it is generally felt in America that such procedure cannot be followed in the event of an extension of operations in the above-mentioned direction.

It must therefore be hoped that the dispute will not enter into a more dangerous phase and that some basis for agreement between China and Japan may even yet be found at Geneva or directly. Serious interests are responsible for the fact that the individual nations often appear discordant and even in open contrast; but

these

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

these same interests may suggest a way out, compromises, prudent decisions. Let us hope that this will come about and that the clouds hanging over the Yellow Sea will disperse. No one dares to desire a storm in the Pacific.

0311

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 1 - 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 10 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

Conversation.

Division of January 9, 1933.

Dr. Alfred Sze

Mr. Hornbeck

Subject: Views Expressed by Dr. W. W. Yen, by Telegram, from Geneva.

793.94

Dr. Sze showed Mr. Hornbeck a telegram from Dr. Yen -- ~~the~~ a paraphrase of which is attached hereto.

In this telegram, Dr. Yen suggests the need at the present stage of some further public indication of the American Government's attitude -- for the purpose of giving fresh guidance to the League. Mr. Hornbeck said that he would bring this matter to the attention of the Secretary of State; but that, in order that the Chinese might not be unduly expectant of a favorable response, he felt moved to repeat what he had said on some previous occasions, namely, that the American Government has been refraining from action of this type for the reasons that (a) its position is well known, (b) it cannot with propriety undertake to "lead" the League in the conduct of its business, and (c) action of this type on the part of the American Government serves merely to irritate Japan against the United States without having the counter-balancing

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

balancing good effect of gaining a favorable response from the League. Dr. Sze said that he had appreciated the correctness of that estimate, but that he felt that it was the impression in some quarters that the United States had lost interest or was inclined to wash its hands of the situation, leaving the whole problem entirely to the League. He did not himself have that impression, but he had encountered its existence. He wondered whether, if the Secretary of State has had conversations with the President-elect, it might not be possible -- perhaps in press conference -- for the Secretary of State to make some reference to the Manchuria situation as being among the subjects discussed and take occasion to reaffirm that the position of this Administration remains as it has been.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he would report all of this.

Stop

→ See items attached.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 12 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

PARAPHRASE

The Chinese Minister has just shown me a cable from W. W. Yen at Geneva, under date January 8, which reads, in paraphrase, as follows:

On account of the failure to agree on conciliation, the Manchuria question is approaching a final stage; it is highly important that the final report by the Assembly be strongly in favor of China, but to attain this it is necessary that there be a gesture by the United States. Members of the League, particularly the small powers, are discouraged by the fact that the United States has been silent since August, notwithstanding the increase in the meantime of Japanese aggression, and the denial made recently of the news report that the American Government had sent a note to Japan after the occupation of Shanhaikwan was surprising, whether or not true. Unless the United States, in view of her important interests in China, has a superior plan of her own for solving the problem, American Government would be wise to support openly the idea that the League render a strong juridical judgment, as helpful to the American position. Although it is true that the dispute is before the League, of which the United States is not a member, the United States is unquestionably vitally interested and therefore should encourage the League by an open declaration instead of remaining under cover and carrying on merely by private conversations unofficial

statements

0314

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

statements, etc. At present France is highly sympathetic; Great Britain alone is troublesome. Thus it is highly important that the United States manifest a more decisive attitude. Yet, recent press reports, while stating that conferences among American officials are discussing many subjects, omit Manchuria. This creates an unfortunate impression here. Briefly, I urge that the American Government make another gesture regarding Japanese activities, for effect upon the League and upon China and in the United States; and it would be very helpful if the President-elect would participate in so doing. This should be done before January 20.

(Signed) YEN.

0315

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 150.941 / 35 Confidential Files FOR State Dept. Memo.

FROM Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Dooman) DATED Jan. 30, 1933.
NAME

/TP//

1—1137 GPO

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793.94/5864

REGARDING:

Division of Far Eastern Affairs believes that any gestures made for the purpose of placating the Japanese or allaying the officially fostered irritation which just now prevails in Japan because of or in relation to the attitute of the U.S. toward the Sino-Japanese conflict, if made in connection with matters other than those which bear directly on the question of that conflict itself, would be open to misinterpretation and be almost sure to be misrepresented (by a certain element in Japan).

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF

From Chinese Legation
Feb 4, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 4 - 1933
Department of State

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Brigadier-General Tsui reported from Kailu on January 29 as follows:

793.94

Owing to the fact that large numbers of Chinese Volunteers have massed at Kailu, the Japanese have turned their attention to Tunglia◎ and have been launching a vigorous attack on that city during the last few days. There were repeated air raids upon that city of late, inflicting considerable damages upon the Chinese defense works there.

At dawn of January 25, about a hundred Japanese soldiers, accompanied by about a thousand troops under Chang Hai-peng of the bogus government and some Mogolian recruits, attacked suddenly the Chinese defenses at Ta◎-Teh-Yang-Tze, a suberb ◎f Tunglia◎, using armored cars, tanks, bombing planes, field guns and machine guns as their weapons. On the same days, two other attacks were made, each one of them was undertaken with heavy bombardment from the air and with heavy field guns and machine guns. The handful of Chinese forces there, numbering less than a thousand men, stood up calmly but gallantly against the attacks, using only rifles, trench mortars, hand grenades and sabres. Although the Japanese bombardments were able to destroy much of the defensive works, the Chinese succeeded in maintaining their positions. At about 6 p.m., the Japanese, exhausted by their repeated assaults, retreated to their ori-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ginal positions.

The casualties on the Japanese side include about ten Japanese soldiers and about forty soldiers of the bogus government. In addition, four Japanese planes were shot down and destroyed. Only 5 Chinese soldiers and about ten horses were injured.

The Chinese Legation, Washington
February 3, 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Feb. 4, 1933

A COPY OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 4 - 1933
Department of State

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office denied categorically the report that Great Britain had proposed to the Chinese Government, through Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China, a round table conference at either Nanking or Shanghai for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute, declaring that the report must have emanated from Japanese sources. The circulation of such reports on the eve of the League's preparing verdict on the Manchurian question serves only to show the extreme desperation and nervousness of the Japanese at the prospect of a strong report in condemnation of Japan's unlawful activities in Manchuria, the spokesman added.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 4, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FEB 8 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From Chinese Legation
Feb. 7, 1933

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 7 - 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 8 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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793.94/5867

3.94

A telegram from Peiping reported that the Japanese have laid claim to Hulutao, alleging that it is the only military harbor of the bogus state of "Manchukuo". The Second Squadron of the Japanese Navy is now at the harbor, joining it with the Kailuan Coal Mines under the protection of a large fleet. Real Admiral Tsuda, Commander of the Japanese Second Squadron, after his conference with Lieutenant-General Omezu at Shanhaikwan, has proceeded on a flagship to Hulutao to direct the construction work of the harbor now being taken up by the South Manchuria Railway Company. The protest of the Netherlands against this construction work is entirely disregarded.

The publication of the telegram of General Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol, professing his determination to resist Japanese aggression was very favorably received by the people of Jehol. All the organizations for the resistance against Japanese aggressions in Chengteh (Jehol City) are now greatly enlarged and are working openly and unitedly for their common purpose. After the Japanese Consulate at Chifeng has been withdrawn, there is now no Japanese in the whole Province of Jehol which is peculiar to the Provinces of North China. The handful of Chinese traitors, realizing the pressure of public opinion, have fled severally from the Province.

Chinese Legation February 7, 1933

0320

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 6 - 1933
Department of State

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 3, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 7 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 4 - 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Conversation.

Count Roncalli, First Secretary of Italian Embassy.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Proposed Friendly Representations to Japan on Basis of the Protocol of 1901.

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793.94/5868

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793.00

Count Roncalli called and stated that his Government wished to inquire what action the American Government contemplated taking in response to the suggestion which the Chinese Government had made to Protocol powers that those powers protest to the Japanese Government on the basis of occurrences at Shanhaikwan.

Mr. Hornbeck said that the American Government had informed the Chinese Government that we were in doubt as to the nature of the alleged abuses in connection with which the suggestion of a protest had been made, but that if and when we perceived that provisions of the Protocol had been violated we would consider what steps it might be appropriate for us to take in relation to American rights and obligations under the Protocol. On the basis of our existing knowledge of the situation, we felt that,

if

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

if any protest were to be made at this time, it would be best for it to be made by powers party to the Agreement of 1902 (the "Conditions") as well as to the Protocol of 1901, and for that reason, he, Mr. Hornbeck, would venture to suggest that the Italian Government confer with the British and the French Governments in regard to this matter. It was felt here that if, in the premises, any one or all of those governments felt that advantage might be gained from their protesting at Tokyo, their action in so doing would have our good will.

Count Roncalli expressed appreciation of this statement of the situation and the suggestion.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 11 1933
DIVISION OF

FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated February 11, 1933

Rec'd 4:55 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

February 11, 1 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"February 11, noon. Troop and supply trains moving eastward through Tientsin have been averaging about two per day for past ten days. American Military Officer who visited Shanhaikwan yesterday reports that General Suzuki has left Shanhaikwan and has established headquarters at Chinchow. Only one Japanese regiment, one tank and two armored trains now at Shanhaikwan. General situation Chinwangtao, Shanhaikwan area, remains substantially unchanged. British Cruiser FOLKSTONE has left Chinwangtao.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

JS

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JUN 24 1933

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793.94.23

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 16, 1933.

EHD:
MMH:

Berlin's despatch No. 2154 of January 28, 1933, reports German press comment on the Sino-Japanese conflict. The comment is not particularly significant, describing the weakness of the League because of non-participation by the United States, imperialistic interests of the United States in China, etc.

MMH:CLS

0324

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Berlin, January 28, 1933.

No. 2154

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict,
German Press Reaction Thereto.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 17 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Copy to M.I.D.
" " ONI.

FEB 21 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 13 1933
Department of State

193.94

F/HS
793.94/5870

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/5839

In continuation of despatch No. 2139 of January 21, 1933, I have the honor to report that the German press continued to follow the developments in the Sino-Japanese conflict with interest but did not indulge in extensive comment.

The moderate Left FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG of January 25 remarked that, as a result of this conflict, the League was in the midst of the severest crisis ~~which~~ which it had as yet experienced. It was suffering from the fact that it lacked actual power and had to reckon

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FEB 25 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

reckon with the two great Powers, America and Russia, which did not belong to the League and which, while greatly interested in the Manchurian question, had not given evidence of particular clarity of purpose or decision in the matter. It was apparent that Japan did not wish to see these two countries co-operating with the League. Japan had hitherto been able to have her own way because both England and France, for general and economic reasons, had practiced forebearance; and because Russia, aware of her weakness in the Far East, tried to be on good terms with Japan; while the United States, instead of proceeding energetically, relied too much on the League.

Judging by the traditional Geneva methods, the attempt would probably again be made to avoid radical decisions. "We cannot refrain from pointing out to America that her absence inflicts upon the League a constitutional restriction, and that her joining would give it added authority. The same applies to Russia...."

According to the moderate Left BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG of January 26, Japan declared in effect: "In the first place, the independence of the State of Manchukuo is a fact. Secondly, there is no China. Thirdly, there is no Sino-Japanese war. For all these three reasons, the League has nothing to do with the whole matter."

The Communist ROTE FAHNE of January 24 took the view that "...in connection with the conflicts over war debts in the last few days, American imperialism was in a position to exert decisive pressure, in

particular

0326

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

particular on the attitude of English imperialism in the Manchurian question. 'Give up supporting Japan in the Far East and we are prepared to cancel your war debts!'"

This journal went on to remark that if America started a general offensive against her Japanese rival it was not because she wanted peace but because of her own imperialistic interests in China. "The interference of the imperialistic robbers can signify nothing but a battle for the division of the spoils, i. e., a world war."

Respectfully yours,

Alfred W. Kliefoth

Alfred W. Kliefoth,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Copy to E. I. C., Paris.
710.
WWS HCF ER

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 6 1933
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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 13, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

This, from Atherton, has just come in.

I think you should have it at once. Therefore, I am not stopping to read the enclosed clippings.

SKH

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 14 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 13 1933

SKH/VDM

FEB 6 1933

0328

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 6 - 1933
Department of State

Ack'd 1/17/33

London, January 6, 1933.

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RECEIVED
FEB 6 1933
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
DIVISION OF JAN 14 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 13 1933

My dear Stanley:

793.94

There is unanimous opinion of regret here at the recent outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese at Shanhaikwan. There is also unanimous agreement that Britain cannot afford to interfere by force of arms in the Far Eastern situation. Furthermore, there is unanimous opinion that the solution of the Far Eastern situation must be found in the League, and with cooperation or full knowledge of the United States. However, there is a distinct and increasing divergence of opinion as to the manner in which the Sino-Japanese controversy is being handled at Geneva. This recent incident has caused renewed criticism by opposition opinion of Sir John Simon and especially his Geneva speech of December 7, which was never very well received here and which is now generally deplored as having encouraged the Japanese viewpoint. The opposition point of view is well put forth in the editorials of the DAILY HERALD, NEWS CHRONICLE and MANCHESTER GUARDIAN of January 3, which I attach hereto.

1-3/

Stanley K. Hornbeck, Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

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FEB 6 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Just before he departed for Geneva the Chinese Minister,
4/ Dr. Quo, issued a statement, a copy of which is also attached.

It may be interesting to note that the TIMES (in contrast to other papers) has as yet published no editorial on this recent Shanhaikwan incident, but I am informed that the Foreign Office press department has stated in fact to correspondents that the incident is regrettable; however, there is nothing England can do outside the League, and it is therefore not well to antagonize Japan so that she will withdraw from the League, unless such a policy has the unanimous support of all League members and the United States. The Foreign Office lays stress on the need for cooperation with the United States, but nevertheless realizes that opinion here is more tolerant of Japan, as a Far Eastern stabilizing influence, than is American opinion.

Attention was drawn this morning (I-13-33) that they had just now for the first time published an editorial on the subject.

The enclosed editorials from the DAILY MAIL of
5-6/ January 3, and the DAILY TELEGRAPH of January 4 give the extreme opposite view from that of the opposition press. I should say general public opinion one hears in ordinary table conversation was summed up by the last paragraph of the editorial from the DAILY TELEGRAPH:

"It

0330

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

> "It is also a fair assumption that no report by the League which was calculated to wound Japan and compel her withdrawal from the League would find the requisite unanimity at Geneva. Japan, once outside the League, would be far less subject to restraint than she is within the Geneva Areopagus; and the threat of a Japanese march on Peking, with a real Sino-Japanese war to follow, would then take on a substance it does not possess at present. Britain, at any rate, has no reason to embroil herself with an old and proud friend and former ally, who is rightly regarded as the main bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East."

Sir John Simon is away in Southern France, and the Foreign Office claims to have incomplete reports as to the situation; consequently very little can be said there officially. I do, however, honestly believe there is a general desire here that the United States should be kept fully informed of all the League proceedings, and that the League proceedings should have the approval of the United States in order that there may be no divergence of action on the part of the two Governments in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

1. "Japan's Defiance", DAILY HERALD, January 3, 1933.
2. "Japan Goes Marching On", NEWS CHRONICLE, Jan. 3, 1933.
3. "The Japanese New Year", MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Jan. 3, 1933.
4. "London Minister's Statement", FINANCIAL NEWS, Jan. 4, 1933.
5. "Japan Warns China", DAILY MAIL, January 3, 1933.
6. "The League and Japan", DAILY TELEGRAPH, January 4, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(1)

DAILY HERALD

LONDON

Jan. 3, 1933.

JAPAN'S DEFIANCE

JAPAN has chosen the opening of the New Year for her new aggression against China, her new defiance of Geneva.

That the attack on Shan-hai-kwan and the ultimatum to the Chinese are deliberate, and deliberately timed, there can be no reasonable doubt.

Tokio is, of course, ready—as it was in September, 1931—with stories of Chinese provocation, of bomb outrages and whatnot.

But to readers of the "Daily Herald," at least, warned ahead of what was impending, these will bring no conviction.

The world and the League are faced by a new challenge. And surely this time it can hardly be ignored.

The Committee of the Assembly meets again in a fortnight's time.

Its attempt at conciliation in December was contemptuously rejected by the Japanese Government. Now comes the "overt act" at Shan-hai-kwan to emphasise the insolence at Geneva.

Sir John Simon has frequently urged that in this business "we must concern ourselves with the realities."

But his policy throughout has been to turn a carefully blinded eye to the realities, to decline to notice invasion, war and conquest, to see only a "controversy" about rights in Manchuria.

He has patiently and complacently gone on pretending that nothing in particular has happened, and hoping that something would turn up.

It is to be hoped that the newest affront will at last shake his complacency and his childlike faith that Japan is "a good and loyal member of the League," and is showing "a spirit which we would wish to welcome and to make use of."

If Sir John can at last be persuaded to face realities, the League may yet assert its authority and save its prestige.

Certainly, it now comes to the crisis of its fate.

For if it continues meekly to condone international crime after crime it will perish of its own futility.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(2)

NEWS CHRONICLE

LONDON Jan. 3, 1933.

JAPAN GOES MARCHING ON

A glance at the map shows the gravity of the news from Shanhaikwan. On the usual pretexts of "concentrations of Chinese troops" and "protecting their nationals," Japanese troops are reported to have forced their way, after more or less heavy fighting, into this walled Chinese city, and will no doubt now proceed to push along the line of the Great Wall, thus cutting off the province of Jehol from Pekin, and rendering its conquest unnecessary. For clearly the Chinese forces in Jehol, caught between Japanese Manchukuo and this new Japanese army, will be incapable of long resistance. It is impossible not to admire the astuteness of these tactics and the cool, cynical efficiency with which they are being carried through. The covering excuses, to be sure, betray some lack of inventiveness in their monotony. But, after all, if an excuse, however unconvincing, will serve its purpose, why bother to invent a new one?

There is no indication at present of the numbers of the Japanese troops in and about Shanhaikwan. But it is known that movements of Japanese troops in the area have been going on recently, and we may be sure that they will be adequate for the work on hand, which is, under one pretext or another, the complete destruction of China. Well may Mr. Lansbury say:

> When we remember the tens of millions sacrificed in the Great War for what was described as a scrap of paper it is a most terrible commentary both on the League of Nations and the Versailles Peace Treaty that it should be possible for Japan to be taking the action she is.

We have never defended the supineness of the League of Nations in this matter, which has allowed an issue manageable by prompt drastic action in its early stages to develop till it threatens another world war. But what is to be said of those secret or open believers in the Balance of Power who, in their eagerness to hamstring the League, are passively conniving at a tremendous shift in the balance of world power, with results which it is hardly possible to exaggerate?

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(3)

PAPER MANCHESTER GUARDIAN NUMBER

LONDON Jan. 3, 1933.

The Japanese New Year

From ancient times the peoples of the Far East were used to celebrate the birth of a new year with gongs and junketing. New-fangled Western calendars brought other customs to the Japanese, who welcomed the first day of 1933 with salvos of machine-gun fire at Shanhaikwan, the terminus of the Peiping-Mukden railway within the Chinese Wall. It may be said that there is nothing new in this—that since the Japanese began the virtual annexation of Manchuria they have had fighting every day in many parts of that enormous region. But though the casualties at Shanhaikwan be insignificant, this is no common "punitive operation" of the kind to which the Japanese must be condemned so long as they remain within Manchuria. The Chinese have officially asserted that this was "an unfortunate frontier incident of no special significance." May they be right, but they are surely wrong, though it is obvious that they want to avoid even the semblance of provocation. Japan has long been mistress of the art of manufacturing "incidents," when they are needed to prepare the ground for an extension of aggression. To mention only two, the "explosions" of Mukden and Tientsin in September and November, 1931, were admirably timed to give the Japanese excuse for crushing military action; if they did not form parts of a premeditated plan, one must extend the view of Mr. Matsuoka and believe that "good and loyal" Japan has all the godlike qualities, including all-knowing foresight.

The "incident of Shanhaikwan" has so far followed classic lines. Explosions are expensive and no longer necessary. A find of "two live bombs" on Sunday night was quite enough to justify the bombardment and occupation of this Chinese city (which, be it noted, lies outside Manchuria within the Chinese Wall). The Japanese have announced that they have acted for "the protection of their nationals"; that is, no doubt, the reason why they indulged their airmen with a little bombing practice over crowded Chinese quarters and why 3,000 troops were yesterday reported to be entraining for a further movement down the line towards Peiping (Peking). It is the business of all Foreign Offices to keep themselves well stocked with whitewash, and Tokio can be relied upon to spread another coat; but even Japanese diplomats must find their soldiers' orders rather difficult to execute. The army, which controls the policy of Japan, has long abandoned all pretence of justification for its actions. Its immediate purpose is, at least, quite clear; its ultimate objective seems unlimited. The Lytton Commission wrote as follows last September:—

> During the month of August several minor engagements took place on the borders of Fengtien and Jehol provinces. . . . There are widespread fears in China that these events are only a prelude to larger military

client "State" in Northern China would be nothing but another outrage against every principle of justice; it would be hateful to the vast majority of the Chinese; it would yet further deepen and embitter all the feelings which make the Sino-Japanese dispute almost insoluble. The League of Nations has already lost much reputation by its handling of this matter. It must not and it cannot stand aside and give the Japanese yet more delays. The Assembly Committee of Nineteen will meet again at latest on January 16. It should meet earlier in view of this new aggravation of the quarrel. In any event, it can gain nothing by further temporising. The Japanese will go their own way, irrespective of the League's recommendations. They may withdraw from membership, but at this stage that is by far the lesser of two evils. A strong unanimous report must be drawn up to show the world that nothing which Japan has done or will do by armed force will be acknowledged. The support of the United States is certain for this line of action. It is the only one which can preserve the League's prestige and make a basis for a genuine settlement.

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clear; its ultimate objective seems unlimited. The Lytton Commission wrote as follows last September:—

During the month of August several minor engagements took place on the borders of Fengtien and Jehol provinces. . . . There are widespread fears in China that these events are only a prelude to larger military operations at an early date, aimed at the occupation of Jehol by the Japanese. . . . The fear of a Japanese attack in this province, which is already claimed as part of the territory of "Manchukuo," is not unreasonable. Its imminence is freely discussed in the Japanese press.

A glance at any map will show how weak is the position of the Chinese forces in Jehol, threatened as they can easily be in rear by any Japanese force advancing from the Peiping railway. Japan already has a garrison at Tientsin; her fleet commands the coast and can advance far up the river to Peiping. A Japanese outflanking movement on these lines would make the Chinese hold both on Jehol and on the northern province of Hopei (Chihli) untenable. It may be that the Japanese will wait till spring before completing all their operations; but it is obvious to all who do not wish to be deceived that this is how this "incident" must be explained.

The Japanese Foreign Office has prepared an ultimatum to Marshal Chang, who still commands the Chinese forces in North-eastern China. It will, it is reported, tell him that "the Japanese army will be compelled "to resort to positive action if he "continues his present actions in "Jehol; that there is danger of opera-"tions in Jehol spreading to Northern "China, if once started; and that he "will be held responsible for the conse-"quences if Japan is compelled to act." The Marshal has been strengthening his garrisons and is undoubtedly in touch with the Chinese commanders in Jehol, but it is crystal clear that the initiative of this renewed offensive proceeds from the Japanese and from the Japanese alone. Japan will probably have an easy task in dealing with the regular Chinese forces. She does not act until the ground is well prepared and she has superior position and material to make up for inferiority in numbers. She may conceivably play out the grandiose farce of Manchu restoration to its logical conclusion. With Mr. Henry Pu replaced on his ancestral

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PAPER FINANCIAL NEWS NUMBER

CITY LONDON DATE Jan. 4, 1933.

LONDON MINISTER'S STATEMENT

The Chinese Minister in London, Dr. Kuo Tai Chi, who will leave to-morrow to attend the League Assembly at Geneva, said: "The Japanese militarists are treating Geneva as a mockery.

"The League of Nations can follow the weak man's road of procrastination no longer.

"China's faith in the efficacy of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact is fast approaching the vanishing point," he said. "A decision must be reached by nations, especially the Powers exercising an effective voice in Geneva, whether to maintain or to repudiate the post-war system of collective responsibility for the maintenace of peace.

"SHIRKED THEIR DUTY"

"Western nations have so far shirked their duties because of Japanese threats of withdrawal. It is pertinent to ask whether a League crawling under the iron heels of militarist Japan is worthy of its existence. Unless reasonable progress is made in effective application of the League principles we may be forced to review our position in relation to other nations and to reorientate our policy in accordance therewith. Reaction in China to disappointment and disillusionment at Geneva may lead to consequences which present leaders have hitherto endeavoured to prevent."

Dr. Kuo expressed the opinion that Japan's economic position will not allow her to carry out her programme.

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DAILY MAIL

LONDON

Jan. 3, 1933.

JAPAN WARNS CHINA

THE public will read with regret the news of fresh difficulties between Japan and China in the Far East. Heavy fighting is reported to have occurred at the port of Shanhaikwan; and, apparently, Chinese troops were the aggressors.

The trouble appears to be mainly due to the action of the Chinese war-lord Chang Hsueh-liang. He has never forgiven the Japanese for expelling him and his brigand forces from Manchuria; and he has of late been concentrating troops on the western frontier of that province with the obvious intention of attacking the Japanese.

Japan has warned him that his proceedings may have grave consequences, but he has so far paid little attention to the warnings. Possibly he imagines that the League of Nations is about to take some violent action against the Japanese. If so, he is preparing for himself a bitter disappointment.

The Manchurian question is now under consideration by the League committee of 19 at Geneva, which must be well aware that **no European Power has the slightest intention of going to war with Japan to restore anarchy and misgovernment in Manchuria.**

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(6)

PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH NUMBER

CITY LONDON DATE Jan. 4, 1933.

THE LEAGUE AND JAPAN

THE fresh outbreak of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan, to the immediate south of the Great Wall, is not only a matter for regret. It is bound to increase the anxiety already felt in British official and political circles regarding the outcome of the protracted and embittered Manchurian controversy. The Committee of Nineteen appointed by the League Assembly to deal with this controversy, in the light of the LYTTON Report, is to meet again at Geneva on Jan. 16. It is sincerely to be hoped that by that time the fighting which has now developed on the border of the Jehol province will have been either stopped or localised. For it would indeed be lamentable if the Committee were to be deflected from its true mission—that of seeking to reconcile the views of Tokio and Nanking on the future status of Manchuria, with the aid of such of the recommendations framed by Lord LYTTON and his colleagues as might still be given practical and effective shape at the present juncture. Should the Committee, however, be driven by the trend of events to abandon this helpful task of conciliation for the thankless one of endeavouring to ascertain the origins of the Shanhaikwan fighting, and to apportion the relevant responsibilities and blame, it is doubtful whether any good would result, and the existing dangers to the League and to peace would be intensified.

These remarks are prompted by the far from discerning zeal with which some of the smaller League States and certain sections of public opinion in this country are urging the League to take drastic action, and the British Government to pro-

BANK HOLD-UP IN

EARLY DAYS IN NEW YORK

From Our Own Correspondent

NEW YORK, Tuesday.

Mr. John Masefield, the Poet Laureate, and Mrs. Masefield arrived here to-day for a lecture tour of the United States and a long rest at Chandler, Arizona.

His replies to reporters' questions settled once and for all the story that he was once a bar-tender in a Greenwich Village, New York, public-house.

"It was nothing so splendid as being a bar-tender," he said. "I was merely the pot-boy and handyman who carried liquor from the cellar, cleaned the brasses and swept the floor. I took the job when I came to the city from a farm, so that I could earn money while preparing for a literary career."

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~~SKH~~
DCR

January 17, 1933.

Dear Ray:

I acknowledge with thanks your informative letter of January 6, in which you discuss British opinion with regard to the situation in the Far East as developed by the recent fighting at Shanhaikwan; also its enclosures. I have read these items, as I do all that you are so good as to send, with great interest and I had occasion immediately upon its receipt to show your letter to the Secretary. All such bits prove helpful.

With kind regards, I am,

Yours cordially,

Stanley K. Hornbeck

793.94/5871

Ray Atherton, Esquire,
American Embassy,
London.

FE:EMD:SKH:CLS

A true copy of the signed original. FE/

0339

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, January 11, 1933.

No. 1910

Subject: Interview with Japanese Chargé d'Affaires re Japanese plans.

PM RECD DEPT OF STATE FEB 13 33 DIVCOM

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Copy in FE File
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 14 1933 Department of State

F/HS

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FILED FEB 23 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Legation's telegram No. 36, of January 9, 7 p.m./ 5729 regarding the situation created by the most recent Shanhaikwan incident, I have the
1/ honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation a member of my staff had on January 9th with Mr. S. Nakayama, the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Peiping.

From Mr. Nakayama's statements it would appear that while the Japanese Government is probably not intending at the present time to extend military operations

south

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

south of Shanhaikwan - unless attacked by the Chinese - it seems to be prepared to assist "Manchukuo" in expelling the Chinese from the province of Jehol.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of conversation
January 9, 1933.

800
CVHE/js.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1910

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Nakayama,
Japanese Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.
Mr. Engert.

Mr. Nakayama came to see me this morning principally to discuss the Ekvall murder case, which also involved the death of a Japanese national. But before he left our conversation also included a reference to the political situation in North China.

Mr. Nakayama stated definitely that his Legation had received instructions from Tokyo to the effect that the Japanese Government had no intention of proceeding south of Shanhaikwan, provided the Chinese make no move to retake Shanhaikwan. The Japanese military had received instructions in this sense.

I asked Nakayama whether a Chinese concentration of troops in the area between Tientsin and Chinwangtao would be looked upon as a threat to retake Shanhaikwan. He replied that he did not know, as that depended upon circumstances. He said that the Nanking Government had undoubtedly instructed Chang Hsueh-liang to recapture Shanhaikwan, but that - as was the case with all instructions from Nanking - it did not necessarily mean that they would be taken at their face value. In his opinion the Japanese forces would not move unless they were actually attacked.

I then asked whether the Chinese were moving troops into Jehol. He said that Japan knew very well that China had been moving considerable forces into Jehol during the

past

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past three or four months. He said that this did not alarm the Japanese Government very much but that the government of Manchukuo was very much alarmed, as it was determined to include the province of Jehol within its boundaries. Nakayama gave me the impression that if Manchukuo should appeal to the Japanese Government in connection with the incorporation of Jehol, Japan would lend military assistance to drive the Chinese out of that province. Nakayama said that as the Chinese had already moved practically all forces available in the Peiping area into Jehol, additions to these forces would either have to come from Shantung and Shansi, or even from further south. In answer to my question as to whether he had heard of any such troop movements from the south, he merely said "not yet".

793.94/5812

C. V. H. E.

Peiping,
January 9, 1933.

CVHE/js.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1924 Peiping, January 19, 1933.

Subject: Editorial Comment on Significance of Occupation of Shanhaikuan.

793.94

PM RECD DEPT OF STATE FEB 13 33 DIV COMM & RPET

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 14 1933 Department of State

F/HS

793.94/5873

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Legation's telegram No. 5 of January 3, 5 p.m./ 5668 and to previous telegrams regarding the occupation of Shanhaikuan, I have the honor to transmit herewith two editorials which appeared in the PEIPING CHRONICLE and the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES respectively on January 11, 1933 commenting upon the significance of the recent occupation of Shanhaikuan by Japanese and "Manchukuo" forces. 1/2/

In the opinion of the editor of the PEIPING CHRONICLE (Government controlled, but British edited) the occupation of this important seaport, which is inside the Great Wall, is but the first of many steps which Japan contemplates taking

FILED FEB 28 1933

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taking in the near future in order to establish a new barrier between China proper and the Province of Jehol, which will pave the way for the ultimate absorption of this Chinese province by the so-called state of "Manchukuo". The editorial complains of the recalcitrant attitude of Japan and of the ineffectiveness of the League in endeavoring to bring about conciliation, and strongly urges the invocation of Article XVI of the League Covenant as the only likely manner of putting a stop to continued agression on the part of Japan. The anxiety and despair revealed in this editorial is akin to the attitude reflected in most sections of the vernacular press at the present time, and is quite understandable in the light of the events of the past sixteen months. If attempts at conciliation fail, and if no other steps are taken by foreign powers to put a stop to further encroachment by Japan upon Chinese territory, there is no telling to what steps the Chinese may be driven in their desperation. The growing insistence of the Cantonese and other factions in the south, and of such political leaders as Sun Fo, the newly inducted chairman of the Legislative Yuan, for strong action by the military may readily lead to open warfare, and very possibly a recrudescence of strong anti-foreign feeling as well.

The editorial from the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES (British owned and edited) expresses the opinion that should the Chinese fail to submit to the demand of the Japanese War Office that all Chinese troops shall withdraw outside the two mile limit along the Peking-Shanhaikuan railway, in accordance with the terms of the Boxer Protocol the Japanese will

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will advance along the line or "march across country to Tungchow or some other point between Tientsin and Peiping." The editorial then quotes an alarming accusation against the Kuomintang which has allegedly been published by the War Office in Tokyo, and expresses the opinion that the Chinese authorities who are faced with such a grave and acute a problem are on the horns of dilemma, just as are the representatives of the Powers at Geneva. The present situation is unquestionably full of dynamite, and whether it is to become still more critical it would be unsafe to predict, but it seems probable that future developments will be determined largely by the policy that is adopted and followed by the authorities in Tokyo.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:
1. Enclosure from PEIPING CHRONICLE, dated January 11, 1933
2. Clipping from PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, dated January 11, 1933.

RLB/k

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1924

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Wednesday, January 11, 1933.

THE NEXT STEPS?

During the past few days there has been a certain amount of clarification of the issues. The Japanese were apparently not prepared for an immediate advance beyond Shanhaikwan. In all probability they intended to see how the world took the Shanhaikwan coup before going further. World opinion has not yet conclusively formulated itself, so there is a lull in the proceedings. Advantage is to be taken of this lull to "rectify the line". Messages from Tokyo indicate that Japanese forces will at an early date occupy the Chiumen Pass, a point on the Great Wall some miles direct north of Shanhaikwan, for the ostensible purpose of preventing Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's forces, who are (according to Japanese reports) in Eastern Jehol (where they have a perfect right to be) passing through the Wall and the Pass and either encircling or cutting the communications of the Japanese usurpers at Shanhaikwan This is the nibbling process. Once the Chiumen Pass is occupied we shall be told that it cannot safely be held---although China and Japan are not at war—unless Sanchia-k'ou also is held; and that will be unsafe if Yiyung-k'ou be not occupied; and then the same excuse will follow for Chiehlin-k'ou; and so *ad infinitum*, or at any rate as far as Japan feels inclined to feel unsafe. All this can be done without coming within China Proper, but each step forward will be a new barrier between China Proper and Jehol, and a step towards the deglutition of Jehol by "Manchukuo". Quite probably some of these steps will be taken so as to present new "accomplished facts" to Geneva.

There is very little sign that Japan is prepared to listen to any talk of a halt and an understanding. In Geneva Mr. Matsuoka says that the Shanhaikwan affair does not modify the Japanese thesis. He might have gone a good deal further and said that it simply endorsed it. That thesis is simply: "What we have done, we have done. There is nothing more to be said; or done, except what we choose to do". Mr. Matsuoka adds that there is no special reason why Japan should remain within the League. He is shrugging his shoulders in advance at anything that may be said at the Assembly when it meets. It is the veiled hint of what will happen if Japan's thesis is not accepted to the very foot of the letter. From Tokyo comes also the report that the Japanese authorities at Shanhaikwan have been instructed to decline the good offices of the British commander at Chinwangtao, another evidence of complete indifference to what anybody else either thinks or says or does. It is further reported from Tokyo that the Japanese representatives at Shanhaikwan have been instructed on matters for negotiation, but have not been instructed to negotiate; and the Chinese authorities at Chinwangtao have similar instructions. As the aggreived or at any rate the aggressive party, with "complaints" to make in virtue of which they have done their very worst at Shanhaikwan, it is for the Japanese to make the first move; but there is no sign of such a move, and the instructions not to accept neutral good offices are significant: good offices evidently must not be accepted until there is another accomplished fact, the occupation of the Chiumen Pass, to add weight to the discussions.

The publication of the Committee of Nineteen's *expose de motifs* and draft resolutions has brought

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another element into the situation. As the Geneva message reached us, there was no indication that these had been published by authority of the League. The message expressly stated: "The text . . . is published this morning in a local paper". There is no hint of official publication, and we hardly think inferences may be drawn from the publication, but if officially authorized, it may be taken to mean that there exists no basis for negotiation on the issues already presented to the League, and the Council should "publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are just and proper in regard thereto". All this, of course, can only refer to the matter already brought to the notice of the League. These new developments have not come within its cognizance, though reported to the Secretariat by Dr. W.W. Yen. With respect to these new outrages, the experience of the last sixteen months has shown the futility of using the League's less drastic machinery, and Dr. Yen would be well advised to resort direct to the invocation of Article XVI, calling on the League to declare the attack on Shanhaikwan an act of war and to enforce the economic sanctions envisaged in Paragraph One of the Article. The previous concern of the League with the earlier subject-matter of the dispute does not preclude the invocation of this Article in respect of the new acts; nor does the Chinese appeal under other Articles in respect of earlier acts stop her invocation of Article XVI with respect to the shameless outrage at Shanhaikwan.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIAMOND CUT DIAMOND!

A TOKIO telegram says that following a joint conference of the War Office and the Foreign Office, orders were cabled to the commander of the Japanese Garrison in Tientsin to negotiate a settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair. He is also directed to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the two-mile limit along the railway in accordance with the Boxer Protocol, "for the purpose of maintaining peace and order at Shanhaikwan." In other words, the price of a local settlement of an isolated incident is the evacuation of the entire railway zone from Shanhaikwan to Peiping, and a free passage for the favoured ones to power in Peiping. The Japanese make no demands that they are not prepared to back up with earnest endeavour. Apart from the specially trained and equipped force which made the spectacular march over the Khingan range to Manchuli and has now been sent south of Chinchow, and the great concentration of tanks at Suichung, it is reported that a very substantial Japanese force it now inside the Wall. That seems to imply that failing Chinese submission to the demand it will be enforced, either by a direct advance along the line or by flanking attacks from the hills north-west of the line and a march across country to Tungchow or some other point between Tientsin and Peiping. This would, of course, be a far less difficult and protracted campaign than an advance through the wilderness of Jehol. If his contact with Peiping were lost, Tang Yu-lin would probably go over to Manchukuo without further ado, and this would simplify the task of "mopping up" the Volunteers which would doubtless follow.

On the eve of the Shanhaikwan affair the War Office in Tokio declared war on the Kuomintang. Under a bold headline: "War Ministry here thinks disposal of Kuomintang is Vital," the *Japan Times* published a statement by the War Ministry which, because of its exceptional importance both in regard to the incident that immediately followed at Shanhaikwan and the renewed crisis that will arise as a result of the Japanese demand for the evacuation of the railway zone, we reproduce *in toto*:—

"Among the various resolutions said to have been adopted by the Kuomintang at the third convention of its central committee, what attracted our keen attention, was the project for vigorous opposition against Japan.

"This plan is aimed at directing offensive operations from the direction of Jehol with a view to restoring the so-called lost territory in the Northeast. For this purpose the Kuomintang advocates enlarging China's air-force, financing the voluntary troops and intensifying the anti-Japanese boycott.

"The real intentions of the Kuomintang in this connection seems to be to instill bitter enmity against Japan among the Chinese people so that they may be able to pretend that the Chinese are united people and so hoodwink the outside world by concealing the prevailing chaos in that country.

"Such an attempt on the part of China will prove a serious menace to peace in the Far East, and although it is quite problematical if this project will ever materialize, we can not afford to tolerate the ideas underlying such a plan.

"Explaining this plan, Mr. Sun Fo made mention of a second world war, but we can not understand why he thus risks the danger of making China the cockpit of an international conflict and precipitating China on the road to its own disintegration.

"Some time ago Chinese politicians were working hard for a conflict between Japan and the United States, and these two peoples at that time seemed to entertain somewhat uneasy feelings toward each other. But now all uneasiness has gone and the Japanese and American peoples see no danger in the way of their future relations.

"Observers of international affairs have also come to see the need of getting rid of all circumstances detrimental to world peace, instead of making futile attempts at applying theoretical principles to developments where such principles can not be properly applied.

"Such is the only way to

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prevent a second world war and secure world peace. In this connection it is most imperative at the present moment to dispose of the Kuomintang and its dangerous foreign policy as an urgent measure to make it possible to safeguard peace in the Far East."

This most significant declaration was not cabled to China. On the other hand, a Rengo despatch from Tokio, of practically the same date (December 25), which was published in this paper, stated that "the Foreign Office attaches little or no importance to the decision reached at the Third Plenary Session, considering it to be a meaningless, bold front taken for the sake of domestic policy." So long as Chiang Kai-shek remained the dominant influence in the Nanking Government this interpretation would undoubtedly be more in accordance with the truth than the War Office interpretation. In this connexion it is of piquant interest to note Mr. Sun Fo's renewed hesitation to take over his post as Head of the Legislative Yuan. We are told that he had a lengthy conference with the Generalissimo at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum Park. The son of the Founder of the Kuomintang faith recently figured as an exponent of the stronger policy in regard to Japan. Whether he was merely appealing to the gallery in his efforts to return to office, or will put his policy before everything, remains to be seen. He has been able to show, in his long political career, great political dexterity. In the Communist era at Hankow he was able to out-shout all others in denouncing foreign banks and other institutions. He has stood for the Party domination and against it, for democracy and for dictatorship. He is that most practical of all politicians: one whose chief principle is that of expediency. But the crisis has put him in a difficult position, and the Nanking message which stated that the capital breathed a sigh of relief when he arrived is significant of the apprehensions that had been aroused.

Meanwhile the Generalissimo's conception of the policy of active resistance consists of keeping as far away from the immediate centre of trouble as possible and issuing statements that his Chief of Staff is inspecting the Yangtze forts! It is a gesture more calculated to depress public opinion than to enthuse it. But those who go in for the precarious business of saving nations must expect to have all their wits about them and employ strange devices. As for the Generals who want the Young Marshal to fight and ask for orders to send their troops to the front, they are politely but firmly ordered by the Nanking Government to cool their ardour and look after their own bailiwick, in which the Generalissimo sets them a notable example. Both at Geneva and the capitals of non-League countries, and in China, the same embarrassment prevails, and only the gravity of the crisis prevents the observer from revelling in the cynical humour of it all. All are in a dilemma, and each is trying to pass the buck to the other.

The *contretemps* is naturally most acute in the North. The Young Marshal said that if Tokio were content to dispose of himself this would afford no difficulty. But that is evidently not enough, and a more potent influence than the 57 Generals is at work. Even if the latter were prepared to permit him to resign—as they refused to do during the Wang Ching-wei controversy—it would not be an adequate solution. The way has to be made clear, apparently, for those who are to uphold the Buffer State plan. Prince Kung is said to be busy in Peiping, but he is hardly likely to be more successful than he was in Manchuria. The Chinese bankers and other leading elements spurn him. Perhaps the preliminary task will fall upon certain Generals who once illumined the political firmament but were thrown out by the Kuomintang triumph five or six years ago. If a Buffer State is the sole alternative to large-scale warfare probably many of the Northern Generals would be ready to join in, perhaps in the hope that thereby they might persuade the Japanese that their biggest job was in the far North. The Kremlin did not disguise its relief—we had almost said glee—that the considerable reinforcement of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, recently agreed to by the Japanese Government, were meant for this part of the world and not for the Siberian border. The Generals inside the Wall would doubtless evince a similar spirit of relief if by quiet acquiescence in the Buffer State scheme they could escape major attention and divert it where the Soviet would least like to find it.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
mam
RECEIVED
FEB 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GREEN
GENEVA

Dated February 13, 1933

Rec'd 5:28 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 18 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State

Washington

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105, February 13, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Following is resume of report Sweetser has given me in confidence of the meeting of the Committee of Nineteen this morning.

Drummond reported that he had carried out on Thursday afternoon the instructions given him by the Committee that morning to make verbal representations to Matsuoka regarding Jehol.

Drummond stated that the Committee felt that if military operations on any large scale took place this would completely frustrate any hope of conciliation. Matsuoka requested that the Committee bear in mind the special situation of Jehol. Manchukuo claims Jehol as part of its territory and the Governor of Jehol has fully associated himself with the Manchukuo. Similarly, Japan had a treaty with Manchukuo obligating her to help defend that state's independence and integrity. The Chinese had many troops in Jehol and had recently moved in many more so that there were now between one hundred thousand and one hundred and fifty thousand there. The Manchukuo

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Manchukuo authorities felt that these troops constituted a danger to them and that they must take defensive action. Japan in turn was obligated to support this action. Of course, if China were to withdraw the troops the difficulty would cease to exist.

Drummond replied that if China withdrew her troops she would feel she was withdrawing troops from her own territory and indirectly be recognizing that Jehol did not belong to her. Matsuoka agreed that this was true but said that as these troops would eventually be driven out anyway they had better go peacefully. At the same time it seemed to him that Jehol was an entirely separate question and had nothing to do with the problem of conciliation. In the circumstances he was not able to give any assurances as to the future.

The Committee then read and approved page by page, subject to certain minor changes, the first three sections of the report to be adopted under paragraph four. Tomorrow, Tuesday, it will finally approve the amendments suggested today which are more of drafting and of emphasis than of substance and will begin examination of the recommendations. It is hoped that the full report, including the recommendations, will have been completed by tomorrow noon or at the latest Wednesday and that the convocation of the Assembly can be immediately issued and the report sent to the printer and distributed in final

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final form to all states by Thursday or Friday. This would allow time for study of the report before the Assembly meets either Saturday or early next week.

Following is authoritative text of final paragraph preceding recommendations in the report (see my 103, February 12, 1 pm, part 3 paragraph 2): 793.94-Conf/788

"In order to facilitate as much as possible the establishment in the Far East of a situation in conformity with the conclusions of the present report the Secretary General is charged with communicating a copy of this report to states non-members of the League signatories of the Pact of Paris or the Treaty of Washington, expressing to them the hope of the Assembly to see them disposed to associate themselves with the views expressed in the report and, if occasion warrants, to concert their action and attitude toward the development of events in the Far East with members of the League".

I am reliably informed that the report will be some forty-five pages long. We shall make every effort to mail it to you in confidence via BREMEN sailing February 17 if report has been agreed to by Committee of Nineteen by that time as the present "time table" would seem to indicate as likely.

F.W OX WILSON

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, January 18, 1933.

No. 1925

Subject: Sino-Japanese hostilities in North China and the provisions of the Boxer Protocol.

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Legation's telegram No. 56 of January 16, 9 p.m., (5758) and previous telegrams on the subject of the situation in the Peiping-Tientsin area as a result of the recent Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanhaikwan, I have the honor to transmit herewith eight memoranda of conversations I have had with some of my colleagues and with others between January 7 and January 17, 1933, as listed below. From these conversations the Department will observe that

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my French, British, and Italian colleagues and I felt that in view of the gravity of the situation the question of possible mediation for the purpose of localizing the incident should be explored, but that we did not feel that mediation would have much chance of success. As regards the applicability of the Boxer Protocol, I informed my colleagues briefly of the main points in the Department's telegraphic instructions No. 16 of January 14, 9 p.m., / 5755 C.L. and they stated that the attitude of their respective Governments would probably be similar to that of the United States.

In my conversation with Mr. W. H. Donald, the adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and Mr. P. L. E. Dzau, I stated, in reply to their inquiries, that in the event of hostilities in this area the best means of ensuring that Peiping would be considered as an unfortified city would be for the Chinese to remove their military headquarters, barracks, and troops from it, and I assured them I was prepared to cooperate with the other members of the Diplomatic Body to assist in working out some means by which hostilities in or near the city might be avoided.

Mr. Hallett Abend, the correspondent of the New York Times in Shanghai, called on me on January 13th and informed me that in a conversation which he had had with General Nakamura in Tientsin the latter seemed very belligerent and stated that if the threat of Chi-

nese

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nese mobilization in this area did not cease, the Japanese might be forced to occupy the Peiping-Suiyuan Railroad.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1/ Memorandum of conversation January 7, 1933.
2/ " " " January 7, 1933.
3/ " " " January 9, 1933.
4/ " " " January 9, 1933.
5/ " " " January 12, 1933.
6/ " " " January 13, 1933.
7/ " " " January 16, 1933.
8/ " " " January 17, 1933.

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Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1925

Conversation. Peiping, January 7, 1933.

Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Ingram, British Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Anfuso, in charge of Italian Legation

Subject: Possibility of mediation in Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanhaikwan.

Pursuant to my conversation with Mr. Ingram this afternoon, we discussed the draft which Mr. Ingram and I had drawn up concerning the possibility of mediation. We all agreed that the situation was grave. Our information was to the effect that the Chinese were moving troops for the purpose of resisting any further attacks by the Japanese.

We agreed that, in so far as our information went, the Japanese were not likely to evacuate Shanhaikwan, and there was every possibility that they would make an attack in the direction of Jehol, which would be resisted. This would bring hostilities into the area adjacent to Peiping and Tientsin. We agreed that we would send off a telegram along the lines discussed.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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1925

Conversation. Peiping, January 7, 1933.

Mr. Ingram, British Charge d'Affaires.

Subject: Possibility of mediation in Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanhaikwan.

Mr. Ingram called this afternoon. He stated that he had been much worried about the situation which was developing at Shanhaikwan and its vicinity. Of course British interests predominated, and the charge would be made that the British out of self-interest were anxious; but he felt that the question of possible mediation for the purpose of localizing the incident and preventing its spread should be canvassed. He had prepared a document which is attached. 1/

We read over the document together, and agreed that the situation is such that mediation is almost impossible, but that it seemed to us that we ought to place all of these facts before our Governments in order that they might know exactly how we felt in the matter. It was decided that we would invite our French and Italian colleagues to discuss the question with us and I called them up.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Enclosure: Draft prepared by
Mr. Ingram.

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The French and American Ministers, the Secretary in charge of the Italian Legation, and myself have been considering question of mediation (which so far neither side shows any sign of desiring) in hopes of localizing Shanhaikwan incident. Now that movement of Chinese reenforcements to Tongshan area has commenced, question becomes acute.

Our view is that any mediation undertaken without full consent of highest authorities on both sides is to be deprecated, and mediation if attempted should be under auspices not of any one power but of great powers in concert, if not of League itself. Main object should be to bring both parties together with representations of major power or powers designated by the League participating as at Shanghai with restricted aim of localizing incident and preventing extension of military operations.

There is difficulty on the one hand that Japanese operations are being directed from Chinchow under instructions of General Muto at Changchun, and on the other that the Young Marshal will probably take no responsibility without sanction of Nanking.

Information available to us indicates that only settlement which could satisfy (a) the Japanese would be demilitarization of Shanhaikwan, and (b) the Chinese would be reoccupation of Shanhaikwan and recognition of

their

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their undisputed right to dispose of their forces where they please inside the wall and probably Jehol. These objectives are admittedly well-nigh irreconcilable, but if extension of operations is to be avoided we feel that in spite thereof some attempt at mediation on lines prescribed in Paragraph II above offers only chance of possible solution.

We are alive to impossibility of undertaking any commitments which would involve our forces as police for any neutral zone, or of offering any guarantees to either side.

We venture therefore to suggest to our respective Governments that the offer of our good offices for purposes outlined above be made to the Governments at Tokyo and at Nanking.

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3

Conversation. Peiping, January 9, 1933. 1925

Mr. Wilden, French Minister
Mr. Ingram, British Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Anfuso.

Subject: Sino-Japanese hostilities - Situation at Peiping - Status of Guards under Boxer Protocol.

At the request of Mr. Wilden I asked Mr. Ingram and Mr. Anfuso, Secretary in charge of the Italian Legation, to meet with me this afternoon. We discussed the situation generally, and Mr. Ingram informed us of the activities of Commander Taylor of the British sloop "Folkstone". Mr. Ingram stated that Admiral Kelly had instructed the Commanding Officer at Chinwangtao to call upon the Japanese Naval Commander and General Ho and remind them of his friendship, and to state that in view of the serious situation which had developed in the neighborhood of Chinwangtao he hoped they would exert every effort to prevent hostilities resulting in destruction of British property at Chinwangtao, and to offer his services for purposes of mediation if desired. He stated that Commander Taylor had informed the Admiral and himself that Admiral Tsuda, the Japanese naval commander at Chinwangtao, had informed him that the Japanese General at Tientsin had been instructed to negotiate for a local settlement of the affair. Mr. Ingram stated that there was no truth in the statement that mediation had been undertaken.

We

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We agreed that we should await the reaction of our respective countries to our telegram of Saturday (January 7th) on the subject of mediation.

We agreed that the situation was grave, as all evidence pointed to the fact that the Chinese intended to make a resistance if attacked. Mr. Ingram informed us of a telegram which he had received from Tokyo commenting on our telegram of Saturday regarding the possibilities of mediation. This was generally to the effect that he felt the crux of the situation lay in the province of Jehol, that the Japanese had assumed the duty of eliminating Chinese jurisdiction in Jehol in the interest of Manchukuo, and that in the assumption of that duty they would proceed. He felt that the only chance of solution or mediation lay in an agreement by the Chinese to withdraw from Jehol, in which case he was sure the Japanese would withdraw from Shanhaikwan. We all agreed that there seemed at the present moment little chance for the Chinese to withdraw from Jehol, and that it would be difficult for any of the Powers to suggest such a move.

Mr. Wilden read a telegram from his Consul at Tientsin, to the effect that the Governor of Hopei had through an intermediary approached him to ask what the Powers would do in case the Japanese should use their position under the Boxer Protocol for the purpose of threatening

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the Chinese military. The French Consul understood that other Consuls had been similarly approached. He stated that he had told the intermediary that this matter was one in which he could not take action, but must be considered by the Diplomatic Body.

I informed my colleagues of my conversation with Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling. It appeared that neither myself nor any of the others had received anything from our Consuls at Tientsin in this matter. A perusal of the documents attached to the Boxer Protocol, particularly the letters under which jurisdiction over Tientsin had been restored to the Chinese in 1902, indicated that the United States was not party to the military arrangements in that area. We agreed that until we had been officially approached in the matter, there was little we could do. We agreed that doubtless we might be approached in this matter officially by Nanking, and that it would be advisable for us to warn our Governments that this action might be taken and that they should be prepared for it.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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4

Conversation. Peiping, January 9, 1933.

1925

Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling

Subject: Maintenance of order in the city of Peiping in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling, a prominent Chinese resident of Peiping, former Prime Minister, called this afternoon accompanied by Mr. Lynn Chu who acted as his interpreter. Mr.Hsiung stated that in view of the unfortunate events at Shanhaikwan there was grave danger that hostilities might extend themselves into the area around Peiping, in which case it might be necessary to take steps to prevent disturbances within the city. He referred to a previous time when he with others, cooperating with the Diplomatic Body, had arranged for the maintenance of order within the walls. He asked whether they could expect our cooperation again and whether we had any plans.

I told Mr. Hsiung that he could count upon our interest, and that knowing he was interested I would endeavor to keep in touch with him. I said, however, that I knew of no plan which we could advance at this moment, in view of our lack of knowledge as to what the situation might develop into. I pointed out that we were without information as to the plans of the military, or as to their attitude toward any such situation. I said that as long as the city of Peiping was used as a military headquarters

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quarters there was of course danger of attack here and that it would be extremely difficult for us to do anything to prevent hostilities; if Peiping were evacuated by military headquarters the situation might be one more easy to handle.

Mr. Hsiung stated that the question of the status of Japanese military at Peiping and Tientsin and along the line of the Railway under the Boxer Protocol was of importance, and he wondered what the Powers party to the Boxer Protocol with the Japanese would do to prevent the Japanese from abusing their rights under the Boxer Protocol and using the military, established under that Protocol for the purpose of protecting the Legations and keeping communications open to the sea, to attack the Chinese armed forces in their rear.

I informed Mr. Hsiung that at the present time I had no certain evidence that the Japanese either intended to or had abused their rights under the Protocol. I said that naturally we were all interested in this phase of the situation, but that until we were possessed of information indicating an abuse of the Protocol we could hardly anticipate such abuse. I stated that I could only give to him assurances in regard to the United States and the forces which it maintains at Peiping and at Tientsin for the protection of the Legation.

In conclusion I assured Mr. Hsiung of our interest in the matter and asked him to keep in touch with me should any concrete plans occur to him.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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5

Conversation. Peiping, January 12, 1933. 1925

Mr. W. H. Donald
Mr. P. L. E. Dzau

Subject: Situation at Peiping.

Mr. Donald is personal adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Mr. Dzau is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, and was formerly in business at Harbin. The above-mentioned gentlemen called on me this morning and inquired as to the possibility of preventing military activities in the city of Peiping, in the event that hostilities should extend to this area.

I informed Mr. Dzau that there seemed to me to be little that could be done in this matter, as the plans of the military and the course of events were unknown. I said that in the unhappy event that hostilities might extend into the area occupied by Peiping, the Chinese could do more than any one else to eliminate the city of Peiping from the field of hostilities by divesting it of all military headquarters, barracks and troops; that as an unfortified city its chances would be better than if it became the scene of military activities due to the presence of military headquarters and soldiers; that, divested of all military establishments, the peace and order of the city might well be left to the civilian authorities, who could make all necessary arrangements

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for its protection from bombing and other disasters. I said that any proposals in this regard should of course be made to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in so far as action by the Diplomatic Body was desired, and that the League was another agency.

I said in so far as I myself was concerned, I was prepared in cooperation with the rest of the Diplomatic Quarter to do what we could, but that it would be impossible for us to give any guarantees as to what the Japanese army might decide to do; that these affairs were entirely in the hands of the military. I stated that I was not prepared to offer any advice in the matter.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, January 13, 1933. 1925

Mr. Hallett Abend
Mr. Roberts

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.

Mr. Abend called and we discussed the present situation. He told me that he had come north in view of what seemed to be impending hostilities in the neighborhood of Tientsin and Shanhaikwan. He said that he had come to Peiping to consult a physician, but that unless he was kept here by the physician for treatment he would return to Tientsin to-morrow, as the arrival of Mr. Ozumi, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Japanese General Staff, is expected in Tientsin. He said that Mr. Ozumi, accompanied by a number of colonels and responsible military men, was coming charged with Japanese terms for negotiating the Shanhaikwan affair.

He said that yesterday he had spent an hour with General Nakamura at Tientsin, who was very belligerent in his interview, pointing out that Japan could not regard with indifference the threat to Japanese arms which it saw in the mobilization of troops in this area, and that unless this threat were removed the Japanese might have to take steps to occupy the Peiping-Suiyuan Railroad.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, January 16, 1933. 1925

Mr. Liu Chung-cheh, Vice Minister of F.A.
Mr. P.L.E. Dzau.

Subject: Sino-Japanese conditions.

Mr. Liu called; he was accompanied by Mr. Dzau. Mr. Liu stated that he had come to pay his respects and to say that he had come to Peiping at the request of Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of effecting a liaison between the Foreign Office at Nanking and Chang Hsueh-liang. He also hoped to keep in touch with the Ministers here, as it was realized that at this time they could not easily go to Nanking.

Mr. Liu asked if I had received the Foreign Office note in regard to the Boxer Protocol and Japanese military abuse thereof. He said he understood we had had a meeting last Friday. I told him that we had not had any meeting of the Protocol powers for the purpose of discussing this note. I said that on Friday Mr. Wilden, Mr. Ingram, Count Ciano and I were here as was our custom exchanging views about the situation, and that we had discussed the note; that the note did not ask anything,- it was a statement of China's policy; and that we had agreed that we would transmit it to our several Governments; and that this had been done.

Mr. Liu asked whether I had any personal comments to make; he said that the Foreign Office had taken two

days

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days to prepare the note and was anxious to have the reaction of the powers in order to follow it up. I informed Mr. Liu than I had no personal comments to make and must await the instructions of my Government before I could say anything in regard to the matter. I said that as soon as I had instructions from Washington I would lose no time in communicating Washington's comments to Nanking and to him.

Mr. Liu stated that Mr. Suma, a member of the Japanese Legation at Shanghai, had called upon the Mayor, Wu Tieh-cheng, and had stated that the Japanese Foreign Office and the military heads were in agreement that no steps should be taken to aggravate the situation, and expressed the hope that the Chinese would not move troops into this area. He said that the Chinese had replied that the Japanese had taken the initiative at Shanhaikwan, and that the Chinese hoped the Japanese would voluntarily withdraw from Shanhaikwan.

I inferred from what Mr. Liu said that conversations along this line were proceeding at Shanghai and Nanking.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1925

Conversation. Peiping, January 17, 1933.

Mr. Wilden, French Minister.
Count Ciano, Italian Minister.
Mr. Holman, Secretary in charge British Legation.

Subject: Provisions of Boxer Protocol and Sino-Japanese hostilities.

When the above mentioned met with me to-day for the purpose of reviewing the situation, Count Ciano stated that he had received no reaction from his Government. Mr. Holman said that nothing had come from London.

The French Minister read to me a telegram from his Government, to the effect that it had requested the French Ambassadors to the several Governments to inquire as to their views. The French attitude seemed to be generally to the effect that it might be appropriate to make representations to the Japanese in the interest of the general situation the benefits of which accrued to all.

I informed them that I had received instructions from my Government to the effect that, as the Chinese Government's memorandum asked nothing, the Department viewed it as a declaration by the Chinese made for purposes of record and required no reply. I stated that I had instructed Mr. Peck at Nanking, if pressed for a reply, to say this to the Chinese authorities there.

With

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With reference to the informal suggestion that the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol attempt to dissuade the Japanese Government from abusing its privileges, which apparently had been made to us and not to the rest, I said that the Department in Washington had informed the Chinese Legation orally that it believed that the circumstances of the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan flowed from factors of the conflict between Japan and China, and not from the provisions of the Protocol. The Department, however, had stated that if developments should involve the provisions of the Protocol then the United States Government would give consideration to those developments as the necessity arose and in the light of the American Government's rights and obligations thereunder.

I informed my colleagues for their confidential information that my Government, commenting on the situation for my own guidance, had pointed out that there were two documents involved in this situation: one was the Boxer Protocol of 1901 to which we were signatory; the other consisted of the "Conditions for the Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin" of July 15, 1902, to which we were never formally a party. I said that our knowledge of these "conditions" grew out of the fact that they had been communicated to us by Prince Ching at the time, and we had acknowledged the information.

As

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As regards the Boxer Protocol, I stated that we were party to that understanding and that in the view of my Government it was possible that the applicability of Articles VII and IX of the Protocol might arise in the present situation. I stated that it was the view of my Government that, shorn of all technicalities and placed in proper perspective, the purpose of stationing a military guard in Peiping and along the railway as provided in the Protocol was to afford a safeguard to foreign lives and property against attacks by Chinese forces; and that therefore the mission of our forces could be regarded essentially as that of providing special protection for the lives and property of foreign nationals, including the Legations, within the areas referred to in the Protocol of 1901, and in case of an emergency calling for evacuation, making available an armed escort to the sea.

I stated that it did not seem to my Government that it should be considered as a rightful or practicable function of our forces to regulate or hamper the legitimate activities of Chinese armed forces, either on the defensive or on the offensive, in connection with the prosecution of hostilities between China and a foreign power; and that certainly the provisions of the Protocol of 1901 were not designed for the purpose of giving a foreign power some peculiar advantage on Chinese soil in a military contest in which it might

engage

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engage with China.

I stated that should hostilities between China and Japan continue and extend to the areas covered by the Protocol of 1901, we and the signatory powers would be confronted with the task of protecting our nationals in the area of hostilities as best we could.

I stated that, bearing in mind that we were not formally a party to the "Conditions for Dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin" of July 15, 1902, it was the view of my Government that, regardless of the attitude which might be taken by the other powers party to those "conditions", it was doubtful whether we would be prepared to join in an attempt to restrict Chinese troop movements on the basis of the provisions referred to.

There seemed to be general agreement that this would be the line taken by all.

The Italian Minister stated that he was being approached by sundry Chinese with a view to renting space in a go-down connected with the Italian Legation for the storage of goods. He said that he was refusing to rent.

The French Minister stated that he had been approached with a view to taking custody of the possessions of the Museum. We all agreed that it would be very difficult to know what to do with Museum property, especially in view of the fact that Pu Yi, if he came to Peiping, might claim that the contents of the Museum were his personal property.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
February 20, 1933.

FROM:
MMH:

You will note that I have graded this despatch Excellent and prepared a memo to A-C/C with regard to that fact.

I think that you will find it worthwhile to read this entire report. I have underscored a few passages with regard to certain outstanding points, as follows:

1. As in the case of other clashes between the Chinese and Japanese, it is most difficult to find conclusive evidence to indicate which side started the incident.

2. It seems clear that the incident in its initial phases involved only the Japanese "protocol" guard at Shanhaikwan but on the morning of the following day two armoured trains and a third train full of Japanese troops arrived on the scene.

3. There is evidence which points to the fact that the resistence of the Chinese troops was valiant considering the means of defense at their disposal.

4. There is some evidence that the Chinese authorities had ordered the

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By Mitton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mobilization of Chinese troops in the Tientsin-Shanhaikwan area about one week before the incident.

5. The concensus of opinion with regard to developments is that the Japanese have no intention of making a drive upon Tientsin and Peiping until after the occupation of Jehol.

6. The only Americans in or near Shanhaikwan are the members of the military detachment of fifteen or twenty at Chinwangtao guarding a summer military camp.

7. It is interesting to note that there were no missionaries or missionary property in the area affected which caused Consul General Lockhart some surprise when the Japanese Consul General, as a result of a telegram which the Department sent to Tokyo, inquired with regard to these missionaries and their property.

J.E.G.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 20, 1933.

A-C/C:

FE is of the opinion that the attached despatch No. 313, January 13, 1933, from Consul General Frank P. Lockhart at Tientsin, to the American Minister at Peiping, China, giving a complete report of the circumstances of the Shanhaikwan incident of January 1, 2 and 3, deserves a rating of Excellent. The Shanhaikwan incident is an important development in the ~~now tense~~ relations between China and Japan. Mr. Lockhart's report is, therefore, above everything else most timely. In addition, Mr. Lockhart has not only covered the facts of the development sufficiently but he has also made adequate and helpful comment upon these facts.

M.M.H.

JEJ/VDM

J.E.J.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 237.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, January 14, 1933.

FEB 13 33

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

Excellent

SUBJECT: Shanhaikuan Incident of January 1, 2 and 3.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FEB 13 1933

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 14 1933 Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my despatch No. 313 of January 13, 1933, addressed to the Legation at Peiping, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
To Legation, January 13, 1933.

800
FPL/DA:w

Original and four copies to Department.

1—1221

F/HS 793.94/5876

FILED MAR 20 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 313

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch No. 337, Dated Jan. 14/33.
From the American Consulate General at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, January 13, 1933.

Subject: Shanhaikuan Incident of January 1, 2 and 3.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of January 2, 1 p.m., January 3, 3 p.m., January 3, 7 p.m., January 4, 11 a.m., January 4, 12 Noon, January 4, 2 p.m., January 5, 11 a.m., January 6, 1 p.m., January 7, 12 Noon, January 9, 2 p.m., January 10, 4 p.m., January 11, 3 p.m., January 12, 3 p.m., and January 13, 12 Noon, all of which were repeated to the Department, on the above-mentioned subject and to report more in detail as follows:

Events of January 1, 2, and 3. Like other incidents which have occurred in recent months in which Chinese and Japanese soldiers have been involved, responsibility for the events at Shanhaikuan on January 1, 2, and 3, has been difficult to fix. Conflicting reports, many of which originated for the purpose of misleading the public, made a confused situation worse confused.

At

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At about 9:30 p.m., on January 1, some unknown person hurled a hand grenade, or grenades, into a Japanese guard house at the railway station at Shanhaikuan. The Japanese claim that the grenade was thrown by a Chinese whereas the Chinese claim that it was thrown either by a Japanese or by the Manchukuo police and that instead of having been thrown against a Japanese guard house it was in fact thrown against a Chinese post. Whoever may have thrown the grenade, or grenades, the undisputed fact is that this act led later to a serious conflict between the Japanese and Chinese, the aftermath of which is still being felt and the end is not yet in sight. Following the explosion of the grenade, rifle shots in considerable volume were exchanged between the Chinese and Japanese and throughout the night of January 1 there was intermittent rifle firing, much of which came from Chinese soldiers stationed on the city wall. The gates to the walled city were shut and barricaded from the inside by the Chinese while the East and South gates were watched from the outside by hundreds of Japanese troops in full war equippage, and who undoubtedly did some shooting. At about 11:00 a.m. on January 2 two armored trains from outside the Great Wall arrived at Shanhaikuan as well as a train full of Japanese troops. There was considerable panic in the walled city of Shanhaikuan and in the area outside the city wall throughout the night of January 1 due to the intermittent firing and this panic increased on the arrival of the armored trains and Japanese troops from beyond the Great Wall. Japanese

women

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women and children fled to the Japanese Barracks while the Chinese populace outside the city wall moved towards the seafront. Shortly after the arrival of the armored trains and fresh Japanese troops a bombardment of the city began. This is believed to have been caused by a demand of the Japanese that the Chinese troops which were manning the South and East Gates should give up these positions in favor of the Japanese who claimed that they desired the gates to be opened so that the civilian population could seek a place of safety. On the refusal of the Chinese to surrender the two gates a Japanese junior officer, Lieutenant Kodama, with a squad of Japanese soldiers, mounted the wall and demanded peremptorily the surrender of the gates. Several of the Chinese soldiers then on guard surrendered their guns, but one young soldier, said to have been about seventeen years of age, on being approached by the Japanese officer and his men, threw a hand grenade at the officer killing him instantly and wounding two of the soldiers who accompanied him. One report has it that the two soldiers were killed. This incident is understood to have occurred shortly before the heavy bombardment of the city began late in the morning of January 2. At 2:30 p.m., January 2, two airplanes flew over Shanhaikuan dropping bombs here and there and causing considerable property damage and some casualties among the civilian population. At 3:30 p.m. on January 2 an extraordinarily heavy bombardment of the city began and this continued until 5:00 p.m. After 5:00 p.m. trains

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trains were made ready at the station and they were filled with Manchukuo and Japanese troops who, it was understood, were destined to Chinwangtao. The night of January 2 was comparatively quiet as only a few shots were heard. During the night, however, further Japanese reinforcements from outside the wall arrived. In the meantime the Commandant of the Garrison, Major Ochiai, is said to have heard that General Ho Chu-kuo, the Linyung Garrison Commander, had arrived in Chinwangtao from Peiping, and would be prepared to open negotiations with him for the settlement of the incident. Major Ochiai claims that General Ho promised to be in Shanhaikuan on the morning of January 3 at 6 a.m. to negotiate but failed to appear or even to send word explaining his absence. Incidentally, General Ho has denied having promised to go to Shanhaikuan as stated. The Japanese Commandant claims to have waited until 10:00 a.m. on the morning of January 3 for General Ho to appear and having learned that the Chinese were making preparations for a stubborn defense, the Japanese opened fire for the third time with renewed strength against the South and West gates and this time they were aided by guns from naval vessels in the harbor. At 12:15 p.m. the Japanese troops entered the city by the South Gate and drove the Chinese soldiers in the direction of Shihmenchai. The city was finally occupied by the Japanese between 2 and 4 p.m. on January 3. Chinese resistance may be measured by the fact that the Japanese, although supplied with heavy artillery

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and aided by bombing planes and the guns from two destroyers, were compelled to make three attempts before finally capturing the city from a small and poorly equipped Chinese force. The Japanese are understood to have lost five commissioned officers and ten noncommissioned officers and about one hundred soldiers killed or wounded. The Chinese losses among the military forces are not known but they were undoubtedly severe. It is estimated that the casualties among the civilian population were about thirty killed.

On January 4 the city was again thrown into panic by rumors that Chinese soldiers were marching on Shanhaikuan with a view to its recapture. Many hundreds of the civilian population from outside the city wall and many others from inside the city who had escaped after the gates were opened, slept on the beaches in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan in bitterly cold weather. The suffering of these refugees was undoubtedly intense.

Although there were a score or more foreigners in Shanhaikuan at the time, there were no casualties among them.

The above account of happenings at Shanhaikuan was obtained from a foreigner who was in the city at the time of the trouble and is believed to be a fairly accurate statement of the happenings at Shanhaikuan from January 1 to January 4, inclusive. He is also an authority for the statement that the resistance of the Chinese troops was valiant considering the means of defense at their disposal.

Strategic

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Strategic Position of Shanhaikuan. Ever since the occupation of Chinchow by the Japanese, Shanhaikuan has been looked upon as the seat of possible future trouble between the Chinese and Japanese because of its strategic position at the entrance to the territory beyond the wall. The presence of Chinese and Japanese troops in the city constituted a menace to the peace and order of the place and on several occasions serious trouble has been narrowly averted. It will be recalled that there was a clash between the Japanese and Chinese on December 8, 1932, an account of which may be found in my political report for the month of December. The Chinese have felt that the Japanese have intended for months past to seize Shanhaikuan at the first opportunity for the twofold purpose of preventing a movement of troops into Manchukuo territory along the Shanhaikuan-Mukden railway and also to serve as a base for operations to seize Jehol. Whether the Japanese, as claimed by the Chinese, instigated the trouble at Shanhaikuan, under plans formulated some time ago and for the purpose above mentioned, will probably never be known, but the promptness with which the Japanese stated that they would endeavor to localize the incident and the announcement that they had no intention of extending their operations down the railway towards Peiping and Tientsin, unless some provocative act on the part of the Chinese compelled them to do so, might well lead to the conclusion that the movement was not designed as a part of an invasion of the Tientsin-Peiping area. To have

embarked

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embarked upon such an enterprise at this time, in the view of the writer, would have required much greater military strength than the Japanese now possess in the Shanhaikuan area and in the territory beyond the wall to a point as far as Chinchow. The despatch of two Japanese cruisers and three destroyers to Chinwangtao led many to believe that that place would be the next point of attack in the general direction of Tientsin and Peiping, but this naval display was undoubtedly nothing more than a measure to prevent the movement of any considerable number of Chinese troops into the area between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan.

The immediate results of the occupation of Shanhaikuan might well be summarized as follows:

Interruption to Railway Traffic. Transportation on the Peiping-Shanhaikuan section of the Peking-Mukden Railway was seriously disrupted and the despatch of trains to Shanhaikuan was immediately annulled. One express train a day, usually considerably delayed, is now being operated between Chinwangtao and Peiping. Other passenger trains are proceeding only as far as Peitaiho. When the heavy troop movement to the Lwanchow-Chinwangtao area began traffic was further disrupted and trains between Tientsin and Peiping were in many cases delayed for several hours.

General Reactions to Incident. A further development of importance was the reaction in other parts of China and in the western world to the incident. The fact that Shanhaikuan is inside the Great

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Great Wall was a preponderant factor. Military and civil officials in Nanking and in other parts of China displayed the utmost concern over the new turn of events. The newspapers were immediately filled with news items purporting to give plans of the Chinese for the recapture of Shanhaikuan, for the defense of Jehol and for the protection of Tientsin and Peiping. Chinese commercial bodies and civic associations also appeared to be aroused to the necessity of more effective measures of defense than have been heretofore employed. The belief appeared to be general among Chinese officialdom and among the Chinese business leaders in the Yangtze region and further south that the Japanese would at once invade not only Jehol but all of North China, including Peiping and Tientsin. In the meantime, Japanese officials in Tokyo, Shanhaikuan, Chinwangtao, Peiping, Tientsin, and elsewhere were announcing somewhat emphatically that the Japanese military desired to localize the Shanhaikuan affair and that they had no intention of extending the operation to the Peiping-Tientsin area. Contrary to these expectations, at this writing there is a complete absence of any evidence that any drive will be undertaken by the Japanese against the Tientsin-Peiping area in the immediate future, but this cannot be said of the Jehol territory nor can it be said that a continuance of the present heavy movement of troops towards the Lwanchow-Changli area might not ultimately provoke the Japanese to take some drastic step by a strategic move in back of these troops through Tangku, which would be accessible to Japanese naval vessels

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and Japanese transports, or by a strong frontal attack down the railway provided sufficient reinforcements can be brought down from outside the Great Wall.

Foreign and Local Views of Incident. The unfavorable impression which the occupation of Shanhaikuan created in China appeared also to prevail in various capitals of the western world, if editorial comment reproduced in newspapers in Tientsin can be taken as a criterion. Many excerpts from editorials published in leading journals in Europe have been reproduced locally and almost without exception the Japanese have been condemned for their military move. As a piece of political strategy, if such it was, it would seem to have been a most inopportune time, from a Japanese point of view, to have undertaken any new military move involving an area inside the Great Wall while the League of Nations is considering a solution of the Sino-Japanese controversy. There are those who believe, on this account, that the occupation of Shanhaikuan at this time was not a planned adventure but was a natural sequence of the clash between the military following the throwing of the bomb.

Concerning newspaper comment, some surprise has been expressed in local circles over what appears to be a reversal of French attitude towards the Japanese. Criticism of the Japanese by local foreign residents is now being more freely expressed than was the case previous to the Shanhaikuan incident. In general, it can be said that the occupation of Shanhaikuan is especially deplored

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One field gun company and one trench mortar company, 1st Battalion, 115th Regiment, 39th Brigade, 32nd Army.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Reserve Regiment, 32nd Army
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd Regiment, 1st Division, 40th Army.
1 pistol company and 1 machine gun company, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division, 40th Army.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 499th Regiment, 84th Division.
1 trench mortar company and 1 machine gun company of the 1st Regiment, 1st Division, 40th Army.
1 cavalry troop and 1 field artillery battery, 84th Division.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 717th Regiment, 39th Brigade, 32nd Army.
1 trench mortar company and 1 machine gun company, 717th Regiment, 39th Brigade, 32nd Army.
1,500 troops of the 39th Brigade, 32nd Army.
2nd and 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, 1st Division, 40th Army.
One mounted artillery company, one machine gun company, and one cavalry troop, 1st Division, 40th Army.
One battalion of Infantry, and one trench mortar company, 501st Regiment, 84th Division.
One bodyguard battalion, 1st Division, 40th Army.
3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Brigade, 40th Army.

American Army Officers Visit Shanhaikuan. American army authorities who visited the Chinwangtao-Shanhaikuan area on January 6 reported that the Chinese line between these two points extended on the right of the railway to the sea and on the left to the mountains and that the right flank was held by the 41st Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Brigade; that the center was held by the 627th Regiment of the 9th Brigade and the left flank by a cavalry regiment of the 3rd Brigade, with the 20th Brigade as a support in the rear. The right flank was without the protection of entrenchments.

Chinese Commanders The Commander-in-Chief at the front is General Shang Chen, former Governor

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Governor of Shansi and Hopei and until a year ago a right-hand man of Marshal Yen Hsi-shan, who now has better connections with both General Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, directs the right flank, General Wan Fu-lin, Governor of Heilungkiang before the Japanese occupation, the left, and General Wang Shu-ch'ang, former Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and now Garrison Commandant for Peiping and Tientsin, has been charged to look after the rear defense. Practically all the "mixed troops," formerly Kuominchun or Chihli troops, have been despatched or are on their way to the front. There are said to be eight brigades of troops in the vicinity of Peiping to guard the former capital.

Chinese Business Man's Statement. A Chinese business man, who is well informed and who has many friends among Chinese officials, in the course of a confidential conversation with a person closely associated with the affairs of this Consulate General, stated that the orders for the mobilization which is now taking place were actually issued about one week before the Shanhaikuan incident. This may have been one of the results of the military conference at Peiping in late December. It appears that about three brigades of Chinese troops had actually entered into the Province of Jehol under this mobilization order previous to the outbreak of trouble at Shanhaikuan. This is said to have aroused the suspicion of the Japanese and the incident at

Shanhaikuan

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Shanhaikuan was, it is alleged, a result of this disquieting movement. The Chinese claim that the attack on Shanhaikuan was launched when only a single brigade under General Ho Chu-kuo was in that immediate area and that only a small number of troops was stationed along the Peiping-Liaoning Railway line this side of Shanhaikuan as the other brigades which had been in that area had been despatched to Jehol. The Chinese business man above-mentioned holds the view that the Japanese, had they do desired and had they acted quickly, could have pushed forward from Shanhaikuan to Lwanchow, Tientsin and possibly Peiping without any serious difficulty after the defense at Shanhaikuan was broken down. The Shanhaikuan clash had the effect, however, of speeding up the order for the despatch of troops to the Lwanchow area, and it was soon found that obstacles might be in the way of a drive to Tientsin and Peiping especially since it became known that an understanding had been arrived at between the Central Government and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang that the troops of General Han Fu-chu and General Liu Chih would be brought to Hopei to take up defense lines evacuated by Chang Hsueh-liang's troops which were being sent to Lwanchow.

To sum up opinion on the military situation, it is generally believed by responsible Chinese officials and business leaders that the Japanese have no intention of making a drive upon Tientsin or Peiping at this time but that ultimately, if such an enterprise is undertaken, it

will

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will only be after the occupation of Jehol and a consolidation of forces in that province.

Anxiety among Chinese. The heavy movement of troops which has been proceeding for the past week has given rise to much concern in Chinese circles lest a major angagement may shortly be started in the Chinwangtao-Shanhaikuan area, although Chinese officialdom continues to announce that the despatch of these troops is for defensive purposes only. Notwithstanding these announcements, close followers of political and military affairs entertain the feeling that the movement is of such a large volume that it might ultimately be intended to attempt to invade Manchukuo territory. Personally, I believe the movement is designed for the defense of Jehol and possibly for use in case of a threat to the Tientsin-Peiping area. The chief danger lies in the possibility that the Japanese may regard the movement as provocative and may take measures to drive the troops back to their former stations, in which case at least the Tientsin area would become decisively involved. The fact that many empty trains are now returning westward to Fengtai would seem to indicate that the Chinese have moved their troops to the Lwanchow region in the belief that they will be able to maintain their position if attacked. Their only means of retreat would be down the railway or overland in a westernly direction.

The heavy military movement has caused a considerable exodus

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exodus of Chinese both from Tientsin and Peiping. So far as is known no foreigners have thus far left this area because of possible trouble hereabouts. From Peiping Chinese have sought safety by moving to points on the Peiping-Hankow Railway and to places on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and from Tientsin there has been a movement of Chinese to the south. For some days after the Shanhaikuan clash trains from the east were crowded with refugees.

Absence of Local Disturbances. The troop movements gave rise in Tientsin to widespread reports that local disturbances would be certain to break out. Up to this writing, however, except for a limited movement of Chinese from the Native City to points south and into the foreign concessions, there have been no signs of any liklihood of disturbances in Tientsin. Up to the date of this despatch, no sandbag barricades or barbed wire entangelements have been erected at or near the borders of the Japanese Concession and there are no signs of any preparations for any emergency. Likewise, along the border of the Japanese Concession, practically all the Chinese police in the Chinese City are still unharmed. No defensive works are noticable in the Native City. The alarm, if it can be so described, appeared to be confined largely to an element in the Chinese population which usually seeks safety on the mere rumor of impending trouble. While these outward signs of peace and order at Tientsin prevail, there is no escape from the fact that some local incident, such as the throwing of a bomb at

police

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police or military posts, or some other trifling incident, might well lead to disturbances of a major proportion.

Observance of Boxer Protocol. Certain reliable quarters are authority for the statement that General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and Commander of the Hopei troops, is quite reluctant to order a large number of troops within a radius of 20 li of Tientsin. He is anxious to avoid any pretext for the Protocol Powers to protest against a violation of the agreement by the Chinese. The defense of the city of Tientsin, therefore, rests entirely in the hands of the Pao An Tui (Peace Preservation Corps) and the Governor's bodyguard. In view of the resistance which the Pao An Tui offered to the Japanese during the trouble in November, 1930, it would seem that this organization could probably hold its ground until Chinese troops in considerable numbers, which are understood to be stationed at a distance of about ten miles from Tientsin, could arrive in the city as reinforcements.

Some significance has been attached by the Chinese authorities to the seeming desire of the Japanese military to invoke the terms of the Boxer Protocol in justification for the Shanhaikuan occupation. Chinese officials profess to believe that if the Japanese are hard-pressed for the evacuation of Shanhaikuan they will, as a last resort perhaps, assert a right to remain there under the terms of the Protocol and thus perhaps avoid some criticism in western capitals for invading the territory inside the Wall.

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Wall.

Settlement by Negotiation. There has been a welter of misinformation circulated concerning the report first given out on January 7 that the Japanese and Chinese military authorities, through the intervention of British naval authorities at Chinwangtao, had agreed to enter into negotiations for the settlement of the Shanhaikuan incident. An American army officer at Chinwangtao reported this information on the above date and stated that General Ho had agreed in writing (presumably to the British naval officer) to meet the Japanese for the purpose of negotiating. Subsequent information received from the army officer in question at Chinwangtao indicated that some preliminary negotiations were actually taking place. On January 13 he reported that General Ho Chu-kuo had sent a member of his staff for the purpose of negotiating, but that the staff officer appeared at Chinwangtao without any specific instructions although the Japanese were in possession of definite instructions. At the time of this meeting it was understood that General Ho was awaiting specific instructions from Nanking. A telegram under a Chinchow date line of January 3, published in the OSAKA MAINICHI, stated that the following would be the terms offered by the Japanese in settlement of the Shanhaikuan affair:

"1. Chinese troops shall not be stationed at Shanhaikuan.
2. The Shanhaikuan region shall be made a buffer zone between China and Manchukuo.
3. Shanhaikuan shall be made the terminus of the

Mukden

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Mukden-Shanhaikuan railway, and this line shall be separate from the Peiping-Shanhaikuan railway.

4. Pending the acceptance of these conditions by the Chinese side, the Japanese forces will not retire from Shanhaikuan.

The Japanese authorities also demand an apology by General Ho Chu-kuo for the present affair and a pledge against the recurrence of similar cases.

These conservative demands have been made in the hope of avoiding the aggravation of the situation. In case, however, General Ho Chu-kuo and General Chang Hsueh-liang refuse to accept the demands, the Japanese military authorities are determined to realize them by armed force."

On January 11 the Japanese Admiral at Chinwang-tao reported to the senior British Naval Officer that negotiations for settlement of the Shanhaikuan affair had passed from him to a higher authority and it was later reported, but not confirmed, that this "higher authority" was Lieutenant General Nakamura at Tientsin who is in command of Japanese Troops in North China. General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, is said to have denied that any negotiations are pending at Tientsin. All indications since a few days after the Shanhaikuan outbreak have pointed to the fact that the Japanese have been willing, and even anxious, to localize the incident and to settle it by negotiation. It is believed that the Chinese have rather resolutely held aloof from any settlement on this basis. This conclusion has been all the more apparent because of the severe criticism heaped upon General Ho Chu-kuo for the settlement of the Shanhaikuan incident of December 8. While there may have been a disposition on the part of the northern

militarists

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militarists to settle the affair by negotiation, dominating influences in Nanking, far removed from the seat of trouble, have apparently opposed a settlement by this means. It may be, however, that a settlement on this basis may be undertaken after the Chinese have concentrated enormous numbers of troops in the Lwanchow region, tactics which might have the effect of inducing the Japanese to settle on more favorable terms than would have been the case in the early stages of the trouble.

American Mission at Changli. Fortunately, no American citizens were at Shanhaikuan during the trouble so far as can be learned. A detachment of 15 or 20 men belonging to the 15th United States Infantry, in command of Lieutenant Moore, is stationed at Chinwangtao to guard the summer military camp. At Changli, a railway station midway between Lwanchow and Peitaiho, there is a mission station belonging to the American Methodist Mission at which are normally located some 15 or 20 missionaries including women and children. A written warning was communicated by this Consulate General to this mission and some of its members withdrew to Peiping and Tientsin while others remained pending further developments. The Chinese authorities were informed and were requested to afford adequate protection. In connection with American missionaries and mission property in the area affected, an enquiry was received from the Japanese Consulate

General

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General at Tientsin a few days ago which was somewhat puzzling. An officer of the Consulate General telephoned this office and said that the foreign office in Tokyo had received a request from the American Ambassador at that place to afford all protection to American missionaries and American mission property at Shanhaikuan. The Japanese consular officer inquired the name of the mission and of the missionaries at Shanhaikuan and was informed that no American mission was maintained there but that an American mission was maintained at Changli where there were some 15 or 20 American missionaries ordinarily stationed. No request was made of the Japanese to afford the mission protection at Changli inasmuch as it might have been misconstrued as an intimation that it was believed Japanese operations would be extended to include that area. It is very probable that the enquiry at Tokyo was based on the misapprehension that the Changli mission was located at Shanhaikuan rather than at Changli.

Public Statements on Incident. In conclusion, and as of possible interest, and to have of record certain statements bearing on the Shanhaikuan incident, there are enclosed herewith a
1/ statement issued at Nanking on January 6 by "an official
2/ spokesman", a statement issued by the Japanese Informa-
3/ tion Bureau on January 5, a Rengo news item dated January 10, concerning the intervention of the British naval authorities at Chinwangtao with a view to the

settlement

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settlement of the controversy by negotiation, an account
4/ of an interview with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang by 60
5/ press representatives on January 8 (Reuter), a speech delivered by General Suzuki at Shanhaikuan on January 7,
6/ describing the Shanhaikuan incident, and a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Mosher summarizing a lecture delivered by Captains D. D. Barrett and T. C. Rote of the 15th United States Infantry, who visited Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan a few days after the incident.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosures:
1/, Statement issued at Nanking on January 6 by an "official spokesman".
2/, Statement issued by Japanese Information Bureau on January 5.
3/, Rengo news item dated January 10.
4/, Interview with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang by 60 press representatives on January 8.
5/, Speech of General Suzuki delivered at Shanhaikuan on January 7.
6/, Memorandum by Vice Consul Mosher.

Original and 1 copy to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy to the Consulates General at Hankow, Shanghai and Nanking, IN TURN.

A true copy of the signed original.

0400

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CHINESE JAPANESE TROOPS CLASH AT GREAT WALL GATE
NEAR SHANHAIKUAN; NIPPONESE CONCENTRATRING
NEAR JEHOL.

Nanking. January 6--An official spokesman stated tonight:

"Intense pride is felt in government circles over the fighting at Shanhaikuan, because, despite the loss of that city, Chinese troops have again shown their mettle. The one regiment of the 9th Brigade that held the city was overwhelmed, only after the most stubborn resistance, by the combined attacks of airplanes, tanks, heavy howitzers and a raking fire from the Japanese fleet. Over two-thirds of the regiment were killed or wounded, and the battalion holding the South Gate, which repulsed two Japanese attacks, was wiped out almost to the last man, as only twenty-seven severely wounded men were left of the battalion of five hundred officers and men.

"After the fighting around Shanghai, the world was convinced that southern Chinese troops could fight desperately against the Japanese invaders, but the heroic behavior of the northern troops at Shanhaikuan shows that northern soldiers gave their lives as readily as their southern brethren for the defence of the country."

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JAPANESE INFORMATION BUREAU

No Particular Change in Shanhaikuan Situation

Tientsin, January 5, 1933.

No particular change in the Shanhaikuan situation has been reported up till last night, and the Japanese troops there are busily engaged in restoring peace and order in the native city. As the fighting has already ceased and no more serious incident has taken place, the Japanese residents who took refuge in the Japanese barracks have now returned to their homes. The Mukden-Shanhaikuan railway which was compelled to cease operations temporarily, is expected to resume its regular traffic on the afternoon of January 4.

According to an official report given by the Japanese Commanding Officer at Shanhaikuan it was the 625th regiment under the command of Ho Chu-kuo which principally took part in the fighting by making use of their trench mortars, machine guns and hand grenades, they having as well many important points along the city walls well protected in accordance with modern methods, and therefore the fighting, while it lasted, was of a fierce nature etc. The Native City of Shanhaikuan was occupied by the Japanese troops after a few hours fighting, and although the city walls were well protected by modern methods the Japanese attacking forces always maintained complete cooperation with their army, navy and air forces.

The Japanese casualties reported up till last night are as follows: 4 officers killed along with 15 of other ranks and 2 officers wounded along with 99 of other ranks, making altogether a total of 120 killed and wounded. The Chinese casualties are not known exactly, but so far it is reported that about 500 dead bodies were found after the occupation of Shanhaikuan, including many officers among which was one colonel.

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BRITISH OFFER AID.

Tientsin, January 10.

Regarding the good offices offered by the Commander of the British warship FOLKESTONE at Chinwangtao, under the instructions of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, Commander of the British Squadron in Far Eastern waters, the headquarters of the Japanese forces in North China at Tientsin, made the following statement at 7 p.m. on the 10:-

"The Commander of the British warship at Chinwangtao called on Rear-Admiral Tsuda, commander of the Japanese Second Squadron in China waters, at 4 p.m. on the 6th, and offered his services as go-between in negotiations. Admiral Tsuda replied that he could not accept his good offices unless he is sure of the Chinese side being desirous to carry on negotiations with Japan.

"At 8 o'clock in the same afternoon, the British Commander sent word to Admiral Tsuda to the effect that the Chinese side was desirous to open negotiations and anxious to learn the place of parleys, hour and names of the Japanese representatives.

"The matter being under careful consideration, no reply has yet been given to the British Commander."

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YOUNG MARSHAL FACES 60 PRESSMEN.

Peiping, January 8.

This morning at his headquarters Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang faced sixty foreign and Chinese newspaper correspondents in the first interview he has given for some time. He appeared to be in good health.

The Marshal struck the keynote of his whole attitude when in response to a question as to whether it was his policy to resist to the last, he countered with another question, "Is it Japanese policy to attack to the end?"

He declared that he had long advocated a pacific settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute, for the present situation was disadvantageous both to China and Japan and it would be even more disadvantageous to both if real war developed.

To defend China was an unquestioned duty, he went one, but asked if all the lessons of the World War had been forgotten. "Is the world going back to a state of savagery and barbarism? Are all the ideals of the world, is all the work to cement peace in the world to go for nothing?

"The whole world is now for peace. Even the Japanese claim that they stand for peace, but what they have done and what they are doing shows whether they are sincere in their talk of a desire for peace."

Turning to the much discussed matter of provocation the Marshal declared it to be ridiculous to assume that the Japanese could move troops freely and when China also moved troops in her own territory it constituted provocation to Japan. He compared this argument to a kidnapper who, when his threatened victim hired guards to safeguard himself, complained to the victim by saying, 'You can't do that, for that is provoking me'.

On the subject of Shanhaikuan Marshal Chang said the placing of blame for the incident was not now a question of finding who fired the first shot or threw the first bomb. They had only to look at the result of the incident to find the cause. The town had been razed andm many people had been killed and the Japanese were in occupation. The beginning of the Shanhaikuan

incident

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incident was similar to the beginning of the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931.

Perhaps, said the Marshal smilingly, it might be as well to send another Commission to find out who fired the first shot, and to see how the affair started.

There should be but one end to this, he said, and that is that Manchuria and Shanhaikuan be handed back to China.

One of the Japanese excuses for taking Manchuria was that they objected to a certain man called Chang Hsueh-liang. Now they had taken a portion of China because they objected to this same man. "He must be a very important individual and I am overwhelmed by the compliment. But if the settlement of this indicent depended upon the disposition of a single individual then it would be easy to settle."

It had been stated, he went on, that Manchuria was now a question of face with the Japanese. They could not abolish Manchukuo because thereby they would lose face. But with China it was not a question of losing face: it was a question of life and death.

"I have been asked how will this end? We will use what means we have to protect our lives and our national existence. We expect another protest from Japan because we now show fight. They will say that we are provoking them, but fighting is an example given us by the Japanese.

"China has been patient. We did not fight back but there was no result. In Japan some people advocated peace but it had no result. The League of Nations and the whole world advocated peace but with no result. We mean to accomplish our aims but without war."

He said he did not know what was Japan's object. If the object of Japan was Chang Hsueh-liang then they would not be so hard to meet. But perhaps their object is the lifeblood of China and that we cannot allow.

The Marshal said he thought it was unbelievable that all Japanese were unreasonable and that all thought obliquely. He believed that the Japanese people were being cheated by propaganda. China's foreign friends could help her by gathering the facts and letting them be known, especially to the whole Japanese people. Facts at the present time were not getting a fair chance but he thought there was no real reason to be pessimistic. The outlook was black but he believed that ultimately truth and righteousness must prevail.

Questioned

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Questioned concerning negotiations the Marshal said there were no negotiations going on. He had not been approached by the Japanese for negotiations. Negotiations when made should be made through the Central Government at Nanking.

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GENERAL SUZUKI ENTERTAINS FOREIGNERS.

Before tiffin General Suzuki said:

It is a great honour to meet here ladies and gentlemen representing nearly all the great nations.

The present incident has already been explained by Major Ochiai and I repeat that what happened is to be debited to General Ho's soldiers.

I came down here with a brigade only to help the Japanese Detachment in S.H.K. I quite agree with Major Ochiai to settle, with General Ho, the incident in a friendly way and I do hope that, together, they will be able to reach a peaceful adjustment.

We have had information that a Chinese Brigade is marching towards S.H.K. and also that the 217th Brigade, from Changli, has moved to Chinwangtao, and that another Brigade from Lanchow is moving Eastwards and therefore you will understand that the task the Japanese Troops in S.H.K. are facing is a very difficult one. We are therefore making hasty preparations for war, but notwithstanding that the situation for us is a very serious one.

General Ho is to be blamed for all this for all this for he promised to meet Major Ochiai on the morning of the 2nd inst. and, together, try to settle everything. But, deliberately, and in opposition to his word given, he did not appear, and Major Ochiai, after having waited from 7 o'clock to 10 o'clock a.m. was compelled, very reluctantly, to open fire against the City of S.H.K.

I do not think that it is necessary to explain that one hour means a very great thing to our Army on a military point of view. To take a stronghold as S.H.K. it requires a lot of skill and to wait or do it during the night would have put our Army to a great disadvantage. We opened, therefore, the bombardment at 10 o'clock a.m. because we were compelled to do so and because we could not do differently; if General Ho would have been faithful to his given word, the bombardment would have been avoided, but as he did not come or send word we could not refrain from doing so.

After two hours of bombardment we silenced the artillery and the nests of machine-guns and blew up the south gate, and two hours later we were in full possession of the City.

For all

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For all this we have to thank our soldiers' bravery and I believe that nobody else in the world would have solved the difficult enterprise in a shorter time, though, I regret to say, it has cost us a lot of dead and wounded.

Though our Officers and men were eager to fight the Chinese Army, all of them obeyed the orders given; viz: to pursue the retreating troops up to the Shaho and then stop. As we had information that the Chinese Army were, afterwards, assembling in the neighbourhood of this river we sent an aeroplane there to reconnoitre.

We are not indisposed against the natives and we have promised and promise again to protect them, but, unfortunately some of them have met death during the bombardment, but again, only the Chinese authorities are to be blamed for that, because they refused to let the people evacuate the City before the bombardment, as we suggested.

We are very sorry indeed for that, but we do our best to investigate the damages suffered during the bombardment and we shall indemnify all the losses undergone. As a matter of fact we have already distributed food etc. amongst the populace.

As the Chief of Police has run away and the City is in a state of chaos, the people have formed emergency corps against ill-disposed ones and we are doing our best to help them with every means.

How the negotiations will be carried on, and the results of them, is yet very early to say.

If the Chinese Army is coming to attack us we have to defend ourselves and, of course, we must do our best to uphold our positions.

I think I explained everything, and you, no doubt, understand that our present condition is very grave.

The natives are still taking refuge at the beach and I suggest that you should tell them to go back to the City, for there is no fear of anything happening to them.

Many rumours are afloat, but we hope that the situation will, very soon, be normal again, for our Army will keep always order and discipline even in moments worse than this one.

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CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

LECTURE BY CAPTAINS D. D. BARRETT AND T. C. ROTE OF THE FIFTEENTH INFANTRY ON THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION AT SHANHAIKUAN

All commissioned officers of the Fifteenth United States Infantry, Captain Braisted of the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, Captain de Angelis of the Royal Italian Marines at Tientsin and Vice Consul Mosher attended a lecture on the present military situation at Shanhaikuan at the Headquarters Building, American Barracks, Tientsin, at 11:30 a.m., January 9, 1933.

Colonel Truesdell introduced the speakers, who had just returned from investigating the Shanhaikuan affair, and stated that Captain Barrett, as a Chinese Language Officer, would discuss the information learned from the Chinese side, while Captain Rote, a Japanese Language Officer, would speak on the information obtained from the Japanese.

Causes of the Operations. The substance of the comment of the two officers was as follows:

The Japanese Chief of Staff informed them that an arrangement had been made with the Chinese garrison to permit Japanese guards to take station at the South Gate of the city, but that when the detachment approached the Chinese fired upon it, causing casualties. The Chinese Commanding Officer, General Ho Chu-kuo, denied this, insisting that the Japanese fired first.

The Action Thus Far According to the Japanese Chief of Staff, upon receiving no satisfactory amends for this incident the Japanese were obliged to attack at the South Gate, which they did at 4 p.m., January 2, taking the city at 2 p.m., January 3, 1933. The American observers saw that the South Gate had been much battered by accurate shell-fire, apparently from Japanese naval and mountain guns, and the German hotel outside the gate and its immediate environs burned. No other important physical damage was visible. All Chinese houses and shops were flying Japanese or Manchoukuo flags. Although the Japanese stated their casualties to have been few, 100 of them were credibly reported to be under treatment at the Railway Hospital at Shanhaikuan.

Disposition and Numbers of Troops at Time of Investigation. The Chinese troops in the area are estimated at 24,000, and include the Ninth, Fifteenth and Twentieth Infantry Brigades, the Third Artillery, and the Third Cavalry Brigade. Of this last, the Fortieth and Forty-first Cavalry Regiments are holding a line half-way between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan, from the sea to the railway, while the 627th Infantry of the Ninth Brigade holds the continuation of this line as far as the mountains. These troops are supported in the rear

by the

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by the Twentieth Independent Brigade. One of the cavalry officers stated that the troops were deployed as they were, across open country, because the cavalry have no entrenching tools. Captain Barrett stated that these troops appeared to be good ones, as Chinese troops go.

The Japanese troops appear to number from 6,000 to 8,000, exclusive of naval units aboard ship, and are concentrated upon Shanhaikuan. Their Chief of Staff asserted that they consist of the Thirty-third Infantry Regiment and a mixed, reinforced Brigade. Captain Rote's experiences with Japanese troops in the field show that a reinforced brigade consists of about 5,000 men. The troops at Shanhaikuan include Railway and Supply Battalions, Transport Troops, Military Police, Signal and Veterinary Detachments, Ordnance, Air Force units, Tanks, Artillery, and a number of Chinese in Manchoukuo uniform. The American officers saw many of these, while the rest are known to accompany such Brigades. Considerable amounts of ammunition were being unloaded, and a large number of Japanese civilians was in evidence. Captain Rote stated that Japanese troops now sent to Manchuria customarily have had morethan one year's service.

Comment — Colonel Truesdell remarked that, from the tactical point of view, the celerity with which the Japanese reinforcements had arrived at Shanhaikuan was noteworthy. The Shanhaikuan-Mukden Railway will carry not more than sixteen trains a day. Little attention, he stated, should be paid to recurrent rumors that the Japanese army and navy do not cooperate well, there being good evidence that they are working well together. The Japanese destroyers, three or four of which are at Chinwangtao, can easily control the railway along that part of the coast with their four-inch guns, so that at the first Japanese attack the Chinese must fall back at least as far as Peitaiho, if not to Ch'angli. If they retreat, they will probably use the military road north of the tracks or the "Mandarin Road", both of which are said to be in good condition. Captain Barrett saw no proof, from a distance, that the railway bridge over the Shih River had been harmed.

Captain Braisted, of the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, said that as he is informed the Japanese destroyers now carry five-inch, not four-inch guns, and that they can certainly control the railway from the sea. The three-fathom line lies close to the shore.

Miscellaneous Remarks — Captains Barrett and Rote said that they had succeeded in interviewing General Ho Chu-kuo personally. He informed them that the Japanese Navy had approached him with a view to a local settlement of the affair, but that having transmitted their communications to Peiping he had heard nothing further, nor received any reply from his superiors. Meanwhile, he intended to hold the line where he was at all costs.

General Suzuki, the Japanese Commanding Officer was not to be seen at Shanhaikuan, since he was busy giving a luncheon party to about thirty persons, including several foreigners who looked like Russians. (See list of guests in center front-page column of the NORTH CHINA STAR

for

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for January 10, 1935). However, his Chief of Staff met the American officers, and informed them that the Japanese consider the question purely local, and have no intention of advancing farther. He stated that they were endeavoring to come to an agreement with General Ho, but that up to that time they had made little progress.*

(Initialled) JSM

JSM

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*NOTE. With reference to the statement of the Japanese intentions, Mr. Hallett Abend, China correspondent for the NEW YORK TIMES, remarked to Vice Consul Mosher on January 8 that a responsible Japanese officer had informed him fourteen months ago that they must and would have control of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, to consolidate their position in Manchuria.

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D-428

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, January 18, 1933.

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Confidential.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy:
Protocol of 1901.

DEPT. OF STATE 1933 FEB 22 9 45 AM DIV. OF COMM. & RECD

FEB 1933

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch
1/ No.D-419 of January 12, 1933, and to enclose herewith a letter of today's date addressed to the American Minister at Peiping, reporting another conversation with Vice Minister Dr. Hsu Mo, relating to the subject of the despatch in reference.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Copy of letter addressed to the American Minister at Peiping, dated January 18, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

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WRP/ECH

4 Carbon Copies

Received 2 27

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FILED JUN 23 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nanking Office.
January 18, 1933.

Confidential

Dear Mr. Minister:

I received last night your confidential telegram of January 17 regarding the relation between Japanese military activities at Shanhaikwan and the Protocol of 1901, and shall be guided by the Department's instruction.

Dr. Hsu Mo dined with me last night and in a few moments of private conversation he gave me, in substance, the report telegraphed by Dr. Alfred Sze of the observations made by the Department, which observations were likewise summarized in your telegram under acknowledgment. Dr. Hsu Mo dissented from the view of the Department that the Japanese military activities at Shanhaikwan originated primarily from the

conflict

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

conflict between China and Japan. He said that it was the Japanese forces stationed at Shanhaikwan under the provisions of the Protocol of 1901 which started the trouble. Your telegram had not been decoded at the time of this conversation, having but just arrived, so I merely indicated a receptive frame of mind. Dr. Hsu Mo said that Dr. Sze had reported that in the Department's view the hostilities were carried on by Japanese airplanes, tanks, naval vessels, etc. whose presence in that neighborhood was not accounted for by the Protocol.

I sent you two copies of my despatch No.D-419 of January 18, 1933, addressed to the Department. In this despatch I ventured the supposition that Dr. Hsu Mo's allusion to the Japanese abuse of rights claimed under the 1901 Protocol was based upon a Reuter telegram from Tokyo stating that the Japanese Government had cabled instructions to the Commander of the Japanese Garrison in North China "to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the two mile limit of the Railway in accordance with the Boxer Protocol". I asked Dr. Hsu Mo last night whether this was what he had in mind and I referred to the fact that the United States was not a party to the two mile understanding. Dr. Hsu Mo said he was aware that the United States was not a party to that understanding and added that he had not had this understanding in mind when he referred to the attempted abuse of 1901 Protocol

privileges

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

privileges by the Japanese. What he had in mind was the opening of hostilities by the Japanese Garrison at Shanhaikwan stationed there under the terms of the Protocol itself.

Dr. Hsu Mo showed no resentment at the position taken by the Department as reported by Dr. Sze, and although he did not mention to me the Department's statement referred to at the end of your telegram under acknowledgment, he seemed satisfied with what Dr. Sze had reported.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Department of State, referring to my despatch to the Department of January 12, 1933.

Yours very truly,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

In duplicate to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

800

WRP/ECH

A true copy of the signed original

0416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 18, 1933.

MMH:
SKH:

There are attached hereto three despatches with regard to the developments at Shanhaikwan during January which became the subject of the Department's instruction to the Legation setting forth its views with regard to our position under the Protocol of 1901.

Two of the despatches are from Nanking, No. D-419, January 12, 1933, and No. D-428, January 18, 1933. The first of these despatches reports a conversation between Mr. Peck and Mr. Hsu Mo of the Foreign Office when the latter presented the Chinese Government's memorandum asking that representations be made to Japan with regard to dissuading Japan from abusing privileges which she might claim under the terms of the Protocol of 1901. The second of these despatches refers to another conversation between Mr. Peck and Mr. Hsu Mo at which time they discussed the Department's informal reply to the Chinese memorandum, in which discussion Mr. Hsu Mo dissented from the Department's view that the Japanese activities at Shanhaikwan grew out of the conflict between China and Japan

rather

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rather than as a result of the provisions of the Protocol. However, Mr. Hsu seemed satisfied with what Dr. Sze had reported with regard to his conversation with an officer of the Department.

The third despatch No. 1925, January 18, 1933, transmits a number of memoranda of conversations between Minister Johnson and other officials, Chinese and foreign, at Peiping, with regard to the matter. Some of the information contained therein has been reported by radio but, in view of the importance of this matter, I feel that it would be worth your while to read this despatch and all of the enclosures in their entirety. In any event, I suggest that you read the last enclosure, No. 8, (tagged) in which the Minister reports which he told the French, Italian and British diplomatic representatives with regard to the Department's instruction.

I do not see any need of your reading the two despatches from Nanking.

S.K.H.

0418

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-419

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, January 12, 1933.

AM. RECD DEPT. OF STATE 1933 DEC 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 DIV. COM. & MAIL
FEB 13 33

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy:
Protocol of 1901.

793.94
mll
793.00

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 5, 5732
of January 10, 1933, transmitting an official Chinese translation of a communication of the same date from the Chinese Foreign Office asking that representations be made to Japan, with a view to dissuading Japan from abusing privileges which she might claim under the terms of the International Protocol of 1901, under which certain foreign Powers are entitled to station troops on the railway between Peking and Shanhaikwan. In this connection I have the honor to enclose a Memorandum of the conversation which took place between Vice Minister Dr. Hsu Mo and me at the time he handed me this communication.

Dr. Hsu Mo did not explain at the time of our conversation the abuse or contemplated abuse by the Japanese Government of the terms of the 1901 Protocol

which

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JUN 23 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

which the Chinese Government had in mind, but on the arrival of the Shanghai newspapers, after the despatch of my telegram, I read the following REUTER message, which seems to show the basis of the Government's apprehension:

> "Boxer Protocol Invoked
> TOKYO, Jan. 9.-- (Reuters).--Following a joint conference between the War Office and the Foreign Office instructions were cabled today to the Commander of the Japanese garrison in North China to negotiate the settlement of the Shanhaikwan affair and to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the two-mile limit of the Railway in accordance with the Boxer protocol, for the purpose of maintaining peace and order in Shanhaikwan."

Had I seen this message before the interview with the Vice Minister I should have been able to point out to him that the provision for the so-called "neutral zone" of two miles on each side of the railway, within which Chinese troops may not be stationed, is not found in the Protocol of 1901, but in the joint note of July 15, 1902, to which the United States was not signatory, although the receipt of the joint note was acknowledged to the American Minister to China in a note from the Chinese Government dated July 18, 1902 (see MACMURRAY pp 316-318).

I find it a practical disadvantage during the present critical period not to be able to subscribe to the REUTER bulletin service maintained in Nanking. As happened in the present instance, dependence on

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

newspapers places this office anywhere up to twenty-four hours behind other government offices in Nanking in the receipt of current news.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP:MCL

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-419 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated January 12, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy: Protocol of 1901".

Memorandum of Interview.

January 10, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Japanese Activities in North China.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck.

Dr. Hsu Mo telephoned to Mr. Peck about 4 p.m. and asked that he call at the Foreign Office, since he had a matter to discuss with Mr. Peck and a document to hand to him.

Dr. Hsu Mo referred to the capture of Shanhaikwan by Japanese forces on January 3, 1933, and said that the Chinese Government was determined to resist any further military activities of the Japanese along the line of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. He then remarked that whether the Protocol of 1901, under which certain foreign Powers claim the right to station troops on this railway, had any force or not, the existence of this Protocol complicated the existing situation. He said the Japanese were abusing privileges claimed under the terms of the Protocol and the Government feared that if the Japanese continued their military activities along the Railway, as the Government anticipated, the resistance offered by Chinese troops might "involve complications to be found undesirable by all parties concerned". The Government

wished

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

wished to announce to the other Powers concerned that it must disclaim responsibility for any situation, in law or in fact, which might arise from the resistance offered by Chinese troops. Dr. Hsu Mo then handed to Mr. Peck the Memorandum of January 10, 1933, setting forth this disclaimer and read with Mr. Peck the English translation supplied by the Foreign Office.

Dr. Hsu Mo said that the Chinese Government wished to suggest informally to the Powers signatory to the 1901 Protocol that they try to persuade Japan not to abuse the privileges which Japan might seek to claim under the Protocol.

Dr. Hsu Mo said that the Ministry hoped that Mr. Peck would telegraph the translation of the Memorandum and the informal suggestion which he had just offered, both to the Department and to the American Minister. Mr. Peck said he would do so. Mr. Peck inquired whether the communication had been telegraphed to the Chinese Legation in Washington and whether it would be released to the press. Dr. Hsu Mo said that the communication had not been telegraphed to Washington and that the Ministry had not decided whether it would be released to the press; probably the fact that such a communication had been sent would be announced, even if the text were not released.

Commenting on the situation in North China, Dr. Hsu Mo said that the Chinese Government had reason to think that the Japanese were planning to set up a "puppet" regime there, similar to "Manchoukuo". For this purpose they might bring Pu Yi back into China, or utilize the services

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of some other traitor. He said that the Chinese Government had made troop dispositions which would make possible a strong resistance to the Japanese should they attempt to advance further.

Dr. Hsu Mo said that while the Chinese Government regarded it as a probability that the Japanese Government would create some incident in North China which should serve as a pretext for setting up a "puppet" regime there, the Chinese Government considered it a certainty that the Japanese would invade and attempt to occupy the Province of Jehol. He observed that the Japanese had made no secret of their intentions with regard to Jehol, which they had officially claimed as a part of "Manchoukuo", i.e. Manchuria. He said that both in Jehol and in the provinces inside the Great Wall the Chinese Government had massed troops for the purpose of resisting the Japanese invasion, although, of course, the Chinese troops would not under any circumstances take the offensive.

In reply to a question Dr. Hsu Mo said that there was no truth in the published reports that negotiations were proceeding between the Japanese and Marshal Chang, or General Ho Chu-kuo, or any one else, with a view to settling the Shanhaikwan incident. He said no negotiations or discussions were going on between the Japanese and Chinese Governments with reference to the Sino-Japanese controversy.

WRP:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 18, 1933.

~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

Mr. Peck transmits herewith a memorandum of a conversation between a certain Dr. Yu, Secretary General of the Chinese General Staff, and Lieutenant H. L. Boatner of the office of our military attaché on detail in Nanking.

It seems that Dr. Yu was trying to interest Lieutenant Boatner in a proposition which contemplated official assistance on the part of the American Government to China in the purchase on credit of munitions of war and related materials.

I do not believe that you need read the despatches and enclosures but would suggest that you make a mental note that this information seems to fit in with other information which we have that there is now a Chinese mission in the United States attempting to make arrangements for the purchase of munitions of war and related materials.

F. E. F.

0425

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D-417

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, January 9, 1933.

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mte
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Confidential

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy:
Tentative Bid by China for
American Military Assistance.

DEPT. OF STATE
JAN 27 1933
DIV. OF CORRESPONDENCE
AM RECD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 13 33
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Copy to FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a Memorandum prepared by me under date of January 9, 1933, containing an account given orally by Lieutenant H. L. Boatner, U.S.A., of the Military Attache's office and now on temporary detail in Nanking, of a conversation held by him on January 8, 1933, with Dr. Yu, Secretary General of the Chinese General Staff. Dr. Yu stated that he is a grandson of Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan and a son of the Marquis Tseng who was Chinese Minister to Great Britain. In spite of his military duties, Dr. Yu has not received a military education, but obtained his doctor's degree at Harvard after writing a thesis on mathematics.

Dr. Yu's

F/HS
793.94/5879
FILED
MAR 9 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. Yu's object in talking with Lieutenant Boatner was to explore the possibilities which may exist for obtaining from the American Government for the Chinese Government technical, material and financial assistance in China's present military resistance to Japan. He argued, in effect, that Japan is a potential enemy of the United States and that it would be to the advantage of the United States to assist China to prevent Japan from strengthening herself by expansion on the Asiatic mainland. The same sort of argument was made to one or two officers of the American Legation last summer by Dr. H. H. Kung, who is now on a special mission in the United States.

I may add that the view seems widely held among Chinese that the alleged American hegemony of the countries bordering the Pacific Ocean will be lost if Japan succeeds in gaining a foothold on the continent of Asia. The corollary to this view is, of course, that the outcome of the present struggle is as vital to the United States as to China and that it would be easier and cheaper for the United States to assist China to frustrate Japan's expansionist schemes, than to fight Japan later on when her strength has been immeasurably increased through obtaining control of the financial and material resources of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Manchuria. Some Chinese explain the lack of response to this reasoning on the part of the United States by saying that the American people are ignorant in regard to Asiatic international politics, are preoccupied with economic difficulties and ambitions, and, rather paradoxically, are characterized by an idealistic mentality which refuses to recognize and face the predatory imperialistic ambitions of Japan.

In view of Dr. Yu's request that Lieutenant Boatner make no report of the conversation described in the enclosed memorandum, Lieutenant Boatner felt that he should make no official report on the subject to his superiors. However, it seemed to me that the matter was of sufficient importance to be placed on record, and now that this has been done, Lieutenant Boatner requests that a copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, be handed to the Military Attache.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation, dated January 9, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.
One copy to the American Military Attache.

800

WRP/ECH

4 Carbon Copies

Received

1 copy detached for note ... RG. 2/14/33.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Confidential

Dr. Yu (Ph.D. Harvard, 1919. Student in Germany on Harvard fellowship.)

Lt. H. L. Boatner, U.S.A.

January 9th, 1933.

Dr. Yu called upon Lt. Boatner on January 8th and stated that he was the Secretary General of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, and as such is directly under the orders of General Chiang Kai-shek, who is Chief of the General Staff.

According to the account of the conversation given to Mr. Peck, Counselor of the American Legation, by Lt. Boatner on the morning of January 9th, what follows is the general purport of what was said:

Dr. Yu observed that it was obvious that Japan is a potential future enemy of the United States. It is Japan's object to obtain a political and military foothold on the Asiatic continent, her present objective being Manchuria and China. If Japan succeeds in obtaining this foothold on the mainland, she will be a much more formidable antagonist against the United States than she would be otherwise.

This being the case it would be to the interests of the United States to assist China to foil the attempt of Japan to expand on the continent, rather than to allow Japan to succeed in this attempt.

What China needs most are expert military advice and war materiel. Dr. Yu strongly advised that special officers of the American Army be sent to augment the staff of the

American

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

American Military Attache, with the duty of giving constructive advice to the Chinese high military command.

Dr. Yu was anxious to learn what the attitude of the American Government would be toward the supplying of munitions of war and of raw materials to be used for the manufacture of munitions in China. He remarked that the Chinese arsenals found it difficult to obtain adequate supplies of iron, copper, steel etc.

Dr. Yu observed that the expense which would be involved in obtaining adequate amounts of munitions and of raw material for use in fighting Japan successfully would be very great and he suggested, in line with his argument already quoted, that the American Government might be willing to take measures which would enable the Chinese Government to acquire munitions and raw materials on credit.

Dr. Yu said that it was no use for the Chinese Government to look to the German Government for assistance in these matters, in spite of the fact that the large number of German officers in Nanking seemed to indicate that there was some kind of rapprochement between the two countries in a military way. The German Government, in point of fact, constantly hampers the Chinese Government by making it difficult for China to purchase military equipment in Germany. All that China can expect from Germany is the opportunity to hire expert German advisers.

Another country to which China might naturally look

for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

for assistance in opposing Japan's imperialistic policy is the Soviet Republic. It would, however, be very dangerous for China to accept assistance from the Soviet Government. The Communist influence in some Provinces, e.g., Kiangsi, is so strong that the Chinese Government is hardly able to eradicate it and the Government's efforts in this direction would be made still more difficult if the Government were to accept assistance from the Soviet Government. China is too weak to accept great aid from Russia which might place China under the complete control of bolshevist influence.

Consequently, all the circumstances of the case lead the Chinese military authorities to look to the American Government for cooperation through the supply of expert military advisers and through making it possible for the military branch of the Chinese Government to obtain munitions and raw materials on credit.

Dr. Yu emphasized that his remarks to Lt. Boatner were made on his own initiative. He hoped that Lt. Boatner would not report the conversation they had had until he (Dr. Yu) had had an opportunity to sound the views of Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, and General Chiang Kai-shek, Chief of the General Staff.

Lt. Boatner was mainly a listener in this conversation. In reply to direct questions, however, he told Dr. Yu that he thought that the policy of the American Government was directly opposed to any direct cooperation with China in China's controversy with Japan in the form of sending

military

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

military advisers, or in the shape of assisting China to obtain munitions and raw materials on credit. He advised Dr. Yu to consult Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attache, in the matter of purchasing munitions and raw materials in the United States, since it was the specific duty of the Commercial Attache to promote American trade with China. Lt. Boatner also advised that the Chinese Government negotiate with commercial firms for the purchase of its munitions and raw materials. Dr. Yu said that the Chinese military authorities did not wish to pursue this course, but wanted to deal with some American governmental department or direct with manufacturer, with an American military officer participating in all negotiations.

Dr. Yu explained, rather naively, that General Chiang Kai-shek, did not want to enter into any negotiations with American authorities until he had reason to know that such negotiations would succeed, for fear that failure would play into the hands of his political enemies. For this reason he insisted that the initiative in the matter must come from the American Government.

WRP/ECH
A true copy of the signed original

0432

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
February 18, 1933.

~~MGE~~:
~~SKH~~:

Mr. Peck transmits herewith a copy of a letter written by Mr. David Z. T. Yui under date November 18, 1932, to a friend of his in China. Mr. Peck makes comment in his despatch on this letter, particularly with regard to Mr. Yui's observations that China should carry on a more efficient system of propaganda in the United States in order to combat the Japanese propagandists.

I suggest that you read Mr. Yui's letter in its entirety as it gives a further clue to the nature of his mission in the United States.

J.C.J.

0433

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-416

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, January 9, 1933.

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
REC'D
FEB 13 1933
DIV. OF FAR EASTERN AFF.
COM.

CONFIDENTIAL.

F/HS
793.94/5880

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy; Chinese and Japanese Propaganda in the United States.

793.94
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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Through the courtesy of an American citizen resident in Nanking this office has been shown a copy of a printed circular letter written from the United States by Mr. David Z. T. Yui, General Secretary of the National Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association of China.

FILED
MAR 7 1933

1/ A copy of this letter, dated November 18, 1932, is enclosed herewith. Mr. Yui at the time of writing the letter was touring the United States and from the tone of his letter his primary object seemed to be to enlist the moral and financial support of Chinese in America for the Chinese Volunteers in Manchuria in their fight against the Japanese and to win the support of the American public for China in the same struggle.

The attention of the Department is invited to the statements made by Mr. Yui to the effect that he and his

associates

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

associates were fairly successful in persuading Chinese communities in the United States to send money to China regularly for the support of the Volunteers. Mr. Yui's dissatisfaction with what China is doing in the United States in the way of propaganda, as compared with what he believed Japan was accomplishing in this line, is set forth in the following sentences:

> "One thing seems clear, and that is, we should redouble our efforts in acquainting the American government, especially the new administration, and the American public with the real situation now existing in the Far East and in helping them to see clearly the necessity and importance of America's taking a firm stand for justice and righteousness. The Japanese propagandists are unusually active in this country trying to do just the opposite. They have now two or three hundred men, including their own consuls, operating in the United States and are spending millions of dollars for the purpose. As compared with the money they are expending for the purpose and the efforts they are putting forth, ours is practically nil and insignificant. Still we should do our very utmost to present our side of the case."

So far as this office has been able to observe, the Chinese Government has been, on the whole, inactive in the matter of presenting to the world China's case against Japan. I was informed some months ago that the Chinese Foreign Office had been given an allotment of $100,000 Chinese currency per month for telegraphic expenses, newspaper subsidies, etc, to be used in connection with propaganda. The inadequacy of this sum, at present exchange rates, to accomplish anything important is obvious. It is currently reported that REUTER'S NEWS AGENCY has been given a monthly subsidy, but I have been unable to learn what is done with the remainder of the $100,000. Presumably it is used in telegraphing to the Chinese Delegation

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in Geneva. In the way of printed material designed to present one side or the other of the Sino-Japanese controversy, this office has received from the local Japanese Consulate General far more than it has received from any Chinese source. In fact, Chinese material has been noticeably lacking.

The average thinking Chinese undoubtedly believes that the justice of China's cause against Japan speaks for itself, and that it requires no elucidation through propaganda. Whether this is the reason for the apparent apathy of the Chinese Government toward propaganda in the United States, or whether the reason is the view often expressed in the Chinese press that American sentiments in relation to international justice are laudable, but that no "effective" opposition to "Japanese imperialism" on the part of the United States is to be hoped for, is not certain. The reason for the Government's inactivity in propaganda may be merely that it has developed no technique in that direction. In the course of a recent dinner party I attended, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was handed a telegram from Mr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan. The telegram, which was in English and had been sent over a private wire, as read to me by Dr. Lo was an instruction urging him to release to the press the reports which the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Government was receiving regarding Japanese Military activities at Shanhaikwan during the first few days of January.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated November 18, 1932, from Mr. David Z. T. Yui.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP:MCL

4 Carbon Copies
Received 2 PM.
1 copy detached for note... HS. 2/14/33.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-416 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated January 9, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy; Chinese and Japanese Propaganda in the United States".

(C O P Y)

David Z. T. Yui, General Secretary
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHINA
20 MUSEUM ROAD, SHANGHAI

November 18, 1932

Dear Friend:

After a 19-day voyage on the Pacific we safely arrived in San Francisco on October 18th. On the whole the voyage was a pleasant one except the annoyances given us at Kobe by the Japanese police who illegally ransacked Mr. Liang's cabin, particularly his baggage, and who kept a very close watch of every of our movements on board the steamer. The case was reported to the Chinese minister at Tohyo. The Dollar Steamship Company is also in possession of a report of the incident and is taking up the case with the Department of State at Washington to see what can be done to prevent recurrence of similar annoyances on an American steamer.

Our steamer reached Honolulu before schedule. Thus, we were allowed 30 hours on shore instead of 12 hours and this extra time we used to great advantage. Here we met with a group of leading Chinese, business men and educators. I reported to them the existing situation in China, particularly the activities of our volunteers in the Three Eastern Provinces. They were profoundly stirred and before the close of the meeting they decided: (1) To remit as soon as possible G$5,000 toward the support of the volunteers; (2) To form a permanent organization in the interest of the volunteers; and (3) to give support to the volunteers on a monthly basis.

In all, we spent 12 days in San Francisco. During this time we held, in addition to a huge mass meeting, several meetings with the various important Chinese groups in that city, and the response was at once generous and enthusiastic. In addition to the funds which have already been remitted to Shanghai, a total of something like $110,000 Chinese currency, including $20,000 Chinese currency from Sacramento and G$5,000 from Seattle, plans are now being completed to secure

and

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and send funds in support of the volunteers on a monthly basis. A cablegram, we were informed, in the joint names of the several important Chinese organizations in San Francisco including the Chamber of Commerce was dispatched to the military authorities in China urging the immediate cessation of civil war and the presentation of a united front at this critical hour of our national existence.

Among the other activities in which we were engaged in San Francisco was the laying of a wreath at the tomb of the late Captain Dollar. The simple ceremony was witnessed by a small group of relatives and friends of the Dollar family. While it was a tribute from our people to the old Captain, we also hope that such a gesture on our part would help to strengthen the friendship between the United States and China.

I am also happy to report that during our stay in San Francisco we rendered an important service to the Chinese Y.M.C.A. there. A new Committee of Management was formed for the Chinese "Y" in that city. This Committee is composed of leading men of various professions of the Chinese community. Under the able and energetic leadership of this Committee we have every confidence that the Chinese "Y" will steadily go forth and render an increasingly large and effective service to the Chinese young men and boys in San Francisco.

We left San Francisco on October 29th. After spending two days in Kansas City enroute we reached Chicago on November 4th. During the four days we spent in Chicago we had the opportunity of discussing the China situation with several American leaders. Also I was given the opprtunity of presenting China's case before a group of some 60 or 70 business and industrial leaders of the city. The Chinese in chicago are pretty hard hit by the depression. But they are most patriotic. At a mass meeting which we addressed the hall was packed so that people had to stand on the stairway leading to the streets. In spite of the hard times they decided to remit $10,000 Chinese currency to help the volunteers and subsequently to give their support on a monthly basis.

Reaching New York City on November 8th, we found ourselves in the very thick of the presidential election, the result of which you of course know by this time. Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York became the President-elect. Just how this change of administration will affect America's foreign policy, especially its policy in regard to the Far East, it is too early to say. One thing seems clear, and that is, we should redouble our efforts in acquainting the American government, especially the new administration, and the American public with the real situation now existing in the Far East and in helping them to see clearly the necessity and importance of America's taking a firm stand for justice and righteousness. The Japanese propagandists

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

are unusually active in this country trying to do just the opposite. They have now two or three hundred men, including their own consuls, operating in the United States and are spending millions of dollars for the purpose. As compared with the money they are expending for the purpose and the efforts they are putting forth, ours is practically nil and insignificant. Still we should do our very utmost to present our side of the case.

Our fellow countrymen in New York are just as patriotic as those in the other cities which we visited, and are equally enthusiastic over the activities of the volunteers. We have had several meetings with the leaders of the Chinese community here, and the result has been indeed most satisfying and encouraging.

Regarding the whole Manchurian situation the advice which men of influence in this country whom we consulted have given us can be summarized as follows:

1. Continue to intensify the activities of the volunteers in Manchuria.

2. Continue to stiffen and heighten the boycott movement throughout the country

3. Whatever dissatisfaction we may have regarding the Lytton Report it is very important for us to keep quiet for the time being. Let Japan raise all the objections as she wants thus to place herseft in a completely isolated position and to incur the displeasure of the entire world.

4. By all means stop immediately the nonsensical fighting among the warlords in our country which, so far as its damaging effect to our cause is concerned, is worse than Japanese invasion.

According to our present plans we shall remain here for four or five more days and then proceed to Washington, D. C., which will serve as our operating base.

With heartiest greetings and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) David Z. T. Yui

David Z. T. Yui.

A true copy of the signed original.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, January 10, 1933.

No. 1911

Subject: Transmission of messages in plain English by military observers.

PM REGD DEPT OF STATE FEB 13 33 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

F/HS 793.94/5881

793.94 note 119.2

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 15 1933 Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Department's telegram No. 4 of January 6, 2 p.m., 5691 I have the honor to report that prior to its receipt, and immediately upon receiving a copy of Captain Barrett's telegram which was quoted in the Legation's telegram No. 23 of January 6, 3 p.m., 793.94/5691 the Legation requested the office of the Military Attaché in Peiping to take steps to prevent the transmission of telegrams of this nature in plain English.

FILED MAR 7 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1/ I have the honor to transmit a memorandum on the subject, from which the Department will observe that Colonel Truesdell, of the 15th Infantry, Tientsin, expresses the opinion that the use of a short wave length, plus the speed of trained operators and the known absence of organized intercept, makes the transmission en clair "fairly well concealed".

The Legation has orally informed the Military Attaché that it does not consider these factors a sufficient safeguard in the transmission of confidential information.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of memorandum dated January 9, 1933.

800.
CVHE/js.

0442

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Dispatch No. 1911

MEMORANDUM

Immediately upon receiving a copy of Captain Barrett's telegram of January 5, 8.15 p.m., to Colonel Burt in Tientsin, which was furnished to the Legation by the Military Attaché, I made inquiries whether it had been received en clair. Upon learning that it had been received en clair I telephoned to Major Constant and requested him to caution Colonel Burt - and through him other officers concerned - against the use of plain English in transmitting military information of the nature contained in Captain Barrett's telegram. Major Constant promised to do so.

He has to-day shown me a personal letter from Colonel Truesdell in Tientsin, dated January 7, 1933, from which I quote the following paragraph:

> "Re your express (letter) on sending un-coded radio. We are using a short wave length. That, plus the speed of our trained operators and the known absence of organized intercept, makes transmission in straight text fairly well concealed. However, in the future, reassure all that we'll encode unless so urgent that time does not permit".

C. V. H. E.

Peiping,
January 9, 1933.

CVHE/js.

A true copy of the signed original
J.S.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 15, 1933.

~~LES~~:
~~EHD~~:
~~[illegible]~~:
~~MMH~~:

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of January 19, 1933, transmits a copy of a despatch to the Legation on the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikwan, the information given being based largely on a report made to the Consul General by the AP correspondent, James Mills, the only foreign press correspondent to visit Shanhaikwan shortly after the occupation. Mr. Mills was at Changchun following the Shanhaikwan affair and was impressed by the concern of the Japanese officials there over the repercussion abroad of this affair.

The Japanese version of the origin of the incident is substantially as that published in the press at the time. Chinese army casualties were estimated at 1,[illegible]00 and Japanese at 114, the latter figure being considered under-estimated. A high Japanese officer believes that the incident would not have occurred had General Ho Chu-kuo been at his post when negotiations were desired of him. Apparently there is no doubt that the Chinese first fired on a Japanese platoon and that the Japanese did not plan and regretted the incident, but the Japanese were quick to turn the affair to their own advantage in connection

with

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with the forthcoming Jehol campaign. The younger Japanese officers are pleased with the Chinese concentration in Jehol, for the larger the Chinese force the greater the blow they will deal to their arch-enemy, Chang Hsueh-liang.

Mr. Mills noted much Japanese military activity along the Mukden-Shanhaikwan railway. Suichung at the southern terminus of this line has been turned into a veritable fortress, while concrete "pill boxes" similar to those found along the S.M.R. have been constructed at numerous points. ~~The~~ A Japanese garrison or guard is found at every station.

WRL:KC

0445

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, January 19, 1933.

793.94

SUBJECT: Japanese Occupation of Shanhaikuan.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FEB 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

PM RECD FEB 13 33

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 717 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated January 17, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 717
to the Legation at Peiping.

FILED
FEB 20 1933

800
HTW

F/HS 793.94/5882

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 717

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, China, January 17, 1933.

SUBJECT: Japanese Occupation of Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams of January 3 4 p. m., 4 12 noon and 5 5 p. m. in regard to the Japanese occupation of Shanhaikuan, I have the honor to submit additional information on this subject.

As far as is known, only one foreign press correspondent - Mr. James Mills of the Associated Press - has visited Shanhaikuan since the incident of January 2 and 3. He returned a few days ago and yesterday gave me a brief resume of the incident and of conditions there which may be of interest to the Legation. It may be mentioned that Mr. Mills who was at Hsinking (Changchun) at the beginning of the year was impressed by the concern exhibited by Japanese officials over the effect the incident might have on world opinion while at the same time they insisted that it was unimportant and would be treated as a local

issue.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

issue. Japanese Headquarters were, he thought, taken by surprise and its occurrence seemed to have been genuinely regretted.

The chief features of the incident as learned by Mr. Mills from Japanese sources at Shanhaikuan were the following: The throwing of the hand grenades at the guard house and in front of the gendermery headquarters on January 1 did no damage and pursuant to the settlement providing for Japanese occupation of the south gate of the city reached that night between the Japanese and Chinese commanders a platoon of Japanese soldiers was proceeding toward the south gate next day when it was fired upon by Chinese soldiers from the wall. The Japanese replied and after some fighting occupied the South Gate as well as two of the three remaining gates. The evacuation of the city by the Chinese troops was demanded by the Japanese and refused by the Chinese officer in Charge and during the exchange of messages which followed General Ho Chu-kuo, the Chinese commander who was absent at the time of the incident, promised to meet Major Ochiai, the commander of the local Japanese garrison, early in the morning of January 3rd. After waiting several hours for him General Suzuki who had in the meantime arrived from Chinchow and taken charge ordered the bombardment of the city for the purpose of driving out the Chinese troops. At ten o'clock the Japanese field artillery, airplanes and two destroyers in the harbor began their work of destruction which continued for two hours. Eight square blocks in the

business

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

business section of the city in which there were a number of substantial buildings as well as the usual one-storied native structures were demolished by the bombardment or destroyed by fire. Three of the four towers on the city wall were badly damaged but the wall itself suffered very little. The Japanese estimate Chinese army casualties at 1100 and report their own at 114. There is reason to believe, however, that their losses have been understated and were probably double the figure given. A foreign resident of Shanhaikuan estimated the number of Chinese civilians killed at 200.

The city was deserted at the time of Mr. Mills visit, about 20,000 of the inhabitants having taken refuge in the vicinity of the international forts about four miles distant from the city where small squads of Italian and French soldiers are quartered and the others having gone farther afield. The Japanese have been endeavoring to persuade the refugees to return to their homes and resume their vocations but few if any had acted upon Japanese promises of protection in spite of their sufferings from inadequate shelter and a shortage of food supplies. They fear that the Chinese troops will attempt to re-take the city, a fear which is not shared by the Japanese.

Major Ochiai was a former teacher or tutor of General Ho when a student in Japan and in the opinion of the Major the incident would not have occurred had the General been at his post. The Major, it is said,

still

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

still believes that a settlement of the incident could at this time be arranged with the General were it possible to get in touch with him. The Japanese proposed terms of settlement are given as follows:

(a) An apology by General Ho;

(b) A pledge against a recurrence of a similar incident;

(c) Chinese troops not to be allowed to enter territory extending two miles on either side of the Peiping-Shanhaikuan Railway in the section between Shanhaikuan and Lanchow.

(Some Japanese reports allege that this is in accord with the International Protocol of 1901 and others with the agreement of 1902 regarding the return of Tientsin to Chinese control - the details of the agreement between the Powers in regard to the protection of the Peiping-Shanhaikuan line are not known to this office.)

The Japanese have dropped the demand for the neutralization of Shanhaikuan and are no longer talking of retiring from that strategic point.

Mr. Mills also noted much activity on the part of the Japanese army along the Fengtien-Shanhaikuan Railway and the presence of military equipment of all kinds at many of the stations although little was seen to be moving. Small concrete forts or "pill boxes" similar to the ones on the South Manchuria Railway lines have been constructed along this line and look-out stations for Japanese sentries have been built on the top of station buildings. A Japanese garrison or guard is found at every railway station. Suichung, he said, was being turned into a veritable fortress as a

precautionary

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

precautionary measure against the cutting of the Japanese line of communications - the Fengtien-Shanhaikuan Railway - between Chinchow and Shanhaikuan.

Although it seems reasonable, as stated above, that the Japanese were taken by surprise by the Shanhaikuan incident and regretted its occurrence, it is quite evident that in spite of their declarations of its having only local significance they were not slow to exploit it and turn it to their distinct advantage. Apparently there is no doubt that the Chinese fired on the Japanese platoon on January 2nd killing and wounding several members of the unit and that it was this incident which led to the unwarranted destruction of the city and loss of life among the civilian population next day as also the occupation of the city.

It is believed by observers including some Japanese that Shanhaikuan would have been seized by the Japanese army before it launched the Jehol campaign in order to guard against possible attack on its flank or rear. The subsequent occupation of Chiumen, the only other gateway in the wall between China and Manchoukuo, seems to support this view. The Japanese military now appear to be turning their undivided attention to the Jehol situation and consequently it is to be expected that no strategic move in furtherance of their plan of campaign will be overlooked. It is understood that at least among the younger officers the Chinese concentration in Jehol province is regarded with complete satisfaction and composure, for it is felt that the larger the

concentration

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

concentration the greater will be the loss inflicted on their arch-enemy Chang Hsueh-liang when the blow is struck.

As already reported, the Japanese have been concentrating troops along the western border of this province between Suichung and Tungliao, in which area the 8th division with headquarters at Chinchow and the 4th cavalry brigade and 14th division recently transferred from the north are, it is understood, largely to be found. Although not confirmed, it is believed that part of the 6th division - it has replaced the 2nd - has been moved into that area. A report just heard but denied in official quarters is to the effect that reserves have been ordered to hold themselves in readiness. On several previous occasions, it will be remembered, reserves were called to the colors for a short period to relieve soldiers doing guard duty along the railway line.

According to reports, Manchoukuo units will be used in the drive into Jehol province but no doubt Japanese troops will bear the brunt of such fighting as may be done. The local press report today that General Chang Ching-hui, Minister of Defense, has been appointed commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force to be sent against that province. Naturally his commandership will be nominal only.

It is not unlikely, as is indicated by some reports, that the Japanese are still endeavoring to secure the allegiance of T'ang Yu-lin, Chairman of Jehol province, to Manchoukuo by peaceful means. He has a great amount

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of property in this province, concerning which reports of proposed confiscation are again being heard. Were he to throw in his lot with Manchoukuo and cooperate with the Japanese troops he would no doubt save his property as well as render the Japanese occupation of that province much easier owing to the rugged nature of the country and the sparse population. Whether or not he is negotiating with the Japanese or whether he is any longer in a position to do so in view of alleged recent troop movements from China into that province or whether some of his generals are on the point of deserting their leader this office has no information. Any of these eventualities are possible; the only one that is reasonably certain is the eventual inclusion of Jehol province within the domain of Manchoukuo.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation at Peiping.
Five copies to Department of State.
One copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
One copy to Consulate General, Tientsin.

A true copy of the signed original.

800
MSM:MTW

0453

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4 General Committee/163 FOR Tel. # 292, 1 1pm

FROM ( ) DATED Feb. 11, 1933.

TO General Disarmament Conference, AMDEL

NAME

1—1127 GPO

793.94/5883

REGARDING:

Pact of Paris is the cornerstone on which this administration has rested its foreign policy, and there can be no doubt in the mind of any European statesman, either from our declarations or our attitude throughout the Far Eastern crisis, of our interpretation of the obligations agreed to under the pact.

MN

0454

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5884

SEE 894.918/10 FOR Tel.#39-4pm.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Feb.12,1933
NAME

TO---

REGARDING: Official press ban issued in Japan against news regarding warships and airplanes to be sent to China or Manchukuo. Also relating to operations in Manchukuo or Jehol, airplanes being built by the army or the navy amd related matters.

fpg

0455

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

EJ

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

TOKIO

Dated February 12, 1933

Recd. 6.12 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

39. February 12, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

An official press ban has recently been issued against publishing anything with regard to (gray) "warships, airplanes or unit strength (for instance, name of warships, number or kind of airplanes) which are expected to be despatched to China or Manchukuo shortly from Japan. Movements of these warships or airplanes must not be mentioned. Any news which can be conjectured of such nature is also banned. However, reports announced by the Navy office in this connection may be published." (End Gray).

Also banned are, one, all mention of details of airplanes being built by the army and the navy by way of experiment; two, anything relating to the plan of operations in Manchuria, especially in Jehol Province; three, news relating to the arrest of emissaries of General Li, commander of the Chinese volunteers, in Penchihu.

To Peiping by mail.

GREW

KLP

note
793.94

894.91/1810

0456

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5885

SEE 793.94 Commission/785 FOR Tel. # 101, 8 pm (Misc).

FROM Switzerland (Wilson) DATED February 9, 1933.
TO NAME

I—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Secretary-General of League will be requested to inform Matsuoka of the Committee of 19's view that reported military operations in Jehol would render conciliation impossible.

hs

0457

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

Peiping via NR.

Dated February 16, 1933.

Rec'd 10:35 p.m., 15th.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 16 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 16 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94
mtc
500.C001

151, February 16, 8 ~~p.m.~~ a.m. FE/JMK

Press yesterday carried following Reuter message under Washington date line February 13th:

"Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations is regarded here as a foregone conclusion. Genuine apprehension exists in official circles that a large scale war over Manchuria is inevitable. Many people here expect Japan to declare a blockade of Chinese ports." Last sentence has created something of a panic among foreign business men here in the North. Can the Department give me any information as to the source?

JOHNSON

JS CIB

FILED
FEB 18 1933

F/G 793.94/5886

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

RECEIVED
1933 FEB - 16 - AM 10:24
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

Washington,

February 16, 1933.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

52

Your 151, February 16, 8 p.m., last sentence.

Apparently loose talk in some circles in response to speculative inquiries by press correspondents. No repeat no responsible utterances.

S Hinson

FE:SKH:CLS FE

793.94/5886

ER
Feb. 16 1933

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1—138

793.94/5886

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
February ~~11~~, 1933.
EJL

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 11 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 11 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1933
Department of State

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
A COPY OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1933

793.94
with
793.51

The allegation contained in a Tokyo report that Foreign Minister Lo Wen-Kan had announced the grant of some big loans to China by the United States for the purpose of maintaining a protracted anti-Japanese campaign was flatly denied and characterized as an entire fabrication by a Foreign Office spokesman.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 10, 1933

FILED
FEB 14 1933

7887/46-47

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
February 11, 1933

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 11 1933
STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 15 1933
DIVISION OF

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1933

A telegraphic message from Kailu dated February 8 reports that a combined force of more than two hundred Japanese and a thousand "Manchukuo" soldiers, armed with field guns and machine guns, have been launching a fierce attack on the Chinese troops under the command of General Li Fang-ting. The engagement has been taking place for several days past and is still going on at present.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 10, 1933

793.94

793.94/5888

FILED
FEB 15 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FEB 11 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 11 1933 Department of State

From Chinese Legation, February 11, 1933.

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1933

793.94

General Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol, sent to the Ministry a detailed account of the recent clashes between the Chinese and the Japanese in Jehol as follows:

(1) In the morning of January 31, a Japanese army plane reconnoitered over Chifeng and Chichieh for about ten minutes and flew away toward the southeast. At nine o'clock in the morning of February 2, two Japanese army planes reconnoitered over Chaoyang and disappeared northward. Simultaneously, a Japanese armored car came to Chaoyang for repairs and left after a short period. An hour later, a Japanese armored motor car came from Chaoyang along the railway to the positions of the Twelfth Company of the Chinese Forces at Nanlin. A clash between the two forces followed during which the Chinese repulsed calmly but gallantly with rifles the Japanese machine gun attack. On the same day, a Japanese armored car launched an attack upon Peipiao which was severely repulsed by the Chinese sentry stationed there. On February 3, a Japanese army plane flew low over Chaoyang and subsequently disappeared to the northeast.

(2) The deaths resulted from the battle at Kailu on January 26 were found to consist of one Japanese artillery officer, one artillery soldier, three machine gunners, and thirty-three privates, in addition to ten wounded soldiers and four planes destroyed. It was also

793.94/5889

FILED FEB 15 1933

0462

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

found that the attackers were a branch unit consisting of several hundred Japanese soldiers and about three thousand bogus government troops. Owing to their repeated repulses by the Chinese and the heavy casualties inflicted upon them, these units of Japanese and bogus government troops were transferred to other places, their positions at Tungliao being filled by other units.

(3) A telegraphic report from Kailu dated February 6 stated that about three hundred Japanese soldiers, several hundred Mongolian cavalry soldiers and some thirty heavy transport carts were advancing toward the north of Tungliao and that the Japanese troops stationed at Yu-Lian-Pao were likely to attack Pa-Shien-Tung.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 10, 1933

0463

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5890

SEE 701.9394/7 FOR Tel # 152, 11AM

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Feb. 16, 1933
TO NAME

1—1127 ors

REGARDING: Japanese Diplomatic Representatives in Tokyo:
quotation from Reuter despatch - "As a positive indication that diplomacy is no longer of any use in dealing with Japan, China is likely to withdraw her representatives from Tokyo in event of Japanese invasion of Jehol. Such action is generally considered to be inevitable although officials state that final decision has not yet been reached".

wb

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated February 16, 1933.

Recd 2:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

152, February 16, 11 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking:

"As a positive indication that diplomacy is no longer of any use in dealing with Japan, China is likely to withdraw her diplomatic representatives from Tokyo in event of Japanese invasion of Jehol. Such action is generally considered to be inevitable although officials state that final decision has not yet been reached."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

0465

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
DIV. COM. & REC.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 16 1933
Department of State

Peping, January 4, 1933.

No. 2. (Individual)

Subject:- EVENTS AT SHANHAIKUAN.

FEB 13 33

793.94

The Senior Minister has the honour to circulate herewith to his Honourable Colleagues a statement regarding events at Shanhaikuan, which has been handed to him, as Dean of the Diplomatic Body, by a representative of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

Le 1 Janvier.

A 9 h ½ du soir, des soldats japonais habillés en civil ont tiré des coups de fusil sur la muraille. Quelques minutes après, des soldats japonais ont jeté une bombe à la gare de Shanhaikwan et des polices du soit-disant Mandchoukuo ont tiré quelques dizaines de coups de fusil.

Notre quartier de Shanhaikwan a envoyé le Chef de Bureau des Affaires Etrangères chez les japonais pour leur demander la raison.

Les japonais nous ont répondu c'est nous qui ont commencé à ouvrir le feu, et comme preuve, les carreaux du poste de la gendarmerie japonaise ont été brisés. En même temps, ils nous ont demandé l'évacuation de la population et encore la retraite de notre garde à Nankwan (Porte de Sud de Shanhaikwan).

Nous avons tout refusé.

Le 2 Janvier

Vers 10 heures du matin, deux trains blindés japonais ont tiré des coups de canon dans la ville, et environ deux centaines de soldats ont grimpé la muraille à l'aide des échelles en bois. Finalement des japonais n'ont pu réussir à entrer dans la ville, car nous nous sommes défendu avec des sabres et des granades.

FEB 17 1933
FILED

Vers midi, trois trains militaires sont arrivés à Shanhaikwan avec trois mille soldats environ et une vingtaine de canons. En dehors de Shanhaikwan, à Wouyencheng, ils nous ont attaqué très violemment.

A 3 heures de l'après-midi, six avions de bombardement ont jeté des bombes dans la ville et causé beaucoup de morts et de blessés.

A minuit, on entendait encore une vive canonnade.

F/G
793.94/5891

0466

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
DIV. COM. & REC
FEB 13 33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 16 1933
Department of State

Peping, January 11, 1933.

CIRCULAR No. 3.

Subject:- EVENTS AT SHANHAIKUAN.

Referring to Circular No. 2 (Individual), dated the 4th instant, the Senior Minister has the honour to circulate herewith to his Honourable Colleagues a letter dated January 9, (with enclosure) which he received from the Japanese Chargé des Affaires.

793.94

F/G 793.94/5892

JAPANESE LEGATION
PEPING

His Excellency
Don Justo Garrido y Cisneros,
Dean of the Diplomatic Body,
and the Minister for Spain.

The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to His Excellency the Senior Minister and with reference to Circular No.2 (Individual), under the date of the 4th instant, relating to the "Events at Shanhaikuan", has the honour to send to His Excellency the attached copy describing how the Shanhaikuan incident took place, which he wishes to be circulated among his Honorable Colleagues.

FILED
FEB 17 1933

Peping, January 9th., 1933.

0467

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

About 9.30 p.m. on January 1, hand-grenades were thrown on, and rifle-shots were fired on the vicinity of the Japanese Gendarmerie Branch Office, residence of the Chief of gendarmes, watch-house of Japanese soldiers at the railway station, and Manchukuo Frontier Police Station, situated at the outside of the South Gate, Shanhaikuan. One of the bullets broke a window-pane of the residence of the Gendarmerie Chief.

Thereupon our garrison was set on guard, and negotiations were opened with the Chinese side. As the result, an arrangement was made for the sake of self-defence and giving protection to Japanese residents and railway, to place the South Gate under the control of the Japanese garrison, and by that means a temporary tranquility was gained.

About 11 a.m. on the 2nd, the Japanese garrison detailed a section of soldiers to the South Gate to guard it in the enforcement of the abovementioned arrangement. Chinese troops stationed in the neighbourhood of the gate threw hand-grenades and fired upon the Japanese soldiers, killing thereby one lieutenant and wounding several men. This made it inevitable for us to accept the challenge in self-defence.

0468

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation,
February 13, 1933.
EJL

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FEB 11 1933
Division of
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FEB 13 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 13 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 15 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ~~OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY~~

DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1933

793.94

General Tang Yu-lin transmitted to the Ministry two reports from Brigadier-General Tung dated February 7 stating that:

(1) The Chinese guards at the Nanlin battle front were being fired upon on February 7 by a Japanese aeroplane with machine guns but they repulsed this attack by returning about five hundred shots;

(2) The Japanese guards at Chaoyangtze numbered one hundred in day time but increased by fifty or sixty at night;

(3) Approximately one thousand infantry and artillery soldiers, armed with Calon pieces and with about fifty motor trucks, arrived at Chin-Chia-Tun (a point to the east of Chinchow) to reinforce the five train loads of Japanese troops dispatched there on January 26 in preparation for the attack on Jehol in four lines of advance, i.e., Kan-Yao-Lin, Sun-Lin-Men, Pa-To-Ying-Tze and Chaoyang-Tze;

(4) Up to February 7, Chinchow was quiet although the number of Japanese aeroplanes had increased to twenty-seven;

(5) The number of Japanese cavalry and artillery soldiers at Suichung was about one thousand.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 12, 1933

793.94/5893

FILED
FEB 15 1933

0469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

From Chinese Legation, February 13, 1933. E.H.L.

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FEB 11 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 13 1933 Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY FEB 15 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 15 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

A TRANSLATION OF A TELEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 11, 1933

DCR

793.94

793.94/5894

Marshal Chang Hsiao-liang transmitted to the Ministry on February 10 a telegraphic report dated February 7 from Brigadier-General Ho Chu-kuo stating that :

(1) A train of Japanese armored cars and three freight cars were stationed at the Shanhaikwan railway terminal, loaded fully with ammunitions and provisions which the Japanese were rapidly transporting into the city;

(2) At 1 p. m. on February 7, a mine laid by the Japanese near the Catholic church at the West Gate of the city exploded after being accidentally lit by a Chinese farmer and the Japanese sentry stationed at Shih-Ho and its vicinity immediately fired some thirty shots in return;

(3) On February 6, a Japanese merchant vessel arrived at Chingwantao, heavily loaded with military supplies, which was reinforced on the next day by a Japanese warship and a Japanese submarine.

Marshal Chang transmitted to the Ministry another telegraphic report of General Ho dated February 9 stating that:

FILED FEB 15 1933

(1) A train arrived at Shanhaikwan from Suichung on February 8, carrying with it approximately two hundred infantry, sixty cavalry, six field guns, and one heavy artillery piece which were stationed at different parts of the city;

0470

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(2) Two Japanese merchant vessels came to Shanhaikwan on February 8, transporting to the Japanese headquarters a large quantity of ammunitions and provisions;

(3) A Japanese armored car stationed at about two thousand meters to the east of the Shanhaikwan railway terminal opened fire upon Chiumenkuo on February 8 and proceeded into the station at noon where it now remained;

(4) Since February8, the Japanese began to search the people coming in and going out at the four Gates of Shanhaikwan very much more strictly than before.

Marshal Chang reported again on February 10, giving a detailed estimate of the recent additions to the Japanese troops now stationed in the Three Eastern Provinces. These additions totaled eight Divisions, including the Sixth, the Tenth, the Fourteenth Divisions, one mixed Brigade of the Seventh Division, a mixed Company of the Ninth Division, the First and the Fourth Cavalry Brigades, two Heavy Artillery Companies, one Railway Engineering Mixed Company, two Aviation Companies and several Companies of Tank operators. It was also learned that the total number of Japanese aeroplanes in the Three Eastern Provinces had exceeded 1,400 and that all government and private arsenals in Japan were kept very busy manufacturing ammunitions and other military supplies as well as a large number of aeroplane and tank models.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 12, 1933

0471

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A).

FROM PEIPING

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in Confidence

Dated February 17, 1933

Rec'd 5:05 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 17 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 17 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

157, February 17, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

According to report obtained by the American Military Attache's office from Japanese sources two Japanese divisions will probably start drive on Jehol about February 21st in order to reach Chengteh before March 1st, the anniversary of establishment of Manchukuo. As terrain is difficult for infantry, bombing planes are to be extensively used and if progress through Jehol proves very slow Japanese may occupy parts of North China south of the Wall. In any event reconnaisance flights will probably be made over Peiping by planes from Chinchow or from airplane carrier off Taku. Such planes may bomb the two flying fields near Peiping in order to cause a panic in the city which might force Chang Hsueh Liang to resign. It is not intended to bomb the city itself unless planes are fired upon by Chinese troops.

By mail to Tokio.

JOHNSON

JS-CIB

FILED JUN 24 1933

F/HS

793.94/5895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 20 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated February 17, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The office of the American Military Attaché states that according to a report from Japanese sources a drive on Jehol by two divisions of Japanese will probably begin about the 21st of this month with the idea of arriving at Chengteh before the anniversary of the setting up of "Manchukuo", March 1. Bombing planes will be used extensively as the terrain is difficult for the infantry, and the Japanese may occupy sections of North China south of the Wall if their progress through Jehol proves to be very slow. Reconnaisance flights over Peiping will probably be made in any case by planes from the airplane carrier off Taku or from Chinchow. In an effort to cause a panic in the city which might result in Chang Hsueh-liang being forced to resign, these planes may bomb the two airplane fields near Peiping. Unless the planes are fired upon by Chinese troops, it is not the intention of the Japanese to bomb Peiping itself.

0473

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 18 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 18, 1933

Rec'd 4:40 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 18 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

160, February 18, 10 a. m.

793.94

Following from American Consul at Nanking:

"February 17, 11 a. m. I have been reliably informed that on the evening of February 16 some Japanese official called at the Foreign Office and inquired whether it was true that China intended to withdraw the Chinese Minister to Japan. Vice Minister Hsu Mo replied that this would depend upon the actions of Japan. (I asked Lo same question last night and he gave me the same answer.) Vice Minister is reported to have asked the Japanese official whether Japan was going to invade Jehol to which the reply was that this appeared to be the orders from Tokyo. Asked whether Japanese would take action inside the Wall the Japanese official replied this would depend on needs of military strategy".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/HS
793.94/5896

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 24, 1933.

EHD:
MMH:

Geneva's despatch No. 502 Political of February 6, 1933, acknowledges the receipt of memoranda of conversations which occurred in the Department and states that they are of value to the Consulate.

LEA:CLS

0475

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 502 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, February 6, 1933.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 18 1933
Department of State

FEB 17 33

793.94

SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict - American Policy.

1—1055 G P O

Sel 793.94/5769
5770
5771
5774

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 27 1933

F/G 793.94/5897

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge with appreciation four instructions from the Department, all of which are dated January 16, 1933, transmitting memoranda of conversations between officials of the Department and officials of foreign governments concerning the Sino-Japanese question.

I wish to state that not only do I find this information of great personal interest but that also it is of definite value to the work of this office to be thus apprised concerning pertinent statements of American policy, or intimations of the trend of American policy, as are disclosed in such records of conversations.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

FEB 28 1933

Original and Five Copies to Department of State,
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

PBG/GdeW.

0476

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

RECEIVED FEB 17 1933 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AND BRANCH

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 18 1933 Department of State

February 16, 1933.

Copies to Tokyo, Peiping, Geneva and Copenhagen 2/20/33 FE (REK)

FE

DC

February 23 1933

793.94 m Personnel, Foreign, Diplomatic

F/HS

793.94/5898

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND THE MINISTER OF DENMARK, MR. OTTO WADSTED.

Far Eastern Situation.

The Minister of Denmark expressed his congratulations at Mr. Roosevelt's escape and his horror at the crime which was committed. I thanked him for it. He said he spoke without any message from his Government and on his own initiative. He then asked what news I had in regard to the Far Eastern situation. I told him I had none except what he presumably had seen himself in the newspapers. He made some remark about the non-recognition policy being the center of the controversy. I took occasion to explain carefully what our position was in regard to that, emphasizing it was a policy designed to express moral disapproval by public opinion and not to involve an act of force, and he, himself, said that it seemed to have been found very welcome among the other nations who were a little afraid of the military and force provisions of the Covenant of the League. He spoke also of mandated islands. I told him that I had made no representation about those; that they were a matter

FILED FEB 25 1933

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0477

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

matter which would not come up unless Japan resigned from the League and then it would seem to be a disputed question between the League and Japan as to whether the mandate continued, and that I had not entered into this question.

H.L.S.

S HLS:CBS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 23 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1007

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

793.94/5898

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 16, 1933, with the Minister of Denmark, Mr. Otto Wadsted, in regard to the Far Eastern situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 16,
1933.

S/1116

793.94/5898

FEB 25 1933

WE; WHF PM

A true copy of the signed original.

FE:MMH:REK
2/20/33

FE
M.M.H.

0479

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 23 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 204

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 16, 1933, with the Minister of Denmark, Mr. Otto Wadsted, in regard to the Far Eastern situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 16,
1933.

793.94/5898

793.94/5898

FE:MMH:REK
2/20/33

FE
M.M.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 23 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 89

The Honorable

Frederick W. B. Coleman,

American Minister,

Copenhagen.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 16, 1933, with the Minister of Denmark, Mr. Otto Wadsted, in regard to the Far Eastern situation. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 16,
1933.

793.94/5898

FE:MMH:REK
2/20/33

FE
M.M.H.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5898

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 23 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

793.94/5898

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 16, 1933, with the Minister of Denmark, Mr. Otto Wadsted, in regard to the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 16,
1933.

S/HLL

A true copy of the signed original.

793.94/5898

FEB 26 1933

FE:MMH:REK
2/20/33

FE
M.M.H.

WE MMF JRM

0482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5899

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/55 FOR Despatch # 233

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED January 9,1933
TO NAME

REGARDING: Shanhaikuan incident of Dec.8th.

Conflicting reports were current as to real cause of clash but there is reason to believe that appearance of Jap. armoured train caused misapprehension among Chinese soldiers as to purpose of visit, and several shots were fired at train which were returned; slight damage to town and only a few casualties. Gen'l. Ho Chu-Kuo and Jap.commander negotiated successfully and order restored by night of Dec.10th.

0 4 8 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

Shanhaikwan Incident of December 8. The event of chief importance was the clash between Japanese and Chinese

0484

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese soldiers at Shanhaikuan on the night of December 8 (See my telegrams of December 10, 11 a.m., and December 12, 10 a.m.). Like all incidents in which Chinese and Japanese soldiers have been involved in recent months, conflicting reports became current concerning the real cause of the incident. These conflicting versions have made it difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion as to who was responsible for the incident, but there is reason to believe that the appearence of a Japanese armored train at the Shanhaikuan station gave rise to a misapprehension on the part of the Chinese as to the purpose of the visit and through a misunderstanding several rifle shots were fired at the train, whereupon about ten shots were fired in return from small caliber mounted guns on the armored train, with slight damage to Shanhaikuan and with only a few casualties. The train is alleged then to have proceeded westward to a railway tank, which was subjected to severe gun fire. The train subsequently returned to the station at Shanhaikuan and some hours later negotiations for the settlement of the affair were entered into between the Japanese commander at Shanhaikuan and General Ho Chu-kuo, the Linyung Defense Commissioner. These negotiations ended successfully and by the night of December 10 order had been restored in Shanhaikuan. Japanese news agencies stated categorically that the incident was adjusted on the basis of General Ho having admitted that the Chinese troops fired first on the armored train and that, for

this

0485

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

this reason, he had assumed responsibility for the clash, General Ho, however, has made no such admission, at least publicly, and there is some doubt that the incident was settled on any such basis. It is understood that the Japanese Consul General lodged a protest with the Chairman of the Provincial Government charging the Chinese military with having instigated the trouble by firing the first shot.

The political and military situation at Shanhaikuan has been intermittently disturbed since the occupation of Chinchow some months ago by the Japanese and it is little wonder that more clashes have not taken place there in view of the maintenance of considerable contingents of both Chinese and Japanese troops within the city. It is known that General Ho, who speaks the Japanese language and has lived in Japan, and who, for this reason, was selected to command the troops in the Shanhaikuan area, has displayed great patience in dealing with the situation there and has avoided many unpleasant incidents by a spirit of conciliation and sound discretion. The criticism which has been directed towards General Ho in other parts of China by those who do not appreciate the delicate position into which he has been placed is undeserved, in the opinion of many who have followed the course of events in the Shanhaikuan area during the past few months.

The Shanhaikuan incident of December 8 created considerable uneasiness at Tientsin, but the local Chinese authorities took precautions to maintain strict order.

Martial

0486

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Martial law, to a limited extent, was enforced for several nights, and traffic was greatly restricted in the Native City. The local situation was also somewhat disturbed because of the arrival in Tientsin shortly after the Shanhaikuan incident of a Japanese destroyer. A false report to the effect that a Japanese bombing plane had arrived at Haikuanssu, near the Japanese Barracks at Tientsin, also did not contribute to easing the situation.

0487

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5900

SEE 893.00/12294 FOR Tel. # 155, 6 pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED February 16, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 OPO

REGARDING: Special military defense organization has been created in the Hopei Jehol area.

hs

0488

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPT. OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 16 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL SKA

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 15 1933 Department of State

F/HS 793.94/5901

February 14, 1933.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Reference Geneva's 105, February 13, 7 p.m.

793.94/5874

793.94

The contents of the third paragraph of this telegram afford a striking example of the wide and deep gulf which may exist between the claims of legal, political and diplomatic principles, rules, and regulations (made by and devised for the family of nations as such) on the one hand and the demands of military and political necessity as viewed by a particular nation faced with particular problems on the other hand.

It is altogether logical for the League to call upon Japan to refrain from military operations in Jehol. At the same time, it is altogether logical for the Japanese, their present situation and problem being what it is (no matter how brought about), to plan and carry out the conquest of that region (this being merely the rounding out of the political and military operations with which they have already gone so far that there remain for them only two alternatives: either

FILED FEB 21 1933 Confidential File

0489

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

either to begin a process of retreat or to press on until they have established for "Manchukuo" a logical military boundary on the southwest.

There can be no resolving of this type of conflict by mere argument and conference. The ultimate arbiter must be force. In this case the territory in question, Jehol, is not only Chinese soil but it has never been in any way within the Japanese "sphere of interest" or administrative jurisdiction. The Japanese army definitely intends to occupy and control it. They are prepared to use force to do so. Using force, they will, regardless whether the Chinese oppose with force, in all probability carry out their intention. Later, the question whether they remain in occupation and control will further be determined by the factor of force, either positive (the comparative armed strength of Japan, of China and of Russia) or negative (the comparative economic weaknesses which may persist or develop in those three countries respectively, or factors external to the Far East which may wear Japan down).

There are many kinds of force: the force of public opinion, the force of money, the force of arms, et cetera. In final analysis, neither words nor

formulae,

0490

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

formulae, neither rules nor regulations nor resolutions nor law nor treaties are decisive where a country is embarked upon a course such as Japan has followed. The deciding factor is that of ~~force~~ pressure -- in some form or forms.

FE:SKH/ZMK

0491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

Dated February 20, 1933.

Recd 4:17 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 20 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 20 1933
Department of State

FEB 20 1933

168, February 20, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Spanish Minister has just informed me that some days ago he received copy of instruction sent to Spanish Ambassador Tokyo directing him in concert with other protocol powers to make a damarche with the Japanese Government urging Japan to respect protocol in any activities here. He said that United States would make similar demarche.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94

F/ESP

793.94/5902

FILED
MAR 7 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to FE

1—138 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

This cable is sent in Confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before communicated to anyone.

1933 FEB 20 PM 5:24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

Washington,
February 20, 1933.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
PEIPING (China)

60

Your 168, February 20, 1 p.m.

FOR YOUR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

The British Foreign Office through the British Embassy here approached the Department in January with regard to the making in Tokyo by several powers of joint or separate representations to the Japanese Government with regard to China's allegation of abuse by Japan at Shanhaikwan of privileges under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. After an exchange of views back and forth, the Department informed the British Foreign Office that it did not repeat not feel it advisable for the American Government to join in such representations at this time, although any effort which the British Government might feel moved, in the premises, to make alone or with the other powers signatory to the Protocol would have the Department's good will.

Department has not repeat not since been approached or had any word on this subject.

S Stimson

793.94/5902

793.94/5902

Enciphered by FE:JEJ/VDM FE

Sent by operator ..... *M.*, ..., *19*....., ...

Feb.20 1933

Index Bu.—No. 50. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

From Chinese Legation
Febr. 14, 1933.

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 15 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 15 1933
NOTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

Peiping reports gave a detailed account of a fierce battle fought between the Chinese and the Japanese at Kailu on February 6. The Chinese troops under Li Fang-ting bore the brunt of the Japanese attack, resulting in heavy casualties on his side. The Japanese at first succeeded in pushing Li's forces back for some fifty or sixty li but, reinforced by Chieh Kuo-chum and Kuo Erh-chia and the Fifth and the Eighth Divisions, Li's forces were finally able to force the Japanese to retreat on February 9. The forces under Kuo, in co-operation with the Fifth and the Eighth Divisions, pressed on until the Japanese were compelled to evacuate their occupied territory in the morning of February 10. In the afternoon of February 10, the Japanese launched a counter-attack with more than three hundred soldiers and seven armored cars armed with machine-guns but were severly repulsed by the Chinese.

793.94/5903
FE/HS

ıe Chinese Legation, Washington
.bruary 14, 1933

0494

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 15 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 15 1933
NOTED

From Chinese Legation
Febr. 14, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

TEXT OF TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1933.

A cablegram from Kailu (Jehol) reported to the effect that the situation in that city has been very quiet since the 12th of February. No enemy troops have been seen in the north of Kehtumenchi, a city on the border of Jehol and Liaoning Provinces.

After the failure of their attack on Kailu on February 10th, the Japanese troops have decided to change their plans of invading Jehol. Instead of entering the Province from Kailu, they will invade by way of Suichung (a city on the western border of the Liaoning Province) and Lingnan (a city on the eastern border of the Province of Jehol).

On the morning of the 12th, instant, the Japanese troops were found to be very busy in transportations on the highway leading from Suichung to Lingnan and outside of the Chiumeng Pass. All inhabitants of that district have taken refuge in some isolated mountainous places. The Japanese have assembled their troops along the line of Chinchow and Chaoyang, stationing their main forces in the vicinity of Chaoyangtsi, and have chosen the city of Ihsien (on the eastern border of Liaoning) to store their munitions. They are getting ready for another concerted attack.

The atmosphere in Peipiao (a city halfway between Chinchow and Chaoyang) is very tense. The distance separating the two armies is not more than fifteen miles, while their vanguards have already had several clashes. The situation has been so aggravated in the night of the 12th that military operations of large scale will be imminent.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 14th, 1933.

F/HS 793.94/5904

0495

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 15 1933
NOTED

From Chinese Legation
Febr. 14, 1933.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 17 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

TEXT OF TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING
DATED FEBRUARY 14, 1933.

793.94

A telegram from Kailu (Jehol) reported that on both the 10th and 12th of February, more than two hundred Japanese cavalry with six armoured cars, assisted by over three hundred Mongolian and "Manchukuo" troops, launched several attacks on the south of Hsinmon Company with the purpose of disturbing peace and order. Thanks to the bravery of our soldiers, the enemies were repulsed.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 14, 1933.

FE
DCR
F/HS
793.94/5905
FILED
FEB 17 1933

0496

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 20 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated February 20, 1933

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 20 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

February 20, 9 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"February 20, 3 p. m. Six troop trains moved eastward through Tientsin over the week-end. Chinese residents of Shanhaikwan state Japanese will suspend regular railway schedules east of Shanhaikwan from today to the 25th and that Japanese will start invasion of Jehol on or about 25th. All information points to large concentration of Japanese troops east of Shanhaikwan. No disturbances this side of the Wall thus far incident to the new situation as far as can be learned.

Repeated to the Department".

KLP-HPD

LOCKHART

JUN 24 1933

F/G 793.94/5906

0497

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5907

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/1727 Confidential File FOR Memo.

FROM State Dept. S (Stimson) DATED Feb. 16,1933

TO NAME

REGARDING:

Conversation with Italian Ambassador who commented on situation in Geneva in regard to Far East and expressed his own regret that the answer of Japan had not been more conciliatory and had not shown better hope of peaceful solution.

ja

0498

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5908

SEE 500. A 15 a 4 General Committee/171 FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. S (Stimson) DATED Feb. 16.1933
TO NAME

REGARDING: Conversation with French Ambassador.

Troubled by stiffness of position being taken by League in Far Eastern situation. Rumored that League proposal insisted that the Japanese should withdraw immediately to the railroad zone and that is quite impossible under present conditions. Belief that the only things the League should insist upon in a settlement were that the sovereignty of China should be respected over Manchuria and that the Japanese should not advance into Jehol and, on the other hand, that the economic rights of Japan in Manchuria should be respected subject to "Open Door " policy.

ja

0499

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 21, 1933

Rec'd 2:35 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 1 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 21 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

170, February 21, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Mukden:

"February 20, 2 p. m. All indications are that major operations in Jehol will begin this week and probably will be preceded by a demand to Chang Hsueh-Liang to withdraw his forces therefrom and by formal invitation to Tang Yu Lin to acknowledge his allegiance to Manchukuo. Military admit that more than two Japanese divisions supported by special units, all available aeroplanes and 31,000 Manchukuo troops in which there are many Japanese, will comprise the attacking force. The figure for Japanese divisions is believed to be low. Indications are that a detachment from Kailu will advance south before the major drive is started in southern Jehol. Very little opposition is expected in the Northeast. Japanese military are eager to surround and inflict a severe defeat on Chang's regulars. Part of the Kwantung army headquarters under General Koiso will be moved to Mukden or Chinchow.

Japanese military assert that developments at

Geneva

F/HS

793.94/5909

JUN 2 a 1933

0500

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Geneva will not affect their plans. Indications that the Peiping-Tientsin district may become involved are increasing.

Insurgents have become active in the Tungpien area".

JOHNSON

JS CIB

0501

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5910

SEE 793.94 Commission/859 FOR Tel. # 171, 2 pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED February 21, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 OPO

REGARDING: Chinese resistance to Japanese acts in Manchuria.

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated February 21, 1933.

Recd 5:52 a.m.

MID informed by telephone Feb 21, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 21 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 21 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

172, February 21, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Military Attache plans to leave on the night of 22nd for Jehol for two or three day visit.

JOHNSON

JS CIB

793.94
note
121.54

F/HS 793.94/5911

FILED
JUN 24 1933

0503

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokio

Dated February 21, 1933

Rec'd 8:25 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 21 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 21 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

.44, February 21, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation today with a member of the Embassy stated that it had been the intention of the Japanese army to start the offensive into Jehol on the 22nd or the 23rd of February but that there seemed to be some delay although he did not expect the delay to be more than three or four days. He said the army expected to reduce the province in about two weeks, but his own opinion was that it would be longer, probably about a month.

In this connection the Military Attache reports that troops of the ninth division are in action against the Chinese 107th brigade and volunteers in the vicinity of Chaoyangsu 60 kilometers north of Chingchow, the "Young Officers Union" is again very active, having circularized the army and others, demanding withdrawal from the League. This action probably influenced the Cabinet's decision yesterday. Direct action against Shidehara, Makino and Admiral Suzuki is considered possible.

Repeated to Peiping.

WSB - RR

GREW

793.94
note
893.00

F/HS

793.94/5912

FILED

FEB 25 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 23 1933

PARAPHRASE CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated February 21, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

During the course of a conversation held on February 21 with a member of the American Embassy the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Japanese Army had intended to begin the drive into Jehol on February 22 or 23, and, although there appeared to be some delay, he did not anticipate that there would be more than three or four days' delay. He also stated that the Army expected it would take about two weeks to reduce the province, but it was his own opinion that a longer time would be required, a month in all probability.

The American Military Attaché reports in this connection that ninth division troops are fighting against Chinese volunteers and the 107th brigade in the neighborhood of Chaoyangsu north of Chingchow 60 kilometers; and that great activity is being manifested again by the "Young Officers Union", which demands withdrawal from the League and which has circularized the army and others. It is considered possible that there will be direct action against Admiral Suzuki, Makino and Shidehara.

0505

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5903

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/828 FOR Tel. # 164, 10 am.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED February 19, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 OFO

J 9/3

REGARDING:

Manchukuo authorities have decided to relieve General Tang Yu Lin of governorship of Jehol and to appoint General Chang Hai Peng as Acting Governor.

hs

0506

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E

JS

Plain

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 19, 1933

Rec'd 3:18a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.94/

164, February 19, 10 a.m.

Manchukuo authorities at Changchun yesterday announced decision to relieve General Tang Yu Lin of governorship of Jehol and to appoint General Chang Hai Peng, principal aide to Chief Executive Pu Yi, as Acting Governor.

JOHNSON

JS

8 28

0507

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ans. 2/9/33
ERP

PENDLE HILL

A QUAKER GRADUATE CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL STUDY

WALLINGFORD, PA.

February 13 1933

File
ERP

February 8, 1933.

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 13 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1933
Department of State

Mr. E. Wilder Spaulding
Assistant to the Historical Adviser
Department of State
Washington , D.C.

Dear Mr. Spaulding,

Kindly prepare for me a chronological history of outstanding events in Manchuria from September 18, 1931, to the present time, giving dates and mentioning the events plus brief accounts of the significance of such events, leading toward a good understanding of the entire Manchurian situation ~~at~~ as it exists today.

I have found that Senate Document 55, 72nd Congress, entitled "Conditions in Manchuria" which you kindly sent me on October 22, 1932, is very useful for such purpose. I am wondering if there is a similar material in your office covering developments between January 1, 1932, and the present.

In addition I shall appreciate it very much if you will outline the fate that has befallen the Lytton Report in Geneva since its publication on October 2, 1932.

All of this material is to be used as refernce for a course called "Christian Pacifism and Social Coercion" offered in Pendle Hill, which will examine the field of international relations during the coming semester, beginning next week. If Pendle Hill is unknown to you I shall be glad to enlighten you on the subject. My name is Japanese, but I am an American citizen by virture of my birth in Hawaii, and I refer you to the offices of Mr. Victor S.K. Houston, delegate to Congress from Hawaii.

Sincerely yours,

David Tokimasa

FILED
FEB 13 1933

F/HS
793.94/5914

0508

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr Perkins:

Among other things, "Due to the pressure of public business..."

EWS

0509

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 13 1933

In reply refer to
HA

Mr. David Tokimasa,

Pendle Hill,

Wallingford, Pennsylvania.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 8, 1933, in which you request "a chronological history of outstanding events in Manchuria from September 18, 1931, to the present time" and information with respect to "the fate that has befallen the Lytton Report in Geneva since its publication on October 2, 1932".

Due to the pressure of public business the Department is not in a position to undertake the research necessary in order to prepare a history of events relating to Manchuria such as you desire and the Department does not have any information regarding conditions in the Far East available for distribution in addition to that already given in the Department's letters to you of October 22 and October 25, 1932.

Requests

793.94/5914

0510

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Requests for information regarding the activities of the League of Nations with respect to the situation in Manchuria may be addressed to the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, which is the authorized distributor in this country of publications of the League of Nations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

E. Wilder Spaulding,
Assistant to the Historical Adviser.

HA:ERP:JAA

FEB 13, 1935

FE

0511

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 22 1933
DIVISION OF

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Feb. 22, 11 am

Rec'd. 1.06 am

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1933
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

793.94

174, February 22, 11 am.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden.

"February 21, 4 pm. Spokesman of military headquarters admits that Japanese troops have crossed Jehol border and are proceeding toward Peipiao.

Unconfirmed, but reliable, reports state that skirmishes have occurred in the direction of Kaiyu and Nanling on the Chinchow-Peipiao Railway, and that a large number of Japanese troops left Mukden for Shanhaikwan yesterday and today.

Many motor trucks, hundreds of carts and two thousand coolies, according to reliable information, have been commandeered within the past few days and have left Mukden over the Fengshan."

JOHNSON

JS

JUN 24 1933

F/HS

793.94/5915

0512

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 23 1933
DIVISION OF

FROM PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated February 23, 1933.

Recd 2:05 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94
note
893.113
894.113
811.113

175, February 23, 10 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking, twenty-second.

"When interviewed regarding suggestion made abroad that there should be an arms embargo in regard to China and Japan spokesman of the Foreign Office said it should be confined to Japan alone if it was imposed at all. He declared China was acting in selfdefense while Japan was waging an aggressive war and to treat the two countries similarly in this matter would be not only unjust but tantamount to assistance Japan who already was armed to the teeth."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

FILED
FEB 27 1933

F/G

793.94/5916

0513

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 23 1933
DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Tokyo

Dated February 23, 1933

Rec'd 8:30 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

46, February 23, 8 p. m.

It was announced yesterday that the Minister for Foreign Affairs intended to call to the Foreign Office the chiefs of mission of countries having interests in the Far East in order to explain Japanese intentions in Jehol. I am now informed that this procedure has been changed and that the Japanese representatives abroad have been instructed to convey the information to the respective governments.

GREW

HPD

F/G 793.94/5917

FILED
FEB 25 1933

0514

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 24, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

Berlin's despatch No. 2184 of February 10, 1933, reports German press comment on the Manchuria situation, which is regarded as dismal. The VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG of February 8 stated that the League hoped the Far Eastern problem would contribute to a rapprochement between America and the League, but apparently the contrary had occurred, as indicated by America's calmness when Japan refused to permit America to participate in the Geneva negotiations; that America appeared to be hoping that economic conditions would frustrate Japan's political plans, and that America seemed to be exerting financial pressure on Japan. The FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG of February 10 stated that Japanese withdrawal from the League would lead to new international complications in which the United States would be involved.

NES:CLS

0515

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, February 10, 1933.

No. 2184

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict,
German Press Comment Thereon.

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 27 1933
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPT. OF STATE
PM RECD
FEB 23 33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 1 1933
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

MAR 2-1933

Sir:

793.94/5839

In continuation of despatch No. 2139 of January 21, 1933, I have the honor to report that certain sections of the German press have continued to comment on the Far-Eastern situation. On the whole, a rather dismal view was taken of the situation. A lack of faith in the League's ability to cope efficaciously with the situation was evidenced and the increasing of armaments in China and Japan was regarded as foreboding war.

Though

FILED
MAR 3-1933

F/G
793.94/5918

M.I.D.
O.N.I.

0516

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Though the United States appeared to be maintaining her well known attitude towards this question, she was seen to have adopted rather a passive role.

While conceding that the Chinese had not been able to achieve military successes, the chauvinistic BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG of February 4 believed that Russia's siding with China would be a blow to Japan as Russian dumping would effectively support the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. In addition, Japan was confronted by America, as all Japanese efforts to win over American public opinion had failed.

Commenting on the treatment of the Far-Eastern question by the League Committee of Nineteen, this journal on February 6 stated that it was typical of Geneva methods for the major Powers to leave the discussion of the matter in the hands of the smaller countries, but invariably to interfere when decisions were to be reached. Japan was aware, however, that the Geneva decision might be actively supported by the major Powers, and for this reason she had objected to American and Russian participation in the consideration of the matter. Japan's strongest card at Geneva was the support of France and England.

The moderate Left VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG of February 8 was of the opinion that American foreign policy was being fought out on two fronts, i.e., in the field

of

0517

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of inter-allied debts and in the Far East. There had been a time when League circles at Geneva hoped that the Far Eastern problem would contribute to a rapprochement between America and the League. It now appeared that the contrary had occurred. The calmness with which America viewed Japan's refusal to permit her to participate in the Geneva negotiations indicated how disinterested America was in the League. While the latter had been politically active in the European capitals and had maintained a firm standpoint in the Manchurian question, these diplomatic steps had not been very successful as neither England nor France had been moved to deviate from their traditional Eastern policies. It appeared that Japan would not make good her threat to withdraw from the League. America appeared to be hoping that Japan would be prevented by economic reasons from carrying out her political plans, and it would seem that America was exerting financial pressure on Japan.

On February 10, the moderate Left FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG remarked that both China and Japan were increasing their armaments and it was an open secret that the armament industries of many other countries had increased production in order to enable them to fill orders from these two countries. Even the United States had supplied Japan with large shipments of raw

materials

0518

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

materials for armament purposes. This journal believed that if Japan should withdraw from the League, her action might lead to new international complications in which the United States also would be involved.

The Social Democratic VORWÄRTS of February 8 believed that Japan's threat to withdraw from the League was merely a bluff and that the League should remain firm in dealing with her.

Respectfully yours,

Frederic M. Sackett.

Frederic M. Sackett.

Copy to EIC, Paris.

710
WWS-HCF-gw

0519

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 24 1933
DIVISION OF

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM PLAIN

Peiping via NR

Dated February 24, 1933.

Recd 12:25 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94

177, February 24, 10 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking, twenty-third.

"The Japanese demand for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Jehol is contained in an aide memoire which was presented at the Foreign Office by the Japanese Consul General this evening."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/G 793.94/5919

FILED
FEB 27 1933

0520

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 24 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via NR

Dated February 24, 1933.

Recd 12:25 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

178, February 24, 11 a.m.

793.94

Following from American Consul General Mukden:

"February 23, 5 p.m. Japanese military state that volunteer commander Liu Kuei-Tang and approximately eighteen thousand of his men surrendered at Lupei near Tungliao and joined the Manchukuo army. Commercial aeroplanes of the Manchukuo air service will be used for transporting army supplies to the front."

JOHNSON

CIB JS

FILED
FEB 27 1933

F/G 793.94/5920

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 24 1933

793.94/5920

To the American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

793.94/5920

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period February 1 to February 23, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:

Two copies of digest of telegrams.

E.T.S.
FE:EVC FE

II-23-33

Feb.24 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD February 1 to February 23, 1933.

The Minister at Peiping reports (February 3) that, according to reliable information, the 88th Division, composed of about 8,000 of General Chiang Kai-shek's best troops, is being transferred from Hankow to Peiping.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (February 11) that, since February 1, troop and supply trains moving eastward through Tientsin have averaged about two a day; that the Japanese General has left Shanhaikwan and has established headquarters at Chinchow (about 100 miles northeast of Shanhaikwan); that only one Japanese regiment, one tank and two armored trains remain at Shanhaikwan; and that the general situation there and at Chinwangtao is unchanged.

The Minister at Peiping reports (February 19) that, on February 18, "Manchukuo" authorities at Changchun announced that General Tang Yu-lin will be relieved of the governorship of Jehol Province and that General Chang Hai-peng, principal aide to Mr. Pu Yi, will be appointed as Acting Governor.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (February 20) that within the past two days six troop trains moved eastward through Tientsin; that Chinese residents state that the Japanese will suspend regular railway schedules east of Shanhaikwan from February 20 to 25 and will begin the invasion of Jehol Province about February 25; that all information points to a large concentration of Japanese troops east of Shanhaikwan; and that so far as can be learned there are as yet no disturbances south of the Great Wall.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 20) that

the

0523

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

FROM Tokyo

Dated February 24, 1933.

Recd 11:44 p.m., 23rd.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 24 1933
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

47, February 24, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. 793.94/5860a

Department's 14, February 3, 4 p.m., Boxer Protocol.

The British Ambassador informs me that he has received instructions to drop (repeat drop) the matter of making representations.

GREW

JS CIB

FEB 25 1933
F/G
793.94/5921
FILED
MAR 7 1933

793.94/5943

0524

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

FE/H

This cable was sent in a Confidential Code. It should be carefully guarded and not communicated to anyone.

Department of State

Washington,

February 25, 1933.

4 pm

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China)

68

Department's 60, February 20, 5 p.m.

Ambassador Grew informed the Department under date February 24 that the British Ambassador had received instructions to drop the matter of making representations.

793.94/5921

Stimson

5/24

See 793.94/5943

RECEIVED
1933 FEB-25- PM 4:23
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

5921
793.94/~~5903~~

Enciphered by FE:JEJ/VDM FE

Sent by operator ____ M., ____, 19____, ____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

0525

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 24 1933 DIVISION OF

FROM

MET

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated February 24, 1933

Rec'd 4:21 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 24 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

793.94

February 24, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"February 24, 2 p. m. Movement of troop trains eastward through Tientsin is estimated at about six per day. Chinese have recently considerably strengthened their position at and near Tangku, machine gun emplacements and fresh constructed trenches being much in evidence. Conditions are quiet along the railway between here and Shanhaikwan but there is undoubtedly increasing anxiety amongst Chinese lest operations should be extended to the region this side the Wall. Threatened invasion this area still very uncertain but in the light of past events Chinese greatly fear that some new development may ~~(*)~~ suddenly and completely alter the present situation hereabouts.

Repeated to Department".

KLP-HPD

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/5922

0526

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 24 1933
DIVISION OF

MET FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated February 24, 1933

Rec'd 6:05 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington,

180, February 24, 2 p. m.

Following from American Military Attache now at Chengteh Jehol dated 23:

"General Tang Yu Lin states Japanese troops, including infantry, artillery, tanks, armored trains, armored motor cars and air craft launched an attack February 21 in the direction Peipiao Chaoyang; that Japanese total concentration on Chinchow front about 40,000 including about 10,000 Manchukuo troops; that Japanese planes bombed Chaoyang and adjacent villages for last three days; that 2,000 of Lei's troops formerly defending Peipiao were forced to withdraw to Chaoyang where Lei's troops now defending. He expects Japanese or Manchukuo troops to attack Kailu and from there sweeping westwards shortly. Manchukuo troops about half Japanese; no Japanese planes have appeared over Chengteh recently".

Please inform War Department.

HPD JOHNSON

F/HS
793.94/5923
FILED
JUN 24 1933

0527

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 25 1933
DIVISION OF

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA NR

Dated February 25, 1933

Rec'd 24th 11 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 25 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.94

182, February 25, 9 a.m.

Following from Consul General Mukden:

"February 24, 5 p.m. Official spokesman reported today that Manchukuo troops under the command of Chang Haipeng are advancing on Kailu. Indications are that they will not meet with much resistance.

CONFIDENTIAL. Bandit activity due to the depletion of Japanese troops in railway zone. Now known strict censorship of bandit news established."

JOHNSON

FEW

FILED
FEB 28 1933

F/ESP
793.94/5924

0528

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

RECEIVED MAR 4 1933 DIVISION OF RECORDS AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 25 1933 Department of State

February 23, 1933.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome and Geneva. 2/28/33 FE (REK)

MAR 3 1933

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Far East.

793.94

The Japanese Ambassador came to tell me on the instruction of his Government that the State of Manchukuo was determined to suppress the irregular forces in the Province of Jehol; that under the Treaty between Manchukuo and Japan, Japan was obliged to support Manchukuo and therefore the Japanese forces were cooperating in this movement in Jehol. He said, however, that his Government instructed him to say they did not intend that the Japanese forces should cross the Great Wall or enter into the Peiping-Tientsin district, unless some action by Chang Hsueh-liang made it necessary for them to do so. I reminded him that on his last visit, at the time when Japan had seized Shanhaikwan, he had told me he thought that that action would be localized and that he regarded the success of its localization as a test of whether the civil or the military powers of the Japanese Government were in control, and I asked him how his

DCR FE

F/G

793.94/5925

FILED

MAR 6 1933

0529

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

his views as to that test were now affected by this movement of the Japanese forces into Jehol. He was a little embarrassed, but he said that the seizure by the Japanese forces of Shanhaikwan was an entry into North China south of the Wall, and that what he referred to when he spoke of the "test" was any further incursions into the Peiping-Tientsin area. He said that the military command of Japan recognized the various interests which were concentrated in the Peiping-Tientsin area and the consequent danger of an incursion into that area, and they did not want to go. I said, "Then you indicate by that remark that it is not a question of the civilian portion of the Japanese Government controlling the military, but of the military controlling themselves". He replied that this incursion into Jehol which was north of the Wall, they did not regard as an incursion into China proper; that Jehol had always belonged to Manchukuo; that the last Governor of the Province of Jehol had been appointed by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the father, and not by the Chinese National Government; and that Jehol was therefore a part of Manchukuo and Manchukuo was resolved to exterminate the irregulars in that Province, and in this case the civilian authorities

0530

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

authorities of Japan were acting in collaboration with the military, and it was not their intention to go into the Peiping area. He asked me to take this last fact as a confidence, lest otherwise the Chang Hsueh-liang forces might trade upon that fact. I reminded him that it had already been made public in the press and he said he remembered that, but nevertheless his Government had asked that it not be published by me. I told him I would not.

H.L.S.

S HLS:HHR

0531

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 3 1933

No. 1026

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5925

793.94/5925

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE

0532

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 3 1933

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,

American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

793.94/5925

793.94/5925

A true copy of the signed original

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE

C. of W.E. P.M.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 868

The Honorable

John W. Garrett,

American Ambassador,

Rome.

793.94/5925

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original.

793.94/5925

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE
MMH

0532

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1580

The Honorable

Walter E. Edge,

American Ambassador,

Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

793.94/5925

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5925

WE; MH
PM

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE
M.M.H.

793.94/5925

0535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 3 1933

No. 427

The Honorable

Andrew W. Mellon,

American Ambassador,

London.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5925

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5925

WE: MM PM

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE

0536

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 218

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 23, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the situation in the Far East, with particular reference to the situation in Jehol Province. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 23,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5925

793.94/5925

FE:MMH:REK
2/28/33

FE

0537

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM TOKIO

Dated February 26, 1933

Rec'd. 7:57 a.m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 27 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 26 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

48, February 26, 7 p.m.

793.94

Following from the American Consul at Dairen.

"February 26, 10 a.m. Japanese reliable source reports that Japanese ~~spectacle~~ regiment in Jehol wiped out by Chinese surprise gas attacks and that air units are under investigation for their failure in scouting work. Large number soldiers' ashes have passed through Dairen recently.

Chinese volunteers have blown up large bridge near Koupangtze on Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway.

GREW

WWC

corrected Feb. 28, 1933

F/HS 793.94/5926

FILED JUN 24 1933

0538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 28, 1933.

With reference to Peiping's telegram No. 185, February 27, 10 a.m., with regard to the report that a Japanese regiment in Jehol had been wiped out by Chinese surprise gas attacks, -

China ratified on August 7, 1929, the Geneva protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare of June 17, 1925. If this report of use of gas by the Chinese is true, the Chinese would not appear to be restricted by this protocol in the use of gas against Japan as, according to the protocol, "the High Contracting Parties ..... agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration" and Japan has not yet ratified the protocol although it has signed it. The United States also has signed but not yet ratified the protocol.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAR 2 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

FES:CLS

0539

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 1 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

FROM Dated February 27, 1933.

Recd 1:14 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

185, February 27, 10 a.m.

793.94

Following from American Consul at Dairen:

"February 26, 10 a.m. Japanese reliable source reports that Japanese regiment in Jehol wiped out by Chinese surprise gas attacks and that air units are under investigation for their failure in scouting work. Large number soldiers' ashes have passed through Dairen recently.

Chinese volunteers have blown up large bridge near Koupangtze on Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway."

JOHNSON

CIB WP

SECRETARY OF STATE
MAR 2 1933
NOTED

JUN 24 1933

F/HS 793.94/5927

0540

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

MET

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated February 27, 1933

Rec'd 4:45 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

186, February 27, 11 a. m.

Following three telegrams have been received from American Consul General at Mukden:

"February 25, 5 p. m. Military spokesman today announced that troops from Chinchow garrison occupied Peipiao February 24th and Chaoyang this noon, encountering very little resistance. The railway suffered practically no damage. Indications are that all irregulars are falling back to first main line defenses extending roughly from Chihfeng through Chienping and Wukungpu to border. All Japanese columns are expected to reach this line in about one week's time unless delayed by unlooked for opposition.

Combined Japanese-Manchukuo force occupied Kailu yesterday and is advancing south and west by all roads.

This morning General Muto issued a statement indicating that if Chang Hsueh-Liang reenforces his regulars in Jehol and attacks the Japanese troops North China may

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JUN 24 1933

F/HS
793.94/5928

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

may become involved".

"February 26, 11 a. m. Referring to the last paragraph of my telegram February 25, 5 p. m., General Muto's statement according to Manchukuo news agency translation, after outlining conditions in Jehol and the necessity of adopting pacific measures which are described as a domestic affair of Manchukuo contains inter alia the following:

"The Japanese troops, however, are absolutely opposed to carrying their military operations outside Manchukuo territory. However, every one must agree that should the authorities in North China undertake positive military action against our troops hostilities may inevitably spread to North China".

This statement seems to be a warning that military operations will be extended to North China if serious resistance is encountered in Jehol and also a movement towards the elimination of Chang.

Manchukuo Foreign Minister telegraphed a similar warning to Nanking and Chang Hsueh-Liang."

"February 26, 5 p. m. Military spokesman reports that Japanese column from Sunlingenchung started moving forward this morning and that all other columns have

continued

0542

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

continued to advance without encountering considerable resistance. According to an unconfirmed report a Japanese detachment from Shanhaikwan is moving all along Wall to cut off retreating irregulars".

CIB-WWC JOHNSON

0543

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in confidence

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 27 1933 Department of State

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Peiping

Dated February 27, 1933

Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 27 1933 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington,

793.94

189, February 27, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. Informant mentioned in Legation's 188, February 27, 3 p. m., stated incidentally that the Chinese had good reason to believe that the Japanese were preparing a thrust into the Lwan River triangle south of the Great Wall which would enable them to operate against Chenteh from the southeast and also cut off communications between Peiping and Chengteh. He thought Japan was anxious to add the Lwan River triangle to Manchukuo as affording a better natural boundary than the Great Wall.

Two. Similar information has also reached the Legation indirectly from a Japanese news source according to which it would take the Japanese at least a month to reach Chengeh unless they also moved up the Lwan River.

RR-WWC JOHNSON

MAR 1 - 1933 FILED

F/HS 793.94/5929

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FEB 28 1933

PARAPHRASE CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated February 27, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The Legation has been informed that the Chinese have good cause to believe that a thrust south of the Great Wall into the Lwan River triangle was being prepared by the Japanese. Such a drive would enable the Japanese to cut off communications between Chengteh and Peiping and also they would be able to operate from the southeast against Chengteh. The informant stated that he thought Japan considered the Lwan River triangle a better natural boundary than the Great Wall and was therefore anxious to add it to "Manchukuo" for that reason.

The Legation has received indirectly from a Japanese news source information similar to the above, according to which it would require at least a month for the Japanese, unless they also moved up the Lwan River, to arrive at Chengteh.

0545

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR

~~MMH~~

~~U~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SHH~~

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 28, 1933.

I have discussed the attached telegram with Mr. Ward of Le and we both feel that the information contained therein was communicated to the Department by the Legation merely for the purpose of information.

We feel that it would be inconsistent with the Department's attitude toward the whole Sino-Japanese controversy to make a protest of the use by China of two pieces of land belonging to an American mission when the purpose of such use by the Chinese authorities was for the defense of its own territory against a foreign aggressor.

In view of the above and of the fact that the mission concerned has made no complaint, we feel that this telegram should be filed without action.

FEF

ok
WWW

0546

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 1 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

Peiping

Dated February 27, 1933

Rec'd 7:36 a. m.

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

188, February 27, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Commander Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's Department of External Relations called today and informed member of my staff unofficially and personally that the Chinese were preparing defense works at Peitaiho, summer resort near Chinwangtao, which will necessitate using two pieces of land belonging to American Methodist Mission. He added that upon the conclusion of military operations the Chinese would of course restore the property to its present condition.

Consul General in Tientsin is being informed.

KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

793.94
note
393.1163M56

F/HS
793.34/5930

FILED
MAR 3 - 1933

0547

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MET

FROM GRAY Tientsin via N.R.

Dated February 27, 1933

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

793.94

February 27, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"February 27, 3 p. m. Troop movements eastward through Tientsin have slowed up appreciably during past few days.

Japanese are erecting brick walls across streets leading from their concession here into Chinese area and have erected barbed wire entanglements and field guns on border near Japanese barracks together with collapsible iron gates at more important street intersections leading into Chinese city. Japanese patrols in Japanese concession have been increased. These precautions are undoubtedly result of recent instructions from Tokyo to prepare for any emergency. Reports have been current for some time that an effort might be made by the Chinese to attack the Japanese concession and Japanese Consul General is understood

FILED

F/HS 793.94/5931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-from Tientsin via N.R., Feb. 27, 4 p.m.

understood to have addressed a note to ~~provisional~~ provincial officials on February 25 requesting that effective measures be taken to protect lives and property of Japanese subjects Tientsin and Hopei Province. There are other indications that Japanese entertain some fear that they may be attacked by Chinese. The tension is increasing and with so much combustible material at hand it will require the utmost effort to prevent an outbreak of serious proportions.

In view of distance and conflicting reports difficult to state definitely what progress Japanese are making in Jehol but indications are that several important towns including Peipiao, Kailu and perhaps Chaoyang have already been captured but claim that Japanese troops have been repulsed at several points.

Repeated to the Department".

LOCKHART

KLP-WWC

0549

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D
DEPT. OF STATE
DIV. COM. & REC.
FEB 27 33

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, January 26, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

793.94

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

Copy in F.E.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 27 1933

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the information of the Legation a copy of a note dated January 22, 1933, addressed by Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Japanese Minister, concerning the Shanhaikwan affair. This copy, in English only, was received by this office from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 4:30 p.m. on January 25, 1933.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Copy of note, as stated.

In quintuplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.

800

RLS/ECH

A true copy of the signed original.
E.C.H.

F/ESP 793.94/5932
FILED
MAR 30 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Replying to the Japanese note of January 11, 1933, relative to the Shanhaikwan affair, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed on January 22, 1933, the following note to Mr. A. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister to China:

"Monsieur le Ministre:

"With reference to your Note of January 11, 1933, concerning the Shanhaikwan affair, I have the honour to inform you that in the interest of veracity the Chinese Government has made another investigation of the circumstances surrounding it and has found them to be truly as follows:

> 'On the morning of January 1, 1933, Japanese forces were reported to be making war-like preparations and troop movements were observed on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway beyond Shanhaikwan. At 1 p.m. on the same day, explosions and rifle shots were heard beyond the South Gate. They were found to have originated from the Japanese soldiers themselves. Soon after, they began to fire on Chinese sentinals posted outside the South Gate, whereupon the latter withdrew into the city. Japanese soldiers then pressed in further and opened fire at the City gate. At this point, the Chinese Garrison sent its staff secretary, Mr. Chen, to the headquarters of the Japanese forces to inquire into the cause of the disturbances. Instead of giving a satisfactory reply, the Japanese actually charged the Chinese soldiers with the responsibility for the trouble. On the night of the same day, the Japanese soldiers advanced on to the South Gate while Japanese armoured and troop trains stood by outside the railway station. At 2 o'clock the next morning, the Japanese headquarters presented a set of unreasonable demands of which immediate acceptance was required under the threat of attack in case of non-compliance. The demands were rejected. In the meantime, Japanese soldiers had already placed Mr. Ma, chief police officer of the Bureau of Public Safety at South Gate, under detention. At 10 a.m. the Japanese began their concerted attack with land, naval and air forces. In the afternoon of January 3, they occupied the city of Lingyu (Shanhaikwan). These are the facts of the case and there was no agreement of any kind between the Chinese and Japanese troops.'

"On the basis of the facts as outlined above, it can be readily gathered that the initial explosions and rifle shots were undoubtedly of Japanese origin. It is also unquestionably clear that there is nothing whatever to justify or support the allegation that an agreement had existed between the local Chinese Garrison and the Japanese forces.

"It

0551

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 3, 1933.

MMH:

Tokyo's despatch No. 275 of January 31, 1933, encloses a copy of the Ambassador's reply to the letter of the Consul General at Seoul with regard to Chosen press comments on military preparations for the invasion of Jehol. Seoul's letter has already been seen by the Division. Mr. Grew outlines the attitude of the Embassy toward anti-American statements, stating that he believes that the recent flurry of anti-American comment is probably sporadic and will not continue, and adding that if the Chosen press gives evidence of continuing this campaign he would like to be kept closely informed in case it should appear desirable "to say a word in the proper quarter" in Tokyo.

JVD.
JES:CLS

0552

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, January 31, 1933.

No. 275.

SUBJECT: Chosen Press Comments on Military Preparations for the Invasion of Jehol.

REC'D DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMUNICATIONS FEB 27 33

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

793.94

F/HS
793.94/5933
FILED
MAR 8 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

S i r :

With reference to the letter of January 17 from the Consul General at Seoul, Chosen, entitled: "Chosen Press Comments on Military Preparations for the Invasion of Jehol", a copy of which is listed as having been sent to
1/ the Department, I enclose herewith, for the record, a copy of the Embassy's reply to the Consul General.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:
1. Copy of letter.

800
JCG:a.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.

0553

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 275 of January 31, 1933 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

Tokyo, January 30, 1933.

John K. Davis, Esquire,
American Consul General,
Seoul.

Sir:

Your letter of January 17, received at this Embassy on January 28, concerning certain Chosen press comments and their combined effect in rendering an appreciable percentage of the Japanese in Chosen acutely anti-American has been given careful attention by the Embassy. The press reports which you mention have likewise been published in Tokyo, and in the case of the accusations that the United States Government is lending money and furnishing arms and ammunition to China, these reports have been publicly denied both by the Department and the Embassy. The reports that officers on the active lists of the American Army and Navy are serving with the Chinese forces or as aviation instructors in China are likewise devoid of truth.

In general the Embassy has not seen fit to issue public denials of the truth of the many anti-American statements which appear in the Japanese press. Some of these statements are too fantastic to deserve serious attention. In other cases the reports generally die of inanition, and while their net result may be to leave an anti-American bias in the minds of the public, it is doubtful even if the denials were published, which is ~~so~~ seldom the case, whether they would materially offset the harm already done. It may be said that the anti-American press campaign of last spring and summer has in recent months been less marked and generally quiescent, which I believe is in accordance with the wishes of the Government. The recent flurry of such anti-American comment is therefore, I believe, probably sporadic and I do not look for its continuance. Nevertheless, if the Chosen press gives evidence of continuing this campaign, I shall be glad to be kept closely informed in case it should appear desirable for the Embassy to say a word in the proper quarter here.

Very truly yours,

Signed: JOSEPH C. GREW

0554

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1935 Peiping, January 30, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conditions.

DEPT OF STATE RECD COM'L
FEB 27 33
PM

793.94

Copy in FE file
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of the Legation's despatch No. 793.94/5875
1/ 1925 of January 18, 1933, I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a further conversation I had on January 19, 1933, with Mr. Liu Chung-chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is now in Peiping.

Mr. Liu invited my special attention to the statement issued by Dr. Lo Wen-kan, the Foreign Minister, on January 17th. This statement was telegraphed to 793.94 Commission/745
the Department in the Legation's telegram No. 59 of January 18, 10 a.m. Mr. Liu implied that it was intended to be taken very seriously.

Dr.

F/HS
793.94/5934
FILED
MAR 11 1933

0555

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dr. Lo's declaration, the Department will recall, was to the effect that if the League of Nations should attempt to impose upon China an unacceptable solution, the Chinese delegation in Geneva would be instructed to remain firm; that Japan, taking advantage of the adjourment of the League over the holiday, had attacked Shanhaikwan and was preparing to invade Jehol, threatening also the Peiping-Tientsin area; that the League "should have admitted forthwith the impossibility of conciliation" and should have adopted "some effective and decisive measures to check the progress of Japanese violence".

In his conversation with me Mr. Liu also said that his Government had heard with gratification that the new administration in Washington proposed to continue the present policy of upholding international treaties.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1933.

800

CVHE/GL

0556

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation. Peiping, January 19, 1933.

Dispatch No. 1935

Mr. Liu Chung-cheh, Vice Minister Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Sino-Japanese conditions

I returned to-day the call of Mr. Liu Chung-cheh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the old Foreign Office building. Mr. Liu asked again about the question of the Waichiaopu memorandum regarding the Boxer Protocol and abuse of rights thereunder by the Japanese.

I informed Mr. Liu that the Chinese memorandum had been forwarded to Washington and that I now had Washington's reaction, which was to the effect that the United States Government considered the memorandum as a declaration made by the Chinese Government for purposes of record, and required no reply. I said that under the circumstances the United States Government would make no reply.

Mr. Liu stated that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had repeated to him the telegram from Alfred Sze at Washington reporting that the Department of State had said that in its opinion events at Shanhaikwan had flowed from the conflict between China and Japan, and not from the Boxer Protocol.

Mr. Liu asked whether I had any comments to make on the statement issued by Mr. Lo Wen-kan on January 17th. I said that I had no comments to make; that we had communicated the statement by radio to Washington. Mr. Liu

stated

0557

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

stated that he had been instructed by Dr. Lo to read that statement very carefully. He understood that Dr. Lo had meant it to be taken very seriously.

Mr. Liu said that the recent statement published in the press here and accredited to President-elect Roosevelt supporting the American Government's policy in favor of maintenance of the peace treaties had been received with much gratification in Nanking.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

0558

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 28 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated February 28, 1933

Rec'd 1:00 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

190, February 28, 9 a. m.

793.94

Following from Mukden:

"February 27, 5 p. m. Japanese spokesman today reported that advance toward Chinese first line positions is continuing satisfactorily and intimated that an attack on the strategically important position at Wukungfu is imminent."

JOHNSON

JS WP

F/HS 793.94/5935

FILED
MAR 1 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI + MID in Confidence

FROM

PEIPING

Dated February 28, 1933.

Rec'd 2:10 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 28 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

191, February 28, 10 a.m.

My 172, February 21, 3 p.m. 5911

793.94

Drysdale returned last night reports forces of Tang Yulin as retreating from Chaoyang in a westerly direction towards Chihfeng leaving forces of Chang Hsueh-Liang to meet Japanese main thrust Chaoyang, Lingyuan, Pingchwan, Chengteh. Chinese first line of resistance at Lingyuan. Chinese plan contemplates Japanese advance Shanhaikwan, Lulung, Fengjun, Yutein, Sanho, Tungchow-Peiping Road, aimed at cutting off Peiping-Jehol communications. It is not expected that Japanese thrust inside Wall will occur unless Japanese thrust from Chaoyang is held up. Drysdale reports civilian population as far as Lingyuan and beyond calm while Chinese forces moving forward to positions with determination and desire to fight. Chief weakness Chinese forces lies in supply and leadership. Chinese now concentrating with the assistance of Nanking on problem of supply.

By mail to Tokyo.

Please inform War Department confidentially.

CIB JS

JOHNSON

FILED
JUL 28 1933

F/HS
793.94/5936

0560

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR - 2 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated February 28, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Last night Drysdale returned. He reports Tang Yulin forces are retreating from Chaoyang in a western direction towards Chihfeng. This leaves Chang Hsueh-liang's forces to meet main thrust of Japanese at Chengteh, Lingyuan, Pingchwan and Chaoyang. Lingyuan will be the first line of Chinese resistance. The Chinese plan is that the Japanese will advance on Yutein, Tungchow-Peiping Road, Sanho, Shanhaikwan, Fengjun and Lulung, with the intention of cutting off communications of Peiping-Jehol. Unless the Japanese drive from Chaoyang is held up it is not expected that the Japanese drive inside the Wall will occur. As far as Lingyuan and beyond the civilian population is calm Drysdale reports, while the Chinese forces, with determination and desire to fight, are advancing to their positions. Supply and leadership are the main weakness of the Chinese forces. With the assistance of Nanking the Chinese are now concentrating on the supply problem.

Tokyo being informed.

Inform War Department in confidence.

0561

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent To ONI + MID in confidence

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM PEIPING

Dated February 28, 1933.

Recd 4:30 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 28 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 28 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

194, February 28, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

893.00/12300

Legation's 173, February 21, 4 p.m.

I am now reliably informed that several regiments of salt division have arrived and are quartered near Peiping.

JOHNSON

CIB JS

F/HS 793.94/5937

FILED JUN 24 1933

0562

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR - 2 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated February 28, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Several regiments of the salt division arrived and are quartered near Peiping according to information received from a reliable source.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Synopsis.

Memorandum of Conversation.
February 2, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Determination of China to Resist Japanese Military Invasion.

Statements by Dr. Sun Fo.

The Chinese Government has received from prominent military leaders assurances of armed support against Japan.

The 19th Route Army will, jointly with Kwangtung and Kwangsi armies, suppress Communist forces in Kiangsi.

General Chiang Kai-shek believes that if the Japanese meet with strong resistance in eastern Jehol, they may invade the Tientsin-Peiping area.

The Chinese Government has not voluntarily adopted the policy of armed resistance against Japan; armed resistance has been forced on China, as the only alternative to China becoming vassal of Japan.

The Chinese Government was greatly pleased at the announcement by President-elect Roosevelt promising support to the sanctity of treaties.

793.94/5436

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-436

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General
Nanking, China, February 3, 1933.

793.94

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Determination of China to Resist Japanese Military Invasion.

M for Pacific
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Copy in FE
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 28 1933 Department of State
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FEB 1933
DEPT. OF STATE DIV. OF PUBLICATIONS
AM RECD

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of conversation with Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, in the course of which Dr. Sun Fo said that armed resistance by China against Japanese invasion was the only alternative to China becoming a vassal of Japan and stated, also, that the prominent military leaders in China had promised personally to support this policy. A synopsis of the memorandum is attached.

Dr. Sun Fo recently accepted the post of President of the Legislative Yuan. His acceptance is considered by many to be a praiseworthy contribution to national unity. The post of President of one of the five Yuans has great dignity, but the Legislative Yuan affords no opportunity for the distribution of lucrative posts, and has no revenue of its own. Dr. Sun Fo is believed to entertain feelings of jealousy and some ill will for General Chiang Kai-shek, as most Cantonese leaders do.

It

F/HS 793.94/5938 FILED MAR 20 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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It is generally felt, therefore, that Dr. Sun Fo sacrificed his own inclinations to some extent in accepting his present post.

Dr. Sun Fo attracted considerable attention in December by his free discussion of the supposedly secret "anti-Japanese Resolution" passed by the Third Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee. This office has been confidentially informed that the followers of Dr. Sun Fo are urging him to demand for himself, or for one of his political adherents, either the post of Minister of Railways or Minister of Communications, both of these posts having possibilities in the way of revenue and political patronage. Dr. Sun Fo seems to be resisting these schemes, in order that nothing may disturb the harmony and unity of the National Government during the present crisis.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation dated
February 3, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department,
In duplicate to the Legation

800
WRP/ECH

4 Carbon Copies
Received 2-4-33.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

February 2, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Determination of China to Resist Japanese Military Invasion.

Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck remarked to Dr. Sun Fo that Americans were more or less spectators of the deliberations at Geneva, since the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, but the Department of State was always keenly interested in information forwarded by the Legation regarding the views of the Chinese Government and of Chinese leaders in reference to pending questions, and this was one of the reasons for Mr. Peck's call on Dr. Sun Fo.

What follows is the substance of remarks made by Dr. Sun Fo, generally in reply to questions from Mr. Peck:

Dr. Sun Fo said that Mr. Peck would be interested to know that Dr. Sun was in correspondence with most of the prominent military leaders in China and had recently received letters from Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, of Kwangsi Province, and from General Yen Hsi-shan, of Shensi Province, announcing their hearty support of the National Government in its resistance

policy

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policy against Japan and their readiness to lead armed forces against Japanese forces whenever the Government might direct them to do so. Dr. Sun Fo said that he had, the same morning, talked with a representative who had just come from General Feng Yu-hsiang, conveying the same message. Mr. Peck referred to the report that General Feng intended to come to Nanking. Dr. Sun Fo said that General Feng was inclined to be skeptical in regard to the intention of the other Generals and was deferring his journey to Nanking until he was sure whether some of the other Generals actually intended to come.

Dr. Sun Fo volunteered the information that General Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jehol, had just announced to the National Government his firm determination to utilize all the resources at his disposal to resist Japanese invasion of that Province, if it should take place. Dr. Sun Fo pointed out that this left no doubt whatever in regard to the attitude of Tang Yu-lin. (The allusion was to rumors that General Tang has been half inclined to throw in his lot with Manchoukuo. W.R.P.†

Mr. Peck remarked that the press had been very non-committal about the visit paid by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to Nanking about January 24 and he asked Dr. Sun Fo whether there was anything which the latter could say about this visit. Dr. Sun Fo made an evasive reply. Mr. Peck remarked that it would be logical to suppose that Marshal Chang had come to ask the National Government

for

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for funds, since it was over the question of funds that a slight tiff had taken place between Marshal Chang and Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan. (Mr. Peck had been confidentially informed from an unofficial source that Marshal Chang had asked the Government for a large sum and had been promised twenty million dollars to be expended as he saw fit, said funds to be raised by means of an issue of bonds. Mr. Peck hoped to elicit some confirmation or denial of this, but was unsuccessful.WRP).

Mr. Peck inquired whether reports that the 19th Route Army would come North to help in armed resistance to Japan were true. Dr. Sun Fo said that the 19th Route Army had made an agreement with the Kwangtung and Kwangsi forces, under which the three forces would actively cooperate in the work of Communist bandit suppression in South Kiangsi. Hitherto the 19th Route Army had remained in Fukien Province. Under the new plan the three forces would serve as a sort of wall against which the Government forces operating from the north of Kiangsi could crush the Communist forces.

Dr. Sun Fo observed that General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, had remarked to him before General Chiang's recent departure to Kiangsi Province that he did not think the Japanese would come into the Tientsin-Peiping area unless it became necessary, but General Chiang thought that the Japanese would feel this necessity if they met with determined resistance when they attempted to enter Jehol from the East. Dr. Sun Fo said

that

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that Mr. Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan, had called on him that morning and had expressed the opinion that if the Japanese succeeded in occupying Jehol, they probably would extend their operation westward and occupy, also, the Provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan.

Mr. Peck remarked that the policy of resistance to the Japanese which the National Government had decided upon might entail a long period of fighting, with consequent suffering and difficulties for China, and he wondered whether the National Government had taken all this into serious consideration in determining upon this policy. Dr. Sun Fo answered that the National Government was quite aware that it could not defeat Japan in actual military operations, but the policy of continued resistance was not one which the National Government had voluntarily adopted; it was forced upon China by circumstances. Dr. Sun Fo said that if China put up no resistance, but acquiesced passively in Japan's occupation of Chinese territory, there was no knowing how far this occupation would extend. It might even extend over the whole of China. In any case, passive submission to Japan could only result in China becoming a vassal state of Japan. Consequently, there was no other course which China could possibly pursue.

Dr. Sun Fo said that the Government had been greatly pleased at the published announcement by President-elect Roosevelt that he intended to support the policy of maintaining the sanctity of treaties.

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In taking his departure, Mr. Peck observed that the next few days would see some momentous decisions at Geneva and he wished to assure Dr. Sun Fo of his personal sympathy with Dr. Sun Fo and the other officers of the Government in the mental strain which they must be laboring under while waiting for these decisions. Dr. Sun Fo seemed very appreciative of this expression of sympathy.

WRP/ECH:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(overflow)

No. 280. Tokyo, February 6, 1933.

SUBJECT: Survey of the Movements and Reactions of the Japanese People since the Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

PM RECD
FEB 27 33
DEPT OF STATE DIV OF MAIL & RECORDS
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Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 28 1933 Department of State
F/HS 793.94/5939
FILED APR 11 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE APR 8 1933 NOTED

Sir:

The following does not presume to be a history of the progress of the Manchurian problem but rather a brief summary of the reactions of the Japanese people to the various phases of that problem as they have developed and of the various movements among the people which have influenced, or which may in the future influence, the development of the

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the situation. This has been compiled for the purpose of presenting a connected narrative of the events and influences which have moulded the Japanese sentiment into the form in which it is found today, thereby bringing out more clearly, it is hoped, the difficulties which must be overcome within the Japanese nation itself before a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian problem can be found.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the reactions of the Japanese people to the momentous events of the past sixteen months, it might be well to summarize briefly the principal historical occurrences which influenced the sentiment of the Japanese people. On the night of September 18 - 19, 1931, the Japanese Army, acting, it is rumored, on Imperial Sanction previously obtained and without the knowledge of the civil government at Tokyo,* occupied Mukden and embarked on an obviously pre-conceived plan whereby, within a few days, the Army was in possession of all important points in South Manchuria except Chinchow. Later this control was extended to parts of North Manchuria. About a week after the outbreak a press ban was imposed upon the publication of reports of the establishment of a new government in Manchuria. The following day this ban was altered to prohibit only the publication of reports of any connection between the Japanese Government or Japanese Army and the new government of Manchuria.** This fact, seemingly insignificant, is actually

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* Despatch No. 423, of December 18, 1931.
** Despatch No. 48, of July 9, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of great importance in considering the reactions of the Japanese people. In September and October, 1931, the League of Nations took up the Manchurian problem and called upon Japan to withdraw its troops within the South Manchurian Railway zone, which was not done. In December, 1931, the moderate Minseito Cabinet was overthrown by the dejection of Mr. Adachi, then Minister for Home Affairs, the so-called "Shidehara diplomacy" was abandoned, and a Seiyukai Cabinet, committed to a"positive policy" and more in sympathy with the Army than was the previous Cabinet, took over the reins of office. The first act of the new Cabinet was to reimpose the embargo on the exportation of gold, thus removing Japan from the gold standard and causing a heavy fall in the value of the yen. In January, 1932, the Japanese Army occupied Chinchow, (although previously assurances had been given to the American Government that "no hostile action" would be taken toward Chinchow). In the meantime the League had appointed the Commission of Inquiry in the Far East to investigate on the spot and to report on the situation. On January 7, 1932, the Secretary of State of the United States issued a note proclaiming a policy of non-recognition of the fruits of actions taken in violation of treaties. On January 8, 1932, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of the Emperor of Japan by a Korean. On February 9, 1932, Mr. Junnosuke Inouye, Minister of Finance in the previous Cabinet and undoubtedly one of the ablest financiers in Japan, was assasinated by a fanatical reactionary. On March 5, 1932, Baron

Takuma

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Takuma Dan, the Managing Director of the vast Mitsui interests, was also assassinated by a member of the same group of reactionaries. On March 9, 1932, the new state of "Manchukuo" was formally established under the headship of Pu Yi, with the control vested in a Bureau of General Affairs composed chiefly of Japanese.* On May 15, 1932, the Premier, Mr. Inukai, was assassinated by a group of young Army and Navy officers, who at the same time threatened Count Makino, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and demonstrated against various large banking institutions.** Having thereby completely cowed the politicians and financiers, the Army agreed to the formation of a super-party Cabinet under Viscount Saito - a Cabinet which would be sufficiently in sympathy with the military.*** On September 15, 1932, the Japanese Government recognized the state of "Manchukuo", in the face of the opposition of the League Commission of Inquiry. In early October the Lytton Report was completed and published, proving to be more damning to the Japanese case than the Japanese had expected. The Japanese Government then carefully prepared a statement of protest and sent to Geneva, to argue its case, a very strong delegation. This delegation has not been able to shake the convictions of the members of the League and the case before the League appears to be going against Japan.

BACKGROUND OF THE JAPANESE FEELING TOWARD MANCHURIA.

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* Despatch No. 610, of May 7, 1932
** Despatch No. 624, of May 20, 1932
*** Despatch No. 635, of June 2, 1932

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There is little doubt that the Japanese Army has had the ambition of controlling South Manchuria, if not of incorporating it in the Japanese Empire, for the past forty years. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War, part of the territory including Dairen was obtained but this was given up by the Japanese under pressure of Russia, France and Germany. China subsequently leased Kwantung to Russia. The Russo-Japanese War was fought to keep Russia out of South Manchuria and as a result of that war the Japanese obtained their first foothold in the territory - the lease of the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchuria Railway. Since then the Japanese Army has made every effort to extend Japanese influence in South Manchuria and to prevent Manchuria from establishing closer relations with China south of the Wall.

While the Army had been intent for many years upon the control of Manchuria, the people of Japan have had little real interest in the territory.* They had a sentimental interest in Manchuria, it being the field of the great battles which established Japan as a first-class power and where so many of their people had fought and died, but they had no great material interest in the region. They could not migrate there, because they could not compete with the Chinese labor, and Manchuria supplied nothing of immediate value in their daily lives. At the same time, they had a vague idea that they were entitled to Manchuria, that they had been cheated out of it by the Powers in 1895, and that some day they would again control it. But they had no idea when they would control the territory and they did not much care.

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* Despatch No. 57, of July 15, 1932.

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When the Japanese Army was preparing, in the summer of 1931, for its coup in Manchuria, it tried to arouse public feeling in Japan. It first used the case of Captain Nakamura, who had been shot by Chinese soldiers while travelling in Manchuria under a false passport and disguised as a narcotics pedlar. The Army even dropped leaflets from Army airplanes over the cities to arouse public resentment against this murder, but without much success. The Wanpaoshan case, in which a number of Koreans were killed, was then used, but the Japanese people refused to be excited about the deaths of a few Koreans, although the Korean people themselves were aroused and killed a number of Chinese in revenge. These incidents are cited to illustrate the apathetic attitude of the Japanese people toward the Manchurian question before the outbreak on September 18, 1931, and the efforts made by the Army to excite them before undertaking its coup.

REACTION TO THE COUP OF SEPTEMBER, 18, 1931.

Although some observers express doubt regarding the matter, it seems to be practically certain that the civil authorities in Tokyo were as much surprised as was the rest of the world at the actions of the Japanese Army in Manchuria on and after September 18, 1931.* The authorities realized that there was growing irritation in the Army and among the Japanese resident in Manchuria because of the stubborn although passive resistance of the Chinese to the extension of Japanese influence in Manchuria. It was also known that the Army, which had been extremely powerful during the Meiji era

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* Despatch No. 335 of September 26, 1931.

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era, greatly resented its loss of power and influence in recent years and feared a greater loss of power should the Disarmament Conference of February, 1932, prove to be successful. It seemed probable, therefore, that the Army would try to do something which would add to the prestige of the nation and thereby increase the influence of the Army itself. The civil authorities, however, had not expected to be confronted with a fait accompli of such magnitude and the Foreign Office was especially perturbed, it being its duty to try to reconcile the Army's actions with the treaties. Numerous incidents, especially at Geneva, show that the Foreign Office was kept in ignorance of the plans and activities of the Army in Manchuria.*

The people of Japan generally received the news of the Army's coup with delight, arising principally from their admiration of the efficiency and bravery of the Japanese soldiers. For the Japanese people, despite protestations to the contrary, are a warlike race and delight in all forms of martial activity, from the sword play of feudal days to the airplanes and tanks of today. It is probable that in no other country in the world is such a large proportion of the literature and drama devoted to tales of carnage. Throughout their history, except at such times as they were compelled to peace by superior force, the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare, either with other nations or among themselves. The swift and facile progress of the Army in Manchuria therefore delighted them, and they had little or no conception of the international complications which would arise. Even the newspaper editorials at first expressed only

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* Despatch No. 383, November 7, 1931.

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only satisfaction in the exploits of the Army. There were,however, two classes of Japanese who looked with misgivings upon the Army's actions. One consisted of the conservative, educated element, which appreciated the possible effect upon Japan's international relations of the seizure of Manchuria; the other consisted of the radical-minded proletariat, which objected to all forms of imperialism. The first class was inarticulate because of fear of accusations of lack of patriotism; the second tried to be articulate and was promptly suppressed.

RISE OF THE MILITARY POWER.

The Army and Navy, under the Japanese constitution, have always occupied a peculiar position. They are not subordinate to the civil authority but, through the right of the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff to appeal direct to the throne, can act independently of the Cabinet and the Diet.* The only control of the civil government over the Army and the Navy lies in the power to control appropriations. This control was exercised to some extent prior to September, 1931, and greatly incensed the younger element of the two services. The various disarmament conferences had limited the size (and consequent importance) of the Navy, and proposed conferences threatened to affect the Army as well. They felt that it had become imperative to do something to justify their existence and to ward off further disarmament. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the officers of the Army and Navy are idealists

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* Despatch No. 423, of December 18, 1931.

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and visionaries. They look back with longing upon the Meiji days, when the two services were all-powerful in the Japanese Government, and when, in their opinion, the country was much better governed than it has been since the political parties obtained control. They abhor the corruption of the politicians and their intrigues with the big financial interests which control the political parties. With a good deal of reason, they believe that the politicians and their backers have their own and their parties' interests at heart instead of the country's. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can do a better job of governing the country than can the politicians.* In this belief they have had a measure of popular support.

These various factors were behind the outbreak of the Army in Manchuria on September 18th and their assumption of control of the government in Japan itself. In October, 1931, the civil authorities in Tokyo discovered that a group of young military officers was planning to assassinate the leaders of the government and the heads of the great financial houses, to destroy the plants of two newspapers which were not supporting the Army's Manchurian adventure with sufficient enthusiasm, and to set up a military dictatorship, thereby removing all civil obstructions to the Army's aims in Manchuria.** The imprisonment of the ringleaders caused the failure of this plot. A later plot, now referred to as the "May 15th Affair", however, was more successful. In this affair, a group of young military and naval officers assassinated Premier Inukai, and, although no actual military dictatorship was

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* Despatch No. 472, of January 29, 1932
**Despatch No. 382, of November 7, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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set up, succeeded in so intimidating the politicians that they have since been entirely amenable to the demands of the military, according to common belief. Certainly all indications are that the military have been dictating the financial and foreign policies of Japan since May 15, 1932.* There has been almost no opposition to the huge demands for funds in the Diet, although during the present session(February, 1933) some dissatisfaction at military dominance has been expressed.

In connection with the military control of the Japanese Government, it should be understood that the Army is absolutely sure of itself and its ability to control not only Japan but the adjacent mainland as well; that it has never been conquered and believes itself to be unconquerable; and that it is prepared to defy the world in order to carry out its imperialistic ambitions. Moereover, it has very strong support in the ex-service men's associations, the young men's associations, and the reactionary societies.

THE GROWTH OF REACTIONISM.

Reactionary sentiment has always been strong in Japan. From the earliest days of foreign intercourse with Japan, there have been groups of men who resent the infiltration of western civilization and advocate a return to the ways of their fathers, when Japan was closed to foreign intercourse and was permitted to develop her civilization in her own way. Reactionary societies were formed, but for many years took little active part in the political life of the nation, devoting their energies principally to the cultivation of patriotism, based on loyalty to the Emperor, and to the promotion of the ancient

* Despatch No. 90, of August 11, 1932.

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ancient manly arts, such as fencing and archery. They were societies more for the preservation of the ancient culture of Japan than for political purposes, although they were used occasionally to intimidate someone who had incurred popular displeasure.

During recent years, however, and especially since September 18, 1931, the reactionary societies have become more numerous, stronger and more active. These organizations believe in an active imperialistic policy for Japan; in Japanese control of Manchuria and Mongolia; in the suppression of communism or other radical cults; in the enhancement of the national spirit; and to some extent, in the failure of representative government in Japan.* They are ultra-nationalistic, with a creed based in Bushido. They have, until very recently, been above the law, as in Japan the plea of patriotism will excuse almost any crime. There are several hundred of these reactionary organizations in Japan.

The Manchurian adventure gave the reactionaries an opportunity to take a more active part in the life of the nation. They immediately came to the assistance of the military and by means of intimidation, prevented the inception of any criticism of the Army's actions. One reactionary society, the Blood-Brotherhood League, murdered Mr. Junnosuke Inouye and Dr. Dan, and, it was later discovered, had planned to assassinate several other prominent men. Their weapons were obtained from an Army officer, indicating

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* Despatch No. 588, of April 22, 1932

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Despatch No. 509 of February 27, 1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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indicating the close relationship existing between the Army and the reactionaries. Another group of reactionaries publishes manifestos from time to time in the newspapers, warning the United States, or the League of Nations, to beware of interference with Japan. Another group planned to assassinate several high personages in November 1932, but was stopped by the police, who were authorized to take action by the Premier, the Foreign Minister and the War Minister. It seems that the authorities considered that the reign of terror had lasted long enough.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly what the reactionary element desires to accomplish. There is no doubt that a considerable proportion would not view the complete cessation of intercourse between Japan and foreign countries as a calamity, but they have no definite plan for a Japan isolated from the rest of the world. Another section advocates a "Back to Asia" movement;* that is, they wish to break away from the West, which they consider is treating them badly in interfering with their "natural expansion", and to set up a "Monroe Dcotrine for Asia" or an "Asiatic League of Nations". Most of them, perhaps, do not consider the future at all but act only on impulses of resentment against a civilization which they cannot readily assimilate.

AGRARIAN AND SOCIAL UNREST.

The farmers in Japan, for centuries past, have been heavily over-taxed - so much so that it has been necessary from time to time to relieve them in one way or another of their

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* Despatch No. 136, of September 23, 1932.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

their accumulated debts. Such a condition arose in 1932. The farmers for a generation or more past, have been taxed excessively in order to support the cities, the military machine, and the subsidized industries(which are in fact a part of the extravagant military machine of Japan). In addition, they borrowed for capital expenditures such as modern sericulture, dairying and similar projects called for. They had accumulated debts amounting to over Yen 5,000,000,000, and, with the falling prices of agricultural products, were unable longer to pay the interest on their indebtedness, with the result that country banks began to fail. By the beginning of 1932, it seemed possible that agrarian uprisings would take place*. The nation could count on no support from the Army in suppressing agrarian unrest, as the Army is mostly recruited from, and to a considerable extent popular in, the country districts. The farmers did not realize that their plight was largely due to the cost of the military machine- they blamed the politicians and the financiers for their unbearable burden of debt. Consequently both the Army and the farmers were hostile to the politicians and the financiers and were sometimes associated in acts of terrorism directed against those two classes.

The agricultural class in Japan is very conservative and adheres closely to the old traditions of loyalty to the Emperor and to the ruling class. Owing to the old customs, however, they regard the military as the real ruling class and look with suspicion and dislike on the modern politician,

* Despatch No. 473, January 29, 1932 and
Despatch No. 19, June 17, 1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

politician, financier and industrialist. They have, in common with the reactionaries and the military, certain radical tendencies, mingled in a peculiar fashion with extreme nationalism and an extreme sense of loyalty to the Throne. They talk of a sort of state socialism, of redistribution of wealth and of assurance of livelihood by the state, but at the same time they are solidly behind the Army in its imperialistic adventures and never consider the overthrow of the Imperial rule. They do not seem to realize that they will eventually have to bear the cost of the Army's adventures. They believe vaguely that the Army can take the necessary funds from the Mitsuis, the Mitsubishis and the Sumitomos.

In the summer of 1932 the Diet , compelled to action by pressure of the military and by fear of serious agrarian troubles, passed various relief measures, which, together with the rise in price of some commodities caused by the fall in value of the yen, served to avert an agricultural crisis during the year.*

Contrary to the farming classes, whose thoughts turn back to the days before the coming of Diets, banks and great corporations, which they feel are draining the country of its life-blood, the city workers are inclined to turn to communism or other radical cults. The ruling classes consider radicalism the greatest danger to the state and suppress it with extremely severe measures. The police encouraged the reactionary organizations as an antidote to radicalism, without realizing that they were thereby perhaps creating

* Despatch No. 117, September, 1932.

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creating a greater danger to the state than the one of which they stood in fear. For the radical movement in Japan has not yet at any time assumed proportions which threatened any real danger to the state.* The police arrest all known communists from time to time(the latest raid having taken place in November , 1932), but in spite of these strict repressive measures, radical creeds continue slowly to gain adherents, principally among urban laborers and students.

There is, therefore, a great deal of social unrest in Japan, arising from dissatisfaction among the farming, military and laboring classes with the modern political and capitalist systems. Whereas, however, the military and farming classes look backwards and advocate a return to the "good old days", with government by the military and suppression of the capitalists and professional politicians, the urban laborers look toward communism for their deliverance. With this dissatisfaction there is mingled a considerable amount of indiscipline.** This is noticeable especially in the Army and Navy and among the students. The younger officers in the Army are inclined to break away from the authority of their superior officers and to take difect action in accordance with their own views. This is shown by the two uprisings of junior officers in Tokyo- the abortive one of October, 1931, and the one which resulted in the assassination of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932. It is also reported that the Manchurian

campaign

* Despatches No. 526,March 12, 1932,and 615,May 17, 1932
** Despatch No. 33, June 30, 1932.

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campaign was largely inaugurated and carried out by junior officers and not by General Honjo or the General Staff in Tokyo. This same lack of discipline is found among the students of the higher institutions of learning, in the activities of the reactionary organizations, and elsewhere. Respect for authority seems to have declined, perhaps because authority, owing to its own misdeeds in the past, has ceased to deserve respect.

ECONOMIC INFLUENCES.

Shortly after, and because of, the Manchurian incident, there took place a strong and persistent flight of capital from Japan in the autumn of 1931. Far-seeing financiers, realizing the possible and probable repercussions of the Manchurian affair, endeavored to remove their liquid capital from the country. This heavy selling of the yen was met by Mr. Inouye, then Finance Minister, by shipment of gold abroad, until the gold reserve of the country was reduced to half a billion yen, when the Cabinet of which Mr. Inouye was a member was overthrown and a Seiyukai Cabinet came into power. This Cabinet promptly reimposed the embargo on the exportation of gold and the yen started on its downward course.

In the meantime the Army needed funds for its Manchurian adventure . At first funds were obtained by special bond issues, authorized by Imperial Ordinance, the issues being taken up by the Bank of Japan. The ability of the Bank to absorb these issues was limited, however, and by the summer of 1932 it became necessary to devise other measures. This was done by causing the Diet to pass several bills in

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the summer of 1932, whereby large bond issues were authorized for military expenditures and for farm relief purposes; the tax-free fiduciary currency issue of the Bank of Japan was increased by Yen 880,000,000, so that the Bank could absorb the new bond issues; and the flight of capital(which would inevitably follow the expansion of the currency) was curtailed by governmental control of transactions in foreign exchange. These measures amounted to devices for permitting inflation of the currency.

The result of these various measures has been that the Army has funds for its purposes; the currency has expanded by about 20 per cent, permitting an easier money market; the lower value of the yen(21 cents as compared to its par of 49.85 cents) has stimulated export trade and the industries connected therewith; prices of raw silk(in yen) have nearly doubled, thereby greatly relieving the farm distress; prices generally have a rising tendency, thereby stimulating all business and industrial circles; and the huge expenditures being made by the Army and Navy for munitions and equipment have caused a boom in certain industries and greatly relieved unemployment. Consequently the country is momentarily prosperous and unemployment and social unrest have decreased.*

This is, of course, a false prosperity and must be paid for eventually by losses in capital values, higher living costs, higher taxes, etc. But the people do not yet realize this.

Propaganda

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* Despatch No. 201, November 18, 1932.

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PROPAGANDA AND PRESS BANS.

From the time that the Council of the League of Nations took up the Manchurian dispute, shortly after its inception, the military authorities realized that the matter was going to develop into a great international question and proceeded to organize Japanese public opinion in their support. Their propaganda took two forms, that of exaltation of Japan's actions and motives, and of debasement of the actions and motives of all other nations.

At first the military propaganda simply consisted of reiteration of the need for military action to protect Japanese lives and interests in Manchuria. Wide publicity was given to the three hundred odd unsettled Japanese claims against the former Manchurian government and to the danger to Japanese and Korean settlers from bandits with which the region, like all parts of China, was infested. "Self-defense" and "protection of interests" were the pleas of the military at this time. But as time went on and the occupation of Manchuria progressed, and it became apparent that the occupation was not so much for the purpose of protecting Japanese interests as of ousting the former Chinese government, the propaganda ascended into higher metaphysical regions. One began to hear of the inherent right of every nation to expand. Someone invented a phrase referring to Manchuria as the "life-line" of Japan, and soon every newspaper was using the phrase, although no one ever tried to explain in what way Manchuria constituted a "life-line" for Japan, or why

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Manchuria should not be considered to be China's "life-line" as well as Japan's. Later the propaganda took a higher form and began to proclaim the noble purpose of the Army in protecting the 30,000,000 inhabitants of Manchuria and in freeing them from the misrule of the Chinese warlords. Then came the doctrine of the sacred duty of the Japanese nation to spread peace and justice over Asia and throughout the world. As Lieutenant General Araki, the Minister for War, himself stated in a pamphlet issued in the summer of 1932:

> " The principle of the "Imperial Way", embodying as it does the true spirit of the founding of the Japanese Empire and the ideals of the Japanese nation, must be spread and diffused throughout the world ..... . Any and all factors standing in its way must be removed and destroyed at any cost, even if we resort to force in so doing". *

This sort of propaganda is popular with the Japanese and moreover is irrefutable- at least without incurring the danger of a charge of lèse majeste .

In addition to organizing the opinion of the Japanese nation on high moral grounds, it was necessary to imbue the people with war-fever.** This was not difficult with a race which is naturally warlike, but it was necessary also to maintain the war-fever until the Manchurian affair should be closed and until the Army should succeed in obtaining the funds and prestige which it wanted. This was done by starting new military operations from time to time and by keeping hypothetical enemies before the minds of the people. At

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* Despatch No. 140, September 28, 1932
** Despatch No. 435, December 29, 1931.

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At first Great Britain was used as the unfriendly nation, it being claimed that that nation was supporting China in the controversy in order to further its economic interests in China.* The attacks, however, soon turned to the United States, following the remarks of the Secretary of State regarding the advance on Chinchow and his note of January 7, 1932, regarding non-recognition of the fruits of aggression.** Anti-American propaganda persisted throughout the greater part of 1932, sometimes reaching such a point that the new recruits in the Army believed that they were joining up for the purpose of fighting the United States. Various pronouncements made from time to time by the Secretary of State were seized upon to further this propaganda and were sometimes deliberately misinterpreted by the Foreign Office or the War Office in order to create the impression desired.*** The newspapers continually attacked the United States, accusing that country of trying to influence the League of Nations against Japan and of trying to obstruct Japan's "Natural expansion". Numerous articles and books were written by Army and Navy officers on the subject of war with the United States and it is undoubtedly true that a considerable part of the Army sincerely believed that war was inevitable in the near future.**** The constant propaganda along these lines fed to the people brought about a state of mind where every American citizen was considered to be an enemy spy, and for a time the Japanese people were afflicted with

* Despatch No. 378, November 6, 1931
** Despatches No. 407, December 4, 1931 and No. 457, January 15, 1932.
*** Telegram No. 207, August 10, 9 p.m. and despatches No. 149, October 8, 1932 and No. 181 of November 4,1932
**** Despatch No. 131, September 21, 1932.

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with a spy mania.* The most ridiculous spy case was that concerning the National City Bank of New York, which asked its branches in Japan to obtain photographs of typical buildings in Japanese cities for advertising purposes. The Japanese Army immediately used this innocent request for its own purposes, claiming that the photographs were to be used, in case of war, to guide bombing planes.** For a while no American citizen dared to use a camera in any part of Japan, but eventually, as the authorities were making themselves ridiculous, the spy propaganda was stopped.

Soviet Russia has also been used to a considerable extent as the hypothetical enemy. Early in the Manchurian campaign the Japanese Army was inclined to accuse the Soviets of giving aid to the anti-Japanese forces.*** This propaganda has recurred from time to time, since becoming especially marked after the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in December, 1932.**** The Japanese Army is now adopting the pose, for propaganda purposes, of being the bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism in the Far East.

It may be said that propaganda cannot prevail indefinitely against the truth. The Japanese Army has overcome this difficulty, as far as its own people are concerned, by the simple method of keeping the truth from them. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair in September, 1931, the newspapers of Japan have been forbidden

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* Despatch No. 147, October 7, 1932.
** Despatch No. 125, September, 19,1932.
*** Despatch No. 410, December 5, 1931.
**** Despatch No. 229, December 16, 1932.

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forbidden to publish various items of news of which the military or other authorities considered it best, for propaganda purposes, that the people remain in ignorance.* Thus there have been press bans(effective today) on the publication of reports regarding the connection of the Japanese Army and officials with the establishment of a new government in Manchuria; on the part played by the Japanese Navy and Army in bringing Pu Yi from Tientsin to Manchuria, to act as Chief Executive in the puppet government; on the taking over of the Chinese railways in Manchuria by the South Manchuria Railway; and on the publication of the names of Japanese officials in the Manchurian government, unless specially authorized.

Thus the Japanese people today are ignorant of many facts known to the rest of the world, and at the same time are fed with propaganda calculated to keep them aroused to a high pitch of enthusiasm for the activities and ideals of their army. The Japanese nation today constitutes an excellent example of the effectiveness of well-considered propaganda.

ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE TODAY.

In considering the influence of the factors noted in the foregoing paragraphs on the attitude of the Japanese people toward their international problem today, certain basic characteristics of the race should also be taken into account. They have the Oriental characteristic of placing supreme importance on the matter of "saving face".

They

* Despatch No. 48, July 9, 1932.

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They are sometimes childishly obstinate and are often willing to die before admitting themselves to be in the wrong. They are an emotional, rather than an intellectual people, and are extremely susceptible to propaganda. They have a highly developed sense of the dramatic and are fond of such poses as death before surrender and defiance of overwhelming odds. They have generally almost no knowledge of higher economics and are prone to believe the government omnipotent in financial matters. They are, as a rule, incapable of comprehending the essential nature of a contract or agreement as understood in the West, and in disputes regarding their meaning are governed more by interest, sympathy or emotion, than by any idea of abstract justice.

As was stated before, the ordinary people of Japan had little material interest in Manchuria before the outbreak of the Manchurian controversy. The occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of the state of "Manchukuo" were the work of the Japanese Army, not of the Japanese people. The people, however, took delight in the valorous deeds of their Army, and did not take thought of the various treaties involved in the matter. They were surprised and perhaps hurt when the League and the United States directed their attention to treaty violations. The Army then started its propaganda of "self-defense", and the people readily swallowed it. Having no strong inclination under any circumstances toward strict adherence to the spirit of agreements, they accepted readily any pretexts offered for violations of the treaties. The same conditions applied in regard

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to the "self-determination of Manchukuo" plea, especially as they were kept in ignorance of the facts. Later the Army, wanting to consolidate its gains in Manchuria and fearing that they might be frittered away in diplomatic negotiations, forced the Government to recognize "Manchukuo", first preparing the people by months of propaganda.* Thinking people who dared to express adverse opinions were promptly intimidated either by the Army or the reactionaries. The Lytton Report was published, but the Army had its fait accompli, which could not be undone without great loss of "face" to the Japanese - a contingency which the Japanese people will not consider. In their obstinacy, they intend to follow the path mapped out for them by the Army, whether that path be right or wrong. They now rather fancy themselves in the pose of " Invincible Determination".

The Japanese people have been genuinely opposed to the League's interference in the controversy from the beginning. They felt that the League was primarily an organization for European affairs and that it was departing from its natural sphere in meddling in the affairs of the Far East, of which it knew nothing.** Later, under the leadership of the Army, the nation developed the opinion that Japan should adhere to its course despite League opposition and should leave the League if necessary.*** Having been misled by Army propaganda

* Despatch No. 57, July 15, 1932.
** Despatch No. 394, November 20, 1931.
***Despatch No. 611, May 7, 1932.

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paganda and kept in ignorance of the truth, they were greviously disappointed by the Lytton Report, but instead of studying the Report carefully in a spirit of self-examination, there were outbursts of self-righteous indignation and defiance. * It is extremely unlikely that the Japanese will admit themselves wrong, whatever proof may be brought against them. The Government sent Matsuoka to the meeting of the League Assembly in December, 1932, in the hope of overcoming the cold logic of the Lytton Report by means of dramatic eloquence. The attitude of the Japanese people toward the League has been hardening steadily and they(but perhaps not the responsible officials in the Government) are fully prepared to secede from the League if they find themselves unable to carry their points. They rather look forward to the new theatrical role of "Japan Defies the World". The present Japanese attitude toward the League was summed up by Lieutenant General Araki when he stated on January 20, 1933(as quoted in the OSAKA MAINICHI):

> " Japan is above reproach. There is nothing wrong in Japan':the rest are all wrong. We should therefore pursue our own course courageously and help the League's retrospection by any means."

It is a significant commentary on the Japanese character that, since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair, there has been little or no considered discussion on the platform or in the press of Japan of the

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* Despatch No. 152, October 8, 1932.

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the duties of the nation under the various treaties involved in the case, or of the probable damage resulting from their actions to the peace-preserving structure of the world. There have been endless discussions tending to excuse their actions but none indicating their duties, Every effort has been made, for example, to find pronouncements by learned men to justify the use of armed force on alien territory in self-defense, but no Japanese, as far as the writer is aware, has come forward to explain to the Japanese people their obligation, incurred by their acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, not to use armed force in the settlement of disputes such as the Manchurian dispute. The discussion of duties under the treaties has not been prohibited by press bans but seems to be tacitly ignored. The Japanese people have an uneasy realization that other nations consider the actions of their Army as crimes under the treaties, although they themselves do not understand why certain bits of paper should stand in the way of the fulfillment of their policy on the Asiatic Continent. Consequently they prefer, even among themselves, not to discuss the matter. There is an element, of course, which fully understands all the implications of Japan's actions but which nevertheless supports the Army and its Manchurian adventure. This element believes that Japan is compelled either to follow to the end the present course of expansion on the Asiatic Continent, or else to fall back to the position of a second or third rate power. Believing that Japan must fight sometime for her "place in the sun", they think it best to fight now, when Japan is in a relatively

advantageous

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advantageous position.

Throughout the foregoing, when writing of the "Japanese people", reference has been to the great mass of the people- the vast, unthinking bulk of the population, who are easily led by the military propaganda. There is also a conservative, clear-thinking element, which realizes the dangers of Japan's present militaristic course and prefers to see Japan progress by normal economic means; which is proud of the position which Japan has achieved in the family of nations and does not wish to see Japan isolated and treated as an international criminal because of the ambitions of the militarists.* There is no way of determining the strength of this element, as it is unorganized and usually is in no position to express its views because of the military-reactionary opposition. It is probably very small numerically, but composed as it is of educated, internationally-minded men of high position, it is comparatively influential. This element reveals its existence from time to time in newspaper editorials, in interpellations in the Diet, and in various other ways.** For example, last summer Count Uchida, the Foreign Minister (voicing the "Invincible Determination" attitude), stated that he " would rather see the country reduced to ashes than to accept any solution which ignored Japan's fundamental principles". Some of the conservative newspapers, however, especially the OSAKA ASAHI, have expressed doubt as to the willingness of the country to be ruined and urge the nation to find some other solution of the controversy

* Despatch No. 165, October 21, 1932.
** Despatch No. 227, December 16, 1932.

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controversy than the use of force. This moderate element believed that the cost of the military adventure in Manchuria will bring the country close to bankruptcy in a short time and will compel the military to listen to reason. Circumstances, adventitiously aided by military expenditure have contrived to bring about an artificial prosperity within the country and as a result there has been as yet little opposition to the huge military budgets, although a little uneasiness is manifested here and there. The FUKUOKA NICHI-NICHI (the most influential newspaper in Kyushu) recently stated:

> " We do not appreciate seeing Japanese farmers grow poorer and poorer because their burdens are increased by expenses in Manchuria ....".

Such examples of conservative thought, however, are rare compared with the vast number of examples of chauvinism constantly appearing in the press and on the platform.

From time to time in the past year the Embassy has been assured by Japanese prominent in the ranks of the moderates that soon they would be in power again and that then the Manchurian problem would be adjusted. They have taken pains to intimate to the Embassy that nothing should be done in the United States to awaken the resentment and strengthen the cause of the fanatical military-reactionist element, as such would delay the return to power of the moderate element. But today the military is still firmly in the saddle and the moderates are apparently no nearer regaining power than they were a year ago.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

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Copy to Legation, Berne
" " Legation, Peiping.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 11 1933
THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Mr. Secretary:

I suggest that you need read only the two covering digests and not the whole of the attached despatch - unless you should have the time.

HSC

793.94/5939

FILED
APR 11 1933
SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~March 24, 1933.~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 29 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

read

U:
Mr. Phillips.

S:
Mr. Secretary.

793.94/5939

I think that you may be interested in reading the attached despatch No. 280, February 6, 1933, from Tokyo, which is a very interesting and well prepared survey of the movements and reactions of the Japanese people since the outbreak of the Manchuria incident.

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 24, 1933.

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
NOTED

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793.94/5939

Tokyo's despatch No. 280 of February 6, 1933, is a very interesting and well prepared survey of the movements and reactions of the Japanese people since the outbreak of the Manchuria incident. The material is not new but it is presented with good coordination and conciseness.

Criticism:

The despatch presents a very good factual account of what has occurred since September 18, 1931. It might be pointed out, however, that the statement on page 6 to the effect that a number of Koreans were killed in the Wanpaoshan conflict is open to question. No mention of the death of any Korean is made either in the memorandum on this subject prepared by the Consulate General at Mukden for General McCoy or in Document B of the so-called Japanese "White Books". Also the statement on page 7 that throughout Japanese history, except at those times when they were compelled to peace by superior force, the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare either with other nations or among themselves is scarcely accurate, as their only foreign war before that with China in 1894 was the attempted conquest of Korea in 1592, while from the early part of the 17th century up to the Restoration

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there was neither foreign nor internal warfare, with the exception of the revolt in 1637 of Christians at Shimabara, a local and unique affair. Although it is true that the superior force of the Tokugawa Shogunate kept the country in order, by the time of the Third Shogun the military character of the clans became very much less in evidence and the pursuit of peaceful occupations was dominant. Also, in such a discussion, the fact should be recalled that the military caste formed a very small part of the population, the great mass of the people being unarmed agriculturists of unwarlike character.

With regard to Mr. Dickover's interpretation of Japanese psychology in connection with developments since September 18, 1931, he makes certain generalizations which are not, in my opinion, entirely accurate and which would tend to give the reader a bias against the Japanese. Although any of these generalizations may be supported by good arguments, when brought together in one despatch without sufficient modifying explanations they may be misleading to the reader. On page 23 he states that the Japanese have "a highly developed sense of the dramatic and are fond of such poses as death before surrender and defiance of overwhelming odds". In several places in the despatch he refers to the Japanese attitude

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as being a "pose" as, for example, he states (page 24) that the Japanese now "rather fancy themselves in the pose of 'Invincible Determination'" and on page 25 he states that the Japanese "rather look forward to the new theatrical role of 'Japan defies the world'". In my opinion such comments overlook the genuine sincerity of the Japanese and their actions have considerably more character than one would infer from the use of such words as "pose" and "theatrical". On page 23 is the statement that the Japanese are, "as a rule, incapable of comprehending the essential nature of a contract or agreement as understood in the West" and also the statement that the Japanese have no strong inclination under any circumstances toward strict adherence to the spirit of agreements. Considerable modification is needed with regard to these two statements if what appears to me to be an injustice is not done to the Japanese as a whole.

[redacted]:CLS (Salisbury)

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SECRETARY OF STATE APR 8 1933 NOTED

March 28, 1933.

793.94/5939

Digest of the Despatch:

Tokyo's despatch No. 280 of February 6, 1933, gives a survey of the movements and reactions of the Japanese people since the outbreak of the Manchuria incident, as follows:

In the first four pages are summarized the principal historical occurrences from the night of September 18, 1931, to the present time.

From pages 4 to 6 is given the "Background of the Japanese Feeling Toward Manchuria", in which it stated that there is little doubt that the Japanese Army has had the ambition of controlling South Manchuria for the past 40 years, while the people of Japan have had little real interest, other than sentimental, in that area. Before the outbreak of September 18, 1931, the Army attempted, without much success, to arouse the feeling of the Japanese people toward Manchuria.

On pages 6 to 8 is described the reaction to the military action in Manchuria. The civil authorities were surprised; although they felt that the Army would try to do something to increase its influence, they were not expecting a fait accompli of much magnitude. The people of Japan received news of the military action in Manchuria with delight,

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delight, as the Japanese are a warlike race. Two classes of Japanese viewed the military activities with misgivings: (1) the conservative, educated element and (2) the radically-minded proletariat.

The rise of the military power is described on pages 8 to 10. The only control the civil government has over the Army and Navy lies in the power to control appropriations. Disarmament conferences threatened to limit the size of the Army and the Army felt it had become imperative to do something to justify its existence and to ward off further disarmament. They were dissatisfied with government by politicians. Following the Manchuria incident the military eventually came to have control of the financial and foreign policies of Japan. The Army is absolutely sure of itself and its ability to control not only Japan but the adjacent mainland as well; it believes it is unconquerable; and it is prepared to defy the world in order to carry out its militaristic ambitions.

The growth of reactionism is discussed on pages 10 to 12. Reactionary sentiment has always been strong in Japan. The Manchuria incident encouraged reactionaries to organize, so that now there are several hundred reactionary organizations. They have assisted the military by intimidating those who they believed were opposed to the

military

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military program. Most of them seem to act on impulses of resentment against a civilization which they cannot readily assimilate.

Agrarian and social unrest is described in pages 12 to 16. The condition of the agrarian population was so unsatisfactory that it seemed possible that there would be uprisings among them in 1932. The farmers did not realize that their plight was largely due to the military machine but blamed politicians and financiers. They are solidly behind the Army in its imperialistic adventures, not seeming to realize that they will eventually have to bear the cost of the Army's exploits. In the summer of 1932 the Diet, compelled to action by pressure of the military and by fear of serious agrarian troubles, passed various relief measures which, together with the rise in price of some commodities caused by the fall in the value of the yen, served to avert an agricultural crisis. City workers, on the other hand, inclined toward radical efforts. The ruling classes consider radicalism the greatest danger to the state and suppress it with extremely severe measures. Although the radical movement has not yet assumed proportions which threaten any real danger to the state, there is a great deal of social unrest arising from dissatisfaction among the farming, military

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and labor classes with the modern political and capitalist systems.

Economic influences are discussed in pages 16 to 17. The results of various financial measures taken since the beginning of the Manchuria incident have been the supplying of funds to the Army for its purposes, expansion of the currency by about twenty per cent, and stimulation of the export trade and connected industries through the fall of the yen. Consequently the country is momentarily prosperous and social unrest has decreased. This is false prosperity and must be paid for eventually by losses in capital values, higher living costs, high taxes, etc., but the people do not yet realize this.

Propaganda and press bans are discussed on pages 18 to 22. The propaganda by the military has taken two forms: exaltation of Japan's actions and motives, and debasement of the actions and motives of all other countries. In addition to organizing public opinion on high moral grounds, it was necessary to imbue the people with war fever. This was done by starting new military operations from time to time and by keeping hypothetical enemies before the minds of the people. First Great Britain was employed for this purpose and then the United States. Soviet Russia has also been used as the hypothetical enemy. The truth has been kept from the Japanese people by press

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bans and the Japanese people today are ignorant of many facts about the Manchuria situation which are known to the rest of the world.

The final section of the despatch is entitled "Attitude of the Japanese People Today" (pages 22-28). Certain basic characteristics of the Japanese should be taken into account: the supreme importance of "saving face", their emotionalism, their sense of the dramatic, their belief that the government is omnipotent in financial matters, and their inability to comprehend the essential nature of a contract or agreement as understood in the West. The people intend to follow the path mapped out for them by the Army whether that path be right or wrong. They have been generally opposed to the League's interference in the controversy from the beginning. There has been little or no considered discussion in Japan of the duties of the nation under the various treaties or the probable damage resulting from their actions to the peace machinery of the world. There is also a conservative, clear-thinking element which realizes the dangers of Japan's present militaristic course and prefers to see Japan progress by normal economic means but there is no way of determining the strength of this element as it is not organized. Although it is probably very small numerically, it is comparatively

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paratively influential. This element believes that the cost of the Manchuria adventure will bring the country close to bankruptcy, which will compel the military to listen to reason.

"From time to time in the past year the Embassy has been assured by Japanese prominent in the ranks of the moderates that soon they would be in power again and that then the Manchurian problem would be adjusted. They have taken pains to intimate to the Embassy that nothing should be done in the United States to awaken the resentment and strengthen the cause of the fanatical military-reactionist element, as such would delay the return to power of the moderate element. But today the military is still firmly in the saddle and the moderates are apparently no nearer regaining power than they were a year ago."

TES:CLS (Salisbury)

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AUG 30 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED AUG 31 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

F/ESP

F.W. 793.94/5939

August 21, 1933.

MEMORANDUM

793.94/5939

F.W. 793.94/5939

With reference to Tokyo's despatch No. 280 of February 6, 1933, which was commented on (April 19, 1933) by the Division as lacking inclusion of certain qualifying or modifying statements which would have been helpful both to the writer of the despatch (Mr. Dickover) and to the reader in the attempt to attain and maintain a well-adjusted perspective, --

Mr. Dickover has prepared an eight page memorandum, under date June 7, 1933, in an effort to refute most of the points contained in the Division's comments.

In his despatch Mr. Dickover made the statement that "Throughout their (the Japanese) history, except at such times as they were compelled to peace by superior force, the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare, either with other nations or among themselves". This statement was made in support of a preceding statement that "the Japanese, despite protestations to the contrary, are a warlike race."

Mr. Dickover seems not to have appreciated the exact nature of the question he has raised. All nations

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and all races have fought among themselves and with each other; and to adduce historical evidence that the Japanese have fought among themselves or with their neighbors over a long period of time tends only to prove that the Japanese are no different from other members of mankind. That obviously is not the burden of Mr. Dickover's assertions; and it is presumably not unfair to assume that he has sought to prove that the Japanese are more warlike and more bloodthirsty than the generality of mankind.

If one were to place in parallel columns the military history since the seventh century of the English people, the flower of Western civilization, with that of the Japanese, one would find that for the seven or eight years of Hideyoshi's Korean campaigns, the English armies occupied and devastated a substantial portion of what today is known as France for a period of more than a century. So far as internal struggles are concerned, there should be to the unbiased mind little to choose between the civil wars in Japan, which flourished from the eleventh century to the seventeenth century, and the internecine wars of the British peoples from the time of the Plantagenets until the Monmouth Rebellion. While no one conversant with the facts would concur in characterizing the episode of the forty-seven ronin as "one of the most

bloodthirsty

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bloodthirsty pieces of vendetta in the history of the world" (for every precaution was taken to avoid injury to those not directly concerned in the matter), it does not begin to compare in ferocity, in merciless slaughter of women and children, and in the number of lives taken, with the massacre at Glencoe. These few comparisons will be enough to show that evidence taken from the history of preceding centuries is worthless as substantiating the thesis that any one race, such as the Japanese, is distinct from the rest of mankind for the reason that it engaged in warfare or that individual members committed crimes which violate our moral standards.

In commenting on Mr. Dickover's despatch the Division suggested that Japan had engaged in only one foreign war prior to Japan's war with China in 1894, namely, Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea (1592-1598). To support his contention that "the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare, either with other nations or among themselves", he brings forward in his memorandum material which he regards as evidence of warfare with foreign nations. It may be said that the writer of the criticism contained in the comment made by the Division was not unaware of the events which Mr. Dickover cites but, in his opinion, they are not pertinent support of Mr. Dickover's contention. Mr.

Dickover

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Dickover advances the following material:

(1) Expeditions against Korean kingdoms by Japan in the early centuries, including that of the legendary Japanese Empress Jingo.

(2) Warfare against the Japanese in northern Japan by the Emishi (the aborigines).

(3) Two expeditions against Japan by the Mongols.

(4) Forays in the fourteenth century by Japanese of the Kyushu coast against the China coast and the Philippine Islands.

(5) Expedition against Formosa in 1874.

Written history in Japan having been begun in the seventh century A.D., the expedition of Empress Jingo against Korea and other reported expeditions during the early centuries belong to Japan's legendary history. Legendary history would seem to be scarcely germane to the discussion. The fighting which occurred between the Japanese and the Emishi (the aborigines) was a part of Japan's consolidation of her territory, similar to America's gradual subduing of the American Indians, while the piratical expeditions against China and the Philippines were conducted by a comparatively small number of Japanese from a restricted area, and they were not national movements. The two invasions of Japan by the Mongols involved fighting by the Japanese on Japanese soil to preserve

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their independence. The expedition against Formosa in 1874 incurred no bloodshed.

Mr. Dickover has devoted a total of four lines out of a paper extending over seven and a half pages to the two and one-half centuries of peace which prevailed during the Tokugawa Shogunate -- an era which cannot be duplicated in point of duration by any other European nation, certainly within Christian times. He explains this fact by a brief reference to the rigorous control exercised over the feudal lords by the Tokugawa Shogunate. This significant achievement, so lightly dismissed but which should nevertheless count strongly on the other side of the balance in any dispassionate evaluation of the temperament of the Japanese people, is perhaps one of the strongest evidences of the justice of the original criticism of the despatch which initiated the discussion: that Mr. Dickover's discussion of Japanese temperament, in the absence of qualifying or modifying statements, would give a reader not thoroughly acquainted with Japan an inaccurate impression of the Japanese people.

There is no dissent with the point of view that the Japanese people are a virile and warlike people. But so are all other virile and vigorous nations warlike. In comparison with the decadent races who live beside the

Japanese --

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Japanese -- the Koreans and the Chinese -- this trait of the Japanese stands out by contrast. Nevertheless any dispassionate and objective examination of the Japanese in the light of the history of the leading members of the Caucasian race can only lead to the conclusion that generally speaking they are no more bloodthirsty and pugnacious than the average.

The statement is made that in 1871, at the time of the abolition of feudalism, there were 400,000 men in receipt of incomes "granted them in consideration of their devoting themselves to military service"; and Mr. Dickover pointed out that if the same proportions are applied to the present population of the United States there would be a military class of 1,500,000 men receiving "pay for the active bearing of arms". Authoritative information in this connection is contained in "Nihon shakai shi" (Historical study of Japanese society) (page 254) by Seijiro Takigawa, published at Tokyo in 1929, as follows:

> "... During the Edo period, conforming to the old custom of keeping secret the number of soldiers, the government never took an accurate census of the warrior class. Hence we have no absolute record of the total number of the samurai. According to the statistical table of 1872 compiled by the Bureau of Census, there were:
>
> | | | | |
> |---|---|---|---|
> | 136,873 | common soldiers | 492,199 | Their families |
> | 258,952 | Samurai | 1,023,215 | " " |
> | 395,825 | Total | 1,515,414 | |

"Since

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"Since the number of the peasant and merchants in Japan after the years 1721 and 1872 was fluctuating between 27,000,000 and 24,500,000, the proportion of the above two classes to the total population was 1 to 14 . . . "

It will be noted that of the warrior class 259,000 were Samurai. By no means, however, were all of the Samurai actively bearing arms. With the continuing peace under the Tokugawas many Samurai entered into peaceful professions retaining the name of Samurai but not engaging in warlike pursuits. All of the officials in the Tokugawa Shogunate belonging to what today would be called the Higher Civil Service, such as the officers of the judiciary and penal services, the local governors (bugyo) and their assistants and secretaries, collectors of taxes, et cetera, were Samurai. Furthermore, this number included military retainers of Daimyo who were engaged in civilian duties as local officials. Making allowances for this large category, the number of men who were actually engaged in bearing arms, quite apart from those following civil pursuits who bore arms as insignia of the class to which they belonged, could not have been very large.

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The Division's comment on the statement with regard to the influence of dramatic effects on the attitude and emotions of the Japanese did not deny the existence of this characteristic of the Japanese: it questioned the extent and degree to which the Japanese people are influenced by the dramatic. This comment has brought forth the statement that it "would be feasible to induce them to consent to the relinquishment of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, if they were led to assume the dramatic attitude of 'Renunciation'". Mr. Dickover seeks to draw a line between the thinking and unthinking classes but whether in respect of the renunciation of Manchuria or of susceptibility to the dramatic element is not quite clear. The important point is whether or not Japanese policy has been influenced, and therefore in the future may again be influenced, by dramatic considerations. It is believed that the Army has been successful in obtaining the support of the people, who are intensely emotional and effervescent, substantially in the manner that Mr. Dickover describes in his despatch by gratifying national pride in the efficiency and valor of the Japanese forces; but it is difficult to accept the point of view that a people would hazard the destruction of their country in

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order to gratify their dramatic instinct. The corollary to Mr. Dickover's statement would be that the Japanese Government and people, in refusing to accept the settlement laid down by the League, were merely striking a pose. Mr. Dickover would surely have been in the minority in supposing that the exertion of pressure by the powers upon Japan last February or even today, would have induced the Japanese to abandon their attitude.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

June 7, 1933. DCR

(FOR THE DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS)

COUNTER-OBSERVATIONS TO THE "INFORMAL COMMENTS ON DESPATCHES RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT TOKYO DURING THE MONTHS OF JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1933", DATED APRIL 19, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 31 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 26 1933
Department of State

On page 3 of the "COMMENTS" of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, reference is made to the Embassy's despatch No. 280, of February 6, 1933, entitled "Survey of the Movements and Reactions of the Japanese People since the Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident", and the Department indicates several points which it is believed should have been modified or elucidated in order to avoid the creation of a false impression. While the writer of the despatch in question does not concur with the Department's comments in all cases, he realizes that a false impression may have been created on certain points, but he desires to state that his opinion was that the value of such a despatch at the moment would have been greatly lessened if it had been voluminous and diffuse, and that unusual care was deliberately taken to present the picture in as brief and concise form as possible. It was felt that detailed explanations of the various points brought out in the despatch would have detracted from its usefulness, and consequently explanatory details, such as are contained in the following counter-observations, were omitted.

1. The Division comments as follows:

"The statement on page 7, for example, that "Throughout their history, except at such times as they were compelled to peace by superior force, the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare, either with other

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nations or among themselves" may be misleading without further elucidation. Is it not a fact that the only foreign war engaged in by Japan before the war with China in 1894 was the attempted conquest of Korea in 1592 and after; and that, from the beginning of the seventeenth century up to the Restoration, there was neither foreign nor internal warfare with the exception of the revolt in 1637 in Shimabara; also that, although the superior forces of the Tokugawa Shogunate kept the country in order, the military character of the clans had become by the time of the third Shogun much less conspicuous than previously and pursuit of peaceful occupations had become dominant? In such a study as is under reference, would not the mention of such points, together with the mention of the fact that the military caste formed a very small part of the population, be helpful both to the writer and to the reader in the attempt to attain and maintain a well-adjusted perspective?"

The writer of the despatch under reference is unable, after further study of the facts involved, to agree with the "Comments" in regard to the above points. Although the history of the Japanese people prior to the introduction of writing in the seventh and eighth centuries is incomplete and partly legendary, it seems to be reasonably certain that the Japanese engaged in several foreign wars before the war with China in 1894. Very briefly, the military history of Japan is as follows: Beginning, apparently, in the first century A.D., the Japanese sent occasional military expeditions to the Korean peninsula for the purpose of subduing the various small kingdoms there, and in 202 A.D., the Empress Jingo herself headed a large expedition to Korea, which invaded and conquered the kingdoms of Shiraki, Koma and Kudara. These kingdoms refused to stay conquered, however, and during the following centuries the Japanese were frequently compelled

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to resort to warfare on the Asiatic continent to hold their gains. These wars with the Korean kingdoms continued as long as Japan was fairly well united under the Emperors, but, as Rein points out (JAPAN, p. 215), in the latter part of the seventh century "long civil wars required all the forces and means of Japan (and) these transmarine possessions were lost". For centuries thereafter the Japanese nation was fully occupied with the long series of civil wars involving the Fujiwara, Taira, Minamoto, Hojo, and Ashikaga families - wars so fierce and prolonged that the nation became impoverished and weakened and foreign warfare became impracticable. Taking advantage of the weakened condition of the country, some of the Korean kingdoms conducted campaigns against Japan and the Emisu (barbarians; probably largely composed of the Ainus) waged incessant warfare in the North. To add to their troubles during this period, the Japanese had to repulse two expeditions launched by the Mongols, one of which established a short-lived foothold in Kyushu. Despite the constant civil wars, however, from about the middle of the 14th century the Japanese of the Kyushu coast conducted forays on the China coast and against the Philippine Islands. These were not mere piratical raids conducted by small groups but consisted of well-organized expeditions (very similar to the forays of the Norsemen), supervised by the Kikuji Family of Kyushu, which became so powerful that tribute-bearing embassies were sent to it from Chinese sea-coast provinces. In the latter part of the 16th century, after Hideyoshi had subdued all of Japan, he organized an expedition against Korea, not merely, as previously, for the purpose of conquering the Korean kingdoms, but primarily to supply an open road for the conquest

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of China, as Hideyoshi had the dream of the Japanese domination of Asia. In this Hideyoshi seems to have anticipated events of the 20th century. More civil wars caused the recall of the expedition and the Tokugawas obtained control of the country. For two and a half centuries thereafter, except for the Shimabara rebellion and campaigns against the Emisu, Japan enjoyed peace - the only lengthy period of peace in the history of the nation. This was, however, a peace of compulsion, as the Tokugawas realized that, in order to maintain their power, it was necessary to curb the warlike propensities of the daimyo and the people. This was done by keeping hostages of the daimyo in Yedo, by setting spies over all officials, by keeping out foreigners who might spread subversive doctrines and by other simple but effective means. After the repressive control of the Tokugawas was removed in 1868, the nation again indulged in frequent military ventures, among which may be mentioned the expedition against Formosa in 1874, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 (which, incidentally, was in part caused by the desire, not consented to by the central government, of the Kyushu clans to subdue Korea), the war with China in 1894, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the occupation of Tsingtao and other German possessions in the Far East in 1914, the Siberian Expedition of 1918-22, the occupation of Russian Saghalien in 1920, the expedition into Shantung of 1928, and the conquest of Manchuria and Jehol in 1931-33.

As will be noted from the above brief account, the Japanese people have been engaged almost incessantly in fighting (whether or not dignified by the name of "war") for the past nineteen centuries, with the exception of the period of the Tokugawa Shogunate, when the measures adopted

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by the Shogunate to protect its own authority effectively prevented any domestic or foreign wars. The writer of the despatch therefore believes that his statement that "Throughout their history, except at such times as they were compelled to peace by superior force, the Japanese have constantly engaged in warfare, either with other nations or among themselves" is entirely justified.

2. In regard to the Division's suggestion that "the military character of the clans had become by the time of the third Shogun much less conspicuous than previously and pursuit of peaceful occupations had become dominant", the writer is under the impression that the change mentioned applied only to some of the clans and cannot be considered as a generalization. It can be pointed out that the episode of the 47 Ronin, the epic of Japanese chivalry and one of the most blood-thirsty pieces of vendettaism in the history of the world, occurred during this period. It is also certain that the early diplomatists and traders in Japan found certain groups of samurai anything but effeminate and peacefully-inclined. The terms "swaggering", "violent" and "bloodthirsty" were often applied to the samurai by these early comers to Japan.

3. It is believed that the suggestion that "the military caste formed a very small part of the population" is difficult to substantiate, although much depends upon the definition given to the expression "military caste". In the absence of accurate censuses, no exact figures are available as to the number of samurai or of persons of the military caste during the various periods of Japanese history. One historian states that the samurai constituted about one-fourth of the able-bodied men; another states that the military

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tary caste constituted one-sixteenth of the total population. It appears to be certain, however, that at the time of the abolition of feudalism (1871), there were about 400,000 men in receipt of incomes, mostly hereditary, granted them in consideration of their devoting themselves to military service. This does not include "ronin" and other unsubsidized persons of the samurai class, but would indicate that 400,000 families were subsidized in consideration of their being available for military service, or, in other words, that there were at least 400,000 families of the status of samurai or above. At the usually-accepted rate of five persons to a family, it appears that there was a military caste at that time of approximately two million persons, or about one-seventeenth of the then population of Japan. If the same proportions are applied to the present population of the United States, we would have a military caste of around 7,500,000 persons, and would have 1,500,000 men receiving pay for the active bearing of arms.

4. The Department asks (page 4 of the "COMMENTS")

> "Does not the reference which appears in several places to the Japanese attitude as a "pose" or a "theatrical role" tend to give the impression that this is characteristic of the whole Japanese race; and if so does it not do an injustice to the majority of the Japanese people?"

The writer of the despatch in reference is not inclined to modify his opinion that the great mass of the Japanese people are apt to permit, and have permitted, their emotions and reactions to be swayed by dramatic influences and attitudes. This is probably true of the unthinking people of all nations, but the writer believes it to be an unusually strong influence in Japan. Accustomed as the Japanese are

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to attending, from infancy, the theatres and story-tellers' booths, they develop their natural theatrical attitude towards individual and collective emotions to an extent which appears abnormal to Westerners. The writer is so convinced of the power of the dramatic attitude over the reactions of the people, that he believes that it would be quite feasible to induce them to consent to the relinquishment of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, if they were led to assume the dramatic attitude of "Renunciation", accompanied by loud sobs and floods of tears. This, of course, does not apply to the thinking minority of the people, but the writer thought he had made this fact clear when he stated, on page 27 of the despatch in reference

> "Throughout the foregoing, when writing of the "Japanese people", reference has been to the great mass of the people - the vast, unthinking bulk of the population, who are easily led by the military propaganda."

5. The Department asks (page 4 of the "COMMENTS")

> "Are "radical creeds" gaining adherents slowly as stated on page 15, among urban laborers and students or do "the urban laborers look toward communism for their deliverance", as stated further down on the same page?"

The writer regrets that this apparent contradiction crept into the despatch in reference. The two statements refer to different phases of the subject. In the first statement the reference is to avowed adherence to a party or group advocating a radical creed; in the second statement the reference is to the general trend of opinion among the urban laborers as contrasted to the trend of opinion among the rural population. As was pointed out in despatches Nos. 526 and 615, of March 12, 1932, and May 17, 1932, respectively, both prepared by Mr. L.E. Salisbury, while radical thought is spreading among urban laborers and students (with a tem-

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

porary reactionary check at present), there are few actual members of radical groups, due to various causes which restrain active advocacy of radical principles. In the second statement, however, the word "communism" is perhaps too definite. The word should rather have been "radicalism" or "radical-liberalism".

6. The Department asks (page 4 of the "COMMENTS")

> "Is it a definitely ascertained fact that a number of Koreans were killed in the Wanpaoshan conflict, as stated on page 6?"

The writer notes that the Lytton Report states that there were no casualties in the Wanpaoshan affair. It appears that the writer, as well as other members of the Embassy staff, were misled by the early exaggerated accounts of the affair which appeared in the Japanese newspapers.

Joseph C. Grew

JOSEPH C. GREW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI + MID in Confidence

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

FROM Tokio

Dated February 28, 1933

Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 28 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 28 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

50, February 28, 7 p. m.

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I am reliably informed that the present Japanese military operations in Jehol consist simply of a wide turning movement with the pivot at Shanhaikwan and designed to sweep the Chinese troops south and west out of Jehol, without requiring or contemplating military action south of the Wall. I further learn from a reliable Japanese source in close touch with the military authorities that while explicit instructions have been issued to the army in Jehol not (repeat not) to cross the Great Wall, the war office here is apprehensive lest the more hotheaded officers force the issue by carrying the offensive into the Peiping-Tientsin region, especially if Chang Hsueh Liang should send bombing planes into Jehol from Peiping. According to this source General Araki does not (repeat not) feel certain of being able to control the situation and will shortly send General Mazaki, vice chief of staff, to

Jehol

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Jehol with a view to restraining the troops from violating the foregoing instructions.

At the same time the ASAHI this morning contains a statement purporting to come from the war office to the effect that the Japanese military authorities will take self-defense measures in North China should the lives and property of Japanese residents in the Peiping-Tientsin region be threatened by disorders arising from the expected defeat of the Chinese forces in Jehol and the possible overthrow of the present administration in Peiping.

The Embassy is of the opinion that the Japanese high military authorities genuinely wish at present to avoid carrying the Japanese operations south of the Wall and will not do so unless such operations are forced upon them by disorderly elements among either the Japanese or Chinese forces or both.

Repeated to Peiping.

WSB-KLP GREW

0629

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR - 1 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated February 28, 1933, from the American Embassy at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

According to reliable information the operations of Japanese forces in Jehol at present are nothing more than a wide revolving movement pivoting on Shanhaikwan, the object of which is the expulsion toward the south and west of the Chinese troops in Jehol, and which does not necessitate or envisage action to the south of the Great Wall. A trustworthy Japanese with close army connections further stated that while definite orders have been issued to the troops in Jehol not to advance beyond the Wall, the Ministry of War fears that the more impulsive officers might make the issue inevitable by pushing the Jehol drive into the Tientsin-Peiping area, particularly if Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should use in Jehol bombing planes operating from Peiping. This Japanese informant added that the Minister of War (Araki) feels uncertain as to his ability to keep the situation under control and accordingly is soon sending to Jehol the Vice Chief of the General Staff, General Mazaki, to try to prevent the army there from disobeying its orders.

This morning the ASAHI published a statement, attributed to the Ministry of War, that the military authorities will take measures of self-defense in North China in the event

that

0630

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that Japanese lives and property are endangered by disturbances developing from the anticipated routing of Chinese forces in Jehol and from the likely fall of Marshal Chang's Government.

It is the belief of the Embassy that the high Japanese command sincerely does not wish that military operations be extended beyond the Great Wall and that it will not conduct such operations unless they become inevitable owing to the actions of unruly elements in Japanese and/or Chinese armies.

FE:WRL:KC

0631

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. D-434

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General
Nanking, China, February 2, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 20 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Chinese Reaction to the Assumed Pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 27 1933
DIV. OF CORRESPONDENCE
AND PUBLICATIONS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

Sir:

The Department is undoubtedly aware that of late the Chinese press has voiced the opinion that Great Britain has a secret understanding with Japan, in consequence of which the British Government is attempting to modify in favor of Japan the pending action of the League of Nations for conciliation of the Sino-Japanese controversy.

On January 27 the semi-official KUO MIN news agency published, in translation, the synopsis of an editorial on this subject published in the January 26 issue of the CHINA TIMES, a Chinese paper issued in Shanghai. Since this editorial explains the reasons commonly given by the Chinese for supposing that Great Britain leans to the side of Japan in the present controversy, a copy of the KUO MIN release is submitted herewith. A brief synopsis of the editorial is attached thereto.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

FILED
MAR 21 1933

Enclosure:
Copy of KUO MIN release.

In quintuplicate to Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.

793.94/5941

0632

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOURCE: KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY, (Chinese Semi-Official), January 27, 1933, Shanghai. Page 1 ff.

(KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY)

Jan. 27, 1933.

CHINESE PRESS COMMENT ON SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS.

Shanghai, Jan. 26.-- Welcoming the return of Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister to China, the China Times, in a leader, dwells at length upon Sino-British Relations which, it declares, are again in danger of being marred by serious misunderstanding.

The journal begins by reviewing Sino-British relations during the past two decades; referring in particular to the Anglo-French Secret Pact in 1915, whereby Japan was allowed to occupy Kiaochow, the then German Leased Territory; the Wanhsien Incident and the so-called May 30 Incident (of Shanghai); the reorientation of British Far Eastern policy during the Washington Conference and finally the revival of Sino-British friendship since Sir Miles Lampson was appointed H.B.M. Minister to China.

"Since the arrival of Sir Miles as Minister to China," the journal declares, "not only have all past Sino-British misunderstandings been dissipated, but the Chinese have begun to look upon Great Britain as one of China's best friends. This goodwill entertained by the people towards Great Britain has elevated Sino-British relations to a state of almost unprecedented cordiality. While it is due no doubt in part to the soundness of British policy towards China, we wish to emphasize however that it is, in the main, to be attributed to the

untiring

0633

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

untiring efforts of Sir Miles Lampson, who had to overcome no mean difficulties in the accomplishment of what he regarded to be his supreme mission, that is, the promotion of Sino-British friendship."

The journal deplores that after such a long period of friendship and mutual understanding, the relations between the two countries are now again facing a new danger.

In this connection, the journal admits that during the early stages of the present Sino-Japanese controversy, the British Government had pursued a policy which was essentially correct; being, as it was, based upon impartiality and justice. "That this was so was fully borne out by the unbiased and faithful report of the Lytton Commission, which was headed by a British statesman," the journal declares.

Recent despatches from Geneva, the hournal continues, indicate however, that the British Government has changed its policy vis-a-vis the Manchurian crisis. After referring to the speech made by Sir John Simon, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, before the League of Nations Assembly, the journal draws attention to the rumours which have been persistent lately of an alleged secret understanding between Great Britain and France on the one part, and Japan, on the other, whereby Japan is alleged to have undertaken not to disturb the Yangtsze Valley on condition that Great Britain and France should not interfere with Japan's military operations in North China.

The

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The fact that the British Government has made no official denial of these rumours, coupled with the close contact which the British delegation has kept with the Japanese delegation at Geneva, "can not but lead us to believe that these rumours are not unfounded," the journal says.

Continuing, the journal points out at length the disastrous consequences of such a fallacious policy on the part of the British Government.

"If it were really true that the British Government has abandoned her previous neutral attitude and resumed the tactics of 'secret diplomacy' of pre-war days, then it would not be China or would peace alone that would be the sufferer. Great Britain herself would reap the disastrous fruits of her own actions," the journal emphasizes.

Continuing, the journal points out that the real interest of Great Britain lies in the preservation of world peace as it is only when peace and tranquility are assured can Great Britain restore her former prosperity. By adopting "secret diplomacy" tactics at a time when world peace "hangs by a single thread," the journal claims, the British Government is really adding fuel to the fire and would only accelerate the outbreak of a world catastrophe, in which Great Britain, with her far-flung empire, would inevitably be embroiled. "There can be no question that such a contingency would prove almost disastrous to Great Britain," the journal declares.

Apart from the danger of precipitating world war, the journal draws attention to another danger to which

Great

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Great Britain would be exposed, should she persist in her present policy.

The journal refers to the significant fact that owing largely to the cordial relations between the two countries, there has been marked progress in British trade with China. It goes on to say: "Should the British Government persist in following such secret diplomacy tactics, the Chinese people, by way of self-preservation, would be compelled to treat Great Britain in the same way as they are now treating Japan. They would refuse to purchase goods manufactured by British factories; and would refuse to unload cargoes from vessels coming from Liverpool. The flourishing British trade with China would thus suffer an immediate slump and the British merchants in China would have to follow in the footsteps of the Japanese merchants, that is, to pack up and return to their mother country for lack of business. The factories at Birmingham and Liverpool would have to reduce their production, thereby increasing the number of unemployed."

But, the journal declares, China earnestly hopes that Great Britain would remain her friend; for such friendship would be a boon not only for China and Great Britain but also for the peace of the world. However, should Great Britain choose to change her attitude, China would have no choice but to adopt such measures as are necessary for her self-preservation.

"These views, we wish to emphasize, have been expressed with no sentiments of resentment. We merely wish to clear up, if possible, the misunderstanding which has

unfortunately

0638

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

unfortunately arisen between China and one of her best friends," the journal says.

After pointing out that British statesmen are in general far-sighted, the journal concludes as follows: "It is our earnest hope that all the various rumours which have been current are merely figments of the imagination and have no foundation in fact; and that Sir Miles Lampson and Sir John Simon will make clear and unequivocal statements which would show that the doubts and misgivings which have haunted us are entirely unfounded in fact; and that the British Government will continue to uphold right and justice and remain China's friend."

0637

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SYNOPSIS

Subject: Chinese Reaction to the Assumed Pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain.

The British policy of secret agreements in favor of Japan during the war was reversed at the Washington Conference.

The present British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, has succeeded in making British-Chinese relations extremely cordial.

This cordiality is now threatened, because the impartial British attitude during the first part of the Sino-Japanese controversy has now changed to a pro-Japanese attitude.

It must be believed that there is some basis for the reports that there is a secret understanding between Great Britain, France and Japan creating spheres of influence.

Great Britain will be the worst sufferer in the wide world disturbances which will follow the revival of this secret diplomacy.

If Great Britain should persist in a partial and unfriemdly attitude China would be obliged to boycott her goods.

It is to be hoped, however, that the British Minister to China and the British Minister for Foreign Affairs will issue statements making it clear that all these suspicions in regard to the attitude of Great Britain are unfounded.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-429

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General
Nanking, China, January 23, 1933.

793.94

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Comments by the Chinese and the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
FEB 28 1933
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 28 1933
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1933
Department of State

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a press release issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 22, 1933, giving comments by Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the speech delivered in the Imperial Diet by Count Uchida, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on January 21, 1933, dealing with the foreign relations of Japan, particularly the Sino-Japanese controversy. A copy of this press release was sent to the Nanking Office of the American Legation by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 22, 1933, without covering despatch.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
Copy of Press Release.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation, Peiping.

WRP/MVD
800

F/ESP
793.94/5942
FILED
MAR 20 1933

0639

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Commenting on Count Uchida's speech on Japan's diplomatic policy delivered before the Japanese Diet last Saturday, Dr. Lo Wen Kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that, so far as the speech dealt with Japan's Manchurian adventure, it gave another conclusive proof that Japan was yet far from having awakened from her dream of military conquest and territorial aggrandisement.

Several months had elapsed, Dr. Lo pointed out, since Count Uchida made his first important speech on the Far Eastern situation last August, but apparently there was no abatement in the Japanese Foreign Minister's open defiance of the authority of the League of Nations, of the sanctity of international agreements, and of the validity of all ordinary principles of international law. Count Uchida again dwelt upon the theme of "Manchukuo" attempting not only to justify its existence, but to demonstrate the possibility of its further expansion. He even openly declared Japan's determination to invade Jehol.

Minister Lo considered that there was no need to waste any more words on Japan's prepesterous arguments, for they had been answered very conclusively, not only by the Chinese Government, but by the Lytton Commission as well.

"So far as China is concerned," the Chinese Foreign Minister concluded, "her position is very clear: "Manchukuo" created and maintained by Japan must go and China must re-assert her sovereign power over the Three Eastern Provinces. There can be no conciliation nor reconciliation nor any prospect of settlement until and unless Japan's puppet regime is declared illegal and discontinued."

Nanking, January 22, 1933.

A true copy of the signed original.

0640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 20 1933
Department of State

February 20, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 28 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

The attached memorandum was handed me on Saturday by the Spanish Ambassador. He said that the instruction sent to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo was that he should hold himself in reserve to speak to the Japanese Foreign Office in connection with the Boxer Protocol only if representatives of the other powers parties to the Protocol should have orders to do so. I told him that our own attitude in the matter had not changed.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

F/HS
793.94/5943

FILED
MAR 7 1933

See 793.94/5902
5921

0641

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SPANISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

Dec 793.94/5921
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 20 1933
Department of State

III-A - (b) c 3

Confidencial.

La Embajada de España, cumpliendo ordenes recibidas de su Gobierno, tiene la honra de poner en conocimiento del Departamento de Estado que el Gobierno de la Republica española ha enviado instrucciones al Ministro de España en Tokio para que de acuerdo con los Representantes, en aquella Capital, de las Potencias firmantes del Protocolo Boxer de 7 de Septiembre de 1901 y siempre que los mismos hayan recibido instrucciones similares, hagan presente amistosamente al Gobierno del Japon, el deseo de España de que las estipulaciones de dicho Protocolo sean observadas y consideradas en pleno vigor con independencia del presente incidente conflicto entre China y Japon.

Washington, 18 de Febrero de 1933.

793.94/5943

0642

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Spanish Embassy, in accordance with orders received from its government, has the honor to inform the Dept of State that the Government of the Spanish Republic has sent instructions to the Spanish Minister in Tokyo to agree with the Representatives, in that Capital, of the Powers, signers of the Boxer Protocol of Sept 7, 1901, and always that these same representatives should have received similar instructions, should patiently present to the Japanese government the desire of Spain that the stipulations of said Protocol shall be observed and considered in full force, independent of the present conflict between China and Japan.

0643

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.65/42 FOR memo.

FROM State Department Secretary (Stimson) DATED Feb.23, 1933
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

793.94/5944

REGARDING: Conversation between the Secretary and the Italian Ambassador in which the situation in the Far East was commented on. Secretary stated that in view of the position taken by Japan he did not see that there was anything else that could be done other than the position which had been taken by the rest of the world. The Ambassador concurred.

fc

0644

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5945

SEE 894.00 P. R./62 FOR Despatch # 278.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED February 2, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 ero

REGARDING: Clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops at Shanhaikwan may be said to have been an inevitable incident in a situation such as that which exists on the border between Manchuria and China proper.

hs

0645

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

(b) The Shanhaikwan Incident.**

The clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops at Shanhaikwan may be said to have been an inevitable incident in a situation such as that which exists on the border between Manchuria and China proper. Considering the Japanese troop movements in that district whether they are against the "bandits" in Manchuria or in the direction of Jehol, and the reported movements of the Young Marshal's forces into Jehol, it is only natural that clashes which are not necessarily planned should occur. The incident occurred during the New Year holidays when most of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers were out of Tokyo and the government offices were closed. The Ministers hurried back to the city and their efforts to localize the affair were apparently successful. There is

little

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* See Section I (b) of this report
** Telegrams Nos. 1 of Jan. 3, 7 p.m. 2 of Jan. 4, 6 p.m.
4 of Jan. 4, 6 p.m., 6 of Jan. 5, 8 p.m.
& 9 of Jan. 9, 9 p.m.

0646

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

little evidence that the incident was a part of any pre-arranged scheme of the Japanese War Office in connection with an advance into Jehol. However, it was utilized to advance the Japanese position. To retire, after occupying Shanhaikwan would have caused them to "lose face".

(c) Japan and Jehol.

The much-talked-of Japanese advance into Jehol has not as yet taken place. Some contend that the Army wishes to make sure of its appropriations for the next fiscal year and possibly will even await the dissolution of the Diet before engaging in more military operations in Manchuria. However, others believe in view of the absence of any violent criticisms of the Manchurian venture by the Diet members it seems unlikely that the military will hold back on their account.

The Japanese contention with regard to Jehol is well expressed in a statement which was issued by the War Office on January 11, translated as follows:

> " Jehol is one of the old four northeastern provinces and is inseparable from the other three. Upon the declaration of independence by Manchukuo, it was made clear that Jehol was included in the new state. Also, in reply to a question asked by the League commission of Inquiry, the Manchukuo authorities announced that the Great Wall is one boundary of Manchukuo. General Tan Yu-lin, Chairman of the Jehol provincial government, was one of the officials signing the independence document and pledged allegiance to Mr. Henry Pu Yi, the Chief Executive.
>
> "Accordingly

0647

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5946

SEE 793.94 Commission/821 Confidential File FOR Tel. # 32, 6 pm.

FROM Mexico (Lane) DATED February 20, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 ...

REGARDING:

Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs desires Department's views on the present public opinion in the U. S; with respect to Japanese policy (towards Manchuria).

hs

0648

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5947

SEE 894.00/467 Confidential File FOR Tel.#45-1pm.

FROM Japan (Gre w) DATED Feb.23,1933
NAME

~~10~~ 11

REGARDING: The drive into Jehol:Thinks it would be unwise to disregard the possibility of unforeseen developments or incidents in connection therewith.

fpg

Confidential File

0649

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (c)

Tokio

Dated February 23, 1933

Rec'd 7:42 a. m.

894.00 note 793.94

Secretary of State,

Washington.

45, February 23, 1 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

In any estimate of the situation in the Far East the following elements should be given consideration.

One. By the decision of the Cabinet to secede from the League of Nations Japan has prepared to burn her most important bridge with the outside world. This step indicates the complete supremacy of the military and a fundamental defeat for the moderate elements in the country. Every important step by the League of Nations has been forestalled or succeeded by a fait accompli here in order to demonstrate Japan's independence of and disregard for Western interference with what she conceives to be her own vital interests. There is no (repeat no) verbal authority in her attitude. The military themselves, and the public through military propaganda, are fully prepared to fight rather than to surrender to moral or other pressure from the West. The moral obloquy of the rest of the world at present serves only to strengthen not to

modify

894.00/467 Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

modify their determination. Any tendency on the part of the Government to compromise would almost certainly result in further assassinations if not in internal revolution.

Two. In this national temper the following elements play their part:

(a) - The desire of the military to maintain prestige and their determination to brook no interference whatever;

(b) - The essential importance of saving face which permits no backward step;

(c) - The carefully nurtured belief that Manchuria is the "life line" of Japan;

(d) - Long strained exasperation with the former chaotic conditions in Manchuria and the failure of the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations;

(e) - The total disregard by the military of future financial difficulties arising out of the huge expenses of the Manchurian campaign;

(f) - The basic inability of the Japanese to comprehend the sanctity of contractual obligations when opposed to their own Far East interests.

With regard to the drive into Jehol, it is believed that

0651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that special measures have been taken to avoid going south of the Great Wall even although this decision may render the campaign considerably most difficult and costly. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to disregard the possibility that unforeseen developments or incidents may in future lead to the taking of the Peiping-Tientsin line. If the League of Nations should apply active sanctions Japan's reply would very likely be to occupy North China. This, of course, would bring foreign interests into direct conflict with Japan and constitutes the greatest future potential danger.

Finally, it may be said that a large section of the public and the army has been led by military propaganda to believe that eventual war between the United States and Japan or Russia and Japan or both is inevitable. The military and naval machines are in a state of high efficiency and are rapidly being strengthened. They possess complete self-confidence and arrogance. The navy is becoming more bellicose. In the present temper of the army and navy and the public there is always the risk that any serious incident tending to inflame public opinion might lead Japan to radical steps without counting the cost thereof. In this respect conditions are still precisely as set forth in my 224, September 3, noon.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 4-#45 from Tokio, Feb. 23, 1 p. m.

The foregoing brief summary represents the opinion of all the principal members of my staff as well as of most of my diplomatic colleagues and other foreigners here.

Strict press bans are in force preventing the publication of any information concerning the present operations in Jehol so that the Embassy is in the dark concerning military developments.

Repeated to Peiping.

WSB-HPD-CSB GREW

0653

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 811.001 Roosevelt,F.D./27 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department Secretary (Stimson) DATED February 16,1933.
TO NAME

793.94 / 5948

REGARDING: Discussion of the Japanese-Chinese situation before the League of Nations.

Conversation between the Secretary and the German Ambassador.

dp

0654

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

0 793.94/5949

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/834 FOR Despatch # 5668.

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED January 23, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 ore

REGARDING:

Memoranda entitled "Obata's Plans in Hsinking" and "The Jehol Plans".

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5668

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, January 26, 1933.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL MEMORANDA.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 2533, of today's date, addressed to the Legation at Peiping transmitting copies of political memoranda.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of despatch No. 2533 to the Legation.

800
TH/th

True copy of
the original.

0656

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2533

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, January 23, 1933.

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING COPIES OF POLITICAL MEMORANDA.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest to the Legation, copies, in translation, of two memoranda entitled "Obata's plans in Hsinking" and "The Jehol plans", submitted by a local Russian. I have no comments to make upon the contents of these memoranda, which are conjectures on the part of the writer.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosures as indicated.

Copies have been sent to:

The Department of State,
The Embassy,
The Consulate General, Mukden,
The Consulate, Dairen.

800
GCH/tll

True copy of
the original.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-Translation-

BEHIND THE STAGE OF JAPANESE POLITICS. OBATA'S PLANS IN HSINKING.

Mr. Obata, former Japanese Minister to China, who at the present time is in Hsinking, is developing the below grandiose plans, which meet with much favor among the Japanese: the position of Obata is the key to an understanding of the entire situation in the Far East.

As is known, it was this very Obata who in 1915 presented the 21 Demands to China, and this took place under the following circumstances: one day Obata invited the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to dinner, and no one else was invited to this dinner. After the dinner Obata took the Minister to a map and made the following announcement: the position of the Allies is hopeless, and the war to all appearances will end with victory for Germany. Europe is exhausted and the time has come for China to throw off the European yoke. I offer you a union for mutual work on a broad scale in Asia. You give us compensation in Manchuria and Shantung and we in turn shall help you get rid of foreign concessions and to extend your influence in Mongolia, as well as in other countries, such as Afganistan, adjacent to Asia. Europe is so exhausted that it cannot counteract our plans, if we operate in a friendly manner. The Chinese Minister was so astonished over this proposition and asked for time to think over and to study this question, and in the final analysis he turn the Japanese proposition down, the more so as the American Minister, whose advice he asked, criticized the project and remarked that the Americans would stand back of the position of Europeans in China, because he saw a danger to himself as well in this plan. Enraged over the Chinese refusal, the Japanese presented their famous 21 Demands, and subsequent events developed along entirely other lines.

The Japanese are of the opinion that the present situation is surprisingly similar to that of 1915. Europe and particularly Russia are now even as then tremendously weakened through war and the depression so that there is again a great possibility for Obata's plan. The problem of the Japanese now is to find that point of Chinese support whereby it would be possible to utilize the Japanese power for the liberation of China from European tyranny and for the rejuvenation of China. This support may be Pu Yi or that Chinese authority which may hold power in the Peking-Tientsin region. This matter cannot be decided at once, but it is the plan of action underlying Japanese policy.

I recommend that you carefully follow the gradual development of this plan of Obata's which is the key to an understanding og many events in the Far East: this bears witness to the fact that the Japanese do not intend to take hold of China by force but by entirely different means.

THE JEHOL PLANS.

The conquest of Jehol will not be brought about as rapidly as operations were carried on along the western and eastern lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and more likely at the Shanghai rate of speed, and will be drawn out for a month and a half or two months with increasing intensity to the end. This is done in order on the one hand to avoid international complications, and principally because of the desire gradually to involve all the forces of Chang Hsueh Liang in order completely to destroy his living power. It is therefore possible that we may even witness an intentional Japanese retreat for the purpose of encouraging the enemy and causing him more intensively to carry on the war. With the destruction of the active force of Chang Hsueh Liang the Japanese are convinced that they will automatically find the way open to the Peking region for his Chinese enemies, because the Japanese do not believe that any Nanking divisions will be sent to the support of Chang Hsueh Liang, figuring that the Nanking crowd is too careful to send its troops

-to-

0658

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to certain destruction as they are required for different purposes in the south of China. The same tactics of involving Chang Hsueh Liang's forces into the war will be pursued also in the Shanhaikwan region, whence the Japanese do not even intend to enter the Peking-Tientsin district: there is a possibility that they may enter Jehol, in the rear of Chang Hsueh Liang's troops operating there. In the same way the Japanese intentionally prolonged their operations in the Shanghai region, as their main purpose was to destroy by bombing the industrial town of Chapei, which caused China losses amounting to two milliard dollars, while the Japanese insurance companies have no intention of replacing the losses to the owners of the destroyed factories and shops. If the Japanese had carried on the fight properly the 19th route army would have retreated rapidly, while to pursue it deep into China did not enter into the plans of Japan and the subsequent bombing and destruction of Chapei would have become impossible. Therefore the Japanese artificially prolonged operations and instilled courage into the Chinese troops, while at the same time they gradually destroyed the actual power of the best Chinese troops, the 19th route army, which near Shanghai lost 20,000 warriors.

Confirmation has again been received from an authoritative source in Japan that a conflict, or, if necessary, even a war with the USSR has definitely been decided upon, and the Japanese military command is busily engaged upon this question.

****

Received January 20, 1935
Trans. by T.L.L.

0659

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 1 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 2 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 1- 1933 Department of State

JS PLAIN

FROM PEIPING Via N R

Dated March 1, 1933

Rec'd Feb. 28, 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

196, March 1, 9 a.m.

Reuter from Nanking twenty eighth:

"Announcement of British arms embargo has been received here with mixed feelings. Chinese circles fully sympathize with British attempt to assist in preventing widening of field of conflict or prolonging bloodshed but they are convinced that British step will not help cause of peace but will increase power of Japanese military aggression. It is pointed out that Japan is well equipped with weapons but China is practically without them. If arms do not come to China she will be helpless before onslaught of Japanese forces. Furthermore, Chinese circles state Japan is fully prepared for such an emergency as she is alleged to be able to buy arms through Siam. It is urged that powers through international action should place embargo on the aggressor thereby contributing to world peace."

JOHNSON

JS

F/HS 793.94/5950

MAR 8 1933 CHECKED

793.94 note 893.113 894.113

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 1 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM AY Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 1, 1933

Rec'd 2:35 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1- 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

197, March 1, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"February 28, 8 p. m.

The army spokesman today reported the capture on the 26th of Hsiawa a strategic point about midway between Kailu and Chihfeng. Unofficially he reported that Suichung units have crossed Jehol border and are engaging Chinese regulars occupying stronger entrenched positions. Situation at Shanhaikwan was described as much more tense due to Chinese concentration and provocative acts.

Army spokesman also read a Tokyo report carried by the official Manchukuo News Service to the effect that Japanese air forces to take action south of the Wall if, one, Chang's troops take positive action in opposing occupation, two, the combined occupation forces are faced by Chinese troops along the Wall, three, Chinese air bases are advanced to proximity of Jehol border and their planes used in Jehol operations, four, Japanese lives and interests in North China are jeopardized. The spokesman however

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JUN 4 1933

F/HS 793.94/5951

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

however points out that War Office had made no official statement of this sense."

JOHNSON

CIB JS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JS

GRAY

FROM TIENTSIN Via N. R.

Dated February 28, 1933

Rec'd 11 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 1 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1- 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.94 note
893.102 Tientsin

February 28, 4 p.m.

My February 27, 4 p.m. The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"February 28, 3 p.m. My February 27, 3 p.m. I can discover no evidence of any intention on the part of Chinese military to attack Japanese concession nor is there any evidence of concentration of Chinese military forces in Tientsin. In this regard the identic note of July 15, ~~1938~~ 1902, is apparently being strictly observed by Chinese at least so far as Tientsin is concerned. Japanese have apparently not added to their local garrison. At present most potential cause of the trouble would seem to be some such incident as that which caused the recent trouble at Shanhaikwan. Conditions are quiet, news from Jehol being anxiously awaited.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

JS

F/HS 793.94/5952

JUN 24 1933

0663

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1- 1933
Department of State

February 27, 1933.

Copies to Peiping, Tokyo, London, Paris and Geneva. 3/2/33 FE (REK)

DCR OK FE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 6 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 3 1933

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, AT 11:35 a.m.

Far East.

The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment to complete the conversation that we were having last Thursday. But in opening he said he wanted to tell me that as a personal matter he thought the tone of my last note to the League of last Saturday concerning the action of the Assembly was temperate and conciliatory. He said he appreciated that I had been trying not to pour oil upon the fire and he thought my attitude would be appreciated by his people, although he had not yet had time to hear of their reaction to my note.

We then passed on to a general talk for which he had come and, taking my cue from what he had said, I reminded him that I had never been unfriendly to Japan; that I had publicly stated, before these events in Manchuria, that I regarded the welfare of Japan and her position and influence in the Far East as important to the welfare of the United States, and that I had frequently, before these events had taken place, called her

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MAR 10 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

her a stabilizing influence in that part of the world. The Ambassador said he remembered the expressions I had used on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday which were very gratifying. I then went on to remind him that when the Manchurian outbreak occurred in September, 1931, I had not attributed it to the Government of Japan or to the statesmen whom I used to know, Shidehara and Wakasuki, or to the people of Japan, but to the efforts of a small group of persons of militaristic ambitions and desires. The Ambassador said he knew this very well. I reminded him further that in what action I had thereafter taken in opposing Japanese actions in Manchuria I was not actuated by hostility to the Japanese Government or people but by a desire to preserve and maintain certain peace treaties which I regarded as vital and important not only to the world at large but also to Japan. I told him that I had made several speeches in which I had explained my views as to the importance of those treaties. I said I believed the Great War had demonstrated that we had developed both in Japan and in this country and in many parts of Europe and the rest of the world a complex industrial civilization which could not withstand modern war, and I explained to him in detail what I meant. I pointed out that we were

developing

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

developing into great congested populations of people who were not self-supporting but were dependent upon trade and commerce for their supplies and food; that I believed the Great War had shown that unless future wars could be checked and minimized this civilization would be destroyed. The Ambassador expressed his assent. I pointed out that these peace treaties, including the League of Nations Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, were earnest attempts by the people of the world to carry out this view and to protect our civilization against its destruction by war, and that they were, each of them, an attempt to stabilize the world after the war and to protect the welfare of each nation. He said he recognized this. I told him that this had been the mainspring of my action.

The Ambassador said he recognized all of this and on his part, although he had been disappointed many times when he had given me assurances which were afterwards not carried out in Manchuria, he still wanted to say that he believed in his people and that sooner or later the moderate elements would not disappoint us. I told him I joined in his hope that this would be so. I then said that in regarding the situation it seemed to me that the whole of Manchuria itself was not as important to Japan as the

confidence

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

confidence and good-will which were being jeopardized by these campaigns. He indicated that he thought this was so. The Ambassador said he was going to devote himself to a cultivation of friendly cultural relations between the two countries, abandoning talk about Manchuria. He expressed himself warmly in the hope that we shall be able to continue our personal relations even after I go out of office. I reciprocated these hopes and told him that I looked forward to the time when the campaign against Chinchow would no longer prevent me from coming to his Embassy, referring to an incident of last winter. The Ambassador laughed and said he hoped so too.

H.L.S.

S HLS:CBS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 27, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Far East.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5953

A true copy of the original signed by the Secretary of State

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 27,
1933.

793.94/5953

S/HHC

Mar. 8 1933

FE:MMH:REK
3/2/33

FE
M.M.H.

0668

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 215

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

793.94/5953

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 27, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 27,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5953

Mar. 3 1933

FE:MMH:REK
3/2/33

FE
MMH

0669

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3 1933.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1025

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 27, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselors of your Legation.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5953

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 27,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5953

S/1111

Mar. 3, 1933

FE:MMH:REK
3/2/33

FE
M.M.H.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 423

The Honorable

Andrew W. Mellon,

American Ambassador,

London.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 27, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 27,
1933.

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5953

793.94/5953

Mar. 3 1933

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M.M.H.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 3 1933

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1577

The Honorable

Walter E. Edge,

American Ambassador,

Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your personal and confidential information and not for distribution to your staff, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on February 27, 1933, with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Katsuji Debuchi, in regard to the Far East. You may in your discretion make the copy of the memorandum available to the Counselor of your Embassy.

Very truly yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/5953

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated February 27,
1933.

A true copy of the original sig-

793.94/5953

Mar. 3, 1933

S/HHH

FE:MMH:REK
3/2/33

FE
M.M.H.

0672

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

4-4
2652-H-377

1933

January 13, 1933. 237

Special Report.

Japan.

Status of Jehol.

1. The War Office issued the following statement to the press on January 11th concerning the status of Jehol:

"Jehol province is one of the old four Northeastern Provinces, and is inseparable from the other three provinces. Upon the declaration of the independence of Manchukuo, it also was clarified that Jehol is a part of Manchukuo. In reply to a question put by the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, the Manchukuo authorities also announced that the Great Wall constitutes the boundary of Manchukuo.

"Furthermore, General Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of the Jehol Provincial Government, is among those who signed the independence declaration of Manchukuo and regarded Mr. Pu Yi as the Chief Executive. Judging from this fact alone, it is a stern reality that Jehol Province is a part of Manchukuo.

"Accordingly, those disturbing peace and order in the province are lawless people of Manchukuo, and those invading it are aggressors. Self-defense measures or expeditionary measures against them are just like the repulse of General Su Ping-wen and the defeat of General Ma Chan-shan, General Li Tu and General Ting Chao.

"If such measures are taken, it will be merely one of the numerous events taking place inside Manchukuo. It will not be a question worthy of a considerable degree of public excitement and will have nothing to do with any other country. It is necessary for the Japanese people to observe events in Jehol Province with a clear, proper understanding of its position."

2. It is believed that the purpose of the War Office in publishing this statement was twofold:

First: it was an attempt to sound out public opinion, both domestic and foreign;
Second: it was designed to prepare the Japanese people for further armed conflict on a large scale in Jehol.

R. S. Bratton
Major, Infantry (DOL),
Asst. Military Attache.

1st Ind.
Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, January 13, 1933 - To: A.C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

2. A reliable representative of the press informed me last evening that a spokesman for the War Office had stated to him yesterday that Chang Hsueh-liang would be asked to withdraw his troops peacefully from Jehol. If he did so, there would be no interference. If he did not do so, the troops would be driven out.

Distribution:
G-2, 4
Navy, 1
[illegible] 1
Military Attache, 1
[illegible] 1

J.C. Mellroy
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Military Attache.

Report No. 6609 13 January 1933.

NOTED BY W. P. D.

F/HS 793.94/5954

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1933

0673

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 25, 1933.

~~EHD:~~
~~MMH:~~

The report of January 25, 1933, of the Military Attaché at Berlin states that German military classes have been sympathetic with the Japanese, while the commercial classes prefer an unstable China to which they can sell goods to a stable one in which the Japanese are in possession. The impotence of the League in the Far East has been regarded with the keenest relish in Germany where it has increased the hope that treaty shackles may be torn off.

~~MMH~~:CLS

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

This copy is for State
Copy also sent to F.E. Sec.

4-3

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 20 2657-B-757 1933

WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3220 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 23 1933
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FE

G-2 Report

GERMANY (Political)

Subject: Proceedings of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the Reichstag in a closed session on January 21st opened a discussion of the Far Eastern question, which discussion will be continued on January 26.

Foreign Minister von Neurath addressed the Committee and read to it a declaration to the effect that Germany proposes to intervene at Geneva for the purpose of bringing about a permanent state of peace in the Far East. Germany, he said, had in the past maintained a neutral attitude, and when this statement was indignantly challenged by a communist member who claimed that Germany is and has been pro Japanese, the Foreign Minister remained silent.

A prominent Nazi leader, Herr Epp in discussing the Manchurian conflict stated that this had been beneficial to Germany as it showed that the League of Nations was powerless to act in such matters.

Comment: - German military classes have been quite sympathetic with the Japanese in their recent exploitation of China. They feel that someone ought to step in there and put things in order so that the country may develop smoothly and systematically. The Chinese are not able to do this themselves and the only ones who can do it properly and well for them are the Japanese. (In this connection, however, it is interesting to find that a German officer of high rank is about to undertake the reorganization of the Chinese Army.)

On the other hand the commercial classes, with an eye to their markets, are far from pleased with the inroads being made by Japan and prefer an unstable China to which they can sell goods, to a stable one in which all of the markets are in possession of the Japanese.

As for the statement of Herr Epp, it has been noticeable during the past year that the impotence of the League in the Far East (and in other places as well) has been regarded with the keenest relish in Germany where it has been a spur to the ever growing hope that the shakles of the Treaty may soon be torn off.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
DSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JC NARS Date 3/9/73

Jacob W. S. Wuest,
Lieut. Colonel, A.C.,
Military Attache.

793.94/5955

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- 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LMB

Code
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CONFIDENTIAL

Received at the War Department
February 14, 1933.
9:30 A. M.

SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 15 1933
NOTED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 14 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 15 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM Tokyo

TO The Adjutant General.

Number 266. February 14th.

Commander Kuantung army with forces now at his disposal will commence operation of clearing Jehol of 100,000 anti Menchukuo troops early part March. Original tactical plan(s) including main attacks up Lanho river through north China definitely abandoned. No pursuit south of great wall. Operations to be confined to Jehol proper. Following Japanese troops believed participating: 9 air squadrons and a tank detachment; 14th Infantry and 4th Cavalry ..... 8th and 6th Divisions.

Repeated to Peking.

G-2 X Foregoing confidential information from General Staff today.
TAG V

McIlroy

Repeat requested for

Note:/Blank space and underscored word.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By _____, NARS Date 3/19/73

793.94

Motors, Wind Portable "Brigades"

SECRET

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793.94/5956
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JAN 1 - 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FEB 24 1933

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 20 1933
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 20 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

#5

793.94

0019 THE FOLLOWING IS AN ESTIMATE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IN NORTH CHINA:
JAPANESE - IN MANCHURIA 60,000 NOT COUNTING GENERAL TAMON'S 2ND DIVISION
WHICH HAS GONE HOME AND NOT COUNTING THE POLICE AND RESERVE GUARDS. MAN-
CHUKUO TROOPS FAVORABLE TO JAPAN,30,000. CHINESE - JEHOL,55,000;PEIPING
/50,000; LWANCHOW 70,000; TIENTSIN-TAKU 30,000. FROM INFORMATION AVAILA-
BLE IT APPEARS AS THOUGH JEHOL WILL BE INVADED BY THE JAPANESE BEGINNING
25 FEBRUARY. HEADQUARTERS OF THE KWANGTUNG GARRISON HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
AT TAHUSHAN IN ORDER THAT THE CAMPAIGN IN JEHOL CAN BE BETTER DIRECTED.
EXTENSIVE JAPANESE CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED AT SUI-
CHUNG AND AT TUNGLIAOCHEN. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THERE IS A REGULAR
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS UP TO THE FRONTIER OF JEHOL. ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDE
14TH,18TH,16TH, AND 10TH DIVISIONS AND 100 AIRPLANES. THE HEADQUARTERS
OF GENERAL SUZUKI HAS BEEN SHIFTED FROM SHANHAIKWAN TO CHINCHOW, LEAVING
AT SHANHAIKWAN 2 ARMORED TRAINS, 1 TANK AND 1 REGIMENT. THE JAPANESE
PLAN IS TO STOP THE TRAFFIC ON THE PEKING-MUKDEN RAILROAD NORTHEAST OF
SHANHAIKWAN FROM THE 20TH TO THE 25TH TO FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF
TROOPS. BARRING SOME UNFORSEEN CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT THINK THAT JAPANESE
WILL ADVANCE SOUTH OF THE WALL AT THIS TIME 1245

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By _____, NARS Date 3/19/73

RECEIVED IN CODE ROOM 0500, 19 FEB, 1933.

DISTRIBUTION: 13(2)....ACTION 00 00A 01 05 10A 11 12 16(2) 19
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SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 21 1933
NOTED

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FILED
FEB 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Chinese Legation
Feb. 17, 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 17 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 24 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 17 1933
Department of State

TEXT OF A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1933

Telegraphic reports from Chenteh (Jehol City) to the Ministry are to the following effect:

(1) There appeared in the streets of Chaoyangtze Japanese propagandist posters announcing that the Japanese would invade Peipiao on the eleventh and the twelfth of this month.

(2) Three Japanese aeroplanes fired upon the Chinese troops stationed at Nanlin on February 9 but were forced to retreat when the Chinese sentry returned fire.

793.94

(3) Since February 13, Japanese troops, having been hotly pursued by Chinese forces, withdrew from the Province of Jehol into the Province of Liaoning. The Chinese forces under Liu Cheng-tung were planning to launch a counter-attack upon Tungliao hoping to capture the base from which the Japanese had repeatedly made their attacks on Kailu.

(4) The Japanese troops in Korea were to be transported into the Three Eastern Provinces via two routes, one following the South Manchuria Railway between Mukden and Antung in the Liaoning Province and another via Chientao near the Korean and the Russian borders in the Kirin Province. Troop trains were seen transporting large quantities of ammunitions, which were said to include poisonous gas bombs, through Yenchi, (a point in Kirin Province near the Korean and the Russian borders) throughout the day and night of February 13, employing forced labor for such purposes. General Muto, the Japanese representative in "Manchukuo," was busily engaged in Changchun organizing the campaign against Jehol. The general plan of attack had been decided upon and secretly transmitted to the Japanese command at Tungliao and Suichung.

(5) After the Chinese had repulsed the Japanese at Tao-Teh-Ying-Tze at Kailu, the Japanese chose the left flank of the Chinese defense as their point of attack. On February 7th they launched a fierce attack upon the Chinese Volunteers on the left flank with over two hundred Japanese and a thousand Mongolian soldiers, applying heavy artillery, machine-guns and armored cars in their attack. The Chinese Volunteers resisted them gallantly in a battle lasting for four days in which Brigadier-General Tsui finally drove the attackers back and recovered the lost territory. The Japanese occupation had, however, reduced the places to ruins, looting and burning as they were driven back.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 16, 1933

793.94/5958

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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BFS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 25 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CODE CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department. February 23, 1933.

9:45 A. M.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

From Tokio.

CONFIDENTIAL

To: The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

JAMES F. McKinley
Brigadier General,
Acting The
Adjutant General.

Number 268. February 23d.

Have reliable information that General Liu and 10,000 volunteers near Kailu have ceased opposition and pledged allegiance Manchukuo. Japan has begun such military preparations in Bonin and Mandate Islands as she deems it necessary, in the opinion of this office. On February 21st Peipiao was occupied by 31st Infantry 8th Division in face of slight resistance.

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SECRETARY OF STATE
FEB 24 1933
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By _____ NARS Date 3/19/73

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BFS CODE CABLEGRAM

1 W

February 24, 1933.

From Tokio, 9:45 A. M.

To The Adjutant General.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 25 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

Copies furnished as noted:

James F. McKinley,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant
General.

G-2 x
TAG v

Number 269. February 24th.

Advance on Kailu from Tungliao of elements of 6th Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade.

McIlroy.

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COPY

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FEB 24 1933
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933
DIVISION OF

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 27 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From Chinese Legation
Feb 24, 1933

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

THE TRANSLATIONS OF THREE CABLEGRAMS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1933

793.94

(1) General Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol Province, telegraphed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reporting severe fightings between the Chinese and the Japanese troops at Chaoyangssu, Nanlin and Kuopeiyingtse on February 21st. The Japanese, Governor Tang stated, were massing large numbers of troops in Chinchow and Ichow preparing for a large-scale attack upon Jehol. As Governor of Jehol charged with the duty of defending it against aggression, Governor Tang pledged that he would survive or perish with his Province.

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(2) The Jehol National Defense Association in the Northeastern Provinces, formed by the Chinese population for the defense of Jehol, sent a telegram to all the public bodies and organizations throughout China stating in part as follows:

The Jehol of today is the Liaoning and Kirin of 1931; the North China of today is the Heilungkiang of last year. If we do not defend Jehol, North China and even the whole country will be endangered. We have but one plain duty before us, that is to summon all our citizens to sacrifice whatever they have in our supreme effort to maintain our territorial integrity. The National Government should pursue this course without the slightest hesitation. The soldiers at the front should be ready to make their supreme sacrifice for their country. Such is the will of the people and such a course the Government must pursue. The people should support their government to the fullest extent, even to reduce and limit our food and economize on all our living expenses, in order to give our government and army every support.

(3) The National Salvation and Defense Association in the Province of Charhar, amalgamated from various organizations for the same purposes in the Province, sent a telegram to all public bodies and organizations throughout China stating in part as follows:

The Japanese invaders, after invading and occupying our Northeast (the Three Eastern Provinces) and after taking Shanhaikwan, are now exhausting the military strength of the whole island Empire for the invasion of Jehol. This is indeed the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

nadir of aggressiveness and treachery. It is gratifying that our National Government has determined to defend against the invaders as evidenced by the gallantry of the forces in the battlefield, the grim determination of Governor Tang of Jehol, and the inspection tour of Acting Chairman T. V. Soong and Marshal Chang Hsiao-liang at the front. The time for national salvation is now here. The Province of Charhar, contiguous with Jehol, will flourish or perish in unison with it. Our patriotism impels us to do our best to support our nation's defenders and to relieve the sufferings of the war victims until victory is achieved.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 23, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 24 1933
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From Chinese Legation
Feb 24 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

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WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 25 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

793.94/5962

MAR 30 1933

A COPY OF A CABLEGRAM

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING

DATED FEBRUARY 23, 1933

Mr. Uyemura, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, handed to Dr. Lo the following memorandum at five p. m. today:

"(1) The presence of troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and other anti-Manchukuo forces is incompatible not only with the sovereignty of Manchukuo but also with the restoration of peace and order in Jehol. The Manchukuo army is now putting into execution its plan to exterminate bandits and remnants of soldier-bandits in the Province of Jehol and the Japanese army is obligated to give assistance to it under the terms of the Protocol concluded between Japan and Manchukuo. Manchukuo government has repeatedly demanded Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw his troops to regions inside of the Great Wall but these demands were unheeded. Should this campaign in Jehol lead to an armed conflict between the Japanese army in cooperation with the Manchukuo army and Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces, it will be entirely due to the presence of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops in Jehol and the responsibility shall therefore rest with China who has rejected the demands of Manchukuo.

"(2) The activities of the Japanese troops in Jehol whose aim is the purification of Jehol Province as stated above and who are in cooperation with Manchukuo forces have no other objective than to insure order and tranquility in that Province. In principle, they will remain within the territory of Manchukuo. But if Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces persist in taking positive action it will be difficult to guarantee that fighting will not spread to North China. If any situation should arise as a result thereof the responsibility shall rest entirely with China.

"(3) Manchukuo has always accorded generous treatment to anti-Manchukuo forces who surrender themselves. Should Tang Yu-lin and his troops as well as other anti-Manchukuo forces surrender to Manchukuo, they will be dealt with leniently in accordance with the policy hitherto followed."

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 23, 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
FEB 27 1933

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 27 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 25 1933
Department of State

From Chinese Legation
Feb. 25, 1933

A TRANSLATION OF A CABLEGRAM
FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DATED FEBRUARY 23, 1933

793.94

A telegram from Peiping reported to the effect that severe fightings have taken place at Nanling and Kailu, both on the northeastern border of the Jehol Province. The Japanese launched a sudden aerial bombardment on Peipiao and Chaoyang and used Mongolian bandits as the vanguard to attack Kailu. Our soldiers there offered a stiff resistance with high spirits.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FEB 27 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

According to a telegraphic report from Hongkong, General Chen Chi-tang, Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, has called a conference for the purpose of devising measures to defend China against the Jpanese and to suppress Communistic bandits. It is decided that the Provinces of Fukien and Kwangsi will each contribute three divisions of troops and the Province of Kwangtung six to ten divisions, to the Province of Kiangsi for the suppression of banditry in that Province and to replace the troops under the command of General Chiang Kai-shek, who will be despatched to North China to resist the Japanese invasion.

Mr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, in a press interview in Shanghai, stated that a satisfactory solution of the financial difficulties in North China had been reached and that China was ready to resist the Japanese invasion at any cost.

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 24, 1933

793.94/5963

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MAR 2 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 3, 1933.

MMH:

Paris's despatch No. 3369 of February 21, 1933, summarizes an address of February 20 by Lord Lytton at the Sorbonne. Certain passages were quite strong and, in general, unfavorable to Japan, comparing the Japanese General Staff to the Prussian General Staff, comparing the attitude of Japan to the authors of the Jamieson raid, and stating that China might cease to look to Geneva and be forced to look to Moscow, a change which could only bring about the spread of communism in China and Korea, which Japan has always feared.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, February 21, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

No. 3369

Subject: Address of Lord Lytton at the Sorbonne concerning the present situation in the Far East.

793.94

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 1933
NO COPY TO BE MADE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 2- 1933
Department of State

F/G 793.94/5964

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK	Yes	No
To the Field		
In D		

Sir:

I have the honor to report that an address was given last night at the Sorbonne by Lord Lytton, briefly reviewing the work of his Commission in Manchuria and making certain observations on the course of present events in the Far East with their attendant danger to world peace. The address which was read in French was given under the auspices of the Nouvelle Ecole de la Paix, an organization founded by Louise Weiss, moving spirit of the weekly "L'Europe Nouvelle", prominent French feminist and an important

FILED
MAR 11 1933

figure . . .

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

figure in present day French politics. Lord Lytton was introduced with remarks of a flattering nature by Miss Weiss and M. Paul Reynaud, deputy and former Minister of Colonies in the Laval Cabinet. The latter presided over the meeting. Lord Tyrrell, British Ambassador, was also on the platform.

Although Lord Lytton's address was of a general nature and consisted principally of a review of the characteristics and living conditions of the masses in the Far East, in the course of which he drew not only from observations made in China and Japan but also from his personal experiences as an Administrator in British India, certain passages were quite strong and, in general, unfavorable to Japan's present attitude in the Far Eastern crisis. After dwelling on the known fact that the Heads of the Japanese Army and Navy are responsible to the Emperor alone, and stressing the feudal bases of both those services, Lord Lytton said that the present influence of the Japanese General Staff is similar to that of the Prussian General Staff between 1870 and 1914, while the present attitude of Japan in Manchuria recalls the authors of the Jamieson raid in South Africa in 1895. Stating further that political thought in Europe had undergone as great a change in the last ten years as it had in Japan between 1860 and 1900, with the League of Nations and the Kellog Pact furnishing

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the principal methods of International cooperation, Lord Lytton said in substance that no nation can be the sole arbiter of its actions in pursuing its national policies and that the failure of Japan to grasp the import of obligations of international instruments has produced the Far Eastern crisis. China, in short, which had learned to look to Geneva, in the end might be forced to look to Moscow, a change which could only bring about the spread of communism in China and Korea which Japan has always feared. In conclusion, and probably to soften the general tenor of his address, Lord Lytton praised the Japanese people as a nation, stating that he did not believe they wished to desert the League, and expressed a hope for conciliation in Manchuria on the basis of the latest Geneva proposals. This he believed could be achieved through modification of the present Manchurian Government and by subsequent negotiations based upon the goodwill of both parties aided by the good offices of other powers.

The address was received with considerable applause by a large audience, although today's press, with the exception of the Paris NEW YORK HERALD does not devote much attention to it. The French press barely reports the event and it is possible that it has been so instructed. Should a full text of Lord Lytton's remarks be made available to the Embassy, copies will be forwarded for the Department's information.

Respectfully yours,

Walter E. Edge

In . . .

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In quintuplicate

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ASR/dc

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 2, 1933

Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 2 1933
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 2- 1933
Department of State

793.94

URGENT.

March 2, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"CONFIDENTIAL. Chinese news agency reports there is no available Japanese air carrier at Chinwangtao. There is at present only a Japanese destroyer there. From reliable source, however, it is learned that there are several Japanese war vessels in the northern part of the Gulf of Pechho. Conditions at Chinwangtao are quiet, likewise here. Troop movements eastward through Tientsin practically ceased during past few days.

Reuter reports that Chihfeng was occupied by the Japanese yesterday afternoon without any fighting and that Japanese troops have passed Wukungfu, 28 miles southeast of Lingyuan, and that troops have reached Hotangkou 15 kilometres northeast of Lingyuan.

Repeated to Department".

WSB-HPD

LOCKHART

F/G

793.94/5965

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 1 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FE

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

March 1st, 1933.

March 6 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1 - 1933
Department of State

F/G 793.94/5966

Dear Hornbeck,

I am sending you
down the enclosed Memorandum as
it is of a negative character &
does not call for any discussion.

I enjoyed my luncheon with
you the other day & was sorry to
have to leave early.

Yours sincerely

D. G. Osborne.

MAR 7 1933
FILED
MAR 7 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Copy sent to London

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MAR 2 1933
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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1- 1933
Department of State

AIDE MEMOIRE.

March 6 1933

On January 23rd an aide memoire was left at the State Department recording the view of His Majesty's Government that it would be desirable that the Powers signatories of the Boxer Protocol should represent in a friendly manner to the Japanese Government their anxiety that the régime set up by this protocol, in which they are directly interested, should be observed independently of any condition arising out of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The French, Italian, Spanish, Belgian and Netherlands Governments had been similarly approached.

793.94 note 793.00

793.94/5966

The views of the United States Government on this proposal were recorded in the State Department's aide memoires numbered 793.94/5794 of January 24th and February 1st. These were duly conveyed to His Majesty's Government. Sir Ronald Lindsay has now been informed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that in view of the lack of unanimity with which their proposal has been received and in view of the changed situation, His Majesty's Government are not disposed, as at present advised, to pursue the proposed policy of representations to the Japanese Government. In conveying this information to the Government of the United States Sir Ronald Lindsay has been instructed to add that the other Governments concerned have been similarly informed.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
February 28,1933.

793.94/5-943

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

March 6 1933

No. 426

To the American Ambassador,

London.

793.94/5966

Referring to the Department's telegram No. 24, February 1, 6 p.m. to the Embassy, with regard to the British Government's suggestion that representations be made by the interested powers to the Japanese Government in connection with the special privileges of those powers under the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the Secretary of State encloses herewith for the information of the Ambassador a copy of an aide-memoire under date February 28, 1933, from the British Embassy in Washington conveying the information that the British Government is not disposed, in view of the changed situation, to pursue the proposed policy of representations to the Japanese Government.

Enclosure:
Aide-memoire, February 28, 1933.

Mar. 6, 1933

A true copy of the signed original

793.94/5966

FE:JEJ/VDM FE
3-3-33

0693

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
FEB 24 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 21 1933
Department of State

XL YG CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: MARINE DETACHMENT AMERICAN LEGATION PEIPING.

TO : CINC ASIATIC.

RELAYED BY CINC ASIATIC TO OPNAV FOR INFORMATION

ØØ2Ø IT SEEMS QUITE PROBABLE THAT THE JAPANESE INVASION OF JEHOL WILL BEGIN ON THE 21IS, THE DAY ON WHICH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS TO MEET, AND THAT 5Ø,ØØØ TROOPS WILL BE USED. THIS IS NOT DEFINITE BUT IS A PERSISTANT RUMOR FROM A SOURCE WHICH CAN USUALLY BE DEPENDED UPON. THE JAPANESE ARE COUNTING ON TAKING NOT MORE THAN 7 DAYS TO ADVANCE TO CHENGTEH FU. SINCE MARCH 1ST IS THE FIRST BIRTHDAY OF MANCHUKUO, THEY WOULD LIKE PARTICULARLY TO BE THERE BY THAT TIME. A DESPATCH OF THE CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY IS ALSO QUOTED IN THE PRESS HERE AS SAYING THAT A FORCE UNDER TAMON WILL COMMENCE THE INVASION ON 21 FEBRUARY AND THAT THE ADVANCE WILL BE IN THREE COLUMNS. BECAUSE THE COUNTRY OVER WHICH THE FIGHTING IS TO TAKE PLACE IS SO DIFFICULT FOR ORDINARY TROOPS, REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE JAPANESE HAVE 1ØØ PLANES OF THE BOMBING TYPE READY. MEMBERS OF THE JAPANESE LEGATION HERE SUBSTANTIATE RUMORS OF AN EARLY ATTACK. THEY HAVE TOLD AMERICAN REPORTERS THAT 27 FEBRUARY IS THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DRIVE. JAPANESE NEWS REPORTERS HERE SEEM TO THINK THAT THE CITY'S LIGHT AND POWER SYSTEM MAY GO DEAD AND THE TELEGRAPH SYSTEM ALSO. THEY INTEND TO COME INTO THE LEGATION QUARTER AND SEND OUT THEIR NEWS REPORTS BY RADIO. APPARENTLY THE JAPANESE DO NOT WANT TO ADVANCE INSIDE THE WALL IF THEY CAN HELP IT BUT IF THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHENGTEH FU IS STOPPED THEY MAY FEEL THAT THEY MUST OCCUPY SOME OF THIS TERRITORY. A REPORT HAS BEEN CIRCULATED THAT THE CHING HO AIRPORT AT PEIPING AND THE AIRPORT AT NANYUAN ARE TO BE BOMBED AND PEIPING RECONNOITERED FROM THE AIR. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE PLANES FOR THIS WORK ARE TO COME FROM THE LANDING FIELD AT CHINCHOW AND WOULD BASE ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT TAKU. THE REASON BACK OF THIS BOMBING ATTACK IS SAID TO BE A DESIRE TO FRIGHTEN THE POPULACE AND MAKE CHANG HSUEH-LIANG SO UNPOPULAR THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD ASK HIM TO RESIGN. THE PLAN IS SAID NOT TO INCLUDE BOMBING OF CITIES UNLESS CHINESE TROOPS FIRE ON THE PLANES. 1455,

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FEB 24 1933
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By ..., NARS Date 3/9/73

793.94/5967

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

RADIOGRAM

JJ

Received at the War Department

February 28, 1933.

793.94

SECRET

From M. A. Tokio

9:35 A. M.

To The Adjutant General

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 28 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 28 1933 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

F/G 793.94/5968

FILED MAR 2 1933

1 W

Number 270. February 28th.
(Do not inform Peking)

In four main columns Japanese are advancing in Jehol, 6th and 8th Divisions 4th Cavalry Brigade and 14th Infantry Brigade in line north to south. Manchukuo forces on right flank east front in reserve. Between Linshi-Chaoyang-Paichuatun (50 kilometers northwest Suichung) advance troops now on line and wide turning movement with Shanhaikwan as pivot expected to be on line Chihfeng-Wukungfu by 2d March.

Bratton.

SECRET

0695

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 3, 1933.

Recd 1:25 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 3 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 3- 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

203, March 3, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 2, 5 p.m. Army spokesman reported occupation of Chihfeng this morning and expressed the opinion that capture of Lingyuan by columns from Chaoyang is imminent. He intimated that drive is generally progressing according to schedule, the advance on Chihfeng having been unexpectedly rapid while that from Suichung being slightly delayed by resistance."

JOHNSON

CIB WP

FILED
MAR 6 1933

F/HS
793.94/5969

0698

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via NR

Dated March 3, 1933.

Recd 1:25 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 3- 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

204, March 3, 11 a.m.

Japanese claim to have occupied Chihfeng where Chinese troops under General Sun Tien Ying are refusing to fight. Japanese have driven Chinese out of Lingyuan. Loyalty of troops of Tang Yu-Lin is extremely doubtful. One brigade has already gone over to Japanese. This leaves Jehol City defended only by troops of Chang Hsueh-Liang who are preparing rearguard defense to cover general withdrawal. Japanese advancing from Lingyuan down main road through Jehol to Pingchuan against resistance.

Please inform War Department.

CIB WP JOHNSON

F/HS 793.94/5970

FILED
MAR 6 1933

0697

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR - 5 1933
WP DIVISION OF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 4, 1933

Rec'd 12:17 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

208, March 4, 10 a. m.

From Consul General Mukden:

"March 3, 5 p. m. Army spokesman confirmed the occupation of Lingyuan and Chienping yesterday and reported the imminent capture of Linhsi. He also said that small Japanese detachments are continuing their advance along Jehol side of Wall.

Manchukuo Agency reports the capture of Pingchuan at noon today. (END GRAY)

CONFIDENTIAL. According to reliable information army originally planned to reach Jehol on March tenth but owing to unexpectedly rapid progress earlier occupation seems probable".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/HS 793.94/5971

FILED
MAR 7 1933

0698

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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IU

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 5 1933
DIVISION OF

GRAY
FROM Peiping

Dated March 4, 1933

Rec'd 7:25 a. m.

F/HS

793.94/5972

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

212, March 4, 3 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

793.94

From Consul General, Mukden:

"March 4, noon.

Japanese official communique just issued confirms the capture of Pingchuan and states that a motor detachment pursuing the retreating Chinese troops had at 12:30 a. m. today reached a point twelve kilometers from Jehol City."

JOHNSON

HPD

FILED
MAR 7 1933

0699

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

REP

FROM GRAC[illegible]
Peiping via N. R.
Dated March 5, 1933
Rec'd 5:10 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 6 1933
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington.

793.94

213, March 5, 8 a. m.

From Consul General Tientsin, March 4, 3 p.m.

"Today's vernacular newspapers allege that General Yu stated yesterday that Japanese Consul General has lodged three protests as follows:

One. That there should be no troops stationed in Tientsin.

Two. That no fortifications should be erected at Tangku and,

Three. That the Chinese troops stationed at Machuangtze should be evacuated.

A responsible official in General Yu's office today informed me confidentially the three successive protests substantially as above have been lodged with Provincial Chairman. Replies to first two were made saying that protocol would be observed. When third note was received matter was referred to Nanking and no instructions have thus far been received in reply. Troop movements eastward through Tientsin have practically ceased."

JOHNSON

IS

F/HS
793.94/5973

0700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

JS

FROM Plain

PEIPING via Naval Radio

Dated March 5, 1933

Rec'd 5:10 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 6 1933
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.94

214, March 5, 9 a.m.

Chinese authorities announced here last night that Chengteh capital of Jehol province was occupied by Japanese yesterday noon. PEIPING CHRONICLE this morning ascribes raid advance of Japanese to political intrigues rather than military successes and accuses General Tang Yu[illegible]ing of hampering supply service by commandeering motor trucks for removal of his personal property. It also asserts that inhabitants of Jehol were dissatisfied with Tang Yu[illegible]ing's oppressive administration; that many secretly assisted Japanese by acting as guides, cutting Chinese telegraphs and setting fire to villages.

General Ho Yingchin, Minister of War, is expected from Nanking this afternoon to consult with Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang regarding military situation.

JOHNSON

JS

F/HS

793.94/5974

FILED

MAR 7 1933

0701

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IU

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Purpose of #1 sent to ONI + MID in confidence

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

Peiping

Dated March 4, 1933

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 5 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

793.94 note 893.00

211, March 4, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

Following from Nanking

"March 3, 11 a. m.

VERY CONFIDENTIAL. From unofficial but reliable sources I have been informed that the Chinese delegation at Geneva has cabled its resignation on the ground that lack of determined resistance by Chinese troops in Jehol has exposed China to contempt and has betrayed her friends. In meeting of the National Government on March 2, the Minister for Foreign Affairs either tendered his resignation because the military party refused to resist Japan vigorously or threatened to resign unless the Government put up strong resistance. Chiang Kai Shek still lurks in Nanchang although his return to Nanking is looked for daily. Soong and Chiang seem to be in open conflict on the question of resistance. It is said that Soong ordered a large portion of his salt revenue guards to join Jehol army but that after arrival in Peiping these troops were ordered by Chiang personally to return to Haichow. This report has

F/HS
793.94/5975
FILED
MAR 8 - 1933
Confidential File

0702

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

has been received from two independent sources. I understand the Government is attempting to suppress all items given above."

I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the above report which may be taken as evidence confirming rumors which have been brought to me to the effect that underlying all of this there may be an attempt on the part of Soong to take advantage of the popularity of counsels of resistance, for the purpose of eliminating the faction counselling non-resistance and taking over the control of the Government from the leader of these counsels, namely Chiang Kai Shek.

JOHNSON

HPD

0703

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR[illegible] 1933

PARAPHRASE

CONFIDENTIAL

A strictly confidential telegram dated March 4, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads in part as follows:

Under date March 3 the American Consul General at Nanking reported that he has been informed from trustworthy, unofficial sources that the delegation from China at Geneva has wired its resignation for the reason that the lack of determined resistance in Jehol by Chinese soldiers has betrayed China's friends and has exposed her to contempt. The Minister for Foreign Affairs either offered his resignation, at a meeting on March 2 of the National Government, because vigorous resistance to Japan was refused by the military party or threatened, unless strong resistance was put up by the Government, to resign. Although the return of Chiang Kai-shek to Nanking is daily expected, he is still at Nanchang. The question of resistance has apparently brought on an open conflict between Soong and Chiang. A large part of Soong's salt revenue guards were, according to reports, ordered by Soong to join the Jehol army but Chiang ordered the troops to return to Haichow after they had reached Peiping. This statement was received from two independent sources. The American Consul General states that he understands that suppression of all the items listed above is being attempted by the Government.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 6 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

MET GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 6, 1933

Rec'd 1 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94 note 393.11

215, March 6, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 5, 5 p. m. Army spokesman today stated that the occupation of Jehol city practically concludes commenced military operations and that the passes in the Wall are being occupied. He also stated that cleaning up operations will be undertaken immediately.

He reported that foreigners at Lingyuan safe including one unidentified American." The American referred to is presumably Miss Harriet Minns. See 393.11/1629 Legation's 207, March 3, 5 p. m.

CIB-WSB JOHNSON

FILED
MAR 7 1933

F/HS 793.94/5976

0705

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
MAR 6 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 6, 1933

Rec'd 2:45 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
note
393.11

216, March 6, 11 a. m.

5970

My 204, March 3, 11 a. m. and subsequent telegrams.

Japanese forces using motor cars to move troops from point to point occupied Jehol City with two hundred odd men about noon on the fourth. Rapid advance of Japanese aided by lack of cooperation between forces of Tang Yu-Lin and other Chinese forces in Jehol. Chinese population of Jehol hostile to Tang Yu-Lin, aided and welcomed Japanese attack on him. Japanese effort limited to keeping Chinese forces on the move, preventing looting and destruction of life and property which thus far they have succeeded in doing. Forces of Chang Hsueh-Liang now engaged in effort to prevent fleeing and disorganized soldiery from penetrating into Hopei and Chahar. It is anticipated that the countryside hereabouts will become dangerous due to wandering bands of defeated soldiers still armed but in plain clothes. All Americans safe.

JOHNSON

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F/HS

793.94/5977

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MAR 7 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 6 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 6, 1933

Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

793.94

March 6, noon.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 6, 11 a. m. Authoritative information indicates that a Japanese airplane carrier is now standing about 20 miles off shore at Chinwangtao.

According to Japanese information bureau Jehol was taken by a detachment of one hundred and twenty-eight soldiers, Tang Yu-Lin and his troops making a precipitate flight.

No reports have been received indicating that any Japanese troops have come this side the Wall incident to the Jehol compaign.

A Reuter despatch reports that Chahar is threatening to declare its independence and join Manchukuo.

The situation at Tientsin is quiet. Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

CIB

F/HS
793.94/5978
MAR 7 1933
MAR 7 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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cib

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 7, 1933.

Recd 1:05 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

219, March 7, 1 a.m.

793.94

From American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 1, 5 p.m. Army spokesman stated that Chiehlingkou and Lendkou passes have been occupied and that a detachment is rapidly approaching Kupeikou. He also reported several minor engagements between Japanese supporting columns and Chinese units."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/G 793.94/5979
FILED
MAR 8 - 1933

0708

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 8 1933

To the American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period February 24 to March 8, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

793.94/5979

793.94/5979

Enclosure:
Two copies of
digest of tele-
grams.

OK
Mar. 9 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

E.J.C.
FE:EJC:KC
3-7-33

FE
M.M.H.

M M H

0709

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD February 24 to March 8, 1933.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (February 24) that the movement of troop trains eastward through Tientsin is estimated at about six per day; that recently the Chinese have strengthened their positions at and near Tangku (about 30 miles southeast of Tientsin) by machine gun emplacements and freshly constructed trenches; and that conditions along the railway between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan are quiet but there is increasing anxiety among the Chinese.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 24) that according to the official spokesman "Manchukuo" troops are advancing on Kailu; that, due to the depletion of Japanese troops in the railway zone, there is bandit activity; and that a strict censorship of bandit news has been established.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 25) that according to the military spokesman Japanese troops, encountering little resistance, occupied Peipiao and Chaoyang (about 50 miles northwest of Chinchow); that on February 24 combined Japanese-"Manchukuo" forces occupied Kailu (northeastern part of Jehol Province) and are advancing south and west by all roads; that on February 25, General Muto (in command of the Japanese forces in "Manchukuo") issued a statement to the effect that, if General Chang Hsueh-liang attacks the Japanese troops in Jehol, North China

may

0710

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

may become involved. The Consul General adds that the Foreign Minister of "Manchukuo" (Hsieh Chieh-shih) telegraphed a similar warning to Nanking and to General Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 26) that according to the military spokesman Japanese troops were continuing to advance without encountering much resistance.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (February 27) that during the past few days troop movements eastward through Tientsin have slowed up noticeably; that at Tientsin the Japanese are erecting defenses in the form of brick walls, barb wire entanglements and field guns between their concession and the Chinese area and have increased their patrols in the concession; and that the Japanese Consul General is understood to have addressed a note to the Provincial officials asking that effective steps be taken to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects in Tientsin and in Hopei Province.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 27) that according to the Japanese spokesman, the Japanese advance toward the Chinese first line positions is continuing satisfactorily and an attack on the strategically important position at Wukungfu is imminent.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (February 28) that there is no evidence of concentration of Chinese forces in Tientsin nor of an intention on the part of the Chinese military to attack the Japanese concession at Tientsin. The Consul General adds that conditions at Tientsin are quiet.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (February 28)

that

0711

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that according to the army spokesman the Japanese forces, on February 26, captured Hsiawa, a strategic point about midway between Kailu and Chihfeng, and the situation at Shanhaikwan is tenser due to Chinese concentration and provocative acts.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 2) that there is only a Japanese destroyer at Chinwangtao; that according to reliable information there are several Japanese war vessels in the northern part of the Gulf of Chihli; that conditions are quiet at Chinwangtao and Tientsin; and that during the past few days troop movements eastward through Tientsin have almost ceased.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 2) that the army spokesman reports the occupation of Chihfeng on March 2 and intimates that the drive is generally progressing according to schedule.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 3) that the Japanese claim to have occupied Chihfeng where Chinese troops are refusing to fight; that the Japanese have driven the Chinese out of Lingyuan (Kienchang); and that the Japanese are advancing from Lingyuan down the main road towards Chengteh (capital of Jehol Province) against resistance.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 3) that the army spokesman confirmed the occupation, on March 2, of Lingyuan and Chienping and said that small Japanese detachments are continuing their advance along the Jehol side of the Great Wall.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 5) that the Chinese authorities announced the occupation on March 4 by Japanese of Chengteh.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 5) that the

0712

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Japanese army spokesman stated that the occupation of Chengteh by the Japanese practically concludes the military operations which have been begun; that the passes in the Great Wall are being occupied; that clean-up operations will be begun immediately; and that all foreigners at Lingyuan are safe.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 6) that according to authoritative information a Japanese airplane carrier is now about 20 miles offshore at Chinwangtao. The Consul General adds that the situation at Tientsin is quiet.

793.94/5979

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 6?) that according to the army spokesman two passes in the eastern part of the Great Wall have been occupied and a detachment is rapidly approaching Kupeikou, a pass farther west.

EGC:KC M.M.A.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 7, 1933

Rec'd 7:02 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

221, March 7, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94 note 793.00

Following from American Consul General at Tientsin:

"March 6, 5 p. m. My March 4, 3 p. m. Instructions were received from Nanking yesterday and Chinese have replied alleging that Japanese have illegally made use of the special privileges of the protocol and abused its terms by occupying Shanhaikwan by force and stationing great number of troops Tientsin. Chinese claim obliged under this pressure temporarily station troops at Moukaitsang and some other places maintenance peace and order and protection lives and property foreigners and Chinese. Reply also stated this does not violate in the least protocol or the 1902 exchange of notes. Japanese reminded that other nations are signatories and that abuse of privileges by Japan has created existing situation North China for which reason Japan not entitled to demand withdrawal of troops. ~~Control of the~~ Trench digging vicinity Tangku attributed to practice maneuvering in preparation for self-defense which action does not violate spirit of protocol. Reply delivered to Japanese today".

CIB-WSB

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/5980

0714

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 1933
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 7, 1933

Rec'd 6:43 a. m.

2d to Peiping

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1933
Department of State

MAR 7 - 1933

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 7, 4 p. m.

793.94

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 7, 3 p. m. A shipment of 100 Ford truck chassis consigned to American Chinese Company, an American concern at Tientsin, for Chang Hsueh Liang, and shipped from Yokohama on the HARU MARU, held at Dairen because of alleged refusal of crew to bring ship to Tientsin. I presented matter personally to Japanese Consul General this morning who is requesting Dairen to telegraph report on case. Meantime company is telegraphing Tokyo branch of Ford Company to bring matter to attention of Japanese authorities with a view to having shipment proceed on HARU MARU or transshipped to American vessel. Strong presumption that action of crew designed prevent delivery trucks to Chang Hsueh Liang. Said to be no other cargo on the ship. Tokyo representations would seem to offer only hope effective assistance.

Repeated to Department".

RR-WSB

LOCKHART

P.C. 006.711

F/HS 793.94/5981

FILED

FEB 6 1933

0715

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT 1—138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

RECEIVED
1933 MAR - 7 - PM 6:08
Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

March 7, 1933.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

In your discretion

Please forward to Tokyo by telegraph Tientsin's telegram of March 7, 3 p.m. with regard to a shipment of Ford truck chassis, at the same time informing the Ambassador that the Department desires that he, at his discretion, take up the matter informally with the Foreign Office.

Hull

FE:EMS:CLS

M.M.H.
FE

793.94/5981

Mar. 7, 1933 PM

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

0716

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS FEB 16 1933 Department of State

Copies sent to Tokyo, Peiping and Geneva
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED FEB 20 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

NOTED FEB 17 1933 SECRETARY OF STATE

February 15, 1933.

February 21 1933

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, February 15th.

F/HS
793.94/5982

793.94 note 711.94

The Japanese Ambassador said that he had nothing particular to say, that he just wanted to talk over the situation and ask some very indiscreet questions. I told him that I should have to use my own judgment as to whether I should answer his indiscreet questions.

He brought up first the question of the fleet in the Pacific and said that he had nothing further to say on that subject except that he was sorry to see that the fleet was remaining for another year in the Pacific. I reminded him that the Navy Department had said that this was done for purposes of economy, that this was a very real matter. He said that presumably, also, the Navy felt it was just as well to have the fleet in a disturbed area. I told him that the Navy naturally looked at all sides of a question and that if it felt the Pacific was the best place to have the fleet, it would certainly keep it there.

RECEIVED MAR 3 1933

The Ambassador then went on to say that since the

0717

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Shanhaikwan incident the League, particularly Great Britain, had taken a much more definite stand against Japan than it had taken before. I said this was quite true and reminded him that I had told him at the time that this act of Japan would inevitably worry the British, but that it seemed to me that the British attitude at the present time was based on the treaties which Japan had overridden. He said that he thought the small nations in the League were going altogether too far in their condemnation of Japan and that it was really absurd to make any demands now that the Japanese troops be withdrawn to the railway zone. I reminded the Ambassador that it was hardly fair to say that the present attitude of the League was merely the attitude of the small nations inasmuch as Great Britain and the others were presenting a united front.

The conversation then turned to some of the stories which were being published, for example, that Great Britain had offered us the use of the Singapore base. I told the Ambassador that if the Japanese military people ran wild and brought on war, it stood to reason that the British would give all the facilities at

Singapore

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Singapore or any where else to the nations which were on the British side. He also spoke of the foolish story that this country had advanced a large sum of money on the security of the Chinese treasury. I told him that stories of this sort were not any where nearly as mischievous as stories being continually given out by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office for the purpose of raising anti-American feeling in Japan. I cited Shiratori's statement that large numbers of American officers were going to China to train the Chinese to fight against the Japanese, which stories the Ambassador knew were false and particularly his last story that there was a secret understanding and alliance between Russia, China and the United States. The Ambassador said that he thought that Shiratori's outbursts were a great trial to Count Uchida and that he has never been able to understand why Shiratori was allowed to remain in the position he holds.

The Ambassador spoke of the probable advance on Jehol. He tried to defend this on the ground that Jehol had been incorporated into Manchuria by Chang-tso-lin and that the puppet state of Manchukuo (he used the word puppet himself) naturally would include all that had formerly

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formerly been called Manchuria. He said he thought it was probably true that the Japanese military would order Chang Hsueh Liang to remove his troops fromJehol, in order to prevent fighting, that it was a peaceful move. I answered that the world would not consider it as a peaceful move, that if he was quoting history we could come down to very much more recent history by quoting the affirmation of Japan that Manchuria was Chinese territory, that if Manchuria was Chinese territory it was obvious that one part of it was also Chinese territory. The Ambassador admitted that history was a dangerous argument. He said that people took the Jehol situation altogether too seriously, that it was a great plain, very sparsely inhabitated and that the only purpose of taking it over from the Chinese was to prevent the revenue going to Chang Hsueh Liang to support his armies. I told him that if it was, as he said, a sparsely settled country, I saw no reason why Japan should be willing to incur the emnity of the whole world by attacking.

The Ambassador reminded me that I had said I did not see any immediate danger of an attack on Peiping. I told him that that statement

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ment remained true, but that it might not be true in the future if the Japanese were in control of Jehol and, therefore, only a few miles distant from Peiping. The Ambassador said that if he were defining Japanese policy he would make it very clear to the world that the Japanese would never interfere with China, taking the ground that in the north it ended at the Great Wall. I told him that, although that might be his policy, it, nevertheless, remained true that if at some future time the Japanese military got the idea that Chang Hsueh Liang was concentrating too many troops in Peiping they might consider an attack on Peiping necessary for the usual "self-protection." The Ambassador admitted this was a danger. He said, however, he felt it was impossible to turn back the hands of the clock, that the vast population of Manchuria was ignorant and wanted only peace and a chance to work, that Manchuria had great resources, that Manchurian money was already at premium on account of the balance of trade and that if Japan could be let alone he felt that, with Japanese assistance, Manchukuo would become in ten years a model state, prosperous and hard working. He said that people claimed that the Japanese would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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would close the door into Manchuria, that even if there were not cooperation with other nations, it will still be useful to the United States because the raw materials for goods sold by Japan in Manchuria all come from this country. He ended by saying that he hoped ten years from now we could compare notes as to what had happened. I told him that I hoped we could, but that I was afraid he was an optimist.

W. R. CASTLE, JR.

U WRC/AB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 21 1933

No.

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

793.94/5982

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had with the Japanese Ambassador on February 15th regarding the situation in the Far East in general.

Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State:
W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:
Copy of memorandum of conversation of February 15th.

U ~~WG~~/AB FE JSK M.M.H.

A true copy of the signed original

FEB 21, 1933

0723

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 21 1933

CONFIDENTIAL FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

No. 200

793.94/5982

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had with the Japanese Ambassador on February 15th regarding the situation in the Far East in general.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of February 15th.

U FE/AB FE EMD m.m.H.

A true copy of the signed original

CR

Feb. 18 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 21 1933

No. 1005

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had with the Japanese Ambassador on February 15th regarding the situation in the Far East in general.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/5982

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of conversation of February 15th.

U VC/AB FE

A true copy of the signed orig.

Feb. 17 1933

0725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,

February 25, 1933.

No. 823.

Subject: Transmitting Translation of an Editorial Regarding the Conflict Between China and Japan.

DIVISION OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS MAR 11 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
To the States
In U. S. A.

RECEIVED MAR 6 1933

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 7 - 1933 Department of State

F/HS 793.94/5983 FILED MAR 13 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit to the Department
1/ herewith translation of an editorial published in yesterday's edition of the newspaper LA OPINION commenting on recent developments in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Respectfully yours,

H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld.

Enclosure:
One, as stated.

711
HFAS/vmm

0726

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LA OPINION - February 24, 1933.

VIERNES, FEBRERO 24, 1933

EDITORIAL

EL JAPON CONTESTA A LA LIGA CON UNA NUEVA AGRESION

La bella y anchurosa provincia de Jehol amenazada con una inminente ofensiva.

———:o:———

COMENTAMOS en nuestro Editoria del 15 de este mes (segunda parte), el último aspecto de los sucesos del Extremo Oriente, refiriéndonos á la amenaza sobre Jehol. La amenaza ha tomado de entonces acá un peligroso cuerpo, con el ultimatum dirijido por los gobiernos de Manchukúo—hechura del Japón—y por el mismo gobierno de Tokío al gobierno chino de Nankin, para que China retire sus fuerzas de la referida provincia de Jehol.

La distancia a que estamos de los hechos no nos impide de ningún modo darnos cuenta de la grave importancia de estos sucesos. La provincia de Jehol está constituida por un territorio de cerca de 150,000 millas cuadradas, es decir, de una extensión siete veces mayor que el territorio de de la República Dominicana. Pero no es solo su importancia de extensión territorial lo que caracteriza a Jehol, sino su posición con respecto al cuerpo del Estado chino. Situada al oeste de Manchuria, Jehol está al norte de China, metida como una cuña entre China y la parte más oriental de sección asiática de la Unión Soviética. De modo que la presencia de los japoneses en Jehol, constituiría un peligro extremo para China, que tendría al enemigo a un paso de sus centros de vida del norte, al mismo tiempo que para la Union Soviética, que vería amenazados de muerte sus puntos de contacto con China, con la cual sostiene desde hace tiempo un importante intercambio comercial.

En su proceso incesante de retirada ante el implacable empuje japonés, las fuerzas chinas fueron reculando hacia el oeste y después de tener que evacuar toda la Manchuria dejándola á expensas del invasor, se reconcentraron como pudieron en la provincia de Jehol, sin iniciar ningún ataque ni ofensiva, en espera de que el gobierno de Nanking pudiera obtener justicia en sus apelaciones a la Liga de Naciones y al mundo civilizado entero para que las ambiciones japonesas fueran refrenadas.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Empero, el Japón no solo ha desdeñado las advertencias de la Liga para que retire sus fuerzas de Manchuria, sino que ha anunciado ya públicamente al mundo su intención de marchar sobre Jehol, para anexar esta provincia al Estado maniquí de Manchukuo. Ya hemos dicho que el ultimatum ha sido pasado al Gobierno de Nanking. Nanking ha contestado en la única forma en que podía contestar, esto es, manifestando al Japón que, como Jehol es una provincia china, habitada por chinos, no podría evitar que éstos hagan resistencia para defender el territorio nacional. Y esta respuesta no es de ningún modo acomodaticia ó capciosa. Nanking sabe que, aunque diera órdenes terminantes de que las fuerzas chinas evacuaran Jehol, la evacuación no se produciría, pues las fuerzas chinas no obedecerían una órden de esta naturaleza y el gobierno sería despedazado en un momento si se atreviera a ceder a la presión japonesa, dando una orden de esa especie.

La perspectiva es, pues, que la lucha en el Extremo Oriente del norte de Asia ha de reanudarse. Los chinos resistirán con fiereza el avance japonés, como ya supieron hacerlo en Manchuria y en Shanghay. Y es probable no solo que la lucha se ranude, sino que presente cada vez caracteres aun más sangrientos, ya que es ahora China entera la que se prepara para una lucha que podrá fácilmente asumir el caracter de una guerra internacional formalmente establecida, y convencidos los chinos de que no pueden confiar en otra justicia que la que ellos mismos puedan hacerse.

En tanto, el mundo contempla estupefacto el atropello de todos los principios,, la violación de todos los pactos, la resurrección de los antiguos tiempos de conquista, en que el más fuerte empujaba y aplastaba al más débil, sin más razón que la ambición de extensión de dominio. Las grandes potencias, que son las que podrían hacer algo que amedrentara al Japón en su desmesurado empeño de conquista, permanecen con los brazos cruzados. La Liga de Naciones ha actuado, pero hay que reconocer que, si la Liga de Naciones no es respaldada por la fuerza efectiva de las naciones que la forman, élla no es más que una simple oficina. Y qué ha de poder una solitaria oficina contra la pujanza de un imperio de 80 millones de hombres fanatizados por un militarismo de inconmensurables ambiciones!

Pero esta inacción, que es acaso la inacción del egoismo, si sigue permitiendo el despedazamiento de China, habrá de tener las más fatales consecuencia. El poder del Japón se consolidará sobre una base continental. Con los años, quizás hasta la misma capital del imperio japonés será establecida en Manchuria. Japón monopolizará con sus crecientes industrias todo el comercio del Extremo Oriente. Las potencias occidentales serán desplazadas de sus posiciones comerciales y talvez si hasta de las territoriales. Y entonces será el tiempo de pensar en el mal que se hizo cruzando los brazos ante la expansion de los conquistadores nipones, pero ya será tarde.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 823 of February 25, 1933, from American Legation, Santo Domingo.

Translation - HFAS/vmm

From LA OPINION - February 24, 1933.

EDITORIAL.

JAPAN ANSWERS THE LEAGUE BY NEW AGGRESSION.

The Fair and Broad Province of Jehol Threatened by an Imminent Offensive.

In our editorial of the 15th of this month we commented on the latest aspect of the events in the Far East and referred to the threat against Jehol. Since then, the threat has become dangerous with the ultimatum addressed by the Government of Manchukuo - the creature of Japan - and by the Government of Tokyo itself to the Chinese Government at Nanking for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the said province of Jehol.

Our distance from the facts does not prevent us from taking account of the great importance of these events. The province of Jehol consists of a territory of more than 150,000 square miles, that is, an area seven times greater than the territory of the Dominican Republic. But it is not only its importance in territorial area which marks Jehol, but its position with respect to the body of the Chinese State. Situated to the west of Manchuria, Jehol is to the north of China, placed like a wedge between China and the eastern part of the Asiatic section of the Soviet Union. Hence the presence of the Japanese in Jehol would constitute an extreme danger for China which would have the enemy only a step

from

0729

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

from its life centers in the north, while the Soviet Union would see a deadly menace to its points of contact with China with which for a long time it has been maintaining important commercial interchange.

In the process of their retirement before the implacable push of the Japanese, the Chinese forces have retreated to the west and after having to evacuate the whole of Manchuria and leaving it to the invader, they concentrated as best they were able in the province of Jehol, without initiating any attack or offensive, hoping that the Government of Nanking would be able to secure justice in its appeal to the League of Nations and to the entire civilized world so that Japanese ambitions might be restrained.

However, Japan has not only disdained the warning of the League to withdraw her forces from Manchuria but has publicly announced to the world her intention of marching against Jehol to annex this province to the puppet state of Manchukuo. We have said that the ultimatum has been delivered to the Nanking Government. Nanking has answered in the only way it could, that is, by stating to Japan that as Jehol is a Chinese province inhabited by Chinese, it could not prevent the latter from resisting to defend the national territory. This response is by no means merely expedient or captious. Nanking knows that although it might give definite orders to the Chinese forces to evacuate Jehol, evacuation would not take place since the Chinese forces would not

obey

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

obey an order of that kind and the Government would be destroyed at once if it should dare to yield to Japanese pressure by giving an order of that kind.

The prospect is, therefore, that the struggle in the Far East in the north of Asia will be renewed. The Chinese will resist fiercely the Japanese advance as they previously did in Manchuria and in Shanghai. And it is probable not only that the struggle will be renewed but that it will become ever more bloody since the whole of China is now prepared for a struggle which may easily become a formally established international war, as the Chinese are convinced that they can trust in no other justice than that which they can make for themselves.

Meanwhile, the world contemplates with stupefaction the insult against all its principles, the violation of all pacts, the resurrection of the ancient times of conquest when the stronger attacked and crushed the weaker with no reason except the ambition to extend his domains. The great powers are those who should do something to check Japan in its unmeasurable scheme of conquest, but they remain with their arms folded. The League of Nations has acted but it must be recognized that if the Leagueof Nations is not supported by the effective strength of the nations that compose it, it is no more than a mere office. And what can a mere office do against the energy of an empire of 80,000,000 people made fanatic by a militarism of unmeasurable ambition!

But this inaction which is perhaps the inaction of selfishness, if it continues to permit the disintegration

of

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of China, must have the most fatal consequences. The power of Japan will be consolidated on a continental basis. With the years perhaps the very capital of the Japanese Empire will be established in Manchuria. Japan will monopolize with its growing industries all the trade of the Far East. The western powers will be displaced from their commercial positions and even perhaps from their territorial positions. And then will be the time to think of the evil which was done by folding arms in the presence of the expansion of the Japanese conquerors, but it will be too late.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 9, 1933.

~~JEJr.~~
~~SJE~~ p.p. enclosure
MMH:

Geneva's despatch No. 521 Political of February 21, 1933, encloses a copy of a communiqué of February 20 of the Japanese delegation at Geneva with regard to conditions in Jehol, activities of "volunteer" troops, and the reason why military action by the Japanese might become necessary. A map giving distribution of Chinese troops is attached.

JES:CLS

0733

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 521 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, February 21, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION
MAR 7 1932
1 COPY RETAINED

MAR 6 33

793.94

SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict Situation in Jehol.

1—1055 GPO

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1933
Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest copies of a communiqué respecting the situation in Jehol which has just been issued by the Japanese Delegation in

2/ Geneva together with a map designed to accompany this communiqué illustrative of the military positions in Jehol with particular reference to Chinese troops.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

No. 1 - Communiqué from Japanese Delegation (in triplicate)
No. 2 - Map showing situation of Chinese troops in Jehol (in triplicate)

Original and five copies to Department of State
One copy to American Legation, Bern, Switzerland

PBG/IS

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793.94/5984
FILED
MAR 13 1933

0734

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 521 Pol. of
Feb. 21, 1933

Japanese Delegation,

Bureau of
Information.

The following is an interpretation of a communication sent to-day by the Japanese Delegation to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations with a request that it be circulated to the members of the Council and the Assembly.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 2 th, 1933.

In view of the attention given by the public to the situation in Jehol, especially since the recent incident of Shanhaikwan, coupled with references to Japanese military concentrations said to be aimed at the "invasion" of that Province - a rumour which is being ceaselessly exploited by the Chinese - attention is called to the following points:

1. The Province of Jehol, formerly known as eastern Inner Mongolia, and one of the "Four Eastern Provinces", is a part of Manchoukuo since the foundation of that State. Tang Yu-lin was named in 1926 Governor-General of the "Special District" of Jehol by Chang Tso-lin. He was confirmed in that position when the "special district" was included among the four North-Eastern Provinces. Jehol proclaimed its independence on September 29, 1931 and Tang Yu-lin was made a member of the Administrative Committee of the North-East that was founded in February 1932. He later signed the proclamation of the new State on March 1, 1932, and was named vice-president of the Privy Council on March 9. In this connection, when the League Commission of Enquiry asked for a definition of the frontier between Manchoukuo and North China, the Manchoukuo Government, through the Japanese Assessor, informed the Commissioners that the Great Wall of China constituted that boundary. This wall, as it is well known, was built by the Hans to indicate the borders of China Proper and to protect it against the incursions of the Northern tribes.

2. However, Chang Hsueh-liang, taking advantage of the preoccupation of Manchoukuo and Japanese troops in combatting

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

bandits and other disorderly elements in Northern Manchuria, proceeded to create disorders in Jehol so as to assert his influence there. By means of military and financial pressure he managed to force Tang Yu-lin to his side. In fact, the frontier of Jehol is only about 70 miles distant from Peiping, and the city of Jehol itself is only 110 miles away. Access to the Province is easy, especially through a motor road linking both cities, which enabled Chang Hsueh-liang to bring his troops to Jehol with rapidity. Furthermore, the principal source of revenue in Jehol is opium; since most of this was marketed through Peking, this was another efficient means of pressure.

Chang Hsueh-liang has organized "volunteer armies" with groups from his dispersed forces and with men recruited in Northern China, as well as bandits. Following the adoption of a policy of "positive military action" by the Third General Congress of the Nationalist Party in December last year, fresh troops were concentrated in Jehol. One of the aims of this policy was to lead the Japanese, by means of "positive action" taken by Chinese troops, to undertake new military measures, thus bringing about a conflict which, the Chinese hoped, would create an unfavourable opinion of Japan, especially within the League of Nations. Although unwilling to endanger his own forces, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is compelled, because of financial and political reasons, to follow the directions of the Nanking Government, which, in turn, enjoys all the advantages of not exposing its own troops even though it were able to direct them to the North.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3. For nearly two months, troops have been continuously concentrated in the region near the frontier south of the Great Wall. There are nearly 79,600 men, this number comprising Chang Hsueh-liang's troops as well as those of Generals Shang Chen, Sung Che-yuan, Pang Ping-hun and Kao Kueitsu.

Fresh regular units of Chang Hsueh-liang's army, as well as 20,000 men under Sun Tien-yin, all now massed in the very interior of Jehol where Chang Hsueh-liang now has seven brigades. In addition to this, 60,000 irregulars from volunteer armies and the 160,000 men of Tang Yu-lin's army bring to a total of 144,000 men the troops opposed to Mandchoukouo.

On February 18, it was learned that Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang had been named commanders respectively of the first and second army corps operating in Jehol and that they had crossed the Wall.

Finally, 100,000 men of Chang Hsueh-liang's reserve troops have been concentrated in the Peiping and Tientsin region.

4. The presence in Jehol of hostile troops constitutes one of the most serious dangers to Manchoukuo because the reason for this occupation is not limited to the occupation of the Province alone, but is a part of a policy aimed at "the restoration of lost territories". Forces in Jehol can threaten the whole central region of Manchoukuo. It is evident that Manchoukuo cannot remain indifferent in the face of such a situation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It should be noted that Chang Hsueh-liang and the Nanking Government have chosen to order the crossing of the Great Wall by an imposing number of their troops at a moment where the League of Nations is seeking a basis for conciliation. The Chinese are fully aware of the dangers such an action would entail since the attitude of Manchoukuo and Japan has already been clearly defined. In fact, when Japanese detachments proceeded to Chao Yan-su and Nanling to search for a Japanese named Ishimoto who had been captured by bandits, the Japanese Government had replied to a protest from the Nanking Government pointing out that the Japanese troops were only engaged in police measures on Manchoukuo territory, and, therefore their activities could not be held as sufficient cause for a protest from the Nationalist Government. Lately the attention of Chang-Hsueh-liang has been called on several occasions by Japanese representatives on the grave consequences that the introduction to Jehol of hostile troops might entail, but no attention seems to have been gievn to these warnings.

5. The operations that would be rendered necessary by the attitude taken by Chang Hsueh-liang do not differ from those that have taken place up to now in Northern Manchuria for the restoration of peace and order in that region. These steps have not met with any serious objection from China or the League of Nations. Manchoukuo continues this task of bringing about peace and order within her territories and nothing can be brought up to oppose this legitimate exercise of her

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rights. As to the action of the Japanese forces, it is regulated by the protocol signed between Japan and Manchoukuo on September 15, 1932, whereby Japan is pledged to aid Manchoukuo in the maintenance of internal order and against all external danger. Even in the case of joint operations, the Japanese forces will not advance south of the Great Wall into the Peking and Tientsin district, unless Chinese troop movements force the Japanese to do so from a strategic point of view. This possible action in Jehol would not be an intervention on Chinese soil, nor a Japanese action against China, but simply action in defence of Manchoukuo territory in co-operation with the forces of that State.


0740

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2
with No 521 Pol. of
Feb. 21, 1933.

Situation des troupes chinoises
dans la Province de Jéhol et des environs
(février 1933)

Troupes irrégulières dans la province d'Jéhol	60.500
Troupes régulières dans la province de Jéhol	83.600
Troupes régulières dans la région du sud de la Grande Muraille	79.600
Troupes régulières dans la région de Peiping et Tientsin	90.300
Autres troupes chinoises disposées de se rendre dans la région de Peiping et Tientsin	164.000



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

0741

0742

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

EXD
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 24 1933
Department of State

793.94

TELEGRAM FROM WAICHIAOPU
February 23, 1933

No. 121 PUBLICITY 112

UYEMURA SECRETARY JAPANESE LEGATION HANDED DR. LO FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FIVE P.M. TODAY (QUOTE) ONE THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS UNDER CHANG HSUEH-LIANG AND OTHER ANTI-MANCHUKUO FORCES IS INCOMPATIBLE NOT ONLY WITH SOVEREIGNTY OF MANCHUKUO BUT ALSO WITH RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER IN JEHOL (STOP) THE MANCHUKUO ARMY IS NOW PUTTING INTO EXECUTION ITS PLAN TO EXTERMINATE BANDITS AND REMNANTS OF SOLDIER BANDITS IN PROVINCE JEHOL AND JAPANESE ARMY IS OBLIGATED TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO IT UNDER TERMS OF PROTOCOL CONCLUDED BETWEEN JAPAN AND MANCHUKUO (STOP) MANCHUKUO GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY DEMANDED CHANG HSUEH-LIANG WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS TO REGIONS INSIDE GREAT WALL BUT THESE DEMANDS WERE UNHEEDED (STOP) SHOULD THIS CAMPAIGN IN JEHOL LEAD TO ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN JAPANESE ARMY IN COOPERATION WITH MANCHUKUO ARMY AND CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S TROOPS AND OTHER ANTI-MANCHUKUO FORCES IT WILL BE ENTIRELY DUE TO PRESENCE OF CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S TROOPS IN JEHOL AND RESPONSIBILITY SHALL THEREFORE REST WITH CHINA WHO HAS REJECTED DEMANDS OF MANCHUKUO (PARA)

TWO ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN JEHOL WHOSE AIM IS PURIFICATION OF JEHOL PROVINCE AS STATED ABOVE AND WHO ARE COOPERATION WITH MANCHUKUO FORCES HAVE NO OTHER OBJECTIVE THAN INSURE ORDER AND TRANQUILITY IN THAT PROVINCE (STOP) IN PRINCIPLE THEY WILL REMAIN WITHIN TERRITORY OF MANCHUKUO (STOP) BUT IF CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S TROOPS AND OTHER ANTI-MANCHUKUO FORCES PERSIST IN TAKING POSITIVE ACTION IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GUARANTEE THAT FIGHTING WILL NOT SPREAD TO NORTH CHINA (STOP) IF ANY SITUATION SHOULD ARISE AS A RESULT THEREOF RESPONSIBILITY SHALL REST ENTIRELY WITH CHINA (PARA)

THREE MANCHUKUO HAS ALWAYSACCORDED GENEROUS TREATMENT TO ANTI-MANCHUKUO FORCES WHO SURRENDER THEMSELVES (STOP) SHOULD TANG YU-LIN AND HIS TROOPS AS WELL AS OTHER ANTI-MANCHUKUO FORCES SURRENDER TO MANCHUKUO THEY WILL BE DEALT WITH LENIENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY HITHERTO FOLLOWED (UNQUOTE)

OUR REPLY FOLLOWS

WAICHIAOPU 23RD PUBLICITY 112

793.94/5985

FILED
1933

0743

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1933

Rec'd 7:12 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 8 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 8, 4 p. m.

My March 7, 4 p. m.

793.94

1598

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 8, 3 p. m. My March 7, 3 p. m. My Japanese colleague informed me today that he has received reply from Dairen which stated crew of HARU MARU unwilling proceed to Tientsin and unwilling allow transshipment of chassis. I request information for benefit of American Chinese Company whether Legation or Department has taken up matter with Tokyo. Company desires to emphasize that shipment was from one American concern to another and that property is still American owned. The holding up of the shipment has created widespread comment here,

Repeated to Department".

WSB

LOCKHART

F/HS
793.94/5986

FILED
APR 6 1933

0744

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 8 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1933

Rec'd 11:44 p.m., 7th

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

222, March 8, 10 a. m.

Reuter from Nanking seventh.

Control Yuan has passed bill of impeachment against General Tang Yu Lin, late chairman of Jehol, for his unauthorized surrender of Chengtohfu".

Reuter from Canton seventh.

Southwest Executive Committee of Kuomintang tonight sent to General Chiang Kai Shek message concerning situation in North China. Message is critical and expresses opinion that Generalissimo should have given greater assistance in defense of Jehol. It urges him to proceed to fighting front to direct counter attack and reiterates readiness of Southwest to dispatch picked army to the North. Southwest is also circularizing telegrams throughout country calling upon people unitedly to urged Generalissimo to go to the front".

JS-WSB

JOHNSON

F/HS
793.94/5987

0745

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 8 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1933

Rec'd 5:25 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

224, March 8, 1 p. m.

5981

Department's 77, March 7, 7 p. m., repeated to Tokyo with Tientsin's March 7, 3 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Dairen to the Legation and Tokyo:

"March 7, noon. HARU MARU, chartered by Daido Kaiun Kaisha to deliver 100 Ford trucks and 2 passenger cars to the American Chinese Corporation at Tientsin, was forced to put into Dairen last night because of crew's refusal, in accordance with instructions from the Japanese Seamen's Union, to be party to delivery of cargo destined for the use of Chinese army. Local gendarmes are demanding confiscation but Kwantung Government is understood to be opposed. Pending decision, HARU MARU has not berthed. If trucks are not confiscated, transportation will present serious problem as it seems certain that Japanese vessels will not be permitted to take the trucks to Tientsin and it is possible that ships of other nationality will not be allowed or willing to undertake shipment.

I

FILED
MAR 8 1933

F/HS
793.94/5988

0746

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#224 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 8, 1 p. m.

I have taken no action but the Kwangtung Government has offered to furnish me an explanation of the case tomorrow. Richards, Ford representative in Dairen, is anxious to avoid situation which might affect Ford sales in Manchuria".

Tientsin and Dairen appropriately informed.

RR-.SB

JOHNSON

0747

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5989

SEE 837.911/37 FOR #316

FROM Turkey (Sherrill) DATED Jan.12, 1933
NAME

TO

1-1127 OPO

5989

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese conflict.

Luncheon at which were present three Japanese, four foreign correspondents and five Turkish correspondents, which was evidently for the purpose of permitting the Japanese Military Attache to influence the Turkish press as concerns the -.

Wi

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Istanbul, January 12, 1933.

No. 316

SUBJECT: Turkish Press.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ Enclosed please find clipping from this morning's JOURNAL D'ORIENT telling of a luncheon given yesterday at the Hôtel Tokatlian to all the press which we hear totalled 12. There were three Japanese, four foreign correspondents and five Turkish correspondents. This is the frankest attempt to influence the Turkish press that I have yet observed, for it states that it was for the purpose of permitting the Japanese Military Attaché to discuss not only the military features of Sino-Japanese relations since the Shanghai episode of last year, but also the Lytton report and current military events around

0749

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

around the Great Wall of China. It also notes that there was present Mr. Kanimura, representative of the Rengo Press Agency of Tokio.

Several of the foreign Embassies here have, among their personnel, individuals especially qualified to deal with the Turkish press, and it is believed that considerable sums are expended for them in behalf of their countries' interests here. Of course the French are greatly helped in this regard by the amount of propaganda news they send out through the Havas Agency, and the English by their Reuter Agency. I have already reported that those two agencies send out current news with a decided slant in their own interests. A case in point is that this morning's article in the REPUBLIQUE of Istanbul reports your interview with Mr. Roosevelt on January 10th under the head line "Suivant le TEMPS l'Amérique aurait compris son erreur".

I venture to suggest that consideration be given to the desirability of some definite instructions being given us here looking toward increasing the Embassy's usefulness in interpreting and, therefore defending, American news that reaches here. It is unfortunate that we have no news distribution agency serving Europe with our news, as the Havas and the Reuter do that emanating from France and England. Perhaps our Government has some such project in contemplation.

Respectfully yours,

COPY SENT E. I. C. PARIS

Charles H. Sherrill.

Enclosure:
1. Clipping from LE JOURNAL D'ORIENT, Istanbul, January 12, 1933.

851
CHS:er

0750

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 316

of January 12, 1933, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

Clipping from JOURNAL D'ORIENT,
January 12, 1933.

Clipping attached to original despatch only.

0751

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5990

SEE 893.00 P. R. Hankow/68 FOR Despatch # 259.

FROM Hankow (Stanton) DATED January 20, 1933.
TO NAME

1-1127 OPO

5990

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese dispute.
In an editorial on December 20th, the WUHAN JIH PAO declared that, inasmuch as the League of Nations had been unable to enforce justice in the - China would be compelled to find its own way out.

hs

0752

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
693.9412

7. Sino-Japanese Relations:

In an editorial on December 20th, the WUHAN JIH PAO declared that, inasmuch as the League of Nations had been unable to enforce justice in the Sino-Japanese dispute, China would be compelled to find its own way out. It was intimated that the boycott of Japanese goods should be made more stringent, at the same time it was hoped

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00P.R/ Chefoo/70 FOR Despatch # 18 to Legation.

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED January 31,1933
TO NAME

1—1127 o.r.o.

5991

793.94/5991

REGARDING: Manchurian Situation.

Unsettled conditions in Manchuria has caused trade to suffer in port of Chefoo. Grave concern is felt in regard to outcome of -. InEastern Shantung there are only 2 brigades (9000) troops whereas formerly there were between 30,000 and 40,000.

p

0754

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
FEB 23 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

THE UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 21 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 21 1933
Department of State

FROM NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING

TO : DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

INFO: CINC ASIATIC

[illegible] IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THE JAPANESE WILL START A LARGE OFFENSIVE IN JEHOL CONSISTING OF DRIVES FROM TWO DIRECTIONS VIZ. EAST AND NORTHEAST. THE CHINESE ARE EXPECTED TO RESIST THIS INVASION TO THE UTMOST WITH REGULAR AND VOLUNTEER TROOPS. IF THE CHINESE RESISTANCE IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE JAPANESE ANTICIPATE THE JAPANESE WILL MOST PROBABLY START AN OFFENSIVE FROM TAKU TOWING TO OUTFLANK THE CHINESE TROOPS IN JEHOL. IF SUCH AN OFFENSIVE IS STARTED THE PEIPING-TIENTSIN AREA WILL BE INVOLVED; HOWEVER THE JAPANESE ARE EXPECTING QUICK REALIZATION OF THEIR PLANS AND DO NOT EXPECT TO BE FORCED TO CONDUCT ANY OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE GREAT WALL IN[illegible]

RECEIVED IN THE CODE ROOM
AT [illegible] FEB 1933

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION....16(2); 19....(c); [illegible]; WA....; O....; WA....; 11....; 12....; 38....; ADMIRAL UPHAM....; 19....; 25....; DALY....; FILE....

793.94

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By [illegible] NARS Date 3/9/73

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
MAR 7 1933

F/HS

793.94/5992

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 2 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 2 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 2 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

793.94

From Chinese Legation
Feb. 25, 1933

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 25 1933
Department of State

A COPY OF A CABLEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NANKING, DATED FEBRUARY 23, 1933

The following is the reply to the Japanese memorandum already despatched to the Japanese Legation:

"(1) Since September 18, 1931, Japan has effected the military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces and has established therein a puppet regime. Japan is now again concentrating large forces and attacking Jehol which, like the Three Eastern Provinces, is an integral part of China's territory. The Chinese Government, in despatching troops to Jehol for the defence against external military aggression, is exercising its inherent sovereign right. That the Japanese Government should demand the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Jehol is manifestly to extend the sphere of such aggression and to further violate the territorial sovereignty of China. The Japanese Government should therefore be absolutely responsible for the invasion of Jehol. As for the puppet regime in the Three Eastern Provinces, it is a Japanese creation pure and simple--a fact which is known to the whole world. For all its illegal activities, Japan should all the more bear the entire responsibility. Against the puppet regime in the Three Eastern Provinces and the so-called Japan-Manchukuo protocol, the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged strong protests with the Japanese Government, declaring that the Chinese Government could never give them recognition. It is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on this subject.

"(2) That Japan should bear the full responsibility for the attack on Jehol has already been stated. The fact that Japan is not only bent upon attacking and seizing Jehol but also declares that her military operations may be extended to North China is sufficient to prove that her long cherished policy of aggression remains unchanged. Chinese troops, in resisting Japanese troops and other forces under Japanese direction or command in Jehol or in taking necessary defensive measures in any other part of Chinese territory, will be acting within their rights. If the Japanese military operations should spread to North China, Chinese troops will naturally exercise their right of self-defence in protection of Chinese territory. Full responsibility for any situation which may be thus brought about should be borne by Japan.

"(3) General Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of Jehol Province, is the high Provincial authority of the Chinese Government. Being in command of Chinese military forces in Jehol, he has the duty to defend that Province. The statement made by the Japanese Government concerning the Chairman of Jehol Province must be regarded as a deliberate affront. The Chinese Government hereby lodges its protest."

Chinese Legation, Washington
February 24, 1933

MAR 9 1933

793.94/5993

0756

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5994

SEE 811.113/237 FOR memo.

FROM State Department (Stimson.) DATED Feb. 27, 1933.
TO Secretary's Office. NAME

1-1127 ore

S792

REGARDING: Embargo on arms to the Far East; Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson reminded the Belgian Ambassador that forty-two nations in the Assembly had delivered a moral judgment on the situation in the Far East, the most dramatic and formal which had been delivered in human history. It is perhaps more effective to be deliberate, rather than to immediately try to couple it with an action as to arms which at best would be reather ineffective so far as Japan was concerned, because Japan was not dependent to any large extent on the importation of arms, being a large manufacturer herself.

th

0757

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/5995

SEE 856.20/11 FOR Tel. 5pm

5995

FROM Batavia (Patton) DATED March 1, 1933
TO NAME

REGARDING: Manchurian situation. Netherlands Indies Government perturbed by,- has cancelled leave of naval and military reserve corps, called some naval reserves to replace mutineers and has forbidden by decree publication army and navy movements. Troops being rushed on commandered vessels to Tarakan oil area in North Borneo. Army air service being concentrated at Surabaya and all available wa vessel proceeding to Tarakan under forced draft.

fp

793.94

0758

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE

cib

GRAY

Batavia

Dated March 1, 19 43.

Recd 6:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

March 1, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Netherlands Indies Government perturbed by Manchurian situation has canceled leave of naval and military reserve corps, called some naval reserves to replace mutineers and has forbidden by decree publication army and navy movements. Troops being rushed on commandered vessels to Tarakan oil area in North Bornao. Standard Oil Company has received from army and navy tremendous orders for lubricating oil and from Philippine Islands rush orders for same.

Fox reports that army air service being concentrated at Surabaya and all available war vessels proceeding to Tarakan under forced draft.

PATTON

JS CIB

0759

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAR 6 - 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 2 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 1- 1933
Department of State

793.94

U
~~S~~
~~FE~~
STATE

F/HS 793.94/5996

EAST

0760

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SHEET NR 2 NPG 11

ADVANCE ALONG GREAT WALL AND THAT PASSES ALONG WALL
PURPOSELY LEFT OPEN FOR CHINESE RETREAT ALTHOUGH NO ACTIVITY YET
REPORTED SOUTH OF WALL ONE REPORT STATES JAPANESE TROOPS MAY
TAKE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES INSIDE WALL NUMEROUS INSTANTANCE OF
CHINESE PROVOCATION ARE CITIED GIVING JUSTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE
DRIVE INSIDE WALL 1420

13 ACTION

00 00A 01 05 10A 11 19
20 16(2) 38 ADMIRAL UPHAM
ONI PRESS

2145 PD 1 MAR

0761

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECRET

DEPT. OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 2 - 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

RECEIVED at the War Department.

March 2, 1933.

9:30 A. M.

From M. A. Tokio

To The Adjutant General.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 2 - 1933 Department of State

Copies
furnished as noted:
James F. McKinley,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

Number 271. March 2d.

March 1st front line Jehol: Linhsi-Chihfeng-Lingyuan-Wukungfu.

793.74

Bratton.

G-2 X
TAG V

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 9, 1978
By ____, NARS Date 3/9/73

FILED MAR 2 - 1933

SECRET

F/HS 793.94/5997

0762

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Code Cable

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 - 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

JJ

Received at the War Department

March 2, 1933.

9:30 A. M.

SECRET

From: M. A. Peiping

To: The Adjutant General.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 3 - 1933
Department of State

3.94

Jehol Province Chinese plan of defense March 1st main line resistance just east of following line postal map Yaochukow on Great Wall Yaokow Lingnan Linguan or Kiechan Chihfeng young Marshal responsible for south front to include Linguan where believed by Chinese main attack of Japanese will be made; north to Tangulin reserve brigade formally at Pinchwan and Hsifengkou are advancing towards main line resistance general reserves 3 brigades being kept area Tachangtz to be used against flank of enemy penetrating Linguan sector or oppose advance enemy south of wall 2 infantry divisions 1 cavalry division additional force near Chihfeng in reserve to stop advance Japanese Kailu Chihfeng and to assist flank attack against enemy breaking through Linguan sector. Abandonment northeast Jehol general reserves in vicinity Jehol City necessary account supply service and transportation.

Drysdale.

F/HS
793.94/5998
FILED
MAR 7 - 1933

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By NARS Date 3/9/73

SECRET

0763

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECRET

CODE CABLEGRAM

March 5, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 - 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 6 - 1933
Department of State

11:00 A. M.

From Tokio,

To The Adjutant General.

Number 272. March 5th.

793.94

All along the line of advance the Chinese forces have been defeated and Jehol City was entered by advance guard of 16th Brigade morning of March 4th.

Bratton.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By ____, NARS Date 3/9/73

F/HS
793.94/5999
FILED
MAR 7 - 1933

SECRET

0764

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6000

SEE 894.113/53 FOR Tel.#55-2 pm.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Mar.6,1933
~~TO~~ NAME

1-1127 OPO

6000

REGARDING: Arms Embargo to Japan: British Ambassador states there is a movement to force British Government to restrict arms embargo to Japan. He has warned his Government of the danger of such a step, which might cause Japan to blockade Chinese ports, leading to grave results.

fpg

0765

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C-1)

TOKYO

Dated March 6, 1933

Rec'd 2:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

note 793.94

55, March 6, 2 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. The British Ambassador tells me that he believes there is a movement in his own country to force the British Government to restrict the arms embargo to apply to Japan exclusively, and that he has emphatically warned his Government of the danger of such a step which would very likely cause Japan to blockade Chinese ports resulting in the grave risk of a general war. I share his views in this respect. Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WSB

894.113

1-5-3

0766

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6001

SEE 893.20/412 FOR Tel.#-6pm.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Mar.6,1933
~~--TO---~~ NAME

I-1127 0 P O

REGARDING: National Aviation School at Hangchow is reported as being evacuated, probably to Pengpuanhui, including personnel and movable equipment. It is reported that an aircraft carrier is off Hangchow Bay.

fpg

0767

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Shanghai

Dated March 6, 1933

Rec'd 6:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 6, 6 p. m.

Reliable information indicates that the personnel and movable equipment of the National Aviation School at Hangchow is being evacuated commencing morning of March 6th probably to Pengpuanhui. Rumors are that an aircraft carrier is reported to be off Hangchow Bay.

Repeated to the Legation.

CUNNINGHAM

CIB

893.20/1412

Note 793.94

0768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 8 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 8, 1933

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 8 - 1933 Department of State

Office of Economic Adviser MAR 9 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 8, 5 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 8, 4 p. m. On March 6, fourth battery, seventeenth regiment, eighth artillery brigade, arrived Yangliutsing, first station south Tientsin, and same day third battery, same regiment, arrived Hsinho, first station this side Tangku. These movements are undoubtedly part defensive measures for Tientsin and are conducive to further allegations concerning possible violations of protocol and exchange of notes July 15, 1902. Conditions remain quiet. Reports from America concerning financial and economic conditions overshadow war news. American banks are open as usual but exchange transactions greatly restricted.

Repeated to the Department".

KLP-RR

LOCKHART

FILED MAR 10 1933

F/HS

793.94/6002

793.94 Note 811.51 Moratorium

0769

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 7 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED
MAR 1 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

March 1, 1933.

Conversation.

The Chinese Minister, Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, and Mr. Hamilton.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

793.94

Subject: Severance of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Japan.

During the course of a call the Chinese Minister remarked that he had been subjected to a good deal of criticism because he was urging the Chinese Government not to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. He stated that he believed that the soundest course of action for China to pursue was to prolong the controversy, thereby weakening Japan, and that he did not think it advisable for China to do anything that would give Japan an excuse for drastic action which would settle the matter rapidly. He stated that the report which appeared in the newspapers several days ago that China had recalled her Minister from Japan was not true.

F/HS
793.94/6003
FILED
MAR 9 - 1933

MMH/REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 10, 1933.

~~LES~~:
~~JEJ~~:
~~RGM~~:
MMH:

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of February 4, 1933, encloses a copy of a despatch to the Legation regarding Japanese preparations for the occupation of Jehol. In this despatch it is stated that Major General Itagaki, head of the local Japanese military mission, who went to Tientsin early in January, later went to Nanking to confer with Chinese military leaders concerning the peaceful evacuation of Jehol. The mission was reported by Dairen papers to have been successful. The Japanese authorities are said to have been anxious to avoid a difficult campaign in Jehol and operations beyond the Wall. Other comments are no longer of interest in view of the course of events in Jehol since the despatch was written.

WRL
WRL:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
DEPT OF STATE
MAR 6 1933

No. --------

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, Manchuria, February 4, 1933.

MAR 8 33

SUBJECT: Preparations for Occupation of Jehol Province.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

F/HS
793.94/6004

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 719 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated February 3, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FILED
MAR 16 1933

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 719
to the Legation at Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies
Received JM

800
HTW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 719.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 3, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Preparations for Occupation of Jehol Province.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams of January 28, 4 p.m. and February 1, 4 p.m. in regard to the preparations for the occupation of Jehol Province by Manchoukuo and Japanese troops, I have the honor to submit additional information on this subject.

In connection with the information reported in my telegram of January 28 that the Japanese military do not anticipate serious resistance from Chinese regulars in Jehol Province, it has been learned in confidence from the official source referred to in the telegram that Major General Itagaki, the head of the local Japanese military mission, who went to Tientsin early in January (reported in my telegram of January 5, 5 p.m.) subsequently visited Nanking where he conferred with

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese military leaders concerning the peaceful retirement of Chinese troops from that province. It may be interpolated that the MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS reported that Itagaki returned to Dairen by steamer from Tsingtao. According to this source his negotiations were successful and consequently it is expected that the Chinese regulars will retire before the advancing forces of occupation without offering any serious resistance. It is claimed that the high Japanese authorities are anxious to avoid a serious clash, fearing that their troops in the field could not be restrained from pursuing the enemy across the border into China or even as far as Peiping. Although this statement is interesting if true - and the Legation may already be in a position to judge its value - the Japanese are probably equally as anxious to avoid heavy fighting in taking over the province because of the great difficulty of conducting a campaign in this rugged and sparsely populated territory where a determined resistance on the part of the defenders might prove very costly to them.

According to a special report to the OSAKA MAINICHI under date line of Hsinking, January 29, 1933 (published in the issue of February 1), it was decided at a military conference held that day that the Manchoukuo Government will issue a warning to the Chinese forces in Jehol to withdraw in

order

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

order to avoid a clash and that if the warning is not heeded military operations will be started immediately. General Chang Ching-hui, Manchoukuo Minister of War, Major General Itagaki, Major General Tada, the highest military adviser to Manchoukuo, who has just returned from Tokyo and Major General Sasaki "Chief of Staff of a Japanese army corps in Manchuria" attended this conference. Although not mentioned, presumably Japanese Headquarters were well represented. The proposed warning appears to dovetail with the above report of Major General Itagaki's negotiations at Nanking. No news of this conference, the holding of which has been confirmed, has appeared in the local press.

There has been a press ban on news regarding northern Jehol since the end of January and although as far as can be learned from official sources the drive has not yet started, reports or rumors persist that both Manchoukuo and Japanese units have begun to move into Jehol from Tungliao and over the Chinchow-Peipiao Railway. It is possible that local operations as a result of the repeated bombing of Kailu and the loss of one Japanese airplane in that vicinity may have occurred but in the absence of any reliable information to the contrary the official statement that the drive has not started must be accepted. It may be mentioned in this connection that Japanese plans appear to be confined to the occupation of Jehol Province at this time and that

without

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

without serious provocation the Japanese are not likely to extend their operations south of the Wall except possibly in the immediate vicinity of Shanhaikuan.

Commandeering of carts started at Mukden at the beginning of the week and it has been learned that each police section (ch'u) of the district has been ordered to furnish five carts forthwith. It is believed that similar requisitions have been made from other districts. Too, passenger trains on the Fengtien-Shanhaikuan line have been running only as far south as Chinchow (Chinhsien) since yesterday on account of troop movements over the Chinchow-Shanhaikuan section according to a well-informed source. It is reasonable to presume that preparations for the drive into Jehol are practically completed and that the drive will start shortly if it is not already under way.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:MHP

A true copy of the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 9, 1933

Rec'd 12:20 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

226, March 9, 9 a. m.

793.94

Reuter reports from Nanking and Tokyo yesterday that both the Chinese Government and the Manchukuo authorities have issued mandates depriving General Tang Yuling former chairman of Jehol of all his civil and military posts. Nanking has also ordered his arrest and punishment for desertion,

Manchukuo has appointed General Chang Haipeng Governor of Jehol.

JOHNSON

JS WP

FILED
MAR 10 1933

F/HS
793.94/6005

0777

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 9, 1933

Rec'd 1:30 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

227, March 9, noon.

5988

Legation's 224, March 8, 1 p. m.

Tientsin's March 8, 3 p. m., to the Legation and Department has been repeated to American Ambassador at Tokyo.

JOHNSON

JS WP

F/HS 793.94/6006

FILED
APR 8 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Copies sent to ONI + MID in Confidence

WP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Peiping

Dated March 8, 1933

Rec'd 12:23 a. m. 9th.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

225, March 8, 10 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Chiang Kai Shek is expected in Pao-ting-fu whither Chang Hsueh-Liang is expected to go for a conference with him. T. V. Soong is also understood to be expected here in the North to attend conference.

Chinese appear still to hold Kupeikou and Western marches of Jehol where fighting has been going on. Spectacular collapse of Chinese defensive in Jehol is producing feeling of resentment against above-named leaders who are now on the horns of a dilemma. This leadership is, I believe, opposed to any attempt to dislodge Japanese from Jehol but public resentment may make them feel it necessary to take some such action. If they take action against Jehol Japanese will without doubt invade this area. If they do not take some such action popular resentment may succeed in disrupting Government.

JOHNSON

JS

FILED
JUN 2 4 1933

793.94 note
793.00

F/HS 793.94/6007

0779

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 10 1933

A telegram dated March 8, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The arrival of Chiang Kai-shek in Pao-ting-fu is looked for and it is expected that Chang Hsueh-liang will go there to confer with Chiang. It is also understood that T. V. Soong is expected to attend the conference in the North.

The Chinese are apparently holding Western marches of Jehol and Kupeikou where there has been fighting. The leaders named above are now in a dilemma due to a feeling of resentment against them produced by the failure of the defense of the Chinese in Jehol. The Minister states that it is his belief that this leadership is not in favor of any attempt to drive the Japanese from Jehol but they may feel it necessary to act, due to the public resentment. This area will without doubt be invaded by the Japanese if the Chinese take action against Jehol. Popular resentment may be successful in disrupting the Government if some such action is not taken by it.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated March 9, 1933

Rec'd 7:10 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 9 1933
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 9 - 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

230, March 9, 4 p. m.

793.94

Following from Consul General Nanking:

"March 9, 11 a. m. Lo told me March 8, 11 p. m. that Suma has been urging him as a man of courage to consent to some settlement with Japan. Lo steadily refused on the ground that no settlement could be permanent while Japan held recently occupied territory. Lo said he did not want to follow example of Li Hung Chang who yielded to Japan after Chinese-Japanese war and then treated with Russia with the result there was a Russian-Japanese war. He told Suma the only settlement he would consent to would be one insuring permanently friendly relations between all parties concerned".

RR-WSB

JOHNSON

FILED
MAR 14 1933

F/HS
793.94/6008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 10, 1933

FROM Rec'd 1:15 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 10 1933 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 10 1933 Department of State

793.94 note 893.00

231, March 10, 9 a. m.

Reuter from Nanking ninth:

"While decisions of Chinese Government concerning resignation of Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang have not yet been announced it is generally believed that Chinese officials as well as public circles here strongly condemn lack of preparedness and lack of determination to fight on part of certain militarists in the North. This lack of preparedness thsy believe resulted in loss of Manchuria and in Jehol debacle. Therefore there is general cry for punishment not only of General Tang Yu Lin but of Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang and General Chang Tso Hsiang.

Believed here that not only will Marshal Chang's resignation be accepted by the Government but he is likely to be dismissed. Being highest commanding officer in Manchuria and Jehol Marshal Chang must be held responsible for loss of both places is general opinion in Nanking. Chinese Government spokesman, however, emphasizes that while feeling among leaders here high against failure of certain militarists to put up effective

resistance

F/HS 793.94/6009

0782

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

resistance in Jehol Chinese Government has not yet reached definite decision".

JOHNSON

JS WP

0783

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 10 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 10, 1933

Rec'd 5:10 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 10 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94 note 893.00

233, March 10, 11 a. m.

According to fairly reliable press reports General Chang Kai Shek and Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang met yesterday near Changhsintien just West of Peiping to discuss military situation in the North and Marshal Chang's resignation. Meeting was also attended among others by T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, General Ho Ying Chin, Minister of War and General Wang Shu Chang Commandant of Peiping-Tientsin area. Results of deliberations not yet announced but it is said that Chang Kai Shek has requested Marshal Feng yu Hsiang and Yen Hsi Shan to meet him at Shihchia-khwang.

JOHNSON

JS WP

JUN 24 1933

F/HS 793.94/6010

0784

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 10 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 10, 1933

Rec'd 11:50 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

232, March 10, 10 a. m.

From American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 9, 5 p. m. Army spokesman reported this afternoon that only one ridge of Chinese front line position North of Kupeikou was taken yesterday and that Chinese defenders are still offering stubborn resistance after three days continuous fighting. He intimated that supporting columns have been meeting with increased resistance. He also reported that the Hattori brigade advancing from Pingchuan toward Hsifengkow lost twenty-five killed and thirty-nine wounded.

Tang Yu Lin believed to have fled to Fengning".

RR-HPD JOHNSON

MAR 11 1933
FILED

F/HS 793.94/6011

0785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

m

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN & GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 10, 1933

Rec'd 6:35 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 10 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

793.94

234, March 10, 4 p. m.

Reuter from Tokyo today:

Japanese Legation in Peiping has been instructed to attempt to negotiate withdrawal of Chinese troops now concentrating around Kupilou otherwise Japanese may be compelled to send troops through Shanhaikwan for purpose of taking the pass from the rear.

Failing Japanese Legation's ability to persuade Chinese to withdraw it is authoritatively intimated that Japanese may approach Sir Miles Lampson British Minister to use his good offices for purpose of obviating necessity to extend operation into North China.

Emphasizing Japanese desires to avoid extending operations into North China the Foreign Office spokesman today declared that Chinese knew this and were emboldened by fact that Japanese troops have scrupulously avoided pursuing them beyond Great Wall. He also said Chinese are sending several divisions from South into North China concentrating them at Mikunhsien and other points seemingly in preparation for an attempt to reenter Jehol Province".

F/HS

793.94/6012

0786

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#234 from Peiping via N R,
Mar. 10, 4 p. m.

Province".

(GRAY) Japanese Legation here states it has so far received no instructions in the above sense. (END GRAY).

JOHNSON

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Paraphrase sent to ONI + MID in confidence

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

FROM

MET
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Tokio
Dated March 10, 1933
Rec'd 7:24 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 10 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

57, March 10, 6 p. m.

(GRAY) Press correspondents quote Foreign Office spokesman to the effect that the Japanese Legation has been instructed to approach Chang Hsueh Liang in Peiping to induce him to withdraw his forces from the neighborhood of Kupeikow, or to create a neutral zone south of the Wall failing which the Japanese threaten to move into North China in force. (END GRAY)

CONFIDENTIAL. The military attache informs me that the General Staff state that there is some fighting at Kupeikow, where the Great Wall makes a loop; that the Japanese hold the Wall and that there are Chinese troops inside and outside the pass; that the Japanese have insisted that the Chinese withdraw from this area and that it may be necessary for the Japanese to send a detachment down from the Wall on either side of the Chinese force to compel withdrawal; that the Japanese have no further intentions unless the Chinese at the Wall are supported by new troops.

WWC-KLP

GREW

F/HS
793.94/6013
FILED
MAR 13 1933

0788

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

MAR 11 1933

A telegram dated March 10, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

Press correspondents quote Foreign Office spokesman to the effect that the Japanese Legation has been instructed to approach Chang Hsueh-liang in Peiping to induce him to withdraw his forces from the neighborhood of Kupeikow, or to create a neutral zone south of the Wall failing which the Japanese threaten to move into North China in force.

The American Ambassador has been informed by the American Military Attaché that the General Staff state that some fighting is going on at Kupeikow, where a loop is made by the Great Wall; that Chinese troops are inside and outside the pass and that the Wall is held by the Japanese; that withdrawal of the Chinese from this area is insisted upon by the Japanese and that the Japanese may find it necessary to compel the Chinese to withdraw by sending a detachment from the Wall on either side of the Chinese troops; that unless new troops support the Chinese at the Wall the Japanese have not any further intentions.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must ~~be~~ closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 10, 1933

Received 10:20 AM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 10 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6014

Secretary of State,

Washington.

236 March 10, 7 pm.

CONFIDENTIAL. (Gray) Legation's 234 March 10, 4 pm. (End Gray) Sir Miles has just informed me that as far as he is concerned there is no truth whatever in the report from Tokyo and he is very much annoyed that his name should have been mentioned.

JOHNSON

WWC CSB

Intimation to use good offices of Sir Miles Lampson.

FILED
MAR 11 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 11, 1933.

MMH:

Warrington Dawson's special report No. 1187 of February 20, 1933, gives a résumé of a series of articles by Francois Coty, Editor-in-Chief of FIGARO, which appeared during February. Coty comments on the dangers to French Indo-China of Chinese nationalism. He states that if Mr. Roosevelt maintains the neutrality of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict, "Manchukuo" will succeed in taking northern sections of China proper as far south as the Yangtze.

FSI

IES:CLS

0791

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 20, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94

F/HS

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1187)

AM REGD
DEPT. OF STATE
MAR 9 33
DIV. COM. & REC

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

793.94/6015

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1187, dated February 20, 1933.

FILED
MAR 16 1933

WD/DG

WD.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 20, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1187

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation

François Coty, Editor-in-Chief of FIGARO, wrote in the issues of February 9th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 18th, and 20th of this paper a series of articles entitled "The Evolution of the Asiatic Crisis" calling attention to the fact that the recent repetition of Japanese canon fire may be taken as a warning that the Japanese will not tolerate any infringement upon their interests in Manchuria.

Coty traces historical developments in the Far East which have led to conditions existing there today. He recalls that the present conflict, that of the Chinese making war upon the Japanese in Manchuria, who according to treaties have a right to be there, is very much the same as that experienced by the French in Indochina when they had to fight off the "pirates"

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and those Chinese forces which were responsible for their existence. The greatest mistake of the French, he says, was the systematic ruination of the Manchurian dynasty, whose interests were the same as those of the French, and favoring Chinese Nationalism, their worst enemy. This Chinese Nationalism has never left Indochina and in order to maintain any semblance of security in this country the French must see to it that their political policy in regard to China is in perfect harmony with their Indochinese interests.

Their error can probably be explained by the fact that the leaders of that period, while thoroughly loyal to France, and wishing to extend her power to her colonies, were also imbued with the principles of the Third Republic. Logically they realized that it behooved them to support the existing dynasty but their Republican ideals made them forget it. Coty remarks that all of France's blunders of the last thirty years, including the overthrow of Austria and the subsequent menacing situation, are the result of this conflict between her imagination and reality.

But Sun Yat Sen, with his European education and attire, impressed French leaders as the liberator of his people. To them he was the "intellectual son of

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

French Revolution." They supported and encouraged him with the result that Bolshevism has become installed in China and is overflowing into Indochina. The overthrow of the Manchurian dynasty brought nothing but difficulty, but, observes Coty, as what had been done could not be undone, France would simply adjust herself to the situation as best she could. If she were to attempt establishing the Emperor of Annam, he would simply be overthrown and the French would be driven from their colony.

Fortunately, writes Coty, all nations do not consider errors irretrievable. Japan, notably, having suffered for the last twenty-five years, as have England and France, from the awakening of Chinese Nationalism, believed that the Chinese Imperial regime should be reestablished in view of the fact that for three centuries it guaranteed peace to the neighboring countries and it was towards this end that Japan's policy was directed.

The collapse of the Imperial regime had resulted in a great deal of confusion in China. The loss of all their traditional decorum was, for the Chinese, something to be regretted. Too, they were falling prey to robbers of all classes from the road builder who demanded enormous sums from the town to the toukioun

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who maintained an elaborate court while commanding an army and ruining provinces. He, Chang Kai Chek, proved to be quite a disappointment when it was found that he was incapable not only of conquering the Bolshevik elements which were devastating the Western provinces, but also of imposing his authority over the Canton Government, also of Bolshevik persuasion. It was evident that he could not become the "Unifier" for which they had hoped and China was falling again into chaos awaiting the triumph of Bolshevism, Zinovief having declared in 1924 that China was to be the pivot of activity for "overthrowing European imperialism and capitalism."

Coty says that it was the advent of an immense national movement in Japan and the subsequent formation of the new Government quite under the influence of the army that were responsible for the answer to anti-Japanese uprisings of the revolutionary Chinese in Shanghai which led to the annihilation of the 19th Chinese Division in the outskirts of Chapei.

He goes on to say that the very small percentage of Japanese in Manchuria made it obvious that Japan's influence there did not tend to change its national character and that the remarkable development of Manchuria under Japan's protection proved that the latter's

interests

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interests were economic rather than political.

Coty recapitulates the events leading to the establishment of the independent Manchurian State, Manchukwo, and of the former emperor, Suan Tong, as its "Regent" remarking that the restoration of the old dynastic title, by which his ancestor had reigned over China for three centuries, had immediate sobering effects not only over those people on Chinese territory but over those in the provinces which belonged to old China by right of conquest.

Remarking on the recent Japanese invasion of the Jehol, Coty says that the Chinese are given the choice of handing over their northern provinces to Manchurian authority or relinquishing Peiping to the Japanese. They have sought intervention from the League of Nations, which has shown no indication of entering into a conflict with Japan. Moscow, on the other hand, has shown distinct concern over the prospect of Peiping falling into the hands of the Manchurian emperor and is doing what it can to prevent it.

Coty goes on to say that if Mr. Roosevelt maintains the neutrality of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict, the Manchurian dynasty will certainly succeed in recovering the northern sections of China probably

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as far South as the Yang Tse Kiang River and establish itself as the defender of order to the general well-being of the Empire.

Coty concludes saying that it is precisely this policy which France should have carried out in China to protect her colony, Indochina.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosures:
Articles from FIGARO of February 9th, 11th, 13th, 16th, 18th and 20th.

In quintuplicate

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. II87 of February 20, I933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February 9, I933

L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

PREMIER ARTICLE

Réflexions au son du canon japonais

Le canon japonais, ébranlant l'Extrême-Orient pour la seconde fois en quelques mois, ramène l'attention mondiale vers cette partie du globe. Dans sa brièveté tragique, l'incident du Chan-Hai-Kouan a revêtu de la part de l'armée japonaise le même caractère de froide énergie que celui de Chapeï, aux portes de Changhaï, qui vit la quasi-destruction de la 19e division chinoise. Par ce second coup de vigueur, l'immense anarchie Céleste et les diverses Chancelleries qui la protègent complaisamment sont averties que le Japon ne tolérera aucune atteinte aux intérêts qu'il possède en Mandchourie.

Laissons la Société des Nations se voiler la face devant ce geste d'un peuple qui ne supporte pas qu'après l'avoir odieusement boycotté au point de vue économique, on assassine par surcroît ses soldats.

La guerre de partisans que la Chine fait en Mandchourie aux Japonais (qui ont, de par les traités, le droit d'y être) rappelle exactement les exploits de la « piraterie » qui sévissait en Indochine au lendemain de notre installation dans cette colonie. Il nous fallut alors faire parler la poudre, non seulement contre les « pirates » qui infestaient le pays, mais contre ceux qui les armaient et les soudoyaient au delà de la frontière. Et ce fut la guerre contre la Chine — rendue plus brève et moins ardue par le fait que la dynastie mandchoue, encore régnante, était médiocrement disposée par ses origines étrangères en faveur du nationalisme chinois.

Elle nous combattit juste autant qu'il le fallait pour « sauver la face » aux yeux de ses sujets xénophobes, mais elle s'inclina rapidement et facilement devant le sort des armes. La fureur de la multitude chinoise, impuissante, devait couver quinze ans, jusqu'à la féroce insurrection des Boxers.

Ceci me ramène à mon étude sur « L'Indochine en péril », publiée il y a dix-huit mois, dans laquelle je mettais en lumière la grande erreur de notre politique asiatique depuis le début du vingtième siècle. Cette erreur a consisté à ruiner systématiquement la dynastie mandchoue, dont les intérêts étaient conciliables avec les nôtres, tandis que nous favorisions son pire ennemi, le nationalisme chinois, qui ne pouvait développer pleinement son action qu'en entrant de nouveau en lutte contre nous.

L'Indochine, disais-je, est une ancienne colonie chinoise, à laquelle le sentiment nationaliste chinois n'a jamais renoncé et ne renoncera jamais. La situation économique des Célestes est encore, à l'heure actuelle, prédominante dans leur ancienne possession et la proximité de leur frontière leur permet mille intrigues. Impossible, par conséquent, d'assurer la sécurité de l'Indochine française si notre politique à l'égard de la Chine n'est pas en parfaite harmonie avec nos intérêts indochinois.

Or un gouvernement, celui des empereurs mandchous, qui ont soumis la Chine il y a près de trois siècles, nous donnait précisément tout repos en ce qui concerne l'Indochine. Il l'avait médiocrement défendue contre notre conquête. Il ne ferait jamais la guerre pour la recouvrer et serait hostile aux agitations nationalistes fomentées contre nous en Chine, parce que les auteurs de ces agitations le considéraient lui aussi comme étranger et conspiraient sa propre ruine.

Le péril ne pouvait venir pour nous que du sentiment nationaliste chinois, que l'évacuation de l'Indochine par la France peut seule nous concilier. Il ne pouvait exister de plus puissant moyen de le combattre qu'un empereur mandchou installé à Pékin et maintenu au pouvoir par notre collaboration discrète.

Nous ajoutions que ces préceptes vitaux de notre politique indochinoise avaient été systématiquement méconnus par nos dirigeants depuis le début du xxe siècle, et qu'on n'avait rien épargné pour rendre la liberté de nous nuire à 400 millions de Célestes haineux et exaspérés. Nous en faisions la preuve en montrant l'appui accordé par la France à Sun Yat Sen et à ses révolutionnaires contre ces pauvres empereurs mandchous, avec lesquels nous étions depuis longtemps parfaitement en repos.

Cette politique — comparable à celle d'un homme qui s'acharnerait à scier la branche sur laquelle il est assis — n'a pourtant rien d'incompréhensible, si l'on tient compte de la dualité de sentiments qui se manifeste dans l'âme de nos gouvernants, surtout depuis une trentaine d'années, et qui se reflète dans les actes des hauts fonctionnaires chargés d'appliquer leurs directives.

Nous l'analyserons pour en comprendre les effets.

FRANÇOIS COTY.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 2 to Special Report N° W.D. II87 of February 2o, I933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February II, I933

L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

DEUXIÈME ARTICLE

Le régime impérial mandchou et les Japonais

ce « fils intellectuel de la Révolution française », et on le soutint, on l'encouragea, jusqu'à ce qu'il eût abattu le Fils du Ciel, mal défendu par son armée de courtisans, de femmes et d'eunuques. Grande victoire de l'esprit moderne, évidemment ! Nous l'avons payée par l'installation en Chine du Bolchévisme, qui déborde maintenant sur notre Indochine et prépare à nos coloniaux de prochains et plus terribles Yen-Baï.

Le Peuple français ne serait pas un des plus intelligents du monde s'il méconnaissait des vérités aussi évidentes que celles rappelées ci-dessus.

Ceux même qui ont cédé à l'entraînement de leurs illusions démocratiques en favorisant l'établissement de la république en Chine sont assez portés à convenir aujourd'hui, après vingt et un ans d'expériences malheureuses, que le renversement de la dynastie mandchoue ne nous a valu que des difficultés — en même temps qu'il en résultait la mort, par le fer ou la faim, de vingt millions de Chinois. Mais ils considèrent que ce qui est fait est fait,

A la chambre de commerce américaine

LES VINS DE FRANCE

Pendant les derniers jours de la sensationnelle mise en vente de parfumerie du *Louvre*, approvisionnez-vous largement : les savons à la violette, très parfumés, sont d'une pâte éminemment pure : leur succès s'affirme depuis cinquante ans. Quant aux Eaux de Cologne, vous en trouverez, à partir de 70°, une gamme incomparable, correspondant exactement à tous vos besoins et aux qualités annoncées. Profitez donc des prix sensationnels consentis actuellement par le *Louvre* sur tous les articles de parfumerie.

Princes de Kessel. Chacun se réjouira de lire ou de relire cette œuvre abondante, grouillante, hallucinante que la Librairie Flammarion met à la portée d'un immense public en la publiant dans «Select-Collection». (2 vol. à 2 fr. chacun.)

M. Lucien Souchon, indisposé, et le général Niessel, occupé ailleurs ce soir-là, avaient tenu à s'excuser, ainsi que M. Xavier de Magallon, ancien député.

M. Bourgeon montra le danger que constitue pour la France l'invasion des étrangers, M. Rabouine déclara notamment : « Nous voulons seulement du travail chez nous et du pain pour nos gosses. »

M. Larbiret dit « l'intérêt qu'il y a pour tout le monde à n'employer que des ouvriers de chez nous ».

Après les discours de MM. Chaudey et Louis Dumat, M. Babu tira les conclusions de cette réunion. Plus de confiance dans les parlementaires. Le président d'honneur de l'A.T.F. demanda à tous les travailleurs de s'organiser et d'imposer eux-mêmes les réformes nécessaires. M. Babu termina en exprimant tout l'espoir qu'il a de voir bientôt la foule des ouvriers se grouper derrière le programme de l'A.T.F.

Tous les orateurs furent très applaudis.

LE COLONEL VUILLEMIN DE L'AERONAUTIQUE DU MAROC EST NOMME GENERAL

Le Journal Officiel vient de publier la nomination au grade de général de brigade du colonel Vuillemin, commandant de l'aéronautique du Maroc.

Aviateur de la première heure, le général Vuillemin, alors capitaine, se signala au début de la guerre par son système de repérage d'artillerie par avions et par ses opérations de bombardement.

Apôtre de l'aviation sportive, il prit part, de 1919 à 1925, à de nombreuses épreuves. Il traversa le Sahara au début de 1920, avec le général Laperrine, atterrit à l'est de Gao et poursuivit son voyage jusqu'à Dakar. En 1928, il vola sans escale de Paris à Bucarest. Blessé dans un accident à Niamey en février 1925, il avait à ce moment-là à son actif 3.000 heures de vol.

Appelé, comme colonel, à la tête des forces aériennes de l'Afrique du Nord, en novembre 1925, il fut élevé à la dignité de grand officier de la Légion d'honneur le 3 juillet 1931. Il commande l'aviation du Maroc depuis le 9 mai 1932.

Légion d'honneur

Ministère de la justice

Est nommé chevalier : M. Maurice Diolot, président de section au tribunal de la Seine.

Ministère des P. T. T.

M. Lefrand, ingénieur électricien, chef des travaux d'électricité industrielle au Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers, est nommé chevalier.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 3 to Special Report N° W.D. II87 of February 20, I933
From American Embassy at Paris
ExtractFrom " FIGARO " of Frbruary I3, I933

L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

TROISIÈME ARTICLE

Touchante histoire d'un petit Empereur

Lorsque nous formulions, en août 1931, le regret que notre politique en Extrême-Orient nous eût amenés à prendre parti contre la dynastie mandchoue — (qui nous avait longtemps procuré, pour les raisons que nous avons dites, une sécurité relative en Indochine) — nous avions tendance à croire ce regret tout platonique. Quelle apparence que, vingt ans après le renversement du dernier empereur de race étrangère, il pût être question de la restauration de son pouvoir, patriotiquement détesté par la presque unanimité des Chinois ?

Sans doute, ces derniers avaient été plongés par la chute du régime impérial dans d'effroyables convulsions intestines, et ils avaient vu disparaître avec lui tout le décor traditionnel dans lequel ils étaient habitués à vivre. Cela leur avait donné beaucoup à réfléchir.

Le pays des mandarins et des lettrés était devenu celui du sabre, et manié par quelles mains !

Au lieu de pouvoir se livrer en paix à l'agriculture et au commerce, leurs deux occupations favorites, les Célestes étaient maintenant la proie de brigands de toute classe, depuis le modeste coupeur de routes qui rançonne un village à la tête de quelques pillards, jusqu'au toukioun (maréchal), entouré d'une cour, qui commande une armée et ruine deux ou trois provinces. Ces successeurs du Fils du Ciel se partageaient son immense empire et en menaient

sympathie non moins bolchévisante, qui obéit au toukioun Chen Chi Tang.

Comme il avait déjà été contraint d'abandonner Pékin et les provinces du Nord à Tchang Soue Liang (fils de feu son vieil ennemi Tchang So Line), Chan Kai Chek ne pouvait être l'Unificateur espéré. La Chine retombait dans le chaos, en attendant le triomphe définitif du Bolchévisme — qui doit faire de ce pays, suivant la parole de Zinovief en 1924, le pivot de l'action « qui abattra l'impérialisme et le capitalisme européens ».

Pendant ce temps, dans une modeste résidence privée de Tien-Tsin, entouré de quelques familiers qui lui étaient restés fidèles, mais en proie à d'incessantes difficultés financières, la pension qui lui avait été allouée par la république chinoise ne lui étant plus payée, l'ancien empereur mandchou, détrôné par la révolution de 1911, vivait à peu près oublié de tous.

A peine avait-il eu notion des splendeurs impériales. Il n'avait pas trois ans, en 1908, quand il fut proclamé empereur sous le nom de Souan Toung après la mort de son oncle Kouang Siou. Il n'en avait pas six, en novembre 1911, quand la république chinoise fut établie. Elle commença par laisser à l'enfant son titre impérial, avec la fonction de célébrer, au nom de la nation, les rites de la religion des ancêtres.

Et cet étrange paradoxe d'une Répu-

A L'INSTITUT

M. Carton de Wiart, l'éminent ministre d'Etat du royaume de Belgique, correspondant de notre Académie des sciences morales et politiques, prenant part à l'enquête ouverte par cette classe de l'Institut sur « la psychologie des peuples », a donné hier à ses confrères lecture d'une étude personnelle sur la « psychologie du peuple belge ».

— Au Grand Palais : Salon d'hiver. — Salon de l'Union des femmes peintres et sculpteurs.

— 15 heures, au Cercle d'Iéna : Réception organisée par le Comité France-Orient, sous la présidence de S. Exc. le ministre d'Albanie à Paris.

Bien n'est moins exact, a-t-il dit d'abord

Signes précurseurs.

M. Daladier s'est montré extrêmement frappé du cycle de catastrophes que constitue, après le *Georges-Philippar*, après l'*Atlantique*, l'explosion survenue à Billancourt.

Ajoutons que l'on pourra déranger l'obligeante machine à toute heure du jour ou de la nuit. Elle répondra toujours, avec une patience et une exactitude mécaniques.

sera le disputeur.

répondra et lui donnera l'heure de l'Observatoire, à une seconde près. Cela départa-

84-00. Aussitôt, une machine parlante lui sage demandera au téléphone Odéon

tuellement d'avance ou de retarder, le

changer. Quand les gens s'accuseront mu-

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February 16, 1933

L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

QUATRIÈME ARTICLE

Le destin romanesque de Pou-Yi

Japon, se déchaînèrent contre les ministres jugés trop pacifistes.

Le général Hondjo, commandant la division d'occupation de Mandchourie, prit sur lui de venger l'assassinat de quelques-uns de ses officiers et soldats en occupant Moukden, dont il chassa aisément Tchang Soue Liang, qui dut se réfugier à Pékin. Le ministre de la guerre, général Mimoto, invité par le reste du ministère à rappeler à l'ordre son subordonné le général Hondjo, s'y refusa et exigea la dissolution du Parlement.

A la fin de 1931, cette dissolution était un fait accompli, et le Japon possédait un nouveau gouvernement, soumis à l'influence de l'armée et pleinement résolu à tous les actes d'énergie.

Il en donna la preuve en ripostant à des violences antijaponaises, qu'avaient commises à Changhai les révolutionnaires chinois, par l'envoi d'un corps expéditionnaire qui anéantit à Chapei, dans la banlieue de cette ville, la 19e division chinoise.

Une ferme attitude à l'égard de la Société des Nations, un énergique avertissement à la Russie soviétique pour le cas où elle serait tentée d'intervenir en Mandchourie, complétèrent ce redressement politique du Japon.

Cependant, à Pékin où il était réfugié, Tchang Soue Liang ne restait pas

D'autre part, M. Henri Garnier, président de l'assemblée des présidents des chambres de commerce, président de la chambre de commerce de Paris, vient d'adresser à M. Caillaux, président de la commission des finances du Sénat, une lettre où il dit notamment :

Vraiment, le redressement technique indispensable a paru trop subordonné à des préoccupations purement politiques ; vraiment, les décisions votées apparaissent comme trop susceptibles de compromettre la défense nationale, la reprise des affaires et la sécurité d'esprit de contribuables injustement frappés.

Sans nous lasser, nous répétons que le salut économique ne peut venir que d'une énergique déflation budgétaire. Suivant votre expression, monsieur le président, « il faut, non seulement arrêter les frais, mais revenir sur les prodigalités consenties ».

A cette heure angoissante, il appartient à la Haute Assemblée de remettre de l'ordre là où il n'y a eu que désordre, d'apporter des solutions de bon sens à la place de décisions puériles dans le trouble des esprits et la confusion des idées.

En dépit des manœuvres de dernière heure de quelques chefs de groupements économiques, un nombre considérable de magasins fermeront cet après-midi pour protester contre les impôts nouveaux votés par une Chambre de démagogues.

Les commerçants du Faubourg Saint-Honoré fermeront leurs magasins aujourd'hui à partir de midi.

De toutes parts, l'ordre est donné : la province répondra, comme Paris, à l'appel qui lui est fait : à Belfort, Chalon-sur-Saône, Langres, Wassy, Saint-Dizier, Remiremont, Poitiers, magasins et casinos seront fermés. Ceux qui ne veulent pas chômer fermeront leurs devantures.

A Arras, à Douai, à Chaumont, à Châtellerault et à Tarbes, la mesure de protestation est renvoyée à vendredi, à cause des marchés. A Cherbourg, il n'y aura pas de mesure collective, mais la plupart des boutiques seront closes néanmoins.

A Marseille, différents groupements affiliés dans l'organisation des états généraux du commerce, qui prépare une démonstration pour dimanche, n'ont donné aucun mot d'ordre.

Par contre, le Syndicat général des petits commerçants, magasiniers et détaillants de Marseille a décidé de demander la fermeture des magasins de midi à 7 heures du soir, et organise un meeting dans l'après-midi. L'appel lancé à tous les adhérents est ainsi libellé :

Commerçants et magasiniers, vous fermerez. Les événement se précipitent et nous devons réagir par tous les moyens. Nous ne pouvons assister impuissants à notre ruine sans protester par notre nombre imposant. Vous démontrerez une fois de plus aux pouvoirs publics votre intention de vous défendre contre l'incohérence administrative de la gestion financière du pays. Vous déclarerez énergiquement que vous en avez assez. »

Dans diverses villes du département et de la région, les organismes locaux, par de vibrants appels, invitent les commerçants, les industriels et tous les magasiniers à participer au mouvement de protestation en fermant leurs bureaux, ateliers et magasins.

Au cours d'une réunion organisée hier soir, au théâtre municipal de Saint-Denis, par le Comité d'entente des anciens combattants, au sujet de la retraite, le colonel de La Rocque a fait approuver par ses camarades présents et la majorité de la salle l'intégralité de l'ordre du jour spécial à l'Association des Croix de Feu et Brisards, qui place en tête de toutes préoccupations l'intérêt général de la nation.

Cet après-midi, fermeture des boutiques

Les Croix de Feu et la retraite des Anciens Combattants

On nous communique :

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 5 to Special Report N° W.D. 1187 of February 20, 1933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February 18, 1933

L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

CINQUIÈME ARTICLE

De Sun Yat Sen au Fils du Ciel

La tentative d'assassinat tramée par le toukioun Chang Soue Liang contre l'ex-empereur mandchou avait échoué dans les conditions que nous avons rapportées. Mais le nouveau gouvernement japonais, résolu à liquider définitivement la question de Mandchourie, jugea insuffisant d'avoir soustrait Pou-Yi à ses assassins.

L'importance que les révolutionnaires chinois attachaient à faire disparaître l'héritier de la dynastie mandchoue soulignait pour le Japon le parti qu'il pouvait tirer du principe incarné dans le réfugié de Daïren.

Le parti était immense : il ne s'agissait de rien de moins que de légitimer le protectorat japonais sur la Mandchourie, d'y agréger, pour commencer, les provinces du nord de la Chine, enfin de concilier à la politique japonaise la sympathie des éléments conservateurs qui subsistent dans les autres régions de l'ancien empire.

La Mandchourie, conquise par le Japon au prix de deux guerres, et par deux fois à demi perdue lors des traités qui suivirent, ne saurait être pour les Japonais une colonie de peuplement : à peine y comptent-ils 200.000 résidants, tous de condition élevée ou moyenne, au milieu d'une population autochtone de cinq millions de Mandchous et de vingt-cinq millions de Chinois émigrés — ces derniers venus chercher à l'ombre du pavillon japonais la sécurité qu'ils n'ont plus dans leur patrie.

Les rudes hivers de Mandchourie interdisent par contre aux paysans nippons, habitués à un climat plus clément, de se fixer sur ce sol riche, mais âpre. D'où cette conséquence que le Japon peut mettre la Mandchourie en valeur et y régner au point de vue économique, mais non y déverser son excès de population et en changer le caractère national. C'est ce qui avait rendu acceptables pour Tokio les traités en vigueur, qui lui assurent un simple protectorat, plutôt économique que politique.

Cette solution fit merveille au temps de feu Tchang So Line, sous lequel la Mandchourie connut un merveilleux développement. Nous avons dit comment son fils et successeur Tchang Soue Liang, par haine du Japon, essaya de faire rentrer son domaine dans l'anarchique giron de la Chine républicaine et comment il fut expulsé de Moukden par le général Hondjo. La nouvelle intrigue de Tchang Soue Liang à Tien-Tsin ayant jeté Pou-Yi dans les bras du Japon, une solution radicale du problème mandchou devenait possible : remplacer le toukioun déchu par l'héritier de l'ancienne dynastie qui avait régné sur la Mandchourie avant de conquérir la Chine.

Le nouveau gouvernement de Tokio, que n'embarrassent point les scrupules démagogiques, ne perdit pas de temps pour procéder à cette substitution.

C'est le 8 novembre 1931 que Pou-Yi, pour échapper aux troubles provoqués à Tien-Tsin contre lui, s'était réfugié à la troisième demande, et fut solennellement installé à Moukden, le 9 mars 1932, comme « Régent de l'Etat mandchou » — titre sous lequel il a été, depuis, officiellement reconnu par le Japon.

Il faut renoncer à employer, pour les choses d'Extrême-Orient, la phraséologie en usage dans la diplomatie internationale. Si le Régent de Mandchourie n'est pour les puissances occidentales qu'une manière de président de la République, il a repris pour l'entourage traditionaliste qu'il s'est composé à Moukden le nom sous lequel on le désigna à Pékin lors de son avènement (Souan Toung) et son titre dynastique (Ta Ching Hoang Ti), qui signifie « Empereur de la dynastie Grande et Pure ».

C'est sous ce titre que ses ancêtres régnèrent sur la Chine pendant trois siècles, et ces syllabes bien connues ont eu, dans l'ancien empire, un prompt retentissement. Tous ceux qui souffrent et meurent de l'anarchie actuelle se sont pris depuis quelques mois, oubliant leur ancien parti pris de race, à espérer la restauration impériale et la fin de l'ère révolutionnaire ouverte par feu Sun Yat Sen.

Ceci est sensible non seulement en terre chinoise, mais jusque dans les provinces qui n'appartenaient à l'ancienne Chine que par droit de conquête. En Mongolie, par exemple — région que la Russie rouge colonise à la faveur de la révolution chinoise et a déjà constituée en république soviétique — les représentants de la noblesse civile et religieuse se sont réunis récemment au temple de Ganjour et ont décidé de se rattacher à l'État Mandchou, demandant en même temps la protection des troupes japonaises.

Comme il n'a jamais existé de liaison ethnique entre Mongols et Mandchous, il est évident que les délibérations du temple de Ganjour ont été influencées par une révolution politique en cours d'accomplissement : la restauration du Fils du Ciel, déjà accomplie à Moukden et en préparation dans le reste de la Chine.

Le gouvernement japonais a fait savoir officiellement qu'il ne resterait pas sourd à l'appel des Mongols.

FRANÇOIS COTY.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Le général Si-Hia, gouverneur de Ghirin, Mandchou de naissance, provoqua la formation dans tous les centres importants de « Comités pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix ». Le 18 février 1932, les délégués de ces comités s'assemblèrent à Moukden et décidèrent qu'un Etat mandchou indépendant (Mandchoukouo) serait proclamé le 1er mars.

La forme républicaine ou monarchique du nouvel Etat n'était pas précisée, mais, quand il fallut en désigner le chef, l'réfugié de Daïren fut choisi à l'unanimité. Le 2[illegible] février, une délégation de l'assemblée de Moukden vint lui offrir le pouvoir, en observant les vieux rites par lesquels l'Empereur était jadis invité à monter sur le trône. Toujours en conformité avec ces rites, Pou-Yi refusa « la charge dont on voulait l'accabler ».

L'Etat mandchou n'en fut pas moins proclamé le 1er mars et les démarches de la délégation furent renouvelées avec plus d'insistances. Pou-Yi accepta le 5,

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 4 to Special Report N° W.D. 1187 of February 20, 1933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February 16, 1933

L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

QUATRIÈME ARTICLE

Le destin romanesque de Pou-Yi

Déjà sous le poignard des Bolchewicks, Souan Toung, le Fils du Ciel, fut sauvé par son précepteur anglais, sir Réginald Johnston, qui l'initiait depuis cinq ans déjà à la culture occidentale.

Sir Reginald réussit à cacher son élève à la Légation du Japon, puis à le faire fuir à Tien-Tsin, où Souan Toung trouva une sécurité relative dans la concession étrangère. Il y vécut plusieurs années (sous le nom de Pou-Yi, qu'il avait porté à sa naissance), des secours que lui faisaient tenir de temps à autre quelques sujets fidèles de la dynastie. Parmi les habitants de Tien-Tsin qui lui rendaient souvent visite, on remarquait un officier nippon, le colonel Dohihara, chef de l'Intelligence service japonais en Chine.

Les instructions du colonel Dohihara relativement à l'ancien empereur mandchou n'allaient pas au delà de la protection à lui accorder, le cas échéant, au même titre qu'à tous les habitants de la concession étrangère de Tien-Tsin. Le destin politique de la Chine semblait alors balancé entre le démocrate Chang Kai Chek, protégé des Etats-Unis, le bolchéviste Feng Yu Siang, homme de confiance de Moscou, et le conservateur Tchang So Line, maître de la Mandchourie et protégé du Japon. Pékin devenait tour à tour la proie de l'un ou de l'autre.

Le jeune Pou-Yi, qui occupait les loisirs de sa précaire retraite à étudier l'histoire de Chine et à apprendre les langues étrangères, était bien éloigné de pouvoir jouer un rôle au milieu de ces puissances en conflit.

Les journalistes d'Occident qui visitaient parfois en lui une épave de l'ancienne Chine signalaient, il est vrai, la réelle intelligence du jeune proscrit, mais s'accordaient à déclarer que son rôle politique était fini sans retour. Ils emportaient sa photographie dédicacée, ponctuaient leurs interviews de quelques considérations sur l'ironie de la destinée humaine, et c'était tout.

Cependant le chaos chinois continuait à dérouler ses péripéties imprévues, mais toujours dramatiques.

Le bolchéviste Feng Yu Siang n'avait pu se maintenir dans Pékin ; il en avait été chassé par Tchang So Line. Celui-ci en fut délogé à son tour par Chang Kai Chek et l'armée démocrate. Pendant que son train spécial ramenait en Mandchourie le toukioun vaincu, il fut mystérieusement assassiné et son fils Tchang Soue Liang lui succéda, au milieu de véhéments soupçons d'avoir ordonné la mort de son père. Les soupçons devinrent une certitude quand on vit Tchang Soue Liang faire massacrer les principaux lieutenants de son père, qu'il avait attirés dans son palais sous couleur de faire avec eux une partie de mah-jong.

Ce parricide et ce guet-apens, dignes de l'Italie de la Renaissance, mettaient Japon, se déchaînèrent contre les ministres jugés trop pacifistes.

Le général Hondjo, commandant la division d'occupation de Mandchourie, prit sur lui de venger l'assassinat de quelques-uns de ses officiers et soldats en occupant Moukden, dont il chassa aisément Tchang Soue Liang, qui dut se réfugier à Pékin. Le ministre de la guerre, général Mimoto, invité par le reste du ministère à rappeler à l'ordre son subordonné le général Hondjo, s'y refusa et exigea la dissolution du Parlement.

A la fin de 1931, cette dissolution était un fait accompli, et le Japon possédait un nouveau gouvernement, soumis à l'influence de l'armée et pleinement résolu à tous les actes d'énergie.

Il en donna la preuve en ripostant à des violences antijaponaises, qu'avaient commises à Changhai les révolutionnaires chinois, par l'envoi d'un corps expéditionnaire qui anéantit à Chapei, dans la banlieue de cette ville, la 19e division chinoise.

Une ferme attitude à l'égard de la Société des Nations, un énergique avertissement à la Russie soviétique pour le cas où elle serait tentée d'intervenir en Mandchourie, complétèrent ce redressement politique du Japon.

Cependant, à Pékin où il était réfugié, Tchang Soue Liang ne restait pas inactif. Jugeant avec clairvoyance la situation des Japonais en Mandchourie, (pays que les traités les autorisent à occuper, mais non à annexer), il prévoyait qu'une solution durable serait cherchée par eux, tôt ou tard, dans la direction du jeune empereur mandchou, toujours enfermé dans sa retraite de Tien-Tsin.

Cette ville étant dans le ressort de l'autorité du toukioun machiavélique, il n'eut pas de peine à y organiser, au début de novembre 1931, des troubles dirigés contre les concessions étrangères et au cours desquels l'infortuné Pou-Yi devait être massacré.

Mais il semble que le destin de Tchang Soue Liang soit de hâter l'heure des événements qu'il prévoit sans pouvoir en changer la nature. Les émeutiers de Tien-Tsin furent repoussés par les garnisons étrangères et particulièrement malmenés par les troupes japonaises. Pou-Yi, un instant en péril, demeura sain et sauf. Et le colonel Dohihara n'eut pas de peine à lui persuader de quitter Tien-Tsin, le 8 novembre 1931. L'ex-empereur trouva un refuge à Dairen (Dalny) sous le pavillon japonais, où il passa trois mois en contact quotidien avec ses sauveurs.

Il ne devait quitter Dairen que pour gravir, contre toute attente de ceux qui avaient vu se dérouler sa douloureuse enfance, les premières marches de son ancien trône.

FRANÇOIS COTY.

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Ce parricide et ce guet-apens, dignes de l'Italie de la Renaissance, mettaient fin au protectorat de fait que le Japon avait pleinement exercé sur la Mandchourie du vivant de feu Tchang So Line.

Les années qui suivirent précisèrent la politique du César Borgia jaune : elle consistait à partager la Chine avec Chang Kai Chek. Ce dernier abandonna, en effet, à Tchang Soue Liang la Mandchourie et les provinces du Nord, y compris Pékin, pour être libre de se retourner contre le gouvernement dissident de Canton, secrètement acquis aux Bolchéviks, et contre les armées rouges chinoises de l'Ouest, dont le pouvoir s'étendait déjà sur des provinces habitées par 80 millions de Chinois.

Spectateur tranquille de cette lutte, qui dure encore, Tchang Soue Liang ne cacha plus son intention de se rendre indépendant et d'éliminer peu à peu le Japon de la Mandchourie.

Tchang Soue Liang ne réussit qu'à provoquer en terre japonaise un immense mouvement national, dont il devait subir le contre-coup. Le gouvernement parlementaire de Tokio, qui avait jusque là fait preuve de la plus grande passivité, fut accusé de vouloir renoncer à un sol pour lequel le Japon a fait deux fois la guerre et consenti d'immenses sacrifices. Les sociétés secrètes nationalistes, très puissantes au

des événements qu'il prévoit sans pouvoir en changer la nature. Les émeutiers de Tien-Tsin furent repoussés par les garnisons étrangères et particulièrement malmenés par les troupes japonaises. Pou-Yi, un instant en péril, demeura sain et sauf. Et le colonel Dohihara n'eut pas de peine à lui persuader de quitter Tien-Tsin, le 8 novembre 1931. L'ex-empereur trouva un refuge à Dairen (Dalny) sous le pavillon japonais, où il passa trois mois en contact quotidien avec ses sauveurs.

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Enclosure N° 6 to Special Report N° W.D. 1187 of February 20, 1933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of February 20, 1933

L'EVOLUTION DE LA CRISE ASIATIQUE

SIXIEME ARTICLE

Ce que nous devions faire, le Japon le fera

Les récents et tragiques événements de Chang-Hai-Kouan se rapportent à cette nouvelle politique du Japon.

Il s'agit, cette fois, de Jehol, province de six millions et demi d'habitants, située entre la Chine proprement dite et la Mandchourie, mais habitée presque exclusivement par des Chinois. C'est là que se sont réfugiées les hordes d'irréguliers formées par Tchang Soue Liang — celles du moins qui n'ont pas été anéanties en Mandchourie.

En bousculant à Chang-Hai-Kouan les troupes de Tchang Soue Liang, en poussant ensuite ses propres régiments vers le Nord, le long de la Grande Muraille, le Japon est en train d'isoler le Jehol et se prépare à prendre comme dans un filet les « pirates » qui occupent cette province. Leur destruction sera l'affaire des semaines qui viennent. Déjà, le gouvernement de Tokio annonce que le Jehol fera retour à l'Etat Mandchou.

Ira-t-il plus avant dans la tâche qui consiste à rassembler les provinces du Nord de la Chine sous le sceptre de son protégé Pou-Yi, redevenu l'empereur Souan Toung ? Pour quelque temps, ce n'est pas probable, car les territoires dont la conquête est amorcée sont immenses, les chemins de fer permettant de s'y aventurer à peu près inexistants et les « pirates » suscités par Tchang Soue Liang pour les défendre au nombre de plus de 100.000.

Du temps passera donc avant que l'armée japonaise ait pacifié le Jehol et délivré la partie habitée de la Mongolie des bolchévistes qui l'occupent. Mais il ne s'agit là que de délais imposés par les difficultés matérielles : la décision du Japon d'aller jusqu'au bout semble irrévocablement prise.

Précisément le général Nakamoura, commandant en chef des forces nippones d'expédition (oncle du capitaine Nakamoura, dont le meurtre par Tchang Soue Liang, en 1931, détermina la rupture avec le toukioun), vient de faire au représentant du *New York Times* une déclaration significative : « Le Japon », a-t-il dit, « n'a pas l'intention d'occuper la « Chine du Nord, *à moins qu'il n'y soit forcé « par des mesures de mobilisation de la « Chine contre l'Etat Mandchou.* Dans ce « cas », ajoute-t-il, « il se verra obligé d'oc- « cuper le chemin de fer de Sui-Yuen à « Pékin ». Mesure qui entraînerait fatalement, on le conçoit, l'occupation de Pékin même et de la province du Pé-Tchi-Li, dont on sait l'importance dans la Chine du Nord.

Voici donc le gouvernement chinois averti : ou bien il laissera docilement rétablir, province après province, le pouvoir de l'Empereur mandchou, ou bien l'armée japonaise prendra immédiatement l'offensive et occupera Pékin.

On conçoit que Tchang Soue Liang, le toukioun parricide, qui voit disparaître feuille à feuille sa part de l'artichaut chinois, fatigue les échos de ses appels à l'aide ! Ceux-ci s'adressent, naturellement, à son confrère Chang Kaï Chek, qui fait à Nankin figure de gouvernement central de la Chine.

Chang Kaï Chek, on le sait, ne manifeste aucun goût pour un conflit ouvert avec le Japon : les rudes leçons que les troupes nippones ont infligées, en diverses circonstances, à ce seul homme de guerre de la Chine, lui ont permis de mesurer l'infériorité de son armée. L'an dernier, quand la 19e division cantonaise défendait avec acharnement le front de Chapeï, il s'abstint de la soutenir. Cette année, adjuré par Tchang Soue Liang de le secourir, il se contente d'implorer l'intervention de la Société des Nations — qui ne montre de son côté aucun empressement à entrer en conflit avec le Japon.

Peut-être Chang Kaï Chek agirait-il avec plus de résolution si les Etats-Unis, dont il est l'homme, se jetaient résolument dans la bagarre. Mais le remplacement prochain de M. Hoover par M. Franklin Roosevelt ne permet de former jusqu'ici aucune prévision sur ce que sera leur attitude. Il s'ensuit que Chang Kaï Chek temporise et abandonne en fait Tchang Soue Liang à son sort.

Le chef du gouvernement de Nankin retire de cette attitude hésitante des avantages temporaires : un rapprochement avec le gouvernement bolchévisant de Canton et un armistice avec les armées rouges de l'Ouest chinois. Moscou a donné le signal de l'un et de l'autre en reprenant à l'improviste les relations diplomatiques avec Nankin, qui étaient rompues depuis l'expulsion de Borodine-Jacob et de Galen-Blücher. Les opérations militaires ont immédiatement cessé sur le front rouge.

Quant au gouvernement bolchévisant de Canton, son chef Ghen Chi Tang a adressé à Chang Kaï Chek un télégramme sensationnel l'invitant à proclamer la mobilisation générale contre le Japon au cas où ce dernier envahirait la province de Jehol.

On conçoit que les partis révolutionnaires, qui mettent depuis plus de vingt ans la Chine en coupe réglée, sentent le sol trembler sous leurs pas maintenant qu'une restauration progressive de la dynastie mandchoue paraît en cours de réalisation.

Barrer la route à tout prix à cette restauration, empêcher le Fils du Ciel de rentrer en souverain dans Pékin, qu'il quitta proscrit et traqué, devient pour Moscou et ses partisans une tâche bien plus urgente que celle de faire échec aux démocrates chinois de Nankin, protégés des Etats-Unis.

Un avenir prochain nous dira si la manœuvre hardie du gouvernement actuel du Japon est destinée à réussir. C'est ce qui paraît devoir se produire si M. Franklin Roosevelt maintient la neutralité des Etats-Unis et écarte ainsi le péril d'une nouvelle guerre entre puissances civilisées.

Dans ce cas, nous verrons sans doute dans quelques années la dynastie mandchoue recouvrer la Chine jusqu'au Hoang-Ho, plus probablement jusqu'au Yang-Tsé-Kiang.

Sous le couvert de l'empereur restauré par lui, qui maintiendra l'ordre parmi au moins 200 millions d'hommes, le Japon se trouvera alors posséder une magnifique sphère d'influence, qui assurera à son industrie et à son commerce un développement sans égal. Il devra ce résultat à sa sage inspiration d'avoir utilisé en Chine ce qui pouvait l'être par une puissance étrangère, c'est-à-dire la dynastie mandchoue, et à son application à se faire le défenseur de l'ordre.

C'est la politique que nous eussions voulu voir suivre en Chine par la France, dans l'intérêt de la sécurité de notre Indochine. Elle aura été finalement adoptée par le Japon, pour le plus grand bien de cet empire.

Ne disions-nous pas il y a trois ans déjà, le 29 janvier 1930, à propos de notre empire africain : « QU'UNE PUISSANCE MIEUX « GOUVERNEE QUE LA NOTRE PROFI- « TERAIT DES DESORDRES CREES PAR « LES AGITATEURS COMMUNISTES » pour se substituer à nous ?

Ce qui est vrai pour l'Afrique l'est aussi pour l'Asie.

François COTY.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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FROM

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Peiping

Dated March 10, 1933

Rec'd 12:20 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

237, March 10, 8 p. m.

Legation's 233, March 10, 11 a. m. United Press correspondent learns from Donald that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang and General Chiang Kai Shek met yesterday briefly at Paotingfu and that Chiang accepted the Young Marshal's resignation. Ho Ying Chin, the Minister of War, with five divisions of Chiang's troops is to take the Young Marshal's place as the representative in North China of the National Government. Chiang assured the Young Marshal that he would take care of the latter's 16 divisions. It is understood that Chang Hsueh Liang leaves tomorrow by train for Shanghai and Europe.

Elimination of the Young Marshal will probably lead to many changes in the administration of this area. Huang Fu has already been appointed Mayor of Peiping.

HPD-CSB JOHNSON

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MAR 13 1933

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

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MAR 11 1933

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated March 10, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

A press correspondent learned that General Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang met on March 9 for a short time at Paotingfu and that the resignation of the Young Marshal was accepted by Chiang. The place of Chang Hsueh-liang as the representative of the National Government in North China is to be taken by the Minister of War, Ho Ying-chin, with five divisions of troops of Chiang Kai-shek. The Young Marshal was assured by Chiang that his (the Young Marshal's) sixteen divisions would be taken care of by Chiang. Chang Hsueh-liang is understood to be leaving for Shanghai and Europe by train on March 11.

Probably many changes will result in the administration of this area as the result of the elimination of the Young Marshal. The appointment of Huang Fu as Mayor of Peiping has already been made.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 11:50 p. m. 10th

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

238, March 11, 10 [illegible] m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 10, 5 p. m. Army spokesman reported this afternoon that at 10 a. m., today Japanese advance troops had reached a village approximately two miles north of Kupeikou and that the Chinese troops were in retreat. He stated that the capture of the pass within 24 hours is expected".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

F/ESP

793.94/6017

FILED

MAR 13 1933

0811

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 1:53 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

239, March 11, 11 a. m.

Japanese Legation here announces officially that Psifengkou and Kupeikou passes were occupied by the Japanese on the ninth and tenth instant respectively.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

793.94

F/HS

793.94/6018

FILED
MAR 13 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 4:37 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

March 11, 2 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"March 11, 1 p. m. Two trains of Chinese troops moved eastward through Tientsin last night. Local Chinese officials affiliated with Chang Hsueh Liang are greatly concerned over Chang's departure from Peiping and seem to believe that developments of last two days may lead to large scale military operations inside the Wall.

It is believed all Chang officials here will be replaced shortly.

According to Chinese sources of information Japanese protested that they learned of transfer of artillery to vicinity Tangku, referred to in my March 8, 4 p. m. No guns have thus far been mounted at Tangku.

Repeated to the Department."

LOCKHART

KLP

F/HS

793.94/6019

FILED
JUN 24 1933
6002

0813

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 13, 1933.

In the absence of any specific request for assistance from the American parties concerned in the Ford truck case (see attached telegram No. 240 of March 11, 4 p.m., from the Legation), I feel that it would be better if the Department refrained from taking action.

Concur. M.M.K.

As the Ford representatives in China, Japan and Manchuria are all vitally interested in this case, I feel that we may take for granted the fact that they have fully reported developments to their head office. In view of the offer of the Japanese army to purchase the trucks in question and the whip hand which the Japanese hold over the Ford plant in Japan and the market in Manchuria, I shall be surprised if any complaint is registered by the Ford Company. It would seem that the only American interest which stands to lose as a result of the non-delivery of the chassis is the Chinese-American Company of Tientsin and it is possible that the Ford

Company

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Company may be willing to compensate the Chinese American Company for losses incurred in the construction of the truck bodies.

I suggest that the Department await further developments.

RCM:EJL

0815

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 7:55 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 11 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1933
Department of State

file
M.M.A

240, March 11, 4 p. m.

227?

(GRAY) My 221, March 9, noon.

Following from American Consul at Dairen to the Legation and Tokyo:

"March 9, 4 p. m. Representative of the Kwangtung Government called at the Consulate today to discuss disposition of Ford trucks on HARU MARU. Three courses of action seem to be open:

One. Return of the trucks to Kobe

Two. Transshipment on a foreign vessel to Tientsin or possibly Shanghai.

Three. Sale of trucks in Dairen.

Return of trucks to Kobe is not desired and is unlikely. While admitting that transshipment to Tientsin was the obvious and technically correct solution, the representative suggested that local circumstances might make this course of action impracticable. A satisfactory explanation of "local circumstances" was not given. It appears that arranging sale of the trucks in Dairen is the solution desired. CONFIDENTIAL. The army has

MAR 18 1933
FILED

F/HS
793.94/6020

0816

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

has already informed Japanese Ford distributor for Manchuria of its willingness to purchase trucks. It is understood that the trucks will be unloaded tomorrow. (END GRAY). Settlement of the matter actually rests with the army and it does not approve of shipment to TIENTSIN ~~(*)~~. However, I am informed a delay of a week more or less in disposing of the matter would not be unwelcome as within that period the situation in the Peiping Tientsin area might so alter as to remove the objection of delivery of the trucks to the American Chinese Company.

At two o'clock Hart reports Chang Hsueh Liang deposited with National City Bank sum sufficient to pay for trucks on delivery to him and that bank which covered itself by war risk insurance advanced payment to Ford Motor Car Company at Shanghai. All negotiations of the American Chinese Company at Tientsin in connection with purchases were with Ford Motor Car Company, Shanghai which ordered chassis from Ford Company at Yokohama. American Chinese Company has incurred large expense constructing bodies for the chassis contracted for delivery c.i.f. Tientsin. Failure of shipment to reach destination will cause serious financial embarrassment to the American Chinese Company which is greatly concerned to learn

0817

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 3-#240 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 11, 4 p. m.

learn that Ford Company is negotiating with Ford agent at Dairen for delivery of the shipment to that agency.

KLP JOHNSON

(*)apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

PLAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 11 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 10:05 a. m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 11 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

241, March 11, 4 p. m.

793.94 note 893.00

Reuter from Nanking today:

"Chinese press here this morning does not publish reports of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's resignation having been accepted or of General Chiang Kai Shek being in supreme military command in North China. This news is being withheld from publication and therefore local press is silent on latest developments.

Private circles in a position to know of developments generally express satisfaction over General Chiang's decision and say they believe his action indicates that General Chiang has North China situation well under control, otherwise he would not have taken such drastic step. Generally developed here that Chinese Government is determined to throw entire nation's energy and resources to resist further Japanese invasion into Hupeh".

KLP-CSB

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6021

FILED MAR 13 1933

0819

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Plain

FROM

PEIPING Via N.R.

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 11:35 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

793.74

242, March 11, 10 p.m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

"Chinese capital is anxiously watching developments in North China and views situation in Peiping and Tientsin with very grave apprehensions. It is generally believed that Japanese invasion of the Peiping- Tientsin area is almost inevitable.

Interviewed by Chinese pressmen upon his arrival from Changshi this morning General Chiang Tsopin, Chinese Minister to Tokyo, declared that he is proceeding immediately to the North to confer with Chiang Kai Shek and Lo Wenkan concerning the Sino Japanese situation."

JOHNSON

JS

FILED
JUN 24 1933

F/HS
793.94/6022

0820

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 8, 1933.

MMH:

Santo Domingo's despatch No. 823 of February 25, 1933, encloses a copy in translation of an editorial from a local newspaper on the Manchuria situation which regrets the inaction of the principal Powers with regard to Japanese aggression.

WES:CLS

0821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in Confidence

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 13, 1933

Rec'd 1:57 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 13 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

245, March 13, 11 a. m.

My 239, March 11, 11 a. m. (6018)

793.94

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Fox Movietone cameraman returning from Kupeikow Sunday March 12 informed Herald Tribune correspondent Keen that he witnessed fighting at Kupiekow Pass where road crosses Great Wall at 8 o'clock Sunday morning. Chinese then holding Wall. Cameraman stated they identified troops of Chiang Hsueh Liang evacuating pass while troops of Twenty-fifth and Second Divisions belonging to Chiang Kai-Shek were entering pass and presumably engaged in the defense of the pass.

I am endeavoring to check accuracy of above information but have no reason to believe that it may not be true. If it is true forces of Chiang Kai-Skek are already in contact with Japanese at Kupeikow.

JOHNSON

CIB WP

FILED MAR 16 1933

F/HS 793.94/6023

0822

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 15 1933

PARAPHRASE CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated March 13, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

My telegram No. 239, of March 11, 11 a.m.:

HERALD TRIBUNE correspondent Keen was informed by Fox Movietone cameraman who returned Sunday, March 12, from Kupeikow, that, at 8 o'clock Sunday morning he witnessed fighting at Kupeikow Pass where the road crosses the Great Wall. Cameraman stated that they identified troops of Twenty-fifth and Second Divisions belonging to Chiang Kai-shek entering pass and presumably engaged in the defense of the pass while the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang were evacuating the pass. Although I have no reason to believe that it may not be true, I am endeavoring to check up on the accuracy of the above information. Forces of Chiang Kai-shek are already in contact with Japanese at Kupeikow if the above information is true.

m.W.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DJ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

WP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated March 13, 1933

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94
note

893.00

Following telegram sent to Legation at Peiping:

March 13, 10 a. m. Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang arrived here at 3 p. m., yesterday by plane. He was met at the aerodrome by several officials headed by Finance Minister, T. V. Soong and Mayor Wu Te Chen. He was well but tired. It is stated he will spend several weeks here recuperating and he is not planning to go abroad immediately. I was present by informal invitation.

Repeated to the Department.

CUNNINGHAM

FILED
MAR 16 1933

CIB WP

F/HS
793.94/6024

0824

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

Tokio

Dated March 13, 1938

FROM Rec'd 9:15 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 19 1938 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1938 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

59, March 13, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94/6025 F/HS

1793.94
Note 15
694.00
894.24

One. Japanese authorities have directed the head offices for Japan of the Standard Oil Company of New York and the Rising Sun Petroleum Company (Shell) to submit figures of their imports during the past calendar year and up to the present date and also prospective imports from now until end of June. I am informed by the general manager for Japan of the Standard Oil Company that this is the first time that such an inquiry has been received by the company.

FILED MAR 15 1938

Two. The war office for the first time in the present conflict is requisitioning some of the commercial motor trucks which have been subsidized by the army and has informed the military attache that they are to be used in transporting supplies to army units in Manchuria.

Three. There is no (repeat no) definite evidence that the two steps mentioned above are connected but in view of the present situation they appear to indicate a general survey or possible mobilization of resources in preparation for more extensive military operations.

WSB-CSB

GREW

0825

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 17, 1933.

Tokyo's confidential despatch No. 294 of February 21, 1933, supplements that part of a recent despatch by Mr. Dickover which dealt with alleged Japanese inability to comprehend the essential nature of a contract or agreement as understood in the West. To substantiate this viewpoint, Commodore Perry's statements with regard to Japanese honesty and comments by the first British Minister to Japan in the same regard are given, followed by Japan's statements with regard to Korean independence before annexation. There is a quotation from Sansom's History with regard to this kind of honesty in early feudal times. The tendency of Japanese merchants to break contracts is discussed. This lack of comprehension of the sanctity of the pledged word appears to be due to the fact that there was nothing in Japan corresponding to the rules of abstract justice contained in the old Roman law until the latter part of the 19th century. According to Mr. Dickover, the Japanese do not understand our feeling that a person is dishonored by a violation of his pledged word unless the pledged word relates to one of their own peculiar ideals or customs. Mr. Dickover concludes that the matter of restoring Manchuria to the sovereignty of China is not the whole of the problem with

0826

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

which the world is faced but that the more important part of the problem lies in the necessity of imparting to the Japanese nation the ideal held by the Western nations of strict adherence to the pledged word.

In my opinion Mr. Dickover's despatch should, to do the Japanese justice, take cognizance of the existence of two groups of Japanese in connection with the breaking of treaties since September 18, 1931, instead of referring in his despatch throughout merely to "the Japanese". It would be difficult to prove that the civilian officials who have signed treaties on behalf of Japan or that the Privy Council which examined those treaties before sending them to the Emperor did not regard them with the same sincerity and the same intention that they would be kept as did other states which signed the same treaties. From September 18, 1931, a group of more or less ignorant military has broken those treaties. It can be admitted that this group has been from the Western viewpoint dishonest. It can also be admitted that the civilian group has not protested very strongly, but, as this lack of protest is very probably due to fear of physical injury or death, it seems to me scarcely accurate to include them among the Japanese who do not comprehend the sanctity of agreements.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In my opinion, the aim of the despatch is to prove that the Japanese do not understand the sanctity of treaties, and, as a result of the desire to prove this, there appears to be a lack of impartiality; for example, at the bottom of page 2 is the statement that "It is true that the Japanese Government has always observed its financial obligations, because it was advantageous to do so in order that Japanese credit might be preserved abroad." No other reason is given for the observation of financial obligations. It is difficult to understand how an observer knows that this is the only reason why the Japanese Government has observed its financial obligations. On page 9 it is stated that "In any other country in the world many a hot verbal battle would have been fought on the platform and in the press on the subject of the duties of the nation under the treaties, but in Japan the subject has been entirely ignored." The phrase "in any other country" seems scarcely correct. It hardly applies to China, and when France recently broke her agreement with regard to the payment of debts there appeared to be little opposition in France to the breaking of this international agreement.

With regard to the conclusion that there is "the necessity of imparting to the Japanese nation the ideal held by the Western nations of strict adherence to the pledged word", there

0828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

are indications that the pledged word is not held in such high regard at present by some countries as this statement would seem to indicate. Reference here might be made not only to the breaking by France of her debt agreement but to Mussolini's statement that the peace treaties are not eternal, a statement which has been carved on a column in Budapest, and to difficulties arising out of the Polish corridor. Mr. Dickover quotes a history of early feudal times, statements of foreigners which were made when Japan was still feudal and when the Japanese were still comparable to the people of Europe in the middle ages. With regard to the "strict adherence to the pledged word" of Western nations, one does not need to go to reference books for examples of non-adherence to the pledged word by Western nations.

In short, my criticism is that a more complete discussion of this subject would indicate the Japanese, as a whole, to be less black than is the picture painted in this despatch.

LES:CLS

0829

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 294. Tokyo, February 21, 1933.

SUBJECT: A Study of Japanese Psychology in regard to Treaties and Other Agreements.

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

DEPT. OF STATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 DIV. COM. & REC'D
AM
MAR 11 33

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

F/HS
793.94/6026
FILED
MAY 19 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

793.94/5939

In the Embassy's despatch No. 280 of February 6, 1933, entitled "A Survey of the Movements and Reactions of the Japanese People since the Outbreak of the Manchurian Incident", it was stated that:

> "They (the Japanese) are, as a rule, in-
> "capable of comprehending the essential nature of
> "a contract or agreement as understood in the West,
> "and in disputes regarding their meaning are governed
> "more by interest, sympathy or emotion, than by any
> "idea of abstract justice."

In

0830

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In the belief that this statement requires further elucidation than was contained in the despatch referred to, the following comments concerning Japanese psychology in regard to treaties and other agreements, with historical evidence, are respectfully submitted.

In view of the extensive propaganda which the Japanese are spreading to justify their actions in Manchuria, and the attitude of the Japanese delegation in Geneva, indicating a desire to ignore or avoid the question of Japan's duties and obligations in respect to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty guaranteeing the territorial and adminstrative integrity of China, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, it may be worth while at this juncture to review the impressions which have been recorded by competent observers in the past regarding the Japanese sense of obligation under agreements to which they have committed themselves. This study is undertaken with this purpose, as well as for the purpose of setting forth certain Japanese peculiarities which mark them off from Western nations. This background may be found pertinent in connection with the present Sino-Japanese controversy.

Judging from past examples of the Japanese attitude towards their obligations under agreements, it would seem that the world was hardly justified in taking it for granted that Japan would observe the letter and spirit of the international agreements mentioned above - at least any further than Japan found it convenient and advantageous to do so. Japanese publicists frequently aver that "Japan has always observed its international obligations". It is true that

0831

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Japanese Government has always observed its financial obligations, because it was advantageous to do so in order that Japanese credit might be preserved abroad. But the history of the diplomatic dealings of foreign nations with Japan is a history of almost constant struggle on the part of the representatives of Western powers to maintain their nations' rights under the various treaties negotiated with Japan. From the earliest days of the intercourse of Western nations with Japan, the tendency of the Japanese officials to disregard their pledged word has been noted and commented upon in the various narratives and biographies of the representatives of the powers.

Commodore Perry's chronicler, Francis L. Hawks, D.D., L.L.D., in the "NARRATIVE OF THE EXPEDITION OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON TO THE CHINA SEAS AND JAPAN" (the official chronicle of Commodore Perry's expedition, published by order of the United States Congress), states:

> "We allude to the systematic falsehood and duplicity exhibited, and often without shame, by the high Japanese officials and public functionaries in their negotiations and intercourse with strangers."
>
> "These were merely measures of precaution, which seemed justified by the wily policy of the Japanese, which forbade any confident reliance upon its justice ..."
>
> "The Japanese with their usual impertubable manner, which is schooled to cunning and deceit ....."

Commodore Perry himself, in a letter to the then Secretary of the Navy which is quoted in Hawks' chronicle, referred to the Japanese as "these very sagacious and deceitful people". These quotations reflect the opinion regarding the honesty and trustworthiness of the Japanese people and officials which was formed by the first American officials to

come

0832

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

come into contact with them, in 1853 and 1854.

Nor did the British officials in the early days of foreign intercourse with the Japanese form a better opinion. Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British Minister to Japan, who resided in Yedo (Tokyo) from 1859 to 1862, gave his views and impressions of the Japanese in his work, "THE CAPITAL OF THE TYCOON: A NARRATIVE OF A THREE YEARS' RESIDENCE IN JAPAN". Writing of the Japanese method of observing a certain clause of a treaty, he states:

> ". . . keeping what seemed the promise to the ear, but breaking it to the heart. The letter of the treaty might be there, but assuredly not the spirit . . ."

In various parts of his narrative he states:

> "Every day seemed to furnish evidence of the futility of any arguments addressed to their (the Japanese officials') sense of justice, or their good faith."
>
> "I am led to place at the head of the list of Japanese vices this one of mendacity, bringing as it does inevitably dishonesty of action."
>
> " . . . mendacity among the Japanese has become something more than a bad habit, an institution and part of the necessary machinery of their system of government and administration."
>
> "But how the several relations of life in a social state are maintained, where there is so little trust or faith, and no acknowledged obligation to speak the truth, is difficult to understand."

Sir Rutherford seems to have had something of a prophetic eye when he wrote:

> "If such were to be the permament state of our relations, it had perhaps been better, and upon the whole more satisfactory to all parties, to have left the Japanese to their much prized isolation, instead of putting a constraint upon them to open their ports, and then leaving them to their own devices."

"No

0833

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

> "No doubt any principle of firmness and resistance to wrong, carries with it a contingency of war. But, on the other hand, unlimited concession and submission is even more dangerous and directly tends to war by encouraging in an Eastern race intolerable and increasing aggressions"

Passing from the views of the early diplomatists to events of more recent times, it is possible to adduce numerous examples of Japanese indifferences to the pledged word. The classic example, however, of the violation of international agreements by Japan is the case of the annexation of Korea. Prior to 1910, Japan had pledged itself to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Korea in a number of treaties:

> Treaty between Japan and Korea, August 26, 1894.
> "The object of the alliance is to maintain the independence of Korea on a firm footing. . ."
>
> Agreement between Japan and Russia, April 25, 1898.
> "The Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan recognize definitely the Sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and pledge themselves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country."
>
> Treaty between Japan and Great Britain, January 30, 1902.
> "Preamble. The Governments of Great Britain and Japan .. being .. specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea .."
> "Artile 1. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country."
>
> Protocol between Japan and Korea, February 23, 1904.
> "The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea."
> "The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire."

Despite

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Despite these supposedly solemn treaty obligations, Japanese subjects assassinated the Empress Dowager of Korea and eventually, in 1910, the Imperial family of Korea was deposed and Japan annexed the country. The annexation, of course, was camouflaged as having been accomplished through the voluntary act of the Korean Government, but those familiar with the history of the case know that it was brought about by means of Japanese soldiers and bayonets.

This callous disregard of the pledged word does not appear to be a recent development in Japan but rather to be the growth of centuries. In his work, "JAPAN - A SHORT CULTURAL HISTORY", Mr. G.B. Sansom describes the code of ethics of early feudal days in Japan as follows:

> "A champion of the creed called Bushido would be hard put to it to justify the breaches of faith which are revealed so clearly and so frequently by feudal documents of the 14th century. The code of feudal ethics did not entirely break down but the sense of obligation was restricted to the narrow confines of the family, or some correspondingly small group. To promote the fortunes of his own unit, the warrior would freely sacrifice a wider loyalty."
>
> "Certain prescribed obligations between employer and servant, or master and apprentice, seem to have been most scrupulously observed, and solidarity was secured by a strict mutual faithfulness among the members of a trade guild. But this high standard of corporate morality was offset by a ruthless unconcern for the rights of persons outside the group, amounting sometimes to grossly anti-social conduct."

It would be difficult to describe in more fitting terms the present Japanese attitude toward the world, except that the ancient loyalty to a small group has been widened until it has become a fanatical loyalty to the State,

and

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and the "persons outside the group" are not other Japanese but other nations. Japan's action in placing its selfish ambitions in Manchuria before concern for the treaties and for the preservation of the peace structure of the world, certainly amounts to "grossly anti-social conduct".

It has been known for many years, in the mercantile circles of the world, that unusual precautions must be observed in dealing with Japanese merchants, because of their tendency to break contracts when they find that the observance of the contracts will be disadvantageous to them. Members of my staff have on several occasions discussed this trait of the Japanese with men, both foreign and Japanese, of the highest standing in the legal circles of Japan. The lawyers have been unanimous in their opinion that the Japanese are not in general dishonest - that is, dishonest in the sense of deliberately committing acts which they know are not honest. They simply do not understand the sanctity of a contract or agreement, as such is understood in Occidental countries. To the Japanese (according to the explanation of one lawyer), a contract or agreement should be profitable to both parties; when for some reason it ceases to be profitable to one of the parties, it should be voided or appropriately altered. This conception of a contract persists today in the Japanese courts, according to the lawyers. It is nearly impossible to obtain fulfillment of a contract by suit in the courts, as the Japanese courts almost invariably advise an amicable settlement or compromise outside of court.

This lack of comprehension of the sanctity of the pledged word, whether in business or in international relations, among the Japanese, appears to be primarily due to the

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the fact that in Japan, until the promulgation of codes of law in the latter part of the nineteenth century, there was nothing to correspond to the rules of abstract justice contained in the old Roman Law - the laws which were passed on from nation to nation in Europe in medieval days and which became the foundation upon which Western peoples erected their codes of civil and commercial laws. In Japan, innumerable laws were promulgated from time to time during feudal days, but in general these laws had little or nothing to do with justice in the ordinary relations or transactions between man and man. Like the laws of the first Tokugawa Shogun, Iyeyasu, they were based on the precepts of the Chinese sages and dealt with the relations between sovereign and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, brother and sister, and friend and friend. They were codes of social behavior, and substantive law was lacking. Later the Tokugawas evolved the so-called Hundred Laws, which were not published as a code for the benefit of the people but were handed down from Shogun to Shogun, for his guidance in adminstration. The hundred Laws dealt with crimes, the relations of the numerous classes of feudal Japanese society, official rank, etiquette, methods of administration, et cetera, but did not contain rules relating to contracts, personal property, or trade and navigation. The relations between buyer and seller, between lender and borrower or between producer and consumer, were not fixed by law but by changing custom, or by the dictates of immediate interest, emotion and sympathy, as variously interpreted by the machibugyo (village headmen or magistrates).

As

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As a result of centuries of living without conceptions of abstract justice and without rigid laws requiring strict observance of the pledged word, the Japanese naturally do not look upon contracts and agreements as do Occidental peoples. They do not comprehend our ideal of rigid adherence to the letter and spirit of an agreement, and do not understand our feeling that a person is dishonored by a violation of his pledged word, unless the pledged word relates to one of their own peculiar ideals or customs. That is, a servant would be dishonored by disloyalty to his master, but a merchant would not be dishonored by failure to deliver goods which he had agreed to deliver.

This inability to perceive dishonor in the breaking of solemn agreements not covered by their own peculiar ideals, is illustrated by the fact that, since the beginning of the Manchurian affair to the present time, no Japanese, as far as the writer is aware, has come forward with an explanation to the people of Japan of their obligations under the treaties and an appeal for closer observance of those obligations. In any other country in the world many a hot verbal battle would have been fought on the platform and in the press on the subject of the duties of the nation under the treaties, but in Japan the subject has been entirely ignored. It is undoubtedly true that some Japanese realize that their Army has taken steps in violation of their treaty obligations, and that they have been prevented from expressing their views by fear of popular disfavor or even of physical danger, but it is also true that the vast majority of the Japanese people simply are unable to comprehend the necessity of strict observance of the letter of the treaties.

To

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To them the treaties, like the domestic contracts and agreements to which they are accustomed, should be capable of being voided by special circumstances, or should permit of a wide degree of latitude in interpretation in order that they may not interfere with steps taken because of special circumstances. This view was expressed by Count Uchida, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his speech at the opening of the Diet on January 21, 1933:

> "Now it is the view of the Japanese Government, that in the light of the realities of the international situation, it is essential in order to obtain true peace that, while accepting the universality of the various principles subserving the cause of peace, a due and proper elasticity corresponding to the exigencies of actual conditions should be allowed in their practical application."

That the "exigencies of actual conditions" should permit of an elasticity in the application of agreements is a typically Japanese view and one which can hardly hope to gain favor among nations accustomed to the more rigid ethical background of the Occident.

The matter of restoring Manchuria to the sovereignty of China, therefore, is not the whole of the problem with which the world is faced in dealing with Japan. The more important part of the problem lies in the necessity of imparting to the Japanese nation the ideal held by the Western nations of strict adherence to the pledged word. Otherwise there can be no assurance that the numerous treaties to which Japan is an important party and which are vital to the security

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of the world, such as the treaties relating to non-aggression, disarmament and demilitarization of certain zones, are now being, or in the future will be, observed by Japan.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 23 1933

Despatch No. 294.

Date: February 21, 1933.

Subject: A Study of Japanese Psychology in regard to Treaties and Other Agreements.

Summary: The comments of diplomatists of early days in Japan showing Japanese indifference to sanctity of agreements. This trait illustrated by the case of Korea. Long known to the mercantile world. Lawyers' opinion as to the basic causes thereof. Probably due to lack of strict codes of law until recent times. Sincere belief that agreements should be elastic. Count Uchida's enunciation of this opinion. Problem for world is not only return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty but also to teach Japanese the Western ideal of strict observance of obligations.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 14, 1933.

RGM: ~~U. Sec'y~~
~~WWH:~~
~~SKH:~~

During January of this year, when Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China, returned to China from leave of absence in England, there occurred a great outcry in the Chinese press against Great Britain on the ground that Great Britain was the power responsible for the failure of the League to take a positive stand against Japan. Sir Miles was able to explain Great Britain's position and the outcry seems to have ceased.

I do not think that you need read the enclosures but I would suggest that you read the despatch which contains Minister's Johnson's comment.

E.E.J.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1951 Peiping, February 13, 1933.

Subject: Chinese Press Comment on Alleged pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain.

DEPT OF STATE REC'D DIV OF COMM & REC MAR 11 33 PM

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Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1933 Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington D.C.

Sir:

793.94/5941

I have the honor to refer to despatches No. D-434 of February 2, 1933, and D-437 of February 4, 1933, from the Consulate General at Nanking, commenting upon the above mentioned subject, and in this connection to enclose herewith several further articles from the vernacular and English language press. Their contents add very little to what has already been reported, but they serve as a further illustration of the widespread indignation voiced in the press, and reveal the great relief that has apparently resulted from the official denials that emanated from London to the effect that there has been no understanding between Great Britain and Japan in regard to Japan's actions in Manchuria.

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While

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While this incident may now be considered closed, at least for the time being, it is significant to observe that the vehement indignation against Great Britain voiced in nearly all sections of the press was timed to coincide with the return to China of Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, and that, presumably through his intervention, uncertainty as to British policy with regard to Sino-Japanese relations was immediately eliminated by an official denial and the reiteration of Great Britain's desire to stand by the recommendations of the Lytton Report as a basis of settlement of the outstanding issues.

That credence should be given to such reports may seem strange, but it should be borne in mind that Chinese officials and the public at large are so exasperated by the prolonged negotiations at Geneva, which appear to them almost as lamentable as Nero's fiddling while Rome was burning, and are in such a state of nervous tension that they are ready to believe any story, however implausible, which would seem to account for the apparent failure of the League to take a positive stand against Japan and in support of China.

Similar propaganda might, of course, at any time be instigated against any other foreign country. The value of a prompt denial of false rumors and of a clarification of policy, if adverse effects are to be avoided, has been clearly demonstrated by this recent incident.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

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Enclosure:

1. Newspaper articles as follow -
   "A Task for Sir Miles Lampson", PEIPING CHRONICLE, January 31, 1933
   "The Need for Clarity", PEIPING CHRONICLE, February 1, 1933
   "Our 'Unequal Treaty'", PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, February 3, 1933
   "A Clear-cut Denial", PEIPING CHRONICLE, February 4, 1933
   "Great Britain and Committee of Nine", PEIPING CHRONICLE, February 4, 1933.

RLB/k
Copy to: Counselor Peck at Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A TASK FOR SIR MILES LAMPSON

"Shih Shih Sin Pao", Shanghai

Unfortunate events between Great Britain and China arose continually after the close of the World War. At first Japan was permitted, in secret agreement, to possess Tsingtao by France and Great Britain. Then British gunboats bombarded Wanhsien with numerous persons killed. This trend culminated with the "May 30" affair, when the Chinese people started their anti-British boycott. In reality, however, Britain had realized the inadvisability of her policy as early as at the Washington Conference, when she unhesitatingly shattered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, forced Japan to give up the control over Shantung, and adopted the same Pacific policy as that of the United States. Sir Miles Lampson has worked, with remarkable skill, for good will between Great Britain and this country from the time of the Shanghai Incident up to the present. During the last six or seven years, the friendship between these two countries could hardly have been greater. This diplomatic success must be attributed to the labours of the Minister.

We regret to learn that, after a period of close friendship with this country, Great Britain tends now to adopt a different policy towards China on the Manchurian issue. The strange attitude of Sir John Simon at Geneva is different from the hitherto impartial mind of the British people. Rumours are now spread in Europe that both France and Britain have promised Japan non-intervention in the latter's invasion of North China, in exchange for the peace and order in the Yangtze valley. These rumours have never been denied by the London authorities, and a compromising spirit is shown at Geneva by the British delegates towards the Japanese envoys. As far as Manchuria is concerned, Great Britain has adopted a wholly new policy. This is almost beyond doubt.

How great a mistake this is! The victims of the secret diplomacy of Britain and Japan are not China only, but the peace of the world as a whole. The first victim, following the collapse of the peace machinery, will be Great Britain. No one can deny that the prospects of Britain as a Power depend vitally on world peace. Any resort to secret diplomacy in the Far Eastern conflict is sure to hasten the next world conflagration.

Ever since the labours of Sir Miles Lampson bore fruit in China, merchants in the country have placed large orders in Great Britain, particularly after the Mukden Incident. Everyone knows that owing to this, the unemployment in Lancashire, in Birmingham and in Liverpool, showed a decrease. If Great Britain continues her secret diplomacy, the Chinese cannot but treat the British in the same way as they treat the Japanese. Steamers from Liverpool arriving at Shanghai will be perplexed to finding that their cargoes cannot be discharged. And British merchants in China will have to follow the Japanese in closing their firms and going home. This shows clearly whether the present policy of London towards China is advisable.

We hope that Great Britain will continue to be our friend We speak at the very beginning of the misunderstanding. We ask both Sir John Simon and Sir Miles Lampson to try to restore our confidence in Great Britain by blowing away all the clouds of suspicion.

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THE NEED FOR CLARITY.

At a time like the present it is essential that doubtful points should be cleared up. Throughout the discussions at Geneva there has been on the part of the British representatives, notably SIR JOHN SIMON himself, such decided reluctance to handle difficulties with decision that not merely in China but elsewhere there has grown up the suspicion that the days of the Anglo-Japanese alliance are by no means dead. That fateful instrument is supposed to have been discarded at the Washington Conference. It served for years to tie the hands of British Foreign Secretaries in dealing with Far Eastern questions; it facilitated the undermining of British trade interests by Japanese competitors whose methods were not too squeamish; and it eventually proved absolutely inadequate to safeguard the very things its British sponsors hoped it would safeguard. It was scrapped at Washington, very reluctantly on both sides, in deference to pronounced hostility in British overseas dominions. Nevertheless, the apparent susceptibility of SIR JOHN SIMON to Japanese influence during the past eighteen months has stirred up misgivings in many minds; and these have not been allayed by repeated hints of an understanding reached at Shanghai last spring, between the French and British authorities on the one side and Japanese on the other, to the effect that the Anglo-French authorities undertook to be lenient with regard to Japanese activities in Manchuria if the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Shanghai.

This report is referred to in one of today's telegrams as having been denied by the British authorities. If so, the denial has been neither sufficiently emphatic nor adequately broadcast. If there is no truth in this allegation of an understanding it ought to have been denied explicitly, emphatically and in such manner that the whole world, and especially the whole of China, should know of it. We submit that, if there has been denial, such denial should be repeated in the most explicit, categorical and public manner possible.

* * *

The foregoing lines were already in type before we received the Reuter telegram from Nanking reporting the increasing anti-British feeling that is to be found there as the result of the daily reports from Geneva of the "British Delegation's anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese attitude"; but this later message simply gives point to what we had already written, with the intention of leaving it just as it stood. It is all the more necessary, in view of the Nanking message, for the British position to be made absolutely clear. It

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would be an irreparable misfortune if, after years of hard work by Sir Miles Lampson in trying to bridge the serious gulf that yawned between Britain and China when he took up his duties as Minister, after marking out of the new line of policy intimated in the Chamberlain declaration and in the documents of 1926, there were to recur an entirely unnecessary estrangement and misunderstanding. All this could be prevented by a few frank words, the very absence of which breeds suspicion and mistrust, and the utterance of which would dispel threatening storm-clouds. It is not as if, at this time of day, anything that is said one way or the other would make a scrap of difference to Japan. Japan, clearly, has decided to go her own way, and nothing that is merely said will prevent her. If, after all, there is a hand of iron inside Sir John Simon's velvet glove, there is all the more reason why there should be more candid speech on Sir John's tongue; and the sooner the better. Let all this mystery and suspicion and growing ill will be dissipated before it is too late.

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PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1933.

OUR "UNEQUAL TREATY."

DOES China regard Japan, or Great Britain, as the enemy? We ask the question in all seriousness, for the reception the Minister has been granted in Nanking is one that arouses just resentment. On no occasion even in the past six years, when China's foreign policy consisted of an effort by all and sundry to affront and antagonise every country enjoying diplomatic relations with her, has a Minister ever been received as Sir Miles Lampson has been greeted on his present visit—and no Minister, in the rather rueful opinion of his fellow-countrymen out here, deserved such a reception. He has most ably led the peace and conciliation school of diplomacy in China, has gone farther than any other foreign representative to meet Chinese aspirations, spent weary and almost torturing days with monumental patience round the Peace Conference table in Shanghai, and was the main instrument in the negotiation of an arrangement which put an end to Shanghai's suffering and enabled the wheels of industry and commerce to revolve once more. His visit Home for a well-deserved holiday should have been the prelude to promotion to a more pleasant Ambassadorial post.

On his return to the Kuomintang capital of China he is browbeaten and threatened. The official newspaper organ of the Government tells him that Nanking rather regrets the sudden burst of generosity it sprang upon him when he paid his last visit to the capital on his way home and was hailed as the "Peace Envoy." It is implied that he has failed to act as an honorary Ambassador for China during his visit to England, and has thus fallen short in his duty to this country—a very strange conception of the rôle of a foreign Ambassador, surely, who does not normally represent any other country but his own. He is told that unless his Government adopts the Chinese viewpoint to the very last full stop on the grave issues now at stake Britain will be subjected to a boycott of her trade and the hostility of this country for the next 30 years. We have had 30 years and more of this sort of thing, anyway, in the past. The "pathfinder in better Sino-British relations" must not attempt to be a pathfinder in still wider relations. He must play up to China and so must his Government, or Nanking will know the reason why!

It is an ironical commentary on the discussions at Geneva on the issue whether the boycott is a weapon of illegal offence or of legitimate self-defence that the nation which has played the leading part as mediator, or as critic of Japan in the Lytton Report, should now be threatened like this! However, there is a very old proverb of the fate which is visited upon all peacemakers and mediators. We might have expected it. As for the boycott threat, its uselessness as a political weapon and its value as an irritant have been exposed over and over again. Did not Dr. V. K. Ting only a week or so ago point out that during the boycott of Japan, when it was at its height, China bought $84,000,000 worth more of Japanese goods than in the preceding year? The consistent apostle of pro-Japanese policy in China, once denounced as a "traitor," is received with marked honours and dithyrambic praise, and is appointed High Adviser to the Generalissimo, who forthwith turns his back on China's responsibilities in the North and goes off to resume civil war. The Minister of a Power which has given abundant evidence of its friendship is received with threats and menaces!

We do not view this episode, however, with unmixed feelings. There are two aspects of this controversy on which we have divided views. On the one hand, we intensely resent, in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, charges that we are seeking any advantage for ourselves, or are bound by pledges to that end, in this crisis. On the other, we have now come to

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the conclusion that conciliation is played out, that we have reached the end of our tether in trying to prevent a catastrophe—on which this paper has never had any illusions—and that conciliation is impossible and must be abandoned. To the extent that these threats and menaces, however bad may be their taste, are directed against the futile effort to keep conciliation alive, to that extent may they be understood. If they are designed to browbeat us into renewed efforts to prevent the imminent irruption into Jehol, we have neither sympathy nor hope for them. We have done the best we can in Tokio, and we have failed. The effort to persuade the Japanese not to invade China Proper at the expense of a peaceful settlement of Jehol cannot be maintained any longer. It was, as we have pointed out before, in any event almost impossible to secure guarantees from either side to ensure that the aim in view would be attained.

What we do intensely resent are the unjust suspicions with which our mediation has been assailed. There was, we are told, a secret agreement in Shanghai, whereby we got the Japanese to evacuate that place in return for an undertaking that we would not interfere in Manchuria. To begin with, it was no small service to China to help restore normal conditions in Shanghai, for the Chinese were the major sufferers. But if we were bound by such a fantastic agreement, why did Lord Lytton afterwards write a Report which supported China to the extent of 90% of its substance on facts and to an even greater extent in its recommendations? The truth is that we have been doing nothing but interfere in the Manchurian situation all along, and have had to bear the brunt of the entire international responsibility, while the two Powers from whom China at various periods in the development of her political emotions expected the most have been able to remain little more than spectators.

Then there is the gross canard about Tibet, on which every youthful fanatic who knows as much about high policy as he does about Einstein's Theory of Relativity has seen fit to express himself with profound ignorance in those magazines which cater to that high order of international comment. Those who know anything at all about British policy in Tibet know that not only in that country, but in Nepaul, Sikkim and Bhutan, British policy is one which supports the native preference for seclusion. They are all left severely alone, and it was but recently that one prominent British writer boasted that he was the first Briton for many years to be allowed to visit Nepaul, where no British traders are permitted. Even Sir Charles Bell, a great friend of Tibet, and a distinguished Tibetan scholar who spent two decades in the Border States of Bhutan and Sikkim, was permitted to spend only ten months in Lhassa. Why do not these critics, if they cannot credit us with such a policy, refer to the writings and utterances of the daring Chinese lady who paid a long visit to Tibet and Lhassa a year or two ago and inform their manifest ignorance in the light of her personal knowledge?

Our whole policy since the war, especially in Asia, has been a retreat from political responsibility, except, unfortunately, in this Far Eastern dispute, where for all our tireless labours and intense anxieties we have had as reward nothing but odium on one side and obstinate and arrogant defiance and non-co-operation on the other. It really seems time that we looked upon the Covenant as an "Unequal Treaty," and emulated the threats of others to withdraw. Others have done this. China and Japan are threatening to do it. It is surely a game three can play as well as two, especially as there are abundant precedents before this crisis. In any event, it is no longer any use trying to stop the irresistible march of events toward war and catastrophe. We have surely done enough to show the Japanese people where the responsibility really lies for a rupture between them and Geneva. Probably we will also be attacked once more by Nanking on the ground that a strong line in Tokio would have averted the seizure of North China and Jehol. We are entirely satisfied that Japan would have been as deaf to threats or commands as she has been to persuasion. On that point our own conscience is perfectly clear. What Britain has to recognise is that the situation has gone quite beyond our control, and that things have gone much too far to prevent a favourable turn toward peace. It would seem, therefore, that Sir Miles Lampson is wasting his time in Nanking, and that his return to Peiping would remove from him and us the flood of suspicion in which once more, as so often in the past, our motives are viewed. For our part, we should feel better about it if we were certain that Nanking had definitely adopted the policy of "self-help," instead of depending on others to fight its battles, and that this anti-British campaign was not another propaganda smoke-screen to cover a new retreat, and escape the wrath of public opinion by directing it against us.

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THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Saturday, February 4, 1933

A CLEAR-CUT DENIAL.

Not a moment too soon the British authorities have issued two important denials of rumours that had gained a wide currency and that were seriously endangering the good relations that have for several years now subsisted between this country and Great Britain. We noted yesterday the denial of a rumour, apparently more widely circulated in Geneva, possibly in Europe, than in this part of the world, that there was no understanding whereby in return for a free hand in Tibet (which Japan is in no position either to guarantee to Great Britain or to help her to secure) Great Britain was to stand aside and leave Japan as free a hand as possible in Manchuria. When noting this denial we urged the necessity of denying rumours still more serious, because they were much more widely circulated in China, referring to an Anglo-Japanese understanding, said to have been reached in Shanghai last spring, whereby it was agreed that if Japan withdrew her forces from Shanghai promptly Great Britain would place no difficulties in Japan's way with regard to Manchuria. This denial is now forthcoming, and it has been made explicit and comprehensive. It covers three points: first, it declares explicitly that Great Britain adheres to the Lytton Report as the basis of policy with regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute; second, it declares that the reported understanding with Japan for the evacuation of Shanghai is "completely without foundation"; and third, it is explicitly denied that the British delegates at Geneva are bringing pressure to bear on other delegations in order to suppress reference in the report of the Committee of Nine to non-recognition of "Manchukuo".

These explicit denials, which ought to have been forthcoming weeks ago, should surely help to clear up a situation that, as will be seen by scanning the translation from "The Central Daily News" in an adjacent column, has been full of grave possibilities of evil; it will take some time for a widely-disseminated rumour to be completely dissipated, but at least its worst effects, it is to be hoped, will shortly be neutralized.

We would suggest that France make her position equally clear. Rumour alleges that she too was a party to an arrangement with Japan about the evacuation of Shanghai, and similarly alleges that for a free hand in Yunnan France is to connive at Japanese machinations in Manchuria, and give Japan a little help at Geneva. The Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907 is put forward as evidence that such an understanding would be but a natural development of Franco-Japanese policy. It would be wise on the part of France to make her position as clear as that of Great Britain has been made; and for both Powers to bring forth at Geneva fruits meet for (shall we say?) repentance.

There is another side to all this that needs to be noticed. If it was possible for competent correspondents at Geneva to interpret British action there as dictated by conditions that, it is now declared, did not actually exist, it is quite conceivable that in Japan a false impression has been created also, not perhaps in the official mind, where the truth must have been known, but in the public mind Certainly our perusal of the English-language

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

press in Japan has suggested that Japanese popular opinion held that Great Britain was all the time on the Japanese side. It must come as a surprise to the Japanese populace that they have been building on a shaky foundation Is it possible that the Japanese military have been to some extent buoyed up by similar hopes, crystallizing into beliefs? And if so, will the discovery that Great Britain has not been hypnotized by the outstretched hands of that weird creature the ghost of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance have any effect on Japanese policy? Japan's Foreign Office and its representatives must have known the facts but Japan s militarists have as little to do with the Foreign Office as the Jews had to do with the Samaritans. Mr. KARAKHAN has recently, in correspondence with the Japanese Government, had occasion to note, and to inform the Japanese Government that he noted, that the Japanese Government did not identify itself with a *communique* issued by the Japanese military. Is it possible that even the Japanese military will at last realize that it is a case of Japanese militarism against the world, and moderate their language and their diplomacy? It is to be hoped so, just as it is certain that had these announcements been made six months ago, as they could well have been, many lives and much property would have been saved, many misunderstandings would have been avoided, and a problem sufficiently difficult to tax the ingenuity of the ablest minds to solve would have been prevented from becoming confusion worse confounded.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND COMMITTEE OF NINE

"The Central Daily News", Nanking

Special reports dispatched from Geneva through the Central News Agency say that, owing to the fact that the Committee of Nine is completely under the British control and that Sir John Simon is decidedly pro-Japanese, not only will the clause declaring the violation of the League Covenant by Japan not be inserted in the report, but, more significantly, Britain has assured Japan that the Sixteenth Article of the Covenant will never be applied.

This news does not shock, surprise or disappoint us, or arouse our indignation. This development is what we anticipated. Ever since the fall of the Paul-Boncour cabinet in France, the League has ceased to be affected by Franco-British co-operation and has come under the autocratic dictatorship of Great Britain. As a matter of fact, there is no room for doubt regarding the fact that the Committee of Nine is under the control of the single hand of Britain.

Sir John Simon became famous for being "more conservative than the Conservatives", after the withdrawal of the Liberal members from the British National Government owing to the dispute regarding the Ottawa Agreement. Sir John has been under the strong influence of the Conservative party. Therefore it is only to be expected that Britain would do her best to meet the wishes of Japan, and that Sir John himself would make clear his pro-Japanese position. The funeral bell of the League has been rung. Our duty of doing our utmost to support the peace organization has been discharged. Now it is time for us to choose our ways and go freely ahead for our own salvation.

That the failure of the League in trying to settle the dispute was largely due to the faltering of Britain has been frankly stated by both the British and Chinese press. The indifference of the British delegates and the British Government's countenance of Japanese outrages must be responsible for the failure of the efforts at conciliation.

Taking into consideration only the relations between the genesis and organization of the Lytton Commission, and Britain, the absolute compliance, by the London Government, with the report, would appear to be a a moral responsibility. That the bogus organization was created solely by military force was clearly pointed out in the report. Both the League and its chief supporter are bound to strengthen this principle. But Britain was the first obstacle to the application of this idea at the Assembly last year and in the Committee of Nineteen. She further obstructed the insertion of the recommendation of non-recognition of "Manchukuo" in the report of the Committee of Nine. The prestige of the League has thus been reduced to ashes. Such being her political morality, how can Britain remain a member of the family of nations?

The close friendship between China and Britain has thus been easily destroyed. Today even her closest friends cannot plead for Britain. Has she any method to keep the Chinese purse of patience unbroken?

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THE PEIPING CHRONICLE. Tuesday. January 31. 1933.

A TASK FOR SIR MILES LAMPSON

"Shih Shih Sin Pao", Shanghai

Unfortunate events between Great Britain and China arose continually after the close of the World War. At first Japan was permitted, in secret agreement, to possess Tsingtao by France and Great Britain. Then British gunboats bombarded Wanhsien with numerous persons killed. This trend culminated with the "May 30" affair, when the Chinese people started their anti-British boycott. In reality, however, Britain had realized the inadvisability of her policy as early as at the Washington Conference, when she unhesitatingly shattered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, forced Japan to give up the control over Shantung, and adopted the same Pacific policy as that of the United States. Sir Miles Lampson has worked, with remarkable skill, for good will between Great Britain and this country from the time of the Shanghai Incident up to the present. During the last six or seven years, the friendship between these two countries could hardly have been greater. This diplomatic success must be attributed to the labours of the Minister.

We regret to learn that, after a period of close friendship with this country, Great Britain tends now to adopt a different policy towards China on the Manchurian issue. The strange attitude of Sir John Simon at Geneva is different from the hitherto impartial mind of the British people. Rumours are now spread in Europe that both France and Britain have promised Japan non-intervention in the latter's invasion of North China, in exchange for the peace and order in the Yangtze valley. These rumours have never been denied by the London authorities, and a compromising spirit is shown at Geneva by the British delegates towards the Japanese envoys. As far as Manchuria is concerned, Great Britain has adopted a wholly new policy. This is almost beyond doubt.

How great a mistake this is! The victims of the secret diplomacy of Britain and Japan are not China only, but the peace of the world as a whole. The first victim, following the collapse of the peace machinery, will be Great Britain. No one can deny that the prospects of Britain as a Power depend vitally on world peace. Any resort to secret diplomacy in the Far Eastern conflict is sure to hasten the next world conflagration.

Ever since the labours of Sir Miles Lampson bore fruit in China, merchants in the country have placed large orders in Great Britain, particularly after the Mukden Incident. Everyone knows that owing to this, the unemployment in Lancashire, in Birmingham and in Liverpool, showed a decrease. If Great Britain continues her secret diplomacy, the Chinese cannot but treat the British in the same way as they treat the Japanese. Steamers from Liverpool arriving at Shanghai will be perplexed to finding that their cargoes cannot be discharged. And British merchants in China will have to follow the Japanese in closing their firms and going home. This shows clearly whether the present policy of London towards China is advisable.

We hope that Great Britain will continue to be our friend. We speak at the very beginning of the misunderstanding. We ask both Sir John Simon and Sir Miles Lampson to try to restore our confidence in Great Britain by blowing away all the clouds of suspicion.

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THE NEED FOR CLARITY.

At a time like the present it is essential that doubtful points should be cleared up. Throughout the discussions at Geneva there has been on the part of the British representatives, notably SIR JOHN SIMON himself, such decided reluctance to handle difficulties with decision that not merely in China but elsewhere there has grown up the suspicion that the days of the Anglo-Japanese alliance are by no means dead. That fateful instrument is supposed to have been discarded at the Washington Conference. It served for years to tie the hands of British Foreign Secretaries in dealing with Far Eastern questions; it facilitated the undermining of British trade interests by Japanese competitors whose methods were not too squeamish; and it eventually proved absolutely inadequate to safeguard the very things its British sponsors hoped it would safeguard. It was scrapped at Washington, very reluctantly on both sides, in deference to pronounced hostility in British overseas dominions. Nevertheless, the apparent susceptibility of SIR JOHN SIMON to Japanese influence during the past eighteen months has stirred up misgivings in many minds; and these have not been allayed by repeated hints of an understanding reached at Shanghai last spring, between the French and British authorities on the one side and Japanese on the other, to the effect that the Anglo-French authorities undertook to be lenient with regard to Japanese activities in Manchuria if the Japanese troops were withdrawn from Shanghai.

This report is referred to in one of today's telegrams as having been denied by the British authorities. If so, the denial has been neither sufficiently emphatic nor adequately broadcast. If there is no truth in this allegation of an understanding it ought to have been denied explicitly, emphatically and in such manner that the whole world, and especially the whole of China, should know of it. We submit that, if there has been denial, such denial should be repeated in the most explicit, categorical and public manner possible.

* * *

The foregoing lines were already in type before we received the Reuter telegram from Nanking reporting the increasing anti-British feeling that is to be found there as the result of the daily reports from Geneva of the "British Delegation's anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese attitude"; but this later message simply gives point to what we had already written, with the intention of leaving it just as it stood. It is all the more necessary, in view of the Nanking message, for the British position to be made absolutely clear. It

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would be an irreparable misfortune if, after years of hard work by Sir Miles Lampson in trying to bridge the serious gulf that yawned between Britain and China when he took up his duties as Minister, after marking out of the new line of policy intimated in the Chamberlain declaration and in the documents of 1926, there were to recur an entirely unnecessary estrangement and misunderstanding. All this could be prevented by a few frank words, the very absence of which breeds suspicion and mistrust, and the utterance of which would dispel threatening storm-clouds. It is not as if, at this time of day, anything that is said one way or the other would make a scrap of difference to Japan. Japan, clearly, has decided to go her own way, and nothing that is merely said will prevent her. If, after all, there is a hand of iron inside Sir John Simon's velvet glove, there is all the more reason why there should be more candid speech on Sir John's tongue; and the sooner the better. Let all this mystery and suspicion and growing ill will be dissipated before it is too late.

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PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1933.

OUR "UNEQUAL TREATY."

DOES China regard Japan, or Great Britain, as the enemy? We ask the question in all seriousness, for the reception the Minister has been granted in Nanking is one that arouses just resentment. On no occasion even in the past six years, when China's foreign policy consisted of an effort by all and sundry to affront and antagonise every country enjoying diplomatic relations with her, has a Minister ever been received as Sir Miles Lampson has been greeted on his present visit—and no Minister, in the rather rueful opinion of his fellow-countrymen out here, deserved such a reception. He has most ably led the peace and conciliation school of diplomacy in China, has gone farther than any other foreign representative to meet Chinese aspirations, spent weary and almost torturing days with monumental patience round the Peace Conference table in Shanghai, and was the main instrument in the negotiation of an arrangement which put an end to Shanghai's suffering and enabled the wheels of industry and commerce to revolve once more. His visit Home for a well-deserved holiday should have been the prelude to promotion to a more pleasant Ambassadorial post.

On his return to the Kuomintang capital of China he is browbeaten and threatened. The official newspaper organ of the Government tells him that Nanking rather regrets the sudden burst of generosity it sprang upon him when he paid his last visit to the capital on his way home and was hailed as the "Peace Envoy." It is implied that he has failed to act as an honorary Ambassador for China during his visit to England, and has thus fallen short in his duty to this country—a very strange conception of the rôle of a foreign Ambassador, surely, who does not normally represent any other country but his own. He is told that unless his Government adopts the Chinese viewpoint to the very last full stop on the grave issues now at stake Britain will be subjected to a boycott of her trade and the hostility of this country for the next 30 years. We have had 30 years and more of this sort of thing, anyway, in the past. The "pathfinder in better Sino-British relations" must not attempt to be a pathfinder in still wider relations. He must play up to China and so must his Government, or Nanking will know the reason why!

It is an ironical commentary on the discussions at Geneva on the issue whether the boycott is a weapon of illegal offence or of legitimate self-defence that the nation which has played the leading part as mediator, or as critic of Japan in the Lytton Report, should now be threatened like this! However, there is a very old proverb of the fate which is visited upon all peacemakers and mediators. We might have expected it. As for the boycott threat, its uselessness as a political weapon and its value as an irritant have been exposed over and over again. Did not Dr. V. K. Ting only a week or so ago point out that during the boycott of Japan, when it was at its height, China bought $84,000,000 worth more of Japanese goods than in the preceding year? The consistent apostle of pro-Japanese policy in China, once denounced as a "traitor," is received with marked honours and dithyrambic praise, and is appointed High Adviser to the Generalissimo, who forthwith turns his back on China's responsibilities in the North and goes off to resume civil war. The Minister of a Power which has given abundant evidence of its friendship is received with threats and menaces!

We do not view this episode, however, with unmixed feelings. There are two aspects of this controversy on which we have divided views. On the one hand, we intensely resent, in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, charges that we are seeking any advantage for ourselves, or are bound by pledges to that end, in this crisis. On the other, we have now come to

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the conclusion that conciliation is played out, that we have reached the end of our tether in trying to prevent a catastrophe—on which this paper has never had any illusions—and that conciliation is impossible and must be abandoned. To the extent that these threats and menaces, however bad may be their taste, are directed against the futile effort to keep conciliation alive, to that extent may they be understood. If they are designed to browbeat us into renewed efforts to prevent the imminent irruption into Jehol, we have neither sympathy nor hope for them. We have done the best we can in Tokio, and we have failed. The effort to persuade the Japanese not to invade China Proper at the expense of a peaceful settlement of Jehol cannot be maintained any longer. It was, as we have pointed out before, in any event almost impossible to secure guarantees from either side to ensure that the aim in view would be attained.

What we do intensely resent are the unjust suspicions with which our mediation has been assailed. There was, we are told, a secret agreement in Shanghai, whereby we got the Japanese to evacuate that place in return for an undertaking that we would not interfere in Manchuria. To begin with, it was no small service to China to help restore normal conditions in Shanghai, for the Chinese were the major sufferers. But if we were bound by such a fantastic agreement, why did Lord Lytton afterwards write a Report which supported China to the extent of 90% of its substance on facts and to an even greater extent in its recommendations? The truth is that we have been doing nothing but interfere in the Manchurian situation all along, and have had to bear the brunt of the entire international responsibility, while the two Powers from whom China at various periods in the development of her political emotions expected the most have been able to remain little more than spectators.

Then there is the gross canard about Tibet, on which every youthful fanatic who knows as much about high policy as he does about Einstein's Theory of Relativity has seen fit to express himself with profound ignorance in those magazines which cater to that high order of international comment. Those who know anything at all about British policy in Tibet know that not only in that country, but in Nepaul, Sikkim and Bhutan, British policy is one which supports the native preference for seclusion. They are all left severely alone, and it was but recently that one prominent British writer boasted that he was the first Briton for many years to be allowed to visit Nepaul, where no British traders are permitted. Even Sir Charles Bell, a great friend of Tibet, and a distinguished Tibetan scholar who spent two decades in the border States of Bhutan and Sikkim, was permitted to spend only ten months in Lhassa. Why do not these critics, if they cannot credit us with such a policy, refer to the writings and utterances of the daring Chinese lady who paid a long visit to Tibet and Lhassa a year or two ago and inform their manifest ignorance in the light of her personal knowledge?

Our whole policy since the war, especially in Asia, has been a retreat from political responsibility, except, unfortunately, in this Far Eastern dispute, where for all our tireless labours and intense anxieties we have had as reward nothing but odium on one side and obstinate and arrogant defiance and non-co-operation on the other. It really seems time that we looked upon the Covenant as an "Unequal Treaty," and emulated the threats of others to withdraw. Others have done this. China and Japan are threatening to do it. It is surely a game three can play as well as two, especially as there are abundant precedents before this crisis. In any event, it is no longer any use trying to stop the irresistible march of events toward war and catastrophe. We have surely done enough to show the Japanese people where the responsibility really lies for a rupture between them and Geneva. Probably we will also be attacked once more by Nanking on the ground that a strong line in Tokio would have averted the seizure of North China and Jehol. We are entirely satisfied that Japan would have been as deaf to threats or commands as she has been to persuasion. On that point our own conscience is perfectly clear. What Britain has to recognise is that the situation has gone quite beyond our control, and that things have gone much too far to prevent a favourable turn toward peace. It would seem, therefore, that Sir Miles Lampson is wasting his time in Nanking, and that his return to Peiping would remove from him and us the flood of suspicion in which once more, as so often in the past, our motives are viewed. For our part, we should feel better about it if we were certain that Nanking had definitely adopted the policy of "self-help," instead of depending on others to fight its battles, and that this anti-British campaign was not another propaganda smoke-screen to cover a new retreat, and escape the wrath of public opinion by directing it against us.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A CLEAR-CUT DENIAL.

Not a moment too soon the British authorities have issued two important denials of rumours that had gained a wide currency and that were seriously endangering the good relations that have for several years now subsisted between this country and Great Britain. We noted yesterday the denial of a rumour, apparently more widely circulated in Geneva, possibly in Europe, than in this part of the world, that there was no understanding whereby in return for a free hand in Tibet (which Japan is in no position either to guarantee to Great Britain or to help her to secure) Great Britain was to stand aside and leave Japan as free a hand as possible in Manchuria. When noting this denial we urged the necessity of denying rumours still more serious, because they were much more widely circulated in China, referring to an Anglo-Japanese understanding, said to have been reached in Shanghai last spring, whereby it was agreed that if Japan withdrew her forces from Shanghai promptly Great Britain would place no difficulties in Japan's way with regard to Manchuria. This denial is now forthcoming, and it has been made explicit and comprehensive. It covers three points: first, it declares explicitly that Great Britain adheres to the Lytton Report as the basis of policy with regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute; second, it declares that the reported understanding with Japan for the evacuation of Shanghai is "completely without foundation"; and third, it is explicitly denied that the British delegates at Geneva are bringing pressure to bear on other delegations in order to suppress reference in the report of the Committee of Nine to non-recognition of "Manchukuo".

These explicit denials, which ought to have been forthcoming weeks ago, should surely help to clear up a situation that, as will be seen by scanning the translation from "The Central Daily News" in an adjacent column, has been full of grave possibilities of evil; it will take some time for a widely-disseminated rumour to be completely dissipated, but at least its worst effects, it is to be hoped, will shortly be neutralized.

We would suggest that France make her position equally clear. Rumour alleges that she too was a party to an arrangement with Japan about the evacuation of Shanghai, and similarly alleges that for a free hand in Yunnan France is to connive at Japanese machinations in Manchuria, and give Japan a little help at Geneva. The Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907 is put forward as evidence that such an understanding would be but a natural development of Franco Japanese policy. It would be wise on the part of France to make her position as clear as that of Great Britain has been made; and for both Powers to bring forth at Geneva fruits meet for (shall we say?) repentance.

There is another side to all this that needs to be noticed. If it was possible for competent correspondents at Geneva to interpret British action there as dictated by conditions that, it is now declared, did not actually exist, it is quite conceivable that in Japan a false impression has been created also, not perhaps in the official mind, where the truth must have been known, but in the public mind Certainly our perusal of the English-language

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THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Saturday, February 4, 1933

GREAT BRITAIN AND COMMITTEE OF NINE

"The Central Daily News", Nanking

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This news does not shock, surprise or disappoint us, or arouse our indignation. This development is what we anticipated. Ever since the fall of the Paul-Boncour cabinet in France, the League has ceased to be affected by Franco-British co-operation and has come under the autocratic dictatorship of Great Britain. As a matter of fact, there is no room for doubt regarding the fact that the Committee of Nine is under the control of the single hand of Britain.

Sir John Simon became famous for being "more conservative than the Conservatives", after the withdrawal of the Liberal members from the British National Government owing to the dispute regarding the Ottawa Agreement. Sir John has been under the strong influence of the Conservative party. Therefore it is only to be expected that Britain would do her best to meet the wishes of Japan, and that Sir John himself would make clear his pro-Japanese position. The funeral bell of the League has been rung. Our duty of doing our utmost to support the peace organization has been discharged. Now it is time for us to choose our ways and go freely ahead for our own salvation.

That the failure of the League in trying to settle the dispute was largely due to the faltering of Britain has been frankly stated by both the British and Chinese press. The indifference of the British delegates and the British Government's countenance of Japanese outrages must be responsible for the failure of the efforts at conciliation.

Taking into consideration only the relations between the genesis and organization of the Lytton Commission, and Britain, the absolute compliance, by the London Government, with the report, would appear to be a a moral responsibility. That the bogus organization was created solely by military force was clearly pointed out in the report. Both the League and its chief supporter are bound to strengthen this principle. But Britain was the first obstacle to the application of this idea at the Assembly last year and in the Committee of Nineteen. She further obstructed the insertion of the recommendation of non-recognition of "Manchukuo" in the report of the Committee of Nine. The prestige of the League has thus been reduced to ashes. Such being her political morality, how can Britain remain a member of the family of nations?

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

Nanking Office.

January 16, 1933.

Confidential

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-O/O
MAY 2
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Mr. Minister:

I beg to refer to my telegram of January 12 and to your two replies of January 13 and January 14, relating to the hope expressed by Mr. T. V. Soong, as Acting President of the Executive Yuan, that the American Government would support the Chinese side in the present controversy by issuing, at this critical moment, a strong statement reaffirming its position.

When your telegram transmitting the Department's reply reached me on the afternoon of January 14, T. V. Soong was not in Nanking. However, I called on him this morning and delivered the reply. He seemed to understand perfectly the reasons which brought about the Department's decision and accepted the

situation

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

situation with equanimity. Just as in the earlier interview, he expressed the belief that the authorities concerned in Europe were becoming timid and irresolute. He said the Chinese Government would like to see some nation, or some one in authority, assume a position of leadership.

In order to give Mr. Soong a stronger realization of the way in which our Government has repeatedly announced its position in relation to the principles involved in the Sino-Japanese controversy, I left with him a newspaper report of the Secretary's speech at Pittsburgh on October 26, with another clipping from the same paper, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of October 27, 1932, giving the Japanese reaction to that speech. The Japanese were reported to have condemned the speech as "vague idealism". These clippings seemed to alleviate Mr. Soong's disappointment at the decision of the Department not to issue another statement at this time.

Our conversation was rather interesting and I
1/ enclose a memorandum of what was said.

Yours sincerely,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure: 1/ Memorandum
dated January 16, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Interview

January 16, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy. Suggested Statement by the American Government.

Mr. T.V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck received on the afternoon of January 14, through the American Legation, the Department's telegram number 11 of January 13, 5 p.m. Mr. Soong was then in Shanghai but Mr. Peck called upon him on the morning of January 16 to deliver the Department's comment on Mr. Soong's suggestion that it would be very helpful to the Chinese Government if the American Government were to issue a statement at this juncture.

Mr. Peck said that he had been instructed to inform Mr. Soong that Dr. Sze, Chinese Minister in Washington, had recently made the same suggestion to the Department of State and had been told by the officers of the Department, in effect, that there were several factors in the situation which made the Department doubt whether it would be appropriate for the American Government, acting on its own initiative, to make a statement at this juncture, and whether such a statement would be productive of any good results. The Department felt, also, that in view of the precise manner in which the American Government had repeatedly expressed its opinions in regard to the situation, there could be no doubt in the mind of anyone what the views of the American Government were.

Mr.

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Mr. Peck said that an example of the statements to which the State Department had referred was to be found in the speech delivered by the Secretary of State at Pittsburgh October 26, 1938, and he inquired whether Mr. Soong had seen that speech. Mr. Soong said that he had not and Mr. Peck handed him the report of the speech as it appeared in the Christian Science Monitor of October 27, 1938, together with one column reporting Japanese comment on the speech. Mr. Soong asked whether he might have a copy made and Mr. Peck said that he might retain the clippings. Mr. Peck observed that that particular statement had seemed to result only in provoking, on the part of Japan, a rather academic discussion and he supposed that it was something of this sort which the Department may have had in mind when it expressed doubt whether a renewed statement at this time, on the initiative of the United States, would produce any good results. As for the appropriateness of such a statement, referred to by the Department of State, Mr. Peck observed that the moment was the eve of expected action by the Committee of Nineteen and, perhaps, the Department had felt that it would be far better for the Committee of Nineteen to take the next step, without having attention diverted by any other party.

Mr. Soong expressed himself as in agreement with all these considerations, but observed that the Committee of Nineteen seemed timid and what the Chinese Government was hoping for was an exhibition of leadership from some quarter.

Mr. Peck observed that it would appear from newspaper reports

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

reports that the Secretary General of the League had worked out one or two tentative proposals for the Committee of Nineteen, and that the Japanese Government had seemed to regard these draft proposals favorably, although it insisted on some strict proviso, e.g., that there should be no reference in the proposal adopted to the non-recognition of Manchoukuo. Mr. Soong said that there seemed to be a probability that the Japanese Government would consent to a compromise measure, if it were proposed by the Committee of Nineteen.

Mr. Soong inquired whether Mr. Johnson, the American Minister, was intending to come to Nanking soon. Mr. Peck said that the latest word he had from Mr. Johnson was to the effect that Mr. Johnson was in doubt whether it would be more adivsable for him to remain in Peiping or to come to Nanking. Mr. Peck inquired what Mr. Soong's own opinion was in this matter. Mr. Soong said that the Chinese Foreign Office would be glad if the diplomatic representatives were to come to Nanking. He remarked that Mr. Ingram, Counselor of the British Legation, had arrived and he inquired whether Mr. Peck knew whether the French Minister was coming. Mr. Peck said that he did not. Mr. Peck remarked that, so far as his own opinion was concerned, there seemed to be much to be said on both sides. He said that he rather felt that if, for purposes of discussion, it were to be assumed that all the Legations had already removed to Nanking, North China would seem to be a rather remote region and less in the public eye. On this account,

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the presence of the diplomatic representatives in Peiping might conceivably be of advantage in the present situation. Mr. Soong said that there was a great deal in this view and he, himself, had formed no positive opinion whether it would be better for the diplomatic representatives to come to Nanking or to remain in Peiping.

Mr. Peck observed that the present moment seemed to be a dangerous time for rumors. He said that a rumor had reached him that the American Minister had advised Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to leave Peiping. Mr. Peck said that Mr. Johnson had authorized him to contradict this rumor emphatically, as being without any foundation. Mr. Soong said that there had been a report that certain Chinese had approached the foreign/diplomatic representatives, urging that they take measures to preserve Peiping from attacks, on the ground that it was a cultural center, and that Mr. Johnson had observed that if all military forces were to be removed from Peiping, this would do away with the probability of an attack on Peiping. Mr. Soong observed in regard to this that he thought it would be far better for the historical relics in Peiping to be destroyed, rather than for Chinese morale to be lowered by a withdrawal of military forces from Peiping. He said the important thing at the moment was to keep up Chinese spirit and not permit it to flag.

Mr. Soong inquired whether Mr. Peck had received any news from the North in regard to Japanese military activities. Mr. Peck said that the Legation had not sent him any news recently and he inquired what Mr. Soong thought

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

thought the next development would be. Mr. Soong said that the Government had arrived at the conclusion that the Japanese probably would not make any further incursion into North China for the time being, but would probably give their attention to attacks on Jehol. Mr. Peck observed that, from press reports, it would appear that the Japanese had already begun such attacks.

Mr. Peck inquired whether there was any special feature of the situation which Mr. Soong would like to have brought to the attention of the American Minister or the Department of State. Mr. Soong said that there was nothing special at the moment.

WRP:MVD

true copy of signed original
M.V.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 21, 1933.

MMH:

Berlin's despatch No. 2217 of February 28, 1933, gives German press comment on the resolution of February 24 of the League. The VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG believes peace has made progress. The FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG regards the League as too weak to work. The GERMANIA regards the resolution as a mere formal act. The GERMANIA also believes that unanimity at Geneva was due to the pressure of American debts.

MES:LS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, February 28, 1933.

No. 2217

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict.
German Press Reaction to Geneva Decision.

793.94

RECD DEPT OF STATE 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 COM. & REC. MAR 11 33
DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 27 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS F/HS
FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK To the Field In U. S. A.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 1933 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE M
APR 10 1933
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1933 Department of State

793.94/6029

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

793.94/5918

FILED APR 18 1933

In continuation of despatch No. 2184 of February 10, 1933, I have the honor to report that German press comment on the Geneva decision in the Sino-Japanese conflict, based on the Lytton Report, was limited to a few moderate journals which did not agree on the fundamental significance of the event.

The moderate Left VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG of February 25 regarded the compactness of the front against Japan as an indication that the idea of peace had made progress, and added that the distance from a sharp resol-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ution to effective measures of boycott was no farther than that already traversed by the League from the opening of the case to the present decision. On the other hand, the moderate Left FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG of February 26 persisted in regarding the League as too weak to work, while the Centrist GERMANIA of February 25 regarded the adoption of the League Resolution as a mere formal act. This journal went on to say that if Washington were to repeat last year's attempt to call a Kellogg Pact Conference - which would be practically identical with a conference of the nine Washington Powers of 1929 - the question would be raised for the first time as to what was to be done in the case of a breach of this pact.

The limitations of the League were apparent, this newspaper continued. In the South American conflicts it had been confronted by the Monroe Doctrine, and its influence did not reach to the Far East. Europe had ceased to be the center of the world. The problem of reorganizing the League on a European basis was never more urgent.

The GERMANIA concluded that in the negotiations between Washington and her European debtors, the Far Eastern problem would be the touchstone for America, and the present unanimity at Geneva was due to the pressure of American debts. With the aid of her new uncontested Manchurian holdings, Japan could strengthen her

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

her position in the Pacific to such an extent that she would ~~there~~ be superior to America.

Respectfully yours,

Frederic M. Sackett.

Copy to EIC, Paris.

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WWS-HCF-gw

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 18, 1933.

~~RCM:~~
~~DMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

Consul General Cunningham reports herein an effort of the Japanese Consul General to have the Senior Consul (Mr. Cunningham) allay the excitement of the Chinese with regard to Japanese military parades and maneuvers in Shanghai.

It seems that the particular parade or maneuver in question was scheduled for January 9, 1933, the same day on which the Japanese Consul General wrote to the Senior Consul. Apparently this did not give the Senior Consul an opportunity to comply with the request. The parade was held and the Consul General about one month later on February 7 discussed the matter with the Japanese Consul General in an effort to induce him to persuade the Japanese military authorities at Shanghai to dispense with military maneuvers and parades which could only be considered by the Chinese as provocative.

It is interesting to note in the last sentence of Mr. Cunningham's memorandum of his conversation with the Japanese Consul General that the latter stated that the Japanese military authorities "have got enough of the Chapei incident."

J E J

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8733

CONFIDENTIAL.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, February 9, 1933.

793.94

Subject: Military and Naval Maneuvers and Parades by Japanese Forces.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

AM RECD DEPT OF STATE U.S.A. DIVISION OF CONTROL MAR 11 33

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1933 Department of State

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a letter dated January 9, 1933, addressed by the Japanese Consul General to the Senior Consul requesting that a statement be issued to allay any misapprehensions of the Chinese populace which might be caused by parades and maneuvers of the Japanese naval and military forces in Shanghai. There is also

2/ enclosed a copy of a memorandum of conversation between myself and Consul General Ishii, dated February 7, 1933. It is not purposed to make further reply to Consul General Ishii's letter.

FILED MAY 22 1933

In order that the situation may be understood by the Department and the Legation it may be stated that it had been proclaimed a few days in advance that the Japanese naval and military authorities in Shanghai would carry out their annual parade and maneuvers on January 6th, but owing to inclement weather the parade was deferred until the 9th, when it took place as announced.

The

F/HS 793.94/6030

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Chinese people in Chapei and outlying contiguous districts made a considerable rush to enter the Settlement, under the impression that there was to be another attack upon that district (see this office's political report for the month of January, 1933).

It was known that the Shanghai Municipal Council had suggested to the Japanese Consul General that there should be no demonstration whatever by the Japanese forces, as it would unquestionably cause commotion in the Chinese community. However, irrespective of this suggestion, the annual parade took place. It was in anticipation of this parade and future military demonstrations that the Japanese Consul General had addressed the letter mentioned to the Senior Consul. This letter was not received in time to be given consideration before the parade but it was regarded by me and some of my colleagues as affording an opportunity to discuss frankly the situation with our Japanese colleague, and the memorandum of conversation enclosed is the result.

Very respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1/- Copy of letter from Japanese Consul General to Senior Consul, dated January 9, 1933.
2/- Memorandum of Conversation, dated February 7, 1933.

ESC MB
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4 Carbon Copies Received

In Quintuplicate.
In Triplicate to Legation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8733 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February 9, 1933, on the subject: "Military and Naval Maneuvers and Parades by Japanese Forces."

COPY

JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL,
Shanghai.
January 9th, 1933.

Sir and dear Colleague,

As the routine manoeuvers and parades of the Japanese naval landing force are usually given as the ostensible reasons for the apprehension which periodically occurs amongst Chinese residents in Chapei and other extra-Settlement Northern districts, I have the honour to request your good offices in making an announcement through the medium of the press or otherwise, of the essentially routine character of these manoeuvers and parades which are similar to those customarily carried out by the armed forces of other Powers in Shanghai.

Such a pronouncement made by you as the Senior Consul should have a reassuring effect and should serve to allay the groundless fears of the residents referred to, inso far as they may be attributed to the activities of the Japanese Naval Landing Force.

I have the honour to be,
Sir and dear Colleague,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) Itaro Ishii,
Consul General.

Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
American Consul-General
and Senior Consul,
Shanghai.

Copied by MB
Compared with NLH

0876

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8733 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated February 9, 1933, on the subject: "Military and Naval Maneuvers and Parades by Japanese Forces."

Confidential.

Memorandum of Conversation. February 7, 1933.

Consul General Cunningham,
Consul General I. Ishii.

Subject: Military and Naval Maneuvers and Parades by Japanese Forces.

I expressed regret to Consul General Ishii that I had not earlier been able to call upon him regarding his letter of January 9, 1933, in which he had requested the good offices of the Senior Consul in making an announcement, through the medium of the press or otherwise, of the routine character of the military maneuvers and parades which the Japanese wished to carry out and which are similar to those customarily engaged in by other armed powers in Shanghai. I stated that I had learned informally that the urgency of his request had passed before the receipt of his letter, therefore I did not feel that the matter was pressing, though I did wish him to know that I was always willing to contribute as far as possible toward allaying the unfounded fears of the Chinese in regard to military activities of all nations. I pointed out to him, however, that since he had been kind enough to ask the Senior Consul to reassure the Chinese and endeavor to allay their fears regarding the demonstrations of the Japanese Landing Force, I would take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the fear of the Chinese in this respect was not surprising; that the relations existing between the two countries were strained and fresh in the minds of the Chinese were the Sino-Japanese troubles of the early part of last year; and I ventured to express the hope that military maneuvers and parades, even on a small scale, should be dispensed with as far as possible within the limits of efficiency, so that fear might not be engendered in the breast of the Chinese people; that I was sure he would appreciate fully that it would not be possible for the Japanese troops to carry out maneuvers and parades on the same scale as did other foreign troops without creating fear and alarm among the Chinese. I instanced that in 1925, after the May 30 incident, Chinese feeling was distinctly anti-foreign and in order that there should be no chance of provoking the Chinese population I had requested the American military and naval forces not to demonstrate more than was necessary; I requested that all military demonstrations within the limits of efficiency be dispensed with. I said that I mentioned

this

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

this in order that he might fully appreciate my feelings in regard to such demonstrations; that at the present time the feeling against the Japanese was considerable, and while other powers might carry out maneuvers and parades without creating any feeling of uneasiness, I ventured to express the belief that the Japanese could not do so.

Consul General Ishii said the occasion for parades and maneuvers had now passed and that he had already represented to the Japanese navy and military authorities that maneuvers should be dispensed with so far as practicable and he believed there would be none which could be considered as provocative to the Chinese; however, he hoped I would not object to his calling upon me should there be any occasion for such parades or maneuvers in the future. He then made the remarkable statement, in a very subdued tone of voice, that he had urged the military authorities not to be demonstrative and that he "believed they will heed my request as they too have got enough of the Chapei incident."

Edwin S. Cunningham

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

April 3

Mr Secretary:

You will find this memorandum of especial interest.

W.P.

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 22, 1933.

U.
Mr. Phillips:

S.
Mr. Secretary:

I think you will be interested in this despatch from the Embassy at Tokyo, a summary of which is attached.

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
NOTED

SKHornbeck

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 22, 1933.

Tokyo's confidential despatch No. 301 of February 24, 1933, encloses a 12 page memorandum prepared by Mr. Neville on the relationship between the Washington Conference and the London Naval Conference and the present situation in the Far East.

Mr. Neville states that armaments are really political instruments and that nations consider what appear to them to be political necessities whenever armaments are discussed. In this belief Secretary Hughes insisted that at the Washington Conference the political situation in the Far East should be considered along with naval reduction. The rights and commitments of the Powers in China were examined and the formulation of an acceptable international policy toward China was achieved. As a result, naval limitation was discussed in an atmosphere of good will and naval rivalry was definitely ended for a period of years and good will and confidence among the Powers gained. This feeling of good will and confidence was based on two assumptions: (1) that the situation in the Far East would be treated as a whole and progress in naval limitation would proceed with a proper consideration of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

conditions in the Far East, and (2) that new situations would be frankly and fully discussed.

By the time the London Naval Conference was called, Russia had emerged again in the Far East as an important element in the situation and the internal conditions in China had been growing steadily worse, not one of the Washington undertakings which China was to fulfil having been carried out. The London Naval Conference, however, took no account of the political situation in the Far East. This created a feeling of uneasiness in many quarters, particularly in Japan, and a belief developed that the London Treaty had no spiritual value and did not touch fundamentals, thereby breeding distrust. (The Geneva Disarmament Conference has had a similar result.)

In 1931 this atmosphere of distrust and suspicion was aggravated by world-wide depression and discontent, by an intense anti-Japanese boycott in China, by conditions in Manchuria which appeared to be worse than ever, the various agreements with the Chinese being still unimplemented, by Soviet Russia being once more a power in the Far East, by the Washington Conference undertakings being still

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

unfulfilled, while the London Conference had ignored the actual conditions that Japan had to face. Then Japan acted alone.

Although Japan should have sought the counsel of the Powers signatory to the Washington settlement, the Powers had paid very little attention to their treaties and obligations under that Conference in respect to the Far East. This dangerous situation had received nothing like the consideration given to the Naval Treaty, although equally important.

The greatest measure of responsibility for the present impasse rests on Japan but the other Powers can hardly wash their hands of it. Matters were allowed to drift when there should have been close consultation and examination of conditions as new developments took place.

The Manchurian problem is political rather than juridical. Mere non-acceptance of "Manchukuo" will not meet the situation. Japan will stay there in the face of any opposition or disapproval. At the present juncture there is little to be done except to await developments. The moral disapprobation of the world and the more potent economic pressure caused

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

by the mounting cost of the venture itself are the factors that must be relied on to convince the Japanese of the undesirability of their present course. After this is accomplished the general problem of the Far East and its relation to world armament will remain. These must be treated as political problems, with tolerance, but with constant watchfulness and frequent consultation.

A re-examination of the Far Eastern situation is needed. It is impossible to reach a solution before a League of Nations commission so long as the commission attempts to assess blame and pass moral judgment. The United States has definite treaty obligations in the Far East. It should be alive to them and make an effort to carry them out. This calls for constant care, cooperation and exchange of views.

The only consideration likely to influence Japan is the re-creation, if possible, of something of the atmosphere among the Powers that obtained after the Washington Conference. Otherwise we must be content to see the present unsatisfactory situation continue indefinitely. The Japanese realize that Manchuria is inseparable from the general problem of China

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

but feel that the indifference of the Powers, the reentry of Russian forces into the Far East, and the danger to huge Japanese interests from an irresponsible local government have rendered necessary the creation of a separatist movement in Manchuria. In their present temper the Japanese are prepared to go bankrupt rather than yield to pressure.

The present dangerous situation can be improved only by convincing the Japanese that their legitimate interests are not in danger and that the Powers interested in the Far East are alive to the political situation which Japan faces on the adjacent continent.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, February 24, 1933.

No. 301.

Subject: Relationship between ~~the Washington~~ Conference of 1921-1922 and the London Naval Conference of 1930 and present situation in the Far East.

Confidential.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 11 1933
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AM RECD
MAR 11 33

Sent to Tokyo
APR 4 1933
Copy in WE
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

Copy sent to Delegate Geneva Disarmament Conference.

F/HS 793.94/6031

AT 793.94

FILED
APR 12 1933

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 8 1933
NOTED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ There is submitted to the Department herewith a paper prepared by Mr. Neville, Counselor of the Embassy, setting forth certain views with regard to the relationship between the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the present situation in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure:
As stated.
800.
ELN:r
Copy to Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies
Received

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1 to despatch
No 301 of Oct. 24, '33 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

MEMORANDUM.

Introduction.

In submitting the following observations it is realized that there is a large measure of opinion opposed to the idea that progress in the reduction of Naval Armament should be considered as bound up with the political situation in the Far East. This opinion contends that Japan is safe from any attack likely to be made upon her, and has no need of a larger Naval establishment; that Japan has no mandate to guard the Far East from attack and that the purpose of the Japanese armaments is to control by force the Far Eastern political situation in her own interest.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these or other moral factors involved, or to assess the relative values of armaments. It is rather its purpose to indicate that armaments are really political instruments, and that nations consider what appear to them to be political necessities whenever armaments are discussed.

It is not contended here that Japanese action in Manchuria might not have taken place had there been closer cooperation among the Powers. Japan has an expanding population and a relatively advanced industry. The Army is an active and popular force in the life of the people. Its desire for glory and influence coupled with the other factors just noted might have impelled the Manchurian venture in any case, but this is a matter upon which it is not very useful to speculate. At the present juncture there is little that can be done but to await developments. The moral disapprobation of the world, and the

more

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

more potent economic pressure caused by the mounting cost of the venture itself are the factors that must be relied on to convince the Japanese of the undesirability of their present course. Even after that is accomplished, however, the general problem of the Far East and its relation to world armament, as envisaged at the Washington Conference, will remain. These must be treated as political problems, with tolerance, but with constant watchfulness and frequent consultation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The political relations among the Powers having interests in the Far East have been governed by the arrangements reached at the Washington Conference of November, 1921-February, 1922. These arrangements constitute an organic unit, of which the Naval treaty is one part. This treaty was, so far as the United States was concerned, part of a political settlement based on acknowledgment of an existing situation. The situation acknowledged was the determination of the British never to be involved in a serious political disagreement with the United States and the determination of the people of the United States to embark on no adventures in the Western Pacific region which would be likely to lead to war. Before the Conference was undertaken, the Administration was satisfied that Congress had no intention of appropriating any money for naval bases or fortifications west of Hawaii. This determination was embodied in treaty form. The British had some years previously come to a similar determination in regard to the Far East or the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would never have been concluded. This attitude on the part of ourselves and the British was a definite consideration in inducing the Japanese to accept Naval limitation.

Another consideration was the China Settlement. The political situation in China had been the cause of

great

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

great uneasiness ever since the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. This war had been followed by a scramble for territory and concessions on the part of the Powers. The Hay doctrine of the "Open Door" was an effort to meet the situation. It has had a great influence, but although it was accepted in principle by China itself and all Powers interested in China, it did not prevent rivalries and clashes of interest before and after the Boxer outbreak of 1900. These culminated in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05.

In this conflict the Japanese had the active support of the British with whom they had concluded an alliance in 1902. The British concluded this alliance, because they felt that it was the only method of meeting the Russian advance into the Far East. Russia in a dominant position in China meant an end or at least a check to profitable British commercial and industrial expansion of the type envisaged by the "Open Door".

After the Russian War the Japanese found themselves supreme in Korea and in possession of a Railway and a leasehold in Southern Manchuria which had been held by the Russians. Korea was subsequently annexed(1910) to Japan and the Japanese developed more or less successfully the South Manchuria area. This was accomplished under the aegis, so far as the Occident was concerned, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In 1911-12 came the Chinese Revolution. While the Provisional Government undertook to fulfil the

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

obligations of the old Chinese Empire, the World War came on before the position of the Powers interested could be clarified and settled anew. Japan fulfilled her obligations to Britain under the Alliance by reducing the German position at Kiaochao and the German possessions in the South Seas. Japan also played a part in the naval activities of the Allies in the Mediterranean.

In the meantime something of an industrial and social revolution took place in the Far East. The demands for war materials taxed the industrial resources of the Western nations even beyond their capacity. The Far East, which hitherto had depended on imports for its machinery and industrial equipment, was forced to supply its own needs and even to supplement the industrial output of Europe. The end of the war found Japan one of the industrial nations of the world. The South Manchuria Railway was building its own locomotives and other equipment, or buying in Japan. The greatest change was in Manchuria. At the time of the Boxer outbreak Manchuria was a sparsely settled area. The railways opened up the country and the great demand for agricultural products had induced millions of Chinese and a less number of Koreans to settle there. It has been estimated that the population of the region increased 20 millions in twenty years.

This development created new problems of a political character. So long as Manchuria was

relatively

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

relatively undeveloped, land, railway and residence problems were not of immediate or pressing importance. The rapidly expanding industries of Japan demanded both raw materials and markets. While China had felt the war stimulus to some extent, internal political difficulties together with a hopelessly ineffective and corrupt official class had prevented healthy development. The Japanese felt that the time had come to regularize their position and assure themselves against future contingencies in China. The methods adopted to this end were not calculated to inspire confidence. They presented the 21 demands. There were long and protracted negotiations, and the Japanese were the recipients of much adverse comment, particularly in the United States and Great Britain. The British felt that they should have been consulted and informed of the Japanese intentions. Then came the end of the war, the Versailles Treaty and much recrimination on the subject of Kiaochao. The Japanese insisted successfully that the rendition of that area should be negotiated between Japan and China- a procedure which is typically Japanese.

The Treaty of Versailles had left the Far Eastern situation virtually untouched and had done nothing concrete about disarmament except the disarmament of Germany. The United States undertook to liquidate these situations. In the belief that armaments are more a result of a political situation than the cause, Secretary Hughes insisted that the political situation

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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in the Far East should be considered along with naval reduction. Japan had to be included in any program of naval limitation, and to obtain Japanese participation, consideration had to be given to that country's international problems and commitments. The greatest of these were China and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was the American purpose to re-examine the rights and commitments of the Powers in China and to formulate an acceptable international policy towards that country,-something which had not been attempted since the Boxer protocol of 1901. This accomplished, it was Secretary Hughes's belief that the details of Naval limitation would be discussed in an atmosphere of good will. This assumption was justified. The interested Nations subscribed to the Nine Power Treaty and the Resolutions in regard to policy in China. The Japanese came to an understanding with China in regard to Shantung and signed the Four Power Treaty ending their Alliance with Great Britain. The termination of the Alliance meant a great deal to them, as it had been their passport to consideration as a great power, as outlined above. The Conference, it was hoped, had definitely put an end for a period of years to naval rivalry growing out of a disturbed political situation. This hope was realized and for a period of years there was a feeling of good will and confidence among the Powers.

This feeling however, was based on two assumptions. One was that the situation would be treated as a whole;

progress

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

progress in naval limitation would proceed pari-passu with a proper consideration of conditions in the Far East. Otherwise the Japanese could justly feel that their interests were being disregarded and that the confidence they had placed in the Washington settlements was not justified. The other was that new situations would be frankly and fully discussed.

Now Russia for all practical purposes had been completely disregarded at the Washington Conference. This could not be helped at the time as there was no government functioning there with which it was possible to treat. In 1929 however, there was an attempt on the part of the Chinese, or of the Military element in Manchuria, to oust the Soviets from the Chinese Eastern Railway. The world found that the Soviets had sufficient military force to defeat this attempt and that the Russians were a decided element in the situation. In the meantime internal conditions in China had been growing steadily worse. Not one of the Washington undertakings which China was to fulfil was carried out. Judiciary reforms, fiscal reforms and payment of debts remained in the same state as at the time of the Conference or even became worse.

With matters in this condition, the London Conference was called to add to the naval restrictions of the Washington Conference. No account was taken then of the political

situation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

situation in the Far East which had formed the basis of the Washington treaties. The Conference merely dealt with the material elements that make up navies. It created a feeling of uneasiness in many quarters, and particularly in Japan. The Japanese probably had nothing to complain of in the bargain they had made, but there grew up a belief that the new treaty had no spiritual value and did not touch fundamentals. The London Conference bred not confidence but distrust. It may be said here that a similar result has attended the efforts at Geneva to restrict armaments, except that no treaties have been produced.

In this atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, aggravated by the world-wide economic collapse and internal problems of industrial and social discontent, the Japanese looked about them. In addition to the normal difficulties in China, the Japanese were subjected to an intense boycott; the situation in Manchuria appeared worse than ever, as the Chinese had used borrowed money to operate railways to the detriment of the Japanese line; their various agreements with the Chinese remained unimplemented and in the background was Soviet Russia, apparently once more a Power. The Washington undertakings were unfulfilled, and the Conference called to supplement the Naval treaty had ignored the actual conditions that Japan had to face. So in 1931 Japan acted alone.

Before taking action Japan should have sought the counsel of the Powers signatory to the Washington settlement. At the same time it must be admitted that these

Powers

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Powers had paid very little attention to their obligations under the treaties and resolutions. The British had acted alone in Shanghai and the British and Americans had acted together at Nanking in 1927. But there had been no comprehensive review of conditions or concerted action since the treaties were made in 1922. The Powers had done nothing with the reports of the Extraterritorial and other commissions beyond filing them. China had received substantial benefits in the matter of customs tariff, for example, with no corresponding improvement in internal conditions. This situation was troublesome and even dangerous but it received nothing like the consideration given to the Naval treaty. It was, however, equally important.

After the Japanese action in September 1931 the Chinese appealed to the League of Nations, alleging aggression on the part of Japan and asking redress under the Covenant. It was further claimed that Japan had violated the terms of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. Japan pleaded self-defense, and confronted the world as the champion of the new state of Manchukuo. In characteristic fashion, Japan insists (1) on the bona fides of the new State and (2) that she is prepared to negotiate with China direct and with no one else.

Before proceeding further it may be well to examine the allegations and defence. Neither will bear much scrutiny. The Chinese are in no position to bring up any of the Washington settlements. They have defaulted

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

on their obligations thereunder and do not come into court with clean hands. The Japanese can hardly maintain that Japan was in danger. China is not a military menace. Nor is Manchukuo in fact an independent State.

The best proof of this is the fact that under present conditions it would be impractical for any Power to negotiate an independent treaty with it. So far as the Kellogg Pact is concerned, it appears to have value only in the relations between politically responsible States. It accurately describes the relations between the United States and Great Britain or France. It is open to question whether it accurately describes international relations with China because the Powers have to maintain armed forces there to assure elementary protection for the Treaty rights of their nationals. Force or the threat of force is always present.

Hence the idea of the Lytton Commission that the powers should work toward "reconstruction" in China was merit.

The fact is that the situation has grown out of political conditions in China which it was the common duty of the Powers party to the Washington Treaties to watch and provide for. While the greatest measure of responsibility for the present impasse attaches to Japan, the other Powers can hardly wash their hands of it. Matters were allowed to drift when there should have been close consultation and examination of conditions as new developments took place.

The Manchurian problem question, therefore, is political rather than juridical. It is impossible for any sort of practical solution to be worked out before a League of Nations Commission so long as the commission attempts

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to assess blame and pass moral judgment. There is no certainly effective means of enforcing any decision save by force. What is needed is a re-examination of the Far Eastern situation. In the past ten years new developments have taken place which must be frankly faced. Russia is once more a Power there- sufficiently so to cause Japan anxiety. Internal conditions in China indicate political and social collapse over a wide area. A politically independent Philippine Government will add a new factor that will have to be taken into account. After eleven years it would seem desirable to revalue the situation, take counsel together and start afresh.

The Armament phase of the Washington agreements has received attention at the expense of the political background which made the Naval treaty possible. This is true of Japan, certainly, and it would appear in some degree to account for the reluctance in Europe of the French and Italians to commit themselves at London. The United States has no commitments in Europe. It has, however, definite treaty obligations in the Far East. It should be alive to them and make an effort to carry them out. This calls for constant care, cooperation and exchange of views. Mere non-acceptance of "Manchukuo" will not meet the situation. Japan will stay there in the face of any opposition or disapproval.

The only consideration likely to influence Japan is the re-creation if possible, of something of the atmosphere among the Powers that obtained after the Washington Conference. No other course seems to offer much, unless

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

we are content to see the present unsatisfactory situation continue indefinitely. Manchuria is inseparable from the general problem of China. The Japanese realize it, but feel that the indifference of the Powers, the reentry of Russian forces into the Far East following the Chinese Eastern Railway incident of 1929, and the danger to the huge Japanese interests from an irresponsible local Government, have rendered necessary the creation of a separatist movement there. They will persist in their present course at least until they have satisfied themselves that their interests are assured. It will cost them a great deal, but in their present temper they are prepared to go bankrupt rather than yield to pressure.

This is not a desirable situation. It is dangerous. It can be improved only by convincing the Japanese that their legitimate interests are not in danger and that the Powers interested in the Far East are alive to the political situation which Japan faces on the adjacent continent.

Fenruary 14, 1933. E. L. Neville

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 4, 1933

No. 245

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

793.94/6031

Note
123-Neville

Sir:

The Department has received your confidential despatch No. 301 of February 24, 1933, enclosing a memorandum prepared by Mr. Neville, Counselor of the Embassy, on the subject "Relationship between the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the London Naval Conference of 1930 and present situation in the Far East". This memorandum is, in the opinion of the Department, excellent both in form and in substance. It gives a thoughtful analysis of a most intricate subject and is a helpful contribution to an understanding of the present situation in the Far East.

The Department desires that you convey to Mr. Neville its commendation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
William Phillips

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3-23-33.

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A true copy of the signed orig-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
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MAR 13 33
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No.D-443

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, February 9, 1933.

793.94
note
741.94

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Rumored Pro-Japanese attitude of Great Britain.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
MAR 1933
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 14 1933
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. D-437, of February 4, 1933, enclosing copies of press articles dealing with the then current charge that Great Britain was taking a pro-Japanese attitude in the present controversy.

In the issue of February 4, 1933, the KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY reproduced still more translations of Chinese press comments adducing evidence to show that Great Britain was pro-Japanese, in spite of the denials issued.

However, in the issue of February 6, 1933, the KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY issued a statement dated Nanking, February 5, 1933, which was apparently inspired by the Foreign Office and intended to close this incident,

inasmuch

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MAR 21 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

inasmuch as it ended with the following words:

> "It is learnt that Sir Miles' assurances have dispelled the fears held in official circles and given great satisfaction to the Government."

A copy of this item is enclosed herewith.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of item from the KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY bulletin of February 6, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation.

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WRP:MCL

0901

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY bulletin
Nanking, February 6, 1933.
Understood to be semi-official.

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-443 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated February 9, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy: Rumored Pro-Japanese attitude of Great Britain".

(KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY)

Feb. 6, 1933.

Nanking, Feb. 5.-- It is understood that Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister to China, has definitely assured Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that there is absolutely no truth in the current rumours alleging that the British Government has any secret understanding with Japan regarding the present Sino-Japanese situation and that the British delegate at Geneva, Sir John Simon, is opposed to the inclusion in the report of the Committee of Nineteen of any reference to the non-recognition of "Manchukuo."

It is learnt that Sir Miles' assurances have dispelled the fears held in official circles and given great satisfaction to the Government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No.D-437

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China, February 4, 1933.

MAR 13 33

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-D/O
MAY 1 [illegible]
ASSISTANT [illegible]

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Rumored Pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 14 1933
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. D-434, of February 2, 1933, in regard to China's reaction to what is construed to be a pro-Japanese attitude on the part of Great Britain.

On January 31, the KUO MIN news agency published in translation another collection of excerpts from the Chinese press dealing with the alleged pro-Japanese attitude of Great Britain. A copy of this release is enclosed herewith. 1/

When Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister, arrived in Nanking on the morning of February 1, 1933, his attention was immediately called to the REUTER press release dated Geneva, January 31, stating that the conversations of the British Ambassador in Tokyo with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs were likely to stiffen the attitude of the smaller Powers of the Committee of Nineteen against toning down projected

reference

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

reference in the report to matters like Manchoukuo and the boycott. It is believed that he immediately telegraphed to London pointing out the danger of press items of this sort. Whether or not in response to his telegram, a REUTER despatch dated London, February 2, stated that the British Foreign Office had issued a statement declaring there was no truth in newspaper reports from Geneva that the British Government was working to secure a free hand for Japan in Manchuria, in return for a free hand for Britain in Tibet. The press message ended with the following paragraph in quotation marks:

> "Sir John Simon has made it quite plain in Geneva that in event of conciliation failing, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to see that the Lytton Report is adopted."

Nothing had been heard in Nanking of any exchange of assistance between Great Britain and Japan in reference to Manchuria and Tibet; the rumor had been that an arrangement had been made secretly between Great Britain and Japan according to which Japan was to have free action in Manchuria and Great Britain in the Yangtze Valley.

A REUTER despatch dated London, February 3, denied frankly, as from official sources, that Great Britain had made any deal with Japan resulting in Japan's evacuation of Shanghai, or that the British delegates at Geneva were bringing pressure to bear on other delegations, in order to suppress reference in the
2/ report to the non-recognition of Manchoukuo. A copy

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of this press despatch is enclosed herewith. It seems evident that this communiqué was issued in response to the suggestion from the British Minister. The apprehensions of Chinese official circles in regard to the feared British action at Geneva have been, so I am informed by the British Minister, greatly alleviated.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1/ Copy of KUO MIN news release dated January 31, 1933.

2/ Copy of REUTER despatch dated London, February 3, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP/ECH:MCL

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Department No.D-437 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated February 4, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy: Rumored Pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain."

(KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY)

Jan. 31, 1933.

Chinese Press Comment on the "Pro-Japanese" Attitude of Great Britain.

Shanghai, Jan. 31.-- The Chinese Press in Shanghai is growing more and more sceptical over the British attitude vis-a-vis the present Sino-Japanese controversy, according to a survey made by the Kuo Min News Agency.

In a leader this morning, the Sin Wan Pao, conservative daily, comments at length upon the reported objection on the part of the British Government to the proposal that the Report of the Committee of Nineteen should recommend the non-recognition of the puppet "Manchukuo."

Quoting a United Press message dated Jan. 29, the Sin Wan Pao points out that Sir John Simon, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, is said to be opposed to the non-recognition point on the ground that "some nations might desire to recognize Manchukuo and that they should have a free voice in the matter."

Characterizing the statement attributed to the British Foreign Secretary as outrageous, the journal asks whether Manchuria is not an integral part of the Chinese territory, and whether it is the desire of the British Government to recognize the puppet state.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"Is the British Government taking exception to the declaration of the American State Department that the United States Government will not recognize any territory acquired by force? Is not Great Britain a signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant, both of which guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China?" the journal asks.

The journal points out that Great Britain has been justly reputed for her faithfulness in the observance of international treaties. It was because of the German violation of the treaty guaranteeing the permanent neutrality of Belgium that Great Britain had entered the World War against the Central Powers. "Is is possible that she can be so oblivious of her treaty obligations and treat all the international treaties as mere scraps of paper, just because of her pro-Japanese sentiments?" the journal asks.

Great Britain as Japan's Scapegoat.

After drawing attention to the disastrous consequences of the British policy, the journal points out that Great Britain has always suffered from her friendship or alliance with Japan. She got nothing out of her Alliance with Japan except the addition of a powerful competitor in her Far Eastern Trade. In the so-called Nanking Road Incident, Great Britain also suffered the consequences of Japanese actions; the main cause of that incident being the alleged murder of a Chinese workman by the authorities of a Japanese cotton mill.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"The British Government is now again assisting the Japanese in violating and destroying the various international treaties. She will go down to history as Japan's accomplice in the breach of the League Covenant. It is indeed hard to predict the extent to which she will suffer from her present policy," the journal concludes.

The China Times.

The adoption of diplomatic and "commercial" reprisals against the so-called pro-Japanese Powers is suggested by the China Times in a leader this morning, under the heading "A warning to the pro-Japanese Powers."

The journal charges that "in utter disregard of the views of the smaller Powers, the British Government is attempting to manipulate the Committee of Nine in order to carry out her pro-Japanese policy." It refers to the fact that the British Ambassador at Tokyo has assured the Japanese Government that the League of Nations would not apply the sanctions provided in Article 16 of the League Covenant. That there is some sort of secret understanding between these two Powers is thus obvious, the journal claims.

However, that there should be such close friendship between these Imperialistic Powers should cause no surprise, it says. What China has to consider now is the question of self-defence against such machinations.

It points out that while the final stage in the present international drama has not yet been reached, China must however decide upon the measures, commercial as well as diplomatic, which she should take against the pro-Japanese Powers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"The fact that these pro-Japanese Powers have not hesitated to trample under foot the cause of right and justice and destroy the League Covenant shows that they do not set much store on China's friendship. They would have therefore only themselves to blame if by such actions, they should draw upon themselves diplomatic or commercial retaliation," the journal concludes.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Department No.D-437 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated February 4, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy: Rumored Pro-Japanese Attitude of Great Britain."

London, February 3.

In view of divergent reports being circulated in China, it is officially emphasised that Britain adheres to the Lytton Report as the basis of her policy in regard to the Sino-Japanese dispute.

The reported Anglo-Japanese understanding at the time of the Japanese occupation of Shanghai whereby Britain promised to support the Japanese in Manchuria in return for Japan's evacuation of Shanghai is completely without foundation. Likewise it is officially denied that the British delegates at Geneva are bringing pressure to bear on other delegations in order to suppress reference in the report to non-recognition of Manchukuo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 15, 1933.

~~EMC~~:
~~JBL~~:
~~MMH~~:

Despatch No. 722 of February 13, 1933, to the Legation at Peiping from the Consul General at Mukden, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department with Mukden's despatch of February 14, 1933, entitled "Developments in Relation to Jehol".

This despatch, which is largely a forecast of what may be expected to occur in the Japanese invasion of Jehol Province, is now of little informative value to the Department as Jehol was captured while this despatch was en route. However, certain statements are still of interest.

Consul General Myers observes that the Japanese were having great difficulty in persuading the officials of Jehol Province to join "Manchukuo" and that a reliable Japanese official had told a member of the Consulate staff that arrangements were not working out as well as the Japanese had hoped; that General Tang Yu-lin and the Nanking Government considered it advisable not to attempt more than "face saving" resistance to the Japanese advance on Jehol,

but

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

but that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang believes that serious resistance must be offered.

Consul General Myers states that a well-informed Japanese civilian is of the opinion that if the Japanese troops met with serious resistance in Jehol, it will be difficult to restrain them when they reach the Great Wall.

A Japanese official confidentially informed the Consulate that Mongolian troops commanded by Japanese officers are now operating in the eastern part of Central Jehol and that the Japanese military, following occupation of Peipiao in December, began the construction of a light railway from Peipiao in the direction of Chihfeng. Consul General Myers feels that if this report is true, the construction of this railway must have been undertaken with the connivance of Tang Yu-lin's local authorities.

The Japanese military estimate that Tang Yu-lin had from 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers and that there are approximately 50,000 bandits and volunteers in Jehol. They estimate the strength of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars as 20,000.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No.------

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, Manchuria, February 14, 1933.

MAR 13 33

SUBJECT: Developments in Relation to Jehol.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

G for Monroe Hall
Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 14 1933 Department of State

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 24 1933 ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SIR:

793.94

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 722 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated February 13, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FILED
APR 8 1933

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 722
to the Legation at Peiping.

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HTW

4 Carbon Copies
Received ... F.E.

F/HS 793.94/6034

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 722

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, Manchuria, February 13, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Developments in Relation to Jehol.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/5826

With reference to my telegrams of January 28, 4 p. m. and February 1, 4 p. m. and to my despatch No. 719 of February 3, 1933, entitled "Preparations for Occupation of Jehol Province", I have the honor to submit additional information concerning the situation in Jehol Province.

793.94/5850

793.94/6004

The press ban on news of developments in northern Jehol and of Japanese troop movements has not been lifted and Japanese consular officers also state that they have been instructed not to give out information on these subjects. Yesterday a responsible Japanese official told a member of my staff that it was improbable that official information concerning the developments in Jehol would be given out before the end of this month. He admitted, however, that by saying no official statements

would

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

would be issued he did not intend to imply that nothing important would happen. On February 7th the same official had said that he probably would be able to give this office interesting information relating to Jehol in a week or so. These circumstances are reported as indications that although Mukden is full of rumors of developments and events affecting Jehol, it is impossible to obtain definite and completely reliable information.

There are several indications that the plans of the Japanese for bringing Jehol Province under the administration of Manchoukuo through "persuasion", instead of by a serious large-scale military campaign are not developing smoothly. Yesterday a reliable Japanese official told a member of my staff that General Itagaki's arrangements, as reported in despatch No. 719 of February 3, 1933, are not working out as well as the Japanese had hoped they would. T'ang Yu-lin and the Nanking Government, this official maintained, consider it advisable not to attempt more than "face-saving" resistance to the Japanese advance on Jehol, but Chang Hsueh-liang believes that serious resistance must be offered. The Legation undoubtedly is aware whether or not there is any truth in this theory. The information is submitted merely as the personal opinion of a local Japanese official who should be well-informed.

Because General Itagaki's plans have not developed as well as the Japanese anticipated, occupation of Jehol has been slightly delayed. It seems hardly possible that

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the province will be brought, as the Japanese hoped it would, under the administration of Manchoukuo by the anniversary of the founding of the new state on March 1. If the attempts to secure T'ang Yu-lin's adherence to the new regime and to persuade the Nanking Government to order its forces to withdraw within the Wall after making a gesture fail, the well-prepared Japanese army will invade the province.

A well-informed Japanese civilian observer contends that if the Chinese forces should offer sustained resistance to the Japanese advance and inflict heavy losses on the invaders, the gorge of the Japanese military will rise to such an extent that it will be exceedingly difficult to restrain the advancing Japanese troops when they reach the Great Wall. This factor is believed to have influenced the cooler heads among the Japanese military to delay slightly the drive on Jehol in the hope that General Itagaki's arrangements may to a certain extent work out successfully, and prevent a major clash between the Chinese and Japanese troops. The delay also gives Japanese and Mongolian instigators more time to stir up internal trouble among the leaders in Jehol. But the Kwantung army considers itself prepared for any evantuality and may begin major operation at any time.

A Japanese official said in confidence yesterday that Mongolian troops commanded by Japanese officers are now operating in the eastern part of central Jehol. It is not clear whether they are operating against T'ang Yu-lin's troops or "Volunteers". The same official said that he had heard that the Japanese military after

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the occupation of Peipiao in December began the construction of a light railway from Peipiao in the direction of Chihfeng. If the report is true the construction must have been undertaken with the connivance of T'ang Yu-lin's local authorities. From the same source it has been learned that the Kwantung army had a large number of light boats sent to the vicinity of Shanhaikuan. This movement, my informant contends, is an indication that the military operations in that vicinity may not be concluded by the coming of the first thaws.

A reliable American who visited Tungliao during the past week reported that four Japanese troop trains under the command of Major General Mogi recently reached that city. He estimated roughly that there were 3,000 Japanese, 500 Mongols and 1,500 Manchoukuo troops concentrated at Tungliao and at Changwu on the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway.

The Japanese military estimate that T'ang Yu-lin has from 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers and that there are approximately 50,000 bandits and "volunteers" in Jehol. They also maintain that there is one brigade of Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars in the vicinity of each of the following places: Lingyuan, Wukungfu, Pingchuan. Another brigade is in the region north of the Lungk'ou pass. The strength of the regulars is estimated to be 20,000.

Movements of Japanese troops and equipment south from Mukden over the Feng-Shan Railway were continued last week. A reliable American saw two military trains moving south and noticed considerable military activity along the railway. It is believed that the principal points

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

from which the Japanese will begin the invasion of Jehol are Tungliao, Suichung and Peipiao.

The Japanese strength at Shanhaikuan is estimated to be 2,000 men. A reliable American who visited that city recently reported that the feeling was that anything might happen there at any time. He also reported that there was considerable activity in the direction of Chiumenk'ou. It is probable that when the Japanese invade Jehol they will attempt to cut off the retreat of the Chinese troops by blocking the Lungk'ou pass. In view of the rugged character of the terrain in the vicinity of the wall it seems probable that the Japanese will proceed as far as the Ch'inglung river over the Shanhaikuan-Peiping motor road.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MH:HTW

A true copy of the signed original.

0918

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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~~[illegible]~~ see page 3
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Despatch No 895 of February 17, 1933 from the Consul General at Stuttgart transmits a poorly translated clipping from the BADISCHE PRESSE.

This article points out that England is determined not to " lift a finger " against Japanese aggression and France refuses to " let the left hand know what the right one does directly to the Japanese." the writer does not know why this " hitch in Anglo-American cooperation. "

Strong criticism is made of our Congressional action to grant freedom to the Philippines inasmuch as such freedom will imperil the political balance of power in the Pacific.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

NO. 895

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Stuttgart, Germany.

DIV. COM. & REC

February 17, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 9 1933

793.94

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING PRESS CLIPPING ON FAR EASTERN EVENTS.

1—1065 G P O

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 14 1933
Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a clipping from the "Badische Presse" (liberal nationalist) of Karlsruhe, in the State of Baden, issue of February 16, 1933, with its translation, containing comment on Far Eastern events which reflect the opinions that are prevalent in this section of Germany and probably throughout the country. It will be noted that reference is made therein to the English attitude in the Manchurian question.

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2/

I regret that it was impossible to obtain more than one clipping of the above mentioned newspaper.

Respectfully yours,

Leon Dominian,
American Consul General in charge.

Enclosures:
1) Newspaper clipping,
2) Translation of newspaper clipping.

Despatch in quintuplicate
Copy to Embassy, Berlin
Copy to Consulate General, Berlin
710
LD-VG

F/HS 793.94/6035

FILED
MAY 19 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fernöstliche Lektion.

Die gegenwärtigen Verhandlungen über die Abrüstung stehen unter der Hochspannung des chinesisch-japanischen Konflikts, und die deutsche Delegation dürfte, als man ihr als ersten Punkt der Tagesordnung die französischen Sicherheitswünsche präsentierte, sich bewußt gewesen sein, daß auch für sie der fernöstliche Konflikt ein Faktum ist, das sie einzusetzen hat. Denn er wirkt nicht nur über die Schalttafel des Völkerbundes, sondern auch indirekt über die Konstellation der Großmächte auf unsere Stellung und Forderungen zurück, und zwar bisher nicht günstig, weil wir noch nicht aktiv damit gearbeitet haben. Da sich aber auf beiden Genfer Verhandlungsfeldern die Dinge zuspitzen, muß die innere Verbindung hergestellt werden.

Die Versöhnungsaktion des Völkerbundes ist gescheitert. Sowohl Japan als auch China haben den Versöhnungstext der 19er-Kommission abgelehnt, ehe er amtlich vorgelegt wurde. Nun hat noch die Außerordentliche Völkerbundsversammlung das Wort, und dann will der Völkerbundsrat seinen „Kriegsartikel" hervorholen, nämlich das Verfahren nach Artikel 15 Absatz 4 einleiten. Das ist der berühmte Absatz, der einen Krieg seiner Mitglieder als legal erlaubt, wenn sich nicht alle Ratsmitglieder auf einen Beschluß einigen. Man wird also einen gemeinsamen Bericht über den Konflikt ausarbeiten. Er wird wohl oder übel eine moralische Verurteilung der Japaner enthalten, die durch Japan geschaffene Lage als vertragswidrig bezeichnen und Vorschläge machen müssen, wie der Konflikt geschlichtet werden soll. Japan und China werden dabei nicht mitstimmen dürfen. Gegen die Macht, die den Bericht annimmt, darf kein Krieg geführt werden. Die Situation wäre also dann die, daß theoretisch, wenn Japan ablehnt, der Völkerbundsrat feststellen muß, ob in der Mandschurei wirklich „Krieg" herrscht — bisher war das bekanntlich nur ein „Zwischenfall", ein „malheur" oder eine „Polizeiaktion". Ist das festgestellt, dann müßte nach Artikel 16 der finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Boykott gegen Japan einsetzen. Und jede Völkerbundsmacht hätte das Recht, legal gegen Japan Krieg zu führen. Sie werden sich hüten, so etwas zu sagen oder zu tun, der Völkerbundsrat und die Mächte. Und Japan wird weiter tun, was es für richtig hält. Wird vielleicht nicht einmal aus dem Völkerbund austreten, sondern sich in dem internationalen Bann ziemlich wohlfühlen, weil es dann die Schererei in Genf los ist. Der Völkerbund hinwiederum wird es bei der Bannbulle bewenden lassen, da sich kein weltliches Schwert finden wird, sie zu vollstrecken. Wahrscheinlich aber wird man den „Kriegsartikel" recht bald wieder fallen lassen, und das Palaver beginnt von vorn.

Die weltpolitischen Folgen werden dadurch natürlich nicht aufgehalten. Man kann sie noch nicht klar erkennen. Sicher ist, daß Japan weder die Mandschurei noch die Provinz Jehol, noch die Grenzstation Schanghaikwan je wieder herausgeben wird. In England hat man sich bereits damit abgefunden. Die „Times" hat alle diese Gebiete abgeschrieben und warnt männiglich, sich dieser „lebendigen Entwicklung" entgegenzustellen. Die amtliche englische Politik runzelt die Stirne, weil die Japaner auf der mit englischem Geld gebauten Bahn Mukden—Tientsin—Peking sitzen, und noch nicht heraus ist, ob sie nicht auch noch ganz Nordchina bis zum Hoangho besetzen und einen Pufferstaat daraus machen werden. Immerhin scheint England entschlossen zu sein, keinen Finger zu rühren. Ob das klug ist, wird erst die Zukunft lehren. Wir sehen aber heute schon mit Bedenken, wie weit sich England und Amerika auseinandergelebt haben, sonst könnte sich England nicht diese Haltung leisten. Die Japaner stellen mit Genugtuung fest, daß der Völkerbund unter englischem Druck bereit war, Amerika und Rußland — die nächstbetroffenen an dem Konflikt — aus der Versöhnungsaktion auszuschalten und heimlich den Japanern den Nacken zu steifen. Auch Frankreich läßt die linke Hand nicht wissen, was die rechte bei den Japanern direkt tut. Man will nur verhindern, daß Japan aus dem Völkerbund austritt und es zu einem offenen Krach in der Abrüstung kommen läßt.

*

Welche Gründe hat England für diese Politik? Rückwirkungen des alten englisch-japanischen Bündnisses? Das hatte nur einen Sinn, als man noch Front gegen Amerika nahm. Verhinderung von noch Schlimmerem? Das wäre eine Täuschung, denn darauf ist die japanische Mentalität nicht eingestellt. Druck auf Amerika in der Schuldenfrage und bei gewissen englischen Kreisen der heimliche Wunsch, die japanische Sturheit werde die weitere Flottenabrüstung zu Fall bringen? Auf alle Fälle ist auffällig und bedenklich, daß die amerikanisch-englische Zusammenarbeit nicht mehr klappt. Wie es damit steht, wird wohl erst die Amtsführung Roosevelts zeigen. Wird er den japanischen Handschuh eines Tages aufnehmen oder weiter zurückweichen als Hoover und die Republikaner? Einstweilen hat er nach einer Konferenz mit Stimion erklärt, er stehe zu der amerikanischen Note vom Januar 1932, wonach Amerika kein Ergebnis anerkennen werde, das durch Verletzung der Verträge zustandegekommen sei. Das ist eine Absage an Japan, wird dieses aber um so weniger rühren, als das amerikanische Parlament unlängst geradezu selbstmörderische Politik getrieben hat, die den Japanern nur recht sein kann. Wir meinen die Annahme des Unabhängigkeitsgesetzes für die Philippinen durch Senat und Unterhaus gegen den Einspruch des Präsidenten Hoover.

Wenn man einmal die Geschichte der Dummheit und Kurzsichtigkeit der Parlamentarier der Welt schreiben wird, dann wird der gegenwärtige amerikanische Kongreß einen Prominentenplatz darin verdienen. Denn er ließ sich nicht von außenpolitischen, sondern von rein innerpolitisch-wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten leiten. Man wollte die Zucker-, Pflanzenfaser- und Oelkuchenkonkurrenz der Philippinen los sein. Also erzwingt man ein Gesetz, nach dem sich Amerika aus der strategisch, geopolitisch und wirtschaftlich blendendsten Position freiwillig zurückziehen soll, die die Welt zu vergeben hat. Dies soll binnen 12 Jahren geschehen. Dann sollen die Philippinen vollständig souverän werden. Amerika wird zwar das Recht behalten, Marine- und Militärstationen zu unterhalten, aber gleichzeitig soll es eine „ewige Neutralisierung" der Inseln bei den Mächten anstreben. Beides zusammen wird nicht möglich sein, und selbst wenn es möglich wäre, dann wäre die

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BADISCHE PR
Karlsruhe, (
, 1933.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1
to Despatch No.895
of American Consulate,
Stuttgart, Germany,
dated February 17, 1933.

BADISCHE PRESSE,
Karlsruhe, Germany.

February 16, 1933.

Welche Gründe hat England für diese Politik? Rückwirkungen des alten englisch-japanischen Bündnisses? Das hatte nur einen Sinn, als man noch Front gegen Amerika nahm. Verhinderung von noch Schlimmerem? Das wäre eine Täuschung, denn darauf ist die japanische Mentalität nicht eingestellt. Druck auf Amerika in der Schuldenfrage und bei gewissen englischen Kreisen der heimliche Wunsch, die japanische Sturheit werde die weitere Flottenabrüstung zu Fall bringen? Auf alle Fälle ist auffällig und bedenklich, daß die amerikanisch-englische Zusammenarbeit nicht mehr klappt. Wie es damit steht, wird wohl erst die Amtsführung Roosevelts zeigen. Wird er den japanischen Handschuh eines Tages aufnehmen oder weiter zurückweichen als Hoover und die Republikaner? Einstweilen hat er nach einer Konferenz mit Stimson erklärt, er stehe zu der amerikanischen Note vom Januar 1932, wonach Amerika kein Ergebnis anerkennen werde, das durch Verletzung der Verträge zustandegekommen sei. Das ist eine Absage an Japan, wird dieses aber um so weniger rühren, als das amerikanische Parlament unlängst geradezu selbstmörderische Politik getrieben hat, die den Japanern nur recht sein kann. Wir meinen die Annahme des Unabhängigkeitsgesetzes für die Philippinen durch Senat und Unterhaus gegen den Einspruch des Präsidenten Hoover.

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Position Amerikas so geschwächt, daß es mehr Geld, vielleicht auch mehr Blut bedürfen würde, die Inseln zu halten als jetzt. Werden neutralisiert, dann müßte Amerika die Hauptlast des Schutzes tragen, aber die anderen Mächte können ihm ihnterreden. Gebe sich aber Amerika wirklich zurück, dann wäre das Gleichgewicht im Fernen Osten so erschüttert, daß es ein politisches Erd- und Seebeben größe und auf England eine neue schwere Last der Verantwortung für den Schutz der Kolonien im ganzen Pazifik und Indischen Ozean, einschließlich der Südsee fiele. Denn wenn die Amerikaner gehen, dann kommen die Japaner mit der Sicherheit eines Naturgesetzes. Die Folgen kann man sich kaum ausdenken: Holland müßte um seine Kolonien zittern, Frankreich würde die Solidarität der christlichen Kolonialmächte ausnützen, um sich England teuer zu machen. Die Südseedominions würden wieder mehr von England abhängig. England selbst aber stünde dann Japan direkt gegenüber.

Man wird verstehen, daß Japan diese Entwicklung ausnützen und dem Augenblicke abnehmen wird, was keine Gewalttat zustandebringen kann. Die Großmächte und der Völkerbund sehen dieser Umkrämpelung des weltpolitischen Gleichgewichts zu, ja, sie befördern sie und suchen sie zu verstehen. Und hieraus muß Deutschland seine Schlüsse ziehen. Sie werden sinnfälliger Art sein, erstens: Völkerbund und Großmächte beugen sich der Macht, die Mächteverhältnisse anerkennen kann, und opfern den Schwachen. Zweitens: Völkerbund und Großmächte, vor allem England und Frankreich, halten und bezahlen in der Mandschurei einen Separatismus, wie ihn Frankreich am Rhein, in der Pfalz, im Saargebiet gebucht und gefördert hat. Drittens: Völkerbund und Großmächte erkennen im Extremste an, daß ein bestehender Vertrag nicht die letzte endgültige Entwicklung aufhalten könne und dürfe.

Sie anerkennen das japanische Lebensrecht, sie weigern sich, das deutsche anzuerkennen. Hierin: durch Japans Vorgehen wird die Abrüstungskonferenz jadoliert, da es weder zu Waffer noch zu Land abrüsten kann, wenn es seine Heute fühern will. Und nun übertragen wir die Lehren des Fernen Ostens auf unsere Lage und dann wollen wir den französischen Sicherheitsforderungen begegnen. Nunmehr: in China hat Jahrhunderte lang der Philosoph, der Denker, der Literat geherrscht. So blieb China bei der Großmittel stehen und kam nicht zum Staat. In Japan regierte der Soldat, und war der Staat die reallte Lebensform. Heute sind wir Zeuge einer Entwicklung, in der China von dem Militärischen und soldatischen Japan zum Staatwesen, zur soldatischen Lebensform gepreßt wird.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.2
to Despatch No.895
of American Consulate,
Stuttgart, Germany,
dated February 17, 1933.

BADISCHE PRESSE,
Karlsruhe, Germany.

February 16, 1933.

T r a n s l a t i o n.

LESSON TAUGHT BY THE FAR EAST.

The present negotiations on disarmament are influenced by the high tension of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The German delegation was probably conscious, when the French wishes for security were presented to it as first item on the agenda, of the fact that the conflict in the Far East is a factor which the German delegation, too, has to take into account, because this conflict reacts upon our position and claims, not only through the switchboard of the League of Nations but also indirectly through the system of the great powers, and that not in a favorable way so far because we have not yet acted upon it. As matters are becoming acute, however, on both of the Geneva fields of negotiation, the connection between them must be established.

The conciliatory action of the League of Nations has failed. Both Japan and China have rejected the reconciliation text of the Commission of Nineteen before it was officially submitted. Now it is the turn for the Extraordinary Assembly of the League of Nations to speak, and then the League of Nations Council intends to produce its "War Article", namely, to institute the proceedings according to Article 15, Paragraph 4. That is the famous paragraph which permits a war of one of its members as legal if all members of the Council cannot pass a unanimous resolution. One will therefore compile a joint report on the conflict. This will have to contain a moral condemnation of the Japanese at all events, define the situation created by Japan as contrary to the treaty and make proposals as to means of composing the conflict. Japan and China will not be permitted to vote in this regard. War may not be made upon the power which accepts the report. The situation would then be such that in theory, if Japan refuses, the Council of the League of Nations must ascertain whether there is actually "war" in Manchuria - as is known, this was so far only an "incident", a "misfortune" or a "police action". When that has been ascertained, then the financial and economic boycott against Japan would have to begin, according to Article 16. And every power of the League of Nations would have the right to make war upon Japan legally. The Council of the League of Nations and the powers

will

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

will think twice before saying or doing anything the like. And Japan will continue to do what it considers right. It will perhaps not even withdraw from the League of Nations but feel quite at its ease in the international ban because it would then be rid of the vexation in Geneva. The League of Nations, on the other hand, will let the matter rest with its edict, because no sword of any nation will be lifted to execute it. Probably, however, one will soon drop the "War Article" and the palaver will begin afresh.

The international political consequences will, of course, not be checked thereby. It is not yet possible to see them clearly. It is certain that Japan will deliver up neither Manchuria nor the province of Jehol nor the border station Shanghaikwan. In England one has already acquiesced in this. The "Times" has written off all these territories and warns one and all of opposing this vital development. Official English politics frown because the Japanese have occupied the railway Mukden - Tientsin - Peking built with English money, and because it is not yet known whether they will not also occupy the whole of northern China as far as the Hoangho and make a buffer-state of it. Nevertheless, England seems to be determined not to lift a finger. Whether that is wise will be shown by the future. But we observe with concern already at this time how far England and America have drifted apart, otherwise England could not afford this attitude. The Japanese ascertain with satisfaction that the League of Nations was prepared, under English pressure, to exclude America and Russia - those concerned most by the conflict - from the reconciliation action and secretly to stiffen the neck of the Japanese. France, too, does not let the left hand know what the right one does directly to the Japanese. One only wants to prevent Japan from withdrawing from the League of Nations and an open quarrel arising in the disarmament question.

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What reasons has England for this policy ? Reactions of the old Anglo-Japanese alliance ? There was sense in that only as long as one opposed America. To prevent worse things ? That would be an illusion because Japanese mentality does not work that way. Pressure on America in the debt question and in certain English circles the secret desire that Japanese stubbornness might wreck further naval disarmament ? At any rate it is striking and critical that there is a hitch in Anglo-American cooperation. How matters stand in this respect will probably be shown only by Roosevelt's administration. Will he take up the Japanese gauntlet

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

one day or recede further than Hoover and the Republicans ? Meanwhile he has declared after a conference with Stimson that he agrees with the American note of January 1932, according to which America would not recognize a result which had been brought about by violation of treaties. That is a challenge to Japan which will, however, move it all the less as the American parliament has recently pursued a policy which is little short of suicidal, and which suits the Japanese. We mean the passing of the independence bill for the Philippines by the Senate and the House of Representatives against the objection of President Hoover.

When the history of the stupidity and shortsightedness of parliamentarians of the world will once be written, the present American Congress will deserve a prominent place therein, because it let itself be guided by viewpoints not of foreign but of purely interior and economic politics. One wishes to be rid of the competition of the Philippines in sugar, vegetable-fibre and oil-cake. Therefore a law is being enforced according to which America is to withdraw voluntarily from the strategically, geopolitically and economically most brilliant position which the world has to bestow. This is to take place within twelve years. After that the Philippines are to become completely sovereign. To be sure, America will reserve the right to maintain naval and military stations, but at the same time it is to strive for an "eternal neutralization" of the isles with the powers. To combine both will be impossible, and even if it were possible America's position would be weakened to such an extent that it would cost more money, perhaps more blood too, than today to keep the isles. If they are neutralized America would have to bear the main burden of protection, but the other powers could interfere. If, however, America should really withdraw, the balance of power in the Far East would be shaken to such a degree that a political earth and seaquake would result and a new heavy burden of responsibility for the protection of the colonies in the whole Pacific and Indian Ocean, including the South Sea, would fall on England. When the Americans withdraw the Japanese appear with the certainty of a physical law. The consequences are beyond thought: Holland would have to tremble for its colonies, France would play upon the solidarity of the Indo-Chinese colonial powers in order to make itself valuable to England. The South Sea dominions would again become more dependent on England. England itself would then confront Japan directly.

One will understand that Japan will make the most of this development and take from the moment what no eternity can bring back. The great powers and League of Nations watch this overthrow of the international

political

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

political balance of powers, they even approve of it and try to understand it. Germany must draw her conclusions therefrom. There will be five of them, namely, first: the League of Nations and the great powers defer to the power which can apply armed force and they sacrifice the weak. Second, the League of Nations and the great powers, above all England and France, suffer and favor in Manchuria a separatism as was suffered and promoted by France at the Rhine, in the Palatinate and in the Saar Territory. Third, the League of Nations and the great powers recognize in the Lytton Report that an existing treaty could not and should not stop living development. They recognize Japan's right to live, they refuse to recognize the German one. Fourth, the disarmament conference is being wrecked by Japan's course of action, because Japan can disarm neither by water nor by land if it wishes to secure its prey. And now we transfer the lessons taught by the Far East to our situation and then we shall face the French demands for security. Fifth, in China the philosopher, the thinker, the man of letters ruled for centuries. Thus China stopped at the stage of family interests and did not develop into a state. In Japan the soldier ruled and the state was the most real form of life. Today we are witnesses of a development during which China is being beaten into a military form of life by the statesmanlike and militaristic Japan.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D-444

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, February 10, 1933.

793.94 note
844.20211

DEPT. OF STATE MAR 13 1933 PM REGD

Subject: Japanese Propaganda in the United States.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 14 1933 Department of State

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

F/HS 793.94/6036

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No.D-416 of January 9, 1933, transmitting a copy of a letter written from the United States by Mr. David Z. T. Yui, General Secretary of the National Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association of China.

Mr. W. P. Mills has allowed me to see copies of a letter dated December 19, 1932, written from the United States by Mr. Yui and of an article written by Mr. H. S. Liang, who appears to be a companion of Mr. Yui in his travels.

FILED MAR 10 1933

What follows is a synopsis of Mr. Yui's letter:

It has been gleaned from discussions with influential American friends in New York and Washington that:

> Both the League of Nations and the European countries in general are afraid of doing anything to risk Japan's challenge to war, nevertheless China should continue to press the League for a just solution;

The

0927

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The United States is obligated to uphold the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, but probably will do no more than refuse recognition of situations brought about by means in contravention of these treaties;

Knowing the world situation Japan will continue her invasion of Chinese territory;

While avoiding a declaration of war against Japan for the present, the Chinese Government and people should do their best to recover Manchuria and resist further invasion and to intensify the boycott;

American opinion is that it is right for China to resume relations with Russia, but China must not rely too heavily on Soviet Russia nor repeat the previous mistakes.

There follows a synopsis of the article by

Mr. H. S. Liang:

The general American attitude toward the Sino-Japanese controversy is that Japan is wrong and China right, but Americans do not want to go to war with Japan over Manchuria;

Clever Japanese propaganda is increasing the number of those Americans who feel that the right policy for America is to let the Japanese and Chinese as Orientals settle their own quarrel;

Japanese propaganda in the United States is disseminated through the radio and through important educational institutions;

Japanese Consuls in the United States, as well as Japanese Chambers of Commerce, and lecturers on Japanese subjects supplied free of charge, are effectively influencing American public opinion;

American writers and speakers receive pay from the Japanese to disseminate propaganda under the guise of "innocent neutrals";

More than by Japanese propaganda, however, China's case in America is being damaged by quarrels among Chinese warlords and politicians; the Nineteenth Route Army, in contrast, has the genuine admiration of the American public;

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In short "The people in the United States by and large are eager to see China recover Manchuria from the Japanese by fair means or foul, provided the Chinese will do the work themselves".

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

1
enclosure

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP/ECH

0929

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

K.F.Chang, Chairman
T.N.Lee, Treasurer
Temporary Headquarters
of the General Secretary
347 Madison Ave., Room 1007,
New York City, New York.

David Z. T. Yui, General Secretary
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHINA
20 Museum Road, Shanghai.

Washington, D. C.
December 19, 1932.

Dear Friend:

In this letter I wish to share with you a few salient points gleaned from our discussions and conferences with a number of influential and important American friends in New York and Washington, D.C., regarding the Sino-Japanese situation. Briefly they may be summarized as follows:

As it is now constituted and situated, the League of Nations is absolutely impotent in dealing with such a major international issue as the Sino-Japanese controversy. The League can only be so strong as the member powers wish to make it. Preoccupied by the questions of reparations, war debts, armament and disarmament and the general economic depression, the European countries are quite hopeless in the face of the Japanese aggression and bluff, and frankly, they are afraid of doing anything to risk Japan's challenge to war. Notwithstanding this fact, China, which from the very beginning of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria entrusted the case to the League, should continue to press the League for a just and satisfactory solution. Moreover, China should utilize the League position as an effective forum to expose to the world Japanese aggressive actions, designs, intrigues in Manchuria and other parts of China as they arise.

Being the chief signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact, both of which have been flagrantly violated by Japan through her actions in Manchuria and elsewhere in China since September 1931, the United States cannot afford to be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a disinterested party in the Far Eastern crisis as it now exists. She is obligated to uphold the sanctity of these pacts which Japan also voluntarily and solemnly signed. The question is, to what extent will the United States go to have the sancity of these agreements upheld. From what can be seen now it is not likely that the United States, much as her sympathy is with China, will do more than to observe the Stimson Doctrine which refuses to recognize any arrangements, situations and agreements consummated in contravention to the spirit and letter of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the Policy of Open Door. This includes the non-recognition of Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo.

Knowing the world situation as well as she does, Japan, contrary to her repeated assurances to the world, will continue with her aggressive program in China and her invasion of Chinese territory. No power in the world, save the financial bankruptcy of Japan herself, can change the mind and the course of action of the military clique which is in full control of the government at Tokyo.

In the face of such a situation what should be China's course of action? The following points deserve our serious attention:

1. The Chinese government and people should be prepared to offer the strongest possible resistance against further Japanese invasion.

2. They should do their best to recover Manchuria within the shortest possible time through their own efforts.

3. By all means they should avoid formal declared war with Japan just now.

4. The Chinese people (and not the Chinese government

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

nor the Kuomintang) should continue to give their greater support to the volunteers in Manchuria and to intensify the boycott movement throughout the country.

5. The Chinese government should unify and reconstruct the country at once along the line of provincial autonomy and federal government.

As regards China's rapprochement with Soviet Russia, the influential American opinion here is that it is altogether right for China to resume the diplomatic relations with Russia. But China must be careful not to rely upon it too heavily for it is doubtful that Soviet Russia is capable of rendering much assistance to China at the present time. Besides, the best and most reliable help always comes from one's own self. What is true with an individual, so it is with a nation. China should not pay too dearly for the Soviet friendship. It will be fatal for her to repeat some of her previous experiences or to make new mistakes of a similar character. Our sincerest hope is that the new rapprochement may prove beneficial to the mutual relationship between China and Soviet Russia and to the peace of the Far East and the world.

With season's best wishes and heartiest greetings,

Sincerely yours,

David Z. T. Yui

A true copy of the signed original.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA

By H. S. Liang

"We know that Japan is wrong and China is right. Still what can we do? China and Japan are so far away from us and we have troubles of our own. Certainly we don't want to go to war with Japan over Manchuria."

This, I think, sums up pretty well the general American attitude toward the Sino-Japanese impasse. True, there is a group of intelligent and far-sighted men and women in this country who perceive the significant implications of the Sino-Japanese trouble and who frankly face the fact that Japan's occupation of Manchuria by force is a direct violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and the League Covenant and thus it raises a fundamental question regarding the sanctity of all international treaties and agreements. They clearly see that if Japan gets away with Manchuria so easily doom is spelled not only for the League of Nations but for all machinery and instruments for world peace. But this group is far too small and ineffective as compared with that vastly larger group who even if they know that Japan is in the wrong insist that the right policy for America to pursue in regard to the Manchurian situation is to keep her hands off and mind her own business. "After all," they say, "the Orientals have to settle their own problems in their own ways. Why should we get mixed up in their mess?" And this group is steadily gaining in number and strength as a result of the intensive and extensive Japanese propaganda efforts in this country.

Granting that the Japanese propagandists, to begin with, have a poor case to plead, and allowing for the transparent falsity of their facts and the easily detectable awkwardness

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of their arguments, one cannot, nevertheless, help admitting that they are putting over a pretty clever piece of propaganda in the United States and that this propaganda is bearing fruit in many quarters.

Let us examine for a moment the methods which the Japanese use in disseminating their propaganda in this country. At once it should be pointed out that money is no consideration for the Japanese in this work, so long as they know that they can get the hearing of the American people in an effective way. One of the most powerful methods they use is the radio broadcast. They have not hesitated to spend millions of dollars to buy fifteen or twenty minutes each day for a period of two or three months on three or four of the largest stations in the United States to spread their propaganda. Aside from the outright harangue about the rightfullness of the Japanese militarists in occupying Manchuria, the superiority of the Japanese over the Chinese, the Manchukuo paradise present and to-be, and Manchuria being Japan's life-line, they arrange to put in each time a nice Japanese musical program or entertainments of other variety as a bait and an attraction.

Another method they use and with effectiveness is to connect up with leading colleges and universities and peace foundations in this country their culture experts such as the internationally famous Japanese-civilization-specialist, the Honorable Doctor Nitobe, at University of California, to deliver a series of lectures on Japanese or rather Oriental culture and civilization and incidentally to drop in the minds of the American people such ideas as how extremely important it is for Japan to have and to hold Manchuria, how Manchukuo is a spontaneous expression for freedom and independence on the part of the 30,000,000 "Manchurian people", and how the Japanese militarists, even if they are a little raw in their

methods,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

methods, will eventually turn out to be the Guardian Angels of the peace and order of the Far East and hence the peace and order of the entire world. It is conservatively estimated that there are at least thirty such Japanese culture specialists and lecturer-propagandists scattered in all parts of the United States.

Then of course all Japanese consuls in this country, aside from whatever their consular functions, are propagandists under cover, and their consulates serve unusually well as Japanese propaganda headquarters. The Japanese chambers of commerce and other patriotic Japanese bodies in the larger cities in this country also come in handy in this great work of spreading Japanese propaganda. For instance, the Japanese chamber of commerce in New York City has sent out to the American chambers of commerce, the luncheon clubs and other people's organizations notices of this kind: "Desiring for a better understanding between the United States and Japan we are ready to supply upon request and free of charge able speakers to lecture on the subjects of Japanese culture and present-day conditions in Japan and the Far East." In the case of these speakers everything is genuinely free; they even pay their own traveling expenses. As America is still in the think of its economic depression, these free lecturers naturally get all kinds of invitations to speak.

Another subtle and to a large degree effective method which the Japanese use is to buy up American writers and speakers who are more or less reputed as authorities or experts on Far Eastern affairs. It is reliably reported here that they have recently succeeded in purchasing the services of four such authorities whose names are all somewhat well-known to those who keep in close touch with the situation and developments in the Far East. Like George Bronson Rea and

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Kinney these so-called experts receive pay from Japan for what they say in print and on the platform. But unlike them they work under the cloak of innocent neutrals.

In addition to the various propaganda methods as mentioned above, the Japanese government has made known its intention to appoint a roving consul-at-large who will do nothing else but to see and entertain important Americans and to exclaim to the American public in press interviews and statements and in public addresses how deeply the peace-loving Japanese love the great American people and how exceedingly solicitous are they about America's goodwill in return. It has also been reported here that the arch defender of Japan's case at Geneva, Yosuke Matsuoka, is considering a trip to the United States early next spring with the specific purpose of renewing his acquaintance with the new American president and of conferring with Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt in an intimate fashion even as Mr. Ramsey MacDonald did with President Hoover a year or so ago before a glowing and burning log at the president's camp here.

But the greatest damage to China's case in America is not done by the powerful Japanese propaganda but by the shameful and nonsensical fighting among the Chinese warlords and by the meaningless and selfish squables among the Chinese politicians. It is an incomprehensible enigma to the American people why in the face of such a grave national crisis as confronts China today the Chinese people cannot work together and present a united front. Why the Chinese warlords are so ferocious in fighting among themselves but are so meek and week-kneed in the presence of Japanese aggressors? And why there is so much dissension among the members of that august ruling body of China, the Kuomintang, even at this most critical hour of China's national existence?

Many

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Many Americans, intelligent and influential, are willing to help China and to see China helped in every way, but down deep in their hearts they wonder whether, after all, the Chinese deserve to be helped. Let it be repeated that so far as China's case in this country is concerned the most damaging thing is not the Japanese propaganda, however powerful it may be, but the shameless, senseless and selfish fighting among the Chinese warlords and the nonsensical and self-seeking squables among the Chinese politicians. Unless these two groups of people are somehow made to come to their senses before it is too late China's case, so far as America or for that matter the whole world is concerned, will be helplessly lost.

If there is one group of people in China whom the Americans genuinely respect and admire it is the 19th route army that gallantly and heroically defended Shanghai against the Japanese invaders. They honestly believe that the fearless resistance of this courageous army has given or should have given China a new spirit. When the heroism and the sacrificial spirit of the volunteers in Manchuria are better known in this country, they will merit the same praise and admiration from the American people. Frankly, the people in the United States by and large are eager to see China recover Manchuria from the Japanese by fair means or foul, provided the Chinese will do the work themselves. One can almost predict that if by some magic power the Chinese can succeed in completely driving out the Japanese troops from Manchuria to-morrow there will be universal rejoicing in this country. After all, the American people are more naturally friendly toward the Chinese and their sympathy goes to them. The question is: Will the Chinese prove themselves worthy of this friendliness and sympathy by regaining Manchuria from the hands of the Japanese militarists within the shortest possible time?

Washington, D.C.,
U. S. A.
Dec. 11, 1932.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Synopsis

February 10, 1933. Despatch to Department No.D-444

Subject: Japanese Propaganda in the United States.

Mr. David Z. T. Yui writes to friends in China that he has gleaned from discussions with influential American friends in New York and Washington that, in their opinion, China should continue to press the League for a solution of the present controversy in spite of the fact that the League and European countries in general are afraid to risk Japan's challenge to war;

Knowing the world situation Japan will continue her invasion, but the Chinese Government and people should do their best to recover Manchuria.

Mr. H. S. Liang in an article written in America states that the American attitude condemns Japan and supports China but wants to avoid trouble with Japan;

Japanese propaganda, in many forms, is swinging American public opinion toward Japan;

Chinese internal quarrels are damaging China's case in the United States;

The American people wish to see China recover Manchuria, but they must do it themselves.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F/HS 793.94/6037

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Copies sent to ONI & MID in confidence

MET

Tokio

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 9:52 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 14 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 14 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

61, March 14, 9 p. m.

(GRAY) Referring to my telegram No. 59, March 13, 8 p. m., a press ban dated March 9th prohibits publication of reports regarding "warships, airplanes or unit strength which are expected to be despatched to China or Manchukuo shortly from Japan". (END GRAY)

Similar press bans have preceded active military operations in the past.

WWC-WSB

GREW

FILED MAR 16 1933

note 894.918

0939

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 15 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated March 14, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

My 59, March 13, 8 p.m.:

Prohibition against publication of reports concerning airplanes, warships or unit strength which are expected to be despatched from Japan to "Manchukuo" or China shortly, has been imposed by a press ban dated March 9.

In the past active military operations have been preceded by similar press bans.

0940

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECR...
MAR 14 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 14, 1933.

U: Mr. Phillips

S: Mr. Secretary

NOTED
MAR 20 1933
SECRETARY OF STATE

This telegram does not call for any action, but --

In case you desire information in relation to the matter to which it relates -- which may become of importance -- the essential facts are presented in the memoranda attached.

Briefly, we feel that the Japanese are not within any legal rights in invoking the Boxer Protocol in this connection.

SKH

SECRETARY OF STATE
MAR 20 1933
NOTED

FE:SKH/ZMK

0941

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 10 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U
S
FE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 10, 1933.

Mr. Castle:

Mr. Secretary:

Telegrams from Peiping and Nanking raise questions with regard to possible invocation of the Boxer Protocol in connection with possible impending developments in North China.

FE is drafting a telegram in connection therewith.

Meanwhile, for your information, there are submitted the memoranda attached (to which in turn are attached copies of the telegrams in question).

SKH

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

NOTED
MAR 20 1933
SECRETARY OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 14 1933
Department of State

793.94
793.00

Secretary of State,

Washington.

249, March 14, 5 p. m.

American Consul General Tientsin informed me by telephone today that Japanese have filed another protest with chairman of Hupei Provincial Government, General Yu Hsueh Chung, against stationing of troops and entrenchments in neighborhood of Tientsin and near Tangku as a violation of the Boxer protocol.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

F/G 793.94/6038

FILED
JUN 24 1933

0943

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 14 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
In confidence

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 4:45 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 14 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

246, March 14, 11 a. m.

One. Minister for Foreign Affairs Lo Wen Kan arrived Peiping from Paotingfu March 13th and requested British Minister, French Minister and myself to visit him at the Foreign Office building at 10:30 last evening. Following is substance of statement which he made to us.

Two. He denied emphatically current rumors that Chiang Kai Shih (Shek?) intended to institute direct negotiations with Japan, saying pointedly that China having referred matters to League and having urged League to reach decisions in the matter and having invited the United States to examine question in light of Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact, China could not now betray friends by compromising with Japan who had violated treaties and flouted world opinion.

Three. He said that Suma, Secretary of Japanese Legation, had called upon him at Nanking a week or so ago and proposed negotiations, arguing that Japan and China were like man and wife, that trouble was one which concerned

F/HS
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FILED
MAR 16 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

concerned Asia and the Asiatics and did not concern outsiders. Lo said that he replied that negotiations would be quite easy provided Japan admitted error of ways, restored seized territory to China, apologized to China, her neighbor, for violation of territory and apologized to the world for violation of treaties solemnly entered into. He told Suma that as long as he was in office there could be no question of negotiations while Japanese soldiers were on Chinese soil.

Four. Lo stated that Chiang Kai Shih (Shek?) was now in control, that General Ho Ying Chin had taken charge as his representative in control of the forces at the front, that Chiang would remain on railway with headquarters at Paotingfu and Shihchiachwang. He stated that General Huang Shao Hsiung, Minister of the Interior, had been made chief of staff and that Yen Hsi Shan was cooperating; that more troops were coming north from Hankow and that they were determined to resist further advances by the Japanese and would make an attempt to drive Japanese from Jehol although he admitted that they had no hope of defending the latter.

JOHNSON

CSB

KLP

0945

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 14, 1933.

U.
Mr. Phillips:

This Division has been watching closely this matter of the Ford trucks. We have felt that the Department should keep out of the matter unless necessity arose for its becoming involved.

SKH

FE:SKH/

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 8, 1933.

MMH:

The report of February 6, 1933, of the Military Attaché at Tokyo quotes excerpts from a supplement published by a local magazine which shows the point of view of fairly prominent Japanese with regard to the League, war with Russia, war with the United States, and the reasons for American interference. It need not be read.

FES:CLS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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FE:SKH/ZMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 8, 1933.

MR:

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MM

FES:CLS

0947

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 14, 1933.

~~MMH:~~ ~~SKH:~~ Concur. M.M.H.

Peiping's telegram No. 250 of March 14, 2 p.m., in regard to the detention of Ford trucks at Dairen, quotes the text of four telegrams received from Consul Vincent who, after outlining the various means used to delay transshipment of the goods in question, states that he has received positive information that shipment of the trucks to Tientsin will not be permitted. Consul Vincent adds that a representative of the American Chinese Company, now in Dairen, is negotiating for the sale of the trucks at that port.

No action is required by the Department.

Concur SKH

RCM

RCM:EJL

0948

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F/HS 793.94/6040

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 14 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 14 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

250, March 14, 2 p. m.

(GRAY) My 240, March 11, 4 p. m. Following from American Consul at Dairen to the Legation and Tokyo:

"March 12, 2 p. m.

Last night, gasoline which was to be unloaded during the day from HARU MARU preliminary to unloading trucks, was still on board. If gasoline is unloaded today it will take at least another day to unload trucks assuming no further delays, and two days to load them on a foreign vessel which is now available but has not yet been chartered. Hence earliest that trucks might reach Tientsin would be 16th. In view of obvious desire to play for time, however, it is very doubtful that shipment will go forward that soon". (END GRAY)

FILED APR 6 1933

"March 12, 4 p. m.

On good authority I have been informed that army headquarters, for reason mentioned in part two of my March 9, 4 p. m., has instructed harbor authorities to effect delay of week or ten days through indirect manipulation, of shipment of trucks, that is until such time

as

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

as delivery in Tientsin would cease to be prejudicial to army's interests. Shall I make official representations to local authorities pointing out unnecessary delay and requesting assistance in speeding shipment? I have no reason to believe that such representations would prove effectual but Ford representative is anxious that they be made.(END)".

"March 12, 6 p. m.

My March 12, 2 p. m. and March 12, 4 p. m. Have just been informed HARU MARU has discharged gasoline but will not be given berth to discharge trucks until 16th".

"March 13, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. Have received positive information that shipment of trucks to Tientsin will not be permitted. Representative American Chinese Company here and is negotiating for sale in Dairen. He is advisedly demanding full payment his Chinese price".

Last telegram quoted indicates settlement of the matter by American Chinese Company of Tientsin through direct representations to Dairen authorities.

CSB-HPD JOHNSON

0950

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MAR 06 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 16 1933 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 15 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 14 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

mam CORRECTED COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (a)

ANKARA

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 1:40 pm

Secretary of State,

Washington

3, March 14, 4 pm.

Minister of Foreign Affairs just returned from Geneva says Japanese must hurry matters because of their increasingly serious economic condition and increasing budget demands of army. Geneva Russian delegation told him failure Chinese resistance Jehol means Japan will invade Outer Mongolia during the next few weeks.

Also said they told him that America will shortly recognize Russia.

WSB CSB

SHERRILL

793.94/6041

FILED MAR 22 1933

0952

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 21, 1933.

MMH:

Warrington Dawson's special report No. 1192 of February 28, 1933, reports that Dr. A. Legendre wrote in FIGARO that the League should have solved the Manchuria conflict by refusing the requests both of the Chinese and Japanese with regard to Manchuria.

FBN:CLS

0953

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPT OF STATE
DIV. COM. & REC.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 28, 1933.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 25 1933
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94

F/G 793.94/6042

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1192)

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 15 1933
Department of State

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1192, dated February 28, 1933.

FILED
MAR 28 1933

WD/DG

0954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, February 28, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1192

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: Dr. Legendre Discusses the Sino-Japanese Conflict

Writing in FIGARO of February 27th Dr. A. Legendre states that a few days before Japan withdrew from the League of Nations he wrote a letter to Monsieur Paul-Boncour, Monsieur Benès, and Sir John Simon suggesting a solution by which this very grave crisis could be averted. His solution, as might have been expected, was based on his point of view that Manchuria is not Chinese territory, Lord Lytton having been duped by Mr. Koo, according to Dr. Legendre, into declaring that Manchuria was a Chinese province. Manchuria has always, on the contrary, been a free territory, remaining autonomous even while the Manchurian dynasty of the Tsinns reigned in Peiping, the Japan-

ese

0955

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ese having not in any way damaged Chinese sovereignty or torn away any Chinese provinces and it is for Manchukwo itself to protest if it considers that its territory has been violated.

Dr. Legendre accordingly considers that the logical solution for the present conflict would have consisted in refusing the requests of both the Japanese and the Chinese, but after recognizing that Manchuria is not Chinese territory.

Dr. Legendre holds American influence largely responsible for the action taken by the League.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosure:
Article from FIGARO of February 27, 1933.

In quintuplicate

Copy to E. I. C.

851.9111/6a

WD/DG

0956

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. 1192 of February 28 , 1933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extracts From " FIGARO " of February 27, 1933

LE CONFLIT SINO - JAPONAIS

Par le Dr A. LEGENDRE

En présence de l'acuité de la situation qui met le Japon dans l'obligation vitale de prendre des mesures militaires de la plus grande gravité, par suite de l'inconcevable incompréhension de la S. D. N., j'adressais quelques jours avant la rupture de Genève, à MM. Paul-Boncour, Benès et sir John Simon, une lettre dans laquelle je leur suggérais le moyen de sortir la S. D. N. de son embarras.

Admettant que le Comité des dix-neuf consente à reconnaître que la Mandchourie n'est pas une terre chinoise — ce qui est la *réalité*, — une solution nette du conflit apparaît aussitôt. En déclarant la Mandchourie province chinoise, lord Lytton fait beau jeu des données de l'Histoire : il s'est laissé duper par M. Koo et consorts au lieu de s'adresser aux Pères Jésuites de Tientsin qui eussent mis la question au point. Les dynasties chinoises n'ont jamais occupé autre chose en Mandchourie que la presqu'île du Liaotong, cet appendice comparable à la presqu'île du Cotentin vue par rapport à la superficie totale de la France. Et encore ces Chinois du Liaotong se sont *toujours* rangés, au cours des siècles, du côté des Mandchous et des Mongols, et ont toujours combattu avec ceux-ci contre la Chine : ceci c'est de l'*Histoire*. Depuis, le Chinois du nord n'a pas changé : il a la haine et le mépris du Chinois du sud, le « Nan Mantze » ou « Barbare du sud », comme il l'appelle. En ce qui concerne la population actuelle de Mandchourie, l'Histoire nous dit encore que les *deux tiers*, soit 20 millions sur 30 des habitants, sont les descendants des hommes des « Bannières », lesquelles Bannières comprenaient un nombre égal de Mandchous, de Mongols et de Chinois du nord, frères de race dont les familles diverses se fondirent peu à peu en un groupe politique unique tant par la voie du mariage que par la communauté des traditions et habitudes sociales. Les émigrés récents chinois ne comptent guère plus de 5 millions d'âmes. Ce n'est donc pas sérieux de considérer cette Mandchourie, qui a conquis plusieurs fois la Chine et n'a jamais été soumise par elle, comme une terre chinoise, pas plus que son peuple n'est chinois. La Mandchourie a toujours été une terre libre. Elle garda même son autonomie au temps où la dynastie mandchoue des Tsinn régnait à Pékin.

Que s'ensuit-il ? Une conséquence capitale : que les Japonais n'ont pas

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

porté atteinte à la souveraineté de la Chine, ne lui ont arraché aucune province. C'est au Mandchoukouo de protester s'il estime qu'il y a violation de son territoire. Ce n'est pas l'affaire de la Chine, encore moins du gouvernement-fantôme de Nankin. C'est tout l'échafaudage Lytton qui croule.

Mais le Comité des dix-neuf n'osa rien sur cette voie, surtout que les Etats-Unis veillaient. Il avait ses textes, ses formules, il crut à cette duperie : un gouvernement national en Chine, une « jeune république en marche » entravée par ce vilain Japon, ce gendarme qui s'est permis de rétablir l'ordre en Mandchourie, à la grande joie de la population d'ailleurs. Aucun Européen ayant vécu en Chine n'aurait l'idée d'accuser le Japon d'agression en Mandchourie. Pour qui connaît le Jeune-Chinois, c'est bien celui-ci le provocateur. Ce qu'il défendait à Genève, ce n'est pas la Chine, mais son « job » si fructueux, ses scandaleux profits par l'exploitation éhontée du pouvoir. Quelle duperie donc que cette prétendue « jeune démocratie » pourtant ainsi qualifiée par la S. D. N. et adoptée, couvée par elle malgré le cri de détresse, de réprobation des masses chinoises ! C'est là le *scandale* du jour. Lorsque nos peuples s'en rendront compte, la S. D. N. en subira une éclipse totale. Si elle avait eu quelque souci des masses chinoises, elle eût écouté leur voix, leur ardent désir d'être débarrassées par l'intervention des puissances de la tyrannie de Nankin.

Et ce qui est non moins grave, on affaiblit le Japon, cette *seule force* de stabilité sociale et d'équilibre politique en Asie.

Le comité a donc donné raison à la faction de Nankin et il s'étonnera des conséquences : l'*extension* du chaos en Chine, du communisme, de la guerre civile et la *consolidation* de la tyrannie du Kouo-Ming Tang et de tous les féodaux qu'il a engendrés avec, comme résultat, plus de souffrances encore pour le peuple. Mais celui-ci n'a jamais compté pour la S. D. N.

Le Japon : vous allez donc l'isoler ? Par cette imprudence, ne craignez-vous pas de le jeter du côté *Moscou-Berlin* ? « Vous ne l'aviez pas voulu », direz-vous plus tard quand l'irréparable sera réalisé.

Il est en outre un fait sérieux à constater : les grands juges de la S.D.N. ignorent l'Asie, l'âme de ses peuples et, par suite, ont jusqu'ici interprété tous les événements d'Extrême-Orient à l'*envers* des réalités. C'est bien là la *grande pitié* de la situation. Ces juges devraient se récuser comme incompétents. Aucun doute que la S.D.N. n'éclaire en rien l'horizon politique : au contraire. elle s'est refusée, par exemple, à écouter la voix du peuple chinois; elle s'est refusée à tenter de remettre un peu d'ordre en Chine et à rétablir ce grand marché. Qu'en est-il résulté ? Des millions de paysans désespérés ont passé au régime soviétique dans le bassin central.

Mais pourquoi donc s'obstine-t-elle à régler ce conflit ? Surtout dans la situation actuelle de la Chine, plus chaotique que jamais ? Quelle garantie de paix, d'un peu d'ordre peut donner la fraction de Nankin plus branlante que jamais ?

Il n'y a qu'une solution au conflit actuel : renvoyer dos à dos Japonais et Chinois après avoir reconnu que la Mandchourie n'est pas une terre chinoise. Les toukiun comprendront la leçon et la situation en Extrême-Orient en sera éclaircie.

Naturellement, on sait bien que la S. D. N. s'efforce d'empêcher toute conflagration, mais, dans son incompréhension, elle nous y mène tout droit. Depuis un an, elle prépare non la paix, mais la guerre.

De même que certains éducateurs américains en Chine qui, en voulant être des apôtres de la paix et de la fraternité universelle, n'ont abouti qu'à être des naufrageurs sociaux, de même en sera-t-il du Comité des dix-neuf qui, par l'aveugle soutien qu'il prête à un clan de féodaux, se révélera bientôt un naufrageur politique : celui de la paix.

La S. D. N., aujourd'hui, doit voir la réalité : ce que le clan de Nankin était venu lui demander, c'est *uniquement* d'être confirmé dans son *fief* par une condamnation du Japon. Peu importe à ce clan le chaos, la dislocation actuelle de la Chine. De ce fait, il s'ensuit donc que la S. D. N., en soutenant ce clan, se range, sans le moindre doute, du côté de l'*anarchie* contre l'ordre. Mais pourquoi agit-elle ainsi ? Parce qu'elle est fascinée, paralysée par la grande ombre de l'Oncle Sam qui se projette sur le Comité des dix-neuf. Aussi ce comité a-t-il commis la *summa injuria* en affectant de réaliser le *summum jus*.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in confidence

FROM

Peiping

Dated March 15, 1933

Rec'd 9:05 a. m.

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 15 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 15 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington

254, March 15, 5 p. m.

My 249, March 14, 5 p. m. 6038

793.94 note 793.00

One. American Consul General Tientsin reports Japanese Consul General have now lodged further protest with Chairman of the Hupei Provincial Government who in turn has requested Nanking Government's instruction. Protest reviews statement made in note referred to in my 221, 5980 March 7, 4 p. m., that position of the Provincial Chairman is not understood and it is deemed unnecessary to argue the point; that the Chinese authorities are responsible for Shanhaikwan incident and imposed restrictions upon movements of Japanese troops making it necessary for them to occupy Shanhaikwan. Protest denies charge that Japanese are illegally abusing privileges of 1901 protocol; suggests that review of terms and articles of exchange of notes of 1902 will clearly establish that previous contentions of Provincial Government are without any basis of fact; asserts that Mokianchwang is within twenty li zone and that stationing of Chinese troops there violates exchange of notes of 1902; states that Japanese will not consent

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JUN 2 1933

F/ESP 793.94/6043

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

consent to stationing of Chinese troops there; that charge that Japanese have individually made use of privileges of protocol of 1901 is ridiculous and not necessary to argue; that construction of trenches at mouth of the Haiho violates spirit of protocol; that trenches are semi-permanent and may not correctly be described as constructed merely for practice and maneuvering; that they are threat to safe communication on the Haiho and that protocol prohibits this; that Chinese offer this excuse only to prevent themselves from being accused of violating protocol; that Chinese seek to shift blame to Japanese who cannot understand this procedure and who cannot tolerate it.

Protest then requests that Chinese quickly correct their illegal actions and reminds them that if any unfortunate consequences arise Chinese will be to blame because of their insincere attitude as expressed in the Chairman's note.

Two. Lockhart states above summary has been obtained from authoritative source and represents main points of protest received by Provincial Chairman from Japanese Consul General on Sunday. Lockhart adds that Chinese are somewhat perturbed over insistence of Japanese in the matter and the reply to Nanking authorities is being anxiously awaited.

KLP-CSB JOHNSON

0960

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAR 17 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated March 15, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

One. Japanese Consul General has now lodged further protest with the Chairman of the Hopeh Provincial Government, who, in turn, has requested Nanking Government's instruction, according to a report from the American Consul General at Tientsin. The protest reviews the statement that the Chinese authorities are responsible for Shanhaikwan incident and imposed restrictions upon movements of Japanese troops making it necessary for them to occupy Shanhaikwan. Protest suggests that review of terms and articles of exchange of notes of 1902 will clearly establish that previous contentions of Provincial Government are without any basis of fact. The protest denies charges that the Japanese are illegally abusing privileges of the 1901 protocol. The protest asserts that Mokianchwang is within twenty li zone and that exchange of notes of 1902 is violated by stationing of Chinese troops there. The protest states that the Japanese will not consent to the stationing of Chinese troops there; that construction of trenches at the mouth of the Haiho violates the spirit of the protocol; that the charge that the Japanese have individually made use of the privileges of the protocol of 1901 is not necessary

to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to argue and is ridiculous; that trenches are semi-permanent and may not correctly be described as constructed merely for practice and maneuvering; that they are prohibited by the protocol as they are a threat to safe communication on the Haiho; that Chinese seek to shift blame to Japanese who cannot tolerate this procedure and who cannot understand it; that the Chinese offer this excuse only to prevent themselves from being accused of violating the protocol.

The protest reminds the Chinese that if any unfortunate consequences arise they will be to blame because of their insincere attitude as expressed in the Chairman's note and then requests that the Chinese quickly correct their illegal actions.

Two. The Consul General at Tientsin states that Chinese are somewhat perturbed over insistence of Japanese in the matter and that the reply of the Nanking authorities is being anxiously awaited. The Consul General adds that the above summary has been obtained from an authoritative source and represents the main points of the protest received from the Japanese Consul General on Sunday by the Provincial Chairman.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 7 - 1933
Department of State

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2657-N-412

February 6, 1933.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Japan. 2900 - Miscellaneous Propaganda.

F/ESP

793.94

Excerpts from an Emergency Reader for Popular Use.

1. The Hinode, a popular magazine published in Tokyo, has issued a booklet entitled "Emergency Reader" (Hijoji Tokuhon) as a supplement to its November issue. In the preface of the reader it is explained that Japan is about to face at Geneva the most critical situation in her history. In the event of failure at Geneva, the nation would want to know whether a boycott or war would result. The Hinode attempts to answer for its readers these two major questions by means of a series of questions and answers. The questions are put by a reporter; the answers are given by twelve more or less prominent men, including five journalists, two retired naval officers, and two retired army officers. The importance of the publication from an intelligence standpoint is twofold: It is typical of a number of inexpensive readers which have appeared and become popular during the past fifteen months; and it shows the kind of ideas being set forth by some of those in positions of considerable importance in the minds of the Japanese populace.

793.94/6044

2. The general nature of the contents of the emergency reader may perhaps best be illustrated by quoting some of the questions and answers:

a. "Why Does the United States Protest Regarding the Manchurian Affair?" pp.43-47.

Questions by a reporter, and answers by Mr. K. Inahara, a member of the editorial staff of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi.

R: "Why has the United States backed up the League and protested against us on the Manchurian Affair?

I: "The ostensible and official reason is that our policy towards Manchuria, the sudden appearance of Manchukuo, and our recognition of the new state - these things, they say, violate the Nine Power Treaty andthe Kellogg Pact."

R: "Is the United States right in thinking Japan has actually violated the Nine Power Treaty?"

I: "No, she is quite wrong, because the Nine Power Treaty forbids other nations to encroach upon Chinese territory, but it does not forbid provinces in China declaring their independence. There is absolutely no reason why the United States should protest against Japan. Rather America should have kicked at Manchukuo for disturbing the peace of China."

R: "But the American people protested against the assistance we gave in effecting the independence of Manchukuo, didn't they?"

I: "There are some who did. . . . All nations, including America, have received help when they have been gaining their independence. It is strange, therefore, that the United States should have protested because we helped to achieve the independence of Manchukuo."

FILED MAR 1 1933

R: "I don't suppose that even the Kellogg Pact has any power to forbid an action of self-defense, such as we took last September, when Chinese soldiers broke a part of the South Manchuria Railway?"

I: "Certainly it has no such power. . . . . We had to act to defend our rights last September. To complain to other signatories or appeal to the League - how could we take such a slow action when the Chinese soldiers were breakingthe railway under our eyes?"

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

R: "I believe there is something behind America's protest and complaint. I want to know the other side of the official story."

I: "The United States protests against us, not because she wants to support or protect the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact, but because she does not want Japan to have a big influence on the continent of Asia. She thinks that when Manchukuo becomes independent, Japan would come to have a firm hold on the continent, and that this would inevitably tend to prevent the United States from making an advance in Asia. This is exactly the reason why she has tried to drive Japan out of Manchuria and this is not my personal opinion. The fact is clear to everybody who tries to look at some of the American policies toward Manchuria since the Russo-Japanese War." As examples, reference is made to the proposals of Mr. Harriman and Mr. Knox in regard to Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway.

R: "Then it appears that America does not want to give up Manchuria?"

I: "The Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact are, after all, mere diplomatic garbs. All of America's kick and grumbling are due to her desire to have Manchuria under her influence."

b. "Is the United States Able to Enforce an Economic Boycott Against Japan?" pp. 85-87.

R: "What kind of people started the agitation in America for an economic boycott against Japan?"

I: "They were mere frivolous and foolish people. The intelligent people and statesmen did not take the agitation seriously.

R: "Do you think Japan would suffer badly from the boycott?"

I: "Just a little, I think, But the question is, whether they can actually enforce the boycott or not."

R: "Will you explain why the United States cannot enforce the boycott?"

I: "..Though it may seem paradoxical, the boycott of America will inevitably stimulate and increase our advance into Manchuria. The American Government is wise enough to realize the process. Every country along the Pacific has closed its doors to our immigrants, and the result is the formation of our continental policy, - the policy of sending our people to continental Asia."

c. "Does the United States or Soviet Russia Want War with Japan?" pp.92-96.

In the discussion of the general question, "Does the United States Really Want to go to War With Japan," Captain Yasutomi, I. J. N., retired, makes no definite statement, but he says there is a hostile feeling among the American people against the Japanese.

With respect to Japan he says: "In our country the people are apt to think ill of everything in and relating to America. They are inclined to be hostile to the Americans. This is certainly a wrong attitude!"

In the discussion of the general question, "Why the American-Japanese War has not Broken Out as Yet," Captain Yasutomi points out that America has not been a militaristic country, but that her policy is and has been one of economic imperialism, which has developed from the capitalistic system. When Japan's policy of economic imperialism began to bring her into conflict with America, a situation developed which might easily lead to war at any moment. A war has not broken out so far because of trade relations between the two peoples. Many of the Americans who are most opposed to a war against Japan are those who have an interest in cotton and these people, with the group of ideal pacifists, form an influential bloc in America.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply to the reporter's question
group in America, Captain Yasutomi says t
and America, the military group may seize
not act promptly. But since in the endthe
peace in America, we are safe from a sudden
The psychology of military or naval officer
fight in battle is the highest glory and ide
Army and Navy are not the exception. They, t
their imaginary enemies, and of course, we a

R: "Is it possible that the United States
Manchurian Affair?"

Capt. Y: "The Manchurian Affair hadbeen a loc
recognition of Manchukuo on September 15th, a
a permanent and international problem. There
to its non-recognition policy, the people of
the world, will be threatened. It might be a
fight each other just at present."

d. "Is the United States Afraid of Japan:

R: "Is the United States afriad of Japan?"

Capt. Y: "In a way she is afraid of us, but in other ways she is not. Generally speaking, our Army and Navy make America afraid of us. The fear of Americans is sometimes almost abnormal. Some of them believe that our Army could invade their homeland at any moment as if by magic, and some fear that our submarines might appear suddenly in New York Harbor."

R: "Does America look down upon us because of our meager economic resources?"

Capt. Y: "Once a war breaks out, Japan shall be economically in disorder, and in order to stop the disorder, even temporarily, the Government has to issue as much paper currency as possible, and convert such raw materials necessary for war supplies as cannot be produced in our country. The Government will commandeer all wadded cotton and aluminum utensils from every family and then Japan will continue to fight. But we cannot keep on fighting for more than a certain length of time. America knows it, and she may look down upon us for this reason."

R: "But when Japan comes to develop and improve the natural resources in Manchuria, how will our position be?"

Capt. Y: "Then Japan will become much stronger, and there are not a few Americans, especially women, who are afraid of the strength of our future. They are afraid that we should threaten them with war in the future."

R: "Does public opinion in America favor war against us?"

Admiral Soma; I. J. N., retired. "America is a country of public opinions. Without the support of public opinion, the Government does not and cannot enforce any national policy, and moreover, it is not so easy and simple to form public opinion in America as in Japan. It took President Wilsontwo years to lead up to a declaration of war against Germany."

e. "Is Soviet Russia Afraid of Japan?" pp. 117-119.

R: "Is Russia afraid of Japan?"

Major General Kawano, I. J. A., retired. ". . . Russia knows that we are a faithful nation as well as a dangerous foe. That is why the Russians suddenly became careful in their negotiations with us and concluded the Hirota-Karakhan agreement regarding our fishery rights in Russian waters."

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

R: "What do the Soviet Russians think of our real strength?"

Gen. K: "They think we are suffering badly from an economic depression, an unbalanced budget, an industrial slump, and so forth, what they call, the inevitable symptoms of a dying capitalistic society, and they may not fear our strength because they think we cannot fight without proper economic support, but once war breaks out between Japan and Russia, every capitalistic Power, with the exception of China, would stand for Japan, and this is an advantage with us. With the support of the other capitalistic Powers Japan could stand a long war with Russia while Russia will be threatened with civil war by the White Russians."

R: "Are there many White Russians in Russia who would wage a civil war against the Government?"

Gen. K: "There is a fair number of them in Russia and about two million in foreign lands. So even if Soviet Russia does not fear Japan, she is afraid of the disturbance and revolt at home."

Truman M. Martin
Captain, Infantry (DOL),
Asst. Military Attache.

Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, February 7, 1935 - 1st Ind. To: A. G. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington.

1. Approved.

J. G. McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Military Attache.

Distribution:
G-2, 4
Embassy, 1
N/A, 1
Peiping,
Manila,
File, 1

MA/Tokyo Report No. 6638 6 February 1935.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 11, 1933.

MKH:

The two attached translations from a Mexican newspaper, supplied by M.I.D., relate to Mexico's attitude toward the Manchuria incident and have both been seen in FE previously.

LES:CLS

0967

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MID

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 10 1933 Department of State

Translation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 14 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF MEXICAN AFFAIRS MAR 13 1933 Department of State

6-6 2657-9-714

F/ESP

793.94/6045

MEXICO'S ATTITUDE IN THE FAR EAST CONFLICT.

Mexico has defined its attitude regarding the existing conflict between China and Japan, according to the ideals of international justice, and making clear at the same time that it cannot approve of the violation of China's sovereignty which implies the protection and premature recognition by Japan, of the Manchurian State.

Our Government, through our Delegate to the League of Nations, señor Ingeniero Arturo Pani, stated that Mexico, although it represents no material interests in China, cannot be indifferent to the affairs of the Far East owing to its position on the Pacific seaboard.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. José Manuel Puig Casaurranc, yesterday (February 24th), gave out the following statement containing Mexico's points of view regarding the armed conflict between China and Japan:

"On January 9th,1933, our representative at the League of Nations in Geneva was instructed by cable to define Mexico's attitude when he deemed it opportune, in accordance with the following points:

I. Mexico finds herself unable to approve of Japan's decision not to resort to pacific means for solving the conflict with China, as this attitude weakens the ideals of international justice and violates the spirit of the Pact of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, and the Nine Powers Treaty.

II. Mexico appreciates the great importance of Japan's material interests in China andher right to obtain guarantees for those interests. Consequently, from a general point of view, the suggestions contained in the Lytton Report appear acceptable to Mexico, considering, nevertheless, that said suggestions perhaps reflect upon the capacity of the Chinese Government to extend just guarantees to foreigners and to capital.

III. Mexico cannot approve the violation of China's sovereignty, which is implied by the protection and premature recognition by Japan, of the Manchurian State.

IV. Mexico believes that international cooperation in the case of China should only be attempted to the extent consected to be China herself.

V. Mexico, although not representing any material interests in China, cannot, with a clear vision of the future, remain indifferent to affairs in the Far East owing to her position on the Pacific seaboard.

VI. Only motives of aspirations toward peace and international justice prompt Mexico to assume the attitude herein indicated, which should by no means be interpreted as an unfriendly act toward Japan, a country with which the Mexican Government and Mexican people have held unchanging friendship.

"While there was hope that the plan of conciliation being prepared by the League of Nations might be successful, our representative at the League was instructed to delay the presentation

FILED MAR 14 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of these "points", in order not to render those steps more difficult by an attitude which might be considered too radical on Mexico's part; but, since conciliation has failed, the communication which Mexico's representative, Señor Pani, was instructed to make, was delivered to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on February 9, 1933".

("EXCELSIOR" - February 25, 1933)

0969

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 21, 1933.

MMH:

The attached translation of an editorial from a Mexican newspaper comments with pride on the Mexican statement to the League with regard to the Manchurian situation. It contains no new information.

JES:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MID

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 1933
2657-g-718
WAR DEPARTMENT

Translation

DIVISION OF MEXICAN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1933
Department of State

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 10 1933
Department of State

Editorial appearing in EL NACIONAL (Organ of the National Revolutionary Party) February 26,1933.

MEXICO A ND THE CONFLICT IN THE FAR EAST

793.94

In moments of great transcendence, when the springs which move international policy reach their highest degree of tension through the influence of events which alter the rythm of the common life of humanity, Mexico adopts a line of conduct which is at once straight and gallant, in keeping with our traditions and unassailable before the tribunal of history.

We refer to the statement made by our Chancellery relating to the announcement of the instructions given the representative of Mexico before the League of Nations, to make known the vital points upon which is based the attitude of our country in the grave problem of the military invasion by Japan of several of the provinces which pertain to the territory recognized as coming under the sovereignty of China.

As is generally known, under the pretext of protecting its interests, the Empire of the Rising Sun consummated in 1931 the military invasion of Manchuria, overthrowing the constituted authorities and proclaiming the independence of a new State which, not being the result of a national desire, is maintained by the power of the armed forces of the invading power, as if it were a part (prolongación) of the latter's territory; and in defiance not only of the common principles of International Law but also of specific contractual agreements contained in writing in the Treaties which guarantee the territorial integrity of China.

It has been sought to disguise this unusual procedure, contrary to all principles of law, with the subterfuge of a declaration of the existence, as a sovereign State, of Manchukuo; a political entity that has nothing to support it but the foreign military power under the auspices of which it was established and is maintained.

In reality, the invasion of Manchuria and the proclamation of its independence as a sovereign State were nothing more than the deceptive means by which the Empire of the Rising Sun has sought to accomplish the conquest of a part of the territory of the Chinese Republic.

International action, retarded for more than two years by the slowness of procedures peculiar to an embrionic law such as - whether admitted or not - International Law, has at last reached the conclusion that the Eastern Empire has notoriously exceeded its right of self-defense (el ejercicio de su propio derecho) and recommends, on one hand, the ratification of China's sovereignty over all the territory constituting that country - including that which Japan claims as part of the alleged State of Manchukuo - and, on the other, the agreement upon (concertación directa) between China and Japan, of a special political system for Manchuria within which shall be guaranteed the private interests of the Empire and those which, in general terms, may have been established by the other world powers.

F/ESP
793.94/6046
MAR 27 1933
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In this state of affairs, the statement of Mexico - withheld for some time so as not to obstruct the conciliatory negotiations of the League of Nations - not only strengthens the views of the report rendered by the Lytton commission - which report, having been approved by the unanimous vote of the nations represented in the League, now constitutes a directing influence in the international policy respecting problems of the Orient - but also defines with great precision and with a higher spirit of justice, the policy which it is expedient to adopt towards a nation like China, which has nothing upon which to base her defense, generally speaking, aside from the strength of her own right and that which she may derive from international solidarity.

. . . . .

In the first place, the declaration of our Chancery deplores the fact that the Japanese Empire, "weakening the ideals of international justice and violating both the letter and the spirit of the Pact of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, and the Nine Powers Treaty, decides not to resort to pacific means for the solution of the conflict with China."

This declaration alone is sufficient to exalt the State taking such an attitude.

The era of territorial conquests has indeed passed, and no longer can the world calmly look on at the development of a military plan, like that of Japan against China, which has for its goal the segregation of territories of a helpless State to incorporate them - even though indirectly - in the dominion of the invading State.

Whatever may be the policial or social systems governing the world, international justice, expressive of the earnest desire of peoples pronounces against all aggression, and the more so when it involves, as in this case, ill-concealed purposes of conquest.

To be concrete, the historic responsibility of Japan is even more serious due to the fact that her military operations against China not only violate the general precepts of International Law - whether written or unwritten, in the documents governing the collective life of nations - such as the League of Nations Pact and the Treaty of Paris, under which all the States agree not to resort to arms to settle their differences, - but they violate, furthermore, the express undertaking contracted by the Empire of the Far East, when it signed the universal treaty known as the "Treaty of the Nine Powers". This document contains specific obligations of the powers interested in the affairs of the Far East, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Chinese nation.

The repudiation by our Chancery of Japan's activities serves to strengthen international ethics which aspire to government of the world by definite standards of right (derecho).

But this is not all: regarding the future government of Manchuria, Mexico's attitude is more liberal toward China than that adopted by the League of Nations upon the advice of the Lytton Commission. This Commission, over-impressed with the idea of furnishing the most efficacious guarantees for foreign interests, generously extends its concessions to Japan. Whereas our country, without being unmindful of the protection which foreign interests in China justly deserve, doubts the incapacity attributed to the Chinese Republic to furnish that protection, and proposes, consequently, that international coöperation shall not be attempted beyond the limits consented to by China herself.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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Mexico, in this regard, is only adhering to her traditional policy, based on complete and profound respect for the sovereignty of each nation. In the last analysis, whatever the contingencies to which foreign interests in a country may be subjected, nothing can justify the use of violence as a means of protecting those interests. Because - as stated by a famous Argentinian delegate at a memorable international convention - citizens who abandon their own country and claim the protection and benefits deriving from their residence in another country, are subject to its laws and must share its fate.

. . . . . .

Mexico's attitude, therefore, in following xx a line of rectitude and justice, proves an opportune act of the presence of our country in an international debate which is engaging, to the highest degree, the opinion of the world.

At a moment when the invasions already carried out by Japan, and those which she is now undertaking on a large scale, on Chinese territory, present before the conscience of the world the problem whether it is possible to consent, in our day, to the consummation of acts of conquest which properly belong to the Sixteenth Century, Mexico takes her stand, with clearness and high courage, taking care to stress the fact that in so doing she is not impelled by any unfriendliness toward Japan, but exclusively by the duty of defending the principles of international justice which inspire her policy; a duty which becomes her, as a sovereign nation, and which is emphasized in this particular case, because of her position on the Pacific seaboard, which will not permit her to remain indifferent to affairs in the Far East, although she does not now represent any material interests in China.

0973

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 9 - 1933 Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY MAR 10 1933 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 13 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

March 8, 1933.

MEMORANDUM.

Mr. Young, in Senator Borah's office, requested material with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Japanese Mandated Islands. Mr. Hamilton informed Mr. Young by phone that there would be sent to him a copy of the Department's press release of February 25, 1933, which contains the text of the communication of February 24, 1933, from the Secretary General of the League of Nations to the Secretary of State and the latter's reply, and a copy of Treaty Series, No. 664, which contains the text of the Treaty of July 13, 1922 between the United States and Japan with regard to the former German islands in the North Pacific. Mr. Young was also informed with regard to where he might obtain Senate Document No. 55, the Report of the League Commission, the text of the report of February 24, 1933, of the Assembly, and Japan's annual report to the League of Nations with regard to the Japanese Mandated Islands.

FE:LES:CLS

793.94 mu 862i.01

This was done without a covering letter - FEF

F/ESP 793.94/6047

FILED MAR 13 1933

0974

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6047

"It is to be noted that the city of Lingyu (Shanhaikwan) is not an open trade port and that, in principle, Japanese nationals have no right to reside there. Even granting the Japanese nationals, in disregard of treaty provisions had taken up residence in that city, the matter of protection should only be the concern of the local authorities. It is not for the Japanese military to usurp or interfere with the exercise of such rights. Moreover, by misusing the so-called right of jurisdiction as a pretext to mass large numbers of troops and attack Chinese territory, Japan has irrevocably placed herself beyond right and reason.

"In short, the attack on and occupation of the city Shanhaikwan, beginning with deliberate work of destruct by the Japanese troops themselves followed by false accusations of provocation on the part of Chinese soldiers in order to disguise the preconcieved nature of their plan only revealed the custmary Japanese tricks which have become well-known to the world. All responsibility appertaining to this affair, therefore, should be borne entirely by the Japanese.

"With further reference to your note under reply, I have the honour to point out that the assertions made therein can hardly be admitted as facts. Besides, the Japanese troops, since their occupation of Shanhaikwan, have subsequently attacked Chinese forces at Chiumenkou and Shihmentsai, thus threatening the safety and peace hitherto prevailing inside the Great Wall. They have, in addition, often paraded and carried out manoeuvres in densely populated sections in Peiping and elsewhere. All such actions constitute violations of the principles of international law and of the provisions of international treaties to which reference has been repeatedly made by the Chinese Government. Even in regard to the engagements contained in the Protocol signed by China and the Powers in 1901, Japan has spared no effort to disregard and violate them. In view of these circumstances, the Chinese Government is constrained to take this opportunity to file further protest.

"Finally, I have the honour to request Your Excellency to communicate with your Government requesting immediate action in respect of the points contained in the last part of my Note of January 4, 1933, namely, the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from the occupied areas at and near Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in the future and the punishment of those who started the trouble, and also in respect of the unlawful activities of the Japanese soldiers stationed in Peiping and elsewhere, which your Government should take steps to restrain."

Nanking, January 24, 1933.

A true copy of the original

0975

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6044

"It is to be noted that the city of Lingyu (Shanhaikwan) is not an open trade port and that, in principle, Japanese nationals have no right to reside there. Even granting the Japanese nationals, in disregard of treaty provisions had taken up residence in that city, the matter of protection should only be the concern of the local authorities. It is not for the Japanese military to usurp or interfere with the exercise of such rights. Moreover, by misusing the so-called right of jurisdiction as a pretext to mass large numbers of troops and attack Chinese territory, Japan has irrevocably placed herself beyond right and reason.

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Nanking, January 24, 1933.

A true copy of
the original
6824

0976

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6048

SEE 893.20/413 FOR Tel.#228-4pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Mar.9,1933.
~~TO~~ NAME

1—1127 OPO

REGARDING: Removal of planes and equipment from National Aviation School at Hangchow: According to telegram from Consul General at Nanking, this had not been done as of March 8. Chiang Kai Shek is reported to have ordered removal of planes and equipment to Loyang, in case of emergency, and Standard Oil Company has been requested by Aviation Bureau at Hangchow, to deliver aviation supplies to Loyang.

fpg

0977

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

MET
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Peiping
Dated March 9, 1933
Rec'd 5:33 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Note 793.94

893.20/4113

228, March 9, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Shanghai's March 6, 6 p. m. Consul General at Nanking now telegraphs as follows:

March 9, 10 a. m. (END GRAY). CONFIDENTIAL. I am reliably informed that no planes or equipment were removed from Hangchow up to March 8, 5 p. m.

Standard Oil Company has received a letter from the Aviation Bureau Hangchow stating that Chiang Kai Shek ordered that preparations be made for the removal to Loyang of the planes and equipment of the school in case of emergency. The Bureau requested that the Standard Oil Company deliver a large stock of aviation gasoline and lubricating oil to Loyang."

JS-WSB

JOHNSON

0978

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6049

SEE 500. A15 A4/1748 FOR Tel. #559, 1 pm

FROM General Disarmament Conference, GENEVA (Gibson) DATED Mar. 9, 1933.

TO NAME

1-1127 0.49

REGARDING:

Japan's withdrawal from the League: Text of communication from the Japanese delegation dated Mar. 6 to the President of the Disarmament Conference, regarding -.

MN

0979

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE

MET

GRAY

Geneva

Dated March 9, 1933

Rec'd 8:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

559, March 9, 1 p. m.

My 547, March 1, 7 p. m.

Following is a communication from the Japanese delegation dated March 6 to the President of the Disarmament Conference now circulated by the League Secretariat:

"The Imperial Government of Japan as an inevitable consequence of the incompatibility existing between their own point of view and that of the majority of the League of Nations respecting the Sino-Japanese affair, regret to have been obliged to withdraw their representatives from the League Assembly. As their determination, however, remains unshaken to contribute toward the establishment of permanent trusty peace, they hereby declare their intention to continue their participation in the General Disarmament Conference. They must nevertheless acquaint the Conference with the fact that, as they consider it indisponsable to effect various important modifications in the national defense of the Empire, in view of the new situation entailed by the changed conditions in the Far East, all the relevant circumstances should, they are thoroughly

793.94
500.C111

0980

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

thoroughly convinced, be taken into due account in the future discussion of disarmament questions".

WSB-RR GIBSON

0981

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6050

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/1753 FOR Tel#58 7pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Mar. 11,1933.
TO NAME

REGARDING: Japanese naval authorities determined to make no concessions at Geneva Disarmament Conference. Increases in military personnel and equipment expected until general situation in Manchuria and specific situation in Jehol settled.

ja

0982

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

Tokio

Dated March 11, 1933

Rec'd 11:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

58, March 11, 7 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 24, March 10, 5 p. m.

As the quoted formal communication of the Japanese Delegation to the Disarmament Conference was published here I was able to discuss the matter informally and ostensibly on my own initiative with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on that basis. He seemed surprisingly vague on the subject and merely said that the Delegation would continue to take part in the work of the conference "so far as circumstances may permit", implying that the participation of the Delegation would not be merely nominal but active. Count Uchida's apparent unfamiliarity with the subject, however, conveys the impression that the matter does not lie in his hands but with the army and navy authorities directly. It seems that nothing is to be gained by seeking elucidation through Foreign Office channels.

A reliable contact in the General Staff of the Army has informed our Military Attache that the General Staff

1753

0983

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#58 from Tokio, Mar. 11, 7 p.m.

Staff is at present determined to permit no (repeat no) reduction whatever in the military machine. On the contrary increases in personnel and equipment are expected to be made until the general situation in Manchuria and the specific situation in Jehol have become settled.

The Naval Attache has no (repeat no) information concerning the attitude of the navy subsequent to that contained in the Embassy's despatches Nos. 36, July 1, 175, November 1 and 223, December 14 last. He is, however, convinced that the naval authorities are determined to make no (repeat no) concessions at Geneva.

I shall make an effort discreetly to obtain further elucidation of the Japanese stand.

CSB-HPD GREW

0984

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6051
509

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/56 FOR Despatch #251

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Feb.9,1933
TO NAME

1-1127 ofo

REGARDING: Shanhaikuan affair. Negotiations for the settlement of the -, were attempted by the Japanese but were spurned by the Chinese higher officials because they thought the invasion south of the Wall was good talking material at Geneva, and because it was a good lever to use on Nanking for financial and military support.

esp

0985

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6052

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tsingtao/59 FOR Despatch # 19 to Leg'n.

FROM Tsingtao (Berger) DATED February 8, 1933.
TO NAME

1--1127 OPO

REGARDING:

Occupation of Shanhaikuan by the Japanese. Little local reaction to the - , the local populace adopting a fatalistic attitude toward the matter.

hs

0988

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy tp Department.

No. 19

AMERICAN CONSULATE
Tsingtao, China, February 8, 1933.

SUBJECT: Political and Military Events in the Tsingtao Consular District during January, 1933.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor, in compliance with Legation Circular No. 201 of November 17th, 1927, to submit the following report on political and military events in the Tsingtao Consular District during January, 1933:

There were no significant developments of either a military or political nature in the Tsingtao Consular District during January. No changes took place in the political situation and the only military move was the return to Tsingtao of one battalion of Chinese Marines, (about 600 men altogether), who are ordinarily garrisoned here but had been doing police duty in Chefoo and neighboring ports during the fighting between Generals Han and Liu.

The Mayor of Tsingtao, Admiral Shen, made a short trip to Tsinan to see General Han during the month.

He.....

0987

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

He also made a visit of inspection to Weihaiwei and Chang Shan Island on the cruiser Hai Ch'i.

It is understood that, while in Tsinan, the Mayor had a conference with General Han and representatives of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang on questions of national defence and the administration of Shantung province. The Mayor's subsequent visit to Weihaiwei and Chang Shan Island was, however, a routine inspection trip in connection with his duties as Admiral of the Northeastern Squadron.

There was little local reaction to the occupation of Shanhaikuan by the Japanese, the local populace adopting a somewhat fatalistic attitude toward the, usually inexplicable, antics of both Chinese and Japanese military. The Chinese newspapers confined themselves mainly to printing the bare news accounts of the incident. The editorial attitude was one of mild disgust that a place so important strategically should be lost without a great/er struggle. The Central Government was also mildly criticised for its supineness in the face of attack by the Japanese. The local Japanese newspapers published the news and, as usual under such circumstances, blamed the Chinese. In this connection, it is of interest to note that both Chinese and Japanese newspapers were closed on the day of the incident and for several days thereafter, in celebration of the New Year. Publication of the regular editions of the newspapers quite naturally was suspended, but apparently no effort was made to get out "extras". On this account, no information regarding

the.....

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the trouble at Shanhaikuan was published in the Chinese and Japanese newspapers at Tsingtao until January 6th, when publication was resumed.

Following the publication of the news regarding Shanhaikuan, there was a certain amount of speculation locally regarding the possibility of a Japanese occupation of Tsingtao. It was apparently the opinion of a portion of the Japanese community, and some of the Chinese in the local government as well, that the Japanese would continue to advance from Shanhaikuan to occupy Tientsin and Peiping and that Tsingtao and Shantung would be occupied simultaneously. Whether their theories regarding the intentions of the Japanese General Staff toward Tsingtao and Shantung are correct can not yet be known, since the expected occupation of the Tientsin, Peiping area has not materialized.

At the beginning of the difficulties at Shanhaikuan, Admiral Tsuda, Commander of the Japanese Second Overseas Squadron, who was, as usual, in Tsingtao, left on his flagship, the "Hirato", for Shanhaikuan. He had not returned at the end of the month.

Respectfully yours,

David C. Berger,
American Consul.

Five copies to Department of State,
Copy to Consulate General, Shanghai,
Copy to Consulate General, Nanking,
Copy to Consulate, Tsinan,
Copy to Consulate, Chefoo,
Copy to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, Manila.

800.
DCB/FP

A true copy of the signed original. FP

0989

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4
2084

Conversation. Peiping, April 19, 1933.

Mr. Tsai Yuan, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Peiping.

Subject: Local situation
Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Mr. Tsai Yuan, in reply to my question, stated that the local situation was very difficult. He said that Japanese planes had appeared in the air east of Tungchow and had dropped leaflets, and he gave me the attached leaflets, which read:

"China is now about to be exterminated by the White race. Japan is coming to save China."

"Japanese and Chinese troops are all brothers of the Yellow race."

(Both leaflets are signed as follows:
"The First Middle Detachment of the Fifth Flying Corps of the Imperial Army.")

His comment was that the Japanese appeared to be trying to persuade the Chinese of Sino-Japanese friendship by dropping bombs.

Mr. Tsai Yuan mentioned the fact that the Chinese still held the bridge across the Luan River. He did not mention the possibility that the Protocol powers might wish to place troops on the bridge, but knowing that he had made this suggestion to the Spanish Minister I took occasion to mention the fact that it would not be possible for the American Government to place forces on this bridge between hostile Japanese and Chinese forces.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

793.94/6052

0990

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6053

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tsinan/57 FOR Despatch # 24.

FROM Tsinan (Stevens) DATED February 6, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 ore

REGARDING: Rumors that a Japanese squadron is being held in readiness to land troops at Chefoo and Tsingtao have been circulated in the Provincial Capital.

hs

0991

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 24

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Tsinan, China, February 6, 1933.

SUBJECT: Political Report for January, 1933.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit herewith a copy of this Consulate's despatch No. 22, of February 6, 1933, to the American Legation, Peiping, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

Harry E. Stevens,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

To American Legation, Peiping,
No. 22, February 6, 1933.

In quintuplicate.

800
HES:HTC

A true copy of the signed original. N.J.

0992

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 22.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Tsinan, China, February 6, 1933.

Subject: Political Report for January, 1933.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to comply with the Legation's standing instructions by submitting the following summary of political and related events in the Tsinan consular district during the month of January, 1933:

JANUARY WAS COMPARATIVELY UNEVENTFUL:

No unusually important political or military developments occurred in the Tsinan consular district during the month of January. Such staple problems as banditry and the boycott were carried over into the new year in practically the same unsolved condition as they were in during the last three months of 1932.

Since the fall of Shanhaikuan, the local Chinese public have shown a much keener interest in the nation's welfare. The activities of the League of Nations are being watched and given prominence in the vernacular press. Many of the lower classes of people who heretofore have been too busy finding the means of subsistence to pay attention to politics are now taking the time

to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to hear about the Japanese aggression. The Far Eastern policies of the United States and the bearing of Mr. Stimson's pronouncements on the recognition of "Manchukuo" are being given more and more publicity in this part of China. The consensus of opinion in educated circles here seems to be that any assistance from the League will come too late to prevent large scale military activities in North China.

RUMORS ARE AFLOAT THAT JAPAN IS PREPARING TO INVADE SHANTUNG:

It is being taken for granted that Japan will not confine her adventure in territorial aggrandizement to the areas north of the Great Wall. Rumors that a Japanese squadron is being held in readiness to land troops at Chefoo and Tsingtao have been circulated in the Provincial Capital. Although the eventualities in this regard are uncertain, there is a conviction that some serious threat to the security of Shantung is in the offing. The uneasiness in official quarters was manifested at Tsinan between January 8 and 12 by the sudden removal of stores of ammunition to a place in the western interior. Over thirty trucks and other motor vehicles were commandeered for this purpose. In addition, there have been two important military conferences of Shantung generals followed by maneuvers and other forms of intensive military training. In this connection, General Han Fu-chu (韓複榘) has issued orders for the reorganization of the provincial militia comprising about 15,000 men with arms. This would raise

the total

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the total number of Shantung troop to the neighborhood of 75,000.

GENERAL HAN FU-CHU DISCREDITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MARSHAL TUAN'S VISIT TO NANKING AND COMMENTS EXTENSIVELY ON THE MILITARY SITUATION:

During an unofficial conversation with General Han at the latter's residence on January 31, the Chairman commented upon several important aspects of the political situation. As well as I remember, his statements were substantially as follows:

"I met Marshal Tuan (段祺瑞) at the railway station when he passed through on his way to Nanking. He said that he had accepted General Chiang's invitation out of courtesy and that his visit had no special political significance other than to offer his assistance to General Chiang in case he needed it. At the military conference in Peiping we did not discuss Marshal Tuan. He has been given no part to play in the northern plan of defence. The newspapers report him to be pro-Japanese but he really hates them as much as any of us. General Chiang has invited many former generals to Nanking for discussion.

We (the Northern generals) do not feel uneasy about Marshal Feng (馮玉祥). He is an ardent patriot and only wants to assist us in driving out the invaders. He has only a small bodyguard and is powerless to interfere with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Marshal Chang will not be replaced by anyone unless his health fails. He has a weak body. His subordinate officers owe every thing they have to him or to his deceased father's influence. Neither Marshals Tuan nor Feng could do anything against Marshal Chang.

The Ministry of War has already instructed Marshal Chang to resist by force of arms any further Japanese advance in North China and we have all agreed to assist him whenever he instructs us to do so.

There are two reasons why Ho Chu-kuo (何柱國) does not counter attack. First, he needs time to prepare his defences in case the counter attack fails. The Japanese have a mechanized army and the only way he could

stop

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

stop them from breaking through is by digging many trenches. This takes a lot of time. General Ho's artillery is too light to clear the ground for a forward advance of his troops. His best plan is to wait for the Japanese to attack. The second reason is that the Central Government does not want General Ho to do anything that might endanger foreign lives and property at Shanhaikuan or compromise our position at Geneva. There is still a little hope that the League of Nations will help China but I believe the help will come too late to prevent war. I feel very grateful for America's help in refusing to recognize Manchukuo or lend money to Japan. That is as valuable to us as receiving troops and guns.

I must keep the 3rd Route Army in Shantung. If the Japanese come, and I hope they come soon, I will meet them with full strength. The Northeastern Squadron will cooperate with me at the coastal ports. If the ships are sunk or disabled near the harbors the marines will land and fight with my soldiers. I have made no plan for withdrawal, but if driven out of Tsinan I can receive reinforcements at Hsuchow (徐州). I hope the Japanese will attack simultaneously at many places in China as that would divide their strength and enable many Chinese soldiers who would otherwise remain idle to assist.

Marshal Chiang Kai-shek recently invited me to go to Nanking, but when I was on the point of leaving he telegraphed instructing me to postpone the trip due to the grave developments in the North."

Respectfully yours,

Harry E. Stevens,
American Consul.

In duplicate.

Copies to:

Department in quintuplicate;
Consuls (General) at Nanking,
Tientsin, Tsingtao and Chefoo.

800
HES:HTC

A true copy of the signed original. H.T.

0996

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/62 FOR Despatch #-

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED February 10,1933
TO NAME

1-1127 ofo

REGARDING: Shanhaikwan Incident and the Proposed Japanese Drive into Jehol. Discussion of the -,

793.94/6054

esp

0997

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Lieutenant-General Inouye, commander of the independent battalions of the Railway Guard, was transferred from Ssupingkai to Mukden.

According to the local Japanese press 1600 Japanese ex-service men have applied for positions in the Manchoukuo Army. It is possible that one factor in this development is the desire of the Kwantung Army to secure the services of trained Japanese soldiers at Manchoukuo's expense. A Japanese official recently told a member of my staff that Japan's military operations in Manchuria are costing the Government 20,000,000 yen a month and that it would cost less than half of that amount to maintain the same number of troops in Japan. Since the outbreak of the "Manchurian Incident" Japanese soldiers serving in Manchuria have received double pay. The reopening of the Mukden Arsenal has decreased to some extent the cost of securing ammunition from Japan.

On December 23rd a Japanese bombing plane which had been struck by several bullets while operating against bandits, exploded as it landed at Hsinking. Six members of the plane's crew were killed and the remaining one severely injured. It is believed that many new Japanese airplanes came to Manchuria during December but it is impossible to confirm officially the reports on this subject.

JEHOL AND SHANHAIKUAN. On December 3rd the Manchoukuo News Agency reported that the Northeastern Army

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Army and the Chinese troops in Jehol were making preparations for an attack on the Japanese troops at Shanhaikuan and in the vicinity of the Jehol border. During the rest of the month the local Japanese press and Japanese officials frequently stated that the Chinese regular troops in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan were being increased and that the "Volunteers" along the Jehol border were being reenforced and were becoming increasingly active. Kailu was mentioned as one of the chief points at which "Volunteers" were being concentrated. The newspaper campaign on this subject was similar to the one that preceded the drive on Chinchow in the winter of 1931. The dangerous situation at Shanhaikuan was aggravated by an exchange of fire on the night of December 8th between Chinese troops and a Japanese armored train which had proceeded to the station at Shanhaikuan to take on water.* Local Japanese contend that the Chinese soldiers fired first. The incident was settled locally but the tension between the Chinese and Japanese increased. And the press and local observers discussed at greater length and more frequently the question of when the Japanese would invade Jehol. It seemed to be clear that the Japanese would not complete their preparations for the invasion of Jehol during December or January. Reliable observers reported that in the Jehol drive the Japanese would use as high a percentage of Manchoukuo troops in relation

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*Despatch No. 705, December 13, 1932.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to Japanese as they felt they could without danger of treachery or defeat. It is believed that the Japanese continued during December their attempts to persuade T'ang Yü-lin to join Manchoukuo. At the end of the month it was apparent that the Kwantung Army intended to invade Jehol sometime before the spring thaws.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6055

SEE 893.20/416 FOR Tel.#251,10 am.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 15,1933
TO NAME

REGARDING: National aviation school at Hangchow. Activities of -.

esp

1001

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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9/09

cib

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 15, 1933.

Recd 2:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

893.00
Note
793.94

251, March 15, 10 a.m.

Legation's 238, March 9, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"March 14, 2 p.m. On March thirteen between twenty and twenty-five air planes from the aviation school at Hangchow arrived in Nanking and after refueling took off on a northwesterly course. In a telegram dated March 12 to a member of my staff an American instructor in the school stated that the airplanes were proceeding to Loyang to remain there indefinately."

893.00/4119

JOHNSON

JS CIB

1002

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.51/403 FOR Despatch #304

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Feb. 24, 1933
TO------ NAME

1—1127 O.F.O.

REGARDING:
Cost of Japanese Military activities in Manchuria and China.

fpg

793.94/6056
1052

1003

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Despatch No. 304.

Date: February 24, 1933.

Subject: Cost of Japanese Military Activities in Manchuria and China.

Summary: The cost of Japan's overseas military activities from September 1931 to March 1934, is approximately Yen 563,450,000.

Expenditures in connection with Manchuria will amount to approximately 15 per cent of the nation's ordinary revenue during the coming fiscal year.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 804. Tokyo, February 24, 1933.

SUBJECT: Cost of Japanese Military Activities in Manchuria and China.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

The passage by the Diet, on February 22nd, of an additional supplementary budget* for the present fiscal year (April 1, 1932-March 31, 1933) on account of the "Manchurian affair" makes it now possible to calculate the cost to Japan of her activities on Chinese territory since September 1931. All extraordinary expenses incurred in the Manchurian and Shanghai

*For translation of this supplementary budget bill see appendix I.

1005

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Shanghai adventures by all Departments of the Government are designated in official accounts as "expenses for the Manchurian affair".

The sum authorized by this bill, amounting to Yen 39,729,606 in the general account, covers the expenditures by various Departments of the Government for the months of February and March 1933 not authorized by previous supplementary budgets. The necessary money will be obtained by loans.

The tabulation appearing below is the estimated cost of the activities on Chinese territory since September 1931:. Explanation follows the tabulation:.

1	Transfers from treasury reserve during 1931-	10,485,000
2	By Imperial Ordinances in January, February and March 1932	69,910,000
3	By Supplementary Budgets March 1932	67,500,000
4	By supplementary budget June 1932	169,526,000
5	By supplementary budget February 1933	39,729,000
	Total at end fiscal year ending March 31, 1933	377,150,000
6	By budget 1933-1934	186,300,000
	Total at end fiscal year ending March 31, 1934	563,450,000**

** It seems probable that this total figure will be increased by subsequent supplementary budgets later in the year.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. This sum was diverted to use for this purpose from two sources; Yen 3,296,000 was from the budget for the year 1931-32 appropriated for other purposes but unused, and Yen 7,189,000 was transferred from the second treasury reserve fund*.

2. Due to the dissolution of the Diet early in January 1932, rendering it impossible to obtain approval for expenditures in Manchuria, three Imperial Ordinances were issued for that purpose. These were discussed in the Embassy's despatch No. 533 of March 26, 1932.

3. At the extraordinary session of the Diet in March 1932, Yen 7,579,161 was passed as a supplementary budget for the fiscal year 1931-32 and Yen 52,519,085 as a supplementary budget for the year 1932-33, making a total as indicated. See despatch mentioned above.

4. See Embassy's despatch No. 80 of June 17, 1932.

5. See appendix I.

6. This figure represents the claim under the heading "Manchurian affairs" in the budget for 1933-34 now under consideration in the Diet. This budget is expected to pass without material amendment. The expenditure is apportioned as follows :

General Account:		186,312,352
Foreign Office	4,700,000	
Army	145,900,000	
Navy	15,500,000	
Communications	50,000	
Finance	20,000,000	
Special Account**:		4,500,000
Chosen Government General	1,200,000	
Kwantung Government	3,200,000	
Total		190,800,000

* Figures obtained from the Department of Finance.
**Figures for the special account are included here for reference. Expenditures under the special accounts for Manchurian affairs amount to approximately Yen 7,000,000, including expenditures for the fiscal year 1933-34 indicated here.

1007

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Except the transfers from the treasury reserve indicated in the first table above, all expenses of the Manchurian and Shanghai affairs have been met by loans. As was pointed out in despatch No. 211 of December 2, 1932, the ordinary revenue shown in the new budget does not suffice to meet even the ordinary expenses of the Government. These loans are as follows:

Date of issue	Amount		Taken up or supplied by
March 1932	80,807,000	(loan)	Deposit Bureau
"	32,845,000	"	"
"	14,962,000	(borrowing)	Bank of Japan
"	7,962,000	"	"
May 1932	50,000,000	(loan)	Deposit Bureau and others.
July 1932	40,000,000	"	Deposit Bureau "
November 1932	156,405,000	"	
Total	383,701,000		

Thus far none of these loans has been raised in the open money market, but have been absorbed by the Bank of Japan and the Deposit Bureau of the Department of Finance, together with other revenue loans raised to balance the budget.

A law* was promulgated on February 7, 1933, which permits the Government to float loans for defraying expenditures on account of the Manchurian affair to a total of Yen 491,000,000, amending an earlier law which permitted the floating of a loan of Yen 260,000,000.

Thus by March 1934, in two and one half years of activity in Manchuria and China, it is estimated that the nation will have spent nearly Yen 600,000,000. With this may be compared the cost of the four year Japanese campaign in Siberia, which amounted to Yen 700,000,000**. It is not strange that

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* See appendix No. II.

** According to A. Morgan Young in "Japan in Recent Times".

1008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that the financial leaders of the country are inclined to view with misgivings an adventure which, during the coming year will consume nearly 15% of the ordinary national revenue, which promises to continue indefinitely as a financial liability, and from which no financial return commensurate with the expenditure may be expected for many years.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosures:
Appendices No. 1 and 2.

Copy to Peiping

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WTT.g

A true copy of the signed original. g

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Appendix No. 1

Supplementary Budget Estimate for 1938-33 Fiscal Year
No. 1 (General Account)

We hereby sanction the supplementary budget for the 1938-33 fiscal year, which has been approved by the Imperial Diet, and cause the same to be promulgated.

Imperial Sign Manual.

February 7, 1933.

Extraordinary Revenue	
Loan:b. Manchurian Affair Loan and borrowings (transfer from Treasury)	Yen 39,472,756
Surplus of Previous Year transferred	256,850
Total Extraordinary revenue	Yen 39,729,606
Extraordinary Expenditure	
For Department of Foreign Affairs: Manchurian affair expenditure	Yen 2,860,112
For Department of Army: Manchurian affair expenditure	27,878,671
For Department of Navy: Manchurian affair expenditure	8,990,823
Total extraordinary expenditure	39,729,606

1010

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Appendix No. 2.

Law No. 1 of 1933 (Promulgated under date of February 7, 1933)

Law No. 1 of 1932 of March 26, 1932 is amended to read as follows:

For the purpose of defraying expenditures incurred on account of the Manchurian Affair, the Government may, in addition to the amount of loans to be issued under Imperial Ordinance No. 8, Imperial Ordinance No. 14, and Imperial Ordinance No. 19 issued in 1932, float a loan of Yen 491,000,000 or borrow this amount.

Supplementary Rule:

The present measure shall be put into force from the day of promulgation.

(Note: the Original law(No. 1 of 1932) provided for the issue of loans up to Yen 67,500,000. This was amended by Law No. 5 of June 17, 1932 to read Yen 260,000 and now amended as above)

1011

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6057

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/54 FOR Despatch # 8734

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED February 10,1933
TO NAME 1—1127

REGARDING: Chinese residents of Chapei,Woosung and Kiangwan uneasy and panicy due to Shanhaikuan incident,early part of month. Organizations attempting to raise funds for aeroplanes for National Defense.

esp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A15 A4/1764 FOR Tel. # 60, 5 pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Mar. 14, 1933
TO NAME

1-1127 OFO

793.94/6058

REGARDING:

Japanese land forces: Resume of information submitted by the Military Attache in regard to the -.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE
FE

MET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

Tokio

Dated March 14, 1933

Rec'd 11:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

60, March 14, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Referring to the Department's No. 24, March 10, 5 p. m.; and my 58, March 11, 7 p. m., the Military Attache submits the following estimate of the situation in regard to the Japanese land forces.

One. Under the provisions of the Manchukuo-Japanese protocol of September 1932 Japan obliged herself (a) to assist Manchukuo in maintaining peace and order within her borders and (b) to assist Manchukuo in defending her territory and sovereignty against outside aggression.

Note
793.94

Two. To date fulfillment of the first part of this obligation alone has necessitated the presence in Manchuria of four Japanese combat divisions, two cavalry brigades, nine air squadrons, and certain other troops, a force of whose total strength today is about 47,000 officers and men.

Three. These units are all part of the peace time standing army of Japan and are in consequence a component

part

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

part of the force Japan considered necessary to insure the national defense of the empire prior to the Manchurian incident.

Four. The War Office and the General Staff have both stated that the complete pacification of Manchukuo will require a force of 150,000 officers and men over a period of from five to ten years. Manchukuo has announced its intention to raise and maintain a standing army of 100,000, and while no public announcement to that effect has yet been made, it is unquestionably the intention of Japan to add to this force some 50,000 of her own men. This latter force will probably be known as a pacification force or special constabulary but it will nevertheless be a part of Japan's standing army. The mission of this Manchukuo Japanese army will be to subjugate the various opposition forces in Manchukuo itself; to defend Manchukuo against efforts of China to recover the territory; and to meet any action of Russia growing out of the railroad situation in Manchuria.

Five. Japan considers that she needs her present standing army for her own defense. Having assumed the obligations of assisting the pacification and defense of Manchukuo, she considers herself confronted with the necessity not of reducing her land forces but of materially increasing them. However, if Japan should withdraw

from

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

from the Arms Limitation Conference and should then increase the size of her army, she would have started another race in armaments in which she knows she cannot successfully compete.

Six. Japan therefore has not withdrawn from the arms conference nor will she do so until she accomplishes or definitely fails in her present purpose (?), viz, to secure the acquiescence, express or understood, by the participating powers, in her plan to augment her land forces by the addition of the strength deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace in Manchuria.

Seven. The Military Attache is of the opinion that in the conference Japan will probably work for an army augmented above the present strength by 50,000 men but will compromise on 35,000 men.

WSB-CSB GREW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Canton/62 FOR Despatch #175 to Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED February 4, 1933.
TO
NAME

1—1127

REGARDING: Shanhaikwan situation.
Repercussions in Canton from developments at Shanhaikwan.

hs

793.94/6059

1017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

893.00PR Canton/62
excerpt

Repercussions in Canton from Developments at Shanhaikwan

The Cantonese leaders have been most advantageously situated for championing the cause, which they have been doing so vociferously, of armed resistence to Japan. If Chiang Kai-shek would only move his armies in the direction of Manchuria, the Cantonese would form the "rear guard" and take care of the Communists. The recent developments at Shanhaikwan have set in motion a renewed clamor in Canton that something be done. In the weekly Memorial Meeting on January 30, Mr. Ts'ou Lu, Chancellor of Sun Yat-sen University, reviewed

1018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6060

SEE 893.00 P. R. Nanking/60 FOR Despatch # D-445.

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED February 13, 1933.
TO NAME

REGARDING:

Japanese aggressions into Chinese territory. Statements issued by the Foreign Office betrayed its uneasiness because of the procrastination of the League of Nations, and denounced the - .

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1019

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

III. FOREIGN RELATIONS

The statements issued by the Foreign Office during the month of January betrayed its uneasiness because of the procrastination of the League of Nations. They denounced the aggressions of Japan in no uncertain terms, particularly after the speech of Count Uchida before the

Japanese

Japanese Diet and after the occupation of Shanhaikwan. The Shanhaikwan incident stirred the Foreign Office to lodge a formal protest with the Japanese Legation, to the effect that Japan was relentlessly carrying out its preconceived plan. It demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, the punishment of the perpetrators of the "outrage", and the prevention of similar occurrences in the future and it reserved the right to appeal for reimbursement for damages done.

1020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6061
1929

SEE 893.00 P.R.Yunnan/52 FOR Despatch # 42

FROM Yunnanfu0 (Reed) DATED Feb.2,1933
TO NAME

1—1127 OPO

REGARDING:

January 28th a mass meeting was held;over 10,000 persons attending to commemorate the Shanghai Conflict of 1932. Lectures given on safety precautions,national salvation by develppement of aviation, etc. Provincial Kuomintang addressed Central Govt. by telegram to the effedt that troops should be massed to drive Japanese out of China; pledging active allegiance and participation of Yunnan.

esp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SECRET

CODE CABLEGRAM JJ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 10 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT

March 7, 1933.

1 P. M.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 8 - 1933
Department of State

From M. A. Tokio

To The Adjutant General.

Number 273. March 7th.

193.94

Japanese casualties to include March 4th, 50 killed and wounded, 150 frost bite.

Japanese front line March 6th: 11th Infantry Brigade at Chuan Ning; 4th Cavalry Brigade at Tang San Ying followed closely by 344th Infantry Brigade; advance troops 8th Division 14th Infantry Brigade on Great Wall from Kupeikou southwest of Jehol to Shanhaikuan.

Believe 33rd Brigade 10th Division in army reserve south of Wukungfu.

Great Wall to be Jehol China boundary wall to Jehol.

Bratton.

G-2 X
TAG V

COPY

→ Partang means 36th Cav. Brig.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By ____, NARS Date 3/19/73

SECRET

F/HS
793.94/6062
FILED
MAR 10 1933

1022

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 10 1933 DIVISION OF RECORDS

Copies sent to Hull Secretary Treasury Navy 1/20/33

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS JAN 21 1933 Department of State

No distribution
M.H.

January 18, 1933.

SECRETARY OF STATE JAN 21 1933 NOTED

Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, January 18th.

793.94 note 711.94

The Japanese Ambassador came to discuss the various newspaper reports that we were bringing pressure to bear to make the League take a firm action against Japan. I told the Ambassador that he should know our stand well enough to realize that a large proportion of these reports were mere exaggeration; I told him that because we had kept silent during the last few months, feeling that the Lytton Report was a report to the League of Nations and should be handled by the League of Nations, did not mean any change whatever in our attitude toward the Far Eastern situation. I said that the only correspondence we had had was due to the fact that the story had got around in Europe that we had changed our policy and that in answer to inquiries we had made it quite definite that there was no change and that there is not likely to be any change when the new Administration comes into office; I told him that Mr. Roosevelt's public statement seemed to make this quite definite.

F/HS 793.94/6063 Confidential File FILED MAR 10 1933

1023

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

definite. The Ambassador said that he was glad to understand this situation and that it was just as he had supposed it would be.

He then brought up reports he had seen in the papers that some consideration was being given as to the protection of foreign interests in Northern China, including the possible neutralization of Peiping. I told him that no particular discussions were going on along these lines here, although I had no doubt that the various military commanders in the region were discussing the matter all the time since it was impossible to say that Japan would not make some move south of the Wall. I added that I did not think any such move was imminent. The Ambassador said he was glad to hear this and he wanted to remind me that he had said the Shanhaikwan movement was really a test as to whether the Government or the Army would control policy, that I must realize that the incident had been localized, which would seem to prove that the Government was in control. I answered that it did (not) seem to me that the fact no particular moves had

1024

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

had been made for the last two or three weeks was particularly significant; that the weather had obviously prevented any large troop movements. The Ambassador ~~immediately~~ said that any movements into the Province of Jehol were merely part of the plan for rounding out the boundaries of Manchukuo. To this I made no comment.

The Ambassador said that it probably was not a good time to bring up the question, but that he had planned to talk with me about the irritation to Japanese feelings over the fact that our fleet remained in the Hawaiian Islands. I told him that I agreed with him that this was not the time to bring the matter up, that, furthermore, the disposition of the American Fleet was a matter solely for the decision of the American Government. He said he quite realized this, but that he was very anxious for a diminution of anti-American feeling in Japan and that the presence of the fleet in Hawaii kept this feeling going. I ignored this remark and told him it seemed to me that the Japanese were doing everything in their power to stir up anti-Japanese feeling in this country

1025

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

country, that the totally wild remarks, having no basis of fact whatever, of Mr. Shiratori, which were intended, of course, to rouse Japanese feeling against this country, could hardly fail to have a repercussion here. I pointed out to him that, even an incident like that of Shanhaikwan, reinforced the idea to the American people that Japan had no intention whatever of maintaining treaties, but will continue to run rough shod over Chinese interests, as well as over foreign sensibilities, that he must realize that this Shanhaikwan incident had inevitably very greatly strengthened the British opposition to the Japanese policy. The Ambassador said he agreed with this and felt that it had been a very stupid move and one which had little justification. I told him that, so far as anti-Japanese feeling in this country was concerned, the attack this morning on the Singer Sewing Machine plant in Yokohama would be taken ~~in this country~~ as a manifestation of anti-American feeling although it was actually the result of labor troubles. The Ambassador had not heard of this and was extremely disturbed; he said he quite realized that it was an incident

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

of a strike, that, nevertheless, it would create a bad impression. I said that the worst of the matter was that there seemed to have been little or no attempt to give proper police protection and that Mr. Grew had instantly and entirely correctly protested on this ground. The Ambassador said that could, of course, be no excuse if the police were not on their job and that he could only deeply regret what had happened.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

1027

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 7 - 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

January 13, 1933.

793.94
mte
75394 Conversation
800.51W 89

MEMORANDUM OF LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND GOVERNOR FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 9:15 O'CLOCK A.M.

Far East.

I called the Governor up at his house in New York and reminded him of our talk on the Far East last Monday and of his assurances to me then of his sympathy with the American policy which we had thus far followed in regard to Manchuria. I told him that matters were now reaching a critical point in the light of the coming meeting of the Committee of Nineteen on January 16th, and that efforts were being made to make it appear that our silence during the recent weeks indicated either a change of policy on our part or that there was going to be a change by the new administration. The Governor said yes, that he had heard the situation was deteriorating that way. I told him I was about to call up our London Embassy and have a conference through them with Sir John Simon, in which I proposed to have them tell Sir John

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793.94/6064
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MAR 16 1933
Confidential File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

John Simon on my behalf that there had been no change in our policy and I did not anticipate any such change in the future. I told Governor Roosevelt that I did not like to send such a message with its implications without telling him first of my purpose and seeing whether he had any objection. He at once said no, that it was the right thing for me to do and for me to go ahead and do it.

I also told Governor Roosevelt that I had been delayed in reaching Washington, owing to the death of a friend on Long Island, but that I had taken up the other matter of his suggestion (meaning about the debts) with the President and that the President was thinking it over. I told him again that I appreciated very much the opportunity of conversation with him last Monday and hoped that we would succeed in opening gradually an effective cooperation. He responded cordially, saying that he felt the same way.

H.L.S.

S HLS:HHR

1029

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies to Tokyo and Peiping 5/13

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 14 1933
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 16, 1933.

File

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 13 1933
NOTED

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Possibility of Chino-Japanese Hostilities in Tientsin-Peiping Area.

793.94

793.94/6065

Reference Tientsin's telegram of March 15, 3p.m. (attached).

The indications, on the basis of this and many previous telegrams from the Far East during the past few weeks, together with items carried in press reports both from China and from Japan, point toward substantial likelihood that the Japanese and Chinese may soon be engaged in military operations south of the Great Wall which would almost inevitably in course of time involve Tientsin and Peiping.

The situation is such that the Chinese must either desist entirely from the policy of making the Japanese insecure in their position in Manchuria, by guerrilla warfare within Manchuria and military harrassment on the border of Manchuria, or continue to strengthen their military position immediately south of the Wall. The Japanese not unnaturally declare that China's activities in that connection are provocative and, if continued, must be met by Japanese military operations in China proper. In fact, Japan's problem in the present stage of

F/G 793.94/6065

JUN 24 1933

Confidential File

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of this contest is to bring such pressure to bear on the Chinese Government as may be necessary to compel that Government to enter into negotiations the objective of which, on Japan's part, would be to obtain recognition by China of the independence of "Manchukuo".

Various observers believe that the British Government has made definite diplomatic efforts to convince the Japanese that it would be advisable for them to stay away from Tientsin and Peiping. Whether that estimate is or is not correct, it may well be doubted whether the advice of Great Britain or any other power or group of powers will, qua advice, suffice to avert hostilities in that area. This prospect makes desirable consideration by the foreign powers of two questions: (a) shall any special effort be made to prevent developments in the direction indicated; and (b) what steps shall be taken, if these developments eventuate, for the protection of foreign persons and property.

Referring to question (a), that of taking special steps, it is believed that there is no initiative which the American Government might advisedly take in this connection. The foreign power which has most at stake in that area is Great Britain. If any initiative is

to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to be taken in the way of proposing concerted representations or action, that initiative should be taken by the British Government and/or the League of Nations.

Referring to question (b), that of protection of foreign property and nationals, it is believed that all steps of an anticipatory character which can advantageously be taken have already been taken. If and when the hostilities become imminent or actually occur, there may arise need for taking, in the light of the information which will then be coming in, new steps. The foreign legations and the foreign military contingents at Peiping and Tientsin have made, it is believed, all the arrangements of a precautionary character which it is possible to make. This has been done on the basis of international consultation and cooperation.

It is estimated that hostilities which may occur between Japanese and Chinese forces in the Tientsin-Peiping area need not necessarily endanger foreign property and lives. At Tientsin, the railway line runs east and west on soil north of the river (Pei Ho), whereas the important foreign concessions and most of the foreign persons resident are located on soil south

of

1032

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of the river. (NOTE: Thus, the British, the French and the Japanese concessions, the troops of those nationalities and of the United States, et cetera. Also, the Chinese city.) At Peiping, the center of foreign interest and life is in the Legation quarter. Although the residences and places of business of foreign civilians are scattered throughout the city and the suburbs, arrangements have been made for concentration in case there develops a situation of emergency. Military operations for the capture of Peiping by an alien invading army could be conducted without laying the city under fire or engaging in combat within the city. (NOTE: Peiping has been captured more than once by attacking military forces without such operations. Whether the Japanese, if they attack, will use such strategy and tactics, is a matter for conjecture.)

Hostilities between the Chinese and the Japanese in this area can be conducted without endangering the position of the armed forces present there of other powers and without necessitating any physical contact between them and the contending Chinese and Japanese forces. (NOTE: In this connection also, the question of how those operations, if they eventuate, will be conducted is a matter of conjecture.)

It

1033

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It is believed that, confronted with this possible development, there is no action which the American Government can advisedly take at this moment. However, thought should be given to the questions: (a) if an inquiry were to come from some quarter proposing international preventive efforts, what would be our attitude; (b) if these hostilities eventuate and the property and lives of Americans in the area are definitely endangered, what new steps, if any, will we be prepared to take; and (c) if the hostilities should so develop as to bring Chinese or Japanese armed forces or both into contact and conflict with American armed forces on the spot (together with those of other powers), what steps would we take.

There is another question to which thought must be given: if such hostilities eventuate and if China makes a new appeal to the League and the United States, under the Covenant of the League and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party, what position will the American Government wish to take?

Finally, thought must be given to the question: if Japan enlarges the sphere of her armed operations in such manner as to carry hostilities to various ports and other parts of China, what should be the attitude of the powers, including the United States?

FE:SKH/ZMK

1034

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 17 1933 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS

GRAY

FROM Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 15, 1933

Rec'd 5:12 a. m., 16th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 16 1933 Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE APR 13 1933 NOTED

F/G 793.94/6065

FILED JUN 28 1933

793.94 note 793.00

URGENT.

March 15, 3 p. m.

Local Chinese officials claim Japanese are bombing villages up to a point 13 miles this side of the Wall between Kupehkou and Hsifengkou. Report not confirmed.

Chinese official told me in course of a conversation yesterday that there is no possibility Chinese agreeing establish neutral zone along Great Wall or to complying with Japanese protest concerning alleged violation protocol and 1902 exchange of notes. Notwithstanding Tokyo protestations of desire confine operations to territory outside Wall, Chinese seem convinced it is only matter of time when Tientsin and Peiping areas will become involved, the excuse being massing of troops this side of Wall and alleged violations of 1901 protocol and 1902 exchange of notes. This general belief has increased anxiety among local Chinese. But little credence is placed in reports that Chiang Kai Shek will compromise situation. Chinese

generally

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#-- from Tientsin via N.R., March 15, 3 p. m.

generally hold that such a course would mean the complete downfall of any leader however strong he might be. There seems to exist pronounced determination at least among local Chinese officials to yield nothing to Japan whatever the consequences. A Japanese fleet of 8 or 10 vessels is still in the open sea between Tangku and Shanhaikwan.

Both sides admit severe fighting at Kupehkou and Hsifengkou within past few days but there is no confirmation that in engagement between Sung Che Yuan and 13th and 14th Japanese brigades 6,000 Japanese were killed and 18 field pieces, 7 tanks and over 5,000 rifles captured. Small groups wounded soldiers have been passing through Tientsin en route Peiping past few days.

WSB-WWC. LOCKHART

1036

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 17, 1933.

Recd 12:25 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 17 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 17 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94

258, March 17, 10 a.m.

My 250, March 14, 2 p.m. 6040

Following from American Consul at Dairen to the Legation and Tokyo:

"March 16, 4 p.m. The South Manchuria Railway Company, on behalf of the Kwantung army, has agreed to buy the Ford trucks at price fixed by American Chinese Company. The trucks are now being unloaded from the HARU MARU."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS
793.94/6066
FILED
APR 0 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated ~~March~~ 11, 1933.

Recd 1:46 a.m., 17th.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 17 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 17 1933
Department of State

F/HS
793.94/6067

Secretary of State

Washington.

March 11, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My March 7, 4 p.m.

793.94

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation.

"CONFIDENTIAL. March 11, 11 a.m. My March 7, 3 pm. American Chinese Company has received telegram from its representative at Dairen stating official order has been received from South Manchuria Railway for the purchase of the one hundred Ford chassis. National City Bank has authorized delivery of shipping documents against payment for the cargo. Case will therefore be closed so far as company here is concerned on payment of money order.

Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

JS CIB

FILED
APR 6 1933

1038

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrasement to ONI & MID in Confidence

FROM

cib
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

Dated March 17, 1933.

Rec'd 2:03 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 17 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 17 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

793.94

259, March 17, 11 a.m. 893.20

Legation's 251, March 15, 10 a.m. 416

Following from American Consul General at Hankow:

"March 16, 4 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL. Within the past few days the Chinese military have shipped approximately fourteen carloads of aviation gasoline from Hankow by rail to some destination in the North. The reported destination is Loyang. I am reliably informed that the Chinese military are negotiating in this area for considerable quantities of timber for delivery by rail at the Yellow River.

Repeated to Nanking."

CIB JS

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6068

1039

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 18 1933

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated March 17, 11 a.m., from the American Minister at Peiping reads substantially as follows:

On March 16, 4 p.m., the American Consul General at Hankow telegraphed the Legation as follows:

Approximately 14 carloads of aviation gasoline has been shipped from Hankow by rail to some destination in the north within the past few days by the Chinese military. Loyang is the reported destination. According to reliable information the Chinese military are negotiating in this area for considerable quantities of timber for delivery at the Yellow River by rail.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 17 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

HANKOW VIA NR

Dated March 17, 1933.

Recd 1:46 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 17 1933
Department of State

Office of Economic Adviser
MAR 18 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Washington.

#15

~~14~~, March 17, 11 a.m.

793.94
note
693.9412

One. There has been a recrudescence of anti-Japanese sentiment in Hankow during the past two weeks. On March 11th the Hankow and Wuchang Chamber of Commerce went on record as being opposed to dealing in Japanese goods and enjoined all Chinese merchants to refrain from doing so.

Two. At least one murder and two mysterious disappearances of influential Chinese having connections with the Japanese have occurred recently, engineered it is reported by bloody group. The Chinese staff of the Yokohama Specie Bank has resigned and other Chinese employees of Japanese firms are most apprehensive. Threatening letters are being constantly received by Chinese dealing in Japanese goods.

FILED
MAR 18 1933

Three. Local Chinese authorities deny the existence of a bloody group but the present strength of anti-Japanese sentiment taken in conjunction with the incidents mentioned indicates the existence of some such organization.

ADAMS

JS CIB

F/HS
793.94/6069

1041

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 20 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 19, 1933

Rec'd 12:58 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 20 1933
Department of State

F/G 793.94/6070

793.94

263, March 19, 10 a. m.

Reuter from Nanking, eighteenth:

"An emphatic declaration that there will be no negotiations or compromise with Japan was made by Lo Wen Kan on his return from the North today. He said Chinese people should do their utmost to protect national territory and regain lost provinces while the nations or world should assume their moral and legal obligations involved by adoption of report of Committee of Nineteen by League Assembly. He added that General Chiang Kai Shek fully supported Government's policy".

Reuter from Tokyo, eighteenth:

"Speaking in Diet today Count Uchida, Foreign Minister, said departure from Peiping of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang would prove favorable for solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese problems. He emphasied that Japanese and Manchukuo troops would not enter North China unless Chinese resort to unwarranted provocations".

JS JOHNSON

FILED
MAR 21 1933

1042

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 20 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 20, 1933

Rec'd 4:45 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 20 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

March 20, noon.

General Yao Tung-Fang has relieved General Ho Chu-Kuo as commanding officer in Chinwangtao area. General Ho and his troops, who have been at Chinwangtao for several months, are being moved to Lwanchow.

General Han Fu-Chu passed through Tientsin yesterday from Shantung to Peiping en route Paotingfu for conference with Chiang Kai-Shek. Unconfirmed reports have been current for several days that Han may assume command of Chiang's forces in North China in the near future.

Both sides still claiming Hsifengkou.

Situation Tientsin quiet.

LOCKHART

CIB

WP

FILED
MAR 21 1933

F/HS

793.94/6071

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 20 1933
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

FROM

Tientsin via NR

Dated March 20, 1933.

Recd 5:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 20 1933
Department of State

March 20, 4 p.m.

My March 11, noon.

793.94

Following sent to the Legation:

"March 20, 3 p.m. My March 11, 11 a.m. Deal has now been closed, 100 chassis being delivered South Manchuria Railway Company. American Chinese Company here apparently satisfied with final outcome. Repeated to Department."

LOCKHART

CIB WP

F/HS
793.94/6072
FILED
MAR 21 1933

1044

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM PEIPING

Dated March 20, 1933

Recd. 3.45 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 20 1933 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

File 21. to Peiping

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 20 1933 Department of State

MAR 23 1933

MAR 22 1933

F/HS

793.94/6073

Secretary of State

Washington

265. March 20, noon.

One. Situation today is as follows: Chinese hold defensive line along inside the Wall controlling Chinese end of passes at Hsifengkow. There is apparently no present intention on the part of the Chinese to attempt to invade Jehol.

Two. Having acquired Jehol and extended their control to the Wall Japanese Government has stopped. Elimination of Jehol and of Chang Hsueh Liang deprives Japanese of any excuse for sending military expeditions into Peiping-Tientsin area south of Wall. Situation now hangs on question of value to Japanese of negotiations and ultimate settlement. Chinese are determined not to negotiate and they seem to believe that negotiations and settlement are of sufficient importance to Japanese to force Japanese to enter this area in the hope that Chinese will be compelled to negotiate.

Three. I doubt whether importance of negotiation and settlement to Japanese is sufficient to outweigh expense and difficulty of conducting campaign in this

area

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

area which would have to be extended as far as Yellow River and therefore believe that situation will continue stalemated for some time.

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

1046

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

RECEIVED
1933 MAR -23- PM 4:30

Department of State

Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

March 23, 1933.

6p

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. B

793.94/6073

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

94 CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 265, March 20, noon, and 273, March 22, 6 p.m.

Department appreciates having your estimates. Please keep Department advised of any changes in your estimate and of concurring or dissenting views among your colleagues.

Hull
AM

793.94/6073

FE:SKH:CLS

FE

Mar. 25 1933. PM

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... *M.*, ..., *19*....., ...

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1—138

1047

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6074

SEE 841.00/1233 FOR Despatch #717

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED March 9,1933
TO NAME

1—1127

REGARDING: Far Eastern crisis. Attitude of England toward,-. Recent speech by Lord Lyyton (Chairman of the Lytton Commission) on subject.

fp

793.94

1048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE FAR EAST.

England desires to take no individual action in the Far Eastern crisis. In this she is supported by like opinion on the part of France, both countries being willing to lose their individual identity in association with the work of the League of Nations. Accordingly, the Cabinet prefers cooperation with the United States under the aegis of the League of Nations to any purely Anglo-American policy.

Lord Lytton (Chairman of the Lytton Commission), who has great weight with public opinion in this country, as well as with members of the Cabinet, set forth in a recent speech his view that in the Manchurian crisis facts must force a solution upon Japan:

1. Without a solution Japan must be prepared to maintain herself in a country of 30 million people, 28 million of which are Chinese, and only 2 million Manchu or Japanese.

2. The markets of China are essential to Japan, and these will only be kept open to Japan by force if Japan maintains her Manchurian venture without placating China.

3. Japan cannot exist indefinitely without the good opinion of the world.

Of course any blockade of the Chinese coast or operation of Japanese troops in China tending to restrict British trade might be expected to modify considerably the opinions expressed above.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 21, 1933.

~~EES~~:
~~JEJ~~:
~~ROM~~:
~~MMT~~:
~~STA~~:

at Mukden or Changchun

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of February 18, 1933, forwards to the Department a copy of its despatch No. 724 to the Legation at Peiping on the subject "Statement of the Japanese Embassy concerning Jehol".

The enclosure to this despatch consists of a statement issued by the Japanese Embassy at Changchun to the effect that the Japanese invasion of Jehol Province became necessary due to (1) appeals from the population of Jehol for protection against bandits and so-called volunteers under Chang Hsueh-liang and (2) the protection of "Manchukuo" from invasions of bandits and other armed forces from Jehol Province.

The statement declares that the occupation of Jehol Province will not in any way involve North China unless Japanese rights and interests there are jeopardized by the Chinese themselves, the responsibility for any such development resting wholly with the Chinese.

At

1050

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

At the time of writing this despatch, February 17, Consul General Myers doubts the sincerity of the Japanese statement in as much as the Japanese made similar statements just prior to their occupation of the city of Harbin. He suggests that the Japanese may invade Peiping and Tientsin at the conclusion of the drive on Jehol in order to force the Chinese to begin direct negotiations for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. The dispute could then be settled on the basis of Japan withdrawing from North China in return for China agreeing not to interfere with "Manchukuo".

LHE:KC

1051

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
DEPT OF STATE
DIV COM & REC

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. ------

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 18, 1933.

MAR 20 33

SUBJECT: Statement of the Japanese Embassy concerning Jehol.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

793.94

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 22 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-O SECTION

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 20 1933
Department of State

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 724 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated February 17, 1933 on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 724
to the Legation at Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies
Received JM

800
HTW

F/HS 793.94/6075

FILED
MAY 26 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 724.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 17, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Statement of the Japanese Embassy concerning Jehol.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/- I have the honor to enclose a copy of a statement issued to the press by the Spokesman of the Japanese Embassy at Hsinking. From the beginning until the fourth paragraph the statement merely repeats assertions concerning Jehol that Japanese and Manchoukuo officials have made frequently. But the fourth and fifth paragraphs are considered noteworthy. As the Legation is aware, there have been several cases since September 18, 1931 of the Japanese announcing that they would not extend their military operations to a given district unless the rights of their nationals were jeopardized. Invariably such announcements have been followed by a military occupation of the district. The invasion of Harbin is an example.

There is a possibility that this procedure may be applied to Peiping and Tientsin. The Japanese

authorities

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

authorities at Hsinking are reported to be concerned over the possibility that the groups of Chinese may become sufficiently incensed over the Japanese invasion of Jehol to attack Japanese residing in China. This concern is undoubtedly sincere, but it is possible that the danger will be exaggerated and made a pretext for military operations.

The theory has been advanced - it is merely a theory - that the Japanese may invade Peiping and Tientsin at the conclusion of the drive on Jehol in order to force the Chinese Government to begin direct negotiations for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. The Chinese Government will not agree to direct negotiations at present but, according to this theory, it would if Peiping and Tientsin were attacked. Then the dispute could be settled on the basis of Japan withdrawing from North China in return for China agreeing not to interfere with Manchoukuo. In this connection it will be recalled that (as reported in despatch No. 722, February 13, 1933) some local Japanese officials have expressed concern over the possibility that it may be exceedingly difficult to restrain the Japanese invading forces when they reach the Great Wall. On the other hand it is possible that the recent indications that the Japanese troops may go south of the Wall are disseminated for the purpose of persuading the Chinese authorities that they will face serious consequences if they offer formidable resistance to the Japanese invasion of Jehol.

Respectfully,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/- Statement by the Japanese Embassy.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MH:mhp

A true copy of the signed original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 724 of M. S. Myers, Mukden, Manchuria, dated February 17, 1933 to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "Statement of the Japanese Embassy concerning Jehol."

STATEMENT ISSUED BY JAPANESE EMBASSY
REGARDING JEHOL SITUATION

General Tang Yu-lin, Governor of Jehol, being one of the signatories of the declaration of the independence of Manchoukuo, the province of Jehol was incorporated in the new state. The province constitutes an integral part of Manchoukuo. This cannot be doubted in the light of historical and geographical facts.

This province has recently become filled with bandits and other lawless elements which have escaped from the punitive campaigns of Manchoukuo and Japanese troops. Villagers of the districts, suffering from plunder and other outrageous acts of the undisciplined insurgents, have repeatedly petitioned the Manchoukuo and Japanese authorities for succor. Under such circumstances, it is rather inhuman to deny this urgent request of the native population. Moreover, the number of so-called volunteers under the influence of Chang Hsueh-liang is still increasing in Jehol, and they, cooperating with the bandits, are assuming an offensive attitude.

On the other hand, peace and order of the entire area of Manchoukuo except Jehol has been almost established, at a tremendous sacrifice by our troops. But Jehol remains the base of activity for all kinds of lawless elements; thus it constitutes a great menace to the general peace of the state. Naturally, the Manchoukuo authorities cannot tolerate the existence of such menace within their territory; and their efforts to remove it, which are a legitimate exercise of the sovereignty of Manchoukuo, may not be regarded in any other light than as a strictly domestic affair.

There are those who criticize such measures on the ground that although directed against Jehol, they will inevitably affect North China. This charge, however, is unjustified, as the question of Jehol and that of North China have no connection with each other. It is quite illogical therefore to maintain that the peace and security of Manchoukuo should be left to the mercy of hostile forces on the ground that, if an offensive action should be started, the turmoil might involve North China.

No such happening will come to pass unless and until the Japanese rights and interests in North China are jeopardized by the Chinese themselves.

This

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

This being so, the question of whether or not such an eventuality takes place depends entirely upon the attitude of the Chinese. The responsibility for any such development would rest, therefore, wholly with the Chinese.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ONI

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 17 1933
Department of State

FE
DCR

Report No. 56.

FEBRUARY 1933
CHINA

POLITICAL FORCES

100 - Political Forces
103 - International relations
500 - International issues or general international situation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAR 20 1933
DIVISION OF

793.94

F/ESP

793.94/6076

OBSERVATIONS IN JEHOL PROVINCE.

I departed from Peiping at 0700, February 4, 1933, by motor truck. Up until arrival at Miyunhsien (密雲縣) about 1100 was anything of military importance observed. Miyunhsien is the military headquarters of the 7th Brigade (Chang Hsueh-liang) and is under the command of Brigadier-General Chang Cheng-feng. There are approximately 10,000 troops here and are quartered in encampments and native houses. The soldiers were of average appearance for Chinese. A great number of horses and some few trucks were in evidence. I departed from Miyunhsien at 1230 and en route met about two battalions of troops apparently on a training hike. This group was infantry and machine-guns. The infantrymen carried the usual equipment excepting no trench equipment was in evidence. The machine-guns were carried on horses and were of the water cooled type. I arrived at Kupeikou (古北口) at 1730. The town was full of soldiers as about one battalion is stationed here and under the command of Colonel Wang. It looked as if the soldiers were quartered mostly in private houses. Throughout the whole day no evidence of transportation of supplies was in evidence. I left Kupeikou at 0700 February 5 and in a short time entered the province of Jehol. Throughout the whole day little was observed as there were no troop movements or evidence of supplies being transported. The road throughout the trip was very rough and is mostly mountain passes and creek beds from Kupeikou to Chengtehfu (承德府) with no flat country. This will bear in two ways on the situation making it difficult to transport supplies and if the fighting reaches this area artillery will be of little value as guerilla warfare will predominate and operation will extend over a period of time. I arrived at Chengtehfu at 1800.

Chengtehfu (Jehol) is the capital of the province of Jehol and is situated in a valley surrounded by mountains and is on the Je Ho River, a tributary of the Lwan Ho River and unnavigable. It was formerly the Summer Palace of the Emperors and contains a palace with large grounds and many temples. It is now a relic of the splendor of old China. The present governor is General Tang Yu-lin (湯玉麟). Until the present it has been enjoying peace and prosperity except for extremely heavy taxes. Its agricultural development is of recent date. Tang Yu-lin's army contains 30,000 men.

On February 6, I met General Lee, Tang's Chief of Staff. He was very hearty in greeting me but his conversation was of little value. His estimates of troops were at Chaoyang (朝 陽) 30,000 of Tang Yu-lin's, at Kailu (開 魯) 30,000 of Chang Hsueh-liang's, and 50,000 Volunteers on a front between the two places. He said that it was impossible to see any artillery as it was all at the front.

On February 1, one Japanese scouting plane had visited Chengtehfu apparently on an observation mission as no bombs or leaflets were dropped; however, since that time anti-aircraft defences have been established on the four highest points in the city

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Report No. 56.

FEBRUARY 1933
CHINA

POLITICAL FORCES

100 - Political Forces
103 - International relations
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OBSERVATIONS IN JEHOL PROVINCE.

and are manned from 0800 until 1500 daily. Their equipment was said to be one 3" gun and four machine-guns at each station.

Since the establishment of Jehol as a province in 1929 the present governor, General Tang Yu-lin, has served in that capacity. Tang is sixty-one years old and was born in that province. In his early days he was a bandit and brigand and eventually joined Chang Tso-lin, ascending to command of the 13th Route Army (1924-25). In 1929 he was appointed governor of Jehol. At present he is very able and active for a man of his age and lives in the palace formerly occupied by the Emperors. His rule has been autocratic and domineering and he has forced heavy taxes on the province. His training has fitted him to be one who does not trust his subordinates as no action is ever undertaken without his express permission. Access to him is very difficult for foreigners. He has become a prominent figure in the present situation due to many circumstances. It is known that the Japanese confiscated millions of silver at his Mukden home and placed it to his credit in a Japanese bank in order to buy him. As yet he has not openly pledged his loyalty to "Manchoukuo", although the Japanese claim that he had a representative at Changchun at the time of the incorporation of "Manchoukuo" and he now is given an office in that group by them. Up until recently he has acted very independently and apparently was content to govern his province as he has given no aid up until now. I was told that he was particularly angered recently when a Nanking representative visited him and attempted to find out his policy as he proclaimed that he was ardently "pro-Chinese" and peeved that Chinese newspapers had continually doubted his allegiance. It may be said that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang can in a little way influence him as Tang was such a close associate of his father, Chang Tso-lin, that he will always act independently of him. Recently due to Tang's financial manipulation of bringing all the silver of the province into his own coffers the provincial bank paper money is deflated and accepted at sixty dollars for one silver dollar. In an interview Tang said "that Japan is drunk with success disturbing the peace of the Far East and the World and that he would stop them, fighting any invasion until the last man".

On February 11th there had arrived in Chengtehfu and en route there 30,000 new troops from Shansi under the command of General Sun Tien-ying (孫殿英). These I understand are the result of a northern alliance "Hu Pei" formed since the Shanhaikuan incident. Each of the following provinces is to furnish 30,000 troops: Shantung, Hopei, Chahar and Shansi. General Sun is a familiar military figure in China as he has participated in internal strifes and worked for many military leaders. He is attributed to have robbed the Manchu tombs at Tungling of their treasures.

The most reliable estimate of troops at the front is given below

Kailu 20,000 Chahar troops (Sung Che-yuan 宋哲元)
15,000 Hopei troops (Chang Hsueh-liang 張學良)

1059

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mitton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Report No. 56.

FEBRUARY 1933
CHINA

POLITICAL FORCES

100 - Political Forces
103 - International relations
500 - International issues or general international situation

OBSERVATIONS IN JEHOL PROVINCE.

Chaoyang 20,000 Jehol troops (Tang Yu-lin)

Estimates of Volunteers ran from 50,000 to 100,000 and they are between these two points. It was heard that the Volunteers bore the brunt of fighting until the present as they were aggressors while the regular troops had taken a defensive stand. It may be said that the regular troops may be bought through their officers and the Japanese may have this in mind.

I left Chengtehfu at 0300 February 12 to return to Peiping. En route I met an enormous number of troops estimated at 10,000 going North. These were the Shansi soldiers mentioned above who comprise General Sun's army. They seemed to be well equipped and their supplies were carried on camels and wagons. In addition a number of wagons of ammunition were seen en route. At Miyunhsien it was learned that 3,000 troops were being moved North the following day. I arrived at Peiping at 2030.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 21 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY

FROM TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

Dated March 21, 1933

Rcvd. 9.05 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 21 1933
Department of State

URGENT.

March 21, 3 p.m.

My March 20, noon. 6071

793.94

Personal and confidential letter dated March 21 from American resident of Changli states General Ho arrived there Saturday night with his troops apparently on way westward. My correspondent interprets this as gradual withdrawal of Ho's army from Chinwangtao area and quotes an officer as saying there would be no fighting in neighborhood Changli as Chinese do not wish any complications with provincial powers. Some movement of troops eastward through Changli probably belonging to General Yao Tung Fang.

CSB
HPD

LOCKHART

F/HS 793.94/6077

FILED
MAR 22 1933

1061

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

McL

Gray.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 21, 1933.

Received 11.20 A. M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 21 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 21 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

269, March 21, 9 P. M.

Vice Minister Liu called this ~~evening~~ under instructions from Lo Wen Kan to say that Lo had received word from Admiral Shen at Tsingtau that four Japanese cruisers had appeared off Taku and that the Japanese battleship HIRADA (Commander Chita) had left Port Arthur for Taku. Lo stated that Commander Chita had stated that if China does not stop despatching troops toward Jehol there would be some action at Tientsin and Peiping. Vice Minister Liu did not know to whom Commander Chita had made above statement. Lo instructed Liu to say to me that China could not halt efforts to resist attack on Jehol and at same time China would be obliged to resist any attacks directed at Peiping or Tientsin. He pointed out that while this was at the present time only a threat it might result in action later and Dr. Lo had directed him to express the hope that interested friendly governments would dissuade Japan from action which could not but endanger interests of friendly powers. Liu stated he communicated above to Lampson.

I promised Vice Minister Liu that I would

F/HS 793.94/6078

FILED JUN 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

communicate his message to you.

All has been quiet here but this evening rumors have been circulating, some inspired by the Japanese Legation, that Japanese may be intending some action. Tientsin reports all quiet there.

JOHNSON

KLP

CSB

1063

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KLP GRAY

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 21, 1933.

Rec'd. 11:10 a.m.

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 21 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 21 1933
Department of State

URGENT

March 21, 1 p.m.

793.94
note
393.1163

Charles O. Kautto, American Missionary of Church of the Brethren Mission residing at Taitoying, Hopei, informs me by letter of March 19 that native mission helper has arrived there from Mutowteng and reported that that place occupied by Japanese March 9 and that Japanese troops occupying American mission property and using such things as they need but had broken no locks. Same mission helper reports Shwangshantze occupied by Japanese March 11 and that American mission property there being used by Japanese troops although no locks to private living quarters broken. Japanese soldiers occupying mission property described as follows: Mutowteng 40th Machine Company, 10th Army; Shwangshantze 10th Company, 10th Army. Mutowteng and Shwangshantze are in Hopei Province northwest

Shanhaikwan

F/HS

793.94/6079

FILED
APR 11 1933

1064

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 21, 1 p.m. from Tientsin

Shanhaikwan and outside the Wall. Mission property not registered this Consulate but red deeds in possession mission authorities. This matter being brought to the attention of Japanese Consul General Tientsin and is reported for such further action as Legation and Department may deem advisable.

Kautto further reports that Taitoying which is situated this side of Great Wall was visited by Japanese airplane on March 18 and two bombs dropped on commercial properties about 250 yards north of mission compound "on which some harmless shrapnel fell". Two Chinese killed on commercial properties by shrapnel.

Telegram published today from Tsunhua (70 li west of Hsifengkou and inside the Wall) states five Japanese airplanes visited that place March 20 and dropped 20 bombs destroying five houses and killing or wounding 10 persons.

Responsible Chinese returning to Tientsin from Shanhaikwan today reports 7000 Chang Hsueh Liang soldiers have gone over to Manchukuo at unidentified place north of Wall. Not confirmed.

LOCKHART

CSB

KLP

1065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 493.11/1691 FOR Tel#268 11am

FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 21, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

793.94/6080

6080

REGARDING: Chinese-Japanese Hostilities. Soong states that the Chinese Government is expecting Japanese occupation of Peiping area and that China would resist as desperately as at Shanghai. Wang Ching Wei refuses to resume post but Soong is returning to Shanghai tonight hoping to force Wang to resume.

b

1066

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6081

SEE 893.00/12317 FOR Letter

FROM Fredrik Norman (.....) DATED March 18, 1933.
TO NAME

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Suggestion that a commission be named by interested Powers for purpose of entering into truce negotiations with Marshal Chiang Kai Shek.

hs

1067

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated March 22, 1933.

Rec'd 12:40 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 22 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Tel. to Peiping

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 22 1933
Department of State

MAR 22 1933

Secretary of State

Washington.

270, March 22, 11 a.m.

Tientsin's March 21, 1 p.m. to the Department and the Legation concerning Japanese occupation of American mission property. Lockhart having brought the matter to the attention of Japanese Consul General at Tientsin I contemplate taking no action in the matter at this juncture.

JOHNSON

CIB JS

793.94

F/HS 793.94/6082

FILED
MAR 24 1933

MAR 24 1933

VC

1068

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—188
PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
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TELEGRAM SENT

1—138

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RECEIVED
Department of State
1933 MAR -22- PM 5:31
Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

March 22, 1933.

7P

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

92 Tientsin's March 21, 1 p.m., and your 270, March 22, 11 a.m.

Department assumes that you are keeping in touch with Lockhart and Department authorizes you, if and when you consider such action advisable, to take matter up with the Japanese Legation and/or to telegraph pertinent facts to Tokyo with suggestion that the Embassy at its discretion present the matter to the appropriate Japanese authorities.

Hull

793.94/6082

793.94/6082

FE:MMH:REK

FE MMH EMH

Enciphered by OK

Sent by operator ..... M., ..., 19....., ...

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

1069

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O. N. I. AND M. I. D.

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 22 1933
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 22, 1933

Rec'd 7:45 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 22 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

March 22, 3 p. m.

Responsible official informed me today that newspaper reports that Chairman of Provincial Government has despatched a reply to the last protest from Japanese Consul General is incorrect (repeat incorrect). Contrary to Shanghai newspaper reports it is also not (repeat not) true that the Japanese have lodged a still further protest, this time in form of an ultimatum, with Provincial Chairman.

Reports of an impending clash between Japanese and Chinese forces in Chinwangtao-Shanhaikwan area thus far not confirmed. Authoritative information from Chinwangtao states Chinese authorities there claim they have no knowledge of plan to attack Japanese that area. Only recent change there is withdrawal of Ho Chu Kuo and some of his troops and substitution of Yao Tung Fan. American army officer who was in Shanhaikwan March 20 reports conditions quiet there, few Japanese soldiers

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MAR 23 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#-- from Tientsin via N.R., March 22, 3 p. m.

soldiers in evidence, perhaps one battalion in addition to regular garrison under Major Ochiai.

Japanese cruiser and two of the destroyers which have been at Taku for several days left there yesterday according to Yi Shih Pao. These vessels have been coming into Taku for a few days at a time for two weeks and spending the remainder of the time in cruising in the open sea between Taku and Shanhaikwan with occasional visits to Chinwangtao.

McL-CSB LOCKHART

1071

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 22 1933
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 22, 1933

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 22 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

273, March 22, 6 p. m.

My March 21, 9 p. m., third sentence.

6078

Vice Minister Liu now informs me that several days ago Admiral Shen of the Chinese Navy at Tsingtau, hearing that Japanese warships were concentrating at Taku, asked Tanaka, Commander of Japanese naval forces at Tsingtau, to transmit to Commander Chita of the HIRADA a request that "in order that misunderstanding might be avoided" Japanese warships should not enter the Peiho. Tanaka transmitted message to Chita who radioed reply to the effect that he personally would like to see the status quo maintained at Tientsin and Taku but that unless China desists from concentrating troops along Jehol frontier then it might not be possible to avoid some Japanese action at Tientsin and Taku. (END PART ONE)

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HPD JOHNSON

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MAR 23 1933

F/HS

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1072

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 22 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 22, 1933

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

273, March 22, 6 p. m. (PART TWO)

According to latest reports received by Liu's office the battleship HIRADA and four cruisers are now lying off Taku. Liu calls attention to the fact that Chita referred to Tientsin and Taku as possible scenes of action rather than Tientsin and Peiping as erroneously reported by Liu yesterday.

Two. I report the above as communicated but wish to add that in so far as I can learn personally by conversation with local Chinese authorities (outside of Vice Minister Liu who makes the above statement by direction of Nanking) I can see nothing in the present situation that convinces me that either side desires to continue military activities. As I stated the other day I believe military action will continue at a standstill for the time being. Local shifting of Chinese forces indicates a process of gradual liquidation of the positions held by forces loyal to Chang Hsueh Liang

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and a concentration of forces more amenable to the control of the Government and Chiang Kai Shih.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

1074

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MAR 28 1933
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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1933
Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE
MAR 25 1933
NOTED

CONFIDENTIAL

March 22, 1933.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Estimate of Probabilities in North China.

F/HS
F.W. 793.94/6084

793.94

Reference Peiping's 265, March 20, noon, and 273, March 22, 6 p.m.

On the basis of all the evidence at present available, there is still warrant for apprehension that hostilities may before long extend into the Peiping-Tientsin area.

It is conjectured that the Japanese authorities at Tokyo, especially the civilian members of the Cabinet, are opposed to the wishes of the army at the front in this connection. There is room for an hypothesis that the Cabinet may be able at least to restrain the army until after the visit of Mr. Matsuoka to the United States shall have been completed. That is, however, purely a speculation. It is believed that the decision will ultimately be whatever the army chooses to make it on the basis of "military necessity".

SKH

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MAR 28 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 24, 1933.

MMH:

Warrington Dawson's special report No. 1199 of March 6, 1933, states that André Dubosoq, in LE TEMPS of March 3, regards the Chinese conception of the present conflict with Japan as very different from the European conception, the Chinese regarding war as a matter of episodes without definite conclusions. Dubosoq states that there is already talk of a Sino-Japanese-Russian triangle which may lead in the very near future to unexpected developments.

LES:CLS

1076

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 6, 1933.

DEPT. OF STATE
MAR 22 33
DIV. COM. & REC.
AM REGD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 19 1933
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 22 1933
Department of State

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1199)

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1199, dated March 6, 1933.

WD/DG

F/HS
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FILED
MAY 19 1933
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 6, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1199

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: André Duboscq Discusses
"The Satisfaction of China"

Writing in LE TEMPS of March 3, 1933, André Duboscq, the Far Eastern Editor, discussed what he called the "satisfaction" of China, asking what might be the real value of the measure favorable to China passed by the League of Nations, since Japan maintains the position she had taken in Manchuria. The fact is that the Chinese conception of the present conflict with Japan is very different from the European conception and is probably far more just. The Chinese regard war as a matter of episodes without definite conclusions, varying according to circumstances and often leading to wholly unexpected results.

Duboscq recalls the pan-Asiatic conferences

held

1078

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

held ever since 1926 in various Chinese and Japanese towns and also at Vladivostok. No noteworthy results were obtained but they might yet prove to be the embryo for an efficient organization, for they showed the clear intention of Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Korean, and Philippino members to unite against Europe and America.

Perhaps the time has come to bear this in mind, since there can be little doubt that small progress is being made by the idea of an Asiatic entente or league of some kind. There is already talk of a Sino-Japano-Russian triangle, and certain persons who are well up on Asiatic questions would not be at all surprised if conversations now being held without the knowledge of the public, but running a parallel course with current events and debates, might lead in the very near future to unexpected developments.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosure:
Article from LE TEMPS of March 3, 1933.

In quintuplicate

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WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. II99 of March 6, I933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " LE TEMPS " of March 3, I933

LA « SATISFACTION » DE LA CHINE

D'aucuns s'étonnent du contentement que marque la Chine pour la « satisfaction » (c'est le terme employé par son représentant à l'assemblée extraordinaire) qu'elle a obtenue à Genève après un an et demi de discussions. Ce n'était pas la peine, pensent-ils, qu'elle refusât si opiniâtrément et si longtemps de négocier directement avec le Japon, pour aboutir à un résultat aussi académique et aussi peu substantiel. Qu'est-ce donc, en effet, que ces recommandations que n'accompagne aucune sanction ? Car qui oserait songer aux sanctions, même en Amérique ? La Société des nations a donné raison à la Chine, mais le Japon conserve la position qu'il a prise en Mandchourie. Alors, que vaut en réalité la satisfaction ainsi accordée à la Chine ?

Ceux qui pensent ainsi ignorent les Chinois. Ils ne savent pas que ces derniers ont une conception de leur conflit actuel avec les Japonais beaucoup plus juste peut-être que celle que nous en avons nous-mêmes, en tout cas différente.

Nous ne reviendrons pas sur la place que tient la question de « face » dans la vie publique et privée des Chinois. On en a trop parlé, sans que Genève en ait d'ailleurs assez tenu compte au cours d'une année et demie de débats sino-japonais. Nous en avons trop parlé nous-même pour redire l'intérêt considérable qu'il y a pour les Chinois à voir leur point de vue justifié en droit devant le monde. Mais, cet intérêt mis à part, une considération d'un tout autre ordre explique leur satisfaction.

Pour un Chinois, notre conception européenne du conflit entre deux peuples : attaque, défense, victoire ou défaite plus ou moins complète, mais en tout cas finale, est une conception simpliste qui ne correspond qu'au rythme précipité de notre manière de vivre et à notre inhabitude de tabler sur le temps et d'en faire un des principaux mobiles de nos actes, un des éléments essentiels de nos raisonnements. En fait, un conflit ne se termine pas par un avantage de la force militaire, telle que la prise d'un territoire, ou quelque gain que ce soit découlant de la victoire ; un conflit se poursuit au delà d'un tel événement, ou, si l'on veut, d'un tel épisode. Il prend alors, suivant les circonstances, tel ou tel aspect pour aboutir un jour, mais lointain peut-être, à un résultat quelquefois très différent de celui d'aujourd'hui. Sans doute, pareille manière de voir pourrait paraître spécieuse si l'on prétendait l'appliquer à tous les conflits, mais dans celui qui nous occupe, au contraire, elle semble parfaitement justifiée.

A deux reprises, le 1er novembre et le 17 janvier derniers, nous avons dit ici qu'une longue épreuve attendait peut-être les Japonais dans le nouvel Etat mandchou. D'abord la lutte contre ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler d'un mot « les bandits » chinois coûte extrêmement cher; ensuite l'immigration chinoise en Mandchourie oppose aux Japonais un flot de population étrangère plus ou moins malaisée à soustraire à une influence chinoise qui s'appliquera à s'infiltrer parmi elle. Notre conclusion était alors, et elle est encore aujourd'hui, qu'il se peut que le temps travaille pour les Chinois. Cette éventualité nous paraissait même plus probable quand le Japon n'avait pas la liberté d'action que lui donne le verdict de la Société des nations et qu'il se sentait moralement tenu de respecter la proposition faite par lui à Genève de laisser le Mandchoukouo démontrer lui-même sa capacité à être indépendant.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la satisfaction de la Chine, fondée en partie sur cette idée qu'un résultat plus substantiel que celui qu'elle obtient aujourd'hui l'attend dans un avenir plus ou moins proche, n'est pas absurde. Quel sera ce résultat? Sera-ce une reprise effective d'autorité par la Chine sur la Mandchourie en face d'un Japon devenu plus conciliant par les difficultés qu'il aura eu à surmonter? Ne sera-ce pas plutôt un rapprochement sino-japonais où la question de Mandchourie entrera avec d'autres et trouvera sa solution dans un programme d'ensemble ? Nous inclinons pour notre part à penser que c'est plutôt à cette dernière possibilité qu'il faut s'attendre.

« L'Asie est une », a dit Okakura Kakuzo. Parole à méditer, dont la réalisation dans les faits pourrait bien avoir lieu quelque jour sous une forme plus ou moins nette. En tout cas, il est à remarquer que l'idée d'un rapprochement asiatique perce dans les informations venues d'Extrême-Orient et commence à éveiller l'intérêt de notre opinion.

La création d'une Société des nations asiatique, dont nous avons dernièrement esquissé les chances de succès, n'est pas la seule forme sous laquelle puisse se réaliser ce que nous ne faisons encore qu'entrevoir. Un télégramme de Tokio, que le *Temps* a publié le 22 février, annonçait que d'après les journaux « le gouvernement japonais établirait une doctrine de Monroe pour l'Extrême-Orient par la conclusion d'un pacte de sécurité (*sorte de Locarno asiatique*) entre le Japon, la Chine et le Mandchoukouo ». Un autre télégramme publié le 17 du même mois avait parlé d'une ligue asiatique pour remédier à l'incompréhension de Genève en matière de politique d'Extrême-Orient. On sait de reste que des conférences panasiatiques ont été tenues depuis 1926 dans plusieurs villes de Chine, du Japon et aussi à Vladivostok. Elles n'ont pas donné de résultats bien marquants, mais elles pourraient être l'embryon d'une organisation plus efficiente. Nous en avons rendu compte en leur temps. Nous avons dit qu'en dépit de leur peu d'ampleur et de retentissement, elles avaient montré les intentions de leurs membres chinois, japonais, indiens, coréens, philippins, etc., de s'unir en face de l'Europe et de l'Amérique. Et nous citions, à l'occasion de l'une d'elles, cette opinion de l'*Osaka Mainichi :* « Tout mouvement qui a son siège dans ces contrées de l'Asie aux ressources infinies et aux populations ardentes, pour humble et insignifiant qu'il soit à ses débuts, ne doit pas être ignoré de propos délibéré. »

Le moment serait-il venu où la preuve en sera faite ? Sans vouloir anticiper sur les événements, nous sommes bien obligé de reconnaître que l'idée d'une entente ou d'une ligue asiatique est en train de faire lentement son chemin. Enfin, signalons qu'un télégramme de Tokio annonce que le ministre de la guerre japonais a assisté, le 1er mars, à l'inauguration solennelle de la « Société de la plus grande Asie » créée en vue de l'unification des nations asiatiques. En même temps, la *Revue Nationale Chinoise*, dans son numéro qui vient d'arriver en France, écrit, sous la signature d'un Chinois, dans un article intitulé : « La reprise des relations sino-russes » :

> Verrons-nous les Soviets renchérir sur leur projet d'une association tripartite — c'est-à-dire de la Chine, du Japon et de la Russie soviétique — capable d'assurer la paix sur le continent asiatique et dans le Pacifique? Projet chimérique, ont déclaré maints spécialistes des questions extrême-orientales ! Maintiendront-ils pareille opinion, après les rapprochements successifs de la Russie soviétique avec le Japon et la Chine?

On nous parle déjà du triangle Chine, Japon, Russie, et ceux de nos interlocuteurs qui connaissent la souplesse des Asiatiques quand ils traitent entre eux ne s'étonneraient point si de conversations ignorées du public, mais parallèles aux événements et aux débats de ces temps-ci, sortaient, un jour prochain, des situations inattendues.

André Dubosco.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 24, 1933.

MMH:

Warrington Dawson's special report No. 1200 of March 7, 1933, states that Dr. A. Legendre, in FIGARO of March 3, regards Jehol as having always been Mongolian territory and the Nanking claim as resting on no justifiable grounds.

LES:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

DEPT. OF STATE MAR 22 1933 DIV. COM. & REC.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MAR 22 33

Paris, March 7, 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 24 1933 DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 22 1933 Department of State

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1200)

793.94

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1200, dated March 7, 1933.

WD/DG

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MAR 28 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 7, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1200

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: Dr. Legendre Discusses the Political Importance of the Jehol

Writing in FIGARO of March 3, 1933 Dr. A. Legendre replied to questions addressed to him by a number of readers concerning notably the ethnical origin of the Jehol and the reasons for Japan's intervention.

He regards the Jehol as having always been Mongolian territory, the claim advanced by Nanking resting on no justifiable grounds. It should furthermore be borne in mind that the Nanking Government not only claims the Jehol and Manchuria but furthermore clamors for Indochina, Java and Burma. And yet it is only a pseudo Government which is not even master of two provinces out of the eighteen provinces in China, and which is able to stand, according to Dr. Legendre,

only

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

only owing to the support of the League of Nations and the United States.

Legendre goes on to say that if Manchukwo was in such a hurry to occupy the Jehol and to show that it would tolerate no Chinese monopoly there it is because this province dominates the fertile zone of the central valleys. With Chinese bandits and mercenaries occupying this point, peace in Manchukwo was impossible.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosure:
Article from FIGARO of March 3, 1933.

In quintuplicate

Copy to E. I. C.

851.9111/6a

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1084

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. I200 of March 7, I933
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " FIGARO " of March 3, I933

LE JEHOL, TERRE MONGOLE

SON IMPORTANCE POLITIQUE

par le Dr A. LEGENDRE

Des lecteurs de *Figaro* m'ont récemment demandé de leur expliquer la situation et la topographie du Jéhol, son origine ethnique, et les raisons de l'intervention du Japon contre les mercenaires chinois de Tchang Hsué Liang.

La région du Jéhol est située à l'ouest de la Mandchourie méridionale et au nord de la frontière chinoise, celle-ci figurée par la Grande Muraille. Cette région est constituée par un massif très accidenté, montagneux par places, avec d'étroites vallées, de vrais cañons souvent. Comme il n'existe guère que des pistes ou sentes, les communications y sont très difficiles et, par suite, les mouvements de troupes. Ce massif fait partie du haut plateau mongol dont les derniers escarpements dominent la plaine chinoise au sud et la vallée mandchoue du Liao à l'est. La superfi-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cie du Jéhol atteint 150.000 kilomètres carrés environ, dont une très faible partie est cultivée, surtout en pavot à opium. La capitale Tcheng-Té-Fou était célèbre au temps de la dynastie mandchoue, qui en avait fait le séjour d'été de la cour impériale. Les districts avoisinants formaient un magnifique territoire de chasse où l'empereur et les dignitaires se livraient régulièrement à leur sport favori. Leur troupe de rabatteurs comptait, paraît-il, de 25.000 à 30.000 montagnards qui, depuis la chute de la dynastie, assurent leur existence par le brigandage.

Tcheng-Té-Fou est célèbre aussi par la beauté de ses temples bouddhiques élevés par les empereurs. Malheureusement, depuis la chute des Tsinn, les soi-disant « républicains » chinois, si occupés à se battre entre eux, dédaignent ces merveilles artistiques qui se délabrent rapidement.

Aujourd'hui, le Jéhol est revendiqué par ces « républicains », les féodaux de Nankin. On ne comprend pas : le Jéhol est territoire *mongol*, l'a toujours été. La prétention de Nankin ne repose sur rien, ni du point de vue historique, ni du point de vue ethnique, encore moins d'un droit de conquête, puisque la Chine a toujours été vaincue dans ses luttes avec les Mandchous et les Mongols. D'ailleurs, si le gouvernement de Nankin ne revendiquait que le Jéhol et la Mandchourie ! Mais il clame très haut que l'Indochine, Java et la Birmanie doivent lui être « restituées » : pas moins ! Oui, ce pseudo-gouvernement, qui n'est même pas maître de deux provinces sur dix-huit en Chine, et ne tient debout que grâce à la S. D. N. et aux Etats-Unis, affiche, à toute occasion, son impérialisme.

Le Jéhol, au cours des siècles, n'a jamais été uni qu'à la Mandchourie, et seul le Mandchou, sous la dynastie des Tsinn, eut le droit de l'occuper. Des paysans chinois y ont sans doute émigré, mais pareil fait d'ordre économique ne saurait déposséder le Mongol de son territoire. En outre, un événement capital s'est produit, l'an dernier, lorsque la Mandchourie a déclaré son indépendance : à ce moment, de tous côtés, même du lointain Kou-Kou-Nor, les princes mongols sont accourus à Moukden pour saluer le réveil mandchou, la restauration du dernier descendant des Tsinn, le nouvel empereur pour eux, le « Mok Khan ». Mongolie et Mandchourie se sont donc soudées à nouveau, veulent vivre leur existence ancienne. Et l'ennemi héréditaire reste plus que jamais le Chinois, surtout celui du Sud qu'il méprise, en particulier le politicien de Nankin ou de Canton. Aujourd'hui, la fameuse cavalerie mongole se bat dans le Jéhol pour le Mandchoukouo.

Même la mission Lytton, d'une partialité si choquante en faveur de Nankin, se garde de nier que le Jéhol fait partie de la Mongolie.

Tang Yu Ling, gouverneur du Jéhol, fit sa soumission au régent du Mandchoukouo, Pou Yi, le 9 mars 1932, et cette région fut incluse aussitôt dans le nouvel Etat. Donc le Jéhol, qui n'a jamais été chinois, se rallie à la Mandchourie ; et celle-ci, en vertu du protocole signé avec Tokio, appelle le Japonais à son aide pour chasser de son territoire l'intrus chinois, les mercenaires de Tchang Hsué Liang, homme-lige de Nankin. D'où l'entrée des troupes japonaises au Jéhol en soutien de l'armée du Mandchoukouo. Quant aux mercenaires chinois, ils sont si peu sûrs que Nankin a dépêché son ministre des finances, Soong, dans le Nord, pour leur remplir les poches de bons dollars sonnants et les encourager ainsi à se battre. Est-il nécessaire d'ajouter que le peuple chinois *ne s'intéresse en rien* à cette aventure ? Il sait trop que la Mandchourie est une terre *étrangère* et que ce n'est pas pour la Chine que les reîtres qu'il déteste se battent au Jéhol, mais uniquement pour consolider le pouvoir des toukiun, de Tchang Kai Chek en particulier. Le verdict de Genève l'a même profondément déçu, ce pauvre peuple : il espérait que la S. D. N. le *débarrasserait* de ses tyrans. Au contraire, elle les a *absous* de toutes leurs folies : d'où la faillite morale définitive de la S. D. N.

Peut-être se demandera-t-on pourquoi le jeune Etat mandchou se hâte tant d'occuper le Jéhol et marque si tôt sa volonté de ne tolérer aucune emprise de la Chine : c'est que le Jéhol, vrai glacis, est situé sur le flanc ouest de la Mandchourie, domine sa grande zone fertile des vallées centrales. Avec les mercenaires et bandits chinois occupant ce glacis, il n'y a plus de paix pour le Mandchoukouo.

C'est ce que la S. D. N. n'arrive pas à comprendre. Faisant foin de l'évidence, de la vérité historique, elle s'enfonce dans son erreur d'une Mandchourie province chinoise. Elle se refuse à comprendre que le Mandchoukouo, doublé du Jéhol, constituera un *Etat-tampon* qui sera le meilleur obstacle à l'emprise de Moscou par la voie de la Sibérie. La S. D. N. serait donc envoûtée puisqu'elle écarte les réalités. Vous verrez que d'ici peu elle nous demandera d'envoyer des régiments français se faire décimer en Mandchourie. D'ailleurs, M. Blum a déjà sommé la France d'aller « désarmer le Japon... sans perdre une heure ». Quel guerrier que ce pacifiste ! Y aurait-il un Tamerlan en herbe dans tout humanitaire socialiste ?

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WSM
HSV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 27, 1933.

~~FES~~:
~~MMF~~:

Istanbul's despatch No. 381 of February 28, 1933, encloses two newspaper articles, published in Turkey, which are severely critical of Japanese pretentions in China. Although the articles are impatient at the League's impotence, confidence is expressed that unanimous world opinion will bring sufficient pressure on Japan to effect an ultimate satisfactory solution.

CC:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, February 28, 1933.

No. 331

SUBJECT: Turkish newspaper attack on Japan.

AM. RECD DEPT. OF STATE MAR 22 33 DIV. OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 28 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAR 28 1933 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my No. 396 (369)? of February 18, enclosed herewith please find clippings and translations of two anti-Japanese articles, one dated February 25, and the other dated this morning, from the pen of Yunus Nadi Bey, editor and owner of the DJUMHOURIET and the REPUBLIQUE.

Respectfully yours,

Charles H. Sherrill

CHARLES H. SHERRILL.

Enclosures:

1. Clipping from LA REPUBLIQUE, Istanbul, February 25, 1933.
2. Translation of enclosure 1.
3. Clipping from LA REPUBLIQUE, Istanbul, February 28, 1933.
4. Translation of enclosure 3.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to Despatch No. 331
of February 28, 1933, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

CLIPPING

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

SOURCE: LA REPUBLIQUE, No.2786, February 25, 1933, Istanbul.

Philosophie sanglante de la Guerre sino-japonaise

Malgré toutes les obséquieuses condescendances de la Société des Nations, une nouvelle guerre vient de commencer en Extrême-Orient. Il n'est pas improbable que les étincelles crachées par ce feu n'embrasent encore tout l'univers. Et se voyant obligées de tenir tête à des calamités et à des catastrophes encore plus graves, les nations supporteront les conséquences de la faiblesse, de l'inertie et de l'indécision qu'elles ont montrées, quand il leur fallait prendre des mesures énergiques pour empêcher cette conflagration.

Si vraiment l'explosion d'une nouvelle guerre en Extrême-Orient était un fléau en quelque sorte inévitable, alors on doit aussi admettre comme également inévitable la rechute de l'Univers dans le feu et le sang que fera se repandre la lente extension du conflit désolant l'Orient. L'humanité doit donc payer par des flots de sang chaque pas qu'elle fait dans la voie du progrès ! Si c'est là une vérité ayant encore cours, nous pouvons souhaiter au Japon qui vient d'amorcer la guerre en Orient, et aussi à l'humanité entière, tout le bien qu'on peut en attendre !

On ne sait que trop de quoi il s'agit : le Japon, qui ne pouvait tenir à l'aise dans ses îles a mis, voilà quelque 30 ou 40 ans, le pied sur une partie de l' Asie continentale ; il a estimé l'an dernier que le moment et les conditions étaient propices pour étendre encore cette domination et, dans ce but, il s'est rué sur la Chine. Les moyens dont il se sert pour exécuter ses desseins, moyens qui rappellent ceux du loup de la fable, consistent à reculer les frontières de la province chinoise de Mandchourie dont il a fait un Etat indépendant sous la domination de ses propres forces, jusqu'à y englober le Jehol, et cela toujours avec le concours de ses propres soldats. En d'autres termes, le but du Japon est d'annexer la province du Jehol à l'Etat libre de Manchou Kouo. Mais, comme tous les hommes ne sont pas aveugles ou gâteux, il n'est personne qui ne s'aperçoive clairement qu'il s'agit simplement, en l' occurrence, d'une campagne de conquêtes et d'annexions, campagne qu'on a soigneusement camouflée. Naturellement, la Chine s'élève contre une telle invasion, et s'efforce de l'empêcher. Quant à la Société des Nations, elle s'est saisie de l'affaire, elle a mené une enquête sur les lieux-mêmes. Voici les points du rapport rédigé à la suite de cette enquête, qui sont favorables au Japon :

1.— Il n'est pas juste de la part de la Chine d'avoir adopté une attitude hostile au point de léser les intérêts japonais ;

2.— Le Japon a des intérêts en Chine et c'est surtout en Mandchourie qu'il possède des établissements et des organisations économiques ;

3.— Il est nécessaire de protéger les intérêts spéciaux du Japon en Mandchourie, tout en reconnaissant et en maintenant la souveraineté et la domination chinoises sur cette contrée.

S'il existe une politique de boycottage et de sabotage adoptée par la Chine à l'égard du Japon, il est nécessaire d'y mettre fin avec la collaboration des autres nations, ce qui est toujours possible. C'est là le seul point sur lequel le Japon peut avoir vraiment raison, et il ne manquait pas, il ne manque même toujours pas encore de moyens de trouver une autre solution, avant même que de songer à déchainer la guerre. Cette solution pourrait intervenir, même si le boycottage chinois n'était qu'une conséquence des plans japonais d'invasion et de toutes leurs suites.

Seulement, le Japon se trouve être entré en action, après avoir saisi le beau pré-

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texte du boycottage chinois, boycottage qu'il a provoqué par sa politique d'envahissement et dans le but de réaliser ses visées de conquêtes. C'est là que réside d'ailleurs la cause qui a transformé en un conflit armé ce problème pour la solution duquel on a déjà dépensé tant d'efforts. On ne connait que trop la règle qui a toujours existé, et que le Japon croit éternelle : le fort ruinera et supprimera le faible, voilà où est le droit !

Mais est-ce bien cela le droit ? Nous croyons précisément que le Japon se trompe sur ce point. Quelque faible que puisse paraître la structure actuelle de la Société des Nations — à ce point même que cette Société craint la retraite du Japon de son sein — une idée est fortement imprimée dans le coeur des peuples, et elle s'y enracine chaque jour plus profondément. C'est l'idée d'aplanir tous les problèmes internationaux, non seulement ceux que provoque la passion tout court de conquêtes et d'annexions — mais aussi les différends de n'importe quel ordre, par des moyens pacifiques très efficaces et tout nouveaux, qui puiseraient leur force dans la souveraineté même de toutes les nations, et cette idée prend la forme d'une conviction qui pénètre sans cesse plus avant dans le coeur de l'humanité. Malheur au peuple qui, se fiant à ses seules forces ne tient aucun compte de cette foi !

Le Japon, pour avoir allumé le brandon de la guerre en Extrême-Orient, en mettant à profit la faiblesse de la Chine, et l'état du monde désemparé au milieu des difficultés d'une crise aiguê, se trouve, aux yeux de l'Univers dans la situation d'un homme qui ayant préparé un guet-apens, enfonce, sans raison aucune, son poignard dans le sein de l'Humanité, ou dans celle d'un incendiaire qui réduirait en cendres tout un quartier. Il n'est pas impossible que l'incendie ainsi allumé vienne en fin de compte consumer la maison de celui-là même qui a lancé le brandon. Au contraire. Du reste, il n'y a pas d'autres moyens d'assurer la paix et la sécurité de l'Humanité.

Avec une vaine insistance, le Japon demanda à la Société des Nations que le différend mandchourien fût résolu directement entre lui-même et la Chine. Sans doute voulait-il amener la Chine à satisfaire à tous ses désirs, en lui mettant le couteau à la gorge, et désirait-il que l'Humanité entière assistât impassible à cette scène de boucherie ? C'est ainsi d'ailleurs que le Japon — et non pas l'Etat indépendant de Manchou Kouo — est sur le point de fondre sur la Chine avec toutes ses forces, le différend n'ayant pu être aplani par l'intervention des Nations. Les événements montreront jusqu'à quel point l'Humanité restera indifférente à un tel conflit. Mais nous pouvons d'ores et déjà assurer ceci : les Etats administrés par un gouvernement officiellement constitué peuvent en apparence sembler indifférents à cette tragédie, la conscience de l'Humanité, elle, a déjà condamné cette grossière agression. Quant aux effets de ce verdict terrible, le temps se chargera de les faire sentir : à nous, à tout le monde et surtout au Japon. De cela nous sommes absolument certains.

YUNUS NADI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2, to Despatch No. 331

of February 28, 1933, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

FULL TRANSLATION

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

SOURCE: LA REPUBLIQUE, No.2786, February 25, 1933, Istanbul.

The Bloody Philosophy of the Sino-Japanese War.

Despite the League of Nations' obsequious condescensions, a new war has just been started in the Far East. It is not improbable that the sparks from this fire may set the entire world ablaze. Realizing that they shall have to face still greater calamities and catastrophies, the nations will suffer the consequences of the weakness, the inertia and the irresolution which they were showing at a time when it was necessary to take energetic measures in order to prevent this conflagration.

If indeed the breaking out of this new war in the Far East were some kind of unavoidable scourge then one would have to admit likewise as inevitable the relapse of the world into fire and bloodshed, as a result of the propagation of the conflict afflicting the Orient. Humanity must thus pay with floods of blood for each step it takes on the path of progress! If this is still a current truth we may wish Japan, who started the struggle in the Orient, as well as all humanity all the good that may be expected therefrom.

One knows only too well what that means: Japan who began to feel crowded on its island set its foot some 30 or 40 years ago on a part of continental Asia: last year, finding the time and conditions opportune for a further extension of its domination, it fell upon China. The means it uses for the carrying out of its design, which resemble very much those of the wolf in the story, consist in pushing back the boundaries of the Chinese province of Manchuria, making the latter into an independent state ruled by the Japanese army and adjoining to it Jehol with the help of that army. In other words, Japan's aim is to annex the province of Jehol to the free State of Manchukuo. But as men are not blind or insane everyone clearly realizes that this simply means a campaign

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paign of conquest and annexation, a war carefully disguised. China naturally rises up against such an invasion and tries to prevent it. As regards the League of Nations, the latter took cognizance of the matter and ordered investigations made on the premises. The following are the points set forth in the report drawn up as a result of these investigations, which are in favor of Japan:

1. It is unjust on the part of China to have adopted an attitude so hostile as to injure Japanese interests.

2. Japan has interests in China, particularly in Manchuria where it has economic establishments and organizations.

3. It is necessary to protect the interests which Japan has in Manchuria, recognizing and maintaining at the same time China's sovereignty and domination over that province.

If a boycott and wilful damage policy has been adopted by China with regard to Japan, it is necessary to put an end to it in cooperation with the other nations, which would always be possible. This is the only point on which Japan is actually right, and there was and still is a means of finding another solution prior to even thinking of engaging in war. This solution could have been reached even if China's boycott were but the result of Japan's plan of invasion and its consequences.

Japan has now engaged in hostilities chosing as a pretext China's boycott, a boycott called forth by its policy of invasion undertaken with a view to realizing its acquisitive aims. That is the reason, moreover, which has transformed into an armed conflict a problem for the solution of which so much effort has already been expended. One knows only too well the old rule which Japan believes to be eternal, namely that the strong will destroy and suppress the weak - might is right.

But is this indeed right? We actually believe that Japan errs on this point. Nevermind how weak the present position of the League of Nations seems to be - so weak as to be afraid of an eventual withdrawal of Japan from its midst, one idea is firmly rooted in the mind of the nations and is growing stronger every day. This idea is the possibility of smoothing out all international conflicts, not only those arising from the desire of conquest and annexation, but all disputes whatever their nature may be by altogether new and more efficacious pacific means which base their strength on the sovereignty of nations. This idea is taking the form of a conviction which is constantly growing in the heart of humanity. Woe to the nation which relies on its

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its own strength alone and fails to take this belief into account.

Japan in lighting the fire-brand of war in the Far East and taking advantage of China's weakness and the distrought conditions prevailing in a world engrossed in the difficulties of an acute crisis, is like someone who, having prepared an ambush, thrusts without any reason whatsoever his dagger into the very heart of humanity, or like an incendiary setting fire to an entire block. It is not at all impossible for the fire thus started to devor likewise the house of its originator. Quite the contrary. Besides, there is no other way to assure Humanity's peace and security.

With vain insistence Japan requested the League of Nations to allow it to settle the dispute directly with China. It had undoubtedly the intention of having China yield to all its demands by placing the knife against the latter's throat, - but did it really expect all the world to remain indifferent before such a butchery? This is the manner in which Japan - but not the independent State of Manchukuo - is ready to pounce upon China with all its armies, it having proved impossible to solve the dispute through the medium of the League of Nations. Events shall prove how long Humanity will remain indifferent in the face of this conflict. We may however state the following right at this moment: countries administered by officially constituted governments may appear to remain indifferent in the face of such a tragedy whereas human conscience has already condemned this brutal aggression. With regard to the effect of this terrible verdict - everyone and particularly Japan will feel it as time goes on. Of this we are absolutely sure.

(signed) YUNUS NADI.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. to Despatch No. 331

of 1933, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

CLIPPING

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

SOURCE: LA REPUBLIQUE, No. 2789, February 28, 1933, Istanbul.

Nous sommes à la veille d'un grand conflit mondial

Pendant que le Japon se préparait à entrer en action pour compléter le jeu qu'il a commencé en Extrême-Orient dans le dessein d'annexer la province du Jehol à l'Etat soi-disant libre de Mandchourie, la Société des Nations, réunie à Genève, a émis un verdict défavorable au Japon en ce qui concerne le fond même du problème mandchourien. Les conclusions prises par la S. D. N. affirment l'iniquité des prétentions et des agissements nippons. Le Japon doit se conformer aux décisions de l'aéropage de Genève, ou bien se retirer de la S. D. N. Il semble bien que cet Etat a préféré la seconde alternative. Le Japon va donc quitter l'Assemblée de Genève pour avoir sans doute (il le pense, du moins) les mains libres en Extrême - Orient et, qui sait, peut - être même dans le grand Océan où il voudrait faire la loi.

Seulement, ces entreprises ne sont pas aussi facilement réalisables que semble le croire le journal nippon «Kokumin Shimbum». En effet, la décision de la Société des Nations fait fulminer cette feuille qui accuse d'ingratitude tous les pays euro - péens, et principalement ceux qui ont profité des services rendus par le Japon au cours de la guerre mondiale. Ce journal dénonce violemment l'attitude de la France et de l'Angleterre, et les menace de sauver l'Asie de leur joug. Si vraiment le Japon arrive à rendre un service d'une telle envergure à l'idéal humanitaire, il aura pour sûr mérité la reconnaissance des peuples ; mais tout porte à croire que les Asiatiques n'ont nullement l'intention de se délivrer d'une domination pour tendre le cou à un autre joug. Ce dont les peuples de l'Asie ont surtout besoin, c'est d'être délivrés de l'impérialieme. Le Japon qui a, paraît-il, pour but de sauver l'Asie, s'est mis au travail en commençant par bouleverser la Chine, et par la placer sous sa poigne de fer. Or, il ne s'agit là, en somme, que d'un impérialisme pire que l'autre, et cette vérité est trop évidente pour ne pas être clairement constatée par toutes les nations asiatiques.

Les Etats - Unis de l'Amérique du Nord adhèrent également au récent verdict de la Société des Nations. Quant à la Russie des Soviets, l'agression nipponne qui se développe en Extrême-Orient l'intéresse de bien près. On peut en conséquence conclure que le Japon se trouve tout seul en face du monde entier, dans l'aventure où il s'est lancé et ce qui pis est, l'opinion publique mondiale est — à juste titre — en sa défaveur. Dans ces conditions, il serait extrêmement curieux de savoir d'ores et déjà jusqu'où le Japon sera entraîné par le jeu éminemment dangereux auquel il vient de se livrer ; le cas revêt un caractère assez grave pour qu'il vaille la peine d'être suivi dans toutes ses phases.

Après avoir signifié à la Chine l'ultimatum pour la province du Jehol, le Japon, a mis les autres Etats, par l'entremise de ses représentants, au courant de ce fait, et il a en même temps émis le voeu de voir ces Etats faire des recommandations à la Chine afin d'empêcher les opérations militaires de s'étendre au-delà de la Grande Muraille. Pour se conformer à ce voeu, les autres Etats auraient donc dû dire à la Chine :

« — Le Japon veut occuper le Jehol ; en conséquence, n'essaie pas d'élever la voix. Que cet Etat s'annexe encore cette province, autrement tu risques de voir le théâtre des opérations militaires s'étendre jusqu'à l'intérieur de ton territoire !... »

Si la proposition japonaise n'est pas une simple ironie à l'adresse de l'humanité c'est qu'elle est alors une comédie jouée à l'intention de celle-ci.

Mais, comme le Japon a vraiment remis son ultimatum, et que les mouvements militaires ont déjà commencé, comme, d'autre part, la Chine s'est préparée à résister, les hostilités qui, pas plus tard qu'-

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hier offraient un aspect chaotique en Extrême-Orient, se trouvent sur le point de revêtir le caractère d'une guerre en règle. Ce conflit suscité par le Japon, sous le prétexte du Jehol après celui de la Mandchourie, entraîne le Japon dans une impasse que lui-même devra craindre. Car maintenant, ce qui importe le plus au Japon, ce n'est pas d'être à même de prendre le Jehol ou non, c'est plutôt de trouver coûte que coûte une fin, n'importe laquelle, à l'oeuvre entreprise. L'affaire de Mandchourie, ou du moins l'acte qui en a été joué jusqu'ici, n'offrait peut-être pas relativement de difficultés au Japon. Mais on ne voit pas trop la fin de celui qui vient de commencer au Jehol. C'est là une guerre qui ne peut prendre fin qu'avec une paix qu'accepteront la Chine et les autres Etats. En d'autres termes, l'état de guerre continuera tant qu'on ne sera pas arrivé à ce résultat. Or, cette aventure est capable de ruiner n'importe quel Etat, fut-il aussi grand que le Japon lui-même.

La guerre est un géant insatiable ; l'Etat qui l'entreprend, quelque puissant soit-il, ne peut se délivrer de sa bouche vorace. Il suffit de voir l'état dans lequel la guerre générale a mis l'Europe pour se faire une idée de tout ce qui attend le Japon dans l'impasse où il s'est fourvoyé.

Reproduisons ici les observations formulées, il y a un an et demi, par un grand critique militaire au sujet de la situation en Extrême - Orient :

« — Le Japon est fort en Mandchourie, il pourra peut - être se maintenir dans cette contrée. Le Japon ferait preuve de sagesse en limitant ses opérations à cette seule province. Il faudra au moins vingt-cinq ans au Japon pour s'installer en Mandchourie, quelle que soit la forme donnée à cet établissement. Mais si, sous n'importe quel prétexte, le Japon franchit, ne fut-ce même que d'un empan, les frontières actuelles — celles d'il y a un an et demi — de la Mandchourie, alors sa situation deviendra difficile, et pourra même être entraînée vers une fin qui condamnera sa cause.

Nous voyons maintenant d'où peuvent surgir ces difficultés : le Japon se trouve seul contre tous les Etats intéressés à ce problème. Le Japon est maintenant obligé de faire entendre raison non seulement à la Chine, en Extrême - Orient, mais à tous les pays du globe. C'est donc que l'Extrême - Orient n'est pas si loin qu'il le paraît. Du reste il n'existe plus, de par le monde, de point qu'on pourrait dire éloigné ou rapproché d'un autre !

YUNUS NADI

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. to Despatch No. 381

of 1933, from the Embassy at Istanbul.

FULL TRANSLATION

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

SOURCE: LA REPUBLIQUE, No. 2789, February 28, 1933, Istanbul.

WE ARE ON THE EVE OF A GREAT UNIVERSAL CONFLICT.

While Japan was getting ready for action to complete the game which it began in the Far East with a view to annexing the province of Jehol to the so-called free state of Manchuria, the League of Nations at Geneva gave a verdict unfavorable to Japan concerning the very root of the Manchurian problem. The conclusions of the League of Nations set forth the iniquity of Nippon's claims and actions. Japan must either submit to the decision reached by the Geneva Assembly or else withdraw from the League of Nations. It would appear however that it chose the latter alternative. It will therefore leave the Geneva Assembly in order apparently to have its hands free in the Far East, - this is at least what it thinks - and, who knows, this may even include the great Ocean where it would like to dictate its will.

Such enterprises, however, are not as easy of accomplishment as might appear to the Nippon newspaper, the KOKUMIN SHIMBUM. Indeed, the decision of the League of Nations makes this paper fulminate and accuse all the European nations of ingratitude, particularly those which benefitted by the services rendered by Japan during the World War. The said paper vehemently denounces the attitude of France and of Great Britain and threatens to save Asia from their yoke. Should Japan succeed in rendering a service of such magnitude to the humanitarian ideal it would no doubt deserve the gratitude of entire humanity; but everything leads to believe that the Asiatic nations have no intention to free themselves from one domination in order to bend their neck under the yoke of another. The thing which the Asiatic peoples need most of all is to be rescued from imperialism. Japan who, it seems, aims at saving Asia started its salutary task by disturbing China and by placing the latter under its iron fist. This would only mean another kind of imperialism, worse than the previous one and this truth is so evident that it is but natural that all the Asiatic nations clearly realize it.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The United States of America likewise adhere to the verdict of the League of Nations. As regards Soviet Russia, Nippon's aggression which is developing in the Far East is of great interest to that country. Thus the conclusion can be drawn that Japan stands isolated against the entire world in the adventure on which it has embarked and - still worse - has against it quite rightly the public opinion of the world all over. In these conditions it is extremely interesting to know for the time being how far Japan will get involved in this very dangerous venture it has engaged in. The question is so serious that it deserves to be examined in all its phases.

Having notified China of the ultimatum concerning the Jehol province, Japan communicated this fact through its representatives to the other nations and furthermore expressed the desire that the other governments should advise China to take the necessary steps in order to prevent an expansion of the military operations beyond the Great Wall. Thus, in order to comply with Japan's desire, the other Governments should have said to China:

> "Japan wishes to occupy Jehol; therefore keep quite. Let that country annex also this province because otherwise you run the risk to see the theatre of war expand as far as the interior of your territory."

In case Japan's proposal is not just an ironical jest aiming at humanity, then it can be only a comedy played for the latter's benefit.

But as Japan has indeed transmitted its ultimatum and as military action has already begun, and as, furthermore, China is getting ready to oppose resistance, the hostilities in the Far East which yesterday had a somewhat chaotic character are on the point of turning into a regular war. The conflict called forth by Japan on the alleged motive of Jehol after that of Manchuria will lead Japan into a deadlock of which it ought to be afraid. The important question as regards Japan is not the fact of taking or not taking Jehol, it is the necessity of making an end of a situation which it has brought about. The Manchurian question, at least that part of it which it has played up to the present, is not a relatively difficult one for Japan. It is not an easy matter to anticipate the turn which events now taking place in Jehol will take. It is a war which can end only with a peace acceptable both to China and to the other Governments. As long as this cannot be accomplished the state of war will continue. And it is an adventure liable to bring ruin to any government, be it as strong as Japan.

War is a devouring giant; the nation which starts it cannot escape its voracity however powerful it may be. A look on the condition in which the World War left Europe is sufficient to get an idea of what lies in store for Japan in the deadlock into which it has blundered.

We

1097

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

We may recall the observations made some eighteen months ago by a prominent military critic with regard to the conditions in the Far East:

> "Japan's position in Manchuria is strong and it may be eventually able to preserve it. It would be wise on the part of Japan to limit its action to that province only. Japan will need at least twenty-five years to establish itself in Manchuria whatever form such an establishment would take. But should Japan for any reason whatsoever make one step only beyond the present boundaries of Manchuria - those fixed one and a half years ago - its position will be a very difficult one and the eventual outcome might condemn its cause."

We now realize where these difficulties may come from: Japan finds itself in an isolated position against all the governments interested in that problem. Japan is now obliged to convince not only China in the Far East, but also all the other countries of the globe. This shows that the Far East after all is not so far away as this would seem to be the case. Besides there is no longer some spot in the world which could be termed as being far or near from any other place on earth.

signed: YUNUS NADI.

er

1098

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated March 23, 1933.

Recd 4:45 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 23 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 23 1933
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington.

March 23, 3 p.m.

My March 21, 1 p.m. 6079

Japanese Consul General has replied that he has "referred matter to the appropriate military authorities requesting them to make an investigation."

LOCKHART

JS CIB

F/E SP 793.94/6088

FTT MD

MAR 24 1933

1095

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

c:b

FROM

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated March 24, 1933.

Recd 6:10 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 24 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State

Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 24 1933
Department of State

URGENT.

March 24, 1 p.m.

Three coaches full of officers' wives and children passed through Tientsin last night from Chinwangtao - Changli area. This may possibly be forerunner of further withdrawal of the troops which have been stationed in that area since early January. From railway sources it is learned that the small detachment of Chinese troops stationed at Shihho, a small village about three miles this side of Shanhaikuan, have been withdrawn and it is reported but not confirmed that a small detachment of Japanese troops now occupy Shihho. No Chinese troops have moved eastward through Tientsin for about a week. Outwardly at least the situation between Tientsin and Chinwangtao seems to be relaxing and there are indications also that general situation at Tientsin is showing some improvement notwithstanding contrary views voiced at Nanking and elsewhere.

LOCKHART

CIB WP

F/FPGO

793.94/6089

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 23 1933

To the American Consul,

Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period March 9 to March 22, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:
Two copies of
digest of tele-
grams.

793.94/6089A

FE:EGC:KC FE
3-22-33

Mar. 28, 1933

A true copy of the signed original.

MMH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD March 9 to March 22, 1933.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 9) that, according to the army spokesman, only one ridge of the Chinese front line position north of Kupeh Pass was taken on March 8, and that the Chinese are still offering stubborn resistance after three days of continuous fighting. The army spokesman intimated that the supporting columns had been meeting with increased resistance, and he stated that a Japanese brigade advancing toward Hsifeng Pass lost 25 killed and 39 wounded.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (March 10) that according to the army spokesman, Japanese advance troops had, on the morning of March 10, reached a village about two miles north of Kupeh Pass and Chinese troops were in retreat.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 10) that a press correspondent has learned that General Chang Hsueh-liang and General Chiang Kai-shek met on March 9; that General Chiang accepted Chang Hsueh-liang's resignation; and that General Chang's place as the representative in North China of the National Government is to be taken by the Minister of War (Ho Ying-chin) with five divisions of General Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

The

1102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 11) that the Japanese Legation announced officially that Hsifeng and Kupeh Passes were occupied by the Japanese March 9 and 10 respectively.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 11) that on the night of March 10, two trains of Chinese troops moved eastward through Tientsin and that Chinese officials in Tientsin are much concerned over General Chang Hsueh-liang's departure and appear to believe that recent developments may lead to large scale military operations inside the Great Wall.

The Consul General at Shanghai reports (March 13) that General Chang Hsueh-liang arrived in Shanghai by airplane on March 12 and that it is stated that he will spend several weeks in Shanghai recuperating and will not go abroad immediately.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 14) that the Japanese have filed another protest with the Chairman of the Hopeh Provincial Government against China stationing troops and erecting entrenchments near Tientsin and Tangku as a violation of the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

The Ambassador at Tokyo reports (March 14) that a press ban of March 9 prohibits the publication of reports in regard to "warships, airplanes or unit strength which are expected to be despatched to China or Manchukuo shortly from Japan".

The Consul General at Nanking reports (March 14) that

on

1103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

on March 13, more than 20 airplanes from the aviation school at Hangchow, after stopping in Nanking for refueling, took off on a northwesterly course, and that it is understood they were proceeding to Loyang (northwestern part of Honan Province) to remain indefinitely.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 15) that Chinese officials in Tientsin claim that Japanese are bombing villages as far as 13 miles south of the Great Wall in the vicinity of Kupeh Pass; that the Chinese seem to be convinced that it is only a matter of time until the Peiping and Tientsin areas will become involved in military operations; and that anxiety has increased accordingly among the Chinese in Tientsin. The Consul General reports further that 8 or 10 Japanese vessels are in the open sea between Tangku and Shanhaikwan and that both Chinese and Japanese admit that there has been severe fighting with the past few days at Kupeh and Hsifeng Passes.

The Consul General at Hankow reports (March 17) that within the past two weeks there has been a revival of anti-Japanese sentiment in Hankow; that Chinese merchants have been urged by the Hankow-Wuchang Chamber of Commerce to refrain from dealing in Japanese goods; that threatening letters are being received by Chinese dealing in Japanese goods; that Chinese employees of Japanese firms are fearful; that there occurred recently two disappearances and one

murder

1102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

murder of influential Chinese connected with the Japanese; and that these actions are reported to have been engineered by a "bloody group", although the existence of such a group is denied by Chinese authorities in Hankow.

The Consul General in Tientsin reports (March 20 and 21) that both Chinese and Japanese are claiming Hsifeng Pass; that the situation at Tientsin is quiet; that it is reported that on March 18, a Japanese airplane dropped two bombs on commercial properties in Taitoying (south of the Great Wall) killing two Chinese; that it is reported that on March 20, five Japanese airplanes dropped 20 bombs on Tsunhua (south of the Great Wall in the vicinity of Hsifeng Pass) destroying five houses and killing or wounding ten persons; and that responsible Chinese from Shanhaikwan state that 7,000 of General Chang Hsueh-liang's soldiers have gone over to "Manchukuo" at a point north of the Great Wall.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 21) that he is informed that four Japanese cruisers have appeared off Taku (the ocean port of Tientsin) and that a Japanese battleship has left Port Arthur for Taku.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 22) that according to authoritative information Chinese authorities at Chinwangtao claim they have no knowledge of a plan to attack Japanese in that area; that an American army officer who was in Shanhaikwan on March 20 found conditions quiet there with few Japanese soldiers in evidence in addition to the regular garrison; and that according to a Chinese newspaper, a Japanese cruiser and two destroyers (which have been dividing their time for the past two weeks between Taku and the open sea, with occasional visits to Chinwangtao) left Taku on March 21.

e.g.c.
FE:EGC:KC
3-23-33

FE
m.m.f.

CR
Mar. 28, 1933

1105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6090

SEE 500. A15 A4 General Committee/237 FOR Tel. # 64, 6 pm

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Mar. 22, 1933.
NAME

TO

REGARDING:

Japan's attitude toward MacDonald's Disarmament Plan: Resume of newspaper comments on -.

1106

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE
FE

MET
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

Tokio

Dated March 22, 1933

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

64, March 22, 6 p. m.
(GRAY)

/Referring to the so-called MacDonald disarmament plan, the newspapers here have published what purports to be the attitude of the Japanese Navy Department toward the plan as follows:

One. The suggestions for world peace in Articles one to six are inconsistent with the League Covenant and are considered unreasonable as Japan will not submit the Sino-Japanese controversy to such a conference as is suggested.

Two. The figures proposed for limitation of naval personnel are given for European countries only and not for Japan, which will give her opinion when her armaments are under discussion.

Three. Since Japan agreed to the London Naval Treaty only on condition that it expire in 1936, Japan is opposed to prolongation of the period of the treaty and will instead claim revision of the tonnage ratios fixed by the Treaty.

Four.

1107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#64 from Tokio, Mar. 22, 6 p. m.

Four. Japan will reserve decision on the prohibition of aerial bombardment pending the solution of the problems of abolition of aircraft carriers and the relative strengths of armies and navies.

Five. The proposal to limit the size of military and naval airplanes to three tons will be opposed as Japan needs large type airplanes.

Six. The proposal to limit the number of military airplanes to five hundred will be opposed pending solution of the problems of aircraft carriers, aerial bombardment and relative strengths of armies and navies.

Seven. The Japanese Delegation is to urge the consideration of the Japanese disarmament plan. (END GRAY)

Officers of the Navy Department this morning informally stated to the Naval Attache that the foregoing published statement of the Japanese position is a fair exposition of the attitude of the naval authorities, but that this attitude has not yet received the approval of the Foreign Office or other organs of the Government and is therefore subject to modification.

HPD GREW

1108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

793.94/6091

SEE 841.00 P.R./274 FOR #724

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Mar. 6, 1933
NAME

TO

1—1127 GPO

REGARDING:

Foreign Affairs. Debate on Far East. Debate on Government's immediate policy with regard to conflict in Far East. Announcement to Government's decision to place a temporary embargo on arms and munitions of war to China or Japan. Comments.

rc

1109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Debate on the Far East.

A Labor motion in the House of Commons for a reduction in the Foreign Office Vote on February 27th offered the occasion for a debate on the Government's immediate policy with regard to the conflict in the Far East, and for Sir John Simon to announce the Government's decision to place a temporary embargo on arms and munitions of war to China or Japan. Sir John said that British policy for the past seventeen months had been one of conciliation, and he resented suggestions that the pursuit of conciliation had been mere temporizing. The Government had never deviated from the view that every means of conciliation should be exhausted, but if it failed the Lytton Report should be adopted; as it expressed a balanced, unanimous and international judgment. He then entered upon the kernel of his statement and declared that while an embargo on the export of arms to be effective must be international, Britain could act alone pending discussion with other countries. Faced, therefore, with the choice of allowing all exports or no exports, it had been decided as from that day that further licences, apart from existing contracts, for the export of arms or ammunition to either China or Japan would not be authorized pending international consideration.

This/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ion, in view of statements made on the
week, caused considerable surprise in
The chief criticism of the Government's
e from Sir Herbert Samuel, Sir Austen
n, and Mr. Amery. Sir Herbert commended
ment for having pressed the League of Nations
rly action on the question of an arms embargo,
that not only arms but financial assistance
withheld from Japan. Public opinion, he
ould not endure the shipment of arms to
t to subdue what resistance the Chinese
Sir Austen agreed that justice would
if assistance were withheld impartially
which suffered aggression and nations
treaties. On the other hand Mr. Amery
on against Japan whose case, he said,
"fundamental realities."
whole the Government's decision was well
the House, but with anxiety that it might
rly against China, since the Japanese
reat a superiority in armament factories.
however, it was felt that the applica-
mediate embargo might be an object
world of Britain's desire to bring the
tion in the Far East to an end at the
sible moment.
al comment, however, which was abundant,
rable to the Government's decision and,

as/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in confidence

WP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Tokyo

Dated March 25, 1933

Rec'd 2:30 a. m.

Tele - 21. to Tokyo

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAR 25 1933 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 25 1933 Department of State

MAR 25 1933

793.94

Secretary of State,

Washington.

67, March 25, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Major Generals Itagaki and Okamura of the Kwantung army have recently come to Tokyo where it is reported that the purpose of their visit is to persuade the home government to permit military operations south of the Wall, without which the Kwantung army will be unable effectively to eliminate the Chinese resistance to the Japanese occupation of Jehol. The Japanese consider themselves to be in a difficult tactical position on the Wall. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister to China, and Suma, First Secretary of Legation, are also enroute to Tokyo, presumably to take part in discussion. A decision whether or not to operate south of the Wall is expected in the near future. The Military Attache believes that limited operations south of the Wall will probably be authorized.

GREW

CIB WP

K

F/G 793.94/6092

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 27 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated March 25, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

It is reported that the purpose of the recent visit to Tokyo of officers of the Kwantung army, Major Generals Okamura and Itagaki, is to induce the home government to allow military movements south of the Wall, on the ground that effective elimination of the resistance of the Chinese to the occupation of Jehol by the Japanese cannot otherwise be accomplished by the Kwantung army. The position of the Japanese on the Wall is considered by them to be difficult from a tactical point of view. Apparently to participate in the discussion, the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, Suma, and the Japanese Minister to China, Ariyoshi, are also on the way to Tokyo. It is expected that a decision in the near future will be reached whether or not to operate south of the Wall. The American Military Attaché is of the opinion that authorization will probably be given for restricted operations south of the Wall.

1113

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1—138 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

1—138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

RECEIVED
1933 MAR -26- Washington,

...is cable was sent in confidential ... should be carefully paraphrased ... communicated to anyone.

March 25, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

noon

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

29

Your 67, March 25, 2 p. m.

Please inform Peiping by telegraph.

Hull

SKH

793.94/6092

m.m.h.
FE:MMH:REK

FE
SKH

CR
MAR 25 1933.
mmh

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____, *19*____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1—138

793.94/6092

1114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 25, 1933.

~~MMH:~~ Concur. MMH. APR 14 1933 Filed
~~SKH:~~ " SKH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I have examined this telegram and the agreement of May 5, 1932, in regard to the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai and find no objection to the instruction which Minister Johnson has sent to the Consul General at Shanghai. According to the telegram, the British and French Ministers have similarly instructed the British and French Consuls General at Shanghai.

Although, as stated, I see no objection to the instruction, I do not believe that there is any need for a telegram to that effect to Minister Johnson for two reasons, as follows:

1. Minister Johnson does not request instructions;

2. In view of the fact thatthe settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai was carried on under the auspicies of the League (although our representatives participated), I believe that it is inadvisable for the Department to issue an instruction in the premises.

JEJ/VDM

J. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 25 1933
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 25, 1933

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 25 1933
Department of State

793.94
note
894.23
893.102

Secretary of State,

Washington.

277, March 25, 3 p. m.

Joint Commission appointed under Article 4 of the agreement of May 5, 1932, covering cessation of hostilities at Shanghai was requested by Japanese in June 1932 to decide whether previously unnotified movement of Chinese troops by rail through the Markham Road junction on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway was / contrary to Article 2 of the agreement.

On June 13th neutral members of the Joint Commission made following decision in reference to movements of troops in Shanghai area:

"The unanimous decision of the neutral members of the joint commission on the matter brought before them is that Article 2 of the May 5th agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in annex one of the agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall

F/G 793.94/6093
APR 15 1933
FILED

1116

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

shall be no hostile movement (by either the Chinese or the Japanese side) in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event any doubt arises the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the commission".

On February 7th the Chinese moved several hundred troops from Soochow to Chekiang Province through Markham Road junction on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway at Shanghai. Japanese Consul General thereupon made verbal protest to Mr. Yui Chinese member of the Joint Commission and after many conversations between the two Yui orally agreed to notify Japanese Consul General or the chairman of the Joint Commission whenever Chinese troops were to be moved through the area. Japanese Consul General communicated this undertaking to his Government and the latter replied that it would not accept verbal assurances of this nature but must insist on written assurances. Chinese member of the Commission insists that movement of Chinese troops through Markham Road junction does not come within scope of the agreement of May 5th. Matter is thus deadlocked between Japanese and Chinese members of the Commission.

Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 3-#277 from Peiping via N.R.
Mar. 25, 3 p. m.

Japanese Consul General on March 8 complained of further unnotified passage of Chinese troop on February 7th of this year. Chinese expressed willingness to give oral notification of such intended passages of troops in future but have maintained that May 5th agreement was not intended to prevent normal transit Chinese troops by rail and have refused to give notice of such movements in writing. I and my British and French colleagues are in general agreement with Chinese position, for agreement was never intended to prevent normal transit of Chinese troops by that railway.

On March 14th Japanese Consul General at Shanghai informed Cunningham that he believed he might find it necessary very soon to ask the neutral members of the commission to reaffirm decision of June 13th last. British, American and French Consuls General have requested our instructions as to what attitude they should take should Commission be called upon by Japanese as indicated. British Consul General offered following formula:

"The decision rendered by the Joint Commission on June 13, 1932, regarding Article 2 of the agreement is still

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#277 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 25, 3 p. m.

still considered to be the only practical interpretation of the wording of that Article. Nevertheless, the neutral members of the Commission feel that the spirit of the agreement was to prevent hostile action against the Japanese troops.

In view of the improved conditions in this area the neutral members of the Commission do not consider that Article 2 should any longer be invoked to prevent the movement of Chinese troops along the railway to other parts of China unless there is definite evidence that such troop movements are hostile to the Japanese in the sense intended by Article 1".

As a result of discussion today with my British and French colleagues I have sent following instruction to Cunningham:

"March 25, 3 p. m. Your despatch No. 7491 dated March 17 regarding Joint Commission. British Minister, French Minister and I are in agreement with views expressed by you in penultimate paragraph.

It would be my personal hope, and I believe this hope shared by my colleagues, that Joint Commission should not be faced with the necessity to make decision

but

1119

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MLT 5-#277 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 25, 3 p. m.

but if question is put before the Commission we are agreed that Commission shall limit itself to the following statement or decision which is an amendment of paragraph two of draft offered by Brenan enclosed with your despatch under acknowledgment:

"The neutral members of the Commission do not consider that Article 2 should now be invoked to prevent the normal transit of Chinese troops by the railway to other parts of China unless there is definite evidence that such troop movements are locally hostile to the Japanese in the sense intended by Article 1".

You will note that we have omitted entirely paragraph one of Brenan's draft which refers to the previous decision. Please keep me telegraphically informed. I am telegraphing Department of this action".

British and French ministers are similarly instructing their consulates general.

WSB-HPD JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
MAR 25 1933

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

No. ------

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, Manchuria, February 27, 1933.

SUBJECT: Developments in Jehol Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1933
Department of State

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

793.94

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 725 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated February 25, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 725
to the Legation at Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies
Received

800
HTW

F/HS 793.94/6094
FILED
APR 10 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 725.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 25, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Developments in Jehol Situation.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatches No. 719, of February 3 and No. 722 of February 13, 1933, in regard to preparations for the Jehol drive, I have the honor to report further developments in this connection.

The strict ban on military news is still being maintained and only the most meagre information has been given out by Japanese Military Headquarters. It is well known that Japanese troops have been moved up to or across the Jehol border in preparation for the advance. Military supplies and reenforcements are still moving toward Chinchow and the opinion is held in some circles that preparations for the main advance have not yet been completed. For this or some other reason, the two American correspondents who intend to accompany the Japanese forces were told yesterday after being advised early in the week to be ready

to

1122

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to depart at a moment's notice that they would not leave before Monday, February 27th. Concerning the above mentioned reenforcements although this office has been unable to obtain definite confirmation of the passage through Mukden during the past few days of a considerable force from Korea, it has reason to believe that such has occurred.

Concerning the recent report of Military Headquarters that a Japanese force had met with little resistance in its advance to Peipiao, the western terminus of the Chinchow-Peipiao (Chaoyang) Railway, an officer of this Consulate General has again been assured by a Japanese official that Japanese troops have been in occupation of Peipiao since December, 1932. The above report very probably refers to a recent movement of reenforcements to Peipiao in preparation for the drive. As the eastern border of Jehol province has been for the most part occupied by Chinese "volunteers", some of whom have no doubt been in touch with Japanese agents, border towns could be in occupation of Japanese troops for some time without coming to the notice of the Chinese authorities.

As was reported in my telegram of February 24 5 p.m., a Manchoukuo force under the command of General Chang Hai-p'eng is advancing on Kailu from Tungliao and as little or no resistance was expected it has probably already been occupied. It was stated by the official military spokesman yesterday that Chinese forces are retreating westward from

Kailu

1123

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Kailu (the press reports General Tsui Hsing-wu's Ninth Independent Cavalry Brigade as moving in that direction) and that groups of "volunteers" are joining the Manchoukuo colors. Liu Kuei-t'ang, who was formerly a commander in Shantung and was the head of one of the largest groups of "volunteers" in Jehol, recently surrendered at Lupei near Tungliao, and joined the Manchoukuo Army (my telegram of February 23 5 p.m.). The strength of his force was reported as being between 15,000 and 20,000 men.

It has again been learned from a reliable source that the Japanese military do not expect serious resistance from the regular troops of Chang Hsueh-liang or from other units in Jehol province. They still apparently believe that the negotiations which were conducted by Major General Itagaki at Nanking will bear fruit and that it is in accordance with Chiang Kai-shek's policy that a show of resistance in Jehol only be made so that the Nanking Government may avoid embarrassment. It is thought, therefore, that Chang Hsueh-liang's troops will retreat after putting up a bold front. In following this situation, it should be remembered that both nations are oriental and are playing the game according to their own standards. The opinion is held by some observers that it is the Japanese policy in Manchuria to employ large forces whenever possible in order to keep actual fighting to a minimum and their casualty list low. In any case in this instance the Japanese appear to be ready for serious

warfare

1124

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

warfare should such eventuate.

A well informed Japanese official during a confidential conversation with a member of my staff stated that the Japanese believe that it will be very difficult for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to maintain his position in North China no matter whether there is serious fighting in Jehol or not. It is expected that he will have to bear the brunt of public disapproval for the failure to uphold Chinese rule in Jehol and that as a consequence his long deferred trip abroad will be taken. The Japanese are, of course, anxious to encompass his downfall and apparently have satisfied themselves that his successor will be Han Fu-ch'ü, the Chairman of Shantung province, who seemingly would be a welcome selection. They anticipate that Han's troops will be called upon to suppress any disturbances that may be created by Chang's retreating troops.

According to information given this office in confidence by a Japanese official, bandits are becoming extremely active throughout the province owing to the dispatch of all available Japanese forces to the Jehol front. The bandits are operating in groups of two or three hundred and many bands are known to be along the South Manchuria Railway lines. On February 22nd Japanese police and soldiers repulsed an attack on a town between Anshan and Liaoyang. The Japanese authorities are said to be concerned over the safety of the railway zone and

it

1125

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

it is claimed that even Mukden is not entirely safe. Because of this situation the Japanese have instituted a strict censorship on all bandit news in order that the people may not become unduly alarmed. It may be added that reports from the interior confirm a marked increase in the activity of small parties of bandits.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:mhp

A true copy of the signed original.

1126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 30 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JMJ
RCM
JMH

Peiping's despatch No 1978 of March 1, 1933.

Transmits, with comment, a clipping from the Peiping Chronicle of Feb 18,1933.

The editorial expresses the belief that China's troubles since 1915 have tended to develop patriotism in China and that the hammering by the outside world, and especially by Japan, has steadily welded the nation into a unit conscious of its unity.

The Legation does not agree with this opinion and feels that the events subsequent to 1915 have not materially altered the patriotism of the vast majority of the Chinese who know little patriotism other than that to the native village or, at most, to the native province.

LHE

1127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1978 Peiping, March 1, 1933.

Subject: Editorial Comment on Sino-Japanese Affairs.

DEPT. OF STATE DIV. OF COM & TREAT
PM REC'D MAR 25 33

793.94
note
893.00

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1933
Department of State

F/HS 793.94/6095 FILED
MAR 31 1933

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington D.C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose an editorial appearing in the Peiping Chronicle of February 18, 1933, entitled "The New Nationalism".

This editorial deals with the question of whether the recent Japanese aggression has caused the birth of a nation in China over-night. It points out that such births are not such sudden things as they seem but are the climax of one long process and the beginning of another. It calls attention to the fact that the first war with England was considered by the rest of the country as an affair local to Canton; that the second war was waged for more than a year before Shanghai became interested in it; and that the Sino-

1128

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Sino-Japanese War was regarded in the south as one of North China's little quarrels. However, it maintains that, with the Japanese aggressions of 1915 and the subsequent failure of the Chinese to obtain at Paris in 1919 the treatment to which they felt they were entitled, the national consciousness began to integrate. It says that while the Japanese contention that China is merely a geographical expression may have been true at one time, that the hammering by the outside world and especially by Japan has steadily welded the nation into a unit conscious of its unity.

As evidence of this unity the editorial calls attention to news items reporting offers to the government of service, of cooperation, and of support from all sorts and conditions of men, as well as popular movements for the amelioration of the lot of the men in the fighting lines and the provision of military supplies. It says further "There is not yet, perhaps, the indissoluble cohesion that is to be found in much smaller units, but the essential cohesion is there; the dominating force is now centripetal, not centrifugal. The thing has not come in a night, but it has come."

In connection with this editorial it may be said that, while the articulate minority in China has certainly become much more conscious of a national patriotism and a national unity during recent years, it cannot be said that the events subsequent to 1915 have materially altered the patriotism of the vast majority of the Chinese who know little patriotism other than that to the native village or at most to the native province.

Respectfully

1129

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Editorial entitled "The New Nationalism", from the Peiping Chronicle of February 18, 1933.

LC/k

1130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Dispatch No. 1978

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Saturday, February 18, 1933

THE NEW NATIONALISM.

Some months ago, a contemporary, commenting on an act of Japanese aggression, declared that it had caused a nation to be born in a night. At the time the judgement did not commend itself to any large number of observers. The signs of a unified and united nation were not as conspicuous as the dramatic terseness of the judgement would seem to imply. After all, births are not such sudden things as they may seem. They are the climax of one long process and the beginning of another; and the two processes are not as sharply defined as to warrant pressing even this way of putting the matter. As we look about us today, however, it is evident that we are living in a new China. Ninety years ago, or more, when the first war with England broke out at Canton, it was regarded by the rest of the country as a purely local affair, and even the Imperial Government in Peking did not concern itself unduly with the matter. When the second war broke out it was waged for more than a year before Shanghai began to have any interest in it. The motto in Shanghai was "Business as usual," even with the British and French merchants there; and so little was it regarded as a Shanghai affair that the Shanghai authorities were looking to the British and French authorities, as well as to other Foreign interests, to help them against the Taipings. Forty years ago a similar state of affairs prevailed, the war with Japan being regarded by south China as one of north China's little quarrels. Not until defeat had made itself felt did the country as a whole, that is to say the articulate portion of it, express any serious interest in the issue. Again, in 1900, it was possible for the south to remain quiescent, though for reasons that were not operative on the earlier occasions, whilst the north bore the brunt of the business.

Not until the Japanese aggressions of 1915 and succeeding years, accentuated by the failure to obtain the treatment "due to a great people" at Paris in 1919, did the national consciousness begin really to integrate. The events of 1915, 1919 and 1925 served as powerful stimuli to conscious integration. The Japanese contention, fifteen months ago, that China was not a nation but merely, as Italy was once described as being, only a geographical expression, may have been true a long time ago; but the hammering by the outside world, and more especially by Japan herself, has steadily welded the nation into a unit conscious of its unity, conscious of an at-one-ment that perhaps it has never before so wholly attained. The Japanese description was belated when it was used; it is now, thanks largely to Japan herself, not merely belated, but archaic.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It is only necessary to glance through our news columns any day of the week to see that the nation has found itself; has, if the phrase may now be permitted, been born. From all over the country offers of service, of co-operation, of support, from all sorts and conditions of men, have been sent to the authorities in Nanking. The popular movements for the amelioration of the lot of the men in the fighting lines, the auxiliary associations of workers preparing medical and hospital supplies, the widespread and substantial contributions for the purchase of aeroplanes, and similar activities all tell the same story, that, whatever local and party differences there may be, the people of this country are today a united people, a nation conscious of nationality, facing one issue with a single spirit. There is not yet, perhaps, the indissoluble cohesion that is to be found in much smaller units, but the essential cohesion is there; the dominating force is now centripetal, not centrifugal. The thing has not come in a night, but it has come. Every sign of the times points to the certainty that the nation as a nation is prepared to follow a lead, given with boldness and without ambiguity. Japan has to thank herself for this; and China has largely to thank Japan.

1132

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 31, 1933.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
APR 3 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~EEJ.~~
~~FEJ.~~
~~ROM.~~
~~MMH.~~
SMH

Peiping's despatch No. 1984 of February 28, 1933, transmits an editorial entitled "Japan To Lose At ~~Last~~", reprinted in the PEIPING CHRONICLE of February 16, from the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO, Peiping.

The writer of this editorial thinks that the Japanese after capturing Jehol Province will eventually seize the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, Ninghsia, Singkiang and Outer Mongolia, to the western end of the Great Wall at Chiayukwan. He even goes so far as to suggest the possibility that the Yellow River may be made the southern boundary of "Manchukuo" and that, eventually, all China will fall under Japanese domination. The editorial writer believes, however, that Japan will ultimately lose in this struggle over Chinese territory.

LHE:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1984 Peiping, February 28, 1933.

Subject: Editorial Comment, Sino-Japanese Affairs.

PM REGD DEPT OF STATE MAR 25 33 RECD

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 27 1933 Department of State

793.94

F/HS 793.94/6096

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington D.C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose an editorial entitled "Japan to Lose at Last", reprinted in the Peiping Chronicle of February 16, 1933, from the Shih Chieh Jih Pao, Peiping.

After remarking upon the extremes to which the League of Nations has gone in its unsuccessful efforts to meet the desires of Japan, and reiterating the ridiculousness of the "Manchukuo" contention that Jehol is a part of that country which Chinese editorials universally maintain, the editorial admits that the present object of Japanese aggression is confined to Jehol. Admitting this,

FILED APR 4 1933

1134

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

this, however, it goes on to intimate that Japan has shown a remarkable ability to find a "reason" for each new aggression as the desire for expansion arose, and points out that the Japanese declaration to the effect that the Great Wall forms the southern boundary of "Manchukuo" plainly indicates her intention eventually to conquer all of the territory north of that wall, including Suiyuan, Chahar, Ninghsia, Singkiang and Outer Mongolia, to the western end of the Great Wall at Chiayukwan. The editorial then proceeds to anticipate that, after the conquest of these territories, Japan will demand that the southern boundary of "Manchukuo" be recognized as the Yellow River, and then eventually as including all China. It continues to the effect that Japan is now feverishly preparing for war and is ready to commence an armed conflict with the whole world.

The editorial likens the present temper of Japan to that of Germany prior to the Great War and concludes as follows:

> "All the advantages Japan possesses now, and whatever is now in her favor, were enjoyed by Germany before the World War. The Allied (Central) Powers could not win the War simply because it is fundamentally impossible for one country to fight all the countries in the world. China should not hesitate to imitate the Belgian sacrifice in North China, and the French resistance in Central China. She must win after a prolonged struggle."

The enclosed editorial is typical of those which tend to show an increasing feeling among Chinese that the present struggle will be a long one, and that its conclusion will not be too favorable to Japan.

Respectfully

1135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:
1. Editorial entitled "Japan to Lose at Last", from Peiping Chronicle dated February 16, 1933.

LC/k

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Miltm O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure Number 1
Dispatch No. 1984

JAPAN TO LOSE AT LAST

"Shih Chieh Jih Pao", Peiping

Apparently Japan will go along the following lines wifh regard to the application of Paragraph Four of Article Fifteen on the part of the League: (1) To hold the League responsible for the failure of conciliation; (2) In the same way as she contested the Lytton Report, to publish a statement rebuking the present recommendations; and (3) To withdraw from the League if necessary. Though accommodating itself to the utmost in order to meet Japanese desires, the League now appears to be still unable to satisfy Japan.

Japan has determined to uphold "Manchukuo" forcibly and immediately to attack Jehol. There is nothing more ridiculous in the world than the Japanese allegation that Jehol is an integral part of "Manchukuo", and that Chinese troops in the Province are invading "Manchukuo". Now the Japanese 6th, 8th, 10th and 12th Divisions are already in Manchuria, and the 4th, 16th, 19th, and 20th Divisions are either on the way to Manchuria or under orders to get ready to leave Japan. The Imperial troops in Manchuria number about 200,000. Skirmishes near Kailu having persisted already for a long period, a large-scale, general conflagration appears imminent.

The present object of Japanese aggression is Jehol, it is true. Nevertheless Tokyo's final object is not Jehol at all. Japan can make "reasons" for her aggression from time to time. She can broaden the scope of her aggression from time to time. The "Manchukuo" authorities told the Lytton Commission that the southern boundary of "Manchukuo" should be the Great Wall. In this expression was implied an evident intention on the part of the treaty-violators to conquer all the territories of Suiyuan, Chahar, Ninghsia, Sinkiang, and Outer Mongolia, because the west end of the Great Wall is at Chiayukwan, thousands of miles away. After the conquest of all these territories, Japan will demand that the southern boundary of "Manchukuo" should be the Yellow River. Next, Japan will take the whole of China.

First rejecting the League's verdict, then launching the attack on Jehol, and now feverishly preparing war against the whole world, Japan is ready to spend Yen 2,238,000,000 in the coming fiscal year, an overwhelming proportion of this sum being military, naval and "Manchurian Affairs" expenditures. The deficit is to be met by bond issues. She is furthermore extremely busy dumping her products in India and the South Sea Islands on the one hand, and purchasing munitions from England and France on the other. All these things show that Japan now stands first and foremost for militarism. She is ready to commence an armed conflict with the whole world. She is more blunt and adamant than the Central Powers before the 1914 tragedy.

All the advantages Japan possesses now, and whatever is now in her favour, were enjoyed by Germany before the World War. The Allied Powers could not win the War simply because it is fundamentally impossible for one country to fight all the countries in the world. China should not hesitate to imitate the Belgian sacrifice in North China, and the French resistance in Central China. She must win after a prolonged struggle.

1137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 31, 1933.

~~[illegible]~~
~~JBJ~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~SMH~~ I think you should glance through all of this. H.

Peiping's despatch No 1989 of Feb 28, 1933.

Transmits memoranda of eight conversations on Sino-Japanese relations.

The covering despatch contains a brief resumé of these memoranda, and should be read in full.

LHE.

LHE.

1138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FW 793.94/6097

PM RECD DEPT. OF STATE WASHINGTON FEB 8 1933

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Change made in FE (Z.P.M.) 2/10/33

7E

Dept Mail Room
Communication
referred to us as per
enclosure to
Legation's 1989,
Feb. 28, 1933
Recommending Banking
warning
cheque.

Feb 9/33.

Dear Mr. Clark:

I find I made a mistake on page 7, 3rd line from the bottom, of the enclosure with my letter of Feb. 8, 1933, to the Minister sending a report of a conversation with Mr. Suma in regard to the Sino-Japanese controversy.

The words "Pacific Northwest" should have

1139

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

been "North Pacific."

If all the copies of this despatch are still in the Legation when you receive this note, I shall be grateful if you will see that the words are altered (in pen will do), as indicated.

I am so sorry to trouble you about this small point.

Yours truly
Willys R Peck.

Thanks.
Please do for me.
EC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, February 28, 1933.

No. 1989

Subject: Memoranda of conversations re Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Confidential

DEPT OF STATE MAR 25 33 PM NCCD

793.94

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 27 1933 Department of State

F/HS 793.94/6097 FILED MAY 29 1933

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of a 1/ confidential letter from Counselor Peck in Nanking dated February 8, 1933, with which he encloses a memorandum, dated February 7th, of a conversation he had with Mr. Yakichiro Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, regarding China's attitude towards direct negotiations with Japan. A synopsis of the memorandum will be found attached to Mr. Peck's letter. A copy of the letter and enclosure has been sent to the Embassy

in

1141

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

in Tokyo for its information.

There are also transmitted the following memoranda of conversations I have recently had with various persons in Peiping, all relating to the Sino-Japanese controversy and the problems arising therefrom:

2/ 1. Conversation on February 6, 1933, with Mr. Chiang Mon-lin, President of the National University of Peking ("Peita"), who told me that, on the whole, the attitude of the students had improved, both as regards their attitude toward their studies and toward their country. As regards Manchuria he said that he had warned T. V. Soong that it was dangerous for China to rely exclusively on the League, and that she might have to fall back upon direct negotiations. He added that China might perhaps be better off without Manchuria than with it, and that even if Chinese authority were reestablished there the various Manchurian leaders would at once fight for supremacy amongst themselves.

3/ 2. Conversation on February 10, 1933, with Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister, who stated that during his visit to Canton and other southern ports recently he was struck by the utter unwillingness or inability of the Cantonese to cooperate with the Nanking Government.

4/ 3. Conversation on February 13, 1933, with Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, in the course of which he stated that his visit to Peiping was for the purpose of arranging

financial

1142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

financial assistance and supplies for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and to discuss the military situation. He also said he was confident that General Tang Yu-lin, the Governor of Jehol, would remain loyal and that China was determined to defend the province. Regarding Marshal Tuan Chi-jui's departure for Shanghai he intimated that it had nothing to do with direct negotiations with Japan, but was due to his desire to separate himself from the intrigues in North China.

5/ 4. Conversation on February 21, 1933, with Mr. W. H. Donald, adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who informed me that he had had some difficulty in persuading T. V. Soong and Chang Hsueh-liang to visit Jehol, but that the trip had been very successful and their reception there had been an enthusiastic one on the part of the people and the soldiers.

6/ 5. Conversation on February 25, 1933, with Dr. John C. Ferguson, a prominent American resident of Peiping. He said he greatly regretted Mr. Stimson's policy of non-recognition because he felt it would be a disaster if Japan were isolated and ruined. He felt that leaders like Araki could be influenced through generals like Banzai or Doihara, both of whom were friends of Dr. Ferguson, and that although the military were determined to control the destiny of Japan, the army was in closer touch with the people than any one else. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Embassy in Tokyo.

7/ 6. A similar topic was touched upon in my conversation

1143

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tion with Sir Miles Lampson on February 28, 1933. He repeated to me some observations made to him by Count de Martel, the French Ambassador in Tokyo, to the effect that within six months Japan would begin to modify her policy. Sir Miles and I agreed that this was too optimistic a view, and I said that I believed the only chance of internal difficulties in Japan lay in a possible future conflict between the army (including the peasants) and the industrialists and proletariat of the cities. A copy of this memorandum has likewise been sent to the Embassy in Tokyo.

8/ 7. Conversation on February 28, 1933, with Sir Miles Lampson when I told him that I did not anticipate much danger to our nationals even if military operations should be extended to this area, as I did not think that either the Chinese or the Japanese would deliberately attack foreigners. Sir Miles agreed, but said that he had sent to the Chief of Police of Peiping a list of British nationals, with the location of their properties, with the request that they be given protection.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1 to 8 as described.

5 Carbon Copies

Received JM

800.

CVHE/js.

1142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1989

Nanking Office
February 8, 1933.

Confidential

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum of a conversation held by me on February 7, 1933, with Mr. Yakichiro Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, who resides in Shanghai. A synopsis of the memorandum is attached thereto.

Mr. Suma is said to be conversant with the efforts which, as reported, the Japanese authorities are making to sound out the possibilities of entering into direct negotiations with the Chinese, and I hoped that he might feel inclined to let fall some hints of what may be going on, but my hope in this respect was disappointed. He was much more communicative to an official of the British Legation when talking with him the other day.

Mr. Suma's views seemed to be based on the following postulates:

Manchoukuo has the same international status as China;

China's leaders are exclusively preoccupied with internal jealousies and quarrels;

Chinese

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

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Chinese popular and official opposition to Japanese military activities is purely artificial, having been created merely as an incident to factional politics;

There is no genuine nationalism in China;

Communist armed forces in China are actively supported by the Third International.

Opinion is reserved in regard to the last item listed above, but the observation of this office does not support any of the other suppositions.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation dated February 7, 1933.

Seven copies to the American Minister.

WRP/MVD

A true copy of the signed original.
M.V.D.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Synopsis

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Attitude Toward Direct Negotiations with Japan.

Mr. Suma's impression is that: General Chiang Kai-shek and some other Chinese leaders do not favor opposing Japan with force;

The Chinese Government's authority and finances are weak;

Communist forces in the interior showed increase of activity and hopefulness after the resumption of relations with the Soviet Government;

The southern provinces, under the guise of suppressing Communists, are combining against Chiang Kai-shek;

An alliance between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists is possible;

In respect to foreign policy, there are no factions in Japan and popular opinion supports the Government;

There will be no military activity in North China, if avoidable;

So long as China refuses direct negotiations with Japan, the danger of grave incidents will persist;

Owing to concessions by Japan, the possibility of conciliation through the League still exists;

American public opinion is swinging toward Japan.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of Conversation

February 7, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy: Attitude Toward Direct Negotiations with Japan.

Mr. Yakichiro Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, resident in Shanghai,
Mr. Peck.

A few days ago Mr. Ingram, Counselor of the British Legation, told Mr. Peck of some interesting hints given to him by Mr. Suma in Shanghai regarding Japanese attempts to "feel out" Chinese attitude toward direct negotiations. Hoping to receive similar interesting revelations, I observed to Mr. Suma that the only Chinese I saw in Nanking were members of the Government, who expressed to me the orthodox views of the Government, viz., that the only thing for China to do is to resist Japan with force. I said that in every country more than one policy had support among the leaders, and I was quite prepared to believe that there were some Chinese who did not favor the policy of resistance to Japan. I remarked that it was quite commonly talked about that General Chiang Kai-shek was lukewarm in regard to the resistance policy. I asked whether Mr. Suma had any thing to say on this subject.

Mr. Suma said that it was true that General Chiang Kai-shek was not very strongly in favor of the so-called resistance policy. Perhaps he saw the deplorable results for China if China should provoke another big incident with Japan. Suma also admitted that there were other Chinese leaders who did not favor opposing Japan with force, but he pointed out that the Chinese Government had so

inflamed

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inflamed public opinion that no leader dared to advocate negotiating with Japan.

Mr. Suma said that he had come to Nanking from Shanghai for the week end, to have a general look around. So many prominent men had gone to Shanghai, however, that he had not been able to see many people, although he had talked with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Suma asked Mr. Peck whether he did not find the Chinese Government very weak at the present time. He, himself, thought that the finances of the Government were in very bad shape. Not only were civil officials behind in their pay, but the Government even found it impossible to supply necessary funds to the army. For instance, while there had been talk of transfers of troops to the north, he had not been able to get news of any actual movements of troops in that direction. There was a report that the 87th Division, General Chiang Kai-shek's crack organization, was going to be moved to Hsuchow, in north Kiangsu, and the 4th Division, now stationed there, was to be transferred to Kiangsi to fight the Communists, but he could not find out that these transfers had actually been effected. It seemed that when a body of troops was thus transferred, it was necessary for the Government to make a large allowance of ready money, so that the officers and men could remit funds to their families for living expenses, and the Government was not able to do this, so the transfers could not take place.

Pressed for his opinion regarding the state of the Chinese Government, Mr. Peck observed that the Government had already announced that it would no longer attempt to suppress internal warfare by means of force, but would rely

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on persuasion. This was the policy followed in connection with the Shantung and Szechuan troubles. Moreover, so far as Mr. Peck was informed, the Chinese Government felt that its financial position was not unfavorable, as compared with that of most other governments, since it had balanced its budget. Members of the Government admitted that its expenditures had been cut down to the lowest possible limit, but it was able to carry on without borrowing, which was more than most governments were in position to do. Consequently, the Chinese Government felt that it could continue on this basis indefinitely.

Commenting on affairs in general, Mr. Suma remarked that after the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Government, the Third International was reported to have sent funds through its agents in Shanghai to the Communist forces in Kiangsi Province. Whether this report was correct or not, the resumption of relations with the Soviet Government had been marked by an increase of activity and hopefulness on the part of the Communist forces in that Province. As Mr. Peck was aware, Mr. Suma said, the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and the 19th Route Army had made a military alliance for the ostensible purpose of advancing into Kiangsi Province to help suppress the Communists. General Chiang Kai-shek had also returned to Kiangsi for the same purpose. However, the desire of the southern provinces to overthrow General Chiang Kai-shek was well known and obviously the suppression of the Communist forces was only an ostensible object of the southern faction, their real object being to occupy Kiangsi Province

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the first step in their northward movement. Mr. Suma suggested that it was a distinct possibility that General Chiang Kai-shek might make some kind of a truce with the Communist forces and even effect an alliance with them, on the understanding that they would withstand the advance of the southern forces. This would enable Chiang Kai-shek to give his attention to north China, where it was needed. Mr. Suma observed that General Chiang Kai-shek was having a hard time in maintaining his present position of political supremacy and he might take any measure, no matter how desperate, in this dilemma. An alliance between General Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists would be extremely serious for everybody concerned.

Turning to Japan's policy, Mr. Suma remarked that Mr. Peck was certainly aware that when the present Government under Count Saito came in, there was no longer any question of factional division in Japan. Army, Navy, Foreign Office and popular opinion were all united in a common policy. Mr. Suma said he could not conceal the fact that the military men in Japan had done some very hot-headed things, but this was all over now. The Japanese Foreign Office was now in a position to say that, unless there was flagrant provocation, there would be no Japanese military activities in north China. The occupation of Jehol Province was a purely domestic matter of Manchoukuo. It was no concern of the Chinese or anyone else.

Mr. Suma said that he had urged Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to settle up the Shanhaikwan incident as soon as possible. He said that he had explained to Lo that the Shanhaikwan incident had been an accident,

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pure and simple, due to mistakes on both sides. He urged that Lo consent to set aside the question of these mistakes for later discussion and settle the Shanhaikwan matter at once. He pointed out to Lo that at the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese controversy the Japanese Government had made a friendly offer to the Chinese Government to settle the dispute on the basis of the "five principles", but China refused and appealed to the League of Nations. Following that refusal by China there had been two important "incidents", namely, the trouble at Shanghai in February, 1932, and the setting up of Manchoukuo. He pointed out to Lo that as long as the present situation existed between the Japanese and Chinese Governments further "incidents" might occur. This was not a threat, but only a statement of fact, and he urged Lo to take it into serious consideration. This dangerous state of affairs would continue as long as China refused to shake hands with Japan and settle their differences by negotiation.

In regard to the League of Nations, Mr. Suma said that it had been decided to summon a meeting of the Assembly on February 11th, at which time the Assembly would vote on the report which would be made to the League in regard to the Sino-Japanese issue. He said that he was glad to tell Mr. Peck that he had just received word that the Japanese Foreign Office had prevailed upon the Government to make two important concessions, in order to facilitate a settlement. He thought that the Assembly would vote for a method of settlement which Japan could now accept, although there remained two or three "small Powers" to be persuaded. Granting that the Assembly should adopt a plan of settlement of the controversy, which seemed

probable,

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probable, Mr. Suma pointed out how serious and regrettable it would be if China should refuse to accept such a plan of settlement. Mr. Suma said that the two concessions made at the last minute by the Japanese Government were made because of the extreme reluctance of the Japanese Government to have the matter pass outside of the sphere of possible conciliation, for if that were to happen it might be necessary for Japan to leave the League. These two concessions having been made, Mr. Suma felt that it was distinctly possible to hope for settlement of the controversy by conciliation.

Mr. Suma remarked, incidentally, that the Japanese Government disseminated to its diplomatic officers daily reports in regard to the state of public opinion in the United States and elsewhere. He was glad to say that the latest reports were to the effect that public opinion in the United States was showing a distinct trend toward Japan, Such large and influential papers as the NEW YORK TIMES and the Philadelphia PUBLIC LEDGER were now showing much better understanding of the Japanese side of the case.

Mr. Suma showed a desire for information regarding American activities and he asked what there was behind rumors which he had seen in the press regarding American Government loans to China for the purchase of arms and of wheat.

Mr. Peck replied that when China purchased arms in the United States it was always from private concerns. He had not heard that any extensive credits had been granted by such concerns and exports of arms to China from the United States recently had not, in any event,

been

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been considerable. The American Government, needless to say, had not established any credit for China, to facilitate the purchase of arms in the United States, because, for one reason, the American Government was not able to do so. Mr. Peck explained in detail the method by which the American Government carefully controls the exportation of arms to China and he observed that American public opinion was not very favorable to the exportation of any arms to China, while it positively disapproved of the shipment of such arms if they contributed to civil wars in China.

In regard to the purchase of wheat in the United States, Mr. Peck explained the purchase effected in September, 1931. He said that the negotiations which had been conducted recently were between the Chinese Government and American non-Government concerns, i.e., the Farmers National Grain Corporation and the Pacific Northwest Grain Growers' Association. Mr. Suma inquired regarding the nature and origin of these concerns and Mr. Peck explained that the Agricultural Marketing Act had created the Federal Farm Board, for the promotion of agricultural interests in the United States; the Grain Stabilization Corporation was a subsidiary of the Federal Farm Board, whose main object was to keep up the price of wheat; the Farmers' National Grain Corporation was a co-operative association of grain growers, originally financed with Government money but now operating independently; finally the North Pacific ~~Northwest~~ Grain Growers' Association was a non-Government cooperative association. Mr. Peck said that the recent negotiations for a second sale of

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wheat

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wheat to China had arisen from the desire of the American wheat growers to dispose of their surplus stocks and from the desire of the Chinese Government to purchase wheat, with the principal object in view, so Mr. Peck had been told, of utilizing the wheat in the construction of highways in the interior.

Mr. Suma remarked that America had started a big aviation project in Hangchow. Mr. Peck replied that the Chinese had set up an aviation school in Hangchow and had engaged a number of American aviators as instructors, he thought about sixteen. Mr. Peck explained that the American Government had nothing whatsoever to do with this aviation school and so far as Mr. Peck was aware the contracts of the American instructors were not even registered in American consulates.

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Conversation Peiping, February 6, 1933.

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Mr. Chiang Mon-lin

Subject: Conditions in China. Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Mr. Chiang Mon-lin called and in the course of conversation stated that the attitude of the students in his university (Peita) was much better. He said that, while about one hundred and fifty had left at the time of the New Year (old style), they had had no trouble about examinations.

He felt that the attitude of the students was much better than it had been, and he had been pointing out to them that their patriotic duty was to be found in preparing themselves for Chinese service by completing their studies and getting well grounded in the subjects upon which China needed help; that agitations and other activities of that kind were not calculated to be of help either now or in the future. He said that he was confident that the students themselves were beginning to realize this.

In regard to Manchuria Mr. Chiang Mon-lin said that soon after the outbreak of trouble in Manchuria he had gone to see Mr. T. V. Soong. He found with Mr. T. V. Soong Mr. Rajchman, a representative of the League who had been in Nanking for some time. He said that it was

Rajchman

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Rajchman who had persuaded China to lay their cause before the League. He told me that he said to Mr. Soong that he thought the Chinese Government was playing a very dangerous game at that time in that it had only one wire open, namely, the wire from Nanking to Geneva; that he felt they should also have a wire open to Tokyo even if it was a secret one, for it was not possible that the League could do very much, and it was always possible that they might have to fall back upon such arrangement as they might be able to make with the Japanese directly.

Mr. Chiang stated that he thought perhaps China would be better off without Manchuria than with it; for even if the Japanese were to move out of Manchuria tomorrow China would find great difficulty in reestablishing authority there, even supposing Chang Hsueh-liang were to be re-instated. He felt that each and every volunteer leader would at once become an active contender for a position of power in Manchuria.

Mr. Chiang stated, however, that he felt China was in a very good position in her controversy with Japan, because throughout she had submitted her difficulties to the League with the result that, whatever happened now, China had the moral support of the world, whereas Japan was in the position of Germany in 1914.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, February 10, 1933.

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Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.

Subject: Conditions in China.

In the course of a conversation to-day Sir Miles said that he had just completed visits to Canton, Swatow, Foochow, Shanghai and Nanking, and that one of the impressions he carried away from these visits was that of the utter unwillingness or inability of the Cantonese to cooperate with or support the Government now at Nanking. He stated that the Cantonese leaders had a feeling that amounted to hatred for Chiang Kai-shek, and that the only thing that prevented them from turning upon him and all that went with him was the situation in Manchuria, which forced the Cantonese to render a certain amount of support to the Government in the interest of a united front, at least in appearance.

He referred to the fact that Hongkong authorities had consented to the stationing of an invoice officer in Hongkong. He said that this had been done somewhat reluctantly and now he had discovered that the Cantonese authorities refused point-blank to recognize documents issued by this officer stationed in Hongkong by Nanking.

Sir Miles stated that he was particularly struck with the amount of activity that was going on in and around Canton; he said that there was great amount of building and much evidence of progress in the provinces planning for reconstruction.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, February 13, 1933.

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Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance

Subject: Sino-Japanese difficulties and domestic situation.

I called upon Mr. T. V. Soong to-day at noon by arrangement, and in the course of conversation he asked me whether I had any information bearing on the present situation.

I told him that I was without very much precise information. I said that the situation seemed now to turn upon the future of Jehol, and that it was my understanding from reports which I had received that, whereas some twenty days ago the Japanese seemed to be preparing to make a concerted attack upon Jehol, it was now rumored that they expected that an attack in force would not be necessary, as it was rather believed that Tang Yu-lin would sell out. I said that I had even heard a rumor that General Itagaki had gone from Changchun to Nanking for the purpose of arranging this.

I said that some time ago we had been much excited by the sudden departure of Tuan Chi-jui for Nanking and Shanghai, and at the time I had been told that he was carrying proposals from the Japanese to the Chinese Government for a settlement of the present situation in Manchuria by direct negotiation. I said that I had not been

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been informed as to the basis upon which such negotiations could take place, but that speculation led to the belief that the Japanese were offering to relinquish their claims on Jehol if China would recognize Manchukuo. I said that personally I was inclined to believe that probably the simplest explanation was the true one, namely, that fearing for his life Tuan Chi-jui had been anxious to get to Shanghai where he could be free of any connections with the Japanese.

Mr. Soong stated that his visit to Peiping was for the purpose of arranging financial assistance for Chang Hsueh-liang and supplies for the armies in the field, and for the purpose of discussing the military situation. He stated that he thought this constituted the best evidence to refute the rumor that there were to be any negotiations.

With reference to the situation in Jehol he said that he could say to me that, not only were they confident that Tang Yu-lin would not sell out, but that he could not if he wished, as they had him now squeezed in so that he could not get out. He said that they were determined to put up a defense in the province of Jehol against any attack by Japan, although they realized that their defense might not amount to very much.

As regards Tuan Chi-jui, he stated that Tuan was getting to be an old man and that the group known as the Anfu clique which had surrounded and supported him

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was now divided in its counsels. One part, the Fukien part, led by his son, was pro-Japanese and wanted him to take some part in bringing about the settlement of the questions at issue between China and Japan. The other, representing the Anhwei part, was opposed. He said that the old gentleman himself did not wish to become involved; he was extremely worried lest he be seized and used by one side or another, and had responded gladly to their invitation to come south, in order that he might definitely separate himself from the intrigues here in the north.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, February 21, 1933.

Mr. W. H. Donald.

Subject: Visit of Mr. T.V. Soong to Jehol

Mr. Donald called and in the course of conversation stated that the visit of Mr. T. V. Soong at Jehol had been a very successful one. He asked me if I had seen the telegram that Chang Hsueh-liang had sent to Geneva from Jehol. He said that the statement which Mr. Soong telegraphed out of Jehol was written by Soong himself, although he, Donald, had edited it. Donald stated that he had drafted the statement which Chang Hsueh-liang had sent to Geneva.

Mr. Donald recalled the luncheon at Colonel Drysdale's house on February 16th and stated that up until midway through the luncheon it was not settled that Soong would go to Jehol; that he, Donald, was then still attempting to get transportation.

He had had some difficulty persuading Soong that he should come north to visit Jehol. He said that he had begun on Soong in Shanghai and that Soong had promised he would go, but when the landing field proved bad and the plane could not leave Soong apparently decided he would not come north and went off to Nanking.

Donald

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Donald said that he got the plane fixed and as soon as it could leave Shanghai had it go to Nanking and went himself to Soong to tell him that the plane was ready and that he must go; and forced him to leave. Soong departed and came to Peiping.

At Peiping Soong procrastinated about a visit to Jehol. Finally, when everything had been prepared, he had, in the course of the luncheon at Colonel Drysdale's, indicated his readiness to leave. Shortly after, they went to see Chang Hsueh-liang, and there Donald suggested that Chang should accompany Soong. It was not decided that Chang Hsueh-liang should go until 9.30 that night.

Donald stated that the trip was made quietly, with stops along the road to review troops, and that their reception at Jehol was an enthusiastic one on the part of the people and the soldiers.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, February 25, 1933.

Dr. Ferguson.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

In the course of conversation to-day with Dr. Ferguson who for many years has been a resident of China, has been an adviser off and on to the Chinese Government, and is now connected with the Peiping Palace Museum, he stated that he regretted exceedingly the policy which Mr. Stimson had adopted. I asked him in what respects, and he stated that he felt Mr. Stimson's doctrine of non-recognition was wrong. In addition he stated that he felt Mr. Stimson's policy of disapproval of Japan's action was wrong. Dr. Ferguson stated that he felt it would be a very grave situation if Japan were to be broken in the present movement upon which she was engaged.

I pointed out to Dr. Ferguson that it seemed to me a very difficult, if not almost impossible thing, for any one to guide Japan at the present time, as Japan's activities appeared to be entirely in the hands of a group of military men led by Araki and General Muto, who were holding themselves aloof from moderating influences and pursuing a course utterly isolated from world influence. None of the usual contacts could be maintained.

Our

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Our lines of communication were entirely through the civilian side of the Government, notably the Foreign Office, which was now completely out of the picture.

Dr. Ferguson expressed some doubt as to the impossibility of influencing leaders like Araki, and mentioned General Banzai and General Doihara as friends through whom he felt he could accomplish something, although he admitted that they were military men and in a sense subordinate to those leaders.

Dr. Ferguson told me that he had had a long conversation with General Banzai within the past year, in the course of which General Banzai had stated that the military were determined to control effectively the policy and destiny of Japan. General Banzai in illustrating his point drew a picture showing graphically the character of the Japanese Government, with the Emperor at the head and two lines drawn: one from the Emperor through the Minister of War and the Chief of the Military Staff to the people, the other from the Emperor through the Cabinet and the Diet to the people.

General Banzai said that in the time of the Meiji Emperor the Japanese Emperor had exercised a very real influence throughout all elements of the Government, mainly because he had been so intimately connected with the restoration and those leaders who engineered the restoration, both military and civilian, and who later were

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were to constitute the body known as the Genro or elder statesmen. The elder statesmen were gradually eliminated by death, leaving to-day only the aged Saionji who is in his dotage. The Meiji had passed on to his reward and was succeeded by his son who was a fool and insane, and during his reign he had lost entirely all the prestige which the Emperor in his person had previously been able to command. The insane Emperor had been succeeded by the present Emperor who was a young man and a nonentity, so that now the prestige of the Emperor was almost gone. In fact, he occupied a position in the Empire little different from that occupied by the cloistered Emperors of shogun days.

The army was in closer touch with the people of the country than any one else in Japan, and through its leaders was determined to do away with the Cabinet and with the Diet, as the Diet was a useless mechanism and represented nothing; so that in fact to-day there was practically a return to the days of the shogunate, with the army in control and the head of the army occupying the position of the shogun.

Dr. Ferguson enlarged somewhat on his feeling that it would be a prime disaster if Japan were to be isolated and ruined. I stated that I agreed with him that it would be a disaster if Japan were to come to ruin, but that it seemed to me that those responsible for the conduct

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conduct of the Japanese Government had isolated themselves from all normal contact, so that we have absolutely no means whatever of influencing them. In fact, I believed that the military leaders who are conducting Japan's policy now are purposely isolating themselves from contact with any outside influence lest they suffer contamination in the eyes of their followers; and I was at a loss to know how we could make any contact with that group in Japan under present conditions.

Dr. Ferguson stated that he believed he could make such a contact through General Banzai, although he admitted when questioned that after all General Banzai was a military man like the rest and would doubtless react as the military leaders dictated that he should react.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Conversation. Peiping, February 28, 1933.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

Sir Miles stated that he had had a long conversation with Count Martel, French Ambassador to Japan, and that Count Martel had stated as his conviction that given another six months the Japanese would begin to modify their policy. Sir Miles stated that he had expressed to Count Martel his feeling that the latter was somewhat optimistic. Martel, however, had clung to his statement and supported it by an analysis of the economic and political situation in Japan. Sir Miles and I agreed that to us the situation seemed rather hopeless.

I pointed out that according to my observation the military were rapidly reviving the old shogunate period in Japan, the military leaders playing the part of the old clan leaders, while the enlisted personnel represented the old Samurai group. I pointed out that my observation indicated that the army was in closer contact with the people of the country than anybody else, because the army through the conscript system was made up of the farmer class. I said that the leaders of the army, so far as I could see, had made a real effort to

cultivate

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cultivate the support of the farmers and to understand their problems, and I was convinced that, under this leadership and solidly based as they were, it would be a long time before there would be any change in the situation in Japan in so far as the army was concerned.

The Diet was out of the picture; it represented nothing. And the only chance of difficulty in Japan, in my opinion, lay in a possible future conflict between the army, including the peasants, and the people of the cities or the so-called industrialists and proletariat; and when it came to the proletariat, fascism after all was the other side of the shield of Bolshevism. Shintoism and nationalism were strong bonds with which to hold the proletariat in line in any policy which the army or fascism might use in Japan to bind to them the workers of the cities.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8
1989

Conversation. Peiping, February 28, 1935.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.

Subject: Danger to foreigners in Peiping and Tientsin areas.

I told Sir Miles in the course of conversation today that I was convinced there was little for us to fear should military activities extend into this area; that the Chinese were not going to attack our citizens, and I did not feel there was any danger to them from the Japanese. The real danger would be from bombs, stray bullets and street fighting, and the best defense from such activities would be for our people to stay away from the streets when trouble came, and away from the actual scenes of conflict. I was not disposed to take alarm and put into effect any schemes for evacuation.

Sir Miles agreed with me and stated that this was also his attitude, but that the other day his Legation had communicated to the Chief of Police a list of British residents and the location of their properties, with the request that they be given protection, following a precedent established back in 1926 or 1927.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. --------

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 28, 1933.

SUBJECT: General Muto's Statement concerning the Jehol Campaign.

793.94

COPIES SENT TO O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 27 1933 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE APR 5 1933 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

PM REGD

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 727 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated February 27, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 727
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

F/HS 793.94/6098

FILED APR 6 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 727.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 27, 1933.

SUBJECT: General Muto's Statement Concerning the Jehol Campaign.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

With reference to my telegrams dated February 25, 5 p.m., and February 26, 11 a.m., I have the honor to enclose a copy of the translation of General Muto's statement concerning Jehol, which was issued by the Manchoukuo News Agency on February 25, 1933. 1/-

The Legation will observe that it is not clear from the statement exactly what actions the Chinese authorities must refrain from committing in order to avoid an attack on North China. The Spokesman of Kwantung Army Headquarters gave as his interpretation of this point in the statement that the Japanese troops would not go beyond the Great Wall unless the Chinese troops, after being driven south of the Wall, return to the attack and attempt to reenter Manchoukuo territory. Judging from the exceedingly elastic or far-fetched interpretation given to Japanese official statements in the past, this interpretation is of little value as an index

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

of future Japanese military action. It seems, therefore, that the main object of this part of the statement is to further Japanese designs for accomplishing the occupation of Jehol Province without encountering more than a show of resistance from the Chinese troops and at the same time of encompassing the elimination of Chang Hsueh-liang, which apparently is universally desired by Japanese officialdom.

In connection with the military operations in Jehol it may be noted that several Japanese officials stated before the drive began that it will be considered a failure if it is not completed within one month.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/- General Muto's Statement concerning Jehol.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:MH:mhp

A true copy of the signed original.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 727 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, at Mukden, Manchuria, dated February 27, 1933, to the Legation, Peiping, China, on the subject "General Muto's Statement Concerning the Jehol Campaign."

SOURCE: Manchoukuo News Agency
Hsinking, Manchuria

TRANSLATION

GENERAL MUTO ISSUES STATEMENT REGARDING JEHOL CAMPAIGN

Within one year after the establishment of Manchoukuo, the administrative organs have been reorganized, the various bandit groups have been suppressed, and the people of Manchuria are now beginning to enjoy the benefits of peace and order. Externally the friendship between Japan and Manchoukuo has been intensified, and although there is a tendency on the part of the League of Nations to avoid recognition of Manchoukuo politically, the situation in Manchoukuo is such that the Powers will find it inevitable to grant de facto recognition to the new state, in view of the reality of the independence of the new state and on account of economic factors. At the present time Jehol province remains the only district in Manchuria where military cliques remain dominant, and bandits continue rampant. In addition troops of North China are entering the province in great numbers, and are adding to the sufferings of the people of Jehol by their oppressive and extortionate measures. The disturbing conditions in Jehol, moreover, are impeding in no small way the restoration of public peace and tranquillity among the people of Manchuria. Under such circumstances the Manchoukuo Government has been compelled to use its army to get rid of the undesirable elements in Jehol province. There is no room for doubt that the province is an integral part of Manchoukuo, as shown by its geographic situation, its history during the past 4,000 years, and the declaration of independence issued by the Manchoukuo Government. In other words the present undertaking in Jehol is nothing more than an effort to solve a domestic affair. The Japanese troops have decided, in the spirit of Japanese-Manchoukuo friendship, to co-operate to the fullest measure with the noble and proper action of the Manchoukuo Government. The Japanese troops, however, are absolutely opposed to carrying their military operations outside Manchoukuo territory. However, every one must agree that should the authorities in North China undertake positive military action against our troops, hostilities may inevitably spread to North China. The responsibility for such an eventuality will naturally have to be borne by the Chinese authorities. In short what the

Japanese

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TRANSLATION

GENERAL MUTO ISSUES STATEMENT REGARDING JEHOL CAMPAIGN

Within one year after the establishment of Manchoukuo, the administrative organs have been reorganized, the various bandit groups have been suppressed, and the people of Manchuria are now beginning to enjoy the benefits of peace and order. Externally the friendship between Japan and Manchoukuo has been intensified, and although there is a tendency on the part of the League of Nations to avoid recognition of Manchoukuo politically, the situation in Manchoukuo is such that the Powers will find it inevitable to grant de facto recognition to the new state, in view of the reality of the independence of the new state and on account of economic factors. At the present time Jehol province remains the only district in Manchuria where military cliques remain dominant, and bandits continue rampant. In addition troops of North China are entering the province in great numbers, and are adding to the sufferings of the people of Jehol by their oppressive and extortionate measures. The disturbing conditions in Jehol, moreover, are impeding in no small way the restoration of public peace and tranquillity among the people of Manchuria. Under such circumstances the Manchoukuo Government has been compelled to use its army to get rid of the undesirable elements in Jehol province. There is no room for doubt that the province is an integral part of Manchoukuo, as shown by its geographic situation, its history during the past 4,000 years, and the declaration of independence issued by the Manchoukuo Government. In other words the present undertaking in Jehol is nothing more than an effort to solve a domestic affair. The Japanese troops have decided, in the spirit of Japanese-Manchoukuo friendship, to co-operate to the fullest measure with the noble and proper action of the Manchoukuo Government. The Japanese troops, however, are absolutely opposed to carrying their military operations outside Manchoukuo territory. However, every one must agree that should the authorities in North China undertake positive military action against our troops, hostilities may inevitably spread to North China. The responsibility for such an eventuality will naturally have to be borne by the Chinese authorities. In short what the

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japanese army hopes for is the healthy development of Manchoukuo, and consolidation of peace throughout the Orient.

I have hereby explained the just and fair attitude of the Japanese army in regard to the present outbreak in Jehol.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paraphrase sent to O.N.I. & M.I.D. in confidence

LJ
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM PEIPING

Dated March 27, 1933

Rcvd. 3.10 a.m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAR 27 1933 Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

278. March 27, 11 a.m.

Situation here and on all fronts remains unchanged. Chiang Kai Shek visited Peiping and had conferences with local military on the 24th and proceeded to Nanking arriving there Sunday where he had conferences, one of the results of which according to Reuters Agency has been the resumption of duties by Wang Ching Wei. It is reported that Wang Ching Wei will come north to inspect military positions shortly.

There is no evidence in any information which either I or the Military Attache have been able to obtain to confirm reports of disagreement among Chinese military. All evidence points to cooperation among Chinese leaders for the purpose of resisting with all the power they possess any effort by Japanese to drive them from positions which they now hold some of which are north of the Wall at Lowanyu which lies between Kupeikow and Hsifengkow, and at Longkow which lies between Hsifengkow and Chiumenkow. Chinese posts along Wall are being strengthened by troops which are arriving or have already arrived from the Yangtze Valley. There is no

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EJ No. 278 from Peiping

is no evidence to indicate that Chinese have or will negotiate directly or indirectly with the Japanese. Chinese appear to be convinced that Japanese will make efforts south of the Wall (see Tokyo's 6092, March 25, 2 p.m.) for they are busily engaged in transferring all objects of value from palaces and other places south by mail to Shanghai and Tientsin.

JOHNSON

HPD

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 28 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram dated March 27, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

At Peiping and on all fronts the situation remains unchanged. Chiang Kai-shek visited Peiping and on March 24 had conferences with local military before proceeding to Nanking where he arrived Sunday. He had conferences at Nanking, according to REUTER'S agency, one of the results of which has been that Wang Ching-wei has resumed his duties. According to reports, Wang Ching-wei will come north shortly, to inspect military positions.

Minister Johnson states that there is no evidence in any information which either he or the Military Attaché has been able to obtain, confirming reports of disagreement among the Chinese military. For the purpose of resisting with all the power they possess, any efforts by Japanese to drive them from positions which they now hold, some of which are north of the Wall at Lowenyu which is situated between Hsifengkow and Kupeikow, and at Longkow which is located between Chiumenkow and Hsifengkow, all evidence points to cooperation among Chinese military leaders. Troops which are arriving or which have already arrived from the Yangtze Valley are being used to strengthen Chinese posts along the Wall. Evidence that the Chinese have negotiated or will negotiate directly or indirectly with the Japanese is lacking.

As

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~indicates~~ As they are busily engaged in transferring all objects of value from palaces and other places south by mail to Tientsin and Shanghai, the Chinese appear to be convinced that Japanese will make efforts south of the Wall.

FE:LHE:KC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

PLAIN

FROM

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated March 27, 1933

Recd. 5.45 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAR 27 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Secretary of State

Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1933
Department of State

793.94
note
500 A 4d

280. March 27, 1 p.m.

Reuter from Shanghai [illegible]:

"In advancing Chinese thesis that vital interests of United States demand active and positive intervention of America in conflict created by Japan's military action against China, Eugene Chen, former Foreign Minister, has issued lengthy statement on American right and obligation in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Chen urges that America demand in return for cancellation of war debts that Britain and France cooperate with United States in assisting China to secure Japanese observance of Nine Power Treaty and carry out general disarmament which would insure international security and peace in Far East. Examining situation from many aspects and considerati[illegible] Chen believes that, willing or unwilling, America is bound to take leading part in task of preventing Japan breaking up the international system in Far East which rests on doctrine of open door Nine Power Treaty and Kellogg Pact. He rejects thesis that Manchuria is a matter of life and death for Japan as a source of raw materials,

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MAR 28 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mitton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

materials, a barrier against Soviets and a home for Japan's surplus population."

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

23

END

