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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 24

1930-39

793.94/6101-6350
Mar.-May 1933



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 27, 1933.

~~SKP:~~

The "Kautto" referred to in the attached telegram is, according to the list of American citizens in the Tientsin consular district under date January 10, 1933, Mr. Charles Oscar Kautto, who, with his wife Mrs. Florence K. Kautto, maintains a mission at Taitowying, Hopei Province, on behalf of the "Assembly of the Brethren". According to this same list Mr. Kautto's reference in the United States is Mr. J. W. Kramer, his father-in-law, of 24 Beacon Street, Redlands, California.

Taitowying is situated just south of the Great Wall about twenty-five miles northwest of Chinwangtao.

I suggest sending the attached telegram.

I also feel that it might be advisable to bring this matter to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. With this in mind, I have prepared a brief statement of the facts on unheaded paper as contained in the telegram of March 27, noon, from Tientsin, in order that, when the matter is taken up with the Japanese Ambassador, this statement of facts might be handed to him informally.

WKE 8.27

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

FROM

Dated March 27, 1933

Recd. 6.55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

March 27, noon. 793.94/6079

By March 21, 1 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 27 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6101

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APR 11 1933

Further letter from Kautto dated March 24 states Japanese airplane visited Taotoying at 9 o'clock that morning and dropped a bomb within 20 feet of the north-east corner of Kautto's residence, a foreign style house, landing just outside the compound wall, making two large holes in the wall and shaking brick from the chimney on Kautto's house. Plane circled over the place for about 30 minutes before dropping the bomb. Soon afterwards another bomb was dropped striking about 200 feet from the southeast corner of the compound and breaking some window panes in mission building. An hour later another plane visited the city dropping two bombs. Kautto reports that altogether there were nine civilians killed including men, women and children. Presumably all were Chinese. Only Americans there are Kautto and wife who were uninjured. Commenting Kautto states "To have the American flag flying from our flag pole, yet those two bombs were scarcely out of reach of the compound,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From Tientsin March 27, noon.

compound, and while there are native holdings adjoining there was no particular provocative reason for their dropping bombs at either place, in fact no military advantage to be gained so far as we know."

In lieu of representations to Japanese Consul General at Tientsin it would seem advisable that the Legation and/or Department might wish to make representations in appropriate quarters.

LOCKHART

KLP

WSE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 30, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
MAH:

Despatch No. 169 of March 3, 1933, from Kaunas, Lithuania, encloses a translation of a speech by the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he hopes the League of Nations will adopt a more decisive course of action in the Manchurian question than it previously did in the case of Vilna.

BB

CC:CLS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quastler NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Kaunas, Lithuania

March 3, 1933.



No. 169

SUBJECT: Lithuania at the League of Nations.

PM RECD



(mure)



F/H/S

793.94/6102

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APR 8 1933

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

LMH.

APR 5-1933

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of the speech delivered by the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Dovas Zaunius, on February 24, 1933, at the meeting of the League of Nations. Difficulty is experienced in transmitting into idiomatic English some of his shades of meaning set forth in the Lithuanian language. A closer

translation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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translation will be possible when the original text of his address is obtained.

Dr. Zaunius' remarks are of interest chiefly by reason of their reference to the Vilna dispute with Poland. Lithuania, a victor before the Hague Court in the case arising out of traffic on the Lithuanian-Polish railway and in the Memel affair, continues to resent what it considers the League's ineffective action on the Vilna seizure. No opportunity is missed to refer to that disappointment although Lithuania's representatives support the League's efforts in defending the rights of small nations.

The semi-official "Lietuvos Aidas" (Nationalist), on March 1, likened the Manchurian and the Vilna cases and blamed both on imperialistic aims of the aggressor nations. This newspaper supports Dr. Zaunius' speech and states that the League's action in the Sino-Japanese case will permit Lithuania to bring up the Vilna matter before the League. There is no indication now that this will be done, although it is not improbable at a future date.

Respectfully yours,

M. L. Stafford

M. L. Stafford
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure

800
MLS/hw

Original and 4 copies to the Department of State
1 copy for American Legation, Riga
2 copies to E.I.C., Paris.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 169 of March 3, 1933, from the
Legation at Kaunas, Lithuania.

SOURCE: LIETUVOS AIDAS (Lithuanian
semi-official daily)
Kaunas, February 28, 1933.

FULL TRANSLATION

SPEECH MADE BY LITHUANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Dr. Dovas Zaunius, made the following speech before
the plenary session of the League of Nations on
February 24 when the Far East Conflict was being con-
sidered:

For many long months Lithuania followed with the
greatest attention the developments of the conflict
which kindled a blaze in the Far East and which threatens
to undermine the basis of the Pact of the League of
Nations, i.e. cooperation of the nations for the pur-
pose of maintaining peace and security.

The reasons that I shall mention here to the
important meeting is based on our sincere desire to
cooperate in the union of nations. It was only for
this purpose that I decided to appeal to the plenary
session not to spare its efforts in reaching for the
high ideal of peace.

First of all, I am interested in the question as
to how this matter shall now be pressed forward. The
draft report prepared by the Committee of 19, now sub-
mitted to the members of the League, has been prepared
according to Article 15, Section 4, of the Pact. The
Committee mentions this in its report, claiming to have
exhausted all its efforts of conciliation and is there-
fore compelled, with the greatest regret, to propose
such decisions which it recommends as the most just and
fitting in this case.

As it is difficult to foresee at the present time
the results of such recommendation and as the results
may be very important to the peace of the Far East, I
consider it my duty to utter a warning against certain
possible results.

By no means and in no case should this recommenda-
tion, once adopted, become the protocol of defeat of the
League of Nations. The organization founded for the
purpose of maintaining the peace among its members and
the settlement of conflicts arising between its members
can never and under no circumstances refuse to meet its
obligations or refuse to consider the questions submitted
to it. This would not conform either with the purpose
of our efforts or the true purpose of the League of
Nations.

If

- 2 -

If we formally agree with Article 15 of the Pact of the League of Nations and the procedure foreseen it shall nevertheless be permitted to inquire what does it really mean and what is our purpose in respect to another pact, the Pact of Paris, which we have all equally signed.

It must be regretted that the initiative of the Lithuanian Delegation, prior to the appearance of this painful conflict before the League of Nations, to harmonize these two pacts, the initiative that was later repeated and supported by Great Britain, could not bring about a common procedure of these two fundamental acts of peace.

Section 4 of Article 15 and Article 12 were drafted at a time when nations did not feel sufficiently strong to close the door on war entirely, and, when this door was left ajar, to a legal war of three months duration since the report of the plenary session. Do not these circumstances justify the opinion that Section 4 of Article 15 was only a ransom tribute, scarcely daring to create a community of nations on a legal basis? We must be afraid that the system of so-called final recommendations, having described the circumstances and imposing no sanctions, shall be understood as a veiled vindication of such methods that do not entirely conform with peaceable methods, while war under all circumstances is condemned by the Pact of Paris. (Translator's note: This paragraph not clear in the Lithuanian text).

The concern of the Lithuanian delegation arises from its experience of ten years.

The members of the plenary session perhaps recall how the Polish Army occupied the Vilna Territory and how that occupation was at first condemned by the League of Nations; that condemnation did honor to the Geneva Institution. That act of force was described by the President of the Council as a flagrant violation of the obligations assumed by Poland. The members of the League of Nations equally well remember the course of that case here and the heavy blow that the League sustained then to its prestige. The procedure of conciliation, injured at the very beginning by the toleration of the events, could give no results. Then resource was sought in the system of final recommendations, as provided by Section 4 of Article 15. The League of Nations shook itself free of this case as though it had reached a final settlement. The invader was left to reap the results of his acts against law and justice. An impossible situation arose after the application of Section 4 of Article 15, and which left an open wound hindering the peace and harmony of nations.

This experience is too painful to Lithuania to be passed unmentioned on this occasion to the members of the League of Nations.

In

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In preparing to approve the recommendation submitted to us by the commission, let us not confuse future decisions while impatient to complete an act the importance of which I do not deny.

The remarks that I have made here have only one purpose: I desire to urge the members of the League of Nations who are also signatories of the Paris Pact that they give their attention to this important matter, for the peace of the Far East and the West, that the League of Nations in adopting this recommendation do not renounce future intervention in this conflict as it did in the Vilna Case.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 31, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

Ward

Peiping's despatch No. 1988, of
March 3, 1933.

This despatch transmits a copy of an editorial from the PEIPING CHRONICLE of March 3, discussing the significance of an allegedly new international doctrine reported to have been invoked at Geneva by the Peruvian delegate; namely, that treaties should be revised and should not be allowed to stand if not entered into freely by both parties. The editor believes that if such an interpretation is permitted, the 1905 and 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties will be wiped out. The editor expresses the hope that this new doctrine will eventually "assure that right will be done with respect both to Manchuria and Jehol".

WKC
LHE:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 30, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~REY~~

~~LES~~

~~RCM~~

~~MMH~~

Nanking's letter of February 24, 1933
to Minister Johnson.

Transmits copy of Chinese Foreign Office
translation of Japanese Memorandum
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Feb 25, 1933 re Jehol.

Transmits Chinese text and Foreign Office
translation of the Chinese reply to the
above mentioned Japanese Memorandum.

Mc
LHE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 31, 1933.

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W. W. Wood
Peiping's despatch No. 1988, of
March 3, 1933.

This despatch transmits a copy of an editorial from the PEIPING CHRONICLE of March 3, discussing the significance of an allegedly new international doctrine reported to have been invoked at Geneva by the Peruvian delegate; namely, that treaties should be revised and should not be allowed to stand if not entered into freely by both parties. The editor believes that if such an interpretation is permitted, the 1905 and 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties will be wiped out. The editor expresses the hope that this new doctrine will eventually "assure that right will be done with respect both to Manchuria and Jehol".

W. W. Wood
LHE:KC




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, March 3, 1933.

No. 1988


Subject: Validity of Provisions of Treaties Signed
Under Duress.



F/HS

793.94/6103

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington D.C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith an editorial from the PEIPING CHRONICLE (Government controlled and British edited) of March 3, 1933, discussing the significance of an allegedly new international doctrine that is reported to have been invoked at Geneva by Senor Calderon of Peru in connection with the Peruvian-Colombian controversy; namely, that treaties should be revised, and should not be allowed to stand if not entered into freely by both parties.

The editor intimates that such treaties are akin to a contract entered into under duress, and, as one speaking for

APR 13 1933

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for China, holds out hope for China if such an interpretation becomes generally accepted. The editor claims that the revision of the Boxer Indemnity by most nations is a tacit admission of "the impropriety of exacting to the full the stipulations of a treaty to which one side is not a 'freely consenting party'", and further alleges that the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915, upon which many Japanese claims in Manchuria are based, were likewise forced upon China by the ultimatum accompanying the Twenty-one Demands. The editor concludes with an expression of hope that the acceptance of the "Calderon doctrine" will eventually "assure that right will be done with respect both to Manchuria and Jehol".

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

✓
Enclosure:

1. Editorial from the PEIPING CHRONICLE of March 3, 1933.

RLB/k

1975

HF PEI FING CHRONICLE Friday, March 3, 1934

A SIGNIFICANT POINT.

A Havas message, reporting the suggested terms for the temporary settlement of the Peruvo-Colombian dispute, quotes Senor CALDERON as repeating a doctrine originally enunciated by a German delegate, that no state should be bound by the terms of treaties to which it has not been a free consenting party. This doctrine is not yet accepted international law. It seems to strike deep at the root principle of the sanctity of treaties. It is the doctrine that underlay German insistence on the modification of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, though it was never openly invoked in this form. It is the sort of doctrine that only secures slow recognition, but once recognized everybody wonders why it was not recognized long ago. The DRAGO doctrine was of the same kind. DRAGO enunciated the view that it was contrary to international interest for states to resort to war to recover debts. This was a new doctrine when he first stated it thus baldly, and it did not receive any enthusiastic welcome except amongst the small states of South America, where debts and threats of recovery by force were not unusual. Nevertheless, DRAGO's essential principle not merely became recognized, but it was eventually absorbed in a much wider principle, that war was not a fit means of pursuing any national policy, and the nations of the world, or most of them, have renounced war as an instrument of policy.

The doctrine now re-stated by Senor CALDERON lies at the root of the modifications of the Treaty of Versailles that have already been made, and at the root of other modifications that are bound, in time, to come. It is a doctrine that finds increasing recognition in practice if not in theory amongst enlightened nations. What are the numerous remissions of various national claims on the Boxer indemnity but tacit admissions of the impropriety of exacting to the full the stipulations of a treaty to which one side was not a "freely consenting party?" Other stipulations of the Boxer Protocol have also gone by the board, for, virtually, the same reason. The doctrine has not been explicitly invoked, but the immorality of the transaction, as Senor CALDERON hints, is sufficient in itself to invalidate the treaty.

The foregoing applications are made to cases in which the treaty, signed without full and free consent of the two parties, was signed at the close of a war. The case where such treaties have been signed not at the close of a war but under threat of one is precisely similar. Such a case, of course, is the case of the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915, signed as the result of the presentation of the Twenty-one Demands and of the ultimatum that was delivered to enforce their

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

acceptance. If Senor CALDERON's doctrine, of German derivation, applies anywhere it applies in this case; and if it applies in this case it cuts the ground from 99 per cent. of Japan's claims in Manchuria. The League has recognized that Japan has pressed and indeed compelled, the admission of doubtful claims in Manchuria, even without invoking this doctrine. If the CALDERON doctrine be invoked, Japan has practically no claims at all left in Manchuria, for not merely the 1915 treaties, but the 1905 understandings, so far as they go, are similarly invalidated. Germany has succeeded, twelve years after the treaty of Versailles, in securing a modification of important points, fundamentally because of the recognition of the immorality of a bond not freely assumed. If Germany has done this, and Senor CALDERON can invoke the same principle, there is still ground for hope that eventually right will be done with respect both to Manchuria and to Jehol.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quateff NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 272


COPIES SENT TO
G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, February 16, 1933.

Subject: Alleged Military Preparations
at Hankow.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for
the information of the Department, a copy, in
quintuplicate, of my despatch L. No. 245 of
February 15, 1933, addressed to the Legation at
Peiping, concerning the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

American Consul General, Hankow, China, to
American Legation, Peiping, L. No. 245,
dated February 15, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

800

WAA:EB

F/HS
793.94/6104

MAR 8 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L. No. 245

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, February 15, 1933.

Subject: Alleged Military Preparations
at Hankow.

Confidential:

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent newspaper reports published throughout China to the effect that the Japanese are actively engaged in military preparations at Hankow. Attention is particularly invited to a news item published in the CHINA PRESS, Shanghai, issue of February 7, 1933, entitled, "Hankow Stirred by Warlike Demonstrations of Japanese." This item states that the five Japanese warships at Hankow impose a warlike atmosphere upon the whole city; that the Japanese have set up anti-air craft guns and machine guns; that they have erected sandbag and barbed wire entanglements between the Japanese settlement and Chinese territory; and that sham battles in the Japanese concession are the order of the day.

So that the Legation may be accurately informed with respect to the above reports, I beg to state that there is no outward sign of any unusual activity in the Japanese concession. The Japanese concession is, to all appearances, perfectly quiet and normal.

The

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese have not erected any sandbag and barbed wire barricades in their concession, nor have they engaged in any sham battle practices. I may add that the Japanese naval contingent here is no larger than it has been for the past year.

It is true that for some weeks Chinese officials at Hankow have been uneasy because of their fear that the Japanese might initiate disturbances here. A few days ago Dr. K. C. Wu, the Mayor of Hankow, informed me that the Chinese Government believed that the Japanese intended to cause disturbances at Tientsin, Tsingtao, Haichow, Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow. I asked him whether he thought that, leaving all other considerations aside, the Japanese would welcome a disturbance at Hankow during the present low water period. He replied that this would not seem to be probable and that perhaps the Japanese had for the present given up their plan of causing disturbances in the Yangtze valley.

On February 7 I sent Vice Consul R. P. Mitchell across the Yangtze to verify the accuracy of information which he had received to the effect that the Chinese military were constructing fortifications behind the bank directly across the river from the Japanese concession at Hankow. Mr. Mitchell made the trip in the company of Lieutenant Commander B. W. Cloud of the U.S.S. LUZON. A copy of Mr. Mitchell's memorandum covering his inquiry is attached hereto.

It seems probable that the cross-ties used in the fortifications mentioned by Mr. Mitchell were purchased with British Boxer Indemnity money for use upon

the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Canton-Hankow railway roadbed. The Legation will note that Mr. Mitchell saw no field pieces and that work on the fortifications was not in progress during his visit.

The Chinese military authorities have not recently attempted to repair or develop the trench system which was constructed about a year ago on the Hankow side of the Yangtze, facing the Japanese concession, and apparently designed for defense against an attack from that concession. On this phase of the matter I enclose a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul E. O. Clubb covering enquiries made by him under my direction.

In conclusion I may state that so far as the general populace of Hankow is concerned, there is no outward evidence of any tension between the Chinese and Japanese.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.


Enclosures:

1. Copy of a Memorandum by Mr. Mitchell.
2. Copy of a Memorandum by Mr. Clubb.

Iniduplicate to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.
Copy of the American Consulate General, Nanking.
Copy to the American Consulate General, Shanghai.

800

WAA:BG



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to Despatch L. No. 245, dated February 15, 1933, from the American Consul General, Hankow, to the American Legation, Peiping, on the subject of Military Preparations at Hankow.

MEMORANDUM

On February 7, 1933, in accordance with the instructions of the Consul General, I visited the Canton-Hankow Railway station area of Wuchang to check reports given me by Texas Oil Company representatives to the effect that the Chinese were establishing fortifications in that area directly across the Yangtze River opposite the Japanese Concession in Hankow. I visited that section of Wuchang with Lieut. Cmdr. B. W. Cloud, Aide to Rear Admiral Y. S. Williams and Flag Secretary of the U. S. Yangtze Patrol.

We discovered that fortifications had been constructed in this area of Wuchang directly opposite the Japanese Concession in Hankow. We observed 26 gun emplacements, with a long line of connecting trenches behind 12 of these gun emplacements. The fortifications which we were able to see stretched from three-fourths to one mile in distance. We cannot be positive when work commenced on these fortifications, but we are of the opinion that it was very recently. Lieut. Cmdr. Cloud stated that no fortifications existed in this area of Wuchang when he visited there slightly less than a year ago on an informal tour for intelligence purposes. Foreign representatives of the Texas Oil Company informed me that several of their Chinese employees had seen men at work on the fortifications within the last week to 10 days. We observed that some of the emplacements apparently had been completed, while others were still under construction, these latter showing construction material strewn about on the ground and earth lying in heaps where it apparently had been freshly dug from the trenches and the emplacements. We reasoned that if the fortifications had not been constructed lately, the scraps of building wood would have been taken away to be used as firewood, and the sand would have been washed away by rains.

Guards were on duty and uniformed soldiers were seen entering and departing from the gun emplacements. We were able to view the fortifications in the immediate vicinity of the railway station, but when we started to walk into another section we were halted by military authorities and officers of the Wuchang Public Safety Bureau, who made us identify ourselves and then ordered us to return to the ferry landing to return to Hankow.

The fortifications have been built behind the second dyke on the Wuchang side, approximately 100-150 yards inland from the first or main dyke bordering the river. Unlike the main dyke, this second dyke is not visible from the Hankow side of the river. The fortifications are further screened by a cement wall which lines the second dyke for a considerable distance.

The

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The station of the Canton-Hankow Railway is situated some 25-30 yards in the rear of this second dyke. Taking the station as a convenient point of location, we observed 12 gun emplacements with parallel trenches stretching northward (or downriver); there are 4 gun emplacements immediately south of the station along the dyke wall; and there are approximately 10 gun emplacements built along the dyke wall farther southward in the vicinity of the city of Wuchang. There is a network of railroad tracks throughout the station area, affording ideal facilities of transportation in an emergency. Several lines of track in the station yards lie only a few feet back of the group of 12 emplacements and trenches.


The emplacements are constructed mainly of crossties, covered by brush wood and mud. In this connection it may be noted that persons entering or departing from the railway station there are able to see only the group of 4 gun emplacements immediately south of the station, and these are built in a manner which do not attract any attention. They present the appearance of little mud huts built against the dyke wall.

We were able to approach very close to several emplacements in the group of 12, and observed that sheet iron had been laid on the ground inside and outside the emplacements. We also noted that holes had been cut through the wall, presumably to admit the end of a gun.

Lieut. Cmdr. Cloud said that the emplacements unquestionably were sufficiently strong to provide for 3-inch, 4-inch, or possibly 5-inch guns, any of which would be easily capable of commanding the Hankow side of the river to include the Japanese Concession as well as the foreign settlement as a whole. While we did not observe any guns in the several emplacements that we were able to approach, Lieut. Cmdr. Cloud pointed out that guns of this size could be transported to the emplacements by rail from nearby buildings in the yards within a comparatively few minutes, if necessary. We noted that military billets were located throughout the yards and that a long armored train lay on a siding.

Reginald P. Mitchell,
 American Vice Consul.

American Consulate General,
 Hankow, China, February 7, 1933.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2, to Despatch L. No. 245, dated February 15, 1933,
from the American Consul General, Hankow, to the American Legation,
Peiping, on the subject of Military Preparations at Hankow.

MEMORANDUM

February 8, 1933.

In running down the rumor that the Chinese were constructing a trench system at or near Liuchiamiao, where some trenches had been constructed once before at the time of greatest local strain between the Chinese and Japanese during the time of the Shanghai trouble, I went along the bund to a point about a mile past the village, then walked over to the railway track and surveyed the surrounding country. On the whole trip I saw nothing or no activity that could not properly be attributed to the usual pursuits of trade and agriculture. But it is of course entirely possible that a detailed investigation of the area north and west of the Japanese Concession would bring to light something. The local troops, besides drilling, are often given the task of digging trenches and filling them up again for practice, and General Yeh P'eng says that there has been some such activity recently. I did not, however, have time to go over the whole area mentioned above, and I doubt that it would be worth doing - there is, by observation and by General Yeh's statement, no military preparation, on the part of the Chinese troops, being carried on in Wuhan.

General Yeh added that, in his opinion, the local Japanese authorities and people were very friendly and decidedly were not making any such preparations that local rumor has been attributing to them. That particular rumor - that the Japanese were laying in stocks of munitions and supplies for defense - General Yeh said
originated

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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originated with a local Chinese news agency and was printed in several local papers, later being telegraphed to Shanghai. This story fits in very well with statements made by Consul-General Shimizu and Vice-Consul Takai of the Japanese Consulate-General. The Consul-General stated that the offending news-agency, and the papers printing the news, were closed down for a specific period (15 days?) on February 2nd, by order of General Yeh. Shimizu called on Yeh P'eng on February 4th, protesting against the rumors that were going the rounds, and was informed by General Yeh that efforts were already being made to stop such activities. At the same time, the Consul-General informed me, he brot to the attention of General Yeh the fact that some gun-emplacements (eight in number) had been prepared near the Wuchang railway station, opposite from the German ex-Concession, hoping that such activities would be stopped "so that the Japanese people would not become apprehensive".

Consul-General Shimizu expressed himself as not at all apprehensive, and it must be recognized that gun-emplacements without guns are not very fearsome. There are in the Wuhan area two 5.1 mortars that were used in the siege of Hsinchow (1926?), the opinion being expressed that they would explode if fired. Three brigades of troops are due to arrive from Nanking to replace the 83rd (bound for Nanchang), and it is possible that these troops would have a few 3-inch guns. Shimizu says two of these brigades have already arrived; Yeh P'eng and Vice-Consul Sakowsky of the German Consulate-General profess to have heard of no arrival. Vice-Consul Takai

remarked

-3-

remarked that some Peiping students had arrived in this area last week for the pushing of the anti-Japanese boycott, and suggests that they may be doing a bit of agitating.

Sakowsky says that he is definitely certain that the authorities themselves are not moving toward any action against the local Japanese along any new lines. He attributes the rumors to some of the 'Bloody Groups', possibly; the anti-Japanese boycott is dying down locally, and such-re-newed vigor on the parts of the anti-Japanese societies might be motivated either by a patriotic desire to awaken the people, or by a Machiavellian plan to create a disturbance from which those societies might expect to receive some political or pecuniary benefit. Grant (CENTRAL CHINA POST) thinks that the Tangpu are behind the agitation. It is to be remembered that the Tangpu have recently had their gullets cut by the General Headquarters regulations providing that they are, with the exception of the Provincial Tangpu, to receive no longer any financial support from the Provincial or National Treasuries; but, if they could stir the radical elements of the local rabble into some embroilment with either the Japanese, or the local authorities, or the foreign colony, for instance, perhaps they could gain back some of the lost ground by being called in to "control the people"? Sakowsky rightly points out, however, that the local Tangpu are at the moment badly split up into warring groups as the result of their present predicament. Y. C. Jao of the HANKOW HERALD attributes the rumors to the press itself.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The rumors exist, but there is no unusual activity on the part of either Japanese or Chinese military or civil authorities. There are lots of old trenches around that would prove suitable places to build mares' nests, and there may even be some new ones. There may even be some new gun-emplacements, minus guns thus far, built near the Wuchang railway station - but there was much more feverish activity in that spot once before without anything untoward happening or, apparently, having been planned. Some group is evidently engaged in planting rumors hoping to grow some benefit, but no one in authority seems alarmed. There is the somewhat remote possibility that the Japanese themselves started the rumors in furtherance of the alleged plan to create incidents in certain important ports of China, but they have thus far entirely maintained all outward appearances of complete innocence. The Concession and their military and their authorities are as quiet and peaceful as one could wish.

CLUBB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND A.L.D.

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated March 28, 1933

Rec'd 5 a.m.

F/HS

793.94/6105

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 28 1933
Department of State

March 28, noon

Japanese commanding officer at Chinwangtao has informed American army officer in charge of the small Fifteenth Infantry detachment stationed there that from two to four airplanes will fly over Chinwangtao next four or five days. No explanation given for these flights. One red plane flying over Fifteenth Infantry camp at three p. m. yesterday.

My March 24, 1 p. m. At Shihho there is a Japanese bridge guard of ten men and two machine guns.

Rengo telegram from Shanhaikwan dated March 24 states Shihmenchai (northwest of Shanhaikwan and inside the Wall) was occupied by Manchukuo troops at two p. m. March 24 and Manchukuo flag hoisted. Not confirmed.

LOCKHART

JS

793.94

MAR 29 1933
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated March 28, 1933

Rec'd 5 a. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington,


284, March 23, 2 p. m.

Department's 92, March 22, 7 p. m.; and Tientsin's
March 27, noon, to the Department and the Legation.

I have summarized those telegrams and Tientsin's
March 21, 1 p. m., to Tokyo adding the following:

"In view of care taken by Japanese to drop leaflets
in English warning foreigners at Lingyuan, Jehol, of
coming air raids with request that national flags be
displayed on foreign property and the foreigners take
cover when planes appear over city, I in urgent letter
to the Japanese Legation have assumed that Japanese
aviators failed to see American flag displayed from
flag pole on Kautto's property. I have requested that
Japanese military authorities be immediately notified
of the above facts and that steps be taken to safeguard
American lives and property from further danger.

Department in its 92, March 22, 7 p. m., suggested
that if deemed advisable I refer matter reported in para-
graph one above to you for presentation at your discretion
to



F/HS

793.94/6106

APR 11 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#284 from Peiping via N.R.,
March 28, 2 p. m.

to appropriate Japanese authorities. In hope of local settlement I refrained from referring matter to you but in view of subsequent developments both matters are referred to you for such action as you deem appropriate".

Have also informed Lockhart of action taken and, with view to expediting action by military authorities, have suggested that Japanese Consul General at Tientsin be informally notified of this Legation's action.

WSB-HPD

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

1933 MAR -28- PM 7:12:22

March 28, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

100 Tientsin's March 27, noon, and your 284, March 28,
 2 p.m.

Department approves and has given Japanese Ambassador here informally an account of the apparent facts, together with statement that you have communicated with Japanese Legation and have informed our Embassy in Tokyo, and comment that incidents of this sort make ~~a very~~ ^{a very} ~~an exceedingly~~ bad impression. Japanese Ambassador concurred in the comment and expressed regret and solicitude, saying he had no doubt but that his Government would take appropriate action and do its utmost to prevent such incidents.

793.94/6106

793.94/6106

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F/HG
Banking Office.
February 24, 1933

793.94/61C7

MAR 27 1933

793.94
Dear Mr. Minister:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAR 23 1933

Department of State

Referring to my radio message of February 24, 9 a.m. transmitting a translation of the Japanese communication to the Chinese Government delivered on February 23, 5 p.m. I beg to state that I have now received from the Intelligence and Publicity Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs its translations of the Japanese communication and of the Chinese reply, which was sent to the Japanese Legation almost immediately. I note that the Chinese

reply

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reply refers to the Japanese communication as a "Memorandum", instead of as an "Aide Memoire", which is the term used in my radio message.

The Legation has presumably already received, or will shortly receive, the text of these translations through the medium of the press. Consequently, I am attaching hereto copies of the Chinese text together with translations, as obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more for purpose of record than of information.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

enclosures
 In quintuplicate to the Legation.
 No copy to the Department.



With the compliments of the Intelligence and Publicity Department.

The following Memorandum was handed to Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, by Mr. Y. Uyamara, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, who called on the Foreign Minister personally at 5 p.m. today (February 23):-

"1. The presence of the troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and other anti-Manchukuo forces is incompatible not only with the sovereignty of Manchukuo but also with the restoration of peace and order in Jehol. The Manchukuo army is now putting into execution its plan to exterminate bandits and the remnants of soldier-bandits in the province of Jehol and the Japanese army is obligated to give assistance to it under the terms of the Protocol concluded between Japan and Manchukuo. The Manchukuo Government repeatedly demanded Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw his troops to regions inside the Great Wall, but these demands were unheeded. Should this campaign in Jehol lead to armed conflict between the Japanese army in cooperation with the Manchukuo army and Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces it will be entirely due to the presence of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops in Jehol and the responsibility shall therefore rest with China who has rejected the demands of Manchukuo.

"2. The activities of Japanese troops in Jehol whose aim is the purification of Jehol province as stated above and who are cooperating with the Manchukuo force have no

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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no other objective than to insure order and tranquility in that province. In principle they will remain within the territory of Manchukuo. But if Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces persist in taking positive action it will be difficult to guarantee that fighting will not spread to North China. If any situation should arise as a result thereof the responsibility shall rest entirely with China.

"3. Manchukuo has always accorded generous treatment to anti-Manchukuo forces who surrender themselves. Should Tang Yu-lin and his troops as well as other anti-Manchukuo forces surrender to Manchukuo they will be dealt with leniently in accordance with the policy hitherto followed.

Nanking, February 23, 1933.

A true copy
 of the signed copy
 is
 ECH

1034

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

Following reply to Japanese memorandum already
despatched to Japanese Legation:

"1. Since September 18th of 1931 Japan effected
military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces and
established therein a puppet regime. Japan is now again
concentrating large forces and attacking Jehol which like
Three Eastern Provinces is an integral part of China's
territory. The Chinese Government in despatching troops
to Jehol for defense against external military aggression
is exercising its inherent sovereign right. That the
Japanese Government should demand the withdrawal of Chinese
forces from Jehol is manifestly to extend the sphere of
such aggression and to further violate the territorial
sovereignty of China. The Japanese Government should
therefore be absolutely responsible for the invasion of
Jehol. As for the puppet regime in the Three Eastern
Provinces it is a Japanese creation pure and simple a fact
which is known to the whole world. For all its illegal
activities Japan should all the more bear the entire
responsibility. Against the puppet regime in the Three
Eastern Provinces and so-called Japan-Manchukuo protocol
the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged strong
protests with the Japanese Government declaring that the
Chinese Government could never give them recognition. It
is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on this subject.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. That Japan should bear full responsibility for the attack on Jehol has already been stated. The fact that Japan is not only bent upon attacking and seizing Jehol but also declares that her military operations may be extended to North China is sufficient to prove that her long cherished policy of aggression remains unchanged. Chinese troops in resisting Japanese troops and other forces under Japanese direction or command in Jehol or in taking necessary defensive measures in any other part of Chinese territory will be acting within their rights. If Japanese military operations should spread to North China Chinese troops will naturally exercise their right of self-defence in protection of Chinese territory. Full responsibility for any situation which may be thus brought about should be borne by Japan.

3. General Tang Yu-lin Chairman of Jehol province is a high provincial military authority of the Chinese Government. Being in command of Chinese forces in Jehol he has the duty to defend that province. The allegations made by the Japanese Government concerning the Chairman of Jehol province must be regarded as a deliberate affront. The Chinese Government hereby lodges its protest.

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal

中國致日本之復文如下

二十三日

(一)自民國二十年九月十八日以來，日本以其武力侵略東三省，設立偽組織，茲又不顧一切，調集大批軍隊，進攻熱河。熱河為中國之領土，與東三省之為中國領土相同，中國政府派兵往熱，防禦外國之武力侵略，乃係行使其固有之主權。日本政府竟要求中國軍隊退出熱河，顯係擴大侵略範圍，破壞中國領土主權，日本政府自應絕對負攻熱之全責。至東三省偽組織為日本一手造成之傀儡，為舉世皆知之事實，其所為之一切非法行為，日本政府尤應負其全責，中國政府因東省偽組織及所謂日滿議定書，業經迭向日本方面嚴提抗議，概不承認，茲不復贅。

(二)日本應負攻熱全責，已如上述。乃日本不惟欲攻奪熱河并稱日本軍隊之行動或將及於華北。足証日本方面蓄意侵略，毫無覺悟。中國軍隊在熱河抗禦日本及受日本指揮之軍隊或在中國領土其他部分內，為必要之防禦，均屬正當。如果日本軍事行動，侵及華北，中國軍隊自必行其自衛。

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

守土之權。其因此發生之事態，應由日本政府負其全責。
三、熱河省政府主席湯玉麟為中國地方軍事長官，在熱河指揮軍隊，自有守土之責。日本政府對湯主席所稱各節，殊屬有意侮辱，中國政府特予抗議。

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Peking, P. R. C.

February 24, 1933

Dear Mr. Minister:

Referring to my radio message of February 24, 9 a.m. transmitting a translation of the Japanese communication to the Chinese Government delivered on February 23, 5 p.m. I beg to state that I have now received from the Intelligence and Publicity Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs its translations of the Japanese communication and of the Chinese reply, which was sent to the Japanese Legation almost immediately. I note that the Chinese

reply

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


reply refers to the Japanese communication as a "Memorandum", instead of as an "Aide Memoire", which is the term used in my radio message.

The Legation has presumably already received, or will shortly receive, the text of these translations through the medium of the press. Consequently, I am attaching hereto copies of the Chinese text together with translations, as obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more for purpose of record than of information.

Respectfully yours,

Willis R. Leek,
Counselor of Legation.

In quintuplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.



With the compliments of the Intelligence and Publicity
Department.

The following Memorandum was handed to Dr. Lo Jen-kan,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, by Mr. Y. Uemura, Secretary
of the Japanese Legation, who called on the Foreign Minister
personally at 5 p.m. today (February 23):-

1. The presence of the troops under Chang Hsueh-liang
and other anti-Manchukuo forces is incompatible not only with
the sovereignty of Manchukuo but also with the restoration of
peace and order in Jehol. The Manchukuo army is now putting
into execution its plan to exterminate bandits and the
remnants of soldier-bandits in the province of Jehol and
the Japanese army is obligated to give assistance to it under
the terms of the protocol concluded between Japan and
Manchukuo. The Manchukuo Government repeatedly demanded
Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw his troops to regions inside
the Great Wall, but these demands were unheeded. Should
this campaign in Jehol lead to armed conflict between the
Japanese army in cooperation with the Manchukuo army and
Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces
it will be entirely due to the presence of Chang Hsueh-liang's
troops in Jehol and the responsibility shall therefore rest
with China who has rejected the demands of Manchukuo.

2. The activities of Japanese troops in Jehol whose
aim is the purification of Jehol province as stated above
and who are cooperating with the Manchukuo force have no

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

no other objective than to insure order and tranquility in that province. In principle they will remain within the territory of Manchukuo. But if Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces persist in taking positive action it will be difficult to guarantee that fighting will not spread to North China. If any situation should arise as a result thereof the responsibility shall rest entirely with China.

1. Manchukuo has always accorded generous treatment to anti-Manchukuo forces who surrender themselves. Should Yang Yu-lin and his troops as well as other anti-Manchukuo forces surrender to Manchukuo they will be dealt with leniently in accordance with the policy hitherto followed.

Nanking, February 23, 1933.

the signed orig.
1986 *EC*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Following reply to Japanese memorandum already
despatched to Japanese Legation:

1. Since September 18th of 1931 Japan effected
military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces and
established therein a puppet regime. Japan is now again
concentrating large forces and attacking Jehol which like
Three Eastern Provinces is an integral part of China's
territory. The Chinese Government in despatching troops
to Jehol for defense against external military aggression
is exercising its inherent sovereign right. That the
Japanese Government should demand the withdrawal of Chinese
forces from Jehol is manifestly to extend the sphere of
such aggression and to further violate the territorial
sovereignty of China. The Japanese Government should
therefore be absolutely responsible for the invasion of
Jehol. As for the puppet regime in the Three Eastern
Provinces it is a Japanese creation pure and simple a fact
which is known to the whole world. For all its illegal
activities Japan should all the more bear the entire
responsibility. Against the puppet regime in the Three
Eastern Provinces and so-called Japan-Manchukuo protocol
the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged strong
protests with the Japanese Government declaring that the
Chinese Government could never give them recognition. It
is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on this subject.

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2. That Japan should bear full responsibility for the attack on Jehol has already been stated. The fact that Japan is not only bent upon attacking and seizing Jehol but also declares that her military operations may be extended to North China is sufficient to prove that her long cherished policy of aggression remains unchanged. Chinese troops in resisting Japanese troops and other forces under Japanese direction or command in Jehol or in taking necessary defensive measures in any other part of Chinese territory will be acting within their rights. If Japanese military operations should spread to North China Chinese troops will naturally exercise their right of self-defence in protection of Chinese territory. Full responsibility for any situation which may be thus brought about should be borne by Japan.

3. General Tang Yu-lin Chairman of Jehol province is a high provincial military authority of the Chinese Government. Being in command of Chinese forces in Jehol he has the duty to defend that province. The allegations made by the Japanese Government concerning the Chairman of Jehol province must be regarded as a deliberate affront. The Chinese Government hereby lodges its protest.

A true and correct copy of the signed original.
[Signature]

中國致日本之復文如下

二十三日

(一)自民國二十年九月十八日以來，日本以其武力侵佔東三省，設立偽組織，茲又不顧一切，調集大批軍隊，進攻熱河。熱河為中國之領土，與東三省之為中國領土相同，中國政府派兵往熱，防禦外國之武力侵畧，乃係行使其固有之主權。日本政府竟要求中國軍隊退出熱河，顯係擴大侵畧範圍，破壞中國領土主權，日本政府自應絕對負攻熱之全責。至東三省偽組織為日本一手造成之傀儡，為舉世皆知之事實，其所為之一切非法行為，日本政府尤應負其全責，中國政府因東省偽組織及所謂日滿議定書，業經迭向日本方面嚴提抗議，概不承認，茲不復贅。

(二)日本應負攻熱全責，已如上述。乃日本不惟欲攻奪熱河，并稱日本軍隊之行動或將及於華北，足証日本方面蓄意侵畧，毫無覺悟。中國軍隊在熱河抗禦日本及受日本指揮之軍隊或在中國領土其他部分內，為必要之防禦，均屬正當。如果日本軍事行動，侵及華北，中國軍隊自必行其自衛。

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守土之權。其因此發生之事態，應由日本政府負其全責。
 (三) 熱河省政府主席湯玉麟為中國地方軍事長官，在熱河指揮軍隊，自有守土之責。日本政府對湯主席所稱各節，殊屬有意侮辱，中國政府特予抗議。

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated March 29, 1933

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.



March 29, 7 p. m.

Second battery first battalion, 16th regiment,
seventh independent artillery brigade, passed eastward
through Tientsin this morning en route to Kaiping near
Tangshan. Considerable quantity of ammunition, said to
be twelve carloads, passed eastward yesterday.

Last paragraph my March 28, noon. Yi Shih Pao claims
Shihmenchai still held by Chinese, second battalion
644th regiment General Yao Tung Fan's army defending.

LOCKHART

WSB

F/H/S

793.94/6108

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAR 24 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED
 MAR 23 1933
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

March 20, 1933.

The Japanese Ambassador,
 Mr. Katsuji Debuchi.
 Mr. Hornbeck.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 24 1933
 Department of State

Subject: Situation in North China.

793.94

F/HS

793.94/6109

When the conversation with regard to Mr. Matsuoka's visit had been concluded, the Ambassador asked Mr. Hornbeck what news the Department had with regard to the situation in North China. Mr. Hornbeck replied that the items received during the day had been conflicting; that from some of it it appeared that quiet was expected, whereas from other items it appeared that more trouble was expected. The Ambassador said that he hoped that there would not be more trouble. (NOTE: On previous occasions during the past several weeks the Ambassador has invariably affirmed that the Japanese troops positively would not go to Tientsin and Peiping.) The Ambassador went on to complain of the Chinese massing of troops inside of the area forbidden by the Agreement of 1902 and said that he thought that the powers should compel the Chinese armies to stay away from the treaty ports and concessions. He talked about the irresponsibility of Chinese soldiers and said they were always a menace to foreigners.

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 MAR 23 1933

1048
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From the substance and tone of the Ambassador's remarks, Mr. Hornbeck gained the impression that the Ambassador has information in the light of which he is apprehensive, or perhaps even definitely instructed, that the Japanese army is planning an advance into the Tientsin-Peiping area.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 21 1933 TO
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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NITE
SERVICE CIPHER
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 23 1933
Department of State

0022 RUMOR TO EFFECT THAT CHINESE PLAN ATTACK AT SHAN ~~XXX~~ KWAN
AQ
DISCREDITED BY REPORT EMANATING CHINWANTAO TODAY WHICH INDICATES
AREA QUIET AND STATES THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR LOCAL KNOWLEDGE OF
CHINESE PREPARATIONS . SPORADIC JAPANESE AIR ATTACKS ON CHINESE LINES
VICINITY KUPEIKOW AND HSIFENGKOW OCCURRED YESTERDAY BUT FORCES INVOLVED
NOT LARGE. REPORTED ALL PASSES BETWEEN KUPEIKOW AND SHANHAIKWAN NOW
HELD BY JAPANESE. ESTIMATED TWO BATTALIONS JAPANESE NOW SHANHAIKWAN.
ONE JAPANESE CRUISER 4 DESTROYERS OUTER ANCHORAGE TAKU, 4 JAPANESE
WARSHIPS TYPE UNKNOWN REPORTED OFF CHINWANTAO. CHINESE LINES HELD
BY ONE REGIMENT ALONG WEST BANK SHIH HO. REPORTED HAN FU CHU MAY TAKE
COMMAND NORTHERN ARMIES 2125

793.94/6110

MAR 24 1933

TOP SECRET 13 MARCH 1933 16(2) 19 24 38 ADM UPHAM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CHINESE LEGATION
WASHINGTON



With the Minister See's compliments

March 21, 1933.

793.94

F/HS
793.94/6111

FILED
MAR 23 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Telegrams received on March 20th 1933.

Nanking March 18th - During the fighting at Sifeng Pass, a map of "The Great Manchukuo" was found on the body of a dead Japanese artillery commander. The map indicates the territories which the Japanese militray contemplate to invade and annex. The territories include Peiping, Tientsin and Tsinanfu. This seems to show clearly that Japan's aggressive designs are not limited to the occupation of Jehol. The Japanese will most probably advance to Peiping and Tientsin until they have realised the dream of the "Great Manchukuo."

*This is
demanded
by
Lokland
March 22
3 p.m.*

Nanking March 19th - The Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin for the fourth time demanded that Chinese forces should withdraw from Tientsin and Mou-Chia-Chuang. The demand was again refused by the Chinese authorities on the same ground as given previously. The Japanese will most probably use this pretext when they make trouble in the Peiping and Tientsin area.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAR 24 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 22 1933

Conversation.

March 21, 1933.

The Chinese Minister,
Mr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Situation in North China.

[Signature]
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 24 1933
Department of State

793.94

F/HS
793.94/6112

The Chinese Minister stated that he had a telegram from Nanking stating that Chinese troops at the Great Wall had found on the person of a Japanese officer a map of "Manchukuo" describing the sphere of military operations and including therein Tientsin and Peiping.

[Handwritten mark]

MAR 22 1933
FRTD

FE:SKH/ZMK

105
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01 Manchuria/860 FOR Despatch # -

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED February 28, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

6113

REGARDING: Statement published by Manchukuo News Agency
concerning the Jehol situation.

hs

793.94/6113

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Dukden, Manchuria, February 28, 1933.

SUBJECT: Statements of the Manchoukuo Government.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 726 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated February 27, 1933, on the above subject.


Respectfully yours,

M. D. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 726
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW



No 726.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, February 27, 1933.

SUBJECT: Statements of the Manchoukuo
Government.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/- I have the honor to enclose, as of possible
value for reference, a copy of a bulletin issued by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mukden, entitled
"Foreign Minister's Statement Regarding the League
2/- of Nations." There is also enclosed the translation
published by the Manchoukuo News Agency of a state-
ment by the Department of Defense at Mukden, con-
cerning Jehol.

The Foreign Minister's exceedingly bitter and
unrestrained criticism of the League was primarily
intended, it is believed, to show the Manchurian
populace that the Manchoukuo Government is not
afraid of the League. In relation to the numerous
articles concerning a "Pan-Asiatic Movement" and a
"Monroe Doctrine for Asia" which have appeared in
the Japanese controlled press recently, the following
extraordinary sentence is considered noteworthy:

"The

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"The fact is that the League has now completely cast off its peace-mask, and has bluntly disclosed its underlying ambition to let the brother races of Asia devour one another, to disturb the tranquillity and suppress the rise of coloured races, and thereby to maintain and advance the cause of White Imperialism in the Far East."

The Legation will observe that the statement serves as an official announcement that Mr. G. B. Rea, "Counsellor of Manchoukuo's Department of Foreign Affairs" has been instructed to bring the statement to the attention of the members of the League, and thereupon to close his office and withdraw from Geneva.

The statement by the Department of Defense which is enclosed has excited considerable comment in Mukden. The statement clearly sets forth that if certain circumstances arise, at least parts of North China will be invaded. It also states that the destruction of Chang Hsueh-liang's power is essential to the security of Manchoukuo. This statement is not believed to be an empty threat but tantamount to an ultimatum to Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw his regular troops from Jehol and to relinquish his authority in North China.


Respectfully yours,

M. J. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Foreign Minister's Statement regarding the League of Nations"
- 2/- Translation of a statement by the Department of Defense.

Original



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MH:mhp

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 726 of M. J. Myers,
 American Consul General at Mukden, Manchuria, dated
 February 27, 1933, to the Legation, Peiping on the
 subject "Statements of the Manchoukuo Government."

SOURCE: Bureau of Information
 and Publicity
 Department of Foreign
 Affairs
 Mukden, Manchuria
 Bulletin No. 35
 February 18, 1933

COPY

FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT REGARDING
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Feb. 18, 1933

I. Inasmuch as Manchoukuo is not a member
 of the League of Nations, it is in no way bound
 legally or morally by any discussions or decisions
 of that body and is, for that reason, prepared to
 resist fearlessly any utterances or actions of the
 League which condemn the sovereignty of this nation.
 On the other hand, however, Manchoukuo does not
 hesitate to take necessary measures to enlighten
 the League in regard to the fundamental principles
 involved in the founding of the State, as well as
 the condition of national progress. It is on that
 account/when the Lytton Commission of Enquiry arrived
 in Manchuria last May, this Government willingly
 received its members, and has thereafter telegraphic-
 ally informed the League authorities as occasion
 demanded with regard to our intentions and designs,
 always animated by the very desire to give light to
 those who are blind to the situation in the Far
 East. Again, from an identical motive and also with
 the object of supervising the actions of the League,
 this Government has stationed its representatives
 at Geneva since last autumn. In this way, this
 Government has in no small measure endeavored to
 prevent the League from adopting any mistaken course
 of actions.

It is an undeniable fact that, when the League
 first encountered the Manchurian issue, it proved
 itself incapable of doing otherwise than of delay-
 ing its settlement by despatching a commission of
 enquiry to the Far East. Not only did this commission,
 however, lack any preliminary knowledge concerning
 Far Eastern problems but it also fell completely and
 readily under the influence of the insidious and crafty
 manipulation and propaganda carried on in China,
 particularly by the old Northeastern militarists
 established in the Peiping Tientsin area, who stand
 as sworn enemies in relation to Manchoukuo. The

commission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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commission has consequently viewed this nation with a preconceived bias from the very outset; it has utterly failed to acknowledge the fact that this State was established by the free will of the people who had long resented the corrupt administration of the Chang family, that Manchoukuo was steadily functioning as a State, and that the welfare of the inhabitants was markedly enhanced in comparison with that under the former regime. In complete disregard of these facts, the individual members of the said commission, arguing from the standpoint of the selfish policies of their own respective home countries, drew up a suggestion which would end in scorning the dignity of an independent nation and forcing upon this country the vicious regime back once more. Furthermore, in all its deliberations since last autumn, the League has looked upon the report of this commission as the only valuable precept and has attempted to use it as the criterion whereby to judge the facts and settle the incidents, as a result of which the present conclusion violently repudiating the independence of Manchoukuo was evidently reached.

II. If the League upholds world peace as its great ideal, it is then only proper that it should order the immediate abolition of the existing system of tariff walls, restrictions upon the entry and departure of foreigners, and the discriminatory treatment accorded aliens, which constitute the causes of international disputes. Freedom of communication and trade throughout the world, as well as the principle of racial equality, should thus be secured. Notwithstanding this, the League is permitting the various nations to pay mere lip-service to the cause of peace and in reality accumulate the root causes of international discord by raising national barriers and by indulging in policies which are exclusive, self-interested, and racially prejudiced. These facts alone sufficiently illustrate the fact that the League is nothing but a hypocritical body which is labouring under the disguised name of peace, to maintain the unnatural balance of power and the unjust status quo. As a machinery for the maintenance of armed peace in Europe, where numerous nations with historically entangled controversies are found interlocked and congregated, this institution may be favourably compared to the system of Triple Alliance and Tripartite Entente which existed prior to the World War. But it is an irretrievable mistake on the part of the League when it lays its hands upon the Far East, which lies far removed and whose conditions differ radically from those of Europe. In reality the discussions relative to the Manchurian issue conducted repeatedly at Geneva have revealed a total lack of cognition on its part and have produced many baneful effects upon us: within our own domain they have encouraged the rampancy of bandits and other outlawry elements, while in China they have

stimulated

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- 3 -

stimulated anti-Manchoukuo and anti-Japanese outrages, as exemplified in the Shanghai affair, the insurrections of Ma Chen-shan and Su Ling-wen, as well as the Shanhaikuan incident early this year. Japan, moreover, would have been pacified long ago and the present problem would perhaps never have been created, had it not been for these debates of the League.

Once again, the League is about to turn a deaf ear to the voice of the 30 million people of this country and refuse to recognize the independence of their nation. Such actions are productive of little result, except that they assist in inciting the military cliques of China, in spurring anti-Manchoukuo and anti-Japanese activities, and thereby prolonging the disturbances of Asia. That they distinctly do not contribute to the cause of world peace for which the League stands must be clear even to that body which is ignorant of Far Eastern affairs. The fact is that the League has now completely cast off its peace-mask, and has bluntly disclosed its underlying ambition to let the brother races of Asia devour one another, to disturb the tranquillity and suppress the rise of coloured races, and thereby to maintain and advance the cause of white Imperialism in the Far East.

In these circumstances, it is a matter of great delight and joy both for the sake of world peace and the happiness of Asiatic races to learn that the Empire of Japan has determined to withdraw from the League which she should never have joined, and thus to restore it as an European League, after realizing that it was hopeless to open the eyes of its officials to the realities of Manchoukuo's independence despite the vigorous efforts of her delegates and Manchoukuo's representatives at Geneva.

No doubt, Japan will hereafter be in position to keep her hands away completely from the indissoluble complications of Europe and move under the free atmosphere in Asia, dictated alone by justice and equity. As a friendly neighbour, Manchoukuo fully supports the step taken by Japan in the present instance. At the same time, this nation intends to solidify the relationship of mutual existence in the spirit of the Manchoukuo-Japan Protocol, and, furthermore, awaken the other peoples of this continent with whom it is resolved to cooperate more fully for the prosperity and peace of all Asia.

In conclusion, this Government takes this occasion to declare that the present actions of the League of Nations will, of course, have not the slightest effect upon the constructive program of Manchoukuo, and that it is strongly determined to strive for the development of its rich natural resources and for the full realization of its

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106

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

cherished land of peace and happiness.

M.B. The text of the Foreign Minister's statement, issued on Feb. 18, 1933, was telegraphed to Mr. George Bronson Hea, Counsellor of Manchoukuo's Department of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, who has been advised to communicate the same to all the delegates attending the League of Nations sessions and others concerned. Mr. Hea was also instructed to close his office and withdraw from Geneva immediately.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 726 of M. E. Myers, American Consul General at Mukden, Manchuria, dated February 27, 1933, to the Legation, Peiping, China, on the subject "Statements of the Manchoukuo Government."

SOURCE: Manchoukuo News Agency
Hsinking

TRANSLATION

MANCHOUKUO WAR OFFICE ISSUES STATEMENT
CLAIMING ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO SUPPRESS
INSURGENT ELEMENTS IN JEHOL PROVINCE

The restoration of peace and order in Jehol is an entirely domestic affair of Manchoukuo, and the suppression of the insurgent elements in the province is nothing more than a legitimate exercise of its sovereignty. The situation in Jehol has been complicated by the entrance of Chang Hsueh-liang's regular troops. The Manchoukuo Government, as a consequence, had decided to invoke its right of self-defense. Its actions, however, will be limited to destruction of the invading forces within the province. It seems that destruction of Chang Hsueh-liang's power is essential to its own security. If he dares to send thousands of his regular troops into Jehol, we shall be compelled to make a thrust at Peiping and Tientsin in order to get at the root of the present trouble in Jehol. However, as long as we succeed in recovering our territory without sending our troops across the Great Wall, we shall not spread the horrors of war to North China, because of our sincere desire to avoid aggravation of the trouble. Nevertheless if the enemy force us to cross the Great Wall the Manchoukuo Army will not be responsible for any situation arising therefrom. The enemy themselves will have to bear the responsibility.

Gleaning from various reports, there are already many units among the Jehol army, Chang Hsueh-liang's regular troops and the volunteer corps, which have given up their adherence to the Tang Yu-lin regime, and fearing the power of the combined Japanese and Manchoukuo forces, some have expressed their desire to tender their submissions to Manchoukuo, while others are favorably disposed to the new regime and are ready to co-operate with our troops. However, such attitudes on the part of those enemy troops are due to their desire of self-preservation, and the troops cannot be regarded immediately as Manchoukuo forces, and it is impossible to predict how they will act. Consequently even if these troops retreat across the Great Wall into North China, it has nothing to do with us, and it would be a mistaken conception to regard it as an invasion of Peiping and

Tientsin

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Tientsin districts by Manchoukuo troops. The Department of Defence of the Manchoukuo Government has raised a huge army of several tens of thousand, with the Minister of Defence, Mr. Chang Ching-hui as commander-in-chief and General Chang Kai-peng as commander-in-chief of the front line, and is about to undertake a campaign for restoration of peace and order in Jehol. With the cooperation of the Japanese forces which will bear jointly responsibility with the Manchoukuo Army for maintenance of peace and order and preservation of the territorial integrity of Manchoukuo, it hopes to terminate its campaign most swiftly, and thereby consolidate its foundation and disclose to the world the stern reality of its existence as an independent state.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. C 001/790 FOR # 312

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Mar. 7, 1933.
 TO NAME 1--1127 ***

6114

REGARDING:

Japanese Opinion regarding results of withdrawal from the
 League of Nations.

793.94/6114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE
NOTE

SEE 893.5061/9 FOR Despatch # 8774.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 1, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

6115

REGARDING: Agitation for payment of Chapei fire
claims involved in Sino-Japanese
hostilities of January to March, 1932.

793.94/6115

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8774

Shanghai, China, March 1, 1933.

Shanghai Fire Claims: Agitation
 for Payment of Insurance.

I have the honor to state that for months past there has been considerable agitation carried on in the press and elsewhere to compel fire insurance companies to pay claims for loss and destruction by fire or other causes on property situated in Shanghai and other areas involved in the Sino-Japanese hostilities of January to March, 1932. This agitation is with respect to policies of ordinary fire insurance and does not cover the policies which were taken out against war risk. I understand that war risk insurance was taken out in many cases, and in those cases where property sustained damage the loss was adjusted and the claim paid without question.

The claimants have induced the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai to take up their case and, according to information appearing in the press, the latter had undertaken to take up the matter with the consuls of the various Powers concerned. I received an

invitation

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Duestgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

invitation from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to be present at a dinner on January 15, 1933, which I was unable to attend owing to a previous engagement. On February 7, 1933, I received a communication from the Chamber, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, in which the Chamber urged that the foreign insurance companies assist the Chinese policy-holders as a means of promoting friendship between them. The Chamber requested my suggestions with regard to the matter. After consulting the American insurance companies interested, I sent a reply dated February 25, 1933, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. In this reply I stated that I could not see my way to attempt to influence the insurance companies under American jurisdiction to alter their attitude towards this question.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin A. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures:

1/- Copy of letter in translation from Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai dated, received February 7, 1933.

2/- Copy of letter to Chinese Chamber of Commerce, dated February 25, 1933.

250.6
 250.6111 9/1

In duplicate
 in triplicate to legation

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8774 from Edwin L. Birmingham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 1, 1950, on the subject "Shanghai Fire Claims: Negotiation for Payment of Insurance."

SECRET

CHINESE CONSULATE GENERAL, SHANGHAI

North Soochow Road

TRANSMISSION

His Excellency Edwin L. Birmingham,
Senior Consul and U.S. Consul-General
Shanghai

Dear Sir:

We missed you very much at our function on the 18th ult., although we knew you were with us in spirit. We have to apologise for our short notice.

Apart from the enjoyment of a happy reunion at the threshold of a new year, we were looking forward to securing your advice and guidance in a matter that is quite distinct from the big international issues regarding which this Chamber has had from time to time to express the opinion of the Chinese business community. It has to do with the aftermath of the Shanghai conflagration as it affects the Chinese holders of fire insurance policies issued by foreign insurance firms whose pleasant relations of many years with these misery-stricken Chinese patrons of theirs are on the verge of being strained. This Chamber has volunteered its mediatory services, and it is our hope that with your esteemed co-operation success and satisfaction on both sides will be the spontaneous outcome.

Here is a matter which must not be discussed cold-bloodedly in terms of strict legalities and technicalities. The question is: is a departure from the path of a blind adherence to the cold letter of the regulations governing the policies justified? Our answer is an emphatic "Yes." Our view is based on a self-convincing precedent. In 1951 the whole city was stirred by the magnitude of the indemnification to be paid by the foreign insurance firms following the big fire at the godowns on Soochow Creek, and the Chinese policy holders had turned upon them a sort of challenge as to whether or not they possessed the magnanimous and chivalrous spirit; they did respond in a manner that brought considerable relief to the affected foreign insurance companies. The premium payable was revised and the Chinese policy holders as a class took upon themselves the burden of meeting the premium at the new ratio of 3 to 1; in other words, the rate was raised from two taels to SIX TAELS.

To-day the table has turned, the sufferers this time being the Chinese policy holders themselves. The disaster has passed the stage of a purely economic issue; the victims of the Shanghai conflagration are actually in

distress

By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

We may have to hold a public reception in the near future should we find that a 'get-together' of the foreign insurance business leaders, representatives of foreign chambers of commerce, the foreign officials, and members of this Chamber in a 'round-table-conference' spirit will help towards the early and satisfactory liquidation of a matter which is liable to be aggravated by being allowed to remain in obscurity any longer.

W. A. R. 1911.

1. *Phragmites australis* (Cav.) Trin. ex Steud.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 8224 from Edwin A. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 1, 1933, on the subject "Chapei Fire Claims: agitation for payment of insurance."

COPY

653.3
SH:RAN

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, February 28, 1933.

Subject: Claims of Chapei property owners
against insurance companies.

Mrs. Hsiao-lai, Esquire,
Chairman, Chinese General Chamber of Commerce,
North Looschew Road,
Shanghai, China.

Sir:

I have received your letter of recent date. I, too, regret very much that I was unable to be with you on the 18th of January. I have carefully noted all that you have said in regard to the situation brought about by the Chapei incident as it affects the holders of fire insurance policies issued by foreign insurance firms.

Although the translation which accompanied your letter was addressed to me as Senior Consul, I am not so addressed in the original Chinese text. I have therefore assumed that your letter was addressed to me in my capacity as American Consul General, and I have not for that reason circulated it to my colleagues of the Consular Body, and the views which I set forth are my views as American Consul General and do not necessarily represent those of my consular colleagues.

The fact that property owners in Chapei suffered horrendous losses during the months of January, February, and March of last year is well known all over the world. Their condition merits and has received sympathy from all quarters. With regard to those who had insurance on their property with American companies, I feel sure that those companies will, where the conditions of the policies permit, be most generous in adjusting and paying claims for losses. I understand, however, that in a number of cases policy-holders who took out only the ordinary policies of fire insurance are now endeavoring through agitation and propaganda to hold the insurance companies liable for losses and destruction occasioned by the recent Sino-Japanese hostilities. As your Chamber is no doubt fully aware, a property owner may insure his property against any number of different risks and perils, but if he takes out only the ordinary insurance against fire he is not insured against losses occasioned in consequence of a state of affairs such as existed in certain parts of Chapei last winter, and the insurance policy or contract

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

note I set clearly those exceptions. Many policy-holders, I am informed, had taken out policies against war risk, for which they paid special rates of premium, and in those cases where the property was damaged the losses were paid without question. These varying rates of premium as between ordinary fire insurance and war risk insurance have been settled by expert actuaries and the principles which underlie the levying of special rates for specific risks are those on which the whole of the insurance business rests, not only in China but all over the world. The stipulations in the insurance policies set forth clearly and unequivocally the risks and perils covered by the policies, and, for my own part, I do not see how it could be possible for the American companies to assume liability for losses not covered by their policies, however much they may be in sympathy with the plight of the policy-holders. To do so would be to upset the vital principles underlying the entire insurance business and would be a grave injustice not only to the companies and their stockholders but to all the remaining policy-holders in the companies concerned.

You may be assured that in the case of the American insurance companies each case will be considered on its merits. Should there be any dispute regarding the circumstances under which the loss occurred which the two parties are unable to settle between themselves, recourse may always be had to the appropriate judicial tribunal. I am informed that in certain instances in the Special District Court in Shanghai suits have been brought against insurance companies which have been decided in favor of the companies on the ground that the losses were occasioned by perils specifically exempted in the insurance policies or contracts.

As an executive officer of the Government I have no authority whatever to attempt to influence the companies under American jurisdiction to alter their attitude towards this question. Should I attempt to do so, it would not only be of no avail in assisting the Chinese policy-holders, but would subject me to severe censure from my Government. Hence, however, you have asked for my advice in the matter, I can only state frankly that while the insurance companies are ready and willing to pay all just claims under their contracts, they should not and can not be made liable for losses against which no insurance had been taken out.

Yours faithfully,

John A. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Copied by [signature]
 Covered [signature]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Chefoo/71 FOR Despatch # 27 to Legation.

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED March 3, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING:

Residents in Chefoo district caused much anxiety by the recent hostilities taking place in the vicinity of Shanhaikwan and Jehol.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Lanchurian situation:

The Chafan district, formerly so dependent upon nearby Lanchuria as a market for its products and an outlet for its surplus population, continues to suffer from the unsettled conditions prevailing therein. Further anxieties were caused the local residents by the recent hostilities taking place in the vicinity of Shanhsikwan and Jehol.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated March 30, 1933

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



293, March 30, 4 p. m.
Department's 100, March 28, 5 p. m.

Following from American Embassy at Tokyo, "March 29,
4 p. m.

Your March 28, 2 p. m. I have brought both incidents
concerning occupation of American missionary property and
bombing of missionary residence to attention of Vice Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs requesting that an investigation
be made and that steps be taken to safeguard American
lives and property",

KLP-WSB

JOHNSON

MAR 31 1933

RECEIVED

F/HS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handed to
 J. T. Anderson
 by SEC 4
 12-28-73*

The Department of State has been informed by its Minister to China that an American citizen residing at Taitowying, Hopei Province, about twenty-five miles northwest of Chinwangtao, has reported that at about nine o'clock on the morning of March 24 a Japanese airplane, which had been circling over Taitowying for about thirty minutes, dropped a bomb within twenty feet of the northeast corner of his residence, a foreign style house, over or near which an American flag was flying from a flagpole. This bomb landed just outside the wall of this American citizen's compound making two large holes in the wall and shaking brick from the chimney of the house. Shortly afterwards another bomb was dropped striking about twenty feet from the south-east corner of the compound and breaking some windowpanes in the building. An hour later another plane visited the city dropping two bombs. Altogether, nine civilians, including men, women and children, apparently all Chinese, were killed. According to the report from this American citizen, there was no particular provocative reason for the dropping of bombs in the neighborhood of his compound and apparently no military advantage to be gained thereby.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


Conversation.

March 28, 1933.

The Japanese Ambassador,
Mr. Katsuji Debuchi.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: The Kautto Incident.



*copies sent
to Peking
and Tokyo*

793.94

793.94/6118

Mr. Hornbeck called on the Japanese Ambassador. The Ambassador opened the conversation with a remark about the splendid spring morning and at once handed Mr. Hornbeck a clipping from the morning paper containing a press account about the Kautto incident. Mr. Hornbeck expressed concurrence with regard to the weather and, without comment, handed the Ambassador the Department's informal memorandum containing a statement of the facts as reported to us with regard to the Kautto incident. The Ambassador read the memorandum and at once stated that he greatly regretted that such an incident had occurred and felt sure that his Government would regret it. Mr. Hornbeck then stated that he had come simply to inform the Ambassador informally that we have this statement of facts and necessarily feel solicitude with regard to the matter; he said that, as indicated by the press report to which the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the Ambassador had referred, our Minister in Peiping is taking the matter up with the Japanese Legation there, and that the facts have also been reported to our Ambassador at Tokyo; that we are not in position to vouch for the complete accuracy of the statement of facts, but we understand that our officials in China are looking into the matter and are not acting precipitately; and that, in the interval, the press here is showing an active interest and of course news of incidents of this sort produces a bad impression. The Ambassador said that he appreciated our concern and was glad that we had chosen to handle the matter in this manner. He repeated that he greatly regretted that such an incident had occurred and said that he was sure that his Government would regret it, would take appropriate steps in the premises and would do its utmost to prevent such occurrences.

The Ambassador then took the initiative on the subject of Mr. Matsuoka's visit (see separate memorandum).

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 3 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

No. 240

To the American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Referring to telegraphic reports sent you by the
 American Minister at Peiping in regard to the bombing by
 Japanese airplanes of Taitowying which endangered American
 mission property there, there is enclosed a copy of a
 memorandum of a conversation on March 28, 1933, between
 the Japanese Ambassador and the Chief of the Division of
 Far Eastern Affairs in regard to this incident.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated March 28,
 1933.

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Mar. 31, 1933

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A true copy of
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 3 1933

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
No. 1046

To the American Minister,

Peiping.

Referring to the Department's telegram No. 100, March 28, 6 p. m., and to previous telegrams, in regard to the bombing by Japanese airplanes of Taitowying which endangered American mission property there, there is enclosed a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on March 28, 1933, between the Japanese Ambassador and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to this incident.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated March 28,
 1933.



6118
 793.94/6106

FE:MMH:REK
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FE
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE



File

Conversation.

March 20, 1933.

The Chinese Minister,
 Mr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze.

Mr. Hornbeck.



F/HS

Subject: Information and Inquiries from the Chinese Government.

793.94
 894.113

The Minister read to me portions of telegrams which he said were from his Government. In the first telegram there was information to the effect that it had been decided to make counter-attacks at the Great Wall. In the second telegram the Minister was instructed to call on the Secretary of State and urge the imposition of an embargo on export of arms to Japan, withdrawal of diplomatic representation from Japan and prohibition of imports from Japan.

The Minister requested then an appointment be made for him to see the Secretary of State.

793.94/6119

FILED
 MAR 29 1933

FE:SKH/ZMK *SKH*

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

"EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO",
 of February 27, 1933.
 DIVISION OF
 MEXICAN AFFAIRS
 MAR 10 1933
 Department of State

6-6
 Translation

2657-7-718

RECOGNITION OF INJUSTICE

In one of the "points" of the declarations, familiar to all, made by the Mexican Chancery in the matter of the Far East conflict, Mexico drawn attention to the injustice which the Japanese Empire is committing in carrying a war of conquest to the Chinese territories of Manchuria and Jehol.

No one among us can deny the sympathy which has always been professed, not only on the part of official Mexico but the Mexican people, toward the people of Japan. Their virility, their admirable development, and even their exotic customs, have contributed to the appreciation, which in many cases has amounted to exaltation. Going to the root of the popular sentiment, we will say that a powerful factor of this affection for the Japanese has been their rebellious attitude toward Yankee imperialism, because it is easy to see in Japan the natural enemy of the power which has caused so many unpleasant incidents, and even affronts, to the countries of America, and principally to Mexico.

But the present Japanese imperialism, openly against all right and against all humanity, has forfeited that sympathy in connection with the proceedings of the Tokyo Government. China is the martyr in this case, and her one hundred and thirty million souls mean nothing if she lacks organization for warfare, if she is unable to respond even in the slightest degree to the elementary needs for facing Japan's heavy machinery.

The Japanese proceedings, even more barefaced than those of the Yankees, - although at bottom with the same ends and identical deceitful pretexts, - have drawn upon the Empire of the Rising Sun, universal censure. And Mexico, which has on various occasions shown proofs of a lucid sincerity, could not be left behind in condemnation of the Japanese outrages which have no justification in this Twentieth Century.


Mexico, invoking this sincerity, a few years ago submitted to the consequences of her noble attitude, upon condemning Yankee imperialism in Nicaragua and recognizing the legitimate authorities of that sister nation, which were deposed by the bayonets of the United States Army.

The case is the same. And, although we are without armies or vessels with which to uphold our opinion in international matters, we must always obey the dictates of a nobility ("hidalguia") which can never ignore the rights of justice.

F/H/S

795.94/6120

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 CSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By 28 NARS Date 3/19/73

MAR 1 1933

SUBJECT:

Foreign Relations;
Status of Relations with Foreign Countries.
Mexico's Relations with Japan.

F/HS

793.94/6121

1. There is attached hereto, translation of a statement issued to the Mexico City press by Dr. José Manuel Puig Casauranc, Minister of Foreign Relations, on February 24th, 1933, defining Mexico's attitude regarding the existing conflict between China and Japan.
2. This same Statement was cabled to Mexico's representative at the League of Nations in Geneva, on January 9th, 1933, with instructions that its presentation was to be withheld until an opportune time, in order not to embarrass the League of Nations in its attempts to settle the question.
3. The Statement was held up by Mexico's delegate, Señor Arturo Pani, until February 9th, when conciliation had failed. On this date it was handed to the Secretary General of the League, by Señor Pani.
4. The gist of the Statement is that Mexico disapproved of Japan's decision not to settle the conflict by peaceful means; that Mexico cannot remain indifferent to affairs in the Far East, owing to her position on the Pacific seaboard; and that Mexico accepts, in general, the suggestions for a settlement, contained in the Lytton Report.
5. In the original draft of the attached Statement, which Dr. Puig Casauranc intended issuing to the press, there was an additional paragraph reading as follows:

"That the history and traditional foreign policy of Mexico have been opposed to acts of aggression violative of treaties, and that Mexico could, therefore, not approve of such acts."

However, in the final draft given to the press, this last paragraph was omitted.
6. It is a significant fact that Dr. Puig Casauranc consulted Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, the Chargé d'affaires of our Embassy here, concerning the advisability of leaving this last paragraph in his Statement. Naturally, Mr. Lane refused to make any comment.

From: Mexico. Report No. 4448. Date: Feb. 28, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Report

3850-a

7. Dr. Puig Casauranc stated to Mr. Lane that he gave a copy of this statement, before it was issued to the press, to the Japanese Minister, Mr. Tsuchiatou Mori, who remarked that he was grateful to him for not having unnecessarily hurt Japan in his statement.

8. Evidently the Japanese representatives here feel there is a change in the attitude of the Mexican people toward their country, due to their campaign in China, because the Japanese Minister, Mr. Mori, recently requested the Mexican Secretary of Education to rent him the Government theatre in Mexico City in order to exhibit Japanese propaganda films on Manchuria, but Minister Bassols, upon the advice of Dr. Puig Casauranc, declined to do this.

9. Dr. Puig Casauranc stated to Mr. Lane that he felt it necessary to counteract Japanese propaganda here in Mexico, which was one reason that he wished to issue his statement to the press concerning Mexico's attitude in the present conflict. He also gave as another reason, his wish to prepare public opinion for possible eventualities.

10. On February 26th there appeared in "El Nacional", the organ of the National Revolutionary Party, an editorial praising the Mexican Government "for adopting an honorable and straight attitude in international affairs", and stating that the invasion of Manchuria by Japan, and her proclamation of its independence as a sovereign state, were nothing more than the deceptive means by which Japan has sought to accomplish the conquest of a part of China's territory. This editorial also states that Mexico's attitude is, that international cooperation should not be attempted beyond the limits consented to by China herself; and that citizens who abandon their own country and claim the protection and benefits deriving from their residence in another country, are subject to its laws and must share its fate. This editorial further goes on to say that Mexico takes her stand, not because she is impelled by any unfriendliness toward Japan, but because of her duty in defending the principles of international justice. A translation of this editorial is forwarded herewith.

11. There is also forwarded translation of another editorial article, which appeared in "El Universal Grafico" of February 27th, which refers to the injustice which Japan is inflicting in Chinese territory; and states that the Mexican people have always admired the Japanese for their virility and progress, and most of all, for their rebellious attitude toward Yankee imperialism, but that Japanese imperialism, openly against all right and against all humanity, has forfeited the sympathy which the Mexican people formerly felt toward Japan. It further states that the present Japanese proceedings are even more barefaced than those of the Yankees. It compares "Yankee imperialism in Nicaragua" with the Japanese imperialism in China, and states that the cases are the same.

12. Further in connection with Japanese activities in Mexico, there is attached hereto copy of a letter sent to the Embassy by the American Consul in San Luis Potosi. This letter is signed "Kataho Nimo", and states that the writer is friendly to the United States and desires

From: Mexico. Report No. 4448. Date: Feb. 28, 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report

3050-a

to advise the Consulate that a Japanese Military Intelligence Officer had recently been in San Luis Potosi and that he had overheard him say that Japan intended attacking the Philippine Islands between June and September, 1933. The letter was written in ink, and the words were printed.

13. This Consul states that he has received several other anonymous letters during the past four or five months, all treating exclusively of Japanese anti-American propaganda, and that there has been a quiet but steady dissemination of Japanese propaganda in San Luis Potosi during the past year.

14. The Mexican Government has recently granted permission to the Japanese Government for two Japanese training ships, the "Yakumo" and "Iwate", which are making a practice cruise, to dock at Acapulco, Guerrero, on April 30th and to remain there until May 6th. These two ships also have permission to dock at Manzanillo from May 27th to May 29th. 206 Cadets of the Japanese Naval school are making their practice cruise on these two vessels, and 1,527 members of the crew.

15. Mr. Tatsuo Kawai, the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, has recently been in Mexico City, and left for Nogales, Sonora, on Thursday, February 23rd. It is a significant fact that Mr. Kawai is returning to Japan via Mexico City, - sailing from Seattle, Washington. Dr. Ruiz Cassaurano, Minister of Foreign Relations, stated to Mr. Lane, our Chargé, that it seemed unusual that Mr. Kawai should come to Mexico City en route to his port of sailing, Seattle.

Robert L. Cummings,
 Captain, Infantry (DCL)
 Acting Military Attaché.

Source: Press;
 Embassy;
 Confidential.

C/p

From: U.S. Mexico.

Report No. 4448. Date: Feb. 28, 1933.

108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P. R. / 62 FOR Despatch # 509.

FROM Japan (Crow) DATED March 4, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Advance of the Japanese and Manchukuo troops
into Jehol began just after the middle of
February and was continuing, apparently with
little opposition, when the month ended.

hs

793.94/ 6122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

States was opposing Japan's retention of them. It seems to have begun with a press report that an American Government official had stated that Japan would have to give up the islands if she should resign from the League.

(b) Jehol*

793.94
 The long-heralded advance of the Japanese and Manchukuo troops into Jehol began just after the middle of February and was continuing, apparently with little opposition, when the month ended. Early in the month reliable reports reached the Embassy that the Japanese were trying to settle the Jehol problem by negotiation. The exact point being negotiated was not clear. It is not believed that the Japanese were open-minded on the matter of Jehol being included in "Manchukuo". They were probably trying to persuade the Chinese to withdraw peacefully before their invading armies and it appears that the negotiations were successful, though little definite information regarding the amount of resistance offered by the Chinese is available in Tokyo.

On February 18, there was an official press ban on the publication in Japan of anything with regard to warships, airplanes or unit strength (for instance, name of warship, number or kind of airplane) which are expected to be despatched to China or Manchukuo shortly from Japan. Movements of these warships or airplanes

must

* Embassy's telegrams Nos. 34, February 3-noon; 35, February 3- 2 p.m.; 39, February 12- 4 p.m.; 44, February 11- 6 p.m.; 46, February 15- 8 p.m.; 48, February 18- 7 p.m.; 50, February 19- 7 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM Peiping

Dated March 31, 1933

Rec'd 12:42 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

295, March 31, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"March 30, 3 p. m. According to strictly confidential information a new treaty, the existence of which is kept secret, has been concluded between Japan and Manchukuo. Contents unknown. Its publication is expected in the near future.

From a reliable source it has also been learned in confidence that the situation along Great Wall has become much more serious during the past week and that influential elements in the army believe that there is grave danger that North China will be invaded unless Chinese attitude is radically changed".

JOHNSON

JS

F/H/S

793.94/6123

RECEIVED

177 6 1933

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 31 1933
 Department of State

file

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in Confidence

793.94

K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated March 31, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Under date March 30 the American Consul General at Mukden reported that he has received strictly confidential information to the effect that a new treaty between Japan and "Manchukuo" has been concluded and that the existence of this treaty is being kept secret. The contents of the treaty are not known. It is expected that it will be published soon.


Confidential information has also been received from a reliable source that during the past week the situation along the Great Wall became much more serious and that it is believed by powerful elements in the army that unless there is a radical change in the attitude of the Chinese there is serious danger of North China being invaded.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET




GRAY

Peiping

Dated March 31, 1933

Rec'd 7:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



296, March 31, 4 p.

My 293, March 30, 4 p. m.

Japanese Legation informs me that Japanese Ambassa-
dor to Manchukuo had replied to Japanese Legation's
report to him of my note of March 28 stating that
matter has been referred to the appropriate authorities
and that more specific reply must await report of in-
vestigation. In answer to this Legation's inquiry as
to action taken to prevent recurrence of bombing
imperilling Americans and property at Taitowying
~~Peiping~~, Japanese Legation stated that all interested
parties had been advised of my report of March 28. On
March 23 Lockhart reported that Japanese Consul at
Tientsin had stated that he had reported matter to
appropriate military authorities.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

APR 3 1933

FILED

F/HS

793.94/6124

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FE
HA

REP


FROM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated April 1, 1933

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



F/ESP 793.94/6125

793.94
note
793.70 Manchukuo


299, April 1, 3 p. m.

Legation's 295. *793.94*

Following from Mukden: "March. 31, 4 p. m.

According to information from a reliable source the treaty referred to in my telegram of March 30, 3 p. m., provides for the transfer to Japanese control of the Manchukuo telephone, telegraph and wireless systems."

KLP



JOHNSON

APR 4 1933

RECEIVED

1091
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12322 FOR Tel. # 288, 8 pm.

FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 29, 1933,
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Wang Ching Wei stated after conference with
General Chiang Kai Shek that China would
adhere to her original policy of resistance
in connection with the Sino-Japanese situation.

hs

793.94/6126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

78

WF

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated March 29, 1933

Rec'd 9:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

288, March 29, 8 p. m.

Reuter from Nanking today:

"Wang Ching ~~Wai~~ returned to full power today when he formally resumed presidency of Executive Yuan. He also assumed chairmanship of Central Political Council in which capacity he becomes according to revised regulations ex-officio Chairman of National Defense Council.

note
 793.94

893.00/12322

Interviewed by Reuter, Wang declared that his recent conferences in Nanking with General Chiang Kai Shek had resulted in formulation of concrete measures regarding military and political affairs while as regards Sino-Japanese question China would adhere to her original policy of resistance. He added that he attached great importance to the proposal for centralizing control of military affairs which now were under very careful control. He declared that there would be no change in personnel of cabinet except in one or two ministries as result of his return to office.

Members of the government including Wang and Chiang Kai Shek held lengthy conference this morning but nature

of

009
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 288 from Peiping

of discussions is not divulged. Owing to pressure of duties as President of Executive Yuan, Wang is not proceeding to North China as he originally intended".

JOHNSON

FW

1094

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.


Dated April 1, 1933

Rec'd 4:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

April 1, 1 p. m.



793.94

Telegraphic reports from two reliable sources Chinwang-
tao state that Japanese occupied Hsihmenchai this morning,
short distance north of Chinwangtao and well inside the Wall.
The situation in region of Shanhaikwan is becoming more
tense, considerable fighting west and northwest that place
having occurred Japanese planes have been engaged in
reconnoitring that region for several days and in some
instances dropping bombs.

LOCKHART

KLP

7/2/4


F/G 793.94/6127

24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.


Dated April 1, 1933

Rec'd 4:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 1, noon.

My March 27, noon.



Under Legation's instruction I brought bombing incident informally to attention Japanese Consul General who has now replied that he immediately referred matter to appropriate military authorities and that as soon as he receives any information concerning it and the occupation of American mission property at Mutowteng and Sawangshantze (see my March 21, 1 p. m.) (#) communicate with me further.

Japanese Information Bureau in a bulletin just issued, attempting to explain Taitowying bombing, charges that Chinese soldiers established themselves in buildings immediately adjoining mission compound as they believed position adjacent to foreign house would afford them protection. Bulletin claims Chinese troops were firing on the Japanese lines and that Japanese naturally retaliated. These statements are at variance with Reverend Kautto's version of the affair.

LOCKHART

KLP

(#) Apparent Omission.

F/G 793.94/6128

RECEIVED

APR 8 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

FROM

Dated April 1, 1933

Secretary of State,
Washington.

300, April 1, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:


"March 31, 10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. Lo Wen Kan is confined to his house
with serious eye trouble but I saw him this afternoon
just after Wang Ching Wei called on him. I told Lo
rumors were about that Wang and Chiang Kai Shek were
willing to begin direct negotiations with the Japanese
and Lo admitted that direct negotiation rumors were
current everywhere but he insisted they were being spread
by the Japanese. Without confirming reported willingness
of Chiang and Wang to negotiate Lo said that while he was
in Nanking they could do nothing in that direction and he
denounced direct negotiations as ~~(*)~~ *unthinkable*. Lo will consider
nothing but stubborn and at least passive resistance but
my strong impression is that Chiang and Wang feel that
some positive action is required and that they are at a
complete loss what step to take. It is impossible to
predict course of events."

JOHNSON

KLP

(..) Apparent Omission



F/HS

793.94/6129

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E

APR 12 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated April 1, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The American Consul General at Nanking reported under date March 31 that serious eye trouble has confined Lo Wen-kan to his home but that the Consul General saw him immediately after he (Lo Wen-kan) had been visited by Wang Ching-wei on the afternoon of March 31. The Consul General states that he told Lo that there were rumors that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang were willing to start direct negotiations with Japan and that Lo admitted that rumors regarding direct negotiation were prevalent everywhere but he insisted that the Japanese were spreading them. Lo said, without confirming the reported readiness of Wang and Chiang to negotiate, that as long as he was in Nanking nothing could be done by them in that direction and the direct negotiations were denounced by him. Nothing will be considered by Lo except stubborn and at least passive resistance but the Consul General states that it is his strong impression that Wang and Chiang feel that some definite action is necessary and that they have no idea at all as to what move to make. The Consul General adds that it is impossible to foretell what will occur.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 941.00 P. R./275 FOR Despatch #741

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED March 13, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Far Eastern Situation. Latest developments in,--.

fp

793.94/6130

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Far Eastern Situation.

Mr. Matsuoka, the principal Japanese delegate to the recent special session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, has been spending a few days in London before returning to Japan by way of the United States. On Saturday evening, March 11th, he and Mr. Joo Tai Chi, the Chinese Minister in London, gave short addresses which were broadcast from London. Mr. Matsuoka, who was the first speaker, briefly reviewed the historical relations between Japan

and/

0100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and and Manchuria, emphasizing the importance to Japan of Manchuria from the strategic point of view and the sacrifices which Japan had made in order to protect itself from the menace of Russia's expansion in the Far East. The greater part of his address was devoted to a plea for sympathy on the part of the British people with the position in which Japan had been placed by the indifference of China to Japan's interests. In conclusion, he confessed failure to understand the importance attached by the League of Nations to Japan's military operations in Jehol, as the League had not shown particular anxiety over the much wider and more important operations in Manchuria. He described the preoccupation of the League over the operations in Jehol as a "tempest in a teapot" and said that in any event the troubles would soon be over.

Mr. Guo's address was an unusually telling summarization of those portions of the Lytton Report and of the report recently adopted by the League of Nations which placed the responsibility for the conflict upon Japan. He denied the Japanese contention that the Government of China was anti-foreign, and argued on the contrary that it was seeking to harmonize the progress of the West with the ancient culture of China. It was Japan, he continued, which had shown a feeling of hostility towards the West, and whose militarists

had/

0101
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-9-

had shown themselves unwilling to fulfill the obligations which they had assumed to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Mr. Luo concluded with a strong plea for the imposition by Great Britain, in co-operation with the other Powers, of an embargo upon the exportation of arms and munitions to Japan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94 Commission/915 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Phillips) DATED March 25, 1933.
TO Undersecretary NAME 1-1127 ***

6131

REGARDING:

Far Eastern situation.
Japanese Ambassador commented on the -
and stated that he felt the situation was
far better than it had been a year ago.


hs

793.94/ 6131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR - 4 1933
Department of State
Peking via N. R.
Dated April 4, 1933
Rec'd 3:50 a. m.

F/HS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

304, April 4, 2 p. m.

My 296, March 31, 4 p. m., and Tientsin's April 1,
noon.

On April 1st Japanese Legation, on behalf of Japanese
Ambassador to Manchukuo, requested information as to exact
location of American mission property at Taitowying.
Lockhart was instructed to supply such information to the
Legation.

JOHNSON

CIB

APR 11 1933

FILED

793.94/6132

793.94
393.1163

K


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RG

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET



FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 4, 1933

Rec'd 10 a. m.

F/HS


793.94/6133

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

April 4, 4 p. m.



Reliably reported from Chinwangtao today that Chinese left flank front line (at or near Haiyang) retreated last night. Reported, but not confirmed, Japanese now occupy Haiyang. Refugees are arriving Chinwangtao from north. No trouble so far Chinwangtao and no Chinese reenforcements have arrived there. Some indication that Chinese battalion now there will shortly evacuate.

CSB-KLP

LOCKHART

APR 5 1933

RECEIVED

010
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 4, 1933.

Reference: Tientsin's April 4,
noon.

It may be assumed that Tientsin has repeated to Peiping the telegram under reference and that Peiping is therefore in position to furnish the Japanese Legation information with regard to the exact location of American mission property at Taitowying. (Peiping's 304, April 4, 2 p. m., reports that the Japanese Legation has requested this information.)

No action by the Department seems to be called for.

MMH|REK
m.m.p.

010

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *P. 4+5 sent to*
ONI & MID

793.94

MT



FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 4, 1933

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State.

Washington.

URGENT.

April 4, noon.



Reverend Kautto called this office today and stated mission property is located immediately outside Taitow-ying city wall and extends from southeast corner of wall, a distance of approximately 300 feet, towards east gate city wall. Just outside of mission compound north wall is a Chinese^{se} incense factory occupying rather long narrow building. On south side of mission wall are a number of small Chinese stores among them being a fruit shop. Across the street from mission compound several hundred feet away to southeast is Chinese inn. Distance from north wall mission compound to east gate city wall is approximately 600 feet. Mr. Kautto said, and subsequently repeated the statement, that 30 or 40 Chinese soldiers were quartered in the incense factory immediately adjoining mission compound wall when bombing took place. This confirms statement of Japanese information bureau in second paragraph my April 1, noon, stating bomb which fell

APR 11 1933
RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEET

2-from Tientsin, April 4, noon.

fell just outside mission compound wall barely missed incense factory building in which the Chinese soldiers were quartered.

Bomb which fell outside southeast corner mission compound was apparently aimed at Chinese inn in which there was also small detachment Chinese soldiers. It is evident bombing was directed at Chinese troops. Kautto states there was no firing by Chinese soldiers prior to bombing but that one shot was fired by them at bombing plane. Immediately after bombing Chinese vacated factory building and inn.

Kautto reported that March 28 Chinese mission worker arrived Taitowying from Shwangshantze and reported Japanese soldiers had vacated mission property there and that no Japanese soldiers were in that city when he left. Meantime Chinese reported to Kautto that mission property Mutowteng had also been vacated by Japanese soldiers. Kautto has not had opportunity to confirm these reports but believed them correct. It was reported to him that notices had been posted on Shwangshantze property by Japanese forbidding any one enter or damage the property.

Kautto further reports that occupation Taitowying by Japanese appeared imminent. I strongly advised him to

have

sent to ONI & MID

0108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MJT

3-from Tientsin, April 4, noon.

*sent to
O. N. + mid*
have his wife leave Taitowying immediately and come to
Tientsin. He is leaving for Taitowying tonight to
bring his wife here.

Artillery firing in considerable volume being heard
in region of Chinwangtao to the west and northwest and
also north of Changli.

KLI-WWC

LOCKHART

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APR 4 1933

A telegram dated April 4, 1933, from the American Consul General at Tientsin, reads in part substantially as follows:

The Reverend Mr. Kautto reports that occupation Taitowying by Japanese appeared imminent. I strongly advised him to have his wife leave Taitowying immediately and come to Tientsin. He is leaving for Taitowying tonight to bring his wife here.

Artillery firing in considerable volume being heard in region of Chinwangtao to the west and northwest and also north of Changli.

m.m.H.

0110
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MOODY MEMORIAL CHURCH

CLARK, LA SALLE and NORTH AV., CHICAGO

H. A. IRONSIDE, Pastor

CHAS. A. PORTER and H. HERRING, Associate Pastors



EVER welcome to this House of God are
Strangers and the Poor—Church Motto.

SUNDAY SERVICES:

Sunday School..... 9:45 A.M.	Yoke Fellow Band..... 4:30 P.M.
Morning Worship..... 10:45 A.M.	Young Peoples Meetings..... 5 P.M.
Evening Service..... 7:30 P.M.	

GREAT CHORUS CHOIR led by Prof. T. J. Bittikofer
(over)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WEEKLY CALENDAR

MONDAY
(Until June 13)
BUSINESS GIRLS' COUNCIL . . . Torrey Chapel, 7:30 p.m.
MOODY MEN'S CLUB . . . Woolley Hall, 7:30 p.m.

WEDNESDAY
WOMEN'S MEETING . . . Torrey Chapel, 2:30 p.m.
THE MID-WEEK PRAYER
and PRAISE MEETING . . . Sankey Auditorium, 7:45 p.m.

THURSDAY
THE SCATTER SUNSHINE SEWING CIRCLE
and THIMBLE CLUB . . . meet alternately in Towner Hall
SUNDAY SCHOOL WORKER'S meeting . . . Torrey Chapel
The Sunday School lesson taught from 7 to 7:30 p.m.
by Pastor Ironside.
POPULAR BIBLE CLASS . . . Main Auditorium, 7:45 p.m.
Lectures by Pastor Ironside.

FRIDAY
CHOIR REHEARSAL . . . Main Auditorium, 7:30 p.m.


SATURDAY
REVIVAL PRAYER MEETING . . . Torrey Chapel, 7:45 p.m.

SPECIAL NOTICES

COMMUNION SERVICE—1st Sunday Morning of each month
BAPTISM— . . . 3rd Sunday Evening of each month
RECEPTION OF NEW MEMBERS— . . . Last Sunday Morning

SUMMER BIBLE SCHOOL,
Monday, June 20 to Friday, July 15
(over)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



OFFICE OF THE PASTOR
THE MOODY MEMORIAL CHURCH
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

April 3, 1933.

APR 5 33

793.94

Honorable Cordell Hall
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.



Honorable Sir:

As president of the Western Book and Tract Company, Incorporated, of Oakland, California, a missionary book concern holding title to the property of the Brethren Mission known as the Western Book and Tract Mission at Taitowying, North China, which was bombed by the Japanese on March 27, I am writing to inquire what steps should be taken to collect damages from the Japanese Government. I raised the sum of ten thousand dollars originally to build this Mission Station and I see from the newspaper reports that it has been seriously damaged, and that nine Chinese Christians were killed, but the missionaries, Mr. and Mrs. Chas. O. Kautto have escaped uninjured. I have nothing but the newspaper account as of course no word has yet reached me from Mr. Kautto, but I understand that two American flags were flying over the Mission at the time of the bombing. This strikes me as rather a serious matter for the Japanese to explain. I feel that we are standing upon our rights in asking the Japanese Government to reimburse us for all damage done.

Your kind attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Most respectfully,

President Western Book and Tract Co.
Oakland, California
Pastor Moody Memorial Church
Chicago, Illinois

HAI:FHF

F/HS

793.94/6135

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 10 1933

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/6135

The Reverend

H. A. Ironside,

Moody Memorial Church,

Clark, LaSalle and North Avenue,

Chicago, Illinois.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 3, 1933, in regard to possible damage to the property of the Western Book and Tract Mission at Taitowying, Hopei, China, as a result of a recent bombardment in that area by Japanese airplanes.

In this connection it may be stated that, according to the Reverend Mr. Kautto's written report to the American Consul General at Tientsin under date March 24, 1933, and his subsequent oral report to the same officer under date April 4, 1933, a Japanese airplane on the morning of March 24, 1933, after circling for about half an hour over Taitowying, dropped two bombs which struck outside of the mission's compound wall but not far from the Kautto

residence

793.94/6135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

residence. Fortunately, the damage sustained by the property appears to have been confined to the breaking of some windowpanes in the mission building, the dislodging of some bricks from the chimney of the Kautto residence, and the opening of two holes in the compound wall. Neither the Reverend Mr. Kautto nor Mrs. Kautto was injured in any way.

Although the matter has been taken up with the Japanese authorities and although preliminary reports appear to indicate that no damage to American property was intended, the Department understands that, in view of the situation in the Taitowying area and as a matter of extra precaution, Mr. Kautto returned to Taitowying on the evening of April 4 for the purpose of escorting Mrs. Kautto to Tientsin.

It is assumed that the question of the possible presentation of a claim for such damage as may have been suffered by the mission at Taitowying has been, or will be, presented by Mr. Kautto to the American Consul General at Tientsin.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:



FE Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE:RCM:EJL

4/7/33

APR 10 1933

LE 33

0111

IV-10-33

E.g.C.

Reg

793-94/6136

Therewith enclosed "Lettering Moving" I
saw the danger lay in — kindly return it
in an enclosed self-addressed envelope, with
an intimation that you have received and
read it, and anything else you may wish

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

IV-10-33.

Miss Hanna agrees
that this letter should
be filed without
acknowledgment.

E. J. C.

To Mr.

With kindest regret for being compelled
by the circumstances of the case to ~~write~~

I have the honor to remain,

Sincerely,

Your humble servant,

E. J. C.

P.S. - on all your & copy my "offer" and
have it published in any American
newspaper of your wish, or make any
other use of it as you judge well before
returning it ~~to me~~ to me.

Address to my I would think the
self-addressed envelope must be from American stamps.

E. J.

P.S. & of course, the air mail postage
on all important correspondence over land
is much more than by air mail.

and please

E. J. C.
Chas. S.
John
G. C. C.
Inland


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET



GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 5, 1933

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



URGENT.

April 5, 6 p. m.

793.94

According to a daily press report from Chinwangtao this morning Haiyang still occupied by Chinese but may be given up at any moment. One Japanese airplane carrier and two cruisers off Shanhaikuan and one cruiser at Chinwangtao. Japanese plane reconnoitred over Chinwangtao this morning.

RESOLUTE world cruise delayed here six hours yesterday afternoon due to the uncertain situation at Chinwangtao and was diverted to Tangku sailing from Taku Bar last night 11 o'clock.

WVC-CSB

LOCKHART

F/HS

793.94/6137

APR 6 1933

FILED

14

0118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6137

12 8 1972

To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period March 23 to April 5, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.


793.94/6137

Enclosure:
Two copies of digest
of telegrams.

egc.
FE:EGC:EJL
4/3/33

FE

Apr. 6 1933



70 M E

0 1 1 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
March 23 to April 5, 1933.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 24) that on March 23 three coaches full of Chinese officers' wives and children passed through Tientsin from the Chinwangtao-Changli area; that no Chinese troops have moved eastward through Tientsin for about a week; that it seems that the situation in the Tientsin-Chinwangtao area is relaxing; and that the general situation in Tientsin is improving.

The Minister at Peiping reports (March 27) that the situation in North China is unchanged; that Chinese positions along the Great Wall are being strengthened by troops from the region of the Yangtze River; and that the Chinese are sending all valuable objects to Tientsin and Shanghai.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 27) that on March 24, according to reliable information, Japanese airplanes dropped several bombs in Taotoying (south of the Great Wall), killing nine civilians in all, presumably Chinese.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 28) that, without any explanation, the Japanese commanding officer at Chinwangtao informed the American army officer in charge of the small American Army detachment stationed there that from two to four Japanese airplanes would fly over Chinwangtao in the next four or five days.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (March 29) that on March 29 one battery of Chinese troops passed eastward through Tientsin en route to Kaiping (about 70 miles northeast of Tientsin) and that on March 28 a considerable quantity of ammunition passed eastward.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 1) that it is reliably reported from Chinwangtao that on April 1 the Japanese occupied Hsihmenchai (a short distance north of Chinwangtao and south of the Great Wall). The Consul General adds that the situation in the vicinity of Shanhaikwan is becoming more tense; that considerable fighting has taken place west and northwest of Shanhaikwan; and that Japanese reconnoitering airplanes have dropped some bombs in that region.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 4) that, according to reliable reports from Chinwangtao, Chinese troops in the vicinity of Haiyang (about 10 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan) retreated on April 3. The Consul General adds that refugees from the north are arriving at Chinwangtao; that so far there is no trouble at Chinwangtao; and that no Chinese reinforcements have arrived there.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 5) that one Japanese airplane carrier and two cruisers are off Shanhaikwan and one cruiser is at Chinwangtao; that a Japanese airplane reconnoitered over Chinwangtao on April 5, and that on April 4 a British vessel on a world cruise was delayed for six hours at Tientsin due to the uncertain situation at Chinwangtao and was diverted to Tangku, sailing from Taku Bar (the ocean port for Tientsin).

EGC:
EGC:EJL

m. m. H.

CE
Apr. 6, 1946

112


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY




FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 5, 1933

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



308, April 5, 4 p. m.

Local situation continues unchanged although serious situation which has developed in Kiangsi and which has forced Chiang Kai Shek to proceed to that point is portentous. Japanese advance through Hsihmenchai and Haiyang does not at present appear to have any significance other than an attempt to clear that area of Chinese forces which have been threatening Japanese at Chiumenkou and Shanhaikwan.

CSB-HED

JOHNSON

F/G 793.94/6138

APR 6 1933

RECEIVED

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM


GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated April 6, 1933.

Recd 6:50 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR -6 1933
Department of State

April 6, noon

Japanese airplane reconnoitring continued at and in vicinity Chinwangtao yesterday. Some fighting still in progress vicinity Haiyang. There are multiplying signs that Japanese are endeavoring to push Chinese forces back to Lwanchow and keep the territory between that place and the Wall free of Chinese soldiers.

LOCKHART

CIB JS

F/H/S

793.94/6139

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APR 7 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ankara, March 14, 1933.

No. 405

~~72~~
~~NE~~
~~52~~
~~NE~~

SUBJECT: Tevfik Rüştü Bey's report upon Russian reaction
in Far Eastern problem.

793.94
not
861.01

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 10 1933
COPY IN FILE
11-600-Turkey
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
APR 7 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR -6 1933
Department of State
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 8
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

F/G 793.94/6140

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

During my long conversation this morning with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Bey (see
my despatch No.402 of today's date) he told me that
immediately upon his arrival in Geneva he had resumed
close touch with the Russian Delegation there, all of
whom he had known before, and some of whom had been in
Moscow when he and Ismet Pasha spent a fortnight there
last year. He said that they talked quite frankly
to him about the development of the Manchoukuo problem.
Litvinov said that the Russians were greatly surprised
at the complete breakdown of the Chinese defense in
Manchuria, because they had thought that the gallant and
skillfully trained trench work which the Chinese 19th

Route

637 06 02

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Route Army had last year opposed to the Japanese at Shanghai gave great promise of similar defensive work by the Chinese in Manchuria. Litvinov believed that one of the reasons that the Chinese defense crumpled up was that financial arrangements had been made in advance by the Japanese with several of the Chinese generals. It would seem that Litvinov said little or nothing to Tefvik Rüştü Bey about whether or not Japan would push her anti-Chinese operations south of the Great Wall. But Litvinov was most explicit in expressing to his Turkish friend that Russia was now convinced that, because of the complete breakdown of the Chinese resistance in Jehol, and also and especially since the Japanese Cabinet felt they must hurry matters because of Japan's increasingly serious economic condition and the constantly growing budget demands from the Army, the Japanese would invade Outer Mongolia during the next few weeks, regardless of the Russian military forces there. I telegraphed reporting this to you in my No. 3 of March 14, 5 pm. In that same telegram I also reported that the Russians told Tefvik Rüştü Bey that the United States would shortly recognize Russia. The Turk told me that he advised the Russians to reconstitute their relations with the United States in the same way that Turkey had done after the Great War; viz., by an exchange of Commissioners or High Commissioners, letting the matter of Ambassadors wait until later on. To this suggestion Litvinov had replied that in his opinion Russia preferred to exchange Ambassadors as soon as possible, and even mentioned the name of Senator Cutting

as a

0125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

as a possible first American Ambassador. Tevfik Rüşti Bey went on to say that he would be more than pleased when Russia and the United States had resumed diplomatic relations, because he was such a great admirer of both peoples. He reminded me that in one of our early interviews he had expressed the opinion that peace in the Pacific would never be assured until we resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. (I reported this in my despatch No. 1 of May 14, 1932.)^{961.01/1759} My only comment on all this was that the Embassy had, as yet, received no indication from the State Department what would be the policy of the new Administration in this regard.

Respectfully yours,

Charles H. Sherrill

Charles H. Sherrill.


710
CHS/g/rs

COPY SENT E. I. C. PARIS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 7, 1933

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR -7 1933

April 7, 11 a.

Three trains of Chinese troops moved eastward through
Tientsin yesterday afternoon.

Officer in charge 15th United States Infantry detach-
ment Chinwangtao reports fighting north of camp between
Chinese forces and Manchukuo troops consisting of Koreans,
Chinese and Japanese wearing divisional uniform as Chinese
with white band left sleeve. Also reports brisk fighting
village about 3 miles north of camp, some stray but spent
bullets falling around soldiers club Chinwangtao. He fur-
ther reports no troops (presumably no Chinese troops) at
Haiyang and that two battalions Chinese troops have left
Chinwangtao for Peitaiho, only one platoon now remaining
Chinwangtao.

Although area above mentioned is in territory under
the jurisdiction of General Nakamura, so far as Japanese
troops are concerned, with headquarters at Tientsin, it
is understood that officers and men of this command are
not concerned with operations which are apparently being
carried

F/G 793.94/6141

STANDARD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R., Apr. 7,
11 am.

carried out by troops from behind the Wall many of whom
belong to Manchukuo army and some of whom may embrace
former Chinese officials and volunteers who are said to
have gone over to Manchukuo during Jehol campaign. Pres-
ent operations variously supported by Japanese air forces.

WSB-HPD

LOCKHART

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated April 7, 1933

Rec'd 9:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

312, April 7, 3 p. m.

My 296, March 31, 4 p. m.

Following from American Embassy at Tokyo:

"April 6, 3 p. m.

Your March 28, 2 p. m. Kautto, Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today stated that the matter of occupation of American mission property at Mutowteng and Schwangshantze was still under investigation by the army and that complete report was not yet available.


Regarding dropping of bombs at Taitowying the Japanese authorities state that it is possible that damage may have been done to property. Japanese scouting planes were operating over this place at the time mentioned against Chinese forces. They were flying at a height of 1,500 meters. At that height it is impossible to make out a flag flying vertically from a pole and suggest that it would be better to place the flag horizontally over the ground or roofs. If damage was done the military sincerely regret it as they have strict instructions to cause no trouble to foreigners and they had and have no

76

F/HS

793.94/6142

RECEIVED



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#312 from Peiping via N.R.,
April 7, 3 p. m.

no intention of so doing.

This information will probably be communicated to you by the Japanese Legation and to Department by Japanese Embassy in Washington".

Two. Nakayama, first secretary in charge of Japanese Legation, called yesterday and stated that he had been instructed by his Government to see me and express regret for the damage done to American property and the danger caused to American life by Japanese bombing at Taitowying; that Japanese investigation of damage done is impossible at this time since property concerned is within Chinese lines; that Japanese military state that it was not their intention to attack or damage foreign life or property; that on the contrary they were doing everything possible to assure protection thereof; that Chinese on occasion use foreign property as shield for staging attacks and that in such Japanese have no other recourse than to resist such attacks; that Japanese authorities hope that Legation warn Kautto to take cognizance of this aspect of the matter and repair to place of safety.

Three. I thanked Nakayama for his expression of regret, expressed appreciation of attitude of the Japanese military as stated by him and as indicated by
operations

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#312 from Peiping via N.R.,
April 7, 3 p. m.

operations in Jehol and concluded with statement that
Taitowying bombing was brought to his attention in the
hope that this knowledge will assist Japanese in their
efforts not to interfere with American property.

Four. Lockhart's April ^{6, 1934} 4, noon, to the Depart-
ment and the Legation and previous reports appear
fully to bear out statement of case as made by the
Japanese Legation. Location of mission property
has been notified to the Japanese Legation.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Handwritten initials and marks: "H", "64", "H", "FE" with a checkmark.

Conversation.

April 7, 1933.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
APR 10 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Toshihiko Taketomi,
Counselor of the Japanese
Embassy
Mr. Hornbeck.

Handwritten notes: "file", "Checked to Tokyo and Beijing E 82".
Stamp: "Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS", "APR 14 1933", "Department of State".

Subject: The Kautto Incident.

Reference Peiping's telegram 510, April 7, 3 p.m.

Handwritten: "793.94"

Mr. Taketomi called on me yesterday afternoon and, stating that he had come under instruction from the Japanese Ambassador, referred to the conversation which I had had recently with the Ambassador on the subject of the Kautto incident, and said that the Ambassador now had an account of the matter from the Japanese Government which he wished to have Mr. Taketomi give me.

Mr. Taketomi then made to me a statement substantially in accord with the statement contained in the telegram from our Embassy at Tokyo, cited above (but omitting what appears in the first paragraph of the said telegram).

There followed some conversation, in the course of which I expressed to Mr. Taketomi the Department's appreciation of the Embassy's courtesy in giving us this account. Mr. Taketomi said that he assumed that the same

F/HS
F.W. 793.94/6142

Handwritten: "R 38", "62-40"

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same account was being given to our officers at Tokyo and at Peiping. I said that I assumed the same and that we would doubtless in due course receive reports in that connection from those officers.

I then took occasion to express regret that the hostilities continue and remarked that it is to be hoped that at all times the combatants on both sides will take account of the fact that in ultimate analysis the jeopardy to which foreign lives and property are subjected arises out of the fact that the hostilities are engaged in; and I remarked further that it is to be hoped that both will so conduct the hostilities as to avoid as far as possible combat in neighborhoods where foreign persons and property are rightfully established. Mr. Taketomi said that he was sure that his people did not wish to imperil or interfere with the rights and activities of third parties.

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FE:SKH/ZMK

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1059

April 18 1933

To the American Minister,

Peiping.

The Secretary of State refers to the Minister's telegram 312, April 7, 3 p.m., in regard to the Kautto incident and encloses, for the information of the Legation, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation on April 7 between the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

F.W. 793.94/6142

Enclosure:
 Memorandum dated
 April 7, 1933.

793.94/6142

FE:MMH:EJL

4/10/33

APR 18 1933

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 14 1933

No. 257

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Referring to the Ambassador's telegram of April 6,
3 p.m., to the American Minister at Peiping (which was
repeated to the Department), there is enclosed, for the
information of the Embassy, a copy of a memorandum of a
conversation on April 7 between the Counselor of the
Japanese Embassy and the Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs.

F.W. 793.94/6142

Enclosure:
Memorandum dated
April 7, 1933.

793.94/6142

mmh
FE:MMH:EJL
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624

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APR 18 1933

A true copy of
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initials
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2000

Peiping, March 15, 1933.

Subject: Editorials on the Fall of Jehol.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/6

I have the honor to enclose six editorials appearing in recent issues of Peiping and Tientsin papers regarding the situation resulting from the capture of Jehol by the Japanese, and the visit of General Chiang Kai-shek to North China.

These editorials indicate a realization that the debacle in Jehol was due to a lack of organization and to the fact that the resources of only a limited region were used. There appears also to be a realization that an endeavor to recapture Jehol would be fruitless. Anxiety is expressed because of the vagueness of the Japanese term "Eastern Inner Mongolia", and the possibility

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sibility that the Japanese conquest may be extended into Chahar and Suiyuan.

Satisfaction is expressed with the change of control from Chang Hsueh-liang to Ho Ying-chin; there is advocacy of the formation of a new line of defense entrusted to reliable men; and a stressing of the need for the organization of all of the intellectual, financial and military powers of the country toward the formation of a definite plan of action.

It is stated that self-preservation motivated General Chiang's visit to North China and that his attitude is not likely to be provocative. There is an expression of the belief that the Japanese do not want to "embark upon the raging sea of intervention in China Proper".

It is impossible to foretell what will result from the visit of General Chiang Kai-shek to North China, but there seem to be indications of a temporary acquiescence in the Japanese fait accompli.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1. THE PEIPING CHRONICLE,
 March 7, 1933, "More Determination".
2. March 8, 1933, "Jehol and North China".
3. March 10, 1933, "The Coming of the Generalissimo".
4. PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES,
 March 10, 1933, "Prolonged Resistance".
5. PEIPING CHRONICLE
 March 11, 1933, "To Return to Reason".
6. March 12, 1933, "The New Situation in North China."

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LC/GL

Copy to Tokyo.

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Tuesday March 7, 1933

MORE DETERMINATION
"Pei Ping Chen Pao", Peiping

It is true that for the loss of Jehol General Tang Yu-lin deserves capital punishment. Now we have to devise some new measures for the recovery of that province. Our anti-Japanese campaign is nationwide in scope and permanent in time, and by no means subject to any standstill when failure occurs at any special place or any particular point of time. We should model ourselves on the Belgians during the European War, and our re-birth is then sure. Belgium regained a glorious independence only after four years of desperate warfare, during which even her central government had to be removed to another country. The Mukden Incident was the preamble to the Sino-Japanese armed struggle, and the Jehol war is only a part of the same conflict. In order to retrieve Jehol and Manchuria, we must prepare for a permanent struggle. The Sino-Japanese war must not come to an end as long as the lost territory is not recovered.

We should not cherish any hope that the Japanese will stop their advance at the Great Wall. The Tokyo military have fixed plans and stages. Their campaign for the conquest of the whole of China is being carried on according to programme. Though declaring that they will not attack the territory within the Great Wall, whenever the vital points along the Wall fall to their hands, the territory within it will be subject to seizure at any moment they feel convenient. We should not regard the fall of Chengteh as the end of the Jehol War. We should by this further strengthen our determination against Japanese ambition, and struggle more desperately for the recovery of the lost land. Our determination should not be shaken even if the whole of North China falls to the Japanese army and the safety of territories south of the Yangtze river is threatened. The eventual victory will be gained only after a prolonged struggle, carried out at the greatest possible sacrifice.

The most important measure today for the authorities to adopt is not to afford sufficient time for the enemy to rest. We should be only concerned with what we should do, instead of with what the enemy will do. The anti-Japanese campaign is not a difficult task if we lay our plans properly, but self-defence must go beyond

empty words. What are the best plans? The concentration of all the military, financial and intellectual energies in the country is the first step. Wherever the Japanese troops fight us, all the soldiers in the whole country must regard this as an attack on them all, so that the enemy may never again defeat us one unit after another. A thorough war plan is absolutely necessary for coping with the situation today. Japan has seized four provinces of China in a period of only seventeen months, the programme being carried out by a war without declaration. But the abnormal situation today can only be utilized by Japan if we have not a thorough plan. If we remain any longer without definite aims, failure in the future is the only logical result.

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THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Wednesday March 8, 1933

JEHOL AND NORTH CHINA
"Ta Kung Pao", Tientsin

With the whole situation affected by the fall of Chengteh, we feel it incumbent on us to call the attention of the Government to the following points.

First, our authorities must clearly realize today that the counter-attack which has been so loudly talked about since the fall of the Jehol capital will bear little fruit. Sheer lack of organization in our own camp and not any superior ability of the Japanese soldiers, brought about the collapse. If we had had a thorough plan, we could have recaptured Chengteh immediately after its fall. As a matter of fact, however, the routed troops are hurriedly falling back towards the Great Wall. The Japanese army has been perfectly successful in encircling the border of the Hopei province and concluding the war in Jehol. All the natural strategic points that we possessed a few days ago have now fallen into the hand of the enemy, and are being utilized to attack us. Moreover, the military planes of Japan continue to bomb our main forces and the highway may be used for a counter-attack. Being still without a thorough plan, the counter-attack will be fruitless.

Second, the Japanese ambition is unlimited. After seizing Manchuria, they wanted Mongolia, and after seizing Mongolia, North China becomes their objective. The Three Eastern Provinces were lost because we had not focussed our attention on this area throughout the past twenty years; and likewise, the fact that the Government did not pay serious attention to Jehol resulted in the eventual loss of that province. Chahar and Suiyuan provinces today are the Jehol of several days ago; and North China today is the Manchuria of the period before the Mukden Incident. Now it is urgent that the energy of the whole country should be concentrated on the Hopei-Suiyuan-Chahar area, which has become the first line of national defence ever since the penetration of the screen. The fact that a part of the troops engaged in the Japanese Jehol campaign was commanded by disgruntled Chinese and Mongols, shows that these traitors will by no means be satisfied

with the occupation of Jehol only. It is clear enough that they will further attack Hopei Chahar, and Suiyuan provinces.

Third, the sacrifices in Jehol were merely the logical results of the lack of a thorough plan and due organization. The question of dealing with the routed troops is another difficult problem. Most of the grey units and those formerly under the command of Tang Yu-lin are now trying to flee into Hopei and Chahar. They will only ruin these districts. We therefore suggest that all these troops should be immediately disarmed and disbanded. Tang Yu-lin should be immediately executed on the spot, so as to show to the country the power of law.

These are the most important points with which the Government today should concern itself. If the past mistakes are not corrected, the entire nation will be brought to a state of subjugation.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Friday, March 10, 1933

THE COMING OF THE GENERALISSIMO.

The collapse in Jehol needed some explaining. Marshal CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, in the plaintive "Peccavi" he has given to the world through a close adherent, has given a good deal of the explanation, good enough as far as it goes, though it does not account for everything. Mr. T.V. SOONG has cast an indirect light on the whole situation. There can be but one course after all that has happened and that has been said, and that is a determined effort at retrieval. How far such a thing is possible, at present, is a matter of opinion, but it seems to be conceded at least that things cannot be allowed to drift from bad to worse. This the central authorities in Nanking have been the first to realize, and hence we have now the definite news that the Generalissimo has come North to see what can be done and, we hope, to do it. The task before him is not an easy one. He has to deal with a situation that is complicated in the extreme. There is no time in which men are more difficult to deal with than when they have been overtaken by disaster. Tempers are soured, sensibilities are easily ruffled, personal dignities are not easy to maintain and are very easily affronted. Yet times like the present are not times in which those who would retrieve a precarious situation can afford to be too hesitant in choosing their words, too tender in apportioning responsibility, or over considerate in expressing their findings on the facts. We do not envy General CHIANG KAI-SHEK the task that lies before him.

First of all he will have to ascertain what ground is not lost but is imperilled, and make dispositions for its security at all costs. There must be virtually the formation of a new line of defence, and its entrustment to dependable men. Here he will have his first difficulty. Obviously there must be some weeding out. There must be no more risking things to half-hearted men whose first consideration is their own interest, men of the TANG YU-LIN type. The men to be placed in command must be dependable beyond peradventure, they must be entrusted with very full powers of drastic reorganization, and must be supported in every loyal effort. General CHIANG has in the past had experience of precisely this sort of thing. He has had to choose his men, and his success in the northward sweep from Canton to Nanking, as well as his success in clearing the mid-Yangtze region of bandits, has shown that he knows how to get the right men for work that has to be carried out with unswerving fidelity to orders. We presume that he himself will be in direct charge of all operations and will be as thorough in his methods here as he has been in the past. It would be well that an announcement of his intention to take full control should be made as early as possible. Nothing could better restore local confidence, and indeed confidence throughout North China, as such an announcement. It is evident from a perusal of the vernacular press that confidence sadly needs restoring.

In establishing the new line of defence considera-

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tion must be given not merely to the points threatened at this moment. The Japanese press is already talking of a forward move into Chahar. There is no sign as yet that there is in Chahar any love for or predilection towards "Manchukuo", but steps must be taken to secure that the story of Jehol shall not be repeated in Chahar. The limits of the Japanese-coined expression "Eastern Inner Mongolia" have never been defined, and the utmost vigilance is necessary to secure the binding of firm bonds between Chahar and the rest of the Republic not yet over-run by the Japanese forces and the "Manchukuo" hordes. There is clearly danger to be ward off along the Chahar-Jehol frontier, and in this the prestige and experience of General CHIANG should be a great asset.

If these matters mere military efficiency or military capacity are not the most important factor. What is needed is a personal approach that shall breed confidence and loyalty. General CHIANG comes on the scene without the encumbrance of personal ties and a past local history, unhampered by entangling engagements and in no sense mortgaged to any clique or party or faction. There is no place, no room, for factions and cliques as the country stands faced with the present issue, and it is to be hoped that in the presence of a commander who is expected to act without fear or favour, to deal with men and issues on their merits, faction and cliquism will disappear, and that in spite of the bitter and humiliating story of the past two months the country will see on the part of the military leaders in the north a genuine determination to stand together and support with all their energy a Commander-in-Chief who, as the choice of the National Government, is entitled to their unswerving loyalty, their unquestioning obedience and their whole-hearted service. Unless General CHIANG can be sure of this, the finest plans he may make, the most brilliant dispositions of his available forces, and the utmost genius he can display will be utterly wasted, and we shall simply have a repetition of the old story.

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PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 1933.

"PROLONGED RESISTANCE."

EVENTS are generally expected to take a decisive turn now that the Generalissimo is in the North, a scapegoat has been provided in the person of Tang Yu-lin whereon Press and public (and high Government officials such as Ho Ying-ching) can vent their wrath, and the ex-rebel forces sent to the "front" are in an impossible situation strategically. Has Chiang Kai-shek come up here at this late hour in order to cover his political opponents in confusion by ordering and commanding resistance, or to confirm them in their view by using the crisis for other purposes? Recent visitors to Nanking have declared that the dominant consideration there is self-preservation, and that is no doubt correct, despite the enormous smoke-screen of propaganda which the patriots have thrown out, the diplomatic offensive at Geneva, and the declarations of prolonged resistance. The Japanese Information Bureau has been stating for weeks that if and when the Generalissimo came up North it would be to consolidate his hold here, and not for the purposes of further armed resistance. The article from that Bureau which we reproduced in our last issue states that in addition to the forces from Honan and Hsuechowfu which have already taken up important positions around Peiping, much larger forces under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control are on the way. It is asserted that the Young Marshal's troops will be reorganised with the Government forces—in other words taken over by the Generalissimo—and "the situation will then be ameliorated." These statements may be taken *cum grano salis*, but Chiang Kai-shek is certainly not likely to be "provocative."

Whether General Chiang will or will not see Marshals Yen and Feng seems to us a point of no particular consequence. If they did meet the Generalissimo would doubtless direct their attention to the strategic situation and politely ask them, as mili-

tary experts, whether they considered it was really possible, all things considered, to continue to defy the Japanese Army, whose superiority in technique and material has once more been so convincingly demonstrated against the rabble in Jehol. It is idle to consider what they might reply: idle because it would be immaterial. But we may take it that Marshal Yen would be pessimistic and peaceful, desiring nothing better than that his province should be spared from the enormous burdens that would be imposed upon it in the event of real resistance. And there is nothing to show that the old Kuominchun are ready at present to support their former chief, in a policy calling for tremendous sacrifices, if not ruin, at the present juncture.

Nevertheless, though the Japanese do not want to embark upon the raging sea of intervention in China Proper, and Chiang Kai-shek doubtless does not want to have his policy and his Government threatened with shipwreck, the problem is not an easy one to solve. Openly to command all the troops who have been ordered to lines of defence in this province to retire to their original stations is impossible. Such a tidal wave of indignation would develop as would threaten to deprive the Government of all further support from public opinion. Canton may be playing politics more than what it claims to be patriotism, but it would not fail to stigmatise such an act as arrant treason, and the politicians might even be able to force the standpat Generals really to set the much-talked-of Expedition marching. The position is one of the utmost delicacy, and will call for the exercise of all General Chiang's undoubted talents.

In this connection Rengo issues a most remarkable despatch, citing "reports from Tientsin" under a Shanhaikuan date-line—an extraordinarily roundabout way to secure such "hot" news—to the effect that it is proposed first to reorganise the defeated forces, and then to use the former Mukden

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troops, and the armies directly controlled by the Generalissimo, for a new campaign of suppression. It is alleged that a virtual ultimatum will be sent to Feng Yu-hsiang, demanding once more that he proceed to Nanking, there, no doubt, to await the Government's pleasure as a prisoner of State. In the event of a continued refusal on his part, the story goes, he will be impeached on the ground that (like the Generalissimo) he took no part in the Jehol campaign, and moreover declined the various orders of the Central Government, namely: (1) that he proceed abroad; (2) that he place himself under the benevolent eye of the Young Marshal in Peiping; (3) that he deliver himself up to Nanking. It will be recalled that these orders were declined on the ground that, being a citizen of China, he had the right to reside where he liked. A more amazing assertion of personal rights has never been made since the Kuomintang established Tutelage. Obviously he is a "traitor," and Rengo tells us that if he continues to display so arrogant a disposition an effort will be made to drive him away from Kalgan by force. The next stage in the effort to consolidate the authority of the Central Government, we are told, is to place Han Fu-chu under surveillance and then to order General Liu Chih, who commands large forces loyal to Chiang Kai-shek in Honan, to attack Shantung, in which the reorganised Northern forces would co-operate, the former moving from the south and the latter from the North.

Whether these reports emanating from sources in Tientsin whose identity is not disclosed are well or ill founded we do not pretend to know. They look too much like having been fathered by a not very pious hope. They are so sensational in their import, however, that we mention them for what they may be worth. If such a situation did develop, the joke would be on Geneva, which would be hopelessly fooled. A more stupendous deception and disillusionment could never have

been perpetrated in the agelong history of political duplicity. But we do not imagine that this amazing story is true, or if true, that civil war is at all likely. Rather is it probable that the opposition will view a passive policy, if adopted, in the North with a silence more eloquent than consent, and bide their uneasy time, if they are allowed to do so, though such of them as have the power to do so would no doubt defend themselves in the unlikely event of their being attacked.

General Araki has put the position as he sees it in a nutshell in a Nippon Dempo despatch published in yesterday's Chinese papers. He says that while he cannot predict the future course of events, Japan hopes to be able to cease hostilities with China. But "China must understand the lack of her own energy and the futility of depending on others." Moreover, he adds, they must understand that the problems of Asia must be solved only by Asiatics. If China understands the present state of affairs, he says, normal friendly relations between the two countries can be restored, leading to negotiations between the two parties. The leaders who claim to be the realists in China, of whom the Generalissimo is the foremost, may feel disposed to act in accordance with the passage we have quoted in inverted commas. They will say—or at least think—that there is nothing else to be done at present if North China is to be saved from a big war, the main ports be secure from occupation, and Nanking-cum-Shanghai remain the capital. Whether the Japanese army would then rest from its labours and the efforts of Japan be concentrated on the reconstruction and development of the enormous area now under occupation, or seek new laurels, remains to be seen.

What would happen to the ex-rebels along the Lan River and between Lanchow and Tientsin if resistance is abandoned it is difficult to say. Their position would be one of extraordinary delicacy, for with

the "reorganised" forces behind them and the Japanese in front of them they would either have to retreat on their own initiative, wait for orders to do so, or assure the Generalissimo, with a sob in their throats, of their undying loyalty. In any case the successive demands and pressure applied to the Chinese authorities in Tientsin cannot be ignored. If the Japanese were to enforce these demands by local action—in which respect the Chinese here are very nervous and crediting rumours of another incident much more serious than the last—the troops at the front would be in a still more difficult position, though it is hardly likely that such action will be necessary, or that if it occurred, the retreating troops would stop off here and join in the tussle. The situation is, however, one of exceptional delicacy and great international importance, and, like General Araki, we cannot venture to predict the course of events with absolute confidence, though the peace movement has much the most powerful backing, whatever may be the ultimate outcome. China's position at present is almost as hopeless as was that of the Young Turks at the end of the Great War, when they had been battered to a pulp as the climax to a long series of defeats extending over a decade. But the Turks came back, and so can China, if she really unites, organises, and waits.

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THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Saturday, March II, 1933

TO RETURN TO REASON
"Pei Ping Chen Pao", Tientsin

The future of North China hinges on the significant trip of General Chiang Kai-shek. Though the Jehol capital has fallen to the Japanese, all the strategic passes and points south-west of Chengteh are still strongly defended by Chinese forces. As a result of severe fighting throughout the past few days, the invaders have been several times repulsed. That troops under the command of General Sun Tien-ying are also obstinately fighting, indicates that our soldiers on the various fronts are little dejected by the fall of Chengteh. Perhaps it is not very difficult to retrieve the territory now already overrun by the enemy, if we can unify our purpose and the supreme command, and organize our rear. Since we have constantly spoken of our resistance as "prolonged", temporary defeat is only what we expected, and we should not be disappointed by it. The most important measure today is to formulate a definite, thorough plan.

Japan has carried on her aggression in China with all her intellectual, financial, and military power. China is resisting this superior invading force by drawing on the resources of only a certain region. Perhaps resistance with all the energy of the entire nation may result in victory. Resistance with the resources of only a limited region must undoubtedly be overcome. General Chiang Kai-shek is the highest responsible military authority in the Central Government. His coming to the North will facilitate the concentration of the energy of the entire country in resisting the invading Japanese. To order the soldiers on the front to go on fighting and to kill as many of the enemy as possible is a simple task, but how efficiently to supply them with sufficient munition and foodstuffs is a difficult question. In our opinion, both the front and the rear should be equally stressed. The Government and the people should both do their utmost in the resistance campaign. In a word, we should concentrate the energy of the entire nation on readjusting the positions both at the front and in the rear.

It has been our consistent view that those who can better utilize scientific methods in warfare will be the victors.

How can we expect any favourable result when the enemy uses tanks, wireless apparatus, newest machine-guns, high-powered trucks, and fighting plane, whilst we are limited to sand bags, camels, old-type rifles, and ordinary telegraphic methods? We should first concentrate all the newest weapons in this country in the Northern defence lines. We should also establish twenty or thirty defence lines in the area north of the Yellow River, so as to defend the territory at all strategic points. Only then may the recovery of Jehol be expected. There are still hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops in Jehol. They are all in a position to recapture Chengteh if properly reinforced. We should quickly return to reason, whence we can discover good and effective defensive plans.

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Sunday, March 12, 1933

THE NEW SITUATION IN
NORTH CHINA
"Yung Pao", Tientsin

It was decided at the historic Paotingfu conference that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be relieved of all the government posts, and the direct command of the resistance campaign against the invading Japanese should be taken by General Ho Ying-chin. The situation in North China is thus completely changed by the shifting of responsibility of resisting the Japanese from the shoulders of the Young Marshal to the shoulders of the Central Government. This step is natural and necessary in view of the successive losses in the four provinces.

Japan is invading China with all the material and human resources at her disposal. But on the other hand, in the past seventeen months, China only used the resources of a limited region. On Marshal Chang only devolved the responsibility for the war at Chinchow, in Heilungkiang, and recently in Jehol. The situation was made worse and more unfavourable for China owing to the fact that the slender forces under Marshal Chang could by no means be compared with the national forces of the Japanese Empire. General Chiang Kai-shek had suddenly left Nanchang immediately after he received the message of the fall of the Jehol city. It is unnecessary to say that in so doing he has earned the respect of the whole country. It is proper that Marshal Chang, who has lost four provinces, should be given a period of rest, all his troops and responsibilities being handed over to the Central Government.

With this new change in North China, the first principle to be adopted by the Central Government is of course a 100 per cent. resistance measure with all the energy of this country, and the first thing for the Central Government to undertake is a campaign for the retaking of Chengteh. The country outside Kupeikou and Hsifengkou is rugged and mountainous. Military supplies can be very conveniently sent to these places, for they are near to both Peiping and Tientsin. The Japanese authorities had threatened to attack Kupeikou from inside the Great Wall from Shanhaikwan. Our

authorities must be more determined to cope with this situation. We must anticipate that the whole country will be transformed into a big battlefield, and every citizen in this country should be ready to take up arms to fight the common enemy. We must also be ready to sacrifice everything in order to preserve the identity of the Chinese people. This is the determination which the Central Government should have after it has taken over the heavy responsibility of resistance against the Japanese invaders in North China.

The determination can be put into effect only when accompanied by a thorough plan. Our central authorities must immediately prepare for an offensive war in Jehol. It was due to the lack of cannons, planes and scientific weapons that Jehol province fell. The Central Government should immediately concentrate all tanks, fighting airplanes, and guns that we have on the front to be employed in recovering Chengteh. There must be absolutely no pretexts for further defeat, which can no longer be excused by the whole nation.

Now it is the time for North China either to fall to the Japanese or be preserved. The Central Government, which is enthusiastically backed by the entire nation, should make the greatest possible sacrifice, and struggle for an outlet for the nation even at the cost of great bloodshed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I think we
 should give them
 some special
 mention —
 either in letter
 or in letter.

SKH

1 April 24

~~SKH~~

~~AKH~~

Erather.
 think this
 should be
 addressed to the
 Ambassador, or
 covered by a letter
 to the Ambassador.

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confirmed by a contract with "Manchukuo". The part
played by the South Manchuria Railway, if as important
as indicated, would imply that the Japanese occupation
of Manchuria, instead of being purely military aggression,
^{in part}
was the result of economic forces.

.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, March 24, 1933.

No. 341.

Subject: The South Manchuria Railway and the Japanese
Occupation of Manchuria.



APR 7 33

CONFIDENTIAL.



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

In the past it has been generally held that the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese was initiated and carried out by the Japanese Army (or by that part of it stationed in Manchuria) without the previous knowledge and consent of the civil branches of the Japanese Government. While nothing has been disclosed which would alter this view, it now appears that it may not have been the Army, or the Kwantung Garrison, alone which
organized

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organized and carried out the occupation, but that an important impelling influence behind the Army may have been the South Manchuria Railway. The Embassy has nothing exact and explicit upon which to base this statement, but numerous small facts point to a larger participation in the affair by the South Manchuria Railway than is generally recognized.

There is no doubt that the South Manchuria Railway had reason for desiring the Japanese control of Manchuria. The Railway was the principal sufferer from the pin-pricking policy which the Chinese administration of Manchuria adopted as a means of resistance to Japanese political and economic encroachment. Despite the Japanese claim that the so-called "parallel railways" were in violation of an agreement, the Chinese were from time to time building railways which served to deflect traffic from the South Manchuria Railway, whose receipts in consequence were steadily decreasing. With the impending completion of the Chinese port of Hulutao, connected with the Chinese network of railways, the South Manchuria Railway could foresee its fall from the position of supreme economic factor of Manchuria. Diplomatic protests against this invasion(as it was considered) of the South Manchuria Railway's territory having had no effect, it would not be strange if the Railway backed forcible measures in order to maintain its supremacy.

On June 12, 1931, Count Uchida was appointed President

of

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of the South Manchuria Railway by a Minseito Cabinet, although he was formerly supposed to have Seiyukai leanings. Count Uchida is said to be in general a careful, astute diplomat of strong nationalistic leanings, but when aroused to be a hot-headed zealot, stubbornly and fanatically devoted to a cause. He has long been an ardent supporter of Japanese expansion in Manchuria, and, according to Tsunego Baba, in an article in the CHUO KORON of May, 1932, it was through his efforts, while Minister to China in 1903, that the Russo-Chinese secret agreement of alliance failed of conclusion. Count Uchida is said to have realized then that the agreement would have "deprived Japan of any pretext upon which she could make war on Russia to assert her interests in Manchuria", and consequently he "spared neither money nor energy to induce Chinese high officials and other notables to cancel the secret treaty which was then ready for ratification by the Empress Dowager". It is reported that Uchida spent two million yen (a part of which went to the Empress Dowager herself) to secure the non-ratification of the agreement. The ostensible reasons for the appointment of Count Uchida to the Presidency of the South Manchuria Railway were (1) to take the railway out of Japanese politics, and (2) to provide as President a man of sufficient strength and prestige to be able to conduct necessary negotiations with the Chinese regarding the many pending questions. At that

time

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time, however, the Japanese-Chinese relations in Manchuria were rapidly approaching a crisis, and it is possible that influences outside of political circles in Tokyo desired to have as President of the South Manchuria Railway a man of strong nationalistic tendencies and of the moral courage necessary to carry through a plan which would certainly arouse great opposition throughout the world.

The Embassy can adduce no direct evidence that Count Uchida was a party to the planning of the Manchurian outbreak, but it is significant that the outbreak occurred only three months after he took office and that in the October following the outbreak he came to Tokyo to advocate the policy which had been taken by the military in Manchuria. At that time, it will be remembered, there was a fairly open conflict between the apparent views of the Japanese military authorities and those of the civil authorities, and it seemed somewhat strange that Count Uchida, himself a civil official appointed by the civil authority, should plead the cause of the military. A probable explanation of this anomaly lies in the supposition that Count Uchida was a party to the plans of the military, if not the master mind behind the entire scheme.

After the downfall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet, according to Baba, Premier Inukai of the incoming Seiyukai Cabinet, because of an old personal enmity toward Uchida, endeavored to remove him from the Presidency of the

South

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South Manchuria Railway, but was prevented from doing so by the influence of the military. Later, when the Saito Cabinet was formed with the concurrence of the military party, Count Uchida was selected as Foreign Minister, although he did not take office until after the Lytton Commission had completed its investigation of conditions in Manchuria. Count Uchida, it will be remembered, was retained in office in Dairen in order that he might advocate before the Commission the cause of the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria and the necessity of a separatist movement in Manchuria. These various circumstances would indicate that Count Uchida, from the beginning of the incident, if not before, was working in close contact with the military and was thoroughly in accord with their views. By inference it can also be presumed that the organization of which he was head, i.e., the South Manchuria Railway, was likewise in close accord with the actions of the military.

The development of the Manchurian incident itself, at least in its early stages, indicates that it may have been organized at the instigation of the South Manchuria Railway. In the Embassy's despatch No. 374, of October 24, 1931, with which was transmitted Mr. Salisbury's report on his investigations in Manchuria, Mr. Salisbury pointed out that the purpose of the Japanese military actions in Manchuria in September, 1931, appeared to be to obtain control of strategic points(i.e. the railway terminals), rather than to protect Japanese nationals, which

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which was the ostensible purpose of the actions.

On September 18th and 19th the Japanese Army occupied Mukden, Changchun, Antung and Yingkow(Newchwang) and on the 21st occupied Kirin. Later operations were extended to Tunhwa, Tungliao, Taonanfu, Hsinmin and Tsitsihar- all, it will be noted, either railway terminals or important railway towns. The purpose of the military actions therefore undoubtedly was to obtain control of the Chinese railways, either for strategic reasons or in order to permit their operation to be taken over and controlled by the South Manchuria Railway.

This latter objective was attained almost immediately after the occupation, although insurgent operations prevented any extensive use of the railways until the fall of 1932. That the operation of all railways in Manchuria(except the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is half Russian owned) should be placed under the control of the South Manchuria Railway was apparently understood from the early days of the Manchurian affair, as on November 13, 1931, a press ban prohibited the publication of reports that " the South Manchuria Railway is making some preparations with the new Manchurian Government about the construction of the new railways or the extension of its railway lines", and on December 9, 1931, a notice was sent to the newspapers to the effect that "Your attention is called to the fact that publication of the report that such railways as the Ssupingkai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi railway will be placed under the trust management of the South Manchuria

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Manchuria Railway upon the establishment of the Heilungkiang government would violate the ban placed on November 13th". Although the South Manchuria Railway operated(as far as possible under the conditions) all the railways of Manchuria from the time of the occupation, no agreement to this effect was made public until March 2, 1933, when the alleged substance of a contract(no date given) between "Manchukuo" and the South Manchuria Railway Company was published. Under this contract, all loans and advances made to "Manchukuo" or the previous administration, amounting to Yen 130,000,000, by the South Manchuria Railway for the construction of railways in Manchuria, are merged into one loan on the security of the railways, the management of which is entrusted (apparently indefinitely) to the South Manchuria Railway. According to this contract, it appears that the South Manchuria Railway can at any time default in payment to itself of principal and interest on the loans and thereupon claim title to the railways of which it is already in practical possession. If it can be assumed, therefore, that one of the primary influences impelling the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was the desire of the South Manchuria Railway to obtain possession of the Chinese railways in Manchuria, this desire can now be considered to have been fulfilled.

As a more concrete indication of the connection of the South Manchuria Railway with the Japanese military activities in Manchuria, Mr. Tokuzo Komai may be cited.

Mr.

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Mr. Komai was one of the leading spirits in the establishment of "Manchukuo", was formerly the head of the General Affairs Bureau of that government, and is now a member of the Privy Council of "Manchukuo". In his recently-published book, DAI MANSHUKOKU KENSETSU ROKU (Record of the Founding of Great Manchukuo) he states that the South Manchuria Railway Company financed the Kwantung Army (the Japanese Army in Manchuria) during the initial stages of the occupation of Manchuria. Again, he states that the lower class employees of the South Manchuria Railway worked in the first lines shoulder to shoulder with the Japanese troops following the first outbreak in Manchuria. If this is true (and there is no reason to doubt it), the relations between the South Manchuria Railway and the Japanese Army in Manchuria must have been so close as to amount to cooperation from the start of the trouble, if not before.

An effort has been made in the foregoing to indicate that the interests of the South Manchuria Railway constituted one of the strong reasons for the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria, if they were not the primary impelling cause, and that it is strongly probable that Count Uchida, while President of the South Manchuria Railway, in collusion with certain officers of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, engineered the entire scheme for the occupation of the region and its separation from China. If such is the case, it

would

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would appear to upset the widespread theory that the Japanese action in Manchuria was simply military aggression, modified to some small extent by economic factors. Instead, while military strategic considerations and the ambitions of the Japanese Army were undoubtedly important factors, the actual and immediate cause of the occupation would seem to have been the irresistible growth of economic forces.

This would not be the first time that local economic and social forces on the edge of a nation's sphere of activity have dictated the policy of the home government.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

800.

ERD:r

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" " " , Berne.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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May 3, 1933.

Dear Mr. Grew:

793.94/6144

I should like to let you know that the Division found very interesting the Embassy's despatch No. 341 of March 24, 1933, which was evidently prepared by Dickover, with regard to the possible relationship of Count Uchida and the South Manchuria Railway to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

The thesis therein developed opens up a provocative field for speculation and the comment given is very welcome. Now that the subject has been touched on in Japanese publications, perhaps it may be expected that further information along this line will become available. We should of course like to be kept informed if any material pro or contra comes to your attention.

It may be of interest to you to know that this despatch has impressed us as being another evidence of the timeliness and variety as well as of the competent manner of presentation of despatches prepared by officers of the Embassy.

With cordial best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 25, 1933.

~~LES~~
~~MMH~~:

Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. 1216 of March 28, 1933, transmits an article from L'ECHO DE PARIS of March 28 in which is discussed the possibility of war between Japan and any other nation over the issue of Manchuria. The article comes to the conclusion that neither China, Russia, nor the United States is in danger of war with Japan. The conclusion that the United States is not interested in war with Japan is based largely on the argument that Japanese-American business enterprises with joint capital offer a satisfactory way out for American commercial ambitions.


CC:CLS

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIV. OF COM. & REG.

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Paris, March 28, 1933

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SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1216)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 1 1933
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Copy in Pe.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 7 1933
Department of State
File MK

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To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's
Special Report No. W. D. 1216, dated March 28,
1933.

RECEIVED
MAY 1 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, March 28, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1216

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation as
Discussed in L'ECHO DE PARIS

L'ECHO DE PARIS published on March 28, 1933 a further article by La Pomarède dealing with Manchuria and entitled "Will the Independence of Manchuria Bring About a War Between Japan and a Third Power?" (For previous articles in this series see Special Reports ^{893.01 Manchuria 1864} No. W. D. 1210 of March 17 and No. W. D. 1215 of March 24, 1933.) ^{no card}

He began by asking who, in the present situation of the Far East, wanted war, and who would declare it, if the spectre of war has indeed appeared.

He states emphatically that China will not declare war on Japan unless egged on by another Power. China lacks trained soldiers as well as modern material and

organized

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organized transport services; furthermore, the young generals of the Chinese national army have studied at the Tokyo Military Academy and have remained for periods of training with Japanese regiments, so that they are fully aware of the strength of their adversary. The Nanking Government is equally powerless to repel a foreign aggression or to impose its will on three-fourths of what is known as the Chinese Republic. Even though the Japanese should drive onward from the Jehol as far as Peiping China would not go to war because she cannot do so.

The Soviets might wage war in her stead, for Vladivostok is surrounded, Mongolia has already been affected by the conflict, and there are menaces in the direction of the Vaikal. It is reported that the Soviets are strengthening the fortifications and the naval defences at Vladivostok. (In this connection please refer to Strictly Confidential Report No. W. D. 761194/524 1054 of June 3, 1932, page 2, lines 12 to 20 inclusive.)

La Pomarède states that he questioned several Russians on the subject, all replying that they would do everything possible to avoid foreign complications and their reconciliation with China aimed merely at economic relations and the reopening of necessary markets; the Manchurian State had adopted a correct attitude

towards

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towards Soviet Russia and there had so far been no occasion for complaints. This was probably true to a great extent, but it was equally true that the Soviets, like China, were not in a position to declare war.

La Pomarède does not consider that there is danger of war even as concerns the United States, although Chinese nationalists had hoped that the United States was about to take up the glove thrown down by Japan. Whereas a great many American business men have lost their time and money in China, there are Japano-American business enterprises with mixed capital which are succeeding very well. Furthermore, the big American newspapers in the Far East such as the TOKYO JAPAN ADVERTISER and the SHANGHAI FAR EASTERN REVIEW have undertaken to enlighten the United States with reference to the abusive interpretation of such high sounding words as "the open door" and "territorial integrity" which threaten to smother the voice of reason.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson
 Warrington Dawson
 Special Assistant

Enclosure:

Article from L'ECHO DE PARIS of March 28, 1933.

In quintuplicate
 851.9111/6a
 WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. 1216 of March 28, 1933 .
From American Embassy at Paris
Extract From " L' ECHO DE PARIS " of March 28, 1933

UNE ENQUÊTE EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

L'indépendance de la Mandchourie amènera-t-elle une guerre entre le Japon et une tierce puissance ?

X

La Société des Nations a prononcé : le Japon s'est retiré. Le conflit subsiste : aux termes du Covenant, la Chine doit laisser écouler trois mois et peut alors se faire justice. Est-ce le spectre de la guerre qui apparaît dans l'ombre ?... Qui veut la guerre ? Qui va la déclarer ? Question angoissante.

Et cela, à propos d'un Tchang Seu Liang ! Cela, pour restaurer une féodalité militaire, ses mercenaires et ses routiers !... Ce serait à désespérer du bon sens humain.

**

D'abord, on peut tenir pour certain qu'à moins d'y être poussée par une puissance étrangère, la Chine ne déclarera pas la guerre au Japon. Les hommes de Nankin — il faut leur rendre ce témoignage — ont un idéal politique ; et à l'égard des satrapes, tyranniques, cupides et butés, qui sont la lèpre et la honte de la Chine contemporaine, l'aversion du gouvernement central n'est pas douteuse... Trop heureux d'être débarrassé de l'un d'eux ! C'est la joie au cœur que Nankin aura appris la chute définitive de l'ancien seigneur de Moukden et son départ vers d'autres cieux.

Aussi bien, pour faire la guerre, faut-il avoir des soldats entraînés, du matériel moderne, des transports et des services organisés, et, par dessus tout, la confiance, source de moral. La Chine n'a rien. Les jeunes généraux de l'Armée nationale, ceux qui valent quelque chose, et le dictateur Tchang Kai Chek tout le premier, ont fait leurs études à l'Académie militaire de Tokio et des stages dans les régiments du Japon : ils savent la force de leur adversaire ; ils ne l'affronteront pas... Après ma visite de l'Ecole militaire de Nankin, où, soit dit en passant, tant d'exercices rappellent les méthodes japonaises, l'état-major chinois m'offrit trois de ces réceptions étonnantes dont la Chine a le secret, et qui délient si bien les langues ; et là, nombre d'officiers supérieurs ou généraux m'exprimèrent... ô ironie ! en japonais — leur indignation et l'impuissance de leur patriotisme ; mais aucun d'eux ne prononça le mot de guerre.

Irrémédiable faiblesse des hommes de Nankin. Ils ne peuvent pas plus repousser une agression extérieure qu'imposer leurs volontés aux trois quarts de ce qu'on appelle la

République chinoise. Aux débuts de la campagne du Jehol, des télégrammes venus de Londres nous annonçaient la constitution d'un front chinois, d'un front unique. On ne pouvait que sourire : car dégarnir la vallée du Yang-Tzou des deux cent mille hommes fidèles au dictateur équivaldrait à un suicide; et ni le dictateur ni sa parenté, ni sa clientèle n'avaient envie de se suicider... Les Japonais sont allés à Chan-Hai-Kouan; ils sont allés à Jehol; peut-être iront-ils à Pékin. La Chine ne fera pas la guerre, parce qu'elle ne peut pas la faire.

Qui la fera pour elle ?
Les Soviets ?

A coup sûr, ceux-là sont directement touchés par la création de cet Etat mandchou qui pourrait servir de base, de tremplin, à une future expansion japonaise. Voilà Vladivostok encerclé, la Mongolie entamée, une menace qui s'esquisse en direction du Baïkal. Qu'en pense l'Union soviétique ? On dit qu'elle remet en état les fortifications et les défenses maritimes de Vladivostok. On sait qu'elle vient de rétablir ses relations diplomatiques avec la Chine. N'est-ce pas avec l'arrière-pensée d'une intervention prochaine ?... Au cours de mon voyage, j'ai eu l'occasion de voir et d'interroger la plus haute personnalité de l'armée sibérienne et de nombreux commissaires du peuple qui, se rendant à un congrès, ont été pendant huit jours mes compagnons de route d'Irkoutsk à Moscou. A tous j'ai posé la même question, et tous m'ont fait une réponse identique : l'U. R. S. S. n'a, pour l'instant, qu'une seule préoccupation : la réalisation du deuxième plan quinquennal, et pendant ces cinq ans, toute idée de guerre est bannie.

« Nous ne voulons pas de guerre, me disait un membre du Comité exécutif, et nous ferons tout pour éviter des complications extérieures. Notre réconciliation avec la Chine n'a d'autre but que la reprise des relations économiques et la réouverture d'un marché indispensable à nos producteurs. L'Etat mandchou a pris à notre égard une attitude correcte, son drapeau fraternise avec le nôtre sur tous les bâtiments de l'Est chinois. Lorsque les Japonais ont débloqué le secteur mandchou du Transsibérien, leur troupes n'ont eu avec nous aucun incident et se sont bien gardées de passer la frontière... Tant que le Japon ne violera pas les traités, quels griefs aurions-nous ? Quels prétextes à intervention ? »

Je crois que mon interlocuteur disait vrai... du moins pour le moment. Une circonstance, au surplus, garantit la volonté de paix des Soviets : sur leurs voies ferrées, le matériel roulant est si vétuste, si proche de l'usure, qu'il ne saurait se prêter à des transports intensifs.

Les Soviets, eux aussi, ne feront pas la guerre, parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas la faire.

Reste alors la grande amie des Nationalistes chinois — l'Amérique, dont les conseillers encouragent si volontiers les initiatives, les revendications de la Jeune Chine, et que celle-ci, dans sa candeur, voyait déjà toute prête à relever le gant du Japon... Quelle désillusion ! La grande amie n'a pas bougé, et son appui s'est borné jusqu'à présent aux avertissements, on ne peut vraiment pas dire aux menaces, du sous-secrétaire d'Etat, Mr. Stimson. A Washington, fera-t-on plus ? Et par exemple, le jour où les Japonais, dépassant la muraille, menaceraient Tientsin ou Pékin, va-t-on leur adresser une déclaration de blocus, un ultimatum, qui signifierait infailliblement la guerre ? — Pour

avancer un pronostic, il faudrait être passé par les Etats-Unis. Je ne puis parler dans cette enquête que de l'opinion des résidents américains d'Extrême-Orient. Cette opinion est en général pro-chinoise, mais elle n'est pas, tant s'en faut, unanimement anti-japonaise, et cela s'explique aisément. La pratique des affaires démontre qu'il y a toujours plus d'avantages à prendre un partenaire dont la maison politique est en bon ordre. Que de « businessmen » américains ont perdu en Chine leur temps et leur argent ! Au Japon, par contre, que d'entreprises à capitaux mixtes américano-japonaises ont parfaitement réussi ! Dans un précédent article, j'en ai cité plusieurs. Mais il y a mieux : en Chine même, un tiers des importations américaines va aux firmes nippones établies dans le pays. L'association des capitaux, l'interpénétration des milieux industriels et commerciaux, travaillent malgré tout au maintien de la paix. La presse, également, y travaille : tels grands journaux américains d'Extrême-Orient, *le Japan Advertiser de Tokyo*, *le Far Eastern Review de Shanghai*, ont pris à tâche d'éclairer l'opinion des Etats-Unis, et ils la mettent en garde contre l'interprétation abusive de ces grands mots sonores, — « Porte ouverte », « Intégrité territoriale » — qui risquent d'étouffer la voix de la raison... Puisse-t-elle être entendue en Amérique cette raison objective ! Et que la crainte de périls imaginaires n'y entraîne pas vers l'abîme les hommes d'Etat responsables de la paix du monde !

L'abîme, ce serait un conflit entre le Japon et l'Occident ou, ce qui revient au même, entre le Japon et l'une des puissances occidentales.

Voyons les choses de haut : c'est en l'espèce la seule manière de bien juger.

On a beau distinguer, ergoter : aux regards de l'Asie, le Japon est le représentant, le pionnier, le tenant de la civilisation occidentale. Notre droit public et administratif, nos principes politiques, nos sciences et notre technique, il les a étudiés et assimilés avant tout autre peuple d'Asie, dans des conditions et avec un succès qui l'ont placé à la tête de l'Orient. C'est ce qu'il a pris à l'Europe qui lui a permis de dépasser l'Asie. Il est ainsi la preuve vivante et comme la garantie de notre supériorité. Il est enfin la transition, l'intermédiaire nécessaire entre les deux civilisations qui s'affrontent... Une rupture avec le Japon, une guerre entre l'Occident et lui marquerait un rebroussement de l'évolution asiatique, une régression de la culture européenne, et donc une étape vers la bolchevisation de l'Orient.

Est-ce cela que veut l'Occident ? Et si ce n'est pas cela, que faire ?

Par son verdict, la Société des Nations, impuissante à agir efficacement, s'est maintenue dans un monde abstrait sans contact avec les possibilités et les faits. Elle passe la main...

Trois grandes puissances — France, Angleterre, Amérique — sont, directement et pratiquement, intéressées au destin et à la paix de l'Extrême-Orient. Qu'elles se consultent, qu'elles remettent le problème à l'étude, non plus sur le plan juridique international, mais sur celui des réalités asiatiques — et elles verront bientôt que le seul moyen pacifique de régler le différend est, par une suggestion commune, par une commune pression amicale sur les parties en cause, d'amener entre la Chine et le Japon, ou mieux, entre la Chine et l'Etat Mandchou, le tête-à-tête d'où sortira la solution.

LA POMAREDE.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 14, 1933.

LMH:
SYH:

Note the attached memorandum
of a conversation between Ministers
Johnson and Lampson on the Boxer
Protocol.

f z f
THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Peiping, March 15, 1933.

No. 2008

Subject: The Boxer Protocol and the Japanese.

PM 11:00

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The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

Sir:

793.94/6043

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 254,
 March 15, 5 p.m., and to previous correspondence re-
 garding the question of the Boxer Protocol of 1901
 in relation to the present Sino-Japanese hostilities,
 1/2/ I have the honor to transmit herewith two brief memo-
 randa of conversations I had on March 11, 1933, with
 Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, and Mr. Liu
 Chung-chieh, the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Af-
 fairs, respectively.

I understood

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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I understood from Sir Miles that his instructions were substantially in accord with the views expressed in the Department's telegram No.16, January 14, 9 p.m., 1933. ^{793.94/5755 (conf. file.)}

Mr. Liu Chung-chieh stated that he believed the Japanese Consulate General in Tientsin had circulated to his colleagues a protest he had addressed to the Chinese garrison commander against the digging of trenches at Tangku, and that the consular body in Tientsin had referred the matter to the Legations in Peiping. I informed Mr. Liu that, as far as I knew, no such protest had been referred to the Legations.

Respectfully yours,


Nelson Trusier Johnson.

Enclosures: 

1/2: Two memoranda of conversations dated March 11, 1933.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Peiping, March 11, 1933.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.

Subject: Boxer Protocol and the Japanese.

Sir Miles stated that he had now received an instruction from his Government in regard to the Boxer Protocol which would enable him to stand aside should the matter be brought up at Tientsin.

I understood from what he told me that the British position in regard to this matter was very much like our own, namely, that the Protocol was for the protection of the foreign powers against an anti-foreign attack by the Chinese, but was not intended to be used by any one of the powers to its advantage in making an attack upon the Chinese.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Conversation.

Peiping, March 11, 1933.

Mr. Liu Chung-eh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hsiao-min Soule Lay, Secretary of the Ministry.

Subject: Boxer Protocol.

In the course of conversation to-day Vice Minister Liu stated that the Japanese Consul at Tientsin had protested to General Yu Hsueh-chung at Tientsin about the digging of entrenchments at Tangku as a violation of the Boxer Protocol. He was under the impression that the Japanese Consul General had circulated the protest and its reply to the Consular Body there, and that the Senior Consul had referred the matter to the Legations.

I told Vice Minister Liu that, while we were party to the Protocol, we were not party to the letters from the Powers to China concerning the rendition of Tientsin, and that in any case I had not heard anything about the protest of the Japanese and the reply of the Chinese being circulated in the Consular Body or referred to the Diplomatic Body here.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 21, 1933.

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Tientsin's despatch No 278 of March 13, 1933
re Editorial comment in North China
from February 16 to March 9, 1933.

Chinese language papers favored a strong defense of Jehol against the Japanese invasion. The TIENTSIN AND PEKING TIMES (British) doubted whether the Chinese could do much in Jehol, and stated that the Japanese would be satisfied only by a complete change of government in China. On February 25th several Chinese language papers recommended the withdrawal of China's minister to Tokyo and some writers advocated the declaration of war against Japan.

Upon the fall of Jehol the native press blamed the defection of the Jehol populace on the long maladministration of T'ang Wu-lin, and the disorganization of the troops was blamed on the Central Government. The TIENTSIN AND PEKING TIMES blamed the Central government for the loss of Jehol as not one single general of its following had associated himself with the defense.

The native press accepted the Report of the Committee of Nineteen of the League of Nations as fair, if not entirely just, to China.

The North China press, as a whole, considered the British Arms Embargo as unfair to China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 278.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 13, 1933.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR -8 1933
Department of State

SUBJECT: Editorial Comment in the Chinese and English Language Newspapers in Peiping and Tientsin on the Japanese Invasion of Jehol Province, Proceedings at Geneva and the British Arms Embargo.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 343 of identic date, to the Legation at Peiping, in quintuplicate, summarizing local newspaper editorials on the recent campaign in Jehol Province, proceedings at Geneva and the British arms embargo.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Despatch No. 343 to the Legation, March 13, 1933, in quintuplicate.

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Original and four copies to Department.

F/HS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Digest of Contents of Summary of Editorial
Comment in the Chinese and English Language
Newspapers in Peiping and Tientsin on the
Japanese Invasion of Jehol Province, Proceed-
ings at Geneva and the British Arms Embargo.

(Attached to despatch No. 343, dated March 13, 1933,
addressed to the Legation (Department No. 278,
dated March 13, 1933))

This despatch summarizes briefly the editorial comment in the leading Chinese and English language newspapers in Tientsin and Peiping on the subjects of the recent Japanese invasion of Jehol Province, proceedings at Geneva related thereto, and the application of a British arms embargo to China and Japan.

The material is arranged under each subject in the order just named, chronologically as it appeared in the press.

The editorial comment on these matters, which is very briefly summarized, ranged from condemnation of the League of Nations and various member powers to blame of the National Government of China at Nanking for the Jehol debacle, and there was also considerable speculation as to the future course of Japan in international affairs.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 343.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 13, 1933.

Subject: Editorial Comment in the Chinese and English Language Newspapers in Peiping and Tientsin on the Japanese Invasion of Jehol Province, Proceedings at Geneva and the British Arms Embargo.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to summarize below, as of current interest to the Legation, the editorial comment of various Chinese newspapers in Peiping and Tientsin and of the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES on the above-mentioned subjects. The only American newspaper in this district, the NORTH CHINA STAR, carried no editorials on these subjects during the period under discussion, which was from February 16 to March 9, 1933.

The Theoretical Defense of Jehol

By February 16 the general attention of the local press was being focused on the situation in

Jehol

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Jehol. On that date the CH'EN PAO (Chinese) (Peiping) urged that China arm herself for resistance to the uttermost, since the recent vindication of China by the League of Nations might be expected to result in increased aggression by Japan. While the League's action was a cause for rejoicing, it by no means provided for the retrocession of Japan's spoils and China must fight therefor. The PEIPING WAN PAO (Chinese) stated that China must promptly raise funds to support the troops in Jehol Province, thereby strengthening their morale and that of the inhabitants, who, released from the burden of supplying the Chinese forces, would not be tempted to assist the Japanese.

On February 21 the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO (Chinese) (Peiping) hailed the conflict over Jehol as the greatest factor for unanimity in China, which should take advantage of the obvious will of the nation to resist the approaching invasion. A prolonged resistance would eventually cause a revolution in Japan and strengthen, rather than weaken, China, while Japan's conflict of interests with the United States and Great Britain would surely lead to her isolation. The PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES (British) supported this contention with the statement that Japan had now set herself against the world at a time when there was

greater

- 3 -

greater international solidarity than ever before. She had recognized "Manchoukuo" with her eyes open, thus giving the League no option but to align itself against her. The apparent will of the Chinese people to resist the invasion was a remarkable change from their apathy of former times, and the present engagement of Chinese women in patriotic war work is of great significance. Should the resistance be successful Chinese diplomacy towards Japan would be much strengthened; if it were not, Japan would be enabled to invade China Proper, and probably would do so. Nothing short of a crushing defeat of Japan, which was wholly improbable, would return the moderates to her Government, but a strong Chinese resistance would moderate the policies of the war party in Japan. The CH'EN PAO (Chinese) stated that now that the League had vindicated China, although without applying the sanctions provided by Article XVI of the League Covenant to Japan, China must show her good faith by fighting for international justice and right.

On February 22 the YI SHIH PAO (Chinese) (Tientsin) added that Mr. T. V. Soong's speeches in Jehol showed a new strength in the Government's policy of resistance which must be backed by the country to the end.

On February 23 the PEIPING CHRONICLE (Chinese) expressed the belief that Japan's avowal that no attack was contemplated on North China unless forced by

Chinese

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Chinese military operations was an indication that Japan was beginning to realize the power of world opinion against her. The PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES stated the next day, however, that the avowal was merely paving the way for further invasion, adding that although Japan was modern in industry and commerce her Government and political thought stood just where they had at her restoration, and she was now withdrawing into her former isolation.

On February 24 the TA KUNG PAO (Chinese) (Tientsin) advanced the theory that China's first duty now was to create a strong defense force, since it was useless to modernize her commerce and industries if they could not be defended from utilization by her enemies. The PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES was pessimistic over the Jehol situation, stating that the Japanese Government would apparently be satisfied only by a complete change of government in China, or the establishment of the entire country as a buffer zone. We must prepare for a conflict between Japan's course and the increasing international pressure on the League to take action.

Jehol and Diplomatic Relations.

At this time a demand for the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan began to make itself heard in the vernacular press. On February 25 the CHING PAO (Chinese) (Peiping) asserted that severance would enable the Chinese authorities to act against Japanese

agents

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agents and influences in China, and if the Japanese should thereby be drawn on to occupy the whole coast resistance in the interior could last indefinitely and prove the ultimate undoing of the enemy. The next day the CH'EN PAO elaborated this thesis, stating that a declaration of war by China would automatically cause the retrocession of Japan's concessions, the lapsing of her commercial treaties, and the disarming of her garrisons on Chinese soil, while Nanking would be enabled to stop the transportation of Japanese troops on Chinese Government-owned railways and to act against Japanese spies. The present state of warfare during technical peace was entirely to the advantage of Japan. The TA KUNG PAO asserted that Japan was reaping all the fruits of aggression while maintaining a status of peace which tied the hands of the League, and that China was mistaken in keeping her diplomatic and consular representatives in Japan. The HUA PEI JIH PAO (Chinese) (Peiping) suggested that China's moral victory at Geneva should be followed by three steps: (1), severance of diplomatic relations, which it was absurd to maintain in the circumstances, (2), severance of economic relations, thus taking the lead in enforcing application of Article XVI of the Covenant, and (3), preparation for a prolonged struggle against Japan. The further into China the Japanese

lines

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lines could be led the greater would be their weakness and the expense of their operations, and such a war would sooner or later cause Japan's breakdown. The CHING PAO stated on February 27 that the immediate recall of the Chinese Minister to Tokyo would show the world that Japan's Note of February 23 (demanding the creation of a buffer zone on both sides of the Great Wall) was tantamount to a declaration of war.

By February 28 the operations in Jehol were in full swing. On that date the TA KUNG PAO (Tientsin) stated that to upset the League's important verdict Japan must conquer not only China but the world, because the League was now a party to the Manchurian dispute, standing as it did in the position of a court of law whose authority had been flouted. Therefore, although China would defend her territory to the best of her ability, the fifty-odd members of the League of Nations must assist her by checking Japan's aggressions. The SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO was of the opinion that China's only hope lay in a prolonged resistance, especially since Japan's desire was to obtain a quick decision in Jehol. The important thing was not the possible loss of Jehol, Peiping and Tientsin, but the final victory, to be obtained only by ceaseless resistance and harassing of the Japanese. China must therefore take immediate steps to provide funds and munitions for a long struggle. According to the

YI SHIH PAO

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YI SHIH PAO the coming war provided China with her best opportunity to become a unified state, since history shows that war tends to arouse patriotism, improve internal politics and encourage military preparedness. The harder the war, therefore, the greater would be the cohesion amongst the Chinese.

The Defense
of Jehol

On March 2 the TA KUNG PAO (Peiping) stated that the Japanese advance at Kailu and the other border districts showed that the necessary preparations had not been made by the Chinese. If China could endure reverses for two or three years she could ultimately win, but it was feared from the reports that no plans had been made at all to resist or meet reverses. The League's stand might mean the failure of Japanese diplomacy but it did not mean the success of China, who must depend upon herself. The Chinese Government had a grave responsibility to protect its troops and guard other provinces from invasion, and something must be done at once. The SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO insisted that a united front and less talk and more action were essential, while the CHING PAO stated that the fall of Jehol would mean danger to the whole country and all resources must be mobilized to prevent it. This editorial even suggested an attack towards Mukden via Shanhaikuan as a means of weakening the Japanese advance in Jehol and of encouraging the volunteers in Manchuria. On March

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3 the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO blamed the hesitant policy of the League for the drive on Jehol, and Great Britain for the League's hesitancy, because that nation's complicated interests, it averred, had led her to avoid pressing the League to act strongly. On March 3 the TA KUNG PAO (Peiping) reflected that encouragement could be derived from the fact that China had many friends and Japan none. On March 4 the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO considered the probable effect of Mr. Roosevelt's assumption of the Presidency of the United States on the Far Eastern situation, suggesting that the transformation of the Hoover-Stimson negative policy towards Japan into a positive policy would depend upon the conduct of China in Jehol, and the possibility of a combination of the United States with Great Britain against Japan. The YI SHIH PAO advised the Chinese to conquer their pessimism, which was their worst foe.

It began to be evident that uneasiness as to the outcome in Jehol was being felt, but subsequent issues contained open criticism of the defense operations and of those responsible for it - an interesting example of the growing freedom of the Chinese press. On March 3 the CHING PAO inquired why, in the face of disquieting reports from Lingyuan and Ch'ihfeng (the key positions in the Chinese defense) the Chinese leaders were still acting independently of each other

and without

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and without support from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang or the Central Government. By March 6 the fall of Ch'engteh (Jehol City) was known, and Chinese editorials of that and the following day were confined largely to demands for a scapegoat in the person of the Military Governor of Jehol, General T'ang Yü-lin, who had ignominiously fled with his personal belongings from the Province. There was no little criticism of the absence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his forces from the scene of the conflict, and of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang for his apparent failure to take suitable action before the debacle. The PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES described the Japanese campaign as a military epic, comparing it to Allenby's march on Damascus in 1928. Its editor deplored, however, the fact that the conquest would probably accomplish nothing permanent towards the solution of the central problem of the whole Manchurian question, since it resulted merely in the shifting of the responsibility for government of the province to Tokyo, which would find the control of millions more Chinese an expensive and troublesome luxury.

The Post-mortem

The vernacular papers united on March 7 in deploring the disgrace to the country caused by the humiliating buckling of the Chinese defenses. On the whole, the unpleasant facts were

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were frankly faced, including the defection of the Jehol populace, which was blamed on the long maladministration of T'ang Yü-lin, and the disorganization of the troops, which was blamed on the leaders of the Central Government. The SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO demanded to know why China should continue to support two million troops among whom there was apparently not a single man willing to die for his country, and inquired if the Central Government had not been aware of T'ang Yü-lin's misgovernment for years past. If the country was to be preserved it must continue resistance in spite of the issue of the Jehol campaign, however. The TA KUNG PAO criticized the authorities without mincing words, holding them responsible for having permitted a man of T'ang's caliber to remain in office. It accused the authorities of having failed to do their duty in the defence of Jehol, or even to punish those responsible for the loss of Mukden a year previous, and intimated that the country looked to the National Government to make good the losses suffered.

On March 9 the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES also laid the blame at the door of the National Government, stating that its generally ostentatious evasion of duty and responsibility and the fact that not one single general of its following had associated himself with the defense were signs of the quality and results

of its

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of its system of government. It was the editor's opinion that the loss of North China was now more than probable.

The League of Nations and Manchuria

On February 18 the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO (Peiping) stated that all hope of conciliation with Japan was gone, together with hope that the League of Nations would apply the sanctions provided by Article XVI of the Covenant for states resorting to war, owing to the desire of Great Britain and France that the interests of capitalists be put before those of world peace. Unless the League carried out the Covenant it was doomed and Great Britain and France would find themselves in a world war, for the subjugation of China by Japan could never lead to permanent peace. On February 22 the PEIPING CHRONICLE and the YI SHIH PAO (Tientsin) agreed that while the Report of the League's Committee of Nineteen was more favorable to China than had been expected and completely vindicated her actions it was no more than a verdict for the plaintiff, who must now help herself.

The Report of the Committee of Nineteen was generally accepted by the press as fair, if not entirely just, to China, and it was urged that its provisions should be carried out in spite of the fact that they alone could not prevent an invasion of Jehol. The CH'EN PAO suggested that the League should not trouble

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the world at this time of depression with economic sanctions against Japan but should oblige her to respect the League Covenant by an international armed force, a process believed by the journal to be less disruptive to the prevailing international situation.

On February 24 the YI SHIH PAO made the point that Japan did not realize that the world was governed today by the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact because her army and navy were completely feudal. Japan was at least in that respect quite as backward as China, and this answered her contention that her reason for invading China was the latter's backwardness and recalcitrancy.

Japan's Secession
From the League

On February 25 the PEIPING CHRONICLE remarked that what "Manchoukuo" has to say is "news from nowhere", and its demand for a Chinese evacuation of Shanhaikuan mere insolence opposed to the realities recognized by the whole world today. Japan could now be expected to withdraw from Geneva, which raised the whole question of the League's competence and willingness to preserve itself from destruction by carrying out the provisions of Article XVI. Meanwhile, China must not surrender an inch of territory without a struggle.

On February 26 the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES carried a signed article by its editor, W. V. Pennell, on Japan's secession from the League of Nations and

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the emphasis thereof on her isolation. The two paths so far considered by Japan were empire-building by conquest, and an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. The first was now banned by world opinion, and Japan could not travel the second alone. Even the Japanese press recognized that the success of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine must depend on the cooperation of China, Japan and "Manchoukuo" - at present, of course, impossible. China could not be expected to assist Japan in a Monroe Doctrine against Russia without a complete volte face in Japan's Government. While the Japanese people were entitled to a fair share of the fruits of the earth these consist, in modern times, not of empires but of free international markets. Thus, it was not Manchuria and the Pacific Islands which were Japan's life-lines, but her economic relations with the world.

On March 2 the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO announced that the result of the struggle would be a second world war. China was now in the most favorable position she had occupied since 1842, and if the opportunity were not utilized she would certainly be defeated in the end. Great Britain and France now realized that the Far Eastern situation was unfavorable to them and would therefore probably force the League to act, while the League itself had been rejuvenated by its recent activities. If it wished to preserve its existence it must rigidly apply Article XVI.

The

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The current practice maneuvers of the United States and Japanese fleets in Pacific waters foreshadowed war between the two countries, and the American acceptance of the League's invitation to participate in the deliberations of the Advisory Committee showed harmonization at last of the policies of the United States and Great Britain. There was every possibility for closer cooperation between China and Russia since the renewal of their relations, while Japan's relations with that country were growing more delicate. A stout resistance in Jehol might therefore determine the future of international relations, and if China were to hold out for six months the world would come to its aid. On March 3 the TA KUNG PAO comforted itself with the reflection that Russia's refusal to join the Advisory Committee was not necessarily favorable to Japan, because it meant only that Russia considered the League's action too weak and was reserving her liberty to act for a satisfactory settlement in the Far East. When Russia took this action it would be affected by the increasing tension between herself and Japan.

The PEIPING CHRONICLE, on March 3, set forth the doctrine enunciated during the dispute between Colombia and Peru that no state should be bound by a treaty to which it was not a free and consenting party. This

doctrine

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doctrine, said the paper, should be applied by the League to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, in which event Japan would have no claims left on Manchuria.

The British
Arms Embargo

The British embargo on the export of arms and munitions to either China or Japan meanwhile had captured the attention of the Press. On February 26 the PEIPING CHRONICLE stated that inasmuch as Japan had clearly violated Articles XII and XIII of the Covenant by not waiting until three months after report by the League Council and by not waiting for any award in the dispute, the sanctions of Article XVI should be applied in full. While an arms embargo might well be the first step in such application it was not sufficient in the present case. On March 1 the paper stated that Sir John Simon, in discussing the British embargo, had admitted that Japan had not acted in accordance with the terms of the League Covenant. Britain's proposed embargo was impartial, but if the League would admit as much as had Simon it would enforce a complete embargo on the international intercourse of Japan alone. However, comments in Great Britain showed that the application of sanctions to Japan was nearer, and the nations should not stand indefinitely on ceremony but enforce Article XVI. The HUA PEI JIH PAO remarked that Lansbury's demand in the House of Commons for an embargo fell short of the sanctions provided, while Simon's

speech

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speech disappointingly showed a pro-Japanese bias. The embargo would work against China, and if all nations applied similar embargos China was lost. The CHING PAO pointed out that Simon's speech evinced that he saw no difference between the agressor and the victim, and agreed that Simon was partial to Japan, while the YI SHIH PAO stated that Simon must bear a large share of the blame in the event of another world war, since he placed Japan above the law by substituting an embargo unfair to China for the sanctions, while admitting Japan's violation of the Covenant. On March 2 the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES defended the British embargo, saying that if it had not been applied to both nations Japan would certainly have blockaded the China coast and seized all war material. The British Government had either to arrange for international action in the matter, which would have been too slow even if successful, or take immediate independent action, which necessitated an equal embargo. Britain would, of course, receive no credit for her sacrifice, but it had probably averted a most critical situation.

In the SHIH CHIEH JIH PAO's editorial on March 3 the British embargo was said to display Simon's shortsightedness, since it assured Japan's conquest of all the resources of Manchuria, which she would eventually

employ

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
employ against the world. The embargo was stated to defeat the purpose of the League's Report, and Simon's pro-Japanese attitude, it was predicted, would have serious results.

Very respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

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Original and two copies to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 277.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 13, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL

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793.94

SUBJECT: views of Chinese Officers on North China
Military Situation.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of
my despatch no. 342, of March 11, 1933, to the Legation
at Peiping, on the subject of the views of Chinese
officers on North China military situation.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

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FPL/DA

Enclosure:

To Legation, March 11, 1933.

Original and four copies to Department.

Handwritten initials

F/HS

793.94/6148

APR 24 1933

RECORDED

4 Carbon Copies
Received *JM*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 342

277, Dated March 13/22
 State Department General Counsel
 at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 11, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Views of Chinese Officers on North
 China Military Situation.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the confidential information of the Legation, a copy of a memorandum of information obtained by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, from certain Chinese officers on the staff of the Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government who attended a dinner on board the SACRAMENTO last evening. It is difficult to state how much of the information is correct, but it is known that local Chinese officials are very much concerned lest the changes now taking place in the political and military organization in North China may bring about a crisis in the near future.

Particular attention is invited to the paragraphs in the enclosed memorandum regarding the entrenchments at Tangku and the views expressed concerning the relations between the Japanese navy and army. No information was vouchsafed as to the basis of the views

expressed

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

expressed on the last named subject.

Respectfully yours,


F. F. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/DA

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

Original and 1 copy to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Information obtained from Chinese officers, Staff of Governor H. C. Yu, on SACRAMENTO 10 March.

General Chang Hsueh-liang conferred with Chiang Kai-shek on Thursday at Changsintien. Chang Hsueh-liang was in Peiping Friday and the Governor, H. C. Yu, conferred with him Friday and was due to return to Tientsin by motor car Friday night. The Governor's visit to Peiping was secret. He announced that he was going to the SACRAMENTO at 2000 and his staff proceeded in two cars and apologized for his absence on very important business.

His staff state that Chinese have just begun to fight and seemed quite nervous keeping in touch with Chinese headquarters by telephone during the evening.

Questioned about Tangku, General Lu, Chief of Staff, stated Japanese protested strongly when Chinese artillery passed through for Tangku.

Chinese state they have no guns mounted at Tangku.

They regret necessity of fortifications at Tangku but state they must be constructed to keep up morale of Army and people. They feel that they must do this regardless of any guarantees the Japanese could give.

Chinese state Japanese in Jehol are very short of food and cannot get enough bread for soldiers in western part.


Chinese do not expect an attack at Tangku as the Japanese Navy have stated they will take no offensive measures in North China unless ordered by the home Government.

Japanese Navy is reported as not in sympathy with the Army, believing Army has gone too far.

Chinese have only one modern A.A. gun in Jehol and it is reported to have brought down two Jap planes, Jap planes keeping away from this gun.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM 6130
 No. L-500



AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General

Nanking, China, February 25, 1933.

APR 1933


Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

793.94

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a translation, made in this office, of an editorial which appeared in the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS of February 24, 1933, entitled "The Necessity for Action".

The editorial expresses the opinion that Japanese militarists will not hesitate to withdraw from the League of Nations and that their aggressive activities in Jehol and beyond will result in a war involving the United States and Soviet Russia. It observes that the United States, because of the presence of the American fleet on the Pacific and because of the American naval construction program, is not unprepared. It continues that no one is able to foretell what future events will result from present hostilities and concludes with the rather gloomy assertion that it is not necessary for China to talk any further, because the destiny of China depends upon its own actions.

It may be that the spirit underlying this editorial

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

was expressed by a prominent official of the National Government who said, in the course of an informal conversation with an officer of the Consulate General on February 23, that from then on the Chinese nation would be concerned only with its duty of self defence; it could no longer concern itself with the possible consequences of resistance to Japanese aggression.

Very respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Translation of editorial.

In quintuplicate to the Legation,
No copy to the Department.

CAB/TVD



0195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Source: CENTRAL DAILY NEWS
Nanking, February 24,
1933., a semi-official
newspaper.

Enclosure with despatch No.L-500,
dated February 25, 1933, from the
American Consulate General, Nanking, to
the Legation, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Controversy.

The Necessity for Action.

The unfavorable atmosphere in Geneva during the past few days has caused Japan to concentrate its attention upon three major problems of foreign policy: withdrawal from the League of Nations, seizure of Jehol, and military preparations against the United States.

If Japan actually withdraws from the League, it will run the risk of diplomatic isolation and of estrangement of the sympathies of the world. However, the militarists are not averse to disregarding the advice of the Japanese Elders and do not hesitate to flaunt their aggressive designs before the opinion of the world. They will withdraw from the League, if necessary, in order to realize their continental policy and to establish their Monroe Doctrine for Asia.

A careful study of the situation prompts the prediction that a world war will break out if Japan succeeds in putting its plans into force. It has defied the League and its present activities may set the world aflame. When the military machine of Japan advances westward beyond Manchuria and Jehol, it will destroy the balance of power in the Far East and will force retaliatory activities on the part of the United States and Soviet Russia. Although the United States has not as yet indicated its attitude toward the League report, it cannot maintain silence after Japan shall have further aggravated the situation by precipitating hostilities in Jehol. According to the Japanese manifesto of February 22, the

question

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

question of Jehol is an internal affair of Manchukuo, and is not even open to discussion so far as the other nations are concerned.

Furthermore, the Japanese navy is preparing to spend six million yen on a series of maneuvers which will test the strategic importance of its mandated islands. These islands are considered to constitute Japan's lifeline on the sea, as Manchuria constitutes its lifeline on the Asiatic continent. These considerations betray a Japan more ambitious than the Germany of 1914. The situation is grave. Japan is anticipating a long and terrible war and if the League wishes to exert its restraining influence by the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, it must act without further delay.

As observed from other points of view, the United States is not unprepared. Its Atlantic fleet will stay on the Pacific until July 1, 1934, and will direct its maneuvers against Japan as its theoretical enemy. Moreover, the United States is exhausting its efforts to build new warships. The Department of the Navy estimates that 135 warships will be built before December 31, 1936, with a total tonnage of 40,735 (sic) tons.

Hostilities in Jehol have just begun and no one can predict what will follow. In the eastern hemisphere, future events have their roots in the realities of the present. But there is nothing to be gained by further argument. Japanese militarists do not consider China as a nation nor the Chinese as human beings. Araki is prepared to go the limit and there is no use for the

Chinese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


China's people to say another word. We must reserve our strength for concrete action and must perform our sacred duty of self defense without hope of assistance from Geneva, Washington or Moscow. We have presented our arguments before the world and have exposed the party at fault. We must march forward and let our actions speak for themselves.

CAB/MD

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8784



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, March 7, 1933.

APR 7 1933



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 note
 893.20

SUBJECT: Repercussions of the Jehol Debacle:
 Mr. T. V. Soong on Jehol: Scathing
 Criticism of China's Military System.

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
 1/ a statement by Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance
 and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, in regard
 to the success of the Japanese army in its invasion
 of Jehol. This statement was issued through the
 KUOMIN NEWS AGENCY and the copy enclosed is from THE
 NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of today's date.

Mr. Soong, always fearless, has been completely
 candid in this statement. His criticism of China's
 military system is unmerciful, but is absolutely in
 accordance with the facts. It takes an exceedingly
 brave official to admit defects in his own government,
 and Mr. Soong has certainly admitted defects of a most
 serious character. To send a Chinese army against the
 well trained, well munitioned, and well provisioned
 Japanese army is but to encourage the Chinese in a
 suicidal policy. China, with the largest standing
army

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-2-

army in the world, probably larger numerically than the combined armies of the entire world, is perfectly helpless against a trained army such as that of Japan. Mr. Soong refers to the admirable defence of Chapei by the 19th Route Army last year, which caused the world to hail

".... the epic of heroism that was the Chinese soldier at Shanghai; today it looks with wondering eyes on the rabble fleeing back to the gates of Peking. These two came from the same book; only the one quickened by a spirit of nationalism, and the other corrupted and paralyzed by the taint of archaic and incompetent military professionalism."

As severe as this criticism is, it is certain that it gives a correct and true picture. However, Mr. Soong does not consider the future to be entirely without hope. He says:

"But we need not despair. Out of the depth of our defeat, with the unconquerable courage that the nation has been showing in face of frequent disasters there will arise from the anvil of Japanese aggression something strong and pure, for great nations must be forged with blood and tears."

If the Chinese nation had more men like Mr. Soong his prophecy might be justified. But it is feared that the number of such men is very limited indeed, and that it will be a very long period before Mr. Soong's patriotic hope of something "pure and strong" will be realized.

There is also enclosed an editorial which appeared in this morning's NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British), under the title "Candid Criticism," which strongly commends the frankness and candor of Mr. Soong. In the final paragraph the editor expresses the hope that Mr. Soong's words will be taken to heart and "that a really combined effort

-3-

effort may result to establish a sounder national polity."

He then adds:

".....the idea of encouraging provincial or regional autonomy with the Central Government as a general mouthpiece for China, is not inconsistent with an immediate liquidation of the main Sino-Japanese problem."

After referring to the sympathy of the League of Nations with China, the editor states:

"Outside help can be secured only on the basis of friendliness towards both parties. It is essential that the first step, at any rate, should be direct as between China and Japan. Mr. Soong is too perspicacious not to realize that fact. If he carries his present candour to its logical conclusion he will do more than realise it. He will give it active expression by means of advice tendered to his colleagues. He is perfectly right in maintaining that the Government has no reason to despair of the people or even of its own ability. It has been the victim, as its prerevolutionary predecessors were, of an inherently defective system."

This might well be regarded as a sound suggestion for carrying into effect Mr. Soong's statement "But we need not despair."

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Article from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
(British) of March 7, 1933; Statement
of Mr. T. V. Soong on Jehol.
- 2/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
(British) of March 7, 1933.

800
ESC:NLH

In quintuplicate
In triplicate to Legation

0201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8284 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 7, 1933, on the subject "Repercussions of the Jehol Debacle: Mr. T. V. Soong on Jehol: Scathing Criticism of China's Military System."

SOURCE: NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
(British). March 7,
1933.

MR. T. V. SOONG ON JEHOL

MAR 7 - 1933

Scathing Criticism of China's Military System of To-day

Mr. T. V. Soong, Acting-President of the Executive Yuan, has authorized Kuo Min to issue the following statement:—

"When I returned from my visit to Jehol, I was asked by various military leaders how long in my opinion the province could be defended. I replied from a week to ten days. I was received with polite but incredulous smiles. 'It would take the Japanese army several weeks to march through Jehol even if they encountered not a single shot,' they said. My answer was 'But the Japanese army is not going to march on foot.'

"Steeped in the traditions of the old-fashioned warfare where vast armies marched and counter-marched with but little bloodshed and do most of the fighting with telegrams and proclamations, our military minds could not imagine the modern battle with its weeks and months of ceaseless and tireless preparations behind the front so that the decisive issue could be developed into crescendo in the space of a few days. Our generals who strut about in field-grey uniform with Sam Brown belts neglect that one universal principle of warfare enunciated by our greatest strategist 'Soldiers are trained for a thousand days to be employed for a single day.'

Japanese Organization

"On the one hand, there was the highly mechanized Japanese army with a railway system at its back, and plentifully supplied with ammunition and foodstuffs, with a transport system worked out to the last detail, for months on end piling up supplies for the thrust that employed squadrons of aeroplanes, tanks, armoured cars, mountain guns and highly mobile cavalry. On the other hand, I saw an army with no staff work, with the generals staying hundreds of miles behind, with no transport except of the most primitive sort, which took several weeks for supplies to reach the front, no liaison between the different commands, no anti-aircraft guns and trenching materials or artillery, and soldiers trained only in drill ground rudiments. When battle develops with enemy aeroplanes skimming about at will, bombing and machine-gunning, and enemy artillery showering death, the same defiles of Jehol which, if well and scientifically defended may prove impregnable, for these conditions become veritable death-traps. And when there is no unity of command, when the terrible *sauve qui peut* arose, there was nothing that could be done and the passes became choked with defenceless humanity.

Resistance Correct

"Nevertheless, and in spite of it all, I maintain that we did right in fighting at Jehol, if only to prove that Jehol is Chinese territory momentarily to be filched by a stronger enemy. At least Jehol did not go by default. In ordering the troops to fight a hopeless battle the Government could quote in its defense the deathless lines of Rostand:

'Is it alone for victory that we fight?'

A battle lost holds hopes as fair and bright.'

"Now that the debacle has come

military leaders could be made to discard 18th or 19th century conceptions of warfare and begin training a modern army in earnest, so long will the national defence be lacking.

"But we need not despair. Out of the depth of our defeat, with the unconquerable courage that the nation has been showing in face of frequent disasters there will arise from the anvil of Japanese aggression something strong and pure, for great nations must be forged with blood and tears.

"This time last year the world was hailing the epic of heroism that was the Chinese soldier at Shanghai; to-day it looks with wondering eyes on the rabble fleeing back to the gates of Peking. These two came from the same book; only the one quickened by a spirit of nationalism, and the other corrupted and paralyzed by the taint of archaic and incompetent military professionalism."—Kuo Min.

0202

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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humanity.

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'Is it alone for victory that we fight?

A battle lost holds hopes as fair and bright.'

"Now that the debacle has come, the public demands scapegoats. There will be scapegoats, and it is all as it should be, but in all conscience the lesson of the Jehol campaign should make us think furiously. The blame lies not so much with individuals but in the system which permits the existence of vast armies of ill-fed, ill-armed and ill-trained soldiery which in time of crisis degenerate into helpless mobs. In any other country for the purpose of national defence the flower of the country is employed. With our imperfect educational system the bulk of our youth educated so as to make good material for modern scientific warfare. But even of the small band of competent very few have been drawn into the army. Until our

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 8784 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 7, 1933, on the subject "Repercussions of the Jehol Debacle: Mr. T. V. Soong's Statement on Jehol: Scathing Criticism of China's Military System."

SOURCE: NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
(British). March 7, 1933.

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL

SHANGHAI, MARCH 7, 1933.

CANDID CRITICISM

Mr. T. V. Soong has been completely candid. The Generals of the various Chinese armies know exactly what the Finance Minister thinks of their military efficiency. In particular Northern soldiers are reminded that patriotism and some degree of fervour are required to conduct even a moderate defence against a modern army. It is now revealed that Mr. Soong, after his recent trip to Jehol, became painfully conscious of the defects of the forces entrusted with the defence of that Province. He maintains that, even so, the gesture of defence, slight as it was, was justified. It certainly has made it impossible for any Chinese apologist, however ecstatic, to be under illusions regarding the relative merits of the Chinese and Japanese troops—or rather of the organisations behind them. Mr. Soong is saying in far blunter terms what this journal said yesterday in examining the causes of the Jehol debacle. The frankness which gives him authority thus to indict his military colleagues may perhaps carry him further to critical assessment of the extent to which the civil element in the Government must share the blame. Taking the events of last year in Shanghai referred to by Mr. Soong with pardonable pride, it may be urged that, although the defence of Chapei by the 19th Route Army aroused enthusiasm and no little admiration, it lamentably exposed the deficiencies which Mr. Soong rightly blames for the loss of Jehol. Without stirring up memories of events best forgotten, it is not unfair to observe that no little of the tribute accorded to the 19th Route Army was due to perception of its great inferiority in equipment as compared with that of the army operating eventually against it. There is no evidence that measures were taken to rectify the shortcomings this exposed. National pride is admirable; the 19th Route Army deserved to receive its glow. Without national determination, however, such an emotion is an emotion and nothing more. As an inspiration it is a disembodied phantom. The Chinese soldier's courage is not impugned. For him commiseration is felt as the victim of a vicarious patriotism which has been blind to the fact that to send troops ill-clad, primitively armed and pathetically badly equipped against a modern army is equivalent to murder.

These are all facts requiring no military knowledge to uncover. They must have been patent to every member of the

10,000 Telephone 6% Debts
140 Ch. Reorg. Loan (Gr.
unspd.)
11.30 Auction
From 9.30 till 11.30 a.m.
OFFICIAL
Morning
Little anxiety to sell.
mess reported at 13.75, March with
Cottons continued firm with but
are scarce except at higher rates.
placed at 93.5, March, but sell
Shanghai Docks could have been
rate.
March, with further buyers at 11.
dealt in, coming to business at
Trams were one of the few stock
3.75, more were asked for.
Intascope: After a small sale
at 6.60, cash.
Tangsz Finance were asked
7.80.
Trust Cos continued neglected
11.40.
Cathay Lands were nominal
placed at 10.5, March.
China Realty could have been
not interest sellers.
in evidence at 25, March, which
Shanghai Lands had good buyers
less.
at that our own market was
States, it is not to be wondered
the financial trouble in the United
With attention concentrated

Yesterday's Business

STOCK EXCHANGE

site page.
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AND SHARES

foreign interests on the insubstantial basis of indefinite forbearance on the part of those interests. When a Chinese Minister can, in a tense moment of national dismay, so far court the risks of unpopularity as to speak as frankly as Mr. Soong has done there is ground for satisfaction. He deserves the ear of his countrymen and their support in acting up to the principles thus plainly prescribed.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch N
Cunningham, American Consul G
dated March 7, 1933, on the s
the Jehol Debacle: Mr. T. V.
Scathing Criticism of China's

SOUR

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL

SHANGHAI, MARCH 7, 1933.

CANDID CRITICISM

Mr. T. V. Soong has been completely candid. The Generals of the various Chinese armies know exactly what the Finance Minister thinks of their military efficiency. In particular Northern soldiers are reminded that patriotism and some degree of fervour are required to conduct even a moderate defence against a modern army. It is now revealed that Mr. Soong, after his recent trip to Jehol, became painfully conscious of the defects of the forces entrusted with the defence of that Province. He maintains that, even so, the gesture of defence, slight as it was, was justified. It certainly has made it impossible for any Chinese apologist, however ecstatic, to be under illusions regarding the relative merits of the Chinese and Japanese troops—or rather of the organisations behind them. Mr. Soong is saying in far blunter terms what this journal said yesterday in examining the causes of the Jehol debacle. The frankness which gives him authority thus to indict his military colleagues may perhaps carry him further to critical assessment of the extent to which the civil element in the Government must share the blame. Taking the events of last year in Shanghai referred to by Mr. Soong with pardonable pride, it may be urged that, although the defence of Chapei by the 19th Route Army aroused enthusiasm and no little admiration, it lamentably exposed the deficiencies which Mr. Soong rightly blames for the loss of Jehol. Without stirring up memories of events best forgotten, it is not unfair to observe that no little of the tribute accorded to the 19th Route Army was due to perception of its great inferiority in equipment as compared with that of the army operating eventually against it. There is no evidence that mea-

sion showed that he was well aware of the qualities required to carry out a successful campaign against an enemy force, albeit natural and not human. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why he and his colleagues were unable to impress upon the country the plain facts of the lack of those qualities in the military machine fondly expected to trip up, if not entirely to delay, the advancing Japanese forces. Apparently the view was that the lesson could be taught only by actual experience. That view must be accepted as, at any rate, coming from one who ought to be able to judge the weaknesses of Chinese political thought. It is hardly endorsed by those who are under the impression that the sound and shrewd instincts of Chinese bankers would have been reliably enlisted by the Government in support of the candour now forthcoming from the Finance Minister.

This is said in no spirit of carping criticism but with the object of recording firm appreciation of Mr. Soong's boldness. If his views are taken to heart and not made the text for recriminatory aspersions on his patriotism, it is possible to hope that a really combined effort will be to establish a sounder national polity. The policy of tolerance, or in simpler terms, the idea of encouraging provincial or regional autonomy with the Central Government as a general mouthpiece for China, is not inconsistent with an immediate liquidation of the main Sino-Japanese problem. It is certain that the League of Nations, of whose sympathy China has had definite proof, is convinced of the urgent need for a rapprochement between the two countries. Outside help can be secured only on the basis of friendliness towards both parties. It is essential that the first step, at any rate, should be direct as between China and Japan. Mr. Soong is too perspicacious not to realise that fact. If he carries his present candour to its logical conclusion he will do more than realise it. He will give it active expression by means of advice tendered to his colleagues. He is perfectly right in maintaining that the Government has no reason to despair of the people or even of its own ability. It has been the victim, as its pre-revolutionary predecessors were, of an inherently defective system. In destroying one incubus the revolutionary leaders have been forced to give place to another which is, in some respects, as inert as and, in others, more sterile than the old. "Corrupted and paralysed by the taint of archaic and incompetent military professionalism" says Mr. Soong of the defeated armies. That is the truth but not the whole truth: paralysis has shown itself in the body politic which has not been able to endure the tonic of realities but has consistently been nourished on the heady draughts of a spurious self-sufficiency. Not, otherwise, can be described those militant challenges to foreign interests on the insubstantial basis of indefinite forbearance on the part of those interests. When a Chinese Minister can, in a tense moment of national dismay, so far court the risks of unpopularity as to speak as frankly as Mr. Soong has done there is ground for satisfaction. He deserves the ear of his countrymen and their support in acting up to the principles thus plainly prescribed.

ina,
of
Jehol:

NEWS
7, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure
Cunningham
dated Mar.
the Jehol
Scathing

to critical assessment of the extent to which the civil element in the Government must share the blame. Taking the events of last year in Shanghai referred to by Mr. Soong with pardonable pride, it may be urged that, although the defence of Chapei by the 19th Route Army aroused enthusiasm and no little admiration, it lamentably exposed the deficiencies which Mr. Soong rightly blames for the loss of Jehol. Without stirring up memories of events best forgotten, it is not unfair to observe that no little of the tribute accorded to the 19th Route Army was due to perception of its great inferiority in equipment as compared with that of the army operating eventually against it. There is no evidence that measures were taken to rectify the shortcomings this exposed. National pride is admirable; the 19th Route Army deserved to receive its glow. Without national determination, however, such an emotion is an emotion and nothing more. As an inspiration it is a disembodied phantom. The Chinese soldier's courage is not impugned. For him commiseration is felt as the victim of a vicarious patriotism which has been blind to the fact that to send troops ill-clad, primitively armed and pathetically badly equipped against a modern army is equivalent to murder.

These are all facts requiring no military knowledge to uncover. They must have been patent to every member of the Government from the Chairman downwards. Mr. Soong's statement could have been made with equal accuracy and greater usefulness a year earlier. Mr. Soong no doubt, can show excellent reasons why it was not. It is at least to his credit that he has made it now. Moreover his own part in shaking up the administration with the view of making it more adapted to cope with modern conditions has been definitely considerable. The trouble is that he has not been able to count on a sufficient volume of emulation in other departments. Although, for example, good work has been done under the personal direction of General Chiang Kai-shek in clearing out the communists in the Middle Yangtze valley and in attempting to reorganise rural administration on better lines, this practical effort has been put out of countenance by the unpractical attitude adopted towards the gathering clouds in the North. Mr. Soong's own success with the National Flood Relief Commis-

... of the candour now forthcoming from the Finance Minister.

This is said in no spirit of nourished on the heavy draughts of a spurious self-sufficiency. Not, otherwise, can be described those militant challenges to foreign interests on the insubstantial basis of indefinite forbearance on the part of those interests. When a Chinese Minister can, in a tense moment of national dismay, so far court the risks of unpopularity as to speak as frankly as Mr. Soong has done there is ground for satisfaction. He deserves the ear of his countrymen and their support in acting up to the principles thus plainly prescribed.

a,

hol:

NEWS

7, 1933.

OFFICIAL INDEXES

Total for the day
5,000 Shanghai Power 5 1/2% Debs
UNOFFICIAL
300 Tram (Beater) FI
Mar. 29
3.00 Auction
200 C. M. C. 7 1/2% Debs, 1927

0206

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD



Forwarded to Department without
comment. Copy retained
in the Archives.

11/11/53

AFC

APR 7 33

Confidential



Nanking Office.
March 11, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/6151

Dear Mr. Minister:

I enclose herewith a Memorandum of a conversation held by me this morning with Mr. Suma, first secretary of the Japanese Legation. He came to Nanking from Shanghai about a week ago and has been engaged in efforts to persuade Mr. Lo Jen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to come to some negotiations with the Japanese Government for a settlement of the present controversy. Doubtless, he has also been sounding out and arguing with other officers of the Government.

The

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Nanking.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
The salient points in Mr. Suna's observations were: the Japanese military authorities have recently given a very stern warning to the Chinese authorities in the Peiping area, pointing out what steps the Japanese may take in that region, if Government troops are sent to Jehol to oppose the Japanese forces there; the departure of General Chiang Kai-shek from Kiangsi to the Peiping area leaves Central China at the mercy of Cantonese ambitions and to the Communist terror; General Chiang Kai-shek will probably be politically eliminated as a result of his participation in anti-Japanese operations.

Yours sincerely,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation dated March 11, 1933.

In duplicate to the American Minister.
No copy to the Department.



No

2/7/77

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

March 11, 1933.

Mr. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation.
 Mr. Peck.

Mr. Suma called on Mr. Peck about 11 a.m. and in the course of a rather lengthy conversation referred to certain possibilities in the present internal and external situation in China, as follows:

The departure of General Chiang Kai-shek from Kiangsi to the Peiping region raises the query, "Why did he go to the North?". General Chiang has hitherto announced that his task of subduing the Communist bands in southern Kiangsi demanded his attention, to the exclusion of everything else. Mr. Suma thought that there were various reliable indications that before General Chiang felt in a position to leave Kiangsi, he made some kind of an understanding, or "truce", with the Communist forces, providing against their expanding their field of operations in his absence. Mr. Suma named one or two Communist leaders who, he said, had been in communication with General Chiang Kai-shek. Naturally, if such an understanding had been arrived at, it must ^{have} included some recognition by General Chiang Kai-shek of the right of the Communist forces to remain undisturbed in their areas. Mr. Suma thought that probably these areas included the Communist

controlled

- 2 -

controlled regions in Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan, and Hupeh. Substantiation of this story of an arrangement between General Chiang and the Communists had been received from a Chinese staff office who had lately returned from Kiangsi.

The forthcoming arrival of a Soviet Ambassador in China would make this Communist menace much more serious even than it is now. The Third International was giving constant advice and assistance to the Communist forces in China.

The question still remained of why did General Chiang go North? The answer probably was, thought Mr. Suma, that with the fall of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, General Chiang feared that he would lose control of the northern provinces and that they would pass to some other General, or group of Generals, unless he went personally to take control himself.

However that might be, Mr. Suma observed that reports were to the effect that Chinese Government troops had now been moved from the Peiping region toward Jehol, with the apparent intention of attacking the Japanese forces. Mr. Suma said that the Japanese military authorities had very recently issued a stern warning to the Chinese authorities in the Peiping region in regard to this troop movement. Mr. Suma said that he had not only seen the text of this warning, but even the Japanese military plan which would be adopted if the Chinese Government forces actually

attacked

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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attacked the Japanese forces in Jehol. Mr. Peck ventured the supposition that this military plan included Japanese reinforcements to Jehol by way of the northern route, i.e., through the Tientsin-Beiping region. Mr. Suma did not contradict this. . .

Mr. Suma said that he still found it difficult to account for General Chiang's actions. He said that General Chiang undoubtedly knew that, if he made an attempt to recover Jehol, he would fail in the attempt and be ruined in the process. This would be very bad for General Chiang Kai-shek, but it raised serious issues, also, for foreigners everywhere, especially in the Yangtze Valley. One of the possibilities which might follow the elimination of General Chiang-Kai-shek and his authority, was an attempt on the part of what Mr. Suma might call "unemployed politicians", like C.C. Wu et al, to cease control of the Nanking Government. These men are mainly Cantonese and it is also possible that if General Chiang were to be eliminated, the southern provinces might take the opportunity to attempt a seizure of the region up to the Yangtze Valley. The turmoil which would result from such an attempt could easily be foreseen.

Mr. Suma said that Mr. Peck had undoubtedly heard of the plan for a confederation of anywhere up to seven of the southern provinces. This plan had recently been revived in an active way. Mr. Suma

did

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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did not think that General Chen Chi-tang, who now is in nominal control of Kwangtung, would embark on such an ambitious undertaking, but there were others who were more ambitious. Mr. Suma evidently expected that an effort would now be made to carry this plan into operation. Even if General Chiang Kai-shek should survive his northern "adventure" he might easily find himself deprived of authority both in southern and northern China and find his authority confined to the one province of Kiangsu. But all of these changes would necessarily entail confusion throughout China and danger to foreign interests everywhere. Mr. Suma thought that General Chiang Kai-shek would be well advised to return to his duties in Central China.

Mr. Suma attempted, as on a previous occasion, to find out what impression Mr. Peck had gained of the Chinese intentions toward the Japanese. Mr. Suma intimated that the determination to interfere with Japan's plans with reference to Manchukuo was confined to a few individuals. He said that even Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had admitted to him that it was essential to prevent any sino-Japanese "incident" from arising in the Tientsin area.

Mr. Peck said frankly that he came into contact with very few important Chinese and those were in the Government. However, he had gained the impression

from

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from what he had read and heard that the Chinese feeling was that no surrender on the part of the Chinese had ever satisfied the Japanese and that since it would be equally disastrous to China to surrender or to resist, the better plan was to resist. Mr. Peck said that he, himself, was somewhat puzzled by the action of General Chiang Kai-shek in going north, because he had always received the impression that General Chiang was not very much in favor of forcible resistance to Japan. In Nanking, he said, there seemed to be differences of view among the high officials of the National Government, which was only natural, since in every country there were differences of view on national questions. In America there were almost invariably at least two opposing views.

I told Mr. Suma that since it now seemed unavoidable that some military action would be taken by Japan in the north China area, a question that confronted me seriously was whether Japanese military action was probable in the Yangtze Valley. Mr. Suma said he supposed this question concerned me in my Consular capacity and that I was thinking of the safety of my nationals. I admitted this. Mr. Suma said he was glad to assure me most positively that it was the Japanese intention to limit as much as possible any action which it might be necessary to take for the protection of Japanese interests. He said that the

Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese realized that in their own interest it was most desirable to avoid any clash in the Yangtze Valley and had promised to prevent such a clash if humanly possible. Mr. Suma said that he could assure me, also, that the military plans of the Japanese higher authorities did not include any action in this region. He said that the mutual understanding between the Japanese and Chinese in the Shanghai area was very clear in this regard and that even though the Chinese had not observed the arrangement made after the Shanghai incident for excluding Chinese troops from a certain region, nevertheless he felt that no trouble would arise. Recent correspondence between the Japanese and Chinese authorities about this question was being withheld from publicity, at the request of the Chinese.

Mr. Suma asked whether Mr. Peck thought there was any foundation in the rumor that American capitalists were meditating a very large loan, say, of \$100,000,000, with the so-called "Peking Treasurers", as security. Mr. Peck said that he thought this rumor was fantastic. Mr. Suma said he thought so, too. For one reason, he had grounds for believing that the so-called "Treasurers" were mostly imitations of the original articles, substituted by Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin. The only really valuable articles, he was informed, were those in the

Historia

0214

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Historical Museum, and those were still in Peiping.

Mr. Suma ventured the supposition that it was unlikely that the Chinese would be able to obtain any large loan from the United States. Mr. Peck said that, in his opinion, this undoubtedly was true. The Chinese had never borrowed more than about \$20,000,000 gold from the United States and the financial condition in the United States at the present time was such as to preclude any interest by American financiers in a loan to China.

Mr. Suma inquired what the prospects were that the new Administration would extend recognition to the Soviet Government. Mr. Peck thought that this was a possibility, because of the trade development which some persons thought would follow such a move. Mr. Suma inquired whether there were any political arguments made for extending recognition to the Soviet Government.

(Mr. Suma evidently had in mind the theory that the American and Soviet Governments might unite in opposition to Japan. W.R.P.) Mr. Peck ignored any possible connection of this subject with international relations, and replied that he thought all political considerations were against the extending of recognition by the United States to the Soviet Government. He said that, so far as he knew, the general opinion in the United States was that the political systems of the

United

0215
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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United States and the Soviet Union were so different that it would be rather dangerous to permit the opening of Soviet consulates in America, with their numerous attaches who might stir up trouble. Mr. Suma seemed to find this theory reasonable.

WRP/ECM



0211

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 15, 1933.

~~NOTE:~~
~~SIGN:~~

I think that you might be interested in reading the two attached letters from Mr. Peck to Minister Johnson with regard to conversations which Mr. Peck had with Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation in China.

J.S.J.

0217

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD



APR 7 33



Confidential

Dear Mr. Minister:



Nanking Office
March 9, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/6152

I think it would be well for me to amplify somewhat my telegram sent to you this morning concerning the visit of Mr. Suma to Nanking.

I have just returned from a luncheon given in his honor at the Japanese Consulate General. After lunch Mr. Suma sought an opportunity to talk with me. He asked me whether I had not observed a change in Chinese official opinion since the occupation of Jehol. It was his opinion that Chinese leaders in Nanking were now prepared to base their policies more in accord with facts than heretofore, in other words, that they were nearer

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister,
Peiping.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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nearer to consenting to direct discussions between Japan and China.

I told Mr. Suma quite frankly that the only Chinese official I met frequently whose ideas were of great importance was Lo Wen-kan. I pointed out that two or three cabinet officials were now in the North, that T.V. Soong was in Shanghai, and that the remaining cabinet officials did not seem to be very influential. I neither assented to nor denied his impression regarding a change of attitude.

Mr. Holman, of the British Legation, was seated where he could not but overhear Suma's conversation with me and he told me that Suma had called upon him the day before and had said very much the same things. We both agreed that Suma is trying to get confirmation of things which he would like to believe. Holman said that he told Suma that he had not observed any greater readiness on the part of the Chinese to take up direct negotiations.

Mr. Suma thought that there were two political tendencies which deserve watching. One was the possibility that something in the nature of a commission should be set up in North China by the Peking Government, to take the place of Chang Hsueh-liang, and the second was the possibility that the regime at Canton should

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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should make use of the way in which the loss of Jehol had discredited the Nanking Government, to set up its own appointees in Nanking.

My conversation with Lo Jen-kan on the evening of March 8 shows that he is far from feeling any greater readiness to negotiate with Japan directly than he felt before the loss of Jehol. I do not think that he was trying to deceive me in regard to his real convictions. His argument against any degree or form of concession to Japan is that Japan has never been satisfied with any gains, and never will be. He pointed out that each encroachment by Japan on China has been followed by another. He has several times insisted that no matter what Japan obtains from China in the way of territory, Japan will always want more, and the only thing which will put a brake on Japan's ambitions is forceable resistance by the Chinese themselves.

It seemed to me that Lo's remark to Suma, as Lo recounted it to me, was very significant, that is, that Lo did not wish to follow in the footsteps of Li Hung-chang. Lo told me that Suma had said to him "you are a courageous man, you should make up your mind". Lo did not tell me so, but the inference was obvious, that

Suma

- 4 -

Suma wanted Lo to make up his mind to initiate direct negotiations. Lo told me that he replied to Suma that he, Lo, was courageous, but courageous only with sincerity. Lo observed to me that Li Hung-chang was no traitor, and that when he signed the treaty of Shiminoseki it was not through any willingness to surrender Chinese territory. Lo pointed out to Suma that after this treaty was signed Li Hung-chang went to Russia and the Russo-Japanese War followed. Lo told Suma that when he consented to a peace, it must be a peace which would be enjoyed by their children and grand-children, and not merely a peace which would contain the seeds of future trouble. The peace must insure friendly relations between all three governments.

It would be interesting to know the mental reaction of Suma to Lo's hint that if China made some settlement with Japan now, China might again have recourse to Russian assistance and might stir up trouble again between Russia and Japan. Of course, it may have been Lo's intention merely to point out that trouble between the Soviet Union and Japan would be the inevitable result of a settlement which left Japan in possession of Chinese territory. I had no opportunity last night to question

Lo

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Lo regarding his precise meaning. However, Lo said that Suma asked him what suggestions he had to offer, and Lo replied that the only way to restore friendly relations between Japan and China was for Japan to withdraw her forces from all the occupied territory.

Lo remarked to me that it was now evident that Japan was going to withdraw from the League of Nations and that Japan's object was to be in position to defy the League and everyone else.

Another guest whom I met last night, Lo Chia-luen, a man high in the Kuomintang and in the Government, told me that all the members of the Government had been greatly depressed by the events in Jehol. He said that from Japanese activities in Tientsin and from information received through the Chinese Military Intelligence Branch, the National Government felt convinced that the Japanese intend to occupy Tientsin and Peiping and that "something terrible was going to happen" in that region.

The Government has decided upon the punishment of General Tang Yu-lin and upon the punishment, also, of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. I understand that the question has been referred to General Chiang Kai-shek, now supposed to be at Pootungfu, of what should be done

to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to Marshal Chang.

Yours truly,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

In duplicate to the Legation
No copy to the Department.

No. 100-100-100
Received *[Signature]*

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal. *[Signature]*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM
No. 340
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Tientsin, China, March 10, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: Detention of Shipment of 100 Trucks
Consigned to American-Chinese Company,
Tientsin.

193.94
The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of
March 7, 3 p.m. and March 8, 3 p.m., on the above-
mentioned subject, and to state, for the confidential
information of the Legation, and for telegraphic trans-
mission to the Department if deemed advisable, that the
National City Bank of New York, which is financing the
transaction involving the purchase of the 100 Ford
chassis, has, according to information given to me by
Mr. L. O. McGowan of the American-Chinese Company,
telegraphed New York and London advising against the
shipment of any goods, financed by the National City
Bank of New York, in Japanese vessels pending the clear-
ing up

F/HS

793.94/6153

PR 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ing up of the present situation in North China. I inquired today of the local acting manager of the National City Bank to verify the above information and he stated that it is correct.

For the further confidential information of the Legation, I may state that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has deposited with the National City Bank of New York a sum sufficient to pay for the trucks on delivery to him and that the bank, which covered itself by War Risk Insurance, advanced payment to the Ford Motor Car Company at Shanghai. All negotiations of the American-Chinese Company at Tientsin in connection with the purchase were conducted with the Ford Motor Car Company, Incorporated, at Shanghai and that company in turn ordered the chassis from the Ford Company at Yokohama. The American-Chinese Company has incurred large expense at Tientsin in building bodies for the chassis, and the contract called for the delivery of the chassis c.i.f. Tientsin. The failure of the shipment to reach Tientsin will cause serious financial embarrassment to the American-Chinese Company, the officials of which are greatly concerned over the sudden turn of events. The company officials were especially concerned today to learn that an agent of the Ford Motor Car Company is negotiating with the Ford agent at Dairen for the delivery of the shipment to that agency. The company is quite seriously affected not only because of the possible loss of the sale of the 100 trucks to the Chinese authorities, but it is also exercised over the possibility that the
delivery

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quigley NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
delivery of the trucks to the Japanese agency at Dairen
may cause very unfavorable reactions on the part of
Chinese officials and Chinese citizens throughout China
against the Ford Motor Car Company.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800
FPI/AMM

Original and three copies to Legation.



2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 April 19, 1933.

~~LES~~
~~JEF~~
~~ROM~~
~~MEH~~

Shanghai's despatch No 8812 of March 17, 1933 transmits four editorials from the North China Daily News (Feb 27-Mar 13, 1933) and reviews several editorials from the Chinese press at Shanghai during that period.

The press seems to hold varying opinions as to whether China should have defended Jehol or should have surrendered it to Japan without a struggle. One paper observes that a short campaign at least saved the Chinese government considerable money. Hollington Tong feels that Jehol will, at some future time, be regained. He thinks that Japan intends to set up two more puppet states, namely, one in Charhar, Suiyuan and Mongolia, and the second in North China proper.

The Shanghai Times criticizes T V Soong for issuing a call to arms in Jehol on February 18th and on March 7th stating that he had prophesied that the province could not be defended for longer than a week or ten days.

OK
 LHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8812

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, March 17, 1933.

793.94


SUBJECT: Editorial and Other Comment on the
Sino-Japanese Situation.

THE HONORABLE


THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

AM RECD



APR 7 1933



F/HS

793.94/6154

I have the honor to transmit herewith for the
information of the Department and the Legation copies
of various editorials which have recently appeared in
the Shanghai press dealing with the present situation
in Jehol and concomitant problems.

- The first is an editorial from the NORTH-CHINA
- 1/ DAILY NEWS (British) of February 27, 1933, at the
beginning of the Japanese push into Jehol. In this
article the editor comments on the effects of the
Japanese push into Jehol in the light of the recom-
mendations of the League Assembly with regard to the
whole Sino-Japanese situation. He questions the
decision of the Chinese Government to resist the
Japanese advance, but believes that it would not be
feasible for China to give up Jehol without at least
a show of resistance. He points out the equivocal
position of Japan in using Japanese troops to establish
the adherence of Jehol to Manchukuo when no state of

war

1228

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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war exists between China and Japan. The editor believes that the military perils of this course may be comparatively small for Japan but that the political perils are incalculable, and he concludes with the pious hope that as these political perils accumulate the Japanese may be more ready to turn to the League for a solution.

2/ There is also enclosed an editorial from the same paper of March 2, 1933, in regard to the debate in the House of Commons having to do with the application of sanctions against Japan. The editor points out in a convincing manner that the sanction clauses in the League of Nations' Covenant are impossible of application in the Sino-Japanese situation. He points out that any nation, if it authorizes the imposition of sanctions against another nation and fails to achieve the desired object, not merely incurs a loss of prestige but also runs the risk of having to go to war. The editor does not agree with the contention that if all nations agree to apply sanctions the danger of war would be negligible, because, he states, the risks incurred by all are not equal, and, moreover, if a nation decides to apply sanctions it must logically be prepared to meet all the resultant eventualities. The editor then deals with the British arms embargo, which, he states, is not applying sanctions.

Both the Chinese and foreign press devoted considerable space to comment on the Jehol debacle and endeavored to draw certain lessons therefrom. The Chinese press was particularly indignant at what it terms the treachery of General Tang Yu-lin (湯玉麟). Some of the papers even stated that it was immediately necessary to take the offensive and win back the province to Chinese

jurisdiction

-3-

jurisdiction. Mr. Sun Fo declared in an interview with the KUOMIN NEWS AGENCY that the blame lay with General Chang Hsueh-liang, as well as with Tang Yu-lin and the other commanders at the front. The most important statement in regard to the defeat, however, was made by Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, who stated that he had prophesied that the province could not be defended for longer than a week or ten days. (See despatch No. 8784, March 7, 1933, to the Department.)

The foreign press in Shanghai commented extensively on the defeat. The NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British), in an editorial on March 6, 1933, stated that the dismay at the defeat might perhaps be tempered in Chinese minds with relief at the thought that much-needed money would not be diverted for the support of a fruitless military adventure. This journal believes that the Japanese Foreign Office is sincere in its statements not to extend military activity south of the Great Wall. This paper considers that the most significant feature connected with events in the North during the past few months has been the aloofness of Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Han Fu-chu (this was prior to the former's departure for the North).

The SHANGHAI TIMES, a British journal commonly reported to be under Japanese influence, in an editorial on March 6, 1933, believes that the Jehol defeat should impress on the Chinese that the idea of further warfare should be immediately abandoned, and that China should recognize Manchukuo and make a treaty both with the latter and with Japan for the preservation of harmony

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the future. In a further editorial on March 7, 1933, the editor of the SHANGHAI TIMES criticizes Mr. Soong, if he knew that resistance was useless, for not advocating a strategic retreat after his visit to the North instead of issuing the statement on February 18, 1933, advocating a "call to arms." This paper again strongly advocates the abandonment of the policy of resistance by the Chinese and the entering into formal relations with Japan to inaugurate an era of peace and cooperation.

Mr. Hollington K. Tong, writing in THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese independent daily) on March 8, 1933, takes the opposite view to that above mentioned. He argues that the Jehol campaign is by no means finished; that there are still several hundred thousand Chinese troops, who, although broken up into small parties, can still maintain a very effective resistance to the Japanese. He recalls Napoleon's expedition to Moscow as an example to show that if China is patient, time and the geography of Jehol are on its side, for if these two factors are supported by the determination to win, China must eventually be victorious in the campaign. He believes that it is the ambition of Japan to create two more puppet states, one in Charhar, Suiyuan and Mongolia, and the other in North China proper.

3/ Following the announcement of the resignation of Chang Hsueh-liang, the editor of the NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS in an editorial on March 9, 1933, copy enclosed, reviews his leadership in North China since the death of his father, and believes that his elimination was inevitable. In a further editorial on March 13, 1933,

a copy

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- 4/ a copy of which is also enclosed, the editor makes a plea for intelligent leadership in the situation brought about in the North by Chang Hsueh-liang's resignation.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of February 27, 1933.
- 2/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of March 2, 1933.
- 3/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of March 9, 1933.
- 4/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of March 13, 1933.

800
PRJ:NLH

In quintuplicate
In duplicate to Legation, Peiping
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8812 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 17, 1933, on the subject "Editorial and other Comment on the Sino-Japanese Situation."

SOURCE: THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS,
February 27, 1933. (British).

EDITORIAL

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1933.

INTO THE UNKNOWN

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HE A.B.

VALUE a

LADIES

That General Confession this evening was no empty and meaningless prayer. "We have followed the devices and desires of our own hearts, offended against Thy holy laws. We have left undone

Desires of Our Hearts

afresh. our sins, we have crucified Him gratitude, by our selfishness, by let Christ be crucified. By our in- we have cried for Barabbas, and Him, and rejected Him. Yes, and servants—but we have refused testimony of His word and His services of this house, by the by our early teaching, through the has come to us in so many ways,— old, for we have rejected Him. He hour of need—but like the Jews of them, have failed Him in many an Him needed it,—though we, like as His disciples who had deserted givenness! We need it, not only How much we all need this for- they do." give them: for they know not what otherwise despatch—"Father, for- prayer speaks to hearts that would be. Down through the ages the man that is, and for man that shall pleads for man that has been, for prayer as wide as humanity. He afresh, He pleads for us. It is a

place, which is called Calvary, there one on the right hand, and the other forgive them; for they know not what

Dean Trivett in the Chapel on Feb. 19

GIVE THEM ??

advance has been given. Her position is equivocal. A state of



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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EDITORIAL

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1933.

INTO THE UNKNOWN

The war machine moves forward in Jehol. The League of Nations has adopted recommendations which, for the time being, cannot be carried into effect. The decision of the League is inevitable; hardly anywhere, outside Japan, is there a responsible voice to question its general justification. At the same time the Japanese Government, having assumed responsibility for the immediate formal inclusion of Jehol in the territory of Manchukuo, feels that it must continue to support military action in assertion of the policy adopted. Chinese resistance is regarded by Tokyo as provocation which may lead to events outside the power of Japan to control. Meanwhile the League and the two Powers, outside its membership but closely concerned with Far Eastern affairs, can confer and wait. From no quarter comes any proposal for forcible intervention between Japan and China. The Japanese Government will be aggravating the situation if it pretends to its people that disagreement with Japanese policy implies intrinsic animosity against Japan or an intention, let alone a desire, to enforce disagreement except by the ordinary power of friendly representations. Even the most definite dissentients cannot be blind to the fact that, being committed presently to the armed argument for the establishment of Manchukuo and to the mortgage of her diplomatic conscience to the General Staff, Japan can hardly call a halt in Jehol. This exposes her to risks: they have been run ever since September 1931. They involve a desperate gamble on the efficiency of the military instrument and, by implication, on the Japanese soldiers' estimate of the feebleness of the opposition likely to be offered in the field. No-one doubts Tokyo's sincerity in hoping to confine the

field against the heterogeneous troops at the command of General Chang Tso-hsiang. Although this journal recently stressed the possible superiority of a courageous repudiation of any show of resistance, it cannot deny the force of the argument that Japanese pressure has been so insistent as to make even that method extrication unfeasible, except at the almost prohibitive cost of losing the last shred of national self-respect. To a Government faced with the gravely tragic responsibilities now presented by events in Jehol it were the grossest discourtesy to offer gratuitous advice or admonition. If there had been no errors at Nanking or Mukden in the past the present disabilities might not obtain. If there were still no deplorable defects in administration and political direction the burden borne by

China might be less onerous. It would be unfair and illogical on that account to belittle the efforts of the Chinese Government in solving its pressing difficulties. To what extent it has been able to secure an actual solidarity in opposition to the invasion of Jehol the next few weeks will reveal. On general grounds it is permissible to express the view that if ever there was a time for sinking a people's internal differences that time has come in China to-day. Mr. Matsuoka's statement that Japan desires to help China may be ironically confirmed by the course of imminent events.

While Japan and China are thus engaged in what is a war in everything but name, the prescription for peace has been drawn up by the League and remains for application at the suitable moment. The rest of the world must stand by but it will not be idle. Already the United States of America has signified its substantial agreement with the League's decision. Acceptance of the invitation to be actively associated with the League's deliberations on future action has not been forthcoming; perhaps it will be delayed until the new President has assumed office. It would be surprising if it were withheld, in the light of the general trend of official American pronouncements. Japan, in regard to the possibilities south of the Great Wall, professes an incongruous helplessness. Greater confidence exists within the League and across the Pacific. There is no suggestion that any Power will be carried against its will into a course of action inconsistent with the obligations accepted under the Covenant or the treaties relevant to this issue. Japan, therefore, can rely on wholehearted cooperation in whatever measure she may devise for limiting her commitments. She need have no fear of outside pressure. Rather she has cause to be doubtful of the strength of her control over the machine to which, once again, the word of advance has been given. Her position is equivocal. A state of her own creation is technically a rebel against a country with which diplomatically she is still on friendly terms. That state is seeking to extend the area of its rebel rule; its own forces are only nominally in the picture just as its administration is but a camouflage for Japanese rule. Japanese troops are hacking their way into Jehol for the sake of establishing that Province's adherence to Manchukuo. Yet no state of war exists between China and Japan. China is resisting an invader; Japan is clearing Chinese troops out of Chinese territory, in urgent solicitude for the re-establishment of law and order in northern China, to quote the picturesque euphemism of Mr.

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and other

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EDITORIAL

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The decision of the Chinese Government to resist the advance into Jehol may be questioned on the ground of expediency; it may be deplored on account of the tragic waste of men and money involved. It cannot fairly be termed an act of provocation. Japanese spokesmen who are betrayed into language of that kind may be excused on account of a feverish desire to conceal the weakness of their case. Others who attempt to take the same line are flagrantly ignoring the facts and, unwittingly perhaps, violating ordinary canons of sportsmanship. Nor is it fitting to evade the issue by citing the symptoms of political disunity in China or overworking the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. Responsible members of the Chinese Government have publicly affirmed their recognition of the League's vindication of the principles of its Covenant. They have also emphasised the need for China, in spite of her sense of military weakness, to show self-reliance in opposing, so far as in her lies, the further development of Japanese plans for the absorption of Chinese territory. None know better than they the inherent defects of their political organisation and the overwhelming forces—in point of training and equipment—likely to be put in the

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THE WOMAN'S PAC

A Fashion

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
Cunningham, American Consul
dated March 17, 1933, on the
Comment on the Sino-Japanese

SOURCE

EDITOR

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, MARCH 2, 1933.

COMMONS DEBATE

The persistence of certain critics of the League of Nations in talking of the application of sanctions against Japan has received a blunt rebuke from Sir John Simon. At the risk of being tedious this journal must repeat its clear deduction of more than sixteen months ago to the effect that the Sino-Japanese trouble had revealed the impracticability of the sanctions clauses in the Covenant. Confirmation of that view has followed every month during which this dispute has lasted. Possibly those whom Sir John again endeavoured to instruct in the realities of the situation are obsessed by experience with the trade unionists' strike weapon. If a strike is launched but is found to be ineffective, it is withdrawn and nothing very serious happens except the loss of trade union money and the infliction of a certain damage to the industry concerned. Both disasters are usually remediable without much trouble or delay. The penalty which a nation runs the risk of incurring, if it authorises the imposition of a sanction against another nation and it fails to achieve the desired object, is not merely a loss of prestige but, almost certainly, exposure to the obligation to make war. The contention that, if all nations agreed to apply sanctions, this danger would be negligible cannot be regarded as practical. To begin with, the risks incurred by all would be by no means equal. More important still, a nation responsible for the proper diplomatic conduct of its international relationships cannot gamble on "ifs"

only to find that the performance is her solo. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Sir John Simon's announcement received with but tepid enthusiasm and, indeed, some definite hostility. Welcome to it must be tempered by diffidence. It gives the world the opportunity of judging where the nations stand. Great Britain and the United States of America have now the chance to come to an understanding which may profoundly encourage the general movement towards solution of the disarmament problem. On the face of it, according to this journal's well-informed Whitehall correspondent, the prohibition is sweeping. Modification of it may be necessary to avert real hardship from trades which have no sort of concern with munitions. Already it has been revised to the relief of manufacturers of civil aircraft. Even then illogicality must intrude to make the critic regard the step with considerable doubt. It is an interesting experiment; it vindicates Great Britain's good faith. It is essentially an attempt to enforce impartiality but the actual working of the prohibition may, in effect, be more of a handicap to one side than the other. Although it is the natural outcome of the "middle of the road" policy reinforcement of it by the unreserved adherence of other nations will be required. Otherwise it will put a premium on disregard of the spirit which it embodies.

Recognising the necessity for applying a damper to the inflammatory oratory of Labour's left wing rump in the House of Commons, Sir John's unequivocal rebuke to pugnacious pacifism will be warmly approved. The question arises whether the Foreign Secretary fully appreciates the need for giving the Government's right wing a salutary corrective. The campaign or misrepresenting Sir John Simon's attitude here has been greatly helped by the vehemently partisan utterances of the back bench Conservatives and their supporters in the Rothermere press. Although Sir John has emphasised his cordial agreement with the League Report they have not concealed their contempt of it. No sign has been given of Sir John's recognition of the need for instilling into their minds some of those elementary principles of fair play and sportsmanship which they so often pretend are their own monopoly. Championship of the weaker is usually in tune with the traditions taught in British schools, colleges and universities. Lofty contempt for that idea underlies most of the public effusions of this Conservative group and its sycophants in the press. It can muster only about forty members, as a recent division showed. It would do well to ponder on the significance of the Labour victory at Rotherham. When it endeavours to prove that the League is some absurd excrescence from which Great Britain can dissociate herself it is patently flouting facts. Once again let it be asserted that the League is no more than its members make it. If they come unanimously to certain decisions under its own rules, after elaborate consideration the

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in the other opportunity to demonstrate its trimmed to match her before the War. The rage for fur-turbans and long the most modest ladies' what bone, that were in vogue merry-widow collars, supported and the throat in the manner of the front in place and passed the throw collar effect held this point to the throat itself, but a son. Not only did it ascend in mans of the most scrupulous was high enough to satisfy the the same gown, it was seen that en when you observed the front needed the bounds of decency. at some might have said she had ver than anybody else, so low ide its appearance, she went far ren the low back décolletée gown. eance is produced. For instance, unusual effect of daring and e restraint on the other end that vice counter-acting it by exces- ame and then by some clever- hique is in going to some ex- One of her personal strokes of xtremes and Restraint anger to her. the dress-designing trade is marvellous technique and no trick its long experience has perfected r apprenticeship when fourteen. e haute couture having started She was practically born into eation. stable air of Paris to her DORIAN

ENDS IN HATS
S: CHARLOTTE REVELL
Letter

hat the League is some absurd xrescence from which Great Britain can dissociate herself it s patently flouting facts. Once gain let it be asserted that the eague is no more than its mem- ers make it. If they come nanimously to certain decisions nder its own rules, after laborate consideration, the hances are that they are right. t is bootless to pretend that hose decisions mean more than heir actual purport implies. The nly logical explanation of views o which Mr. Winston Churchill as lately given expression is hat the more powerful nation ust *ipso facto* be right when it s in dispute with a weaker. ritish statesmen in the past ave not hesitated to condemn his theory, which perhaps explains why the Foreign ecretaryship is the one high office in the State to elude he versatile genius of Mr. Churchill. Sir John Simon's urtherwise admirable speech eems here to have left what, to many people, will seem to be an mportant lacuna. The League may be the failure that partisans annoyed with its decision eclare. The difficulty of its posi- ion cannot be ignored. It has, however emerged with consid-

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Great Britain, in declaring an embargo, is not applying sanctions but is taking a step which logically should be taken by any friendly nation during a state of war between two countries. In the past there has been far too much inconsistency in deploring the use of the armed argument but making useful profits out of material supplied to maintain it. Those who recently have been making so much political capital in Geneva and London out of the civil war in Szechuen must have been terribly pained to think that the ferocity of the outbreak was enhanced by bombing aeroplanes imported from abroad. The man who tells a small boy that smoking is very bad for him but at the same time presents him—at a price which carries an additional percentage in recognition of the riskiness of the transaction—with a packet

gain let it be asserted that the League is no more than its members make it. If they come unanimously to certain decisions under its own rules, after elaborate consideration, the chances are that they are right. It is bootless to pretend that those decisions mean more than their actual purport implies. The only logical explanation of views to which Mr. Winston Churchill has lately given expression is that the more powerful nation must *ipso facto* be right when it is in dispute with a weaker. British statesmen in the past have not hesitated to condemn his theory, which perhaps explains why the Foreign Secretaryship is the one high office in the State to elude the versatile genius of Mr. Churchill. Sir John Simon's otherwise admirable speech seems here to have left what, to many people, will seem to be an important lacuna. The League may be the failure that partisans annoyed with its decision declare. The difficulty of its position cannot be ignored. It has, however, emerged with considerable credit from recent discussions. Mr. Churchill himself gave it only the other day a first-class testimonial; it seems unfortunate that he should appear to be on the side of those who would torpedo it. All the more necessary is it for Sir John to guard against possible criticism. The precision of his support of the League cannot be bettered. It is rather in his casual *obiter dicta* that he unluckily gives the enemy cause to blaspheme as, for example, his impulsive and by no means clear allusion to the crisis of 1914-1918 in retort to Mr. Lansbury. The right thing can sometimes be said at the wrong moment. Silence may be usually golden and some of the loquacity with which the Government at Westminster has to contend is distinctly leaden. Sympathy with Japan has its appropriate place, just as frank recognition of China's shortcomings. From Sir John Simon there has been explicit recognition of Japan's error; there has been only im-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS

the Young Marshal's troops from Mukden, Changchun and other parts of Manchuria while he was still in Peking, was ostensibly justified by Japan on account of the Marshal's own misgovernment of that area and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Government at Nanking. The pretext does not cover the basic fact of the Japanese General Staff's intention to make of a forward move in Manchuria the instrument for reasserting its own waning political control in Tokyo. Nevertheless it is only fair to the Young Marshal to hazard the opinion that, owing to the circumlocutory organization in which the Kuomintang system involved his relations with Nanking and also to the peculiar frame of mind of the Foreign Office in the summer of 1931, rather than to want of warning from him, Japanese portents in Manchuria were so blithely ignored.

The Young Marshal, gifted with personal charm, with a sincere goodwill, with a real honesty of intention, yet hampered by the defects of his own qualities and by the pertinacity of evil traditions, has long been a pathetic figure of incapacity amid events on the homeric scale. With the reservation necessary in considering the kaleidoscope of Chinese politics,

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch Cunningham, American Consul, dated March 17, 1933, on Comment on the Sino-Japanese

his resignation must be regarded as terminating his leadership, nominal or otherwise. It may be expected that he will go abroad and enjoy that rest for which he has been yearning and which his advisers have not been able, for various reasons, to ensure his taking. It may be urged that he has been the helpless victim of circumstances—a butterfly broken on the wheel of grim realities. Responsibility for the destiny of nearly 30,000,000 people has been his; the judgment of events on such a stewardship must be inexorable and relentless. The maintenance of a facade of sovereignty can be easily achieved so long as there is no intrusion of outside standards of comparison. The arsenal of Mukden with its wealth of munitions disappeared from the control of the Young Marshal in one night at the blast of Japanese bugles. That ignominious catastrophe ought to have been regarded as an omen. Yet, in the reorganization south of the Great Wall, neither Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang nor his coadjutors at Nanking seemed to realise the importance of replacing the simulacrum by the substantial actualities of troops well-equipped, regularly paid and properly led. Political alarms and excursions filled the air with sounds. There was nothing done to fit the Northern troops for the rôle forced upon them by Japanese aggression. Yet all the time the politicians were staging a drama of resistance in which the soldiers, already fugitives from the territory within their custody, were to play the principal parts. The slender shoulders of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had to bear the burden of directing the drama. The inevitable has happened. The play is ended—a dismal "frost."

in S. China, and Other

SOURCE

DAILY NEWS

EDITOR

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, MARCH 9, 1933.

DEFEAT'S PENALTY

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang resigned last August. He plainly expressed his desire to go abroad. Political pressure, combined with the negligent atmosphere prevailing in Peking at the time, induced him to reconsider the decision but the desire remained. The personality of the young man who, by the tragic turn of fate, was suddenly called upon to fill the rôle of warlord of Mukden has commanded sympathy by reason of its combination of the eagerness to do right with constitutional defects which have been accentuated by his environment. His succession was not solely based on hereditary right. He was definitely chosen by the Manchurian generals for the post after they had considered and rejected the claims of General Yang Yu-ting, the leader of the Fengtien party. He immediately found himself in the midst of intrigues, extrication from which was secured at the price of embarrassing commitments. His administration of Manchuria carried the legacy of corruption and misrule. Powerful hands, carrying out the behests of an active brain and determined will, were required to purge a pernicious system. The new ruler had before him the proof of the unsoundness of his father's departure from the original policy of holding aloof from the politics of China proper. He would have been compelled, however, to give more hostages to the Japanese

show.

Peking, following up this coup with a dramatic appearance at Nanking in November, 1930, as a full member of the Central Political Council. It has often been said that he signed his political death warrant by that step. More youthful than his years in his general demeanour and outlook, he showed all the signs of hero-worship in his loyalty to General Chiang Kai-shek and, in some measure, the affection was returned. All through the political difficulties of last year when the fiery political mind was assailing the Young Marshal for his delinquency in losing Manchuria, General Chiang Kai-shek appears to have stood by his Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the North. The sudden coup, which ejected the Young Marshal's troops from Mukden, Changchun and other parts of Manchuria while he was still in Peking, was ostensibly justified by Japan on account of the Marshal's own misgovernment of that area and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Government at Nanking. The pretext does not cover the basic fact of the Japanese General Staff's intention to make of a forward move in Manchuria the instrument for reasserting its own waning political control in Tokyo. Nevertheless it is only fair to the Young Marshal to hazard the opinion that, owing to the circumlocutory organization in which the Kuomintang system involved his relations with Nanking and also to the peculiar frame of mind of the Foreign Office in the summer of 1931, rather than to want of warning from him, Japanese portents in Manchuria were so blithely ignored.

The Young Marshal, gifted with personal charm, with a sincere goodwill, with a real honesty of intention, yet hampered by the defects of his own qualities and by the pertinacity of evil traditions, has long been a pathetic figure of incapacity amid events on the homeric scale. With the reservation necessary in considering the kaleidoscope of Chinese politics, his resignation must be regarded as terminating his leadership, nominal or otherwise. It may be expected that he will go abroad and enjoy that rest for which he has been yearning and which his advisers have not been able, for various reasons, to ensure his taking. It may be urged that he has been the helpless victim of circumstances—a butterfly broken on the wheel of grim realities. Responsibility for the destiny of nearly 30,000,000 people has been his; the judgment of events on such a stewardship must be inexorable and relentless. The maintenance of a facade of sovereignty can be easily achieved so long as there is no intrusion of outside standards of comparison. The arsenal of Mukden with its wealth of munitions disappeared from the control of the Young Marshal in one night at the blast of Japanese bugles. That ignominious catastrophe ought to have been regarded as an omen. Yet, in the reorganization south of the Great Wall, neither Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang nor his coadjutors at Nanking seemed to realise the importance of replacing the simulacrum by the substantial actualities of troops well-equipped, regularly paid and properly led. Political alarms and excursions filled the air with sounds. There was nothing done to fit the Northern troops for the rôle forced upon them by Japanese aggression. Yet all the time the politicians were staging a drama of resistance in which the soldiers, already fugitives from

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch
 Cunningham, American Consul
 dated March 17, 1933, on
 Comment on the Sino-Japan

in S.
 i, China,
 l and Other

SOURCE

DAILY NEWS

EDITED

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, MARCH 9, 1933.

DEFEAT'S PENALTY

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang resigned last August. He plainly expressed his desire to go abroad. Political pressure, combined with the negligent atmosphere prevailing in Peking at the time, induced him to reconsider the decision but the desire remained. The personality of the young man who, by the tragic turn of fate, was suddenly called upon to fill the rôle of warlord of Mukden has commanded sympathy by reason of its combination of the eagerness to do right with constitutional defects which have been accentuated by his environment. His succession

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0241

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch
Cunningham, American Consul
dated March 17, 1933, on
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SOURCE

DAILY NEWS

EDITOR

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL

SHANGHAI, MARCH 9, 1933.

DEFEAT'S PENALTY

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang resigned last August. He plainly expressed his desire to go abroad. Political pressure, combined with the negligent atmosphere prevailing in Peking at the time, induced him to reconsider the decision but the desire remained. The personality of the young man who, by the tragic turn of fate, was suddenly called upon to fill the role of warlord of Mukden has commanded sympathy by reason of its combination of the eagerness to do right with constitutional defects which have been accentuated by his environment. His succession was not solely based on hereditary right. He was definitely chosen by the Manchurian generals for the post after they had considered and rejected the claims of General Yang Yu-ting, the leader of the Fengtien party. He immediately found himself in the midst of intrigues, extrication from which was secured at the price of embarrassing commitments. His administration of Manchuria carried the legacy of corruption and misrule. Powerful hands, carrying out the behests of an active brain and determined will, were required to purge a pernicious system. The new ruler had before him the proof of the unsoundness of his father's departure from the original policy of holding aloof from the politics of China proper. He would have been compelled, however, to give more hostages to the Japanese than his sense of his own deficiencies, apart altogether from his political convictions, suggested was desirable. He hoped that his own personal, if fleeting, knowledge of the Japanese military system would enable him to handle successfully his own problems of army reform. He had been able in 1925, in the company of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, to get into contact with China of the Lower Yangtze. He leant towards the Kuomintang doctrine with all the fervour of his age. He therefore made his choice.

It is easy now, seeing the whole of his domain in foreign hands, to criticise his judgment. Recognition must be paid to the patriotic motives which, amid much that was not so creditable, were at work in enlisting his enthusiasm for the idea of a unified China. He acted up to the principles he espoused. The outstanding gesture was given when, to end the strife between the Government and the Northern Coalition, he led his army over the Great Wall and occupied

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Enclosure No. 4 to de
Cunningham, American
dated March 17, 1933,
Comment on the Sino-J

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, MARCH 13, 1933.

LEADERSHIP WANTED

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is in Shanghai. General Chiang Kai-shek is in the North, having accepted full responsibility for China's military policy in the face of Japanese entry into Jehol. Mr. Wang Ching-wei is due shortly to arrive from Europe and to resume the Presidency of the Executive Yuan which, during his absence, has been held by Mr. T. V. Soong concurrently with the Finance portfolio. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's resignation has been definitely accepted. He has frankly stated the cause of the *débâcle* in Jehol. As this journal pointed out in discussing his relinquishment of office four days ago, he has shown a sincere desire to do the right thing. Events and his environment, added to the defects of his own qualities, have been too much for him. In this moment of personal disappointment it is only fair to note that his intentions and many of his actions, where they were not hampered by avoidable and unavoidable disabilities, have been firmly imbued with the highest sense of national duty. It is pleasant to think that, contrary to the usual attitude towards a political leader in distress, his colleagues, while regarding his resignation as inevitable, are disposed cordially to recognise his loyalty to the idea of a centralised government and his notably unselfish acts performed to further that cause. The bitter attacks on the Young Marshal made by politicians far from the scene of action receive no countenance from the members of the Government at Nanking. Indeed there is a real feeling that, at personal risk, he did more for the Government than others on whom that duty more heavily pressed. It is expected that he will remain for some time here and afterwards

against Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek would belie the reputation which he possesses if he contemplated such an offensive. His task is plainly that of consolidating national effort in every sense of the term and, at the most, to ensure a show of resistance, to check Japanese actions on this side of the Great Wall. It is suggested that he and his colleagues cut very little ice in Peking and that the old protagonists of civil warfare, negligent of the Japanese intrusion, may try to make the North once more completely independent of Nanking. If Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and General Yen Hsi-shan are inclined to throw their influence into the scale on the side of Japan, they are displaying no particular anxiety to give immediate effect to that disreputable emotion. They may not be enthusiastic in acclaiming General Chiang Kai-shek but they are not devoid of some sense of national pride and, practically, of public opinion, tattered and torn though it may be. General Han Fu-chu, preserving his provincial integrity in Shantung, is not on easy terms with Nanking just yet. That is very different from the state of being ready to give active aid to all Japanese plans of whatever kind. The resignation of the Young Marshal has resulted in General Chiang Kai-shek taking over responsibility for the North. He has sent certain of his own troops into the zone of operations as an earnest of his intentions. There is ground for the assertion that he has been well-received. It would be idle to deny that the old adam of political intrigue is still active. Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's movements are even now a matter of lively speculation. At the same time the position may be vividly contrasted with that of 1930 when the Young Marshal's intervention which ended the Civil War was effective only because it averted the need for General Chiang Kai-shek in person to come to Peking. Now the Generalissimo has been to the outskirts of the old capital. At the moment he is the leader to whom Peking, as well as Nanking, is looking for guidance.

The test is great. Leadership once more is the burning question in a time of national crisis. General Chiang Kai-shek may or may not accept the test. If he does not, the hope of the present Government for maintaining its political hold on any part of China sadly wanes. If he does, he is facing the most complex problem in his career and, still more important, in the recent history of China. He is under no illusions regarding the prospect of resistance to Japan, as an immediate event. Neither he nor his colleagues in the Government can, in their opinion, make a direct approach to Japan at this juncture. Apart altogether from the desire to keep unbroken the very thread which links them with Canton, where bellicosity rages in inverse proportion to the risks of close contact with Japanese troops, they feel that the political consequences of permitting China to be a doormat for the Japanese soldier put aside all idea of negotiations. The problem may be roughly analysed as of two tenses: the present and the future. The latter is, perhaps, more important. The former is the more difficult. General Chiang Kai-shek has to satisfy public opinion that a definite resistance is being opposed to Japanese movements on the Great Wall. He has to show a leadership which can convince former opponents that it is entirely divorced from old ambitions

China or on anyone else matters little. The probabilities are there and have to be taken into account. General Chiang Kai-shek must recognise them. They should urge him to grasp that leadership without faltering; it is the only hope for China—and for the Government to which he belongs.

Edwin S.
Shanghai, China,
Editorial and Other

A DAILY NEWS,
1933. (British).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 8812 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 17, 1933, on the subject "Editorial and Other Comment on the Sino-Japanese Situation."

SOURCE: The NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS,
of March 13, 1933. (British).

EDITORIAL

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, MARCH 13, 1933.

LEADERSHIP WANTED

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malefactor at his side was to enter Kingdom into which the seemingly remarkable faith. He speaks of present day. In one is born faith, which continued down to the other was hardened. It is a process which continued down to the faith and penitence were born, then heard the same prayer. In one witnessed the same suffering, ha other, with Jesus in the midst, ha one on one side and one on the men. These two robbers crucified is already declared as a divider of reveal the true penitent. The Cross Jesus, and mark how his word, a man who now makes his request of First consider the faith of the The True Penitent promises. grace abounding adds attraction dared to hope for, and to the pard more than he had dared to ask, certain, immediate, complete, teward of such faith, absolute penitent faith, and here is the re with me in Paradise." Here I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou Kingdom." And Jesus said: "Verily me when thou comest into the we think upon it: "Lord, remember in faith that it thrills us to-day prayer so humble and yet so strong addresses himself to Jesus with like to think so, for the man the in the days of his ministry? W love which had won so many hear As they drove the cruel nails, and 22, 43.

Sermon Preached by Dean Trivet in Holy Trinity Cathedral on Feb. 26

THE THIEF WHO REPENTED

the very thread which links them with Canton, where bellicosity rages in inverse proportion to the risks of close contact with Japanese troops, they feel that the political consequences of permitting China to be a doormat for the Japanese soldier put aside all idea of negotiations. The problem may be roughly analysed as of two tenses: the present and the future. The latter is, perhaps, more important. The former is the more difficult. General Chiang Kai-shek has to satisfy public opinion that a definite resistance is being opposed to Japanese movements on the Great Wall. He has to show a leadership which can convince former opponents that it is entirely divorced from old ambitions and personal prejudices. At this critical time he has to be able to stand out as just a leader who serves while he leads. If he can do this and, by so doing, evoke a similar spirit from those whose support he needs he may see daylight through the thick clouds ahead. He must be in full agreement with Mr. T. V. Soong on the causes of the Jehol debacle. They cannot be remedied in a flash. That is where the future tense applies. Chinese troops lack not courage. The marvel indeed is that men who can so little depend on the regularity of the paysheet, who so often go short of food, to say nothing of adequate equipment, can stand the terrible punish-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 6 1933

Peking Office.
 March 10, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/6155

Strictly Confidential

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 10 1933

Department of State

Dear Mr. Minister:

1/

I enclose a copy of a very interesting Memorandum
 made by Vice Consul ailles of a conversation held by
 him today with Mr. Dyer, American, and Commodore
 aillie-Grohman, now adviser to the Chinese Navy.

The dire predictions of Mr. Dyer are undoubtedly
 based on remarks by Dr. J. Heng Liu, and the latter is
 something of an alarmist. Nevertheless, it is only
 fair to Mr. Dyer to state that the belief seems wide-
 spread among Chinese officials that the Japanese
 definitely intend to seize Tientsin and Peiping very
 soon.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

APR 12 1933

RECEIVED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

As for the possibility of an alteration in the present "resistance policy" of the National Government, my impression is that General Chiang Kai-shek, now reported to be in Paotingfu, is quite capable of making some settlement with the Japanese, surrendering what is lost, in the hope of forestalling any further losses. If he were to do that, presumably T. V. Soong and Lo Wen-kan would throw overboard this Government. There would be few persons of importance left in the Nanking regime, aside from Chiang Kai-shek. In that case, too, the fear of the people here would probably be realized that Wang Ching-wei will go to Canton and set up a "real" Chinese Government there.

I am telling you in a separate letter of the efforts being made by Mr. Suma to influence Lo Wen-kan to consent to a settlement and of Lo's assertion to me that he has turned a deaf ear to Mr. Suma, on the ground that no surrender to Japan has ever prevented Japan from wanting more.

Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Chinese who determine events are so
 widely scattered that any particular foreigner
 can see only a portion of the picture and none
 can predict anything with confidence.

Yours sincerely,

Billys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

✓
 Enclosure: 1/ Memorandum of Conversation dated
 March 9, 1933.

In duplicate to the American Minister.
 No copy to the Department.

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal
 L.H.

No

J. H. F.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

Strictly Confidential

March 9, 1933.

On March 9, 1933, the writer took luncheon with Mr. Brian R. Dyer, an American adviser to the National Health Administration, Nanking. The other two guests were Commander H. T. Baillie-Grohman, adviser to the Chinese Navy, and Lieutenant J. J. Ellis, U. S. Marine Corps.

During and after luncheon the conversation was largely on Chinese politics and the recent fighting in Jehol. Mr. Dyer stated that he had had a long talk on March 8, 1933, with a Chinese friend who was a well known Chinese Government official and who had just returned from the North. This Chinese friend stated that the Chinese military, the supply corps, the medical corps, and in fact all the branches of the Chinese Army that were supposed to defend Jehol, had been a complete failure and that he (the Chinese friend) was appalled at the gross inefficiency that he had witnessed in North China during the last few weeks.

Mr. Dyer, in talking alone with the writer after luncheon stated that at the present time he believed that the National Government of China controlled but two provinces, namely, Kiangsu and Chekiang. It appears that a considerable rift has occurred between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V.

Soong

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Soong which among other ways has reacted disadvantageously to the Hangchow Aviation Unit. Colonel Jouett is greatly worried and Mr. Dyer is going to Shanghai this week end to see him. Mr. Dyer intimated that it might quite possibly result in all of the Americans there losing their jobs. The writer inquired whether it was a matter of change of location of the school or something of that sort. Mr. Dyer said that it was much more vital. Although he did not state so in so many words, Mr. Dyer implied that Chian Kai-shek intended to replace T. V. Soong as the "Father" of the School and run it to suit himself (Chiang).

Mr. Dyer then commented on the strong statement that T. V. Soong had made the day before yesterday as reported in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of March 7, 1933, and remarked that the version of this statement, which by the way T. V. Soong made in English, as published in the Chinese papers was most innocuous. Mr. Dyer said that the statement as made in English was the strongest statement that he had ever heard a Chinese make in public. The writer commented on the fact that the statement had the frankness and apparent sincerity of a statement that an outspoken foreigner would make and remarked that T. V. Soong appeared to have many of the characteristics of a foreigner. Commander Baillie-Grohman, who had

joined

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

joined in the conversation by this time remarked that no Chinese could ever become foreign in action or thought and cited as an example Admiral S. K. Chen. He said that when he arrived several years ago the British Consul General and the British Admiral had told him that Admiral Chen was thoroughly foreign in his ways. Commander Baillie-Grohman stated that on the surface this was undoubtedly true, but that on learning to know the real man, he was convinced that he was just the same as the rest of the Chinese military leaders and that his British training had only given him a thin veneer.

Mr. Dyer stated that he would not be at all surprised to see the Japanese take North China within the next two weeks and that it was well within the realms of possibility that they would take the Yangtze Valley as well. He said that a number of prominent Chinese officials felt that it would be wise to allow Japan to keep what they now have provided Japan would promise to take no more. They feared, however, that Japan might also take the Yangtze Valley temporarily and use it as a bargaining point for Manchuria. Mr. Dyer seemed to feel that a complete turnover in the Nanking Government in the next week or so was quite possible and commented upon the fact that Dr. J. Heng Liu was very much "up in the air".

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1933.

~~MEMO:~~

I think that the remarks contained in my memorandum of March 25, 1933 (attached), on the subject of the Minister's telegram No. 277, March 25, 3 p.m. (attached) are also applicable to this despatch No. 8810, March 17, 1933, from Shanghai, which was written prior to the date of the telegram mentioned.

8-8

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8810

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, March 17, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

AM RECD



APR 7 1933

Sir:



I have the honor to enclose a copy of a self-
 1/ explanatory despatch No. 7491 of this date, with
 enclosures, from this Consulate General to the
 American Legation at Peiping, in regard to the
 subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
 Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate
 General despatch No. 7491,
 with enclosures.

ESC MB
 800

In Quintuplicate.

F/HB
 793.94/6156

APR 20 1933

0252

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D I G E S T

Of Despatch No. 7491 dated March 17, 1933, from the American Consulate General at Shanghai to the American Legation at Peiping (pursuant to Legation's circular instruction No. 200 of January 20, 1933).

Subject: Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
1932: Movement of Chinese Troops.

Mr. Ishii, Japanese member of Joint Commission, made verbal protest to Mr. Yui, Chinese member, against movement of Chinese troops through Markham Road Junction. Mr. Yui verbally agreed to notify Mr. Ishii or Chairman of Joint Commission whenever troops were to be moved but Japanese Government refused to accept verbal agreement. Formal protest filed.

Mr. Ishii on March 14th expressed opinion that a request would be made for meeting of neutral members of Joint Commission to determine attitude of Commission at present.

Discussion as to whether normalcy has been re-established.

British colleague has submitted draft of compromise.

Suggestion for way of escape by members of Joint Commission.

0253

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7491

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, March 17, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
1932: Movement of Chinese Troops.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.



I have the honor to transmit copies, as indicated below, of correspondence in reference to the movement of troops on February 7, 1933, through Markham Road Junction, which is part of the area covered by the Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5, 1932.

It appears that on February 7, 1933, the Chinese moved several hundred troops from Soochow to Chekiang Province, through Markham Road Junction. The Japanese representative on the Joint Commission, Mr. I. Ishii, thereupon made a verbal protest to the Chinese member, Mr. O. K. Yui. After many conversations had taken place Mr. Yui verbally agreed to notify Mr. Ishii, or the Chairman of the Joint Commission, whenever troops were to be moved. Mr. Ishii communicated a statement of this situation to his government and the latter replied that it will not accept a verbal assurance of this kind

but

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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but that it must be in writing. As a result, Mr. Ishii on March 8, 1933, addressed to Mr. Yui a protest against the movement of the Chinese troops on February 7th through the area in question, as per enclosure No. 1, a copy of which was forwarded to me as Chairman of the Joint Commission. As was to be anticipated, Mr. Yui on March 11th replied that his interpretation of Article 2 and of Annex 1 of the Agreement was

"fully declared at the meeting of the Joint Commission on June 13th, 1932, and in my letter to the Chairman of the Joint Commission under date of June 20th, 1932,"

which opinion the Chinese continue to hold.

Mr. Ishii has at various times reported to me, more or less indefinitely, the various conversations he had with Mr. Yui, and especially in regard to the verbal agreement. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum of conversation, dated February 14, 1933, which covers the situation until March 14th, when Mr. Ishii expressed the opinion that a request would be made for a meeting of the neutral members of the Joint Commission for the purpose of determining the attitude of that Commission at the present time. A copy of a memorandum of the conversation last referred to is also enclosed.

Article 2 of the Agreement of May 5 states:

"The Chinese troops will remain in their present position pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement."

The pertinent part of Annex 1 states:

"In the event of doubts arising in regard thereto, the positions in question will, upon the request of the Joint Commission, be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers, members of the Joint Commission."

The

-3-

The opinion of the members of the Joint Commission will be unanimous that Markham Road Junction is within the area indicated in Annex 1. On June 13, 1932, the neutral members of the Joint Commission made the following decision in reference to the movements of troops in that area:

"The unanimous decision of the neutral members of the Joint Commission on the matter brought before them, is that Article II of the May 5th Agreement provides an area within which there shall be no movement of Chinese troops, that area being defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement referred to. Outside that area there shall be no hostile movement (by either the Chinese or the Japanese side) in the vicinity of Shanghai. In the event of any doubt arising, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the neutral members of the Commission."

It is to be regretted that Mr. Ishii should have urged his protest upon the Chinese and provoked them to commit their view to writing, because the reply of Mr. Yui could not have been in any other sense than that contained in his letter of the 11th of March. In various conversations Mr. Ishii has stated that the Chinese troops are to remain in their present position "pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by this Agreement." He inquired whether normal conditions have been re-established within this area, but this is a matter of opinion. My own view is that conditions are as good as they were prior to January 28, 1932; but even if conditions are normal, Mr. Ishii takes the position that the Chinese troops must remain in their present position pending the completion of "arrangements" later on. The clear implication of Mr. Ishii is that there should be a
round

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round table conference. This possibility is of course more remote today than ever. In February, March, April or May of last year a round table conference was a remote possibility, but I cannot conceive of one being held at the present time to deal with matters which Mr. Matsuoka and others then had in mind. The question immediately arises as to whether the neutral members of the Joint Commission will take the same position they did on June 13th last year, or will reverse themselves. I do not feel it would be inconsistent to modify the views expressed at that time. It is believed that conditions are reasonably normal and it is certain that the agreement was not intended to cover a question such as the movement of troops from one part of the country to another through Markham Road Junction unless there is reason to believe that the movement of such troops is antagonistic to the Japanese.

My British colleague, who is shortly going on home leave, handed me yesterday a draft of a compromise which might be found necessary should Mr. Ishii insist upon convening the neutral members to determine whether the movement of troops on February 7th was in contravention of the agreement. Unfortunately I have been unable to reach my British colleague to secure his permission to transmit this to the Legation but I am taking the liberty 5/ of doing so anyway.

It can scarcely be believed, though I may be wrong, that the final paragraph in the memorandum of conversation of March 14th with Mr. Ishii should be taken seriously. It does not seem possible, in the face of world public

opinion

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opinion which condemns Japan's activities, that even the military would be presumptuous enough to carry into effect the suggestion there made. Mr. Ishii, in this conversation last referred to, requested that I secure an instruction from the American Minister regarding the points to be raised should he request a convening of the neutral members of the Joint Commission.

The neutral members of the Joint Commission could find a way of escape by requesting our respective Ministers to accept our decision that our work has been completed. This, however, is not entirely in accordance with my ideas and therefore I would hesitate to join in such a request. I am of the opinion that this Commission serves a very useful purpose, as both the Japanese and Chinese have a respect for the opinion of the Commission and there is a feeling that perhaps at some time it might have a very salutary effect upon local conditions should either side become more or less unreasonable. If the Commission is abolished and terminated there would be no opportunity for its personnel to exercise their good influence toward improving any conditions which might develop.

The Minister's telegraphic instruction in regard to the action to be taken in the premises is respectfully requested.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.


Enclosures:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosures: ✓

- 1/- Copy of letter from Mr. Ishii to Mr. Cunningham, dated March 8, 1933, with encl.
- 2/- Copy of letter from Mr. Yui to Mr. Cunningham, dated March 11, 1933, with encl.
- 3/- Memorandum of Conversation, dated February 14, 1933.
- 4/- Copy of Memorandum of Conversation, dated March 14, 1933.
- 5/- Draft of Compromise.



In Triplicate to Department

In Triplicate to Legation.

1255

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl #1

JOINT COMMISSION

American Consulate General

(JOINT COMMISSION CIRCULAR NO. 111.)

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT COMMISSION PRESENTS HIS COMPLI-
MENTS TO ITS MEMBERS AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE
FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

(From the Japanese Delegate to the Chairman.)

March 8th, 1933.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose here with a copy
of my letter under even date addressed to Mr. O. K.
Yui, Chinese Delegate to the Joint Commission,
regarding the passage of Chinese troops on the 7th
ultimo, through the area defined in the Agreement
of May 5th, 1932.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(sd) Itaro Ishii,
Japanese Delegate, Joint
Commission.

Edwin S. Cunningham, Esquire,
Chairman,
Joint Commission,
Shanghai.

Enclosure:

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY)

March 8th, 1933.

Sir,

I have the honour to call your attention to the fact that on the 7th ultimo, a large number of Chinese troops passed through the Markham Road Junction which is situated in the area defined in Annex I of the Agreement signed on May 5th, 1932.

In view of the provisions of the Agreement and the unanimous decision reached on the 13th June, 1932, by the neutral members of the Joint Commission, I am constrained to lodge a strong protest against the aforesaid movement of the Chinese troops and to request you to see to it that no such movement of Chinese troops through the area in question will take place in future.

I beg to add that I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Joint Commission.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Itaro Ishii, Japanese Delegate,
Joint Commission.

O. K. Yui, Esquire,
Chinese Delegate,
Joint Commission,
Shanghai.

Circulated: March 10, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl # 2

JOINT COMMISSION

American Consulate General

(JOINT COMMISSION CIRCULAR NO. 112.)

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT COMMISSION PRESENTS HIS COMPLI-
 MENTS TO ITS MEMBERS AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE
 FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

 (From the Chinese Civil Delegate to the Chairman.)

March 11th, 1933.

E. S. Cunningham, Esquire,
 Chairman,
 Joint Commission,
 Shanghai.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of
 my letter under even date addressed to Mr. Itaro Ishii,
 Japanese Delegate to the Joint Commission, in connection
 with the passage of certain Chinese troops through the
 Markham Road Junction for Mangchow on the 7th ultimo.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir,
 Your obedient servant,
 (sd) C. K. Yui
 Chinese Civil Delegate to
 the Joint Commission.

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE:

March 11th, 1933.

Sir,

In reply to your letter of March 8th, 1933, concerning the passage of Chinese troops through the Markham Road junction for Hangchow on the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to state that such troop movement does not come within the scope of the Agreement signed on May 5th, 1932.

Our interpretation of Article II and Annex I of the said Agreement was fully declared at the meeting of the Joint Commission on June 13th, 1932 and in my letter to the Chairman of the Joint Commission under date of June 20th, 1932. We hold the same view regarding the troop movement in question.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir,
 Your obedient servant,

(sd) O. K. Yui
 Chinese Civil Delegate to
 the Joint Commission.

Itaro Ishii, Esquire,
 Japanese Delegate,
 Joint Commission,
 Shanghai.

 Circulated: March 13, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 2491 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 17, 1933, on the subject: "Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5, 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops."

COPY

Memorandum of Conversation.

January 14, 1933.

Consul General Cunningham,
 Consul General Ishii.

Subject: Movement of Chinese Troops.

Mr. Ishii said he desired to report to me, as Chairman of the Joint Commission, that he had taken up with Mr. Yui, the Chinese member of the Commission, the question of the moving of Chinese troops via Markham Road Junction. He said his government considered that according to the Sino-Japanese Agreement the movement of troops within a certain area was prohibited and that the neutral members of the Joint Commission had supported that position in the decision last year. He said he might bring the protest to the attention of the Joint Commission and request a meeting to consider the recent movement of troops through Markham Road Junction; that Mr. Yui had given verbal assurances that he would notify the Joint Commission when it was contemplated to move troops but he would not put such assurance into writing. Mr. Ishii said he had submitted to his own government the question of whether the verbal agreement would be adequate or not. I told Mr. Ishii that I would always be willing to contribute my services in an effort to adjust any differences between the two countries which was within the scope of the Commission's work. I said that the neutral members of the Joint Commission had decided last year that the movement of Chinese troops within a certain area was in contravention of the agreement, however, without committing my Minister to any policy I would informally suggest to him that the present was far removed from the time of the former decision and there might be some question as to whether or not normalcy had been restored in that area. Mr. Ishii then stated that even if this were true, Article 2 provides further that the movement should not take place until other arrangements had been made, meaning, as he said, until a round table conference had been convened. I said I was not prepared to express my Minister's views at the present time as to whether or not the movement of troops on Markham Road would be a contravention of the agreement but it would be necessary, should the question be brought before the Joint Commission, for me to refer it to my Minister for instructions. Mr.


Ishii

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Ishii then said "Do not refer it until I hear from my government and have requested a meeting of the Joint Commission." I informed him I would not specifically refer the question to the Minister though I would probably report the occurrence concerning which he had been protesting to the Chinese Government. Mr. Ishii then said the entire question was now in the hands of his government.

Edwin S. Cunningham.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huse NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 7491 of Edwin S. Cunningham.
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March
17, 1933, on the subject: "Sino-Japanese Agreement of
May 5, 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops."

COPY

Memorandum of Conversation.

March 14, 1933.

Consul General Cunningham
Consul General Ishii.

Subject: Movement of Chinese Troops.

Mr. Ishii referred to his conversation with me on February 12, 1933, in which he requested that I would not refer to my Minister the matter of the Marham Road incident; he also referred to his letter of protest of March 8th to Mr. Yui and Mr. Yui's reply of March 11th. He then informed me that he believed he might find it necessary very soon to ask the neutral members of the Commission to reaffirm the decision of June 13th last in reference to the Marham Road incident. He asked whether I had more to say than I had said to him on February 12th and subsequently, but he was answered in the negative. He asked whether my personal opinion was to the effect that normalcy had been restored in the Chapei area. I informed him that to a most decided extent I believed it had been. I endeavored to give the impression, without stating in so many words, that conditions are better than they had been prior to January 28th of last year. He then stated, somewhat indefinitely, that there had been no "arrangements" following normalcy, with which I agreed, but added that such arrangements are hardly conceivable at the present time. He asked me to secure an instruction from my Minister regarding this particular matter. I agreed to do so and reminded him that he had requested me not to refer it to my Minister at our previous interview. He now desires not only that the matter be referred to the Minister, but that it be done by telegraph.

Mr. Ishii stated that his naval authorities had informed him that they were prepared to prevent by force the movement of Chinese troops within the area described. I expressed surprise that anything of this kind should be considered so long as the movement of troops was not directed against the Japanese.

Edwin S. Cunningham.

A true copy of
MR 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 749 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 17,
 1933, on the subject: "Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops."

Draft of Recommendations Submitted by British
 Consul General.

The decision rendered by the Joint Commission
 on June 15th, 1932, regarding Article 2 of the agree-
 ment, is still considered to be the only practical
 interpretation of the wording of that Article.
 Nevertheless the neutral members of the Commission
 feel that the spirit of the agreement was to prevent
 hostile action likely to embarrass the withdrawal of
 the Japanese troops in accordance with Article 3.

In view of the improved conditions in this area,
 the neutral members of the Commission do not consider
 that Article 2 should any longer be invoked to prevent
 the movement of Chinese troops along the railway to
 other parts of China unless there is definite evidence
 that such troop movements are hostile to the Japanese
 in the sense intended by Article 1.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM **COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

MET



GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 10, 1933

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



316, April 10, 4 p. m.

Local situation remains quiet, conditions in Shanhai-
 kwan, Lwan River area obscure. Apparently fighting there
 has been between Nationalist Government troops and
 pro-Manchukuo Chinese forces cooperating with small Japan-
 ese cavalry force. Japanese apparently disavow pro-Man-
 chukuo force. There is some indication that Japanese may
 be aiding anti-Government Chinese forces inside Wall in
 manner similar to Chinese volunteers who have been operating
 in Manchuria. This phase of situation being watched.

KLP-HPD

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6157

APR 11 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 18, 1933.

~~EEB:~~
~~JES:~~
~~RCM:~~
~~MMH:~~

Mukden's despatch No. 730 of March 16, 1933, to the Legation at Peiping giving some sidelights on the Jehol campaign.

The Consul General quotes James A. Mills, a representative of the Associated Press, who entered Jehol with the Japanese army, to the effect that the "high speed" corps met with little or no resistance and that its engagements were with fleeing Chinese troops of whom thousands were killed by bombs and machine gunning from airplanes and by light artillery shell fire and machine gunning from tanks and armored cars. He states that the Japanese troops paid for all supplies obtained from farmers - a thing which greatly impressed the Chinese. The natives seemed to welcome the downfall of Tang Yu Lin.

Mention is also made of the praiseworthy action of Miss Harriet Minns, an American missionary at Lungyuan, in protecting her students against airplane attacks.

OK
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, March 16, 1933.

APR 10 33
SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on the Jehol Campaign.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

Copy in D.S.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 10 1933
Department of State

793.94
I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 730 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated March 16, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 730
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

4 Carbon Copies
Received

F/H5

793.94/6158

RECEIVED

APR 11 1933

12

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February, 1933.

To the Foreign Residents in Johol Province.

The aim of the present campaign of the Imperial Army lies only in suppressing the insurgents and bandits who are disturbing peace and order and torturing innocent people in Johol Province.

In this connection, the Army wishes to warn you to take temporary refuge elsewhere so that you may escape contingencies.

If things prevent your taking refuge, the Army expects that you will assemble together somewhere and put up clear signs visible from the air and the ground, and promptly inform the Japanese or Manchoukuo Armies in the vicinity. You must everything you can to prevent exposing yourselves to danger.

Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

檢着了這單子的人應該帶到左近住的西洋人處請他看看萬別放下
 凡有拾得此單子者應須帶往左近西洋人處請其看閱萬勿背違

0271
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 730.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, March 16, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on the Jehol Campaign.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Concerning the recent Japanese occupation of Jehol province, I have the honor to state that several American correspondents accompanied the Japanese army into Jehol and from one, Mr. James A. Mills of the Associated Press, several letters have been received by the local Associated Press correspondent for his information and transmission to Tokyo. Although I have not seen any of these letters part of their contents has been verbally passed on to me. Mr. Mills accompanied the motorized supply train of the Kawahara "high speed" corps and arrived at Chengte on March 7th together with headquarters of the 8th Division.

In substance, Mr. Mills stated that the "high speed" corps met with little or no resistance and

that

- 2 -

that its engagements were with fleeing Chinese troops of whom thousands had been killed by bombs and machine gunning from airplanes and by light artillery shell fire and machine gunning from tanks and armored cars. As showing the broken down morale of the Chinese troops, it was mentioned that uniforms were thrown away and civilian dress donned whenever obtainable and that when the Japanese learned of this many partly clothed persons in civilian attire were shot down at sight as plain clothes soldiers. The few prisoners taken were turned over to the Manchoukuo political agents, Chinese speaking Japanese, who accompanied the supply train and carried with them large quantities of Manchoukuo flags and posters and handbills for propaganda purposes. Small bodies of Chinese troops fled into the hills with their arms and the opinion was expressed that they would sooner or later prey upon transport trains and small detachments. Recent press reports giving relatively heavy casualties among the Japanese troops indicate that such activities have begun.

Mr. Mills also reported that the roads are inconceivably bad and that the towns are very small and poverty stricken. Although there had been few casualties among the troops - only one killed and two wounded in the Nishi Division up to March 3 - the motorized equipment suffered heavily due to inadequate servicing and inefficient operation, a subject that will be further referred to below.

The

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The rapid dash of the Japanese forces across the province was characterized as a victory of superior equipment over men with no leaders. Many reports of Chinese officers having deserted their men were heard, a son of T'ang Yü-lin being among the number.

Mr. Mills reported that the discipline of the Japanese troops was excellent. They paid for such supplies as they obtained on the way and even for hot water. At no time were Japanese soldiers billeted on the people; they were always quartered in vacant or public buildings. It was mentioned that nothing impressed the people so much as the Japanese paying for supplies.

The impression given is that the people are greatly relieved at the disappearance of the numerous Chinese soldiery who must have preyed upon them in every conceivable way. All reports, I may add, agree on this point and it is understood that the people although apathetic and not comprehending the political issues at stake welcome a change as offering relief from T'ang Yü-lin's oppressive rule. From another source it has been learned that Chinese merchants near the western border of Feng-tien are favorably disposed toward the new regime because of the improvement in currency conditions.

The praiseworthy action of Miss Harriet Minns, an American missionary at Lingyuan, was mentioned. As a result of handbills dropped by Japanese airplanes, copies of which are enclosed, Miss Minns made two large American flags which were displayed horizontally over her school and a dugout which
 had

1/-

- 4 -

had been prepared in advance as a place of refuge. When the planes were heard coming she marched the children into the dugout and after the bombardment of the town they returned to the school in a similar manner. It was stated that this example had a good effect on the morale of the townspeople, several of whom were killed by the bombing. Reports of this occurrence have appeared in the press.

Another American correspondent, Mr. A. T. Steele of the New York Times, was to have joined the Japanese contingent which started from Suichung. As he arrived there one day late it was arranged that he accompany a train of six trucks loaded with gasoline which, it was expected, would catch up with the contingent in one or two days' time. Two of these trucks broke through the ice in crossing a river and had to be left behind. One by one the others broke down, the last one failing to function at a point about 30 miles distant from Suichung. An attempt was made to procure horses and carts to carry the cargo forward but these did not exist according to the statements of the farmers and at least were not to be found. It was explained that largely due to poor judgment and inexperience on the part of the transport personnel all six trucks and their cargo had to be abandoned. The unit together with the correspondent returned on foot to Suichung. In this connection it is noteworthy that the motor car distributors who sold some of the trucks offered

to

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to instruct army drivers in their operation but were told that there was no time for instruction and that at any rate the trucks would be used for only one trip.

It may be added that the inference may be drawn from Mr. Mills' complaints regarding the lack of promised cooperation, food for his interpreter, et cetera, that the presence of foreign correspondents was not welcomed by the units in the field.

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Handbills dropped from Japanese airplanes.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:mhp




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Tientsin via N.R.

FROM

Dated April 10, 1933

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

*Help letter to Moody
memorial Church*
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 10 1933
Department of State
See 793.94/6135

URGENT.

April 10, 3 p. m.
6063

My March 22, 3 p. m., and third paragraph from end
my April 4, noon. Kautto in letter dated April 6 reports
his safe arrival at Taotowying and plans remain there.
States letters from Shuangshantze and Mutowteng report
Japanese officials have visited both of these places to
investigate damage done mission premises.

Kautto states there has been no further bombing
Taotowying since March 24 although April 5 two reconnoi-
tring, three bombing planes flew over city for about two
hours. On April 4 Japanese plane also flew over Taotow-
ying to Funingshsien dropping four bombs on last named
and two on there without casualties.. On 5th, however,
two bombs were dropped on Funingshsien, one of them falling
in courtyard of magistrate's yamen killing three men.

Chinwangtao authoritative source reports Japanese
plane dropped bomb near Chinese armored train at point
about half way between Peitaiho and Chinwangtao yesterday.

WSB-CSB

LOCKHART

F/H/S
793.94/6159

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APR 17 1933

In reply refer to
 FE 793.94/6159

The Reverend


H. A. Ironside,
 Moody Memorial Church,
 Clark, LaSalle and North Avenue,
 Chicago, Illinois.

Sir:

Referring to the Department's letter of April 10, 1933, in regard to the property of the Western Book and Tract Mission at Taitowying, Hopei, China, the Department has received a telegram under date April 10 from the American Consul General at Tientsin stating that the Reverend Mr. Kautto, in a letter under date April 6, reports his safe arrival at Taitowying and his plan to remain there. Mr. Kautto's letter states further that since March 24 there has been no further bombing of Taitowying although on April 4 and April 5 Japanese planes flew over the city.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:



MR:MMH:EJL

FE

Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

4/12/33

793.94/6159

0278

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Canton/63 FOR Despatch # 183 to
Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED March 13, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation.
No definite decisions reached at the
military conclave held in January at
Canton of the leaders of the Kwangtung,
Kwangsi and Fukien armies, in connection
with the - .

hs

793.94/6160
6160

-2-

1. Military Affairs.

70391
It was stated in the report for the previous month that nothing definite was known regarding what decisions, if any, were reached at the military conclave held in January at Canton of the leaders of the Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien (Nineteenth Route) armies. The developments of the month under review, however, throw further light on this matter.

In the first place, it is perhaps safe to say that all three groups agreed on letting others bear the brunt of resisting Japan in the North, owing not only to practical difficulties in the way of equipping and transporting an expedition to operate so far away from base, but also to the fear that such action would merely result in making the South vulnerable to the ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, it was announced at this time, according to the time-honored formula, that "the troops of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien are in constant readiness for mobilization and will start for the North as soon as orders have been received from Nanking". Various generals vied with each other in letting the public know through the press that they had petitioned the authorities to be permitted to lead the vanguard. The public was still impatient over inaction, and so apparently to satisfy it, spokesmen later on formally announced a decision to despatch an expedition of forty thousand

men

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Nanking/61 FOR Despatch #459

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Mar.13,1933
/TA// NAME 1-1187 ***

REGARDING:

Sino-Japanese situation; This was intensified
by situation in Jehol. Efforts made to resist
invasion of Jehol by Japanese.

fpg

793.94/6161
1161

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394
The Sino-Japanese controversy was intensified by the situation in Jehol. On February 11 T.V. Soong departed on a spectacular trip to "Jehol City" (Chengteh 承德) and from that city he issued a stirring appeal to the rank and file of the national defense units at the front to "hold our ground in order to show the enemy and the world at large the gallantry and undaunted spirit of our soldiers". On February 19 General Ho Ying-chin told press reporters that, "The Government and the people are determined to resist the

invasion

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

invasion of Jehol, and if my presence is needed at the front, I will gladly proceed north to do my part in resisting the enemy". At the weekly memorial service two days later, Mr. Tan Chen declared that the Government had already made its choice and was taking every possible measure to prepare itself for the impending military campaign in the north.

A National Defense Commission was formed as an emergency organization. It consists of the presidents of the five yuan, the Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign Affairs, Railways and Finance, the Chief of Staff, the Inspector General of Military Training, certain members of the Military Affairs Commission and other appointed by the Central Political Council. It meets daily for the purpose of determining matters of policy.

On February 23 at 9 p.m. Consul General Gremura delivered the Jehol "ultimatum" to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Chinese Foreign Office immediately rejected the Japanese ultimatum, and the invasion of Jehol became inevitable. Chinese popular sentiment against the Japanese became more bitter and there was a noticeable amount of support to the proposal of C. C. Wu and the Chinese delegates to the League of Nations to recall the Chinese Minister from Tokyo.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Hankow/70 FOR Despatch # 278.

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED March 11, 1933.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Rumors circulated of probable Sino-Japanese renewed activity.

hs

793.94/6162
 6162

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6. Sino-Japanese Relations in Wuhan:

792.94
February was a month characterized by a plethora of rumors about purposed action locally of Japanese war-vessels against the Chinese, about Chinese military attacks to be made on the Japanese Concession, about military and other stores being collected secretly by the Japanese with secret meetings held, and about gun emplacements constructed and guns placed by the Chinese - the guns always being directed point-blank at the Japanese Concession. There has been little substance behind the whole

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/55 FOR Despatch # 8789

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 9, 1933
 TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1187 o.p.

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations:

Invocation by the Japanese of Article II of the Agreement of May 5, 1932 following movement of troops through Shanghai during February; preparations of the Chinese for drive into Jehol and reception by the Chinese of the report of the Committee of 19.

793.94/6163

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

70392
 SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:

The local Sino-Japanese situation was quiet during the month of February. On the 7th of the month five troop trains carrying a considerable body of Chinese troops, said to belong to the 4th Division of the 17th Army which had been hitherto stationed in Anhui Province, passed through Markham Road Junction en route from Hankow to Hangchow. This incident brought up the question of the Agreement of May 8, 1938, in as far as it concerns the passage of Chinese military forces through the Shanghai area. Officials of the Japanese Consulate General, including the Consul General, made oral representations to

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Mayor's office that the transportation of these forces was in violation of the agreement. It is understood that the representations were made under Article 2 of the Agreement, which provides that the Chinese troops were to remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with by the agreement. The Japanese Consul General was understood to have in preparation a formal protest to be made both to the Chinese authorities and to the Joint Commission but no formal protest had been made on the subject up to the end of the month.

The Secretary General of the Chinese Municipality is reported in the press to have taken the position that the Chinese troops referred to in Article 2 of the agreement were the troops which had fought against the Japanese; that the prohibition could not refer to all Chinese troops, as the Chinese Government possesses the full right to transfer its soldiers in Chinese territory as it sees fit and that therefore the Chinese authorities do not regard the troop movements on February 2th as a violation of the Agreement, since normal conditions had already been restored. It is understood that the Japanese authorities would have been satisfied if the Chinese had formally notified them of the proposed troop movements and that they are endeavoring to obtain a guarantee of this sort for the future. The Chinese apparently are loath to give such a guarantee but are understood to have promised informally that they would inform the Japanese orally of any subsequent troops movements if such a course were necessary.

Ending

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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During the month the attention of Shanghai was divided between the report of the League of Nations Committee of Nineteen, which was later adopted by the Assembly, and the preparation for and development of hostilities in the Jehol region. Local reaction in the foreign press to the report of the Committee of Nineteen was dealt with in this office's despatch No. 7462 of February 21, 1933. The Chinese press as a whole was gratified at but not overly enthusiastic concerning the report and its subsequent adoption by the Assembly. The SHUN PAO, a local Sunminto newspaper, stated that this is the first time that world public opinion has been given such concrete expression and that by the adoption of the report Japanese policy has been condemned by the whole world and Japan is placed in a position of complete isolation. The majority of Chinese newspapers, while expressing gratification at the report, were of the opinion that although the report gives to China certain moral support and is an encouragement to resistance against the Japanese, yet China must still rely almost entirely on its own efforts. The SHUN PAO, in commenting on the possibility of the League enforcing Article 16 of the Covenant relating to sanctions, is of the opinion that the current economic depression and other problems of the Powers make it extremely unlikely that any Power will carry out these sanctions and therefore the Chinese themselves must undertake to carry them out.

THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese, independent) of February 16, 1933, points out that in case Article 16 is applied China would not only be able but be legally bound, as a member of the League, to completely boycott Japanese

convia

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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goods, with the full support of other League members, and to carry on the boycott officially through the Maritime Customs; likewise that China would have the right to demand passage for Chinese troops directed against the Japanese through the concessions held by countries which are loyal members of the League. The same paper, in an editorial of February 14, 1933, has the following to say in regard to the report of the Committee of Nineteen:

"But whether there is to be a new declared or undeclared war to be made on her by Japan, China is in a very different position than that which she stood in when the Japanese aggression first started. Then China had no pledged support. Moral support she had but moral support does not regain territory or sovereignty. The League has now decided to all intents and purposes against the Asiatic aggressor, and unless the League utterly stultifies itself it must go on to the logical conclusion.

"China seems to be winning a continuous round of moral victories over Japan. That is all very gratifying to a people who for centuries have been indoctrinated in the teachings of Confucius. That they now need most of all is some other kind of a victory that will guarantee to them certain elementary human rights."

However, Mr. Hollington K. Tong, writing in the Asiatic Review on February 14th, with regard to the conclusions reached by the League sub-committee which reaffirmed Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, states that this action is entirely ineffective and that only economic sanctions will induce Japan to modify her policy toward Manchuria. He declared that the League's action was similar to the so-called Asquith policy at the time of the Balkan wars, when Lord Asquith pronounced that Great Britain would not recognize territorial changes effected by violence. Mr. Tong states that this method did not

work:

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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work; that the Balkan states kept the territory they had conquered and that the changes were recognized later by the great Powers, including Great Britain. Mr. Tong states that in the present instance there is a suspicion that the League, and especially Great Britain, is trying to evade responsibility for an immediate settlement by this new form of procrastination.

In the light of the Chinese military debacle at Jehol the following quotation from Mr. Tong's article is of interest:

"What is puzzling to the simple-minded Chinese is the apparent League indifference to Japan in detaching Jehol, which is still under Chinese control, from the Republic of China. The Chinese have been told by neutral foreign diplomats that except by a miracle Japan will get Jehol. The League may not be able to do anything immediately in the matter of a fact accomplished, but openly to permit Japan willfully to take another province of China is something beyond comprehension."

CHINA PLANS FOR DEFENSE:

The patriotic desire of Chinese to do something for their country, which is natural at a time of crisis like the present, has been responsible for the carrying on of a considerable campaign locally for raising funds with which to purchase airplanes and send supplies to the north. It is learned that all employees of the National Government, including foreign members of the Customs, Salt and Post Office staffs, have been required to contribute a percentage of their salaries toward the purchase of airplanes. The China National Aviation Association has been formed here with the object of raising a fund of two million dollars, local currency, for the purchase of one hundred and fifty airplanes. Included

in

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in this association are the Mayor of Shanghai, the Chairman of the General Chamber of Commerce, the General Secretary of the China Bankers' Association, and prominent merchants and bankers. A number of preparatory meetings were held during the month of February and the campaign was started on March 1st, to last for two months. A total of two hundred groups have been organized to raise ten thousand dollars each. In addition to this, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce has issued a circular to trade associations asking that various kinds of military equipment, such as field glasses, blankets, steel helmets, et cetera, be sent to the Chamber. It is understood that a large quantity of supplies was collected locally to be forwarded to the Chinese troops in Jehol, before the defeat of the latter.

Mr. T. T. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, made a trip to Beijing and Jehol during February and after his return to Shanghai he expressed himself in a press interview on February 22nd, as fully satisfied that the government was prepared to resist the continued invasion by Japan and put up a stiff resistance. Mr. Soong declared that the government had raised sufficient funds for the upkeep of the northern troops for three months; that the morale of these troops was high and that he had been deeply impressed by the work carried on on behalf of the troops by various public bodies in the north. There is a vast contrast between these statements attributed to Mr. Soong, and the statement which he issued through the Kuo Min News Agency on March 5th, after the Jehol defeat; that is, that after his visit to Jehol he had told inquirers that the province could not be defended

against

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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against the Japanese for more than a week or ten days.
The two statements taken together indicate Mr. Soong's
outstanding ability to give the public what it would
like to hear with the seeming bluntness and candor of
the financier who wishes it to be known that he is not
a seeker after popularity.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12330 FOR Despatch # 8803
FROM X Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED March 17, 1933
TO NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING: Chinese "Foreign Legion".

Transmits an article by Mr. Hollington K. Tong which appeared in THE CHINA PRESS in which he makes suggestion for the formation of a , to be used against the Japanese; so far as is known, no official sponsors this movement.

esp


793.94/6164

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handwritten initials and marks

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated April 11, 4 1933

Rec'd 6:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



April 11, 4 p. m.

793.94

Authoritative Chinwangtao report states 18 bombing planes flew over Chinwangtao this morning. Telegram to Yishihpao reports district east of Lwanchow heavily bombed yesterday by Japanese. Bombs dropped at Haiyang, Taitowping, Funing and other places. Bombing apparently continuing today. There is increasing evidence that effort is being made to push Chinese regulars back to Lwanchow. Chinese report that Japanese have 37 airplanes at aviation field at Suichung just outside Great Wall.

LOCKHART

KLP-WWC

F/HS

793.94/6165

APR 12 1933

RECORDED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

*Paraphrase sent to
 ONI & MIO
 in confidence*

MET

Tokio

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (a)

Dated April 11, 1933

Rec'd 6:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

75, April 11, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My 67, March 25, 2 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 APR 11 1933
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 11 1933
 Department of State

793.94

F/HS
 793.94/6166

The limited objective attack referred to has been approved. According to statement of Japanese General Staff to Military Attache the attack was launched April 10 by Japanese line from Kowpeikow to Shanhaikwan in order to dislodge Chinese from commanding positions immediately south of Great Wall and there establish Japanese outpost line of resistance/along Wall. No advance in force into North China contemplated.

The situation on the Manchuria-Soviet border occasioned by dispute over Chinese Eastern Railway rolling stock appears to be somewhat tense but the Japanese General Staff state that they do not expect it to develop into a serious armed clash. Not repeated to Peiping as above information considered confidential by Japanese military authorities.

WSB-RR

GREW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APR 14 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated April 11, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

Approval has been given for the limited objective attack referred to in my telegram of March 25, 1933. The Military Attaché was informed by the Japanese General Staff that the attack was launched on the tenth of April. This was done by the Japanese line from Kowpeikow to Shanhaikwan with a view to dislodging Chinese from commanding positions just south of the Great Wall and establishing there a Japanese outpost line of resistance to cover the Great Wall main line of resistance. It is not contemplated to make an advance in force into North China.

Due to a dispute over rolling stock of the Chinese Eastern Railway the situation on the Soviet-Manchuria border appears to be somewhat tense but, according to the Japanese General Staff, no serious armed clash is anticipated. Above information is considered confidential.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAR 29 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 3 1933

This item comes from the Navy. Original

source, apparently Tokyo. For what it may be worth, the statement that the Japanese army "has requested permission for that army to enter the Tientsin-Peiping area" should be connected with the report which we had recently that two very high officers of the Japanese army who have been at the front were going to Tokyo to urge there that operations be extended into the Tientsin-Peiping area. The "permission" referred to would presumably be that of the General Staff or the Cabinet, more likely the former.

793.94


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FTT FT)

APR 11 1933

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Op-13/PS

SECRET

28 March, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 APR 3 1933
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

F/HS

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

SUBJECT: Proposed entry of Japanese Army into Tientsin-Peiping area.

1. According to confidential information received from Tokyo, by way of the American Legation at Peiping and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the General Staff of the Japanese Army in northern China has requested permission for that Army to enter the Tientsin-Peiping area. It is understood that this request is based upon the extent of the casualties which that Army has received in its recent operations.

793.94/6167

H. M. Lammers.

Show to Op-10, Op-11, Op-12, Op-16, Op-38.

CC: F. E., State Dept.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By 12 NARS Date 3/19/73

FILED

APR 11 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 20, 1933.

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT
FOR CHINESE MINISTER TO SEE THE SECRETARY.



F/HS

793.94

The Chinese Minister has shown me a telegram in which his Government instructs him to see the Secretary of State personally at the earliest possible moment and lay before the Secretary certain suggestions in connection with the Far Eastern situation. The Minister requests that an appointment be given him.

This Division recommends that the appointment be made, and requests that, before the Minister is received in this connection, an opportunity be given for the undersigned to explain to the Secretary what subjects, in all probability, the Chinese Minister will bring up.

793.94/6168

10:15 A.M.
 Tuesday, 20 IV. 33

SKH and ZMK

336.9.6.1.1.1.1
 CEFILL

FE:SKH/ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
COLUMBIA

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

APR 5 1933

DIVISION OF



March 29, 1933

*Ans'd
Apr. 4*

Dr. Stanley K. Hornoleck
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Dr. Hornoleck:

793.94

I have agreed to give a paper at the forthcoming meeting of the American Society of International Law on the general subject of "Non-Recognition as a Sanction in International Law". Needless to say, a large part of the grist for my mill in connection with writing this paper relates to the so-called Hoover-Stimson doctrine of non-recognition applied to the Sino Japanese situation. I have been making rather strenuous efforts to get together all the material I can on the precise effects of a non-recognition policy ~~which has~~ applied over a considerable period of time. I am particularly interested in the precise effect of such policy on the status of economic relations and particularly on the official position of consular representatives. In so far as I have been able to learn, the American consuls in Manchuria are still carrying on their official business and under exequaturs issued by the Chinese government. ~~I have not been able to learn whether practical questions about the status of our consuls in Manchuria have actually been raised.~~ If it is not asking too much and if the material you have available can be issued for this purpose, I would appreciate having any information you may be able to give me on this specific point and any other points relating to the general problem of the effect of non-recognition on economic relations. Needless to say, I would greatly appreciate any other suggestions you may care to make which relate to the general subject of my paper.

With kindest personal regards and cordial greetings, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

Frederick A. Middlebury

APR 5 1933

FILED

F/HS

793.94/6169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 4, 1933.

My dear Doctor Middlebush:

In reply to your letter of March 29, 1933, with regard to a paper on the general subject of "Non-Recognition as a Sanction in International Law", which you are to prepare for the forthcoming meeting of the American Society of International Law, I take pleasure in sending you herewith a copy of Senate Document No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria", a copy of a letter addressed on February 23, 1932, by the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, a copy of a press release of March 11, 1932, a copy of an address entitled "The Pact of Paris", delivered on August 8, 1932, by the Secretary of State, and a copy of an address entitled "Policy and Action in Relation to the Current Situation in the Far East", delivered by me on October 18, 1932. You may find it helpful, also, to consult the report on the Manchuria problem adopted by the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on February 24, 1933, a copy of which
you

Frederick A. Middlebush, Ph.D.,
Dean, School of Business and Public Administration,
University of Missouri,
Columbia, Missouri.

793.94/6169

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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you may be able to obtain from the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, which is the organization in the United States distributing publications of the League of Nations. The text of this report, as presented to the League Assembly by the League Committee of Nineteen, is printed in the NEW YORK TIMES of February 18, 1933. I assume that you are familiar with the Report of the League Commission of Inquiry, which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C., for seventy-five cents a copy.

With regard to your reference to American consuls carrying on their official business in Manchuria under exequaturs issued by the Chinese Government, I may say that American consuls in China do not function under exequaturs. The procedure there consists merely in notification to the Chinese Government by the American Government of the assignment of consular officers to the various posts in China where the American Government maintains consular offices. Your understanding that American consuls in Manchuria are carrying on their official duties is correct.

With

0306

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

With regard to the possible effect of non-recognition
on economic relations, I beg to be excused from attempting
to go into the field of conjecture or prediction.


With kindest regards and all best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

SKH

Enclosures:

Senate Document No. 55;
Letter to Senator Borah,
February 23, 1932;
Press release, March 11,
1932;
Address, August 8, 1932;
Address, October 16, 1932.



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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report



CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

6180

CHIEF OF STAFF

WAR DEPARTMENT

JEHOL (Sketch attached)

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD, May 3, 1972

By 8 NARS Date 3/19/73a) Operations

The preliminary drive for the long anticipated occupation of Jehol began at Chaoyangze on the Jehol border, west of Ichow, when the Japanese began their advance at 10:30 p.m. February 20th. Nanling was occupied at 6:30 a.m. the 21st and Peipiao fell at 1:00 p.m., with the short branch line Ichow-Peipiao railroad completely in Japanese hands. The attack was effectively supported by aviation bombing and but little resistance was encountered, the area being lightly defended by small local garrisons.

The main offensive was launched on February 24th with a general advance from three directions, southwest from Tungliao towards Chihfeng, westward from Peipiao towards Chaoyang and Lingyuan, and northward from Suichung towards Lingnan and Lingyuan.

The northern column consisting of troops of the 6th Division (Lt. General Sakamoto), the 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade (Maj. Gen. Mogi) and "Manchoukuo" and Mongolian cavalry and armored cars left Tungliao in the early morning of February 23rd and entered Kailu at noon February 24th. The southward advance was continued towards Chihfeng, the volunteers and Tang Yu-lin's troops under General Tsui Hsing-wu rapidly retreating before the invaders. Reliable sources report that some of these units went over to the Japanese. Paichingtala, south of Kailu, and Suitung on a parallel road were occupied on February 25th and Hsiawa was entered the night of the 26th by Mogi's 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade. The advance was resumed early the 27th along a road leading towards Taokolangyingtze. Advancing westward, the Japanese arrived at the outskirts of Fangshan, about 25 miles north of Chihfeng at 10:00 a.m. February 28th. Japanese reports of March 1st claim the occupation of Paoshowying near Chihfeng on March 1st. See accompanying map.

In the meantime, a second column of the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division under General Suzuki launched an attack from the east the morning of the 25th and took Chaoyang at noon of the same day. The westward advance was resumed at 2:00 p.m. but now the Japanese encountered stiffened resistance and heavy fighting took place at Tamiao, northwest of Chaoyang on February 27th. Chienping, between Chihfeng and Lingyuan, and Yehposhow, 10 miles from Lingyuan, are reported to have been occupied at 2:00 p.m. March 1st without resistance, one brigade of Tang Yu-lin's troops going over to the Japanese. Tang's troops withdrew to the northwest into the sector allotted them, thus unmasking the Young Marshal's troops holding a sector from Yehposhow inclusive southward to the Great Wall just northwest of Chinwangtao.

A third Japanese column consisting of the 14th Brigade of the 7th Division under Major General Hattori with units of the 8th Division attached, attacked northwestward from Suichung

From M/A, China

Report No. 8524

March 2, 1933

F/H/S

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early February 26th and encountered the Chinese troops at Paishihchui where considerable opposition was encountered and overcome. The advance was resumed at 3:00 a.m. February 27th. At Shemaoshan, which is strongly held by three Chinese divisions, 108th, 116th, 119th (formerly Independent 8th, 16th, 19th Brigades), serious resistance was encountered and, in spite of lavish use of artillery, tanks and bombing planes, no progress was made and the fighting still continues.

b) Troops

In addition to Tang Yu-lin's 36th Division and six independent brigades, totalling about 25,000 men, and numerous volunteers whose fighting value is questionable, Jehol is defended by six divisions (formerly independent brigades, see page 1, Appendix to this report) and two regiments of artillery of Chang Hsueh-liang, totalling about 48,000 men, the 29th Army Corps of Sung Che-yuan of 16,000, the 106th division under Pang Ping-hsun of 9,000, and the 40th Division of Sun Tien-ying of 25,000. A total of about 125,000 troops and about 50,000 volunteers.

The above troops are disposed as follows: north Jehol, based on Chihfeng, Tang Yu-lin's 36th Division, three infantry and three cavalry brigades and Sun Tien-ying's 40th Division.

Lingyuan is covered by three divisions of Chang Hsueh-liang whose other two divisions are in the Pingchwan-Hsifenkow area and one at Chengteh. The 29th Army Corps of Sung Che-yuan is in the vicinity of Hsifenkow. Pang Ping-hsun's 106th Division is in the area Yaolukow-Yackow, south of Lingnan.

c) Aircraft Carrier

Unconfirmed reports state that the Japanese aircraft carrier "Hosho", capable of carrying twenty-six planes, has left Port Arthur and is cruising off Chingwangtao.

MANCHURIA

a) Operations

There have been no operations of any importance in Manchuria proper. The activities of the Japanese troops have been confined to policing operations, in the course of which fighting occurred with volunteer forces at Fengchiatun and Tutouchan, west of Suichung. On February 12th a unit of the 6th Division clashed with volunteers at Hsiachuankou, 18 miles east of Tunhwa in central Kirin. Some minor fighting took place near Fuchin and at Tsachenfang on the lower Sungari on February 12th.

The situation along the eastern line C.M.R. has become threatening. Bands of well-armed bandits are attacking stations and railway camps, in spite of near presence of Japanese troops.

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Mishan and Hulan in northeast Kirin have been reoccupied by volunteers following the withdrawal of Japanese troops from these isolated places.

Japanese sources report the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the frontier towns in North Manchuria, including Suifenho, Tungning and Manchuli, to eliminate the possibility of frontier clashes.

b) Troops

One of the groups of Japanese army officers on tour of observation in Manchuria and North China (see page 1, of Situation Report No. 8514, February 15) arrived at Peking and called on the Commanding Officer of the Marine Guard on February 18th. The officers who were in civilian clothes were extended the courtesy of taking the Saturday morning parade and review. This group is one of three groups of battalion and company commanders of different Japanese divisions now traveling on a month's tour of observation with the mission as given out "of collecting useful hints for the education and training of raw conscripts".

The commanding officer of the Japanese garrison in North China, General Nakamura at Tientsin, is reported to have issued orders for the organization of a reserve force from among the Japanese reservists at Tientsin who number about 1500.

It is reported from Tokyo that the Japanese War Office has decided, in view of the valuable services rendered by them in the past, to increase the number of dogs and carrier pigeons for military use in Manchuria. The plan for the extension of the dog corps will be completed in five years, and an outlay of ¥50,000 is included in the military budget of 1933-34 for the purchase of 300 dogs.

Dogs are now being trained at the Chiba Infantry School, where improvements for this training will be arranged. A new dogs' corps is to be established in the barracks of the Japanese garrison at Kungchuling in Manchuria.

The carrier pigeon corps at Nakano will supply an even greater number of pigeons to the Kwantung army this year, and a carrier pigeon corps, comprised of 300 well-trained birds, will be established by the War Office in "Manchoukuo".

It is reported from Moscow that the repatriation of some thousands of Su Ping-wen's soldiers, who were interned at Tomsk, was begun on February 17th. The repatriation will be by a long and tortuous route by Trans-Siberian Railway to a point near Kiashta whence they will cross into Sinkiang and thence report to their new station by marching.

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c) Surrenders

It is reliably reported that General Liu Kwei-tang who rebelled and fled from Shantung north in June 1932 (see Situation Report 8325, June 21, 1932) and, after committing many depredations enroute, turned up at Jehol as commander of the 4th Volunteer Division, defected to the "Manchoukuo" forces.

Japanese sources report that of the 50,000 Chinese who had surrendered or were captured in military operations in Manchuria, about 40,000 were released after being given fare for return home, while about 10,000 were reorganized into the "Manchoukuo" armies or local militia forces.

d) Armed Colonists

The armed colonists in the Chinasassu region on the Sungari sustained their first casualty when one settler was killed while accompanying a Japanese army unit in a brush with volunteers near Hulino, west of Hsiansing.

ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN

In spite of the continuous anti-communist operations of the government troops in the eastern Hopei-Honan-Anhui area, that mountainous region still gives shelter to many Red bands which usually scattered because of difficulty of securing provisions, unite at times to raid outside their territories. During one of these raids the 26th Government Division and the 7th Independent Brigade were badly mauled south of Teyeh in eastern Szech. Troops of the 75th Division came out second best in an encounter with some 3,000 Reds in the Chengcheng region in Honan. In spite of these setbacks, the situation in the junction of the Hopei-Honan-Anhui area is the most favorable in years and a large area has been freed from communist control.

In Kiangsi a Red attack on Nanfeng, eastern part of the province on the border of Red territory, has been repulsed by government troops on February 14th with heavy losses to the attackers. Yu Ting-yueh, a divisional commander of the 11th Red Army, has surrendered to General Hsu Ke-hsiang of the 24th Division.

In Fukien the 19th Route Army continues its activity in the suppression of banditry, and in slow westwardly advance from Changchow via Lungyen to the Kiangsi border.

In Szechwan the situation is more favorable. Paoning and Fachow in northeastern part of the province have been retaken; the Reds still hold Hankiang, 30 miles north of Fachow and the towns of Chungkiang and Tungkiang, 20 and 60 miles east of Fachow, where the Red forces are effectively maintaining themselves. While a general offensive is spoken of to drive the Reds out of

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Szechwan, no cooperation exists between the several militarists in that province, and this makes effective action against the Reds there difficult.

The communist remnants under General Ho Lung, which recently have been active on the border of Hunan and Kupeh, have been routed by government troops under General Li Kuo-chun of the 1st Independent Brigade and are reported to have fled into South Szechwan.

THE SITUATION IN SECHWAN

There have been no new developments in the war between the two Lius in Szechwan since the return of Liu Wen-hui to the capital at Chengtu. Taking advantage of the disagreement among the Szechwan militarists after the Neikiang conference at the end of December, Liu left his positions along the Min River and on January 7th advanced on Chengtu by three routes. Liu Wen-hui's troops occupied the capital after some negotiations with Generals Teng Hsi-hou and Tien Sung-yao, although the bulk of his troops are still in the Kiating region along the Min River.

Liu Hsiang still holds the territory grasped from his uncle, Liu Wen-hui, including the Tseliutsing salt wells which provide a rich revenue. Liu Hsiang is now back in Chungking. The final settlement of the Szechwan war is yet to come.

AG

W. S. Brysdale
 Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
 Military Attache

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APPENDIX: - COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES

Northern Provinces

FOPEI - Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Note: The designation of Chang Hsueh-liang's independent brigades has been changed into divisions numbered by adding one hundred to the previous number and designation, in order to conform with the National Government designation of Chinese armed forces. There has been no change in the internal organization of these renumbered units.

Troops Loyal to Chang Hsueh-liang.

<u>1st Army Corps</u> - Yu Hsueh-chung			
114th Division	Chen Hsueh-chun	Hsueh'ang	9,000
118th "	Tu Chi-wu	Peits'ang	9,000
			<u>18,000</u>
<u>2nd Army Corps</u> - Yang Shu-chang (Less one Division in Jehol)			
115th Division	Yao Tung-fan	Chinwangtao	7,000
<u>3rd Army Corps</u> - Ho Chu-kue			
109th Division	Ho Chu-kue	Chinwangtao	8,000
120th "	Chang Ching-wu	"	<u>7,000</u>
			<u>15,000</u>
105th Division	Liu To-chuan	Peiping	9,000
107th "	Chang Cheng-feng	Hsueh'ang	7,000
111th "	Tung Ying-pin	Yangliutsing	7,000
115th "	Li Chen-t'ang	Chunliangcheng	8,000
Hqrs. & one Regt.			
		Tangku	
		Peitang	
117th Division	Huang Shih-yueh	Pastang	9,000
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Cheng-to	Petowchen	3,000
3rd "	Wang Chi-feng	Haiyangchen	1,500
4th "	Kuo Hui-peng	Loting	1,500
5th "	Li Fu-ho	Lutai	2,100
6th "	Pai Fung-hsiang	Tingchow	2,100
6th Ind. Art. Brig.	Wang Ho-hua		2,000
12th Regiment		Kaiping	
(Less one Regiment in Jehol)			
7th Ind. Art. Brig.	Ch'iao Fung	Peiyuan	2,750
15th Regiment		Chinwangtao	
(Less one Regiment in Jehol)			
8th Ind. Art. Brig.	Liu Han-tung	Tungchow	3,000
17th Regiment		Luanchow	
18th "		Tungchow	
1st Hqr. Regt.	Pe Hsueh-ling		2,250
5th Battalion		Luanchow	
7th "		Luanchow	
8th "		Chinwangtao	
(Less one Battalion in Jehol)			
The Com. Detach.	Hung Jui-fu	Peiping	<u>1,800</u>
			<u>102,000</u>

From H/A, China.

Report No. 6524.

March 2, 1933.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.L. INTEL. DIV.

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HOPEI (Continued)

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Chang Hsueh-liang.

29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan
 (Less two Divisions in Jehol)

2nd Division	Pao Kang	Haifengchow	8,000
3rd "	Chang Jen-chieh	Tsunhua	8,000
			<u>16,000</u>

32nd Army Corps - Shang Chen

139th Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Lianchow	7,000
141st "	Kao Hung-wen	"	7,000
142nd "	Li Hsing-chun	"	7,000
84th "	Fao Kuei-tse	"	8,000
Four Ind. Reserve Regiments		"	7,000
			<u>36,000</u>

40th Army Corps - Pang Ping-hsun (Less one Division in Jehol)

39th Division	Pang Ping-hsun	Tsienan	8,000
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Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

Salt Division	Wen Ying-sheng	Banyuan	20,000 (From Kiangsi)
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Two Regiments of this Division have arrived at Banyuan, the rest being now en route to this destination.

Total Troops in Hopei	<u>182,000</u>
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CHAHAR - Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Loyal to Chang Hsueh-liang.

110th Division	Ho Li-chang	Kalgan	7,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Huang Hsien-sheng	Huashihwa	1,500
			<u>8,500</u>

Total Troops in Chahar	<u>8,500</u>
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JEFOL - Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Nominally under Chang Hsueh-liang.

Tang Yu-lin's Troops.

36th Division	Tang Yu-lin	Linyuan	12,000
Hqrs. & two Brigs.		Tehpeshow	
One Brig.		Chienping	4,000
31st Ind. Brig.	Fu Chuan	"	1,500
1st Ind. Cav. Brig.	Chao Shao-shen	Lintung	1,500
9th " " "	Tsui Hsin-wu	Chihfeng	1,500
10th " " "	Shih Wen-hua	Linsi	2,400
2nd Ind. Brig.	Chang Yu-ting	Lintung	2,400
10th " " "	Ma Kuei		<u>25,800</u>

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JHEOL (Continued)

Troops Loyal to Chang Hsueh-liang.

<u>52nd Army Corps - Wang Chu-chang</u>			
108th Division	Ting Hsi-chun	Shamashan	8,000
112th Division	Chang Ting-shu	Chengteh	8,000
116th "	Miao Chen-lin	Yaswangmiao	8,000
119th "	Sun Te-shan	Lingnan	7,000
129th "	Wang Yang-sheng	Pingohwan	5,000
130th "	Yu Chao-lin	Lingyuan	7,000
11th Regt. of the 6th Art. Brig.		Lingnan	2,000
16th Regt. of the 7th " "		Chengteh	2,780
6th Bn. of the 1st Hqr. Regt.		Lingnan	780
			<u>48,800</u>

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Chang Hsueh-liang.

<u>29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan</u>			
37th Division	Feng Chih-an	(Haifengchow)	8,000
38th "	Chang Tse-chung	(" Arva)	<u>8,000</u>
			16,000

<u>40th Army Corps - Sung Ping-hsun</u>			
106th Division	Shen Ho	Yasuhow	9,000

<u>41st Army Corps - Sun Tien-ying</u>			
40th Division	Sun Tien-ying	Chihfeng	25,000

Volunteers in Jehol.

1st Army	Feng Chen-hai	Haiowa	15,000
2nd Army	Li Hsi-ching	Tientshan	5,000
3rd Army	Tang Wen	Erhkuanyingtsu	5,000
4th Army	Tan Tse-hsin	"	6,000
5th Army	Pang Chen-hue	Linkiatse	6,000
6th Army	Lin Chen-tung	Tientshan	7,000
7th Army	Pang Tung	Chihfeng	2,000
8th Route Army	Cheng Kwei-lin	Lichahow	<u>6,000</u>
			50,000

Total Troops in Jehol 125,800

SHANSI - Hsu Tung-chang, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Loyal to Yen Hsi-chan.

<u>Thirty-third Army - Hsu Tung-chang</u>			
66th Division	Li Fu-ying		8,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.	" "	Taiyuan	
		Taihoien	
69th Division	Yang Cheng-yuan		8,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.	" "	Pingyang	
		Tunsheng	
			<u>16,000</u>
<u>Thirty-fourth Army - Yang Ai-yuan</u>			
66th Division	Yang Hsiao-ou	Iman	8,000

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SHANXI (Continued)Troops Loyal to Yen Hui-shan.

<u>Thirty-fourth Army - Yang Ai-yuan (Continued)</u>			
71st Division	Yang Tsch-feng		8,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.		Taihu	
" "		Pingyao	
			16,000
<u>Thirty-fifth Army - Fu Tso-yi</u>			
72nd Division	Li Sheng-ta		9,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.		Hsueh	
" "		Hsiyang	
<u>Railway Protection Army - Sun Chen</u>			
1st Brigade	Hung Hsien-chi	Yutse	5,000
2nd "	Ma Yen-shen	"	2,000
			6,000
<u>Emergency Army - Jung Hsueh-lu</u>			
1st Brigade	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	5,000
2nd "	Chow Yuen-chien	Tatung	5,000
			10,000
<u>Artillery Regiments - Chow Tai</u>			
21st Art. Regt.	Li Pe-shen	Taiyuan	800
22nd " "	Shih Kuo-fan	Taiyuan	800
23rd " "	Li Hui-shin	Yutse	800
24th " "	Hsu Ching-lung	Taiyuan	800
25th " "	Chang Yang-chi	"	800
26th " "	Chieh Ching-hsi	"	800
27th " "	Chao Chung-pao	Pingyang	800
28th " "	Tung Tso-shen	Taiyuan	800
29th " "	Chang Chien	Fubeien	800
30th " "	Liu Pang-chu	Yangchow	800
			8,000

Total Troops in Shanxi

65,000

SUIYUAN - Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of Provincial Government.Troops Loyal to Yen Hui-shan.

<u>Thirty-fourth Army - Yang Ai-yuan</u>			
70th Division	Wang Ching-kue		8,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.		Hsueh	
" "		Saratol	
<u>Thirty-fifth Army - Fu Tso-yi</u>			
73rd Division	Fu Tso-yi		8,000
Hqrs. & one Brig.		Hsueh	
" "		Fengchen	
<u>Cavalry Army - Chao Cheng-shen</u>			
1st Brigade	Sun Cheng-sheng	Taiyuan	2,000
2nd "	Lin Ju-yi	Fengchen	2,000
3rd "	Kuo Fung-shen	Wayuan	2,000
4th "	Chang Yu-chien	Fengchen	2,000
			8,000

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SUIYUAN (Continued)

Total Troops in Suiyuan 24,000

SHANTUNG - Han Fu-chu, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Nominally Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

Third Route Army under Han Fu-chu.

<u>20th Division</u> - Sun Tung-hsuan	Hqrs. at Weihsien	
58th Brig. Chang Shu-lin	Yenchow	4,000
59th " Chao Hsin-teh	Pingtu	4,000
60th " Ma Chin-kung	Weihsien	4,000
		<u>12,000</u>
<u>22nd Division</u> - Ma Liang-min	Hqrs. at Tainan	
64th Brig. Ning Shun-hsiao	Tainan	4,800
66th " Li Chao-piao	"	4,200
		<u>9,000</u>
<u>29th Division</u> - Tiao Fu-lin	Hqrs. at Chowtsun	
85th Brig. Li Han-chang	Chafoo	3,000
86th " Chen Teh-hsin	Weihsien	3,000
87th " Jung Hsing-kung	Kiaochow	4,000
		<u>10,000</u>
<u>74th Division</u> - Chiao Li-chih	Hqrs. at Tainan	
220th Brig. Li Yi-chih	Tainan	4,000
222nd " Ma Kuan-yi	"	4,000
		<u>8,000</u>
<u>31st Division</u> - Chen Shu-tang	Hqrs. at Tainan	
241st Brig. Tang Peng-chih	Tainan	4,000
243rd " Yun Chi-chang	"	4,000
		<u>8,000</u>
11th Cav. Brig. Li Hsuan-to	Tsingchow	1,500
Pistol Brigade Lai Tai-ping	Tainan	4,000
		<u>5,500</u>

Total Troops in Shantung 52,500

SHENSI - Yang Hu-cheng, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

17th Route Army under Yang Hu-cheng. (Less two Divisions in Kansu)

42nd Division	Fang Chin-tai	Shangnan	10,000
1st Inf. Brig.	Wang Chih-yuan	Changshu	5,000
(1st and 17th Divisions of this Route Army are in Kansu)			<u>15,000</u>

11th Route Army under Liu Chen-hua.

64th Division	Liu Hsu-en	Changku	8,000
65th "	Liu Chen-hua	Lantien	10,000
			<u>18,000</u>

16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan.

10th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan (Less two Divisions in Hupoh)

44th Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Tungshan	9,000
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SHENSI - Yang Hu-cheng, Chairman of Provincial Government. (Continued)Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

2nd Division	Huang Chieh	Tungkwan	14,000
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Central Government Troops.

68th Division	Ching Tuck-hsin	Tulin	10,000
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Total Troops in Shensi	64,000
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KANSU - Shao Li-tse, Chairman of Provincial Government.Troops believed to be loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.17th Route Army under Yang Hu-cheng. (From Shensi)

<u>38th Army Corps - Sun Yu-ju</u>			
1st Division		Tsingshui	6,000
17th "	Sun Yu-ju		12,000
Brig. & one Brig.		Lanchow	
" "		Pingliang	
" "		Chinschow	
			18,000

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

6th Division	Ma Chung-ying	Szechow	6,000
14th "	Lu Tsu-sh'ang	Wuchow	6,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Ma Fu-ching	Liangchow	4,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Tung Chi-hsiang	Pingliang	5,000
10th "	Shih Ting-hsin	Neifengshan	5,000
			22,000

Total Troops in Kansu	40,000
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NINGHSIA - Ma Hsueh-kuei, Chairman of Provincial Government.Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

7th Division	Ma Hsueh-pin	Ninghsia	7,000
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Troops Believed to be loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.15th Route Army under Ma Hsueh-kuei.

1st Ind. Brig.	Ma Chung-liang	Ninghsia	5,000
2nd " "	Ma Tung-chiao	"	5,000
			10,000

Total Troops in Ninghsia	17,000
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SINKIANG - Chin Shu-jen, Chairman of Provincial Government.Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

Troops of Chin Shu-jen, Commander of 8th Army Corps	10,000
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CHINESE - Ma Lin, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

9th Division	Ma Fu-feng	Sining	5,000
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Central Provinces.

KIANGSI - Hsiung Shih-hui, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

<u>2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wen</u>			
9th Division	Li Yen-nien	Kiukiang	9,000
<u>17th Army Corps - Hsu Ting-yue (less one Division in Anhwei)</u>			
4th Division	Hsing Chen-men	Nanchang	12,000
<u>18th Army Corps - Chen Cheng</u>			
11th Division	Lo Cho-ying	Kinki	10,000
14th "	Chow Chih-ju	Susan	<u>2,000</u> 12,000
<u>37th Army Corps - Mao Ping-wen</u>			
8th Division	Tao Chih-yo	Nanchang	10,000
23rd "	Li Yun-shieh	Fushow	8,000
24th "	Hsu Ka-hsiang	"	<u>2,000</u> 20,000
5th Division	Chow Kuang-yuan	Anjen	10,000

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

21st Division	Liu Chen-nien	Hakow	20,000
28th "	Wang Mao-tah	Tungsin	9,000
37th "	Kuo Ping-sheng	Loan	3,000
50th "	Tsueh Sen	Iming	10,000
52nd "	Li Ming	"	8,000
53rd "	Li Tung-heng	Tungsiang	<u>10,000</u> 20,000

Central Government Troops.

<u>4th Route Army under Ho Chien. (From Hunan)</u>			
39th Division	Chang Ying	Pingsiang	8,000
62nd "	Tao Kuang	"	<u>2,000</u> 10,000
10th Division	Pai Chao-tsung	Kian	10,000
43rd "	Liu Shao-hsien	Tungsin	10,000
77th "	Lo Lin	Iming	8,000
79th "	Wang Chin-wen	Hungfeng	7,000
32nd Ind. Brig.	Pe Tien-min	Fushow	<u>4,000</u> 29,000

<u>26th Route Army under Sun Lien-chung.</u>			
28th Division	Sun Lien-chung	Tungfeng	7,000
27th "	Kuo Shu-hsun	Fushow	<u>7,000</u> 14,000

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Kiangsi (Continued)

Central Government Troops.

<u>4th Army Corps - Wu Chi-wei</u>			
90th Division	Wu Chi-wei	Sincheng	8,000
<u>14th Army Corps - Wei Li-huang (Less one Div. in Hupei)</u>			
10th Division	Chiang Fu-sheng	Nanchang	8,000

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tang.

1st Group of armies under Chen Chi-tang.
 (For other units of the 1st Group of Armies see under Kwangtung and Fukien)

<u>1st Army Corps - Fu Han-mow</u>			
1st Division	Li Chen-chiu	Kamuhow	8,000
2nd "	Yeh Chao	Teyu	<u>2,000</u>
			17,000

<u>2nd Army Corps - Hsiang Han-ping</u>			
4th Division	Chang Wei-hsin	Cinfeng	6,000

Troops Loyal to Li Tsung-jen.

4th Group of Armies under Li Tsung-jen.

<u>15th Army Corps - Pai Chung-hsi</u>			
44th Division	Wang Chan-pin	Dangman	12,000

Total Troops in Kiangsi	258,000
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CHKIANG - Lu Ti-ping, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

6th Division	Chao Kuan-tao	Tushan	10,000
18th "	Chow Hung-yuen	Huangchow	10,000
(A portion now stationed at Lungchow in Kiangsu)			
36th Ind. Brig.	Tai Yuch	Kiangshan	<u>5,000</u>
			25,000

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

Six Regiments Provincial Defense Force)	
Two Reserve Regiments. One Gendarmerie Bn.))	8,000
One artillery Corps. Two Flotilla)	

Total Troops in Chkiang	33,000
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HONAN - Liu Chih, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

<u>1st Army Corps - Chen Chi-cheng (Less one Division in Hupei)</u>			
3rd Division	Li Fu-tang	Huangchow	14,000

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HONAN (Continued)

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Division	Ma Tsung-shan	Kaifeng	14,000
1st Art. Regt.	Li Lu-chung	Chengchow	1,600
2nd " "	Li Yu-ching	"	1,600
3rd " "	Li Chung-wei	Loyang	1,600
4th " "	Kung Chiang-kuei	Kaifeng	1,600
5th " "	Kung Shih-chi	"	1,600
6th " "	Lu Chao-hsiang	"	1,600
1st Com. Regt.	Hsu Chen-lin	"	1,600
7th Art. "	Li Shih-te	"	1,600
14th Cav. Brig.	Chang Chen-kuei	Kweitch	2,100
			<u>48,900</u>

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

16th Route Army under Ma Fung-kuei.

35th Division	Ma Fung-kuei	Sintai	7,000
72nd " "	Ma Chuan-liang	"	6,000
2nd Cav. Brig.	Li Teh-tsang	Sinyang	2,000
			<u>15,000</u>

20th Route Army under Chang Fung.

28th Division	Li Hsu-lin	Huangshwan	8,000
68th " "	Chang Fung	Sinyang	8,000
75th " "	Kung Tien-tsai	Huangshwan	8,000
			<u>24,000</u>

20th Division	Kao Tse-shu	Chowkiahaw	8,000
45th " "	Tai Ming-shuan	Shanhseng	10,000
13th Cav. Brig.	Liu Fung-chi	Chengyang	2,100
1st " "	Chang Hsiang-shuan	Kaifeng	2,100
12th " "	Sun Pao-yu	Juchang	2,100
			<u>22,300</u>

Central Government Troops.

58th Division	Chen Tsch-han	Shanghai	8,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Chen Ming-shen	Chungking	2,000
			<u>11,000</u>

Total Troops in Honan

117,300

ANKENI - Wu Chung-hsin, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

3rd Army Corps - Wang Chun

7th Division	Tsang Wan-chung	Lochow	8,000
12th " "	Tang Kuei-yuan	Liuw	6,000
			<u>14,000</u>

Both Tsang Wan-chung and Tang Kuei-yuan have been newly appointed Commanders of the 7th and 12th Divisions, respectively.

17th Army Corps - Hsu Ting-yao

28th Division	Hsu Lien-cheng	Pengyu	10,000
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Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Route Army - Chen Tiao-yuan (less two Divisions in Kiangsu)			
88th Division	Juan Chao-shing	Hweishow	6,000

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ANHWEI (Continued)

Central Government Troops.

25th Route Army under Liang Kuan-ying.

32nd Division	Liang Kuan-ying	Hueishan	12,000
5th Ind. Brig.	Chang Ting-shan	Yingshan	2,000
15th Cav. "	Chang Hung-shan	Tsukun	<u>2,100</u>
			16,100

11th Cav. Brig.	Chiang Kuo-ju	Lianan	2,100
1st Ind. "	Shih Chung-sheng	Shewashou	4,000
2nd " "	Li Yen-shing	Suozung	4,000
33rd " "	Tang Yun-shan	Anking	4,000
40th " "	Sung Shih-mo	Hueikin	<u>4,000</u>
			18,100

Total Troops in Anhwei

64,800

HUPEN - Hsia Ts-yin, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Army Corps - Chen Chi-cheng			
80th Division	Li Sue-sho	Tailiping	8,000

15th Army Corps - Chien Ts-shan			
12th Division	Wan Yach-huang	Sungfow	10,000
89th " "	Tang Ma-po	Kuangshui	<u>2,000</u>
			12,000

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan.

10th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan			
41st Division	Chang Chen-han	Siangyang	8,000
48th " "	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Ishang	<u>12,000</u>
			20,000

28th Division	Kuo Ju-tung	Tsyeh	12,000
51st " "	Fan Shih-cheng	Loohow	8,000
69th " "	Wang Yi-chung	Wushang	<u>2,000</u>
			22,000

Central Government Troops.

9th Route Army under Shang Kuan Yun-hsiang.

47th Division	Shang Kuan Yun-hsiang	Kuangtai	14,000
54th " "	Hsu Heng-ling	Lotion	<u>12,000</u>
			26,000

22nd Route Army under Chang Yin-hsiang.

50th Army Corps - Chang Yin-hsiang			
50th Division	Peng Chen-shan	Hueihang	10,000 *
51st " "	Chang Yin-hsiang	"	8,000 *
53rd " "	Peng Hsing-hsien	Kichai	<u>2,000 *</u>
			20,000

* Old Kuomintang units.

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HUPEH (Continued)

Central Government Troops.

34th Division	Chang Wan-hsin	Sientaochen	10,000
82nd "	Fung Ching-fang	Chienli	8,000
85th "	Chen Hung-yuan	Tungshan	9,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Kingmen	4,000
3rd " "	Li Ting-wu	Sinti	4,000
3rd " "	Wang Lo-ya	Yingcheng	8,000
7th " "	Li Chung-chien	Tayeh	8,000
34th " "	Lo Chi-kiang	Saichow	8,000
37th " "	Liu Pei-hsu	Yingcheng	8,000
38th " "	Pan Chen-chai	Sinkowchow	4,000
			<u>59,000</u>

Total Troops in Hupeh

189,000

KIANGSU - Ku Chu-tung, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek.

<u>1st Route Army under Chen Tiao-yuan.</u>			
46th Division	Yueh Sheng-hsuan	Tsingkiangpa	4,000
57th "	Li Sung-shan	Haichow	<u>6,000</u>
			10,000
<u>14th Army Corps - Wei Li-huang</u>			
83rd Division	Li Ho-an	Shanghai	8,000
87th Division	Wang Ching-chiu	Hankow	10,000
88th "	Sun Yuan-liang	Wusih	8,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Lu Hsueh-shu	Hankow	8,000
2nd " "	Chang Ting-min	"	8,000
2nd Com. Regt.	Chen Li-wei	"	1,600
8th Ind. Art. Regt.	Liu Pei-ping	Chinkiang	1,600
1st " " Brig.	Shih Yen-kuei	Hankow	<u>4,000</u>
			51,200

Total Troops in Kiangsu

69,200

HUNAN - Ho Chien, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops.

4th Route Army under Ho Chien. (Less two Divisions in Kiangsi)

<u>20th Army Corps - Liu Chien-hsu</u>			
15th Division	Wang Tung-yuan	Taihsien	9,000
16th "	Pang Wei-jen	Singtan	9,000
19th "	Li Chunsh		8,000
Hqrs. & two Brigs.		Lichow	
One Brig.		Wienning (Hupei)	<u>26,000</u>
34th Division	Chen Chu-chun	Fenghsung	8,000
63rd "	Chen Kuang-chung		10,000
Hqrs. & two Brigs.		Chaling	
One Brig.		Taihsien	

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HUNAN (Continued)

Central Government Troops.

1st Ind. Brig.	Li Hse-chun	Yungui	4,000
			<hr/>
Total Troops in Hunan			48,000

Szechwan - Liu Wen-hui, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops.

6th Division	Li Chi-hsiang	Tzechow	8,000
23rd "	Lo Tse-chow	Tzechow	8,000
			<hr/>
			16,000

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

20th Army Corps - Yang Sen

1st Division	Ho Chin-ao	Tzechow	9,000
2nd "	Wu Hsing-kuang	"	9,000
3rd "	Yang Han-chung	Chungking	9,000
			<hr/>
			27,000

21st Army Corps - Liu Hsiang

1st Division	Tang Shih-tsun	Jenchow	10,000
2nd "	Wang Tsan-hou	Jungshien	9,000
3rd "	Wang Ling-chi	"	9,000
4th "	Pan Shao-teung	Tsaihsing	8,000
Model Division	Pan Wen-hua	Jenchow	10,000
Instruc. "	Huo Huan	Jungshien	10,000
Frontier Def. Force	Chen Lan-ting	Chungking	10,000
Machine-gun Corps	Liu Ping-hsun	Jenchow	500
			<hr/>
			66,500

24th Army Corps - Liu Yen-hui

1st Division	Chang Ching-ping	Jenchow	10,000
2nd "	Liu Yun-ken	Changtu	10,000
3rd "	Hsien Shou-hsun	Kiangyang	10,000
4th "	Tang Ying	Kiating	10,000
			<hr/>
			40,000

Szechwan-Tibet Frontier Force - Liu Wen-hui

1st Division	Lang Hsun-man	Pengshan	7,000
2nd "	Chen Kwang-teao	Neichow	7,000
3rd "	Chen Ting-hsun	Sintsing	7,000
Guards "	Tong Ho	Changtu	7,000
12th Ind. Brig.	Su Hua-chow	"	2,000
13th " "	Wang Chih-jen	"	2,000
			<hr/>
			32,000

25th Army Corps - Tang Hsi-hou

1st Division	Huang Yin	Changtu	9,000
2nd "	Li Chia-yu	Kiangchow	9,000
3rd "	Ma Te-chi	"	9,000
			<hr/>
			27,000

29th Army Corps - Tien Sung-yao

1st Route Corps	Wang Hse-chung	Sinta	6,000
2nd " "	T'ang Hong	Changtu	6,000
3rd " "	Tsang Hsien-tung	Tungkiang	6,000

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Szechwan (Continued)

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

29th Army Corps - Tien Sung-yao (Continued)

4th Route Corps	Lo Hui-chang	Paoning	6,000
5th " "	Wang Ming-chang	"	6,000
			<u>12,000</u>

Border Defense Troops.

Liu Tsun-hou	Kaichian	10,000
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Total Troops in Szechwan 248,500

Southern Provinces.

FUKIEN - Chiang Kwang-mai, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tung.

1st Group of Armies under Chen Chi-tung.

(For other units of the 1st Group of Armies see under Kwangtung and Kiangsi)

1st Ind. Div.	Huang Jen-huan	Cheaping	6,000
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Central Government Troops.

19th Route Army under Tsai Ting-kai.

60th Division	Shen Kwang-han	Lungyen	12,000
61st " "	Mao Wei-shaw	Hsiangyu	10,000
One Brigade		Shaowu	
78th Division	Ou (Chu) Shou-mien	Chaoan	10,000
One Special Reserve			
Brigade	Tan Chi-hsin	Tungshan	5,000
Four Special Reserve Regiments		Chunchow	<u>10,000</u>
			47,000

2nd Division	Lu Tsing-yang	Hsiehwa	8,000
49th " "	Chang Chen	Kanahih	4,000
54th " "	Liu Ho-ting	Shaowu	10,000
2nd Mixed Brig.	Hsiao Hsin-shuan	Taki	3,000
3rd " "	Chen Wei-yuan	Shuihsu	3,000
2nd Brigade	Lin Ping-shaw	Kingteh	<u>4,000</u> (NAVAL CONSTB.)
			22,000

Total Troops in Fukien 78,000

KWANGTUNG - Lin Tzu-hai, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tung.

1st Group of Armies under Chen Chi-tung.

(For other units of the 1st Group of Armies see under Kiangsi and Fukien).

2nd Ind. Div.	Chang Jui-kwei	Suatsu	6,000
Constb. Brig.	Chen Han-kwang	Kiangshew	5,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Chen Chang	Kungyang	<u>6,000</u>
			17,000

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KWANGTUNG (Continued)

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tang.

1st Group of Armies under Chen Chi-tang. (Continued)

<u>2nd Army Corps - Hsiang Han-ping</u>			
5th Division	Chang Ta	Shoklung	6,000
<u>3rd Army Corps - Li Yang-ching</u>			
7th Division	Huang Ta-shin	Swatow	6,000
8th "	Huang Chih-wen	Limping	<u>6,000</u>
			12,000
3rd Ind. Division	Li Han-hun	Nanyang	6,000
Training Division	Hsiao Pei-man	Canton	6,000
1st Ind. Regt.		"	2,000
2nd "	"	Tingtak	2,000
3rd "	"	Linschow	2,000
4th "	"	Suewen	<u>2,000</u>
			20,000

Total Troops in Kwangtung 55,000

KWANGSI - 4th Group of Armies under Li Tsung-jen, Commander-in-Chief,
 and Pai Chung-hai, Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

<u>7th Army Corps - Liao Lei</u>			
19th Division	Chow Tzu-huang	Linschow	10,000
24th "	Tung Lien-fang	Kweilin	<u>10,000</u>
			20,000
<u>15th Army Corps - Pai Chung-hai</u>			
45th Division	Wei Tung-sung	Lungchow	12,000
Four Ind. Regts.	Wei Tung-sung	Nanning	8,000
10th Division	Pai Chung-hai	Nanning	<u>8,000</u>
			28,000

Total Troops in Kwangsi 48,000

KWEICHOW--Wang Chia-lich, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

<u>25th Army Corps - Wang Chia-lich</u>			
1st Division	Chen Hsing-yi	Kweiyang	3,000
2nd "	Ho Chih-chung	Swaiting	3,000
4th "	Pe Hui-ch'ang	Anshun	4,000
5th "	Hsiao Hsui-chung	Chanyuan	3,000
Training Div.	Hsu Chih-tan	Kweiyang	3,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Li Chen-ch'ang	Tsuyi	3,000
2nd "	Hsu Chih-hai	Anshun	2,000
3rd "	Tu Yu-chin	Sungshan	<u>2,000</u>
			30,000

16th Route Army under Mao Kiang-hsiang.

2nd Division	Tu Hsu-tsai	Kiang (Szechuan)	4,000
3rd "	Chiang Tsai-chen	" (")	<u>2,000</u>
			6,000

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KWEICHOW (Continued)

Total Troops in Kweichow 36,800

YUNNAN - Lung Yun, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

10th Route Army under Lung Yun.

3rd Brigade	Lung Yu-tsang	Kwangan	6,420
5th "	Lu Tao-yuan	Chiupai	4,420
7th "	Kung Shun-pi	Ami	4,420
9th "	Chang Ch'ung	Tunnanfu	2,520
Bodyguard Corps	Yen Chia-chen	"	2,000
Mixed Regiment	Ch'ien Yi	Hongtse	800
First "	Tsun Tsun-kuei	"	2,000
Peace Maintenance Battalion	Shih Hua	Talifu	426
			<u>22,836</u>

Total Troops in Yunnan 22,836

Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria).

LIAONING (Manchoukuo Troops)

1st Army Corps	Chen Kuo-jai	Sinlitun	8,000
2nd "	Chang Pi	Seichang	12,000
3rd "	Ting Chiang	Chinei	12,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Wang Tien-chung	Seichang	5,000
2nd "	Chiang Chuan-su	Penghwangcheng	5,000
3rd "	Li Shou-chen	Chwangho	5,000
Emergency Army Corps	Yu Chih-chen	Seichang	15,000
Border Def. "	Chang Hsi-pang	"	"
3rd Brig.	Chang Hsi-pang	Kailu	4,000
4th "	Chang Peng-fei	Chiumenhow	4,000
5th "	Tang Yu-chen	Kailu	4,000
6th "	Wang Hsi-chen	Changkiowen	5,000
			<u>79,000</u>

Total Troops in Liaoning 79,000

KIRIN (Manchoukuo Troops)

1st Ind. Brig.	Liu Pao-lin	Changchun	5,000
2nd "	Li Wen-ping	Hsishan	5,000
3rd "	Chu Jung	Yanki	4,000
4th "	Chang Tse-pang	Ningun	4,000
5th "	Chu Li-han	Changchun	4,000
6th "	Wang Shu-tang	Kirin	4,000
7th "	Pai Wen-ching	Tushu	5,000
1st " Cav. Brig.	Liu Ya-kun	Samsing	1,500
2nd "	Li Yu-chiu	Hsishan	1,500
One Art. Regt.	Ho Chun-chang	Changchun	1,200
			<u>35,200</u>

Total Troops in Kirin 35,200

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HEILONGJIANG (Manchoukuo Troops)

2nd Ind. Brigade	Hsu Pao-chen	Waho	3,000
3rd " "	Kuan Chin-teh	Anta	4,000
1st " Cav. Brig.	Wu Sung-lin	Taian	2,000
8th " " "	Chang Chih-yuan	Tsitsihar	<u>2,000</u>
			<u>11,000</u>

Total Troops in Heilongjiang 11,000

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

Air Forces Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

1st Squadron	Yen Yu-tsung	Nanking, Kiangsu.
2nd "	Shih Pang-fan	Chengchow, Honan.
3rd "	Liu Pang-hsin	Hankow, Chekiang.
4th "	Tsui Tsang-shih	Hankow, Hupoh.
5th "	Tien Yi	" "
6th "	Chang Ting-nang	Siangyang, Hupoh.
7th "	Chang Yao-ku	Kanchow, Kiangsi.

Air Forces of the 4th Route Army - Ho Chien

1st Squadron	5 airplanes	Changsha, Hunan.
2nd "	5 "	" "

Air Forces of the 1st Group of Armies - Huang Kwang-jui

1st Air Corps - Tan Shou

1st Squadron	Tao Tso-teh	Shiuchow, Kwangtung.
2nd "	Hsieh Hsing	Canton, "
3rd "	Wu Chien-wen	Shiuchow, "

2nd Air Corps - Ting Chi-hsu

4th Squadron	Ma Ting-huai	Canton, Kwangtung.
5th "	Wu Chien-ming	Swatow, "
6th "	Lo Lun	Canton, "

Training Corps	Ma Han-hsien	Canton, Kwangtung.
----------------	--------------	--------------------

Air Forces of the 4th Group of Armies - Li Tsung-jen

14 airplanes	Kweilin, Kwangsi.
--------------	-------------------

Air Forces of the 21st Army Corps - Liu Hsiang

11 airplanes	Chungking, Szechuan.
--------------	----------------------

Air Forces of the 19th Route Army - Yang Kuan-yu

4 airplanes	Amoy and Foochow, Fukien.
-------------	---------------------------

Air Forces of the 3rd Route Army - Hsu Fu-chu

5 airplanes	Tainan, Shantung.
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CHINA (Military)

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RECAPITULATION.

Troops Loyal to Chang Hsueh-liang	189,000
Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Chang Hsueh-liang	110,000
Jehol Troops Nominally under Chang Hsueh-liang	25,300
Volunteers in Jehol	50,000
Troops Nominally Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek	52,500
Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek	221,100
Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek	245,400
Kwangtung and Kwangai Troops	144,000
Central Government Troops	326,200
Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control	325,656
Manchukuo Troops	125,200
Troops Loyal to Yen Hsi-shan	69,000

TOTAL FORCES UNDER ARMS IN CHINA, NOT INCLUDING IRREGULARS 1,994,556

LEGEND

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
RAILWAYS
ROADS
SECONDARY ROADS
GREAT WALL
ROADS AVAILABLE FOR MOTOR
TRAFFIC EXCEPT IN JUNE-JULY
KILOMETRES

Scale



SITUATION OF MAR. 1st, 1935

ONLY UNITS DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED HAVE BEEN INDICATED

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE, PEIPING, CHINA.

0329

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES

NOTE: This information will hereafter be attached as an appendix to this report.

MANCHURIA

a) Operations

Aside from minor skirmishes and some desultory fighting with isolated volunteer bands which attempted to return to western Liaoning from Jehol after the 7th drive was completed, there have been no operations of any magnitude in the former Three Eastern Provinces comprising the present "Manchoukuo".

The 7th drive in the irregular square area between the Mukden-Shanhaikwan and the main line S.M.R. was practically free from fighting. The major volunteer and irregular units, forewarned, slipped away, some of the lesser fry were caught, others surrendered, and the operation was successfully completed with booty of about 1200 rifles and four automatic rifles.

An iron bridge on the Lungliao-Tahushan Railway line was blown up by volunteers with the object of hindering troop movements.

b) Troops

Heavy Japanese troop movements are reported on the S.M.R. and the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railways. Passenger trains on the latter road for some days following February 2nd have run south only as far as Chinchow because of troop movements on the Chinchow-Shanhaikwan section. Japanese cavalry of the 8th and 6th Divisions is reported concentrated in the Sulchung area and at Taotenyngtze, north of Tahushan. In Mukden, carts were commandeered in the early part of this month, each police sub-station having been ordered to furnish five carts.

Recruit replacements to the Manchurian divisions, totalling about 15,000 or more, are reported to have arrived at Mukden between February 2nd and 7th, in twenty-four trains. As mentioned in the last situation report, these recruit replacements, contrary to previous practice, will receive their recruit training in Manchuria. This new policy will materially strengthen the Manchurian divisions by transfer of the depot units to rejoin their organizations, and will make available a reserve if required. The recruits will also be gradually acclimated to the extreme climatic conditions of Manchuria by the time their services are required for active operations.

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Another object in view is to give the recruits on the ground the training required in guerrilla warfare against irregular troops, and in solving the problems incident to policing a vast country for some years to come.

Tokyo reports that a group of 30 battalion and company commanders selected from various organizations of the Japanese army is under orders to proceed to Manchuria for a month's tour of observation.

Chinese sources report the enlistment of two thousand Mongols in a Mongol volunteer cavalry force under command of Colonel Saito, I.J.A., cooperating with the Japanese in the vicinity of Tungliac. The presence of these troops is confirmed by the rescue of the crew and the plane "Kusano" (see p.4, Situation Report No. 8499) which fell near Kailu on January 25th by volunteer troops friendly to the Japanese.

SHENHAIKWAN

Aside from some minor skirmishes at Chiuzankow Pass about the first of the month, and an unimportant brush when a Japanese relief column on the way to the pass repulsed an attack on February 2nd, the situation in Shenhaikwan and vicinity remains unchanged.

The Japanese garrison at Shenhaikwan is reported to have been reinforced on February 9th by about 350 men and six guns. They have doubled their sentries, plapted mines, and have electrified their wire entanglements.

JEHOL

Aside from some sporadic and unimportant fighting and bombing in the vicinity of Kailu, north-east Jehol, on February 8th and 10th, the long rumored invasion of that province is still in abeyance. The Kailu attacks which were featured as beginning of the Jehol invasion are believed to be purely local and confined to the operations between the Japanese garrisons of Tungliac and the Chinese troops and volunteers at Kailu. Kailu is situated in relatively flat area, sparsely populated and unimportant. It can be taken by the Japanese at will and it seems certain that no major issues will take place in that vicinity.

The reports of large Japanese concentrations on the Jehol border are current and plentiful, but in view of the recent operations in Northern Manchuria which resulted in immense extention of the area over which the Japanese divisions have to be strung out, it is doubtful whether much more than one division could be spared for invasion of Jehol.

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Probabilities are that when the invasion of Jehol materializes, the invading force will consist of the 8th Division with headquarters at Chinchow, near the Jehol border, and some reinforcements from the 6th Division based on Kirin. Little help except in artillery and special service troops can be expected from the 14th and 10th Divisions and the 14th Brigade of the 7th Division, which are strung out the full length of the eastern and the western sections G.S.A., for a distance of some 750 miles with detachments operating at various points 150 miles northward and southward of this line.

The Japanese are confident that a division reinforced by additional cavalry should be able to complete the main operations and bring the whole province of Jehol under some sort of control within a few weeks after commencement of the operations. Of course, "Manchoukuo" troops will form a part of this force, regardless of their effectiveness, to lend "face" in bringing Jehol back into the "Manchoukuo" fold.

Of course the 1st and 4th Independent Cavalry brigades which are used mainly in the nature of flying columns with no fixed base, for rapid operations wherever required, will be accorded a large part in Jehol operations.

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN

The situation in Kiangsi is definitely easier and the menace to Nanchang has been removed. It is reported that troops of Liu Chen-nien, transferred from Chantung to Chekiang last December, as well as reinforcements from the 19th Route Army, and from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, will be sent to Kiangsi to participate in the communist eradication campaign in that province.

Successes are reported by government troops in central Kiangsi with the communist armies retreating from Kinki (northeast of Luwen) to their mountain stronghold at Sincheng, east Kiangsi, near the Fukien border. Government troops are trying to intercept a Red force at Tsungjen about 70 miles south of Nanchang which is endeavoring to rejoin the Red forces at Juikin, in southeast Kiangsi.

Large quantities of propaganda leaflets are being prepared to be scattered from planes in communist areas in Kiangsi, promising rewards to those who turn over to the government.

In northeastern Szechwan the situation is not favorable. The communist armies which invaded Szechwan from Shensi are becoming increasingly active. Hankiang, Paohow, Tungkiang and Suiting in northeastern Szechwan are reported to have been occupied by the Reds, and troops

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under General Liu Tsun-hou, former military governor of Szechwan stationed at Suiting, are retreating southward. Portions of the garrisons of these districts have gone over to the Reds.

Other communist forces are reported active near Chuhsien further south. Troops are being sent to the affected area by General Liu Hsiang to halt the Red advance.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

AG

S. V. Constant
 Major, Cavalry
 Assistant Military Attache

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CHINA (Military)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX: - COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES
(Bi-monthly report of changes)

Northern Provinces

HOPAI

Troops Loyal to Chiang Kueh-liang

6th Ind. Art. Brig.	Wang Ho-kuei	
12th Regiment		Maiping and Ch'angli

JEROL

Troops Nominally under Chiang Kueh-liang

41st Army Corps - Sun Tien-ying	
40th Division	Changteh (from Hopai)

KINGHSIA

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

7th Division	Ma Hung-kuei
--------------	--------------

Ma Hung-kuei has been newly appointed commander of the 7th Division.

Central Provinces

KIANGSI

Troops Believed to be Loyal to Chiang Kai-shek

50th Division	Tueh Sen	Luang
55th " "	Li Tung-hong	Chintekchen

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek

2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wan	
9th Division	Kiukiang

Central Government Troops

14th Army Corps - Wei Li-kuang	
10th Division	Huachang

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tang

1st Group of Armies - Chen Chi-tang

1st Army Corps - Yu Hsu-mou	
2nd Division	Taiya

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KIANGSI (Continued)

Troops Loyal to Li Tsung-jen

4th Group of Armies - Li Tsung-jen

15th Army Corps - Pai Chung-hsi
44th Division Wang Tsun-pin Lungnan

CHENGLANG

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek

6th Division Chao Kuan-tao Kiangshan

KIANGSU

Personal Troops under Chiang Kai-shek

1st Ind. Art. Brig. Shih Wen-hsi Hanking 4,000

The 1st Independent Artillery Brigade is a newly organized unit.

HUNAN

Central Government Troops

4th Route Army under Ho Chien

20th Army Corps - Liu Chien-shu
19th Division Li Chunsh Lichow

SENCHEWAN

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

20th Army Corps - Yang Sen
3rd Division Yang Han-chung Chukhsien

29th Army Corps - Tien Sung-yao
3rd Route Corps Tseng Hsien-tung Tanghsien
4th " " Lo Hsi-chang Huangyan

Border Defence Troops Liu Tsun-hou Kaimien

Southern Provinces

FUKIEN

Central Government Troops

2nd Division Lu Hsiang-pang Kweihsia
1st Brigade Yang Ting-ying (NAVAL CONSTB.)

The 1st Brigade has been disbanded.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report

FUKIEN (Continued)

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tang

<u>1st Group of Armies</u> - Chen Chi-tang		
1st Ind. Div.	Huang Jen-huan	Chenping

KWANGTUNG

Troops Loyal to Chen Chi-tang

<u>1st Group of Armies</u> - Chen Chi-tang		
Constb. Brig.	Chen Han-kuang	Kuangchow

The Constabulary Brigade is the former 1st Independent Brigade reorganized.

2nd Ind. Brig.	Chen Chang	Nanyung
3rd " Div.	Li Han-hua	"
Training "	Miao Pei-man	Canton
1st Ind. Regt.	"	"
2nd " "	"	Yingtak
3rd " "	"	Linchow
4th " "	"	Suowen

The 3rd Independent Division and the Training Division formerly belonged to the 4th Army Corps which was abolished some time ago.

<u>2nd Army Corps</u> - Hsiang Han-ping		
5th Div.	Chang Ta	Shaklung

<u>3rd Army Corps</u> - Li Yang-ching		
7th Div.	Huang Yen-chen	Swatow
8th "	Huang Chih-wen	Limping

KWANGSI

Troops Loyal to Li Tsung-jen

4th Group of Armies - Li Tsung-jen

<u>7th Army Corps</u> - Liao Lei		
19th Div.	Chow Tse-huang	Liuchow
24th "	Tan Lien-fang	Kweilin

The designation of the 21st Division has now been changed into the 24th Division.

<u>15th Army Corps</u> - Pai Chung-hsi		
45rd Division	Chen Chung-fang	Kweiping
48th "	Wei Yang-sung	Lungchow
10th "	Pai Chung-hsi	Nanning

The 45rd Division is the former four Independent Regiments reorganized.

Pai Chung-hsi has been newly appointed commander of the 10th Division.

KWEICHOW - Wang Chia-liah, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

<u>25th Army Corps</u> - Wang Chia-liah		
1st Div.	Chen King-yi	Kweiyang

No. 8514

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KWEICHOW (Continued)

Miscellaneous Troops Nominally under Central Government's Control.

28th Army Corps - Wang Chia-lieh (Continued)

2nd Division	Ho Chih-chung	Kweiting
4th "	Pe Hui-ch'ang	Anshan
5th "	Hiao Hsai-chung	Chengyuan
Training Div.	Hou Chih-tan	Hsuiyang
1st Ind. Brig.	Li Chen-ch'ang	Tsunyi
2nd " "	Hou Chih-hai	Anshan
3rd " "	Tu Yu Chiu	Sungtan

18th Route Army under Mao Kwang-hsiang.

2nd Division	Tu Kuo-tsai	Peanting
3rd "	Chiang Tsui-shen	Tsunyi

Mao Kwang-hsiang's troops of the 18th Route Army have recently been defeated by the 28th Army Corps under Wang Chia-lieh, resulting in the above-mentioned two divisions only now remaining under the former's control, the rest having surrendered to the latter's army.

Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria)

LIAONING (Manchoukuo Troops)

1st Independent Brig.	Wang Tien-chung	Suichung
-----------------------	-----------------	----------

KIRIN (Manchoukuo Troops)

2nd Independent Brigade	Li Wen-ping	Nishan
2nd " Cav. "	Li Yu-chiu	"

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
GRAY

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated April 11, 1933

Rec'd 9:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



April 11, 4 p. m.

My March 13, 11 a. m.

Chang Hsueh Liang left today for Europe.

Repeated to the Department.

CUNNINGHAM

WSB-RR

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note
893.44
Chang Hsueh Liang
893.00

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/57 FOR Despatch #279
(#341 to Legation)

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Mar. 13, 1933.
H6/111 NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation: Military Operations in
connection with -. Invasion of Jehol by Japanese -
"Manchukuo" troops outstanding event of February,
1933.

fpg

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Military Invasion of Jehol by Japanese-Manchukuo
Operations. troops outstanding event of February.

793-94
 Occupation of Shanhaikuan seems to have been a preliminary step in the Jehol campaign. Japanese-Manchukuo forces occupied in rapid succession, with but slight resistance, the more important cities of Jehol. Chengteh (Jehol) captured by a detachment of 185 Japanese troops, General Tang Yu-lin having precipitately fled a few hours before their arrival. Victorious troops are reported to have been cordially welcomed by civilian populace. Foreigners residing in Jehol, including the one American missionary, Miss Harriett Minns, reported by both foreign and Japanese sources as safe. Reports entertained that disorganized and retreating soldiery will constitute a menace to the safety of cities and villages in their path. Whereabouts of General Tang Yu-lin, unknown. Believed to be in hiding in some foreign con-

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cession in Mantain. Main body of Chinese regular troops still remain in positions inside Wall occupied prior to the Jehol campaign. Believed that these troops will be retained in this region no longer than necessary due to limited facilities for their maintenance. Next thirty or sixty days will reveal whether Japanese intend to remain outside the Wall, as repeatedly announced with reservations, or extend their military operations inside the Wall. Chinwangtao area remarkably quiet and undisturbed throughout month of February.

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Military Operations. The outstanding event of the month was the concerted drive of the Japanese and Manchukuo forces against the regulars and volunteers in Jehol. The ease and speed with which this drive was executed apparently came as a great surprise to Chinese officialdom as well as to the reading public and seemingly no less so to the Japanese military who for some months had been preparing for the subjugation of Jehol. In the light of subsequent events, it seems reasonable to conclude that the occupation of Chanhai-kuan on January 3 by the Japanese forces was a preliminary step in the general preparations for successfully prosecuting the Jehol campaign. The occupation of Chanhai-kuan provided the Japanese with excellent railway terminal facilities, repair shops, sheds, and other equipment for use in connection with the movement of large bodies of troops on the Mukden-Chanhai-kuan section of the Liaoning Railway. The occupation of the city by the Japanese also had the added advantage of preventing any concentration of large bodies of Chinese troops at an important gateway to the region in which it was proposed to conduct major military operations. These several factors seemed

to make

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to make it strategically necessary for the Japanese to occupy Shanhaikuan.

Shortly after the Shanhaikuan incident, the Japanese military command rapidly pushed forward the preparation for the invasion of Jehol and on February 23 the drive was commenced from three directions, namely: Kailu, Chinchow and Chaoyangtze. From February 24 to March 4 the combined Japanese and Manchukuo forces swept everything before them, occupying in succession many important cities practically without any fighting whatsoever. Chaoyang, Taipingfang, Tehposhou, Lingyuan, Chianping, Chihfang, Pingchuan and finally Chengteh (Jehol) fell to the invading forces in rapid succession. Chengteh, the headquarters of General Tang Yu-lin, is said to have been captured by a force of 128 Japanese soldiers, Tang and his troops having precipitately fled a few hours before the small detachment of Japanese troops arrived. The details of the military subjugation of Jehol will be omitted in this despatch inasmuch as I contemplate, if time is available, preparing a separate despatch describing the military operations incident to the occupation of that Province. Suffice it to say that, up to the time of writing, little actual fighting has taken place and that the loss of life has been very small indeed. The greater number of casualties on both sides are believed to have been caused by the extreme cold and exposure to which the contending forces were subjected rather than to casualties from actual combat. The defeated regulars

and

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and volunteers, the latter being especially poorly disciplined and inadequately equipped and officered, generally withdrew in confusion and fled towards the west and south, pillaging as they went and threatening to create a bad situation for the civilian population in their path resident both outside and inside the wall. From reliable sources it appears that the Japanese and Manchukuo forces were very generally welcomed by the civilian population in the captured Jehol cities. Foreigners recently arrived in Tientsin from the Province of Jehol have stated that in many cities the Japanese and Manchukuo forces were given a very cordial reception and that after the exodus of the Tang Yu-lin troops and volunteers there was a decided improvement in the general order and peace of the areas freshly occupied. From the same foreign source, which was later confirmed through Japanese sources, it was learned that all foreigners residing in Jehol were safe and unharmed. It may be of interest to note that there was but one American in Jehol at the time of the invasion and that was Miss Harriett Minns, a missionary, who presumably remained at Linyuan although warned some time ago to withdraw from the area threatened by invasion. Miss Minns elected to remain there and was apparently not harmed in any way. According to Japanese news reports she sought safety, with her Chinese mission pupils, in a quickly constructed dug-out and raised the American flag which the Japanese took pains to respect. A Reuter

despatch

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- 1/ despatch under Tokyo date line of March 9, describing her experiences, is enclosed.

The retreating and disorganized military units presented a problem for the Chinese authorities this side of the Wall. It was feared that these troops might organize themselves into groups of looters and invade some of the larger cities inside the Wall. Efforts were made to prevent any serious difficulties of this character by the stationing of dependable troops of Chang Hsueh-liang at the more important passes. If news reports can be believed, this action had the effect of forcing many of the defeated troops into Chahar and it was in that region that fears were especially entertained that the roving bands of disorganized soldiers would become unruly and loot the cities and villages as they went along. Just how these defeated troops are conducting themselves in that region is not known.

The whereabouts of General Tang Yu-lin, who was responsible for the fall of Jehol, has not yet been established. At the first sign of any impending attack on Jehol, General Tang, with his family, together with all the personal possessions he could assemble, fled in the middle of the night and succeeded in keeping his destination secret. Rumors are current that he is in hiding in one of the foreign concessions in Tientsin. It may be of interest to note that on the morning of March 6 the French police authorities raided a residence said to be occupied by one of Tang Yu-lin's officers in the French concession and seized 37 kilos of opium and three revolvers.

Some

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Some suspicion seems to have been entertained that General Tang was in the house which was raided, but reports from the French authorities do not denote that any Chinese military officers were arrested. The presence of General Tang in Tientsin is not yet confirmed but since the foreign concession areas in this city afford the only close haven of safety for military leaders against whom the wrath of the Chinese politicians and Chinese public is being directed, there is reason to believe that Tang and some of the other officers responsible for the Jehol failure may have found their way to one of the concessions in Tientsin. At least the concession areas have on previous occasions been so utilized.

While the advance in Jehol was rapid and most of the territory was occupied with but little, if any, actual fighting, within the past few days it is apparent that at least ^{one} of the passes through the Wall - Kupeik'ou - was still being held by the Chinese. Reinforcements were being brought up by both sides and that crucial point may yet prove to be pivotal as regards the general situation in North China. The plan of the Japanese campaign in Jehol seems to have proceeded in substantially the same way as it did in North Manchuria some months previous and which resulted in the forced withdrawal of Su Ping-wan's forces into Soviet territory. The main body of the regular Chinese troops stationed in the area this side of the Wall have, so far as is known, remained in the positions which they occupied prior to the beginning of the Jehol campaign. Up to the time of writing, there has

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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has been no movement of Chinese troops on the railway westward through Tientsin and recently the movement eastward has almost ceased. The facilities for keeping some 60,000 to 80,000 Chinese troops in the Lunan area are wholly inadequate and for that reason it is believed the troops now there will be kept in that region only if Japanese threats of invasion continue indefinitely. It would seem reasonable to suppose that within the next thirty or sixty days it will be known with some degree of certainty whether the Japanese will confine their activities to the territory outside of the Wall, as frequently announced with the usual reservation concerning provocative acts on the part of the Chinese, or whether their conquest will be extended to the Beijing-Tientsin area. In that event the whole military situation may undergo a sudden change.

Throughout the month of February the Chinwangtao area, notwithstanding its close proximity to the Great Wall, and the occupation of Shanhaikuan by Japanese troops, was remarkably quiet and undisturbed, the month being entirely free from any incidents or serious controversies between the Chinese and Japanese forces in that immediate area.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
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
cib

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 12, 1933.

Recd 12:45 a.m.



Secretary of State
 Washington.



321, April 12, 1933

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"April 11, 8 p.m. Army spokesman announced:

One. That general attack along the Wall has been in progress since April 10th in order definitely to suppress Chinese counter attacks.

Two. That Leng Kou was captured this morning and that Japanese are advancing toward Chienchangying.

Three. That aeroplanes bombarded Chinese base of operations at Dolonor."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

APR 13 1933

PTL:MBJ

F/HS


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib



FROM

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
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PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 13, 1933.

Received 6 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.



327, April 13, 2 p.m.

Following from American Consulate General at Mukden:

"April 12, 7 p.m. Army spokesman reported today
 that Japanese army occupied Chienchangying yesterday
 morning and are pursuing Chinese toward Chienan. He stated
 that Japanese forces at Chiehlingkou dislodged entrenched
 Chinese opposite pass and are now advancing toward
 Taitouying."

JOHNSON

CIB JS

F/G 793.94/6175

APR 13 1933

NOTED

793.94

0348

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM PEIPING

Dated April 14, 1933.

Recd 5:05 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

330, April 14, 1 p.m.



Yoshizawa visited Peiping. I am informed that he

was not able to see any Chinese of importance here or in the South. I believe purpose of his visit was to inform himself of current Chinese reactions to Japanese occupation of Jehol and activities along Wall. He left impressed with fact that for the time being no Chinese are prepared to commit themselves to negotiations direct or indirect. I believe that he expects a change of government in May or at latest in July and that Seiyukai will succeed present government and that he will be Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was accompanied by Count Iwaki of the House of Peers and Mr. Hashimoto of the Diet.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CIB WP



F/G 793.94/6176

793.94
 note
 894.00

24 1933

12

0349

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APR 14 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated April 14, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

With regard to Yoshizawa's visit to Peiping, information has reached me that he was unable to see any important Chinese either in the South or in Peiping. It is my belief that the visit was made in order that Yoshizawa might acquaint himself with present reactions of the Chinese to activities along the Great Wall and to the occupation of Jehol by the Japanese. Yoshizawa departed with the impression that the Chinese are not ready, at the present time, to commit themselves either to direct or indirect negotiations. It is my opinion that Yoshizawa anticipates that a change of government will occur next month or not later than July; that he expects the present government will be succeeded by the Seiyukai, and that he will be Foreign Minister. Count Iwaki of the House of Peers and Mr. Hashimoto of the Diet accompanied him.

The information contained herein has been repeated to the Tokyo Embassy.

m.m.h.

1351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

MET

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 14, 1933

Rec'd 6:15 a. m..

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 14 1933

Department of State

793.94
April 14, 3 p.

It is difficult to determine exact military situation between Lwanchow north war zone to Great Wall but Chinese claim Chienan has been recaptured by them with heavy losses there as well as at Lengkou but latter is held by Japanese. Japanese (or so-called pro-ally Manchukuo forces) are apparently occupying a number of towns inside the Wall. The capture of Taitowying by the Japanese which was reported in the press has not been officially confirmed.

Conditions are quiet at Chinwangtao today. Japanese airplane activity that vicinity appears to have been appreciably reduced during past twenty-four hours.

KLP-WWC

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/6177

0351

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.94/804 Dissemination File FOR Memorandum

FROM State Dept.
Far Eastern Division (Hornbeck) DATED Mar. 14, 1933
NAME 1-1127 ***

///

REGARDING: Manchuria Situation: Discusses American-Japanese Relations, in connection with - .

fpg

793.94/6178

1352

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Tientsin via N. R.

Dated April 15, 1933

Rec'd 3:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

April 15, 1 p. m.



Authoritative information just received from Chinwang-
tao shows that nine Japanese airplanes bombed for two hours
this morning front line from Mafeng to Haiyang to north
of that town dropping sixty bombs.

Heavy fighting reported at Lulung last night. Respon-
sible Chinese official informed me today that Taitowying has
been captured by Japanese. Large number Chinese troops
at Changli were withdrawn last night to Lwanchow, according
to information received from railway authorities. Request
has been received for forty railway cars at Changli denoting
further withdrawal. Present movement is undoubtedly
intended to drive Chinese to west bank of Lwan and appears
to be succeeding.

LOCKHART

KLP

F/G 793.94/6179

APR 17 1933

FILED

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MET

Tokio

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (c)

Dated April 15, 1933

Rec'd 5:58 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



80, April 15, 11 a. m.
 793.94/6176

Reference Peiping's 330, April 14, 1 p. m., while

it is unwise to make political predictions in Japan under present circumstances, the press reports of an early fall of the Cabinet are probably premature. A change in the Government will in all probability take place before very long, but I am informed on reliable authority that Prince Saionji desires the present Cabinet to remain in power for the present. As one influential Japanese said to me, "Japan is in a serious rut and does not know how to get out of it. We do not wish a new Cabinet until that way out can be found, but when a new Government does come in it will follow a more conciliatory policy in international affairs than the present one". The consensus of opinion among the moderate thinkers is that the policy hitherto followed has brought the country into a deplorable international position from which Japan must extricate herself by a new orientation. Japanese history, they point out, shows that

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F/G 793.94/6180

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#80 from Tokio, April 15, 11 a.m.

that the country has passed through periodical cycles of anti-foreign chauvinism which in every case have been followed by periods of international cooperation, as in the Meiji era. These liberal thinkers, many of whom are substantial and influential men in high position, confidently predict a similar outcome in the present situation and they aver that the military leaders themselves are now more willing to listen to reason.

Similar statements have been made to me for many months past but the present asseverations appear to carry more conviction and assurance than those made previously. I am aware that they come directly from the Genro himself. The decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, by which Japan is placed in an unenviable position before the world, is the climax which may conceivably give the moderates the foothold for which they have waited during the past eighteen months.

In view of the effective occupation of all Manchuria it is difficult to foresee precisely what form a new and conciliatory orientation in foreign policy will take. Nevertheless there exists a feeling here that the political pendulum has now swung as far in the direction of chauvinistic nationalism as it will

135

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MBT

3-#80 from Tokio, April 15, 11 a. m.

go and that the eventual future tendency will be towards international conciliation rather than a continued isolated defiance.

Under the present domination of the nation's affairs by the military I personally consider that it is idle to predict a change of orientation in international policy until concrete evidence of such a change is forthcoming. The foregoing views and hopes for the moderates are therefore for the present reported as worthy merely of attentive consideration rather than as reliable prophecy. Repeated to Peiping by mail.

HPD

GREW

0354

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 18 1933 MET
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
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COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
APR 15 1933
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 15, 1933

Rec'd 4:47 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 15 1933

Department of State

332, April 15, 1933

Following from American Consul General at Hankow:

"April 13, 4 p. m.

One. Pressure to prevent Chinese from dealing in Japanese goods is increasing at Hankow. Another Chinese was shot but not killed on April 11th for dealing in Japanese goods. Threatening letters received by Chinese residing in the Japanese Concession have caused a noticeable movement of Chinese from the Concession during the last few days. On April 10th three Chinese pilots of Japanese naval vessels on middle river were kidnapped at Hankow. These men have not, however, been injured.

Two. Since April 10 there have been twelve Japanese naval vessels in port: one cruiser, four destroyers and seven river gunboats.

Three. Although feeling between the Chinese and Japanese at Hankow has become somewhat tense, I believe that neither the Chinese forces nor the Japanese authorities desire rioting or a military clash at Hankow at present".

RR-KLP

JOHNSON

F/G

793.94/6181

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693.9412

21 1933

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75


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COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

cib

FROM

GRAY



TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated April 17, 1933.

Recd 5:50 a.m.

F/HS

Secretary of State

Washington.

URGENT.

April 17, 4 p.m.



American resident of Changli telegraphed me today
 that Changli bombed yesterday; no damage; self-styled
 national salvation army arrived Changli today; no
 fighting, all quiet, all foreigners safe and opinion
 expressed that new buffer zone being established.

793.94/6182

LOCKHART

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APR 18 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 18, 1933.

SKH:

F/115

773.94/6183

In the penultimate paragraph of his telegram of April 4, noon, Consul General Lockhart states that he "strongly advised" Mr. Kautto to have his wife leave Taitowying immediately and come to Tientsin. He added that Mr. Kautto was leaving for Taitowying that night for the purpose of bringing his wife to Tientsin.

Consul General Lockhart in his telegram of April 10, 3 p.m. stated that Mr. Kautto, in a letter dated April 6, had reported his safe arrival at Taitowying and that he planned to remain there.

In view of the advice given by Consul General Lockhart, I see no need for the Department to issue instructions to Consul General Lockhart in the premises. I noticed in this morning's press that all Americans in the area of hostilities were being advised by the Legation and the Consul General at Tientsin to withdraw to places of safety and I presume that this advice would cover Mr. Kautto.

As requested, there is attached hereto, for handing to the Japanese Ambassador, a summary of the information contained in Tientsin's telegram of April 17, 10 a.m.


J. E. J.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib



FROM

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated April 17, 1933.

Recd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



April 17, 10 a.m.

One. Chinese have evacuated Chinwangtao and Changli and practically all Chinese forces that area have withdrawn to Lwanchow. Detachment of fifty Manchukuo troops in control at Chinwangtao. Heavy bombing by Japanese air forces Saturday at various places north of Luan River especially at Haiyang which has been evacuated by Chinese. Chinwangtao and Changli quiet with local self governments established. Rail traffic beyond Lwanchow suspended.

Two. Letter dated April 13 received from Kautto stating that on 12th Japanese planes visited Taitowying and dropped eight bombs killing four and injuring three, all civilians, and that on April 13 place was again raided fifty or sixty bombs being dropped more than twenty people killed and many injured. Kautto reports that three of the killed were standing "on the outer side of our doorway when a bomb struck in the street about thirty feet in front of them". Another bomb struck about thirty feet from Kautto's servants quarters. Wooden blinds on one mission building were damaged, holes were made in compound door, walls scarred by shrapnel fragments and

F/HS

793.94/6183

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393.1163

136
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- From Tientsin, April 17, 1933.

and nearly half of window panes in mission buildings shattered. During the bombings American flag five feet by nine and a half feet was flying from flag staff in compound. Flag was hit by shrapnel in 5 places. Japanese officer gave Kautto proclamation forbidding any one to enter or occupy mission property. All Chinese troops evacuated Taitow night of April 12.

Unless otherwise instructed I shall make no local representations.

LOCKHART.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓
 PLAIN

RECEIVED
 Department of State

1933 APR-18- PM 6:14 Washington

Naval Radio

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

April 18, 1933.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94/6183

123 Tientsin's April 17, 10 a.m. to Department.

Are you taking any action?

Unless you suggest otherwise, Department contem-
 plates giving to Japanese Ambassador here informally
 an account of the apparent facts as reported in
 Kautto's letter of April 13, paragraph two of telegram
 under reference; and Department suggests that you
 similarly communicate with Japanese Legation.

Inform Tientsin.

793.94/6183

Hall
 W

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

FROM

GRAY



Peiping via N.R.

Dated April 17, 1933

Rec'd 5:50 a. m.

F/G

Secretary of State,

Washington.



793.94/6184

335, April 17, 4 p. m.

My 327. /6175

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"April 14, 4 a. m. Referring to my telegram of April 11, 8 p. m. It was again stated by army spokesman yesterday that object of present campaign is the destruction of counter-attack bases and that if Chinese continue to counter-attack from new bases it will be necessary to dislodge them. He reported capture of Chienan in the afternoon of 12th and progress of all columns operating east of Luan River in face of initial stiff resistance.

(Second following by cable)".

"April 17, 10 a. m. Army spokesman announced yesterday afternoon that Yungping was occupied April 15th, that occupation of Funing was expected soon and that only one Chinese battalion was now at Chinwangtao".

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

RECEIVED

PR 18 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Paraphrase sent to
 ONI & MID*

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

in Confidence



McL

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.(b)

Peiping.

FROM

Dated April 17, 1933.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

335, April 17, 4 P. M. (second paragraph)

"There is reason to believe that the campaign
 will in any case be continued until Chinese evacuate
 territory east of Luan River."

JOHNSON.

CSB

F/HS
 E.W.793.94/6184

PR 18 1933

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APR 17 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

The second paragraph of telegram 335 dated April 17, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, concludes substantially as follows:

It is anticipated that in any event until the Chinese evacuate territory east of the Luan River ~~the~~ the campaign will be continued.

0365

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information
of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams
received by the Department in regard to developments in
China for the period April 6 to April 17, 1933.


In the event that other Governments are communicat-
ing to the Secretary General of the League of Nations
information of similar character, the Secretary of State
would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to
the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confiden-
tial as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The
Secretary General should not disclose the names or
designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:
Two copies of digest
of telegrams.

eqc.
FE:EGC:KC
4-14-33

FE

OB
Apr. 18, 1933.



MTH

793.94/6184

793.94/6184

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
April 6 to April 17, 1933.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 6) that on April 5, Japanese airplane reconnoitring continued in the vicinity of Chinwangtao; that there is some fighting near Haiyang (about 10 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan); and that there are increasing indications that the Japanese are trying to push the Chinese forces back to Lwanchow (about 50 miles southwest of Shanhaikwan).

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 7) that on April 6, three trains of Chinese troops moved eastward through Tientsin; that fighting is going on north of Chinwangtao between the Chinese forces and "Manchukuo" troops consisting of Koreans, Chinese and Japanese; that, although so far as Japanese troops are concerned, the above-mentioned area is under the jurisdiction of General Nakamura, with headquarters at Tientsin, it is understood that Nakamura's troops are not concerned with the operations which seem to be carried on by troops from beyond the Great Wall; and that the present operations are variously supported by Japanese air forces.

The Minister at Peiping reports (April 10) that the situation in Peiping is quiet; and that conditions are obscure in Shanhaikwan and the Lwan River area where fighting has apparently been occurring between Chinese Government troops and pro-"Manchukuo" Chinese forces cooperating with a small Japanese cavalry force.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 10) that a crisis has arisen between Soviet railway officials and "Manchukuo" in regard to sending rolling stock into Siberia;
 and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and that on April 8, the frontier at Manchouli (extreme northwestern part of Heilungkiang) was closed for freight traffic, but there is no intention of stopping passenger traffic.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 10) that on April 5, two Japanese reconnoitring and three bombing airplanes flew for two hours over Taitowying (south of the Great Wall); that on April 4 and April 5, bombs were dropped on Funingsien (south of the Great Wall and 20 miles west of Chinwangtao), one killing three men in the magistrate's courtyard; and that on April 9, according to an authoritative source, a Japanese airplane dropped a bomb near a Chinese armored train about half-way between Peitaiho and Chinwangtao.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (April 11) that, according to the army spokesman, a general attack has been in progress since April 10, along the Great Wall, having for its purpose the definite suppression of Chinese counter-attacks; that on April 11, Lengkow (a pass in the Great Wall about 60 miles west of Shanhaikwan) was captured by the Japanese who are advancing toward Chienchangying (south of the Great Wall); and that airplanes bombarded the Chinese base of operations at Dolonnor (southeastern part of Chahar Province).

The Consul General at Shanghai reports (April 11) that on April 11, General Chang Hsueh-liang (who was until recently in command of the Chinese troops in North China and who resigned a few weeks ago) left for Europe.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 11) that on April 11, according to a reliable report from Chinwangtao,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

18 bombing planes flew over that town; that, on April 10, according to press reports, the district east of Lwanchow was heavily bombed by the Japanese, bombs dropping at Haiyang, Taitowying, Funing and other places; and that there is increasing evidence that an effort is being made to push the Chinese regulars back to Lwanchow.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 12) that traffic on the east line of the Chinese Eastern Railway is interrupted due to the wrecking and looting by brigands on April 11, of a passenger train about 30 miles west of the Siberian border, the Russian engineer, fireman and one Chinese being killed.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (April 12) that on April 11, according to the army spokesman, the Japanese army occupied Chienchengying (just south of the Great Wall and about 50 miles west of Shanhaikwan) and is pursuing the Chinese south; and that Japanese forces at Chiehlingkou (a pass in the Great Wall about 25 miles west of Shanhaikwan) dislodged intrenched Chinese troops opposite the pass and are advancing toward Taitowying.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 14) that apparently Japanese or so-called pro-ally "Manchukuo" forces are occupying a number of towns south of the Great Wall; that conditions at Chinwangtao are quiet; and that Japanese airplane activity in that vicinity seems to have been greatly reduced within the past twenty-four hours.

The Consul General at Hankow reports (April 13) that pressure to prevent Chinese from dealing in Japanese goods is increasing in Hankow; that there has been a noticeable movement of Chinese from the Japanese Concession recently,

due

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

due to threatening letters received by Chinese living there; that on April 10, three Chinese pilots of Japanese vessels on the Yangtze were seized at Hankow but were not injured; and that since April 10, there have been 12 Japanese naval vessels in port at Hankow.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 15) that on April 15, according to authoritative information from Chinwangtao, nine Japanese airplanes bombarded the Chinese front line about 10 miles west of Shanhaikwan for two hours dropping 60 bombs.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 17) that the Chinese have evacuated Chinwangtao and Changli which are quiet with local self-governments established; that "Manchukuo" troops are in control of Chinwangtao; that on April 15, there was heavy bombing by Japanese air forces at various places north of the Luan River, especially at Haiyang which has been evacuated by the Chinese; that rail traffic is suspended east of Lwanchow; that on April 12 and April 13, Japanese airplanes bombed Taitowying (south of the Great Wall), killing more than 24 people and injuring many; that on April 12, all Chinese troops evacuated Taitowying; and that all is quiet at Changli and all foreigners are safe.

The Consul General at Mukden reports (April 17) that on April 15, according to the army spokesman, Yungping (about 50 miles west of Shanhaikwan) was occupied by Japanese forces; and that the occupation of Funing (30 miles west of Shanhaikwan) was expected soon.

SAC.
 REGC:KC

FE m.m.H.

1371

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DIVISION OF

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR -7 1933

April 6, 1933.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE CHINESE MINISTER,
APRIL 6.

793.94
When the Chinese Minister called today, I in-
quired whether he had any news from the Far East, to
which he replied that he had nothing since two days ago,
that the then reports indicated that the Chinese were
withdrawing to Lwanchow, in order to avoid a clash
with the Japanese forces; the Chinese were not able to
put up a strong fight, but if the Japanese pushed
through as far as the Lwanchow-Peiping region, the
Government would have to put up a strong resistance,
otherwise it would fall; the Chinese people through-
out the country were demanding resistance, yet it was
apparent that the Chinese Government were not in a
position to offer such resistance.

William Phillips.

U WP/AB

APR 14 1933

FILED

F/H/S

793.94/6185

0375

72



No.

FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

Mr. Chapman
Mr. North
Mr. Grew

undorable

Joseph C. Grew,

Sir

There is enclosed, for your information, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which the Under Secretary had on April 6th with the Chinese Minister concerning the situation in the Far East.

Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of State:

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
conversation of April 6th.

0372

No.

Sir:

Very truly yours,

1 enclosure:

U VC/AB

FILE

W. M. H.



100-443887-100

137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

No.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information,
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which
the Under Secretary had on April 6th with the
Chinese Minister concerning the situation in the
Far East.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
conversation of April 6th.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

No.

The Honorable
 Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
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Sir:

There is enclosed, for your information,
 a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which
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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

1 enclosure:

Copy of memorandum of
 conversation of April 6th.

U VC/AB

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OR
 Apr 10 1933
 Apr 10, 1933 PM

137
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 24, 1933.

~~LE:~~
MTH:

Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. 1219 of April 1, 1933, states that LE JOURNAL recently carried an article approving retention by Japan of her Mandated Islands on the grounds that these Islands came into Japan's possession by virtue of secret agreements antedating the League Covenant. The Special Report also states that a recent article in LE TEMPS regrets Japan's declaration of intention to withdraw from the League but at the same time expresses some sympathy for Japan's attitude toward Manchuria.

bb
CC:CLS

0374


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Paris, April 1, 1933

APR 15 33



F/HS

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1219)



793.94/6186

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's
Special Report No. W. D. 1219, dated April 1,
1933.

FILED
APR 26 1933

WD/DG

W.D.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 1, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1219

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Japanese Policy as Viewed
in the French Press

Writing in LE JOURNAL of March 29, 1933, Saint-Brice approved Japan's avowed intention of retaining the Mandate islands in the Pacific, taking the following argument as basis for his approval:

"The League of Nations has no concern in the distribution of these islands, which was decided at a period when no thought was taken for a future league of nations. The attribution of the archipelago was made not, as many people assert, by the peace treaties but by secret conventions which intervened at the outset of the war, when the great Powers implored the Empire of the Rising Sun to contribute its assistance whose great value for restor-

ing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ing order was fully appreciated. Japan did her job and does not intend to be frustrated of the fruits. She now says 'J'y suis, j'y reste'. She would be greatly surprised if any Power were to take up the glove, even that Power which is the chief rival of Japan in the Pacific but which also knows how to organize might in the service of right."

Roman de Marès writing in LE TEMPS of March 30, 1933, considered that Tokyo could not approve the verdict of the League of Nations, which would have meant denying her entire policy in Manchuria, which is vital to the Empire, but what he regrets especially is that the influence of Japan should henceforth be lost in Geneva. The world-wide character of the League will suffer greatly from this, being already without the collaboration of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

De Marès does not expect Japan to reconsider her decision in regard to the League, but he expects that direct conversations, possibly of an unofficial or even private nature, may be opened between Nanking and Tokyo. He concludes:

"The complexities of the Chinese policy, together with the Government instability at Nanking, placed Japan in a good position to await some events in China itself

as

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

as solution for the problems which have arisen between the two countries. It is a question of patience and of the wear and tear of political passions which so often disturb the yellow races. When more is known about the game of Chang Kai Chek and Wang Cheng Wei, perhaps the possibilities which may exist for an accord will appear more clearly."

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

✓ Enclosures:

79

Article from LE JOURNAL of March 29, 1933
Article from LE TEMPS of March 30, 1933

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. 1219 of April 1, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From " LE JOURNAL " of March 27, 1933

LES REVISIONS TERRITORIALES dans les îles du Pacifique

La sortie du Japon de la S.D.N.
 va-t-elle les ouvrir ?
 La question ne peut être résolue
 que par la négative

La sortie du Japon de la Société des nations va-t-elle fournir à l'Allemagne et à d'autres nations peut-être l'occasion de poser la question des revisions territoriales ? L'affaire est de singulière importance au moment où l'on parle tant de corriger les traités de paix.

A première vue, on pourrait être tenté de penser que du moment qu'il rompt tous les liens avec la ligue de Genève l'empire du Soleil levant ne peut plus exercer de mandat d'administration dans les îles du Pacifique, au nom de la Société des nations. On sait que les traités de paix ont créé deux sortes de mandats, qui sont tous les deux soumis au contrôle de Genève. Il y a des mandats orientaux, destinés à préparer l'éducation des territoires de l'empire ottoman; il y a des mandats coloniaux, destinés à assurer aux anciennes colonies allemandes une gestion de haute civilisation.

A vrai dire, ce second type de mandat n'a été qu'une des innombrables équivoques introduites dans le traité de paix pour éviter ce que M. Paul-Boncour appelle l'exploitation de la victoire. Les vainqueurs n'ont pas voulu avoir l'air de se partager un butin, comme si les paiements en nature n'étaient pas les plus sûrs et les plus simples ! Le régime nouveau que l'on a créé a de nombreux inconvénients, notamment d'engendrer une situation précaire et aussi de laisser la porte ouverte aux réclamations de l'Allemagne. On pense si les Allemands vont laisser passer l'occasion d'exploiter la condamnation morale prononcée contre un de leurs vainqueurs par la Société des nations, condamnation ratifiée par les Etats-Unis ! Ils ont le choix entre deux partis. Ils peuvent soutenir que le Japon n'est plus qualifié pour exercer un mandat au nom de la Société des nations ; ils peuvent, au contraire, éviter de soulever l'incident et faire valoir cette sagesse auprès du Japon.

Cette seconde tactique ne serait certainement pas la moins adroite, car les Japonais ont fait savoir clairement qu'ils entendent conserver les îles Mariannes et les Carolines. La Société des nations n'a rien à voir dans la distribution de ces îles qui a été décidée dans un temps où l'on ne songeait même pas à une future ligue des nations.

L'attribution des archipels a été faite, non pas, comme beaucoup le disent, par le traité de paix, mais par des conventions secrètes qui sont intervenues dès le début de la guerre, quand les grandes puissances ont imploré l'empire du Soleil levant d'apporter un concours dont on appréciait alors toute la valeur à la cause du rétablissement de l'ordre. Le Japon a accompli sa tâche ; il n'entend pas être frustré. Il dit : « J'y suis, j'y reste ! ». Nous serions bien étonnés s'il se trouvait une puissance pour relever le gant, même celle qui est la principale rivale du Japon dans le Pacifique, mais qui sait, elle aussi, reconnaître la force au service du droit.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° 2 to Special Report N° W.D. 1219 of April 1, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From " LE TEMPS " of March 30, 1933

LE JAPON ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Le retrait du Japon de la Société des nations, officiellement notifié par le gouvernement de Tokio au secrétariat général de l'institution internationale de Genève, est un événement d'une portée considérable et pour le développement de la situation en Extrême-Orient et pour l'activité même de la Société des nations. Parce qu'on savait depuis un mois que ce retrait ne pouvait plus être évité après la résolution votée par l'assemblée et le refus de la délégation nipponne d'en admettre les termes, on s'est peu à peu habitué à l'idée de l'absence du Japon du conseil et de l'assemblée de Genève. Il n'en reste pas moins que la décision du mikado, seul juge de la politique engageant le Japon en matière de traités et de relations extérieures, marque un grave tournant de la collaboration internationale sur le terrain de l'Orient lointain. En réalité, le retrait du Japon est la conséquence directe des erreurs de procédure commises lorsque la Société des nations fut saisie, en septembre 1931, du conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie.

Il est certain que, obligée de juger conformément aux principes du pacte, la Société des nations, engagée à fond dans une affaire qui n'aurait jamais dû être transportée sur le plan de la politique générale, ne pouvait se prononcer autrement qu'elle ne l'a fait; mais comme, d'autre part, le gouvernement de Tokio ne pouvait revenir sur la reconnaissance officielle du Mandchoukouo sans répudier toute l'œuvre nipponne accomplie en Mandchourie, sans sacrifier une politique conforme aux intérêts vitaux de l'empire, la rupture était inévitable. Il faut le regretter non seulement en raison de la situation de fait qui se trouve ainsi créée en Extrême-Orient, mais surtout en raison de l'influence de tout premier plan que le Japon exerçait à Genève et dont la Société des nations se trouvera privée désormais. Il est exact, en effet, que l'empire du Soleil-Levant fut un des premiers et des plus actifs artisans de la Ligue et que, membre permanent du conseil, il a servi avec un louable zèle, par des initiatives souvent heureuses, les causes de la Société. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement de Tokio, dans la notification qu'il vient de faire au secrétariat général, est en droit d'affirmer que sa politique nationale, qui tend, dit-il, à assurer la paix en Extrême-Orient, est conforme, dans son esprit, à l'action générale de la Société des nations. Là où le différend commence, c'est que Tokio estime que pour rendre possible le maintien de la paix dans les diverses régions du monde il importe de donner au pacte de la Société des nations une application variant suivant les conditions réelles qui existent dans chacune de ces régions.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le Japon, ayant donné le préavis stipulé par le pacte, se retire du conseil et de l'assemblée de Genève, mais restera pourtant en contact avec la Société pour les questions d'ordre universel traitées sous les auspices de celle-ci. L'empire du Soleil-Levant se trouvera désormais dans la situation des Etats-Unis et de l'Union soviétique vis-à-vis de la Société des nations, et il n'est que trop certain que le caractère universel de l'institution en sera singulièrement affecté. Il n'y a plus maintenant que les quatre principales puissances européennes qui siègent à titre

permanent au conseil, et par là même l'action de la Société semble devoir se limiter de plus en plus aux seuls problèmes du monde occidental. Est-ce un bien? Est-ce un mal? Seule l'expérience encore à faire pourra nous fixer à cet égard. Pendant le délai de deux ans, terme du préavis, le Japon maintiendra à Paris un bureau réduit chargé de garder les contacts pour les grandes questions, telles celles du désarmement, de la conférence économique et du règlement du travail, auxquelles Tokio continuera à s'intéresser au même titre que les autres puissances. Y a-t-il des chances pour que le Japon revienne sur sa décision avant l'expiration des deux ans du préavis donné avant-hier? Il n'y paraît guère. Cela ne serait possible, en effet, que si la Chine concluait un accord direct avec lui, ce qui aurait pour effet de poser la question sous un aspect absolument nouveau à Genève.

On n'en est pas là, et si l'on est porté à croire que des conversations directes ne tarderont pas à s'engager, du moins à titre officieux ou privé, entre Nankin et Tokio, il faut s'en tenir pour l'instant aux faits tels qu'ils sont connus. Le Japon a refusé de s'incliner devant les recommandations de la Société des nations, de telle sorte que, si aucun fait nouveau ne vient modifier les données du problème, la Chine aura le droit, dans un délai de trois mois, de prendre les initiatives qu'elle jugera nécessaires pour défendre ses intérêts qu'elle estime lésés. Or, il est infiniment douteux que le gouvernement de Nankin soit sérieusement disposé à user de cette faculté. Le Japon a organisé la Mandchourie et a achevé la conquête du Jehol. Il n'a aucune raison actuellement de franchir la Grande-Muraille et de s'avancer en plein territoire chinois proprement dit. Si Nankin veut donc effectivement continuer la lutte, ce serait l'armée de Tchang Kai Chek qui devrait prendre l'offensive au nord de la Grande-Muraille, ce qui n'est pas vraisemblable. On voit bien l'intérêt que peuvent avoir les Chinois à provoquer une avance des Nippons en direction de Pékin, ce qui aurait pour effet de déterminer une nouvelle tension internationale. Mais on ne voit pas l'intérêt que peut avoir le Japon à céder à semblable tentation, alors que ses buts immédiats, la reconstitution de l'unité territoriale de la Mandchourie par l'occupation du Jehol et la consolidation du Mandchoukouo comme Etat autonome sous contrôle japonais, sont pratiquement atteints.

La complexité de la politique chinoise, avec l'instabilité gouvernementale à Nankin, met le Japon en bonne posture pour attendre de l'enchaînement des événements en Chine même la solution des problèmes qui se posent entre les deux pays. C'est une affaire de patience et d'usage des passions politiques qui troublent si profondément le monde jaune. Quand on verra clair dans le jeu de Tchang Kai Chek et de Wang Cheng Wei, celui-ci étant invité à reprendre la présidence du conseil exécutif avec toutes les graves responsabilités que cela peut comporter dans les circonstances actuelles, on discernera peut-être les possibilités d'accord qui peuvent exister. Jusque-là on continuera à se débattre dans les intrigues, la confusion et le désordre qui sont les éléments ordinaires de la politique chinoise.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM


PEIPING

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Dated April 18, 1933.

Recd 4:35 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.



Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 18 1933

Department of State

336, April 18, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. FOR THE SECRETARY.

Last evening United Press correspondent informed me that Nakayama in charge Japanese Legation visited him and suggested possibility some foreign military officer arrange meeting between the Japanese and Chinese military to afford opportunity for agreement to armistice. His idea was that negotiations should not be conducted in the presence of foreigners and that terms would be that Chinese remain south of motor road connecting Peiping with Shanhaikwan, Japanese to retire to the Wall.

I consider that for any one at this time to suggest such a proposal to the Chinese would merely court a rebuff and if it became publicly known would subject nationality concerned to undeserved criticism in China and I propose to be guided accordingly should such suggestion be made to me.

JOHNSON

JS CIB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-138

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Department of State

1933 APR -18- PM 4:45

Washington,

April 18, 1933.

57

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 336, April 18, 2 p.m.

First paragraph. This method of approach is /
apparently much employed and must be guarded against.
It affords, however, useful information.

Second paragraph. Department concurs and
approves.

793.94/6187

Hull
WJ

793.94/6187

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

CR
Apr. 18, 1933. PM

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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April 17 1933


No. 253

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

The Department encloses herewith, as of possible interest, a copy of an address given on April 7, 1933, by the Honorable William R. Castle at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Social and Political Science at Philadelphia.

Copies of this address were handed informally by Mr. Castle to an officer of the Department.

Enclosure:
Address.



FE:EMS:KC
4-15-33

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APR 17 1933

SKH

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Address by the Honorable William R. Castle, jr., at annual meeting of American Academy of Social and Political Science, Philadelphia, April 7, 1933.

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC.

For many years there has been a tradition in this country that the United States is China's best friend, China's defender against the encroachments of western nations. One never quite knows how such traditions originate or what keeps them alive, but that they affect Government policy is indubitable since governments hesitate to fly in the face of public sentiment. In the case of China this tradition may have been started and certainly has been fostered by the missionaries, but it has persisted even more, in all probability, because of instinctive American sympathy for the under dog. When anything happens in the Orient China generally pays. At times we have even been inclined to be a little self-righteous about this Chinese friendship of ours, have boasted that although other nations had concessions we had nobly refrained from taking any for ourselves. That was about all our vaunted unselfishness amounted to. We shared in extra-territoriality because that was necessary in the protection of our trade. We were never wholly disinterested and it was right that we should not have been. Altruism in international affairs, when carried too far, usually defeats its own ends. It is taken, and generally with reason, as a sign of weakness. The nation with that stigma can never be a really useful friend and this is especially true in the Far East. In defending our legitimate interests in China we assisted other nations to defend theirs and at the same time we helped China to progress because we were respected. The Open Door Policy, for which the United States is largely responsible, is the principal example of this.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huatgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

In recent days people are prone to forget that an equally important factor in our Pacific policy is the traditional American friendship for Japan. We felt that we had opened Japan to the world, had introduced her, so to speak, to the other members of the family of nations and we were proud of the extraordinary progress of our protégé. It is true that this friendship has had its vicissitudes. There have been times when we have wondered whether perhaps this protégé was not adopting too many of the bad qualities of western civilization along with the good. At the time of the Chinese-Japanese war our two loyalties came into conflict; we felt that Japan had abused her success. As usual, this was the instinctive sympathy for the oppressed which always affects our estimate of nations as well as individuals. But even then we realized that Japan was only doing what the great Western nations had done throughout their history. There was still an idea that to the victor belong the spoils. We had not yet learned, as we have learned since the World War that in this modern and complex civilization the fruits of victory are generally bitter fruits. A little later, however, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, America became more than ever enthusiastically pro-Japanese. We were sentimental about it as we had often been sentimental about China. Japan seemed to us the under-dog and we like it when the under-dog wins in splendid fashion. This was the heyday of our admiration for Japan, and the Japanese made the not unnatural error of believing that American applause was directed solely

at

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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at Japanese military strength. Actually it was because the weaker nation, which we liked, had conquered the stronger nation, which we were inclined to dislike. We were not so much pleased that the Japanese military had shown itself efficient as that it had demonstrated that efficiency in what seemed to us a righteous cause. Japan had also, among other things, pushed back one of the principal oppressors of China-- at least as we interpreted the word "oppressor." The Japanese did not at all recognize this aspect of the matter, became conscious of it only, and then without understanding, when American sentiment changed again after it became clear that Japan was merely replacing Russia in its hold on China. When, during the World War, Japan presented the famous Twenty One Demands, American opinion was deeply shocked. This was the low water mark in the changing tides of American opinion of the Japanese.

In the formulation of official policy, or rather in the method of making this policy effective it is also highly important to understand the attitude toward the United States of the countries to be affected thereby. This is particularly difficult in the Orient. It is silly to talk about Chinese public opinion, if by this is meant national opinion. There is no such thing, except, perhaps, flashes here and there kindled by propaganda and as promptly extinguished. In general Chinese public opinion is a matter of locality. On the whole, it may be said however that official China looks to us for support, is friendly when that support is forthcoming and inclined to be contemptuous when it is not. In

Japan

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Japan the situation is very different. Japan is a compact country; a large proportion of the people are literate; newspapers are read avidly; public opinion is a force which must be reckoned with. But because the country is so compact the creation of public opinion through official propaganda is comparatively simple. For many reasons Japan thinks of the United States as a friend, wants and needs us as a friend. The names of Perry and of Harris are revered. The aid and encouragement which we gave in the days when Japan was just issuing from its long isolation are not forgotten any more than is our generosity at the time of the great earthquake. The United States is Japan's best customer. All this being true, it is hard for the Japanese to understand why it seems always to be America which blocks the way to what, in the Japanese mind, is merely normal expansion. At the Washington Conference it was felt that we took the lead in forcing Japan out of Shantung; that we were primarily responsible for the Nine Power Treaty which was in their opinion a device to prevent Japan from accomplishing its manifest destiny. Japanese pride was deeply hurt by the passage of our immigration law and the memory of what seemed a gratuitous insult still rankles. Japan finds it impossible to reconcile our professions of friendship with our actions, thinks that we are double faced.

In this Japan is wrong. There is a profound psychological difference between the two races. Because Japan made great forward strides after the country was opened to the world, because it adopted western methods with

amazing

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amazing ease and developed an astonishing efficiency in the use of our tools, we thought that this change was accompanied by a complete and progressive acceptance of our intellectual processes and spiritual values. This was not true. The texture of the human mind cannot in a moment be changed as clothes are changed. Ideals, developed through endless generations, cannot be instantly eradicated; far less can they be instantly replaced by other, alien ideals. We have made a mistake in not realizing this. We have expected the Japanese to react as we should react and when they have not done so we have been disappointed. The Samurai mentality persists. It is highly, almost blindly patriotic and subordinates everything to what is believed to be the good of the nation and to the glory of the Emperor. We may not lag far behind the Japanese in the fundamentals of patriotism, but to us the whole picture is different. To us the higher patriotism consists in scrupulous observance of treaty commitments even if this appears temporarily disadvantageous. To the Japanese mind loyalty to country must supersede loyalty to paper agreements. Therein lies the deep divergence between the national points of view; therein the certainty of misunderstanding; therein the danger of conflict if the American interpretation of what is right is pressed with too little appreciation of Japanese standards. The Japanese accept the post war treaties as expressions of wholly admirable opinion but not as obliging them to forego actions for the good of the state. They do not accept them literally, as I hope the western nations

accept

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accept them--as Hoover and MacDonald accept the Kellogg Pact for example--as a compelling and restraining axiom of national policy.

Ever since the fateful 18th of September, 1931, American policy toward the Manchurian trouble has been based firmly on these treaties, specifically the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris. This policy has put us in direct opposition to Japanese policy and all that I have said before was intended to show why this is so. We are not unfriendly to Japan, but the Japanese think we are because they cannot understand why, if we profess friendship, we cannot accept, as the Japanese people accept, the official version of all that has happened. The Japanese claim is, of course, that the successive moves since the 18th of September have all been in the nature of self defense and have, therefore, been permissible under the Kellogg Pact.

When the trouble began the League of Nations immediately took jurisdiction. The American Government welcomed this because it removed international action from the charge of being in the self-interest of any one nation, put it squarely where it belonged, as solely in defense of the sanctity of international treaties to all of which, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, Japan was signatory. We were not a member of the League but we had signed the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power and Four Power treaties. We, therefore, could not dissociate ourselves from the rest of the world without repudiating our joint responsibility under these treaties. We immediately informed the League that

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that we should watch sympathetically the actions of that body, that we must reserve to ourselves independent judgment as to decisions taken, but that within these limits we should gladly cooperate to bring about peace in the Far East under the aegis of the treaties by which we were bound. When the League took up the discussion of the bearing of the Kellogg Pact on the situation we went so far as to appoint the American Consul in Geneva to sit with the Council of the League to discuss that particular subject. We have throughout advised and cooperated with the League in so far as such cooperation was possible to a non-member. We had the specific and independent duty of protecting such American interests in the Far East as might be jeopardized. We had the duty, along with other signatories, of supporting the peace treaties. We had never to lose sight of the fact that the Japanese were very sensitive to pressure on the part of this country and were inclined to hold us responsible for leadership against Japanese actions. We, therefore, had to be extraordinarily careful not unnecessarily to irritate the Japanese against us because we were determined to avoid any possibility of war. We have, therefore, consistently let it be understood by the League that we were not in favor of economic sanctions, believing them to be all too often the preliminary to war and in this particular case constituting for the United States a real danger because of the incorrect but widespread Japanese belief that we were the leaders in mobilizing world opinion against Japan.

No

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No one could have been firmer than President Hoover in his resolve to maintain the letter and the spirit of the declaration issued by him and Prime Minister MacDonald after their conference at the Rapidan that we "resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge." It was in direct pursuance of this obligation that he urged the doctrine, first explicitly stated in Mr. Stimson's notes to Japan and China on January 7, 1932, that we should not recognize territorial or other changes brought about by aggressive action. This note stated that the American Government "cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy, and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties." The important part of this statement is the last clause because this clearly enunciates a new doctrine. It was probably a little more far reaching than the rest of the world was at the time ready to adopt, but events moved rapidly

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rapidly in the Far East; the fighting in Shanghai brought home to all nations having interests in China the very critical situation; and as a result on March 11 the Assembly of the League of Nations voted that members of the League should not recognize any situation, treaty or arrangement brought about by means contrary "to the terms of the League Covenant or of the Pact of Paris." With this vote the western world ratified the new principle of international law first formulated by the American Government.

The President was responsible for this action, but he stood firmly against the clamor of those who, without sufficiently weighing the consequences, demanded the institution of a boycott against Japan. He believed and believes in the power of organized and expressed world opinion gradually to right wrongs. No nation is willing indefinitely to stand condemned by world opinion.

As one looks back over the history of the last two years, especially in the light of that admirable document, the Lytton Report, one can see where mistakes were undoubtedly made. But the mistakes came from lack of full realization of what was going on and from the influence of sentiment. The American Government has been criticized for not taking a stronger stand against Japan at the very beginning. We did not know then as we know now the far-reaching plans of the Japanese military, or if, as the Japanese claim, there were no detailed plans, we did not foresee the almost universal support which would be accorded by the Japanese people to the progressive military movements. (In this paper all mention of the Shanghai incident

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incident is omitted because it was almost surely not included in any original plan because it had little relation to the Manchurian operations, and because it was, on the whole, unpopular in Japan.) We also hesitated to adopt a strong stand because we had confidence in the fine men who were at the head of the Japanese Government and know that outside pressure would certainly play into the hands of the extremist elements. We did not, of course, realize that the military would gain such complete control of the Government that they could dispose of civilian officials as they pleased. In other words, we had no conception of the complete breakdown of civil government in the Island Empire. Even so, however, the moderation of the American Government was justified. A belligerent attitude would have created a bitterness which might have led to disastrous consequences.

Sentiment also played its part. Once more China was the under-dog. In the immediate threat against the integrity, territorial and administrative, of China we were inclined to forget the provocation which had been given Japan, to forget the years of misrule in Manchuria under which misrule Japanese treaty rights had been flaunted and Japanese lives sacrificed. We thought of Manchuria as just as much a part of China, just as closely connected with Nanking as Ohio is with Washington. We forgot that Chang Hsueh Liang had only recently announced his fealty to the Nationalist Government and that when the Japanese threat was removed he would be quite as willing, if self interest pointed that way, to set himself up again as an independent war lord. In

other

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other words, we ignored the fact which Japan could not ignore that only a drastic change in the whole situation could safeguard undoubted Japanese rights in Manchuria. It is certain that at the beginning of the trouble Japan had no thought of annexing Manchuria, very probable that it had no idea of creating an independent state of Manchuria. America, along with most of the rest of the world, condemned Japan for its actions, which were certainly unjustified, and failed utterly to take account of the surrounding circumstances. We failed also to understand the national psychology of either Japan or China.

Both the League and the United States accepted unquestioningly the Chinese point of view. It was a correct point of view only if it is possible to isolate a minute of time from the centuries that have gone before and the centuries which must follow. At the moment Japan was undoubtedly the aggressor and as such to be condemned. The world rallied to the defense, the moral defense at least, of China. All the pressure was brought to bear on Japan, none on China because nobody wanted to be thought pro-Japanese. But as we look back on it now we can see that in all probability those were right who said that China should be forced to hold conversations with Japan immediately. That Japan ought to be willing to accept now but probably will not accept it would gladly have accepted then. Probably at the beginning of the trouble Japan would have been well satisfied, for example, if China had made Manchuria an autonomous province and had appointed a Governor General who would have respected Japanese rights and interests. Even if Manchuria's connection with

Nanking

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Nanking had been hardly more than a paper connection it would have maintained the terms of the Nine Power Treaty which guarantees the administrative and territorial integrity of China. It would have saved face for Japan. It possibly would have been the best thing for Manchuria. It might well have initiated an era of good will in the Far East which would have benefitted both Japan and China immeasurably. But it could only have been accomplished if the League and the United States had been willing to force China to agree to direct conversations. It is interesting to remember that a similar but even more far reaching arrangement, giving Japan extensive rights in the development of Manchuria, was discussed cursorily between the Chinese and the Japanese at the Washington Conference. No encouragement was given by America or the other powers represented, although the Chinese were inclined to be receptive to the idea, because it was felt that the settlement of the Shantung issue was far more pressing. Mr. Hughes told the Chinese to take up Manchuria with Japan after Shantung was settled. It was never done.

It is very easy, of course, to look back and say what should have been done. At the time there was too much sympathy for China, too little understanding either of the power of the Japanese military or of the hardening of public opinion in Japan resulting from the steady propaganda poured out in the press. There is today unqualified belief on the part of the Japanese people that Japan has throughout acted in self-defense, even that the state of Manchukuo is the expression of the popular will of the Manchurians. And all this, of course, makes the

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the fulfilment of the recommendations of the Lytton Report very remote but not, perhaps, entirely hopeless in some modified form, especially since the Report points out that, although the present situation is unfair and untenable, the government of Manchukuo being really a puppet of Japan, equally unwise and not likely to insure peace in the Far East would be a return to the status quo ante.

The actions of the Government of the United States during all this Manchurian controversy have been strictly within the tradition of our policy in the Pacific area, and, what is perhaps even more important, has demonstrated American willingness to cooperate with the rest of the world in maintaining the various post-war treaties which have been negotiated for the purpose of creating a world peace structure. In the Pacific area, as elsewhere in the world, it is the duty of the American Government to protect and to promote the interests of its own citizens. Unfortunately there are too many in Japan who not only believe that our cooperation with the League has been motivated primarily, if not solely by this duty; who believe also that the promotion of American interests is in conflict with the rights and interests of Japan. This is not true. The successive acts of Japan have not for the moment materially affected American interests except in Shanghai which was a separate incident. In the long view they will affect American interests adversely if they perpetuate animosity between Japan and China, because it may be said in all certainty that nothing would so advance American interests in the Orient as the real peace and progress which would result from a close friendship and understanding between Japan and China. Normal trade flourishes

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flourishes only in times of peace and in the end, therefore, the most effective trade promotion is the promotion of all methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The only methods so far devised are the various treaties under which we have acted and this has been the one and only guide in all the American negotiations, decisions and acts. The time will come when Japan will understand this.

It is exceedingly unfortunate, also, that so many Japanese believe that we have acted through rancour against Japan, dislike of Japan. This is emphatically false. Not a single American move has been made with the purpose of injuring Japan. We understand fully that Japan is necessary in the Far East, that the destruction of Japan as a great power, either through internal revolution or as the result of a senseless war with this country or with the world would open complications which might well keep the Orient in turmoil for generations. We know that Japan has been a stabilizing influence in the Pacific and, although Japanese actions during the last year and a half have shaken our faith, we believe that Japan may well reassume the role when the sane civilian elements have again taken control of the Government. On the other hand, we could not display our friendship for Japan by being recreant to our engagements with the other nations of the world. We can see that the Orient has its special problems but we cannot admit that the Orient lies outside the general peace structure of the world. We understand that the interests of Japan in Manchuria are vitally important, but
 this

0396

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By Milton D. Shulman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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this cannot blind us to the further fact that good relations between Japan and China are as important, if not more important, than are the special interests of Japan in Manchuria. Our policy in the Pacific is, without claiming any special favors for ourselves, to continue our traditional friendship for both Japan and China and to keep open the door of opportunity for all nations.

On the whole the most definite contribution of the American Government during this controversy has been the doctrine of the non-recognition of the spoils of aggression. That is a real addition to the precepts of international law. If maintained by the world it will certainly be a deterrent to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It may show a way eventually, after the passion of strife has cooled, to a real understanding between China and Japan, an understanding which can come only through direct conversations and the courageous facing of the facts by both nations. The enunciation of the doctrine stopped for the time at least the imposition of sanctions which might well have meant war. These last months have shown also the value of international cooperation, of a common front. This cooperation has not increased the danger of war; it has minimized it. To be sure we could have sat back and said we did not care what happened in the far distant western Pacific. In this way also we should have been safe, but it would have been the temporary safety of weakness. The United States would have earned the contempt of the rest of the world, the enmity of China and if Japan had praised

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us it would have been a scoffing praise. As it is we have proved ourselves to have ideals and have maintained our policy of equal opportunity for all in the Pacific area where we shall always do our utmost to maintain peace.

0401

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 17 1933


No. 1056

To the American Minister,
Peiping.

The Department encloses herewith, as of possible
interest, a copy of an address given on April 7, 1933,
by the Honorable William R. Castle, at the annual meet-
ing of the American Academy of Social and Political
Science at Philadelphia.

Copies of this address were handed informally by
Mr. Castle to an officer of the Department.

Enclosure:
Copy of address.



FE:ES:KC

4-15-33

APR 17 1933

SRH


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 17, 1933

Rec'd 6:17 a. m., 18th

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

URGENT.

April 17, 3 p.



Forces now occupying towns between Lwanchow and Shan-haikwan are described by the Japanese as "anti-Chiang Kai Shek forces." Intimation being conveyed at Chinwangtao that present movement will not extend westward of Luan River but at the same time it is hinted that everything depends on attitude of the "anti-Chiang Kai Shek forces". These are believed to be the troops recently described by the Japanese as pro-Manchukuo troops. The territory between the Luan River and the Great Wall is now believed to be entirely free of Chinese regulars.

Americans military authorities at Chinwangtao report improved conditions there with shops in native city reopened and neighboring villages peaceful. Manchukuo soldiers have strict orders to pay for all purchases and any one looting is to be executed.

F/G 793.94/6188

PR 1 1933

WSB-KLP

LOCKHART

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

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KLP

FROM


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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.


Dated April 18, 1933.

Rec'd. 7 a.m.



Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 18 1933

Secretary of State
 Washington.



338, April 18, 5 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden,
 "April 17, 6 p.m.

Army spokesman announced this afternoon that all Chinese troops at Chinwangtao have been withdrawn and that it is being policed by Japanese railway guards normally stationed there; that Funing was occupied yesterday and that the main Chinese concentration east of the Lwan River at Changli toward which Japanese troops are advancing from the north.

The complete evacuation of Luantung area by Chinese troops appears to be imminent."

JOHNSON

KLP

WWC

F/G 793.94/6189

APR 19 1933
 RECD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LEJ

GRAY

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated April 18, 1933

Recd. 6.17 a.m.



FROM

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 18 1933

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington

339. April 18, 6 p.m. 15-21/1000

Legation's 332, April 5, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at

Hankow:

"April 15, 1 p.m.

Paragraph one of my April 13, 4 p.m. The
 three kidnaped Chinese pilots of Japanese naval
 vessels have been released and have returned to work."

JOHNSON

KLF

ENC

F/G

793.94/6190

APR 19 1933


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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cib

GRAY



FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 19, 1933.

Recd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



793.94

342, April 19, 4 p.m.
Department's 123, April 18, 6 p.m.

Japanese Legation has been informed of report
contained in paragraph two of Tientsin's April 17, 10 a.m.,
to the Department. Tientsin informed by mail as instructed;
also Tokyo.

F/HS

793.94/6191

JOHNSON

CIB JS

APR 29 1933
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
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Paraphrase sent
to ONI + MID*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *in confidence*

MET Peiping
This telegram must be FROM Dated April 19, 1933
closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (a) Rec'd 7:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



344, April 19, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

Mr. Tsai Yuan of Chinese military headquarters here gave me today two leaflets printed in simple vernacular Chinese on thin colored paper reading in translation as follows: "China is now about to be exterminated by the White race. Japan is coming to save China."

'Japanese and Chinese troops are all brothers of the Yellow race'. Both leaflets bore following "signature": "The first middle detachment of the fifth flying corps of the imperial army." He stated that these had been dropped eastward of Tungchow by Japanese airplanes. If authentic the tenor of these leaflets indicates a new line of propaganda on the part of the Japanese.

(?) In this connection please note Tientsin's April 18, 3 p. m., which reports Japanese as describing forces now occupying towns between Lwanchow and Shanhaikwan as "anti-Chiang Kai Shek forces." There is evidence here that the Japanese are putting into execution a plan to assist forces hostile to National Government authorities.

Lockhart

F/G 793.94/6192

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET 2-#344 from Peiping, Apr. 19, 6 p.m.

Lockhart informed me over telephone today that Chinese
 commander in Lwanchow area was one who was prominent in
 disturbances at Tientsin in the winter of 1931.

Repeated to Tokyo.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

0408

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 21 1933

PARAPHRASE

Telegram dated April 19, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Two leaflets printed in simple vernacular Chinese on thin, colored paper were given me today by Mr. Tsai Yuan of the Chinese military headquarters here. They read, in translation, as follows: "China is now about to be exterminated by the white race. Japan is coming to save China".

The second leaflet reads, in translation, as follows: "The Japanese and Chinese troops are all brothers of the Yellow race". The following signature appeared on both leaflets: "The first middle detachment of the fifth flying corps of the Imperial Army". Mr. Tsai Yuan stated that these leaflets had been dropped by Japanese airplanes eastward of Tungchow. If authentic, a new line of propaganda on the part of the Japanese is indicated by the tenor of these leaflets.

Japanese are reported as describing forces now occupying towns between Lwanchow and Shanhaikwan as "anti-Chiang Kai-shek forces", according to a telegram of April 18, from the American Consul General at Tientsin. Local indications are that a plan to assist forces hostile to the Chinese Government authorities is being put into execution by the Japanese. The Consul General at Tientsin informed the

American

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American Minister in a telephone conversation on April 19,
that the Chinese commander in the Lwanchow area was one
who, in the winter of 1931, figured prominently in the
disturbances at Tientsin.

FE:LHE:KC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Peiping

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone. (a)

Dated April 19, 1933

Rec'd 9 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

343, April 19, 5⁴⁵ p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY.


Spanish Minister who is also Senior Minister called
on me yesterday to say that Tsai Yuan of Chinese Military
Headquarters had come to him yesterday and in course of
conversation had unofficially suggested possibility that
protocol powers might place protocol troops at railroad
bridge over Lwan River for the purpose of preventing
destruction of the bridge and observing situation there.
I discussed matter with my British colleague last night
and this morning my British colleague, Senior Minister
and Legarde, Counsellor French Legation, discussed question
informally. I stated that original purpose of protocol
was to recognize the right of powers to protect Legations
at Peiping from attack by Chinese and have free access to
the sea in case of evacuation; that we were not threatened
with attack by Chinese and access to sea for evacuation
purposes was not interrupted; and therefore I did not
believe that protocol was involved. I pointed out that
both sides in this controversy evidenced a desire to

involve

FE

F/G 793.94/6193

793.94
2-11-33



141

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#343 from Peiping, Apr. 19, 5 pm.

involve protocol powers for their own purposes and I thought it would be wise for us to refuse to become involved under any such conditions. I stated that I did not believe my Government would favor placing American troops between hostile Japanese and Chinese armies.

Lampson agreed with my point of view and stated that he was sure his Government would not agree to the use of troops. Legarde concurred. In reply to Garridos' question we stated that if Tsai Yuan asked him for an answer he should refer him to us as individuals,

Repeated to Tokyo.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

TOKIO

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (b)

Dated April 19 1933

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

APR 19 1933

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 19 1933

Department of State

83, April 19, 7 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. MANCHURIA MILITARY SITUATION.

One. It does not now appear that the reported

efforts of General Koiso, Chief of Staff of the Kwan-
tung army, now in Tokyo to obtain substantial reinforce-
ments in Manchuria will be successful. Latest indica-
tions are that the Japanese army along the Great Wall
will not be ~~subject to~~ ^{increased} and that operations in North
China will not extend beyond the foothills ^{south} of the Wall.

The Japanese intend, however, to drive all Chinese
forces beyond the hills and to break up any military
units in that region which appear to be a menace.
The Japanese will make no statement to that effect
because they believe that the Chinese would take mili-
tary advantage of the information.

Two. The Japanese state that they do not antici-
pate any serious difficulties with the Soviet over the
Chinese Eastern Railway. The Foreign Office is of the
opinion that the matter can be settled locally between
the Russian and Manchukuo authorities. The Japanese

will

743.9
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 20 1933
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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Paraphrase sent
to ONI & MID
in confidence

F/G

793.94/6194

RECEIVED

APR 20 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#83 from Tokio, Apr. 19, 7 p. m.

will disclaim any responsibility for the actions of the Manchukuo officials, and will suggest that the difficulties be settled by reference to the agreement which the Russians made with Chang Hsueh Liang in 1924. I am informed that the Japanese reply to the Soviet memorandum can be expected in about a week and that its tenor will be as indicated above.

Second paragraph repeated to Peiping.

KLP-WWC

GREW

0 4 1 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 20 1933

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated April 19, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

General Koiso, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who is reported to be making efforts in Tokyo to obtain substantial reinforcements in Manchuria, will apparently fail in this regard. It would appear from latest indications that the operations in North China will not extend beyond the foothills south of the Wall and that the Japanese Army along the Great Wall will not be increased. The purpose of the Japanese is, however, to break up any military units in that area which seem to be minatory and to drive all Chinese forces beyond the hills. No statement to that effect will be made by the Japanese for the reason that such information would, they believe, be taken advantage of militarily by the Chinese.

No serious difficulties with Soviet Russia with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway are anticipated by the Japanese, according to their statements. The opinion of the Foreign Office is that the Russian-"Manchukuo" authorities can settle the matter locally. Any responsibility for the actions of the "Manchukuo" officials will be disclaimed by the Japanese, who will suggest

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

suggest that the agreement which the Russians made with Chang Hsueh-liang in 1924 be referred to for settlement of the difficulties. Information has been received that the tenor of the Japanese reply to the Soviet memorandum will be as indicated above and that the reply can be expected in about a week.

The American Legation at Peiping has been informed of the contents of the second paragraph.

0414

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY



Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 19, 1933

Rec'd 10:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 19 1933

Department of State

April 19, 3 p. m.

793.94

Developments last few days tend to confirm growing belief that combination has been formed between Manchukuo forces and rebel groups from the regulars in Changli-Chinwangtao area and that these have been responsible, with energetic assistance Japanese air forces, for driving Government forces to west bank Lwan River. There are increasing signs that this new "anti-Chiang Kai Shek army" or "pro-Manchukuo army" is preparing extend its operations to territory west of Lwan River in which case change of Government this area may be expected. It is significant that general in command of so-called Fifth National Salvation Army which is now in occupation Changli and some other towns east of Lwan River is Li Chi Chun who is alleged to have taken a prominent part in ^{bringing about} ~~incorporating~~ disturbances in Tientsin November 1931 and who is believed to have either conceived or aided in the execution of the plan to spirit Pu Yi to Manchuria at that time.

Japanese

F/G 793.94/6195

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APR 20 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R., Apr. 19,
 3 p. m.

Japanese airplanes flew over Peitaiho, Lwanchow
 and Tangshan yesterday and dropped propaganda leaflets
 in profusion extolling the virtues of the Japanese
 pointing to peaceful conditions in Jehol, et cetera.

WSB-WWC

LOCKHART

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Peiping

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- FROM
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (a)

Dated April 20, 1933

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

345, April 20, 2 p. m.


CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Tientsin's April 19, 3 p. m.; and my 344, April 19,
 6 p. m.

Following from Nanking, "April 19, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. Minister of Industries, Chen, has
 just told me he is leaving by train this afternoon to go
 to Peiping to endeavor to bring about unity among the
 Chinese forces in that area. He admitted fearing that
 "something terrible might happen". Another reason for
 his visit is the near approach of the Japanese forces.
 He did not specify precise nature of the calamity he
 feared but I inferred that it was the demoralization of
 the Chinese forces. I shall endeavor to obtain details
 and in the meantime I respectfully request that you do
 not quote Chen".

There are numerous current rumors about discontent
 among Chinese troops at front since evacuation of Lwan
 River area. Former troops commanded by Feng Yu Hsiang
 during Yen Hsi Shan revolt of 1930 which for some time
 have



Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 20 1933
 Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6196

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#345 from Peiping, Apr. 20, 2pm.

have been stationed in Shansi under the control of Yen Hsi Shan as so-called "guest troops", now en route for Lwan River front.

Following telegram, just received by Military Attache from Lieutenant Felber commanding small detachment 15th Infantry at Chinwangtao, is quoted as indicating plans of so-called volunteer or anti-Chiang Kai Shek forces now operating east of Lwan River with the aid of Japanese.

"Surprising developments. Fighting this area to stop on Monday (which it did). Buffer state between Manchukuo and Nanking around Tientsin-Peiping area to be created and inaugurated today with either Wu Pei Fu, Yen Hsi Shan or Feng Yu Hsiang at the head of a state to be called Republic of China. All above will support new state. Rumored General Li Chi Chun now meeting General Ho Chu Kuo in Peitaiho. Expect General Ho Chu Kuo to join new state. Both Ho and Li are former officers Wu Pei Fu. Also believe civil or military Governor Tientsin in on this. Chinese troops at Chinwangtao changed name to 'Republic of China Forces' but still wear 'Manchukuo' on cap. I called on General Chang Tsung Jui, commanding troops in Chinwangtao, who stated troops now belonging Wu Pei Fu Republic of China and
that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#345 from Peiping, Apr. 20, 2 pm.

that proclamation issued at Chinwangtao states that they will not come under Manchukuo or Japanese but will belong to this Republic of China which, of course, does not state if it is Nanking or this buffer state. Customs House flying Chinese flag. No flags flying native city. Small flags with characters saying 'Welcome General Li' displayed".

In this connection please see personal letter to Hornbeck dated March 18 which should reach Department shortly and which describes interview I had with Wu Pei Fu on March 17th when Wu Pei Fu indicated that he was prepared to lead a new movement in this ^{area} opposed to Chiang Kai Shek.

Repeated to Tokyo.

KLP-WSB

JOHNSON

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
720
843.00

MET

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 21, 1933

Rec'd 7:17 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 21 1933
Department of State

April 21, 1 p. m.

No developments of importance were reported from Lwan-
chow area yesterday. American army authorities Chinwangtao
report today large amount small arms ammunition sent from
Shanhaikwan westward.

Unconfirmed reports are current that efforts are being
made Tientsin to establish a coalition for the control of
north China but the political atmosphere is such that even
if the reports should prove true it is certain that great
difficulty will be experienced in bringing the factions
together. The most important factor in the whole situation
would seem to be the attitude of the thousands of troops
that have been withdrawn to the Lwanchow area most of whom
were originally recruited in Manchuria and could doubtless
be persuaded sooner or later to join some new faction or
the Manchukuo army if assured of pay and rations. Local
Chinese officials are becoming more and more depressed over
the uncertainties of the situation and the general outlook.

WSB:KLP

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/6197

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22 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.20/425 FOR Tel. #-10pm.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Apr. 21, 1933.
NAME 1-1127 ***

//////

1/19/33

REGARDING: American personnel of Central Aviation School
returned to Hangchow from Loyang on April 20th.

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793.94 / 6198

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

72

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated April 21, 1933

Rec'd 7:17 a. m.

note
793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

April 21, 10 p. m.

My March 6, 6 p. m. American personnel of
 Central Aviation School returned to Hangchow from
 Loyang on April 20th.

Repeated to Department.

CUNNINGHAM

JS

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

2012-10-10

Repeated

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#85 from Tokio, Apr. 22, 11 a. m.

Repeated to Peiping.

WSB

GREW

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P A R A P H R A S E


Telegram dated April 22, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

It has been previously reported that the future policy toward China has been the subject of conferences at Tokyo between the Japanese Minister to China and the Japanese Government. The alleged gist of the decisions has now been published by certain newspapers. This includes the statement that the Japanese Government, while it will observe neutrality in the ordinary civil strife in China, is prepared to consider favorably any central or local force which may sincerely strive for friendship with Japan and for the peace of the Far East, will protect its trade with Japan, and will give due regard to the safety of the territory of such force. It would seem that this means that the Japanese Government is now prepared to support openly local leaders who are willing to restrain the anti-Japanese boycott and who are friendly to Japan. That Japan is prepared to lend countenance to the movement in North China of separatists, already reported, may also possibly be considered to be meant.

The American Legation at Peiping has been informed of the foregoing.

0427

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



WILLIAM MADISON ANDERSON, Jr., D. D.
Vice President

ROLLIN THOMAS CHAFER
Secretary and Registrar

CHARLES FRED LINCOLN
Treasurer

Evangelical Theological College

(Denominationally Unrelated)

3909 SWISS AVENUE
DALLAS, TEXAS

Cable Address: "Evencol"

Telephone 8-8174

APR 22 33

April 19th, 1933.



The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Attention Honorable Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Dear Sir: Re: FE 793.94/6135

Your letters of April 10th. and 12th. in reply to mine of April 3rd. regarding possible damage to the mission property at Taitowying, N. China, received. Your courtesy and promptness are greatly appreciated and set my mind at rest.

I will take no further steps until I hear from Mr. Kautto himself and find out if there is anything else I should do.

Respectfully yours,

HAI/JCK.

1604 N. La Salle
Chicago, Ill.

APR 23 1933

793.94/6200

0428

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2031

Peiping, March 29, 1933.

Subject: Memoranda of Conversations
re Sino-Japanese Relations.

793.94



APR 22 33

CONFIDENTIAL.



F/HB

793.94/6201

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/4

I have the honor to transmit herewith four memoranda of conversations I have recently had with various Chinese personages regarding Sino-Japanese relations and their effect on the local situation.

On March 16th and 20th I called on General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, who has been appointed to take Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's place as head of the Peiping Military Council. On both occasions he seemed anxious to know whether I thought that the Japanese would come south of the Great Wall, and he stated that the Chinese intended to resist any further advance.

In

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In a conversation I had with Dr. Hu Shih and Dr. V. K. Ting, two prominent Chinese scholars, on March 19th, they told me that although General Chiang Kai-shek had been annoyed with T. V. Soong because of the latter's support of the Young Marshal, they did not believe that it would come to a break between them. They thought it was very necessary that Wang Ching-wei should cooperate with Chiang and T. V. Soong and they believed he would. They said Chinese militarists had no conception of the technical knowledge required in modern warfare, and that any attempt to retake Jehol would be hopeless. Whether the Japanese would come south of the Wall depended entirely on the question whether Tokyo felt that by doing so they could force the Chinese to negotiate.

Dr. H. H. Kung, ex-Minister of Industries and a brother-in-law of General Chiang Kai-shek, called on me on March 20th on his return from Europe and the United States. He said that the fact that diplomatic relations between China and Japan continued permitted the Japanese to know every move the Chinese planned or made; on the other hand, even if relations were broken off the Japanese still had their concessions at Tientsin and Hankow and were represented in the International Settlement in Shanghai. Dr. Kung also said he could not understand why the League was unwilling to impose sanctions, or why the United States was un-

willing

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

willing to join in making them effective. He thought
 economic sanctions would stop the Japanese at once.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures: ¹

Copies of four memoranda of
 conversations between
 Minister Johnson and General
 Ho Ying-chin, March 16th and 20th;
 Dr. V. K. Ting, Dr. Hu Shih, March 19th;
 Dr. H. H. Kung, March 20th.

800

CVHE/GL

2 Carbon Copies *JM*
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 2031

Conversation.

Peiping, March 16, 1933.

General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of Military
Administration and Acting Chairman of the
Peiping Branch Military Council.

Subject: Call of courtesy - Local situation.

I called by arrangement on General Ho Ying-chin this morning at 11 o'clock. I stated that I had no particular business except to pay my respects and express my pleasure at seeing him again. I asked whether he had any news.

General Ho stated that all was quiet to-day at Kupeikow and Hsifengkow, although there had been some severe fighting at Hsifengkow. He said that he had come to Peiping as a soldier, to do a soldier's duty, and that he had no intention of taking over or becoming responsible for the civil administration of the city; that appointments here in Peiping were a matter for the Government at Nanking to take care of and he was not making any changes.

He said that they intended to resist any attacks by the Japanese with such force as they had. He asked me whether I thought the Japanese were coming inside the Wall, and I said that I did not know. I said that I felt certain the Japanese leaders did not want to come south of the Wall, but that this decision might be un-

certain

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

certain in view of the fact that I understood that the Chinese had successfully made an attack upon the Japanese at Hsifengkow, and one could not tell what might come out of a situation like that where two armies were facing one another and one might be seeking to avenge itself upon the other.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

21
 2034

Conversation.

Peiping, March 20, 1933.

General Ho Ying-chin

Subject: Local Conditions.

I made a call of courtesy upon General Ho Ying-chin, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese armies.

General Ho informed me that all was quiet along the front to-day, although he confirmed the report that there had been some very severe fighting at Hsi-fengkow within the last few days. He asked me whether I believed the Japanese were coming into this area. I gathered that he himself believed the Japanese would come down.

I stated that it seemed to me there was little chance that the Japanese would come south of the Wall, but that of course this was a matter about which I knew very little.

General Ho stated that they were making preparations to offer resistance to any further advance wherever such advance might take place.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:MA

0434

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

EXPLICITLY CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure No. 3
Despatch No. 2031

Conversation.

Peiping, March 19, 1933.

Dr. V. K. Ting
Dr. Hu Shih

Subject: Chinese political situation and
Sino-Japanese relations.

Dr. V. K. Ting and Dr. Hu Shih dined with me last evening and in the course of conversation after dinner the discussion turned upon present conditions.

They stated, in reply to my query as to a possible break between T.V. Soong and Chiang Kai-shek, that Chiang Kai-shek was very much put out with T.V. Soong because of Soong's continued support of Chang Hsueh-liang. They said that Chang Hsueh-liang had decided to resign as early as last August, but for some reason or other which at the time they were unable to understand, after a period of ten days Chang Hsueh-liang suddenly changed his mind. They now knew that his decision not to resign was based on a telegram which T.V. Soong had sent to him urging him not to resign. But in spite of this, they did not believe that T.V. Soong and Chiang Kai-shek would break.

Dr. Ting stated that it was very necessary to the situation that T.V. Soong, Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek cooperate with one another. He recounted a conversation which he had had with Wang Ching-wei more

than

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

than a year ago, in the course of which he had pointed out to Wang Ching-wei that he was a "shu tai" (peasant) and that Chiang Kai-shek was a "lin mang" (roughneck), and that while China could not be governed by a peasant alone, something might be done if the peasant and the roughneck could cooperate with one another. It was their belief that Wang Ching-wei would resume his job as President of the Executive Yuan, thankless though it was, and would work with Chiang Kai-shek.

The weakness of China from a military point of view, according to Mr. Ting, lies in the fact that the Chinese military have no proper conception of the education needed by a military man in this time. As an example, he quoted the following conversation which he had had with Chiang Kai-shek: he said that he had reproached Chiang Kai-shek on the ground that in the Military Academy at Nanking the teaching was inadequate in view of the fact that most of the lecturers were German who had to lecture through the aid of an interpreter who was neither acquainted with military matters nor with adequate Chinese. Chiang Kai-shek's only reply was: "Suppose I require the professors to learn Chinese?"

The average Chinese military man, he said - and he included Chiang Kai-shek in this - seemed to think that all that was necessary for a military education was to fan their morale and then to teach them the rudiments of drill and the handling of gun; he had not the faint-

est

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

est conception of the fact that the military business to-day requires a complete mastery of the science of physics and mechanics and engineering. He drew a comparison between the average Chinese general and General Crozier.

They both stated that Chiang Kai-shek and the rest of the military had no intention of attempting to re-take Jehol province, chiefly because they were aware of the fact that in so far as material equipment was concerned they were not able to compete with the Japanese. In so far as they had any plan, it was merely to dig in along the border and offer a defense against any further advances by the Japanese.

The question was: would the Japanese come south of the Wall? Both Hu Shih and V. K. Ting seemed to believe that the Japanese might be led to come south of the Wall in the expectation that by so doing they could force the Chinese to negotiate. Therefore, the answer to the question "will the Japanese come south of the Wall" is: what value do the Japanese set upon negotiations? As the Chinese have no intention to negotiate the Japanese would be merely pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp if they come south.

They felt that the loss of Jehol and the loss of Manchuria were lessons which the Chinese military were taking to heart, but they both thought that the lessons were not completely learned. These lessons would not

be

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huey NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

be complete until Chinese military leaders were prepared to recognize the value to military science of the knowledge possessed by scientists.

Chiang Kai-shek himself, while a good man and in many respects an able politician, was not capable of sharing responsibilities with others; he did not trust anybody.

As regards the Japanese, both Dr. Ting and Dr. Hu Chih expressed the opinion that Japanese military leadership was already beginning to be corrupted through contact with Korea and with the Chinese in Manchuria. Dr. Ting reported a conversation that he had had with a Chinese who was interested in some mines near Peiping. This Chinese reported that he had gone to Mukden for the purpose of attempting to make arrangements to get the products of his mines out, but had had to pay considerable bribes, even to Japanese officers, in order to get at the authorities with whom he wished to negotiate.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:LA

0438

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4
Despatch No. 2031

Conversation.

Peiping, March 20, 1933.

Dr. H. H. Kung, Member of State Council.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation and Dr. Kung's trip abroad.

Dr. H. H. Kung called upon me to-day. After discussing somewhat generally what he found on his visit to the United States and other countries, Dr. Kung stated that the Chinese were determined to resist any further efforts of the Japanese to encroach upon Chinese territory. He stated also that the Chinese authorities would never negotiate as long as Japanese remained on Chinese soil.

Dr. Kung stated that one of the problems which was puzzling them at the present moment was the question of diplomatic relations with Japan. He said that one group was urging that diplomatic relations be broken, while another group was urging that diplomatic relations be permitted to continue as they now were. He asked me whether I could advise him. He said that to continue to permit Japanese diplomats and military attaches and other officials to remain in China undisturbed was to continue a situation which permitted the Japanese to know every move that the Chinese made and every plan they had, and it was therefore necessary that they should break off relations in order that they might prevent knowledge of plans and purposes leaking out. But,

he

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

he said, breaking off relations with Japan was complicated by the fact that Japan possessed concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, and because of the existence of the International Settlement at Shanghai, as it would be very difficult to handle these questions, if relations were broken off, without complications with other powers.

I told Dr. Kung that I was not in a position to advise him or any Chinese in regard to this question, but that offhand it struck me that for the Chinese to take the initiative in severing relations was to take a very long step in the direction of freeing Japan to do a lot of things which she might otherwise now be stopped from doing, and that resumption of relations would be very difficult under the circumstances. The present situation put the onus entirely on the Japanese.

Dr. Kung said that he did not know just what was the wise thing to do; it was a very puzzling matter. He expressed some feeling in regard to the unwillingness of the League to impose sanctions. For his part, he felt that sanctions were a legitimate step in view of all that had taken place, and he could not understand why sanctions were not imposed, nor why the United States was not willing to join in sanctions. He thought that the imposition of economic sanctions against Japan would bring Japanese activities at once to a stop.

I told Dr. Kung that I did not see how the United States could go so far as to cooperate in any plan for the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the imposition of sanctions; and that in any case it seemed to me that sanctions would gain little, for, from all that I could read on the subject, it appeared to me that unless the sanctions to be applied were of a very thoroughgoing and drastic character they would have little effect upon the economy of Japan, for I believed that Japan could live and fight for a long time on what she could herself produce.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NIJ:EA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 Mary 3, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
 MCH

Tientsin's despatch No 289 of March 28, 1933 transmitting a copy of a letter from Rev. Kautto reporting the bombing of his mission's property at Taikowying on March 24, 1933 by Japanese airplanes. A copy is also enclosed of Consul General Lockhart's letter of March 28 to the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin ~~on March 28, 1933~~, requesting that he bring the matter to the attention of the Japanese military authorities with a view to preventing any further bombings which may endanger American life or property. This letter also requested information concerning the occupation of American mission property by Japanese troops at Mutowteng and Shwangshantze.

~~SECRET~~
 MCH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huatjen NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 289

AM 1100

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 28, 1933.


770233

793.94

SUBJECT: Dropping of Bombs from Japanese Airplanes
at Taitowying.

F/H

793.94/6202



WASHINGTON



I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my
 despatch No. 353, of identic date, to the Legation at Pei-
 ping, on the subject of the dropping of bombs from Japanese
 airplanes at Taitowying.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
 F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

800
 300

FPL/DA

Enclosure:

To Legation, March 28, 1933.

Original and 1 copy to the Department.

MAY 15 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 in Dispatch
 No. 289, Date March 28, 1933
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

No. 353

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, March 28, 1933.

Subject: Dropping of Bombs from Japanese
Airplanes at Taitowing.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of
 March 27, 1 p.m., on the above-mentioned subject and
 1/ to enclose herewith a copy of the letter addressed
 to me under date of March 24, by the Reverend Charles
 O. Keutto, giving the information on which the above-
 mentioned telegram was based. I have acknowledged
 receipt of the Reverend Mr. Keutto's letter and have
 informed him that the matter would be taken up with
 the appropriate Japanese authorities. I have also
 informed him that I would invite the Legation's

special

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

special attention to the penultimate paragraph of his letter in which reference is made to a desire that the Japanese troops, should they occupy Taitowying, refrain from entering the mission premises. It will be observed that, in this connection, reference is made to the occupation of mission premises at Shwengshantze and Mutowteng concerning which I telegraphed the Legation on March 21.

Referring to the Legation's telegram of March 28, 2 p.m., instructing me to bring to the attention of the Japanese Consul General, informally, the bombing 2/ incident at Taitowying, I beg respectfully to enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed by me today to my Japanese colleague.

Respectfully yours,


F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/, From the Reverend Charles O. Kautto, March 24, 1933.
- 2/, To the Japanese Consul General, Tientsin, March 28, 1933.

800
 300
 FPL/DA:w

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In duplicate to the Department.



0 4 4 C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Taitowying,
Funingsien,
Hopei, N. China.
March 24, 1933.

The American Consul General,
Tientsin, China.

Hon. Sir:-

This is to inform the Consulate of the war developments that have taken place during the past few days.

This morning before 9 o'clock several airplanes reconnoitered over this place without dropping bombs. But about 9 o'clock one came and kept circling around for nearly half an hour; finally we heard whizzing sound, the house shook and there was a loud explosion, bricks falling down on both sides of the roof. We looked through the window and saw that the bomb had fallen within twenty feet of the northeast corner of our house (a foreign style structure) and landing just outside the compound wall had made two big holes in it. One of our native buildings, about 15 feet east of our house suffered cracks in its brick walls and some broken window panes. Soon afterwards there came another explosion, the bomb striking about 20 feet from the southeast corner of our compound, debris from it breaking only some windows in our Gospel Hall. The plane then dropped six bombs inside the city of Taitowying. On investigation we found that the bricks that had tumbled down over our roof were from our two chimneys. About an hour after that another plane came and dropped two more bombs inside the city. Altogether there were nine civilians

killed

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

killed, including men, women and children. While writing this another plane came and dropped a bomb but we do not yet know the location in this immediate vicinity nor the damage.



We do not know whether it would do any good to protest to the Japanese authorities. We have the American flag flying from our flag-pole, yet these two bombs were scarcely out of reach of the compound, and while there are native holdings adjoining there was no particularly provocative reason for their dropping bombs at either place, in fact no military advantage to be gained so far as we know.

In case the Consul should deem it advisable to notify the Japanese Consulate would he kindly request them in the event that they occupy the town, not to occupy the mission premises as they have already done at Shuang-shantzze and Mutouteng?

Sorry that we have to give all this trouble to the Consul but we thought that the Consul should be informed as it is American property. Glad to add that personally we, Mrs. Kautto and I, the only American citizens located here, have sustained no injury.

Yours very respectfully,

(Sgd) CHARLES O. KAUTTO



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

800/300
 FPL/DA

Enclosure No. 2 in Japanese
 No. 287 Dated March 28, 1933
 From the American Consulate General

American Consulate General, Tientsin, China.
 Tientsin, China, March 28, 1933.

My dear Mr. Kuwashima:

Referring to my letter of March 21, 1933, and to your reply of March 22, 1933, concerning the occupation of the American mission property at Kutowteng and Shwangahantze, both in Hopei Province north of the Great Wall, I beg to state that I have received from Mr. Charles O. Kautto, an American missionary at Taitowying, Hopei, a letter dated March 24 in which he informed me that on that date at about 9 a.m. a Japanese airplane, after having circled over Taitowying for approximately thirty minutes, dropped a bomb within twenty feet of Mr. Kautto's residence, a foreign style house situated in the church of the Brethren Mission compound, where an American flag was flying as a mark of identification. While the bomb fell just outside of the compound wall, the explosion shook bricks from the chimney of Mr. Kautto's house and made two large holes in the wall of the compound.

K. Kuwashima, Esquire,
 Japanese Consul General,
 Tientsin.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


-2-

A second bomb was dropped shortly afterward within a few rods of the southeast corner of the compound and the explosion resulted in the breaking of some windows of the mission buildings. About one hour later another plane visited the city dropping two bombs but apparently no damage was done to the American property.

I bring this matter informally to your attention in the hope that you may take it up with the appropriate military authorities with a view to preventing any bombings which may endanger the life and property of American citizens residing at Taitowying. Fortunately, the two Americans residing at Taitowying in this case escaped injury. It is my understanding that the American Legation at Peiping has brought the matter to the attention of the Japanese Legation at that place and that the American Legation has also informed the American Embassy at Tokyo concerning the matter.

In connection with my letter of March 21, 1933, I shall greatly appreciate any information you may have been able to obtain concerning the occupation by Japanese troops of the American mission property at Mutowteng and Shwangshantze.

Yours very sincerely,



F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

7 4 4 1
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
MMH:

Warrington Dawson's
Special Report No. 1225 of
April 11, 1933, encloses an
article from LE TEMPS
anticipating an Asiatic union
or Far East league of nations
to include China and Japan.
The writer considers that the
economic interests of those two
countries provide means for
their coming together in such
an organization.

bb
CC:EJL

0450

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 11, 1933

793.94



SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1225)



APR 22 33



F/HS

793.94/6203

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W. D.
1225, dated April 11, 1933.

MAY 3 - 1933

FILED

enclosure

WD/DG

WD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 11, 1933

Serial No. W. D. 1225

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
 Special Assistant

SUBJECT: André Duboscq Discusses
 "The Asiatic Equilibrium"

Writing in LE TEMPS of April 8, 1933 André Duboscq dealt with the idea of an Asiatic union, which he said was beginning to gain ground though its projected form was still undetermined. His attitude consists, briefly, in asserting that economic interests in common between China and Japan are so numerous, even outside of Manchukuo, that the two nations have at their disposal the means necessary for reaching a settlement on a broad basis.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
 Special Assistant

✓
 Enclosure:

Article from LE TEMPS of April 8, 1933

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° W.D. 1225 of April II, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From " LE TEMPS " of April 8, 1933

EQUILIBRE ASIATIQUE

L'idée d'une union asiatique, sous une forme encore indéterminée, fait lentement son chemin. Nous la retrouvons dans les nouvelles venues d'Asie comme dans les articles de la presse européenne. On a pu remarquer que le président de la Ligue nationale japonaise, M. Adatchi, s'était servi, le 28 mars, dans un discours où il souhaitait précisément une organisation entre les nations d'Asie, du terme de Société des nations asiatique. On s'est peu à peu familiarisé avec l'idée nouvelle qui tout d'abord avait généralement semblé n'être qu'un paradoxe. « Se hasarder à prévoir quelque réconciliation sino-japonaise, écrivait courtoisement un de nos confrères, paraît certes prématuré »... Expliquons-nous mieux.

Ce que nous avons entrevu, avec d'autres, n'a rien d'une réconciliation au simple sens du mot et ne peut être saisi qu'en tenant compte du plan asiatique sur lequel nous sommes. L'entente sino-japonaise que nous envisageons est d'une nature particulière. Le programme n'en est pas limité à un but précis à atteindre. Elle ne porte pas sur tel objet plutôt que sur tel autre. La Mandchourie, le Jehol ne sont que l'occasion de sa réalisation et non point sa raison. Il est même vrai de dire qu'à s'en tenir à ce qu'expriment les noms de ces régions à l'heure actuelle, ils n'apparaissent que comme des sujets de conflit et nullement de rapprochement entre la Chine et le Japon.

Mais les Japonais savent parfaitement que leurs succès militaires n'ont pas le caractère qui satisfait de tous points et d'une manière décisive aux conditions psycho-politiques dans lesquelles ils ont eu lieu. Ils savent trop quelle est l'étrange élasticité de la masse chinoise, que l'on a souvent comparée à un ballon qu'on enfonce d'un côté mais qui gonfle de l'autre, pour prendre de tels succès pour plus qu'ils ne valent. Ils savent trop quelle force insaisissable représentent quatre cents millions d'hommes indifférents, sauf exceptions, aux idées et aux opinions, occupés seulement du labeur quotidien qui leur assure leur subsistance et, si possible, la possession d'un peu de terre cultivable, pour croire qu'ils entameront jamais cette indifférence ou transformeront d'autorité cet unique souci. L'exemple des Mandchous est d'ailleurs là pour quelque chose. Si ces derniers ont régné trois siècles sur les Chinois, c'est qu'ils se sont gardés de les assimiler par la force. Ils se contentèrent d'exercer le pouvoir pour ainsi dire à côté d'eux, pouvoir réduit au prélèvement d'un impôt régulier, jusqu'au jour où ils disparurent, abâtardis, vaincus par le temps et par « cette garde éternelle sur un monde qui leur était étranger à tous points de vue ».

Sans doute, depuis quelques années, de nouveaux éléments sociaux se sont fait jour parmi la population chinoise : les éléments extré-

mistes poussés par les Russes contre les intérêts étrangers en Chine ou encouragés par d'autres pour des causes souvent inconsidérées et sans issue pratique. Ces éléments peuvent être doublement dangereux pour les Chinois. D'abord, ils les détournent de cette « conquête silencieuse dont on parle peu, dont on ne parle pas assez — écrit M. Jean Hugonnot dans un article de la *Revue du Pacifique*, qui révèle chez l'auteur le sens de la politique asiatique, — et qui, pourtant, plus que toute autre, assure-t-il, peut nous donner la clef du problème extrême-oriental ». Ensuite, ces éléments risquent de provoquer de la part des Japonais des actes inconsidérés propres seulement à compliquer encore la situation politique en Extrême-Orient.

Nous voulons croire toutefois que, malgré l'état d'esprit qu'on a souvent dépeint ces temps-ci de l'armée japonaise, le gouvernement de Tokio ne cédera à aucune impulsion et conservera la maîtrise absolue de ses actes. Ce qui, du reste, en est garant, c'est l'unanimité avec laquelle les leaders du parti Seiyukai comme du parti Minseito ont approuvé la grave décision du gouvernement à propos de la Société des nations. Fort de ces appuis, Tokio pourra tenir le pays en garde contre les aventures périlleuses.

Entre le temps, auxiliaire des Chinois, et la méthode, qualité des Japonais, l'équilibre s'établira-t-il pour créer entre eux le rapprochement général que nous envisageons ? Nous le croyons fermement, et le nombre augmente de ceux qui le croient comme nous. En tout cas, il est bien évident que ce rapprochement n'est pas une simple réconciliation après le conflit actuel. La question de Mandchourie, avions-nous dit précédemment, et nous le répétons, entrera avec d'autres et trouvera sa solution dans une étude d'ensemble, tant politique qu'économique. On voit déjà poindre au Japon des intentions significatives. A peine Tokio avait-il reconnu l'Etat de Mandchourie qu'il assurait que le principe de « la porte ouverte » y régnerait; principe commode à proclamer, en vérité, quand on y fait soi-même le plus gros chiffre d'affaires et que l'on a fermement l'intention de faire tout ce qu'il faudra pour que cela continue ! Seulement, les Japonais, déçus par la Corée et Formose, qu'ils ont eux-mêmes qualifiés « colonies administrées au profit des commerçants chinois », entendent, par l'application du principe de la porte ouverte, tout en se réservant la part du lion, contenir ces derniers en les mettant en concurrence avec les hommes d'affaires étrangers, qui seront eux-mêmes certainement limités dans leurs moyens d'action.

Mais les intérêts économiques portant sur le Mandchoukouo ne sont pas les seuls à régler entre Chinois et Japonais. Ces intérêts sont multiples et constituent pour les deux peuples une monnaie d'échange précieuse pour un large règlement.

ANDRÉ DUBOSCO.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 RECEIVED DEPT. OF STATE

April 24, 1933.

U:
 Mr. Phillips.

Referring to Peiping's 357, April 22, 8 p.m., and 358, April 23, noon, in regard to the Japanese and the Chinese approaching the British Minister to China with a view to arranging an armistice between Japanese and Chinese armed forces in the Peiping-Tientsin area.--

As both the Chinese and the Japanese have approached the British Minister, as the British Minister has referred the matter to London, as Minister Johnson has merely been informed of developments by his British colleague and as Minister Johnson appreciates the delicacy of the situation, it is believed advisable that the Department issue no instructions to Minister Johnson at the present time. There may arise the question whether, in the event that the powers are to assist in endeavoring to arrange an armistice, such endeavor should not be conducted under League auspices. In case that question should arise, it seems preferable that the matter of acting as a go-between be left to the British Government, which is a member of the League.

FE recommends that these telegrams be filed without action.

MMH/REK

7 4 5 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

mam

PEIPING

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (b)

FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
APR 22 1933
12:45 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

357, April 22, 8 pm.

My 336, April 18, 2 pm.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

One. I have just seen British Minister who tells me that on evening of the 19th Nakayama came to see him and after talking about unwillingness of Japanese to come south of Wall and difficulty of present situation with hostile forces facing one another, suggested possibility of Lampson bringing two sides together to discuss arrangements for an armistice. Lampson pointed out difficulty of making proposal to Chinese who were attempting to defend their own country and special difficulty attending such a proposal from one of the powers party to League who had passed on question. Lampson reported matter to London.

Two. Chiang Mon Lin, President of Peita University, came to see Lampson on evening of the 20th and stated that on the evening of the 19th there had been a meeting at the military headquarters of Ho Ying Ching at which he, Hu V. K. Shih, Ting and General Yu Hsueh Chung and others had been present and that at this meeting the difficulties of the present situation had been discussed and it was agreed that

F/H/S

793.94/6204

FILED

JUN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #357 from Peiping

that he should see Lampson and ask whether he would arrange for an armistice between Chinese and Japanese. He referred to Shanghai negotiations as a precedent.

Three. Lampson made following four points to Chiang:

(a)- Shanghai agreement was subject of misunderstanding among Chinese, British being accused of secret arrangement with Japanese to wink at Japanese occupation of Manchuria if they evacuated Shanghai.

(b)- Any question to be discussed at such a conference should be strictly defined.

(c)- On Chinese side official spokesman must be appointed by Central Government.

(d)- Question of what friendly powers should sponsor discussions should be settled.

Lampson told Chiang matter was one of extreme delicacy, that he would report the talk to his Government and that he wanted to discuss matter with me. Chiang said he would report substance of Lampson's remarks to Nanking and would see him again.

Part two follows.

JOHNSON

WSB CSB

145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RR


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)

Peiping

FROM Dated April 22, 1933.

APR 23, 3:19 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

357, April 22, 8 p. m. (Part Two)

Four. Chiang Mon Lin came to see Lampson again today, the 22nd, and stated that Ho Ying Ching had reported Lampson's four points to Wang Ching Wei and to Chiang Kai Shek and that Wang Ching Wei had replied substantially as follows:

(a)-All China was grateful for what had been done at Shanghai by the powers and there would be no further chance of a misunderstanding.

(b)-Wang agreed suggestion that discussions be limited to cessation of hostilities with no discussion of Manchuria or other questions. Suggested that agreement be verbal rather than in writing.

(c)-Wang suggested tentatively that Liu Chung Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, be Chinese spokesman acting with advice and support of Ho Ying Ching. Wang Ching Wei as Premier would be solely responsible. He is now chairman of Defense Commission in charge of situation in North and word of Commission is final. Chiang Kai Shek has delegated whole power to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

357 April 22, 8 p.m. from Peiping (part two)

-2-

Wang Ching Wei. Chiang Mon Lin stated that when Wang Ching Wei speaks he carries Chiang with him. Ho Ying Ching is Chiang's representative in the North.

(d)-Wang Ching Wei made no comment upon the question of participating friendly powers but referred to Wilden, French Minister, as having expressed willingness to assist in any way possible.

Five. Chiang Mon Lin stated that he thought a verbal agreement, such as Wang suggested, would be dangerous as being liable to misunderstanding. Lampson told him not only would this be true but he was certain Japanese would insist on a written agreement.

Six. Lampson told Chiang Mon Lin he would give further consideration to matter.

Seven. Lampson and I agreed that matter was one of great delicacy and to be handled with great caution but that if a serious proposal for cessation of hostilities were made it should be transmitted without commitment. He is telegraphing in this sense to London and at same time stating that unless otherwise instructed he proposes to see Nakayama during next few days and refer to his proposal and ask whether he has any thing of a concrete character to suggest.

Repeated to Tokyo. (End message).

JS

JOHNSON

0458

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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Department of State

1933 APR 25 PM 6:01
 This cable should be carefully read before being communicated.
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF RECORDS & COMMUNICATIONS
 RECEIVED

Washington, 25
 April 24, 1933.
 6p

AMLEGATION,
 PEIPING (China).

33 CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

Your 357, April 22, 8 p.m.

Department concurs in view expressed in paragraph seven, first sentence. Department feels that the powers should avoid becoming involved except in response to express initiative and evidence of full authority on the part of Chinese to make approaches; and that, on the part of the powers, effort, if made, to assist in endeavoring to arrange an armistice or promote conclusion of an agreement might well be made under League auspices; and that, in view of Great Britain's membership in the League and extensive interests in North China, leadership in any action of the powers in capacity of a go-between should advisedly be left to the British Government. You should, with due caution, cooperate, but in a supporting capacity.

Department feels that all who may be concerned with or drawn into efforts toward consummation of an agreement between the Chinese and the Japanese should weigh carefully

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/6204

0459

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
 Charge Department
 or

Department of State

Charge to
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- 2 -

Washington,

the ultimate implications of every provision which may be suggested for inclusion in such an agreement. The circumstances under which the Nine-Power Treaty was made, the objectives sought to be obtained in that Treaty and the other agreements related thereto, and the provisions of the whole group of Washington treaties should be kept constantly in mind. The objectives and efforts of the League and the United States in relation to developments since September 1931, the disclosures of the attitudes of various governments, the existing situation in China and in Japan, and the whole question of effecting the best possible adjustment as among conflicting principles ^{and} rights and interests should be given fullest possible consideration at each step.

Full

793.94/6204

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.


U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

7E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR
 This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- FROM Peiping
 fore being communicated to anyone (B) Dated April 23, 1933.



Recd. 2:56 A. M.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



358, April 23, noon
 My 357, April 22, 8 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

British Minister has just informed me that last
 night he was handed a letter from Lo Wen Kan stating that
 situation was hopeless and asking him to do what he could
 to arrange for armistice.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JS

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6205

JUN 24 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ASB
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 23 1933

April 24, 1933.

WFE
DCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 2 1933
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Reference Paris' telegram 184, April 22, 4 p.m.

793.94/6206 c.f.

Mr. Norman Davis' suggestion that the President and the Secretary of State might take occasion to discuss with Messrs. MacDonald and Herriot the North China situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAY 3 1933
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
W. 793.94/6206

793.94/6206

Davis reports that Massigli and Boncour of the French Foreign Office have expressed to him alarm over the situation in North China and Japan's disregard of treaties; that Massigli has suggested that it is vital that the United States, England and France take some action in common; and that Boncour has stated that France is prepared to collaborate fully with England and the United States in cooperation with the League and to join in any measure or course of action agreed upon.

Davis suggested to his interlocutors that the President and the Secretary of State might take occasion to discuss the situation with Messrs. MacDonald and Herriot.

Comment:

Confidential File

JUN 24 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Comment:

While it is realized that the presence of these British and French representatives in Washington would afford an opportunity to discuss this situation and problem -- which might to advantage be discussed --, at the same time, it is believed that solicitude with regard to this matter should be greater on the part of the British -- and even on the part of the French -- than on the part of the American Government. Great Britain has more in the way of material interests at stake in North China than have we. Both Great Britain and France are members of the League of Nations. The responsibility of both, especially the British, in connection with this whole matter is greater than ours; their willingness to cooperate has during the past twenty months been less to be relied upon than has ours; and the Japanese have taken less unkindly to exertions on the part of the foreign powers initiated by them than to the like initiated by us. It therefore is believed that the President and the Secretary of State, if approached by the British or the French on this subject should be prepared to discuss it, but unless so approached should avoid discussion of it. In other words, any initiative taken in connection with discussion here and now of this question should be British and/or French and not American.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The reasons for this view are, especially, that the situation in North China is at this moment particularly delicate. The Japanese have been trying to induce representatives of foreign powers to constitute themselves go-betweens in an approach to the Chinese the object of which would be to cause the Chinese to give up the armed contest; and at the present moment the Chinese are beginning to approach the representatives of the foreign powers with suggestions looking toward the consummation of a truce. The representatives of the powers must tread warily in this connection. There is warrant for a feeling on our part that any endeavor to arrange an armistice or promote conclusion of an agreement might best be made under auspices of the League of Nations; and that, in view of Great Britain's membership in the League and extensive interests in North China, leadership in an intermediary capacity might advisedly be left to the British. The rôle of the American Government would be, as it has been, to cooperate ^{but} in a supporting capacity. In addition, it is felt that the taking by the American Government of an initiative in this connection here and now would, when it became known to the Japanese -- as it would in all probability -- be resented by the Japanese and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

and would complicate our position in relations with the Japanese when their representatives arrive for the preliminary conversations and at the Economic Conference and in other connections. It therefore is suggested that we avoid this subject unless the British and/or the French first bring it up.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

mam

PARIS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM to anyone (b)

Dated April 22, 1933

Rec'd 4:05 pm

Secretary of State
 Washington
 April 22, 4 pm.

DAS
 THE UNDER SECRETARY
 APR 24 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE
 APR 24 1933
 NOTED
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 24 1933
 Department of State
 F/H/S

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY FROM NORMAN DAVIS.

Massigli of the Foreign Office called yesterday to discuss disarmament. Before leaving he told me their news from China is most alarming, that Japan is evidently proceeding deliberately to dismember North China assuming that the other powers will not interfere. He said that he thought the United States, England and France should confer with a view of determining what should be done about it and then to agree to act jointly in whatever course should be agreed upon. He also told me that Paul Boncour had returned to Paris and had just expressed a desire to see me. I accordingly called on Boncour. After discussing disarmament and informing me he could not leave Paris for Geneva next week, Boncour said he was greatly disturbed over Far Eastern developments and that Japan's flagrant disregard of treaties created an intolerable situation. He thought it vital that America, England, and France should act together but felt that once they reach a decision as to a common course of action they should then propose it to, and act only through, the Committee of

793.94/6206

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Queiroz NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #184 from Paris

of Nineteen. The French obviously feel that if Japan is permitted to tear up treaties as she is now doing the whole machinery for international peace will be so imperiled as to undermine the sanctity of all treaties. I asked him what he would suggest as a wise course of action for dealing with that situation. He said that he did not know but that the first thing that had occurred to him was an embargo. I told him this would most probably lead to war and it should not be undertaken without a full realization of the probable consequences. As regards an embargo solely against the shipment of arms, this might do China more harm than good and would most probably lead to real, serious difficulty with Japan. He said that he did not have anything definite to propose but that France is prepared to collaborate fully with England and the United States in cooperation with the League and to join in any measure or course of action agreed upon. I told him it was a most difficult and serious matter as to which I had no instructions but added that perhaps the President and you might take occasion to discuss it with Messrs. MacDonald and Herriot.

MARRINER

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 4, 1933.
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
 MAY 19 1933

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

TEJ
 BOM
 MCH
 SHH

Shanghai's despatch No 8828 of March 27, 1933, transmits a copy of an article by Mr Eugene Chen which appeared in THE CHINA PRESS on March 27th.

Mr Chen states that had the leadership of the Kuomintang revolution not fatally faltered in 1929, the retrocession to China of all Russian rights and interests in Northern Manchuria would have been an accomplished fact today.

The United States should intervene in the Sino-Japanese conflict for

1. strategic considerations
2. juristic "
3. economic "
4. international "

Mr Chen thinks that Japan is preparing for a war with the United States.

He believes that it is both a right and a duty of America to demand the return for the cancellation of the war-debts that Great Britain and France, in particular, shall cooperate with the United States, first in actively assisting China to secure Japanese observance of the Nine Power Treaty and, secondly, to carry out general disarmament on a scale and in a manner which shall ensure international security not alone among the nations of Europe and the Americas

7 4 6 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

but as between the states and peoples of Far Asia on the one hand and Japan of the other.

Such an orientation of American policy is possible with a realistic treatment of the war-debts which are an instrument of high policy to be used in bringing about a wise and creative settlement of the present disordered affairs of Nations.


THE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8828

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAY 19 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, March 27, 1933.

Subject: Statement by Eugene Chen Advocating
American Intervention in Far East.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 24 1933
Department of State

I have the honor to transmit herewith an excerpt
from THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese independent) of March
27, 1933, containing the text of a statement issued
on March 26, 1933, by Mr. Eugene Chen, former Chinese
Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he advocates
American intervention in Sino-Japanese affairs. He
urges that the United States use the war debts due
from Great Britain and France to form an alliance of
those three countries against Japan in the Far East;
that America demand in return for the cancellation of
war debts that Great Britain and France cooperate in
actively assisting China to secure Japan's observance
of the Nine Power Treaty and to carry out general dis-
armament on a scale and in a manner which will ensure
international security, not alone among the nations of
Europe and America, but as between the states and peoples
of Far Asia on the one hand and Japan on the other.

All




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

All of the premises on which Mr. Chen bases his argument may not be entirely true, but at least the argument itself may not be without interest to the Department and the Legation.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

- 1 - Excerpt from THE CHINA PRESS
of March 27, 1933.

PRJ MB
800

In Quintuplicate.

Copy to Legation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8828 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 27
 1933, on the subject: "Statement by Eugene Chen Advocating
 American Intervention in Far East."

SOURCE: THE CHINA PRESS
 (Chinese independent),
 March 27, 1933.

INTERVENTION AGAINST JAPAN IN FAR EAST POLICY

FOR U.S.? ARGUES EUGENE CHEN.

Intervention Against Japan In East Best Policy For U.S., Argues Eugene Chen

MAR 27 1933

China Press

Strategic, Juristic, Economic And International Considerations Demand Action By America To Check Japanese Hegemony Over Continent Of Asia, Ex-Foreign Minister Says

Developing the thesis that American interests would be served by intervention against Japan in the Sino-Japanese conflict, Mr. Eugene Chen, former minister of foreign affairs, yesterday issued the following statement through Kuo Min:

With the failure of the League of Nations to resolve the conflict created by Japanese aggression in China, the time has come to center attention on the role which historic circumstance assigns America. Willing or unwilling, America is bound to take a leading part in the task of preventing Japan from breaking up, by military violence, the international system of the Far East which rests, in part, on essentially American foundations in the shape of the doctrine of the Open Door (formulated and inserted by American statesmanship into the political thought of the Great Powers), the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg or Peace Pact, two authentic American documents in the sense that they were conceived mainly by the political mind of America.

2. The reasons dictating American intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflict may be grouped under (1) strategic considerations, (2) juristic considerations, (3) economic considerations, and (4) international considerations.

3. The Strategic Considerations arise out of the Manchurian thesis of Japan. Manchuria is said to be a matter of "life or death" to Japan for three reasons: as a source of raw materials, as a barrier to Soviet Russia, and as a home for Japan's surplus population. To the first, the Chinese reply is that Japan can obtain all the raw materials required in Manchuria by buying them in the ordinary course of international trading, just as America and other countries now do when raw materials from abroad are needed.

4. Japan's pretended fear of Soviet Russia is hardly serious in view of the actual course of Soviet policy in Manchuria. Ever since its declarations in 1919 and 1920, Soviet Russia has repudiated not only in words but in deeds the Tsardom's policy of territorial aggression in Manchuria. And the present writer is in a position to state that had the leadership of the Kuomintang Revolution not fatally faltered in 1929, the retrocession to China of all Russian rights and interests in Northern Manchuria would have been an accomplished fact today. And it is not at all idle to speculate or suggest that the same thing might have come to pass if South Manchuria had escaped the ravages of

is her present campaign for the subjugation of China, which has already begun with her deliberate conquest of the whole of Manchuria and the actual hostilities waged by her armed forces against the regular forces of the Chinese Government for the capture of Jehol, the fourth Chinese province to be conquered by the Japanese army.

China is at once an end and a means in the scheme of conquest which the Japanese General Staff have been working out since September 18, 1931. Chinese raw materials and the China market are vital to a Japan resolved and determined to rival in world-greatness the other Island-power on whose Empire the sun is said never to set; and in order that China should forever be a market for the absorption of Japan's factory output, Japanese domination must involve a non-industrialized China in the matter of all production likely to compete with Japanese production.

A subjugated China is also a Japanese means because the domination and use of the material resources and man-power of China, as well as the possession of strategic Chinese centers are equally vital to Japan in the event of war with America.

8. Juristic Considerations. In his inaugural address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared: "In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor, resolutely who respects his obligations and the sanctity of his agreements." In the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan covenanted with the United States and the other signatories to respect the territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity of China and, in the Kellogg Pact, she also covenanted with the United States and the other signatories not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

policy in Manchuria. Ever since its declarations in 1919 and 1920, Soviet Russia has repudiated not only in words but in deeds the Tsardom's policy of territorial aggression in Manchuria. And the present writer is in a position to state that had the leadership of the Kuomintang Revolution not fatally faltered in 1929, the retrocession to China of all Russian rights and interests in Northern Manchuria would have been an accomplished fact today. And it is not at all idle to speculate or suggest that the same thing might have come to pass if South Manchuria had escaped the grip of Japan in 1905 and remained under the loose hands of a dying Tsardom then on the eve of its last decade of life.

5. As regards a Japanese "home" in Manchuria, it is notorious that all attempts to induce Japan's surplus population to settle in Manchuria have failed. There appears to be something in the physical or psychical make-up of the Japanese (who are an island race) which disables them from settling permanently in a continental region like Manchuria, away from the sea. There might be parts of China where the Japanese could live and thrive, particularly in the maritime provinces of Shantung, Kiangsu and Chekiang. But these provinces are all overcrowded. There are, however, desirable "vineyards" elsewhere—in the western seaboard of America and Canada and in the "empty spaces" of the Australias—which the Japanese can colonize. Into these "White men's" lands, the Japanese may not enter as long as the Pacific is not dominated by the Japanese naval power; and to achieve this naval domination, American naval power must first disappear from the Pacific.

6. For this reason, as well as for the added one bred of implacable Japanese resentment due to American refusal to concede racial equality, Japanese military thought is dominated by the conception and the reality of the inevitability of Japan's third "decisive war"—with America. For this war, the Japanese General Staff have planned and are preparing just as they planned and prepared for the first "decisive war" with China in 1894-5 and the second "decisive war" with Tsarist Russia in 1904-5. The chief preparation for the second war was the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which, though terminated, continues in principle to determine British foreign policy vis-a-vis Japan. And in the scheme of preparation for the third war, it is the task of Japanese diplomacy to sustain the spirit of the Alliance in order to frustrate any attempt at an *Anglo-American naval combination in the Far East* than which there is nothing that Japan fears more as an agency of international discipline and coercion. Incidentally this accounts for the omission of the words "Australia" and "New Zealand" in the vocabulary of Japan's publicity thugs when clamoring for a "home" for their "surplus population."

7. But the most formidable indication of Japan's war preparation

inaugural address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared: "In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor, resolutely who respects his obligations and the sanctity of his agreements." In the Nine-Power Treaty, Japan covenanted with the United States and the other signatories to respect the territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity of China and, in the Kellogg Pact, she also covenanted with the United States and the other signatories not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. These two Treaties, it must again be repeated, are American documents in the sense that they were begotten of American inspiration and statesmanship. At this date it is unnecessary to labor the point that Japan has violated those pacts of nations in circumstances constituting an intolerable outrage on America and the rest of the civilized world as represented by the League of Nations.

Japan has occupied and severed by military violence a great area of Chinese territory nearly three times the size of Japan Proper with a Chinese population about one-half that of the entire population of Japan Proper. And as if to signalize the cynical fact that she had to resort to force, i.e. war, as an instrument of national policy, Japan has sought to justify her transgressions in Manchuria on the ground that the latter is a "matter of life or death" to her.

It is a Chinese submission that Japan's military conquest of Manchuria and Jehol has created a situation upon whose occurrence the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact were intended to become operative and that, in consequence, it is a matter of national honor and good faith on the part of the Unit-

(Continued on Page 14, Col. 2.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chen Advises Intervention Against Japan

MAR 27 1933 *Chinese Press*
 (Continued from Page 9, Col. 8.)

ed States to see that Japan resolutely respects her obligations and the sanctity of her agreements under the Treaties.

9. Economic Considerations also make for the same conclusion enforced by the foregoing strategic and juristic considerations. The doctrine of the Open Door in China, as already noted, an American conception and an American contribution to international security in the Far East. If it was valid in the days of John Hay when American prosperity was not yet largely dependent on foreign exports, the doctrine is still more valid in these days when American prosperity and the American standard of life based on it depend not only on domestic consumption of America's machine-production but on foreign consumption of the surplus output of such production. If this is true, then the China market may well be regarded as a necessity to the machine-age in America, the more so because America's policy of goodwill towards China is an "investment" which, after the liquidation of Japan's destructive activities in China and a consequent increase in China's buying capacity, will yield the American trader a return that no alien pressure nor alien guns can ever extort from the Chinese people.

countries in
 rials from
 4. Japan's
 Soviet Russia
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10. What may be described as International Considerations are best defined in a discussion of America's responsibility to implement her obligations and her agreements under the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact in view of Japan's calculated violation of these pacts.

While not specifically asking America to go to war with Japan, it is the right of China—a right vested in her by two American Treaties—to ask America (a) if she abides by the terms and obligations contained in those treaties and (b) if so, in what manner she means to assist China to secure Japanese observance of the Treaties. Apart from material assistance not involving actual warfare, it is within the power and competence of the United States to intervene decisively in support of the Treaties.

11. In the war-debts due to America, there is such power. Whether these debts can be paid or not by Britain and France and the other European debtors, it would be futile as well as mischievous for America to cancel them unconditionally. Unconditionally cancellation will not make either for American prosperity or for world "recovery," since the depression which afflicts America and the world is but a manifestation (though a massive manifestation) of a great secular Revolution that is re-shaping the existing order of society. Even as the French Revolution inaugurated an epoch in history characterized finally by the political security of the individual and the rise of nationalism, so the Revolution that is unfolding itself in our midst is destined to assure economic security to the individual and international security among the Nations.

This thesis cannot, for obvious reasons, be developed here; and so it must suffice to insist that, apart from other economic and social conditions, a regime of peace—ecumenical peace—is a necessity if the new world order, on whose threshold we almost stand, is to be realized without the bloodshed and violence that has often marked the onset of great revolutionary changes in the affairs of men.

12. But world-peace is not possible without disarmament, military

system of disarmament envisaged by the civilized mind as a necessity if there is to be a higher organization of the life and work of nations. This is even a more imperious need than either French military disarmament or British naval disarmament. While there can be no true peace unless France and Britain eventually disarm, these countries are in truth modern states, broad-based on democracy and the liberties which it is the fashion in some quarters to deride. They can ordinarily be trusted, even as America can be trusted, to use great power soberly and with restraint. Not so Japan.

15 As a result of the naval decisions of the Washington Conference, Japan has been able to capture naval predominance in Far Eastern waters. There is no single Power, whether it be America or England, that can now challenge Japan in the seas of Far Asia. This fact, coupled with the character of the real government of Japan, explains why the Japanese dare, with impunity, to tear up great treaties deriving from American statesmanship, to invade and occupy by force the richest region of extra-mural China and so begin the conquest of China as a whole, and arrogantly to defy and flout America and the states constituting the League of Nations.

16. The real government of Japan is not the so-called Cabinet whose Robot mouthpiece is the Foreign Office at Tokyo. The true Government of Japan is the Japanese General Staff. It is customary to read Japanese history in the sense that the Meiji Revolution in 1867 ended the Shogunate as the ruling institution of feudal Japan. That transaction did not liquidate the Shogunate but merely transformed its personnel, substituting the military and naval clans of Satsuma and Choshu for the Tokugawa family and leaving the Shogunate as a feudal institution to survive in the Japanese General Staff.

It is this feudal institution—this veiled Shogunate—that has continued to rule what Japanese propaganda calls "Modern Japan." There is no more sinister albeit extraordinary phenomenon in modern history. "Modern Japan" emerged as one of the Great Powers of the world under the auspices of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which Japanese statecraft eventually transformed into a purely Japanese instrument of high policy, enabling Japan to defeat Tsardom, to dig her toes into rich Chinese soil in Manchuria and then proceed to the annexation of Korea. Had it not been for British material and moral assistance, Japan would hardly have secured the ranking of a Great Power and, today, would not be the danger she is to China and America and, ultimately, even to the British Empire.

17. On the basis of the foregoing views, it is the Chinese submission that the vital interests of the

Government and People of the United States demand the active and positive intervention of America in the conflict created by Japan's military violence against China in order, first, to discharge the obligations of honor and good faith pledged to China under the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; secondly, to ensure the national safety and security of the United States against Japanese designs to capture naval predominance in the Pacific as a whole; and, thirdly, to recreate American prosperity which is only possible in a regime of world-peace to be initiated by and through the effective disarmament of Japan, followed by the general disarmament of the other Powers.

18. Such an orientation of American national policy is possible by a realistic treatment of the war-debts which, in this period of profound secular changes, are not merely an economic weapon in the hands of the American Government but an instrument of high policy to be used in bringing about a wise and creative settlement of the present disordered affairs of Nations.

It is true that this must involve a development of American policy which may seem to conflict with a narrow reading of Washington's warning against foreign entanglement. But it is permissible for a foreigner, for a Chinese, to repeat what was greatly proclaimed by the Democratic Party under Wilsonian leadership and emphasize the manifest destiny of America as a World Power and the reaching out of her influence to the places where men meet and act so that civilized society shall not perish from the

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10. What may be described as International Considerations are best defined in a discussion of America's responsibility to implement her obligations and her agreements under the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact in view of Japan's calculated violation of these pacts.

II. In the war-debts due to America, there is such power. Whether these debts can be paid or not by Britain and France and the other European debtors, it would be futile as well as mischievous for America to cancel them unconditionally. Unconditionally cancellation will not make either for American prosperity or for world "recovery," since the depression which afflicts America and the world is but a manifestation (though a massive manifestation) of a great secular Revolution that is re-shaping the existing order of society. Even as the French Revolution inaugurated an epoch in history characterized finally by the political security of the individual and the rise of nationalism, so the Revolution that is unfolding itself in our midst is destined to assure economic security to the individual and international security among the Nations.

This thesis cannot, for obvious reasons, be developed here; and so it must suffice to insist that, apart from other economic and social conditions, a regime of peace—ecumenical peace—is a necessity if the new world order, on whose threshold we almost stand, is to be realized without the bloodshed and violence that has often marked the onset of great revolutionary changes in the affairs of men.

12. But world-peace is not possible without disarmament—military and naval, though what is called moral disarmament is also vital. Disarmament, however, is not practicable if, besides the strictly European difficulties of security, equality of status and territorial revision, one of the Great Powers of the World—Japan—reveals itself nakedly in the figure of a nation whose ruling classes, morally, are like savages armed with machine-guns. There is not another case like this in the whole course of historical experience (not even Athens, at the moment she resolved on the destruction of Melos, can be thought of in this connection) of great power used so ruthlessly—without restraint, without that moral sense of responsibility which marks off man from beasts of prey.

13. It is therefore both a right and a duty of America to demand in return for the cancellation of the war-debts that Great Britain and France, in particular, shall co-operate with the United States, first, in actively assisting China to secure Japanese observance of the Nine-Power Treaty and, secondly, to carry out general disarmament on a scale and in a manner which shall ensure international security not alone among the nations of Europe and the Americas but as between the states and peoples of Far Asia on the one hand and Japan on the other.

14. The effective and entire disarmament of Japan is, it must be insisted upon, a condition of the

action did not liquidate the Shogunate but merely transformed its personnel, substituting the military and naval clans of Satsuma and Choshu for the Tokugawa family and leaving the Shogunate as a feudal institution to survive in the Japanese General Staff.

It is this "feudal institution"—this veiled Shogunate—that has continued to rule what Japanese propaganda calls "Modern Japan." There is no more sinister albeit extraordinary phenomenon in modern history. "Modern Japan" emerged as one of the Great Powers of the world under the auspices of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which Japanese statecraft eventually transformed into a purely Japanese instrument of high policy, enabling Japan to defeat Tsardom, to dig her toes into rich Chinese soil in Manchuria and then proceed to the annexation of Korea. Had it not been for British material and moral assistance, Japan would hardly have secured the ranking of a Great Power and, today, would not be the danger she is to China and America and, ultimately, even to the British Empire.

17. On the basis of the foregoing views, it is the Chinese submission that the vital interests of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 4, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Shanghai's despatch No 8833 of March 31 1933, transmits to the Department an article from the SHANGHAI EVENING POST by H. G. W. Woodhead commenting upon the statement of Mr Eugene Chen advocating American intervention in the Far East. Mr Woodhead quotes a statement made by Mr Chen in 1927 while he was Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hankow government. This statement, in part, reads as follows;

" This is not true of Nationalist China. Today, this new China is strong and is conscious of its power and its ability by economic means to enforce its will on Chinese soil against any Power".

Mr Woodhead inquires, then, " why, if this is so, must the American dog worry the French and British cats to kill the Japanese rat that ate up Manchukuo?"

~~SECRET~~
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 8833

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, March 31, 1933.



Subject: Statement by Eugene Chen Advocating
American Intervention in Far East:
Comment by Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

AM REC'D



Referring to this Consulate General's despatch No.
of March 27, 1933, enclosing a copy of a statement

by Mr. Eugene Chen advocating American intervention in
the Far East, I have the honor to transmit herewith an
excerpt from THE SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY (American)
of March 28, 1933, containing comments by Mr. H. G. W.
Woodhead on Mr. Chen's statement. Mr. Woodhead scarcely
does himself justice in his reply, which is reminiscent of
some of the diatribes Messrs. Chen and Woodhead used to
hurl at each other about a decade ago when Mr. Woodhead
was editor of the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES and Mr. Chen
edited a daily paper in Peking. Mr. Woodhead believes
that Mr. Chen's thesis is not worthy of serious consideration,
which belief will doubtless be shared by the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General

Enclosure:

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Enclosure:

1/- Excerpt from THE SHANGHAI EVENING
POST & MERCURY of March 28, 1933.

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In Quintuplicate.

Copy to Legation.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8833 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 31,
1933, on the subject: "Statement by Eugene Chen Advocating
American Intervention in Far East: Comment by Mr. H. G. W.
Woodhead."

SOURCE: THE SHANGHAI EVENING POST
& MERCURY (American) of
March 28, 1933.

ONE MAN'S COMMENT FOR TODAY.

**ONE MAN'S COMMENT
FOR TODAY
MAR 28 1933
THE HOUSE THAT CHEN BUILT.
AN EUGENIC HABITATION!**
By H. G. W. WOODHEAD, C. B. E.

MANY of my readers will doubtless remember the cumulative
nursery rhyme that dealt with certain happenings in "The
House that Jack Built." It is unnecessary to repeat the whole
rigmarole here. I will limit my quotation to one verse:

"This is the dog
That worried the cat
That killed the rat
That ate the malt
That lay in the house that Jack built."

Now let us take the above lines as a parable: substitute
America for the dog; Great Britain and/or France for the cat;
Japan for the rat—and lo and behold, you have the house that
Eugene Chen built. For has he not, in effect told the United
States that by means of its strangle-hold over Great Britain and
France in the matter of war-debts they are to be worried into
"actively assisting China to secure Japanese observance of the
Nine Power Treaty" and to bring
about the "effective and entire
disarmament of Japan"?

Secretary Hull's Dilemma
It is a typically Eugenic thesis,
and doubtless the new American
Secretary of State, eagerly search-
ing for some means of embroiling
his country in another world con-
flict will start worrying the cat
or cats immediately. He has no
option in the matter. For has not
Mr. Chen told him, without
mincing words, that American pro-
sperity can only be recreated
"through the effective disarmament
of Japan"; that America's vital
interests "demand the active and
positive intervention of America in
the conflict created by Japan's mili-
tary violence"; and that it is "the
right of China" to demand of the
United States "in what manner she
means to assist China to secure

Japanese observance of the Trea-
ties."

A Slight Inconsistency
THERE is a slight inconsistency
in these peremptory state-
ments of America's duties and
China's rights which I might per-
haps refer to in passing. Early in
1927 the British Government
volunteered certain proposals to the
Chinese authorities in Peking and
Hankow in regard to Treaty re-
vision. It is interesting to recall a
passage from Mr. Eugene Chen's
Declaration of January 23, 1927
(he was at that time holding
the exalted position of Nationalist
Foreign Minister):

"The leading assumption," he
wrote, "of all British and other
foreign declarations of policy re-
garding China is that she is unable
to look after her own interests,
and that in pursuance of the spirit
of the Washington Conference
Great Britain and the other Powers
must enter into self-denying
ordinances respecting her in order
to safeguard her integrity and
independence and promote her
political and economic development,
and the rehabilitation of her
finances." This is not true of
Nationalist China. Today, this new
China is strong and is conscious
of its power and its ability by
economic means to enforce its will
on Chinese soil against any Power.

Why, if this is so, must the
American dog worry the French and
British cats to kill the Japanese
rat that ate up Manchukuo?

What Of Mongolia?
HOW far Mr. Eugene Chen,
today is entitled to pose as
the spokesman of China I do not
know. I was under the impression
that the policy of which he was
the most vociferous exponent in
1927 had been completely dis-
credited. There would seem, there-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rat that ate up Manchukuo?

What Of Mongolia?

HOW far Mr. Eugene Chen today is entitled to pose as the spokesman of China I do not know. I was under the impression that the policy of which he was the most vociferous exponent in 1927 had been completely discredited. There would seem, therefore, to be considerable doubt as to the extent to which his "Chinese submissions" are to be regarded as authoritative. In the interests of historical accuracy, however, it seems desirable that some slight errors in his masterly exposition of Japanese and American policies should be exposed. He states for example that "ever since its declaration in 1919 and 1920 Soviet Russia has repudiated not only in words but in deeds the Tsardom's policy of territorial aggression in Manchuria." But even if this were true—and one could forget the Soviet invasion in Northern Manchuria in 1929 by which recognition of Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway was enforced—what about Mongolia? Has Soviet Russia repudiated "the Tsardom's policy of territorial aggression" in Mongolia, in deed, as well as in word? If so perhaps Mr. Chen will explain how it comes about that the last vestige of Chinese authority in that vast territory has disappeared since the Soviet Government's declarations of 1919 and 1920, although Outer Mongolia was formally recognized by the Soviet in 1924 as "an integral part of the Republic of China." As it is "a matter of national honour and good faith on the part of the United States" to drag Britain and France in company with herself into "active and positive intervention against Japan" to secure the restoration of Manchuria, would it not be advisable to make a complete job of it, and simultaneously effectively disarm Soviet Russia and eject her from Outer Mongolia?

"Japan's pretended fear of Soviet Russia" writes Mr. Chen, "is hardly serious in view of the actual course of Soviet policy in Manchuria." I suppose that Japan, also, is supposed to share Mr. Chen's blindness as to the "actual course of Soviet policy" in Outer Mongolia.

"Mons Parturibat"

EVER since Mr. Chen's return to Shanghai rumour has credited him with the intention of making a weighty pronouncement on the subject of Chinese policy. The mountain has been in labour, but on this occasion has produced not even a mouse, but only a nursery rhyme. To suppose that the American State Department, much less Congress, will be influenced in the slightest degree by such irresponsible and ridiculous advice would demand the assumption that American statesmen had taken leave of their senses. Mr. Chen attributes much of the Manchuria trouble to the fact that the Kuomintang Revolution "fatally faltered in 1927." In other words the Nationalists, already dangerously embroiled with various foreign Governments by the savage and provocative acts of the clique of which Mr. Chen was one of the most noisy if not the most power-

ful members, repudiated Soviet dictation.

It would, doubtless, be very gratifying to the Governments of America, Great Britain and France to feel that while they were (on Mr. Chen's advice) adopting "active and positive intervention," Mr. Chen himself was working for a re-orientation of Chinese policy with a view to the restoration of Soviet domination over the Kuomintang. But as the idea of the dog and the cats hunting Mr. Chen's rat is preposterous it seems unnecessary to devote further serious discussion to his gratuitous advice to America as to how her "manifest destiny" is to be fulfilled.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 26, 1933.

~~WAS:~~
MMH:

Warrington Dawson's
Special Report No. 1223 of
April 8, 1933, encloses
clippings from the MERCURE
DE FRANCE and L'AVENIR
which take the stand that
the policy of the United
States and the League of
Nations regarding the
Manchuria situation is driv-
ing Japan to an understand-
ing with Russia and with
Germany.

BB
CC:EJL

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
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
Paris, April 8, 1933

SPECIAL REPORT

(No. W. D. 1223)



APR 23 33



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The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
wards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's
ial Report No. W. D. 1223, dated April 8,

al Report No. W. D. 1223, dated April 8,

MAY 5 - 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 8, 1933

Serial No. W. D. 1223

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
 Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Situation in the Far East

Writing in the MERCURE DE FRANCE of April 1, 1933 Dr. Legendre set forth in detail his principal objections to the Lytton Report and the attitude of the Powers towards Manchukuo and a hypothetical solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict. This article repeats in concrete form the various arguments which were advanced in his recent articles forwarded from time to time to the Department with comments in the present series of Reports.

In the conclusion to his present article, which he has entitled "The Solution of the Sino-Japanese Conflict" Dr. Legendre declares that the Powers will soon find themselves compelled to reach a decision of some kind in order to save China from a complete col-

lapse

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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lapse which would prove profitable to nobody except Soviet Russia. He considers that the existing chaos under the dictatorship of the Kwo-min-tang, especially at Nanking, is hastening on the date of the collapse. Even though the League of Nations may remain indifferent to the humanitarian aspect of the problem, it cannot be forgotten that China represents a big market which must be safeguarded.

As for the reproaches advanced against Japan as an "aggressor," Dr. Legendre declares that no European who has lived in China during recent years could ever accuse Japan of an aggression. The disorders which have occurred are attributed to the Young Chinese.

In his closing lines, Dr. Legendre attacked the United States saying:

"Why this comedy of the defense of democracy as well as the principles of the League of Nations? What democracy is being defended? That of Nanking, which is a sheer fiction? Is it not true that these nations have been fascinated and paralysed by the great shadow of Uncle Sam which was always cast over the Committee of Nineteen? American imperialism is carrying things too far, it tends to impose its law upon the whole of humanity. And it must be said that the nations obey

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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like so many lap-dogs. As an example we may take a reunion of forty nations which has been led into committing the 'summa injuria' while affecting to bring about the 'summum jus' and, what is far graver, it has prepared without a sense of its responsibility an almost inevitable understanding on the part of Japan with both Moscow and Berlin."

An extract reprinted in L'AVENIR of April 6th from LA REVUE DES VIVANTS summing up the relations of Russia with Japan and China, especially in Manchuria, since the Treaty of Portsmouth is also enclosed.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
 Special Assistant

Enclosures:

Article from MERCURE DE FRANCE of April 1, 1933
 Article from L'AVENIR of April 6, 1933

In quintuplicate

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WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° 1223 of April 8, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of April 1, 1933

LA SOLUTION DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Durant seize mois — pas un de moins — la Société des Nations, aux prises avec le problème mandchou, s'est montrée totalement incapable d'aboutir à une solution rationnelle, équitable, qui n'obligerait pas le Japon à quitter Genève, à rompre avec la communauté internationale des grands peuples. Elle vient enfin d'aboutir : mais quel étrange verdict ! L'Histoire sera sévère pour la S. D. N.

Mais pourquoi cette impuissance de la S. D. N. ? Parce qu'elle n'a que trop de tendance à considérer ses principes comme immuables et partout applicables. Elle vise trop haut dans le pacifisme et de plus dans l'universalité. C'est une grave erreur de sa part d'avoir élaboré des statuts qui *postulent* l'égalité des races, qu'elles soient blanche, jaune ou noire, l'uniformité aussi de leur évolution politique avec la même capacité présumée pour chacune de se gouverner, d'assurer sa vie économique et sa pleine indépendance. Or, il y a des peuples de tout âge social, et certains ne peuvent se passer de tuteurs ; c'est ce que les dogmatiques de l'universalité, de l'uniformité devraient s'efforcer de comprendre. L'universalité, par une prétendue égalité raciale, n'objective rien de tangible dans le domaine des humains : ce n'est qu'un mot prétentieux qui couvre une conception puérile, absurde, que renie la biologie.

Mais le plus étrange dans les actes de la S. D. N., c'est qu'elle admet dans son sein des peuples en tutelle réelle

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure N° I to Special Report N° I223 of April 8, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From "MERCURE DE FRANCE" of April I, 1933

ou masquée, ou encore en voie de formation et sans unité aucune, donc à souveraineté ou indépendance limitée : la Chine en est le plus frappant exemple.

Ce qui se révèle plus sérieux encore, c'est que cette Chine est en plein chaos, sans gouvernement effectif, donc livrée aux fantaisies des toukiun, de féodaux hissés au pouvoir par eux-mêmes avec l'aide des étrangers et s'y maintenant par la vertu du sabre, c'est-à-dire grâce à des armées de mercenaires. Quand même, vous observerez à Genève ce curieux spectacle : la mise sur le même pied devant le tribunal des Nations des représentants d'une nation hautement policée comme le Japon et ceux d'un pays en pleine anarchie, la Chine, sous la botte de millions de reîtres et de brigands, une Chine morcelée, dépecée en fiefs que se dispute féroce-ment une horde de toukiun. Mais, se diront nos peuples, toujours soucieux d'ordre et de paix, la S. D. N. n'aura pas l'ombre d'une hésitation; ne pouvant admettre la légitimité de l'anarchie, du chaos, elle se range du côté du Japon en ce qui concerne la question de Mandchourie, et va reconnaître que la prétendue agression japonaise n'a été qu'une opération de police nécessaire. Nos peuples se trompent : la S. D. N. a toujours favorisé, soutenu, non pas la vraie Chine, mais un petit clan politique, le Kouo Ming Tang, honni par les masses dont la misère dans l'insécurité est poignante. Ce petit clan a même été adopté par la S. D. N. et figure — on a peine à le croire — dans son Conseil. Si bien que les féodaux chinois, tyrans de leur peuple, sont appelés à intervenir, sont conduits à vouloir imposer leurs vues dans tous les grands problèmes intéressant les nations les plus évoluées, les plus policées. Comment expliquer pareille aberration de la S. D. N.? C'est simple, bien que stupéfiant, et montre à quel degré toute idéologie est nocive, néfaste à la paix du monde. On s'imagine en effet à Genève que les toukiun chinois sont de vrais démocrates, pacifistes

même; on ose le dire! On parle avec émotion, comme M. Paul-Boncour à la Chambre, de la « jeune république chinoise progressant dans la liberté », alors que les masses, sans l'ombre d'un droit, sont piétinées, décimées par toutes sortes de hordes : reîtres, communistes et brigands organisés. « La jeune démocratie de Nankin en pleine évolution féconde! » Quelle duperie! Alors que, dans la réalité, la pauvre Chine n'est plus qu'une épave qui devient de plus en plus le jouet de Moscou. Cette duperie est le scandale du jour, de l'époque présente. Lorsque les peuples s'en rendront compte, la S. D. N. subira une éclipse totale. « Un gouvernement central et national existe en Chine », dit lord Lytton dans son rapport. Il l'affirme, mais c'est pour se démentir dans ses conclusions, puisqu'il recommande aux Puissances de mettre la Jeune Chine en *tutelle*.

Le problème fut ainsi clairement posé à Genève : d'un côté le Japon, grand pays fortement organisé dont la population, aussi homogène que disciplinée, révèle une communauté parfaite des aspirations, des buts; de l'autre côté, la Chine, aujourd'hui à la dérive, virant à toutes les impulsions venant de factions politiques dominées par des dictateurs militaires se battant entre eux pour les dépouilles opimes du pays.

Ce sont là des faits, des réalités indéniables; la S. D. N. aurait donc pu, depuis longtemps, découvrir le véritable agresseur, et, par suite, se déterminer, juger en pleine connaissance de cause, d'autant plus qu'il est indéniable que les délégués de Nankin à Genève ne représentent en rien la Chine, mais leur *seul* clan. Aussi leur souci est-il non de faciliter le retour de la paix en Extrême-Orient, mais plus simplement de *sauvegarder à tout prix leur fief de Nankin avec ses bénéfices*. D'ailleurs, ce clan ne s'intéresse nullement à la Mandchourie : ce n'est qu'une attitude, une question de « face » et aussi une soumission à la volonté de certaine grande puissance

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dont il est le client. La S. D. N., si elle se fait encore des illusions sur la sincérité de la faction de Nankin qui la dupe et la bafoue si effrontément, n'ignore pas la collusion entre cette faction et la grande puissance dont il vient d'être question. Elle hésitait donc, n'osait se prononcer, surtout que toute la II^e Internationale donnait de la voix en faveur du Kouo Ming Tang, de la faction de Nankin : Lansbury en Angleterre, Vandervelde en Belgique, Blum en France. Celui-ci va même jusqu'à sommer la France de « prendre l'initiative d'aller désarmer le Japon tout de suite, sans perdre une heure ». C'est pur enfantillage sans doute, mais il y a tant de gens pour l'endosser ! N'est-il pas étrange que tous les pacifistes et humanitaires professionnels, libéraux ou socialistes, soutiennent ardemment les féodaux du Kouo Ming Tang, au détriment des masses affamées et trop souvent massacrées ? On comprendra lorsqu'on saura que les politiciens du Kouo Ming Tang se sont affublés d'une défroque de démocrates et, grâce à une propagande effrontée, font croire à l'existence réelle d'une jeune république en pleine évolution. En ce qui concerne les socialistes, ceux-ci, depuis le voyage en Chine de leur pontife Vandervelde, considèrent la Chine comme une « Terre promise au marxisme » ; aussi les voit-on se dresser contre quiconque veut toucher à leur idole : la Jeune-Chine socialisante. Peu leur importe le servage, les souffrances des masses chinoises, leur douloureux calvaire depuis vingt ans. Aussi bien est-ce là le scandale du jour ! Sauver le politicien d'abord, même le plus malfaisant ; le déclarer « tabou » ! Tel est le souci présent chez l'internationaliste. Et la S. D. N. s'incline. Le socialiste ne crie plus : « Mort aux tyrans ! » Il les bénit au contraire, les défend de toute son ardeur ; ceux de Chine tout au moins.

Mais quel est le résultat de cette politique ? L'extension rapide du bolchévisme en Chine centrale et méridionale,

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une extension si rapide qu'elle atteint aujourd'hui le Far-West chinois, le riche territoire du Setchouen jusqu'ici indemne et qui, en raison de son éloignement de la côte, a toujours été le grand foyer de résistance à toute révolution politique ou sociale. Est-ce que la S. D. N. pouvait sérieusement ignorer ces faits ? On comprend qu'elle ait tenu à sauvegarder ses principes si elle croit à leur violation, mais elle ne saurait écarter cette poignante réalité de l'anarchie chinoise, d'une guerre civile devenue chronique... Chronique aussi la famine qui, ces dernières années, a fauché des millions d'êtres, hommes, femmes et enfants, pendant que s'engraissent toukoun, politiciens, mercenaires et brigands. Mgr de Guébriant, qui est rentré récemment d'un long voyage en Chine occidentale, dans des régions que je connais bien pour y avoir vécu, m'a fait le plus douloureux tableau de la misère du peuple sous une révoltante tyrannie.

Mais j'en reviens à la S. D. N. : puisqu'elle semblait toujours croire qu'il existe en Chine une « jeune démocratie en marche » et qu'elle n'osait renier cette faction politique que, dans une heure d'égarement, elle admit dans son conseil, il m'était facile de lui fournir un moyen de s'évader de l'impasse où elle s'était engagée. Et ce moyen s'appuie sur des données solides, irréfutables, celles de l'histoire et de l'ethnographie.

En effet, que dit l'histoire ? Que la Mandchourie, pas plus que la Mongolie, n'a jamais été une terre chinoise. Si la Jeune-Chine était moins ignorante des grands faits historiques ou plutôt si elle n'avait l'habitude de les nier dès qu'ils la gênent, elle avouerait que les vastes territoires ci-dessus n'ont jamais fait partie intégrante de la Chine, au contraire : leurs peuples l'ont souvent, au cours des siècles, conquise, dominée. Mais est-ce que le Kouo Ming Tang, qui compte à peine deux provinces sur dix-huit sous son autorité, ne revendique pas aussi l'Indo-

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Chine, la Birmanie et même Java? Il est vrai qu'il y a vingt ans à peine, le Chinois considérait encore comme ses tributaires toutes les nations du monde. « Tien hia », « sous le Ciel », il y avait lui, le « grand civilisé », le « pur », et tout le reste de l'humanité n'était que « Mantze », « barbares » méprisables.

Mais j'en reviens à la Mandchourie. Je passe sous silence la Mongolie, où domine aujourd'hui le Bolchévick sans que la faction de Nankin ait jamais songé à protester, pas plus d'ailleurs que la S. D. N. ou les Etats-Unis, aujourd'hui si soucieux de défendre la Mandchourie. Mais le territoire mandchou, qu'est-il exactement?

Si l'on se reporte à l'histoire ancienne, cette contrée a été le berceau originel non du Chinois, ce peuple hybride ethniquement, si mal caractérisé, mais de tribus nomades turco-mongoles, très guerrières, qui, au cours des siècles, n'ont cessé de se ruer périodiquement sur la Chine et de lui imposer leur loi, leurs dynasties. La dernière de ces tribus conquérantes fut celle qui, au dix-septième siècle de notre ère, établit à Pékin le règne des Tsinn, renversés en 1911.

Ce qu'il importe de faire ressortir, c'est que le Chinois n'a jamais reconnu, à aucune époque, les Mandchous comme étant des frères de race; au contraire, il les tenait en profond dédain, les traitant de « Mantze », ni plus ni moins que l'Européen. Je parle d'expérience : j'ai en effet vécu des années dans la capitale du Setchouen, à Tchentou, où existait un camp d'officiers et de soldats mandchous avec leurs familles. Or, ces maîtres de la Chine étaient considérés par le peuple plutôt en ennemis qu'en compatriotes. Et si vous aviez à vous venger d'un Chinois importun, il suffisait de le qualifier de « lou tsai », ou « esclave de Mandchou », pour qu'il décampât aussitôt, vexé à fond. Lors de la révolution de 1911, tous les Mandchous isolés dans l'intérieur furent massacrés par les Chinois.

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Bref, le Mandchou n'a jamais été considéré par le Chinois comme faisant partie de sa famille : il a toujours été pour lui l'étranger haï. Le Mandchou, d'ailleurs, le lui rendait bien : aussi la dynastie impériale des Tsinn, originaire de Mandchourie, interdisait-elle sa terre natale à tout sujet chinois. Et c'est seulement depuis la disparition de cette dynastie, en 1911, que le Chinois a émigré en Mandchourie, émigration qui a pris un grand développement depuis que l'anarchie, sous le Kouo Ming Tang, avec ses massacres et ses ruines, a provoqué l'exode d'énormes masses de paysans. Ces masses hésitaient d'autant moins qu'elles savaient devoir trouver la sécurité sous la protection japonaise.

Mais c'est par un retour sur le passé qu'on se rend mieux compte de la vraie situation et du rôle historique de la Mandchourie, de cet immense *glacis* où tant de races se sont heurtées au cours des siècles. De ces chocs, il résulta des refoulements tant vers l'est que vers l'ouest et le sud. Aucun doute qu'un certain quantum de la population japonaise primitive ne soit venu du Continent, de la Mandchourie et de la Corée. Si l'histoire n'était là pour nous l'enseigner, l'anthropologie à elle seule y suffirait. C'est surtout dans le nord du Hondo, sur la mer du Japon, que j'ai rencontré ce type ethnique.

L'Aïnu, d'ailleurs, homme de race blanche, premier envahisseur du Hondo, est certainement venu du Continent. D'autres vagues de conquérants ont suivi : ceux du clan Yamato, les plus connus, puisque tout Japonais déclare descendre de ces fameux guerriers.

Bref, la Mandchourie n'est pas une terre chinoise : elle a été, à une époque ancienne, qui se compte par siècles, le champ de manœuvres de tribus nomades, très guerrières, qui ont un jour pénétré en Chine, en Corée ou au Japon, ou bien entrepris une longue, très lointaine chevauchée comme celle des Turcs qui, partis de

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Mongolie, finirent par se stabiliser en Europe après avoir enlevé Byzance à la chrétienté.

Ces dernières années, la Mandchourie a été envahie pacifiquement par les Chinois du nord pour y trouver la paix et le millet quotidien. Le Japonais est venu lui aussi, sous l'aspect de l'industriel surtout, et de plus, heureusement, sous celui de *gardien de la paix*. Un intrus, a-t-on dit, ce Japonais; nullement, il réoccupe une place, des lieux que parcoururent autrefois ses ancêtres, soit pour paître leurs troupeaux, soit pour rompre des lances contre une tribu voisine. Pour le Chinois, la Mandchourie était la terre maudite d'où lui venaient tous ses malheurs au cours de tant de siècles. Jamais il ne put la soumettre, fut toujours conquis par elle.

L'émigrant chinois doit choisir : ou collaborer avec le Japonais, ou subir la loi de Moscou autrement tyrannique.

A propos de cette Mandchourie, il est question aujourd'hui de faire respecter l'intégrité de la Chine en invoquant le traité de Washington. Mais qui donc respecte ce traité? Pas même les Chinois. Est-ce que les clans politiques n'ont pas dépecé leur pays? Est-ce qu'il existe une Chine compacte, unifiée, suivant le postulat des signataires du traité de Washington qui, faisant foin des réalités, reçoivent aujourd'hui le démenti des faits?

D'un autre côté, il ne faut pas oublier que des troupes européennes et américaines occupent certains grands centres de la Chine, y tiennent *garnison*. Ce pays, en raison du chaos qui y règne, subit donc certaines servitudes; y toucher serait accroître ce chaos.

D'un autre côté, est-il nécessaire d'observer que le fait d'avoir été conquise par le Mandchou n'autorise en rien la Chine à réclamer le territoire de celui-ci? Une Allemagne annexée par la France serait-elle en droit aujourd'hui de déclarer la France terre allemande du fait de cette union?

Il faut aussi se rappeler l'existence de la Grande Muraille : n'est-ce pas un *symbole* ou plutôt la preuve tangible, irréfutable, d'un antagonisme millénaire? Elle fut en effet construite par le Chinois, dans quel but? Mais pour s'isoler de la Mandchourie, pour se protéger contre ses hordes. Donc, la Mandchourie, terre ennemie pour la Chine.

On peut ajouter que la nature elle-même a pris le soin d'isoler la Mandchourie de la grande plaine chinoise du nord, de la vallée du Fleuve Jaune : le plateau mongol, ses escarpements du Jehol, dominant cette plaine et forment même, vers l'est, une véritable chaîne de montagnes qui se termine à la mer dans le golfe du Petchili, à Shan Hai Kouan, passe étroite si souvent forcée par les envahisseurs de la Chine : Hsiang Nou, Toba, Khitan et Nu Tchen, sans compter les Mongols qui formèrent la dynastie Yuan (xiii^e siècle) et s'allièrent toujours avec les hordes mandchoues pour mettre à mal la Chine. Donc, la Mandchourie forme une région naturelle, une unité géographique isolée de la Chine proprement dite, de celle des 18 provinces, d'un territoire où politiquement n'ont jamais été intégrées les terres mongoles ou mandchoues. Le Chinois, d'ailleurs, n'a jamais eu de terme pour désigner la Mandchourie dans son ensemble : c'était une terre barbare qu'il affectait d'ignorer, c'était le « keou wai », le « pays au delà des passes » de la Grande Muraille. Et cette fameuse Muraille figurait réellement la *frontière*, la limite *septentrionale* de la Chine. C'est derrière elle que s'organisa toujours la défense du territoire chinois contre les hordes du « keou wai ». Rarement cette défense prit la forme de l'offensive en portant la guerre sur le sol ennemi, la Mandchourie. Par exemple, si ce pays fut occupé à l'époque des Ming, ce ne fut que très partiellement, à l'extrême-sud, dans la basse vallée du Liao. Et cette emprise se révéla si peu solide que la dynastie des Ming fut bientôt renversée (xvii^e

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
siècle) par la ruée mandchoue qui, jusqu'à notre époque, fournit à la Chine ses nouveaux maîtres : les Tsinn.

Il est intéressant d'observer que cette conquête de la Chine au XVII^e siècle ne fut pas réalisée par les seules forces mandchoues, mais aussi par les contingents mongols et même chinois (1). Les Annales de l'Empire nous disent en effet que, lors de l'entrée des vainqueurs à Pékin en 1644, la garde était représentée par huit bannières mandchoues, huit mongoles et huit chinoises. En 1909, j'ai encore vu la même organisation à Pékin comme garnison impériale.

Mais qu'étaient ces guerriers chinois qui se qualifiaient *Han jen* (fils de Han)? C'étaient de très anciens émigrants venus du Tche Li et surtout du Shantoung et vivant dans une enclave du vaste territoire mandchou, c'est-à-dire dans la presqu'île du Liaotong et la partie orientale de la basse vallée du Liao dont nous avons déjà parlé. La partie occidentale de cette vallée était occupée comme aujourd'hui par des tribus mongoles. Quant aux tribus mandchoues, elles occupaient le territoire au nord et au nord-est de l'enclave chinoise jusqu'au voisinage du fleuve Amour, entre la vallée du Sungari et celle de l'Oussouri, avec la chaîne Tchang Pai Shan formant la limite orientale. La fameuse « Palissade », pendant de la Grande Muraille, mais simplement représentée par un fossé et une ligne ininterrompue de saules, partait de la région de Shan Hai Kouan, se dirigeant vers le nord-nord-est jusqu'au haut Sungari. Mais, plus au sud, une section de la « Palissade » se rabattait au sud-est en côtoyant la frontière orientale de la presqu'île du Liaotong: c'est ainsi que se trouvait exactement limitée l'enclave chinoise entre Mongols et Mandchous. Les « Han Jen » qui occupaient cette enclave ne

(1) Certaines de ces données historiques m'ont été fournies par le général Ting, l'envoyé extraordinaire de Son Excell. Pou Y, régent du Mandchoukouo et puisées aux archives impériales de Moukden.

comptaient que des Chinois du nord, frères de race, sans aucun doute, des Mandchous et Mongols. Leurs mœurs, leurs traditions, étaient si peu différentes de celles des Mandchous que ceux-ci oubliaient leur fierté de conquérants et, par le mariage, s'unissaient couramment avec les Han jen. Si bien que les diverses familles mandchoues



et chinoises se fondirent peu à peu, au cours des siècles, en un groupe politique et social unique. Et comme l'organisation guerrière était le principal objectif des tribus mandchoues, qu'elle était leur orgueil d'hommes valeureux, jamais vaincus, le Han jen fut admis dans cette organisation des Bannières et il obtint même le grand honneur de pouvoir constituer les siennes sur le même pied que celles des clans mandchous et en nombre

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égal. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que ces Chinois du Liao-tong se soient toujours rangés du côté des Mandchous et Mongols, qu'ils se soient battus avec ceux-ci contre la Chine à toutes les époques. D'ailleurs, ces Chinois des Bannières entraînèrent toujours avec eux les Han jen du nord, du Tcheli et du Shantoung; et ce furent leurs forces combinées qui conquièrent le trône de Pékin en 1644, y placèrent la dynastie mandchoue des Tsinn: ceci, c'est de l'histoire, et tous les rapports Lytton n'y changeront rien. On objectera: mais les princes mandchous ont toujours interdit l'union, le mariage entre leurs sujets et les Chinois. Il faut distinguer: c'était le mariage avec une femme de la Chine proprement dite qui était rigoureusement défendu, mais non avec une fille des guerriers des Bannières chinoises, comme nous l'avons expliqué. J'ai même souvent constaté que le Chinois du nord, comme celui des Bannières, n'a guère changé, garde son particularisme, sa fierté de race: il a la haine et le mépris du Chinois du sud, le « Nan Mantze » ou « Barbare méridional », comme il le baptise. Il sait, ce *Han jen*, que la Chine du nord, en liaison avec les tribus mandchoues et mongoles, a toujours formé le centre de gravité politique du vaste territoire et que, dans toute lutte pour la suprématie, il a réussi finalement à dominer la Chine centrale et méridionale.

Des auteurs anglais ou américains, s'appuyant sur de pures hypothèses, tel Owen Lattimore dans son livre « Manchuria: cradle of conflict », veulent nous faire croire que le Mandchou, sitôt maître du pouvoir et installé à Pékin et autres grandes cités, se muait aussitôt en Chinois, perdait ses caractéristiques. Owen Lattimore en donne comme exemple l'adoption par les empereurs du cérémonial, des us et coutumes des anciennes cours chinoises. Mais qu'y a-t-il d'étonnant dans cette adoption? Les dynasties précédentes avaient été toutes fondées par des Nordiques dont le berceau était la Mand-

chourie, la Mongolie ou les provinces chinoises limitrophes. Ces Nordiques, si j'en juge par les éléments actuels, ne formaient pas une race homogène, mais le type humain de haute taille et généralement à peau blanche, qu'on observe à l'heure actuelle, représentait, sans aucun doute, le groupe conquérant, celui qui imposait sa loi à la masse. Chaque siècle, avant comme après l'ère chrétienne, nous savons qu'il y a eu flux et reflux entre le grand « réservoir » de tribus mongoles et mandchoues et les provinces chinoises du nord, c'est-à-dire qu'il y eut migration ou invasion périodiquement. Ces mouvements ne pouvaient donc que favoriser le mélange de ces divers groupes d'une même race et modifier leurs habitudes sociales ou économiques, d'où la transformation, par exemple, en agriculteurs, donc en sédentaires, de certains de ces nomades, de même qu'il en fut des Scythes dont nous parle Hérodote, ces Scythes qui, par leurs mœurs, leurs traditions, rappellent tant les Hsiong Nou (2) qui, de même que les Mongols et Mandchous, ont été souvent les maîtres de la Chine. D'où il s'ensuit que les Mandchous de la dynastie Tsinn, une fois sur le trône de Pékin et reprenant un cérémonial antique, ne faisaient autre chose qu'imiter leurs ancêtres, les précédents conquérants. Quant à la culture de ceux-ci, elle était très ancienne et ne différait guère dans ses principes de celle dite chinoise. On peut même ajouter que celle-ci, non la première en date, n'est pas née dans la Chine propre, mais fut apportée de l'ouest et du nord, si l'on en juge par les récentes découvertes, dont celles du professeur japonais Torii.

D'autre part, les grandes voies d'extension de cette culture furent à travers la Mongolie et la Mandchourie (3), cette Mandchourie particulièrement riche en vestiges préhistoriques. De Mongolie et de Mandchourie, cette civi-

(2) Qu'on identifie avec les Huns.

(3) Et pas seulement par la voie du Turkestan.

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lisation pénétra en Chine du nord. D'ailleurs, si Mongols et Mandchous n'avaient été que des nomades barbares, comment auraient-ils pu organiser leurs conquêtes sur le vaste territoire chinois et les faire durer? On sait aussi par les Annales impériales que Mongols et Mandchous, loin de dédaigner l'agriculture, l'ont pratiquée partout où elle était facile.

J'ai parlé de flux et de reflux de clans ou tribus : en ce qui concerne les Bannières chinoises de Mandchourie, les *Han jen* qui les formaient étaient probablement des Mandchous qui, n'ayant pas réussi à se fixer au Tcheli ou au Shantoung, ou en ayant été chassés par un choc en retour, rentraient au foyer ancestral. Owen Lattimore reconnaît, d'après les Archives Impériales, que ces *Han jen* étaient considérés comme si peu différents des vrais Mandchous des clans, qu'ils étaient facilement adoptés par ceux-ci et versés dans leurs Bannières. Il ajoute même que les émigrés récents subissent rapidement l'influence du nouveau milieu et rentrent ainsi dans la grande famille actuelle, celle historiquement mandchoue par naissance ou par adoption.

Ces faits historiques ont, comme on le verra, une grande importance, quand il s'agira de déterminer si la population actuelle de Mandchourie est vraiment chinoise, comme le prétend lord Lytton pour justifier ses conclusions.

J'en viens aux anciennes Bannières chinoises : elles s'étaient si bien intégrées dans la grande famille mandchoue-mongole que, durant les trois siècles que les Tsinn régnèrent à Pékin, les *Han jen* furent les serviteurs fidèles de la dynastie et se confondirent avec les autres Bannières dans les camps des capitales provinciales. J'ai vécu des années à Tchentou au voisinage immédiat d'un de ces camps : or, je n'arrivais pas à distinguer les uns des autres les guerriers de la trinité mandchoue-mongole-chinoise Han. Ces hommes, avec leurs familles, vivaient

séparés de la population : c'était la consigne. Les grands chefs des Bannières redoutaient le contact avec la masse chinoise, dont la moralité plutôt lâche et la recherche d'une vie facile par tous les moyens étaient si loin des mâles vertus qui font les conquérants.

C'est pour la même raison que, durant plus de trois siècles, l'entrée en Mandchourie fut interdite à tout Chinois de la Chine proprement dite, sauf par permission spéciale de la famille impériale ou des chefs des Bannières.

Owen Lattimore, qui a inspiré la mission Lytton, croit nous donner une nouvelle preuve de prétendue transformation du Mandchou en rappelant qu'après la conquête l'élite des clans s'empresse d'adopter la culture chinoise. Ce qui est vrai, c'est que tous les Mandchous appelés à une fonction importante se mettaient à l'étude de la langue, des mœurs et des traditions des diverses régions de l'immense Empire afin d'acquiescer une compréhension exacte de leurs devoirs envers le peuple conquis. Mais, dans ce nouveau milieu, le Mandchou restait Mandchou par ses caractéristiques et ses tendances. D'ailleurs, il ne saurait en être autrement : une race forte ne se laisse pas assimiler, absorber; fière de son passé, de sa vitalité de conquérante, elle reste elle-même, soucieuse avant tout de conserver les qualités qui lui assurent la domination des peuples.

Il est donc hors de doute que le conquérant mandchou garda en Chine toute sa personnalité traditionnelle et raciale. D'ailleurs, quelle étrange idée de croire qu'un peuple puisse changer d'âme comme de chemise! On ne saurait supprimer l'inconscient, les instincts ou sentiments qui ont façonné une âme au cours d'une longue histoire; on ne saurait neutraliser au commandement, par la seule volonté ou des influences superficielles, des hérédités millénaires qui dominent notre moi, ont la force de véritables réflexes.

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Non, l'âme ancestrale d'une race n'est pas un vain mot; elle ne meurt pas : sa vie est éternelle. Elle est la flamme qui active le foyer intérieur, psychique, provoque toutes nos réactions intimes. Elle est notre conscience, notre soutien dans la lutte contre l'influence d'un nouveau milieu, d'une nouvelle société humaine qui réagit sur nous, cherche à imposer ses concepts. C'est pourquoi le Mandchou ne s'est pas plus chinisé que le Japonais ne s'est européenisé. Est-elle donc indéracinable, cette croyance simpliste qu'il suffit d'emmagasiner quelques-unes de nos idées, de les répéter comme perroquet, puis de s'affubler d'un complet veston, pour transformer un Noir ou un Jaune en un être nouveau? Rien de plus naïvement erroné : c'est confondre apparence et réalité. Notre homme, en vérité, ne perd rien de son facies psychique; son milieu intérieur ne change pas; il reste celui de sa race. Vous n'en ferez ni un Européen, ni un Américain.

Les Mandchous sont donc restés eux-mêmes et n'ont cessé, durant trois siècles de domination, de constituer un bloc solide dont l'autorité sur l'ensemble de la Chine était incontestable, comme j'ai pu en juger par moi-même par la sécurité dont je jouissais dans des régions perdues au cours de mes explorations. Il faut aussi se rappeler que la Mandchourie, durant cette période, resta autonome, sous le gouvernement d'un prince de la dynastie, et constituait la grande réserve de puissance, de cohésion de tout l'Empire. C'est là que les Bannières s'alignaient en guerriers, que les clans se préparaient à fournir les grands chefs ou contrôleurs des administrations chinoises. La Mandchourie restait donc le centre du pouvoir des Tsinn, la région vitale motrice et régulatrice de l'Empire tout entier. L'organisation politique et sociale était si forte, si solidement étayée sur des traditions millénaires ayant fait leurs preuves, qu'il a fallu, pour la saper, et, par suite, amener la chute du

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régime, toute l'action incessante, tenace, de l'Européen ou de l'Américain, son infiltration et intervention constante dans tous les domaines, même celui familial et éducatif. *C'est nous, les étrangers, et surtout l'Américain*, qui avons détruit le colosse impérial pour mettre à la place de petits politiciens sans valeur aucune, vaguement façonnés à notre image, lesquels, depuis 1911, ont fait de la Chine un enfer véritable, comme on l'a vu, un enfer pour toutes les classes laborieuses, pour les masses paysannes en particulier. Aussi, de désespoir, l'homme des champs passe-t-il trop souvent au communisme, devient un « Jacques rouge ». Et cependant sa résignation à la tyrannie est si grande! Mais cette fois la coupe d'amertume (*sin k'ou*) était trop pleine : il a réagi, s'est jeté dans une folle aventure.

On sait en effet que tout un gouvernement soviétique s'est créé en Chine centrale, couvrant une superficie de plus d'un million de kilomètres carrés avec une armée véritable, dont les cadres ont été formés à Berlin et à Moscou.

Tel est le résultat pour la Chine d'une action étrangère imprudente qui, en fomentant la révolution de 1911, a brisé l'unité de la Chine et en a fait l'épave dont j'ai parlé. L'ardeur d'une certaine république à transformer la grande allure le peuple chinois, à le faire passer brusquement de l'âge patriarcal à l'âge démocratique, a été une profonde erreur, une erreur contre le bon sens. Sous le vain prétexte, par exemple, de libérer la femme, des éducateurs américains sont allés jusqu'à saper la famille, cette grande force morale de la Chine, son meilleur soutien; ils ont ainsi brisé l'équilibre social d'un vieux peuple : d'où le chaos actuel. Ces éducateurs, pleins de bonnes intentions, ont voulu être des rédempteurs; et, dans la dure réalité, ils n'ont été que des naufrageurs sociaux. Dans leur zèle d'apôtres démocrates, ils sont allés jusqu'à réparer, organiser le coup d'Etat de 1911, le renverse-

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ment de la dynastie mandchoue : il leur fallait tout de suite une république, une grande république jaune, « sœur de la grande Démocratie américaine », suivant une formule consacrée.

Le résultat : depuis vingt ans, c'est, pour le pauvre peuple chinois, « sin k'ou, t'sien sin ouan k'ou », c'est-à-dire « angoisses, mille peines et souffrances ».

Dire que si la dynastie des Tsinn était restée au pouvoir, la Chine eût évolué graduellement, eût progressé en améliorant ses institutions dans le respect toutefois de ses traditions vitales, de celles qui avaient fait sa force, sa durée à travers les vicissitudes de son histoire. Tout le peuple chinois aujourd'hui a le profond regret de la disparition de la dynastie, bien qu'il l'ait toujours regardée comme étrangère; fait à noter lorsque le pseudo-gouvernement de Nankin réclame la Mandchourie comme province de Chine. Naturellement, le peuple, dans sa détresse actuelle, a toujours présente à l'esprit l'image du Fils du Ciel, du Patriarche suprême, père de la grande famille chinoise. Il espère en son retour, en escompte la fin de sa misère. Déjà, toute la Chine du nord se prépare à l'union avec le Mandchoukouo, à la formation d'un bloc nordique sous un nouveau « Tientze » ou « Fils du Ciel », l'empereur Pou Y, dernier descendant de la dynastie des Tsinn. D'ailleurs, cette Chine du nord ne s'est jamais ralliée au pseudo-gouvernement de Nankin, elle a toujours tenu en profond mépris les petits politiciens du Kouo Ming Tang.

J'en viens maintenant à une question très importante puisque la décision finale, le verdict de la S. D. N., repose sur elle et a servi à le justifier : c'est la question de la nationalité des peuples qui occupent aujourd'hui la Mandchourie. La mission Lytton ne s'est pas embarquée dans des recherches ethniques ou historiques. Sans la moindre hésitation, elle déclare la Mandchourie peuplée presque uniquement de Chinois et, par suite, inéluc-

tablement chinoise. C'est là une erreur grossière, inadmissible : rien de plus facile que de le prouver : déjà, l'aperçu historique donné plus haut nous met en garde contre pareille assertion. En effet, quelle a été la première mesure prise par les Tsinn sitôt maîtres à Pékin pour empêcher l'envahissement de leur terre natale par le Chinois? Défense expresse de toute émigration vers la Mandchourie, défense qui s'étendit sur près de trois siècles et ne fut annulée qu'en 1906. Quelques groupes de Chinois furent admis de temps en temps, mais seulement des hommes du nord, qui devenaient les fermiers, les serfs plutôt, des grandes familles mongoles ou mandchoues et cultivaient leurs domaines. En ajoutant à ces nouveaux fermiers ceux très anciens d'avant la conquête de 1644 et hommes-lige de la famille impériale, des dix princes héréditaires et aussi des Bannières, on arrive à un chiffre de trois à quatre millions environ à la chute des Tsinn. On ne saurait être plus précis, puisqu'il n'existe pas d'état civil en Mandchourie, pas plus qu'en Chine. Tout ce monde attaché à la glèbe n'a jamais revendiqué la nationalité chinoise, vague entité, d'ailleurs, n'ayant aucun sens pour lui et ne figurant dans sa langue sous aucun vocable. Ces paysans chinois étaient complètement « mandchouisés », absorbés par les possesseurs du sol à un degré beaucoup plus marqué que de nombreux Irlandais, Français ou Allemands qui ont émigré aux Etats-Unis et se déclarent sans hésiter Américains. D'ailleurs, le peuple en Chine pense « provincialement », presque jamais « nationalement » ; l'idée de patrie chez lui est des plus floues, même chez les bruyants politiciens de Canton ou de Nankin, qui remplissent le monde de leur bourdonnement de frelon dit « nationaliste ». Ce nationalisme, d'ailleurs, n'est qu'une étiquette empruntée à l'Europe et que rien ne matérialise.

Mais quel est le chiffre global de la population de Mandchourie? Il oscillerait entre 25 et 30 millions, mais

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ce n'est qu'une estimation, puisqu'il n'y a jamais eu de recensement. Ce sont les Japonais qui donnent ce chiffre dans leur *Manchuria Year book*. Naturellement, cet annuaire n'a aucune prétention à la vérité ethnique et ne fait aucune distinction entre les anciens habitants, autochtones ou émigrés des époques reculées, et la masse de paysans chinois qui, ces dernières années, fuyant la misère et la mort, sont venus chercher un refuge en Mandchourie et tendent à s'y fixer. Cet exode est très récent : il remonte à une dizaine d'années au plus, lorsque l'anarchie a crû en Chine par l'alliance du Kouo Ming Tang avec Moscou. On estime le nombre de ces émigrants récents à 5 ou 6 millions, et c'est un maximum. Si, d'autre part, on admet que la population totale de Mandchourie est de 25 millions d'âmes (le chiffre de 30 millions devant être exagéré, ainsi que je l'ai toujours observé en Chine), il s'ensuit que 20 millions environ des habitants actuels sont les descendants des *vieilles familles mongoles, mandchoues et chinoises*, ces dernières faisant partie, comme il a été expliqué, de la formation des Bannières, privilège qui réalisait leur fusion dans le corps de nation mandchou-mongol. Et l'origine de cette fusion remonte aux époques les plus reculées, à nous ne savons combien de siècles. Dans ces conditions, les vrais Chinois ne comptent que pour 20 % dans le total de la population actuelle du Mandchoukouo et encore sont-ils des Nordiques, c'est-à-dire des frères de race des Mandchous et Mongols, des descendants de ceux qui se rangèrent du côté des Tsinn pour assurer leur domination sur la Chine.

Or, que dit le rapport Lytton ? Que, depuis 1906, « des millions de paysans chinois ont émigré en Mandchourie. Ces paysans prirent possession du sol et de ce fait la Mandchourie se trouve maintenant *définitivement* chinoise. » Vous avez bien lu : des millions de paysans ; c'est d'une affirmation aussi vague que se contente lord Lyt-

ton. Il n'est pas allé au delà, il ne s'est livré à aucune recherche sur l'origine ethnique de la population, et il n'a pas craint de formuler, avec quelle légèreté ! que des « millions d'émigrés récents chinois » (en réalité 5 à 6 millions) suffisaient pour *submerger* l'ancienne population et lui ravir son statut national mandchou-mongol, la déposséder de ses droits millénaires de premier occupant (4).

Donc, la vérité ethnique, démographique, n'est pas plus respectée que la vérité historique dans le rapport Lytton en ce qui concerne la Mandchourie. Quant à la partie traitant de la Chine proprement dite, si les faits politiques énumérés répondent généralement à la réalité, l'interprétation en est souvent fautive, absurde même, et d'une partialité par trop évidente à l'égard de la faction de Nankin, partialité qui eût été beaucoup plus marquée encore si le général Claudel n'y avait mis son veto.

Bref, les erreurs et les contradictions du rapport Lytton, celles-ci d'une réelle gravité, font de ce document un dossier plus que médiocre, trop souvent incohérent et même dangereux pour la paix, en raison de certaines conclusions. Mais aussi pourquoi la S. D. N. a-t-elle envoyé comme chef de mission en Chine un homme d'une grande valeur et conscience sans doute, mais qui présente cette carence rédhibitoire d'ignorer la Chine, de n'y avoir jamais vécu ? Il s'est donc trouvé perdu dans ce maquis. Et ce qui montre l'étendue de son incompréhension et la ténacité de ses illusions, c'est que le 21 février, à Paris, lord Lytton osait déclarer que « l'anarchie en Chine n'est qu'une apparence ; c'est le Japon qui serait déséquilibré ». Le jugement de l'histoire, sinon de l'opinion, ne pourra qu'être sévère pour lord Lytton, son rapport et ses déclarations. Rapport et déclarations jugent la valeur

(4) Que penserait le Français si, du fait de l'immigration chez lui de 4 à 5 millions d'Italiens depuis 20 ans, une commission de la S. D. N. venait déclarer, après enquête, que la France est désormais *italienne* ? C'est ainsi qu'a raisonné lord Lytton.

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de l'enquête en Chine. Mais quel danger pour la paix que ce pacifiste qui se range du côté de Nankin, donc du côté des féodaux, des fauteurs de guerre civile!

Et cependant, c'est *sur son rapport* uniquement que s'est basé le Comité des Dix-Neuf pour rendre son verdict. C'était d'ailleurs la planche de salut pour ce comité : que sait-il, en effet, de l'Asie, de ses peuples, de leurs réactions? L'un de ses membres m'a écrit : « Ce n'est pas un comité de juristes, de théoriciens ou d'amateurs, c'est une réunion de représentants officiels de 19 Etats. Et j'ajoute que toutes les résolutions ont été prises unanimement. » On discerne mal pourquoi le fait d'être représentant officiel d'un pays vous confère des connaissances spéciales, surtout de l'Asie. En outre l'unanimité des résolutions ne saurait nous étonner : c'est l'unanimité dans l'incompréhension et l'idée absurde que la S. D. N. défend le concept *démocratique et pacifiste* en soutenant le clan de Nankin, lequel clan serait en Asie le porte-drapeau de ce concept. Peut-il exister plus folle illusion? Les tyrans du Kouo Ming Tang, des démocrates, des pacifistes! Mais voilà vingt ans qu'ils se battent entre eux pour les meilleurs fiefs, au prix d'indicibles souffrances pour le peuple chinois qui, de désespoir, passe trop souvent au gouvernement soviétique de la Chine centrale, car, au moins, celui-ci fournit à tous ses adeptes le pain ou le riz quotidien.

J'ai dit plus haut la partialité du rapport Lytton, son omission ou altération de faits historiques et ethniques de la plus haute importance, faits très embarrassants d'ailleurs pour la S. D. N. Mais tout s'explique si l'on réfléchit que le but de l'enquête Lytton en Mandchourie était, avant tout, de chercher un moyen de couvrir les erreurs de la S. D. N., en particulier cette faute irréparable : l'admission dans son conseil d'une faction politique, d'un gouvernement-fantôme. Pour sa défense donc, pour la justification de sa ridicule politique, la S. D. N.

et ses envoyés en Chine n'hésitent pas à déclarer faussement qu'il existe un gouvernement *central, national* en Chine avec des droits sur la Mandchourie; d'où il s'ensuit que le Mandchoukouo ne saurait être reconnu comme terre libre, que le Japon devra faire amende honorable pour son audace.

Mais, pour qu'on puisse juger la valeur d'ensemble du rapport Lytton, il suffit de relever certaines contradictions des plus notoires. Par exemple, celle où la mission, après avoir fait le tableau le plus sombre d'une Chine disloquée, anarchique, après avoir été obligée de reconnaître que ce chaos sanglant est dû à la faction de Nankin, s'oublie à vouloir livrer la Mandchourie à cette faction. Plus loin, le rapport se risque à faire cet étrange constat : « que la faction de Nankin a vraiment acquis du mérite ». Mais si la mission Lytton estime que le clan de Nankin a des qualités, a bien mérité de la Chine et, par suite, est capable de gouverner, pourquoi donc recommande-t-elle aux Puissances de le mettre en *tutelle* et de réorganiser *elles-mêmes* la pauvre Chine? Tout n'est que contradiction dans ce rapport : en veut-on une nouvelle preuve? La mission Lytton a été obligée de reconnaître que la faction de Nankin, agressivement xénophobe, fait foin de tous les traités et, par suite, de tous les droits de l'étranger. Or, cette mission recommande au Japon de solutionner la question de Mandchourie par des tractations avec Nankin et la mise sur pied de nouveaux traités. Un enfant dirait : « A quoi bon? »

Un autre exemple : le rapport Lytton fait un grand éloge du Japon, explique qu'il a transformé la Mandchourie et l'a mise en valeur au bénéfice surtout des indigènes et de millions de Chinois émigrés, qu'il y a maintenu l'ordre malgré Nankin et Moscou. On s'attend donc à la conclusion que le Japon doit rester en Mandchourie, ne serait-ce que pour empêcher le Bolchévik

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de s'y incruster. Nullement. On dit au Japonais : « Va-t'en ! Nous allons créer en Mandchourie une gendarmerie à nous. » Or, ce n'est pas ce pays qui en a besoin, mais la Chine elle-même, pantelante sous le talon de millions de reîtres et de bandits. Toujours la contradiction, l'oubli des prémisses dans ce rapport que le « Times » baptise « admirable ».

Pourquoi aussi les envoyés de la S. D. N. refusent-ils l'indépendance au Mandchoukouo ? N'est-ce pas renier le principe wilsonien ? Et notre Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, que pense-t-elle de pareille attitude ? N'est-ce pas elle qui a établi comme axiome que « la résistance à l'oppression était un droit et le plus sacré des devoirs » ? Or, jamais peuple n'a été plus opprimé que le peuple mandchou par les toukiun d'origine chinoise. Que peut donc attendre cette ligue pour défendre la cause du Mandchoukouo ?

Faut-il encore d'autres preuves de l'incohérence du rapport Lytton ? Il n'y a qu'à lire ce qu'il dit du Mandchoukouo ou ne dit pas. Par exemple, il oublie de mentionner ce fait si important que la dynastie des Tsinn a toujours été considérée par le peuple chinois comme une dynastie *étrangère*, ainsi que celle des Yuan ou Mongols. Quant à la Mandchourie, nous l'avons signalé, ce n'était pour ce peuple qu'une terre située hors de Chine (kouan wai), au delà de la Grande Muraille : donc un *pays étranger*. Mais, en ce qui regarde la population de Mandchourie, le rapport Lytton s'étend complaisamment en hypothèses ou affirmations des plus curieuses. Celle-ci par exemple : que tout groupe humain, s'il vit en contact quelque peu prolongé avec le Chinois, perd tout de suite sa personnalité raciale, se fond dans le particularisme de ce dernier, est, en un mot, « assimilé », parce que le Chinois « is all-absorbing », possède cette miraculeuse capacité ! Cliché absurde que la mission Lytton a ramassé dans les ports de Chine. Mais, de cette affirmation, la

mission va jusqu'à supprimer 80 % des habitants de Mandchourie : les anciens. Comment, direz-vous ? Simple-ment en déclarant que le Mandchoukouo renferme une population « overwhelmingly chinese », c'est-à-dire un pourcentage écrasant de Chinois. Or, nous savons que ce pourcentage d'émigrés est de 20 % ; nous avons donc raison de dire que lord Lytton oublie, escamote 80 % de la population, soit les descendants des Mandchous, des Mongols et des Chinois des Bannières, confondus dans le même groupe ethnique et social.

Il y a encore cette naïve remarque de la mission Lytton : que les émigrés chinois conservent des *relations* avec leur village d'origine. Est-ce une raison de plus pour chinoiser la Mandchourie ?

Mais pourquoi, dira-t-on, lord Lytton veut-il absolument que cette Mandchourie soit chinoise, peuplée presque uniquement par des Chinois ? Parce que Nankin, autrement, n'aurait aucune raison de revendiquer le Mandchoukouo, et ainsi toute l'accusation portée contre le Japon d'avoir violé les frontières de Chine *tomberait d'elle-même*. Et la S. D. N., qui s'est jetée à corps perdu dans cette aventure pour s'efforcer de relever son prestige dans le monde, perdrait une fois de plus la « face » et gravement.

Lord Lytton n'est pas plus heureux quand il cherche à prouver que le peuple de Mandchourie est de cœur avec la Chine dans ses aspirations. Comme il ignorait le milieu où il opérait, il a pris au sérieux 1.500 ou 1.600 lettres reçues par la mission, hostiles au nouveau gouvernement. Mais ces lettres, pour qui connaît les méthodes chinoises, étaient dictées sous la menace ou fabriquées à tant la ligne, donc sans valeur. De pareilles lettres écrites spontanément par des paysans ou ouvriers à une mission officielle étrangère, quelle plaisanterie ! Ces pauvres gens ne l'oseraient jamais. L'idée même ne peut leur en venir. Cependant, le rapport Lytton enregistre candidement :

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« Ces lettres donnaient l'impression d'exprimer avec *spontanéité* des opinions *sincères*. » On n'est pas plus ignorant de la Chine et de ses caractéristiques! Mais toutes ces erreurs ou illusions sont enregistrées à Genève. Et c'est ainsi que trop souvent se règlent les affaires de ce monde, que le sort d'un pays est à la merci d'une *carence officielle*.

Sur un point important, la mission Lytton nous fournit encore une preuve marquée de cette carence. Elle déclare nettement que la Mandchourie n'a pu se proclamer indépendante que sous la pression du Japon. C'est une sérieuse erreur, dont les conséquences sont déplorables, car le comité des Dix-Neuf en a été très impressionné. Erreur sérieuse, dis-je; en octobre 1928, j'étais, en effet, en Mandchourie, à Moukden, et le dictateur Tchang Hsue Liang, fils de Tchang Tso Ling, me demandait une entrevue. Etant renseigné, sachant que gouverneurs et généraux du pays, soit mandchous, soit chinois, menaçaient de l'abandonner en raison de sa collusion avec la faction de Nankin, je conseillai à Tchang de rompre sans hésiter avec le Kouo Ming Tang, dont l'action était néfaste pour la paix sur son territoire. Tchang n'a pas osé rompre et il a perdu son beau royaume, vaste comme la France et l'Espagne réunies.

Je n'ai donc pas été surpris de la naissance du Mandchoukouo (mars 1932), aboutissement d'un effort d'indépendance en pleine préparation en 1928. L'initiative de cette libération a été celle des chefs et notables des anciennes Bannières ou clans mandchous, mongols et chinois.

En outre, s'est fait sentir l'influence des grandes familles mandchoues, obligées de fuir la Chine lors de la révolution de 1911, pour échapper au massacre qui était fait de leur congénères, y compris femmes et enfants. Ces familles, souvent d'une haute lignée de conquérants, n'ont jamais pardonné à la Jeune-Chine, au Kouo Ming

Tang, sa cruauté et les indignes humiliations qu'il leur a fait subir. En Mandchourie, ce fut la curée : les jeunes politiciens du Kouo Ming Tang, dits « républicains », confisquèrent toutes les grandes propriétés à leur bénéfice. Aussi, la réaction, la révolte, gronda bientôt au souvenir de ces spoliations et de ces massacres; elle éclata cette année, la Mandchourie ressaisissant son indépendance, elle jamais soumise, d'ailleurs, mais berceau de tant de conquérants de la Chine. Toute sa gloire ancienne lui est revenue à la mémoire, toutes les victorieuses chevauchées des siècles passés. La Mandchourie se devait donc de revivre sa vie indépendante, de secouer le joug odieux du Kouo Ming Tang.

C'est fait aujourd'hui, non sous la pression du Japon, comme on l'a dit, mais par le réveil, la *résurrection de l'âme ancestrale chez un grand peuple qui a terriblement souffert*. Des millions d'anciens Chinois émigrés, tant spoliés ces dernières années, sont de cœur avec ces Mandchous qui ont partagé leur sol avec eux. Quant aux Mongols, frères de race, leurs princes *accourent de tous côtés* vers la Mandchourie, même du si lointain Kou Kou Nor, pour saluer le nouveau *Mok Khan*, l'« Empereur ».

Or, il est grave de constater que la mission Lytton n'a rien compris à cet éveil d'une très grande nationalité : faisant foin de toute tradition historique et de toute réalité ethnique, elle s'évertue à rapetisser ce grand fait international.

Donc, les envoyés de la S. D. N. renient le principe wilsonien, le principe des nationalités qui est cependant la charte de cette Société. Ils n'ont même pas compris qu'il est urgent de constituer un *Etat-Tampon* entre la Russie soviétique et la Chine déjà si contaminée, Etat qui ne peut être que le Mandchoukouo.

Il est non moins incompréhensible que la faction de Nankin réclame le territoire mandchou : comme on l'a vu, cette prétention ne repose sur rien, ni du point de vue

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historique, ni du point de vue ethnique, encore moins d'un droit de conquête, puisque la Chine a toujours été vaincue dans ses luttes avec les Mandchous et Mongols. Les politiciens de Nankin vont jusqu'à déclarer que, du fait de l'abdication des Tsinn, en 1912, la Mandchourie cesse d'être territoire impérial, l'apanage de l'ancienne dynastie, et devient ainsi province chinoise. Pareille prétention ne mérite pas d'être discutée. Comme si Hsuan Tong, le dernier descendant des fameux conquérants mandchous, avait pu, en abdiquant, abandonner l'héritage de ses pères, sa terre toujours victorieuse, pour la placer sous l'autorité du pays vaincu ou plutôt d'un petit clan de politiciens profondément méprisés par Chinois et Mandchous et qui ne représentent qu'eux-mêmes, sauf pour la S. D. N. et la II^e Internationale!

Dans toute cette question de Mandchourie, ce qui étonne le plus, c'est de voir la mission Lytton adopter toutes les déclarations fantaisistes des politiciens de Nankin, toutes leurs déformations effrontées de la vérité; bien mieux, la mission étale sa partialité choquante au grand jour, surtout dans certaine annexe du rapport. Cette mission très coûteuse n'aura servi qu'à aggraver le conflit, à préparer une ère de complications inextricables. Et dans son incompréhension des faits, si inquiétante pour l'avenir, le comité des Dix-Neuf n'a pas été moins imprudent que ces enquêteurs: n'a-t-il pas consacré leur carence?

Quant au Japon, on a fait tout pour le rejeter de la S. D. N., même la France, par l'attitude étrange de sa délégation, nageant en pleine idéologie; on lui a blessé la « face » au bénéfice d'une horde de toukiun, de féodaux. Aussi, craignez d'en subir le contre-coup en Europe, car s'il est un grand peuple soucieux de la paix en Asie, il a aussi la rancune tenace.

Mais quel est l'enseignement à tirer de pareil résultat, de pareille faillite de la S. D. N. et de son secrétariat.

aussi incompetent que le comité des Dix-Neuf? C'est que Genève n'aurait jamais dû se mêler du conflit sino-japonais, d'un problème asiatique trop complexe pour elle et si différent des situations prévues par la S. D. N. Et la solution de ce problème reste toujours celle de négociations directes entre la Chine et le Japon. Ce qui surtout apparaît inadmissible, c'est que le comité des Dix-Neuf se fasse l'instrument inconscient d'un petit clan politique qui l'a bafoué et aujourd'hui rit à plein gosier de l'avoir si bien dupé qu'il a obtenu gain de cause. La déclaration Paul-Boncour à la Chambre l'a, en particulier, follement amusé. Quant au pauvre peuple chinois, qui voit ses tyrans absous et encouragés, il va maudire une fois de plus la S. D. N.

Le gâchis actuel est sans issue pour le cénacle de Genève, puisqu'il condamne le *gendarme*, répudie toute force. C'est sans doute par ses homélies qu'il compte réduire les cinq millions de reîtres et de bandits qui écument la Chine. Si la S. D. N. ne s'était pas occupée de ce conflit, il y a beau temps qu'il serait réglé: elle a *entretenu* la guerre. D'ailleurs, le verdict de son comité ne résout rien: quelle sanction effective peut être prise? Nous allons envoyer des corps d'armées et des flottes en cette Mandchourie qui se dérobe à l'oppression d'un toukiun? Il faudrait aussi ne pas oublier qu'en aboutissant à *affaiblir* le Japon, nous *fortifions* d'autant la Russie bolchévique. Donc, quelle imprudence de toucher à la *seule* force de stabilité sociale et d'équilibre politique qui existe en Asie! Est-ce vraiment le moment d'errer à ce degré? La S. D. N. prend devant l'histoire une bien lourde responsabilité. Et qui en fera les frais? Les peuples. Sauve-t-elle au moins ses principes? Nullement, puisqu'elle se range du côté de l'*anarchie contre l'ordre*, du côté de l'*anarchie* chinoise. Quelle étrange leçon de moralité politique elle donne ainsi au monde! Croit-elle, la S. D. N., conduire ainsi les nations à la paix? Mais

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ce qu'elle prépare, c'est la guerre, une nouvelle grande guerre. Et, le feu une fois mis à l'Asie, pense-t-elle pouvoir l'arrêter par ses oracles? C'est l'univers entier qui flambera, et ce seront les peuples qui paieront, une fois de plus, de leur sang, les erreurs de leurs bergers. Jamais d'aussi pauvres équipes n'avaient encore gouverné le monde.

Elles n'ont rien su prévoir ou comprendre, rien empêcher depuis 1920. Et pendant qu'elles rendaient le verdict du 24 février contre le Japon, elles se bouchaient les oreilles pour ne pas entendre le *han iuen*, le cri de vengeance, la clameur étouffée, mais formidable, des masses chinoises, de tout un peuple martyr qui avait cru dans la justice de Genève et voit la S. D. N. donner raison à ses féodaux, à ses tyrans et consolider leur pouvoir alors qu'il entretenait, depuis un an, l'espoir d'être débarrassé par elle d'un régime odieux. Mais la voix du peuple chinois, de cette énorme masse humaine, c'est, pour le cénacle de Genève, *Vox clamantis in deserto*.

Cependant les Puissances seront bientôt acculées à une décision: à celle de sauver la Chine d'un *effondrement* total dont seul profiterait Moscou. Le chaos actuel, sous la dictature du Kouo Ming Tang, de Nankin en particulier, nous mène à grande vitesse vers cet effondrement. Si le côté humanitaire laisse indifférente la S. D. N., elle ne doit pas oublier, dans la crise économique actuelle, que la Chine est un grand marché pour nos peuples, un marché qu'il est urgent de sauvegarder. A Londres, le Japon vient, par la voix de M. Matsuoka, d'inviter les Puissances à agir: vont-elles encore faire la sourde oreille et se contenter de brimer le gendarme japonais, cet *agresseur*, comme il a été qualifié à Genève? Agresseur: mais aucun Européen ayant vécu en Chine, ces dernières années, n'aurait l'idée d'accuser le Japon d'agression. Pour qui connaît le Jeune-Chinois, c'est celui-ci le provocateur. Et c'est pure candeur de la part de certains de nos parlemen-

taires d'ajouter foi à cette propagande de Nankin qui a eu l'effronterie d'assimiler l'action du Japon en Mandchourie à l'invasion de la Belgique et de la France par l'Allemagne. Cette farce des Jeunes-Chinois a d'ailleurs eu plein succès: aussi riront-ils longtemps de la « stupidité du Barbare français », ainsi qu'ils nous baptisent.

Mais il y a certains dessous des plus curieux, des plus comiques même dans le conflit sino-japonais, qu'il est utile de signaler parce qu'ils en disent long. Par exemple, Nankin était d'accord, l'an dernier, avec Tokio pour l'évacuation de la Mandchourie *sans combat* et pour la non-résistance à Shanghai. Cette collusion a été d'ailleurs le secret de Polichinelle, et la S. D. N. n'a pu l'ignorer. C'est uniquement la jalousie du clan de Canton qui a fait avorter cette belle combinaison, si bien chinoise. Oui, c'est là le patriotisme des coryphées de Nankin. Ce que voulait ce clan si menacé de crouler, c'était l'appui du Japon... à n'importe quel prix!

La propagande de Nankin a bien cherché par tous les moyens à masquer ces turpitudes et surtout l'état d'anarchie actuelle, grandissant avec l'extension de la jacquerie communiste. Mais toute cette propagande mensongère ne peut faire illusion sur les conséquences d'un tel chaos et donner le change à des nations coloniales d'une longue expérience, comme la France et l'Angleterre. A quel mobile donc ont-elles obéi à Genève, le 24 février, surtout qu'elles ne peuvent se méprendre sur la valeur réelle du rapport Lytton, sur son incohérence? Aussi, pourquoi cette comédie de la défense de la *démocratie*, ainsi que des principes de la S. D. N.? La défense de quelle démocratie? De celle de Nankin, cette fiction, cette duperie? La vérité n'est-elle pas que ces nations ont été fascinées, paralysées par la grande ombre de l'oncle Sam, laquelle s'est toujours projetée sur le comité des Dix-Neuf? L'impérialisme américain exagère: c'est au monde entier qu'il tend à imposer sa loi. Et les peuples d'ailleurs obéissent comme

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autant de toutous. Voyez plutôt: Un cénacle de quarante nations en est ainsi venu à commettre la *summa injuria* en affectant de réaliser le *summum jus*. Et ce qui est non moins grave, il a préparé, dans son inconscience, une entente presque fatale du Japon avec Moscou et Berlin.

La S. D. N. a donc bien travaillé pour la paix!

Mais va-t-elle en rester là? Son devoir n'est-il pas de ramener le Japon à Genève?

D' A. LEGENDRE.

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Enclosure N° 2 to Special Report N° 1223 of April 8, 1933
 From American Embassy at Paris
 Extract From " L' Avenir " of April 6, 1933

Les Soviets et le Japon en Mandchourie

Dans le dernier numéro de la Revue des Vivants, un confrère anonyme étudie avec beaucoup de soin et de science les rapports de l'U. R. S. S. et du Japon en Chine et particulièrement en Mandchourie, depuis la guerre de 1904-1905, c'est-à-dire le traité de Portsmouth. Nous y trouvons un résumé en tous points parfait des manœuvres dont depuis 1931 la Mandchourie a été l'objet, et des conclusions qu'on peut tirer, pour l'avenir, des derniers événements :

Au cours de 1931, le Japon a essayé d'obtenir par voie de pourparlers le contrôle sur tous les chemins de fer mandchouriens et la renonciation de la Chine à toute construction des nouvelles lignes projetées. Ces pourparlers ne purent aboutir. Le Japon décida donc de brusquer les choses et d'atteindre ses buts par la « manière forte ». D'où l'occupation de Moukden en septembre 1931 (1). Les événements qui s'ensuivirent sont connus. Du point de vue des rapports russo-japonais, il est évident que l'offensive japonaise en Mandchourie devait provoquer chez les dirigeants soviétiques une profonde inquiétude. Les nombreuses notes que Moscou échangea avec Tokio décelèrent une ferme volonté d'éviter tout incident, de ne pas se prêter à des provocations. En octobre, l'U.R.S.S. oppose des dénégations formelles à la note par laquelle le Japon l'accusait de fournir des armes et des instructeurs aux troupes du « général » Ma-Tchan-Chan, qui opérait dans la région de Tsitsikar. A ce sujet, si peut-être les premiers jours du conflit les autorités soviétiques locales ont pu prêter quelque aide au général chinois, il est certain que l'U.R.S.S. adopta une politique de neutralité absolue poussée à l'extrême et qu'elle se désintéressa des mouvements de partisans et de bandes armées qui harcelaient un peu partout les troupes japonaises d'occupation. Au moment même où la délégation japonaise était de passage à Moscou pour se rendre à Genève (commencement de novembre 1932), l'U.R.S.S., sans prévenir Nankin, faisait arrêter à leur débarquement à Vladivostok, puis expulser après confiscation de leurs armes, les volontaires chinois à destination du rayon Hailar-Mandjouria.

La période plus difficile des rapports russo-japonais fut celle de novembre 1931 à avril 1932. Le 5 novembre 1931, Vorochilov faisait au correspondant de l'« United Press » des déclarations de neutralité à l'égard des deux parties en conflit. Quelques jours après, Moscou envoyait une note protestant contre les bruits d'une assistance soviétique aux généraux chinois, à laquelle Tokio répondait en exprimant l'espoir « que l'U.R.S.S. gardera la même attitude de neutralité scrupuleuse

que le Japon a adoptée lors du conflit russo-chinois de 1925 ». Le 22, Litvinov répliquait à cette note avec une certaine âpreté de langage, en soulignant la différence entre la « défensive » russe de 1929 et l'« offensive » japonaise de 1931. C'est que, entre temps, le 18 novembre, les troupes japonaises, après avoir franchi le chemin de fer de l'Est, occupaient Tsitsikar. Nouvelle note russe en février contre l'utilisation que les Japonais avaient faite et prétendaient encore faire du C. E. R. pour les transports de troupes. Le Japon, cette fois, demanda carrément, le 28 février, l'autorisation d'utiliser la ligne à l'est de Kharbine, et le même jour, les Soviets, mis en face d'un ultimatum déguisé, répondaient qu'ils consentaient « exceptionnellement » au transport « en nombre limité de troupes japonaises de Kharbine jusqu'à la station d'Hailin ». Mais en même temps, les Soviets s'arrangèrent pour réduire au minimum la valeur pratique de l'autorisation à laquelle ils n'avaient pu se soustraire, en vidant le C. E. R. de tout le matériel roulant : wagons, locomotives, avaient été évacués, d'un côté vers Tchita, de l'autre vers Vladivostok. A ce moment, les rapports entre l'U.R.S.S. et le Japon atteignent leur plus haut degré de tension. A partir du mois de mai 1932, il se produit une certaine détente, le Japon ayant acquis, du fait de l'attitude à laquelle les Soviets étaient forcés, la liberté totale de mouvement dont il avait besoin. Notes et déclarations se succèdent, mais sans apporter d'éléments nouveaux. Les discussions devant la S.D.N., l'attitude des Etats-Unis persuadaient au Japon de ne point compliquer trop son jeu en poussant à la rupture avec l'U.R.S.S.

Vers la fin de l'année 1932 et au commencement de 1933, nous assistons à deux faits apparemment contradictoires : un « rapprochement » sino-japonais et la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre le gouvernement soviétique et la Chine, relations rompues depuis 1927. M. Matsukata venait à peine de déclarer à Genève au correspondant du « Temps » la satisfaction du gouvernement japonais pour l'attitude correcte de l'U.R.S.S. que la nouvelle de l'accord Litvinoff-Yen soulevait dans la presse et dans les sphères dirigeantes japonaises d'assez violentes réactions. L'idylle cesse brusquement, une période nouvelle de suspicion et de mauvaise humeur va s'ouvrir. Quelles en seront les conséquences ?

En Mandchourie, rien ne peut se produire entre l'U.R.S.S. et le Japon, à moins que celui-ci soit décidé à prendre l'offensive au delà des frontières soviétiques. Et on ne voit pas pour l'instant, quel intérêt il aurait à s'y engager. L'U.R.S.S. a fait, en Mandchourie, toutes les concessions possibles : elle a laissé les militaires japonais s'installer le long du C. E. R., a abandonné à eux-mêmes les « irréguliers chinois », a accepté de reconnaître « de facto » le Mandchou-Kuo par la confirmation des consuls soviétiques dans les principales villes mandchouriennes. Cette situation ne diffère pas extrêmement de celle qui aurait été faite à l'U.R.S.S., si celle-ci avait mené une guerre pour défendre ses posi-

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tions en Mandchourie et si elle l'avait perdue.

Mais il ne faut pas oublier que cette situation est due exclusivement à la ferme volonté de l'U.R.S.S. de ne pas arriver à une guerre avec le Japon. La raison essentielle de cette attitude doit être cherchée dans la situation peu brillante dans laquelle se trouvent, à la fin du plan quinquennal, l'industrie lourde et légère et les approvisionnements en blé et en denrées alimentaires. Une guerre d'une certaine envergure et d'une certaine durée, même en dehors de toutes les autres complications possibles, risquerait de détraquer complètement l'organisation industrielle et économique du pays, durement éprouvée par toutes les expériences « in corpore vili » auxquelles l'ont soumise les multiples changements de programme, de rythme et de politique entre 1928 et 1932.

Il reste pourtant entre les deux Etats des raisons profondes de conflits qui excluent, à notre avis, toute possibilité d'un rapprochement durable entre eux, et qui, même si elles n'aboutissent pas à une guerre, empêcheront toute collaboration sérieuse et seront une cause permanente de tiraillements et de frictions.

1) Il y a, avant tout, la raison essentielle que l'U.R.S.S. des Soviets a hérité de la Russie des Tzars, celle de l'équilibre en Extrême-Orient, menacé par le programme expansionniste du Japon, que le mémorial Tanaka de 1927 a exposé dans toute son inquiétante ampleur et dans sa tendance panasiatique. Aujourd'hui, l'U.R.S.S., même en dehors de toute question d'équilibre, ne peut que voir avec beaucoup d'appréhension s'installer sur ses frontières extrême-orientales une puissance possédant les moyens militaires dont dispose le Japon.

2) Ce danger se complique de l'existence en Mandchourie du Nord de fortes agglomérations de Russes blancs, comprenant les survivants de la catastrophe de Koltchak et d'autres groupements armés antisoviétiques. Leur rêve et leur programme, c'est la reprise de la lutte contre les Soviets, lutte qui pourrait tout au moins aboutir à la création d'un Etat indépendant dans la Sibérie orientale, où se rétablirait ainsi la situation d'avant 1922. Les chefs japonais, surtout les militaires, n'ont pas renoncé à utiliser éventuellement un tel concours. Nous indiquons à cet égard un seul témoignage, de

source non suspecte. Un ancien attaché d'ambassade de Tokio a fait au journal « La Croix » les déclarations suivantes : « Il faut considérer l'apport des Russes blancs qui se sont réfugiés en grand nombre à Moukden, à Chang-Tchoun, à Kharbine, où ils dépassent 100.000, et qui sont des membres de l'aristocratie, des ingénieurs, des contremaîtres, des industriels, etc., groupement d'élite que le Japon, comme l'écrit un journal tsariste, peut attirer dans son orbite pour reconstituer une Sibérie antibolcheviste. Appuyé sur cet Etat devenu libre, le Japon, de l'avis du général Oraki, ministre actuel de la Guerre et ancien attaché militaire à Saint-Petersbourg, pourrait, non seulement converser plus librement avec l'Amérique, mais songer, sans être taxé d'utopie, à détacher la Transbaikalie de la suzeraineté bolchevique et à amorcer la dislocation de l'U.R.S.S. (16 juin 1932). »

3) Le marché chinois présente pour l'U.R.S.S. un intérêt qui n'est pas négligeable, surtout dans la situation actuelle. Les chiffres des échanges russo-chinois sont assez modestes : en 1927-28, les exportations russes en Chine avaient atteint 14 millions de roubles et les importations de Chine 31,6 millions, où le thé figure pour 27,9 millions de roubles, soit pour 88 %. Mais étant donné les difficultés croissantes qui s'opposent aux exportations russes, tout débouché est précieux pour l'U.R.S.S., d'autant plus que celle-ci peut avoir en échange de ses produits vendus en Chine (cotonnades, produits du pétrole, chaussures en caoutchouc, parfumerie, produits sibériens) le thé qui tient un rôle important dans la vie russe. Sous ce rapport aussi, il y a donc opposition d'intérêt entre l'U.R.S.S. et le Japon (1).

Nous ne croyons pas que, pour l'instant, ces conflits d'intérêts cherchent une solution dans la guerre. Mais si l'extension de l'offensive japonaise dans le Jehol, et le projet de la « Chine du Nord » autonome amenait les Etats-Unis à intervenir directement en Extrême-Orient, il est à peu près certain que les Japonais essaieraient d'occuper Vladivostok pour enlever à la flotte américaine ce point d'appui possible. Mais l'hypothèse que nous avançons là dépasse le cadre des rapports russo-japonais et se place dans celui d'une lutte intercontinentale sur le Pacifique.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated April 24, 1933.

Recd. 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



April 24, 3 p.m.

A usually well informed authority stated today that Manchukuo forces are gradually withdrawing eastward from Lwan River; that Chinese armored train has been moving eastward this morning and has now reached a point about six miles east of Lwanchow; that no fighting is taking place and that there is reason to believe that withdrawal is by agreement. Above has not been confirmed but am disposed believe correct.

A train of soldiers, rails and coolie labor which arrived at Yangtsun yesterday in connection with construction of rail cut off from that point to Lutaion Peiping-Mukden railway was suddenly withdrawn last night and work suspended.

Reports are still current at Tientsin, apparently with good basis of fact, that a group of military and political leaders are negotiating for the establishment of a new government in this area to be independent or at least

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 24, 3 p. m. from Tientsin

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least semi-independent of Nanking. This movement is sponsored by leaders who are alleged to be dissatisfied with Chiang Kai Shek's failure to provide military and financial support in the effort to meet Japanese aggression. Actually, however, these leaders are largely concerned, in my judgment, with expedients to obtain a stop of hostilities and to negotiate an understanding with the Japanese and/or Manchukuo authorities to prevent the invasion of Tientsin and Peiping and consequent loss of this area. It is difficult at this stage to name those who have identified themselves with the movement. It is possible that the main objective of the movement may be to create a buffer state comprising the territory between Lwanchow and the Wall.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 2, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~MMH~~

To read the despatch
 I think that this despatch should be read in full.

Mukden's despatch of March 31 1933 concerning present relations between China and Japan.

This is a well prepared report, chiefly based upon newspaper items appearing in the JAPAN CHRONICLE ~~Chronicle~~ of March. A copy of a statement given to the press on March 9th by General Araki, is enclosed. This statement contains the following:

" Japan has no special desire to conclude an alliance or enter into an entente cordiale with China, but if that country reverts to a policy of friendship with Japan, an understanding will gradually be promoted between the two nations".

Consul General Myers thinks that the Japanese are disappointed that, following the Jehol campaign, Chiang Kai-shih replaced Marshal Chang in North China with little or no opposition from northern military leaders. Some Japanese hoped to establish a neutral zone south of the great wall but General Itagaki and other leaders are now favoring the establishment of a buffer state. This idea becomes more difficult of accomplishment with Chiang Kai-shih in control of the area in question. Lately he has become the butt of Japanese press propaganda in succession to Chang Hsueh-liang.

MMH
 LHE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECU

No. _____

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, March 31, 1933.

APR 22 33

SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on Present Sino-Japanese Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 24 1933

Department of State

I have the honor to enclose herewith my despatch
No. 736 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated
March 29, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 736
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

4 Carbon Copies
Received *F. C.*

MAY 20 1933

F/HS

793.94/6211

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 736.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, March 29, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Some Sidelights on Present Sino-
Japanese Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 725, of February 25, 1933, under the subject "Developments in Jehol Situation," in which the statement was made that the Japanese anticipated that the Jehol campaign would lead to the resignation of Chang Hsueh-liang and the creation of disturbances by his defeated soldiers in North China, I have the honor to report further on Japanese views regarding possible developments in that area.

1/- In THE JAPAN CHRONICLE of March 9, 1933, there appeared a brief report, a copy of which is enclosed, of a statement to the press given by General Araki, Minister of War. He stated inter alia that the overthrow of Chinese influence in Jehol may be expected to lead to disturbances in North China as a result of the rivalries between the military leaders

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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leaders. Possibly "the wish was father to the thought." It has been learned from a responsible Japanese that influential elements in the army are greatly displeased with the way the situation has developed since the occupation of Jehol. General Chiang Kai-shih's clever move in rapidly concentrating his troops in North China and the absence of opposition on the part of northern leaders to his assumption of control apparently took the Japanese by surprise. No disturbances have occurred and instead of some northern warlord with Japanese blessings, if not with their material assistance, endeavoring to assert his supremacy and at the same time to keep the North free from southern domination, northern leaders have accepted the changed situation at least without outward objection. According to confidential information, the aim of these influential elements is the establishment of a buffer state north of the Yellow River, with which a settlement of border problems including the cessation of hostilities could be negotiated. It is understood that Major-General Itagaki who has played a prominent role in events since September 18, 1931, dislikes the suggested plan of a neutral zone south of the Great Wall - it is to be noted that the Japanese press have not mentioned it recently - and is one of the supporters of the buffer state proposal. Unfortunately for its proponents, events have not thus far moved in the desired direction but it may be deduced from the history of the occupation of Manchuria

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Manchuria that a suitable pretext will not be wanting for long as soon as the policy has been resolved.

Japanese press statements and the activities of Japanese diplomats give credit to the opinion that since the occupation of Jehol the responsible Japanese authorities have been engrossed in seeking a means to induce China to recognize the altered situation or at least to enter into negotiations for an armistice along the Jehol front and for a cessation of the boycott. That the difficulties attending the reaching of an amicable settlement with China at this time are practically insurmountable are, it is to be inferred from recent press reports, fully recognized, a Tokyo despatch dated March 27, carried by the Manchoukuo News Agency, for instance, indicating that Japan will not take positive steps to open negotiations with China at present but will "wait for a suitable opportunity for international harmony and cooperation among Japan, China and Manchoukuo." Moreover, the cost of the Manchurian adventure, both direct and indirect, is rapidly mounting and as its effects are becoming apparent even to the most ardent patriot as well as becoming more widely felt, the military may in a spirit of ultra-patriotic fervor again seek a settlement by carrying the sword into North China. Manchoukuo which was hailed as a buffer state against a rampant and demoralizing communism and a chaotic and disunited

China

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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China now, in the minds of at least some Japanese, needs the protection of a buffer state.

The increasing outspokenness of Japanese laymen concerning Japan's policy vis-a-vis Manchuria and Japanese logic are equally exhibited in an article concerning the recent changes in North China which appeared in THE JAPAN CHRONICLE of March 22, 1933. This article which is based on reviews in recent issues of the "Oriental Economist" states that in the opinion of the Economist Japan's China policy should be centered on China proper as its trade with that country is far more important than with Manchuria and Mongolia and points out that its trade with China during the past two years has decreased by about fifty per cent, a heavy sacrifice which Japanese traders and manufacturers have patiently borne on account of the Manchurian affair. It characterizes Japanese diplomacy as "mailed-fist and bluff" and states that it cannot but intensify nationalism in China and decrease Japan's trade with that country. Concerning the advent of Chiang Kai-shih's power in the North, the article proceeds in the following optimistic vein:

"Now, however, the resignation of Chang and Chiang Kai-shek's advent in the North promise to give opportunity for Japan's bluff diplomacy being converted into a conciliatory policy. We are credibly informed that the fall of Chang and the ascendancy of the Chiang party in the North are going to give effect to what Japan has been aiming at, that is, the scheme for establishing a neutral political power in the Peiping-Tientsin zone. This being so, the Jehol expedition

will

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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will not cross the Great Wall and the Peiping-Tientsin district will be spared the ravages of war, to the relief of the Powers. The development is particularly important in that it has opened a way for negotiations between Japan and China proper. Of course, Chiang is also a Chinaman, and to save appearances he may be called upon to declare that he is determined to keep up the anti-Japanese struggles in place of Chang Hsueh-liang, but even if he does so, it will be only by way of a domestic policy, and not a policy he will seriously pursue.

"On the whole, then, it is to be expected that things will move peacefully in the Peiping-Tientsin district. It is already reported that the great man of the North, Yen Hsi-shan, has met Chiang and promised to support his man Ho Ying-chin in command of the North, and that an understanding is now being arranged with Feng Yu-hsiang also. So unless Chiang Kai-shek loses his hold on China - and his position is not likely to be shaken for the present at any rate - a closer rapprochement may be expected between Japan and China. Of course it is unthinkable that all the complicated problems between this country and China will be swept away at a single stroke, but after China and Japan have been colliding at right angles at every turn and they have gone their different ways and reached the present impasse, it is enough to create an exceedingly hopeful feeling in the business community here that a prospect has come in sight of a compromise being arranged with the Chiang Kai-shek party.

"Indeed, Chiang will have various difficulties to face and there are also anti-Chiang elements which are anxious to step into Chiang's shoes, but now that Japan's diplomacy is passing from bluff diplomacy to something better calculated to lead to a way out, some sort of co-operation may be expected between Japan and China. It depends on time and on the attitude of this country. And seeing that this latter is changing to a line more favorable to compromise, is it not in order to hope that China will also show herself more conciliatory?"

In this connection the army spokesman at Mukden recently made the statement at a press conference that the Japanese believe that Chiang Kai-shek will be unable to take any definite stand either favorable to

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to or against Japan before he has consolidated his position in North China. According to available information, army circles are of the opinion that circumstances will not permit him to undertake the much-to-be-desired direct negotiations for the settlement of the Manchurian and other issues. Lately it has been noted that Chiang Kai-shih has become the butt of Japanese press propaganda in succession to Chang Hsueh-liang; whether this will develop into a definite campaign to discredit him will no doubt depend upon the trend of his policy in regard to Japan.

Confidential information from a reliable source just received is to the effect that the situation along the Great Wall has during the past week become much more serious and that the Japanese military believe that it is only a matter of time until they will be obliged to invade North China in order to put a stop to the repeated attacks by Chinese troops on Japanese positions along the Wall. The military claim that the Chinese are taking advantage of the fact that the Japanese troops have been ordered not to go south of the Wall.

With further reference to this subject matter, there were also given in the above mentioned article extracts from a symposium of views of leading Japanese economists on the consequences of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations which appeared in earlier issues of the "Oriental Economist." Concerning the Jehol campaign, Mr. Ogucki Kirooku, a Seiyukai member

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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member and former Vice-Minister of Finance, expressed the opinion that the leaders of the army will not "expressly order a march outside of Manchuria (Jehol is obviously included in that territory) but it is to be greatly questioned whether in military operations action can be precisely limited to the national boundaries." Mr. Katsuta Teiji, "who specializes in forecasting business weather," also is reported to have stated in the same symposium that he fears that the Jehol campaign will be extended beyond the limits of Jehol. He added: "In Japan, the graver the situation becomes the greater airs will the military give themselves and the more deeply will the country pass under the sway of something that may be called imperialism or militarism, as there will be nothing for it but to allow men of the fighting profession to have their own way when fighting is going on." Mr. Takahashi Kamekichi, described as a well-known economist and head of the Takahashi Economic Inquiry Institute, holds that the nation must control the army. His view is expressed in part as follows:

"It is evading our responsibility too much to hold the military and others solely responsible as if it was no concern of the majority of the nation, and content ourselves with merely worrying about the possible consequences of their actions. This is to make too little of the will of the nation - the attitude of men in desperation. I do not think that all of us are in such desperation. This being so, it is not likely that Japan, will on her motion, aggravate the situation so far as to precipitate war. As far as Jehol, perhaps yes, not even the

military

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
military can drag the nation along any farther.
They may have dragged us along, so far as the
Manchurian question is concerned, but beyond
and farther than that no one can do so."

It may be mentioned in conclusion that both
Major-General Okamura, Assistant Chief-of-Staff of
the Kwantung Army, and Major-General Itagaki are
now in Tokyo for the purpose, according to the press,
of conferring with officials of the Government in
regard to the policy to be adopted in respect to
North China.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.



Enclosure:

1/- Copy of statement given to the press
by General Araki, Minister of War.

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MSM:mhp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 736 of M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General, Mukden, Manchuria, dated
 March 29, 1933, to the Legation, Peiping, on the
 subject "Some Sidelights on Present Sino-Japanese
 Situation."

SOURCE: THE JAPAN CHRONICLE
 March 9, 1933

COPY

ARAKI'S APPEAL TO CHINA

High Time Folly of Resistance Was Recognized

Hope of Help Futile

In a Press interview, General Araki, Minister for War, says it is high time China realized the folly of her present course. The combined forces of Japan and Manchukuo have cleared Jehol of soldier-bandits and occupied all strategical points along the Great Wall, thus putting a virtual end to the present campaign in Jehol. It is, however, difficult to say how the situation will develop.

It seems inevitable that the overthrow of Chinese influence in Jehol should lead to disturbances in North China due to rivalries between militarist leaders. As for Japan, her sincere desire is that China will stop all warlike operations and bend her energies to the pacification of the general situation. A year and a half has passed since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair, and China ought to have learned something of the defects of her own system as a State and also of the fact that her reliance on outside help is the root cause of her present troubles.

The War Minister is inclined to think China must be inwardly conscious that Eastern problems cannot be solved except by Eastern peoples. Japan has no special desire to conclude an alliance or enter into an entente cordiale with China, but if that country reverts to a policy of friendship with Japan, an understanding will gradually be promoted between the two nations. It is high time China awoke to the folly of her present attitude towards Japan, the War Minister said.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1933.

~~TO:~~
~~JEF:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~SMH:~~
~~CHH:~~

Mukden's despatch of March 29, 1933, with respect to the Jehol campaign transmits a copy of a RENGO report of military operations between February 20 and March 24, as published in the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES of March 7, 1933.

This despatch is a well-prepared summary of the Jehol campaign. Among other things, Consul General Myers states that foreign and Japanese observers agree that the "Manchukuo" troops did not behave satisfactorily; that they were always late and whenever they could escape from Japanese surveillance, they looted. Foreign observers have very roughly estimated that from 35,000 to 50,000 Japanese troops were used during the campaign and that there was no large scale fighting on any of the routes until the battles at Kupeikou and Hsifengkou about the 7th of March, 1933. The Japanese military claim that from the beginning of the campaign until March 4, they suffered 13 killed and 48 wounded. After March 4, casualties were slightly greater. The battle of Kupeikou started

on

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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on March 7, and the village was occupied on March 10. The final Chinese position was not taken until the 12th. The Japanese report that at Kupeikou they suffered 24 killed and 84 wounded.

The Japanese military authorities informed an American newspaper correspondent that the Chinese had offered much less resistance than had been anticipated, for the following reasons:

- (1) insufficient preparations;
- (2) the Japanese attacked while the Chinese were shifting troops;
- (3) the Chinese troops were of bad quality, undisciplined and lacking in arms and knowledge of modern warfare;
- (4) as a result of secret negotiations some Chinese commanders had agreed to offer no real resistance; and
- (5) the inhabitants of Jehol had no sympathy with the Chinese commanders and refused to assist them.

[Signature]
LHE:KC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

RECU
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, Manchuria, March 29, 1933.

APR 22 33
SUBJECT: The Jehol Campaign.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 24 1933
Department of State

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 734 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated March 25, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓ Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 734
to the Legation at Peiping.

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HTW

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MAY 23 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 734.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, March 25, 1933.

SUBJECT: The Jehol Campaign.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 730 of March 16, 1933, entitled "Some Sidelights on the Jehol Campaign", and to my telegrams reporting the progress of the Japanese invasion of that province, I have the honor to supplement my reports on the subject.

1/- a summary of the military operations between February 20th and March 4th as reported by the Hengo News Service and published in the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES of March 7th, 1933 is enclosed. In general the article is correct, but among the inaccuracies which appear the following may be noted: The main body of the troops advancing toward Chengte from Kailu did not pass through Weichang. Lieutenant-General Nishi is the commander of the 8th Division formerly stationed at Chinchow. The available information indicates that neither he nor any of his troops were engaged in the northern part of the campaign

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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campaign. His troops entered Jehol Province from Chaoyangssu and Suichung. Chaoyang was occupied on February 25th, not the 26th. The names of the commanders of some Japanese detachments and the spelling of the names of towns in several cases are not the same as those customarily used. For example, Motegi not Mogi is the correct name of the commander of a cavalry brigade which is mentioned.

Orders for the advance on Jehol Province were issued by General Muto to his commanders in the field on February 19, 1933. And on the following day the Japanese troops concentrated at strategic points along the eastern border of Jehol began moving from their bases. The advance was made over three main routes, namely: from Tungliao via Kailu, from Chinchow via Peipiao and Chaoyang, and from Suichung over the Suichung-Lingyuan road. For strategic reasons minor detachments from the main bodies advanced along the less important roads. For example, one detachment proceeded from Chengwu to Suitung and joined its main body at Hsiawa. Only Japanese units were dispatched over the center and southern routes where resistance from Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars was expected. On the extreme southern flank was the Nakamura brigade which moved westward over the execrable roads on the northern side of the Great Wall.

Before the campaign began the Japanese military admitted that they wished to deal a crushing blow to Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars. They also admitted that they hoped and expected that one of the results

of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the campaign would be the downfall of Chang Hsueh-liang.

On the northern route Manchoukuo troops cooperated with the 6th (Sakamoto) Division, but after the capture of Kailu they were hardly mentioned. Even on the easy routes where they were used the Manchoukuo troops, which always had Japanese officers with them, were supported on both flanks by regular Japanese troops. Foreign and Japanese observers agree that the Manchoukuo troops did not behave satisfactorily. They were always late, and whenever they could escape from Japanese surveillance, they looted. On the northern flank Liu Kuei-t'ang and his 12,000 men, who surrendered at the beginning of the campaign and thereupon were immediately included in the Manchoukuo army, advanced from Lupei toward Lintung. His troops were supported and carefully watched by Japanese units.

The Japanese force, according to the Military Spokesman, consisted of the 8th (Nishi) Division and the 6th (Sakamoto) Division plus attached units. The military refused to indicate the numerical strength of the Japanese troops. Foreign observers have very roughly estimated that it was from 35,000 to 50,000 men. The special units are believed to have been made up from the 10th, 14th, and 7th Divisions; the 4th Cavalry Brigade of the 3rd Division, and special tank, airplane, and motor corps.

For use in the campaign, according to reliable reports

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reports, the Japanese military commandeered in South Manchuria 2,000 coolies, hundreds of two-wheeled carts and draught animals, and about 400 motor trucks. Many of these trucks are reported to have broken down. Carelessness and lack of knowledge are believed to have accounted for the loss of as many trucks as the extremely bad roads and severe cold. To provide against emergencies approximately twenty-two ships of the Japanese Navy patrolled the coast off Shanhai-kuan and Chinwangtao during the campaign.

It is known that the Japanese garrisons throughout this consular district were reduced to a minimum by the transfer of troops to the Jehol border. The depletion of the garrisons in the interior caused the Japanese authorities considerable anxiety for the safety of the railway zone. Even the new recruits that arrived in Manchuria early in February were used in the campaign. It is believed that they were not sent to the first line but were utilized by the transportation and supply corps, and engaged in similar duties in the rear. The aviation force of the Kwantung Army was, as I have reported, greatly reenforced before the campaign began, and it is believed to have played a more important part in the campaign than any other branch of the army. In addition to routing the enemy by bombing and machine gun fire before and during the advances of the infantry and cavalry, airplanes were used to carry fuel, food, warm clothing, and other supplies to the "high speed" advance guards. Frequently such supplies

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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supplies were dropped to the troops from the air.

This office has not included in this despatch the information available in Mukden concerning the number of Chinese troops engaged and their disposition, because it is realized that the Legation undoubtedly is already adequately informed on such subjects.

As the Legation is aware, the Japanese planned to occupy Chengte by March 10th, but due to the Chinese resistance being even less than expected, the progress of the Japanese troops from the beginning exceeded their schedule. In this connection a few figures obtained from the Spokesman of the Kwantung Army showing the extremely rapid advance of the Japanese advance guards and the complete failure of the Chinese to resist may be of interest. The Motegi detachment left Tungliao early in the morning of February 23rd and entered Chihfeng at 11 a.m. March 2nd having advanced approximately 360 kilometers. The Kawahara motorized corps left Chaoyang early in the morning of March 1 and reached Chengte, 266 kilometers distant at 2:30 p.m. March 4th. The Yoneyama detachment left the eastern border of Jehol Province at an undesignated point and after advancing 290 kilometers, reached Lengkou at noon on March 4th. As the Legation is aware, these forced marches were made over bad roads in intensely cold weather.

During this advance General Muto, and Lieutenant-General Koiso, accompanied by most of the staff officers

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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officers of the Kwantung Army, transferred their headquarters from Hsinking to Chinchow. General Koiso, Chief-of-Staff, is believed to have been the real director of the campaign.

After the occupation of Chengte there were many rumors concerning the whereabouts of T'ang Yu-lin. The most plausible report was that he had fled in a motor caravan to Fengning.

Except for a few engagements in the vicinity of Shamaoshan on the Suichung-Lingyuan road, there was no large scale fighting on any of the routes until the battles at Kupeikou and Hsifengkou began. Before the fighting at these passes bombing from airplanes, machine gun and light artillery fire were sufficient to put the execrably led, badly equipped and uncoordinated Chinese forces to flight.

The complete rout of the Chinese in the early part of the campaign is indicated by the low number of Japanese casualties as well as by the speed of the advance. The Japanese military claim that from the beginning of the campaign until March 4th they suffered 13 killed and 48 wounded. After March 4th the supporting columns while on their way to rejoin the advance guards sustained more numerous casualties from disorganized Chinese troops which either not wanting to flee with the others or becoming trapped fought bravely. For example the Military Spokesman admitted that the Takada detachment was attacked while advancing south
 from

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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from Chihfeng and suffered 10 killed, 29 wounded, and 40 cases of frostbite. Incidentally it must be mentioned that there is reason to believe that the official Japanese casualty figures are much too low. From an authoritative source it has been learned that two companies of the Hattori Brigade which were left behind the main columns to guard a town were completely wiped out. The failure of the military to mention this loss is understood to be merely one instance of their not infrequent practice of understating casualties.

As usual in winter campaigns in Manchuria the Japanese troops suffered severely from frostbite. The Kwantung Army announced, according to the MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS, that during the campaign there were 500 cases of frostbite of which 50 are serious. In explanation the Army stated that tactics called for such fast troop movements that the soldiers had to discard the heavy cold weather outfits which had been provided.

On March 5th, one day after the occupation of Chengte, troops of the Kawahara detachment began their advance on Kupeikou. At the same time other Japanese units continued their advances towards the other passes which had not fallen and still other units advanced to the west. Weichang and Linshi, in the western part of the province, were occupied on March 6th with practically no fighting. In the south Chiehlingkou was occupied by the Nakamura Brigade on the 8th and after severe fighting the first line at Hsifengkou fell to the Hattori Brigade on March 9th, and the second gate the next day. In this

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In this campaign including the subsequent counter-attacks the Hattori brigade lost 86 killed, while 120 were wounded. This number is said to include a scouting unit commanded by a lieutenant which was completely wiped out.

After the Japanese captured Hsifengkou the Chinese made frequent counter-attacks, according to the Japanese military, and severe fighting ensued. The bravery of the Chinese soldiers in the face of superior equipment and airplanes is attested by the fact that the Japanese unexpectedly found it necessary to reenforce their troops at Hsifengkou. During the preparation of this despatch reports of intermittent fighting were still being received.

According to information from the Japanese military the battle for Kupeikou started on March 7th. After heavy fighting the village was occupied on March 10th but the final Chinese position was not taken until the 12th. And after that date reports of engagements were received daily. The Japanese military reported that their casualties at Kupeikou from March 7th to March 13th were 24 killed and 84 wounded.

The Spokesman of the Kwantung Army attributed the sustained resistance at Kupeikou and Hsifengkou to the Chinese troops having been entrenched in naturally formidable positions, to the good marksmanship of the picked Chinese troops, and to ammunition, supplies and arms, including anti-aircraft guns, having been sent from Peiping. Unofficially he intimated that

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that the Chinese soldiers were afraid to flee because they would have been shot if they had attempted to do so by other Chinese units stationed behind them.

During the campaign the Japanese military frequently stated that their troops would not go south of the Great Wall, except to occupy strategic positions in the immediate vicinity of it unless the Chinese became unbearably provocative. It was never made clear in such statements exactly what action on the part of the Chinese would warrant, from the point of view of the Japanese military, an invasion of North China. It is believed that the statements were purposely vague in order that they might cover any pretext the military subsequently selected if they decided to advance beyond the Wall. But a more important reason for the publication of such statements was the military's belief that Chinese military resistance in Jehol would be decreased by a threat to invade North China unless the Chinese troops retreated to the south of the Wall.

In an interview with an American newspaper correspondent after the conclusion of the major operations of the campaign, Lieutenant-General Koiso said that the Chinese offered much less resistance than he had anticipated. The Japanese casualties, he added, were less than expected. In explanation of the complete failure of the Chinese to attempt to defend their territory he gave five reasons: 1. Insufficient preparations; 2. The Japanese attacked while

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while the Chinese were shifting troops; 3. The Chinese troops were of bad quality, undisciplined, and were lacking in arms and knowledge of modern warfare; 4. As a result of secret negotiations instigated by Manchoukuo some of the Chinese commanders promised not to offer real resistance, and in order to "save face" for these renegades sham battles with their troops were actually staged during the campaign; 5. The inhabitants of Jehol had no sympathy for the Chinese commanders and refused to assist them or to cooperate with them. Another Japanese army officer added that Chang Hsueh-liang sent his worst troops into Jehol and kept his best in Peiping. In the same interview General Koiso said that he considered the rapidity of the advances of the Japanese motor corps the salient feature of the campaign. On the other hand, he confirmed the rumors prevalent in Mukden that the Japanese military were not satisfied with the performance of the Manchoukuo troops.

The Japanese troops, according to General Koiso, were afforded a splendid reception by the populace. They did not bomb any of the towns and they paid for whatever materials they took. The troops now in Jehol, he continued, will be engaged for the next two or three months in cleaning up the 30,000 "bandits" who, according to Japanese estimates, are still in the province. Most of the bandits are in the triangular area formed by connecting Chihfeng, Lingyuan and Chengte. Another large remnant of the Chinese
 army

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army is in the Weichang-Linhai area. The Japanese military expect that the suppression of banditry will be more difficult than was the campaign itself.


General Koiso said also that if T'ang Yu-lin wished to join Manchoukuo his life and property would be protected. It is known that the Japanese never took T'ang's troops seriously, and also that they were very eager to have Chinese who are of any importance at all join Manchoukuo because they have encountered great difficulty in securing the services of Chinese who have had any experience in governing.

Japanese military and civilian officials in Hsinking are reported to be very pleased with the outcome of the Jehol campaign and they are now going ahead with their plans for developing the province.

To what extent the well-developed Chinese sense of realism and secret negotiations conducted by Major-General Itagaki and other Japanese and their implied threats of invasion of North China reduced Chinese resistance may never be known. It is clear, however, that the utter failure of the Chinese defense was due primarily to the absence of effective government throughout China and more directly to gross negligence on the part of the military authorities.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General.



Enclosure

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosure:

- 1/- Copy of Rango News Service Report of
military operations between February
20th and March 4th as published in the
PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES of March 7,
1933.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 734 of M. S. Myers, American
 Consul General, Mukden, Manchuria, dated March 25, 1933,
 to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "The Jehol
 Campaign."

SOURCE: The Rango News Service
 THE PEKING AND TIENPSIN TIMES
 March 7, 1933

(COPY)

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF JEHOL

Summarised Description of Operations.

THE KAWAHARA MECHANISED DETACHMENT

Peiping, March 5.

Combined forces of Japan and Manchukuo left their
 respective bases between February 20th and 26th, for
 the campaign clearing out Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars,
 volunteer corps and brigands from Jehol, setting out
 in the three following directions:-

1. The North Route. Starting from Tungliao, it
 proceeded to Jehol or Chengteh via Kailu, Hsinglungchi,
 Chihfeng and Weichang.
2. The Centre Route. Starting from Chinchow,
 it proceeded to Chengteh by way of Peipiao, Chaoyang,
 and Lingyuan.
3. The South Route. Starting from Suichung, it
 proceeded to Chengteh via Shamaoshan and Lingyuan,
 where a junction was established with the Centre
 Route Army.

Besides there is Liu Kwei-tung's command, made
 up of Shuntang brigands. When the military drive was
 about to be started, Liu surrendered, and cooperating
 with the Japan-Manchukuo forces, operated in the
 northern part of Jehol Province. On February 25,
 he occupied Lupei, on the following day Tienshan,
 and entered Lintung on March 1st. No further refer-
 ence will be made to this force in the present article.

Proceeding with the North Route first, we note
 that Generals Sakamoto, Nishi and Chang Hai-peng,
 Commander-in-Chief of the vanguard of the Manchukuo
 Army, operated on the route. It may be remembered
 that General Chang Ching-hui, Commander-in-Chief of
 the Manchukuo Army, gave orders to General Hai-peng
 on Feb. 23rd to advance his troops, and the latter

forthwith

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forthwith removed his headquarters to Tungliao.

On the other hand, the Hatta Brigade, belonging to the Sakamoto Division, in co-operation with the Nishi Division, left Tungliao before daybreak on the 23rd in the wake of the Manchukuo Army. At noon, the Japanese vanguard defeated a Chinese force at Molimiao, and entered Kailu together with a Manchukuo detachment between the 24th and 25th, putting to rout Tsui Hsing-wu's troops westward to Tienshan.

General Chang Hai-peng removed his headquarters to Kailu on the 24th. On the 25th, the order was given to the Mogi cavalry force to set out to give chase to Feng Chang-hai's brigands, who were put to rout westward by Japanese aircraft.

On the other hand, the Kumagae Detachment, which left his main body at Hsinglungchi, advancing south westward occupied Hsiawa in the night of the 26th. Continuing its advance, the detachment occupied Hpei in the morning of the 27th and Paitatzu in the evening. In the meantime, the main body of the Mogi cavalry force left Hsinglungchi on the 27th and chasing Li Hai-ting and Kung Chang-hai, who were retreating towards west, occupied Shiherhkitzu via Machiatien in the evening. Both the main body of the Mogi force and the Kumagae detachment advancing southward, pushed onward with Chihfeng as their objective point. By the 28th the former occupied Fangshan and the latter Laoyehmiao.

By noon on March 1, the main body of the Mogi force bivouacked at a point 2 Km. east of Chihfeng, and entered the city at 11 a.m. on the following day. The Chinese forces, which put up resistance to the Japanese cavalry regiment, were those under Feng Chan-hai and Ho Tsing-ming numbering about 3,000 all told. They fired field-guns and trench-mortars, and showed an obstinate front for a while, but by 9 o'clock in the morning, they began to falter, and finally turned and ran in great disorder.

THE CENTRE ROUTE

The Nishi Force received the order advance on the 20th, leaving Chinchow in the evening of the same day. Fighting several battles on his way with men under Tung Fu-ting, supported by Chang Tsung-yun in the right and Sun Teh-chuan and Tang Yu-ting's cavalry troops in the left, numbering about 30,000 strong all told, and putting them to rout, the Division occupied Nanling early in the morning of the 21st, and entered Peipiao by the evening in defiance of a severe snowstorm. The march westward was kept up and on the 24th, the Suzuki Brigade

reached

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reached Mangniuyingtzu and Shihmentzuuikou. By 8 o'clock in the morning of the 25th, the Hayakawa Regiment occupied Taohuayuan, located in the mid-way between Peipiao and Chaoyang. The forward March was kept up in conjunction with the Tanaka Regiment. Chinese troops abandoned Chaoyang and tried to escape towards Lingyuan. Japanese aeroplanes sighting them, dropped bombs on them, giving great damage to them. Keeping up the rapid advance, the Hayakawa Force occupied Chaoyang in the morning of the 26th. Whilst adjusting things in the city and restoring order, the Japanese troops distributed uniforms, shoes and provisions, which the opponents left behind in large quantities to the inhabitants.

General Nishi, accompanied by his staff officers, arrived at Chaoyang from Peipiao at 6 p.m. on the 27th.

After the occupation of Chaoyang, and while the main body of the Chinchow Force was watching the development of the situation in various directions, the Matsuda Cavalry Corps alone advanced northwestward detaching itself from the main-body, which proceeded to Lingyuan via Peypaishou. In the afternoon of the 27th, the cavalry force passed through Laohushan, and repulsing Sun Teh-chuan's men, as it went, advanced westward on the Chihfeng highway. The Matsuda Corps passed through Tangchiachangtzu in the afternoon of the 28th, and pressed upon Chienping in the same evening. After repulsing Chao Kuo-tseng's command, the Japanese mounted soldiers occupied Chienping in the morning of March 1, where they awaited the arrival of the Kumagae detachment, which was marching towards the town via Hsiawa, Hopei, Paitatzu and Laoyehmiao. Their van, however, kept up the northward march, and came close upon Chihfeng by passing through Paoshouying during the day.

On the other hand the Kawahara Corps, which had been watching the development of the situation at Chaoyang, as mentioned before, considering the time was opportune, suddenly rose on March 1st, and advancing swiftly in motor-trucks, occupied Yepaishou under the cover of aircraft, at 1 p.m. on the same day. In the afternoon, Japanese troops pressed on Hotangkou in the east of Lingyuan. This day men were sped at the rate of 8 Km. per hour, the fastest record in the army.

On the following day, or March 2nd military motor-trucks extending over 2.5 miles long, sped along and entered Lingyuan at noon.

Quite a sensational race took place between the Kawahara Corps, which set out from Chinchow and the Yoneyama vanguard of the Hattori Brigade,

which

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which advanced from Suichung, for the occupation of Lingkuang, the latter having won the laurel by dashing into the south gate of the city at 11.35 about half an hour earlier than the Kawahara's command.

The latter named corps, chasing routed opponents, forged ahead and occupied Ssutaoiling situated in the midway between Lingyuan and Pingchuan by 4 p.m.

On the following day, march was continued in defiance of a snow-storm, and Pingchuan was occupied at 11 a.m.

The Kawahara vanguard did not make much headway on the 3rd owing to a blinding snow-storm, but the weather having cleared up on the following day, it swept eastward to Chengteh. And after having occupied the Tienshaoshan's position, defended by Tang Yu-lin's troops numbering 7,000-8,000, at noon, completely occupied the city of Chengteh, the capital of Jehol, at 2.30 p.m. on the 4th.

THE SOUTH ROUTE

The Hattori Brigade, which attended to the drive on the South Route, set out from Suichung at 8 a.m. on February 27th, and advanced on the most difficult road ever travelled by an army, loading motor-trucks with troops, whose column extended more than 2.5 miles long. A violent attack launched by the Yoneyama vanguard, Chinese troops, who were putting up obstinate resistance at Paishihtzuimen began to waiver by the evening of the same day. Early in the morning of the 27th, the Yoneyama vanguard supported by the Tani Detachment, launched a general attack on the enemy position at Shamaotzu.

It may be mentioned here in parenthesis that Chinese troops, who entrenched themselves in the powerful position in front of the Hattori Brigade, were picked men under Sun Teh-chuan, under the direct command of Chang Hsueh-liang. They were equipped with guns and trench-mortars. These men were brought over to Jehol from Luanchow by crossing over the Great Wall in January. Their main body was stationed on the Lingyuan highway, and established relations with brigades in the neighbouring regions and those under Tung Fu-ting at Chayang. The position held by them was declared to be impregnable.

The main body of the Hattori Brigade set out to take part in the general attack of the Yoneyama vanguard on Shamaotzu. But before the arrival of the Brigade, the vanguard and Tani Detachment had occupied Pienluyingtzu, a corner of the rugged

mountains

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mountains, at 7.30 a.m. The attack progressed rapidly, and by 2 p.m. on the 27th, Paishihtzuimen was occupied.

Sun Teh-chuan and Cheng Kuei-lin, the latter being the commander of a volunteer corps, tried to put up determined opposition at Shamaoshan, by entrenching themselves in semi-permanently constructed trenches. But the Japanese forces launched a general attack on them, under the support of aerial bombing by military planes, which set out from Sui-chung at 7 a.m. on the 28th. In no time the opponents collapsed, and were put to rout. During the battle, Japanese casualties were one killed and four wounded.

No sooner had the Shamaoshan position been occupied than the second Chinese position built at Yehchikow was commenced. At 7 p.m. in the same day, Tachangtzu was occupied, and an hour later, Laoyeh-miao was taken. Without stopping, the Toneyama force marched ahead on the Lingyuan highway in dark night lit dimly by stars.

On March 1st, the Chinchow aeroplanes appeared at 9 in the morning, to help the Hattori Brigade attacking Peichangyingtzu. The opponents were frightened by the appearance of the Japanese aircraft, and started to fall back in a general retreat and by 9 o'clock the Chinese position at Peichangyingtzu was completely occupied by the Japanese Brigade.

On the 2nd, the Yoneyama advance guard competed in the occupation of Lingyuan with the Kawahara detachment advancing from Chaoyang, and won the undying glory by entering the city about half an hour earlier than their rival.

At noon on the 4th, the vanguard occupied Lingkow on the Great Wall, and the military advance was halted there. - Rengo.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12335 FOR Despatch # 8834

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED April 3, 1933
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Statement by Wang Ching-wei, President of the
Executive Yuan, urging Chinese resistance
against Japan.

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793.94/6213
6213

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8834

Shanghai, China, April 3, 1933.

Statement by Wang Ching-wei.

With reference to the recent return to China of Mr. Wang Ching-wei and his resumption of the Presidency of the Executive Yuan, to which reference was made in the political report from this office for March, I have the honor to transmit herewith an excerpt from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of April 1, 1933, containing the text of a statement by Wang Ching-wei. This statement originally appeared in the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE a fortnightly Kuomintang paper published in English.

Mr. Wang, after referring to the circumstances which caused him to return to China, states that in his opinion there is no alternative except the most determined resistance against Japan, and he proceeds to point out what he believes necessary for the Chinese Government and people to do in order to develop their powers of resistance. His comparison between conditions today and those which prevailed in

North China

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North China and Manchuria at the end of the Ming dynasty are of interest, as are also his observations on Communism and Fascism. Mr. Yang dismisses Communism in a brief sentence saying that it has been tried and found wanting. With regard to Fascism, it is quite evident that Mr. Yang has a decided admiration for the results of the Fascist experiments in Italy and Germany. He points out, however, certain fundamental differences between those two countries and China which, in his belief, would make Fascism unworkable in this country.

The conclusions which Mr. Yang reaches must be somewhat disappointing, at least, to those who had expected something more definite and concrete from him in the way of a cure for China's troubles. He merely states as follows:

"Our principal efforts should be directed to fostering and strengthening the democratic and other reconstructive forces of the nation, to establishing a true democracy, not to instigating movements which could only lead to national self-destruction. After we have established a true democracy, it is still time to think whether we as a nation would go the way of Britain and France or that of Italy and Germany. Although we may not live to see our nation saved, we must show our successors a definite way out. And that way is by promoting and fostering productive enterprises, and applying such productive power to military purposes so that we may carry on an effective and sustained resistance for the preservation of our nation."

Mr. Yang Ching-wei's statement concerning continued resistance is referred to in the editorial from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of April 1, 1933 a copy of

2/ which is enclosed. This paper takes the view that so long

as

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as Chinese political leaders to announce
 a policy of continued military defiance of Japan, it
 will be impossible for China to rehabilitate itself.
 The editor suggests that it might be well for China
 and Japan to adopt the formula which was successful in
 Shanghai last year, namely, definitely to suspend
 hostilities without touching on, or discussing specific
 controversial issues.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin L. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

REJ:MC
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enclosures:

- 1/- Excerpt from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS
 (British) dated April 1, 1933.
- 2/- Editorial from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS
 (British) dated April 1, 1933.

In duplicate to Department
 A true copy of the signed original. Ca



pecially when they are promptly and fully reported in the Press of the country that is being abused at the moment and read there, I may add, with little or no understanding of the circumstances under which they were uttered or the relative importance of the person uttering them.

These things must be; and while they may affect a country's popularity, which is, after all, a thing of the moment and in the lives of nations is not important, they do not have the power to destroy friendship between nations, especially when it is based, as in the case of England and America, on mutual respect and a general feeling of moving in the same direction in history and along parallel lines that need never collide.

You see I am leaving you with my mind at rest about the all-important question of British-American relations. I feel that they will take care of themselves and that we, as individuals, can do most to strengthen them, not by talking too much about them, but by helping to keep our respective countries from ever abandoning their belief in those fundamental things for which we fought

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WANG CHING-WEI'S VIEWS
China's Position and the Way Out:
Resistance and Diplomatic Contact
APR 1 - 1933

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By *M. J. O. Johnson*, NARS, Date *12-18-75*

WANG CHING-WEI'S VIEWS

APR 1 - 1933

China's Position and the Way Out: Resistance and Diplomatic Contact

The following article, of which an advance proof has been supplied by the courtesy of "The People's Tribune" will appear this morning in that journal over the signature of Mr. Wang Ching-wei, who has resumed his post as President of the Executive Yuan.

At this most critical moment in the history of the country, when all the comrades are striving their utmost to meet the situation, I could not, in all conscience, remain in Europe to complete my cure and recover from the effects of my prolonged illness. When the deplorable news of the fall of Szechuan reached me in my hospital at Tübingen, I felt that in spite of my poor health I had to return to China at once. My anxiety was further increased on my way home when I learned of the loss of Jehol, although, subsequently, I was gratified to hear the news of Comrade Chiang Kai-shek's departure for the North. I felt considerably relieved because I knew what effect General Chiang's presence would have on the morale of our men at the Northern defence lines, how it would strengthen their determination and fighting spirit. On the other hand, when thinking of the sufferings and sacrifices of our troops at the front and of the difficulties confronting the various comrades in the Central Party and Government organisations, I could not help feeling more and more uneasy. This being my first public utterance since my return to China after an enforced absence of so many months, I am taking this opportunity to express my heartfelt appreciation for what the comrades, both at and behind the front lines, have gone through.

China's position to-day is such that there is no alternative but the most determined resistance. It is true that diplomatic negotiations must go hand in hand with armed resistance, but of the two it is the latter which is more likely to lead to a fundamental solution, for without resistance there can be no prospect of success in negotiation. The recent decision of the League of Nations has clearly proclaimed Japan the aggressor and China the wronged party. This proves that international justice is not yet extinct. While this may be regarded as the result of diplomatic negotiations, it is even more so the fruit of our resistance. Hereafter, therefore, the more strongly we resist the more hopeful will be the results of our negotiations. This is why I say that the only way out of the present situation is to be found in active, determined, resistance.

Develop Strength

With regard to successful policy of resistance, we must realise that the first requisite is the unswerving determination on the part of everybody concerned to carry through the policy, the second the development of our national strength and ability. It is necessary that every single individual in the country be determined

example, the United States of America. The American Government, while generally not concerned with the question of military preparedness, was able at a moment's notice to summon together two million soldiers and was able also to ship huge quantities of military supplies to Europe as soon as the war with Germany was declared. There is only one explanation to this, and that is the American people had attained to a high degree of productivity. Thus it is obvious that the ability to resist lies primarily in the productivity of the people.

But how is a people's productivity to be increased? My reply is that the first necessity is that the people be given the opportunity to lead a peaceful life and fully to enjoy the fruits of their labours. Their life, property, and freedom must be fully protected. So, when you speak of resistance, you immediately go to the fundamental questions of political administration and social adjustments. In this light, the problem of military preparedness thus becomes a problem of secondary importance.

Moreover, as a matter of fact, our ability to resist is not altogether a material one; for the spiritual aspect is at least of equal importance. I do not wish to take you back to the past, but let me just cite one example. The fall of Chengteh was the direct result of non-resistance by Tang Yu-ling's troops. These troops were generally fairly well equipped and armed. Why did they fail to resist? For the simple reason that they were cursed with the planting and the smoking of opium. Is it to be wondered that the result was as it was? You could not expect resistance from an opium-cursed army. As for the people, they had been forced to plant and smoke opium, and even if had they wished to resist, they did not have the necessary will power and strength. It was too much to expect them to resist at all, not to say for any length of time. The outcome was a foregone conclusion and this was what had actually happened.

The Need for Training

It is plain, therefore, that of two armies with similar equipments, only the one that has received proper training and has imbibed the spirit of the National Revolution can be depended upon to offer any effective resistance. Victory invariably goes to those who have the necessary will power and are imbued with the proper spirit even though possessed of only inferior equipment; never to those who lack the proper spirit even though they may be in possession of all kinds of material advantages. This is es-

case of protection and assistance. In fact, occasionally our people fail in their productive enterprises through misgovernment. If we can pay attention to protecting and assisting our people to produce, and then apply their productivity to matters of military preparedness, we can hope for a lengthy period of resistance.

During my illness in Europe I carefully studied the various resolutions of the Third Plenary Session of the Party pointing out the needs of the times and laying down the general principle for the Party to follow. But what we need to-day is action, not words—immediate action. Our ancient sages said, "The good and the bad are enough to ruin the nation." By this it is meant that if we cannot make use of the good and discard the bad, the country will head for destruction. Merely having a mixture of good and bad is like so many words: making use of the good and avoiding the bad means definite action. When one dwells upon this point, one cannot help feel remorseful.

Why have we not been able to enhance the productive power of our people? Why have we not been able to apply our people's productive power to military strength? It is entirely due to the fact that the bad ones among us have been engaged in destructive activities and caused all kinds of obstacles, exploiting the fact that the Central authorities, with their hands full in dealing with the problem of resisting Japan, cannot give the attention to make their destructive activities impossible. The Central authorities, however, are determined to see that these destructive elements put an end to their sinister activities. For it is only by exposing their crimes and stopping their destructive activities that those who believe in co-operation can effect solidarity among themselves and be able to face the crisis. As for the bad elements, they can only be treated as outcasts. Whether we can make use of the good and discard the bad is a question of action; and whether we wish to make use of the good and discard the bad is a question of choice. If we are determined in our choice of action, then it is not difficult to see action; otherwise, only empty words will be the result.

China's road to national salvation thus lies fundamentally in the strengthening and fostering of the democratic and other reconstructive forces of the country, not in the blind, superficial imitation of other countries, not in the wholesale transplantation of such alien systems as Communism and Fascism. The popular saying that everything foreign which comes to China becomes bad and corrupted, contains a great deal of truth, and my convictions have only been strengthened by what I recently saw and observed in Europe.

Communism Found Wanting

The so-called Communist experiment has been tried, and found wanting. It is nearing its end, and no useful purpose is thus served by enlarging on it here. This is, however, not the case with Fascism, which is acquiring an increasing, if yet insignificant, number of adherents in China. Fascism is alleged to have saved Italy; it is being officially tried in Germany; so why not apply it as a panacea to China's ills?

But granted it to be a fact that Fascism has been beneficent to the Italian and German peoples—which I have strong reasons for doubting—the advocates of Fascism here forget that there are certain fundamental differences between the conditions in China and the conditions in Italy and Germany. Both these countries were essentially democracies, with a long period of political education along constitutional lines, with the people in possession of certain constitutional rights and powers. How they utilised these rights is not for us to judge, but the fact is that the Fascist Dictatorship in those two countries is to some extent based on popular support. The Fascist movement there are fundamentally civilian in character, neither Signor Mussolini nor Herr Hitler being military leaders. No armed force worth speaking of entered into play when the Fascist regime was established both in Italy and in Germany. Eight thousand Italian Fascists marched on Rome, it is true, but the Fascist dictatorship in Italy was not the

speculate on the chances of success and failure—not even of life and death. We can only prepare ourselves so that we will have an opportunity to die on the field of honour instead of in our beds. Although we may not live to see our nation saved, we must show our successors a definite way out. And that way is by promoting and fostering productive enterprises, and applying such productive power to military purposes, so that we may carry on an effective and sustained resistance for the preservation of our nation.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With regard to successful policy of resistance, we must realize that the first requisite is the unswerving determination on the part of everybody concerned to carry through the policy, the second the development of our national strength and ability. It is necessary that every single individual in the country be determined to face the difficult national situation. But this, I think is already generally recognized throughout the country. What we therefore must concern ourselves particularly about, is our strength and ability to continue the resistance. How is this particular ability expressed if not primarily in armed force? The fact of the matter however, is that we are sorely deficient in military equipment. Our guns, bombs and other implements of war are not comparable to those of our enemy and the fighting which is now going on between our comrades at the front and our enemy is almost comparable to a fight between unarmed flesh and blood on the one side, and highly mechanized implements of modern warfare on the other side.

Where are the implements of war to come from? And is our strength and ability to resist only expressed in fighting machines? We are an agricultural nation. But, according to Customs statistics, we imported foodstuffs to the amount of Tls. 300,000,000 for last year. This means that agricultural nation though we are, we had to spend Tls. 300,000,000 on imported foodstuffs or the entire nation would have had to face starvation. What surplus funds could we in these circumstances really have to purchase arms and ammunition? I have mentioned this to show that resistance is not limited to military weapons. In other words, there are other equally, if not more, important aspects to the problem of resistance.

America's Example

A modern nation pays the greatest attention to the question of productivity during ordinary times. The productivity of a people must be increased in normal times so that in times of war all resources can be utilized. Therefore, the greater the people's productivity, the greater their power of resistance. Take for example Russia. The former Czarist Government paid little or no attention to the productive enterprises of the Russian people and laid only stress on military preparedness, with the result that after the war broke out with Germany, Russia rapidly went down to defeat. Take another

effective resistance. Victory invariably goes to those who have the necessary will power and are imbued with the proper spirit even though possessed of only inferior equipment; never to those who lack the proper spirit even though they may be in possession of all kinds of material advantages. This is especially true in the military sphere. In a word, in trying to strengthen our power of resistance we must go deeper, down to the fundamental questions of political and social adjustments. For on their solution depends our power to increase the national productivity, and, in turn, our military preparedness.

The real problem confronting us is therefore not the problem of resisting the Japanese aggression, but the very problem of national preservation. The entire people must realize that they are struggling for their national existence. Not only must we be spiritually determined, but we must also develop our material ability to resist. Failure in either would face the nation with complete extinction.

The conditions to-day are reminiscent of the conditions prevailing three hundred years ago when the Ming Dynasty came to its tragic end. The Chinese generals were then fighting against the Manchus at Liaotung, while the officials charged with the destiny of the nation were loud in their demands for resistance, treating those who even mentioned peace with the Manchus as traitors. The reality however was that while there were plenty of soldiers, there was no ammunition. China's armed forces then thus amounted to only so many generals without soldiers, for soldiers do not count when they have no fight in their hearts. And when the enemy arrived, there was no other way of showing one's patriotism but death. There was the determination to resist but there was not the strength to resist, and the country therefore was completely lost.

Fault of Misgovernment

It is not for us to travel the same path to-day. The fact that we do not at present possess adequate equipment for resistance cannot be hidden. But with the country as big as it is, and with a population of four hundred millions, it is sheer cowardice to insist that we cannot attain to the material strength necessary for, and be guided by a spiritual inspiration to, a successful resistance.

Our problem is fundamentally not the lack of productivity. With the common people, it is purely a

fundamentally civilian in character, neither Signor Mussolini nor Herr Hitler being military leaders. No armed force worth speaking of entered into play when the Fascist regime was established both in Italy and in Germany. Eight thousand Italian Fascists marched on Rome, it is true, but the Fascist dictatorship in Italy was not the outcome of civil war, while in Germany the Fascist Dictatorship was primarily the result of the ballot box. Both Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler effected a coup d'etat, but their coup d'etat—if what they did could be called such—was only more or less in the nature of a constitutional revolution.

China's Feudalism

China, on the other hand, is still dominated by a feudal militarism. The people here enjoy, generally speaking, very few rights; they are still far from the constitutional period—suffering under the oppression of a predatory militarist regime. Even under the nose of the Japanese invasion armed forces have been utilized for the purpose of settling internal differences, and in the last fighting in Szechuen alone between 40 to 50 thousand casualties were suffered. And while the Central Government is getting stronger everyday, it is yet unable to exercise the full force of its authority throughout the whole of the Republic, being in many parts hampered by the prevailing system of regional independence.

In these circumstances, a Fascist movement in China could only mean a movement for the establishment of a military dictatorship. And since there are so many outstanding military leaders, an attempt of any one of them to proclaim, with the aid of the so-called Fascists, himself the dictator of China would immediately lead to a most sanguinary civil war on a nation-wide scale. And to what purpose? Our primary efforts should be directed to fostering and strengthening the democratic and other reconstructive forces of the nation, to establishing a true democracy, not to instigating movements which could only lead to national self-destruction. After we have established a true democracy, it is still time to think whether we as a nation would go the way of Britain and France or that of Italy and Germany.

With the national state of affairs at such a critical stage, the above may sound unrelated and disconnected. But it is important to realize that there is no other way open to us except carrying on as best we can. We cannot now even afford to

2.50	22.25	22.50	22.25	236	239	10.1	29.2
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Share Market Report.—With the business during the earlier part of the week after the Settlement. Transactions for the 5,395 shares) as against 26,096 shares for

Chinese Government Bonds have (British Issue) which touched 77½ during 1925 G S Bonds likewise eased slightly from point higher than their rate at the commec

The following comparative "Nominal" rates at the commencement and close of th

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|---------|---|
| 5 % | Reorg. - Loan 1913, British Issue |
| 4 1/2 % | Gold .. 1908, |
| 5 % | Gold .. 1912 |
| 5 % | Gold & Loan 1925, stamped (Per G\$5) |
| 5 % | Shanghai-Nanking Railway bonds |
| 5 % | S'hai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Bonds |
| 5 % | Hukuang Railway Bonds |
| 5 % | Lung Tsing U-Hai Railway Bonds |
| | Chinese Engineering & Mining Co. " Bear |
| | Shanghai Elect. Construction Co. " Bear |
| | Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation |
| | Chartered Bank of I. A. & China |

Secretaries of Companies are req

SHANGHAI, APRIL 1, 1933.

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

sayan nira vuniḍ-ḥara

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

0547

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

is it logical or fair to dismiss this complex problem with a contemptuous reference to Chinese disunity and lack of efficient military resources. It has been pointed out that the essence of the Washington Treaty lay in the signatory Powers' joint realization of the inherent disorganization of China, which made the adoption of a common policy of vigilant patience an appropriate attitude. Japan's decision to break the ranks may have all the justification claimed for it by Tokyo and denied by Geneva. Its accentuation of China's internal difficulties can certainly not be gainsaid. Although the grip of the General Staff on Japan's policy is as tenacious as ever, it is possible to believe that, for the moment, the soldiers are content. They may consider the task of consolidation more urgent than that of extending their territorial responsibilities. This gives an opportunity to those who discern the importance of ending, in some form or other, the present state of uncertainty. Even a firm decision against anything more than passive resistance cannot prevent, on China's part, the adoption of measures which, although purely consequential in themselves, may impel further Japanese military action. Another stage of deterioration may thus be begun to the grave unsettlement of the already distracted North. This calls for close attention by Japan. It also throws on the Chinese government, for which Mr. Wang Ching-wei is now again speaking, definite responsibilities.

To rhetorical pronouncements it were unwise to attach much importance. Their danger lies, however, in the tendency to suggest that they are adequate answers to the march of events. The Chinese Government has taken note of Geneva's decision. It realizes that the Conciliation Committee cannot get under way with any expedition. No doubt it has also made note of its right to ask its associated Governments in the League what course it had better follow as now situated. Mr. Eugene Chen has lately taken the trouble to pronounce on the duty of an individual Power. It might be more fitting for China to obtain from the Powers clear advice as to her own duty. Unmistakably have the principal members of the League—and the United States of America—indicated their conviction that the cause of world-peace is best served by their keeping clear of warlike entanglements in the Far East. That does not imply disregard of their responsibilities. The signatories of the Washington Treaty for example, have yet to consider formally the effect of recent events on their own position and their relations with all parties to that Treaty. The functions of the League, in the near future, may have to be directed with the purpose of bringing that problem to the fore. In the meantime China cannot do better than prescribe for her own malady, after taking consultation with her friends. The heavy strain thrown upon her administrative fabric by the severance of Manchuria and the enhanced aloofness of Canton requires urgent attention. The League may not be able effectively to counter either blow directly. It can, however, reasonably endeavour, if so desired by China, to offer assistance in the improvement of the economic resources of the limited but actually large areas under Nanking's control. In this enterprise, looking ahead, Japan's good offices may eventually be enlisted, despite her withdrawal from the League. Thus, while designed immediately to compass much needed internal reform, it may help to

Enclosure No. 2 to the
 Department of State letter
 dated April 1, 1933
 by Mr. Gustafson

North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL.

SHANGHAI, APRIL 1, 1933.

CALL IT A PEACE!

So far as can be judged, actual military operations in the North are in a state of suspense. Neither side is anxious to attempt any movement likely to extend the area of conflict. General Chiang Kai-shek must be well aware of the impossibility of any serious effort to retake Jehol. The Japanese General Staff are probably satisfied with the clearance to the Great Wall. Only under the pressure of some really dangerous Chinese stroke are they expected to make further encroachments on Chinese territory for the moment at all events. This state of semi-peace and semi-war is dangerous. Mr. Ariyoshi has possibly correctly sized up the position by declaring that the time is not ripe for negotiations. Certainly that is true if Tokyo holds to the view that abject compliance with whatever conditions Japan may feel disposed to specify is expected of China. Mr. Wang Ching-wei's statement published to-day in these columns, by courtesy of his official organ, "The People's Tribune," can be interpreted as an endorsement

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

General Staff are probably satisfied with the clearance to the Great Wall. Only under the pressure of some really dangerous Chinese stroke are they expected to make further encroachments on Chinese territory for the moment at all events. This state of semi-peace and semi-war is dangerous. Mr. Ariyoshi has possibly correctly sized up the position by declaring that the time is not ripe for negotiations. Certainly that is true if Tokyo holds to the view that abject compliance with whatever conditions Japan may feel disposed to specify is expected of China. Mr. Wang Ching-wei's statement published to-day in these columns, by courtesy of his official organ, "The People's Tribune," can be interpreted as an endorsement of the Japanese Minister's opinion. At the same time, when the natural flamboyance of Mr. Wang Ching-wei's appeal is properly discounted, there is left a clear hint of his recognition of the practical need for negotiation rather than immediate military defiance of Japan. How far Mr. Wang Ching-wei's decision to resume office has resulted in a closing of the Government's ranks, which in the last few weeks had become perceptibly ragged, remains to be seen. A promising sign is the formal approval of plans for associating non-Kuomintang politicians with the Government. Diplomatic contact with Japan is imperative but it would be foolish to ignore the difficulty of reconciling an ill-instructed public opinion to that view. Hence the Government at Nanking, especially with the knowledge of the continued hostility of Canton, must proceed cautiously. This condition is complicated by a marked recrudescence of communist activity in Kiangsi and Hupeh. In the latter province General Ho Lung is reported to have returned although he has not been able to reach his old haunts. In Szechuen, domestic rivalries prevent effective action in ejection of the communists who have gained a footing in the North of that Province.

When Mr. Matsuoka tells New York that Japan's action is protecting China from communism and political disunity, he flagrantly misstates the position. The recent pre-occupations of General Chiang Kai-shek in the North—due of course to events in Jehol—have coincided with a marked recovery of communist morale. In other words the communist situation really demands the Generalissimo's personal attention and yet it is difficult to see how he can neglect the call which the foreign invasion necessarily makes on his leadership. Nor

for her own malady, after taking consultation with her friends. The heavy strain thrown upon her administrative fabric by the severance of Manchuria and the enhanced aloofness of Canton requires urgent attention. The League may not be able effectively to counter either blow directly. It can, however, reasonably endeavour, if so desired by China, to offer assistance in the improvement of the economic resources of the limited but actually large areas under Nanking's control. In this enterprise, looking ahead, Japan's good offices may eventually be enlisted, despite her withdrawal from the League. Thus, while designed immediately to compass much needed internal reform, it may help to solution of external difficulties. So long as official utterances and the policy they appear to embody emphasise China's defiance of Japan in the military sense, so long is it impossible for China to find support for practical measures of rehabilitation. If formal negotiation with Japan in settlement of major issues is impossible—and the reasons are recognised as being not without weight—it is within the power of the two countries, after taking stock of the situation and realising the danger to both in its unchecked fluidity, to abandon formality and set dogmas and agree to a definite suspension of hostilities without specific discussion of controversial issues. On a smaller scale this was done last year in Shanghai. It has led to a working arrangement which has—in a good hour be it spoken—gained strength as the days have passed. Can it not be attempted on more ambitious lines? Let China and Japan "call it a peace" and perhaps the mere invocation may, in due course, produce the reality.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hufsch NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Shanghai/56 FOR Despatch # 8836.

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED April 1, 1933.
 TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Japanese delegate on the Joint Commission
 filed protest with Chinese delegate on the
 Commission against the passage of Chinese
 troops through Markham Road Junction on
 February 7th.

hs

793.94/6214
 6714

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:

793.94
On March 8th the Japanese Consul General, in his capacity as Japanese delegate on the Joint Commission, filed a protest with the Chinese delegate on the Commission against the passage of Chinese troops through Warham Road Junction on February 7th, to which reference was made in the political report for February. The Chinese were requested to see that no movements of Chinese troops would take place in future through this area. The Chinese delegate promptly replied on March 11th stating that the troop movement in question did not come within the scope of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.20/426 FOR Tel. # 353, 11 am.
FROM China (Johnson) DATED April 22, 1933
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: Entire personnel of Loyang Aviation School departed from Loyang
19th and flew to Hangchow, stopping at Pengpu and Nanking.
Bombing group remains at Nanking.

esp

793.94/6215
6215

155
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 22, 1933

Rec'd 1:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

353, April 22, 11 a. m.

My 251, ^{4/16}March 15, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"April 21, 10 a. m. Nineteen airplanes and entire
personnel of aviation school at Loyang departed from
Loyang April 19th, spent night at Pengpu, and flew to
Hangchow yesterday stopping for few moments at Nanking.
Bombing group remains at Nanking for time being".

JOHNSON

CIB WP

not to
793.94

893 20/4/26

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (B)

FROM Dated April 24, 1933.
Recd. 2 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



365, April 24, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.74
note
793.94119

My 357, ⁶²⁰⁴April 22, 8 p. m. I have just received a call from Y. C. T. Shen, Director of the Asiatic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanking. Shen is the one who handed Sir Miles the letter from Lo Wen Kan referred to in my 358, ⁶²⁰⁵April 23, noon. Shen told me that Lampson had told him of his conversation with me. He intimated that Nanking was loath to participate in any formal negotiations for an armistice. He stated that Nanking looked upon Chiang Mon Lin's suggestions as being purely personal and said that Nanking's view was that a formal or written understanding was unnecessary; that assuming the Japanese were sincere in their statement that they did not wish to come farther the Chinese on their side certainly did not intend to make any attack and they thought that the Chinese and Japanese military in the ^{field} (*) should be able to come to some informal arrangement to that end. He said that Nanking hoped that the friendly powers would warn Japan that China intended to defend the Peiping and Tientsin areas with every means

at

F/HS

793.94/6216

FILED

JUN 24 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

365, April 24, 7 p. m. from Peiping

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at its disposal and that further advance by Japan would involve international complications. He suggested that protocol powers might do this.

I informed Shen that I would transmit to Washington Nanking's hope that we might participate in a warning but that I did not believe that Washington would find it possible to issue any such warning to Japan and as regards the protocol I pointed out to him that the protocol was between the powers and China and not between the powers and Japan and that I therefore did not see how the protocol was involved.

WSB RR

JOHNSON

(*) Apparent omission.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 April 26, 1933.

~~LES~~
~~TRT~~
~~RCM~~
~~ICM~~

Harbin's despatch No 5722 of March 30th, 1933, transmits the text of a protest the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Harbin filed with the Soviet Consul General at that place against the Soviet's permitting the defeated troops of General Su Ping Wen to return to China at a point near Tientsin.

[Handwritten signature]
 LHE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1933.

~~WAS:~~
~~HE:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~MMH:~~

Mukden's despatch of April 3, 1933, reports recent political developments in Manchuria. A large portion of this despatch is devoted to events in the Jehol campaign which are no longer of special interest.

Consul General Myers states that the second "Manchukuo" army which was especially organized for the Jehol drive, numbering between 2,000 and 3,000 men, was sent to Chinchow prior to the drive, but as these troops showed signs of being unreliable, two units were disarmed, but the third ran away with their arms. The Japanese military authorities have opposed the creation of "Manchukuo" military groups but have, from time to time, been induced to organize such units to satisfy the demands made by the Chinese occupying official positions in "Manchukuo".

CK.
 LHE:KC

055

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Mukden, Manchuria, April 3, 1933.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

793.94

PM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
APR 24 33
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 24 1933
Department of State

F/HS
793.94/6217

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 737 to the Legation at Peiping, China,
dated April 1, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FILED
MAY 8 - 1933

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 737
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
HTW

155

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 737.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, April 1, 1933.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my confidential despatch No. 736, of March 29, 1933, under the subject "Some Side-lights on Present Sino-Japanese Situation," I have the honor to report briefly on recent political developments.

As of possible interest, there is given below a brief resume of the situation along the Great Wall as outlined a few days ago to foreign press correspondents and representatives of the local consulates by a member of the Japanese military mission at Mukden. He stated that the Japanese army has definitely taken the following passes, namely, Kupeikou, Haifengkou, Chiehlingkou and Iyunkou (last named is north of Shihmenshai) and that there are a number of small passes between Lowenkou and Kupeikou which are not occupied by either side. Lengkou, it was admitted, was taken early in March by a small detachment which was later withdrawn during the fighting around Haifengkou. It has since

been

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By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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been held by the Chinese but its early occupation by a Japanese force which was recently concentrated at a village a short distance away is anticipated. The Chinese troops, it was stated, have built trenches parallel to and within gun range of the Wall extending from Lowenkou to Shanhaikuan and frequently carry out "petty" night raids on the Japanese positions to their great annoyance. In the past week fairly serious attacks were made on Chiehlingkou and Hsifengkou and during the fighting around the former place on March 24 Japanese troops made a sortie south of the Wall driving the Chinese out of their trenches. He stated that the Japanese then withdrew and the Chinese reoccupied their trenches.

In reply to a question regarding possible operations south of the Wall, the spokesman expressed as his personal opinion that they would be necessary in case the Chinese continued to pursue a provocative attitude and to occupy the positions now held near the Wall. The Japanese army, it was said, considered that it had the situation along the Wall well in hand.

The spokesman also mentioned that practically all Chinese regular troops had withdrawn from Jehol and that only remnants of volunteers remained. The Army estimates that there are forty groups of bandits in the province. T'ang Yu-lin was reported to have arrived at Kalgan and his troops at Dolonnor (Tolun), Chahar Province, where according

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

ing to Japanese estimates there are now altogether about 30,000 troops. The strength of the Chinese regulars in the triangular area between Shanhaikuan-Lengkou and the Lan River was given as about 60,000 and of those south of Hsifengkou and Lowenkou as 30,000. Around Kupeikou and Tangshan, on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, their forces were estimated at 30,000 and 60,000 respectively.

According to Japanese press reports the situation along the Jehol border, particularly in the neighborhood of Shanhaikuan, has become tense in the past week as a result of the provocative activities of Chinese troops. It was stated that large numbers of Chinese troops had arrived at Shihmenchai, south of the Wall and northwest of Shanhaikuan, on March 27th and had come in conflict with pro-Manchoukuo volunteers under Ting Chiang from Iyunkou who repulsed them and captured the village of Chutsaoying on the 28th. The spokesman of the military mission denied that any Manchoukuo volunteers had gone south of the Wall, claiming that the volunteers in question were anti-Manchoukuo. However, from a reliable Japanese source it has been learned that some Chinese insurgents who surrendered to Manchoukuo have been organized as irregular units or volunteers and that the above mentioned volunteers belonged to a Manchoukuo unit. The occupation of Shihmenchai by the Japanese appears to be imminent according to a Manchoukuo News Service report of March 30.

Reliable

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL

Reliable information regarding the disbandment of the Second Manchoukuo Army which was specially organized for the Jehol drive has just been received. This force, estimated at between 2000 and 3000 men, was sent to Chinchow (Chinhsien) some time before the drive began but as these troops showed signs of being unreliable the Japanese decided to send them to Tungliao to be disarmed. Two units were sent there and disarmed without difficulty. The third unit while en route between Sauping kai and Tungliao stopped the train near Cheng-chiatun and fled with all their arms. The fourth unit was subsequently disarmed at Chinchow. What disposition has been made of these men is not known. It is possible, however, that some of them are being organized into a labor corps at Mukden for the construction of a motor road between Mukden and Fushun, on which work will be started very soon. In this general connection mention may be made that it was learned that the Japanese military last autumn were opposed to the creation of a Manchoukuo army because no Manchurian units had proved reliable even with Japanese officers. It is claimed, however, that the military agreed to the formation of these units at the instance of Manchoukuo leaders. It is reported that a few Chinese connected with the Manchoukuo Government have been urging the Japanese to permit Chinese to play, at least outwardly, a more prominent role in the Government and that the Japanese complain of a dearth

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dearth of experienced Chinese officials. Probably the Japanese have been delaying the confiscation of so-called "traitor property" in the hope that officials of the former government may be induced to seek employment with the new government. Owing to the resignation of Chang Hsueh-liang some of his followers may now be ready to make terms with the new regime.

Another incident concerning which apparently authentic news did not appear in the press - the press reported a wreck on the Ssuningkai-Taonan line - was the wrecking and looting of a passenger train on March 17 on the Taonan-Tsitsihar line which resulted in over 100 casualties including eight Japanese killed and four injured. According to information received from a reliable source all second and third-class passengers were looted and the Manchoukuo guards, sixteen in number, for the second and third-class coaches were disarmed while neither the guards for the first-class coach nor any first-class passengers were disturbed. It is thought that this train was wrecked by the Manchoukuo unit which disappeared near Chengchiatun. This was one of the most serious cases of train robbery that has ever occurred in Manchuria.

Reference may be made to recent Japanese press reports stating that the War Office, Tokyo, will in April begin calling to the colors altogether 100,000 officers and non-commissioned officers on the reserve list and ex-service men for the purpose

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purpose of strengthening the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and of giving these men training in the latest appliances. According to reliable information those to be sent to Manchuria, the number of which is unknown, will comprise mainly non-commissioned officers and officers up to and including the rank of captain, in which ranks the Kwantung Army has suffered relatively the heaviest casualties.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
 Five copies to Department.
 One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.
 One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./65 FOR Despatch # 2023

FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 29, 1933
 TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Invasion of Jehol successful due to Chinese internal treachery and strife among officials, followed by resignation of Chang Hsueh-liang and reorganization of his forces to suit Chiang Kai-shek, still with no good effect toward defense of province. Fall of Jehol City a complete surprise to the Chinese populace.

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793.94/6218

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The inherent inability of the Chinese to comprehend, let alone exhibit anything resembling Occidental patriotism with its consequent sacrifices; his complete lack of an understanding of the spirit that will make a man lay down his life for a cause; coupled with his inability to cooperate where his personal interests are involved has been largely responsible for the debacle which took place in Jehol early in March. Disloyalty of various commanders and the impossibility of coordination between ignorant officers having no knowledge of modern warfare made a farce of the defense in spite of numerous verbose resolutions to "fight to the last man".

The month opened with the Japanese offensive against Jehol well under way while the Chinese made hurried efforts to augment the forces defending that province. Although the invasion of Jehol had been impending for more than a year, no adequate preparation had been made by the Chinese to meet this danger; the various factions being engaged in the old Chinese game of disputing among themselves as to who should bear the brunt of the defense.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang continued insistent that the defense of Jehol was a national problem requiring the cooperation and resources of all China, but General Chiang Kai-shek seemed determined to avoid weakening his own position by direct participation of the Government and sent only financial assistance, leaving the defense of the province to a motley group of disputing and jealous generals with their private armies.

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The unexpectedly rapid advance of the Japanese attacking forces through the Province of Jehol and the capture on March 4th of Jehol City, the capital, came as a complete surprise to the Chinese public which had been fed upon patriotic slogans and assurances of the invulnerability of the Chinese position. It is remarkable that with the thousands upon thousands of Chinese troops in Jehol, the advance Japanese army of occupation consisted of only 2 armored cars, 130 trucks and 600 men.

With the final debacle at Jehol City, Chiang Kai-shek could no longer disregard the public clamor that arose, and, compelled also by motives of self-preservation he came north and took actual control of the situation. He established his headquarters at Paoingfu, about 100 miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow railway, and almost immediately there was a stream of national officials and members of the Kuomintang going to Paoingfu to confer with him. Among them were the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance, Yen Hsi-shan, Chiang Tso-pin, Chinese Minister to Japan, General Han Fu-chu, Chairman of the province of Shantung, and a representative of Feng Yu-hsiang. Chang Hsueh-liang, tendering his resignation, was the first. His resignation was accepted and Ho Ying-chin, Minister for Military Affairs, was appointed to relieve him as Chairman of the Peiping Military Council responsible for the defense of North China. General Ho Ying-chin immediately set about taking over control of the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang; reorganizing them and shifting them about in a manner calculated best to serve the interests of Chiang Kai-shek, thereby

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thereby bringing about the elimination of Chang Hsueh-liang's organization and preventing disloyalty.

There was reported to be considerable disagreement between Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand and Lo Wen-kan and T. V. Soong on the other over the proper attitude to maintain toward the Japanese. There is constant reiteration of reports to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek favors tacit temporary recognition of Japanese gains and possible eventual direct negotiations, but that T. V. Soong and Lo Wen-kan demand that every effort be expended to retake Jehol, maintaining that direct negotiations with Japan would mean death to the Nanking regime. T. V. Soong is reported to believe that China's only chance lies in a prolonged struggle and that he consequently favors provoking Japan into invasion of the Peiping-Tientsin area, endeavoring thereby to compel Japan to make such tremendous expenditures as will cause her eventual ruin.

There is evidence indicating that T. V. Soong's policies may control and that there will be no direct negotiations, at least for the time being. Treasures from the Palace Museum as well as other valuables, are being hurriedly shipped to the south, and there is the usual departure of officers' families. Numerous patriotic bodies have been born in North China out of the most recent Japanese aggression. These patriotic organizations - a new thing to China - are busily engaged in offering "aids" and "comforts" both to the wounded and to the soldiers at the front.

Japan's withdrawal from the League accompanied by

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her denial of any obligations under Article I of the League Covenant was a further indication of her inherent disregard for the validity of written undertakings. Considerable perturbation has been caused among Chinese by the movements of Japanese naval vessels both in North China waters and upon the Yangtze. Exhibiting her ability to construe written undertakings as her policies dictate, Japan has continued to show a decided inclination towards provocative action. She has protested vigorously against what she calls a Chinese infringement at Tientsin and Taku of the terms of the Exchange of Notes of 1902; has protested against the movement of Chinese troops through Shanghai as contrary to the terms of the Agreement of May 5th; and by sending an airplane carrier to Hangchow has been at least partially responsible for the removal of the newly-established aviation school from that place to Loyang in Honan, though this latter move is also said to have been made under instructions from General Chiang Kai-shek who, after a dispute with T. V. Soong, wanted to assure to himself complete control of the school under all eventualities.

The remarkable resistance now being offered by the Chinese at points along the Great Wall between Kupeikow and Hsifengkow, and between Hsifengkow and Chiumenkow has been received with pleasant surprise by the nation, and has caused the press increasingly to demand that there be no direct negotiations. There is some fear

however

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however that the seriousness of this action may impel the Japanese to enter the Peiping-Tientsin area in order to attack these points from the rear. It is now known that they fear the reaction at home against too heavy casualties and it is reliably reported that the Japanese military have already broached this subject to the Government recommending such action.

The present lull, disturbed only by the resistance being offered at the above-mentioned points, is not at all reassuring however. Chiang Kai-shek has returned temporarily to Nanking, where he is participating in conferences of the National Defense Council which will determine the course of Chinese policy and possibly result in a reorganization of the Government with Wang Ching-wei resuming his duties as President of the Executive Yuan. This National Defense Council was created secretly sometime during February when strict measures were taken to prevent the news from leaking to the press. Its primary object is said to be the unification of the efforts of the entire country. It is largely under the control of General Chiang Kai-shek, and included Ho Ying-chin, Chen Shao-kwan, Lo Wen-kan, the presidents of the five Yuens and the members of the Central Executive Committee.

China as a whole has been little affected by the Jehol campaign. Each province has its own troubles which to it are paramount, and while its rulers will proclaim to the heavens their patriotism and desire to fight unto death, each concentrates upon maintaining his own satrapy and extorting the maximum from the people. Under such

circumstances

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circumstances it is a virtual impossibility to obtain effective coordination of effort towards national aims.

Canton forms the nucleus of a government which to all intents and purposes is independent of that at Nanking. Kweichow and Yunnan remain little affected by the Nanking régime. Szechuan is the cock-pit of western China where the Nanking Government is little more than a myth. In the vast region comprising Kansu, Kokonor and Sinkiang the control of the Nanking Government is so slight that petty wars and earthquakes occur without that Government being aware thereof. Verbose declarations of patriotic intentions are common, and increase in daring in proportion to the distance from possible Japanese retaliation, but in all of these out-lying regions the question of the eventual disposition of Jehol is at present of very little primary importance. While the articulate Nanking Government is crying out to the world against the rape of Manchuria, Szechuan is interested in its numerous independent generals and its newly acquired communist menace; Honan and Shensi are suffering from famine; Hunan and Hupeh are busy building roads after the partial eradication of their communist menace; Yunnan is troubled with French penetration; Chinese Turkestan is worrying with its Mohammedans, and Kweichow with its aborigines who are now reported to be ravaging the borders of Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Each province is too consumed by its local problems to be vitally interested in Jehol.

As the month closes there is considerable speculation as to the future. Amidst all this turmoil there is progress.

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progress, and the Nanking Government, hampered as it is by lack of support in outlying regions and by internal dissension, appears to be making an honest effort to improve the conditions of the people within the limited territory it controls. It is true that the modern laws and regulations promulgated for the governance of the people are impossible of enforcement under present conditions, but their promulgation is a step in the right direction and should eventually prove beneficial. The Chinese Maritime Customs began to enforce its regulations more strictly; there were efforts to obtain more control over the cable and radio companies; there were efforts to require the registration of publications and of newspaper correspondents; there were promises of a better administration of justice in the Shanghai courts; there were indications of a willingness on the part of the Government to discuss claims against it; and notable progress toward the construction of better communication facilities.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./64 FOR Despatch # 1994

FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 13, 1933

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

6219

793.94/6219

REGARDING: The Shanhaikwan Incident, its connection with the Boxer Protocol and its effect on the Chinese Populace. Invasion of Jehol toward end of February after long preparation, collapse of Chinese resistance due to treachery among Chinese officers, Tang Yu-lin's actions and effect of defeat on the Chinese people.

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I. SINO-JAPANESE HOSTILITIES.

1. The Shanhaikwan Incident and the Boxer Protocol.

170-12
 "At the beginning of 1933 - as at the beginning of 1932 - the shadow of Japanese militarism casts a gloom over a world desperately in need of peace", exclaimed Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, when he learned that Japanese forces had occupied Shanhaikwan on January 3, 1933.

Nobody knows, and probably nobody ever will know, just how the incident started. As in the case of similar incidents in the past, there are conflicting versions from Chinese and Japanese sources as to who began the shooting. Nor does it greatly matter, for the relations between China and Japan have become fundamentally so strained that the investigation of isolated incidents no longer serves any useful purpose. They are merely symptoms of an unhealthy condition which, even irrespective of the wishes of the persons immediately concerned, may at any moment degenerate into a catastrophe.

It suffices it to say that rath^{er} a fighting broke out near Shanhaikwan on January 1st which ended, after stiff Chinese resistance, on January 3rd with the occupation of the city by Japanese forces hastily summoned from Chinchow. There was much loss of life and damage to property. The promptness with which Japanese armored trains, tanks, bombing planes, and naval vessels appeared on the scene left no doubts in the minds of im-

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partial observers that the Japanese deliberately precipitated the incident as a step in the furtherance of their political and military program, which they have been methodically pursuing for the past year and a half. Nobody is any longer deceived by the flimsy pretexts Japan is constantly using to justify every new act of aggression and the large scale hostilities which usually accompany it. Almost exactly a year ago the attack on Chinchow took place and, although it was temporarily halted (so the Chinese firmly believe) by an American warning, the Japanese allegation that Chinese troops were being massed there for an invasion of Manchuria has now been repeated. Ever since then an advance on Shanhaikwan had been expected, and it was almost consummated on December 8-9, 1932, when a clash occurred between a Japanese armored train and Chinese soldiers. (See Legation's telegram No. 1315, December 10, 12 noon, 1932). Although the Japanese Government has been in the habit of letting its troops act first and explaining and defending their actions afterwards, at that particular time - presumably for purely strategic reasons - it did not wish to take advantage of the incident, and it was settled locally.

A fresh opportunity came three weeks later, and this time the Japanese military decided to extend the sphere of their operations south of the Great Wall by driving the Chinese out of Shanhaikwan, notwithstanding the fact that the local garrison commander, General Ho Chu-kuo, who studied in Japan and speaks the language,

had

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had for months shown the most conciliatory spirit and the greatest tact in avoiding provocation.

Shanhaikwan, it must be remembered, is situated at the point where the Peiping-Mukden Railway pierces the Great Wall by a narrow Thermopylae a few miles from where it ends in the sea. By occupying this border town Japan has blown in the gateway to China proper and has opened a passage to Tientsin and Peiping. Although Tokyo immediately announced that it had issued instructions to localize and settle the Shanhaikwan affair, the Chinese receive such news with serious misgivings, especially in view of the oft-repeated Japanese formula that no invasion of North China is intended unless there should be Chinese provocation. "It is peculiar", remarks a Chinese journalist in commenting on Japan's alleged desire to negotiate, "that negotiations in the Japanese mind cannot be conducted except on the ruins of a city and over the dead bodies of innocent Chinese!"

As a matter of fact, the negotiations came to nothing because Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang refused to deal with General Nakamura, the Japanese Commandant in Tientsin. For when Nakamura proposed to him on January 4th that, as a basis for a settlement, no Chinese troops should in future be stationed at Shanhaikwan and that the town should be neutralized, intimating that otherwise "grave consequences might occur in North China", the Young Marshal merely replied that he was under the orders

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orders of the National Government and that any further communications the Japanese wished to make must be addressed to Nanking. Nevertheless, Marshal Chang issued strict instructions to his troops not to aggravate the situation by attacking the Japanese, and his orders have been loyally carried out.

In view of the large British economic interests represented by the Peiping-Mukden Railway, the Kailan Mining Administration, and the port of Chinwangtao, the senior British naval officer (Commander Taylor of the sloop "Folkestone") at Chinwangtao, was instructed by Admiral Sir Howard Kelly to place his good offices at the disposal of both parties. The Chinese replied (January 8th) that they were not authorized to conduct any negotiations, but even if they had been it is doubtful whether the British Legation in Peiping - which was opposed to such mediation - would have permitted meetings to take place. Incidentally, the Young Marshal replied to the British Minister's request that adequate measures be taken for the protection of British interests, that the Chinese authorities could not be held responsible for any damage such interests might suffer as a consequence of Japanese aggression.

The danger of serious international complications, apart from what might be caused by the presence of material foreign interests in North China, also lies in the so-called Boxer Protocol of September 7, 1901, and the Exchange of Notes of July 15 and 18, 1902, by virtue of which certain of the powers acquired the right to

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station troops along the railway between Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanhaikwan for the purpose of ensuring safe communications from the Legations to the sea. And among the points which may be so occupied according to Article IX of the Protocol are precisely Shanhaikwan, Chinwangtao, Changli, Lwanchow, and Tangku, - all in the vicinity of the recent fighting. Now that Russia, Germany, and Austria are no longer "Protocol Powers", the only great powers enjoying this right are the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. They maintain a total of about 6,000 troops in the Peiping-Tientsin area, of which some 1600 are normally Japanese. The sector of the railway specifically assigned to Japan, by agreement among the powers, is the one from Lwanchow to Shanhaikwan, a distance of 61 miles.

The Exchange of Notes of 1902 regarding "conditions for the dissolution of the Provisional Government at Tientsin" furthermore specified that no Chinese troops must be stationed within 20 li of the foreign forces in Tientsin, or moved within a two-mile zone on either side of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway, and that no maritime defenses must be maintained at Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan. To this Exchange of Notes the United States has never formally been a party, and although some of its stipulations may be considered as logically flowing from the provisions of the Protocol, the interested powers for many years past have made no serious attempts to enforce these conditions, recognizing that the foreign

forces

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forces available would be inadequate to occupy and control the entire railroad, and under normal conditions no objections have been registered against the presence of Chinese troops at or near the line.

The whole question was raised, though apparently not officially, by a news despatch from Tokyo on January 9, 1935, to the effect that the commandant of the Japanese troops in Tientsin had been instructed to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to a point outside the two-mile railway zone "in accordance with the Boxer Protocol for the purpose of maintaining peace and order at Shanhaikwan". The Chinese Government immediately sent a Memorandum to the signatories of the Protocol calling their attention to the fact that Japan, by taking unlawful advantage of the special privileges claimed under the Protocol, had attacked and occupied the city of Shanhaikwan, slaughtered thousands of peaceful Chinese citizens, and inflicted considerable damage to property. "In these circumstances", the Memorandum continues, "the Chinese Government cannot assume responsibility for any situation, in law or in fact, which may result from the exercise by the Chinese defensive forces of the legitimate right of resisting the aggressive actions of the Japanese troops."

This communication was considered as in a nature of a statement only, and the Legations to which it was addressed decided that no reply, expressing either agreement or disagreement, was necessary.

The Chinese Government feels of course very strongly

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ly that the 1901 and 1902 agreements were never meant either to facilitate the invasion of North China by an individual country, or to prevent the Chinese Government from making use of its right of self-defense. Therefore, and notwithstanding the anomalous situation created by the existence of small "Protocol" detachments of Japanese troops along the railway behind the Chinese front, the National Government immediately ordered Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to send reinforcements into the Lwanchow-Chinwangtao area, where by the end of January between forty and fifty thousand Chinese troops were believed to have been assembled, with others to resist if attacked. On January 5th Nanking warned the League of Nations to lose no time in taking effective measures to check Japanese actions, and that the Chinese military forces would resist any further aggression. And in a stiffly worded note to the Japanese Minister (January 22nd) the Chinese Government demanded "the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops from the occupied areas at and near Shanhaikwan, the prevention of similar occurrences in future, and the punishment of those who started the trouble".

The adv^y ds of both sides are still facing a- (Stone River), about one mile southwest of Shanhaikwan, and although the Japanese have made no move in the direction of Chinwangtao, they occupied the Chiumenkou Pass (some 8 miles north of Shanhaikwan, on the Great Wall) on January 10th after some fighting. This they explained was necessary to protect the Japan-

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ese flank between Shanhaikwan and Chinchow, and also because this pass was one of the principal avenues through which Chinese support was reaching the volunteers in Manchuria. But the Chinese regarded it at once as proof that the Shanhaikwan affair must be linked with Japan's threat to Jehol. For Chiumenkou commands the most important route between southeastern Jehol and the sea, and by using Shanhaikwan as a base of operations the Japanese were now able not only to move more effectively against Jehol, but also to menace the whole Peiping-Tientsin area in the event that stubborn resistance in Jehol should render it necessary to isolate that province entirely.

It was therefore only natural that the Chinese Government should maintain that the occupation of Shanhaikwan and of Chiumenkou ceased to be mere local incidents and had become matters of international importance. "After Shanhaikwan - what?" the Chinese asked themselves anxiously, and in order to draw attention to the fact that the world was being faced by a new challenge which it could not well afford to ignore, the Chinese delegates at Geneva created quite a sensation by cabling to Nanking urging the National Government to take immediate steps to recapture Shanhaikwan. They doubtless wished to proclaim the futility of relying any longer upon the League, and the necessity that China demonstrate her readiness and ability to protect her own interests, even at the risk of precipitating war with Japan.

The moral effect of the Shanhaikwan incident upon

Chinese

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Chinese public opinion has been very great indeed. The vernacular papers throughout the country and many societies declared that China was unable to remain passive in the face of these unprovoked attacks, and that it was high time for the government to take military action, both to prevent further aggression and to recover what had been lost. In this attitude they were confirmed by the fact that Japan had made no attempt to conceal her intention of including Jehol within the boundaries of Manchukuo. With Japan's vanguard inside the Great Wall "the camel's head is in the tent" (as the Arabs say) and the consequences to the tent are likely to be disastrous.

2. The Invasion of Jehol.

Although the long-anticipated Japanese offensive against Jehol did not begin in earnest until towards the end of February, the stage had been cleared for it ever since last summer when the Ishimoto incident threatened a crisis. (See the Legation's despatch No. 1671, August 17, 1932, pp. 2-5). Only at that time the Japanese military were evidently too busy in Northern Manchuria to open a campaign in Jehol. But as soon as they had successfully concluded their main operations against Ma Chan-shan and Su Ping-wen, had cleared the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Sungari area of anti-Manchukuo forces, and had restored order in the bandit-ridden triangular region between Mukden, Antung and Chinchow, they again turned their attention to the situation in Jehol.

although

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Although the grounds on which the Japanese have hitherto started military operations have never been very convincing, the following appear to be their main excuses on this occasion:

(a) The case of the missing Japanese liaison officer Ishimoto has never been satisfactorily cleared up. He was kidnapped last July, the Japanese allege, by Chinese volunteers under Li Hai-feng. The Japanese demanded of General Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jehol, that he take steps to obtain his liberation. This Tang Yu-lin promised to do, but it is said that when he approached Li Hai-feng the latter demanded one million dollars Mex. and the incorporation of his volunteer troops into the regular Jehol Army. This led to a complete deadlock, and although the Japanese have since then been negotiating with Li Hai-feng direct, they have had no success, and they now claim that Ishimoto is either dead or that his life is in extreme danger.

(b) The Japanese maintain that Jehol is one of the "constituent provinces of Manchukuo", and they point out that General Tang Yu-lin was among the Chinese notables who signed the declaration of independence of Manchukuo on February 18, 1932, and that he never repudiated his signature. He is also still listed as Vice President of the Manchukuo "Privy Council". And when the new State announced its independence to the world it specifically mentioned Jehol as one of the four Northeastern Provinces

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Provinces which composed it.

(c) The Chinese have used Jehol as the principal base from which elements hostile to Manchukuo have been supplied with money and reinforcements, and where soldier-bandits who had been defeated by the Japanese were allowed to take refuge.

(d) The Third Plenary Session at Nanking last December adopted a resolution urging the government to concentrate troops in Jehol and other northern provinces for the purpose of recovering Manchuria, and in the meantime to lend every possible assistance to the Chinese volunteers in fighting the Japanese. (See Legation's despatch No. 1915, January 16, 1933, pp. 25-27). As a result of this resolution the Japanese claim Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang redistributed his forces in North China and sent at least three brigades outside the Great Wall. This they look upon as a "provocative policy" which endangers Manchukuo and which, by virtue of Japan's treaty relations with the latter, the Japanese Government cannot tolerate.

There is an element of truth in all these allegations, but the Chinese Government very naturally takes the position that Japan's presence in Manchuria is illegal ab initio, and that China has a perfect right to move its troops anywhere it pleases within its own territories, and to take any measures it sees fit to expel the invader. The Chinese have made no secret of the fact that they have been trying to embarrass

Japanese

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embarrass Japanese civil and military efforts in Manchuria in every possible way, and that they will continue to do so. The Nanking Government has been very insistent that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should go through with the general defense program for North China, and Chinese public opinion seems determined that the passive policy must cease and is all in favor of action at whatever cost. The unexpected resistance of the 19th Route Army (Cantonese), in Shanghai a year ago encouraged the people to think that man for man the Chinese soldier was not inferior to the Japanese, and ever since then the leaders in Canton have been particularly noisy in clamoring for a policy of defiance. They even demanded "the infliction of the extreme penalty upon Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang for the loss of Shan-haikwan". And toward the end of January a military conference at Canton, at which the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Fukien were represented, decided to invite General Tsai Ting-kai (who commanded the 19th Route Army) to take 30,000 men north to help in the defense of Jehol. Needless to say the plan never materialized, but the publicity it got served to feed popular emotions and to render them oblivious of the fact that China is in no sense prepared for war as it lacks most of the technical equipment of a modern army.

There is every indication that Japan hoped until the last to avoid direct military action in Jehol by obtaining General Tang Yu-lin's unequivocal adherence to Manchukuo. Japanese emissaries - of whom the kidnapped Ishi-

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moto is said to have been one - have tried by every means to induce him to break definitely with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. But Tang Yu-lin managed to remain "sitting on the fence", keeping his agents both at Mukden and Felping. As his ruthless cupidity was well known to the Japanese, and as his principal source of revenue (estimated at \$20,000,000 Mex. per annum) was derived from the opium traffic, Japan offered him very tempting terms in connection with the Manchukuo project for an opium monopoly. It is said that Tang Yu-lin himself was ready to throw in his lot with Manchukuo, but that several of his subordinates desired to remain loyal to the Young Marshal. He was therefore obliged to maintain a precarious position of semi-neutrality, with the result that his allegiance was claimed both by the National Government and by Mukden, although neither was sure what he would do if put to the test.

As time went on, however, and it became increasingly clear that Tang Yu-lin would go on indefinitely playing with both sides while openly professing loyalty to Marshal Chang and the National Government, the Japanese decided upon military demonstrations, doubtless with the idea of intimidating him. Throughout January and February troop concentrations took place on the border of Jehol, and towns like Kailu in the north and Chaoyang in the southeast were frequently and heavily bombed by Japanese planes. Minor skirmishes also occurred almost daily between Japanese troops and Chinese volunteers,

and

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and as the Young Marshal's brigades were steadily moving northward there was imminent danger of a serious collision at any time. Throughout these weeks Tang Yulin kept in close touch with the Young Marshal, and the Japanese Higher Command therefore reluctantly decided to eliminate him by force before the spring thaws rendered the difficult terrain impassable.

Whatever China's just grievances may be, she can at least not complain that Japan's invasion of Jehol was in the nature of a surprise attack. Few major operations have ever been better advertised. According to a Rengo message from Tokyo of January 11th "a War Office spokesman" made the following statement for publication:

"Jehol is an integral part of Manchukuo, and a punitive expedition against its lawless elements is Manchukuo's internal affair which admits no outside interference. Jehol is one of the former four Northeastern Provinces and is inseparable from the other three. When Manchukuo declared its independence it was made clear that Jehol is part and parcel of it. The Lytton Commission was also told that the Great Wall forms the border of Manchukuo".

This was confirmed by General Araki, the Minister of War, himself, who said:

"The question of Jehol is a domestic matter of Manchukuo pure and simple, and Japan - as signatory of the Protocol with that State - cannot either postpone or suspend..... the clean-up campaign in Jehol".

And on or about January 15th the Japanese Prime Minister, Viscount Saito, was reported to have remarked:

"It is unquestionable that Jehol is within Manchukuo territory, and in the solution of the Jehol problem Japan is doing her utmost to prevent the situation from extending outside Manchukuo".

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Most important of all, Count Uchida, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of his speech in the Diet on January 21st made the following categorical declaration to the world:

"I may be permitted to say a few words regarding Jehol. That the Great Wall is the boundary line between Manchuria and Mongolia and China leaves no room for doubt, when the matter is viewed from the historical standpoint. And it is plain that Jehol Province is an integral part of Manchukuo, when the circumstances of the establishment of that country are taken into consideration. But at present, the attempt of creating disturbances in the province is not only carried on on a large scale, but regular soldiers under Chang Hsueh-liang are said to be crossing the boundary line and encroaching on Jehol Province. It goes without saying that the maintenance of peace and order in regions within the domains of Manchukuo must be attended to with authority by the two countries jointly under the Japan - Manchukuo Protocol. The so-called Jehol question is a purely domestic question of Manchuria, and Japan, because of its treaty obligation, is greatly concerned in it".

The National Government felt at last obliged to take Japan's threats seriously, and on February 11th T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, arrived in Peiping to discuss the military situation with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and to put some funds at his disposal for the payment of the troops in Jehol. "Jehol is an integral part of China", he declared, "and if this attack on it is delivered it will be met by the force of the entire nation". Incidentally, he said that if Japan actually invaded Jehol he saw "little use in maintaining a Chinese Minister in Tokyo", but he denied that China intended to declare war on Japan.

T. V. Soong

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T. V. Soong remained ten days in the North, of which four days (February 16-19) were spent on a trip to Chengteh (or Jehol City), the capital of the province, which he and the Young Marshal took for the moral effect it would produce. They are said to have been received with considerable enthusiasm, and in a speech which T. V. Soong made there he said:

"Our cause has become the world's cause.... Reckless and ambitious as is Japan's militarism, I cannot believe that one nation can defy the awakened conscience of the world.... You must now color the map with your own heart's blood to show the world that Jehol, like the Three Eastern Provinces, is Chinese territory. On behalf of the Central Government I pledge you that we will never give up the Northeast; we will never give up Jehol!"

The Young Marshal also took this occasion to send to the Chinese Delegation in Geneva a cable from Chengteh which read as follows:

"The determination of the Government and people of China to resist the Japanese invasion has crystallized in the concentration of forces here for the purpose. My presence in this capital city of the province of Jehol, in company with Mr. T. V. Soong, is to complete plans to meet the threatened continued violations of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity by Japan. The Chinese Government has endured unspeakable humiliations in its prolonged efforts loyally to avoid aggravating the situation, in order to assist the League to arrive at a basis for conciliation in accordance with the Covenant and the Treaties.

"But the hope for conciliation has been time and again frustrated by Japan, and the hope of peace has been destroyed by her military operations in Jehol in the face of the solemn injunctions of the League. Japan has made the specious claim that she invaded Manchuria to sustain treaty rights, but she has not even that pretext for invading Jehol, for there are no treaties in connection with this province.

"We

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"We have categorical orders from the Central Government to resist invasion. We are now here to do our part. The people are determinedly behind us. You will assist us by explaining our position and attitude to the League and the world".

T. V. Soong left Peiping for Shanghai on February 21st, and although the Japanese drive against Jehol really began on February 20th with an advance from Lichow toward Peipiao, the railhead of the branch-line from Chinchow, the Japanese Government on February 23rd made one last effort to avoid the necessity of a possibly prolonged campaign by delivering the following Memorandum to the Nanking Government. This document and the Chinese reply to it are of historic interest and are therefore quoted in toto.

"1. The presence of troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and other anti-Manchukuo forces is incompatible not only with the sovereignty of Manchukuo, but also with the restoration of peace and order in Jehol. The Manchukuo Army is now putting into execution its plan to exterminate bandits and the remnants of the soldier-bandits in the province of Jehol, and the Japanese Army is obliged to give assistance to it under the terms of the Protocol concluded between Japan and Manchukuo. The Manchukuo Government repeatedly demanded of Chang Hsueh-liang to withdraw his troops to regions inside the Great Wall, but these demands were unheeded. Should this campaign in Jehol lead to an armed conflict between the Japanese Army, in cooperation with the Manchukuo Army, and Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces, it will be entirely due to the presence of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops in Jehol, and the responsibility must therefore rest with China which has rejected the demands of Manchukuo.

"2. The activities of Japanese troops in Jehol, whose aim is the purification of Jehol Province as stated above and who are cooperating with the Manchukuo forces, have no other objective than to ensure order and tranquility in that province. In principle they will remain within the territory of Manchukuo, but if Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and other

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other anti-Manchukuo forces persist in taking positive action it will be difficult to guarantee that fighting will not spread to North China. If any situation should arise as a result thereof, the responsibility must rest entirely with China.

"3. Manchukuo has always accorded generous treatment to anti-Manchukuo forces which surrender themselves. Should Tang Yu-lin and his troops and other anti-Manchukuo forces surrender to Manchukuo, they will be dealt with leniently in accordance with the policy hitherto followed."

The last paragraph is obviously intended as a direct bid for General Tang Yu-lin's defection.

The Chinese Foreign Office lost no time in answering this somewhat impertinently worded communication, and within a few hours of its receipt the office of the Japanese Legation in Nanking was handed the following:

"1. Since September 18, 1931, Japan has effected the military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces and established therein a puppet regime. Japan is now again concentrating large forces and attacking Jehol which, like the Three Eastern Provinces, is an integral part of China's territory. The Chinese Government, in despatching troops to Jehol for defense against external military aggression, is exercising its inherent sovereign right. That the Japanese Government should demand the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Jehol is manifestly to extend the sphere of such aggression and to further violate the territorial sovereignty of China. The Japanese Government must therefore be absolutely responsible for the invasion of Jehol. As for the puppet regime in the Three Eastern Provinces, it is a Japanese creation pure and simple, a fact which is known to the whole world. For all its illegal activities, Japan should all the more bear the entire responsibility. Against the puppet regime in the Three Eastern Provinces and the so-called Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, the Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged strong protests with the Japanese Government, declaring that the Chinese Government could never give them recognition. It is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on this subject.

"2. That Japan should bear full responsibility for the attack on Jehol has already been stated. The fact that Japan is not only bent

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upon attacking and seizing Jehol, but also declares that her military operations may be extended to North China, is sufficient to prove that her long-cherished policy of aggression remains unchanged. Chinese troops, in resisting Japanese troops and other forces under Japanese direction or command in Jehol, or in taking necessary defensive measures in any other part of Chinese territory, will be acting within their rights. If Japanese military operations should spread to North China, Chinese troops will naturally exercise their right of self-defense in protection of Chinese territory. Full responsibility for any situation which may be thus brought about must be borne by Japan.

"3. General Tang Yu-lin, Chairman of Jehol Province, is a high provincial military authority of the Chinese Government. Being in command of Chinese military forces in Jehol, he has the duty to defend that province. The statements made by the Japanese Government concerning the Chairman of Jehol Province must be regarded as a deliberate affront. The Chinese Government hereby lodges its protest."

This of course definitely closed the door to all further negotiations, and the Japanese Higher Command at once ordered a general advance into Jehol. The season was on the whole advantageous to the attackers, for although the temperature was no longer as low as a month before, the ground and the rivers were still frozen and gave increased mobility to the Japanese Army which is well supplied with automotive equipment. The Japanese invasion was evidently carefully planned and took the form of a simultaneous advance from three directions: the first was based on Tungliao in the north, and proceeded via Kailu in the direction of Chihfeng; the second was based on Chinchow in the east, and proceeded via Chaoyang toward Lingyuan; and the third, based on Suichung in the southeast, likewise had Lingyuan for its immediate objective. All three movements

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were intended to converge on Chengteh, the capital of the province.

Considering the mountainous character of the country, the absence of good roads, and wintry weather with occasional snowstorms, the Japanese moved with surprising rapidity. By March 2nd they had occupied Chihfeng and Lingyuan - the two strongest positions held by the Chinese - and on March 4th they entered Chengteh.

This sudden collapse of Chinese resistance came as a great shock to the general public and was unexpected even by well-informed foreigners. That the Japanese military machine could and would ultimately overcome all Chinese resistance was, of course a foregone conclusion. But with over 100,000 Chinese troops of one kind or another securely in control of the main roads through this rugged country, and with at least another 100,000 readily available inside the Great Wall to support them, it was believed that the Japanese would find the conquest of Jehol a slow, as well as hazardous and expensive undertaking.

The loss of this province almost without striking a blow for it shows, in the first place, that the ever-present treachery among the Chinese generals has again betrayed the nation, for it is obvious that several high officers with their commands must have gone over to the Japanese and "Manchukuo". And in the second place, it is dismal proof that after a year and a half of warning and ample time for preparation China - divided against herself in a hundred ways - is still in no position to

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wage even a defensive war against Japan, let alone to think of regaining Manchuria by reconquest.

The full effect of this shattering blow on the situation in China proper, and especially on the fate of the National Government, cannot yet be gauged but is certain to be profound. To some extent it will also be determined by what Japan intends to do with her latest success. For with the domination of Jehol and the passes she will hold the Peiping-Tientsin area in the hollow of her hand, and as the Japanese have intentionally always left the world in doubt as to their ultimate objectives, it is not impossible that some fresh incident may cause them to try and "solve" the North China problem as well. They have already warned the Young Marshal of the danger of military operations spreading to North China "for strategic reasons", if he compels Japan to act. Although this was probably meant to apply primarily to the contingency of serious and prolonged resistance in Jehol, the unforeseen ease with which the Chinese were routed may likewise lead to hostilities south of the Wall.

In the present state of popular feeling in China, when there seems a genuine demand for a policy of self-defense and self-help, the Central Government will find it difficult to live down this new humiliation. It is caught on the horns of a most embarrassing dilemma: if it tries to compromise it will probably be swept out of office by a less cautious group, and if it adopts an aggressive policy it will only invite further military disasters.

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disasters. One is tempted to say facetiously that China is to-day literally fighting with her back to the Great Wall! And it is certain that peace in Eastern Asia has never been in greater danger.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 3, 1933.

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~~SECRET~~

Hankow's despatch No 287 of March 29 1933
 concerning Sino-Japanese Relations.

Consul General Adams states that the "bloody-hand" group are very active at Hankow and have terrorized for many weeks Chinese dealing in Japanese goods and Chinese attached to foreign firms. The Chinese compradore of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha was murdered on March 4th at Hankow and two other Chinese dealing in Japanese goods have disappeared. This has spread terror among Chinese merchants.

Chinese at Hankow, for the most part, feel that the Japanese will invade China south of the great wall.

The Japanese Consul General at Hankow informed Consul General Adams that he considers the Kuomintang unfriendly to Japan and that General Chiang Kai-shek, although realizing the hopelessness of the situation would content himself by preparing an army for future use against Japan.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 287. 2831

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, March 29, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy, in quintuplicate, of my despatch L. No. 263 of March 29, 1933, addressed to the Legation at Peiping, concerning the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,


Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.


Enclosure:

American Consul General, Hankow, China, to
American Legation, Peiping, L. No. 263,
dated March 29, 1933.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

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L. No. 263

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Hankow, China, March 29, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to attach hereto, as enclosure No. 1, an editorial entitled "Peace Prospects" which appeared in the CENTRAL CHINA POST, issue of March 27, 1933. The statement made in the editorial to the effect that several branches of business activity have been gravely affected by the threats and outrages committed by the "bloody-hand" group are not exaggerated. In fact it may be conservatively stated that most Chinese dealing in Japanese goods and many prominent Chinese attached to foreign firms have for weeks been terrorized by letters threatening them with death.

The Chinese compradore of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha is known to have been lured from a Chinese club and murdered on March 4, 1933, in a road back of the Japanese concession. The disappearance of two other Chinese merchants who were known to be dealing in Japanese goods caused the hurried departure from Hankow of a number of Chinese. The

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The last of the kidnappings known occurred at about 5 p.m., March 20, 1933, on Ming Chuan road in the native city when four young Chinese entered Foo Chang shop which dealt in American and Japanese dye-stuffs and forcibly abducted the proprietor, Mr. Hsu Wei-ching.

It is known that the Japanese Consulate General has filed protests with the Wuhan Garrison Commander against this terrorism. I have not been able to ascertain how strong these protests were.

The murder of the compradore of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha was featured in the local press, but following that incident the strict military censorship existing here has prevented the publication of any items concerning the terrorization which exists. This censorship made all the more surprising the sudden appearance on March 24, 1933, of a prominent article in the SIN MIN PAO, Hankow, describing the organization of an anti-Japanese society with its offices in the headquarters of the Wuhan branch of the Kuomintang. A translation of this article is attached hereto as enclosure No. 2.

It is thought that the Legation may be interested, in this general connection, in the comment amongst intelligent Chinese here on the subject of Japanese intentions with regard to future military operations in China.

From

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From various sources I gather that a considerable majority of the intelligent Chinese here are definitely of the opinion that the Japanese military authorities intend to extend their military operations south of the Great Wall. Some of these give as the reason for such extension the statement that Japan intends to incorporate in Manchukuo territory North China down to the Yellow River. Others state that Japan's reason for coming south of the Great Wall would be to force an agreement with China, recognizing the independence of Manchukuo, before the League and Powers associated with the League get in a position to bring pressure to bear on Japan with the object of forcing her to relinquish her gains in Manchuria. One intelligent merchant here stated that Japan knows that she could not force such an agreement from China merely by occupying the Tientsin and Peiping areas, and that if Japan does occupy these areas, further Japanese military operations in the Yangtze Valley may be taken as a foregone conclusion.

A few days ago Mr. Shimizu, the Japanese Consul General at Hankow, called on me and asked me directly whether the popular feeling in the United States was antagonistic to Japan on account of her activities in Manchuria. I replied that I had no information on this subject beyond what had appeared in the newspapers. In subsequent conversation Mr. Shimizu said

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
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that he considered that the Kuomintang was definitely unfriendly to Japan and that General Chiang Kai-shek, realizing the hopelessness of present military operations against Japan, had carefully conducted himself so as to avoid a military clash with Japan, but that he envisaged the possibility of future military operations against Japan and to that end was building up an efficient military organization.

All of the foregoing comment is submitted merely with the thought that the Legation will be interested in knowing the impressions which prevail in this center.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
 American Consul General.



Enclosures:

1. "Peace Prospects," an editorial from the CENTRAL CHINA POST, Hankow, March 27, 1933.
2. Article from SIN MIN PAO, Hankow, March 24, 1933, describing organization of anti-Japanese Society in Wuhan (English translation).

In duplicate to the Legation.
 In quintuplicate to the Department.
 Copy to American Consulate General, Nanking.
 Copy to American Consulate General, Shanghai.
 Copy to American Consulate General, Tientsin.

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Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 263, dated March 29, 1933, on the subject of Sino-Japanese Relations, from the American Consul General, Hankow, to the American Legation, Peiping.

The Central-China Post

Monday, March. 27, 1933.

PEACE PROSPECTS

Now that Jehol is firmly in Japanese hands and a scapegoat has been provided in an attempt to appease the wrath of the Chinese people, it is natural that observers should search for signs of an early peace between the two nations at war. Opinions differ very greatly as to the prospects of this or of early negotiations, that is negotiations which will be revealed. If one regards the enormous smoke screen of propaganda which the patriots have thrown out as having any substance in it then peace prospects do not exist. On the other hand there is no question but that at Nanking the dominant consideration is that of self preservation and real war with Japan is the last thing wanted. For weeks the Japanese Information Bureau has been stating that if Chiang Kai-shih came North it would be for the purpose of using the crisis for the purpose of gaining and consolidating a hold there and not for purposes of further armed resistance.

But be this as it may, it does not bring peace any nearer. So far the Generalissimo has shown no signs of being provocative. In fact every action speaks to the contrary and his tactics, according to reports from news agencies, of forcefully disarming defeated troops, shows an intention to prevent if possible action by

irresponsible bodies likely to embroil China further with Japan. On the other hand, two months ago Japan categorically declared war upon the Kuomintang. The elimination of Chang Hsueh-liang would normally have put an end to the Kuomintang in the North, but the presence of the Generalissimo, Ho Ying-chin, the Minister for War, and the various other Nanking nominees receiving appointments all indicate a revival in an intensified form of this party government, and against this Japan has steadfastly set her face. In fact it was the primary cause of the war, and without definite negotiations which will absolutely divest the party of its powers for moves against Japan, there is small prospect of a cessation of hostilities in the near future.

The occupation of Hsifengkow and Kupeikow by Japanese forces coupled with the reported action of the Generalissimo in rounding up defeated troops within the Wall, has for the time being prevented an attack by Japan through Shanhaikwan, but it has not altered in any way the conditions prevailing in the vicinity of Tientsin, Taku, and other adjacent districts. According to the official Asiatic News Service, four more Japanese warships carrying ammunition and aeroplanes arrived off Chinwangtao on the 18th inst, and another four were cruising about within a radius of 11 miles from Taku evidently with the intention of landing troops, while Tientsin reports state that at night

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time strong searchlights are played on the vicinity of the fort. There is no reason to doubt the news agency reports and the actions referred to indicate quite clearly that the protests of the Japanese Government anent the fortification of the Taku Forts and the presence of a Chinese army at places forbidden by the Boxer Protocol, may at any time be followed by action to enforce the Japanese demands.

It is difficult to see, in view of the hostility prevailing against the Generalissimo, and the strong anti-Japanese propaganda engendered by this hostility, how he can order, first, the dismantling of the forts if they have as alleged been re-equipped and, secondly, the removal of the large bodies of troops to regions where they will not be infringing the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, without further endangering a position already too onerous. Openly to command all the troops that have been ordered to stations of defence in the old metropolitan province to retire to their original stations would mean a wave of indignation against Nanking that would rise and sweep away every vestige of public support. The S. W. confederation would stigmatise the order as arrant treason. Even the wonderful army mobilised allegedly for the purpose of recovering lost territory might by its force be compelled to march in earnest.

In addition there is the revived anti-Japanese campaign in several places, notably the Wuhan cities. The strictest of censorship has not been

able to prevent the activities of anti-Japanese societies here becoming known although all the kidnappings of merchants having dealings with Japanese firms have not been published nor the threatening letters from the "Bloody Hand" group recently received by foreign firms. Several branches of business activity have been gravely affected, notably the coal, dye, flax and hemp and now rice dealers have published their intention of refraining from any further dealings with Japanese. All this is the result of local anti-Japanese activity and the same process is increasingly apparent up river, where this group have succeeded in preventing the loading of Japanese steamers.

So far, only the mildest of protests have been made, but the activities referred to can be only regarded by Japan as an inspired extension of the boycott as the chief weapon in China's armoury, and for the use of which the Generalissimo and the Party now that they have taken command in the North will be held responsible. The crisis may, from a party point of view provide an excellent opportunity for the subjugation of enemies antagonistic to the Nanking regime, but the process creates a situation which from the point of view of that *vis a vis* Japan is equally if not more dangerous to the peace of China. Coupled with the foregoing activities is the pernicious propaganda spread through the school books against which Japan has on more than one occasion signified her intention of acting, and for this again Chiang Kai-shek and the Party will be held responsible should they succeed in obtaining a grip of the North in any way similar to their hold on the Yangtse Valley. Taking all things into consideration, we cannot yet see the gateway of peace opening in the Far East.

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Enclosure No. 2, to despatch No. 263, dated March 29, 1933, on the subject of Sino-Japanese Relations, from the American Consul General, Hankow, to the American Legation, Peiping.

Translation of news items appearing in the SIN MIN PAO, Hankow, March 24, 1933.

A General Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association Organized by Wuhan Students:

The Wuhan General Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association held its first preparatory meeting in the Provincial Kuomintang Headquarters in Wuchang on March 23, 1 p.m. They passed a number of resolutions.

- (1) The General Association shall be the highest organ of the students.
- (2) During the period of preparation no other activities will be conducted.
- (3) Members on the Preparation Committee shall be nine, one from each of the nine schools.
- (4) The schools on this committee shall be the Wuhan University, Chung Hwa University, Higher Middle School, Central China University, Normal School, Women's Normal School, Higher School for Girls, 1st Middle School for Girls, and 1st Provincial Middle School.
- (5) The name of the organization shall be the Wuhan Students Anti-Japanese and National Salvation General Association.
- (6) The General Association will hold its inauguration meeting on next Thursday (March 30).
- (7) The general principles governing the organization of the association will be passed.
- (8) After the inauguration of the Association it will draw up general principles governing the organization of anti-Japanese societies in the various schools and will distribute them to the schools for guidance.
- (9) Primary schools may be included in the association.
- (10) At the inauguration of the General Association only representatives of the various schools shall attend.
- (11) At meetings of the General Association each school shall have one vote.

Activities of the Hankow National Products Promotion Committee:

On March 23 the Hankow National Products Promotion Committee addressed letters to the Bankers Association and Cash Shops Association asking them to stop the acceptance of Japanese goods as mortgages. The associations were asked to put this resolution, adopted at the 4th meeting of the Standing Committee, into effect immediately after the receipt of the letters.

The Committee issued a circular to all trade unions asking them to investigate and list, within one week after the receipt of the circular, all obstructive (Japanese) articles or goods in their member shops, and to send the lists to the Committee for consideration.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

APR 21 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
Japanese Ambassador.

Mr. Hornbeck.

- Subject: (1) Matsuoka *Co. 33.94/Matsuoka*
(2) Kautto
(3) Peiping-Tientsin Area
(4) Viscount Ishii's Visit

793.94

(3) After exchange of statements with regard to the Kautto incident, the Ambassador then said that he was troubled over the reports in the newspapers of fighting south of the Wall: the papers had said that the Japanese had occupied Chingwangtao; he found that difficult to believe, as Chingwangtao was a port which had an international interest and at which there were troops of various foreign powers; he felt that the report must be in error. The Ambassador went on to say that he did not believe that the Japanese troops had any intention of going to Tientsin or Peiping; in fact, he said, his Military Attaché had information from the Army authorities stating that they had no such intention; but, the Army always added the proviso, "unless the Chinese make it necessary." The Ambassador said

April 19, 1933

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 25 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

APR 22 1933

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

F/H/S

793.94/6221

MAY 23 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

said emphatically that he hoped that the Army would manage to confine its operations to the area east and north of the Luan River. Mr. Hornbeck remarked that he hoped so too.

The Ambassador then said that he wished to say something with regard to Viscount Ishii's visit.

(NOTE: See memorandum (4).)

FE:SKH/ZMK

0604

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 25 1933
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 APR 21 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
 Japanese Ambassador.

Mr. Hornbeck.

- Subject: (1) Matsuoka
 (2) Kautto
 (3) Peiping-Tientsin Area
 (4) Viscount Ishii's Visit

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 APR 22 1933
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

F/HS

793.94/6222

(2) After exchange of statements with regard to Mr. Matsuoka's visit, Mr. Hornbeck stated that the Department wished to give the Ambassador further information with regard to bombings at Taitowying. He then handed the Ambassador a strictly informal memorandum (of which a copy is here attached). The Ambassador read the memorandum and said that he greatly regretted that such things were happening. He said that he would take the matter up with Tokyo. Mr. Hornbeck said that he did not feel that it was necessary that the Ambassador take the matter up with Tokyo, as we were letting it be handled by our authorities in China and our Minister at Peiping had already informed the Japanese Minister there; we wished, however, to keep the Ambassador informed. The Ambassador said that he appreciated our attitude in the matter.

FE:SKH/ZMK

MAY 23 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handwritten:
 H-11 C
 1st class
 14-19-73
 SKT

The Department of State has been informed by the American Consul General at Tientsin, China, that the American citizen residing at Taitowying, Hopei Province, about twenty-five miles northwest of Chinwangtao, near whose property bombs were dropped by a Japanese airplane on the morning of March 24, has now reported that on April 12 Japanese airplanes again visited Taitowying and dropped eight bombs killing four and injuring three civilians; that during the night of April 12 all Chinese troops evacuated Taitowying; that on April 13 Japanese airplanes dropped fifty or sixty bombs killing twenty and injuring many; that three persons, who were standing on the outer side of a doorway of this citizen's property, were killed by a bomb which struck in the street about thirty feet in front of them; that another bomb struck about thirty feet from the servants' quarters on this property; that wooden blinds on one building of this property were damaged, holes were made in a door, walls were scarred and half of the windowpanes in the buildings were broken; that, during these bombings, an American flag five by nine and one-half feet was flying from the flagstaff in the compound of this property; and that this flag was hit by shrapnel in five places.

793.94/62222

Handwritten: L.E.G.
 FE:JEJ/VDM
 4-18-33

Handwritten: m.m.v.
 FE

0608

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

76

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEY

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated April 25, 1933

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 25 1933
 Department of State

April 25, 3 p. m.

793.94

Chinese armored train has now moved eastward to Anshan following up withdrawal of Manchukuo forces. Railway authorities report no fighting but Chinese vernacular newspapers persistently report Chinese regulars are engaging the enemy in that area killing many of them and reoccupying territory previously lost. There is reason to believe that the withdrawal is a part of the Japanese-Manchukuo plan to withdraw their forces to the immediate vicinity of the Wall but if the Chinese as claimed are attacking the forces now being withdrawn a reversal of the present plans of the Japanese may be shortly expected in which it is doubtful whether the invading forces would be willing to stop on the east bank of the Lwan River as they did recently. The situation east of the Lwan River is not entirely clear but the reports of fighting are believed to be propaganda to stimulate support from the south. Local Japanese military authorities have predicted severe fighting in the Miyun-Kupeikow area and announced a determination to drive

F/HS

793.94/6223

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R., Apr. 25,
3 p. m.

drive the Chiang Kai Shek troops from that region where-
upon Ho Ying Chin's position will become more untenable
at Peiping.

WSB-HPD

LOCKHART

0608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chutefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 5722



March 30, 1933.

APR 24 33

SUBJECT: THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL SU PING WEN'S TROOPS.



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 25 1933
Department of State

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 2578, of to-day's date, addressed to the
Legation at Peiping concerning the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of despatch No. 2578 to the Legation.

800
Th/th

F/HS

793.94/6224

169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2578

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, March 30, 1933.

SUBJECT: THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL SU PING WEN'S TROOPS.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Hsinking Government appears to be disturbed because the Soviet Government aided the return to China of several thousand Chinese soldiers formerly under the command of General Su Ping Wen. It will be remembered that these soldiers fled with General Su into Siberia when the Japanese military made a drive on the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway in December last. On March 21, 1933, Mr. Hsieh Chieh Shih, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Hsinking, instructed the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shih Lu Pen, to file a protest in this connection with the local Soviet Consul General. The text of the protest reads in substance as follows:

"When the Lytton Commission proposed a meeting with Ma Chan Shan last year, your Government refused to visa their passports. Besides, when our Government requested you to prevent the rebel leader from fleeing into Soviet territory, you assured us that, while it was impossible to comply with our request in view of the long distance of the frontier line, the rebel leader and his men, if they should find their way into Soviet territory, would be disarmed and be placed under personal restraint.

"Notwithstanding, when Su Ping Wen and others fled into your territory, our request for their surrender to us was ignored. Much to our regret, these anti-Manchoukuo leaders were sent back home safely by way of Vladivostok, only to allow them to fan anti-Manchoukuo movements in their home country.

"That the Soviet side should have facilitated their

- landing -

0611

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"landing in Tientsin, close by the scene of bloodshed and complications and to rejoin in anti-Manchoukuo demonstrations is a surprise to our side.

"Such move as taken by your side is considered as a most unfriendly gesture of your attitude, while we have been ever anxious to further the friendly relation with your country. Here, we have to express our deep regret of your unfriendly move."

Respectfully yours,

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

800
GCH/tll

5 copies to the Department
1 copy to the Embassy, Tokyo
1 copy to the Consulate General, Mukden.

True copy of
the original.

[Signature]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

PLAIN

FROM

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 26, 1933.

Recd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



372, April 26, noon
Reuter from Canton, 25th:

"Newspapers here give considerable prominence to joint telegram sent to Hu Han Min by Kuomintang organizations in Nanking and elsewhere urging him to return to Nanking. They also display prominently his reply that he would have no regard for his personal welfare if the Central authorities were to replace their nonresistance policy by a resistance policy and replace their empty talk by action so as to safeguard the country's territory and save the party principles from complete collapse."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/6225

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APR 27 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated April 26, 1933.

Recd 5:20 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.



375, April 26, 3

Following is summary of statement of Wang Ching Wei
released through Kuomin April 15th just received from Consul
General at Nanking:

"Japan will not give up Manchuria or Jehol or abandon
her aggressive policy; China cannot submit to aggression
or recognize puppet government of Manchukuo; consequently
there can be no direct negotiations between China and Japan.

Armed resistance to Japan even though hopeless must be
continued and must be accompanied by efforts to bring League
members to realization of their duty to take economic and
military measures against Japan as provided in the Covenant
since otherwise past League resolutions are meaningless.

If policy of resistance accompanied by diplomatic
efforts were replaced by declaration of war by China against
Japan defeat, humiliation and permanent loss of sovereignty
and territory would inevitably result."

JS CIB

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6226

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APR 27 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated April 26, 1933

Recd 5:20 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.



April 26, 3 p.

Withdrawal Manchukuo forces has now reached point between Changli and Chinwangtao. No fighting and except for Chinese armored train no Chinese military units of regular establishment have crossed to east bank Lwan River according to best information available Tientsin. As situation develops along the railway between Lwanchow and Chinwangtao the inference becomes clearer that the withdrawal is the result of an agreement or understanding as intimated in my April 24, 3pm.

LOCKHART

JS CIB

F/H/S

793.94/6227

79 27 1933

79 27 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 28, 1933


To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period April 18 to April 26, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

Enclosure:

Two copies of digest
of telegrams.



290.
IV-27-33

FE

m.m.H.

793.94/6227

CR
APR 28, 1933

m.m.H.

m.m.H.

793.94/6227

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES IN
REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
April 18 to April 26, 1933.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 18) that on March 30 the "Manchukuo" Ministry of Communications informed the Soviet Vice President of the Chinese Eastern Railway that "Manchukuo" would not compromise in the matter of the incident in regard to removing rolling stock into Siberia. (Early in April about 300 cars and locomotives were moved into Siberia and later the Japanese ordered the frontier at Manchouli closed.) In reply to a demand made on April 10 that the rolling stock be returned within one month, the Soviets stated that the cars would be returned but not the locomotives. The Consul General adds that the Japanese are carrying on a press campaign demanding the arrest and deportation of the Soviet Vice President and the General Manager of the Railway. The Consul General reports further that the Soviet Consul General has confirmed a report that the "Manchukuo" Foreign Office has demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet customs offices from the Chinese towns of Manchouli (northwestern Heilungkiang Province) and Gulfenho (southeastern Kirin Province), to which the Soviet Government has agreed, stating that these offices have been operating solely for the convenience of passengers and shippers.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 19) that recent developments indicate that "Manchukuo" forces and rebel groups from the Chinese regulars in the Changli-Chinwangtao area have combined and have been responsible, with the assistance of Japanese air forces, for driving Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Chinese Government troops west of the Lwan River and that this "anti-Chiang Kai-shek army" may extend its operations west of the Lwan River. The Consul General adds that on April 18 Japanese airplanes flying over Peitaiho, Lwanchow and Tangshan dropped leaflets praising the Japanese and pointing to the peaceful conditions in Jehol Province.

The Minister at Peiping reports (April 20) that he has been told that there is on foot a movement to create a buffer state between "Manchukuo" and Nanking around the Tientsin-Peiping area; that the new state is to be called Republic of China and is to have at the head either Hu Pei-fu, Yen Hsi-shan or Feng Yu-hsiang (all former prominent northern militarists); and that Chinese troops at Chinwangtao have changed their name to "Republic of China Forces" but still wear "Manchukuo" on their caps.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 21) that on April 20 a large amount of small arms ammunition was sent from Shanhaikwan westward and that Chinese officials in Tientsin are becoming more and more depressed over the general outlook.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 22) that, in reply to a note of the "Manchukuo" Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Harbin in regard to the locomotives which were removed into Siberia, the Soviet Consul General pointed out that the locomotives were the property of Soviet Russia, a number of them being part of a purchase by Russia and stranded in the Far East in 1918 and 1919, and that Soviet representatives on the railways are acting in accordance with instructions from the Soviet Government. The American Consul General reports further that conditions along the eastern line of the railway are

bad

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

bad and that the Chinese accuse Japanese and Koreans of seizing rice lands and expelling Chinese owners near Imienpo (about 85 miles southeast of Harbin).

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 24) /6210 that, according to a reliable source, "Manchukuo" forces are gradually withdrawing eastward from the Luan River; that no fighting is taking place; and that a movement is in progress with a view to the establishment in North China of a new government independent or at least semi-independent of Nanking.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 25) /6223 that Japanese military authorities in Tientsin have announced a determination to drive Chiang Kai-shek's troops from the Miyun-Kupehkwow area (north of Tientsin near the Great Wall).

The Minister at Peiping reports (April 26) /6226 that on April 15 a statement by the President of the Executive Yuan (Wang Ching-wei) was released through a Chinese news agency to the effect that, as China cannot submit to aggression there can be no direct negotiations between China and Japan; and that, even though hopeless, armed resistance to Japan must be continued, accompanied by efforts to bring League members to realize their duty to take economic and military measures against Japan.

753.94/6227
 The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 26) that the withdrawal of "Manchukuo" forces has now reached a point east of Chengli and that there is no fighting in that area.

egg.
 FEESC:KC
 4-28-33

FE
 m.m.H.

0618

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM


Peiping

This telegram must be
 paraphrased
 before being communicated
 to anyone. b)

FROM

Dated April 25, 1933

Rec'd 4:25 p. m.



Washington.

369, April 25, 11 p. m.

My 365, April 24, 7 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Liu Chung Chieh, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 asked me to come to see him this evening. General Ho Ying
 Ching was there and stated that all quiet on Lwan front
 but that serious fighting was proceeding at Kupeikou and
 that he believed Japanese intended to drive Chinese
 forces out of passes into the plain. He insisted that
 Chinese had made no attack upon Japanese--that in all
 cases Japanese were taking initiative and that Chinese
 were merely trying to resist efforts to drive them back.
 He said that they knew Chinese could not make a successful
 resistance but there was nothing else they could do. He
 did not understand Japanese statements that they would
 not come beyond the wall--he feared they might come to
 Peiping.

Two. Vice Minister Liu repeated statements made to
 me yesterday by Shen, Chief of Asiatic Department of
 Foreign Office. He stated that Lo Wen Kan had asked him
 to

F/HS

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JUN 24 1933

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#369, April 25, 11 p. m. from Peiping

-2-

to see interested ministers and to ask them whether their governments could not ascertain purposes of Japan. He pointed out that China was in a hopeless situation; they could not negotiate with the Japanese or make terms without breaking faith with the League and the friendly powers party to the Pact of Paris; they were attempting with such force as they possessed to defend themselves and their country against further invasion by Japan-- they were not attacking the Japanese--and yet the Japanese continued to push forward their attacks and were now threatening Peiping and Tientsin. He said that they were anxious that some way be found to stop the destruction to life and property now going on. Not being in a position to make direct overtures to the Japanese they had no other recourse but to seek the aid of the friendly powers.

Three. I told Liu that matter was fraught with difficulties but that I would inform Department of his conversation. As I left he informed me that T. V. Soong would seek an opportunity to bring to our attention the plight that they were in.

Four. I shall see British Minister tomorrow and report his views.

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RR

Peiping

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone (B)

Dated April 26, 1933.

FROM

Recd. 7:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

377, April 26, 5 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's 133, April 25, and my 369, April

25, 11 p. m.

I saw my British colleague this morning and we
 are agreed that situation revealed by statements of Chiang
 Mon Lin as reported in my 357, April 22, 8 p. m., and more
 recent statement of Vice Minister Liu indicate lack of
 agreement between Wang Ching Wei and Foreign Office authori-
 ties and we, therefore, propose to do nothing further in
 this matter. Before doing anything myself I shall, of
 course, inform Department and obtain its approval.

RR-WWC

JOHNSON



F/G 793.94/6229

JUN 24 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quelehan NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 April 27, 1933.

~~1000~~
~~8000~~

There is attached a copy
 of the Legation's first
 representations to the
 Japanese Legation at Peiping
 in regard to the bombing of
 mission property at Taitowying
 occupied by Mr. Kautto. You
 may care to read it in toto.

f. s. f.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Forwarded to Department of State
 covering dispatch to Consulate
 Hon. of the American Legation



APR 26 1933

Peiping, March 27, 1933.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that on March 21st the American Consul General at Tientsin reported to the Legation that he had received a letter dated March 19th from Mr. Charles C. Kautto, an American missionary of the Church of the Brethren Mission residing at Taitowying, Hopei, stating that on March 15th Japanese troops of the 40th Machine Gun Company of the 10th Army had occupied the American mission's property at Mutowtang, Hopei, and that on March 11th troops of the 10th Company of the 10th Army had occupied American mission property at Hawangshentze, Hopei. The American Consul General immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin who replied stating that

M. Nagatani, Legation,
 First Secretary,
 Japanese Legation,
 Peiping.

H/G 793.94/6230

793.94

APR 26 1933

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that the matter had been referred to the appropriate Japanese military authorities for action.

In the same letter Mr. Kautto reported that on March 18th a Japanese airplane visited Taitowying, which lies in Hopei some distance south of the Great Wall, and dropped two bombs on Chinese commercial property about two hundred and fifty (250) yards from Mr. Kautto's residence at the American mission, on which certain shrapnel fell without doing any damage.

A much more important report has now been received from Mr. Kautto under date of March 24th stating that a Japanese airplane visited Taitowying at 9 o'clock that morning and dropped a bomb within twenty feet of the northeast corner of Mr. Kautto's residence, a foreign-style house in the mission compound where an American flag was flying from the flagpole. The bomb landed just outside the compound wall making two large holes in the wall and shaking brick from the chimney on Mr. Kautto's residence. Soon afterward another bomb was dropped striking about twenty feet from the south east corner of the compound, the result breaking window panes in a mission building. An hour later another plane visited the city dropping two bombs. This bombing resulted in the death of nine

civilians

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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civilians including men, women and children. The only Americans in the city are Mr. Kautto and his wife who were fortunately not injured by the bombs which were dropped in such proximity to their residence.

Mr. Kautto particularly calls attention to the fact that before the first bomb was dropped the plane circled over the city for about thirty minutes. The following is a direct quotation from Mr. Kautto's report:

"We have the American flag flying from our flagpole yet these two bombs were scarcely out of reach of the compound, and while there are native holdings adjoining, there was no particularly provocative reason for their dropping bombs at either place, in fact no military advantage to be gained so far as we know".

I am aware that when Linguan, Jehol, was bombed, the Japanese aviators first dropped leaflets requesting that foreigners in the city put up identifying flags on their property and that they seek cover whenever Japanese planes should appear. This advice was followed with the result that no bombs were dropped near American or other foreign mission property identified by foreign flags. In view of the care exercised by the Japanese aviators at Linguan, it would appear that the aviators

at

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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at Taitowying failed to see the American flag flying as an identification mark on the foreign-style residence of Mr. and Mrs. Autto, which was so narrowly missed by two of the four bombs dropped during the bombing of the city.

I accordingly request that you will be so good as immediately to notify the Japanese military authorities of the above facts with the request that appropriate steps be taken to safeguard American lives and property from further grave danger.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(sgd) Nelson Trusler Johnson.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 5, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
 MMH: *ps*

Dairen's despatch of March 20, 1933, to the Ambassador at Tokyo, refers to a shipment of 100 Ford motor trucks from Japan consigned to Tientsin, which was taken to Dairen by the Japanese ship carrying the shipment on the grounds that the trucks were destined for Chang Hsueh-liang's army and that the Japanese Seamen's Union in consequence forbade the crew to deliver the goods at Tientsin. The final outcome was that a representative of the Tientsin consignees sold the hundred trucks at a comparatively high price to the S.M.R. in Dairen.

It is suggested that the settlement arrived at, and the Consul's comments, be read in full (p. 5).

bb
 CC:CLS

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(Source: Geneva's 59, February 24, 6 p.m.)

"who are signatories of or have acceded to the Pact of
Paris or the Nine Power Treaty".

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for the Department

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Dairen, Manchuria, March 20, 1933.

793.94

SUBJECT: Ford Motor Truck Case

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo, Japan.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit the following brief summary of the developments and final settlement of the Ford motor truck case.


The early morning of March 7, 1933, the Haru Maru with a cargo of one hundred Ford motor trucks, two Ford touring cars, and gasoline consigned to Tientsin, was forced to put into Dairen because of an alleged mutiny of the crew which, for patriotic motives, refused to be party to the delivery of materials destined for the use of the Chinese army. The crew, it was reported, had received orders from the Japanese Seamen's Union that they would be subject to punishment by the Union if they delivered the cargo to Tientsin. There was good reason to believe that the Seamen's Union was prompted to take the action it did by the Japanese Army, or other government authority, which did not wish to act openly in the case. The trucks and cars were consigned

to

F/G 793.94/6231

FILED

MAY 26 1933



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to the American Chinese Company (American), having been ordered by that company for Chang Hsueh-liang's army.

When the Haru Maru first arrived at Dairen there was agitation on the part of the local gendarmerie to seize the trucks as contraband. Such an obviously unwise move was never considered seriously however. On March 7th the Consulate informed the Embassy that it seemed certain that the Haru Maru or other Japanese ship would not take the trucks to Tientsin and that it was improbable that a ship of other nationality would be permitted or willing to do so.

On March 9th a representative of the Kwantung Government called at the Consulate and, after pointing out that "local circumstances" (a phrase he did not explain) might prevent the obviously correct solution of the case, i.e., immediate transshipment of the trucks to Tientsin, and that a return of the Haru Maru with cargo to Kobe was undesirable, suggested that the sale of the trucks in Dairen seemed to be the most feasible arrangement. He was informed that a decision as to the disposition of the trucks must come from the American Chinese Company and that in so far as the Consulate knew, the Company was anxious that the trucks be transhipped to Tientsin. In the meantime the manager of the Manchurian Motors, a Japanese firm acting as Manchurian distributors for the Ford Company, had on his own initiative gone to Changchun to discuss the case

with

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with the Kwantung Army authorities. He returned to Dairen on the 9th of March with the information that the Army was prepared to purchase the trucks although it did not wish to appear as the purchaser.

Mr. Richards, representative of the Ford Motor Company who happened to be in Dairen, had made tentative arrangements with a foreign ship in port to take the trucks to Tientsin and was endeavoring through the local agent of the Haru Maru to have the trucks unloaded. Although several promises were made that the Haru Maru was to discharge its cargo, there was one delay after another with no good reason therefor. On March 12th the Haru Maru discharged its cargo of gasoline but was informed that a berth for discharging the trucks would not be available until the 16th, although it was reliably reported that a berth suitable for the discharge of the trucks was actually available on the 13th. The Consulate had been authoritatively informed that the Kwantung Army was opposed to the immediate transshipment of the trucks to Tientsin but that a delay of a week or more in deciding the case might not be unwelcome, as within that period changes in the Peiping-Tientsin area might be such as to remove any objections to the delivery of the trucks to the American Chinese Company.

On March 13th the Consulate was informed in confidence by a representative of the Kwantung Government that the Army had definitely decided not to permit shipment of the trucks to Tientsin. During the conversation the question of sale locally was discussed. The

representative

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representative stated that the South Manchuria Railway Company was willing to buy the trucks, and price, if not obviously unjust, would not be a consideration. This information was given to Mr. L. O. McGowan, representative of the American Chinese Corporation, who had arrived in Dairen that morning.

The South Manchuria Railway Company was buying the trucks on behalf of the Kwantung Army but it would not buy them directly from the American Chinese Company, insisting that the sale must be made through the Manchurian Motors, a Japanese firm distributing Ford products in Manchuria. Insistence on this manner of dealing was made with a view to having it appear as a normal Dairen transaction; not for the purpose of allowing the Manchurian Motors to profit from the sale, although it did eventually receive a small commission.

Under these complicated conditions negotiations began. Mr. McGowan requested the price which he was to obtain for the trucks in Tientsin, gold \$88,500. This price included bodies for the trucks which had been built and were ready for delivery in Tientsin. Mr. McGowan pointed out that the bodies without the trucks were of no value to his firm and that the South Manchuria Railway Company could take delivery of them in Tientsin. The sum of \$88,500, that is, \$885 per unit, was far higher than the Dairen price for a similar number of trucks. The South Manchuria Railway Company however eventually agreed, on March 16th, to purchase the trucks after Mr. McGowan had eliminated the truck

bodies

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bodies from the transaction and reduced his price to gold \$24,750. On the same day the Haru Maru started unloading the trucks and during the following days the financial details of the sale were completed. Mr. McGowan returned to Tientsin yesterday. The two touring cars are being transshipped to Tientsin.

Comments on the case are needless. It is obvious that the Kwantung Army had acted indirectly in an extralegal manner to prevent the delivery of what it terms war materials to the Chinese Army. A precedent has been established which may have far reaching effects. Incidentally the transaction has been financially unfortunate for all concerned. The American Chinese Company has received less than it might have had the trucks been delivered in Tientsin. The South Manchuria Railway Company has paid far more for the trucks than it would have had to for trucks obtained in the normal way in Dairen. The shipping company, or its insurers, has lost the cost of handling the cargo and other Japanese shipping companies are placed in an unenviable position. And the Manchurian Motors has lost the profit from what might have been a normal sale in its territory. It would appear that Chang Hsueh-liang, the original purchaser to whom delivery was prevented, is the only gainer, as it may be assumed that, in his present retirement, he will be pleased to recover the \$88,500 deposit rather than have one hundred trucks delivered to his successors in Peiping.

Respectfully

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Respectfully yours,

John Carter Vincent
American Consul.

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JCV:L

2 copies to Department
1 copy to Legation, Peiping
1 copy to Consulate General, Tokyo
1 copy to Consulate General, Tientsin
1 copy to Consulate General, Mukden
1 copy to Consulate General, Harbin

A true copy of
the signed original.
a.m.l.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 26 1933
 Department of State

Conversation.

April 21, 1933.

Mr. Katsuji Debuchi,
 Japanese Ambassador.

Mr. Hornbeck.

APR 25 1933

DIVISION OF

- Subject: (1) Matsuoka 032.9447
 (2) Viscount Ishii
 (3) Japanese Training Squadron
 (4) Peiping-Tientsin Area

THE UNDER SECRETARY

APR 22 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

APR 25 1933

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

793.94

(4) After exchange of observations with regard to the Japanese training squadron, the Ambassador said that the press was exaggerating ~~his~~ accounts of what is going on in the Peiping-Tientsin area. He said that he was sure that the Japanese Army did not intend to go to Peiping and Tientsin. I asked whether he had information with regard to the Luan River bridge, whether it had or had not been destroyed or injured. The Ambassador stated that the bridge had been threatened and the British had been worried about it but that it was "safe", it had not been injured. He then said that he thought that everything would be quiet in that area within a little while. (NOTE: This expression of view on the part of the Ambassador must be taken for what it may be worth as an indication of the hope and/or belief of the Japanese Foreign Office. The Ambassador always

JUN 24 1933

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always expresses himself optimistically in connection
with such matters and has repeatedly affirmed his
confidence that things would not happen which very
soon have happened.)

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Forwarded to Department of State
 Copy retained in the
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs
 Department of State

Conversation with Mr. Galt, Peiping, February 27, 1933.

APR 26 1933

Department of State

Mr. Galt, Acting President of Yenching University.

Subject: Extraterritorial Protection.

Mr. Galt asked whether I could give him any advice as to the local situation, which they should have. I stated that the situation was, as he had seen in the papers, uncertain; that the Japanese were moving into Jehol Province and the Chinese were putting up a resistance there. My information indicated that there was no intention on the part of either Chinese or Japanese to precipitate military activities in this area; and that the Japanese had announced that they had no intention of moving south of the wall unless attacked by the Chinese.

I said, however, that if the Japanese met determined resistance in Jehol there was every likelihood that they might make a thrust in the Tientsin-Peiping area for the purpose of cutting off the rear of the Chinese forces in Jehol and thus hastening Chinese retirement there. I said that I felt we could not shut our eyes to this possibility, but that even in this case I did not anticipate that there would be any critical danger to Americans peacefully residing here who minded their own business, staid in their houses and

off

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off the streets and away from scenes of actual conflict.

As regards the school, I said it seemed to me that the chief danger there was from the students who might, in case of military activities here, get out of hand and engage in hostilities of some kind or other, which would of course bring the University under danger of attack. I thought the wise plan for the school to follow in such case would be for the University to close and send the students away. Mr. Galt stated that that was their plan.

He said that it was not his intention to use the American flag or make any claim to extraterritorial protection. I told him that using the flag had nothing to do with extraterritoriality; that the flag was merely an indication of the presence of American citizens and their property; and that any American citizen in good standing and in peaceful occupation of his property had a right to use the flag for his own protection. I said that I did not see what this had to do with extraterritorial rights, which concerned themselves merely with the lack of Chinese jurisdiction over American citizens and their property.

Mr. Galt referred to the fact that marines had at one time been sent to Tungchow. I stated that marines had been sent to Tungchow for the purpose of protecting some children in an American school at Tungchow, but

that

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that I felt this was not a proper use of the marines; that children in a place of danger should be brought to the Legation where marines could protect them; that I was opposed to the sending of marines to isolated places for the purpose of protecting people in their homes or in schools. If carried to its logical conclusion Americans living in Ninghsia on the borders of Kensu and other equally or more distant places would have the right to have marines sent to them for their protection, which was obviously impossible and absurd. I stated that in so far as protection was concerned Americans living in China were under the protection of Chinese and should not fail to keep the Chinese feeling that they were responsible for their protection; that when Chinese protection failed or was withdrawn, then it was the policy of the American Government to call Americans away from the places of danger or from places where such protection was lacking, and bring them to points where we could protect them; and that that would be the plan which we would follow here.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138 PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
 Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to \$

TELEGRAM SENT
 1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

1933 APR -26- PM 2:08

Washington,
 April 26, 1933.

793.94

AMLEGATION,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (China).

134 *Confidential for the minute.*

One. /For your confidential information and guidance
 in case you are approached on this subject by your French
 colleague:

High officials of French Foreign Office have expressed
 to Norman Davis great concern over Far Eastern developments,
 especially North China, and opinion that it is vital that
 America, England and France act together. Boncour stated
 that France is prepared to collaborate fully with the Uni-
 ted States and England in cooperation with League and to
 join in any course of action or measure agreed upon. ~~Depart-~~
~~ment is instructing Davis to suggest to Boncour that initia-~~
~~tive should come from the League and/or the French or~~
~~British Governments and that this Government's attitude and/~~
~~position are as communicated repeatedly at Geneva to the~~
~~effect that we are prepared to try to cooperate but should~~
~~not repeat not be expected to take the lead; also to suggest~~
~~that French Foreign Office impart to the French Minister~~
~~imparting the views which it imparted to Davis.~~

793.94/6233A

FE: SICH *in m. h.*

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Enciphered by SICH
 Sent by operator M., 1933

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/83 FOR Despatch # -

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED March 22, 1933
 TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Chinese and Japanese versions of the Shanhaikuan Incident;
 Events leading up to, and Japanese preparations for, the
 Jehol Invasion.

esp

793.94/6234

6234

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

79394
SHANHAIKUAN On January 1st at about 9:20 p.m.
INCIDENT. hand grenades were thrown at the
Japanese Gendarmery Headquarters
in Shanhaikuan and at two or three other buildings
inhabited by the Japanese Military.* Only one
exploded and it caused no damage. The Chinese

*Despatch No. 717, January 17, 1933.

authorities

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authorities claim, according to THE PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, that the bombs were "planted" by Japanese. After the explosion the Japanese and Chinese military agreed, according to the Japanese version of the affair, that Japanese troops should patrol the South Gate of the city for the purpose of protecting their nationals and the railway, and that the Chinese troops should withdraw from the vicinity of the gate. The next morning while the Japanese troops were on their way to the gate they were fired on, the Japanese military contend, by Chinese troops. The Japanese replied and after a sharp engagement in which both sides sustained casualties, the Japanese troops occupied the gate.

The Japanese commander then demanded that the Chinese troops be evacuated from the entire city. The Chinese refused. The next morning Major-General Suzuki, who had arrived from Chinchow with reinforcements and had taken over command, waited several hours for General Ho Chu-kuo, the Chinese commander, who was absent at the outbreak of the affair, to come to Japanese headquarters to negotiate a settlement of the incident. As General Ho did not appear, the Japanese at 10 a.m. bombarded the city from the land, sea, and air. Eight blocks in the business section were destroyed and three of the four towers on the Great Wall were badly damaged. After sharp fighting in which both sides suffered casualties Japanese troops occupied the entire city.

At

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At first the Japanese proposed that the incident be settled locally and advanced as their terms: an apology by General Ho Chu-kuo, a pledge against the recurrence of a similar incident, and a promise by the Chinese commander that Chinese troops would not enter the territory extending two miles on either side of the Peiping-Shanhaikuan Railway in the section between Shanhaikuan and Lanchow. But it was soon apparent that the Japanese did not intend to withdraw from Shanhaikuan. Before the occurrence of the incident it had been presumed that the Japanese military would block for strategic reasons the gateway to Manchuria at Shanhaikuan before invading Jehol.

A few days after the Japanese had occupied Shanhaikuan, the Kwantung Army proffered a new explanation of the incident. Last October, the Army asserts, bands of assassins came to Manchuria to murder General Muto and other Japanese and Manchoukuo dignitaries. On December 24th a Korean member of the gang was arrested in Hsinking by Japanese gendarmes. He revealed that the gang's base was in the vicinity of Peiping. Japanese gendarmery officers who went to North China to investigate caught another Korean and examined other persons involved in the plot. The gendarmes learned, according to their story, that Chang Hsueh-liang was connected with the plot through the "Volunteer" organizations which he is said to support. In view of the gravity of the conspiracy the gendarmes decided to bring the

Korean

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 By Milton D. Shults NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Korean who was caught in North China to Hsinking for examination. They intended to travel by way of Shanhaikuan, but hearing of a Chinese plot to liberate the prisoner at Shanhaikuan they changed their plan and came by way of Dairen. Chinese mistakenly thinking that the prisoner was in Shanhaikuan threw hand grenades at the Gendarmery Headquarters and at other buildings in the hope of rescuing him in the subsequent confusion.

According to the press the Chinese assert that all the steps leading up to the occupation of the city were part of a prearranged Japanese plan.

On January 10th after considerable fighting the Japanese troops occupied Chiumenkou, one of the gateways in the Great Wall north of Shanhaikuan. It was necessary to occupy Chiumenkou, the Japanese maintain, because Chang Hsueh-liang was sending troops into Manchuria through that pass to attack the Japanese garrison at Shanhaikuan.

During the month the Japanese press frequently reported that Chinese troops were being concentrated in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan and in Jehol and that Chang Hsueh-liang was making "warlike preparations". The Chinese troops did make unsuccessful attempts to regain Chiumenkou. At the end of the month Japanese troops were firmly established at Shanhaikuan and Chiumenkou; and with these strategically important points occupied the Army was ready to turn its attention to Jehol.

JEHOL

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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JEHOL The occupation of Shanhaikuan and Chiumenkou aggravated the tension prevailing along the Jehol border. The Japanese claimed that "Volunteers" and bandits were increasingly active in the vicinity of the border and were preparing for an attack on Fengtien Province. On January 3rd the Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo sent a telegram concerning the Shanhaikuan incident and the situation in Jehol to Chang Hsueh-liang. After accusing him of instigating the Shanhaikuan incident the Foreign Minister asserted that Chang had been using "Jehol, our border Province" as a base for the operations of "Volunteers", and infringing the sovereign rights of Manchoukuo by sending Chinese troops into Jehol. In view of these facts, the Foreign Minister stated, Manchoukuo was seriously considering the adoption of appropriate measures.

On January 7th Japanese airplanes bombed the insurgents who were concentrated north of Suichung. During the rest of the month Japanese airplanes frequently bombed points in the vicinity of the Jehol border where insurgents were reported to be concentrating. Several air raids were made on Kailu where a large irregular army was said to be making preparations for an advance to Tungliao.

Shortly after the fall of Chiumenkou, a Japanese cavalry detachment that had participated in the fighting there proceeded north along the Jehol border and defeated groups of the enemy it encountered on the way. In addition to the activities of this detach-

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ment there were, according to Japanese reports, frequent minor clashes in the vicinity of the border. On January 24th a Japanese detachment repulsed an attack by Volunteers in the vicinity of Chao-yangssu.

In view of the critical situation Japanese reenforcements were sent to garrisons near the Jehol border. The 4th Cavalry Brigade was transferred to Suichung.* And part of the 14th Division, according to an unconfirmed report, was transferred to the south from Tsitsihar.**

On January 12th THE JAPAN ADVERTISER published a Japanese War Office statement, the general tenor of which was frequently repeated by the local Japanese-controlled newspapers. The statement sets forth that:

"Jehol is one of the old four northeastern provinces and is inseparable from the other three. Upon the declaration of independence by Manchukuo,, it was made clear that Jehol was included in the new state. Also, in reply to a question asked by the League commission of inquiry, the Manchukuo authorities announced that the Great Wall is one boundary of Manchukuo. General Tan Yu-lin, chairman of the Jehol provincial government, was one of the officials signing the independence document and pledged allegiance to Mr. Henry Pu-yi as chief executive.

"Accordingly, those who disturb the peace and order of the province are outlaws and those who invade it are aggressors. Defense measures against them correspond to the expeditions against General Su Ping-wen, General Ma Chan-shan, General Li Tu and General Ting Chao.

"If such measures are taken, it will be an entirely Manchukuo domestic affair. They should not cause public excitement and will have nothing to do with any other country. It will be necessary for the Japanese public to observe events in Jehol with a proper understanding of its position."

*Telegram, January 10, 12 noon.

**Telegram, January 15, 10 a.m.

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In addition to the contentions made in this statement, the local press frequently asserted that Chang Hsueh-liang was using Jehol as a base from which to disturb "the peace and order of Manchoukuo," that he was sending his troops into Jehol and making other warlike preparations, and that he was stirring up trouble in Jehol in order to divert attention from his serious predicament in North China. The local press also asserted that T'ang Yu-lin was very unpopular in Jehol, that the people were groaning under oppression, and that the Mongolian tribes wanted to shake off T'ang's yoke. Most of the articles were concluded by a warning to Chang Hsueh-liang that if he did not discontinue his machinations in Jehol, Japanese troops might invade the province. This propaganda was generally familiar in tone and substance to that which has preceded various "bandit suppression drives" in Manchuria.

There is reason to believe that during January the Japanese increased their efforts to persuade Chinese leaders in China proper as well as those in Jehol that it would be advisable to offer no more than nominal resistance when the Japanese invaded Jehol. It seems probable that in some cases such efforts at persuasion were accompanied by warnings that if serious resistance was encountered in Jehol, North China might be invaded. However, it was obvious that if the Chinese leaders refused to withdraw after offering merely "face-saving" resistance, the Japanese Army would undertake, on as large a scale

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scale as was necessary, the subjugation of the province by force of arms.

Early in January Major-General Itagaki, Chief of the Japanese Special Military Mission at Mukden, visited North China in connection with the Shanhai-kuan incident. From a reliable source it has been learned that in the course of his trip, which is reported to have included Nanking, the General, who has played a very important part in Japan's Manchurian adventure, emphasized to Chinese leaders that it would be foolhardy for China to attempt serious resistance to the Japanese invasion of Jehol.*

At the end of January it was learned that the Japanese military were confident that General Itagaki had persuaded the Chinese to give up Jehol after only a show of force. It was also learned that Chang Hai-p'eng had already been selected as the first Manchoukuo Governor of Jehol, and that the Kwantung Army ^{new} expected to have him assume his/position in Jehol Province after a short and comparatively simple campaign.

The Japanese were confident that T'ang Yü-lin would not be a serious obstacle to their invasion of Jehol. They were, however, disappointed because they could not persuade him to join Manchoukuo. With some of his nominal subordinates they were more successful. Their arrangements with such minor military leaders, especially those in northeastern Jehol were, of course, kept secret.

*Despatch No. 719, February 3, 1933.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 13 -

It is impossible to obtain accurate information concerning the activities of Japanese agents in Jehol during January. For example, a Japanese official admitted that Mongolian Cavalry commanded by Japanese officers was actively stirring up trouble in the eastern part of Central Jehol. He said he did not know any details of the activities of these troops.

At the end of the month it was clear that the Japanese were completing their preparations for the long anticipated drive on Jehol and that major military operations would begin in the near future.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 550. S 1 Wash./213 FOR Tel. # 75, 3 pm
FROM Mexico (Daniels) DATED April 25, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:
Wellington Koo and Quo Tai Chi are coming to Washington
to discuss with the Department Far Eastern questions.

MN

793.94/6235

6234-1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
EA
DP

KLP

GRAY

Genova

Dated April 25, 1933.

Rec'd. 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

169, April 25, 6 p.m.

I am told informally by a member of the Chinese delegation here that Wellington Koo and Quo Tai Chi are starting for Washington. My informant gave me to understand that Koo and Quo hope to take advantage of the invitation to discuss economic and monetary matters in Washington, to go into Far Eastern questions with the Department, in view of developments in North China.

Note
793.94

WILSON

WSB

CSB

1212

165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
 PLAIN
 COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 Peiping via N. R.

Dated April 28, 1933

FROM Rec'd 7:40 a. m.

Secretary of State
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 28 1933

TREATY DIVISION

388, April 28, 1933

Department of State

APR 28 1933

Reuter from Hanking today

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

F/HS

793.94/6236

"Wang Ching Wei has issued lengthy statement in which he refuted criticism that the Government's policy towards Japan was a policy neither of peace nor war. Wang admits that China is in no position to wage war on Japan and adds that it is because of this that Government has decided on policy of resistance which he defines as 'fighting the invader to the best of our ability but regardless of our military strength or the consequences'. This he says distinguishes resistances from war..

Regarding a policy of peace Wang declares that China cannot acknowledge military defeat and accept terms dictated by Japan but that while at present there is no possibility of direct negotiations eventually there must be negotiations. He declares that whatever form future negotiations may assume China will not concede beyond the minimum in consonance with her national honor but this minimum he leaves otherwise indefinite."

McL
 WSB

JOHNSON

165
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 1, 1933.

U.
Mr. Phillips:

It is gratifying to note
(see page 2 as marked of the
incoming telegram) that the
British Government's views
are "substantially along the
lines of" those which we ex-
pressed in our instruction of
April 25 to Johnson.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone: (A-1)

FROM PEIPING

Dated April 28, 1933

Rec'd 7:18 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington:

387, April 28, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 377/⁶²²⁹ April 26, 5 p. m. Lampson, Wilden and I

dined last night with Vice Minister Liu Chung Cheh.

There were present Generals Ho Ying Chin, Sung Che Yuan,
 Shang Chen, Huang Shao Hsiung and others of the commanding
 officers of the forces now occupying the line from Kupeikow
 to the Lwan River. Mr. Chen Kung Po, Minister of Indus-
 tries, was also present. Chen informed me that he had
 come north because of rumored political intrigues
 reported in my 345/⁶¹⁹⁶ April 20, 2 p. m. He stated that
 that situation had been more or less liquidated but
 intimated that it was of greater importance than the
 fighting at the front. Chinese still hold Nantianmen
 and are shifting forces from Lwan River area to Kupeikow
 front to reenforce troops now fighting there. All present
 seemed in good spirits and General Sung took particular
 pains explaining to me that all were cooperating together
 in defensive operations and branded reports of dis-
 affection among their number as being Japanese propaganda

intended



F/G 793.94/6237

JUN 24 1933

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#387, . From Peiping, April 28, 2p.m.

intended to weaken public spirit.

Chen Kung Po informed Lampson that Nanking desired cessation of hostilities but would not be party to any written understanding on this question fearing commitments which might jeopardize their position in regard to Manchuria, Jehol and related questions. Lampson intends to see Nakayama shortly to ascertain whether he has any suggestions of a concrete nature to make. Lampson has received from London approval of his actions thus far but commenting on general question substantially along the lines of your 133, April 25, 6 p. m.

None of us is able to understand Japanese withdrawal from Lwan River sector except on the theory that having driven Chinese forces from the hills they are now withdrawing to Wall and intend to strike at any new movement of Chinese troops within that area. It would appear that Japanese desire to see demilitarized zone on the Chinese side of wall.

JOHNSON

CSB-KLP


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



Secretary of State,
 Washington.

April 28, 3 p. m.


FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated April 28, 1933

Rec'd 6 a. m.



The withdrawal of the Manchukuo forces along the railway eastward from Lwanchow is continuing and according to information obtained in conversation with a high official of the provincial government yesterday Chinese regulars are not following up withdrawal or counter-attacking in that region, the only activity on the Chinese side being railway repair work by a small detachment of the soldiers on the armored train which is gradually working itself eastward along the railway.

LOCKHART

WSB

KLP

F/G 793.94/6238

793.94

RECEIVED
 17 1 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P. R./64 FOR Despatch # 348.

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED April 1, 1933.

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ... 6239

REGARDING: Conquest of Jehol by the Japanese "Manchukuo"
 forces appears to have proceeded with little
 opposition as far as the Great Wall.
 . Difficulties encountered by the Ford Motor
 Company in delivering trucks to China.

793.94/ 6239

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(d) Military Operations in Jehol.

793.94
 The conquest of Jehol by the Japanese "Manchukuo" forces appears to have proceeded with little opposition as far as the Great Wall. There the Chinese forces, according to the reports available in Tokyo, have caused no little trouble. The Japanese claim that most of this is due to a number of places where the positions on the Wall are tactically disadvantageous. Kupeikow proved to be one of these spots. The Japanese claimed to hold the Wall but because of a loop at that point the Chinese made their position very difficult. They, therefore, tried to get the Chinese to move their forces out of a neutral zone south of the Wall. ** Little information has been available in Tokyo regarding the extent of the fighting but it is apparent that the Japanese troops on the spot wish to move into North China. Two major generals attached to the Kuangtung Army have recently returned to Tokyo for the purpose, it is alleged, of persuading the Government to allow the Army to operate south of the Wall. They claim that their troops are in a very difficult tactical position on the Wall. *** The Japanese Minister to China and the First Secretary of the Japanese

Legation
 * Embassy's telegram No. 64, March 22- 6 p.m.
 ** Embassy's telegram No. 67, March 18- 6 p.m.
 *** Embassy's telegram No. 67, March 25- 2 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Legation in Peiping have also returned to join the conference. A press ban dated March 9 prohibits publication of reports regarding "warships, airplanes, or unit strength which are expected to be dispatched to China or "Manchukuo" shortly from Japan".*

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(b) Difficulties encountered by the Ford Motor Company in delivering trucks to China.*

793.94
 On March 7, the HARU MARU, carrying one hundred Ford Motor trucks, two Ford touring cars, and gasoline consigned to the American Chinese Company at Tientsin, was forced to put into Dairen because of an alleged mutiny of the crew which, for patriotic motives, refused to be party to the delivery of materials destined for the use of the Chinese Army. The crew,

* See despatch of American Consul in Dairen dated ¹¹ March 20, 1923.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-E1-

it was reported, had received orders from the Japanese Seamen's Union that they would be subject to punishment if they delivered the cargo to Tientsin. When the boat first arrived at Dairen there was agitation on the part of the local gendarmes to seize the trucks as contraband. Though this obviously unwise move was abandoned it soon became apparent that no Japanese ship would be likely to carry the cargo to Tientsin and that probably no foreign ship would be permitted or willing to do it. After many delays, without good reason, the American Consulate was informed that the Kwantung Army was against the shipment of the trucks to Tientsin and that arrangements were being made to purchase them locally.

Finally, it was arranged that the South Manchuria Railway Company was to buy the trucks on behalf of the Kwantung Army and that the purchase was to be made from the Manchurian Motors, who are the local distributors of Ford products in Dairen, and not from the American Chinese Company. After protracted negotiations the sale was made and the trucks were unloaded, the touring cars being allowed to proceed to Tientsin.

The transaction was financially unfortunate for all concerned. The South Manchuria Railway had to pay more for the trucks than it would have paid for trucks purchased in the normal way in Dairen. The American Chinese Company received less than it would have received


had

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had the trucks been delivered in Tientsin. The shipping company lost the cost of handling the cargo. The Manchurian Motors lost the profit from what might have been a normal sale in its own territory.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Asked if the Department had received any reports concerning damages to American property by Japanese airplane operations in China, the Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked if the matter of making a protest or representations would be left to our men in China. The Secretary in reply said that he thought that the correspondents were familiar with the usual practice where sporadic instances occur. Action is usually initiated locally; and where the occurrence is accidental or unintentional, it is usually attended to by the people on the spot. A correspondent here asked whether it was fair to assume that no declaration as to our Far Eastern policy would be made until the domestic program had been cleared up. Mr. Hull in reply said that he did not know how to comment on that question as it was like asking a man if he had quit beating his wife. He then added that the question apparently assumes that we have no policy concerning the Far Eastern situation. The correspondent then said that he understood from Mr. Roosevelt just prior to his inauguration that certain policies regarding Manchuria, announced under the previous administration, would be continued. The Secretary in reply said that in view of what is well known, he had nothing new to say on that subject. The correspondent then asked if there had been in recent weeks any change in our previously announced policy. He was informed in reply that the Secretary had not heard of anything either pro or con on that subject. The correspondent then added that he thought that these various questions arise from the impression among some people that the previous administration would have sent a protest to Tokyo concerning this latest advance of the Japanese forces south of the Great Wall, while the present administration apparently is doing nothing of that sort. Mr. Hull in reply said that he wished that the correspondent would talk that out with the other correspondent who asked the question.

793.94/6240

M. J. McDermott.

793.94

APR 27 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

file page 3
 (NOT FOR THE PRESS)
 (FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
 Division of Current Information

NO. 86

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1933

MONETARY CONTROL

At the press conference this morning Secretary Hull said, OFF THE RECORD IN CONFIDENCE AND NOT FOR REPETITION, that we are now passing through a rapidly changing phase of some important portions of our financial and economic situation and that, while he could talk to the correspondents for an indefinite time on the technical side of the gold, silver and exchange situation, the conditions are changing so rapidly in the course of development of further policy that he felt obliged at this time to remain quiet on those matters. The matter is highly technical, change is going on and further comment might cause more confusion than enlightenment. For that reason, the Secretary asked the correspondents to cooperate with him to that extent. END OF SECTION OFF THE RECORD.

A correspondent said he appreciated the situation but that he would like to ask if there were any misconceptions current, if the Secretary wanted to steer the correspondents away from any misinterpretation of the action, or to correct what may have appeared in the many speculative articles written since yesterday. Mr. Hull in reply said that there was nothing so far that he desired to correct and that the only thing that happened yesterday was a more definite announcement regarding what had been going on since March 4 about the gold export situation. Another correspondent then asked if the Secretary meant that he would not care to interpret the effect this move might have on the negotiations. The Secretary in reply said that he would not care to offer such an interpretation just now because the President is seeing the correspondents twice a week on these matters. It is not advisable to have too many spokesmen. He then added that while he thought he could dovetail into the President's ideas and utterances, he did not think it advisable for him to discuss the matter today. Mr. Hull then added furthermore, that the above is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

Referring to the preliminary conversations which have been going on between the Secretary and the British Ambassador, a correspondent asked if the matter of intergovernmental debts had been taken up or if the conversations had been limited to the broad program before the conference. He was informed in reply that the conversations had been limited to the broad program embodied in the agenda of the forthcoming conference. A correspondent here remarked that, without trying to get the Secretary to depart from his desire not to discuss the developments, it would appear on the surface that the decline in the value of the dollar would reduce intergovernmental debts by that amount. He then asked if that was correct. The Secretary answered by saying that the correspondent in his question illustrated the very point that was made in the beginning of this conference: You can talk about the level of the dollar today and by this afternoon you might have to talk about it in an entirely different way and in still another way tomorrow morning.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huesteggen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

Observing that the Department had heard definitely as to who will represent Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan and China, a correspondent asked if any word had been received along that line from any other countries. Mr. McDermott answered the question by saying that a new list containing the latest information would be made available to the correspondents after the conference.

Observing that the Japanese raised the question sometime ago, through press despatches, whether political events would be discussed during the visit to Washington of the Japanese statesmen, a correspondent said he believed that the Secretary had indicated that the invitation limited the discussions to the agenda of the economic conference and to the broader phases of disarmament. The correspondent observed furthermore that some similar question has now arisen in the case of the Chinese. Mr. Hull replied to the effect that he had stated at the time that the invitations were sent out that the same invitation was sent to every nation alike and that the scope of the conversations was well and very definitely defined, that is, they have been limited to the agenda of the conference plus any reference to the fundamentals of disarmament. The invitations did not refer to any concrete plans, local, regional or otherwise.

A correspondent observed that it appears likely that the Congress will take some action on the thirty hour bill and the minimum wage amendment and that the Congress is bringing up more and more what will happen in case the cost of production in this country is increased as compared with the situation abroad where longer hours and lower wages prevail. The correspondent then asked if the Department in approaching the forthcoming conference had that legislation in mind. The Secretary replied to the effect that if we kept in mind every individual instance about legislation or each particular step of importance, we might become utterly lost in grasping and dealing in a broad way with the general situation. No matter how definitely the different nations may adopt and pursue given policies concerning their economic rehabilitation and the safeguarding of their industrial and commercial situations, the obstructions on every international boundary have, after all, choked down their finances and commerce between them and other countries, regardless of what their domestic policies may have been or may be.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

Asked if the bill to empower the President to make reciprocal commercial treaties and to rearrange tariff rates had been completed, Mr. Hull said that it is approaching completion. There has been no rush about the submission of the proposal because of the desire of the administration to await all developments concerning the matter. The Secretary added that he thought it would be completed by the time the President is ready to take up the matter with a view to placing it before the Congress. A correspondent here asked if the Secretary thought that it would be possible to retain the "most-favored-nation" idea in these trade agreements. Mr. Hull in reply said he thought he could tell the correspondents more about the question after we get through with the preliminary conferences and obtain a slant on the question from the gentlemen representing the different governments.

0668

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

APR 28 1933

DIVISION OF

22 April 1933.



Memorandum for Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

The following received from U.S.S. SACRAMENTO dated 11 P.M.
 April 19th.

15th U.S. Infantry Camp at Chinwangtao reports fighting stopped
 Chinwangtao area on Monday. Japanese state buffer state will be formed today
 between Manchukuo and Nanking around Tientsin-Peiping area with either
 Wu Pei-fu, Yen ^{Shan} ~~Shan~~ or Feng Yu-hsiang at head; state to be called
 Republic of China. All of above reported will support new state. Rumored
 Gen. Li Chai-sum now meeting Gen. Ho Chu-kuo in Peitaiho. Expect Ho Chu-
 kuo to join new state as both he and Li are former officers Wu Pei-fu.
 Also Governor of Hopei, Yu Hsueh-chung, believed in on agreement Chinese
 troops (Chinwangtao) changed name to Republic of China although still
 wearing Manchukuo uniforms and reported now belong Wu Pei-fu. Chinwangtao
 quiet. Troops evacuating shortly and native city to be taken over by local
 police and two Manchoukuo officers. Traffic manager railroad Shanhaikwan sent
 to Tientsin to arrange through traffic. Press reports Manchukuo office es-
 tablished Tientsin Monday has been very active. All Chinese troops now west
 of Luan River. Reported Japanese troops have arrived at Tangshan and that
 Japanese planes have heavily bombed Luanchow, Tungchow and Shihsia.

F/HS

793.94/6241

793.94

APR 28 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.
 Dated May 1, 1933.
 Rec'd. 9:20 a.m.



793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

May 1, 4 p.m.

F/HS

793.94/6242

Two Chinese armored trains have now proceeded as far as Peitaiho and passenger traffic to that place and to Chinwangtao will probably be restored today or tomorrow. Reliable local authority reports that Japanese military have approached railway authorities with the intimation that restoration of passenger and freight traffic to Shanhaikwan would be welcomed.

Five trains of Chinese troops passed through Tientsin moving westward from the Lwanchow area yesterday and, according to railway authorities, are destined to points on the Peiping-Hankow railway. This represents the first large movement of Chinese troops away from the Lwanchow area and is further evidence tending to confirm that the recent withdrawal of Manchukuo and/or Japanese forces entirely from the Lwan River was by arrangement.

WSB*KLP

LOCKHART

3 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 2- 1933
Department of State

REP

FROM



GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 2, 1933

Rec'd 6:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94

May 2, 3 p. m. / 6242

My May 1, 4 p. m. Three more trains have moved west-
ward through Tientsin from the Lwanchow area. Passenger
traffic has now been restored to Peitaiho.

LOCKHART.

HPD

F/G 793.94/6243

FILED
3 1933

1665

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.94/808 FOR Despatch # 5727.

FROM Harbin (Hanson) DATED April 6, 1933.
TO NAME 1-127 o.o.

REGARDING:

Press comment on the Far Eastern situation
and the probabilities of American inter-
vention in the matter.

793.94/6244

6244

hs

7670

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893,00 P. R. Canton/64 FOR Despatch # 192 to Legation.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED April 6, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese situation.
Mr. Kan Chieh-hou, Inspector General for
Foreign Affairs, interviewed by the press
on the subject of the - .

hs

793.94/6245

6245-9

167

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

7. Regional Inspector General of Foreign Affairs on Sino-Japanese Crisis.

Mr. Kan Chieh-hou, Inspector General for Foreign Affairs for the Five Southeastern Provinces, interviewed by the press on March 9, is quoted at length on the

Sino-Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Sino-Japanese situation. After describing the present state of affairs as evidencing a complete lack of preparation or determination to resist Japan on the part of China, which state of affairs he compares with the situation prevailing at the end of the Sung and Ming dynasties, Mr. Kan predicts that, with the occupation of Jehol, Japan will now divert its attention from military operations to political moves. These moves, he explained, have three objectives:

- (1) To induce China to enter into direct negotiations with Japan whereby the former would recognize the latter's gains in the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol in exchange for a pact guaranteeing China's territorial integrity south of the Great Wall, a promise of financial assistance, and the enjoyment by China of certain rights in Manchukuo. In the event of refusal by China to negotiate, Japan will force compliance by despatching troops to Peiping, Tientsin, Changhai and the Yangtze Valley.
- (2) If Japan is successful in the foregoing objective, it will proceed to endeavor to dominate all China through the medium of the northern militarists whom it will seek to place in power by intrigue.
- (3) Having achieved this, Japan will seek to eliminate European and American influence in China in order to realize its aim of establishing her Asiatic "Monroe Doctrine".

Mr. Kan feels hopeful, however, that if the Chinese people maintain stout hearts they will be able to recover

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 550. S 1/707 FOR Memo.

FROM State Department U (Phillips) DATED April 28, 1933.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

6246

793.94/6246

REGARDING:

Russo-Japanese situation discussed in conversation between
 M. Herriot and the President.

MN

0674

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



The Chinese Legation has received from the Foreign Office-Nanking, the following message:-

"We categorically deny the report published in the London Daily Express alleging that peace discussions regarding the North China situation are under way between China and Japan and reiterate our determination to continue resistance against further invasion."

The fact that the severest fighting is now going on between Chinese and Japanese forces at Kupeikow clearly indicates that such allegation as referred to here above is without foundation.

The Chinese Legation
Washington, D.C.
April 28, 1933

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F/HS
793.94/6247

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 1 - 1933
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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MAY 3 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

KLP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 4, 1933.

Rec'd. 2:45 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

400, May 4, 11 a.m.

Following from Consul General Mukden:

"May 3, 5 p.m.

No official information regarding withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China is obtainable here nor has native press reported it. From a reliable source it is now learned that the Japanese are not withdrawing beyond the highway south of the Wall owing to its strategic value. It is alleged that counter attacks have ceased and that the withdrawal is according to previously announced plan. Some troops - one eye witness reports having seen 10 train loads - have been returned to their former posts in South Manchuria presumably because of the marked recrudescence of banditry.

JOHNSON

WSB * KLP

F/H/S


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET



FROM

GRAY

Peiping

Dated May 4, 1933

Red'd 10:45 a. m.




F/HS

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

403, May 4, 5 p. m.

Legation's 342, April 19, 4 p. m.



793.94/6249

As a result of action of this Legation and of American Consul General at Tientsin in calling attention of Japanese authorities to serious damage inflicted on American Methodist Mission property at Miyun by Japanese airplane bombing on April 18th the Japanese Charge d'Affaires on April 29th personally informed me that Kwantung army would reimburse mission for losses suffered. This was confirmed on May 1st in letter to Lockhart from Japanese Consul General at Tientsin who asked that this mission submit a detailed list of its losses. See Tientsin's despatch No. 368 of April 22 nd et seq for details.

No Americans resident at Miyun and so far as known Chinese staff of mission was not injured by bombing.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12344 FOR Tel. # - 4 pm.

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED May 4, 1933.
 TO NAME : 1-1127

REGARDING: Preparations under way for fresh drive against
 Chiang Kai Shek's troops at Miyuan.
 Increasing signs of revival of military operations
 in Chinwangtao area.

793.94/6250

6250

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MET

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated May 4, 1933

Rec'd 8 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

May 4, 4 p. m.

One. From personal adviser of General Yu Huaeh Chung, Chairman of Hopei Provincial Government, I learn confidentially that an attempt to assassinate the General night before last was frustrated by the General himself. A petty officer of the guard and a bugler were involved, the former being personally disarmed by General Yu and the bugler by the General with the aid of a squad of soldiers. \$500 and two revolvers were taken from the petty officer and over \$1,000 and two revolvers from the bugler. They confessed to having been given \$3,000 and a promise to pay them each \$200 if the plot succeeded. Both miscreants were court martialed and shot today. The attempted assassination undoubtedly has a political bearing on the question which is not yet clearly defined.

12344

Two. Three bombs were thrown without serious damage in the Japanese Concession last night as follows: one at the electric light plant, one fairly near Japanese barracks and one near office of Japanese Consulate.

Three.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#-- from Tientsin via N.R., May 4,
 4 p. m.

Three. Japanese military authorities let it be known today that preparations are under way for fresh drive against Chiang Kai Shek's troops at Miyuan and that vicinity. There are increasing signs of a revival of military operations in Chinwengtao area.

RR:WSB

LOCKHART

068

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED April 12, 1933.

MAY 4 1933

Mr. Secretary

Mr. Moley:

The item of chief importance

in this publication is Mr.

Matsuoka's letter of February 25

(last page in the book); and, of

next importance, the Foreword

(three pages at the beginning).

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

JAPAN'S CASE IN THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

F/HS

AS PRESENTED BEFORE THE SPECIAL
 SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS

793.94/6251

MAY 8 - 1933

FILED

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JAPANESE DELEGATION
 TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
 —
 GENEVA, 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPAN'S CASE IN THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

AS PRESENTED BEFORE THE SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

JAPANESE DELEGATION
TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

—
GENEVA, 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOREWORD

Do you want chaos to continue in China, endangering international relations, with the eventual possibility of another great war?

That is the general burden of the first two addresses, which I delivered before the Assembly of the League of Nations. Japan wants no war. She seeks to prevent the development of war. Her actions in Manchuria have been taken with this object in view, and therefore in conformity with the purposes of the League of Nations. It is because there is in Europe and America so little understanding of Japan and China, and their relations with Russia, that the Western World has permitted itself to be misled with regard to the policies of my country. These policies, the disordered condition of China, and the potentialities with regard to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have endeavoured to explain.

In the address which I delivered extemporaneously before the Assembly on December 8th, 1932, there may appear to be contradictions in my references to Soviet Russia. These are not contradictions but a logical conflict that arises from a contradiction of the facts themselves. One fact is that we want no trouble with the U.S.S.R.; the other is that we want no extension of Communistic control in China. With regard to the U.S.S.R. there are two trends of thought in Japan at the present moment. One is that that country is a menace to Japan, because of efforts to spread Sovietism over the Far East and because of the military development within the Soviet Union. Those Japanese who are anxious over this combined development and propaganda think that our country should strike at the U.S.S.R. before the

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potential menace fully materializes. The other opinion is that the issues conflicting between the two countries can be peacefully settled by means of diplomacy. The writer shares this latter view.

In the same address of December 8, I referred to Japan being misunderstood at the present time and called attention to the fact that Jesus of Nazareth, also misunderstood, was crucified in His time. As I have said, I was speaking extemporaneously, and I failed to phrase the remark as well as might have been done. But, of course, I had no intention of comparing Japan with Jesus. I meant only to give a striking example of error in contemporaneous judgment. Japan believes she is doing what is right under the circumstances and conditions existing at present in the Far East and believes that time will vindicate her actions.

The observations of the Japanese Delegation, dated February 21 and circulated among the Members of the Special Session of the League, and the last speech of mine before the General Assembly on February 24 represent the earnest and last efforts by Japan to warn the Members against taking precipitate action, without having an opportunity of fully and intimately acquainting themselves with all the facts of the case. Such action can solve nothing, and would only add one more difficulty to a situation already complicated and confused enough as it is.

My Farewell Message was dictated to my secretary on the train that carried us away from Geneva to Paris on the afternoon of February 25, a day which I shall never be able to blot out of my memory as long as I live. It fairly expresses the emotion and thoughts that surged up in me as I waved my hat to a multitude of friends, both Japanese and foreigners, who had come to the station to bid me godspeed, and as I watched through the windows the beautiful hills and sparkling rivulets of Switzerland fleeting past us as our train sped on. Sad but not disappointed, calm but determined, I surveyed mentally what

had happened at the League in the past three months and tried to look into the future to discern the meaning of all that—with an humble prayer at heart that all may yet turn out well for all—for humanity.

For the purpose of improving or elucidating the phraseology, I have made some slight corrections in the addresses as originally delivered. Where statements or their phraseology were found to be inaccurately rendered in the Minutes, due rectifications have also been made.

YOSUKE MATSUOKA.

New York City, March, 1933.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I

ADDRESS DELIVERED
AT THE NINTH PLENARY MEETING

December 6th, 1932

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—Almost all, if not quite all, of the points made by the Chinese Delegate have been answered and completely refuted in advance. I do not, therefore, think it necessary at this moment to enter into a discussion with him. I reserve the right to make further observations, if I deem it advisable, later. Also, I do not really feel it necessary for me to detain you long by making a speech, but there are some points upon which Japan wishes particularly to lay stress and to bring out more clearly and forcibly. Therefore, I trust you will permit me to claim the indulgence of this body.

The Japanese point of view has already been stated in our Observations, in my addresses before the Council and in communications to it. But the issue is of such a serious character that we want to spare no effort to bring the Members of the Assembly to a realisation of the facts.

There seems to be an impression that Japan opposes, and China supports, the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. No such generalisation is warranted. There is much in the Report that the Chinese can accept with no pleasure. The document has brought a strong light to bear upon the conditions prevailing in China which representatives of her Government throughout the world have long sought to cover, to excuse and to condone. There are many parts and passages in the Report which we regard as entirely correct and accurate. Our principal disagreement with the Report, in the sections dealing with the disordered

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condition of China, is where it occasionally expresses optimism for the rehabilitation of the country. We, too, have hope, but it is not for the immediate future, for a country in China's condition of disorganization, as Chinese history shows, cannot recover quickly. For a country vaster than Europe in territory and larger than Europe in population to change abruptly from an ancient to a modern State is too much to expect in a brief period of time.

Japan is a loyal supporter of the League of Nations. In conformity with the principles of peace, on which the League is founded, we have striven to avoid war for many years under provocations that, prior to the drafting of the Covenant, would certainly have brought it about. Our adherence to the Covenant has been a guiding principle in our foreign policy for the thirteen years of the League's existence, and we have been proud to participate in the advancement of its noble project. No open-minded person who has observed our long and earnest patience in our relations with China can contend to the contrary.

Our Government was still persisting earnestly in efforts to induce the Chinese Government at Nanking and that of Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden, to see the light of reason when the incident of September 18th, 1931, took place. We wanted no such situation as has developed. We sought in Manchuria only the observance of our treaty rights and the safety of the lives of our people and their property. We wanted from China the right to trade, according to existing treaties, free from unwarranted interference and molestation. But our policy of patience and our efforts at persuasion were misinterpreted by the Chinese people. Our attitude was regarded as weakness, and provocations became persistently more unbearable.

A Government which had its beginning as a result of aid obtained from Soviet Russia, in arms, men and money (seven or eight years ago) and which is still imbued with what are called "revolutionary" principles, was not content to injure our trad-

ing interests in China proper, but extended its campaign against us into Manchuria with the avowed purpose of driving us out of that territory—territory which we, through war with Russia, had returned to the Manchu Dynasty twenty-seven years ago. That our rights and interests were assailed, and even, in some cases, the persons of Japanese subjects attacked, are facts established by record. That we acted in self-defence is clear and warranted.

When the United Kingdom Government sent troops and naval vessels to Shanghai, in 1927, it had foreknowledge of the menace threatening that city. The United Kingdom Government was, therefore, in a position to inform the League of its intentions. Our Government was in no such position with regard to Manchuria, because it did not expect the incident of September 18th, 1931, to take place. Our Government had no knowledge of the trouble until after it occurred. But, on learning of it, we informed the League. It must be well noted, in this connection, that, prior to the incident, we had been making every effort to negotiate and bring about better understanding and feelings in Manchuria, and had not been abandoned until the last moment the hope that our efforts would be crowned with success. Our Government also hoped subsequently to check the developments and limit their scope in the affected territory, but too many elements were active in opposition. Chinese military forces were mobilised at Chinchow and rebel armies, remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces, assembled in other parts of the country.

Later, in October, 1931, Japan proposed to enter into direct negotiations with China, with a view to arriving at a pacific settlement of the controversy. Our Government was insistent on this point. But the Council of the League failed to countenance it, and China, encouraged by the attitude taken by the League, turned a deaf ear to this proposal, thus stiffening and complicating the situation. What followed is well known. At the same time, the boycott—which had been going on in China

before the incident—was greatly intensified, thereby provoking, on the one hand, further ill-feelings in Japan and, on the other hand, adding fuel to the mob psychology in China.

The Chinese Representative spoke before the Council the other day of the legalisation of the boycott. If that is admitted, it is sure to create a very serious situation. In point of fact, the statement he made in that sense provoked a fresh outbreak of the boycott in many parts of China (as related at length in the communication made by our delegation yesterday to the League). The boycott, as we see it in China, is a great hindrance to the promotion of international peace and co-operation. It creates circumstances which threaten the good understanding between nations, on which peace depends. It therefore deserves a thorough consideration on the part of the League, one of whose primary duties lies in the elimination of possible causes of friction between nations.

While the situation was developing in Manchuria, efforts were made in Europe and America to rally what is called "world opinion" against Japan. The craft of propaganda, in which our Chinese friends are particularly adept, was put into effective use in shaping world opinion against Japan before the facts were fully known.

The success of this last activity in Western countries had unfortunate effects in the East. It encouraged Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising attitude towards us. It encouraged them to believe that Western countries would interfere and save them from the consequence of their anti-foreign policies as they were applied to Japan and her interests. It accentuated a situation from which we were unable to withdraw without danger of further and more serious evils to follow.

In dealing with China, Japan is dealing with a State in a menacing condition. The actual menace to us not only existed prior to the incident of September 18th, 1931, but was being intensified by the activities of the Kuomintang Party and officials

of the Nanking Government. As far as there is a National Government in China, that Government is related closely to the Kuomintang. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry is emphatic on this point. It states on page 16 that, "in 1927, the Central Government was established at Nanking. It was controlled by the party (Kuomintang Party)—it was, in fact, merely one important organ of the party." Against such a party and Government, and against their declared policy and active efforts to terminate our interests and treaties in Manchuria, we have acted in defence. We have acted also with a view to promoting and preserving peace. Because our action came as the result of an incident does not alter the general fact. It had to come sooner or later. The menace to Japan was actual. If her rights and interests in Manchuria were violated, the sufferer would be none but Japan.

The question is asked why the Japanese Government did not seek protection from the League. The answer is that, in view of the present structure and scope of the League, effective protection could not be expected from that body promptly. In the situation that existed in Manchuria, Japan had to deal first with imminent danger; secondly, with a country whose authority did not extend to Manchuria; and, thirdly, with a Government which had adopted a policy of unilateral abrogation of treaties and conventions. In so exceptional a situation, was it possible to expect protection from the League? As to the other reasons, I had occasion to mention them before the Council.

If it is contended that the League could have afforded Japan adequate protection, why was it—may I be permitted to ask—that the League Council gave its approval, with no dissenting voice, when the United Kingdom, with France, the United States and Japan, sent troops to Shanghai in 1927? Not only did the League refrain from protesting on that occasion, the Government of China also refrained. At that time, Dr. Wellington Koo was the Prime Minister of the Government at Peking. The Govern-

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ment then welcomed the presence of the British and other troops at Shanghai as of possible service to them in staying the advance of the Nationalist forces then hostile to them. The same Peking Government also refrained, for the same reason, from calling the attention of the League to the despatch of Japanese troops to Tsinanfu in 1927 and 1928, for then the Japanese might have been of help in saving them from defeat. The Chinese Representative, in a statement made before the Council the other day, claimed that Japanese troops were sent to Tsinanfu with the object of interfering with the advance of what he called the "ever-victorious" Nationalist army and of preventing the unification of China. Dr. Koo must know very well that our real object in despatching troops to the capital of Shantung was to protect the lives and property of our people.

He must also know that the "Old Marshal" gave vent, at the time, to a display of anger that our troops refrained from assisting him, as they could have done. They could have saved the "Old Marshal's" position in North China and incidentally that of Dr. Koo. But they followed the traditional Japanese policy of refraining from interference in the civil wars of China. Now, however, Dr. Koo comes to Geneva as a representative of the Government which defeated his chief of four years ago and reverses his position.

At the time when the United Kingdom sent troops to Shanghai, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, sent a letter (dated February 8th, 1927) to the League of Nations, from which I beg leave to quote. On the subject of the condition of China, the letter says:

"Unfortunately, since 1922 (the date of the Nine-Power Treaty), China has become more disunited than ever... That Canton Nationalist Government has now increased its authority over the greater part of the country south of the Yangtze River, and claims to be recognised as the only Government of

all China. This fact has modified the hypothesis upon which the Washington policy was based."

On the subject of the boycott, Sir Austen's letter to the League states:

"The extremists of the Canton Nationalist party have singled out the British people for an implacable campaign of calumny and boycott. Indeed, enmity against Britain has been deliberately and persistently cultivated by this section and its advisers, in order to promote the solidarity of the Nationalist Party and stimulate its aggressive spirit..."

"The extremely friendly and considerate attitude of His Majesty's Government, as shown at the Washington Conference and on many other occasions, was contemptuously brushed aside."

Will any one who knows the terms of the treaties regarding China, signed at the Washington Conference, dispute the fact that the greatest concessions made by any Power to China at that time were those that Japan made? Greater than the concessions of all other nations combined were those which Japan made to China.

With regard to anti-British propaganda, Sir Austen's letter to the League reads:

"... it is essential that the official stimulation of the anti-British propaganda must cease. The comparative peace of the greater part of Southern China during the last two or three months has proved that, when organised agitation and intimidation are absent, friendly relations between the Chinese and British people remain as excellent as they have been in the past."

Those are the words of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

The same thing can also be said of relations between the Chinese and Japanese people.

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In regard to a settlement by the League of the difficulties which existed between the United Kingdom and China five years ago, Sir Austen said in conclusion that:

"His Majesty's Government deeply regret that there does not appear to be any way in which the assistance of the League in the settlement of the difficulties in China can be sought at present."

Japan, likewise, saw no way in which the League could help her in Manchuria. Moreover, let it be noted the marked difference between the case of Shanghai and that of Manchuria. Whereas the United Kingdom sent troops to Shanghai, Japanese troops were already on the spot by virtue of treaty rights, for the protection of the Japanese interests along the South Manchuria Railway.

It was the plan of the Nationalist Government (in which the present National Government had its beginning) to concentrate its propaganda and hostility upon one foreign Government, its interests and its people in China, at a time. In 1926 and 1927, the hostility against Japan was deliberately abated under orders from the Government, and concentrated upon the British. They were then the "capitalists and imperialists" to be got rid of first. The British Concessions in China Treaty Ports were pointed out to the masses of ignorant and hungry people and to the undisciplined and rapacious soldiery as places of wealth which they were encouraged to recover. Much of the country was placarded with pictures depicting John Bull as an ogre who had garnered his wealth by exploiting Chinese labour and robbing the Chinese people. It was as a result of such incitements that the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were surrendered to the Nationalists. But there the British tolerance came to an end. When General Chiang Kaishek arrived with his army at Shanghai, he found that that city was not to be a prize for his army. It was surrounded by an adequate defence force of British,

French and other troops, who were prepared in redoubts, behind barbed wire entanglements, to hold it against him. On surveying the lines, it was evident to the Chinese Commander-in-Chief what would happen to his troops if he attempted the assault. Needing his soldiers for fighting other Chinese generals, he wisely and quickly came to terms with the British officials.

Since that time the concentration of hostility has been made against Japan, accompanied by efforts abroad to spread dislike and distrust of us by adroit and insidious diplomacy and by propaganda. Sooner or later the results could not be otherwise than what has occurred. What has taken place the Assembly knows.

At the root of the present trouble between Japan and China we find the lack of cohesion between realities in China and the aspirations of the modern Chinese. In order to satisfy these aspirations, progress is needed. Progress in China, is, in our opinion, essential, not only to the maintenance of law and order, but to a stabilisation of her foreign relations. It should, therefore, be the urgent duty of the League to aid China in this direction. The fundamental principle of the League is to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security, as pointed out in the Preamble of the Covenant. Japan, for her part, is ready to do all in her power to co-operate with the League in helping China to attain progress.

With regard to the independence of Manchoukuo, the Japanese Government cannot be held responsible. Even the Report of the Commission of Enquiry nowhere impeaches the Japanese Government in this connection. It is one thing to state that some officials or officers interested themselves in the autonomy movement (the Commission perhaps meant to refer to the attempt to recover peace and order through local government, although the phraseology is not clear). It is another thing to hold a Government responsible for abetting an independence movement. Prior to September 18th, and even thereafter, our Govern-

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ment had no plan or design to accomplish the independence of Manchuria, nor has it allowed itself at any time to be connected with the independence movement.

First came the movement of the leaders of the people in the territory itself. This, contrary to the Commission's Report, was definite and emphatic, and began within eight days after the incident of September 18th. Before our troops in Manchuria had time to consider anything beyond their immediate military duties, before our Government had time to learn the full significance of the events that were taking place, the movement was being launched by Chinese leaders in Manchuria. Learning of this movement, our Government took immediate steps to avoid participation, reaffirming its traditional policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of China. On September 26th, both Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, and General Minami, the War Minister, issued instructions, respectively, to the civil and military representatives of Japan in Manchuria, forbidding participation in this movement.

But their efforts could not stop the movement on the part of the leaders of the people in Manchuria, nor could it stop the sympathy of Japanese with them. The people of Manchuria had suffered too long under the oppression of ruthless dictators; and, seeing the opportunity to organize a civil Government, they lost no time in taking advantage of it.

We have given an outline of the progress of this movement in our Observations on the Commission's Report, and the Manchoukuo Government furnished the Commission with a detailed history of the movement on the occasion of its visit to Manchuria. I shall not, therefore, take up more of your time by narrating the story. I only wish to refer you to these documents, which I feel confident will give you a right picture of the movement.

With regard to the recognition of Manchoukuo there is this to say. The new government had the sympathy of all Japanese people. We saw in it the solution of a problem which had

troubled us for forty years. We saw in it the termination of hostile incitement from China Proper. We saw the advent of a civil Government, composed of reasonable men who understood the strategic and economic importance of the territory to Japan. We saw the promise of peace for the future. We wanted peace. We did not, and we do not, want Manchuria. We wanted only the preservation of our rights and interests there. Here, at hand, was the solution, the prompt recognition of Manchoukuo; and our Government, in giving that recognition, acted in response to the demands of the Japanese people and the appeals of Manchoukuo. If all the conditions in the Far East were fully known and carefully weighed, it would become evident that Japan, so vitally interested in Manchuria, could not possibly withhold the recognition any longer. In point of fact, the extension of recognition to one State by another is entirely within the exercise of its sovereignty and can in no case be contested by another. There are many precedents in European and American history. I would add that the effect of the recognition of Manchoukuo by Japan cannot fail to be wholesome throughout the entire Far East. It should be known that the whole nation of Japan regards Manchuria as a key to the solution of all Far Eastern questions.

The Commission's Report says (on page 125) that:

"The all-important problem at the present time is the establishment of an administration acceptable to the population and capable of supplying the last need—namely, the maintenance of law and order."

The Report states also (on page 132) that:

"It would be the function of the Council, in the paramount interest of world peace, whatever may be the eventuality, to decide how the suggestions made in our report may be extended and applied to events which are still developing from day to day, always with the object of securing a durable

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understanding between China and Japan, by utilising all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action, which are at present fermenting in Manchuria."

It is stated in Chapter IX of the Report (page 127) that:

"A mere restoration of the *status quo ante* would be no solution. Since the present conflict arose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question theoretically and to leave out of account the realities of the situation."

And in another place (on page 130) the Report says that "a satisfactory regime for the future might be evolved out of the present one without any violent change."

In the light of these findings of the Commission of Enquiry, I should like to know what the Assembly will think of the actions already taken, and of those that are being taken, in Manchoukuo by Chang-Hsueh-liang and by the Nanking Government. But it is my opinion that these actions run counter to these findings by the Commission. We would therefore suggest that the sound forces, of which the Report speaks, be left to develop naturally. Interference with their development might bring about consequences contrary to what the League has been seeking to accomplish.

We Japanese, knowing China, do not take seriously the warnings often made at Geneva—that China will be unified and militarised as a result of Japan's action in Manchuria. We believe that a really united China is a peaceful China, not a militarised China. I am afraid advantage is taken by the Chinese Representatives of Western unfamiliarity with Eastern psychology. There are more armed soldiers in China even to-day than in any other country in the world. There are between two and three million men in arms. But the hostility of any of the military chiefs to

foreigners is not as great as their hostility to one another. This has always been the case, from the days of the first British wars with the Chinese. Chinese generals do not always support one another against a foreign enemy. In short, Chinese armies are not created primarily for the national defence of the country.

Since the proclamation of the Republic in China, Governments have been short-lived. They have risen and fallen in quick succession. And now what do we see? A National Government that had its beginning in the Russian movement to "sovietise" China; a Government that controls only the several provinces about the mouth of the Yangtze River, and even these not completely; a Government that rebelled from the Soviet movement, but retained its revolutionary principles regarding the unilateral abrogation of treaties with foreign countries. The League Commission's Report states at the top of page 23 that "Communism has become an actual rival of the National Government." The communist movement controls as many provinces as the recognised Government. I might even say that communism is to-day eating into the very heart of China. In this connection, we would say that Japan cannot afford to shut her eyes to the possibilities of the future.

Our action in recognising the State of Manchoukuo was the only and the surest way for us to take in the present circumstances. In the absence of any other means of stabilising conditions in that territory—where we have interests, both strategic and economic, which we cannot sacrifice—we had no other recourse.

Now the Assembly has to consider whether it will or will not make suggestions for a settlement, and, should it decide to make them, what those suggestions will be. Any suggestions should, we think, be governed by the following principles:

- (1) The terms must be such that they can be effectively put into operation, and that they will accomplish and preserve peace in the Far East.

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(2) A solution must be found for the disordered condition of China.

(3) In case any plan for settlement is found by the League, this organisation must take upon itself the responsibilities for its execution.

Considering the actual condition in China, the execution is one that is likely to be costly, and the League should have both the will and the means to make the necessary sacrifices. Is any Member of the League ready to participate with others in such an undertaking?

Japan is fully conscious of the fact that the League is a bulwark of peace. The spirit of the League coincides with the fundamental policy of Japan, which is to consolidate peace in the Far East and to contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. This she believes to be her share in contributing towards the progress of the world and the promotion of human welfare.

It is true that voices have been raised in some quarters criticising the efficiency of the League. But the fact that the Manchurian affair has not led to open war between China and Japan, or to trouble between other interested Powers, is assuredly due to actions of the League. It may be safely said that the League has thus fulfilled the high object of its existence. To hope for anything over and beyond what it has done in this direction would be to expect too much, under present conditions in China.

Again, as to the apprehension entertained in some quarters that the present case might lead to weakening, or even undermining the principles of the Covenant, we firmly believe that such apprehension is entirely groundless. The exceptional nature of the present case makes it plain that you can hardly apply to it those principles by generalisation. Nor do the Japanese actions militate against the Pact of Paris, or against any other treaties.

The Report of the Commission brings out this exceptional nature clearly when it states, on page 38, that:

"This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges."

All the world is in a constant state of change. All objects, animate and inanimate, are constantly moving, let us hope, towards a better state. Might not the League well take cognisance of the ever-changing conditions in the East and judiciously adjust its views and actions to them? As we Japanese read the Covenant, it is not a hard, implacable instrument.

In conclusion, I would say that, as for Japan and China in particular, we look for the time to come when these two nations of the distant East will realise the common origin of their culture and traditions and the common interests of their existence, and will co-operate with a sense of mutual understanding and respect, in the policy of upholding peace in the Far East, thereby serving the cause of world peace, in and with the League of Nations.

Allow me only to add a few words in reference to what is called the Fushun incident.* We have already filed with the

* Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese Delegate, had earlier in the session read the following telegram, which, he said, he had received from the Chinese Legation in Washington:

"Edward Hunter, a correspondent of the International News Service belonging to Mr. William Hearst, has made an investigation on the spot of the massacre and reports what follows:

"What I saw with my own eyes and heard from refugees and inhabitants leaves no possibility of doubt that unbelievable massacre occurred. Three villages burnt, nothing left alive. Villagers at bayonet point were herded like cattle and slaughtered. Houses were soaked with kerosene and burnt. Japanese admit that the attackers of Fushun were not natives of villages, who were suspected of giving the volunteers food and lodging. Hunter saw scattered shreds of bloodstained clothes of peasants, and crude burial of remains of killed under fresh sod."

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Council the information obtained by us upon enquiry addressed to our Government, and I presume you have that information by this time. Nevertheless, let me point out that our Chinese friends have a habit of exaggerating and thereby misrepresenting. We are ready to stand by and prove that the facts as given by our delegation are true.

As to Mr. Hunter's information, to which the Chinese Delegation has attached so much importance, allow me to give you some information about this representative at Mukden of the International News Service. This correspondent went to Fushun, on the South Manchuria Railway, on November 30th, and only met one missionary, from whom he heard the story. He immediately went to Shanhai-Kwan, a long way from Mukden, and sent his despatches abroad. The foreign correspondents at Mukden were very angry at his action and despatched their telegrams contradicting and correcting the telegram sent by Mr. Hunter.

If any delegate is particularly interested in this affair, I would suggest that he should read these news items in the newspapers. I shall not take up your time now by reading the telegrams and press reports.

"Japanese Embassy denies Hunter's account, but admits killing 350 alleged bandits and unspecified number of unruly associates."

"In a second telegram Hunter reports that he visited eight villages completely destroyed along three routes to Fushun and suspected of lodging the volunteers. A survivor relates that he escaped because he was mistaken for killed. With 100 others they fled to hillside after watching homes burned. They were gathered together to be photographed, but instead of that they were machine-gunned. Later someone whispered, 'Japanese gone,' but those who rose from the ground were again machine-gunned. Later the Japanese bayoneted survivors, including children."

II

EXTEMPORANEOUS ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

December 8th, 1932

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—Since the day before yesterday, I have been listening with very keen interest to the addresses which have been made. On the speeches themselves I reserve the right to make whatever comment I may deem necessary at a later stage, and I shall not enter into a discussion on them at the moment. However, I would like to point out a feature which I might characterise as altogether unfair in the speeches of many of my Colleagues. That feature is the cutting out and breaking off of parts of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry and the taking of small portions of my addresses and the Observations of my Government, without any reference to the context. Such quotations were often made the basis of criticism and attacks against me or against my country, or were used to produce conclusions altogether unwarranted, if one were to take pains to read the whole of the context. That, I consider, is altogether unfair and I do not think that any of you will disagree with me.

As an example, I cannot understand why many of the speakers referred to a passage in the Report of the Commission where it is stated, with reference to the action of Japanese troops on the night of September 18th, that:

"The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence."

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That is the passage as quoted by my Colleagues, but it leaves out the remainder of the paragraph, which, so far as I can recall, only one or two speakers read. The rest of the paragraph reads as follows:

"In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence."

If I am correctly informed, I have heard that the Commissioners had pretty hot discussions on these two passages. I heard that some of the Commissioners could not agree to accept the first unless it were qualified by the second. If you wish to prove what I have heard, I would propose to the Assembly that the Commissioners should be called in. This is one instance in which I feel a misrepresentation has been made.

Again, to show you how some of my statements were misrepresented, let me refer you to a passage in the speech of our learned Colleague from Greece, who is well known and respected in my country. I have yet to go through the records; so I may be wrong, but I did understand him to say, in reference to the question of self-defence, that Japan has got to prove that she is not guilty of the charge—the conclusion as found in the Report of the Commission. That is to say, you bring a charge and then tell the defendant to prove that he is not guilty. I do not think such a rule of burden of proof exists in any country. Certainly it does not exist in my country, and I cannot bring myself to believe that such a rule of *onus probandi* prevails even in the League of Nations.

I think these two examples suffice to show what I mean in referring to a feature that I may characterise as altogether unfair.

I particularly make a reservation with regard to the address of our Chinese Colleague to-day. I will not now go into the details of that speech, but I trust you will permit me to refer to one or two points. He was anxious to show in what a bad

condition Japan was economically and financially. I am not prepared to make any protest to that charge; to a certain extent, I admit it. Japan also belongs to that group of Powers which are suffering from the world depression, and I envy China, which our Chinese Colleague claims to be on a higher plane of finance and economics—perhaps the only exception in the world to-day. I congratulate him.

Then our Chinese Colleague referred to military caste—I do not remember whether it was Dr. Yen or Dr. Koo who referred to that, either in the Assembly, or in the Council, or even outside the Council. Anyhow, whichever it was, he tried to make out that there were military clans and that Japan is to-day under the thumb of those military clans. Let me simply say that there are no military clans to-day in Japan, neither is there a military caste. I do admit that there are Japanese who are clad in khaki carrying sabres, but I find men in all countries somewhat similarly dressed. They do not come from any particular class and they do not come from any particular caste. For instance General Tanaka, to whose alleged memorial the Chinese Delegate has referred so often, comes from one of the poorest families of Japan. Father and sons were only able to make a living by manufacturing Japanese parasols, and that General Tanaka, whom we regard with respect and love in Japan as one of our great statesmen, carried some of the parasols his father made to other villages to sell. I can give you a great number of cases where noted generals and admirals in Japan also come from very poor families. We have no caste in Japan to-day that particularly produces navy and army officers. When our Chinese Colleague was referring to General Araki as the ruler of Japan, I think he was forgetting that there was an Emperor in Japan whom we regard as our ruler both in name and in reality, and then there are the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State. General Araki is only War Minister.

I think most, if not all, of the points raised by various speak-

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ers, including the Chinese Delegate, were answered in advance, and I should like to ask you carefully to study our Observations as well as our statements.

Let me now refer cursorily to the British action in 1927. The Chinese Delegate drew our attention to the difference between the British action then and our actions in Shanghai last spring, or in Manchuria since last autumn. The only difference I can see is that the United Kingdom sent her troops out to China, while, as I pointed out the other day, we had marines in Shanghai, and later we sent land forces. As regards Manchuria, as I also pointed out the other day, our troops were there in virtue of a treaty to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese subjects; there were, and are to-day, over one million Japanese subjects in Manchuria, including Japanese of Korean origin. The United States sent troops to Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of their citizens. I think about seven thousand troops were sent to protect six or seven hundred Americans. Had we adopted that standard, we should have had to send troops to the number, say, of over ten million, and we have not that number in Japan.

Perhaps I can better illustrate what I have in mind by telling the following story: I look upon our dispute in this way—and particularly with reference to the British action in 1927. Britishers had a treaty right to be in China and, finding they were in danger, the British Government sent out troops to lick the spoilt boy of the Far East, if need be. As I pointed out the other day, Chiang Kai-shek quickly came to terms and therefore the Britishers were not obliged to fight. But in our case, in connection with Manchuria, our troops were there. It is as if we were invited into the house of our neighbour, who began to abuse and even to attack us by every imaginable means. We persevered, and, although we Japanese have a lot of patience—more than the average Westerner — we at last got mad and hit the neighbour, and straightaway our neighbour comes to Geneva and says the Japanese invaded his house and struck him down for no cause.

Is it the duty of the League of Nations to protect one from the consequences of one's own folly and actions, inimical, not only to the interests of one's neighbour, but also to the peace of the world?

Our distinguished Colleague from the United Kingdom very aptly said yesterday that none of us can accept the Report of the Commission of Enquiry *in toto*. I do not quote his words, but refer to the sense of them. May I be allowed to undertake to improve his statement just a bit? In the Report of the Commission we do find in a certain sense the unanimity which some speakers have stressed so much; but it is *unanimity in disagreement*. Or, I may put it another way, and say *disagreements in unanimity*. If an impartial reader will take the trouble to compare the Report passage by passage, he will find in it, as we have had occasion to point out time and again, passages which are contradictory. I am not criticising the members of the Commission at all. On the contrary, I pay a very high tribute to their integrity and to the painstaking work so conscientiously carried out by them. Nevertheless, with five members, it is perfectly natural that we should find disagreement in a report such as this. If we did not, it would be a marvel. The very fact that there is *unanimity in disagreement*, or *disagreements in unanimity*, proves that these gentlemen were conscientious and sincere. Contradictions and disagreements are there, nevertheless. While I agree with the distinguished Representative of the United Kingdom, I must add that the very nature of the Report makes it impossible for any one of us to accept it *in toto*.

With regard to the point so often put forward by some Delegates that Japan has violated the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, and so forth, it suffices for me again to declare that Japan contends and believes that she is not guilty of such violation.

We Japanese do appreciate and understand the apprehension entertained by some of the so-called small Powers, and we

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take the stand that our actions in Manchuria do not warrant such apprehension. On this point, however, I shall refrain from dilating.

On the whole, I am in accord with the principles advocated by different speakers, particularly by those representing what we call small nations. The only difference of opinion, if there is any, is that we do not believe our actions have militated against these principles.

Sir John Simon, M. Paul-Boncour and others pointed out the complexity of the question and pleaded for realities to be taken into consideration. I think we cannot stress that point too much. Again, our Colleague from Italy called attention to the elasticity and flexibility that should be borne in mind in applying the Covenant, and I perfectly agree with him. I even believe that, if we do not bear in mind this particular point, the consequences which any decision taken in the League of Nations would produce would be contrary to what is sought and contrary to the very principles of the League.

May I be permitted to call your attention to the fact that, with all our wishes to perfect it, the League as it exists to-day is far from perfection?

Japan decided at the Versailles Conference to join the League of Nations, believing that the United States of America, one of the prime movers, if not the prime mover, for the League of Nations, would join. As you all know, the United States of America, for their own reasons, refused to join. Let me be very frank and say that, the moment America decided not to join the League, every self-interest of Japan, narrowly construed, would have dictated that Japan should not join the League. America, that great Power across the Pacific Ocean, is out of the League; Soviet Russia is out of the League. At our door we have China, that vast country in these fearful conditions. I ask you to use a little imagination. How would you have acted if you had been Japan?

As we all know, the Japanese Government did not change its decision to be in the League. Why? Simply because it was anxious to contribute what little it could towards the League and thereby to contribute towards world peace. There could have been no other reason whatever. To-day, I have to confess, there are a number of serious thinkers in Japan, who, disgusted, exasperated that their case is not fully understood by the League of Nations, are urging withdrawal—that we made a mistake in entering at all. By what has been going on at Geneva you have produced these men in Japan, although I have to say, as I have said often before, that the majority of our people are still for the League. They are still for remaining loyal—just as loyal as they have been in the past.

Approach the same point from another angle. To-day, Japan is confronted with grave dangers. Conditions in China are worse than ever, despite the assurance of our Chinese Colleague to the contrary. In a word, Japan is to-day faced with an appalling situation throughout Eastern Asia, and is fighting single-handed to save the Far East—not to start war in the Far East; far from it. And we are confronting that situation with Soviet Russia still outside the League of Nations.

Now, having these cold facts before you, Gentlemen, would it not only be a bit of common sense to suggest to yourselves that Japan cannot be judged under the Covenant of the League without any elasticity or flexibility being allowed to it—as though the League of Nations included Soviet Russia, the United States of America and all other Powers among its Members, and as though the League of Nations were perfect to-day?

One speaker referred to nationalism and internationalism. He spoke as though some peoples in Europe were on a higher plane, while the Japanese were on a lower plane. I cannot quite see my way to agree to such a representation of Japan and other Powers. We Japanese, I think, can state, without fear of contradiction, that Japan has in the past contributed to international-

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ism, if not throughout the world, at least in the Far East, and has contributed to world peace in an indirect way, if not in a direct way. We believe that a real internationalism can only be achieved through a healthy nationalism. We believe it, and, if that speaker meant to criticise Japan for holding such belief, I accept the criticism.

Again, several speakers have stated that the League is the life-line of their existence. This statement is, as I understand it, primarily made for the promotion of the self-interest of each individual Member. In Japan, we entertain a similar notion when we refer to Manchuria. That idea we base first on self-interest, and secondly on that great policy of Japan to which I have had occasion to refer—the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. Nevertheless, primarily we refer to Manchuria as our life-line from the standpoint of our own self-interest. I do not claim to know exactly the intentions of these speakers in referring to the "life-line", but I do say that these gentlemen, when they speak of the League of Nations as their own life-line, admit that they are speaking primarily from self-interest, and I submit that it is only fair to allow us Japanese to present our case and make contentions based on the self-interests of Japan.

I will say a few words about Manchoukuo. As I have already had occasion to point out, the conditions in Manchoukuo are improving and the situation compares favourably with that of China Proper to-day. Its administration is working in a better way; its finances are assured; the most difficult question of currency offers no reason for anxiety. Our idea is that the healthy development of Manchoukuo will eventually contribute to the attainment of the high object for which the League stands.

Manchoukuo, when fully developed, will form the cornerstone of peace in the Far East—that is our faith. If, Gentlemen, you wish to know more about Manchoukuo, I can inform you that there are in Geneva three gentlemen connected with the Manchoukuo Government. One is General Tinge, personal represen-

tative of the Chief Executive of Manchoukuo; another is George Bronson Rea, Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is regarded as one of the greatest authorities on Far-Eastern affairs; and the third is Mr. Arthur H. Edwardes, formerly Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs of China, who has accepted the position of Adviser to the Manchoukuo Government. This proposal was made to him by Manchoukuo to utilise his knowledge and experience gained in the Maritime Customs of China and later as the head of that great institution which was built up by Sir Robert Hart—perhaps the only institution worth mentioning in China.

May I now refer to the impression in some quarters that the actions of Japan in Shanghai and Manchuria were the actions of militarists? That is not true. That is a misrepresentation and, by the repetition of dogmatic statements which have no foundation, people were led to believe that misrepresentation. The moment our troops acted in Manchuria, the whole of the Japanese nation was roused and supported them. I belong to a political party in Japan, and we Japanese politicians fight among ourselves in much the same way as you. But, once this incident in Manchuria was known, we buried our differences. The people of all classes and of all shades of opinion buried their differences and supported the military officers who had acted as they should have acted. The same can be said about the military actions in Shanghai.

In this connection, will you allow me to suggest to you that if there were no good reason it would be inexplicable that the whole nation should stand by the actions of the officers? There was not one dissenting voice throughout the land. There are sixty-five million Japanese of pure blood, and they all stood up as one man. Do you suppose that they all went mad? Do you suppose that they were all insane? It is a pretty hard thing to make sixty-five million people insane, and I trust that our delegation here are not regarded by you yet as insane. Does

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not common sense suggest to you that there must have been a very serious reason? Can you not at least suspect—unless you presume that we all went mad—that there must have been some good reason for the sixty-five million people to unite as one man in backing up these actions?

The reason is plain and simple. Our nation regards the issue connected with Manchuria as involving the very existence of Japan; she looks upon it as a question of life and death.

I owe it to candour to state—though it may shock some of you—that the irresponsible and misguided voices which were raised in the autumn of last year and the spring of this year in Geneva scared some of our people so much that they made up their minds to confront even the severest sanction under the Covenant—that is to say, economic boycott. They were ready to face it if need be, and I have to tell you, Gentlemen—and this does not imply any threat on our part, though our Chinese Colleagues conveniently refer to my utterances as threats because of a particular emphasis or a certain intonation which is really a habit of mine—that even to-day our nation is prepared to undergo it. And why? Because they believe that it is a question of now or never. They bow not before threats, they stoop not down even under sanctions. They will calmly face them because, rightly or wrongly, they believe that—now or never! And they do believe that they are right.

I need only point to half a century of Far-Eastern history to convince you that the aim of our Empire has been peace, in spite of all the accusations to the contrary advanced by our Colleagues from China. To mention but a few events: the wars with the United Kingdom and France were started in the eighteenth century; the Tai Ping Rebellion, lasting fourteen long years, which was started in 1850; and the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, over Korea. The cause of this last war was the presumption on the part of China that she had suzerainty over Korea, which

forms a kind of dart directed at the very heart of Japan, as you can see for yourself if you have before you a map of the Far East.

China agreed, in the Treaty of Tientsin, that she would not contend for suzerainty over Korea. She violated that Treaty, and, instead of acting faithfully, she set about increasing her power in Korea. This brought about the Sino-Japanese War. Then the partition movement of China began to set in, and the Boxer uprising came. After that, the danger of partition increased more and more as time went by. China was more than once almost on the point of being partitioned. In this connection, I need hardly refer to the fact that, in the Boxer Rising, it was owing to Japan's participation in the allied expedition to Peking that the Powers were enabled to save their Ministers and their wives and children from being murdered. Suppose we had declined to join the troops of other nations and these Ministers and their families were murdered in Peking, do you imagine, knowing the temper of the world then and the realities that existed in the Far East, that there would have been any China to-day? A few years afterwards came the Russo-Japanese War. The greatest cause of this war was the secret alliance treaty concluded between China and Russia. We learned of it at the Washington Conference, to our great surprise. As we all know now, they very skillfully hid it from us and we didn't know that secret alliance treaty against Japan, under the terms of which Russia was offered every facility to make her way down to the southern extremity of Manchuria. Again, I am afraid, there would have been no Manchuria, perhaps no China, to-day, if Japan had not had the courage and strength to fight Russia.

We often hear of John Hay's note for the preservation of the integrity of China and so forth. We pay all our respects to that note of the Secretary of State of the American Government. However, taking into consideration the realities of the Far East, and the temper of the Powers since, would you imagine that the paper on which the note was written would have alone

enabled China to continue to exist? There must have been power behind the note. And whose power was it? Largely the power and strength of Japan. So we Japanese, to be very frank, feel that our Chinese friends ought to be thanking Japan as much as the United States of America for saving China from being partitioned, and for, later on, saving the Republic of China which these distinguished gentlemen from China now claim to represent.

Now let me refer to another point. For argument's sake, suppose Japan accepted the suggestions contained in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, such as the demilitarisation of Manchuria and the policing of that vast territory by setting up an international gendarmerie. To be very frank, the idea of creating a special gendarmerie for preserving peace and order in a country as big as Germany and France combined—outlawry and banditry rampant—appears to us an absurdity. You simply cannot do it. That scheme was once tried, I believe, in Turkey. Even there you could not succeed; in Manchuria never. Before we draw such conclusions, let me tell you what must be expected in the event of our accepting such suggestions. In the first place, you have to decide whose troops should be there. Suppose we agree to some plan of getting the sovereignty of China restored there. Naturally, I think my Chinese friends would contend that troops should be sent back to take control of the situation, for there must be some troops to restore order and maintain peace in Manchuria. Then what would happen? Are those troops to be the troops of General Chang Hsueh-liang or the troops of the Nationalist Government of Nanking? They have got to decide that in the first place. If I understand it correctly, the Report of the Commission makes it clear that the restoration of the *status quo ante* is impossible. Does that lead to the conclusion that General Chang Hsueh-liang should not go back to Manchuria? I do not know, but common sense will point to such a conclusion.

Now, let us suppose that General Chang Hsueh-liang does not send his troops back to Manchuria. Then it is left only to the Nationalist Government to send troops. Would it be permitted to do so? I am afraid they will have to settle that question between themselves before either of them can go into Manchuria, and that will at least entail hostilities and civil wars for the next two or three years.

What are you going to do in the meantime with Manchuria? Are you just going to take advice from Geneva that the people in Manchuria should keep quiet until these militarists settle that issue between themselves? And, when they settle that issue between them and send in some Chinese troops, I am inclined to think that that will produce another impasse and create a far worse situation than the one we are now facing. On that point, let me remind you that, in Chapter IX, the Report enumerates nine principles and then comes to the tenth principle. There it states that the conditions enumerated cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China. Now, when do you expect to have a strong Central Government in China? Not tomorrow. Certainly not. In a year? No. In two years? No.

I have made a life study of the Chinese problem and I believe I know something of it. I dare make the forecast that China will not be united and will not be able to have a strong Central Government (as an Oriental I feel sad for it) certainly for the next ten years, perhaps even for the next twenty years, and maybe not in our lifetime. That is the direction in which the actual conditions in China point. We must take these realities into consideration before we try to apply the fundamental principles of the League of Nations. We Japanese are not against these principles. No! But we call your attention to the realities of the situation. I am glad that many of my Colleagues agree with our contention on that point.

To put the matter briefly, the Japanese heart is adamant before threats and unwarranted criticism, but it is soft before

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acts of kindness, appreciation and sympathy. Let me illustrate this by referring to our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only half a year ago, it would have been impossible to imagine any newspaper or anybody in Japan daring to advocate the signing of a non-aggression treaty between the two countries. What do we see to-day? Are we so unreasonable? Are we not amenable to reason and responsive to kindness? Before I left Tokio, I saw one of the greatest newspapers in Japan calling upon the people to give serious consideration to the question of a non-aggression pact, and only a few days after I arrived in Geneva the majority of our newspapers took up the question and expressed themselves in favour of it—a rapid and big change in public sentiment in Japan. What was the reason for this? The reply is very simple: Soviet Russia understood the Manchurian question. It understood our position and our actions there, and refrained from meddling with affairs in Manchuria. Not only that, but recently Soviet Russia has been doing all she could to save those Japanese in Manchuli and elsewhere along the frontier of Manchoukuo, who were held as hostages by a Chinese general who had been persuaded to rebel against Manchoukuo by Chang Hsueh-liang. This act of kindness appealed to the heart of Japan; hence this vast and rapid change in the national feeling towards Soviet Russia.

Half a year ago, it appeared that there was no hope whatever of inducing the Japanese nation to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia, but I can now state from this tribune that there is very good hope of it.

Cannot the League of Nations take a profitable hint from this? As long as you hold out false hopes to the Chinese people that outsiders will come to their assistance, so long can we have no real peace in the Far East. This the Soviet Government understands, in addition to understanding the motives of Japan in connection with the Manchurian question.

With imperialistic Russia we might have had a war a long

time ago over Manchuria, which even this League would not have been able to prevent; but, thanks to Soviet Russia, we not only have no fear of that, but there is good prospect of coming to an understanding and peace. Is the League of Nations against or for that peace which is to be established between Soviet Russia and Japan in the Far East? It is for you to decide.

The League, as I have already had occasion to point out, has rendered a signal service to the cause of peace in connection with the Manchurian question. Another service it has rendered is that of preventing Powers from taking sides in this matter. That is the great service which the League has rendered for the cause of peace in the Far East. As you all know, the Powers were quarrelling in the Far East. Chinese statesmen are particularly adept in the art of causing Powers to find themselves at loggerheads. Since the League exists to-day, and because of its actions, the Powers have been prevented from taking sides. That is a great contribution.

Is it, however, too much for me to be so frank as to say that this very League which has prevented the Powers from taking sides—and has thus rendered great service to the cause of peace in the Far East—has given the appearance at least of taking sides with China against Japan? I do not believe for a moment that this was the intention of the League, but in some way such an appearance has been given. I do not know who is to be blamed, but at least the Chinese advertised in their own country, as well as abroad, that the League was backing up China against Japan. This encouraged China to continue in her attitude of refusing to start direct negotiations with Japan. I know personally that there are many Chinese in China who desire to enter into direct negotiations, but I will not divulge their names, lest they be attacked and killed by hare-brained students.

As you all know, the object of the League of Nations is peace. The object of the great Powers, such as America, the United Kingdom, France and others, is also peace. The object of Japan,

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despite propaganda to the contrary, is peace. We do not differ in our object, but we differ with some as to the means. We are grappling with a grave question of life and death to our nation. We are also grappling with the great question of restoring peace and order in the Far East. Would not common sense suggest to you that the Japanese, with a history which has even been praised by some of my Colleagues, know something of the Far East, know what they are doing and know with whom they are dealing in the Far East?

Some people in Europe and America contend that world public opinion is against Japan, that Japan is defying world opinion, and so forth. Is that so? We are getting letters and even, in some cases, telegrams from different parts of Europe and America, appreciating our position and our contentions, and even encouraging us to persist in our present attitude. The number of these people is increasing. The situation is being better understood everywhere. But suppose that public opinion were so absolutely against Japan as some of the people try to make out, are you sure that the so-called world opinion will persist for ever and never change? Humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago. And to-day? Can any of you assure me that the so-called world opinion can make no mistake? We Japanese feel that we are now put on trial. Some of the people in Europe and America may wish even to crucify Japan in the twentieth century. Gentlemen, Japan stands ready to be crucified! But we do believe, and firmly believe, that, in a very few years, world opinion will be changed and that we also shall be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth was.

Finally, let me call attention to another point; I shall have finished in a few minutes. Let me again give you, in the fewest words possible, just a broad outline of the actual conditions in the Far East. Outer Mongolia fell off from China, as you know, many years ago; to-day it is virtually a part of Soviet Russia. I cannot find Tibet on the map of China to-day. Chinese Turke-

stan has hardly any connection with the so-called National Government at Nanking. And we find Sovietism right in the heart of China. The area over which the influence of that Sovietism extends is about six times as large as Japan Proper. I approach that problem with a question: will it stay there limited to the present area? Why has not that movement spread more rapidly? The answer is: there stands Japan. At least Soviet Russia respects Japan. Were Japan's position weakened, either by the League of Nations or by any other institutions or Powers, you may be sure that that Sovietism would reach the mouth of the Yangtse in no time.

Or suppose that Japan, getting disgusted, decides to keep away from China Proper and simply watch whatever development the conditions of China might take: in that case also I am sure that Sovietism would spread rapidly and would cover the greater part of China in no time. I feel sure of it, whatever our Chinese friends may say to the contrary. Not only that, but if we came to a definite agreement with Soviet Russia that we would keep aloof whatever might happen, what then?

If the object of the League of Nations is really world peace—and I believe it is—and peace in the Far East is part of it, which would you prefer? Would you prefer to weaken Japan, the only hope to-day in that appalling situation throughout Eastern Asia, thus bringing about more chaos in the Far East; or would you prefer to see Japan's position strengthened? That would give you a hope of re-establishing peace and order in the Far East. Gentlemen, I leave it to you to answer that question, and I thank you for your kind attention and patience in listening to me.

III

OBSERVATIONS OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION ON THE DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN

February 21, 1933.

I. The Japanese Delegation deeply regret to find themselves unable to agree to the Draft Report submitted to the Assembly today by the Committee of Nineteen. There are a number of points in the Report which Japan cannot regard as statements of fact. Much of the Report is derived from the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. The Japanese Government have already made observations regarding this Report of the Commission of Enquiry. They feel, therefore, that there is no further use in labouring the argument with regard to the facts.

II. The present Sino-Japanese dispute is primarily due to the absence of authoritative and efficient central government in China. For the past twenty-one years, since the Monarchy was overthrown and the contest for power began among the military leaders, there has been no such government in China, and conditions have gone from bad to worse.

It was the condition of China, the anti-foreign and particularly anti-Japanese, activities of the Nationalist Party and Government, the persistent and repeated acts of provocation on the part of Chinese official and semi-official agitators in Manchuria (which is vital to Japan's security and existence) that brought about the state of affairs leading to the unfortunate incident of September 18, 1931. It was not the intention or desire of the Japanese Government to see Manchuria separated from

nominal Chinese sovereignty; and had the League been fully and well apprised of the facts, it probably would not have acted in haste in the early stages of the trouble, assuming an attitude of condemnation and rallying Western opinion against Japan precipitately and with unfortunate effect. To this attitude at least a measure of the blame is due for what has subsequently occurred.

III. Events which have transpired since the incident have given opportunity to leaders in Manchuria to establish the independence of the country. The military action which Japan took until September 15, 1932 (the date of the recognition of Manchoukuo) was an act of self-defence necessitated by conditions existing in China. The actions which Japan has taken since that date are based upon the Protocol signed by the two countries on that date. The undoing of this Treaty, as the Japanese Delegation have repeatedly stated, cannot be considered. This attitude on the part of Japan is based on the conviction that it is the only way to consolidate peace and security, not only in the region of Manchoukuo but throughout the whole Far East. Japan persists in her hope that, in the course of time, China will come to terms with Manchoukuo and Japan on this basis, which cannot fail to be also of benefit to China.

IV. Japan's policy in Manchoukuo is to assure the protection of her rights and interests, by assisting in the maintenance of order in that country and the preservation of its security against external aggression. This will, in turn, contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the Far East. For Japan to accept the Draft Report would create uncertainties and probably disorders in Eastern Asia.

Japan implicitly believes in the sanctity of treaties, including the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. These treaties, however, only set forth general principles, and, in practical application, the realities of the situation

with which we have to deal must be duly taken into consideration. This should be the attitude of the League. In the case of the present Sino-Japanese dispute, Japan is convinced that, having regard to the exceptional conditions existing in China, a fundamental and conclusive solution of the dispute cannot be realised unless the principles of these treaties are applied in a way to harmonise with realities. Japan, in her endeavours to secure peace and welfare in the Far East, has had to reconcile these treaties with actions essential to the purpose.

V. Manchoukuo, since its establishment as an independent State, has gone forward steadily on the road of progress. Relieved of the blight of mis-government, the industrious and thrifty Manchu, Mongol and Chinese peoples have already begun to reap the benefits of their labours, where formerly they were robbed of much of them. Under the authority of civil government such as they never knew before, these people have already made progress in the domain of finance, railway administration, commerce and industry. Practically all of the hostile elements, largely composed of the remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's armies, have been suppressed. Only in the Province of Jehol does organised opposition continue.

VI. There are bandits and remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops in Jehol, and recently, encouraged by the attitude the League has been displaying in the Sino-Japanese dispute, and having an eye to the progress of the situation in Geneva, the young Marshal has been concentrating his forces on and within the borders of the province. It must be noted in this connection that the bandits and troops directed by Chang Hsueh-liang have long been thrown out beyond the eastern border of Jehol, threatening the very heart of Manchoukuo. In this way China is making a demonstration before the League. The province of Jehol is a part of Manchoukuo. Japan is bound by a treaty with that country to assure its security and cannot remain inactive

in this situation. If Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw his forces to within the Great Wall no military action would be necessary. The adoption of the Report by the Assembly will be likely to stiffen further the attitude of the Marshal in refusing to withdraw his forces, thereby aggravating a situation which Japan is anxious to avoid. (A communication on this subject, setting forth the details of the situation was sent to the League on February 20th.)

VII. (a) The Draft Report, while emphasizing the importance of the principles of the Covenant, does not offer an effective plan of solution for the dispute. The Draft proposes that a settlement be based on the principles laid down by the Commission of Enquiry. Yet the Commission stated that nine of the ten principles it proposed could not be fulfilled without a strong central government in China. There is no such government, and considering, in the light of Chinese history, the conditions actually prevailing in that country, there is no prospect in sight of such a government coming into being. Japan could not await indefinitely an eventuality so distant and uncertain.

(b) The Draft Report states that "the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China." This is not the Japanese view. It belongs to the people of Manchuria, now Manchoukuo. By historic right, by the particular character of the majority of the people, by the fact that China has never held or governed Manchuria except under Manchu Emperors, by reason of mis-government under the self-established rule of the Changs, the people have the right to independence. And who could more properly and rightfully be their ruler than the former Emperor of the Manchus?

(c) The Draft Report recommends the withdrawal of Japanese troops. It is true that Japan agreed to evacuation to the Railway Zone in the Council Resolutions of September 30 and December 10, 1931. But Japan agreed to this withdrawal on con-

dition that the protection of Japanese life and property would be assured. It must be remembered, in this connection, that Japan made a declaration on the occasion of the adoption of the Resolution of December 10, 1931, saying that her acceptance does not "preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly of an exceptional nature, called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria." It is presumed that the Draft Report contemplates that the security of the whole of Manchoukuo is to be maintained by a local gendarmerie force after the evacuation of Japanese troops. There is no precedent in the history of the world in which the security of such a vast territory was secured by gendarmerie. The proposition is absurd and cannot be put into practice. If the Japanese troops were withdrawn, the country would be quickly overrun by bandits and by Chang Hsueh-liang's troops, resulting in anarchy and disorder. Would the League be prepared to accept responsibility in such a situation, arising from the adoption of the Report?

(d) The Draft Report recommends the organisation of a committee to assist in the settlement of the dispute. It is proposed that this committee include representatives of Soviet Russia and the United States. On constitutional grounds Japan opposed the inclusion of representatives of non-member states on the proposed committee of conciliation. It is only logical that she should maintain the same attitude regarding the committee envisaged in the Draft Report.

(e) Finally the Draft Report asserts that the maintenance and recognition of the existing régime in Manchuria is no solution of the problem and proposes that the members of the League and also other states refrain from recognizing the present régime

either *de jure* or *de facto*. In so pronouncing judgment and proposing to influence, or even bind, if only morally, both member and non-member states in the matter of recognizing or not recognizing another state, the League would be acting *ultra vires*. In any case it would be embarking on an adventure which surely could not contribute to peace or to the happiness and welfare of the thirty million people of Manchoukuo, and it might prove to be an obstacle to the good understanding and friendly relations between nations, upon which peace depends.

VIII. As a whole, the Draft Report encourages the Chinese to reject overtures for peace and to evade a settlement. This is unfortunate. The consequences may be fraught with danger to the welfare of the peoples of the Far East. The adoption of the Report will, it is feared, bring about a result contrary to what the League is seeking to accomplish. It will tend to intensify the situation, jeopardise it, and possibly produce consequences of a serious character.

IX. Japan is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. No other nation or group of nations would assume that responsibility. Japan intends to encourage and assist Manchoukuo in healthy and steady development. At the same time she intends to deal with China with the utmost good will and forbearance. Her object is lasting peace with the great neighbour beside whom she must continue indefinitely to live.

Japan is ready to cooperate with any friendly power or group of powers who understand her real intentions and are willing to go hand in hand with her in the great task of re-establishing peace and order in the region of Eastern Asia, now facing an unprecedented and an appalling situation.

X. In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation want to call the serious attention of the Members of the League to the gravity of the action that they propose to take. It is stated at the outset of the Report that "the issues involved in this conflict are not simple", that

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"they are exceedingly complicated", and that "only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them." The Japanese Delegation fully agree with this statement. They would ask the representatives of the Powers in the Assembly if they are sure that they have an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as the historical background, qualifying them conscientiously to vote upon this Report.

The Draft Report is based substantially on the Lytton Report. But it should be remembered that the Lytton Commission spent but six weeks in Manchuria and fifteen in China, the greater part of which was passed in Peiping. In these circumstances, we feel entitled to say that, while crediting the Lytton Report with many admirable qualities, it is not a document one can possibly look upon as containing all the facts of the case or upon which alone final judgment should be based.

The Japanese Delegation appeal to the Assembly to think twice before making their decision.

IV

ADDRESS DELIVERED BY YOSUKE MATSUOKA, CHIEF JAPANESE DELEGATE, AT THE SEVEN- TEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

February 24, 1933

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—I do not feel called upon to reply to the discourse of my distinguished Chinese Colleague, for most of the points brought up by him were made very clear in the Observations of my Government and subsequent speeches of mine; some of them you will find replied to as I proceed with my speech.

The Japanese Delegation have notified the Assembly that they disagree with the Draft Report prepared by the Committee of Nineteen and cannot accept it. It is hardly necessary for me to say that the Japanese Government have given careful and serious consideration to this document and that it is with sad disappointment that they have come to this conclusion.

One outstanding feature that is noticeable throughout the Draft Report is the failure on the part of the Committee of Nineteen to realise the actual situation in the Far East, the difficulties of Japan's position in the midst of unparalleled and appalling circumstances, and the ultimate aim that is impelling Japan in her action.

For over twenty years China has been going through a revolution which has brought disaster to her people. Tens of millions of people have lost their lives as a result of internecine warfare, tyranny, banditry, famine and flood; hundreds of millions of them have been plunged into misery and despair. With armies

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of communists ranging over a wider territory than the Nanking Government controls, a condition of chaos reigns throughout the country. Such distress and misery as exist among the Chinese people are beyond the imagination of the average man or woman living in Western countries. And the end of this catastrophe is not in sight. No one can foresee how long it will continue.

The fundamental cause of the trouble in the Far East is the lawless condition in China, the impossible reign of self-will in that country, without recognition on her part of her obligations to her neighbours. China has long been derelict in her international duties as a sovereign State and Japan as her nearest neighbour has been the greatest sufferer on that score.

Since the beginning of the revolution, which has shattered China into parts, all of what were called under the Manchu Dynasty the dependencies of the Empire have been lost to the Republic. Over none of these former dependencies has China any longer any control. Tibet is independent; Chinese Turkestan is completely cut off from contact with China Proper; Outer Mongolia became many years ago a part of the Soviet Union. Only Manchuria has remained, down to last year, a part of China—a part by a measure of contact and association, under the nominal sovereignty of that country. To say that Manchuria was under full sovereignty of China would be a distortion of the actual and historic facts. Now this territory has gone, it has become an independent State.

China is a vast country; but it is not a nation or country in the sense that Western peoples use the term. It is a country, larger than Europe, a region with as many governments in it as there are governments in Europe, a region with almost as many different groups of people, speaking almost as many mutually unintelligible dialects. That is one reason why China, in spite of her size, in spite of the enormous number of men in the various armies of the many dictators, is unable to defend itself to-day, unable to rid itself, as it desires, of the foreign military forces

stationed in and about its Treaty Ports, and the foreign naval vessels that ply the Yangtze River. These forces as I have said before, are not only Japanese. They are British, American, French, Italian and others. They guard the lives of the diplomats accredited to the Central Government, the so-called Central Government. Less than five years ago a portion of these forces, British and American, had to go into action at Nanking, the capital of the country, to save the lives of their official representatives assaulted by Government troops. For the moment, however,—this present moment—the hostility to other foreigners is abated, as you all must have noticed. It is being officially restrained with a definite object in view. We are not now hearing of China's determination to undo the "unequal treaties". Why not? Why has this agitation, vigorously and officially conducted prior to September, 1931, come abruptly to an end? Have you thought about that point? The answer is obvious. I need not make it.

China is a backward country, a country in an appalling condition of disintegration and distress. China is a problem, as the Lytton Commission has reported, to the peace of the world.

Beside China and beside another vast country,—I speak of Soviet Russia,—is Japan, a comparatively small country, very different from either of its colossal neighbours. The conditions of these neighbours in the past twenty years have given us Japanese deep and anxious concern. Our anxiety is not ended. We look into the gloom of the future and can see no certain gleam of light before us.

Inexorably situated beside China in chaos, Japan has had to bear and forbear, and for many years tried patiently to have her many grievances with the Chinese settled in an amicable manner. She followed that policy of conciliation even in the face of violent criticism from a portion of her own people. It has been Japan's hope and determination that Manchuria should become a land of law and order, of peace and abundance, a land that would be of benefit not only to Eastern Asia but to the world

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at large. To achieve that end Japan was long prepared to cooperate with China, and she sought this cooperation, sought it for years. The Chinese, however, would not accept our proffered friendship and assistance. Instead, they offered constant obstructions and created continuous difficulties. In recent years—and especially since the deliberate development of anti-foreign sentiment by the Kuomintang and by the Nationalist Government—this opposition was intensified. The more we displayed patience, the more intense became the opposition until at last it reached a point that was intolerable. Instead of meeting us halfway, China took this attitude of ours as a sign of weakness. The Chinese began to claim that the Japanese should be driven out of Manchuria, that Japan should no longer share in the development of that land, condemning Japan as an aggressor pure and simple, as though there was no reason whatever for her to be in Manchuria, ignoring the whole historical background. This is not the first time that China has accused us of aggression. The impossible attitude and the violent movement based on such psychology on the part of the Chinese lay really at the bottom of the trouble, that finally resulted in what happened. Japan's policy of patience and conciliation failed. It failed because of China's, or rather Chang Hsueh-liang's, inability to appreciate Japan's intentions and friendliness.

It should not be necessary for me to dwell upon the importance that Japan attaches to Manchuria. The Assembly of the League should know by this time the economic and political necessities of Japan in that territory. But at this critical moment I want to remind you again that Japan fought two wars in Manchuria, in one of which she staked her existence as a nation on the outcome. She wants to fight no other.

It is true that international peace can be secured only upon the basis of mutual concessions. There are, however, with every nation, certain questions so vital to its existence that no concession or compromise is possible. The Manchurian problem is one

of them. It constitutes such a problem to the nation of Japan. It is regarded by our people as a question of life and death.

The Powers of the world have long been dealing in fictions regarding China. Long ago we should have noticed that the first Article of the Covenant requires that a State, Dominion or Colony, to be a member of the League shall be "fully self-governing". China is no such state. Beyond China Proper the sovereignty of China has long been gone, while within China Proper there has been no constituted government supreme and able to govern. The Nanking Government administers to-day the affairs of less than four out of the Eighteen Provinces.

The world cannot deal in such fictions as these and call upon the League to uphold the letter of treaties.

It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that Japan has been and will always be the mainstay of peace, order and progress in the Far East. If she has taken a definite stand regarding Manchuria in recent months, it is because she has been actuated by the implicit faith that that was the only course left to her after years of unrewarded forbearance and waiting. If she insists upon the maintenance of the independence of Manchoukuo, she is guided by the confident belief that in the present circumstances that independence offers the only guarantee of peace and order in the Far East.

Even after the present Sino-Japanese dispute began, Japan continued in her policy of conciliation. If China had been capable in those days of realising the actualities of the situation and had agreed to negotiations with Japan in a sincere desire to arrive at an agreement, one could have been accomplished without great difficulty. But China did not take that course. And what did she do? Instead, she appealed to the League of Nations. She sought to bind Japan's hands through the intervention of the Powers composing the League. And the League, not fully understanding the real issues involved or the actual conditions existing in the Far East, and perhaps not suspecting the real

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motive for the Chinese move, gave her encouragement. Here lies the trouble.

It cannot be doubted that the League of Nations, in dealing with the Sino-Japanese dispute, endeavoured sincerely and conscientiously to bring about a satisfactory settlement at an early date. But, in point of fact, its actions have continually resulted in giving China a false hope and in encouraging her to take an attitude of defiance against Japan. In making her appeal to the League China was not, as you have been told, acting from love of peace and loyalty to principles. A country with more armed men than any other is not a nation of pacifists. A country which has habitually broken international pledges is not a nation that respects principles.

In proposing to the League to send a Commission of Enquiry to China, Japan was actuated by the belief that it was urgent and essential that the League should fully understand the realities of conditions existing there. But the result was disappointing to Japan. The Report of the Commission proved to be, in some respects, superficial in character. It displayed, in parts, a lack of penetration. It often failed to probe the problem to its depths. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly the brief time in which the Commission had to make its investigations.

In this connection let me say a word regarding the population of Manchoukuo. A false impression has been given to the world by the Lytton Report on this subject. There were no authentic statistics upon which the Commission could base its view. No reliable Chinese census has ever been taken, even in China Proper, and any figures placed before the Commission by Chinese authorities could not be regarded as dependable. For many years the racial term "Chinese" has been applied, particularly by foreigners, including Japanese, to most of the people of the Chinese Empire. But this laxity in expression should not be taken to mean that Manchus and Mongols, or even the people of China Proper, are all of a single racial stock. The majority of the

people of Manchoukuo are distinctly different from those of China. Even the people of North China, from the Provinces of Shantung and Hopei, who have migrated to Manchuria to the extent of several millions in recent years, are strikingly different from those of other Chinese Provinces, different from those of the Yangtze Valley, more different from those of South China, radically different from those of Western China—different in physical appearance, different in many of their customs and in some cases even in their language. But even these immigrants who have gone from China to Manchuria in recent years do not form the bulk of the population. They form probably but a tenth, or at most but a fifth, of it. The great body of the population can properly be described as Manchurian. It is formed by the descendants of the old Manchu stock, by old Chinese stock which affiliated itself with the Manchus in former years, and by Mongols. The great majority of these people have never lived in China and have no such attachment to that country as the Lytton Report describes. Here the Report was clearly in error.

Regarding the Report of the Committee of Nineteen, I am constrained to make a critical remark. I do not want to accuse that Committee of prejudice, but I cannot refrain from making the observation that, while China is exonerated, nothing whatever is said of the work of my country and people in their long and difficult efforts to preserve peace, to promote law and order, to benefit the people of Manchuria.

The good work of my country in Manchuria is on record. It is not on record, however, in the Draft Report, but you can see it in Manchuria. The physical developments that we have made there are visible monuments of our efforts and our ability. The well-ordered cities of the Leased Territory, the thriving condition of the Railway Zone, the improvement of Chinese cities influenced by our initiative, the vast mining and industrial enterprises, the schools, the hospitals, the technical bureaus,—these things, the like of which exists nowhere under Chinese adminis-

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tration, are testimony to our service to the people of the land. In short, we have been and are a great civilizing and stabilizing force in that wild country. If the Committee of Nineteen knew and understood what we have done to benefit the people of Manchuria they might have gone out of their way to say just a word in favour of this great work of ours. If they did not know and understand why the people of China Proper migrate to Manchuria, it might have been well for them to enquire. Yet they have felt that their knowledge was sufficient to qualify them in proposing to the Assembly that it adopt the momentous proposal contained in this Draft Report. Do you really think it is right? Do you think it is common-sense?

On the first page of the Report are these lines. I quote them:

"The issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated. And *only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background*, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them."

This passage was, as you know, taken from the Lytton Report, and the Commission was right in having this passage in its Report. Beginning with this statement, the Committee of Nineteen proceeded to pass judgment in this dispute, judgment against a nation which is the bulwark of whatever law, order, and peace there exist in the Far East, and in favour of one whose backward condition has been the cause of wars in the Far East for nearly a century. I suppose I may take it that the members of this Assembly who are now about to vote on the Draft Report have all read histories of China written by impartial authors. But I am not too sure of that, for there seems to have been a lack of careful reading even of the Lytton Report.

Let us now turn to the recommendations made by the Commission of Enquiry. Their full significance seems to have been overlooked in the Draft Report before us. I refer in particular

to the tenth and final Principle contained in Chapter IX. That Principle reads as follows:

"Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

I would ask the League to consider carefully this definite warning. I would ask that it be not misled by the thought or the hope that China can be changed by the mere sending of technical commissions to aid the harrassed government with advice regarding sanitation, education, railway, financial and other administration. More than that is needed, much more—so much that no great Power or group of them would be willing to undertake the task. Some form of international control may be helpful, but who is going to undertake it? Of this I am speaking earnestly, and I am speaking with knowledge of China—the real China, the China that exists in fact and not in theory or imagination, the China that has made many wars already, and now seeks to make another, the China that does not fight her own battles, but calls on distant friends to fight her nearby neighbour.

In the above connection, permit me to put one categorical question to my Chinese Colleagues. Although my Colleague Dr. Yen expressed—on behalf of the Government that exists at Nanking, but which does not rule the whole of China—his willingness to accept the recommendations without any reservation, I would put this categorical question to him and his Colleagues to answer: Are the Chinese Government really prepared to accept these recommendations which envisage in the final analysis the imposi-

071

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tion on China of an international control in one form or another? You cannot get away from that, however, you may try to cover it up with words. Will you make the position of your Government clear on this point before the Assembly votes on this Draft Report?

I have no doubt that the attitude of the League in the present dispute has always been conceived with a genuine desire to uphold the sanctity of treaties and the principles of peace and serve the cause of peace, but its efforts have had the result of adding confusion to the situation. The Jehol affair, which is giving all of us concern at this moment, is a case in point. It is a demonstration on China's part, made for the purpose of affecting the League's decisions. There would have been no onrush of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops beyond the Great Wall except for instigation from the Nanking Government which, in turn, has been encouraged by the attitude the League of Nations has been taking vis-à-vis Japan. The Japanese Government are not in the least anxious about the outcome of a conflict with these Chinese contingents. They are not the troops of a modern army, well trained, well disciplined, well organized, well officered. They are not troops inspired with zeal for a cause or love of country. They are mercenary troops, with loyalty only to their military chief, and, like other Chinese armies, loyal because their chief provides for them the means of living. The moment some other chief tempts these soldiers with money or means of living they will desert their present chief. But Japan is loath to see further unnecessary bloodshed, and, for that reason, has been and is endeavouring to persuade Marshal Chang to withdraw his forces. The prospects, however, do not seem at this moment very encouraging.

I refer to the situation in Jehol to bring home to you the possible effect the adoption of the Report now before us may have upon the situation in the Far East. Please think seriously on this point. The adoption of this Report would give the im-

pression to the Chinese that they had been exonerated from all responsibility, that they could continue to defy Japan with impunity. It would serve further to embitter the feelings of the Japanese and Chinese peoples, whose interests are closely interwoven. The two peoples ought to be friends and should co-operate with each other for their common welfare.

By the adoption of the Report before you, however, the Assembly would not be helping us, either Japanese or Chinese, along the road to that goal, nor would it serve the cause of peace or the interests of the suffering masses in China. There are two Chinas: the China of war lords, politicians, and of those gentlemen who have been educated abroad and represent an imaginary China at an Assembly like this, and the China of four hundred fifty million souls suffering under the yoke of these war lords and politicians, who care nothing about their welfare. By the adoption of this Report, would you be serving the cause of these suffering masses in China?

The Report of the Committee of Nineteen not only accepts the Report of the Commission of Enquiry but goes even further: it passes judgment on the basis of premises which are incongruous and far removed from actualities.

Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was only nominal at most, but the Draft Report before us would undertake to establish Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria in a more or less effective manner; that is to say, it undertakes to introduce into Manchuria the power and influence that China has never had before. Let us pause and think; does it stand to reason? It would, moreover, open the way for Chinese agitators and give rise to more complications only to end, I am afraid, in another and possibly worse catastrophe.

Again, the Draft Report makes an attempt to establish a measure of international control over Manchuria, where there has been and is no such control. A moment ago I was referring to the international control of China, but now I am referring to

the setting up of international control of Manchuria. What justification is there for such an attempt on the part of the League of Nations? I cannot see. Would the American people agree to such control over the Panama Canal Zone? Would the British people permit it over Egypt? In any case, how would you do it? Which of your Governments would undertake it, assuming a grave and heavy responsibility certain to entail sacrifices—sacrifices, I am sure, of great magnitude?

In this connection, let me state clearly once and for all that the Japanese people will, for reasons too patent for me to feel it necessary to explain, oppose any such attempt in Manchuria. You can be sure of that. We do not mean to defy the world at all; it is only our right. This must be plain to anyone who would take pains to read the history of the Far East.

A verdict is given in the Draft Report that the Chinese boycott against Japanese goods imposed after the outbreak of the present dispute falls within the purview of retaliatory measures. My distinguished Chinese Colleague referred in particular to this, and you, Gentlemen, will in time know what is meant. If the adoption by the Powers of any forcible measures, made necessary by the exigencies of the situation, for the protection of their rights and interests and for the protection of the rights and property of their nationals in China, is on each occasion to be met lawfully by a retaliatory boycott, a very dangerous principle will have been established, and established by the League of Nations. The seeds of incalculable future trouble for each and every Power interested in China will have been sown.

You should think twice before you adopt a report which includes such a principle as this.

If you are interested in the problem of peace in the Far East, and I believe you are, you will find, as I had occasion to point out previously, that the real question, the greatest question before us to-day is the anarchy in China. But you have not proposed to do anything in that connection. The Manchurian question is

only one phase or rather one result of it. In the eagerness to deal with the Manchurian question, you are forgetting the big question that lies at the root of all the troubles in the Far East—the anarchy in China. What are you going to do about it?

In the actual circumstances in which Japan finds herself as above described, and for the reasons above stated at some length, there is no alternative for her to take in regard to the Draft Report before us. The Committee of Nineteen has left her none. She had promptly and unequivocally to answer "No".

Our desire is to help China as far as lies within our power. We are sincere. This is a duty that we must assume whether we like it or not. Paradoxical as this statement may sound to you at this moment, it is true; and our present effort to assist Manchoukuo to her feet, over which we are unfortunately having differences, will lead some day, I am confident, to the realisation of Japan's desire and duty to help China and thereby at last to succeed in firmly establishing peace throughout the region of Eastern Asia.

Gentlemen, will you give Japan a chance to realise this aim or will you not?

I beg this body to realise the facts and see a vision of the future. I earnestly beg you to deal with us on our terms and give us your confidence. Our history during the past sixty years is, I think, a guarantee of our good faith; is that history of no worth beside China's history, the history of creating disturbances and bringing about catastrophies in the Far East? To deny us this appeal will be a mistake. I ask you not to adopt this Report,—for the sake of peace in the Far East and for the sake of peace throughout the world.

V

**DECLARATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
FOLLOWING THE VOTE OF THE ASSEMBLY ON
THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE
OF NINETEEN**

February 24, 1933

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—On behalf of my Government I wish to make a declaration.

It is a source of profound regret and disappointment to the Japanese Delegation and to the Japanese Government that the Draft Report has now been adopted by this Assembly.

Japan has been a member of the League of Nations since its inception. Our delegates to the Versailles Conference of 1919 took part in the drafting of the Covenant. We have been proud to be a Member, associated with the leading nations of the world, in one of the grandest purposes in which humanity could unite. It has always been our sincere wish and pleasure to co-operate with the fellow-members of the League in attaining the great aim held in common and long cherished by humanity. I deeply deplore the situation we are now confronting, for I do not doubt that the same aim, the desire to see a lasting peace established, is animating all of us in our deliberations and our actions.

It is a matter of common knowledge that Japan's policy is fundamentally inspired by a genuine desire to guarantee peace in the Far East and to contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Japan, however, finds it impossible to accept the Report adopted by the Assembly, and in particular, she has taken pains to point out that the Recommendations contained therein could not be considered such as would secure peace in that part of the world.

The Japanese Government now finds themselves compelled to conclude that Japan and the other Members of the League entertain different views on the manner to achieve peace in the Far East and the Japanese Government are obliged to feel that they

have now reached the limit of their endeavours to co-operate with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences.

The Japanese Government will, however, make their utmost efforts for the establishment of peace in the Far East and for the maintenance and strengthening of good and cordial relations with other Powers. I need hardly add that the Japanese Government persist in their desire to contribute to human welfare and will continue their policy of co-operating in all sincerity in the work dedicated to world peace, in so far as such co-operation is possible in the circumstances created by the unfortunate adoption of the Report.

On behalf of the Japanese delegation, before leaving the room, let me tender their sincerest appreciation of the labours ungrudgingly given to find a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute, before you for the past seventeen months, by the President and Members of the Council, as well as by the President and Members of the General Assembly.

(Following this address the Japanese Delegation withdrew)

VI

**FAREWELL MESSAGE GIVEN OUT BY YOSUKE
MATSUOKA ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE
FROM GENEVA**

February 25, 1933

About to leave Geneva I cannot repress my deep emotion; I can hardly find words to express my thoughts. I left Tokyo with the determination to take any amount of pains to explain Japan's case and enable the people of Europe to understand our difficulties and our position. I was determined to prevent a clash between the League and Japan, to make it possible for Japan to stay in the League and to continue her cooperation in the interest of world peace. When I arrived in Geneva I dared permit myself to entertain some hope.

Three months afterwards, I am leaving Geneva with that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

hope shattered, with mixed feelings of sadness and resignation. I am sad not for Japan but for the League for taking such precipitate action. Time will show that it hurts the League more than Japan. I am sad most for China, for such action by the League not only will not solve anything but will add another element of confusion in the conditions of China, already bad enough as they are. It will only lay one more obstacle in the way of Japan's arduous fight against chaos.

The only good I can think can come out of all this will be incidentally to help further to unite the Japanese people, making them better realise the magnitude and the difficulties of Japan's task, and increase their determination to risk all to achieve their end—that is to recover and maintain peace and order throughout the region of Eastern Asia. If the League's action were only to produce that effect, Japan may even find cause, after all, to thank the League. In any case let us hope this action of the League will not widen the gap that separates East from West; however, none but God knows what the future holds in store for us all.

I hardly need to say there is no place in my soul for resentment or misgiving. I am sad it is true, but not disappointed; I am still hoping that some day Japan will be understood. I am leaving Geneva with the prayer that the Members of the League may be enabled to see the light and with ardent wishes for the success of the League. One consolation I have was the abstention of the Siamese Representative from voting yesterday. He represents the only Asiatic nation, besides Japan and Manchoukuo, which has a real national integrity and responsibility, with the will and ability to govern.

On leaving Geneva I wish again heartily to thank the Members of the League for the labour so ungrudgingly given for the past seventeen months in their earnest attempt to find a solution for the most complicated problem that the League has faced in the thirteen years of its existence. I wish also to express my thanks for the many courtesies shown me and the Japanese Delegation by the city of Geneva and the Genevese.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY
FROM
Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 6, 1933

Rec'd 4:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

May 6, 1 p. m.

It is reported, but not confirmed, that Japanese Military authorities, incident to the reoccupation by the Chinese troops of the army of the area east of Lwanchow following recent withdrawal of Manchukuo forces from that sector, are preparing to again drive the Chinese forces to west bank of Lwan River. Japanese airplanes are reported to have dropped bombs on Lulung yesterday and at Yucha seven miles to the northward.

Chinese are attributing recent attempt to assassinate General Yu Hsueh Chung, reported in my May 4, 4 p. m. to machinations of Manchukuo secret agents in Tientsin.

LOCKHART

KLP

HPD

F/H/S

793.94/6252

MAY 9 - 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

FROM Dated May 6, 1933

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

409, May 6, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY.

Following message has been received from Felber
commanding army detachment Chinwangtao:

"I have heard it rumored that the troops of Wan Fu
Lin are gradually taking Luanhsin area. Third cavalry
division Peitaiho definitely established. Units 19th
route army at Funing in ragged condition. Fifth armies
front ~~Han(?)~~ ^{NANTASSU} to Shenho. Japanese trucks running day
and night hauling supplies from Shanhaikwan to Haiyang.
150 trucks loaded at Shanhaikwan ready to move on minute's
notice to Haiyang. Japanese sailors landed daily at
Shanhaikwan taken on tour this area including Haiyang.
Major Ochiai helping Japanese Colonel at Haiyang get
acquainted with terrain of this area. Unable find out
number of Japanese force at Haiyang. Know regimental
headquarters there; strongly believe Japanese intend make
drive through here due to fact that Haiyang loaded with
supplies and will become basis for operations. Rumored
three

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MAY 9 - 1933

0718

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#409, from Peiping, May 6, 1 p.m.

three attacks to be made soon, one on right flank through to Peiping, one through center near Yiyuankuo; other from left flank through Haiyang toward Lwan River. Believe battlefield Japanese outside Shanhaiwan. Railroad south Peitailing repaired. Chinese officer in Peitaiho to arrange for conference with Japanese reference situation this area."

Neither Military Attache nor I know how much weight to give these reports but we believe them to be within the realm of the possible. Chinese activities here indicate belief that Japanese intend to make drive on Peiping and Tientsin area.

893.00 There are reports current that purpose of drive is to break power of Chiang Kai Shek in this area. Japanese entertain the hope that with elimination of Chiang forces hostile to him in North China will combine for the purpose of establishing independent regime in North China. Repeated to Tokyo, by mail to Nanking.

JOHNSON

CSB
KLP

0719

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram dated May 6, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The Minister has received a message from the commander of the United States Army detachment at Chinwangtao in which the commander states that he has heard a rumor that the Luanhsin area is being gradually taken by Wan Fu Lin's troops; that the third cavalry division has been definitely established at Peitaiho; that the units of the 19th route army are in ragged condition at Funing; that the front of the Fifth Army now extends to Shenho; and that supplies are being hauled to Haiyang from Shanhaikwan by Japanese trucks which are running night and day. The commander also states that one hundred fifty trucks were loaded at Shanhaikwan ready to move to Haiyang on a moment's notice; that Japanese sailors who were daily landed at Shanhaikwan were taken on a tour of this area in which Haiyang was included; and that the Japanese Colonel at Haiyang was being helped by Major Ochiai to get acquainted with the terrain of this region. The commander states that he is unable to learn the strength of the Japanese force which is at Haiyang and adds that he knows the regimental headquarters are there and firmly believes that, due to the fact that Haiyang is loaded with supplies, the Japanese intend to make a drive through Chinwangtao, operations will be based on Haiyang. The commander adds that it is rumored that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that there will soon be made three attacks, one from the left flank toward the Lwan River through Haiyang, one through to Peiping on the right flank and the third near Yiyuankuo through the center, and the commander believes the Japanese battlefield is outside Shanhaikwan, and states that repairs have been made on the railroad south of Peitailing and that a Chinese officer is in Peitaiho to arrange for a conference with the Japanese in regard to the situation in this region.

The American Minister states that neither he nor the American Military Attaché knows how much value these reports have but that they believe them to be a possibility. The Minister reports that activities of the Chinese at Peiping indicate their belief that the Japanese intend to make a drive on the Tientsin and Peiping region.

The Minister adds that there are reports that the reason for the drive is to break Chiang Kai-shek's power, that the Japanese hope that with the removal of Chiang, forces hostile to him in North China will merge for the purpose of setting up in North China an independent regime.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 13, 1933.

~~JEV~~ *2 copies - initial - Minister's memo. JF*
~~MMH~~

Peipings despatch dated March 31, 1933, encloses a memorandum of conversations had by Mr. Spiker with Sir Miles Lampson and the Assistant Chinese Secretary of the British Legation concerning the movement of Chinese troops through the Markam Road Junction Railway area.

It appears that early in February, 1933, a body of Chinese troops passed through this area without previous notification being given to the Japanese authorities as provided for in a Sino-Japanese agreement. The Japanese Consul General informed the Secretary of the Joint Commission created by the Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement of May 5, 1932, that if negotiations then proceeding with the Chinese concerning the above mentioned passage of troops were unsuccessful, it might be necessary to refer the question to the Joint Commission.

Since reference to the Commission of this matter would call for a definite decision against one of the parties to the Armistice Agreement in respect of a matter but remotely connected with the 1932 Sino-Japanese "war" at Shanghai, several members of the Commission felt that it would be better to dissolve the Commission than to be forced to take sides in the dispute.

The British Minister through his Consul General at Shanghai informed the Japanese of the situation and the Japanese Minister replied that he hoped the matter might be settled without formal reference to the Commission.

EX-100

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FE

No. 2033

Peiping, March 31, 1933.

Subject: Question of possible dissolution of
the Joint Commission created by the
Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement of
May 5, 1932.



F/HS

793.94/6254

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In reference to my telegram No. 277 of March
25, 3 p.m., concerning the above subject, I have
the honor to enclose for the Department's informa-
tion a copy of a memorandum of conversations had
by Mr. Spiker, First Secretary of this Legation,
with Sir Miles Lampson and with Mr. L. H. Lamb,
Assistant Chinese Secretary of the British Lega-
tion, on March 17th and March 18th respectively,
in respect of certain personal representations
made by Sir Miles Lampson to the Japanese Consul
General at Shanghai with a view to dissuading the

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Japanese

MAY 22 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japanese from formally requesting a ruling from the Joint Committee in reference to the passage of Chinese troops through Markham Road Junction at Shanghai while en route between points on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway. Sir Miles pointed out that such request for a formal ruling might well cause the dissolution of the Commission, which does not care to take sides in a Sino-Japanese dispute which does not appear directly concerned with the preservation of the military status quo at Shanghai.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversations, dated March 18, 1933, as stated.

Copy to American Consulate General, Shanghai.

800.

CJS-SC

2 *Encl. 2*
 FR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
 2033

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION,

March 18, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. C. J. Spiker,
 First Secretary, American Legation.

Sir Miles Lampson,
 British Minister.

Mr. L. H. Lamb,
 Assistant Chinese Secretary, British Legation.

Subject: Question of possible dissolution of the
 Joint Commission created by the Sino-
 Japanese Armistice Agreement of May 5,
 1932.

Yesterday at the tea dance at the German Legation, Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, approached me and very briefly outlined the action which he had taken in respect of a recent Japanese complaint at Shanghai against previously unnotified movements of Chinese troops by rail through the Hankow Road Junction on the Shanghai-Banking Railway. He stated that the Chinese, in response to such complaint, had given assurances to the Japanese that oral notice of such troop movements would be given but that the Chinese declined to give such undertaking in writing with the result that the Japanese had threatened to make an issue of the matter by referring it formally to the Joint Commission created by the Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement of May 5, 1932. Certain members of the Commission believed that in such event, it would be better that the Commission should be dissolved rather than permit itself thus to become involved in this recent Sino-Japanese dispute. Sir Miles stated that he desired that the American

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American Legation should know of his personal representations in respect of this matter and that Mr. Lamb, Assistant Chinese Secretary of the British Legation, would call on me today to give fuller details.

In accordance with this arrangement Mr. Lamb called and briefly outlined the case as follows: - In June, 1938, the Japanese, on the basis of the Sino-Japanese armistice agreement of May 5, 1938, protested to the Joint Commission against the previously unnotified movement by rail of Chinese troops through Markham Road Junction. The Commission supported the Japanese contention, with the result that the Chinese agreed thereafter to give advance oral notice to the Japanese authorities whenever Chinese troops should desire to pass by rail through the junction named.

In early February of this year, the Japanese Consul General informed the Secretary of the Joint Commission that the question of the passage, without previous notification to the Japanese authorities, of 6,000 Chinese troops of the 4th Division of the 17th Army through the Markham Road Junction might have to be referred to the Commission, if negotiations then proceeding between Mr. Yui and the Japanese Consul, Mr. Ishii, should not prove successful.

Since reference of this matter to the Joint Commission would call for/definite decision against one or the other of the parties to the Armistice Agreement in respect of a matter which was but remotely connected with the 1938 Sino-Japanese "war" at Shanghai, and was possibly more directly connected with the present conflict between the two countries named, it was considered by certain members of the Joint Commission that it would be better to dissolve the Commission than to have it forced into the position

or

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of taking sides in the dispute. The British Minister accordingly instructed the British Consul General at Shanghai to inform the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai that if the Japanese forced this issue it might well result in the breaking up of the Joint Commission and that in his (the British Minister's) opinion the Japanese were very ill-advised in thus forcing this minor issue. This personal expression of opinion of the British Minister was transmitted early in March by the British Consul General at Shanghai directly to the Japanese Minister and the latter replied that he hoped the matter might be settled without formal reference of the question to the Joint Commission.

CJS/k

A true copy of
the signed original
na *K*

3727

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

GRAY

FROM Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 8, 1933.

Rec'd. 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

May 8, 4 p.m.

Chinese forces have retreated to Changli and Japanese-Manchukuo forces have advanced to Peitaiho. There is every probability that Chinese will again be compelled to withdraw to west side of Lwan River.

From a reliable source I learn that through intervention of third party General Ho Chuo had consented to meet with Japanese on Sunday to discuss ways and means of ending (?) trouble in area east of Lwanchow but Japanese refused to confer. It is difficult to predict the objective of the new operations but it would not be surprising if territory up to the Lwan River is added to that already under control of Manchukuo.

WSB*HPD

LOCKHART

F/HS

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note
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Manchuria

0728

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Tokyo

Dated May 9, 1933

Rec'd 11:00 p. m. 8th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

95, May 9, 9 a. m.

American Consul General at Seoul reports small
detachments of troops are and have recently been moving
through Seoul for Manchuria.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

JS

*Paraphrase to M.I.D.
C. N. Land*

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 9 - 1933

Department of State

*File
gm<*

F/HS

793.94/6256

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FILED
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0729

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram dated May 9, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

Small detachments of troops are and have recently been moving for Manchuria through Seoul, according to a report received from the American Consul General at Seoul.

0731

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAY 2 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze,
 Chinese Minister.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Manchuria Situation:
The Peiping-Tientsin Situation.

RECEIVED
 MAY 3 1933
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

F/HS

The Chinese Minister, after disposal of other matters, said that he had received from his Government information that suggestions were being made at Peiping for some sort of action on the part of the foreign powers toward bringing about a cessation of hostilities in the area north of Tientsin and Peiping. He wondered whether we had been informed of this and whether there was anything that the powers could and would be inclined to do.

I said that during several days past we had been receiving telegrams which indicated that both from Japanese and from Chinese sources efforts were being made to draw the representatives at Peiping into some sort of action in the capacity of potential mediators. I said that in connection with this information we had reports on the situation which, without definitely so stating, made it evident that any move toward an

offer

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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offer or an effort on the part of the powers to go into action in a "go-between" capacity would be a delicate and difficult undertaking -- for the reason most of all that China's leaders, both political and military, have not yet given evidence of having arrived at any position of unity or solidarity among themselves. I said that, in making that statement, I did not wish to imply or impute blame; that everybody who intelligently observes and studies Far Eastern affairs must realize that China is passing through a period of internal upheaval in the nature of what is ^{frequently} ~~usually~~ referred to as a "five-fold" revolution and that it stands to reason that there must be differences of opinion among her leaders and people and there must be internal political contests over a considerable period of time. These are simple facts which they as well as the rest of the world must take cognizance of and face. Nevertheless, it is particularly unfortunate, in view of China's problems in the field of foreign relations, that such are the facts in her internal situation. It is highly desirable, toward the strengthening of China's position in international relations, that China's leaders "get together" and develop some way of expressing themselves unitedly on questions of
foreign

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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foreign relations. It is exceedingly difficult for other countries to assist a nation which talks, in its foreign relations, through a multiplicity of mouths; and still more difficult to exert effective influence in connection with a controversy between that nation and some other country. I said that I believed that the Minister well realized that the world was viewing with regret and abhorrence the military activities which are going on in North China but that, under existing circumstances, the world can hardly be expected to take a firm stand with regard to the problem presented while the Chinese leaders and people show no sign of firmness in terms of singleness of purpose and centralization of authority and responsibility on their own part. The Minister indicated that he concurred in this sizing up of the situation.

The Minister then remarked that he was exceedingly glad that Minister T. V. Soong is coming away from China and coming to Washington, for the reason, especially, that this will make it possible for Soong to see China in a new perspective and to gain an understanding of the point of view from which the American Government and people observe the Far Eastern situation.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Minister then went on to say that it was his estimate that the Japanese have a definite desire to push forward vigorously in the Tientsin-Peiping area and consummate the seizure of Tientsin and Peiping before the convening of the Monetary and Economic Conference -- in order that their participation in the discussions at the Conference may be against the background of such a fait accompli.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

0734

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 17 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

No. 273

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the Ambassador at Tokyo a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held on April 26, 1933, between the Chinese Minister and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, in regard to the Peiping-Tientsin situation.

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated April 26,
1933.

793.94/6257



May 13, 1933
CR ✓

FE:MMH:REK
5/12/33

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793.94/6257

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 17 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

No. 1080

To the American Minister,

Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the confidential information of the Minister at Peiping a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held on April 26, 1933, between the Chinese Minister and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, in regard to the Peiping-Tientsin situation.

793.94/6257

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated April 26,
1933.

793.94/6257



SKH

mmh
FE:MMH:REK
5/12/33

FE

CR *mmh*
May 15 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Nanking/62 FOR Despatch # D- 474.

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED April 8, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1187 ***

REGARDING: Manifesto issued by the Chinese Minister
for Foreign Affairs in which he made clear
his attitude toward the Japanese withdrawal
from the League of Nations.

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793.94/6258

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

I - CHINA-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY

On March 26 the Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a manifesto in which he made clear his attitude toward the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations.

"Article I Paragraph 2 provides that any member of the League may withdraw two years after notification of its intention to do so, provided that all its international obligations under the Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal ... Japan is not entitled to withdraw unless and until it has carried out not only all the resolutions and decisions of the League in respect of the present dispute, and other obligations under the Covenant, but also all the obligations under those international agreements, provisions of which have also been proclaimed by the League as the guiding principles for the settlement of the dispute."

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 9, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

The attached confidential letter from Mr. Peck to Minister Johnson dated April 3, 1933, encloses a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Peck and the Minister of Industries, Nanking. The Minister of Industries informed Mr. Peck that it appeared that Japanese troops were getting ready to invade Chahar Province. In reply to a direct question, Mr. Peck stated that he felt there were some persons in the Chinese Government who thought that direct negotiations with Japan was the only solution to the present situation although the announced policy of the Government was to the contrary. The Minister of Industries confirmed this statement and stated that one insuperable obstacle to direct negotiations was that at the outset Japan would demand formal recognition of "Manchukuo". The Minister of Industries inquired how China could recognize "Manchukuo" when the League of Nations and, in fact, the whole world refused such recognition!

ETW/VDM


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

Extra Copies Sent To The Department Without Comment
dls 10/33



MAY - 8 33

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300K
Nanking Office
April 3, 1933

Confidential

E/H/S

Dear Mr. Minister:

On April 1, 1933, I wrote to you at some length giving the results of my investigations into the probable policy which will be followed by the National Government in the Sino-Japanese controversy. In that letter I expressed the belief that there is a decided difference of opinion between different influential leaders regarding the continuance of the "forcible resistance to Japan" policy.

On the afternoon of the day I wrote you that letter I had occasion to call upon Mr. Chen Kun-po, Minister of Industries, on a matter of business and naturally seized the opportunity to sound him out on political

793.94/6259

MAY 10 1933

FILED

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson

American Minister,

Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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political subjects. Mr. Chen is a shade less secretive in such matters than the majority of his colleagues and he made one or two interesting statements and admissions.

1/ A memorandum of conversation is enclosed herewith.

It will be observed that Mr. Chen admitted, for example, that there are persons in the National Government who think that direct negotiations with the Japanese is the only way out of the present impasse. This is important in view of the fact that the announced policy of the Government is directly contrary to this opinion. Direct negotiations are, also, violently denounced by the Chinese press in general.


It is hard to see what is going to break the present deadlock.

Yours very sincerely,

Willy R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
 Memorandum of Conversation, dated April 1, 1933.

In duplicate to the Legation
 No copy to the Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION.

April 1, 1963.

Confidential

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industries.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck asked Mr. Chen what the latest developments were in the Sino-Japanese controversy and Mr. Chen said that the Government had received information that Japanese troops were being moved about in a way which showed that the Japanese were getting ready to invade Chahar Province, and General Hwang Shao-hsiung, Minister of the Interior, who is now assisting in military matters at Peiping, had gone to Chahar to investigate Chinese defense preparations.

Mr. Chen asked Mr. Peck what he thought was going to be the outcome of the Sino-Japanese controversy. Mr. Peck admitted that this was a legitimate question for Mr. Chen to ask him, but he had found it impossible to form any opinion of what was going to happen. Mr. Peck said that he felt that there were some persons in the Government who thought that direct negotiation with the Japanese was the only way out of the situation. Mr. Chen confirmed that there were such persons. Mr. Peck said that he, himself, was at a loss to form even a

personal

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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personal opinion in regard to the course which China should pursue and he thought that the Chinese leaders were really at a loss what course to take. Mr. Chen cautiously said nothing, but nodded his head in assent.

Mr. Chen said that there was one insuperable obstacle to negotiations with the Japanese, which was that, at the very outset, Japan would demand formal recognition of Manchoukuo by the Chinese Government. Mr. Chen inquired how China could recognize Manchoukuo when the League of Nations and, in fact, the whole world had refused to recognize Manchoukuo?

MRP/ECH

1604

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 15, 1933.

~~INT~~
~~SEC~~
~~SECRET~~
 The attached letter dated April 1, 1933, to Mr. Johnson from Mr. Peck describes interviews which he has had with a Chinese newspaper man and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The newspaper man made the following interesting statements:

(1) General Chiang Kai-shek did not wish to weaken his military units by fighting the Japanese as he needed to conserve their strength for internal use.

(2) The Special National Congress of Kuomintang Representatives will be convoked on July 1, 1933, as the members of the National Government are at a complete loss how to deal with the present situation and they wish to pass off on the representatives of the people the onus of making any definite decision which might be unpopular or mortifying. The Congress would be a "cut and dried" affair with the members bribed to vote for previously formulated decisions. Another possible reason for calling the Congress was to force Canton to share in the decisions and thus prevent the question of direct negotiations with Japan being used as a pretext for secession by Canton.

(3) The National Government was unable to resist Japan by force and would soon have to enter into secret negotiations with Japan.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton L. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Peck makes the following statements regarding his conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

(1) The Minister said that the Special Congress of Kuomintang Representatives was to be held for the purpose of beginning the process of terminating the Period of Tutelage, of installing a Constitutional Government, and of relegating the Kuomintang to the position of a simple political party among other parties. He said that the process should have been begun long ago and perhaps now it was too late.

(2) The Minister said that the Japanese were spreading rumors of direct negotiations for two reasons - (a) to prove that the Chinese were beaten in fighting and willing humbly to sue for peace, and (b) to show the League and the U.S. that it was useless to stand up for the Chinese in view of point (a) above.

(3) Mr. Peck remarked that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei were reported to favor a policy of "simultaneous resistance and negotiations". Dr. Lo neither affirmed or denied the statement. Lo said that he felt that it would not be morally or legally possible to negotiate with Japan until occupied territory had been restored and troops withdrawn. Lo ~~remarked~~ remarked that the only thing the Government could do under the present circumstances was to be patient and sooner or later justice would be done to China.

(4) Dr. Lo stated that he believed that Chiang Kai-shek would go North again and that he believed Chiang and Wang Ching-wei were still friendly.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


Mr. Peck concludes his memorandum by stating that he feels that Chiang is privately convinced of the necessity of beginning negotiations with the Japanese, that Wang is becoming convinced of the soundness of such views, **BUT** that Lo Wen-kan is determined to frustrate all tendencies to direct negotiations. Dr. Lo will be assisted in his views by his Cantonese connections and by T. V. Soong.

ETW

0748

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM REEB



[Handwritten signatures and initials]
MAY 11 1933
Department of State

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THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 22 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY - 8 33

Banking Office.

April 1, 1933.

F/HS

793.94/6260

Dear Mr. Minister:

The position and intentions of most of the leaders in banking with regard to the prosecution of the "resistance policy" against Japan are extremely obscure. Several theories are current about the future course of the National Government in dealing with Japan, a subject which is obviously of the greatest interest not only to Japan, but also to the League of Nations and to the American Government, which have set the seal of moral approval on China's past resistance to Japanese military activities.

Yesterday afternoon I talked with a Chinese newspaper man whose views are based upon contact with what I may call the outer fringe of the inner circle of Chinese politics. My informant recalled that he had always expressed to me his firm conviction that the National Government would never

Wayte

The Honorable Nelson Tamm
American Minister,
Canton.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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wage against the Japanese more than face-saving hostilities; at least until the Japanese crossed the Great Wall into the Peiping-Tientsin area. He called attention to the cessation of fighting at the passes through the wall for the last few days. (At that time we had not received the teletypegram dated Tokyo, March 31, stating that a Shanghai wire message reported a severe artillery duel in progress at Chiuchow. Following the Chinese opening of a bombardment on Japanese positions at seven o'clock this morning".) My informant said he did not believe that General Chiang Kai-shek would give up in fighting the Japanese the military strength on which his power as "Commander-in-Chief" is based. My informant's views were of the pessimistic order and he reported that while Chiang publicly expounds the theory that China must nurture her strength, in order to be able to fight Japan successfully at a later date, Chiang is in reality conserving his strength for internal use.

With reference to the "Special National Congress of Kuomintang Representatives", which the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee decided, on the morning of March 30, to convene on July 1, 1938, informant said that this

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was merely a confession on the part of the individuals composing the National Government that they were at a complete loss how to deal with the situation. He said that confronted with a similar impasse in the past, the Government had always summoned a congress or a conference. The object of this device, he said, is to transfer the onus of making an unpopular, a mortifying, or a doubtful decision, from the leaders to the ostensible representatives of the public. When the delegates assemble they are bribed to keep still, or to vote in favor of the particular measure which the conveners of the conference wish to "put over". He said that he had heard minor members of the Central Executive Headquarters joking about the forthcoming congress on July 1, 1933, and saying that they would not demand more than five dollars for their votes. Informant said that another possible object in view in summoning the Congress on July 1 was to compel the Canton regime to share in whatever decisions were made, including the question of resistance to Japan, in order to prevent Canton from utilizing a possible decision to open direct negotiations with Japan, as a pretext for secession. Informant was of the opinion

that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that the National Government had made no genuine preparations to resist Japan by force, was quite unable to conduct any effective resistance, and would shortly begin secret negotiations with Japan, as a matter of sheer necessity. He said that even Tang Ching-wei had publicly advocated "simultaneous resistance and negotiation".

In reporting these observations, it is necessary for me to add that my informant has a cynical tendency to tear off the shams of official pretence. He is the counterpart of those Americans who take pleasure in exposing to foreigners what they describe as the pretended altruism of American foreign policies. Nevertheless, opinions such as are reported above are, as you will probably agree, widely held among Chinese and foreign residents alike.

Later in the afternoon, without making a preliminary appointment, I called upon Mr. Lo Jen-kan, Minister for Foreign Affairs. I had not seen Mr. Lo since March , when he dined with me. At that time his eyes (tachoma) were beginning to pain him severely and he has been confined to his house for the last four or five days.

Shen

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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When I sent my card into Mr. Lo, he was engaged with a visitor, and I was asked to wait for a few minutes and chat ed with a couple of secretaries.

Dr. Lo's visitor turned out to be the lately installed "Premier" Wang Ching-wei. He left after a quarter of an hour, and Mr. Lo asked me in.

If the conditions of Lo's eyes were to force him to leave at the present moment, even for a fortnight, the change in China's internal and external situation might conceivably be material. On this account, as well as because of my genuine friendship for Lo, I inquired anxiously whether he was not going to take expert treatment. Lo admitted that his eyes pained him extremely and that he was in danger of going blind. Nevertheless, he insisted that he could not absent himself from Peking at this time. From his later conversation I was able to divine the reason of his unwillingness to leave, even to go to a Shanghai hospital.

I inquired casually about the "Special Congress of Two Hundred Representatives" on July 1. Lo said that the idea behind this movement was to begin the process of terminating the Period of Tutelage, of installing a Constitutional Government, and of

relocating

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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relegating the Kuomintang to its rightful position, i.e., that of a simple political party among other parties. He said that these processes should have been initiated long ago and perhaps now it was "too late". He spoke sarcastically, as is his habit, of the Party theory that only zealous Party members should take positions of responsibility in the Government and he observed, with obvious reference to himself, that in spite of this theory some men who did not believe in the Party doctrines had achieved important positions.

I told Lo, quite sincerely, that I had not come to trouble him about politics, but to inquire about his health. However, I said, if he was not averse to discussing such things, I would like to ask a question or two. Lo said I was by all means to proceed.

I asked how things were going in the North. Lo said that all kinds of rumors were being spread by the Japanese that direct negotiations with Japan were imminent. He said that the Japanese had a twofold object in spreading these rumors:

(1) to prove that the Chinese, having been beaten in fighting, were now willing humbly to sue for peace, and were a "damnable people";

(2)

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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(2) to show the League of Nations and the United States that it is useless to stand up for the Chinese people, who have the characteristics aforesaid. In order to elicit further comments, I remarked that it was reported that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei favored a policy of "simultaneous resistance and negotiation". Lo said quickly, "So long as I am here, what can they do?"

Please observe that Lo neither denied nor confirmed the truth of the report I quoted. I did not wish to force Lo either into a false denial of the report, or into an admission that it was true, since the latter would be directly contrary to his past and present unceasing insistence that the policy of the Government was one of endless resistance to Japan by force. The impression I got was, of course, that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei secretly favored direct negotiations with Japan.

Lo went on to say that he could not see how it would be morally or legally possible to negotiate with Japan, unless Japan first restored all occupied territory and withdrew all her troops. He said that if China consented to negotiate with Japan before these conditions were fulfilled, China would commit a wrong against coming Chinese generations by surrendering their heritage, and would commit a

FORM

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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wrong against those friendly nations who had stood up for China and had given her moral approval, even though the assistance they had rendered had not been effective.

Lo asked bluntly what the Government could do, in the present circumstances. He answered China could only be patient. China must never yield. Sooner or later, justice would be done to China. He said he had told Suma (First Secretary of the Japanese Legation) that although the Japanese might seize province after province, sooner or later, perhaps three hundred years hence, China would "kick them out".

Lo digressed into the field of Chinese traditional culture, a personal interest of his. He said he could not understand why Japan pursued a policy of seizing territory by force, a policy of robbery with violence. What did Japan expect to gain, in exchange for losing friendship? Confucius had taught the philosophy of "ta'ung" which he translated as "Universality". Confucius taught that all peoples in the world were brethren and that wars of conquest were wicked.

Reverting

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Reverting to practical matters, I asked whether Chiang Kai-shek would go North again. Lo replied, "Oh yes, I think so."

I asked whether Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Ching-wei consulted together in friendly fashion. Lo replied that Chang Ching-wei had told him that they did. Lo said he had not seen Chiang more than once, when Chiang first returned to Hankow a few days before, owing to the fact that Lo had been confined to his house with his eye trouble.

In the evening I received the KMTN bulletin, to which reference has already been made, reporting that fighting had recommenced between Japanese and Chinese forces in the Northern area. Although this report, if true, might indicate merely personal initiative on the part of a local commander, the report somewhat initiated theories about future events, based upon an assumed mutual abandonment of hostilities along the Great Wall.

While, therefore, it is obviously premature to make any predictions, I may say in closing that my own feeling is that Chiang Kai-shek is privately convinced of the necessity for beginning negotiations with the Japanese and would be willing to begin them;

that

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that Wang Ching-wei is gradually becoming convinced of the soundness of such views; that Lo on-kan is determined to frustrate all tendencies to direct negotiations, which objective, incidentally, his Cantonese connections will enable him to accomplish rather successfully; and that H. V. Soong will assist the efforts of Lo on-kan by those measures which are open to the Minister of Finance.

Very truly yours,

Willys A. Beck,
 Counselor of Legation.

In duplicate to the American Minister.
 No copy to the Department.

100-100000-100000
 100-100000-100000
 100-100000-100000

0756

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 16, 1933.

~~TOP SECRET~~
MMH

Mr. Peck's letter dated April 1, 1933, to Mr. Johnson encloses a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Buss of the conversation which took place at a recent dinner party in Hanking.

The principal guest of the evening was a reserve member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. He expressed himself as being in favor of resisting Japan not because he felt there was any possibility of defeating the military forces of Japan, but because he felt that eventually China would emerge from the ordeal a stronger and more united nation.

An American professor who was present stated that he felt that resistance was worse than futile and that China should plan to make its economic resistance more effective and should realize that the most it can expect its army to do is to make the Japanese advance as costly as possible.


Mr. Peck remarks in his letter that the school of thought in China which seems to be the most influential at present demands continued resistance, even though temporarily futile, and looks to ultimate victory.

Chw.

0757

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

copy in FE
Apr 14/33
P.M. 3:00
The Department Without Covering



Handwritten signature

File 300

Handwritten initials

Banking Office,
April 1, 1933.

MAY - 8 33

g for Buss

793.94

F/HS

793.94/6261

Dear Mr. Highley:

1/ With the idea of giving you an impression of the attitude of Chinese leaders toward the Sino-Japanese controversy, I am enclosing herewith a memorandum of a conversation which took place at the home of Professor H. H. Bates on March 28, the persons present being Mr. and Mrs. Lo Chia-lun, President Chen, of the Peking University, et al., as listed.

Mr. Lo's views may be taken as representing the philosophical attitude of the intellectual element of the National Government. This is to be distinguished from the attitude of selfish politicians and practical minded militarists, as well as the attitude of those

WNC

Honorable Nelson Traylor Johnson,
American Minister,
Peking.

FILED
MAY 23 1933

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

who advocate an intermediate policy. You will note that Dr. Lo looks far beyond the present and immediate future and that he believes there is a strength inherent in China which will ultimately defeat the imperialism of Japan.

It may be that the intellectuals who are of this school of thought are influenced by the belief that there are new forces in the world working for international justice which will, in the long run, assure to China her rights as a nation, on the other hand, their attitude may be based upon Chinese history, which is largely a record of recurrent cycles of submission to foreign domination and of nationalism which expels such domination and restores Chinese intellectual and political independence. This philosophical view of the controversy is a mixture of defeatism, as regards the present, and optimism, as regards the future. It demands continued resistance, even though temporarily futile, and looks to ultimate victory. This seems to be the most influential school of thought in China at present.

Very truly yours,

M. D. G.

Gillys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure

1/- as stated.
 In quintuplicate.
 800
 CAB:MCL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huelsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of After Dinner Discussion.

March 28, 1938.

Dr. and Mrs. Lo Chia-lun
 President Chen Ku-wan, Peking University.
 Mr. Han Li-wu, Secretary of the Board of Trustees
 of the British Warer Indemnity.
 Mr. and Mrs. R. F. Mills.
 Prof. and Mrs. Bates.
 Vice Consul and Mrs. Claude A. Buss.

Dr. Lo is a reserve member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and he enjoys the confidence of the civilian leaders of the National Government.

After a dinner at the home of Prof. Bates on March 28, 1938, his fellow guests asked him questions about political policy which he seemed pleased to answer.

He said that the focal point of the present Japanese attack was Tsifengkou but that subsequent operations in Tientsin and Peiping were inevitable. He expressed the wish that operations would extend that far, because a new China "could be born on the ruins of the Imperial City." He was not quite sure how the renaissance would take place, but he had faith that it would occur.

Mr. Mills asked what the Chinese were absolutely determined to resist further Japanese aggressions and Dr. Lo replied "There is no other alternative. Perhaps you think me a fanatic or a mystic, but I believe that

resistance

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

resistance will bring an unexpected reward. No one ever thought that we could resist at Kiangwan and Yuesue, but we did resist and we were not the losers thereby. There are forces greater than the superior military equipment of the Japanese, and although I can not define these forces, I believe that they will assert themselves for justice and the Chinese."

Vice Consul Buss remarked that resistance was a practical impossibility and that for civilians to clamor for resistance meant that they were shifting responsibility to military commanders. It seemed incumbent upon the former group to formulate a constructive program which could be enforced if and when resistance failed.

Dr. Lu commented that resistance could not fail, and he naively added, "If resistance should fail, it would be the beginning of a new era for China. Perhaps ten, twenty, or even thirty years would be required, but China would emerge from its ordeal, a stronger more united nation."

Prof. Hosen stated that on the other hand he felt that resistance would be worse than futile. I have no confidence whatever in the Chinese military system and I hesitate to think of the lot of the common people if the support of a defeated and demoralized army is added to their burdens. China should rather plan to make its economic resistance more effective and should realize that the most that it can expect its army to do is to make the Japanese advance as costly and

expensive

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

expensive as possible."

The conversation lasted far into the night and it was primarily a defense by Dr. Lo of the Chinese policy of "resistance". His defense seemed very feeble, because it lacked definition and was based exclusively upon his sentiment that "events are greater than we: they are beyond our control and it is useless for us to attempt to guide them." Time after time Dr. Lo resorted to his argument of fatalism, and I am convinced that he was not attempting to center the conversation about "the necessity for resistance" as a means of avoiding a discussion of more delicate problems of policy. He answered with an alacrity and an enthusiasm which are quite beyond Dr. Lo's powers of simulation. He gave the impression that his mind was entirely closed to any other course than "resistance" and that he was blissfully blinded to the dangers, if not the utter futility, of the policy of military resistance.

C BRUCE

0762

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

cib

FROM

GRAY

TIENHSIN VIA NR

Dated May 9, 1933

Recd 5:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

URGENT.

May 9, 3 p.m.

Japanese military headquarters state that Japanese troops have now crossed the Luan River at a point northwest of Lwanchow in a flanking movement the object of which is to capture that city. Railroad authorities report heavy artillery firing last night northwest of Anshan. Japanese troops now occupy Chienan and Funing. Pressure will probably not proceed beyond Lwanchow today. Owing to the reduced number of Chinese troops in the area east of Lwanchow the Japanese advance is likely to be more rapid than the April advance. Fighting has been renewed in the Miyun-Kupeikow sector.

LOCKHART

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/6262

MAY 10 1933

FILED

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0763

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 12 1933

To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period April 27 to May 10, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.


Enclosure:
Two copies of digest
of telegrams.

793.94/6262

793.94/6262

EJL
FE:EGC:KC
5-12-33

FE



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0764

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES
IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
APRIL 27 to MAY 10, 1935.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 27) that, although Soviet officials minimize the importance of the controversy in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese-"Manchukuo" faction threatens drastic action if the rolling stock which was removed to Siberia is not returned by May 10; and that disorders continue on the eastern line of the railway.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (April 28) that "Manchukuo" forces are continuing to withdraw along the railway east from Lwanchow.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (April 29) that on April 28 the Soviet Vice President of the Chinese Eastern Railway handed to the Chinese President of the railway a note stating that it is an incontestable fact that the railway belongs to Russia and again protesting against "Manchukuo" action in alleged violation of agreements which give certain privileges but no rights of ownership to the Chinese Government.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 1) that on April 30 five trains of Chinese troops, the first large movement of such troops away from the Lwanchow area, passed through Tientsin westward, destined to points on the Peking-Hankow railway.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 2) that three more trains of Chinese troops have moved westward through Tientsin from the Lwanchow area and that passenger traffic has been restored to Peitaiho (south of Chinwangtao).

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Consul General at Mukden reports (May 3) that, according to a reliable source, the Japanese are not withdrawing northward beyond the highway south of the Great Wall owing to its strategic value; and that a number of Japanese troops have been returned to their former posts in South Manchuria presumably because of the marked recrudescence of banditry.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (May 3) that conditions are quiet in northwestern Manchuria.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 4) that "Manchukuo" visa regulations have been promulgated to go into effect on June 1, 1933.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 4) that on May 2 an attempt at Tientsin to assassinate the Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government (General Yu Hsueh-chung) was frustrated by General Yu himself; that on May 3 several bombs were thrown without serious damage in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin; that, according to Japanese military authorities, preparations are under way for a fresh drive against General Chiang Kai-shek's troops at Miyun (north of Tientsin and just south of the Great Wall); and that there are signs of a revival of military operations in the Chinwangtao area.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (May 8) that since May 6 no trains have been operated on the Ussuri Railway between Pogranichnaya (eastern border of Kirin Province) and Vladivostok but that train movements on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway are not affected.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 8) that the Chinese forces have retreated to Changli and the Japanese-"Manchukuo" forces have advanced to Peitaiho.

The

0766

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The Consul General at Mukden reports (May 9) that, according to the military spokesman, the new Japanese offensive in the Lwan River area has made considerable progress.

793.9-1/62/62

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 9) that, according to Japanese military headquarters, Japanese troops have now crossed the Lwan River at a point northwest of Lwanchow in a flanking movement the object of which is to capture that city; that Japanese troops now occupy Chienan and Funing (a short distance southwest of Chinwangtao); and that fighting has been renewed in the area north of Tientsin in the Miyun-Kupenhkow sector.

MAY 12 1924

EGC
EGC

m. h. p.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

This message must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (c)

Dated May 9, 1933

FROM

Reed. 3.55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

96. May 9, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The renewed Japanese offensive in North China which started yesterday southwest of Shanhaikwan has evidently been instigated by the continual but desultory attacks by Chinese forces on the Japanese forces south of the Wall. While the General Staff declines to reveal its intentions or objective, the Military Attache believes that the offensive may sweep along the old Mandarin Road westward to Peiping. With the investment of Peiping the Japanese would be in a position to demand a cessation of Chinese attacks on the Wall in return for Japanese withdrawal from Peiping, thus offering a face-saving device for the Chinese while securing Japanese occupancy of the Wall without further opposition. Until the present operations develop further, however, the foregoing hypothesis is purely suppositional.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

RR

WSB

793.94/6263

F/H/S

Paraphrase to M.D. and M.D.

Department of State

0768

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram dated May 9, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

The continual but desultory attacks by Chinese forces on the Japanese forces south of the Wall have evidently instigated the renewed Japanese offensive in North China which began yesterday southwest of Shanhaikwan. It is the belief of the Military Attaché that the offensive may sweep along the old Mandarin Road westward to Peiping, although the General Staff declines to reveal its objective or intentions. The Japanese, with the investment of Peiping, would be in a position to demand a cessation of Chinese attacks on the Wall in return for Japanese withdrawal from Peiping, thus securing Japanese occupancy of the Wall without further opposition while offering a face-saving device for the Chinese. The foregoing hypothesis is purely suppositional, however, until the present operations develop further.

3765

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

795.94/6264

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tientsin/58 FOR Despatch # 295.

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED April 7, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1137 ***

REGARDING:

Successful Jehol campaign waged by the
Japanese causing the withdrawal of
many of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops.

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Military Operations After fall of Chengteh on March 4
in Jehol. Japanese troops rapidly pushed
 forward and captured on March 9 and
 11, respectively, Kupehk'ou and Hsifengk'ou after consider-
 able resistance by Chinese. The reasons for the collapse
 of Tang Yu-lin and fall of Jehol summarized as follows:
 opposition of Tang to the despatch of reinforcements from
 the Northeastern Forces; diversion by Tang of funds remitted
 by Nanking for maintenance of his troops; dissatisfaction
 of higher civil and military leaders of Jehol due to
 ill-treatment by Tang; lack of enthusiasm on part of
 volunteers because they were not accorded equal treatment
 with government troops; inefficiency and untrustworthiness
 of Tang Yu-lin.

Tientsin Maritime Customs overhauled a Japanese trawler
 attempting

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

reorganization of the Jehol Government.

Military Operations
in Jehol.

Following the fall of Chengteh on March 4, reported in my Despatch No. 341 of March 8, the Japanese quickly pushed forward to the Great Wall and successfully, but not without considerable resistance for a week or more on the part of the Chinese, occupied Kupehk'ou, Haifengk'ou and other strategic points along the wall. The Chinese in a last and seemingly determined effort to hold Kupehk'ou and Haifengk'ou Passes, despatched fresh bodies of troops to those two strategic points, but they were in due course overwhelmed by the superior equipment and training of the Japanese soldiers, to which was added the tremendous power of an effective Japanese Air Corps. Many thousands of the troops of Chang Mauch-liang who took part in the Jehol campaign withdrew from the various fighting zones in confusion. The capture of Kupehk'ou and Haifengk'ou by the Japanese would undoubtedly have been as easy to accomplish as was the occupation of Chengteh had it not been for the despatch to the two passes of picked troops from Chiang Kai-shek's army in the south. These troops appeared to give a very good account of themselves in the face of overwhelming obstacles. The two passes above-mentioned having been occupied on March 9 and 11, respectively, and made secure from counter attacks from the Chinese, the Japanese proceeded to give attention to the western boundaries of Jehol, employing air forces, as they had done previously in the main Jehol campaign

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 10 1935

Department of State

cib



FROM

GRAY

TIENHSIN VIA NR

Dated May 10, 1935.

Recd 5:40 a.m.

F/HS

Secretary of State

Washington.

May 10, 3 p.m.

193.94
Artillery fire is being heard today half way between
Lwanchow and Tangshan to the northwest of railway and
Manchukuo forces are said to have advanced to Changli.
Latter not yet confirmed but Manchukuo forces are un-
doubtedly making progress towards Lwanchow.

LOCKHART

JS CIB

793.94/6265

12

077

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

FROM

Peiping

Dated May 10, 1933

Rec'd 9:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

417, May 10, 4 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Renewed Japanese offensive Lwan River area is difficult to explain. While it is true that units of Chinese forces returned to that area upon withdrawal of Japanese, units were small and presence logical because of disturbed conditions.

Two. When Japanese retired to wall they left Manchukuo forces in Lwan area under the command of General Li Chi Chung which Japanese described as anti-Chiang Kai Shek forces (see Tientsin's April 14, 3 p. m.). Between April 12 and April 20 interesting developments occurred that area described in the Legation's 346, April 20, 2 p. m. There is reason to believe that Japanese expected, as a result of activities Lwan area, that agents opposed to Chiang Kai Shek would take advantage of situation to organize a movement against Chiang Kai Shek in this area which Japanese army would support (see Tokyo's 85, April 22, 11 a. m. to the Department). This plan failed.

Three.

Paraphrase to Mr. Dand
CONFIDENTIAL - see confidential
 MAY 10 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 F/H/S
 793.94/6266

0774

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEET

2-#417 from Peiping, May 10, 4 p. m.

Three. General Ho Chu Kuo informed me yesterday that through good offices, apparently initiated by Kai Lan Mining Company and a British naval officer at Chinwangtao, he endeavored to meet Japanese for the purpose of arranging truce but Japanese refused to meet him. Ho Chu Kuo believes failure of plan for uprising here and at Tientsin so infuriated Japanese military that they made use of presence of small Chinese forces in Lwan River as a pretext for launching present attack Lwan area.

Four. There is reason to accept accuracy of General Ho's estimate. End of last week General Nakamura at Tientsin informed Hallett Abend that Japanese military intended to launch campaign in this area on unprecedented scale from the direction of Lwan area and from direction Kupeikow extending in latter case southward to cut railway between Peiping and Tientsin with a view to inflicting severe defeat upon National armies and forcing retirement south of Peiping-Tientsin railway. Implication of Nakamura's statement was that Japanese hoped blow to Nationalists forces would be so severe as to destroy Nationalist control in this area and permit anti-Chiang Kai Shek movement to materialize.

Five. Suma, first secretary of Japanese Legation recently returned from Japan whither he accompanied Ariyoshi, informed

0775

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#417 from Peiping, May 10, 4 p. m.

informed me on the 6th instant that Japanese forces infuriated by Chinese resistance at Kupeikow intended to avenge themselves upon concentration at Miyun but would not proceed beyond that point. United Press correspondent informed me that Suma stated to him on the 7th that Japan had certain convictions in regard to situation prevailing in China and would pound away at the Chinese until Chinese accepted these convictions.

Six. It is difficult to estimate extent of Japanese intentions behind Japanese movement south of Wall. On the face of events as they are occurring there would appear to be an indication on the part of the Japanese of a determination to carry their activities beyond Manchuria and areas north of Wall with a view to determining political developments in China proper or at least in that part of China north of the Yellow River. On the other hand Suma informed me on the 6th that the Japanese Government derived considerable satisfaction from the setting up of the branch military council at Peiping under the chairmanship of Huang Fu a returned student from Japan and stated categorically that Japan was not concerned with developments south of Wall,

0776

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-#417 from Peiping, May 10, 4 p.m.

its only concern being the security of the Japanese lines along Wall. If this statement is to be accepted it may be that renewed Japanese activities in the Lwan area and at Miyun are to draw Chinese attention to realities of the existing situation and away from the presence of Soong in Washington and afterwards in London where possibly Chinese-Japanese conditions may be discussed.

To Tokyo by mail.

WSB-KLP

JOHNSON

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated May 10, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The American Minister states that an explanation is not easy of the recrudescence in the area of the Lwan River of the Japanese attack. Although, when the Japanese withdrew, Chinese units went back to this area the units were not large and, due to unsettled conditions, it was logical for them to be there.

"Manchukuo" troops commanded by General Li Chi-chung were left in the Lwan River region by the Japanese upon their retirement to the Wall. These forces are described by the Japanese as anti-Chiang Kai-shek. The Minister feels it reasonable to suppose that as a result of the Lwan River area activities the Japanese expected agents in opposition to Chiang to seize the opportunity to build up in that area an anti-Chiang movement, which was to receive the support of the Japanese army. This scheme did not materialize.

The Minister reports that he learned on May 11 from General Ho Chu-kuo that the latter, through good offices seemingly begun by an officer of the British Navy at Chinwangtao and by the Kai-Lan Mining Administration, tried to have a meeting with the Japanese to bring about a truce but that the meeting was declined by the Japanese. It is General Ho's belief that the Japanese military were angered to such an extent by the frustration of the scheme for a

revolt

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

revolt at Tientsin and at Peiping that they seized the pretext of small Chinese units being in the Lwan River area in order to begin the attack now under way there.

The Minister believes it reasonable to consider the General's appraisal a correct one. Toward the close of the week of May 6th, Hallett Abend learned from General Nakamura at Tientsin that it was meant by the Japanese military to commence in this region a campaign on an extraordinary scale from the Kupeikow area and from the Lwan region, in the case of the Kupeikow drive extending southward in order to intercept the railroad between Tientsin and Peiping with the object of severely defeating the Nationalists armies and compelling them to withdraw to the south of the railroad. The statement by Nakamura implied that it was the hope of the Japanese that the blow to be inflicted on the National armies would be heavy enough to extinguish the control by the Nationalists of this region and to allow the realization of the movement against Chiang.


The Japanese First Secretary, who not long since got back from a trip with his Minister to Japan, informed Minister Johnson on May 6 that while the Japanese troops would not go farther than Miyun, angered by the resistance put up at Kupeikow by the Chinese they meant to wreak vengeance on the Miyun concentration. The Minister was informed by a press correspondent that he was told on May 7th by the Japanese First Secretary that Japan would continue to hammer away at the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib



FROM

GRAY

Department of State

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated May 11, 1933.

Recd 11:46 p.m., 10th.

Secretary of State

Washington.

418, May 11, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"May 9, 8 p.m. According to military spokesman the Japanese offensive in the Luantung area which was launched on May 7th as a result of the Chinese reoccupation of area and resumption of counter-attacks has made considerable progress, the capture of Chienan and Funing on 8th being reported.

With the anticipated early evacuation of the area by the Chinese the present advance will probably cease."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

F/HS

793.94/6267

JUN 24 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tsinan/59 FOR Despatch # 30

FROM Tsinan (Stevens) DATED April 6, 1933
 TO NAME 1-1137

6268

REGARDING: Local reaction to the Jehol debacle, given
 in order of sequence.

hs

793.94/6268

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

LOCAL REACTION TO JEHOL DERADLE.

The following occurrences, given in the order of their sequence, show quite well the effect produced locally by the collapse of the Chinese defense in Jehol Province:

The first news that T'ang Yu-lin (湯玉麟) had decamped under humiliating circumstance was conveyed to the Provincial Chairman by the Japanese Consul General here on March 4th. General Han at once endeavored to have this information confirmed from Peiping. The reply he received being indefinite he concluded that the report was unfounded and a part of Japanese propaganda. The next day telegrams from Tokyo announcing the capture of Ch'engte were received and given wide publicity in the vernacular press.

General Han, who was still without official confirmation from Chinese sources, became irritated

and

078

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huntington NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EX-101
FBI EASTERN
MAY 11 1933
Department of St
ZE
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FROM

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA NR

Dated May 11, 1933.

Recd 3:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

May 11, 3 p.m.

According to railway authorities, Manchukuo forces made no progress along railway yesterday. Chinese armored train is still at Shihmen. Chinese resident of Changli just arrived here states troops now occupying Changli are Manchukuo and that no Japanese troops were there when he left.

LOCKHART

JS CIB

793.94 / 6269

JUN 24 1933

078

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NET

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 11, 1933

Rec'd 7:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

420, May 11, 1 p. m.

My 417, May 10, 4 p. m. / 6200

An unidentified airplane flying at great height believed to have been Japanese military plane passed over Peiping flying from north to south and back again at about 5:30 this morning. Shots were fired at plane by anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on northeast city wall. Plane dropped numerous handbills in east section of the city which were promptly gathered up by police. One of these bills has come into my possession through a Chinese employee of the Legation residing in that section of the city. Handbill opens by quoting proverb to the effect that those who are in the right gain help while those who are in the wrong will lack assistance. Invites attention to conditions in China where militarists have been despotic and have usurped authority, people oppressed and soldiers driven to the battlefields. States "Our Japan-Manchukuo allied army has marshaled its soldiers and addressed themselves to deliver the people

793.94

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2-933

0784

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#420 from Peiping, May 11, 1 p.m.

people of our friendly country from the hands of tyrants. Wherever our great army has gone those who were hostile to us have been completely routed. This is clear evidence to prove that those who gain the good will of the people will prosper while those who do not will fail". Handbill goes on to state that spirit of Japanese-Manchukuo soldiers is very high, their weapons excellent while China and her militarists, a motley force without discipline, can by no means resist. "You, soldiers, are merely made fun of by Chiang Kai Shek, one person. He borrows your heads to extend his personal power. Should you still fail to be awakened at an early date, to separate yourselves from your army and to become a new people your successor then, our great army, will advance on a ~~punitive~~ *punitive* campaign, your leader will be exterminated, the good and the evil will alike come to harm and all will lose your stupid lives due to the failure of Chiang Kai Shek, one person." Handbill ends with following: "Our army takes pity upon you impressed soldiers and is distributing this sincere and solemn commandment. It is hoped that you soldiers will not be silenced any longer lest you might suffer from meaningless sacrifices. Moreover we are all Eastern Asiatic people. Since we have the same language and belong to the same race we should live and prosper together.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#420 from Peiping, May 11, 1 p.m.

together. Why should we slaughter each other? If Chiang continues to be violent and if he fails to repent his error it is feared that the tragedy of Koupeikou will occur at Peiping and at Tientsin".

WSB-RR

JOHNSON

0786

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 12, 1933.

~~7~~
LMH

Special Report No. W.D.1235, of April 29, 1933, from the American Embassy at Paris refers to despatch No. W.D.1216, of March 28, 1933, and encloses further articles appearing in L'ECHO DE PARIS which discuss Japanese opinion concerning Manchuria (somewhat vague), and "French Asia and the Chinese World", in the course of which it is remarked that the great mass of French interests in the Far East is situated in the Chinese world, either China proper or the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Mr. Dawson considers this admission of particular interest in view of the general French policy of supporting Japan.

FJC

0787

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 29, 1933


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PM RECD




MAY 10 1933

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W. D. 1235)



F/H S



793.94/6271

To the Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special
Report No. W. D. 1235, dated April 29, 1933.

WD/DG

FILED
MAY 26 1933

0788

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 29, 1933

Serial No. W. D. 1235

SPECIAL REPORT

By Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation as
Discussed in L'ECHO DE PARIS

Continuing Despatch No. W. D. 1216 of March
28, 1933, I am enclosing further articles by
La Pomarède which appeared in L'ECHO DE PARIS of
April 15, April 17, and April 20, 1933.

Among the subjects discussed are the Japanese
opinion concerning Manchuria which appears to be
somewhat vague, and "French Asia and the Chinese
World," in the course of which the writer remarks
that the dominating fact is that the great mass
of French interests in the Far East is situated
in the Chinese world, either in China properly speak-
ing or in the Indochinese peninsula. In view of the

general

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

general French policy of supporting Japan, this admission made in the columns of the militarist and nationalist organ L'ECHO DE PARIS is of particular interest.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson
Special Assistant

Enclosures:

Article from L'ECHO DE PARIS of April 15, 1933
" " " " " " April 17, 1933
" " " " " " April 20, 1933

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/DG

Copy to E. I. C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Special Report No. M. D. 1235, April 21, 1933.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extrait from L'UNION DE PARIS, April 15, 1933.

UNE ENQUETE EN EXTREME-ORIENT (1)

L'OPINION JAPONAISE ET LA QUESTION DE LA MANDCHOURIE

XIII

Que le féodal dégénéré, seigneur de la Mandchourie, ait provoqué l'intervention étrangère; que les droits et les biens des Japonais aient été systématiquement menacés, lésés; que leurs troupes se soient crues, le 18 septembre 1931, en état de légitime défense, il n'en est pas moins vrai que le cabinet de Tokio n'avait pas prémédité l'événement. Le coup de force initial a été un acte spontané de l'armée japonaise et, l'on peut dire, des éléments les plus jeunes de l'armée. Nous aurions mauvaise grâce, nous, Français, à nous en montrer choqués: notre épopée coloniale n'a-t-elle pas été dans son ensemble la « geste » d'une jeunesse militaire ardente, qui souvent agissait en dehors, sinon au rebours, des ordres de son gouvernement et dont l'héroïsme créateur forçait la volonté du pays?... Il semble bien qu'au Japon l'initiative des militaires n'ait pas eu d'abord l'assentiment général: les partis politiques, les ministres responsables restaient froids. Les patriotes s'en plaignirent. Ils firent plus que se plaindre: ils tuèrent. Ils tuèrent des hommes d'Etat, un magnat de la finance, dont la tiédeur ou les préoccupations égoïstes étaient à leurs yeux des crimes contre le Grand Japon. Actes de terrorisme patriotique, conformes à la pure tradition et dont l'histoire japonaise est remplie.

Cela se passait il y a environ un an. Mais aujourd'hui, quel est l'état des esprits? La Société des Nations a prononcé, le Japon s'est retiré. L'opinion publique soutient-elle le cabinet d'union nationale? Est-elle pour ou contre la politique des Samourais,

L'opinion, depuis quelque temps, a manifesté une inquiétude, une agitation où les observateurs pessimistes, parfois malveillants, se plaisent à voir les signes précurseurs d'un prochain bouleversement.

A ce malaise, deux causes: l'une, matérielle, la crise économique, qui a semé la misère dans les campagnes et dans les villes; l'autre, morale, l'évolution des idées qui a donné aux esprits le vertige et s'est attaquée aux dogmes anciens. Ces causes agissant sur des milieux différents ont fait naître deux mouvements politiques nouveaux, de tendances extrêmes et absolument contradictoires: communisme ou socialisme, à gauche; à droite, fascisme ou « nazi ». Quelle est la plus forte de ces deux tendances? Qui l'emporte?... Toute la question est là pour savoir si les Samourais ont bien tout le pays derrière eux et à quoi s'expose l'Europe si, en matière de politique chinoise, elle met le Japon hors du jeu.

Le premier en date des deux mouvements que je viens d'indiquer, c'est le communisme ou socialisme bolchevisant. Son apparition remonte à la fin de la guerre: l'on voyait déjà en 1919, dans certaines vitrines de Ginza (2), des traductions de Lénine et de Karl Marx. La doctrine

Le mouvement adverse est autrement fort.

Le second mouvement, de date plus récente, est aux antipodes du premier: c'est le fascisme. Il sort du berceau. Il a dû le jour à un double sentiment d'indignation provoqué dans l'âme des jeunes, d'un côté par le spectacle des iniquités politiques et sociales dont leur génération se dit la victime; de l'autre, par l'aveu de décadence nationale impliqué d'après eux dans la politique exté-



L'AMIRAL SAITO,
 président du cabinet d'Union nationale

rieure des précédents gouvernements.

Le mouvement pourrait bien aboutir à une sorte de restauration du Shogounat. Il est à la fois socialiste et nationaliste. Socialiste à un degré de hardiesse que nous n'aurions pas imaginé. Songez qu'en ce moment circule sous le manteau, dans les milieux militaires, un document secret qui n'est autre que le programme social du fascisme japonais: non seulement l'on y préconise la limitation du capital libre, l'étatisation progressive des grandes banques, des grandes industries, des grandes propriétés, mais l'on va jusqu'à prévoir la mainmise de l'Etat sur les biens impériaux. Si la partie sociale du programme est encore le secret de l'avenir, la partie nationaliste, par contre, est en voie de réalisation. On sait qu'elle comportait pour article essentiel l'intervention en Mandchourie, et qu'une propagande par le fait, dont un septuagénaire, président du conseil, a été l'illustre victime, dicta au gouvernement la politique étrangère qu'il devait suivre et qu'il a suivie. Ce que l'on sait moins peut-être, c'est qu'à la base du mouvement fasciste, il y a une majorité d'officiers subalternes et même de cadets. Dix élèves de l'Ecole militaire (imaginez chez nous: dix Saint-Cyriens) ont estimé de leur devoir patriotique de tuer le premier ministre, et ils l'ont tué!... Par la suite, l'état-major général a pris la tête d'un mouvement qu'il n'avait pas créé et qui maintenant le pousse et peut-être le dépasse. Le général Araki, ministre de la guerre, est aujourd'hui le chef de ce fascisme que son autorité et sa rude éloquence s'efforcent de discipliner. Les troupes — et combien plus nombreuses que les troupes socia-

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ont bien tout le pays derrière eux et à quoi s'expose l'Europe si, en matière de politique chinoise, elle met le Japon hors du jeu.

Le premier en date des deux mouvements que je viens d'indiquer, c'est le communisme ou socialisme bolchevisant. Son apparition remonte à la fin de la guerre : l'on voyait déjà en 1919, dans certaines vitrines de Ginza (2), des traductions de Lénine et de Karl Marx. La doctrine socialiste a évidemment trouvé bon accueil chez les ouvriers, puisqu'en 1928, deux ligues, dites de Prolétaires, ont dû, par ordre, se dissoudre et qu'elles comptaient alors 500 membres. Mais c'est surtout dans les universités et les écoles supérieures que le marxisme a recruté des adeptes. Le ministère de l'intérieur, pendant quatre ans, les a pourchassés impitoyablement : de 1928 à 1931, 1,422 personnes ont été déferées aux tribunaux pour activité communiste; 409, jugées coupables et condamnées. Fait à noter : parmi les 1,422 prévenus, il y avait 463 diplômés de l'enseignement universitaire et secondaire, soit 33 0/0. En 1932, le gouvernement se flattait publiquement d'avoir jugulé le danger communiste et, pour bien le prouver, il autorisait l'étude et la discussion du marxisme dans les universités. Faisons la part belle au communisme japonais en lui attribuant un millier d'intellectuels aptes à servir de chefs. Les troupes, ce pourraient être les travailleurs des deux sexes inscrits aux « Labour Unions » — qui, remarquons-le, se défendent d'être communistes. Mais ces Labour Unions comptent à peine 400,000 membres sur les 10 millions de travailleurs qui constituent le prolétariat nippon. Tout cela est encore bien peu dans un pays où l'âme du plus humble renferme une parcelle si ardente d'idéal national...

(1) Voir l'Echo de Paris des 28 février, 5, 8, 11, 14, 21, 24, 28 mars, 8 et 9 avril.

(2) La principale rue, quelque chose comme les grands boulevards de Tokio.

ves de l'Ecole militaire (imaginez chez nous : dix Saint-Cyriens) ont estimé de leur devoir patriotique de tuer le premier ministre, et ils l'ont tué !... Par la suite, l'état-major général a pris la tête d'un mouvement qu'il n'avait pas créé et qui maintenant le pousse et peut-être le dépasse. Le général Araki, ministre de la guerre, est aujourd'hui le chef de ce fascisme que son autorité et sa rude éloquence s'efforcent de discipliner. Les troupes — et combien plus nombreuses que les troupes socialistes et communistes — ce sont d'abord les huit ou dix associations impérialistes ou social-fascistes. Ce sont surtout les associations de réservistes et anciens combattants — trois millions d'hommes, sur qui toute parole, tout acte du « Gounjin », — l'Homme de l'Armée, — exerce une irrésistible emprise, car le « Gounjin », de son vivant, est le modèle admiré et, mort au combat, il passe au rang des dieux !

LA POMAREDE.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Non, au Japon, entre socialisme et fascisme, la partie n'est pas égale, et un bouleversement, s'il se produit, se produira fatalement au bénéfice du second. Un Américain, qui connaît bien le pays, M. Hugh Bryas, écrivait dans la revue *Asia*, en février 1932 :

« La plupart des Japonais se contentent de marcher au milieu de la route; mais, dans les moments de crise, d'instinct, ils tournent à droite, et non pas à gauche. »

Quoi qu'il en soit, pour ce qui concerne le conflit sino-japonais et l'intervention en Mandchourie, il y avait une correspondance trop intime entre la politique du fascisme japonais et le sentiment de l'opinion publique pour que l'accord ne se fit pas entre eux. L'accord, aujourd'hui, est total. Le pays unanime, même la fraction que l'on pourrait qualifier de socialiste, emboîte le pas à l'armée.

Je visitais, fin décembre, l'un des plus grands journaux japonais, le *Tokio Asahi Shimbun*; j'en admirais le « building » à huit étages, l'organisation ultramoderne, la superbe machinerie. J'avais pour guide l'aimable M. Machida, qui, au journal, dirige le service de la politique étrangère et a passé de longues années à Paris en qualité de correspondant de presse.

— Que dirai-je de votre part à vos confrères de la presse parisienne ? demandai-je à M. Machida au moment de prendre congé.

— Vous a-t-on signalé, me répondit-il, une seule manifestation hostile à la politique du présent gouvernement ? Avez-vous lu dans nos journaux un seul article, une seule ligne discordante ?... Eh bien ! dites aux Français que le Japon tout entier est derrière son armée de Mandchourie !

Je suis convaincu que M. Machida a dit vrai.

Telle est, je l'ajoute, la conviction des Anglo-Saxons bien informés. Je citerai notamment un journaliste anglais de grande classe, M. Woodhead, ancien directeur du *Pekin and Tien-Tsin Times*. Rentrant à Shanghai en novembre, après une enquête au Japon, il expliqua à ses compatriotes, dans une série d'articles, que l'opinion japonaise, sans distinction de parti, soutenait résolument le gouvernement et l'armée, et que cet état d'esprit était le fait capital.

« Il faut », concluait M. Woodhead, « ou se résigner ou faire la guerre. »

Tout de même*, faire la guerre au Japon pour maintenir la féodalité chinoise... Quelle interprétation abusive des principes du droit international !

Faire la guerre au Japon, au risque de le rejeter hors des voies occidentales... Quelle singulière façon de travailler au progrès et à la paix du monde !

Combien (ô président Herriot ! ô lord Lytton !), combien l'Europe serait plus sage, plus clairvoyante, de prendre en main la reconstruction de la Chine et de s'y consacrer avec le Japon dans un esprit de loyale collaboration !

LA POMAREDE.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclose No. 2 to Special Report No. W. D. 1235, April 29, 1933.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 17, 1933.

UNE ENQUETE EN EXTREME-ORIENT ⁽¹⁾

LA POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE

La France d'Asie et le Monde Chinois

XIV

Une enquête en Extrême-Orient paraîtrait incomplète aux lecteurs de l'*Echo de Paris* si elle ne leur exposait, pour conclure, quels sont ou quels devraient être là-bas les principes fondamentaux de notre politique nationale.

De bons esprits sont trop portés à juger les affaires d'Asie d'après des sympathies et des aversions que ne détermine pas la réalité objective. La vraie méthode, si l'on veut y voir clair, consiste à poser d'abord deux questions : La France a-t-elle en Asie de gros intérêts ? — Si elle en a, comment les sauvegarder ? — La réponse à ces deux questions dissipera toute équivoque.

Le fait qui domine tout, c'est que la masse prépondérante des intérêts français en Extrême-Orient se trouve située dans le monde chinois, soit dans la Chine proprement dite, soit dans la péninsule que ses affinités avec la Chine ont fait dénommer indochinoise.

J'ai parlé, dans un article précédent, des intérêts que nous avons en Chine. Intérêts matériels : chemins de fer, concessions, propriétés foncières soutenant la vie de nos missions religieuses et de nos œuvres d'assistance et d'enseignement. Intérêts moraux incomparablement supérieurs aux intérêts matériels, car dans une sorte de conflit de civilisations, où tant d'éléments lui sont réfractaires et hostiles, la France, en Chine, représente, propage, défend, avec sa propre culture, la culture catholique et latine. Position éminente dont la perte serait un aveu de décadence.

En Indochine, c'est bien autre chose et c'est beaucoup plus. Le mot de possession territoriale ne suffit pas. C'est un Empire que nous avons dans la péninsule... Une superficie de 700.000 kilomètres carrés, plus grande que la France. Une population équivalente à la moitié de la métropole. Trois royaumes protégés, une

colonie directe. Des races prolifiques, en grande majorité industrielles, avides de progrès et dont la qualité est prouvée par ce qu'elles ont fait dans le passé ! Des richesses forestières, minières, agricoles, une industrie pleine de promesses. A combien évaluerons-nous la richesse totale de notre Indochine ? A deux cents, deux cent cinquante milliards de francs... Sait-on que la colonisation française a déjà pour sa part acquis un million d'hectares de terres excellentes où elle a investi un capital de près de deux milliards ? Sait-on que l'ensemble du mouvement commercial annuel approche de cinq milliards, et que les importations (deux milliards et demi) sont pour ainsi dire exclusivement au bénéfice de la métropole ? Magnifique domaine, en vérité, dont l'aménagement atteste nos capacités colonisatrices et qui nous garantit un accroissement continu de ressources et de débouchés.

La richesse, d'ailleurs, n'est qu'une face du diptyque indochinois. L'autre face, c'est la responsabilité morale, la plus noble tâche que puisse assumer un grand peuple : celle d'orienter, d'animer l'évolution intellectuelle, politique et morale de vingt millions d'Asiatiques associés par l'histoire au destin de la France.

En Chine, nous avons des intérêts considérables. En Indochine, nous avons une partie de la France, et à moins d'un suicide, nous ne saurions la laisser contaminer ou mutiler. Tel est le premier point, essentiel à mettre en lumière.

Voici le second : Le passage du Royaume d'Annam sous la suzeraineté française a été un incident dans le procès de dissolution de l'Etat Chinois : il ne pouvait signifier la brusque métamorphose d'hérédités et de traditions millénaires. Notre influence, notre éducation, se sont imposées à deux générations d'Annamites, à trois tout au plus : c'est encore bien peu. Limitrophe de la Chine, la France d'Asie est toujours reliée à sa voisine par des affini-

(1) Voir l'*Echo de Paris* des 28 février, 5, 8, 11, 14, 21, 24, 28 mars, 8, 9 et 15 avril.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Les ethnographiques et mentales que le temps n'a pas abolies. Aussi bien cinq cent mille purs Chinois, dont les congrégations tiennent dans le commerce indigène une place privilégiée, conservent-ils le contact avec ce qui fut si longtemps le foyer spirituel du monde indochinois ; et celui-ci, par ses réactions, par ses réflexes, reste, dans une large mesure, solidaire du monde chinois.

Ce monde chinois, le gouvernement dictatorial qui en incarne les aspirations, sont-ils favorables, indifférents ou hostiles à nos intérêts — je dis : à nos intérêts d'Extrême-Orient ? — Voilà ce qu'il importe de savoir.

Libérons-nous ici de la servitude des amitiés. Les Chinois qui résident en France ont, en général, un charme prenant, une sociabilité qui nous abuse ; mais, ce n'est pas chez nous qu'il faut voir la Chine, c'est chez elle.

Or, ce qu'elle nous montre chez elle, c'est le programme, ce sont les actes du parti nationaliste à la tête des affaires ; à l'intérieur, c'est une énorme masse inévolue, une féodalité militaire despotique, un pouvoir central impuissant ; vis-à-vis de l'étranger, de l'aveuglement, de l'intransigeance, et, — tranchons le mot — de la xénophobie.

A quoi servirait de masquer la vérité ? La politique étrangère du gouvernement chinois est en opposition permanente avec les intérêts de la France.

La preuve ?... Nous tenons avec raison à ce que l'on appelle le droit d'exterritorialité, car l'abandon de ce droit aboutirait à faire juger nos compatriotes de Chine et les litiges qui les concernent par des tribunaux indigènes qui n'ont encore ni la compétence ni l'impartialité nécessaires. A nos objections Nankin a répondu tout simplement par la dénonciation unilatérale des traités, et sans le conflit sino-japonais, l'abolition de l'exterritorialité était chose faite le 1^{er} janvier 1933.

Nous tenons également à nos concessions et rien n'est plus équitable puisque ces coins de terre mis en valeur par nos efforts prolongés sont des îlots de protection contre la fureur des guerres civiles et les exactions des satrapes... Eh ! bien, une campagne violente pour la reprise des concessions a déjà été lancée dans le public chinois, et si le gouvernement de Nankin a laissé tomber la question, c'est toujours en raison du conflit sino-japonais ; mais ce n'est que partie remise.

Que dire enfin de la confiscation systématique des biens fonciers de nos missions ? Expropriation pure et simple ou sentence arbitraire rendue par les tribunaux, il n'y a jamais de compensation ni d'indemnité. C'est la spoliation, au mépris de tous les traités... En novembre dernier, j'ai assisté à une conversation tristement édifiante entre le procureur de la mission française de Nankin et notre conseiller juridique auprès du gouvernement central ; le premier exprimait ses doléances, son anxiété justifiée par des faits multiples ; le second ne pouvait donner ni apaisements ni espérances.

Je pourrais citer d'autres exemples ; mais les trois que je viens d'indiquer démontrent suffisamment à quel point les intérêts de la France en Chine sont menacés par un nationalisme anti-étranger dans son principe et sans scrupules dans ses procédés.

Passons à l'Indochine. De quel œil, le monde chinois, placé au seuil de la France d'Asie et plus ou moins mêlé à sa vie, de quel œil regarde-t-il notre présence et le fait de notre suzeraineté ?

N'oublions jamais que Sun Yat Sen, le fondateur du nationalisme chinois, a légué aux héritiers de sa pensée une doctrine de revendications pan-asiatiques, qui déborde les frontières de leur pays et à travers l'Union Indochinoise englobe le Siam, notre voisin, et même la Birmanie. Les preuves ne manquent pas d'un accord tacite sinon formel entre la Chine du Kouo-ming-tang et ceux de l'Annam qui veulent détruire le protectorat. S'il en était autrement, s'il n'y avait pas accord, pourquoi, chaque année à Canton, la salle des séances des nationalistes chinois serait-elle mise à la disposition des groupements annamites révolutionnaires ? Pourquoi, en

depuis 1911 n'ont fait que rendre plus irrémédiable la décomposition de l'Etat chinois en y propageant deux fléaux mortels, un militarisme dévorant et une anarchie générale qui est la plus belle avenue tracée vers le bolchevisme. Que de taches rouges, en ce moment, sur la carte de Chine ! L'une d'elles est aussi large que la France. Lourdes menaces, dirons-nous, pour notre Indochine. Menace pour ses frontières où la piraterie, fille du militarisme chinois, risque d'apporter le désordre et l'insécurité. Surtout, menace pour sa paix intérieure, car une Chine bolchevisée poussera vers le sol voisin des ramifications souterraines par où viendra la pensée, le mot d'ordre de Moscou. Or, à moins d'un miracle qui mette fin à la présente anarchie, la bolchevisation de la Chine est une éventualité prochaine et les Soviets, qui l'escomptent, sont à pied d'œuvre pour l'accélérer.

Problème vital pour la France d'Asie... On pourrait encore discuter, composer, avec un nationalisme exigeant, injuste même, mais qui serait fort et obéi. Par contre, rien à attendre de l'anarchie bolchevisante. La dissolution de l'Etat chinois concerne au premier chef la France — puissance asiatique — parce qu'elle menace directement tous ses intérêts et jusqu'à l'existence de son empire d'Indochine.

Telle est la réponse à la première question qui a été posée. Tel devrait être l'axiome de notre politique extrême-orientale.

LA POMAREDE.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 sition des groupements annamites
 révolutionnaires ? Pourquoi, en
 bonne place parmi les mausolées
 des héros républicains, la tombe de
 l'Annamite qui voilà dix ans tenta
 d'assassiner M. Merlin, le gouver-
 neur général ? En novembre dernier,
 la presse chinoise de Shanghai
 n'annonçait-elle pas, à tort ou à rai-
 son, l'arrivée de deux délégués de
 l'Annam auprès du gouvernement
 de Nankin ? ...Le moins que l'on
 puisse dire c'est que la Chine offi-
 cielle a des égards, d'étranges com-
 plaisances pour nos ennemis décla-
 rés.

Mais déjà la Chine officielle n'est
 plus maîtresse des forces qu'elle a
 déchainées. C'est comme un torrent
 qui l'entraîne. Et voici qu'apparaît
 un nouveau danger, plus grave que
 le précédent. Les révolutions et
 guerres intestines qui se succèdent

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Enclosure No. 3 to Special Report No. W.D. 1235, April 29, 1933.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 20, 1933.

UNE ENQUETE EN EXTREME-ORIENT ⁽¹⁾

La sauvegarde de la France d'Asie

XV

Comment sauvegarder nos intérêts, comment garantir notre France d'Asie, tout en conservant l'esprit et les mains libres pour le plus redoutable des problèmes, — le problème de l'Europe ?

Sur le bateau ^{**} qui fait le service entre Haiphong et Hong-Kong, je rencontrai, en octobre dernier, un Américain, docteur ès sciences naturelles et professeur à l'Université chinoise de Canton. Il ne nous aimait guère. Me montrant un point de la côte où flotte le drapeau français : « Quand donc, me dit-il tout à coup, quand donc la France adoptera-t-elle une autre attitude à l'égard de la nouvelle Chine ? » Quand se décidera-t-elle à lui restituer Kouang-Tchéou-Dan ? — « Mais pouvez-vous, lui répliquai-je, nous garantir dix ans de paix intérieure et de gouvernement normal ? Et vous, Américains, voulez-vous nous aider à remettre de l'ordre dans la maison chinoise ? » — « Ah ! pour cela, répondit-il, ce serait contraire à notre idéal politique. » — « Alors, lui dis-je, que pensez-vous du rapport Lytton ? » Levant les épaules, mon docteur ne répondit pas.

C'est tout le plan de sauvegarde des intérêts français qui était en cause dans cette brève discussion.

En premier lieu, quoi que prétendent les nationalistes chinois, leur pays n'offre encore aux étrangers aucune des garanties requises d'un Etat moderne : rien ne justifierait une modification des traités. Eclairée par un corps consulaire parfaitement informé, notre diplomatie a pris à Nankin la seule attitude raisonnable, qui est de résister à des revendications inadmissibles. Extériorité, concessions, territoire à bail, la France n'a rien cédé — et elle a eu, elle a toujours raison. Mais c'est en quelque sorte la partie négative de notre plan de sauvegarde.

Ce plan doit avoir aussi une partie positive basée sur le fait qu'il

n'y aura pas de sécurité réelle pour nos établissements d'Extrême-Orient aussi longtemps que des forces dissolvantes entraîneront la Chine aux abîmes, et avec elle, tout le continent asiatique. La condition fondamentale de la sécurité française — et européenne — est la reconstruction intérieure de la Chine. Or, la Chine ne peut se reconstruire sans le concours de l'Occident. Ecoutez lord Lytton et les conclusions de son rapport d'enquête : « Puisque l'instabilité politique de la Chine est... un souci pour le reste du monde... la condition finalement indispensable pour une solution satisfaisante est une coopération internationale, temporaire, à la reconstruction intérieure de la Chine, ainsi d'ailleurs (ceci est une pierre dans le jardin nationaliste !) que l'avait recommandé le docteur Sun Yat Sen. » Il est, je pense, bien peu de Français de Chine qui ne souscrivent aux conclusions de lord Lytton.

Mais sous quelle forme s'exercerait cette coopération ? La réponse sort du cadre réduit d'un article. Toutefois, il n'est pas inutile de le rappeler, la coopération internationale à la modernisation d'un Etat asiatique a été organisée ailleurs avec succès, et il ne s'agirait en somme que d'entreprendre en Chine sur une plus vaste échelle ce que l'on a fait au Siam au temps du roi Chulalongkorn. Les grandes lignes s'entrevoient : des conseillers financiers et juridiques au gouvernement central et dans les provinces, une gendarmerie internationale contrôlant les chemins de fer, une gendarmerie chinoise dressée et encadrée par des étrangers, le licenciement des troupes féodales et irrégulières, des routes, des voies ferrées... La souveraineté chinoise, pleinement respectée. Pas de zones d'influence, des domaines de collaboration. Sans doute, l'œuvre serait longue : vingt ans, trente ans, peut-être davantage. Mais quel bienfait pour l'Asie ! quelle garantie pour la paix et pour l'avenir du monde !

Cette idée, qui est celle de bien des Français et de bien des étrangers, il faudrait lui faire prendre corps, en préparer la réalisation ?

Comment ? Avec qui entamer des pourparlers ? qui, parmi les puissances, place le problème chinois

(1) Voir l'Echo de Paris des 28 février, 5, 8, 11, 14, 21, 24, 28 mars, 5, 7, 15 et 17 avril.

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sur le terrain de la collaboration internationale ? Après avoir étudié avec nous la solution de lord Lytton, qui serait disposé à la suggérer, à l'imposer à la Chine ?

Ce qui contribue à entretenir l'anarchie c'est précisément que les puissances n'ont pu encore réaliser l'unité d'opinion et l'unité d'action. Un diplomate italien qui connaît admirablement la Chine, le comte Sforza, a écrit que l'Angleterre se trouvait là-bas dans une situation statique, et l'Amérique au contraire, dans une situation dynamique. Ces termes pourraient servir à classer les puissances qui ont des intérêts en Chine : les unes y ont à peu près exclusivement des intérêts commerciaux, des forces d'expansion intellectuelle et politique (c'est le groupe dynamique) ; les autres y possèdent en outre des territoires, des concessions ou de gros capitaux investis (c'est le groupe statique). *A priori*, il doit y avoir antinomie entre les deux groupes.

Au groupe dynamique appartiennent l'Italie, l'Allemagne, l'Union Soviétique et l'Amérique.

Par des procédés différents, l'Italie et l'Allemagne s'efforcent de nouer avec la jeune Chine des amitiés également rémunératrices. Le ministre d'Italie et sa femme, née Mussolini, ont joué de la sympathie fasciste pour pénétrer dans l'intimité du dictateur de Nankin. L'Allemagne, avec sa mission militaire de soixante officiers et sous-officiers s'est installée au cœur de l'armée nationaliste. Tous ces efforts, toutes ces intrigues, la France d'Asie ne doit pas les négliger — mais ils ne forment que l'arrière-plan de la politique étrangère en Chine.

Il en est autrement de l'U. R. S. S. Ses intérêts commerciaux sont pour l'instant médiocres, mais son dynamisme, intellectuel et social, est extrêmement puissant et ses visées politiques, illimitées. Elle escompte la bolchévisation de la Chine, elle sait que le désordre général est sa meilleure propagande. L'U. R. S. S. est, pour le continent asiatique, le suprême danger.

A l'horizon opposé, dotée d'un potentiel civilisateur qu'elle a cru irrésistible, se tient l'Amérique. Se prévalant de son désintéressement territorial et d'un commun idéal républicain, inondant le marché de ses produits, attirant la jeunesse par ses universités luxueuses et ses missions qui regorgent d'or, l'Amérique s'est posée en conseillère, en tutrice de la nouvelle Chine. Elle a tout permis, tout excusé, tout oublié. Elle a réussi à rompre le front traditionnel de l'Occident sans y avoir rien gagné qu'une américanisation de surface. Elle est la première responsable du chaos où sombre la Chine et du bolchevisme qui va recueillir les épaves.

Ce n'est point parmi ces puissances que la France d'Asie trouvera les principes et le soutien d'une bonne politique.

Aussi bien fait-elle partie avec l'Angleterre et le Japon, du groupe qui a été qualifié de statique.

L'Angleterre, à vrai dire, forme transition entre les deux groupes. Ses intérêts commerciaux la rattacheront au premier, mais l'importance des capitaux investis par elle (neuf ou dix milliards de francs), ses six concessions, sa colonie de Hong-Kong, l'attirent plutôt dans le groupe opposé. Depuis dix ans, sa politique oscille entre deux tendances, politique de prestige ou politique de patience, manière forte ou laisser-faire, et ces variations qui ont porté atteinte à sa suprématie, ont toujours marqué un recul de l'influence occidentale. Les conservateurs anglais sont persuadés qu'une politique ferme servirait mieux les intérêts britanniques. Souhaitons que leur opinion l'emporte...

Malgré son commerce avec la Chine (20 0/0 des importations, et il est le 3^e), la situation du Japon y est avant tout statique, en raison des capitaux investis, presque égaux aux capitaux britanniques ; en raison de ses vastes possessions sur le continent ou dans les eaux chinoises ; et enfin, à cause des 300.000 résidents japonais dont il faut protéger les biens et la vie. Souffrant plus que les autres du désordre de la Chine et de sa xénophobie, le Japon est aussi menacé plus directement par son éventuelle bolchévisation. Basée sur une profonde con-

térieure de la Chine, que lord Lytton reconnaît indispensable.

Il est bien évident que les puissances du second groupe y sont beaucoup plus intéressées que les autres, puisque, par leurs possessions territoriales, elles ont pris racine sur le sol chinois ; puisqu'elles sont bon gré mal gré des puissances asiatiques.

S'il y avait une logique dans les affaires de ce monde, l'étude et la préparation d'une collaboration internationale, dans le cadre de la souveraineté chinoise, devraient sans plus tarder faire l'objet d'une triple entente France - Angleterre - Japon, dont l'autorité entraînerait bientôt l'adhésion des puissances, de toutes les puissances occidentales.

Et comme préface à cette triple entente, il conviendrait, dès maintenant, par un échange de vues entre la France et le Japon d'arrêter un protocole relatif aux éventualités chinoises.

Le Japon désire une conversation avec la France. Lors de sa dernière visite à Yokohama, l'amiral commandant nos forces navales d'Extrême-Orient en a reçu le témoignage. Pourquoi la France se déro-

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Quant à la France, elle est le type même des puissances du second groupe. Sa situation en Chine et sur les confins de la Chine est essentiellement statique. Attachée par raison au *statu quo*, opposée à des rétrocessions que tout contre-indique, la France redoute particulièrement une conquête bolchevique, dont l'union indochinoise serait tôt ou tard victime. Placée par rapport à la Chine dans une situation identique à celle du Japon, la France n'a avec le Japon aucun point de friction, aucun désaccord de principe.

Revenons à la reconstruction in-

préparation d'une collaboration internationale, dans le cadre de la souveraineté chinoise, devraient sans plus tarder faire l'objet d'une *triple entente France - Angleterre - Japon*, dont l'autorité entraînerait bientôt l'adhésion des puissances, de toutes les puissances occidentales.

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 Ah ! oui, je sais... l'indépendance de la Mandchourie ? — Eh ! bien, je répéterai ce que j'ai dit le 20 mars dans ma réponse à un article de M. Herriot :

« Ménagez un tête-à-tête entre l'Etat chinois et l'Etat mandchou. L'année ne sera pas close qu'ils n'aient trouvé la solution ! »

Le malade soignera lui-même son panaris : occupons-nous de sa maladie de cœur.

LA POMAREDE.

FIN

0795

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated May 12, 1933

Rec'd 3:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

424, May 12, 11 a. m.

My 420, May 11, 1 p. m.

Aeroplane marked with large circles on wings flew from the north over Peiping again this morning between 6 and 6:30 o'clock and was seen to drop large number of papers believedly propaganda handbills. Am seeking to obtain copy. Plane was heavily fired upon by Chinese machine guns and possibly anti-aircraft guns since several heavier reports were heard during the plane's flight. Chinese police deny that the plane dropped bombs as rumored. During its flight plane flew low directly over the Legation quarter. Chinese press reports that after visit of plane yesterday Japanese Legation representative called at police sub-station seeking copies of leaflets dropped by plane and making inquiries as to effect of plane's visit. Defence Commissioner, through native press, is urging populace not to be alarmed by the visit of plane and states that adequate defence measures have been taken by the military authorities.

Tokyo informed by mail.

KLP-WWC

JOHNSON

F/HS

793.94/6272

193.94

16270

0801

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 740,0011 Four Power Pact/67 FOR tel. #33 noon Confidential File

FROM Italy (Garrett) DATED May 11, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 o r o

6273

REGARDING: Farewell audience between American Ambassador to
Italy and Mussolini.

Mussolini commented on affairs in the Far East
stating that the gravest danger the world
was facing was Japan. Also stated he could
see nothing to prevent her gaining control
over China and thought that the whole world
would be menaced.

fc

Confidential File

793.34/6273

0801

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B-1)

FROM PEIPING

Dated May 12, 1933

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

429, May 12, 10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Mr. Y. C. T. Shen, Director of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office, came to see me today. He described his call as personal but intimated that Vice Minister Liu knew of his coming and what he had to say. He asked whether I had considered any action in view of appearance of Japanese aeroplane over Peiping, I stated that I had not nor knew of any ground for taking any action. In the course of somewhat lengthy conversation he stated that there were leaders in the Government who had believed that the Japanese would refrain from penetrating into Peiping-Tientsin area in order to avoid international complications and now that it appeared that the Japanese were in fact to invade this area they were disposed to count upon some action on the part of the powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain. He interposed that he himself did not share this view but he thought that if it was clear to those leaders that

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 12 1933
 Department of State

I/G 793.94/6274

JUN 24 1933

FILED

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REP

2-429, from Peiping, May 12, 10 p.m.

no action would be taken by the powers, knowledge of this might result in some change in the Government's policy.

I recalled to Shen the policy which the Government of the United States had followed, through statements of policy made at home and in supporting action thus far taken at Geneva. I stated that my feeling of friendship for China demanded that I tell him most frankly that Chinese leaders should not expect the United States to go beyond what had already been said or done by these responsible for the policy of the United States; that while we were watching developments with undivided interest I was sure that the United States did not wish to become physically involved in this situation. I stated that as American Minister I intended to remain here as long as the situation was tense but that should the Chinese Government authorities, military or civil, be driven from Peiping it would then be necessary for me to follow the Chinese Government to which I was accredited.

By mail to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

KLP-WWC

0803

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RECEIVED
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 TRANSPORT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JUN 23 1933

*Copies to Beijing
 Tokyo and Geneva, May 23 1933.*
 5/9/33 FE (R&K) 12 1933

Conversation:

SECRETARY OF STATE
 MAY 6 1933
 NOTED

Mr. Jules Henry, Counselor of
 French Embassy;

Mr. Hornbeck.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAY 8 1933
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/HS

Subject: Situation in North China.

793.94

Mr. Henry called and read me a telegram from his Government quoting from a telegram which they had from their Minister in China. In this it was stated that various Chinese, speaking on behalf of various Chinese governmental agencies, had been approaching the British and the American Ministers on the subject of some type of possible intermediation by the powers toward averting Chinese-Japanese hostilities which are a threat to various interests in the area south of the Wall and leading to Tientsin and Peiping. The French Government wished to know the views of the American Government. (Note: A part of what Mr. Henry read bore a striking resemblance to a statement which appeared in yesterday evening's Washington STAR as an AP despatch under date line Tokyo, May 1. See clipping attached).

I discussed with Mr. Henry the situation as we see it in the light of information, both official and press,

of

793.94/6275

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of the past few days. I then gave our view, outlining it in substance along the lines of our recent instruction to Minister Johnson. I said that we felt that the foreign governments and their representatives must exercise great caution: not only have approaches to the representatives of the powers at Peiping been made from a number of Chinese sources but such approaches have been made - and were even earlier made - from Japanese sources. Both the Chinese and the Japanese have tried and will try to get the foreign powers involved in some manner. Any efforts exerted by the powers toward inducing the Chinese to come to an agreement at this stage with the Japanese would be likely, if successful, to produce a situation which would be highly advantageous and pleasing to the Japanese but disadvantageous and displeasing in the long run to the Chinese (with the exception of the comparatively few Chinese immediately concerned with present military problems in the Peiping-Tientsin area). This Government wishes to be helpful in anything which ^{it} may be practicable to do. We perceive just now no possible course of action toward which we would be inclined to take an initiative. But if the French or the British Governments or their representatives in China have

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have anything definite to propose, we would be prepared to participate in discussions in a frame of mind pre-disposed toward cooperation. I said that to us the situation seems just now less acute than a few days ago but still cloudy and still one in which, as ever, it is necessary to be very careful. Mr. Henry said that he agreed with all of this and that he would inform his Government.

SKH

FE:SKH:CLS

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CHINESE LEADERS SEEKING ARMISTICE

Japanese Foreign Office Announces Negotiations Under Way in Peiping.

By the Associated Press.

TOKIO, May 1.—The Japanese foreign office disclosed today that Chinese leaders were seeking through American and British Ministers in Peiping to negotiate a Sino-Japanese armistice.

Official reports were received that certain Chinese approached both Nelson T. Johnson, the United States Minister, and Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, proposing that they assist in opening negotiations.

Neutral Zone Desired.

A meeting between Sino-Japanese military leaders for the purpose of deciding on an armistice and establishing a neutral zone south of the Great Wall of China is desired.

The report admitted that these Chinese are not connected with Marshal Chang Kai-Shek, the virtual dictator of the Nationalist government at Nanking, or his Peiping representative, Gen. Ho Ying-Ching.

The Japanese have demanded that the triangular area between the Lwan River and the Great Wall, extending 60 miles along the coast and 100 miles inland, and a 10-mile strip for another 100 miles inland, be made a neutral zone. This is territory in North China proper.

The Japanese Army, which advanced as far as the Lwan River and has just withdrawn again to the Wall on the coast, will make repeated drives over that area, military leaders said, until the Chinese agree to neutralize the zone.

Held Joint Operator.

Manchukuo became joint operator after Manchuria was seized from Chinese rule by the Japanese Army and the new state established.

Li contended the agreements were unfair because they were concluded in a period of China's greatest weakness, of which Russia allegedly took full advantage.

THE EVENING STAR, WASHINGTON, D. C., MONDAY, MAY 1, 1933.

0807

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

May 12 1933

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held on May 2,
1933, between Mr. Jules Henry, Counselor of the French
Embassy, and an officer of the Department, in regard to
the situation in North China.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

John Phillips

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated May 2, 1933.

MMH

FE:MMH:REK
5/9/33

FE
mmh

CR-5-1

MAY 1933

793.94/6275

0808

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 12 1933

No. 272

CONFIDENTIAL - STATE USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.


Sir:

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1933, between Mr. Jules Henry, Counselor of the French
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the situation in North China.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated May 2, 1933.



CR
May 9 1933

FE:MMH:REK
5/9/33

FE

mm

793.94/6275

0809

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1078

May 12 1933

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:


There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation held on May 2,
1933, between Mr. Jules Henry, Counselor of the French
Embassy, and an officer of the Department, in regard to
the situation in North China.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum
dated May 2, 1933.



FE:MMH:REK
5/8/33

FE
m m f.

CR 567
May 6 1937

793.94/6275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 550. S 1 Wash./359 Confidential File FOR letter
FROM General Disarmament (Davis) DATED April 13, 1933.
TO Conference, AMDEL NAME 1-1127 o r o

REGARDING:

Far Eastern situation: Memorandum of conversation on
April 2, 1933, between Ramsey MacDonald and Norman Davis, concerning --

MN

793.94/6276

081

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND I.D.

FE

GRAY VIA NR

TIENTSIN

Dated May 13, 1933

Rec'd. 10.10 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 5 pm

From reports believed to be correct, Lwanchow and Tangshan both occupied by Japanese and/or Manchukuo forces today. These troops are said now to be moving towards Tang, Shanghai. Japanese spokesman intimates it may yet be necessary to occupy Peiping and states important victories won in Kupeikou area and profess desire not to be forced to advance along the railway westward as far as Tientsin.



LOCKHART

PFC

RR

F/ESP

793.94/6277




7812

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 13 1933
Department of State
GRAY

EJ



TIENTSIN via N.R.

Dated May 13, 1933

Recd. 5.30 a.m.

F/ESP

793.94/6278

Secretary of State

Washington

May 13, 11 a.m.

Japanese military spokesman states Japanese troops will occupy Tungchow and that Liu Kuei Tang's Manchukuo army will occupy Kalgan and perhaps extend operations southeastward along Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

Japanese aircraft carrier KOMAI arrived at ~~Tokubai~~ ^{TAKU BAR} yesterday which event created considerable speculation and concern at Tientsin as regards possible extension of bombing operations. Japanese troops were busily engaged yesterday in filling sand bags and placing them at convenient and strategic points in Japanese concession. There has apparently been no important change in the Lwanchow area.

LOCKHART


RR

WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JS TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY



TIENTSIN via N.R.

FROM May 14, 1933

Rec'd 1:00a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.



F/H/S

193.94

May 14, noon

My May 13, 8 p.m. The reported occupation
 of Tangshan has not been confirmed and is probably
 incorrect. Tientsin is quiet but an air of
 expectancy prevails.

LOCKHART

JS

793.94/6279

0814

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

GRAY

TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

Dated May 15, 1933

Recd: 4.50 a.m.

Division of

FAI EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 15 1933

Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

May 15, 1 p.m.

Director of the Telephone Administration has just informed Consulate General that telephone message from Tangshan states that place now being bombed by Japanese airplanes. This report not yet confirmed in other quarters. Other sources report gunfire being heard north of Tangku. General He's troops are at Tangku; all Chinese troops having been withdrawn from Lwanchow. Unconfirmed reports are in circulation that one span of railway bridge at Lwanchow has been damaged.

There were two bomb throwing incidents in Tientsin native city last night. In one case several men were wounded and in another six were wounded. Martial law in native city was enforced.

Several trains of Chinese troops moved westward through Tientsin yesterday and railway authorities have been requested to furnish additional equipment for further movements.

Work is now being rapidly pushed on rail cut - on both sides from Yangtsun to Lutai on Peiping - Chinwangtao line.

KLP
 WSB

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/6280

MAY 24 1933

793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

EJ

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated May 15, 1938

Recd. 9.20 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 15 1938

Department of State

438. May 15, 4 p.m.

Refer to Tientsin's May 13, 11 a.m. and May 13, 8 p.m.

to the Department and the Legation.

Following telegram has been sent to Tientsin:

"May 15, 4 p.m. Confidential report your May 13, 11 a.m. and May 13, 8 p.m. and marked air activity by Japanese. I have in answer to American Board Mission's inquiries advised that women and children be evacuated from Tungchow. I suggest that you issue similar advices to American citizens resident in area which would be affected if advance on Tungchow transpires. It is further suggested that you promptly supply Japanese authorities with list of American citizens American owned properties in that area with descriptive data as to relative location of mission compounds to city walls, et cetera. Please supply Legation with copy of such list which will be transmitted by me to the Japanese Legation for information of the Japanese authorities. Legation is informed that part of Chinese Boys School of American Board Mission at Tungchow now being used as hospital for certain wounded Chinese soldiers.

F/G

793.94/6281

793.94
 293.11
 393.1163 Am 3

6278

6277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

No. 438 from Peiping

soldiers. This fact should be mentioned by you in reporting to the Japanese authorities location of this and other Mission property. Department has been informed.

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 16 1933
 Department of State

MET

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin

Dated May 16, 1933

Rec'd 5:55 a. m.

F/ESP

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

May 16, 3 p. m.

There remained at Tangshan early this morning one
 regiment of Chinese troops. Later telephone communica-
 tion was cut.

A Japanese destroyer arrived at Tangku this morning
 having on board a high ranking Japanese officer who has
 come to Tientsin to present gifts to and to comfort
 Japanese soldiers on behalf of the Emperor.

WSB-HPD

LOCKHART

793.94/6282

793.94

JUN 24 1933

0818

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

PEIPING

This message must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated May 15, 1933

Recd. 9.50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

439. May 15, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

One. Japanese forces have captured Shihhsia between Kupeikow and Miyun. Fighting there has been very severe with much loss of life on the part of the Chinese who have been fighting desperately against better equipment on air and land. Advance from Chinwangtao of Japanese troops is proceeding along old government road connecting Chinwangtao with Peiping through Tungchow. Japanese military at Tientsin have informed newspaper correspondents that they propose to take Tungchow and will there stop advance. I have considered it wise to advise American women and children to be evacuated from Tungchow.

Two, Peiping quiet but there have been many departures of Chinese. Police have erected sandbag protection at street corners and police stations during last three or four days doubtless due to reports that with the approach of the Japanese disturbances within the city might be created. It has not seemed necessary to take steps to evacuate women and children from places in the city and particular place of safety (first)

because

793.94

793.94/6282-1/2

FILED

0819

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

No. 439 from Peiping

because of the danger of starting a panic in the city,
(second) because there does not seem to exist any real
danger within the city. We feel that Americans will be
safer in their homes.

Three. Huang Fu is expected here day after tomorrow.
I understand that he comes with some idea of trying to
arrange an armistice for cessation of hostilities
pending some settlement of the greater problems
involving Manchuria and other questions.

Four. Japanese advance with attendant fighting
and death or wounding of many thousands of Chinese
soldiers who have been putting up an ineffectual defense
seems to me a cold blooded attempt to bring into
existence by force conditions more favorable to Japanese
policy. Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSB

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

CONFIDENTIAL

A telegram dated May 15, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

Shihsia, which is between Miyun and Kupeikow, has been captured by Japanese troops. The fighting there has been very heavy and the Chinese, who have waged a desperate fight on land and air against better equipped forces, have sustained great loss of life. From Chinwangtao the advance of Japanese forces is proceeding via Tungchow on the old government highway which connects Peiping and Chinwangtao. Newspaper correspondents have been informed by the Japanese military at Tientsin that the Japanese intend to capture Tungchow and their advance will stop there. The Minister states that he has thought it wise to advise the evacuation from Tungchow of American women and children.

The Minister reports that Peiping is quiet but that many Chinese have left the city. Sandbag protection has been erected at street corners and at police stations by the police during the past few days probably due to rumors that disturbances within the city might arise with the approach of the Japanese. The Minister states that it has not appeared necessary to take steps for the evacuation of women and children from the city because no real danger seems to exist in the city and because a panic might be started in the city. The Minister believes that their homes are the safest place for Americans.

The Minister adds that Huang Fu is expected in Peiping on May 17.

0821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1933 MAY 15 - PM 5:20 Washington,

May 15, 1933.

AMLEGATION,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

PEIPING (China).

159 Your 438, May 15, 4 p. m., and 439, May 15, 6 p. m.

In connection with reporting on steps taken by
American authorities with a view to protecting American
lives and property, it would be helpful here to have
simultaneous ^{by} information ^{regarding} ~~covering~~ action along similar
lines taken by authorities of other governments.

793.94/6282-1/2

793.94/6282

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (A)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated May 16, 1933

Rec'd 5:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

441, May 16, 4 p.m.

Department's 159, May 15, 5 p.m. / 1252 1/2

793.94
 limited to Tungchow and immediate neighborhood. Americans
 chiefly involved. I have had no information regarding other
 nationalities. We were chiefly concerned about
 children in American school at Tungchow. Peiping City
 and neighborhood quiet. It has not seemed necessary
 to consider precautionary steps here as no immediate
 danger expected.

JOHNSON

JS

F/ESP

793.94/6283

0823

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☐
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State
 RECEIVED

Washington
 May 18, 1933.

1933 MAY -20- PM 2:19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 AMLEGATION COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
 PEIPING (China).

This cable was sent in confidential code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased, but
 not retransmitted in any form.

5P

1751 ~~441, May 16, 4 p.m.~~
 URGENT.

I desire that you telegraph in detail your considered estimate of the present situation and that you outline the various possibilities that ^{might} eventuate in case Japanese forces occupy Peiping. I desire particularly your estimate of the likelihood of American lives being endangered and of the likelihood of the American marine guard becoming involved.

As the situation develops I desire that you keep the Department informed as promptly and fully as possible not only with regard to your own views and action taken by American authorities but also in regard to the views and action taken by your most interested colleagues.

Hull

793.94/6283

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/6283

3824

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated May 17, 1933

Rec'd 7:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

URGENT.

May 17, 2 p. m.

According to a report to railway authorities Japanese
 occupied Tangshan this morning.

General Huang Fu arrived in Tientsin this morning
 after having stopped in Tsinanfu yesterday to confer with
 Han Fu Chu. It is understood Huang Fu will proceed to
 Peiping this afternoon. His arrival has aroused fresh
 hopes that an amicable adjustment or at least a better
 understanding may be arranged with the Japanese. Both
 Japanese and Chinese officials have privately expressed
 this view to me within the past few days. General Muto's
 widely published statement concerning possibility of
 again withdrawing Japanese forces to the Wall if provoca-
 tive activities of Chinese are discontinued has also
 aroused renewed hopes that a way may be found to prevent
 the occupation of Tientsin and Peiping. There has been
 considerable exodus of Chinese into the foreign concessions
 from native city for past two days.

U.S.S. SACRAMENTO

F/G 793.94/6284

793.94
 note
 8:11.30
 1 hour

1824

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R.,
May 17, 2 p. m.

U.S.S. SACRAMENTO left today for Hsinho preparing
to sail for Chefoo on May 22.

GW-WSB

LOCKHART

0828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.0093/34 FOR desnatch #286

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Apr. 18, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

General Chiang and other new members of Government are making no courtesy calls on the consular body in Foochow because they do not care to call on the Japanese Consul General, according to a member of the Provincial Government

ma
✓

793.94 / 6285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Handwritten initials: L.C., 72, 7E

JS

PLAIN
 FROM
 PEIPING (Via N.B.)

Dated May 18, 1933

Rec'd 2:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

446, May 18, noon

Reuter from Shanghai 17th:

"Interviewed by Chinese press here this evening spokesman of Japanese Legation emphasized that Japan regarded Great Wall as boundary between China and Manchukuo. He said Japanese attack inside Wall was only intended to compel Chinese troops to refrain from attacking Manchukuo border and he declared that Japanese operations would cease if responsible Chinese leader was able to guarantee cessation of hostilities by Chinese troops thus preventing war operations from spreading to Peiping. He said Chinese authorities in North China intimated a desire to arrange armistice but as Chinese Government was determined to continue fighting Japan was unable to consider these peace overtures at present."

JOHNSON

JS

F/G 793.94/6286

0828

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

cib

TIENTSIN VIA NR

FROM

Dated May 18, 1933

Recd 4:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

May 18, 2 p.m.

The explosion of a bomb on a railway bridge near Tientsin central station yesterday just before the arrival of Huang Fu's special train is interpreted as an attempt on the life of Huang and resulted in the arrest and execution of a slightly wounded Chinese caught near the bridge shortly after the explosion. The Chinese is said to have confessed receiving money for placing the bomb on the bridge. Bombings are of almost daily occurrence here now.

There has apparently been little actual fighting in the Lwanchow region and progress west of that place has been slow. Considerable looting by retreating forces has occurred. The damage to the Lwanchow bridge previously reported will require about 3 weeks to repair, according to American military report.

The Tientsin Bureau of Public Safety has been put under the direct control of the Provincial Government."

LOCKHART

JS CIB

793.94
note
93.00

File
793.94/6287

1821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

GRAY

FROM PEIPING VIA NR

Dated May 19, 1933.

Recd 2 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

452, May 19, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"May 16, 1 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 19 1933

Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6288

793.94
note
861.77 China
893.01 Manchuria

One. Railway Administration confirms report of shooting on May 14th near Chalantun into eastbound train the from Manchuli which connected with/Siberian express. Several passengers wounded, cars riddled.

Two. Local Japanese inspired Press has commenced publishing articles alleging that Halha(Outer Mongolia) Mongols have expressed desire to unite with Manchukuo.

Three. Negotiations regarding Chinese Eastern Railway have apparently been switched into diplomatic channels."

JOHNSON

JS CIB

MAY 24 1933

0830

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRET
MAY 22 1933

May 20, 1933.

NOTED

Mr. Secretary:

The "Southwest Political Council", a sort of a branch or sub-organization of the Nationalist Party in China, addresses, from Canton, to the League, to the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and to the Government of Soviet Russia a lengthy statement. They say that negotiations are under way in North China for an agreement the terms of which if adopted would be disastrous to the interests of the Chinese people and a "menace to the world". They conclude with a forceful declaration, on behalf of the Chinese people, of the principle of non-recognition.

The communication bears the signature of six people, of whom the first, Tang Shao Yi, is a well-known figure in China's public affairs with a status somewhat that of an "elder statesman".

I have shown this telegram, for his information, to the Chinese Minister. There is no action that we need take on it.

SKH

FE:SKH:CLS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET


PLAIN

FROM Canton

May 19, 1933

May 19, 1933

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



793.94
 ntl
 793.01 Manchuria

The Southwest Political Council is constrained to address this communication to the League of Nations, which is seized of the Sino-Japanese dispute relating to Manchuria, and to the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty which guarantees the territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity of the Chinese Republic, as well as to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a signatory of the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924.

Two. The Chinese people as a whole are irrevocably opposed to any compromise or agreement with Japan based on Chinese recognition of the Japanese created State of Manchukuo. Manchuria together with Jehol is an integral and vital part of the Chinese Republic whose territory is one and indivisible; and for this reason among others, the tearing away of Manchuria and Jehol cannot be suffered by China save at the risk of such material and moral enfeeblement that her survival as an independent and sovereign state would become a matter of incalculable difficulty.

Three.

F/A. 793.94/6289

FILED

MAY 23 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Canton, May 19.

Three. This Council is informed that negotiations are in train between agents of the Japanese general staff, which is the real government of Japan, and emissaries of the Nanking Military Commission, to (underline) which the government at Nanking is entirely subservient (underline) for a settlement of the dispute relating to Manchuria including Jehol on terms not only inconsistent with the League of Nations resolution condemning Japanese policy and action in Manchuria as well as with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty but in utter disregard of the vital interests of China as a self-respecting and independent country.

Four. The terms under negotiation include the following:

(A) - The Japanese Government considered it impossible to demand the Chinese National Government to recognize the independence of Manchukuo, but hopes that the Chinese Government will, from the commencement of negotiation, effectively stop all activities toward disturbing the peace of Manchukuo and will consider the Manchukuo Government as (underline) de facto (underline) to ensure everlasting peace between China and Japan, these two governments will mutually agree to include provinces north of the Yellow River as "non-war" area.

(B) -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-from Canton, May 19.

(B) - The Chinese Government will give full guarantee that the boycott of Japanese goods will not be a measure of national policy.

(C) - Should the foregoing two principles be agreed to, the Japanese Government will voluntarily abolish unilateral treaties, and will surrender all rights and privileges pertaining to concessions, extraterritoriality and river navigation, and will further proceed to conclude treaties with the Chinese Government on equal and reciprocal basis with a common object of maintaining an "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine".

Five. A fourth term is also under negotiation which pledges the Japanese Government to give "the Chinese Government every assistance economically, financially and militarily" in order (according to one version) to suppress red bandits "but, according to another version, to enable the Nanking Military Commission to suppress other military forces in China".

Six. The real meaning of the foregoing terms is clear. Not only must the Chinese Government agree to a and thus in effect consent to the (underline) de facto (underline) recognition of Manchukuo/ permanent severance of Manchuria / and Jehol from China but Japan is to extend over the rest of China the system of "cooperation" which the Japanese General Staff and its agents are working out in Manchukuo. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the danger to the Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

4-from Canton, May 19.

Chinese people and the menace to the world involved in these terms.

Seven. As there does not exist political machinery enabling the Chinese people to effect (otherwise than by civil war) a change of government in Nanking in order to mark their opposition to the aforesaid terms, it devolves on the Southwest Political Council as a duly constituted and nationally recognized political organ, first, to register the nation's opposition to the negotiations now in train between the agents of the Japanese General Staff and the Nanking Military Commission or its emissaries whether or not the said negotiations are being conducted, at this stage, with the knowledge of the members of the Government at Nanking; and, secondly, to inform the League of Nations and the friendly powers to whom this communication is addressed that the Chinese people will refuse to recognize the validity of any agreement which the Government at Nanking may be coerced to conclude with the Japanese Government in violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity in Manchuria and Jehol and in contradiction with the terms of the League of Nations resolution relating to the Manchurian question as well as with the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty.

Tong

183

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

5-from Canton, May 19.

Tong Shao Yi; Sheo Fu Seng; Tang Cha Kyue; Chan
Chai Tong; Li Chung Yen; Chaulu,

Members of the Standing Committee of the South-
west Political Council, Canton.

KLP-HPD

0836

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Charge to
\$

Washington,

1933 MAY -20- PM 1:16

May 20, 1933.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
AMLEGATION,

30h

PEIPING (China).

173
Your 457, May 20, 9 a. m.

Under date May 19 Department received telegraphic communication from Southwest Political Council along lines indicated in your telegram under reference. Department is filing communication without ~~acknowledgment~~. *(acknowledgment)*

793.94/62894

H-ee
SKH

793.94/6289

CR
May 20 1933.

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by *Pf*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1923 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

TIENTSIN VIA N.R.

FROM Dated May 19, 1933

Recd. 8.30 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 19 1933
 Department of State

F/HS

793.94

URGENT. May 19, 3 p.m.

A state of emergency was declared in the native city last night incident to widely circulated reports that plain clothes organizations would start serious disorders at midnight. The strictest martial law was enforced but no disturbances occurred. Chinese authorities were much alarmed.

793.94/6290

Manchukuo forces at Tangshan are numerically small. Some are said to have advanced to a point half way to Lutai but this is not confirmed. Railway authorities state Chinese forces are now retreating from Lutai to Tang'ruan. It is believed that Japanese forces as such are showing reduced activity in Lwanchow area.

Unconfirmed reports are current in Chinese circles that all of Chiang Kai Shek's troops have withdrawn from Miyun and that that city is now held by so called grey troops.

A considerable number of troops passing westward through Tientsin.

CSB
 WSB

LOCKHART

0838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

KLP

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 19, 1933.

Rec'd. 11:50 a.m.

F/HS

793.94/6291

Secretary of State,
Washington.

455, May 19, 4 p.m.

My 424, May 12, 11 a.m.

Airplane believedly Japanese biplane bomber with
bombs in racks circled high over Peiping and environs for
half an hour this morning then departed in northeastern
direction. So far as known no propaganda leaflets were
dropped as on previous visits of Japanese planes.
Sporadic machine gun fire by Chinese was frequently heard
during airplane's visit.

JOHNSON

WSB:KLP

0835

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 20, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

Referring to Minister
Johnson's telegram stating that
a Japanese bombing plane with
bombs in racks circled over
Peiping yesterday, -

There is attached a flimsy
of the United Press staff
correspondent's account, which
gives details, of this incident.

FE:SKH:CLS

SKH

1933,
DEPT.
COMMUN.

0841

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
 Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

20- PM Washington,
 May 20, 1933.

AMLEGATION,
 PEIPING (China).

174

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 455, May 19, 4 p. m.

If United Press accounts of this incident are approximately accurate, Department feels that on the basis of this incident and/or any other similar incidents a protest by the diplomatic body or Ministers of the leading powers would be in order. You should take no repeat no initiative in the matter but in case the question is raised by one of your colleagues you are authorized in your discretion to take, as of your own conception, that position.

Free

793.94/6291

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1919 1-138

793.94/6291

084

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 23, 1933.

~~YES~~
~~NO~~
~~SPN~~
The attached despatch dated April 24, 1933, from Canton encloses a newspaper clipping of a speech of Dr. Kan Chieh-hou, Inspector General for Foreign Affairs for the Southwestern Provinces. Dr. Kan accompanied Mr. Eugene Chen to Japan in 1931 and his speech gives an account of the trip.

Dr. Kan states that agreements were reached with Baron Shidehara and confirmed by the late Mr. Inukai to the effect that (1) Japan would reaffirm China's sovereignty in Manchuria, (2) China would respect Japan's economic interests in Manchuria, (3) a joint committee would study the numerous outstanding cases in Manchuria, (4) the Chinese could build without objection railway lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, (5) Ruinous railway competition would be done away with by means of through traffic arrangements and rate adjustments, (6) a non-aggression pact would be concluded between China and Japan.

In talking with Japanese military officials Dr. Kan and Mr. Chen found an intense hatred for Chang Hsueh-liang, a contempt for the political parties in Japan and a feeling of doubt as to whether there was any use in negotiating treaties.

Dr. Kan and Mr. Chen hurried back to China with the hope of turning their agreement with Shidehara into a formal treaty, but

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

"anchuria was invaded before Canton and Nanking could settle their differences and proceed with the matter of the treaty.

Consul General Pallantine states in his covering despatch that Mr. Chen's report of the trip made no reference to an attempt to negotiate a treaty and that one is led to believe that Dr. Wan has assumed "a sort of poetic license for the purpose of showing how much more successfully the nation's diplomacy vis a vis Japan would have been conducted by the Canton group than it has been conducted by the Nanking Government".

ETW

084

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 194

793.94

M for Ballantyne

April 24, 1933.


Subject: Dr. Kan's Explanation of
Eugene Chen's Trip to
Japan in 1931.



The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister, Peiping.



F/HS

793.94/6292

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a clipping
1/- from the CHUNG KAI GAZETTE of April 22, 1933, quoting an
address delivered by Dr. Kan Chieh-hou, Inspector
General for Foreign Affairs for the Southwestern Pro-
vinces, delivered before the Thursday Club, an inter-
national luncheon group, in which he gave an account
of the trip to Japan made by Eugene Chen in 1931.

Dr. Kan asserted that Eugene Chen, as an outcome
of the visit, reached an agreement with Baron Shidehara,
embodied in a memorandum, regarding the relations of
China and Japan, and that he conferred also with Mr.
Inukai as well as the Chief of the Japanese General
Staff on questions relating to this subject. The
most significant features of the alleged agreement were
the withdrawal of Japanese objections to Chinese rail-
way lines paralleling the South Manchuria Railway, and
provisions for co-operation in through traffic arrange-
ments on their respective lines to avoid ruinous

competition

MAY 31 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

competition. In return China undertook to respect Japanese economic interests in Manchuria in so far as they had a treaty basis and were consistent with Chinese sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Mr. Inukai is alleged to have told Mr. Chen that his views on Chinese policy coincided with those of Baron Shidehara, but Mr. Kan represented the Chief of Staff as being inclined to discount the value of negotiations and treaty making and distrustful of Chang Hsueh-liang. Japanese military leaders he described as being contemptuous of political parties.

Mr. Chen's own statement of his visit to Japan is somewhat at variance with Mr. Kan's. As reported in my despatch of November 17, 1932, Mr. Chen stated that no attempt was made by him to negotiate with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, his object having been merely to ascertain what the real aim and policy of Japan was in China, particularly Manchuria. If this were all, then there could have been little impropriety in the Japanese Foreign Minister's having received him - as he might, for example, have received a foreign newspaper correspondent. Mr. Kan, however, leads one to infer that the outcome of the visit was something more substantial than a mere statement of policy in general terms, but considering all the circumstances at that time and subsequent developments, it is fair to conclude that Mr. Kan has assumed a sort of poetic license for the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

the purpose of showing how much more successfully
the nation's diplomacy vis a vis Japan would have
been conducted by the Canton group than it has been
conducted by the Nanking Government.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

In duplicate to Legation, quintuplicate to Department
and one copy to Nanking.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Clipping from CANTON GAZETTE, April 22, 1933.

800

CAC:GL

15

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Canton Gazette April 22, 1933

Eugene Chen's Secret Trip To Japan In 1931

**LIGHT THROWN UPON IT BY DR. KAN
 CHIA-HOU, INSPECTOR FOR FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS FOR S.W. PROVINCES,
 WHO WENT WITH HIM**

**CONFERENCE BETWEEN MR. CHEN AND LATE MR. INUKAI
 HELD UNDER MOST PECULIAR CONDITION, TOLD**

Dr. Kan Chia-hou, Inspector for Foreign Affairs for the South-Western Provinces, speaking before a large gathering of members and guests at the Thursday Club meeting held at the Nam Yuen Restaurant at which he was the honored guest of the day, gave the first public explanation of the secret trip to Japan made by Mr. Eugene Chen in 1931. The speaker who is well qualified to throw light upon the subject, as he went with Mr. Chen on that trip, addressed his audience as follows:—

"Ladies and Gentlemen: A few years ago, Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang invited some foreign guests to dinner. Feng did what a Chinese host is used to do. He apologized that he could not give them very much in the dinner and requested them to be satisfied with having more rice so that they would not leave still feeling hungry. cannot escape the ordeal of saying a few words.

"After two courses had been served, the guests rose up, thanked the host and left. Feng was very much surprised, and disappointed, as he had prepared an elaborate dinner of fifteen or twenty courses. The guests, having been frequently informed that Feng treated his guests with two loaves of black bread and a bowl of vegetable soup and having heard what Feng had just said, thought that the two courses were a much better dinner than they expected.

"I regret that our hosts today are noted for their generosity. How I wish that we could believe as Feng's guests believed so that we could leave after the first two courses and I would be relieved of the difficult thing of giving a speech. But, since we enjoy the tiffin and we remain, I

"A week ago, a Hongkong paper published some news about me. In the last paragraph, the editor gave a brief account of my public career in which he said "Mr. Kan Chia-hou, as we remember, accompanied Mr. Eugene Chen to Japan in the year 1931."

Why Trip Was Secret

"Our trip to Japan has been a mystery to the public. I think it is not improper to take this opportunity to tell you what was the object and what was the result of our trip to Japan. In May and June, 1931, we received information that the military of Japan was planning to take drastic measures in Manchuria and we were also informed that the liberal elements in Japan, then in power, were very nervous over what might happen in Manchuria. So it was suggested that the responsible leaders of the two countries might meet and talk over the matter in the hope that the unhappy thing might be avoided. As our trip to Japan might cause misunderstanding to those who were not aware of our purpose, we decided to make it a secret one.

(Continued on Page 5)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EUGENE CHEN'S SECRET TRIP TO JAPAN IN 1931

(Continued from Page 1)

Eugene Chen, Shidehara Confer

"Three conferences were held between Mr. Eugene Chen and Baron Shidehara and they were able to reach an agreement. The points agreed were put in a memorandum of which two copies were made, one kept by Mr. Chen and one by Baron Shidehara.

"The Japanese Government would issue a declaration reaffirming Japan's respect for Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, which would be declared as an integral part of the Chinese territory, and announcing that Japan had no territorial and political ambition in Manchuria. On the part of China, the Chinese Government was prepared to respect the Japanese economic interests in Manchuria insofar as they had treaty basis and in so far as they were not inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty and with the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

Divergent Issues

"A commission would be set up with Chinese and Japanese delegates who would study the numerous outstanding cases in Manchuria and would recommend to their respective Governments as to how they might be settled. The Chinese and the Japanese Governments would be free to accept, alter or reject the recommendations.

Differences Concerning Railways

The Japanese Government would not raise further objection, as it had in the past, to the parallel lines to the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese claimed that there was a treaty provision under which China undertook not to construct parallel lines to the South Manchurian Railway. But there was no such treaty

provision. There was only an entry in the minutes of the Peiping Conference. Anyway, Japan would not raise any further question on this subject. The Chinese and the Japanese railway administrations would make arrangement for through traffic and for rate adjustment between the Chinese and the Japanese lines so as to do away with ruinous competition.

Non-Aggression Pact

"A non-aggression pact would be concluded between China and Japan. By including this in the agreement, we had clearly in mind the aggressive schemes of the Japanese military.

"In order to be sure that the opposition party would also follow the same policy when it should come into power, we had a conference with the late Mr. Inukai, leader of the Seiyukai, who would be the Premier, should his party come up to form the cabinet. As we did not speak Japanese and Mr. Inukai did not speak Chinese or English, we arranged to have an interpreter to interpret for us. The interpreter failed to appear at the appointed time; I suggested to carry on the conversation by writing as Mr. Inukai was quite good in Chinese.

"We told him the main points of the agreement between Mr. Chen and Baron Shidehara and asked him whether he would observe the same line of policy when he was installed in power. He assured us that his policy coincided with that of Baron Shidehara with respect to Manchuria.

Hatred For Chang Hsueh-liang

"Then we wanted to know the attitude of the Japanese military. In a few conversations with the chief of the General Staff and the head of its Intelligence Department, now the Japanese chief delegate to the Disarmament Conference, we were quite sure as to what they were going to do. They expressed their doubts as to whether there was any use in negotiation and making of treaties. They showed intense hatred for Chang Hsueh-liang. They did not conceal their contempt for the political parties in Japan. What they said forecast all what happened later—the invasion of Manchuria and the organization of a government in Japan which serves only as a mouthpiece of the Japanese military.

Hurrying Back To China

"We decided to hurry back in the hope that the government resulting from the forthcoming peace conference between Nanking and Canton, might turn this agreement into a formal treaty, before the Japanese military took the matter into their own hands. But it was too late. The Peace Conference went on very slowly. Manchuria was invaded by Japanese military forces. The opportunity was lost for the co-operation between the liberal elements in China and Japan.

International Friendship And Goodwill

"Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very glad to have the opportunity to be present at an organization the purpose of which is to promote international friendship and goodwill. International friendship and goodwill can be brought about only by mutual understanding and mutual understanding depends to a very great extent upon constant contact. This is what the Thursday Club is doing and it has done very successfully.

"As the Chairman has just said, I am a "wai-kon-lau", an outsider coming to Canton. Although I am a "wai-kon-lau", and I cannot speak the Cantonese dialect, I have experienced very warm reception from the Chinese and foreign friends alike. But I still regret I cannot speak the dialect.

Funny Situation

"I shall illustrate the difficulty of not being able to speak the dialect. A certain friend of mine came to Canton, several years ago, to attend the extraordinary session of the Parliament. He was invited to dinner by a friend who lived at Loh-ti-han, near the west gate of the city. He sent for a sedan chair and told the coolies to carry him to the West Gate, Loh-ti-han. As soon as he got to the West Gate, the coolies put down the sedan chair, and would not proceed any further. As it was raining very heavily, my friend demanded for the reason. The coolie said, "You told us to go to the west gate and then you will "loh-ti-han" (meaning get down and walk). As my friend mispronounced the name of the street, he had to walk in the rain.

0848

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 20 1933
Department of State

FE

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 20, 1933

Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

461, May 20, 4 p. m.

Reuter from Shanghai today:

"When interviewed this morning Sun Fo, President of Legislative Yuan, declared that report of a Sino-Japanese compromise having been reached was untrue. He said if any arrangement had been made it was for a local truce in North China which would in no way effect the general Sino-Japanese situation. He said he did not believe that Japanese troops would enter Peiping or Tientsin."

JOHNSON

HPD

F/G

793.94/6293

0845

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED COPIES SENT TO
 PLAIN O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 20, 1933

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

457, May 20, 9 a. m.

Southwest Political Council in Canton yesterday issued statement which is said to have been communicated to League of Nations, signatories of Nine Power Treaty and Soviet Ambassador to China, denouncing any compromise or agreement with Japan based on recognition of Manchukuo. Statement claims that negotiations are not in progress between Nanking and Tokyo regarding following terms:

One. Chinese Government will effectively check all activities tending to disturb peace in Manchukuo.

Two. To ensure everlasting peace between China and Japan the two Governments agree to constitute provinces north of Yellow River into a neutral area.

Three. Chinese Government to guarantee that boycott of Japanese goods will not be measure of national policy.

Four. In return for the above Japanese Government will abolish all unilateral treaties and surrender all rights and privileges pertaining to concessions, extra-territoriality and river navigation and will conclude

treaties

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 20 1933
 Department of State
 May 20, 1933

F/G

793.94/6294

MAY 23 1933

793.94

793.94/6294

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Peiping via N.R.,
 Dated May 20, 1933

treaties with China on reciprocal basis with the common object of maintaining an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

Five. Japanese Government also to give Chinese economic, financial and military assistance in the suppression of Red bandits.

Statement concludes that as there does not exist any political machinery enabling Chinese people to effect change of government in Nanking other than by civil war it devolves upon Southwest Political Council to register the nation's opposition to the present negotiations and to declare that Chinese people will refuse to recognize validity of any agreement in violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty, administrative integrity of Manchukuo, terms of League resolution and provisions of Nine Power Treaty.

Statement is signed by Tang Shaoy, Hsiao Fo Cheng, Teng Tsi Ju, Chen Chi Tang, Li Tsung Jen and Tsou Lu.

HPD

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be- FROM
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (B-1)

TOMIO

Dated May 20, 1933

Rec'd 6:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

104, May 20, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. The Japanese General Staff office
 states that Japanese troops are now within 25 miles of
 Peiping on both northern and eastern sides; that occupa-
 tion of Peiping will probably not be necessary; that
 there is no intention of occupying Tientsin, which is
 not and never has been one of their tactical objectives;
 that the Japanese forces have now practically accomplished
 their purpose in North China; that General Liu Kue-Tang
 has declared independence of Chahar Province from China
 and that it is rumored that the movement for the indepen-
 dence of North China is gaining ground in the Tientsin
 area.

Not repeated to Peiping.

GREW

CSB

HPD

Note
 893.01
 Manchuria



Paraphrase sent
 to ONI & NIO
 in confidence

F/HS
 793.94/6295

0852

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 22 1933

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

Telegram dated May 20, 1933, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo, reads substantially as follows:

According to information from the office of the General Staff, Japanese forces have reached points twenty-five miles from Peiping eastwards and a similar distance northwards; that it is unlikely that it will be essential to occupy that city; and that the occupation of Tientsin is not now nor has it been a tactical aim of Japan, so it is not intended to occupy it. The Ambassador reports that according to the office of the General Staff the objectives of Japanese troops in North China have by now in effect been attained; that in the area of Tientsin the North China separatist movement is making headway, according to rumor; and that Chahar's separation from the Chinese Republic has been announced by General Liu Kuei-t'ang.

385

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 20, 1933

Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

URGENT

May 20, 11 a. m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 20 1933
 Department of State

793.94
 note
 393.11

A bomb exploded on the platform at Tientsin East Station last night about one o'clock shortly after arrival of express from Tangiau killing one Chinese, wounding several others, burning three passenger coaches and creating great excitement. Near midnight series explosions, said by some to be bombs or hand grenades and by others to be artillery, were heard southwest of Japanese concession in vicinity of Nankai University. These explosions, estimated at from forty to fifty, accompanied by some machine gun and rifle firing, kept up intermittently until about five a. m. Various versions of the disturbances are current, some being that groups of plain clothes men are again active and others attributing disturbances to groups of persons bent on ousting present local government. Latter probably correct.

There

F/HS

793.94/6296

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- From Tientsin, May 20, 11 a. m.

There were two visitations of Japanese airplanes over Tientsin this morning, one at 8 o'clock composed of three planes and another at 11 o'clock of one plane. (but?) No bombs were dropped by Chinese fired at eleven o'clock plane with machine guns and rifles without effect. The visit of these planes creates considerable concern.

Considerable concentration Chinese troops at Yangtsun and Peitsang, between Peiping and Tientsin and Japanese Information Bureau persistently reports revolt of large forces of Chinese troops in area this side Tangshan. Tension of last 24 hours indicates further important developments impending in this area. Have advised Americans residing in suburban areas of Tientsin to remove to foreign concession areas.

393.11

LOCKHART

GW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.
Dated May 20, 1933
Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

460, May 20, 3 p. m.

My 455, May 19, 4 p. m. / 6291

At 9:30 this morning 11 Japanese bombing planes flew over Peiping and environs and departed northeastward. So far as known Chinese refrained from anti-aircraft fire. It is believed that demonstration was largely to encourage continued withdrawal of Chinese troops toward Peiping in accordance with rumored agreement the existence of which however no definite confirmation can yet be obtained. Present orderly withdrawal of Chinese troops toward Peiping from north and east however tends to confirm report that some understanding has been reached between Japan and Chinese.

Two. At 10:30 this morning a lone Japanese plane flew over Peiping. Japanese sentry at gateway to the Japanese Legation guard compound while gazing skyward at this plane was attacked and severely injured by a Chinese who alighted from a motor car wielding a big sword, then sought to regain motor car which, with engine running, waited. Chauffeur started car too quickly



F/HS

793.94/6297

793.94

0854

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#460, From Peiping, May 20, 3 p.m.

quickly however and assailant was captured by Japanese guard and taken into barracks while guard hastily erected sand bag barricades at gate. A representative (allegedly of Swiss nationality) of ^{Ullstein} ~~Ullman~~ press in Germany took photograph of scene) was invited by Japanese guards to enter compound and was then man-handled and arrested for taking such street photograph without permission of Japanese guard.

JOHNSON

WSB

CSB

0857

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JH
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
EDN.I. AND M.I.D.

PEIPING via N.R.

FROM Dated May 21, 1933

Rec'd. 3:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, May 21, 11 a.m.

Router from Tokyo twentieth.



793.94
"Chinese proposals for a truce thus far have not been taken seriously by Japanese military authorities who are insisting that truce can only be accepted on following conditions:

One. Must be formally proposed by responsible Chinese Military Commander.

Two. Demilitarized zone ten miles deep to be established south of Great Wall.

Three. Anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo movements and boycott to be suspended.

Four. Nanking to promise it will cease supplying arms and munitions to anti-Manchukuo volunteers".

JOHNSON

JS

F/HS

793.94/6298

1933

0858

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N.R.

Dated May 21, 1933

FROM Rec'd. 6:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

465, May 21, 1 p.m.

Legation's 457, May 20, 19 a.m. Central Executive


Committee of Kuomintang in Nanking yesterday replied to Southwest leaders denying alleged terms of an Armistice and asking them to cease attacking Central Government: "You have unreasonably given a credulous ear to rumors and circulated false Sino Japanese terms to confuse public opinion both in China and abroad. Furthermore you have formally communicated your statement to foreign countries thereby displaying our weakness. Your action is as greatly deplored by us as it is welcome to our enemy."

Reply then urges Southwest leaders to bear in mind present national difficulties and to help carry out government's plan by sending troops against communists so as to enable Nanking deal with Japanese invasion.

JOHNSON

JS

COPIES SENT TO
N.I. AND M.I.



F/H S

793.94/6299

FILED

MAY 23 1933

0855

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Peiping

Dated May 22, 1933

Rec'd 3:23 a. m.

F/HS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

468, May 22, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY.

Your 174, May 20, 4 p. m.



793.94/6300

There has been no suggestion on the part of colleagues
of taking any action concerning flight of Japanese planes
over Peiping. I shall observe Department's instructions
should such suggestion come forward.

JOHNSON

WP CIB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via H. R.

Dated May 22, 1933

Rec'd 4:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



470, May 22, noon

Reuter from Changchun twenty-first:

"Interviewed today General Koiso, Chief of Staff to Marshal Muto, indicated that halt in Japanese advance line at Miyun and Tangshan marked completion of campaign to eliminate Chinese bases of attack on Great Wall. He continues 'Future peace now depends entirely on the Chinese attitude. If we are convinced that the Chinese will not advance beyond their present positions we are prepared to withdraw our main strength leaving only observation outposts.'

Questioned concerning activities on western frontier General Koiso stated control of Kalgan was essential to security of Manchukuo west boundary but asserted that as population north of the Dolonor-Kalgan line was friendly to Manchukuo's operations in that area were not required.

He expresses optimism concerning early peace explaining that formal delimitation of neutral zone might be left to diplomatic conversations in Nanking, Peiping or Tokyo or conclusion

F/ESP
 793.94/6301

MAY 23 1933

PTED

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#470, from Peiping, May 22, noon.

conclusion of an armistice between the commanders in the field.

Koiso emphasized that fears of foreigners that Peiping and Tientsin might become a battleground could be removed by Chinese forces abandoning an aggressive attitude."

JOHNSON

CIS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A-1)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated May 22, 1933

Rec'd 5:56 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

469, May 22, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Your 175, May 20, 5 p. m.

One. Chinese retirement along entire front continues.

They now occupy a line running roughly from about half way between Peiping and Miyun and through Tungchow and generally along river to Tientsin. Japanese appear to be following Chinese as they retire. No fighting reported. Last night Japanese cavalry reported about four miles from Tungchow. Missionaries at Tungchow believe that Chinese are not preparing to make a stand at Tungchow. Retirement of Chinese is orderly.

Two. It seems at the present moment entirely possible that Japanese will continue forward movement until they have occupied or encircled Peiping. I have been unable to obtain any accurate information as to understandings either arrived at or in process of arrangement between Chinese and Japanese. Japanese are reported to have demanded



F/HS

793.94/6302

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RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-469, From Peiping, May 22, 2p.m.

demanded that all Chinese troops evacuate south of Peiping and Tientsin. I am informed by private sources here that Ho Ying Chin intimated yesterday to the local heads of educational institutions that they should allow their students to go elsewhere as arrangement which he had made with Japanese was not being adhered to by them because of attack on Japanese sentry on Saturday and Japanese would come in.

Three. It is impossible to forecast events in Peiping should Japanese occupy city but if retirement continues as at present Japanese occupation should be orderly and without danger. Neither my colleagues nor I have considered situation in Peiping dangerous. I know of no reason why American Legation guard should become involved unless it would be for the purpose of cooperating with other guards for the maintenance of the neutrality of the Legation quarter.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

WSB

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

A telegram dated May 22, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The Chinese are continuing to withdraw along the entire front. Their line now runs roughly from about midway between Miyun and Peiping and passes through Tungchow and goes to Tientsin along the river. It appears that the Japanese are following the Chinese as they withdraw. There have been no reports of fighting. Japanese cavalry was reported as being about four miles from Tungchow on the night of May 21. It is the belief of missionaries at Tungchow that no preparations for a stand at Tungchow are being made by the Chinese. The Chinese are retiring in an orderly manner.

The Minister reports that at the present time it seems very possible that the forward movement of the Japanese will continue until Peiping is occupied or surrounded by them. The Minister states that he has not been able to get any accurate information regarding understandings which have either been reached or are being arranged between the Japanese and the Chinese. It is reported that the Japanese have demanded that the area south of Tientsin and Peiping be evacuated by all Chinese soldiers. The Minister has received information from private sources in Peiping that it was intimated by Ho Ying Chin on May 21 to the local officials of educational institutions that their students should be allowed

0865

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

allowed to go to other places as an arrangement which Ho had made with the Japanese was not being kept by them because of an assault on a Japanese sentry a few days ago and the Japanese would enter.

The Minister adds that it is impossible to foretell events in the city if the Japanese should take it but if the withdrawal goes on as it is at present the occupation by the Japanese should be without danger and should be done in an orderly way. The Minister and his colleagues do not consider as dangerous the situation in Peiping, and the Minister adds that he knows of no reason why the American Legation guard should be drawn into the matter unless, for the purpose of maintaining the Legation quarter's neutrality, it should cooperate with the other guards.

0866

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 22, 1933

Rec'd 5:45 a. m.

F/HS

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

May 22, 6 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



793.94

Martial law enforced last two nights Chinese areas except ex-German concessions. No further disturbances have occurred but reports current that efforts still being made by plain clothes men to renew disturbances such as took place Friday night. Japanese military authorities state positively no Japanese troops outside their concessions Friday night. Chinese state disturbances were due to the activities plain clothes men instigated by "a certain foreign power". All explosions and firing took place well outside Japanese concession and I believe no Japanese troops actively participated in incident. Chinese police stations in affected areas were not occupied either by Chinese or Japanese throughout morning.

There was apparently no change in military situation in Tangshan area over week end.

Approximately 4 to 6 ^{thousand} farmer refugees, with their

families,

793.94/6303

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-From Tientsin, May 22, 6 p. m.

families, carts and personal belongings, have assembled for safety immediately adjoining French arsenal in east suburbs Tientsin having fled from fear of looting by retreating soldiers from Tangshan area.

LOCKHART

WWC

CSB

0868

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A-1)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated May 22, 1933

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.


Secretary of State,
 Washington.

474, May 22, 7 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR SECRETARY.

My 469, May 22, 2 p. m. / 6702

One. I have just seen my British and French colleagues. Lampson informed us that this morning Vice Minister Liu called upon him and discussed present situation. Liu stated that Huang Fu had not had any discussions with the Japanese. He said that acting on the authority of the Minister of war he had come to say that the Chinese pursuant to recent statement by General Kato, had withdrawn their forces to the line mentioned in my telegram above referred to, but that Japanese continued to press forward and that Japanese occupation of Peiping and Tientsin was imminent. Liu stated that they would resist if Japanese approached Peiping. He asked whether Lampson would be willing to act as go-between. Lampson said yes provided Chinese put request in writing and spoke as one man, and also suggested that Chinese draw up formula which would be acceptable to the Chinese. Liu asked whether Lampson thought



F/HS

793.94/6304

793.94
 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#474, From Peiping, May 22, 7pm

thought Japanese would be receptive. Lampson undertook to find out. Liu suggested that inquiry as to Japanese attitude should be made at Tokyo and not here at Peiping where no responsible Japanese was present. Lampson has repeated this to Tokyo with the suggestion that the British Charge d' Affairs at Tokyo sound Japanese provided London approves. We discussed present situation. We agreed that there was no occasion at present for us to take any action vis a vis our local communities. We can only watch situation and be prepared to take action should that become necessary.

1249318
 Three. We discussed question of Legation guards. We agreed that it would be impossible for us to force neutrality of diplomatic quarter. We are without information as to intentions of local Japanese guard and feel that it would be inadvisable here or at Tokyo to make inquiries. Guard is independent of diplomatic secretary now in charge of the Japanese Legation.

Repeated to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

CSE

WWC

0870

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 17, 1933.

~~Mr. Phillips:~~
~~Mr. Secretary:~~

Please note especially
the section which I have
marked on pages 3 and 4.

2
SKH

SKH:CLS

0871

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation:

The Chinese Minister of Finance.
 The Chinese Minister.
 Mr. Hornbeck.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 22 1933

Department of State

Subject: MANCHURIA SITUATION
The Immediate Situation
in the Peiping-Tientsin Area.

Suggestions.

May 16, 1933.

MAY 1 1933

NOTED

THE UNDER SECRETARY

MAY 17 1933

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F/H/S

795.94/6305

Mr. Soong and Mr. Sze called by appointment. The ostensible purpose of this call was to discuss questions which Mr. Soong had raised, through Mr. Arthur Young, with regard to payments on the American share of the Boxer Indemnity. The Chinese Minister inquired whether we had any late information from Peiping, and Mr. Hornbeck gave him an account of the most recent information which we had (received this morning). Mr. Hornbeck took advantage of this opportunity to state that we had received also two telegrams relating to business or relations between China and the United States and to give account of the contents of these two telegrams: first, a telegram stating that the papers which the Consulate at Nanking had sent to the Foreign Office in August last

for

MAY 21 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

for signature by the Minister of Finance in connection with the sale of wheat had apparently been misplaced and were being looked for at Nanking; and, second, we were informed that the Ministry of Industries at Nanking was apparently encouraging the imitation by Chinese of American patents or patented articles. Having imparted this information, Mr. Hornbeck suggested that perhaps there were questions which the Minister of Finance would like to bring up before we entered upon a discussion of these or any other questions that were "on the calendar".

Mr. Soong then said that the matter which was giving him most concern was the immediate situation in North China. He said that the Japanese were rapidly approaching Tientsin; the Chinese had been putting up a good fight; they had had some 30,000 casualties during the past two weeks of which 20,000 were within the past few days; they were about at the end of their resources; and he wondered whether the powers could not do something.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he had noted that the Chinese armies were making a substantial resistance and that the Japanese advance did not seem to be as rapid as the Japanese army had estimated that it would be; he said that

he

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

he regretted, and all Americans regretted, that these hostilities continued and so much bloodshed is taking place; he wondered whether Mr. Soong had conceived any outline of steps which he envisaged as possible and, if taken by the powers, likely to be ameliorative of the situation under discussion. Mr. Soong had apparently not thought the matter through. He said that he thought that the powers, especially the United States, Great Britain and France and possibly Italy, might take "some stand". There followed a discussion which finally resulted in the suggestion by Mr. Sze that he felt that the American Government, at the time of issuing a communique in relation to the conversations between the representative of China and the President might say something indicative of interest by the present Administration in the political situation in the Far East; if nothing else, he said, the American Government might state that it deprecated the continuation of hostilities and bloodshed there; and he went on to say that the world has had as yet no pronouncement from this Administration in relation to the Sino-Japanese conflict -- all that the world has had having been the statement issued by the President-Elect

before

This idea was used, in substance, in the Communique of May 19 1972.

SKF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

before the inauguration affirming solicitude with regard to the sanctity of treaties.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he would make a memorandum of the conversation and bring these points to the attention of the Secretary of State.

The conversation then turned to certain matters outstanding in relations between China and the United States. (See separate memorandum).

SKH

FE:SKH:CLS

0874

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6306

SEE 861.77-Chinese Eastern/1191 FOR Tel.#447-lpm

FROM China (Johnson) DATED May 18, 1933
TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Japanese invasion. Reuter from Canton to effect that the Southwest Political Council has decided to telegraph to Central Party authorities urging them to send a large Army to safeguard Tientsin and Peiping against possible -.

tfr

0874

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
EF

cib

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated May 18, 1933

Recd 4:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

447, May 18, 1 p.m.

Router from Canton today:

"Southwest Political Council has telegraphed to Foreign Office in Nanking and to Chinese Ambassador in Moscow urging that everything possible be done to prevent proposed sale of Chinese Eastern Railway by Russia. Council has also decided to telegraph to Central Party authorities urging them to send big army to safeguard Tientsin and Peiping against possible Japanese invasion of that area."

noted
793.94

861.77-C.E.
/1191

JOHNSON

JS CIB

0875

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. C / 643 FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. FE (Hornbeck) DATED Mar. 22, 1933.

TO NAME 1-1127 ***

6307

793.94 / 6307

REGARDING:

Suggests development of more satisfactory methods of communication with League in endeavor to secure better cooperation. Consummation of arrangement for maintenance of American diplomatic representative at Geneva would be helpful in connection with problems of relations with Far East.

ja

0878

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM



REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Dated May 23, 1933

Rec'd 8:02 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

105, May 23, 8 p. m.

793.94
CONFIDENTIAL. I have just been told by what is believed to be a reliable source that instructions have been sent to the Japanese troops in North China not (repeat not) to enter Peiping and that in case of any tendency to break in, another more drastic order to the same effect is in readiness.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

RLP

WSE

F/G 793.94/6308

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 550. S 1 Wash./555 FOR Tel. # 171, 1 pm
 FROM () DATED May 20, 1933.
 TO China NAME 1-1127 ...

793.94/6309

REGARDING:

Joint statement of President and T.V. Soong on May 19th
 to Press.

0881

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated May 23, 1933

Rec'd 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

477, May 23, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking.

"May 22, 4 p.m. I am confidentially and I think reliably informed that Wang Ching Wei in address at the memorial service May 22 denied that the Chinese Government is making any approaches to Japan for a settlement. No positive action whether diplomatic or military to remedy the situation is possible for China. However, if Japan attacks Peiping opposing intervention will be inevitable. In these circumstances only course open for China is watchful waiting. Proposals for settlement can be made only from the invaders and those invaded cannot originate them. This is the reply to criticisms that the Government has no policy."

JOHNSON

GW KLP

793.94/6310

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

COPIES SENT TO

GRAY O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 23, 1933

Rec'd 6 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

May 23, 4 p. m.



793.94

Responsible Japanese military authorities here freely assert Japanese expect occupy Peiping within two days. Eighty cases gasoline placed aboard train mentioned my May 23, 10 a.m. which Japanese stated would be required in Peiping as they expected to have 200 motor trucks there tomorrow or next day.

Unconfirmed reports are in circulation that Bruce has been signed under which Japanese will shortly begin withdrawal main forces to vicinity Great Wall. Indications are that definite proposals have been made but not yet accepted by Japanese.

Conditions are reported quiet Tangkwang this afternoon.

VWC-RR

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/6311

0882

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B-1)

FROM PEIPING

Dated May 23, 1933

Rec'd 6:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

475, May 23, 1 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 23 1933
 Department of State

793.94

One. Local situation remains quiet. During the week-end city much disturbed because of quartering of troops in east city. Most of these troops left last night, however, and city quiet this morning. Japanese yesterday at Tientsin requested transportation from the railway for 600 troops to reenforce Legation guard at Peiping and for protection Japanese life and property Peiping. Question referred to Ho Ying Chin yesterday afternoon who consented, giving orders that train should not be interfered with as troops were coming under Boxer protocol. Lockhart reports some 250 of these left Tientsin this morning.

Two. With reference to conversation with Vice Minister Liu, reported in my 474, ⁶³⁰⁴ May 22, 7 p. m., Lampson informed French colleague and myself this morning that Mr. Shen, Chief Asiatic Department Foreign Office, called on him last night to ask that communication be treated as personal from Liu, saying that they were extremely anxious not to

jeopardize

F/G 793.94/6312

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#475, From Peiping, May 23, 1 p. m.

jeopardize chances of an arrangement by even a suggestion of third party mediation. Lampson informed him that it was too late, that he had already sent message. Subsequently agent of Huang Fu called on Lampson stating among other things that on last Saturday when Japanese sentry was attacked, at that very moment Huang Fu was at Japanese Legation conferring with Japanese Military Attache, who broke off discussions when he heard of attack on sentry. Apparently there have been no discussions since. The Chinese are anxious to renew contacts but are at a loss to know how and are afraid of third party mediation.

Three. Two large bombing planes appeared over Peiping this morning, one circling over diplomatic quarter followed by three small pursuit planes which came low over Chienmen Gate tower traveling from south to north over Palace.

JOHNSON

WSB

0884

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tientsin

FROM Dated May 23, 1933

Received 3:15 AM

Secretary of State,
Washington.



May 23, 10 a.m.

793.94
not 2
811.30 (see)

Confirming my conversation with Legation last night Japanese military authorities demanded train under terms of protocol to transport approximately 600 troops to Peiping this morning 7 oclock demanding protection Japanese nationals there. Train was supplied by Chinese authorities and left this morning 7:25 consisting 7 third class coaches one first class and 14 other cars loaded with equipment and military supplies. Master reports 253 officers and men on train but member of my staff witnessing departure estimates number much larger and approximately 600. The movement out of Tientsin East Station was orderly and while Japanese train was standing on tracks a short train Chinese troops from Tangku passed immediately alongside without incident. Chinese forces being rapidly withdrawn from Tangku and occupation that place by Manchukuo troops momentarily expected. Conditions there last night panicky. ^{Lutai} (2)ai was severely bombed by Japanese airplane yesterday afternoon with a number of civilian casualties.

This morning

793.94/6313

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 2.

From Tientsin May 23 1933

This morning at 9 oclock bomb exploded in ricksha about 200 yards outside Japanese concession to southwest killing instantly ricksha puller and creating considerable excitement. Japanese troops however did not leave concession area. Part of ricksha was blown into yard Methodist Mission.

Tension here has appreciably increased last 24 hours.
U.S.S.SACRAMENTO left Hsinho for Chefoo yesterday.

LOCKHART

WSB
CSB

0881

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

PEIPING

Dated May 24, 1933

Rec'd 4:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

480, May 24, 11 a. m.

Following from Consul General, Nanking:

"May 23, 7 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL. Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me May 23, 6 p. m. that the best troops in the North except forces of Ku Tsuch Chung had been destroyed and that further resistance was impossible because of the lack of money. He led me to infer that the Japanese will be allowed to enter Peiping unobstructed if they desire to enter but that attempt to capture Tientsin is to be opposed by General Yu. He remarked that China had done her best to prevent Japanese advance but was now helpless and that it was the duty of the League powers to act. He reiterated his determination never to sign any document giving territorial or other concessions to Japan."

JOHNSON

JS

Paraphrase sent to ONI & MID in confidence

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED

MAY 24 1933

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 24 1933

Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6314

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Confidential

MAY 24 1933

A telegram dated May 24, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads substantially as follows:

The American Consul General at Nanking reports under date May 23, 7 p.m. that he was informed on May 23, 6 p. m. by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the best troops in the North except forces of Yu Hsueh Chung had been destroyed and that, because of the lack of money, further resistance was impossible. The Foreign Minister gave him the impression that the Japanese will be allowed if they so desire to enter Peiping unobstructed but that General Yu is to oppose attempt to capture Tientsin. The Foreign Minister repeated his determination never to sign any document giving to Japan territorial or other concessions. According to the Foreign Minister, it is the duty of the League powers to act, China having done her best to prevent Japanese advance but being now helpless.

1888

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MAY 24 1933

Peking

Dated May 24, 1933

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (b)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

482, May 24, 1 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

Mr. S. G. Cheng, confidential aide to Huang Fu, called this morning and informed me that a preliminary arrangement had been arrived at between Japanese and Chinese military for a cessation of hostilities beginning last night; that this was to be followed by discussions between delegates duly appointed by the Japanese and Chinese military for final arrangements.

Repeated Tokyo.

KLP-WSB

JOHNSON

F/G

793.94/6315

JUN 2 1933

FILED

0885


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET




GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated May 24, 1933

Rec'd 6:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



May 24, 4 p. m.

Conditions in Tientsin quiet last night and today.

Chief interest is centered on developments Peiping. Rail traffic between Tientsin and Peiping almost normal and there is no tangible evidence that Manchukuo troops have made any further advance towards Tangku. The main military operation appears to be in the neighborhood of Tungchow and Peiping.

WSB-KLP

LOCKHART

F/G 793.94/6316

793.94

K

0891

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 26 1933

No.

To the American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State enclosed for the information of the Consul two copies of a digest of certain telegrams received by the Department in regard to developments in China for the period May 11 to May 24, 1933.

In the event that other Governments are communicating to the Secretary General of the League of Nations information of similar character, the Secretary of State would have no objection to the Consul transmitting to the Secretary General, for his discreet use, confidential as to source, a copy of the enclosed digest. The Secretary General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in this digest.

793.94/6316

793.94/6316

Enclosure:


Two copies of digest
of telegrams.

RE: 100

FE

H/W

V-25-33



793.94/6316

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIGEST OF TELEGRAMS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIAL SOURCES
IN REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA FOR THE PERIOD
MAY 11 to MAY 24, 1933.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 11) that early on the morning of May 11 an airplane, believed to have been a Japanese military airplane, flew over Peiping and dropped a number of handbills encouraging the Chinese to rebel against Chiang Kai-shek, praising the Japanese-Manchukuo regime, and concluding with the statement "If Chiang continues to be violent and if he fails to repent his error it is feared that the tragedy of Kupehchow will occur at Peiping and at Tientsin."

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 13) that, according to the Japanese military spokesman, Japanese troops will occupy Lungchow (about 15 miles east of Peiping) and the Manchukuo army will occupy Falgan (100 miles northwest of Peiping in Chahar Province) and may possibly extend operations southeastward toward Peiping. The Consul General states that a Japanese aircraft carrier has arrived at Taku Bar (the seaport of Tientsin) and that Japanese troops have been busily engaged in placing sand bags at strategic points in the Japanese concession. The Japanese spokesman intimates that it may yet be necessary to occupy Peiping and professes a desire on the part of the Japanese not to be forced to advance westward as far as Tientsin.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 15) that fighting in the area north of Tientsin near the Great Wall has been very severe with considerable loss of life by the Chinese who have been resisting desperately; that Japanese troops are advancing from the east along the old Chinwangtao-Peiping government road; that newspaper correspondents at Tientsin have been informed by the Japanese military

that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that the Japanese advance will stop after taking Tungchow; that Peiping is quiet; and that the police there have erected sandbag protections at strategic points.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 15) that, according to the Director of the Telephone Administration, Tangshan (50 miles northeast of Tientsin) is being bombed by Japanese airplanes; and that on May 14 there were two bomb throwing incidents, with a number of men killed and wounded, in the native city of Tientsin where martial law was enforced. The Consul General adds that on May 14 several trains of Chinese troops moved westward through Tientsin.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 16) that a Japanese officer of high rank, who came to bring gifts to Japanese soldiers and to comfort them on behalf of the Emperor, arrived on a Japanese destroyer at Tangku (ocean port of Tientsin).

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 17) that the arrival of General Huang Pu in Tientsin on May 17 has aroused fresh hopes that an amicable adjustment may be arranged with the Japanese and that the published statement of General Muto (in charge of Japanese armies in Manchuria) in regard to the possibility of Japanese troops withdrawing to the Great Wall if Chinese provocative activities are discontinued has aroused hope that a way may be found to prevent the occupation of Tientsin and Peiping.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (May 17) that, according to reliable reports, conditions are very bad on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway which is infested with brigands; that few trains and few passengers are moving; and that passenger traffic has been resumed on the Ussuri Railway between the Manchuria border and Vladivostok.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

vostok.

The Consul General at Harbin reports (May 16) that on May 14 there was shooting into an eastbound train on the Chinese Eastern Railway about 250 miles northwest of Harbin, the cars being riddled and several passengers wounded.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 18) that just before the arrival of Huang Pu's train a bomb exploded on the railway near Tientsin; that bombings are of almost daily occurrence in Tientsin; and that apparently there has been little fighting in the Lwanchow area and progress west of that place has been slow.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 19) that on May 19 an airplane thought to be a Japanese biplane bomber with bombs in tanks circled over Peiping and environs for a half hour but that so far as known no propaganda pamphlets were dropped.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 19) that on the night of May 18 a state of emergency was declared in the native city of Tientsin; that the strictest martial law was enforced but no disorders occurred; that a considerable number of troops are passing westward through Tientsin; and that, according to railway authorities, Chinese forces are retreating from Lutai (35 miles northeast of Tientsin).

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 20) that on the morning of May 20 eleven Japanese bombing planes flew over Peiping and environs; that so far as is known the Chinese refrained from anti-aircraft fire; that later in the morning while watching a lone Japanese airplane a Japanese sentry at the Japanese Legation was attacked and severely injured by a Chinese who attempted to escape but was captured by the Japanese guard; and that a press representative

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

tive (said to be of Swiss nationality), who was photographing the incident, was invited into the Japanese Legation compound and was manhandled and arrested for taking such a street photograph without permission of the Legation guard.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 20) that on the night of May 19 a bomb exploded at the railway station, killing one Chinese, wounding several others, and burning three passenger coaches; that during the night there were a number of explosions, accompanied by some machine gun and rifle firing southwest of the Japanese concession; that there is a considerable concentration of Chinese troops at a point about half way between Tientsin and Peiping; and that the Japanese Information Bureau persistently reports the revolt of a large number of Chinese troops in the area about 50 miles northeast of Tientsin.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 22) that the orderly retirement of the Chinese continues along the entire front with the Japanese apparently following but that no fighting is reported; and that the Chinese now occupy a line running roughly from about 20 miles north of Peiping, through Tangchow and generally along the river to Tientsin.

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 22) that there have been no further disturbances in Tientsin and that there appears to have been no change in the military situation in the Tangshan area (50 miles northeast of Tientsin) within the past few days.

The Minister at Peiping reports (May 23) that the situation in Peiping is quiet; that during the past few days the city was much disturbed on account of the quartering
 of

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

of troops in the eastern part of the city; that most of these troops left on the night of May 22 and the city is now quiet; and that on the morning of May 23 two large bombing planes flew over Peiping, one of which circled over the Legation quarter followed by three small pursuit planes which came low over Chienmen tower at the edge of the Legation quarter.

793.94/6311

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 23) that on May 23 a train, demanded by the Japanese under the terms of the Protocol of 1901 to transport Japanese troops to Peiping to protect Japanese nationals there, left Tientsin carrying approximately 600 Japanese troops, equipment and military supplies; that Chinese troops are being rapidly withdrawn from Tangku; that during the past twenty-four hours tension has increased appreciably in Tientsin; that, according to responsible Japanese military authorities in Tientsin, Japanese will occupy Peiping within two days; and that indications are that definite proposals for a truce have been made but not yet accepted by the Japanese.

793.94/6316

The Consul General at Tientsin reports (May 24) that conditions are quiet at Tientsin and that railway traffic between Peiping and Tientsin is almost normal.

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 28-2-28
 28

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 28-2-28
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FE

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
MAY 25 1933
TELEGRAM

Peiping via N. R.
Dated May 25, 1933
Rec'd 3:07 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 25 1933
Department of State

483, May 25, 10 a. m.
Reuter from Nanking twenty-fourth:

793.94
note
793.94119

"Commenting on the North China truce today Wang Ching Wei declared 'A truce exists on the North China fronts. The Chinese Government is devising appropriate measures to deal with the situation but the Chinese public may rest assured that it will not be a compromise or surrender.'"

JOHNSON

JS
CIB

PTT END
MAY 26 1933

F/HS
793.94/6317

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6513

SEE 550. S 1/804 FOR Tel#106 noon

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED May 24, 1933
 TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese continually suggesting to British Embassy at Tokyo that if order could be restored in China, Japanese goods would be absorbed there and pressure on Indian and other markets would be relieved.

ja

0898

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Tokyo

Dated May 24, 1933

Rec'd 2:06 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

106, May 24, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Embassy informs me that in connection with the Indian tariff question prominent Japanese are continually suggesting to them that if order could be restored in China, Japanese goods would be absorbed there and pressure on Indian and other markets would be relieved. There seems to be reason to believe that the Japanese delegation may put forward a suggestion of this character at the Economic Conference in London, but that the Japanese would prefer that the suggestion should emanate from some other quarter because any Japanese suggestion in regard to China would meet with suspicion at the present time.

The British Charge d'affaires informs me confidentially that he does not believe that restoration of peaceful conditions in China would in itself provide a permanent solution of the difficulties over the Indian markets, although a general increase in the China trade would undoubtedly ease the present tension.

Repeated to Peiping.

JS

GREW

50.8/804

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

1933 MAY - 10 - PM 5:50 Washington, *May*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS May 10, 1933.
SPM

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

155 Referring to press items attributing to T. V. Soong
certain preposterous statements about QUOTE assurances
UNQUOTE, ~~adequate~~ denials have been made by Soong and
Department.

793.94/6513 A

793.94

Grill
UD

FE:SKH:CLS

may 10
FE
348

May 10, 1933

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

0900

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:KC

SOURCE: WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS,
May 9, 1933

SOONG IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID UNITED STATES WOULD
AID CHINESE.

Sensation is Created in Peiping by Press Reports
From Washington on Intervention.

PEIPING - Press dispatches from Washington quoting T. V. Soong, Chinese delegate to economic conversations there, as saying he had been assured of American intervention in China if Japanese troops captured Peiping created a sensation here today.

The dispatches quoted Soong as asking the Nanking Government to refrain from making any effort toward an armistice in view of his reported assurances of aid.

Army Moves On.

Nelson T. Johnson, United States Minister, was besieged with requests for verification.

"Only Secretary Hull will be able to answer that one", he said.

Japanese infantry, already in full possession of the Luan River triangle, approximately 250 square miles of China proper, was sweeping inland between the Mandarin highway and the Great Wall in what was apparently an encircling movement directed toward Peiping and Tientsin.


Troops Massing.

Meantime, in the other theater of action near Nantienmen, directly north of Peiping, Japanese troops were massing for a major assault on the Chinese base at Miyunhsien.

The Japanese military attache confirmed reports that the general offensive against the Chinese was in full swing from the Luan River triangle to Nantienmen. He again threatened occupation of Peiping and Tientsin if Chinese resistance continued.

0901

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Reference Tokyo's telegram 107, May 26, 11 a.m.

With regard to Ambassador Grew's report that two leading Tokyo newspapers had published despatches from their Washington correspondents to the effect that the President had hinted to Viscount Ishii that the United States would abandon the doctrine of non-recognition of "Manchukuo" if Japan would support the disarmament proposals and would cease military operations in North China, -

This Division ^{assumes that} ~~regards~~ these reports ~~are~~ without basis in fact and published apparently for the purpose of discovering what reactions there might be to such reports.

JUN 1 1933
 FILED

FE:LES:CLS

0902

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

FROM TOKYO

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 27 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dated May 26, 1933

RECEIVED
MAY 26 1933

Rec'd 12:48 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 26 1933
Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6319

793.94
note
893.01 Manchukuo

107, May 26, 11 a. m.

Two Japanese newspapers the CHUGAI SHOGYO and the TOKYO NICHINICHI this morning published despatches from their Washington correspondents to the effect that at the first conversations between the President and Ishii the President hinted that if Japan would cease military operations in North China and would support the disarmament proposals, the United States would abandon the so-called "Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of Manchukuo". The CHUGAI correspondent who telegraphed this is known to be a close friend of Fukai.

GREW

KLP

RR

JUN 1 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin

Dated May 26, 1933

Rec'd 6:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

May 26, 3 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 26 1933
Department of State

Three. Japanese military airplanes visited Tientsin
this morning but dropped no (repeat no) bombs.

Rail traffic now ^{stopped} (*) between Shanhaikwan and points
east lower Anchow due repairs made by Japanese military
who are also repairing damage Lwan River bridge.

There has apparently been no change in military
situation Tangshan area and no evidence of Japanese with-
drawal.

Japanese military command here states no truce
negotiations are under way but general belief, based on
fact that military situation has undergone no change for
several days, is that some sort of an informal preliminary
understanding has been, or is about to be, arranged at
Peiping. Tension considerably relaxed here.

WVC-CSB

LOCKHART

(*) apparent omission.

FE

F/HS

793.94/6320

793.94

0904

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

FROM

PEIPING

Dated May 26, 1933

Rec'd 2:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

484, May 26, 11 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

My 482, May 24, 1 p. m.

That a truce has been arranged there appears to be no doubt, although strictest secrecy is being maintained as to how and where arranged; tension in city much relaxed.

Two. Huang Fu and others near him, who are concerned with arrangement for cessation of hostilities, give evidence of extreme fear lest contact with other Legations halt arrangements as Japanese have indicated that they will brook no third party mediation.

Three. Real crisis will be reached when negotiations between Japanese and Chinese delegates begin. It is believed Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister, is coming North for these arrangements. Fact will then be that Japanese will be able to dictate terms to Chinese with their army within a few hours march of Peiping and Tientsin, Chinese will desire to limit negotiations to the question of the cessation of hostilities leaving all questions relating to Manchuria and Jehol and related matters for subsequent settlement

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 26 1933
 Department of State

F/HS

793.94/6321

793.94

0905
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#484, From Peiping, May 26, 11 a.m.

settlement. Whether they can succeed in thus limiting
discussions remains to be seen.

Sent to Tokyo by mail.

JOHNSON

KLP

RR

0906

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

P A R A P H R A S E

MAY 26 1933

A telegram dated May 26, 1933, from the American Minister at Peiping, reads in part as follows:

The tension in Peiping has relaxed a great deal. There seems to be no doubt that there has been arranged a truce, although the greatest secrecy as to where and how this truce was arranged is maintained.

Those who are concerned with arranging for a cessation of hostilities, such as Huang Fu and others close to him, appear to be extremely fearful that the arrangements may be halted due to contact with other Legations, as it has been indicated by the Japanese that no third party mediation will be tolerated by them.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 27, 1933.

~~TEI~~
~~ROY~~
~~MH~~

Peiping's despatch dated April 22 encloses a copy of a despatch from Tientsin which states that the American Chinese Company of Tientsin has received from the Chinese military authorities in Peiping a new order for one hundred Ford chassis to replace those recently diverted to Dairen and there sold to the South Manchurian Railway.

CSW

0908

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2067

Peiping, April 22, 1933.

Subject: Detention of shipment of one hundred trucks consigned to the American Chinese Company, Tientsin.


793.94

CONFIDENTIAL

F/HS



MAY 26 33



793.94/6322

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

793.94/6153

In reference to despatch No. 340 of March 10, 1933, from the American Consul General at Tientsin to the Legation (copy to the Department without covering despatch), to a despatch dated March 20, 1933, from the American Consul at Dairen to the American Embassy at Tokyo (copy sent direct to the Department), and to the Legation's telegram No. 258 of March 17, 10 a.m., to the Department, in reference to the detention at Dairen by the Japanese of one hundred Ford truck chassis consigned to the American Chinese Company, an American firm at Tientsin, I have the honor to enclose for the Department's

JUN 6 1933

FILED

information

0909

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

1/ information a copy of despatch No. 364 of April 17, 1933, from the American Consul General at Tientsin to the Legation, stating that the American Chinese Company has obtained from the Chinese military authorities in Peiping a new order for one hundred Ford chassis to take the place of those which were recently diverted to Dairen and there sold to the South Manchuria Railway Company under the circumstances described in the Dairen Consulate's despatch referred to above.

From the record of the case it would appear that the detention of the shipment of trucks has worked out to the very marked advantage of the American Chinese Company.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Copy of despatch from
American Consulate General,
Tientsin, to Legation, No.
364, April 17, 1933.

350.

CJS-SC

1 Carbon Copy *JM*

Received

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 864

1
2067

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 17, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: Order for Ford Trucks.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of March 7, 3 p.m., March 8, 3 p.m. and March 17, 11 a.m., on the above-mentioned subject, and to state that the President of the American Chinese Company, Mr. L. O. McGowan, has informed me that the Company has obtained from the Chinese military authorities in Peiping a new order for one hundred Ford chassis to take the place of those which were recently diverted to Dairen and there sold to the South Manchuria Railway Company. Mr. McGowan stated that the hundred chassis covered by the new order will be shipped in an American vessel from a Pacific Coast port and will be transshipped at Shanghai to a British vessel destined for Tientsin. The payment for these trucks will be from the deposit

made

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

made in the National City Bank of New York to cover the cost of the original shipment which was diverted to Dairen. I have been informed that efforts were made by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to obtain the withdrawal from the National City Bank of these funds which were originally deposited by the Marshal, but the military authorities now in control at Peiping were prevailed upon to renew the order. The Company accordingly will deliver the chassis as quickly as possible and by the method above described.


Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800

FPL/MRE

Original and three copies to Legation.



0912

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, April 25, 1933.

No. 2074

Subject: Question of possible dissolution
of the Joint Commission created
by the Sino-Japanese Armistice
Agreement of May 5, 1932.

F/H

CONFIDENTIAL

793.94

PM RECD



MAY 26 33



793.94/6323

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 2033, of

March 31, 1933, concerning the above subject, I
have the honor to enclose for the Department's in-
formation a copy of a memorandum of a conversation
had by me with Sir Miles Lampson, the British Min-
ister, and Mr. H. Wilden, the French Minister, on
March 25th, in respect of the exact wording of the
formula to be offered by our respective Consuls
General for use in the statement to be made by the

Joint

JUN 6 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Joint Commission in the event that the Japanese insist upon a formal reference to the Joint Commission of the question of the movement of Chinese troops through the Markham Road Junction of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway at Shanghai.

The decision reached during the conference covered by the enclosed memorandum was transmitted in full detail to the Department in my telegram No. 277 of March 25, 3 p.m. ⁶⁰⁹³ this despatch being a written confirmation of such telegraphic report.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure!

1/ Memorandum of conversation March 25, 1933.

CJS/js.

800.

1 Carbon Copy

Received *JM*

Copy sent to American Consulate General, Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Peiping, March 25, 1933. 2074

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.
 Mr. H. Wilden, French Minister.

Subject: Neutral military commission at Shanghai
under agreement of May 5, 1932.

Sir Miles brought up the question to-day of what we should do about the Commission which we had set up at Shanghai under the agreement for the evacuation of Japanese troops signed on May 5, 1932, in our presence. This Commission had been established for the purpose of watching the fulfilment of that agreement.

In June of last year the Chinese moved certain troops through the Markham Road Junction of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, and the Japanese protested this as a contravention of that part of the agreement which stated that the Chinese soldiers should continue in their present positions. The Neutral Commission upheld the Japanese protest, and the Chinese then agreed to notify the Japanese should they send troops through again.

On February 7th of the present year another lot of Chinese troops had passed through that junction without notification to the Japanese, whereupon the Japanese made further protest. Sir Miles stated that he had thought this matter had been ironed out through a promise on the part of the Chinese to give oral notice to the Japanese should they desire to move troops through that junction again, but he was disappointed in this belief, as the

Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese apparently were insisting that the Chinese should give written notice, a thing which the Chinese were refusing to do on the ground that the agreement was not intended to prevent the normal shifting of Chinese troops.

Sir Miles stated that it had been suggested that one way to deal with the question was for us to disband the Commission, on the ground that it had served its purpose, but he was somewhat reluctant to do this, as the Commission had performed a useful service and could continue to perform useful service in view of conditions at Shanghai; however, he felt that something would have to be done, and he submitted to us a formula offered by the British Consul General at Shanghai for a statement to be made by the Neutral Commission if the Japanese should refer the question to that Commission. This formula was as follows:

"The decision rendered by the Joint Commission on June 13, 1932, regarding Article 2 of the agreement, is still considered to be the only practical interpretation of the wording of that article. Nevertheless the neutral members of the Commission feel that the spirit of the agreement was to prevent hostile action against the Japanese troops.

"In view of the improved conditions in this area, the neutral members of the Commission do not consider that Article 2 should any longer be invoked to prevent the movement of Chinese troops along the railway to other parts of China unless there is definite evidence that such troop movements are hostile to the Japanese in the sense intended by Article 1."

I stated that it was not my understanding that

either

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

either the agreement of May 5th, for the cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, or the Commission set up under that agreement were intended to prevent the normal transit of Chinese forces over the railway which passed around Shanghai, and that I thought it unreasonable of the Japanese to force this question. After reading over the formula presented by the British Consul General I stated that it seemed to me that it would be sufficient if we eliminated the first paragraph which referred to the past and seemed to justify the Japanese contention, and used only the last paragraph amended by eliminating the words "In view of the improved conditions in this area"; changing the words "any longer" to "now", the word "movement" to "normal transit", the word "along" to "by"; and inserting the word "locally" in front of the word "hostile". They all agreed in the end to instruct our Consuls General in Shanghai to use the amended formula in the following terms:

"The neutral members of the Commission do not consider that Article 2 should now be invoked to prevent the normal transit of Chinese troops by the railway to other parts of China unless there is definite evidence that such troop movements are locally hostile to the Japanese in the sense intended by Article 1."

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NIJ.EA

0917

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 31, 1933.

~~EE:~~
MMH:

Tokyo's despatch No. 394 of May 12, 1933, reports the Embassy's action with regard to occupation of American mission property and the dropping of two bombs by Japanese military forces at Taitowying. Most of the information in this despatch is already known to the Division. The enclosures are a memorandum on the subject prepared by the Embassy and handed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, a memorandum of a conversation between the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Neville, and a copy of a note from the Vice Minister to Mr. Neville in which it is stated that the Japanese troops used the mission property at Mutwoteng as billets on March 9 with the consent of a Chinese church keeper and that troops stayed at the American mission at Schwangshantze on March 13 with the permission of the deputy Chinese minister, American missionaries being absent in both instances. The Vice Minister states that expenses incurred will be defrayed by the Japanese military authorities in due course.

~~EE:~~
LES:CLS

0918

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, May 18, 1933.

ff

No. 394.

Subject: Report on Embassy's action regarding
occupation of American Mission property
and the dropping of two bombs by Japanese
military forces at Taitowying.

F/ESP



MAY 26 33

COPIES SENT TO
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94

793.94/6324

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1933
Department of State
File

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

FILED
JUN 6 1933 3

Sir:

I wish to refer to the Department's instruction
793.94/6118
No. 240 of April 3, 1933, transmitting to me a copy
of a memorandum of a conversation on March 28, 1933
between the Japanese Ambassador and the Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to the bombing
by Japanese airplanes of Taitowying endangering American
mission property there.

On

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

On March 28, 9 p.m. this Embassy received a telegram from the Legation in Peiping reporting the occupation of American mission property in the Hopei Province by Japanese troops and the dropping of two bombs near the Taitowying residence of Mr. Charles Kautto, an American citizen, who was flying an American flag over his compound. The next morning, March 29, I called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and brought these two matters to his attention, handing 1/ him a memorandum a copy of which is enclosed herewith. I asked that an investigation be made and that steps be taken to safeguard American life and property in the future. The Vice Minister said that he would take the matter up with the military authorities and would let me know the result of the investigation in due course. I immediately informed the Legation at Peiping of the action I had taken.

On April 6, the Vice Minister requested Mr. Neville to call on him at the Foreign Office. A memorandum of 2/ their conversation on this occasion is enclosed. The Vice Minister read to Mr. Neville extracts from a report he had received from the military authorities in which the latter stated they were still investigating the matter of the occupation of the mission property but admitted that bombs had possibly been dropped on Mr. Kautto's premises. After suggesting that in the future American flags be spread on the ground or roofs of buildings where they may be more easily seen from the air, the military

0920


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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military authorities expressed regret over what had happened in the case of Mr. Kautto. A summary of this interview with the Vice Minister was also cabled to the Legation at Peiping.

3/ On April 7 Mr. Neville received a letter from the Vice Minister, a copy of which is enclosed, in which he transmitted a statement to the effect that the Japanese troops had used the mission property at Mutwoteng with the consent of the church keeper Chang and that at Schwangshantze with the consent of the Chinese minister Chen, the American missionaries being absent from both places at the time the troops arrived. The statement contained in the letter from the Vice Minister was immediately transmitted to the Legation at Peiping.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

Copy to Peiping.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of a memorandum handed by the Ambassador to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
2. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Neville and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3. Copy of a letter from the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Neville.

360.

SWW:r

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1 to despatch
 No 394 of May 12, 33 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

Tokyo, March 29, 1933.

Handed to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the Ambassador,
 March 29, 1933.

MEMORANDUM.

The American Embassy is informed by the American Legation in Peiping that, according to a report from Charles Kautto, an American missionary at Taitowying, Hopei Province, Japanese troops of the 10th Army occupied American mission property at Mutwoteng and Schwangshantze on March 9th and 11th respectively. These two places are in Hopei Province but north of the Great Wall. On March 21st the American Consul General at Tientsin brought this matter to the attention of the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin who promptly replied that the matter had been referred by him to the Japanese Military authorities for investigation. No further advice has been received at the American Legation in regard to this occupation of American property.

Mr. Kautto reported later that at 9:00 a.m. on March 24th, a Japanese airplane after circling over Taitowying for 30 minutes, dropped a bomb within 20 feet of his residence, a foreign style house in a mission compound where the American flag was flying for the purpose of identification. This bomb fortunately fell just outside of the compound wall, making two large holes in it and shaking bricks from the chimney of the residence. Soon afterward a second bomb was dropped within some yards of the compound, the debris breaking windows in the mission buildings. Although nine civilians were killed at this time, Mr. and Mrs. Kautto were not injured.

Mr. Kautto made the following comment: "We have the American flag flying from our flag pole, yet these two bombs were scarcely out of reach of the compound, and while there were native holdings adjoining there was no particularly provocative reason for dropping bombs at either place. In fact there was no military advantage to be gained so far as we know".

The American Minister in Peiping, in an urgent letter to the Japanese Legation, assumed that Japanese aviators failed to see the American flag displayed on Kautto's property, in view of the care taken by Japanese authorities to drop leaflets in English warning foreigners at Lingyuan, Jehol, of coming air raids with the request that national flags be displayed on foreign property and

that

0922

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that foreigners take cover when airplanes appear. The American Minister requested that the Japanese military authorities be notified immediately of the facts above stated, and that steps be taken to safeguard American lives and property.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2 to despatch
 No 394 of May 12, 33 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

Memorandum of Conversation between
Mr. Arita, Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Mr. Neville, April 6, 1933.

I called on Mr. Arita at his request at 10:30 a.m. He said that he had asked me to come on account of the informal memorandum which the Ambassador had left with him on April 29 in regard to the complaint of one Mr. Kautto, an American missionary at Taitowying, Hopei Province, China. He read to me from a report that he had received from the Military authorities.

The report stated that in regard to the occupation of missionary property at Muwoteng and Schwangshantze in Hopei Province north of the Wall, the Army was still investigating the matter and were unable, as yet, to submit a full report.

So far as concerns the dropping of bombs on Mr. Kautto's premises at Taitowying, it was quite possible that it might have occurred, as on March 24, at 9:00 a.m., Japanese planes were operating in that vicinity, dropping bombs in an effort to damage some Chinese forces that were congregating in the place with horses. The planes were flying at an altitude of some 1500 meters, and at that distance it was impossible to see a flag flying vertically from a flagstaff. The Army suggested that flags be spread on the ground or on the roofs of buildings where they would be plainly visible from an airplane. As the region is under Chinese control, it was and is impossible for the Japanese military to conduct any further investigation. If Mr. Kautto suffered from the operation of the air force, the Japanese Army greatly regrets the matter, as strict orders have been given to cause no trouble to foreign interests or persons. It was not part of the program to annoy or injure Mr. Kautto or any American or other foreigner.

He said further, that this information would be communicated, probably, to the Minister in China by the Japanese Legation, and to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

E.L.N.

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0924

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 3 to despatch
No 394 of May 12 1933 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

C O P Y

April 7th, 1933.

The Gaimusho,
Tokyo.

Dear Mr. Neville,

With reference to the conversation we had yesterday,
I beg to transmit to you the following information re-
garding the alleged occupation by the Japanese troops
of the American mission property at Mutwoteng and
Schwangshantze:-

"The Japanese troops used the mission property
at Mutwoteng as billets on March 9th; they did
so with the consent of the church keeper Chang,
as the American missionary was not there.

"They also stayed at the American mission at
Schwangshantze on March 13th on obtaining the
consent of the deputy Chinese minister Chen in
the absence of the American missionary".

I understand that the expenses incurred to the mission
by the use of the mission property will be defrayed by the
Japanese military authorities in due course of time.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H. Arita.

E. Neville, Esq.
Councillor,
American Embassy,
Tokio.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 3, 1933.

~~JEH~~
 MMH

Peiping's despatch No. 2081, dated April 22, 1933, encloses five memoranda of conversations held by Mr. Johnson between March 22 and April 6, 1933, in regard to the local situation as affected by Sino-Japanese relations.

The principal statements reported in the memoranda are noted in the covering despatch. The information is largely of a historical nature at the present time due to subsequent events in the Peiping area.

EXW

0926

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, April 22, 1933.

No. 2081

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations
and Local Conditions.

PM RECD



MAY 26 1933



F/HS

793.94/6325

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

1/5/

I have the honor to transmit herewith five memoranda of conversations I had with various persons between March 22 and April 6, 1933, but which it was not possible to write up immediately.

All conversations relate to the local situation as affected by Sino-Japanese relations. They call for no special comment, but the Department's attention is invited to my interviews with Dr. C. T. Wang, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and with Mr. S. Nakayama, the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation. Dr.

Wang,

JUN 6 1933

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Wang, who had just had a talk with General Chiang Kai-shek, said that there was determination to resist any further advance by the Japanese, and he thought the Japanese were no longer as sure of themselves as they used to be. Mr. Nakayama, after stating that the Japanese are under orders not to come inside the Great Wall, explained that it was necessary, occasionally, to strike a blow south of the Wall to show that they could at any time pounce upon the Chinese and destroy them. He admitted that so long as the present tense situation continued, a settlement by negotiation was out of the question.

In my talks with the British and French Ministers on March 25th and April 4th we were all agreed that there was little likelihood of a Japanese invasion of this area. Monsieur Wilden stated his information was that the Japanese were very anxious to negotiate and that General Chiang Kai-shek would also favor negotiations if the Japanese offered any practical basis for a settlement.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1/	Memorandum of conversation, March 22, 1933.
2/	" " " " March 24, 1933.
3/	" " " " March 25, 1933.
4/	" " " " April 4, 1933.
5/	" " " " April 6, 1933.

800.
 CVHE/js.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 1
 Dispatch No. 2081

Conversation.

Peiping, March 22, 1933.

Dr. Chengting T. Wang.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations.

Dr. C. T. Wang called. He stated that he had just been down to Paotingfu where he had had a talk with Chiang Kai-shek. He stated that every one was cooperating for the purpose of establishing defensive measures against the Japanese, and that there was a determination to resist any further advance by the Japanese into this area.

Dr. Wang expressed the opinion that Japanese leaders were becoming somewhat dubious as to the next step. In support of this argument he remarked that Baron Shidehara was reported to have been to see the Genro. He also cited an article which had appeared in the Japanese press and which had been translated and published in the magazine headed by Dr. Hu Shih and Dr. V.K. Ting, which represented two Japanese debating Japanese policy toward China under the anonymous names of "Mr. K" and "Mr. L". He said that this debate was so liberal in its view that he was persuaded that the Japanese Army would not have permitted its publication in Japan had they not been somewhat in doubt as to their own policy.

Dr. Wang expressed the view that economic conditions in Japan would sooner or later force the Japanese to discontinue their present military activities, and he cited a statement made by C. Walter Young to the effect that Japan could not continue the present expenditure beyond a year.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2
2081

Conversation.

Peiping, March 24, 1933.

Mr. Liu Chung-cheh, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: Local Conditions.

I lunched to-day with Vice Minister Liu, and in the course of lunch the Vice Minister again informed me that there was no intention on the part of the Chinese to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese.

In regard to the attempt upon the life of Chang Hsueh-liang who is now in Shanghai, he expressed the opinion that this attempt had been made by Mr. Tu, a well known Chinese who has been for some time in the French Settlement in Shanghai, where he has been connected with the gambling and opium interests; and he said that it was probably an attempt to hold up Chang Hsueh-liang for money.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

0931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3
2081

Conversation.

Peiping, March 25, 1933.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister
Mr. H. Wilden, French Minister.

Subject: Local Conditions.

I asked Sir Miles and Mr. Wilden whether or not they agreed with my point of view in regard to the local situation, which was that the Chinese were determined to oppose any further advance of the Japanese into this area, and not to negotiate directly or indirectly. I stated that it was also my view that there was no present evidence that the Japanese intended to invade this area, and I believed that there was little likelihood of their doing so in view of the fact that they had attained all of their objectives in Manchuria and Jehol and were now deprived of a last reason for coming in here through the elimination of Chang Hsueh-liang from the picture.

I stated that it was my conviction that the younger leaders of the Japanese military in actual contact with the situation along the Wall and in Jehol would doubtless wish to find a reason for coming in, but that I thought that the leaders in Japan would oppose this plan because of the great effort from a military point of view which it would entail.

Both Sir Miles and Mr. Wilden stated that this was also their view. We felt that matters in so far as Chinese and Japanese forces were concerned would remain at a stalemate for some time.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Conversation.

Peiping, April 4, 1933.

Mr. Wilden, French Minister.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation

In a conversation with Mr. Wilden this morning he informed me that he was under the impression that the Japanese did not attempt to carry their operations into this area although he thought they might continue attacks along the wall.

He stated that he had been informed by Mr. Baudet, his representative in Nanking, that while Lo Wen-kan continued to refuse to have anything to do with negotiations, he thought that Wang Ching-wei, who believed that negotiations were the only way out of the present threatening situation, had done much to quiet Lo Wen-kan on this subject. Mr. Baudet had reported that it was the opinion among certain officials in Nanking that Chiang Kai-shek would be in favor of negotiations if the Japanese could offer any practical basis for negotiations.

Mr. Wilden stated that he had been informed by Mr. Padoux, one of the advisers of the Chinese Government, that the latter had seen the Japanese Minister, Mr. Ariyoshi, on several occasions, as well as Mr. Suma, and that it was his impression that the Japanese were very anxious to negotiate for a settlement with the Chinese and would continue prodding the Chinese until they were forced to negotiate.

It

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It was Mr. Padoux's opinion that the Japanese diplomatic representatives believed that if they could obtain China's consent to Japan's position in Manchuria and the independence of Manchukuo they would be very liberal to China in regard to other matters such as extraterritoriality, the Boxer Protocol, the Boxer indemnity, - questions on which the Japanese could afford to be much more lenient than any other country.

Mr. Wilden expressed it as his opinion that the Japanese probably would be content to let matters stand as they were, Japan insisting on the independence of Manchukuo, and China insisting on her point of view.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huey NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-

2081

Conversation

Peiping, April 6, 1933.

Mr. S. Nakayama, Secretary in charge
of Japanese Legation.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation.

I asked Mr. Nakayama about the situation and he said that apparently conditions along the Wall were for the time being quiet. He said that the situation was as follows:

At Kupeikow there are certain troops of the old northeastern forces at the Wall, while behind them are two divisions of troops belonging to the Central Government. At Hsifengkow there are the troops of Sung Che-yuan belonging to the old forces of Feng Yu-hsiang, with Central Government troops at their back. At Hsih-menohai there are old forces belonging to General Ho Chu-kuo of the old northeastern army, also with forces of the Central Government at their back.

He said that the situation is not unlike that occupied by Tang Yu-lin in Jehol; that the old forces of the northeastern army are being pushed from behind by the forces of the Central Government, are not being well supplied with food, and are very uncertain of their future, for if they attack the Japanese they may be destroyed, and if they retreat they will be disarmed. He said that officers of these forces are trying to get in touch with the Japanese troops with a view to reaching

some

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

some understanding for their mutual safety; but that all the time they are making sorties against the Japanese, for they realize that the Japanese are under strict orders not to come inside the Wall. On the Japanese side it is necessary for them occasionally to strike a blow at the Chinese who are making these sorties, in order to make it clear that they are ready at any time to pounce upon them and destroy them. He classified the affair at Hsihmenchai as being such a gesture.

He expressed himself as being pessimistic as to the chance for any settlement by negotiation, because he realized that the Chinese were unwilling to negotiate, and as long as the present tense situation continued he thought that negotiations were out of the question, for the Chinese continued to believe that intervention by a third power would be possible.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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0935

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 1, 1933.

~~SECRET~~
Peiping's despatch No. 2084, dated April 24, 1933, encloses memoranda of conversations in which the Chinese Director of Foreign Affairs, Peiping, approached the Spanish Minister in regard to the stationing under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of foreign troops at the Luan River Bridge for the purpose of holding it as between Japanese and Chinese hostile forces.

The American and British Ministers and the French Counselor of Legation all felt that their respective governments would not be willing to use troops for this purpose.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, April 24, 1933.

No. 2084

Subject: Applicability of Boxer Protocol.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 343, of
April 19, 5 p.m., I have the honor to transmit here-
with, for the purpose of completing the records of the
1/3/ Department, three memoranda of conversations I had
with Don Justo Garrido y Cisneros, Minister of Spain
and Senior Minister in Peiping, and with Sir Miles
Lampson, British Minister, and Monsieur Lagarde, Coun-
selor of the French Legation, on April 18th and 19th,
4/ respectively, and of a conversation on April 19, 1933,
with

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

with Mr. Tsai Yuan, of the Peiping office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These conversations related to the evident desire on the part of the Chinese Government to invoke the Boxer Protocol for the purpose of preventing, if possible, a Japanese advance across the railway bridge over the Luan River. We all felt that it would be a mistake for our respective governments to place any troops between the two hostile armies.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure: ✓

1/	Memorandum of conversation,	April 18, 1933.
2/	" " "	April 18, 1933.
3/	" " "	April 19, 1933.
4/	" " "	April 19, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure # 1
 Request # 2084

Conversation.

Peiping, April 18, 1933.

Mr. Garrido, Spanish Minister.

Subject: Applicability of Protocol - Use of
foreign forces at Luan River Bridge.

Mr. Garrido, Spanish Minister and Senior Minister, called and stated that he had just had a visit from Mr. Tsai Yuan, Attache to the Office of the Chinese Military Headquarters, who said that he had come to state that the situation was very difficult and that the Chinese still held the bridge across the Luan and were anxious to maintain the Protocol. Mr. Tsai Yuan had made an unofficial and what he termed a personal suggestion that perhaps the situation might be helped if the Powers having troops under the Protocol were to station their troops at the Luan River Bridge for the purpose of holding it.

Mr. Garrido asked if I would take this message to Sir Miles Lampson, and said that he would be glad to see us or afford an opportunity for meeting at any time that we suggested.

I stated that in so far as sending troops to the Luan River Bridge was concerned, I was sure that my Government would not favor this; that we would not desire to put our forces between the two hostile forces, possibly to find ourselves under the necessity of fighting both sides to maintain our position.

I said that I would see Sir Miles at the earliest opportunity and give him the message which Mr. Garrido had given to me.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2
 2084

Conversation.

Peiping, April 18, 1933.

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.

Subject: Applicability of Protocol - Use of
foreign forces at Luan River Bridge.

I called upon Sir Miles and gave him the message which the Spanish Minister had given to me this morning. I stated that I had told Mr. Garrido that I was certain the American Government would not favor the placing of American troops at the Luan River Bridge for the purpose of holding it as between Japanese and Chinese hostile forces.

Sir Miles stated that his Government's position would be the same. He stated that this was the first time that any reference to the Protocol had been made, and possibly it put the matter in a new light. He thought perhaps that question might be explored.

I stated that it seemed to me that in this case the Protocol - which was essentially an understanding forced upon the Chinese for the purpose of obtaining recognition of the right of the foreign powers to protect their Legations at Peiping against attack by Chinese, and affording access to the sea in case evacuation of Legation personnel might be necessary - was not involved, in that we were not threatened with attack by Chinese. The Protocol was being invoked by the Japa-

nese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

nese in defense of their right to use their railway in a war against the Chinese, and it was being invoked by the Chinese for the purpose of persuading the foreign powers to prevent advance by the Japanese in a war against them; and no good could result from our becoming mixed up in such a situation.

Sir Miles agreed with this, and it was suggested that he and I and Lagarde meet with Mr. Garrido very informally to-morrow at eleven o'clock in the morning for the purpose of discussing unofficially this situation.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-
2084

Conversation.

Peiping, April 19, 1933.

Mr. Garrido, Spanish Minister.
 Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister.
 Mr. Lagarde, Counselor of French Legation.

Subject: Application of Boxer Protocol to present situation.

Mr. Garrido informed us that he had received a visit on yesterday from Mr. Tsai Yuan, who is attached to the local Chinese Military Headquarters, in the course of which Mr. Tsai Yuan had said to him that the Chinese still held the bridge across the Luan River, but that if the Japanese pressed them further it might possibly be necessary for them as an act of self-defense to destroy the bridge. Mr. Tsai Yuan had stated that it was not the desire of the Chinese to violate the Protocol, but self-defense might make it necessary for them to do this thing. It was therefore his personal idea that the powers party to the Protocol having forces in this area might wish to place troops at the bridge for the purpose of holding it. Mr. Garrido stated that he thought Mr. Tsai Yuan might wish a reply.

Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, stated that he thought the reply in regard to the stationing of troops should be a decisive negative; that he was certain his Government would not be willing to place

British

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

British military forces between the Japanese and Chinese forces.

I stated that it seemed to me that the Boxer Protocol was not applicable to the situation which now confronted us, as the Boxer Protocol was an arrangement dictated to the Chinese in settlement of the Boxer uprising, for the purpose of establishing the right of the foreign nations to protect their Legations at Peiping against attacks by Chinese, and affording facilities for evacuation of the Legation personnel by free access to the sea in case that might be necessary; and that in this case we were not threatened with attack from Chinese, and access to the sea was not denied as the road was still open to Tientsin; and I felt that the Protocol was being invoked by both sides to serve their own interests.

Mr. Lagarde and Sir Miles agreed with this, and we all agreed that if Mr. Tsai Yuan should seek a reply to his unofficial suggestion made to Mr. Garrido, he should be referred to the individual Legations.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 1, 1933.

~~JEJ:~~
~~MH:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 2085 of April 27 encloses memoranda of three conversations in regard to the possibility of armistice negotiations. In the first two the United Press representative informed Mr. Johnson that the Japanese Secretary in charge of the Japanese Legation felt that the time was appropriate for some third party to bring about negotiations. In the third memorandum Mr. Roger Greene informed Mr. Johnson that he believed the Chinese were approaching Sir Miles Lampson on the subject. Mr. Johnson's replies were non-committal.

etc

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huotefen NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, April 27, 1933.

No. 2085

Subject: Suggestions for a Sino-Japanese
Armistice.

PM REGD



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Legation's telegram No. 377/
of April 26, 5 p.m., and also to its telegrams No. 357/
April 22, 8 p.m., No. 358/
April 23, 12 noon, No. 365/
April 24, 7 p.m., and No. 369/
relating to the possibility of armistice negotiations
between the Chinese and Japanese military forces, I
now have the honor to transmit herewith memoranda of
1/2/ two conversations I had with Mr. H. R. Ekins, of the
United

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

3/ United Press and the NEW YORK TIMES, on April 17th
and 19th, and of a conversation with Mr. Roger S.
Greene, of the Peking Union Medical College, on April
20, 1933, which show how the question was first brought
to my attention.

In this connection the Department will be inter-
ested in referring to despatch No. 7525, of April 21,
1933, from the Consul General in Shanghai to the Lega-
tion, a copy of which was sent to the Department direct,
from which it appears that the suggestion of an armistice
was also made by Mr. H. G. Woodhead, a British journalist,
in an article which was published in the SHANGHAI EVENING
POST AND MERCURY of April 20, 1933.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosures:

1/ Memorandum of conversation, April 17, 1933.
2/ " " " April 19, 1933.
3/ " " " April 20, 1933.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
2085

Conversation.

Peiping, April 17, 1933.

Mr. Ekins.

Subject: Possibility of an Armistice.

Mr. Ekins came to me at the Peking Hotel this evening and stated that there was a matter of which he desired to inform me for my personal consideration. He said that Mr. Nakayama, Japanese Secretary in charge of the Japanese Legation, had come to him, and in the course of conversation had suggested that the time was appropriate when foreign military officers or some members of the foreign Legations - possibly the British or the American - might bring about negotiations between Japanese and Chinese military forces for the purpose of arranging an armistice, such negotiations to take place not in the presence of a third party.

He said that Mr. Nakayama suggested that the terms might be that the Chinese remain this side of the motor road connecting Peiping with Shanhaikwan, the Japanese to retire to the wall. Mr. Ekins stated that Mr. Nakayama had said that he was not making this suggestion under instructions from Tokyo.

I thanked Mr. Ekins for his information and made no comment.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2085

Conversation.

Peiping, April 19, 1933.

Mr. Ekins.

Subject: Possibility of an armistice.

Mr. Ekins stated during a conversation to-day that Mr. Nakayama seemed much interested in the suggestion which he had made to him some days ago concerning the possibility of an armistice. Mr. Ekins wondered whether I had given the matter any consideration. He commented to the effect that Mr. Nakayama disclaimed any instructions from Tokyo, and that furthermore Mr. Nakayama apparently was not being kept informed of the military situation as he had been in the past.

I told Mr. Ekins that the suggestion did not interest me; that I thought Mr. Nakayama ought to be able to approach the Chinese directly in the matter; and that I would await further information with interest.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3
2085

Conversation.

Peiping, April 20, 1953.

Mr. Roger S. Greene.

Subject: Possibility of Sino-Japanese armistice.

Mr. Roger Greene of the Peking Union Medical College and Hospital called to-day. He stated that Dr. Chiang Mon-lin had informed him of a meeting which had been held yesterday at the headquarters of General Ho Ying-chin, at which General Yu Hsueh-chung was present, and certain civilian leaders of Peiping among whom were Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Wong Wen-hao, and I think Dr. V. K. Ting. There were others whom Mr. Greene could not recall. At this meeting the present situation between Japanese and Chinese forces in this area was discussed, and it was recommended that the British Minister be approached with the suggestion that he arrange between both parties an armistice which would permit both sides to discontinue hostilities, and without commitments by the Chinese in regard to principles.

Mr. Greene understood that Dr. Chiang Mon-lin or one of the civilian leaders involved was to see Sir Miles Lampson this evening at six o'clock. He asked me if I had heard anything of this, and I told him that I was without any information on the subject.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 27, 1933.

~~JES~~
~~MCH~~

See attached digest to letter from Mr. Peck to Mr. Johnson dated April 21, which encloses a copy of a statement given to the press by Jang Ching-wei. Mr. Peck feels that the statement accurately reflects the Government's views and requests Mr. Johnson to bring the article to the special attention of the Department.

E.H.W.

0950

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quateman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


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DIGEST:

Despatch of the
Counsellor of the Legation
at Nanking, dated
April 21, 1933, to
the American Minister.



copy in FE

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Covering despatch:

Statements made by Mr. Wang Ching-wei in this inter-
view correctly describe the Chinese Government's
position in the Sino-Japanese controversy.

The arguments against direct negotiations seem very
convincing.

Report of interview:

Japan will not give up Manchuria or Jehol or abandon her
aggressive policy; China cannot submit to aggression or
recognize puppet government of Manchoukuo: consequently
there can be no direct negotiations between China and
Japan.

Armed resistance to Japan even though hopeless must be
continued and must be accompanied by efforts to bring
League members to realization of their duty to take
economic and military measures against Japan as provided
in the Covenant since otherwise past League resolutions
are meaningless.

If the policy of resistance accompanied by diplomatic
efforts were replaced by declaration of war by China
against Japan defeat humiliation and permanent loss
of sovereignty and territory would inevitably result.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


Nanking Office, April 21, 1933.



Dear Mr. Minister:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the KUO MIN release of April 15, 1933, entitled "Special Interview with Mr. Wang Ching-wei".

In this interview Mr. Wang has so accurately described the Government's conception of its duties in respect of the Japanese incursions and the arguments are so convincing, to me at least, that I respectfully recommend that the interview be brought specially to the attention of the Department. The asterisks have been inserted by this office and indicate statements which have been made to me personally by Mr. Wang Ching-wei or other high officials of the Chinese Government. The digest of the enclosure has been prepared in a form suitable for use as the body of a radio message, if you should think it advisable, in view of the pending discussions in Washington, to use this method to bring to the Department's attention immediately an official statement of the Chinese Government's position in the Sino-Japanese controversy.



Respectfully yours,

Enclosure:

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Copy of "Special Interview with Mr.
Wang Ching-wei."

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

WRP:MCL

0952

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Semi-official
KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY,
Nanking, April 15, 1933.

(KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY)

April 15, 1933.

SPECIAL INTERVIEW WITH MR. WANG CHING-WEI.

The following interview was granted this morning
by Mr. Wang Ching-wei to a representative of the Kuo
Min News Agency:-

Question: There has been a great deal of talk
lately about China and Japan coming to a compromise.
Is there any truth in this matter?

Answer. Most certainly not. Any one with a
* modicum of common-sense should be able to distinguish
* between what are rumours and what are facts. How could
* China and Japan in the present circumstance possibly
* come to a compromise? Will Japan give up The Three
* Eastern Provinces and Jehol, abandon her present policy
* of aggression, and dissolve the puppet regime in so-
* called Manchukuo? Can China ever submit to the Japanese
* acts of aggression and recognize the puppet government?
* When Japan is not willing to give up her present policy.
* nor China submit to this policy, how can there ever
* be a compromise? How can there be direct negotiations
* between China and Japan?

Question: You have been advocating the policy of
active, prolonged, resistance without closing the
channels of diplomacy. Do you still uphold this policy?

Answer:

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Answer: Yes. In resisting we cannot be certain of

* victory. Nevertheless, we must do our utmost, and
 * utilize all our available resources, however inadequate,
 * in carrying out this policy of resistance. While it
 must be admitted that since General Chiang's
 assumption of the active direction of military
 affairs in the North, with the co-operation of the other
 military leaders, not much progress has been made in
 the military sense, the present situation in the North
 has nevertheless to a certain extent improved, as is
 generally recognized.

Fully determined to resist, we must however not be
 elated over occasional victories, nor discouraged by
 temporary reverses. Only in this spirit will our policy
 of prolonged resistance bear fruit.

* As regards diplomacy, we have the recent decision
 * of the League of Nations openly proclaiming Japan the
 * aggressor and China the wronged party, a decision which
 * was the result of our diplomatic efforts no less than
 * the fruit of our policy of resistance. But whether the
 * League of Nations will go further, and adopt the economic
 * and military measures against Japan as provided for in
 * the Covenant, we do not know. Such measures are the
 * natural corollaries of the decision. Otherwise the
 * resolutions of the League of Nations have no meaning,
 * and will be just so much empty talk. On our part, there-
 * fore, we have, by the method of diplomacy, to bring the
 * members of the League of Nations, and the rest of the
 * civilized world, to a realization of their responsibi-
 * lities in the matter.

Your

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Your reference to the recent rumours reminds me of what the Japanese newspapers have been advocating all along. Have you read them? Their argument is that since China is obstinate in her resistance, Japan should extend her military campaign to within the Great Wall. Can there be any truth in the current rumours considering what the Japanese are openly advocating in their own papers?

There is another thing. I have been told that a great many Japanese are not in favour of the present aggressive policy of their Government, on the ground -- a very proper one -- that a policy of aggression can only result in the ultimate ruination of both China and Japan. This shows that the sense of justice and fair play is still alive, even in Japan.

My opinion therefore is that, besides the most determined resistance on our part, we should direct our diplomatic efforts in arousing the nations of the world to adopting whatever effective measures are necessary to check the aggressive acts of Japan-gone-mad, while at the same time strengthening those sections of the Japanese people who are opposed to the suicidal policy of their present rulers.

Question: There is the impression among certain people that the Central Authorities are hostile to the suggestions dealing with the general question of war and peace, which have been recently submitted to them, with the result that numerous misunderstandings are alleged to have arisen even among the members of the Central

Executive

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Executive Committee of the Party and the Military Affairs Commission. What is the truth of the matter?

Answer: Should we, in the present circumstances,
 * deviate from our declared policy of resistance and simul-
 * taneous resort to diplomacy, and, instead, advocate an
 * open declaration of war, we may have to face a military
 * defeat and suffer permanent territorial losses. Should
 * we have to sue for peace, we are sure to suffer a loss
 * of our national sovereignty and the most abject humilia-
 * tion. Should we pursue a policy of procrastination and
 indecision, a policy of neither the one nor the other,
 we may have to face the evils pertaining to both war
 and peace.

In these circumstances, with pressure from all sides, the mental agony of those at the helm of the Central Government may be compared to that of a person forced to jump into a burning fire. While we are determined to face the present crisis -- with our bodies slowly burning in the fire -- how can it be true that we have refused to welcome those who are prepared to go through the same sufferings and tortures as we are going through. With what other feelings but those of encouragement and gratitude can we regard them?

We sincerely hope that those who have been summoned to the various conferences that will shortly take place, will come and attend; sharing and helping us out of our perplexities. The fact that some of our comrades, on account of their present duties, are unable to come,

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -


and at the same time are not in a position to express their views fully in writing (with the result that misunderstandings may arise), can only cause us the deepest regret. We are doing our best to make up for whatever deficiency there is. But we cannot bear to think that at the present hour of national crisis there are still people who, standing aloof, are light-hearted enough to make jest of our efforts. If there are such people, how can we help it.

* Prior to the Incident of September 18, 1931, I have
 * had many differences with a number of the comrades at
 * Nanking, owing to my disagreement with various policies.
 * But the emergence of the national crisis made me bury
 * all these differences, and take my share in the common
 * suffering. I returned from Europe not because I am sure
 that I am able to contribute to the salvation of the country, but because I feel that the least I can do is to jump into the fire so that I may at least find a fitting grave.

0957

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. 362  Sent To The Department Without Comment

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

MAY 20 33 Tientsin, China, April 11, 1933.

F/HS

193.94
Subject: Occupation of Premises of Church of the
Brethren Mission at Shwangshantze and
Mutowteng.



The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of April 10, 3 p.m., reporting further concerning the occupation of the American Mission property at Shwangshantze and 1/ Mutowteng, and to enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated April 6, 1933, on which the information contained in the above-mentioned telegram was based. I have today acknowledged receipt of the Reverend Mr. Kautto's letter, 2/ a copy of my reply being enclosed herewith for the Legation's information.


Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/, From the Reverend Kautto, April 6, 1933.
2/, To the Reverend Kautto, April 11, 1933.

800
FPL/DA:w
Original and one copy to Legation.

A true copy of
the signed original


793.94/6329

FILED

JUN 6 1933

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Taitowying, Funingsien,
 Hopei, N. China,
 April 6, 1933.

The American Consul General,
 Tientsin, China.

Hon. Sir:

This is to let you know that I have arrived safely at my station, without meeting any difficulties, and seeing only one plane, which came from the south and flew to the northwest just as I was about a mile from home.

On arriving home I learn that on Monday morning, just after my departure, there was heavy bombing heard in the north, at Chiehlingkou, and again in that same location in the afternoon; but none since then.

On Tuesday some planes flew over Taitowying and on down to Funingsien, dropping four bombs on that city, and two in different villages near there, but no casualties occurred.

On Wednesday, yesterday, there were two reconnoitering planes and three bombing planes flying over Taitowying and vicinity for about two hours but no bombs were dropped. (No bombs have been dropped in this town since March 24.) But that day two bombs were dropped on Funingsien, one falling in the courtyard of the hsien magistrate yamen, killing three men, and the other falling behind the hsien yamen horse barn, injuring some men.

This morning, when on the way from Changli to Funingsien, about half way, I met the hsien militia. They had with them some seven or eight cart loads of

prisoners

0955

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

prisoners whom they said were to be transferred to Tientsin, while they themselves were to stay at Changli. They also said that the hsien magistrate had left the city last night, going to Changli, and that many of the business people had also gone. All business houses in Funingsien are closed.

A letter has come from Shuangshantze saying that some Japanese officials have been there investigating the damage done to the mission property, one of them having remarked that a little thing like occupying the building and using the straw and fuel (which we left under lock) shouldn't have been reported.


Tonight a letter has come from Mutouteng, stating that Japanese officials have investigated the mission premises there also and have recorded in their book the statement given them as to the number of times soldiers have stayed there, and the amounts of straw, fuel and coal oil used. The letter also adds that no locks there have been broken open.

As for our leaving the station here the facilities for doing so are rather limited, the R. R. officials informing me that the train on which I came up was the last to come as far as Changli, until further notice, the present terminus being Tangshan. However through the kind services already rendered by the Consul we trust that nothing of a serious nature will necessitate further trouble for the Consul, to whom we are heartily grateful.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) CHARLES O. KAUTTO

A true copy of
the signature
in.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

800
 FHL/DA:W

American Consulate General,
 Tientsin, China, April 11, 1933.

The Reverend Charles C. Kautto,
 Church of the Brethren Mission,
 T'ai'owying, Funinghsien,
 Hopei Province.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 6, 1933, in which you report your safe arrival at T'ai'owying and your plans to remain there. I beg to suggest that you keep closely in touch with the military situation and that you and your wife withdraw to a place of safety at the very first sign of any impending trouble.

I observe what you say concerning the information which you have received from Shwangshantze and Mutowteng. I am glad to know that the Japanese officials are investigating the damage done to your mission property there. This information has been brought to the attention of the American Legation at Peiping, together with the other information contained in your letter concerning the activities of the Japanese air forces at T'ai'owying and Funinghsien.

For your information, I beg to state that the American Legation has received a telegram from the American Embassy at Tokyo stating that the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on April 6 that the matter of the occupation of the American mission property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng was still under investigation. The Japanese authorities stated that the planes which dropped the bombs at T'ai'owying on March 24 were flying at an elevation of 1500 meters and that at that height it is impossible to distinguish a flag flying vertically from a pole, for which reason the Japanese authorities suggested that it would be better to place the flag horizontally over the ground or roofs. While this certainly is not the customary

way

0961

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

way in which to display an American flag, you might find it expedient to adopt this measure temporarily, for your own personal safety, in case further bombs should be dropped on T'ai't'owying. The military authorities in Tokyo expressed regret for the damage done to the mission property at T'ai't'owying and stated that standing instructions are that no trouble shall be caused to foreigners.

The First Secretary in charge of the Japanese Legation at Peiping has called upon the American Minister and expressed his regret that damage was done to your mission property and that American life was subjected to danger by the Japanese bombing of T'ai't'owying. The First Secretary also assured the American Minister that it was not the intention of the Japanese military to do damage to foreign life or property; that on the contrary they are doing everything possible to assure protection thereof; that the Chinese soldiers sometimes use foreign property as a shield behind which to attack the Japanese and that in such cases the Japanese must return the attack; that the Japanese authorities hoped you would be warned to take cognizance of this aspect of the matter and repair to a place of safety.

I shall be very glad if you will continue to keep me informed of developments at T'ai't'owying. I must, however, again express the hope that you will not remain in T'ai't'owying if there is the slightest danger of further bombing activities or other military operations which might endanger you and Mrs. Keutto.

Very truly yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

Copy to Legation.

one signed original
 [Signature]

1962

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 6, 1933.

~~JED:~~
~~MMH:~~

Tientsin's despatch to the Legation No. 366 dated April 17, 1933, encloses a letter from the Reverend Mr. Kautto stating that the "Head of Pacification Committee" (Japanese) informed Mr. Kautto that there would be no more bombing at Taitowying and that the occupation of the mission's property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng was only temporary.

ETW/VDM

0966

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD
No. 366
RECEIVED
MAY 26 1933
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 17, 1933.

M for Lockhart

Subject: Occupation of Premises of Church
of the Brethren Mission at
Shwangshantze and Mutowteng.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1933
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of April 17, 10 a.m., on the above-mentioned subject, and to
1/ enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me under date of April 13, 1933, by the Reverend Mr. Charles O. Kautto, which letter formed the basis of paragraph two of the telegram above-mentioned. The letter explains itself. It will be observed that reference is made to the occupation of the American mission property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng and that the "Head of Pacification Committee" who visited Taitowying after the bombing on April 12 and 13 assured the Reverend Mr. Kautto that there would be no further bombings and that "the populace may now expect peace and prosperity". He further observed that it had not been the intention (presumably of the Japanese soldiers) to occupy the property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng indefinitely but only as a temporary convenience.

It is

F/HS

793.94/6330

RECEIVED
MAY 27 1933

0964

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It is worthy of note that shortly after the bombing of Taitowying Japanese soldiers and carts of supplies came into the city in considerable numbers.

Respectfully yours,


✓
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ Letter from the Reverend Mr. Charles O. Kautto,
dated April 13, 1933.

800
FPL/MRE:1

Original and one copy to Legation.

A copy of
the signed origi-
nal. 

0965

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Taitowying,
Funingsien, Hopei,
April 13, 1933.

The American Consul General,
Tientsin, China.

Hon. Sir:

Your valued and most kind letter of April 11th, File No. 800 FPL/DA:w, reached us this evening just a few minutes after the Japanese "Head of the Pacification Committee" had called on us.

First we want to thank the Consul for his wise counsel and fatherly advice. In compliance with your request for any further information we are glad to have the opportunity of noting the following incidents.

Yesterday and today have been somewhat more disturbing to the daily routine than usual. In the forenoon of April 12th planes visited this city and dropped eight bombs, killing nine and injuring three, all civilians. April 13th we were again visited by a number of airplanes, which dropped bombs more or less all forenoon and until about 3 P.M. How many we do not know as we lost count, but not less than fifty or sixty, we should judge. As a result more than twenty people perished and a number were injured. Three men were killed as they stood on the outer side of our doorway when a bomb struck in the street about 30 feet in front of them. Another bomb dropped at the same time fell a little farther along the same street and about 30 ft. from our servants' quarters, but we are glad to say no one was hurt. As to the damage to our buildings it amounted to damaged wooden blinds on the Gospel hall, some holes in the compound door, and nearly half of the window panes shattered. Of course the outside of the walls next to the bombing considerably resemble having passed through a hard case of small-pox together with the scratching accompanying same.

All those who were killed today were civilians also for the very good reason that not a soldier remained in the town, all having evacuated last night. One entire family of nine was wiped out.

The "Head of the Pacification Committee" during the course of our conversation assured me that there need be no further fear from bombings, and that the populace might now expect peace and prosperity. To avoid a recurrence of the incidents in connection with mission property at Shuangshantze and Mutouteng he also wrote an order and posted it on our compound door, with our permission, to the effect that their men are not to molest the mission nor occupy the property. In closing he remarked that it had not been the intention to occupy the properties at Shuangshantze and Mutouteng indefinitely but only as a temporary convenience.

The Consul has been troubled too much already on our account and we trust this will be the last of a serious nature, while of course we are glad to pass on any useful information, at any time. We are happy to be able to state that we are in our usual health, and most heartily thank the Consul for his personal interest and concern on our behalf.

I may add that shortly after the entrance into the city of the above mentioned "Head of the Pacification Committee" Japanese soldiers and carts of supplies came into Taitowying in considerable numbers; how many it would be difficult to estimate as I did not go far from the compound and no one seemed to know.

It

0964

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It should also be noted that once more "Old Glory" has done its share nobly. Yesterday morning we hoisted a large, new flag, (about 5 ft. by 9½ ft.) which we had made, and tonight as we took it from its lofty post we found it bore five wounds from flying shrapnel. But it had served to protect the entire compound.

Very respectfully yours,

/signed/ CHARLES O. KAUTTO

A true copy of
the signed original.
ll

0967

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 31, 1933.

~~JMG~~
~~134H~~

Tientsin's despatch No. 307, dated April 18, 1933, encloses under cover of a despatch to the Legation a copy of a letter dated April 6 from the Rev. Charles O. Kautto, Church of the Brethren Mission, T'aitowying. The information contained in the letter was telegraphed to the Department by Mr. Lockhart on April 10, 3 p.m. There is also enclosed a copy of Mr. Lockhart's reply to the Rev. Kautto in regard to the Japanese expressions of regret to the American Legation at Peiping for the bombing of American Mission property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng. Mr. Lockhart also requests the Rev. Kautto to keep him informed of conditions and to evacuate if there is the slightest danger of further military operations or bombing activities.

2705

0968



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 307.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 18, 1933.

793.94



g for Lockhart

SUBJECT: Occupation of Premises of Church of the
Brethren Mission at Shwangshantze and
Mitowteng.

F/H/S

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

PM RECD



MAY 26 33

793.94/6331

- I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of April 10, 3 p.m., and April 17, 10 a.m., and to
- 1/ enclose herewith, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 362 of April 11, 1933, addressed to the Legation, transmitting copies of correspondence exchanged between myself and the Reverend Charles O. Kautto at Taitowying,
 - 2/ Hopei Province, and also a copy of my despatch No. 366 of April 17, 1933, addressed to the Legation at Peiping, enclosing a copy of a letter dated April 13, 1933, addressed to me by the Reverend Charles O. Kautto, on the above-mentioned subject, together with
 - 3/ a copy of my reply. The enclosures explain themselves.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/, To the Legation, dated April 11, 1933.
- 2/, To the Legation, dated April 17, 1933.
- 3/, To the Reverend Charles O. Kautto, dated April 18, 1933.

800

EPL/DA:w

Original and four copies to the Department.

1-1221

JUN 7 1933

FILED

0969

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

No. 362

Enclosure No. _____ In Despatch
No. _____ Dated April 11, 1933
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, The American Consulate Gen
at Tientsin, China.

Tientsin, China, April 11, 1933.

Subject: Occupation of Premises of Church of the
Brethren Mission at Shwangshantze and
Mutowteng.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of April 10, 3 p.m., reporting further concerning the occupation of the American Mission property at Shwangshantze and
1/ Mutowteng, and to enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated April 6, 1933, on which the information contained in the above-mentioned telegram was based. I have today acknowledged receipt of the Reverend Mr. Kautto's letter,
2/ a copy of my reply being enclosed herewith for the Legation's information.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:


- 1/, From the Reverend Kautto, April 6, 1933.
- 2/, To the Reverend Kautto, April 11, 1933.

800

FPL/DA:w

Original and one copy to Legation.

the copy of
the signature
original



0971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Taitowying, Funingshsien,
Hopei, N. China,
April 6, 1933.

The American Consul General,
Tientsin, China.

Hon. Sir:

This is to let you know that I have arrived safely at my station, without meeting any difficulties, and seeing only one plane, which came from the south and flew to the northwest just as I was about a mile from home.

On arriving home I learn that on Monday morning, just after my departure, there was heavy bombing heard in the north, at Chiehlingkou, and again in that same location in the afternoon; but none since then.

On Tuesday some planes flew over Taitowying and on down to Funingshsien, dropping four bombs on that city, and two in different villages near there, but no casualties occurred.

On Wednesday, yesterday, there were two reconnoitering planes and three bombing planes flying over Taitowying and vicinity for about two hours but no bombs were dropped. (No bombs have been dropped in this town since March 24.) But that day two bombs were dropped on Funingshsien, one falling in the courtyard of the hsien magistrate yamen, killing three men, and the other falling behind the hsien yamen horse barn, injuring some men.

This morning, when on the way from Changli to Funingshsien, about half way, I met the hsien militia. They had with them some seven or eight cart loads of prisoners whom they said were to be transferred to Tientsin, while they themselves were to stay at Changli. They also said that the hsien magistrate had left the city last night, going to Changli, and that many

of

0971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the business people had also gone. All business houses in Funingsien are closed.

A letter has come from Shuangshantze saying that some Japanese officials have been there investigating the damage done to the mission property, one of them having remarked that a little thing like occupying the building and using the straw and fuel (which we left under lock) shouldn't have been reported.


Tonight a letter has come from Mutouteng, stating that Japanese officials have investigated the mission premises there also and have recorded in their book the statement given them as to the number of times soldiers have stayed there, and the amounts of straw, fuel and coal oil used. The letter also adds that no locks there have been broken open.

As for our leaving the station here the facilities for doing so are rather limited, the R.R. officials informing me that the train on which I came up was the last to come as far as Changli, until further notice, the present terminus being Tangshan. However through the kind services already rendered by the Consul we trust that nothing of a serious nature will necessitate further trouble for the Consul, to whom we are heartily grateful.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) CHARLES O. KAUTTO

A true copy of
 the signed original
 is attached




0972

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

800
FPL/DA:w

American Consulate General,
Tientsin, China, April 11, 1933.

The Reverend Charles O. Kautto,
Church of the Brethren Mission,
T'aitowying, Funingshsien,
Hopei Province.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 6, 1933, in which you report your safe arrival at T'ait'owying and your plans to remain there. I beg to suggest that you keep closely in touch with the military situation and that you and your wife withdraw to a place of safety at the very first sign of any impending trouble.

I observe what you say concerning the information which you have received from Shwangshantze and Mutowteng. I am glad to know that the Japanese officials are investigating the damage done to your mission property there. This information has been brought to the attention of the American Legation at Peiping, together with the other information contained in your letter concerning the activities of the Japanese air forces at T'ait'owying and Funingshsien.

For your information, I beg to state that the American Legation has received a telegram from the American Embassy at Tokyo stating that the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on April 6 that the matter of the occupation of the American mission property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng was still under investigation. The Japanese authorities stated that the planes which dropped the bombs at T'ait'owying on March 24 were flying at an elevation of 1500 meters and that at that height it is impossible to distinguish a flag flying vertically from a pole, for which reason the Japanese authorities suggested that it would be better to place the flag horizontally over the ground or roofs. While this certainly is not the customary

way

097

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

way in which to display an American flag, you might find it expedient to adopt this measure temporarily, for your own personal safety, in case further bombs should be dropped on T'ai't'owying. The military authorities in Tokyo expressed regret for the damage done to the mission property at T'ai't'owying and stated that standing instructions are that no trouble shall be caused to foreigners.


The First Secretary in charge of the Japanese Legation at Peking has called upon the American Minister and expressed his regret that damage was done to your mission property and that American life was subjected to danger by the Japanese bombing of T'ai't'owying. The First Secretary also assured the American Minister that it was not the intention of the Japanese military to do damage to foreign life or property; that on the contrary they are doing everything possible to assure protection thereof; that the Chinese soldiers sometimes use foreign property as a shield behind which to attack the Japanese and that in such cases the Japanese must return the attack; that the Japanese authorities hoped you would be warned to take cognizance of this aspect of the matter and repair to a place of safety.

I shall be very glad if you will continue to keep me informed of developments at T'ai't'owying. I must, however, again express the hope that you will not remain in T'ai't'owying if there is the slightest danger of further bombing activities or other military operations which might endanger you and Mrs. Kautto.

Very truly yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Copy to Legation.




0974

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

No. 366.



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 17, 1933.

Subject: Occupation of Premises of Church
of the Brethren Mission at
Shwangshantze and Mutowteng.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of April 17, 10 a.m., on the above-mentioned subject, and to
1/ enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me under date of April 13, 1933, by the Reverend Mr. Charles O. Kautto, which letter formed the basis of paragraph two of the telegram above-mentioned. The letter explains itself. It will be observed that reference is made to the occupation of the American mission property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng and that the "Head of Pacification Committee" who visited Taitowying after the bombing on April 12 and 13 assured the Reverend Mr. Kautto that there would be no further bombings and that "the populace may now expect peace and prosperity". He further observed that it had not been the intention (presumably of the Japanese soldiers) to occupy the property at Shwangshantze and Mutowteng indefinitely but only as a temporary convenience.

It is

0975

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It is worthy of note that shortly after the bombing
of Taitowying Japanese soldiers and carts of supplies
came into the city in considerable numbers.


Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/ Letter from the Reverend Mr. Charles O. Kautto,
dated April 13, 1933.

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FPL/MRE:1

Original and one copy to Legation.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

Taitowying,
 Funingshsien, Hopei,
 April 13, 1933.

The American Consul General,
 Tientsin, China.

Hon. Sir:

Your valued and most kind letter of April 11th, File No. 800 FPL/DA:w, reached us this evening just a few minutes after the Japanese "Head of the Pacification Committee" had called on us.

First we want to thank the Consul for his wise counsel and fatherly advice. In compliance with your request for any further information we are glad to have the opportunity of noting the following incidents.

Yesterday and today have been somewhat more disturbing to the daily routine than usual. In the forenoon of April 12th planes visited this city and dropped eight bombs, killing nine and injuring three, all civilians. April 13th we were again visited by a number of airplanes, which dropped bombs more or less all forenoon and until about 3 P.M. How many we do not know as we lost count, but not less than fifty or sixty, we should judge. As a result more than twenty people perished and a number were injured. Three men were killed as they stood on the outer side of our doorway when a bomb struck in the street about 30 feet in front of them. Another bomb dropped at the same time fell a little farther along the same street and about 30 ft. from our servants' quarters, but we are glad to say no one was hurt. As to the damage to our buildings it amounted to damaged wooden blinds on the Gospel hall, some holes in the compound door, and nearly half of the window panes shattered. Of course the outside of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the walls next to the bombing considerably resemble having passed through a hard case of small-pox together with the scratching accompanying same.

All those who were killed today were civilians also for the very good reason that not a soldier remained in the town, all having evacuated last night. One entire family of nine was wiped out.

The "Head of the Pacification Committee" during the course of our conversation assured me that there need be no further fear from bombings, and that the populace might now expect peace and prosperity. To avoid a recurrence of the incidents in connection with mission property at Shuangshantze and Mutouteng he also wrote an order and posted it on our compound door, with our permission, to the effect that their men are not to molest the mission nor occupy the property. In closing he remarked that it had not been the intention to occupy the properties at Shuangshantze and Mutouteng indefinitely but only as a temporary convenience.

The Consul has been troubled too much already on our account and we trust this will be the last of a serious nature, while of course we are glad to pass on any useful information, at any time. We are happy to be able to state that we are in our usual health, and most heartily thank the Consul for his personal interest and concern on our behalf.

I may add that shortly after the entrance into the city of the above mentioned "Head of the Pacification Committee" Japanese soldiers and carts of supplies came into Taitowying in considerable numbers; how many it would be difficult to estimate as I did not go far from the compound and no one seemed to know.

It

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 3 -

It should also be noted that once more "Old Glory" has done its share nobly. Yesterday morning we hoisted a large, new flag, (about 5 ft. by 9½ ft.) which we had made, and tonight as we took it from its lofty post we found it bore five wounds from flying shrapnel. But it had served to protect the entire compound.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) CHARLES O. KAUTTO

A true copy of
the signed original
is attached.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

800
EPL/DA

Enclosure No. <u>3</u>	to Dispatch
No. <u>3</u>	Date <u>APR 18 1933</u>
From the American Consulate General at Tientsin, China.	

American Consulate General,
Tientsin, China, April 18, 1933.

The Reverend Charles O. Kautto,
Church of the Brethren Mission,
Taitowying,
Funingsien, Hopei.

Sir:


I beg to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your letter of April 13 in which you report the details of further airplane raids on Taitowying on April 12 and 13. I appreciate very much your sending me the information contained in the letter under acknowledgment. The information was promptly transmitted to the American Legation and to the Department of State.

I infer that you and your wife were subjected to very great danger and I feel much relieved to know that you escaped injury. In case you should continue to remain at Taitowying, against which I have strongly advised, I trust that you will keep me informed of any important developments in the political and military situation.

Very truly yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

A true copy of
the signed original.




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Blustein NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 19, 1933




Conversation:

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 25 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. George G. Barber, President of the Board
of Trustees of Yenching University
(150 Fifth Avenue, New York City);

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Chapman.

Subject: Possibility of Measures Being Taken for
the Protection of Yenching University in
the Event of Japanese Occupation of Peiping.



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Mr. Barber observed that Yenching University represented an investment of American capital to the extent of six and a half million dollars according to one method of calculation, and eight million dollars according to another; he recalled that the University had originally been a purely missionary enterprise, and added that the present annual budget is \$250,000 comprising contributions from the boards of foreign missions of six Protestant churches (he later added that he was also connected with the Board of Managers of the Yenching-Harvard Institute, which had just completed the installation of certain equipment at Yenching, comprising a library now probably the finest in all of China); he stated that the funds for all annual expenses came from American sources with the exception of the tuition fees collected, which came to an insignificant amount. Mr. Barber stated that the body which he represented was

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of course desirous that this American investment should not be destroyed by possible military activities in the vicinity of Peiping, and for this reason he had suggested to Mr. Hamilton over the telephone that the Department consider the desirability of communicating with both the Chinese and Japanese diplomatic representatives at Washington, pointing out the nature of the American interest in Yenching, and requesting that steps be taken to respect the property.

Mr. Hamilton recalled that he had informed Mr. Barber by telephone that the step proposed had received the Department's most careful consideration in connection with the general question of the protection of American interests in Peiping, but that the Department had not felt that such a step would serve any useful purpose at this time. Mr. Hamilton assured Mr. Barber that the protection of American interests in the Peiping-Tientsin area was receiving the constant and careful consideration of the American Minister to China and of the American Consul General at Tientsin, as well as of the American military authorities in China; that the latest information from the American Minister, contained in telegrams dated May 15 and 16, indicated that Minister Johnson did not feel that the situation warranted any immediate apprehension for the safety of American

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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American lives and property, and that with the exception of the Americans at T'ungchow, it had not been deemed necessary to suggest to Americans in Peiping or its vicinity withdrawal to the Legation Quarter. Mr. Hamilton explained the status of the Legation Quarter and the Legation guards, who would, if such action seemed advisable, ^{cooperate} ~~assist~~ to put a defense plan into operation, the first step of which was the gathering into the Quarter of foreign residents in Peiping. Mr. Hamilton also observed that our information indicated that the Japanese approach to Peiping would probably be from the east and northeast, if they decided to occupy the city, and that as Yenching University was situated some miles to the west of Peiping, it was possible that, even if the Japanese took the city, Yenching might be unmolested. Mr. Barber stated that even if the civil authorities in Japan should desire to prevent the Japanese occupation of Peiping, it would be difficult for them to exert any control over the military; he added that the civil authorities in Japan had very little to say nowadays. Mr. Barber stated also that while he realized that the military were in power in Japan, his information was to the effect that there were constant indications that the civil population was becoming restive under this state of affairs. Mr. Hamilton's information

did

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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did not indicate that there were more than slight and infrequent indications of Japanese popular unrest. Mr. Barber went on to say that the American money invested in Yenching and in the Yenching-Harvard Institute represented an effort to train the Chinese to be able to manage things for themselves in educational affairs. He stated that much American money had been expended in Japan by missionary and other groups with a similar intent to assist in self-development by the Japanese, and that he believed that this was duly appreciated by a certain element among the civil authorities of Japan.

Mr. Hamilton observed that in most of the cases of a change in military control in China between rival Chinese groups, there might be a certain amount of local disorder for two or three days, but that ordinarily disorders were of no longer duration; and that it was very rare for foreign life and property to suffer seriously during such brief transitional periods.

Mr. Hamilton stated that he supposed that the staff at Yenching were keeping in constant touch with the American Legation. Mr. Barber stated that such was his information. He added that the present plan was to dismiss all students when the approach of Japanese forces became imminent in

order

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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order that there might be no excuse for any destruction. Mr. Hamilton stated that he considered this a wise move, as the presence of radical or prominently anti-Japanese students might involve Japanese reprisals. Mr. Barber appeared somewhat exercised lest this move, or an appeal for protection might cause the authorities of the University to "lose caste" with the Chinese, and stated that so far the attitude of the University had been to go along with the Chinese, and to identify itself with them. Mr. Hamilton stated that a list of property owned or occupied by Americans along the reported Japanese route had been handed to the Japanese and Chinese authorities by the American Legation and/or the American Consul General at Tientsin. Mr. Jacobs remarked that undoubtedly the maps of the Japanese showed the foreign property in and about Peiping, and he felt sure that Yenching University would be so shown.

Mr. Hamilton concluded by assuring Mr. Barber that the protection of American lives and property would continue to receive the careful consideration of the American authorities in China and of the Department, and reiterated his suggestion that the University keep in touch with the American Legation and follow its advice.

Mr. Barber expressed his thanks and left.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 1, 1933.

~~100~~
LMH

The attached note dated April 21, 1933, from the American Minister to the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation reports damage done to and occupation of American Mission property at Taitowying, Shwangshantze, and Lutowteng by Japanese troops.

EXW

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM. RECD



Extra Copies Sent To The Department Without Sending
 To The State

MAY 26 33



Peiping, April 21, 1933.

Sir:

In reference to my communication of April 7th describing the location of the American mission property at Taitowying, Hopei, to your reply of April 11th, and to previous communications concerning damage to American property at that place as the result of bombing by Japanese airplanes, I have the honor to inform you that Mr. Charles C. Kautto, the American occupant of the property, in a letter written from Taitowying on April 12th, reported that on the forenoon of April 12th Japanese airplanes visited the city and dropped a number of bombs, killing nine and injuring three civilians. On April 13th a number of planes bombed the city during the forenoon until about 3 p.m., resulting in the death of twenty people and the injury of a number of others. Three

M. Nakayama, Esquire,

First Secretary of the
 Japanese Legation,
 Peiping.

F/H/S

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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men were killed as they stood on the outer side of the doorway to the Mission compound, the bomb striking about thirty feet from the doorway. Another bomb dropped at the same time fell a little farther along the same street and about thirty feet from the servants' quarters of the Mission where, fortunately, no one was injured. The bombing damaged wooden blinds on the gospel hall, made holes in the compound door, shattered nearly half of the window panes in the Mission buildings and caused minor damage to the surface of the walls of the compound. During the bombings an American flag five feet by nine and one-half feet was flying from the flag-staff of the Mission.

Mr. Kautto stated that the Japanese "Head of the Pacification Committee" called on the evening of April 12th, assured Mr. Kautto that there need be no further fear from bombing, wrote an order, and, with the Mission's permission, posted it upon the compound door, this order being to the effect that the military forces under the control of the Japanese are not to molest the Mission nor occupy the property.

The Japanese officer further remarked that it had not been the intention of the Japanese forces to occupy the American property at Shwangshantze and

Mutowteng

1988

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Mutowteng indefinitely but only as a temporary convenience. It will be remembered that on March 28th I wrote to you concerning the occupation of American mission property at the two places named, to which communication you replied on the following day.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) Nelson Trusler Johnson.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatlefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 6, 1933.

JEF:
MMH:
SAH

Nanking's despatch No. D-478 dated April 18, 1933, states that Dr. Hsu Mo, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed Mr. Peck that the Chinese Government was concerned over press reports of speeches by Mr. Eldridge, a former Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of Commerce, and Mr. Castle.

Mr. Eldridge declared that the way to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy was to award Japan a mandate from the League covering Manchuria, thus giving Japan "face". Dr. Hsu Mo said that the proposal to give Japan a mandate over Manchuria was entirely unacceptable to the Chinese Government.

The disturbing phrase in Mr. Castle's speech was to the effect that the American Government's policy of refusing to recognize the so-called state of "Manchukuo" might quite conceivably be changed. Being pressed for an opinion on the above, Mr. Peck stated that he did not think it probable that the American Government entertained any present intention of departing from its announced policy in regard to "Manchukuo" since the President on January 17, 1933, had issued a statement that the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

international policy of the United States was based upon the theory of the sanctity of treaties. Mr. Peck also pointed out that Mr. Castle and Mr. Eldridge were no longer officials of the American Government.

Copies of the above referred to speeches, as reported in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, are enclosed with the despatch.

Mr. Peck also reports that a British diplomatic officer ~~had~~ asked him whether Mr. Castle's statement had caused him any trouble and stated that Sir John Simon had made a public statement practically the same, viz., that if circumstances materially altered, the decision of the League not to recognize "Manchukuo" might, likewise, become subject to change.

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ETW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

No.D-478

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General,
Nanking, China, April 18, 1933.

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Subject: Speeches made by Mr. W.R. Castle and
Mr. Francis Reed Eldridge concerning
the policy of the United States
with respect to "Manchoukuo".

F/HS

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1933
Department of State

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in my capacity of
Counselor of Legation, I called upon Dr. Hsu Mo, Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs, on April 13, in connection
with a matter under diplomatic negotiation.

The Vice Minister took the opportunity to tell me
that his Government was concerned over reports which
had appeared in the press that Mr. Eldridge, a former
Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of
Commerce, had made a speech in which he declared that
the only way to settle the Sino-Japanese controversy
was to give Japan "face" and that this might be done by
awarding to Japan a mandate from the League of Nations
covering Manchuria. The Vice Minister said that re-
ports had also been published that Mr. Castle, formerly
Under Secretary of State, had made a speech at Philadel-
phia in which he made the startling announcement that the
position taken by the American Government in the notes
it addressed to China and Japan on January 7, 1932,

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announcing

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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announcing its policy of refusing to recognize the so-called state of "Manchoukuo" might quite conceivably be changed.

Dr. Hsu Mo said that the proposal to give Japan a mandate over Manchuria would be, of course, entirely unacceptable to the Chinese Government. In regard to the reported statement by Mr. Castle, he intimated that his Government was profoundly surprised at the idea that the American Government might not intend to adhere to the policy enunciated in the note of January 7, 1932 addressed to the National Government. He inquired whether I could give him any information on the subject. He observed that if Mr. Eldridge had a bias in favor of Japan, it might be explained by the fact that he had lived there and that his wife was partly Japanese in race.

Being pressed for an expression of opinion, I replied that I did not think it probable that the American Government entertained any present intention of departing from its announced policy in regard to Manchoukuo, since the President, on January 17, 1933, had issued a statement that the international policy of the United States was based upon the theory of the sanctity of treaties. I remarked that this statement was issued at the moment when the Committee of Nineteen was sitting at Geneva to adopt a draft report to the Assembly of the League and that the world at large seemed to have taken the statement made by the President-Elect as being an assurance that the policy of the

previous

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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previous administration in regard to Far Eastern matters would be continued under the newly elected President. I observed that Mr. Castle, when he made his speech at Philadelphia, was no longer an official of the American Government. In regard to Mr. Eldridge, I observed that, so far as I knew, he, also, was no longer an officer under the Government. I suggested, therefore, that the Vice Minister need not attach too much significance to these two pronouncements, but I said that I would report to the Department the concern which he had expressed on behalf of his Government.

There are enclosed herewith copies of the United Press telegrams, published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of April 9, 1933, which contain the reports referred to by the Vice Minister.

I have the honor to add that a day or so after this interview a British Diplomatic officer asked me whether Mr. Castle's statement had "caused me any trouble". I told him that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had taken occasion to express to me the concern felt by his Government. My British colleague remarked that I might be interested to know that Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister, had made a public statement practically the same as Mr. Castle's, viz., that if circumstances materially altered, the decision of the League of Nations not to recognize "Manchoukuo" might, likewise, become subject to change. I replied that I supposed this

idea

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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idea was based on the diplomatic theory of "rebus sic
stantibus", which had been adduced as justification
of the act of the Chinese Government in unilaterally
declaring the abrogation of the extraterritoriality
provisions of our treaties with China, and my British
colleague agreed that my supposition was probably
correct.

Respectfully yours,



Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation and
American Consul General.

Enclosure[✓]

Copy of the United Press
telegrams, published in
the NORTH CHINA DAILY
NEWS of April 9, 1933.

5 copies to Department
2 copies to Legation

800
WRP-T

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to Despatch D-478 to Department of Willlys R. Peck, Counselor of Legation and American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated April 18, 1933, on the subject of "Speeches made by Mr. W.R.Castle and Mr.Francis Readd Eldridge concerning the policy of the United States with respect to "Manchoukuo".

NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS, April 9, 1933.

COL. STIMSON'S DOCTRINE

Explanation by Hoover Official

U.S. AND MANCHUKUO

Recognition Possibility Not Obviated

Philadelphia, Apr. 7.

Mr. William R. Castle, former Under-Secretary of State, to-night shattered the popular interpretation of the now famous Stimson doctrine of "non-recognition."

In an address here to-night, Mr. Castle said the "Stimson Doctrine" did not obviate the possibility that the United States may recognize Manchukuo. At the time that the policy was enunciated, Mr. Castle asserted, it was not stated that the United States would never recognise Manchukuo.

"Times may change the condition and times may affect the entire problem," he added.

Mr. Castle then went on to say that, because of the difference in outlook between the Far East and the Occident, the Japanese fail to understand why the United States seems to block their natural expansion.

"Japan looks to us as a friend," he continued, "but cannot understand or forget the insult to her race in our very unnecessary immigration laws."

Mr. Castle's

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Castle's address was made before the American Academy of Political Science which is discussing the entire Far Eastern policy of the United States.

Mr. Castle was followed by Mr. George S. Sokolsky, formerly of Shanghai, who said that China, in the last century, had passed through a series of revolutionary changes similar to those which Europe passed through in five or six centuries. These changes had brought confusion not only among peoples of the west but among the Chinese themselves, Mr. Sokolsky said.

Mr. Roland Morris, former Ambassador to Japan, and Mrs. Pearl Buck, authoress of "Good Earth" and other novels dealing with Chinese life, are to speak later.-- United Press.

Washington Puzzled

Washington, Apr. 7.

Because of the lateness of the hour, Mr. Castle's statements were not widely circulated among officials or Congressmen but those who read the address were plainly puzzled. Some of them said that they had believed that the "Stimson Doctrine" applied specifically to the Japanese military action in Manchuria. They recalled that the State Department, under Colonel Henry L. Stimson, reiterated the policy in connection with the war between Paraguay and Bolivia over the Gran Chaco area.

Officials in the new Roosevelt Administration declined to comment on the address to-night other than to point out that the present Government had made no declaration of policy with regard to the Far East.

Mr. Castle, who at one time, was a special

Ambassador

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Ambassador to Japan, was Under-Secretary of State when the notes to Japan and China containing the so-called Stimson doctrine, were written.

The principal note was written on January 7, 1932. Because it was couched in diplomatic language which might be misinterpreted by the public or in the press abroad, the State Department issued an explanatory statement regarding its contents. The statement at the time was believed to have been written by Mr. Castle although it carried no signature.

"In the first place, of course, we have no desire to question Japan's legitimate treaty rights in Manchuria," the statement read. "We do not intend to interfere with them in the slightest degree. In the second place, we have no desire to intrude ourselves into any settlement which Japan and China may make of their present unhappy difficulties, except--and these are the exceptions:

"First, that nothing in that settlement must impair our rights in China as set out in the open-door policy and in the Nine-Power Treaty which embodied the open-door policy; and

Second, except that the settlement should not be achieved by a violation of the methods agreed to in the Kellogg Pact."--United Press.

Face-Saving Programme

New York, Apr. 7.

Mr. Francis Reed Eldridge, former Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of Commerce, to-day declared that a "face-saving" programme is necessary

before

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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before any settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy can be obtained.

In a radio address under the auspices of the League of Nations Association, Mr. Eldridge offered what he believed was a logical programme. He proposed that the Chinese Government should ask the League of Nations to take over Manchuria as a mandate just as the German colonies were taken over after the world war.

Having taken over the disputed territory, the League would then appoint Japan as the mandatory power and as a reinstated member of the League. Japan would administer Manchuria as a mandated territory and would make regular reports to the League.--United Press.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 6, 1933.

~~JEB:~~
MAH:

Shanghai's despatch No. 8871 dated April 21, 1933, encloses a newspaper clipping containing a proposal by H.G.W. Woodhead that the British, French and American authorities propose an armistice to end the fighting in north China.

There is also enclosed a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Josselyn and the Commissioner of Finance of the Shanghai city government in which the latter stated that he personally favored Mr. Woodhead's suggestion as it was impossible for the Nanking Government to make such a proposal since it would mean an immediate attack against the National Government by opposing elements in China.

ETW/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 8891

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, April 21, 1933.

SUBJECT: Possibility of Foreign Powers Requesting
an Armistice in North China.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
a self-explanatory despatch No. 7525 of this date,
with enclosures, from this Consulate General to the
Legation in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's
despatch No. 7525, with enclosures.

800
PRJ:NLH

In duplicate

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7525

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, April 21, 1933.

subject: Possibility of Foreign Powers Requesting
 an Armistice in North China.

The Honorable

Nelson Brunsler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

- I have the honor to transmit herewith an excerpt
- 1/ from the SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY (American)
 of April 20, 1933, containing a proposal by Mr. H. G. W.
 Goodhead that the British, French, and American authori-
 ties propose an armistice to end the present fighting
 in North China. There is likewise transmitted here-
 - 2/ with a copy of a memorandum of conversation between
 an officer of this Consulate General and Mr. J. K. Choy,
 Commissioner of Finance of the Shanghai City Government.
 Mr. Choy was, of course, giving merely his own personal
 view, but I have no doubt that his views are shared by
 a large number of responsible Chinese officials.
 Mr. Choy is known to the Minister and to other members
 of the Legation staff who were in Shanghai during 1932.
 He is a man of considerable mental energy, as well as
 frankness, and his views on various questions are
 usually sound. From a Chinese point of view there
 can be no question of the desirability of having such

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-


a proposal come from the Foreign Powers. Whether or not the Foreign Powers will consider that their own interests, as well as those of humanity and the world at large, will be best served by making such a proposal, is a different matter.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin C. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Excerpt from SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY (American) of April 20, 1953.
- 2/- Copy of memorandum of conversation, as stated.



In duplicate to Department

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch No. 7525 From Edwin L. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 21, 1933, on the subject "Feasibility of Foreign Forces Against an Armistice in North China."

SOURCE: SHANGHAI OVERSEAS POST
 & CHINA, April 20,
 1933. (American daily
 newspaper.)

EXCERPT

ONE MAN'S COMMENT FOR TODAY

THE NORTHERN CRISIS. FIGHTING MUST STOP.

By H. G. W. WOODHEAD, C.B.E.

WHATEVER excuse may be given by the Japanese for their invasion of Eastern Hopei, their action cannot be viewed with indifference by the more important of the Treaty Powers. Great Britain, as I emphasized yesterday, has extremely important interests in the railway, mines, and Chinwangtao harbour—interests which cannot but be adversely affected by the Japanese incursion into the Peiping-Shanhaikuan Railway zone. She also controls the administration of the most important of the foreign municipalities in Tientsin.

Other Powers, also, have interests which they are entitled to uphold when, as is now the case, they are jeopardized by Japanese military action. In common with Great Britain, France and the United States still maintain their Legations at Peiping, and garrisons at Peiping and Tientsin. They have certain rights on the railway arising out of the 1901 Protocol, and the subsequent Agreement for the dissolution of the Tientsin Provisional Government. The French have a Concession at Tientsin, and all three Powers have important financial and commercial interests in that city. Japan must be left under no illusions as to the gravity of the situation that must arise if she extends her present military activities to the region of Tientsin and the former capital, or even if she continues to occupy the Shanhaikuan-Lanchow section of the railway. She cannot expect nations with no interest in her quarrel with China to allow their rights—based upon Treaties and Agreements to which Japan herself is a party—to be ignored.

Nanking's Dilemma

THE plain truth is that unless and until a state of war exists between Japan and China, the Powers mentioned above have every right to demand a cessation of hostilities within China Proper. Japan occupied a special position in Manchuria which made it impolitic for the Powers to interfere other than by seeking to find a method of conciliating the disputants. In Hopei, however, and es-

pecially that portion now within the sphere of Japan's military activities, British interests predominate, and those of Britain, France and America combined far exceed those of Japan. There is no rhyme or reason why they should be abandoned. And a firm but not unreasonable attitude now is imperative if they are not to suffer irreparable injury.

Subjected to unceasing pressure from irresponsible patriots, the Nanking Government, at the moment, simply dare not take the initiative in any move calculated to terminate hostilities on the Hopei borders. Mr. Wang Chingwei, who has on several occasions admitted the futility of military operations against Japan, has nevertheless felt constrained to announce that "the Government authorities have decided to order a counter-attack in the Lanchow Region." Any attempt to convert this order into action will inevitably result in further hostilities in the railway zone, and a Japanese advance on Tientsin. No responsible Chinese leader wishes for such developments. None, however, dare breathe a suggestion of an armistice, however much, in his heart of hearts, he would welcome such a solution as a temporary expedient.

An Armistice?

A PROPOSAL for an armistice, to have any hope of success, must come from a third party or parties. And who have a better right to make it than the American, British and French Government? Neither party can deny their interests in the maintenance of peace in Hopei, or their right to demand that continued hostilities should not be permitted to jeopardize them. An armistice arranged under their auspices would not cause either side to lose face, nor prejudice any of its future rights.

The Agreement for the dissolution of the Tientsin Provisional Government in fact entitles the three Powers to claim certain rights in the railway zone, enforcement of which would mean the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

An Armistice?

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The Agreement for the dissolution of the Tientsin Provisional Government in fact entitles the three Powers to claim certain rights in the railway zone, enforcement of which would mean the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from the Lanchow-Shanhaikuan sector. And a redistribution of the Railway Guards ought certainly to be feasible, by which Japanese forces in this area are replaced by French or British units. In 1911 Japan had only 10 N.C.O.'s and men at Shanhaikuan, while the French had 53 officers and men there, and the British 92 at Chinwangtao. The French today, maintain a post of 71 officers and men at Shanhaikuan, and the 260 Japanese who are normally stationed there, are strictly speaking, not at this post to protect special Japanese interests, but to maintain the common rights of the Protocol Powers. Their replacement by neutral units (British or French) would constitute a guarantee to both parties to the present dispute that the terms of any Armistice would be duly observed.

"Without Prejudice"

THERE is very good reason to believe that the Chinese authorities, while unwilling to take the initiative in arranging an armistice, or even to hold any negotiations on the subject with Japan whatsoever, would not regard with disfavour the mediation of third Parties based upon their own unquestioned treaty rights. Any agreement reached in this way would be between Japan and the mediators on the one hand, and between the same Powers and China, on the other. The obligations assumed both by China and Japan would be to third parties, and not to each other. And no sacrifice of principle would be demanded of Nanking or of Tokyo.

The effect, however, would be the creation of a neutral zone, which would keep the regular forces of both nations out of range of each other, and avert the danger of any further extension of hostilities within the Great Wall. If the Chinese decided to continue to dissipate their slender financial resources on military reorganization, there would be nothing to prevent them doing so. In fact they would be more favourably situated for this task than today, when military debacles follow each other in rapid succession. It might be hoped, however, that the cessation of hostilities within the wall, under what would virtually be a guarantee from neutral nations, would encourage Nanking to follow Mr. Wang Ching-wei's "Road to national salvation"—namely, to concentrate on increasing the productivity of the nation.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 7525 of Edwin S. Jerningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 21, 1938, on the subject "Possibility of Foreign Powers Requesting an Armistice in North China."

Memorandum of Conversation

April 21, 1938.

Consul . . . Jerningham
 Mr. . . . Choy, Commissioner of Finance,
 Shanghai City Government.

Subject: Possibility of Foreign Powers
 Requesting an Armistice in
 North China.

Mr. . . . Choy, at a dinner at Mayor Lu He-chen's on the evening of April 20, 1938, brought up the subject of the possibility that Great Britain, France and the United States might now combine in requesting that an armistice be brought about in North China. Mr. Choy referred to Mr. Woodhead's article in the SHANGHAI MORNING POST AND MERCURY of April 20, 1938, in which Mr. Woodhead advocates such a proposal for an armistice. Mr. Choy stated that he considered this a very sound idea; that it would be utterly impossible for the Hankow Government at this time to make such a proposal, since there would immediately be an outbreak against them on the part of the Chinese. He said that the conditions at Hankow were extremely critical at present vis-a-vis both the Canton opposition and the communists in Kiangsi, and that if Hankow were overthrown now the country might very easily be thrown into a state of anarchy. Mr. Choy stated that one of the worst features in the Chinese character was their refusal to face facts, and he used as an illustration that if China were in the position of America today, China would not go off the gold standard as America has done, but would shilly-shally along, refusing to face the situation as it exists. Mr. Choy stated that his own viewpoint in matters of this sort was distinctly non-Chinese; that he, himself, had been largely responsible for persuading the Chinese military authorities to agree to the foreign offer of good offices which finally resulted in the Shanghai agreement of May 5th last, ending the local Sino-Japanese hostilities.

Mr. Choy asked me to pass this view along to the higher American authorities, and I replied that I would be glad to do what I could. I made no comments, however, on his proposal.

HEH:AM

PMJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 1, 1933.

~~RCM~~
~~INT~~
~~MMH~~

Tientsin's despatch No. 310, dated April 22, 1933, encloses a copy of a despatch to the Legation (with enclosures) in regard to the damage done by Japanese airplane bombs to the American Methodist Episcopal Mission property at Miyun. Mr. Lockhart encloses a copy of his communication to the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin in which he requests that an investigation be made of the damage done at Miyun and informs the Japanese authorities of the value and location of the property belonging to the same mission at Shih Hsia and Tsunhua City. Reimbursement is requested for the losses incurred.

ETW

1007

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 310.

PM RECD

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 22, 1933.

LEGAL ADVISER
JUN 8 1933
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Le

MAY 26 33

G for Lockhart

*793.94
note
393/1163 MSU*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE HONORABLE
JULIUS ROSEN
SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Bombing of Property of American Methodist Episcopal Church at Miyun, Hopei.

WASHINGTON.

copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 27 1933
Department of State
[Signature]

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith copies, in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 368, dated April 22, 1933, to the Legation at Peiping, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
To Legation, April 22, 1933.

800
FPL/MRE:w

Original and four copies to Department.

F/HS

793.94/6336

FILED
JUN 13 1933

K

1008

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunter NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 368.

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 370 Dated April 22, 1933
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 22, 1933.

Subject: Bombing of Property of American
Methodist Episcopal Church at
Miyun, Hopei.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me under date of April 20, 1933, by Mr. Mark W. Brown, Secretary of the Methodist Episcopal Mission, Peiping, reporting that on April 18, 1933, the church property owned by the American Methodist Episcopal Mission at Miyun, 100 li south of Kupei-k'ou, was seriously damaged by bombs dropped from Japanese airplanes. It will be observed that the damage to the property is estimated at Y\$3,000 and that the property consists of a church building, a school and parsonage, all of which are located on the main north and south street of the west city, about half way between the South Gate and the Drum Tower. The map referred to in Mr. Brown's letter is being retained in the files of the Consulate General. It will be further observed that the American flag was flying

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

flying on the property when the bombs were dropped.

2/ There is also enclosed herewith a copy of a letter addressed to me under date of April 20, 1933, by Mr. Brown indicating that the American Methodist Episcopal Church owns property at Tsunhua City. It is stated that this city was bombed early in April but that the American property was not damaged. A map showing the location of the church property is attached to the copy of Mr. Brown's letter herewith enclosed. It will be observed that the property is valued at well over Y\$100,000.

I have brought to the attention of the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin the damage done to the American property at Miyun and have informed him of its exact location. I have requested that an investigation be made with a view to determining the amount of damage done and that the mission be reimbursed for its losses. I have also informed my Japanese colleague of the location of the American property at Tsunhua city and at Shih Hsia Chen. A copy of my letter to the Japanese Consul General is enclosed herewith. It is assumed that the Legation may wish to bring to the attention of the Japanese Legation at Peiping the damage inflicted on the mission property at Miyun and inform the Legation of the location of that property as well as the location of the American property at Tsunhua city and at Shih Hsia Chen.

I did not report the bombing of the Miyun property by telegraph to the Legation inasmuch as I felt certain that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

that the matter must have been brought directly to the
attention of the Legation by Mr. Brown.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/ From Mr. Mark W. Brown,
dated April 20, 1933.
- 2/ From Mr. Mark W. Brown,
dated April 20, 1933.
- 3/ To Japanese Consul General,
dated April 22, 1933.

800
FPL/MRE

Original and one copy to Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. *MLC*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

NORTH CHINA CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH

FINANCE COMMITTEE
Hsiao Shun Hutung, Peiping.

April 20, 1933.

American Consul General,
American Consulate General,
Tientsin, Hopei.

Dear Sir:-

During the several severe bombings of Tsunhua City early in April our Methodist Mission property located at this place was fortunately not damaged. Since April 11th no bombs have been dropped at this place. However, we wish to request that you would call to the attention of the Japanese military authorities that the American Methodist Church has very considerable property holdings in and near Tsunhua City and we trust in the event of any future bombing they will take usual care to avoid any injury to our property.

I am enclosing herewith two copies of a rough sketch showing Tsunhua City and environs which shows the relation of our church property to the City. One copy of this map I trust you will forward to the Japanese authorities in Tientsin for the guidance of their air men in any future bombings. As the sketch shows, our Mission property is located in the South Suburb some fifty yards from the city wall. Our one property in the city proper is located just inside the South gate. This latter property includes the hospital and a chapel comprising some thirty chien of buildings. The large property contains over 100 chien, many of which are large school rooms in semi-foreign style. A conservative estimate of the value of our Tsunhua property would be well over \$100,000.00 Mexican. There is no American missionary living in Tsunhua, the entire compound being under the control of the Chinese church and under the immediate direction of the Rev. H. F. Chiang, a graduate of Boston University, resident in Tsunhua.

Our rather extensive property holdings in Tsunhua are due to the fact that before 1900 this was the principal foreign missionary station of our church outside of Peking and Tientsin. Following its complete destruction in 1900 our foreign station work was re-opened at Changli and since that time Tsunhua has not had a permanent missionary resident there. It is perhaps unnecessary to add the information that Tsunhua City is distant 320 li northeast from Peking, 119 li southwest from Hsifengkou and 18 li due south from the Great Wall Pass at Lowenyd.

We shall be greatly obliged if you will inform the Japanese authorities of our appreciation of the fact that up to date no damage has been done to our property and that our purpose in sending this communication is to facilitate their further efforts in avoiding damage to American property.

Yours sincerely,

MWB:MD

Copy to American
Legation, Peiping.
Third copy enclosed.

/sgd/ MARK W. BROWN
M. W. Brown, Secretary,
Methodist Episcopal Mission.

A true copy of
the signed origi-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

NORTH CHINA CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH

FINANCE COMMITTEE
 Hsiao Shun Hutung, Peiping.

April 20, 1933

American Consul General,
 American Consulate General,
 Tientsin, Hopei.

Dear Sir:-

I am writing to inform you that on April 18th, 1933 at about the noon hour the church property owned by the American Methodist Episcopal Church located in the city of Miyun, 100 li south of Kupeikou, was seriously damaged by Japanese bombs. Of the eighteen chien of buildings in our property, six chien were demolished besides damage to other buildings. A conservative estimate of the value of our church property at this place is \$3000.00 Mexican. The property consists of a church building, a school and parsonage, and is located on the main north and south street of the old or West City about half way between the South gate and the drum tower *as indicated on the enclosed map by the rectangle enclosed in the red lines. At the time of the bombing on April 18th our resident Chinese pastor was displaying an American flag and the property was being temporarily used by the Peking Y.M.C.A. for relief work. Our pastor escaped injury by taking refuge in a dug-out and returned to Peking the evening of the same day bringing a report of the damage. The second bombing occurred on the evening of the same day but we have received no report as yet so do not know if further damage has been done.

I trust you will take the necessary steps to bring to the attention of the Japanese authorities that their bombs are destroying American property in the hope that there may be no repetition of this incident. The matter of compensation for damage suffered will be taken up later.

May I also request that you will call attention of the Japanese authorities to the fact that in the market town of Shih Hsia Chen (石匣鎮) located 60 li northeast of Miyun-hsien, 40 li southwest of Kupeikou, we have a property consisting of 20 chien of buildings in two adjoining yards, located on the main market street of the town, the conservative value of which is \$2000.00 Mexican. This town has been so repeatedly bombed that we have not as yet been able to get any report as to damage done to our property there. When we receive such a report I will forward the information to you.

Very sincerely yours,

/sgd/ MARK W. BROWN
 M. W. Brown, Secretary,
 Methodist Episcopal Mission.

MWB:MD

Copy to American Legation
 Peiping. Third copy enclosed.
 * Map of Miyun sent under
 separate cover.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 nsl.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

800
FPL/MRE

American Consulate General,
Tientsin, China, April 22, 1933.

Sir and dear Colleague:

I have the honor to inform you that the Secretary of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Peiping has informed me, in a letter dated April 20, 1933, that the property owned by the American mission at Miyun, 100 li south of Kupeik'ou, was seriously damaged by bombs dropped from a Japanese airplane on April 18, 1933. The property was damaged to the extent of approximately Y\$3,000. An American flag was flying over the property at the time the bombs were dropped. The property consists of a church building, a school and a parsonage and is located on the main north and south street of the west city about half way between the South Gate and the Drum Tower. I beg respectfully to request that an investigation be made of the damage inflicted upon the property and that the mission organization be reimbursed for its losses.

In this

K. Kuwashima, Esquire,
Japanese Consul General,
Tientsin.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


In this connection, I beg to state that the American Methodist Episcopal Church also owns property at Shih Hsia Chen, 60 li northeast of Miyun and 40 li southwest of Ku-peik'ou. This property is located on the main market street of the town and is valued at about \$2,000. The American Methodist Episcopal Church also owns property at Tsunhua City, Hopei. This property, which is rather extensive and is valued at over Y\$100,000, is located in the south suburbs some 50 yards from the city wall. There is also one small property in the city proper just inside the South Gate. The latter property includes a hospital and a church chapel. I bring these facts to your attention in order that the military authorities may know the exact location of American properties in the towns mentioned.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.



101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75


7E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.E. AND M.I.D.



Tientsin via N. R.
Dated May 27, 1933
Rec'd 5 a. m.

F/HS

Secretary of State,
Washington.



May 27, noon.

793.94

793.94/6337

Japanese military authorities state withdrawal of Manchukuo troops eastward from Lutaitangku area has now begun. Railway authorities confirm above. Japanese troops are withdrawing north from Tungchow area according to local Japanese military. Situation here greatly relaxed and exodus of refugees from Chinese areas has practically ceased. There appears to be reasonably good prospect of rail traffic being shortly restored to Peitaiho and Chinwangtao and possibly to Shanhaikwan if the rumored truce proves effective. In view of the conflicting elements in the Chinese military situation, however, some doubt exists as to the effectiveness or permanency of such an arrangement.

LOCKHART

KLP
RR

FILED
JUN 1 1933

K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 29, 1933

FROM'd 12:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

485, May 29, 10 a. m.
 Reuter from Canton, twenty-eighth.



"Southwest Political Council has despatched telegram

further accusing Military Council of compromising with Japan as shown by recent truce in North China. Southwest leaders ask whether Military Council in replacing resistance with truce and withdrawing troops to Tangu and Tungchow, stopping supply of arms to volunteers and forbidding boycott activities had approval of the Central Executive Committee. If so these things not only constitute violation of resolutions of fourth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee but are also contrary to wishes of the people. If approval of Central Executive Committee was not obtained then that body should mete out severe punishment to the official organ or private individual who dared compromise with enemy and commit act of selling the country".

JOHNSON

CIB WF

F/G 793.94/6338

JUN 1 1933
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 29, 1933

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 29 1933

May 29, 3 p. m.

Department of State

793.94

There is taking place an unexplained but so far comparatively small movement of artillery, armored and other trucks westward through Chinwangtao by rail. Destination not known. A well known non-American resident of Chinwangtao generally conversant with affairs there is predicting restoration traffic Peiping to Chinwantao within week and early settlement present military situation by arrangement.

LOCKHART

KLP

RR

F/G

793.94/6339

FILED
 JUN 1 1933

1018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED **COPIES SENT TO**
TIENTSIN **O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

Dated May 30, 1933

FROM

Rec'd. 9.20 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 30, 5 pm

793.94

Two armored trains, said to have on board Generals Huang Fu and Ho Chu Kuo, with large number of body guards arrived at Tientsin about noon and after a brief stop proceeded to Tangku. There is no reason to believe that Huang Fu was not aboard but in his stead Ho Ying Ching's Chief of Staff, reported but not confirmed that Japanese Charge des Affaires Nakayama was a member of the party. Reported that representatives of the Kwantung army are arriving at Tangku to meet Chinese representatives for the purpose of negotiating, presumably of military phase only of present controversy.

LOCKHART

KLP

F/G

793.94/6340

K

100

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Hankow/71 FOR Despatch # 304.

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED April 20, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.
Proclamation issued on March 1st by the local
Garrison Headquarters, strictly prohibiting
any activities that would lead to disturbance
of the public order.

hs

793.94/6341

6341

1020

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 304.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, April 20, 1933.

Subject: Military and Political Information
Available in the Hankow Consular
District During March, 1933.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy, in quintuplicate, of my despatch L. No. 275, of April 20, 1933, addressed to the Legation at Peiping, reporting military and political information available in the Hankow consular district during the month of March, 1933.

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.


Enclosure:

American Consul General, Hankow, to American Legation, Peiping, L. No. 275, April 20, 1933.

In quintuplicate

800

OEC/MYH



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DIGEST OF CONTENTS

Despatch L. No. 275, April 20, 1933, Military and Political Information Available in the Hankow Consular District during March 1933.

1. General.

2. The Middle-Yangtze and Kiangsi Reds: With the withdrawal of troops, Red activities in the region north of the Yangtze River are increasing in extent; the newly organized Paochia (保甲) system is inferior to the old Mintuan (民團) for purposes of the peasants' self-defense. The campaign against Ho Lung in southwest Hupeh has thus far been ineffective. In Kiangsi, on the main front five Government divisions suffered material defeat at the hands of the Reds. An uprising of Yao tribes on the Hunan-Kuangsi border complicated the situation in that quarter during the month, but K'ung Ho-ch'ung (孔荷龍) was very active in northwestern Kiangsi. Kuangtung has thus far failed to send any large bodies of troops into Kiangsi for purposes of Red suppression.

3. The Communist Campaign in Szechuan: The Reds in Szechuan are moving farther east, but that apparently does not signify that T'ien Sung-yao's (田頌堯) campaign against them is progressing very satisfactorily. There is evidence of considerable popular unrest in Szechuan.

4. Terrorist Activities in Wuhan: A series of murders occurring in Wuhan throughout the month has terrorized the local population. The original supposition that the murders were committed by some anti-Japanese group is apparently only partly true, the probability being that at least some of the murders have been committed for political reasons. There is some evidence connecting Chiang Kai-shek's General Headquarters with the actions.

5. Political Moves in Central China: The culmination of Nanking's efforts to extend control over the Yangtze Valley opium revenue has been the legalization, in substance, of the opium traffic, with the establishment of public warehouses in Hankow and other parts of Hupeh and the directing of all shipments of the drug to those points. The opium is sold from the warehouses by governmental organs, with the revenue going to Nanking.

Chiang Kai-shek has other troubles in Kiangsi besides those of Red-suppression, a conflict between Hsiung Shih-hui and Ch'en Ch'eng, and the proposed northern expedition of the Canton Government, both requiring his attention, but in Hupeh his political power has been extended. The January election of officers for the Hankow Tangpu was nullified with the taking over of power by a committee comprising five

members,

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members, all of whom were Chiang Kai-shek men. Under the direction of this new committee there has been set up a demand by various local bodies for the appointment of Chiang Kai-shek to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces in China. Chiang Kai-shek's Commissioner of Finance in the reorganized Hupoh Government succeeded in getting a loan of \$600,000 by the use of \$2,400,000 in securities, but he has thus far been unsuccessful in floating the \$3,000,000 Rehabilitation loan of 1932.

6. Sino-Japanese Relations: The series of murders in March, though possibly in part for other reasons than "trading with the enemy", has effectively put a stop to the Japanese trade in this area. There have been formed during the month various student and women's groups for the support of the Chinese cause against Japan, but the airplane-buying campaign has proved very weak - probably because of popular suspicion that not all the funds thus contributed would go to buy airplanes. The WURAN DAILY NEWS takes Japan's withdrawal from the League philosophically, but continues to iterate its demand that the league shall take effective steps to stop the aggressions of the Island Empire.

7. Miscellaneous: The Mohammedan uprising in Sinkiang is evidently more serious than the first reports of the Provincial Chairman indicated. A general rain in Shensi improved conditions there to a certain extent. Negotiations between Chinghai and Tibet are reported to have broken down.

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L. No. 275.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
 Hankow, China, April 20, 1933.

Subject: Military and Political Information
Available in the Hankow Consular
District During March, 1933.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to report below military and political information available in the Hankow consular district during the month of March, 1933, as directed by the Legation's circular instruction No. 201 of November 17, 1927.

1. General:

The outstanding items of interest in this district during the month were: signs of returning vigor manifested by the Red movement in the middle-Yangtze region, and important Red victories in the Kiangsi war; the campaign of the Szechuan militarists against the Reds in the north of that province; activities of some terrorist group or groups in Wuhan, nominally under the patriot's aegis; and the moves made on the political chessboard. The situation in this part of the country has become more tense during the last few weeks than has been true for some time, and there is a feeling of uneasiness in the air.

2. The Middle-Yangtze and Kiangsi Reds:

Indicative of some of the difficulties one meets in getting at the truth of the military situation in China is the stipulation of the newly-issued regulations for press censorship that there shall not be published any item "Concerning any other military news unfavorable to our side". Taken in conjunction with the Chinese militarist's practice, sanctioned by long tradition, of turning his defeats into victories through adroit manipulation of the facts, the practice of allowing the truth to be known only in its favorable aspects is a formidable barrier to research as well as to public confidence. But, as regards the Red situation in the middle-Yangtze region, as remarked in the TA KUNG PAO (L'IMPARTIAL, Tientsin) of April 2nd, "Although the completion of the military task of suppression of

banditry

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banditry in Hupeh should have been reported some time ago, the fact of the matter is evidently that not only can no date for such completion be set but that the bandits are apparently extending their influence. According to a report given out by the Hupeh Government, the Reds are still to be suppressed in more than 40 Hupeh hsien - 6 in east Hupeh, 7 in the south, 7 in the center, 10 in the west, and 12 in the north. There are 70 hsien in the province. Withdrawals of troops from Hupeh for service in the North and Kiangsi have permitted the Reds to gather their scattered forces in the Honan-Anhui-Hupeh sector for new conflict with the Government forces, with northeast Hupeh and the Honan hsien of Lihuan, Chingfu, Shang-ch'eng, Huang-ch'uan, and Kuangshen being the scene of their activities. The Red troops there call themselves the 25th Red Army. The Mintuan (People's Militia) were abolished in central China under the orders of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) for the organization of the Paochia system - which is more of a system of joint guarantee of the members of each "chia" (戶) that they are all politically pure, than it is one for joint defense. The people were disarmed because they sometimes turned Red - or lost their arms to the Red armies - and now, with the troops withdrawn, they are left practically helpless. Taken in conjunction with the fact that the widely-advertised peasants' cooperatives, which were to loan money to the peasant for the purchase of productive farm goods so that he could lift himself out of his economic distress, have largely failed to materialize because of a lack of capital funds, the supplanting of the Mintuan by the Paochia system would seem to have been a bad move, inspired though it was by the belief that the ancient Chinese legal principle of vicarious responsibility would prove efficacious in the overcoming of social discontents.

And, there has been a considerable increase of banditry in east-central Honan, where economic conditions are very bad, with the formation of several large groups of desperados. In southwest Hupeh, Ho Lung (賀龍) still remains in the Shih-Haofeng region, with his three (or four) Red divisions more or less intact. The campaign against him by Fan Hsi-chi (范黑績), head of the Hupeh Peace Preservation Corps, has thus far been fruitless; the terrain is too difficult for him to do anything against Ho Lung with the few regiments of Pao-An troops that he leads. Besides, with Ho Lung now no longer threatening the peace of Hunan, the Hunan troops are "at ease" so far as the campaign in Hupeh is concerned, and Ho Lung in his present circumstances can afford to be very disdainful of the present efforts to dislodge him.

During the month, the 44th Division (Hsiao Chih-ch'u - 蕭之楚) of the 10th Army was sent north from Hupeh and has been fighting on the Leng-k'ou front; it is reported that Hsiao Chih-ch'u has now been given command of the 26th Army, and that Chiang Kai-shek has ordered the 48th

Division

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Division to proceed to the North also. The Hupeh commanders, in view of the Red situation (and probably for political reasons besides) are loath to part with any more local troops, however, and the 48th will very likely be kept here if they can manage it. The 83rd Division has left Wuchang, one-half proceeding to Paoting and the rest going to Nanchang, and the work of garrisoning Wuhan has been taken over by some of the 10th Gendarmerie Division troops.

Chiang Kai-shek passed through Hankow on his way north on March 6th. It has been said that, before he left Kiangsi, he had reached an arrangement with the Red leaders for an armistice. If that is true, the Government troops soon breached the agreement, for on March 3rd it was reported that they were headed south into the heart of the Soviet territory, having passed by Kinki, Nan-ch'eng, and Nanfeng, without opposition, while it was said that from west Kiangsi the telegrams of victory "come flying in like snowflakes", the Government troops being "anxious to get to the North to fight the dwarfs". At Huangpei (黄陂) and Tungpei (东波) in Ihuang hsien, however, a big battle took place, and the 52nd and 59th Divisions were nearly annihilated by the 1st, 3rd, and 5th, and (probably) 22nd Red Armies; Li Ming (李明), commanding the 52nd, committed suicide when the battle went against him, while the commander of the 59th (Chen Shih-chi - 陈时驥) was captured and presumably killed. The 9th Division, transferred to Kiangsi only the month before, went to the assistance of the 52nd and ran into an ambush. Of the three divisions, no more than one-quarter escaped death or capture, and it is probable that the survivors did not bring back the whole of their equipment. The 52nd and 59th Divisions were well-equipped, being a part of Ho Ying-ch'in's (何应钦) First Army Group, while the 9th Division had one regiment fully equipped with the latest machine-rifles capable of firing 600 rounds per minute.

This battle, which is reported to have lasted five days, occurred in the first decade of the month, and the Reds under Fang Chih-min (方志敏) and Shao Shih-p'ing (邵式平) on March 4th re-captured Huwan (浒湾). Probably with reinforcements from another Red group, about the middle of the month they captured Lin-ch'uan (Fuchow), and, pressing west, engaged the 11th and 14th Divisions of Ch'en Ch'eng (陈诚) somewhere between Lin-ch'uan and Nanchang. The Government forces again suffered a material defeat. The exact extent of the defeat is not known, but the information was that the remnants of the broken troops "got away with only their pants".

What has happened during the month in west Kiangsi is rather obscure, and complicated by the fact that there was an uprising of some Yao (瑶) tribes in the Hunan-Kuangsi hsien of Ch'uan-chow, Jangyang, Hsingan,

Yungming,

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Yungking, and Tachien, with the charge being that the Red leader Li Ming-jui (? - 李明瑞) had engineered the movement of revolt to strengthen his position in southwest Kiangsi. Liu Chien-hsu (劉建緒) and Chou Tsu-huang (周) operated against the Yao respectively from Hunan and Kuangsi, and it is reported that the rebels have split up into small groups and taken to the hills. Victories against Li Ming-jui in the Lienhua-Ningkang-Yunghsin area have been reported, but the reliability of the reports waits upon confirmation - the Huangpei-Tungpei battle was reported to have been a great victory for the Government arms, too. Wu Ch'i-wei (吳奇偉) reported that his Central Route troops had re-captured Kuang-ch'ang on March 19th.

K'ung Ho-ch'ung (孔荷龍) in March continued the movement he had begun the month before, eastward from the Red northwest corner of Kiangsi, capturing Shangkao on March 3rd, and by the end of the month was very close to the Kiukiang-Nanchang railway line, threatening Yunghsiu (Chien-ch'ang); communications between Nanchang and Kien had been severed with the capture of Hsinkan (and, probably, Ch'ing-kiang). An important battle is now in progress for the possession of the important point of Changshu (樟樹), between Ch'ing-kiang (清江) and Feng-ch'eng (豐城). K'ung's Reds have also again penetrated north into Hupeh, now being in possession of Chinniu (金牛), southwest of Teyeh; Ho-sheng-ch'iao (賀勝橋) and Kuanfu (官華橋), on the Nuchang-Changsha line, were captured and looted on March 27th. Chu Shao-liang (朱紹良) has returned to Hankow from Nanchang to take charge of the campaign against K'ung's Reds in south Hupeh. The pay of the Hupeh troops is much in arrears.

About March 24th, Ch'en Ch'eng (who has been in command in Kiangsi in the absence of Ho Ying-ch'in and Chiang Kai-shek) telegraphed to Canton, stating that the Reds were fleeing to the region around Yütu, headed south, and urging strongly that Canton despatch heavy forces into Kiangsi to assist with the work of extermination. Ch'en Chi-t'ang (陳濟棠) let it be known that he contemplated sending 10 regiments into Kiangsi, but "it is hoped that the Central Government will stand the military expense". It is to be noted that Ch'en Chi-t'ang received his appointment as Vice-Commander in Chief of the Forces for Bandit Suppression in April, 1932, and that up to the present, despite almost daily announcements in the press columns that Kuangtung was preparing to take drastic action against the Kiangsi Reds, he has done little more to justify the title than defend the borders of his own province against incursion from the north. The operation of Kuangtung forces in the southwest corner of Kiangsi is

essential

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essential from a military point of view because of the necessity of holding the Meiling Pass, commanding the route into the Nanyung region; that work has been done in recent months by Yu Han-mou (余漢謀). Ch'en Chi-t'ang's delegate, bearing an autographed letter from General Ch'en, stated on his arrival in Shanghai on March 31st that the Kuangtung commander was resigning his post as Vice-Commander of Bandit Suppression, because of the press of business and the critical financial straits in which the Kuangtung treasury finds itself.

On March 31st, one month after the staggering defeat of the three Government divisions in the Tungpei-Huangpei battle, this news was let out by Nanking through the medium of an ASIATIC report, and Chiang Kai-shek stated that because of the state of affairs in Kiangsi he would have to hurry to Nanchang. Nothing was said about the defeat of Ch'en Ch'eng's two divisions. It seems probable that Nanking admitted that the defeat incurred in the Tungpei-Huangpei battle in order to justify Chiang Kai-shek's trip to Nanchang during a period of crisis in the north.

3. The Communist Campaign in Szechuan:

T'ien Sung-yao (田頌堯) has made some progress against the Hsu-K'uang Reds in the course of the month, it being evident from newspaper reports that he has captured both Pachung and Nankiang twice - Pachung on March 2nd and 10th, and Nankiang variously on the 17th and 19th. Despite the penchant of the Szechuan generals for tergiversation, and the suspicion which consequently attaches to their words, it seems probable that the two places are now in the hands of T'ien's troops, the Reds abandoning that area to move farther east. Ch'ang-ch'ih (長池), a strategic point, was reported taken by T'ien's armies on February 26th, and his whole battle-front stretched 350 li (115 miles) in length, from Kuangyuan through Pachung to Tseng-k'ou (曾口), with 30 regiments of Szechuan troops being engaged. Farther east, Liu Mao-en (劉茂恩) cooperated to some extent from the Shensi border in the attack on T'ung-kiang, with Liu Ts'un-hou (劉存厚) and Yang Sen (楊森) advancing from the south, but in the latter part of the month it was announced that he was withdrawing his troops from the Shensi-Szechuan border to proceed north (?). According to a Chungking report of March 27th, Liu Mao-en's troops were moving to the assistance of T'ien Sung-yao, and the Red movement eastward was endangering the cities of Yuanhsien (Suiting) and Wanyuan. Liu Ts'un-hou, according to the same report, had telegraphed to Liu Hsiang (劉湘) requesting that assistance be sent to T'ien Sung-yao, so the indications are that the last-named is in difficulties. Other sources give evidence to the effect that the situation in Szechuan is far from favorable, due to the popular unrest as a result of the militarists' oppressive

rule,

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rule, with the people stirring restlessly. They have reached the stage where "they cannot find a way to live, but their prayers for death are unanswered" (謀生不能 求死不得). An editorial paragraph that appeared in the TA KUNG PAO of March 21st makes a pertinent comment in this connection:

"From the time when Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien entered into Szechuan, differing reports have come in from various quarters; if telegrams are received from official quarters, naturally they are sunny kisses telling of victories over the Reds, but reports from private quarters are not such as would completely warrant optimism. The case of the early report by official circles of the capture of Paching, with private information being to the effect that no such thing had occurred, is one in point. The fact of the matter is that Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien fights over several thousand li, but the number of his men and guns is actually not great. Should the troops sincerely cooperate in the attack, what difficulty would there be in suppressing (the Reds); it is only necessary that the masses should not be misled (by the Reds), and what apprehension need there be of the movement's growing larger? The pity of it is that the Szechuan militarists are too short-sighted and too selfish of heart, and not one of them would sacrifice troops in a stiff fight. The people of Szechuan have had too much of misery and bitterness, and as regards the noxious government of the militarists they all hold the attitude 'We'll die together' (與汝偕亡 - in the malignant sense that 'You'll not live when we die'. - EC), so that it is very easy for them to accept extreme doctrines. In view of these two circumstances, no matter what sort of optimistic telegrams are beaten out by the Szechuan armies, such telegrams cannot but arouse men's suspicions."

There seems to be growing up the popular belief that the Communists should be permitted certain rights as a political party, and the military campaign against them abandoned, for the establishment of a united front against Japan (see, especially, TA KUNG PAO editorial of April 3rd).

4. Terrorist Activities in Huhan:

Early in March, there occurred two murders in Hankow, one of the murdered men being the N. K. K. compradore and the other being connected with the administration of the Japanese Concession. The local newspapers published the details of the murders, basing their accounts on the assumption that the murders had been committed by some such patriotic body as the "Iron and Blood Group" (鐵血團).

It

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It was also assumed that the culprits would speedily be brought to justice. No one was apprehended, and publicity suddenly stopped, but it is learned on reliable authority that at least seven persons have been murdered by those unknown persons during the month, with the total possibly reaching ten or more. One of the men was followed to Shanghai and killed there. The reason for the lack of publicity is easy to understand when there is taken into consideration the fact that, according to the statements of intelligent foreign observers, the "Black list" of the murdering group comprises twenty names - and it is promised by the same group that anyone who gets cognizance of the group's activities and passes on the information will have his own name added to the list. The fact that the police offer no protection against the activities of the group is explained by the sober allegation that the local Garrison Headquarters, acting under orders from Chiang Kai-shek's General Headquarters in Nuchang, has issued orders that the police shall not interfere; and, by the trustworthy testimony of a Chinese member of the office staff, a case occurred in Nuchang where a group of young men entered a shop and murdered the owner, then showed some badge to a policeman who came up and departed without interference or question. The local population, in such circumstances, is extremely nervous and reticent when the subject comes up.

This amazing situation may actually be due to anti-Japanese activities on the part of some secret organization. However, private and reliable information indicates that some, at least, of the murders are political, with Chiang Kai-shek's General Headquarters in back of the whole movement. One hypothesis is that the murders are connected with Chiang's efforts to strengthen his power in this section of China, and that the actual murderers are members of the Blue Shirts (藍衣社), Chiang's Fascist organization, which has some 2,500 members in Wuhan. The great strength of this organization is among the Whampoa cadets, but strenuous efforts have been made recently to extend its influence into academic circles. The attempt has been made to introduce these secret agents of Chiang into local troops, and into troops in the North (during Chiang's recent visit to that area), but a fight is being made against them, by other military leaders and political groups, wherever they are found. Hence the conflict, which has reached the assassination stage. Incidentally, it is now stated that a split has occurred within the ranks of the Whampoa cadets in the Blue Shirts due to the widening breach between Canton and Nanking, and, moreover, that the organization which was intended by Chiang to break down discipline in the troops of opposing militarists has also broken down the discipline of some of his own troops in Kiangsi.

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A slightly different version of the reasons for the terrorist activities is given in a memorandum by Consul Stanton, as follows:

"From a reliable source it has been learned that the murder of the N. K. K. compradore and others has no connection whatever with the anti-Japanese movement but that these murders were due to the opposition of the group which formerly controlled the opium traffic of this section of the Yangtze to the recently organized group in which General Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates and General Ho Chien are vitally interested.

"My informant also stated that the recently established 'People's Agricultural Bank of Four Provinces'...was owned and controlled by General Chiang Kai-shek and those interested in the new opium group. He also informed me that the light railway which General Chiang Kai-shek had ordered to be built 'for strategic purposes' between Chuchow, Hunan, and Chiuchow, Kwangtung, was in reality to be constructed to facilitate the transportation of opium and that in this venture General Ho Chien was to share fifty per cent of the expenses and profits."

(It is not without interest to note that no one seems to know how much currency is being issued by the above-mentioned bank, or what the security for the issue is, if any. The bank is, however, controlled by General Headquarters.)

It is quite possible that the murders are not committed by one group, and that they are, thus, born of several different strategies.

5. Political Moves in Central China:

The movement for the establishment of Nanking control over the lucrative opium revenue of the Yangtze valley, as noted in this office's political reports for December and February, culminated in the establishment of public warehouses (main warehouse at Hankow, with five branches in Hupeh) for the collection of the drug, all traffic not passing through such warehouses to be classed as smuggling, and hence illegal. The "Forty-Eight Houses" that long controlled the opium traffic in Hankow by the first of March had dwindled to 25 in number, and those firms were asked to subscribe the sum of \$3,000,000 toward the establishment of the warehouses. This they refused to do, and the Special (Opium) Tax Bureau let it be known that it had put up \$1,500,000 for the purpose, but it is doubtful whether that amount was actually appropriated. Each of the 25 opium firms is required to give \$500 per month to the Special Tax Bureau (a total of \$12,500) to meet the

expenses

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expenses of administration. The opium is to be bought by the warehouses at a fixed price, and then sold by the warehouses on their own account. Of the profits, 240,000 will be paid each month to the Kupeh Government as its regular subsidy, while the remainder goes through the Special Tax Bureau to its superior organ - the Ministry of Finance at Nanking. The legalization of the opium traffic in Kupeh seems to have been accomplished. Local reports are to the effect that control of this traffic is unified in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (宋子文). (In this connection, see this office's Despatch No. 267 of April 5, 1933.) It is unlikely, however, that this action marks the end of the matter.

Chiang Kai-shek's troubles in Kuangsi do not stop with the Reds, and, apart from a probable desire on his part to leave Nanking at this moment, his recent departure for Nanchang is possibly motivated by other than anti-Red considerations. There is said to exist a bitter conflict between Hsiung Shih-hui (熊式輝) (friend of Chiang Kai-shek), the present Chairman, and Ch'en Ch'eng (son of Chiang Kai-shek's sister, and a Hunan man), due to the desire of the General Ch'en to himself get the Chairmanship. This makes for a weakening of the unified command that would be necessary for effective action against the Reds. Besides this, however, Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly will keep a watchful eye on the proposed northern expedition of the Kuangtung-Kuangsi militarists, for it is most improbable that he is quite certain that the Southern troops would reach the front facing the Japanese. It is said here, as a matter of fact, that he is now attempting to reach an agreement with Canton concerning domestic policies if possible, but that if he fails he hopes to reach some arrangement with the Communists whereby he will be able to use them against Canton.

Chiang Kai-shek's men in Kupeh continue to brandish the big stick in the furtherance of their chief's interests. It was reported by this office that the local Tangpu were this year given the power of electing their own officers, and that the first election took place in Hankow on January 21st. However, in March the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang found that the newly elected members were "undesirable", and there was appointed a Committee for the Reform of the Hankow Chapter. This Committee comprises five members, all of them Chiang Kai-shek men, including Ch'en Hsi-tseng (陳希曾), who besides being Director of the Hankow Public Safety Bureau is the head of Chiang Kai-shek's secret organization in this port. The Committee on March 27th assumed control of Party affairs in the Hankow Municipality - and it may be noted that the Hankow Tangpu is an exceptionally powerful organ, having influence in the province second only to the provincial Tangpu (incidentally, since the stopping of the provincial

subsidies

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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subsidies to the Hsien Tungpu, whose organs are in most cases continuing their activities by getting contributions from the local population). At its first business meeting on March 29th, the new Committee of the Hankow Tungpu passed a resolution calling for the sending of a telegram to the Central Government urging that Chiang Kai-shek be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces of China, so that there might be the unification of command for resistance to the Japanese invasion; similar action was taken by the Hupeh Provincial Tungpu, the Hankow Tungpu itself, the various minor Tungpu in Suhan, the Hankow Chamber of Commerce, and labor unions of the port, with remarkable unanimity.

Chia Shih-yi (賈士毅), Chiang Kai-shek's Commissioner of Finance in the present Hupeh Government (reorganized in February), on March 18th received a loan of \$600,000 from local banks. The security was \$2,400,000 worth of Government bonds and certificates, the rate of interest demanded was 1.2% per month, the term of the loan was 6 months, and the sinking fund for repayment is to be found in the receipts of the Provincial Treasury and the revenue from the Hankow Business Tax. Besides this, Banking has approved the floating by Hupeh of the \$2,000,000 rehabilitation loan of 1932, and it is stated that the Provincial Government plans to use the proceeds of this loan for the rehabilitation of former ed areas, the construction of highways, and the betterment of economic conditions in the villages. The local Chambers of Commerce were directed by the Provincial Government to consider means of marketing the bonds, and on March 18th Hsia Tou-yin (夏斗寅) in conjunction with the heads of those Chambers of Commerce decided that there should be collected one month's house rent in Suhan for the purchase of the bonds, and that the Chamber themselves should make up any deficit. On March 20th, the Hankow Chamber of Commerce resolved that, in view of the actual distress of the merchant class, the Government should be requested to exempt them from subscribing to the bonds. Their representatives on March 22nd called on Chia Shih-yi, Commissioner of Finance, and made this request of him, but the Commissioner informed them that, in view of the importance of the work of bandit-suppression, it was impossible to accede to their desires in the matter. On the 26th, Chia Shih-yi called on important bankers and merchants for the purpose of discussing plans for the floating of the loan, but up to the end of the month had not been able to get them to agree to subscribe.

6. Sino-Japanese Relations:

On March 1st, the local Garrison Headquarters issued a proclamation strictly prohibiting any activities that would lead to disturbance of the public order. On the evening of March 4th, the first of the strange series of

murders

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murders occurred, the victim being Yang Chih-ching, comprador of the N. K. K. Company. Garrison Headquarters said that the culprits would be arrested at once, and responsible authorities ventured the opinion that the murder was the result of a personal feud. As described above, however, other murders followed immediately upon the heels of the first, and the whole matter suddenly disappeared from the pages of the newspapers. Undoubtedly, however, even though some of the murders may have been inspired by other than patriotic motives, as one result of the acts of terrorism Chinese began to leave precipitately the employ of the Japanese and their homes in the Japanese Concession, and advertisements began to appear in the local press to the effect that various persons, shops, and trade unions, did no longer, and would not in the future, deal in Japanese goods, and that they had severed all business relations with Japanese firms and persons. Hankow has hastily abandoned its position as an important importer of "enemy goods". (For further detail, see this office's Despatch No. 263, March 29th, to the Department.)

There have during the month been formed various student and women's groups in Wuhan, for the furtherance of the Chinese cause against Japan, but the airplane-buying campaign has singularly failed of success - the students and the lower classes give their coppers, and the workers have percentages taken from their wages, but the wealthier members of society evidently limit their contributions to nominal amounts. The reason for this backwardness probably finds expression in the words of a Changsha correspondent:

"The 'general mobilization' efforts that are now on in Changsha include 'resist Japan' and 'destroy the bandits (Communists)'; so far this mobilization is limited to propaganda work and forced contributions from teachers and government employees. I find a deadening question at the heart of all movements to produce patriotic funds: does the money get far beyond private pockets? It is hard to succeed in war measures against Japan when the armies aren't united, where there is no adequate military preparation, and where the nerve of popular support of war is cut by suspicion."

This comment is closer to political realities than the worn cliches of the Nanking organs.

In an editorial on March 30th, the WUHAN DAILY NEWS remarked that the world could hardly be expected to show surprise at Japan's withdrawal from the League inasmuch as the latter had been so long disregarded by Nippon, but contended that it was still of paramount importance that the League should take immediate and effective steps to restrain the actions of Japan in China, with economic sanctions and an embargo on the export of war

material

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material to Japan to constitute the first steps. The DAILY NEWS felt that it would also be desirable if Japan would respect the sovereign rights and territory of China, annul the recognition of Manchukuo, withdraw the Japanese troops to the railway zone (in Manchuria), and avoid aggravating the situation.

7. Miscellaneous:

The report of Chairman Chin Shu-jen (金樹仁) of Sinkiang that "all but one or two" of the Moham-medan rebels in his province had been suppressed, as noted in this office's February Report, seems to have been not strictly accurate. Aksu fell to the rebels in the beginning of March, the Chinese Taotai fleeing in the direction of Kashgar. From Karakash came the news that the Chinese Amban there had been killed along with several other Chinese, and similar trouble was reported from Keria. At the end of the month it was reported that the Chinese forces were gaining victories in the northern part of the province but were losing ground in the south. The moral is, of course, that so long as the Chinese general admits the existence of "one or two rebels" the situation probably is critical.

A general rain in Shensi mitigated somewhat the parched drought conditions that have been prevailing in that famine-stricken region, and now the peasants hope to get a 25% crop.

The negotiations between Chinghai and Tibet are reported to have broken down.


Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams,
 American Consul General.

In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.
 In quintuplicate to the Department of State.
 Copy to American Consulate General, Shanghai.
 Copy to American Consulate General, Nanking.
 Copy to Commander Yangtze Patrol Force.

800

SEC/MYH



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Sources of Information

The information contained in this report was obtained, with the cooperation of the rest of the office staff, from local newspapers, correspondence and conversation with Chinese and foreigners both of the official and private classes, naval sources, and from personal investigation and observation.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Chefoo/73 FOR Despatch # 40 to Legation.

FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED April 29, 1933.
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Rumors current among well-informed Chinese circles that General Han Fu Chu, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government is endeavoring to negotiate with the Japanese with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement that would prevent the invasion of Shantung by Japanese forces.

793.94/6342

6342

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Rumors of Han Fu Chu's Negotiations with Japanese:

Rumors are at present current among well-informed Chinese circles that General Han Fu Chu (韓復榘), Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government is endeavoring to negotiate with the Japanese with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement that would prevent the invasion of Shantung by Japanese forces. However, it has been impossible to confirm this.

1035

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 NOV 6 - 1934
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 5 - 1934
 Department of State

May 31, 1933.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Contest between Various Official
"Authorities" in Japan.

FE
DCR

793.94

It has been known for some time that there has been going on for years a contest between the "military" and the other-than-military elements in Japan. It has been known for some time that there is going on a contest within the military element itself.

On January 4, 1933, the Japanese Ambassador, recently returned from Japan, informed Mr. Hornbeck that the Cabinet was now definitely in control; that Japan did not intend to proceed with military operations against Jehol -- "unless the Chinese made it necessary", and did not intend to proceed against Tientsin or Peiping. He said that this would be a test case, and its outcome would prove that the Cabinet had the army in check.

On January 5, the Japanese Ambassador made practically the same statements to the Secretary of State.

793.94/6342 - 2

NOV 5 - 1934
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- 2 -

On January 7, the Ambassador repeated these statements again to Mr. Hornbeck.


Under date Tokyo, May 22, the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE of May 23, 1933, carried an article by Mr. Wilfrid Fleisher, cabled from Tokyo, stating that a portion of the Japanese army in China, "apparently marching ahead on its own initiative and without orders from Tokyo, was within two miles of Peiping this afternoon and was continuing its advance"; and that "even the War Office in Tokyo now appears to lack control over the situation"; and ". it has been evident for some time that the Cabinet has ceased to exert any restraining influence on the army's operations in northern China."

[Handwritten signature]

FE:SKH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP



TELEGRAM RECEIVED COPIES SENT TO

GRAY O.N.I. AND M.I.D.


FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated May 31, 1933

Rec'd 8:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



487, May 31, 3 p. m.

793.94
 193.94.19

Strict press censorship prevents as yet reliable information regarding truce negotiations which began yesterday afternoon at Tangku. Not even names of Chinese delegates have been officially announced but it is understood they include General Chang Chun, former mayor of Shanghai, and General Ho Chu Kuo, who until recently commanded Chinese forces at Shanhaiwan. Principal Japanese Delegates are said to be Generals Koiso and Okamura.

According to some reports the Japanese will insist that the Chinese recognize Manchukuo but claim only purely military matters will be discussed for the present.

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

F/G 793.94/6343

JUN 1 1933
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
104

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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REP



FROM

PLAIN


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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated May 31, 1933

Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



URGENT. PRIORITY.

May 31, 6 p. m. General Nakamura, Commander of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin, formally announced this afternoon that Major General Okamura, vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, signed an agreement at eleven eleven this morning at the Japanese barrack at Tangku with Lieutenant General Hsiung Ping of the Chinese Army terminating the present hostilities. The terms of the agreement are substantially as follows:

One. The Chinese troops shall immediately all withdraw to districts south and west of a line connecting Yen Cheng, Changping, Katoliying, Shunyi, Tunchow, Sanho, Paoti, Lintingchen, Nigho and Lutai. They shall not make advance over this line nor repeat any provocations.

Two. The Japanese troops in order to insure the enforcement of number one will visit these places occasionally by airplane or otherwise and Chinese authorities shall afford them protection and facilities for inspection.

Three

F/G 793.94/6344

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- From Tientsin, May 31, 6 p. m.

Three. The Japanese troops when fully satisfied that the Chinese have carried out number one term will not continue pursuit across the above line but will voluntarily withdraw to the Great Wall.

Four. The maintenance of peace and order north and east of the line specified in number one term and south of the Great Wall shall be carried out by the Chinese police authorities.

Five. This agreement shall come into force immediately.

It appears that the above agreement has its inception on May twenty-fifth when General Hsu Yen Mao, a staff officer of Hoy Ying Ching made certain proposals at Miyun for a truce of the Japanese Kwangtung army authorities.

The special train carrying the delegates back to Tientsin is expected at Tientsin between six and seven o'clock this evening.

LOCKHART

CSB

KLP

1044


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

FROM

Dated May 31, 1933

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 31 1933

May 31, 3 p. m.

Department of State

CHOKO MARU due to arrive June 1 or 4 is bringing to Tientsin approximately six hundred additional officers and men for the Japanese garrison here. These will probably prove to be replacements from fresh drafts sent to relieve men returning to Japan in 30 or 60 days. Notwithstanding statements referred to in my May 27, ¹⁶²³⁷ noon, no substantial change has taken place in the position of Japanese troops in Tangshan area so far as can be ascertained and but little in Tungechow area.

No definite information is available concerning progress of negotiations referred to in my May 30, ¹⁶³⁴⁰ 5 p. m. Reports are very conflicting regarding the names of representatives on both sides but Yi Shih Pao states that among the members is Major General Hsiung Pin Counselor of the Peiping Military Council, chief delegate, Brigadier General Chien Tsung Tse and Colonels Chang Hsi Kuang and Hsu Yen Mou. There is an evident attempt being made to keep as far as possible all names and other facts until such time as a definite

agreement

F/G 793.94/6345

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-from Tientsin via N.R.,
May 31, 3 p. m.

agreement has been reached. It is fairly certain that one of the Japanese military representatives is General Okamura, Vice Chief of Staff to General Mutto.

Feng Yu Hsiang's revolt created some comment but doubt is entertained that he will be able to muster much support outside of Chahar.

KLP-WWC

LOCKHART

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 9, 1933.

~~SECRET~~

Mukden's despatch dated May 1, 1933, encloses a despatch to the Legation supplementing a previous despatch entitled "Some Sidelights on Present Sino-Japanese Situation."

Consul General Myers interprets the Japanese motives behind the invasion of the Luantung area as political rather than military and notes that this interpretation seems to be borne out by the so-called Japanese "new policy" to be adopted toward China, namely, (1) to break the morale of the Chinese military by hammering the Chinese armies; (2) to grant protection and safety to Chinese civilians residing in Japanese controlled areas; (3) to force China to understand that the question of "Manchukuo" has been closed with Japan's recognition of the new state; (4) to enter into direct negotiations on such questions as the boycott, tariff, extraterritoriality, etc. when China stops her anti-Japanese actions and proposes negotiations; and (5) to remain neutral toward internal military quarrels in China on the whole, but to render assistance to those Chinese military leaders who desire to promote peace in the Far East. The despatch points out that

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

the chief new feature of the above outlined policy is its alleged declaration by the Japanese Foreign Office.

Consul General Myers states that he has received reliable information to the effect that Japanese troops have been withdrawn from the Luantung area but that ample garrison forces have been left in the district which can be supported by airplanes if necessary.

It is believed that any change which will result in a conciliatory attitude being adopted toward the Japanese will be welcomed but unless the situation in north China develops favorably within the next two or three months the Japanese may deem it necessary to occupy Peiping and Tientsin.

The Japanese press has reported that a movement is underway among the people of the Luantung area to secure the incorporation of that area in "Manchukuo". In spite of denials that Japan is encouraging a separatist movement, the reports from occupied territory have a familiar ring and are in accord with

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

Japanese practice elsewhere.

It has been reliably reported that the "pro-'Manchukuo' volunteers" under Li Chi-chun were trained and supplied by the Japanese army before the Jehol campaign. It is believed they have Japanese officers and were used at the beginning of the Luantung campaign in order that Japan might disavow responsibility for action in the vicinity of Chinwangtao if protests were received from foreign powers.

28

ETW/VDM

1049

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, May 1, 1933.

MAY 31 33

G for Myers

SUBJECT: Japanese Attitude toward North China Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE



WASHINGTON.



Copy in FE

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 747 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated April 29, 1933, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
 M. S. Myers
 American Consul General.

JUL 3 1933

FILED

Enclosure: /

Copy of despatch No. 747 to the Legation at Peiping.

4 Carbon Copies

Received *JM*

800
HTW

F/G 793.94/6346

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 747.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, April 29, 1932.

CONFIDENTIAL - Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Japanese Attitude toward North China
Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

753.74/6211

Referring to my despatch No. 736, of March 29, 1933, entitled "Some Sidelights on Present Sino-Japanese Situation," in which the Japanese attitude toward the situation in North China was discussed, I have the honor to submit supplementary information on this subject.

A high Japanese military officer at Hsinking was reported to have stated a short time ago that the Japanese Army for strategic reasons was forced to occupy the Luantung area - that is, that part of Hopei Province east of the Luan River. Although strategic is primarily a military term, it is to be inferred from events since the beginning of 1933 that the motives were political rather than military. This interpretation seems to be borne out by the so-called new policy to be adopted toward China, a copy of which as reported in THE

JAPAN

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

JAPAN TIMES of April 20, 1933, is enclosed herewith. It seems that the chief new feature of the policy is its alleged declaration by the Foreign Office. As was pointed out in my despatch above mentioned, there is every reason to believe that the Japanese Government is extremely anxious to find a solution of the present impasse in its relations with China and in the absence of a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Chinese is prepared to continue to hammer the Chinese armies on the front in order to destroy Chinese morale and induce acceptance of the Japanese formula for a settlement.

Information obtained by a foreign correspondent from military sources is to the effect that some of the Japanese forces in the Luantung area have returned to their bases in Manchoukuo. This step was compared to the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Shanhaikuan following the clash there with Chinese troops at the beginning of January. However, it was pointed out that the territory has not been evacuated and that the garrison forces left there are sufficient for all purposes especially as the assistance of air squadrons could be promptly secured in case of need. The official spokesman reported that there have been several instances of Chinese attacks on positions east of the Luan and indicated that these provocative acts would lead to retaliation if continued. However, for the present the Japanese troops in this section are apparently being given a rest and the extension

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sion of hostilities west of the Luan does not appear imminent.

Although definite information regarding Japanese plans in regard to North China are not procurable, there is reason to believe that the idea of a buffer state or even of an autonomous regime in the North has been abandoned as being impracticable. Apparently any change in the situation in the North which will result in a more conciliatory attitude being adopted toward the Japanese will be welcomed; nevertheless, only by a cessation of all hostilities and the reaching of a general understanding in regard to outstanding questions can the prevailing tense situation be definitely liquidated. It may be added that the impression gained by an observer from Japanese officials at Hsinking a few weeks ago was that unless the situation in North China develops favorably within the next two or three months the Japanese may deem it necessary to occupy Peiping and Tientsin.

The Japanese military allege that the morale of the Chinese troops in North China has been broken and that there is much discontent among the northern military leaders. The Japanese press have reported that the to-be-expected launching of a movement among the people of Luantung to secure the incorporation of that area in Manchoukuo is under way and that Li Chi-chun, an alleged grandson of Li Hung-chang and head of the Manchoukuo volunteers

(alias

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

(alias Ting Ch'iang), is organizing a state salvation corps to invade the districts west of the Luan with the ultimate object of adding Hopei Province to Manchoukuo. In spite of Japanese denials, as telegraphed by Reuter from Tokyo on April 22, that Japan is encouraging a separatist movement, the reports from occupied territory have a familiar ring and are in accord with established Japanese practice elsewhere. However, it is not possible to offer an opinion in regard to the authenticity of the reports themselves.

It may be mentioned that the efforts of the foreign correspondents to obtain from the Army spokesman satisfactory information regarding the "pro-Manchoukuo volunteers" under Li Chi-chun have been unsuccessful. However, from a reliable source, a member of the staff of this office learned in confidence that these levies were raised in this district and trained by Japanese officers at Mukden before the Jehol campaign. Naturally they were armed by the Japanese Army and it is believed that they have Japanese officers. The impression gained by a close observer is that they were used in the beginning of the Luantung campaign with the object of ascertaining the attitude of the Powers toward military operations in the vicinity of Chinwangtao and of disavowing responsibility were protests received, as apparently feared.

Respectfully

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Copy of an article from THE JAPAN TIMES
of April 20, 1933.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

800
MSM:mhp



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 747 of M. S. Myers, American
 Consul General, Mukden, Manchuria, dated April 29,
 1933, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "Japan-
 ese Attitude toward North China Situation."

SOURCE: THE JAPAN TIMES
 Tokyo
 April 20, 1933

(COPY)

POLICIES FIXED FOR DEALING WITH CHINA

Japan to Oppose Attitude of Nanking Group

ARIYOSHI RETURNS

Chinese Must Settle Affairs with Manchoukuo Direct

Akira Ariyoshi, Minister to China, left Tokyo
 this morning for Nanking. He returned home about a
 month ago to confer with policy of Japan towards the
 Nanking Government.

As a result of his consultation with the Foreign
 Office, the following basic policies have been
 decided on for adoption in future diplomatic dealings
 with China, it is reported.

1. The Imperial Japanese Government is to oppose
 firmly to the anti-Japanese policy adopted by milita-
 ristic statesmen of China. The defensive measure
 with the use of military force along the Great Wall
 will be continued as long as the Chinese military
 leaders do not stop military operations.

2. Although Japan opposes those military leaders
 of China, she will take measures necessary for the
 protection and safety of Chinese people whether they
 reside in China, Japan or Manchoukuo.

3. Japan desires to make China understand that
 the question of Manchoukuo has been closed with
 Japan's recognition of the new State and any attempt
 to settle problems concerning Manchoukuo by negotia-
 tions with China has been cancelled. All problems
 pending between China and Manchoukuo should be settled
 by direct negotiation between the two countries.

4. Problems that are to be settled by direct
 negotiation between Japan and China include the pre-
 ventation of aggressive acts, the control of anti-
 Japanese boycott and movement, the tariff question,
 the extraterritoriality problems, and others, but
 they are not to be discussed in connection with
 the Manchoukuo question.

5. Unless China gives up her traditional policy
 of setting one enemy against another, and wishes

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the revival of sincere and just relations with Japan, Japan will never propose the opening of direct negotiations with China.

6. While internal disturbances do not end in China, and communists and bandits remain active, Japan will take a strict neutral attitude towards all military leaders in different districts. However, when one of such military leaders really thinks of the peace of the Orient and desires friendly relations with Japan, we are prepared to give proper consideration for the safety of his territory or the guarantee of local trade with Japan, as far as circumstances permit, wherever his influence be effective.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 8, 1933.

✓
M.H:

Mexico's despatch No. 126 of May 26, 1933, encloses a newspaper report of a statement by the Japanese Minister to Mexico, the first part of which deals with Chinese oppression in Manchuria before September 18, 1931, and the second part of which describes glowingly improvements in the banking situation since September 18, 1931. No new material is contained in the statement of the Japanese Minister.

FE:LES/ZMK

1058

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mexico, May 26, 1933


No. 126

Subject: Statement of Japanese Minister to Mexico re-
garding the purposes of Japan in Manchuria.

PM RECD



MAY 31 1933



F/G

793.94/6347

793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

As being of possible interest to the Department,
I have the honor to enclose a translation of a news
item published in EL NACIONAL of May 19, 1933, sum-
marizing a statement given to EL NACIONAL on May 18th
by Mr. Yoshiatsu Hori, Minister of Japan to Mexico,
regarding the purposes of Japan in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

Josephus Daniels
Josephus Daniels.

Enclosure:

Translation of news item published in EL NACIONAL
of May 19, 1933.

710 (China-Japan)

SEA/kk

JUN 12 1933

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 126 of May 26,
 1933, from the Embassy at Mexico City.

SOURCE: EL NACIONAL
 (Organ of the
 National Revolu-
 tionary Party)
 May 19, 1933

FULL TRANSLATION OF NEWS ITEM

REAL PURPOSES OF JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

 To create a Modern State where an
 oppressed Territory of China former-
 ly existed

 The new Government has succeeded, in
 only one year, in unifying the money
 and increasing industry and commerce

The real efforts of Japan in Manchukuo have been directed toward making the territory in question a "Modern State." This task, begun a little over a year ago, has progressed notably.

The above is the substance of a statement made to us yesterday by Mr. Yoshiatsu Hori, Minister of Japan in Mexico, which statement, by virtue of its length, we are compelled to summarize.

OPPRESSION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

The disastrous situation into which the Manchurian people had been plunged by the old Chang dynasty has frequently been described. But the worst oppression was exercised in the economic field. It being the region where the famous "Soya" bean is cultivated and exported, it has served for many years in the modern history of China as a military base for Chinese military chiefs. Being geographically independent from the rest of China, all chiefs who have established their authority in that strategic region have exercised a controlling influence over Northern China.

Among others, the Chang family, which had Mukden as the seat of their Government, reigned over the entire territory of Manchuria for many years. At times they attempted to extend their influence south of the Great Wall. They were not successful, but, once they withdrew to their base in Manchuria, no military commander was able to overthrow them. This was not because they and their armies were stronger than their opponents but because of the advantageous position which Manchuria offered them. The country was rich and productive; its capacity to pay taxes was enormous, especially as the "Soya" bean grew rapidly in importance as a raw material for various industries. Besides, the bean in question was being exported in constantly increasing quantities.

On the other

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On the other hand, there was a limit to the imposition of taxes. The old Chang government then invented a plan by means of which it could get gold (amasar oro) out of practically nothing, in order to increase its enormous army and build the largest arsenal in the world, as well as to provide funds for frequent adventures (aventuras) into Central China. This plan was very simple: it only required a few printing machines to turn out all the bills the Chang government needed.

This production scheme worked as follows: In the first place, the Chang Government issued a decree prohibiting the direct sale of the "Soya" bean by the grower to the brokers or exporting companies; the entire crop had to be sold to the purchasing agents designated by the authorities. The printed bills mentioned above were given to the growers by the Government Agents for their hard work. The Chang government, in turn, sold these crops to foreign companies and received cash therefor, mostly the Japanese gold yen. This attractive and remunerative business was rudely interrupted by the incident of September 18, 1931.

CENTRALIZATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM OF MANCHUKUO

In order to obtain the unification and centralization of the banking system throughout the territory, the new government established a Central Bank of Manchukuo in its new Capital immediate following the establishment of the State. After the preparatory period of three months (March to June, 1932), the bank formally commenced operations on July 1st. At the same time, the Bank of the Three Provinces and the banks of the Kirin and Hefunkiang were consolidated to form part of the new Central Bank, commencing to operate immediately as branches of the latter.

In this way the banking system of Manchukuo was unified and centralized precisely in the same form as that obtaining in many modern countries. Even when the three old provincial banks had a nominal capital for their operations, it was practically impossible to ascertain the exact amount of their assets, because when they suffered losses they would compensate themselves with new paper money or with the profits from the sales of "Soya" beans, in which they were all interested.

In order to make known to the public the assets of the Central Bank, 30,000,000 in national money has been added thereto, but since the provincial banks have been incorporated with it, the Central Bank has taken over all the assets and liabilities of the banks in question, including the paper money issued by them. This paper money in circulation has been put down (colocado) as a liability (deuda pasiva) at the current rate of exchange, after a conference between the Government and the Bank. The assets, on

the other

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the other hand, constitutes the credit of the bank, represented by its investments in loans, real estate and its regular business.

The old provincial banks put into circulation more than ten different kinds of bills. The values thereof on the market varied considerably. For example, the Fengtien bill, originally issued at a value of \$1.45 against the silver dollar, subsequently circulated at a value of \$0.60 against the same unit. The Heilunkiang bill dropped more than 23 (? figures blurred) times its original value and the Kirin bill six.


MAGNIFICENT SITUATION OF THE NEW STATE

All the foregoing gives an idea of the notable change in the economic conditions of the country since the establishment of the new regime. The improvements obtained with the new banking system are only one of many reforms and improvements which the new Government proposes introducing. It should not be forgotten that the reforms mentioned above are the result of work covering a period of less than one year.

The new regime is carrying out improvements in other branches. This and the work of reconstruction (rehabilitation), as well as the development of the prosperity of the people, undertaken by the Government, promise steady progress.

Translated by
 LC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE MAY 19, 1933.

Mr. Secretary:

MAY 27 1933

There is attached ^{NOTED} a memorandum giving an estimate of possible developments if and when the Japanese occupy Peiping.

In case Peiping is threatened, presumably the Defense Plan for the Legation Quarter at Peiping would be put into operation and the American Legation Guard would cooperate with the other Legation Guards in protecting the Legation Quarter.

During the past two or three days and up to this morning, the latest information available warranted an estimate that there need be no immediate apprehension with regard to the safety of American lives at Peiping and with regard to the American Legation Guard becoming involved in military operations against either Chinese or Japanese armed forces. In the light, however, of press reports received today giving an account of highly provocative activities on the part of a Japanese military airplane which has been flying over Peiping with its movements apparently coordinated with activities of the Japanese Legation Guard, there is ample reason for fear lest ill-advised

action

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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action on the part of the Japanese, either deliberately conceived for the purpose of making trouble in the city or foolishly indulged in, may lead to a physical encounter between Japanese and Chinese within the city the consequences of which can no more accurately be estimated than could the consequences of lighting a fire-cracker in a powder factory.

SKH:CLS

SKH:CLS

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 18, 1933

MAY 27 1933

Division of
 NOTE FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN -1 1933

Department of State

Japanese Occupation of Peiping: Estimate of
 Developments If and When That Happens.

RECEIVED

MAY 31 1933

DIVISION OF

In case the Japanese forces occupy Peiping, it is almost impossible to predict exactly what will occur. However, there are outlined below a number of possible eventualities, as follows:

It is not believed likely that there will develop at Peiping conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops on a scale comparable to that which occurred at Shanghai in January and February, 1932.

In case the Japanese press determinedly on to Peiping, the Chinese military opposition may disintegrate. In that event the Japanese troops would probably occupy Peiping without any major disturbance to Peiping and without particular hazard to foreign life and property. If the Chinese opposition does not disintegrate, fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces may be expected to occur around and within the city of Peiping but probably outside the Legation Quarter. During that conflict, the inhabitants of Peiping, including Americans and other foreigners (even those within the Legation Quarter) would likely be exposed to some hazard, especially in connection with airplane flights over Peiping and combat operations by such airplanes. Airplane flights, although a menace to all inhabitants of Peiping,

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 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Peiping, will probably not result in the killing of foreigners except in isolated and casual instances.

There is in existence a Defense Plan for the Legation Quarter at Peiping. Under this plan the various Legation Guards at Peiping, including the American Legation Guard, cooperate in measures designed to protect the Legation Quarter. In case there develops at Peiping a threatening situation, the plan would be put into operation by the foreign military commanders. The first step under the plan would probably be the assembling of Americans and other foreigners who reside outside the Legation Quarter at designated concentration points from which they would be escorted by the Legation Guards into the Legation Quarter. Once the foreigners in Peiping are assembled within the Legation Quarter, the protective measures of the foreign defense forces would be confined to protecting the Legation Quarter and its inhabitants. The greatest danger in a situation where the Defense Plan is put into operation probably lies in the fact that under the plan the Japanese Legation Guard is assigned duties and functions similar to those assigned other Legation Guards. The Japanese Legation Guard is charged with the defense of a certain sector of the Legation Quarter and it is also charged with escorting foreigners from certain concentration points outside the Legation Quarter to within the Quarter. While Japanese Legation guards are escorting foreigners to the Legation Quarter, Chinese ~~may~~^{might} attack the Japanese guards, with resultant

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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resultant hazard to and casualties among the foreigners under escort. Also, the Japanese Legation Guard, while in charge of defense measures in its sector of the Legation Quarter, ^{might} ~~may~~ provoke attacks by the Chinese, which might endanger the integrity of the Legation Quarter as a whole.

In case the Japanese forces approach the vicinity of Peiping, Japanese civilian reserves in residence outside the Legation Quarter and/or the Japanese Legation Guard may clash with Chinese forces within the city. The Japanese may also instigate rowdies to create disorders in the city (as ^{is done} at Tientsin). In any of these events, unless foreigners had already been withdrawn within the Legation Quarter, there would result serious hazard to foreign lives. Such action by the Japanese might make easier the capture of Peiping by Japanese forces attacking from without, or it might result in general fighting outside the Legation Quarter which would endanger the Quarter itself.

At the present time the Defense Plan has not been put into operation. The American Minister's most recent reports (May 15 and 16) indicate that the city of Peiping and the neighborhood are quiet; that no immediate danger is expected; and that it has not seemed necessary to consider ^{special} precautionary steps. The Minister reports also that it has not as yet seemed necessary to take steps to evacuate American women and children who are in residence outside the Legation Quarter to places within the Quarter.

The American Minister is under instruction to keep the
 Department

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Department informed promptly of developments and to continue to consult with his interested colleagues, attempting to devise such arrangements as may seem desirable and practicable to meet the situation as it develops, and bearing always in mind the desirability that the foreign military commanders at Tientsin and Peiping ~~may~~ constantly consider such means as they may deem desirable and practicable for the protection of American lives either in the locale or by evacuation.

It is entirely possible and feasible for the Japanese to occupy Peiping without involving the Legation Quarter and without American lives being exposed to serious hazard. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Japanese may abuse foreign rights and privileges and take such steps as would endanger the whole Legation Quarter, involving other foreigners, and expose to serious risk the lives of the foreign inhabitants at Peiping. It does not, however, seem likely, in the light of available information, that they would go so far.

In a situation fraught with so many possibilities, the most practicable course of action would seem to be to rely upon the American Minister and American military commanders to use their sound discretion in meeting, in the light of existing instructions, the exigencies of the situation as they arise.

MMH:FJC/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 2, 1933.

~~Mr.~~

Mr. William sent a copy of the
attached to the Department on
January 19, 1933.. The previous
copy is also attached hereto and
carries with it a digest. The
case appears to be ready for
filing.

ETW
ETW



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

200 West 57th Street
 New York City

May 24, 1933



Re: FE 793-94-Maurice William

F/HS

Dear Mr. Phillips:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of May 17th addressed to the Ambassador Hotel, Washington and which has been forwarded to me here.

I should have been very happy to act upon your suggestion that I call on Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck had your letter reached me before my departure. The documentary material to which I referred in my letter to Secretary Hull has been forwarded to Dr. Hornbeck some time ago.

On the assumption that you yourself may wish to go over this material, I take pleasure in enclosing a copy. Copies have been forwarded to the League of Nations by request of Mr. Norman H. Davis. The facts brought out in this material may be unknown to the State Department and you may perhaps wish to convey them to Secretary Hull.

If I can be of any further service please feel free to call upon me.

Cordially yours

Maurice William
 Maurice William

MW:MP

Mr. William Phillips
 Under Secretary of State
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C.

793.94/6349

MAY 31 1933

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

May 29, 1933.

Dear Mr. William:

I have received your letter of May 24th enclosing some documentary material on the difficulties in the Far East. I have not yet had a chance to go through it as these are very busy days here in Washington, but I shall look forward to an early opportunity to read what you have sent me. In the meantime I wish to thank you for your courtesy in addressing this material to me.

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

Mr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York, New York.

A true copy of
the signed original.
BB7

U:VC:BBF

793.94/6549

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huatzen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Announcing
**SUN YAT-SEN
VERSUS COMMUNISM**

New Evidence Establishing
China's Right to the Support
of Democratic Nations

By MAURICE WILLIAM



A book with a highly significant background—
one involving famous personalities, one which
illuminates, in a singular fashion, present day
policies and politics of the Far East, one which
has enormous implications respecting the
future story of mankind.

THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY
BALTIMORE, U. S. A.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The "Why" of the Book

JOHN HAY said, "The world's peace rests with China."

Dr. William's new book presenting "new evidence establishing China's right to the support of democratic nations" is addressed to the thesis that American prosperity is bound up with China's stability.

China's stability in turn is bound up with the interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teaching. Mme. Sun, on December 20, 1931, attacked both Canton and Nanking followers of Sun for betraying his revolutionary principles. What is the explanation? Why has China suffered five years' internal war?

The present volume gives the answer and the answer also to such questions as these:

What was responsible for Bolshevik Russia's successes in China and why were the Russians, after nearly four years of progress, expelled from China?

What was responsible for the ultimate defeat of the "world revolution" in China?

Why are Sun Yat-sen's loyal followers divided into opposing Left and Right Wing factions?

Why are the Right and Left Wing factions in complete agreement with regard to Dr. Sun's *Principle of Nationalism* and *Principle of Democracy* and in conflict only with regard to Dr. Sun's *Principle of Livelihood*?

Why can either Wing cite Dr. Sun in support of its interpretation of his *Principle of Livelihood*?

How did it happen that up to August 3, 1924, Sun identified his *Principle of Livelihood* with Marxian socialism, and thereafter repudiated the identification?

To what extent is this change responsible for the Left and Right Wings and for civil war in China?

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In brief, here is a book which strikes deeply into the underlying causes of and the possible remedies for China's unhappy plight. American understanding and support can go far toward stabilizing China, a result which must prove beneficial to every other nation. The book indicates in detail how Sun Yat-sen changed his point of view, near the close of his life, and how that change was induced by his absorption of an earlier book by the present author, entitled *The Social Interpretation of History*.

Some Comments

Ray Lyman Wilbur, President, Stanford University; past chairman Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations:

"The interaction of mind upon mind shown by the effect of Mr. William's SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY upon Sun Yat-sen is dramatic, if not epochal. The points in Mr. William's book found hospitable lodgment in his mind, and, interpreted by him, they have become of great significance in the unfolding of the new China."

James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University; Chairman Research Committee Institute of Pacific Relations; Director, Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

"Of all the strange chapters in the history of East and West there can be none stranger than this, that the founder of the Chinese republic and the spiritual leader of the new China found in the writing of an unknown American author so clear a statement of the solution of the hardest problem in his political philosophy that he made the American formulation his own. The book in question is THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY and its author, Dr. Maurice William of New York City. The reading of THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

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by Dr. Sun Yat-sen may yet turn out to have been one of the most important single incidents in the history of modern Asia, for the consequences were immediate and far-reaching and have only just begun to show their full extent in the orientation of China. . . . Viewed in this light we have not merely the meeting of two minds but of two civilizations: The American and the Chinese.

Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, Research Professor of Government, New York University; Honorary Economic Adviser, Nationalist Government of China:

"That change was apparently brought about by there falling into his hands *THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY*. If the country [China] had gone Communist, it could not have counted on any foreign help beside that of Russia, but rather on direct foreign hostility. There was a long struggle between these forces, but apparently the anti-Communists have triumphed, due practically entirely to the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been intellectually convinced by Dr. William's book.

Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago; Author, China in Revolution:

"In paragraph after paragraph Dr. Sun either quoted, almost word for word, or paraphrased, the arguments which he had found in *THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY*. He now repudiated several of his own earlier theories, substituting therefor the system of thought which he had recently discovered in Dr. William's work."

L. T. Chen, Editor, "San Min Chu I:"

"It is a fact that Dr. Sun referred to Professor William again and again in his lectures on the three people's principles. It is also a fact that many passages in his book seem to be paraphrases of theories advanced in Dr. William's book."

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The Contents

FOREWORD. *Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur.*

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PREFACE. *Dr. Jeremiah Whipple Jenks.*

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PART I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IN THIS VOLUME.

Chapter I. Sun Yat-sen's Service to Democracy.

Chapter II. Sun Yat-sen Upset Russia's Plans for "World Revolution."

Chapter III. The Importance for Democracy of a General Knowledge of Sun Yat-sen's Ultimate Rejection of Communism.

Chapter IV. The Role Assigned to China by Russia in the Communist Plans to Achieve the "World Revolution," and the Advantage to Russia of Continual Civil War in China.

Chapter V. The Need for Unity in China and the Role the United States Might Play in Promoting It to the Lasting Political and Economic Benefit of the Peoples of Both Countries.

PART II. DR. SUN'S CHANGE OF POSITION WITH REGARD TO BOLSHEVISM, MARXISM, AND THE CLASS-WAR.

*In this part Dr. Sun's change in position is shown in three parallel columns, Dr. Sun's early position in the first, his later position in the third, with passages from *The Social Interpretation* in the center.*

PART III. THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY THAT DR. SUN ULTIMATELY ACCEPTED AND WHICH CAUSED HIS CHANGE OF POSITION WITH REFERENCES TO BOLSHEVISM, MARXISM, AND THE CLASS-WAR.

In this part the device of parallel columns is also utilized, showing the relationship, topic by topic.

HISTORY OF "THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY" AND OF ITS RELATION TO THE "SAN MIN CHU I." *Dr. William J. Gust.*

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

APPENDIX I. The Three Principles of the Kuomintang. *Edward Bing-Shuey Lee.*

APPENDIX II. Quotations from various authoritative sources showing *disagreement* as to the correct interpretation but *agreement* as to the importance of Sun's Third Principle, "The Principle of Livelihood."

INDEX.

SUN YAT-SEN VERSUS COMMUNISM

New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the
Support of Democratic Nations



Cloth. 6 x 9. xx + 222 pages + index.

\$5.00

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Publishers of Scientific Books and Periodicals
BALTIMORE, U. S. A.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NORMAN H. DAVIS
Forty-eight Wall Street
New York

January 4, 1933.

Mr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York City

Dear Mr. William:

I wish to thank you for your letter of December 30th with copies of the enclosures, which Dr. Wilbur intends to present to President Hoover and Secretary Stimson.

I have found this extremely interesting and I would welcome an opportunity sometime in the near future to have a talk with you about the Far Eastern question. It is, as Dr. Shotwell says, quite extraordinary that an American should have written a book which should have had so much influence upon Dr. Sun and upon the Chinese revolution.

I intend to get a copy of your "Social Interpretation of History" and read it at the first opportunity, and also "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism".

If you have not already done so, I would suggest that you write to Major General Frank R. McCoy in Washington, who was on the Lytton Commission, and send him copies of the same material which you sent to me. I am certain that he will be interested in it.

I think it would also be wise to get this information into the hands of some of the members of the League of Nations who are dealing with this question.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Norman H. Davis

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Howard Mansfield
 Lucius H. Beers
 Henry DeForest Baldwin
 Franklin B. Lord
 Allan B. A. Bradley
 Allen Evarts Foster
 George DeForest Lord
 Parker McCollester
 Bernhard Knollenberg
 Sherman Baldwin
 John H. Vincent
 James S. Hemingway
 Herbert Brownell, Jr.

C O P Y

L O R D, D A Y & L O R D

25 Broadway,
 New York.

Cable Address
 LORDATTY

January 12, 1933.

 Franklin L. Partridge
 Franklin Grady
 Thaddeus G. Cowell

Dr. Maurice William,
 200 West 57th St.,
 New York City.

Dear Dr. William:

It is very kind of you to send me copies of the statements you have prepared relative to the Sino-Japanese controversy and the cause of the civil war in China. It is not often that the author of a book finds himself responsible for civil war and for international relations that shake the whole world. In dealing with public affairs, it is dangerous to omit an investigation of causes. You certainly have made out a strong case for the proposition that your book is an important cause of the present civil war in China. I think it of great importance that this should be understood.

Thanking you very much for giving me the opportunity of reading your statements and letters, I remain

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

H. deF. Baldwin

HdeFB:LG

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

1707 I Street
 Washington, D.C.
 April 14th, 1932

My dear Doctor William:

I am so delighted with your enclosures. You seem to have hit the nail exactly on the head. It is the interpretation of "The Principle of Livelihood" that separates them.

I should like so much to have you talk with T.V. Soong and with Wang Ching-wei. These two are the leaders of the divergent views. You, who know so well the reasons for the conflict between them, would be sure to bring these leaders of the opposing factions together by explaining the reasons for Dr. Sun's conflicting views.

It has always seemed to me that they were all so very sincere, but out of a sense of loyalty were following two different roads. Loyalty is an outstanding trait in the Chinese, regardless of what people may say to the contrary.

I feel that you have a responsibility and ought to go to China. What a glorious thing it would be to help them see their loyalty through the same eyes! If you could get Mme. Sun and Wang Ching-wei to back you, T.V. Soong could bring Chiang into line.

Do help. I feel that perhaps you are the bridge over which they will walk and get acquainted. You and Mme. Sun are perhaps closer to Dr. Sun than any other two people ever were.

I will be in New York for a few days some time in May and want so much to see you.

Always good wishes.

(signed) Max Newell

(Mrs. Isaac Newell)

NOTE:

Colonel and Mrs. Isaac Newell have lived in China for seventeen years. Colonel Newell held the post of Military Attache to the American Consulate at Peiping, China.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CAUSE AND CURE OF WAR
 1116 Grand Central Terminal Building
 New York City

120 Paine Avenue,
 New Rochelle, N. Y.
 March 17, 1933.

Mrs. Mary G. Schonberg,
 Executive Secretary,
 National Council of Jewish Women,
 615 Madison Avenue, N. Y.

My dear Mrs. Schonberg:

What seems to be a long time ago, you sent me Maurice William's manuscript. Anxious as I was to peruse it, I was unable to do so for some time. I came home from Washington sick with a bad cold and I was also overwhelmed with responsibilities which consumed most of my time.

I have now read the manuscript and find it most astonishing. I am not convinced that the main motive of Japan's present day action is Civil War in China, nor am I completely convinced that the Civil Wars are led by advocates of the Right and the Left. If, however, these two things are really true and that the Lytton Commission overlooked them, somebody, who is firm in that faith, ought to make straight tracks for Geneva and try to persuade the League to prepare an amended report. Dr. Shotwell might do it, since he seems to approve of Mr. William's statement, or, at least, to think favorably of it. Mr. William has a very logical way of putting his facts and the whole story is wonderful, indeed. It ought not to be Mr. William, but some friendly advocate, who would insist upon action at Geneva.

I thank you very much for having permitted me to read this manuscript and I apologize for having kept it so long. I now return it.

If, ever, there should be an opportunity to meet Mr. William, it would give me great pleasure to do so. You mention that it might be possible, but that was so long ago, the possibility has probably passed. I do not see that meeting me would do him any service. It would give me pleasure and it is always a pleasure to meet you.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Carrie Chapman Catt

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C O P Y

April 2, 1933

Mrs. Mary G. Schonberg, Executive Secretary,
 National Council of Jewish Women,
 625 Madison Avenue, N. Y.

Dear Mrs. Schonberg:

I am returning you by this mail the "evidence" of Mr. William which you were good enough to send me. Thank you for the privilege..... I find it a most illuminating slant on the present situation. It is a new and a most unbelievable angle and it is difficult to believe that one man could have played so important a part in the events of the world as did Mr. William and his book, and yet kingdoms have changed hands and geographies rewritten for lesser reasons than these. The whole thing is so logically developed that one is carried quite away with it.

Has anything further been done about getting it to the authorities in Geneva? Or is it too late? I think it would be well, Mr. William permitting to have some of this on file for any advanced study groups who might apply. Are there any such?

I for one got more out of Mr. William's material than I did I believe when I read Dr. Sun Yat-sen's own work.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) (Mrs.) Blanche S. Marx

(Note: Mrs. Marx was formerly the Chairman of the Department of Peace of the National Council of Jewish Women)

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Who is Who in America, 1932

Stuart, John Leighton, missionary; born of American parents at Hangchow, China, June 24th, 1876. Son of John Linton and Mary Louisa (Horton) S; A.B., and B. Litt; , Hampden-Sydney College Va., 1896. D.D. 1915; B.D., Union Theological Seminary of Virginia; Litt. D. Princeton, 1930. Ordained Presbyn. ministry; missionary in China since 1905; Prof. New Testament, Nanking Theological Seminary, 1908-1919; President, Yenching University, Peiping, since 1919; Trustee China Foundation for Promotion Education and Culture.

Author: Essentials of New Testament; Greek (in Chinese) 1916; Greek-Chinese-English Dictionary of the New Testament, 1918; Commentary on the Apocalypse (in Chinese) 1922.

Decorated 3d, Class Order of Chia Ho, Republic of China.

Address. Yenching University, Peiping, China.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

YENCHING UNIVERSITY
 PEIPING? CHINA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 24, 1932

Dr. Maurice William
 180 West 57th Street
 New York, N. Y.

My dear Dr. William:

The manuscript of your latest production reached me a few weeks ago, but as this happens to be about the busiest time of the year for me, I have been forced to delay the careful perusal of this material which it deserves. The time before the opening of our academic year and immediately following that event are always especially busy for an administrative officer, and this year I had to make a trip to Nanking and Shanghai in the midst of this period.

I have now only been able to finish the manuscript and accompanying copies of correspondence, etc. You are unquestionably rendering a timely service in carrying the original influence upon Dr. Sun to this extension of the inquiry into his change of attitude. You are also quite right in attributing the division among his followers, in large measure at least, to misunderstanding of what it was he stood for in relation to communism, and some alternative to the philosophy of economic determinism. I have no special suggestions to make regarding the manuscript. Your work has been so thorough, and your appreciation of the issue so remarkably sensitive for one living at such a distance from this country, that there is very little to add. The one comment that I would make is that theoretical acceptance of Dr. Sun's views and loyalty to them as understood by his various followers is inevitably being to some extent superceded by the exigencies of new factors in the situation here, and the political groupings that are growing out of such changing conditions. This does not lessen at all the importance of the efforts you are rightly stressing, and his teachings will continue to be read and to mould the thinking of public-spirited Chinese for a long time to come.

In regard to the argument made by yourself in your letter to Dr. Shotwell, I am in full sympathy. One can scarcely overstate the desire of patriotic Chinese to have relations commercial and otherwise with America in preference to any other country, and the opportunity that we have, not only for generous and disinterested friendliness, applied to political reforms and progressive efforts of all kinds, but the natural benefits that would come to our own depleted foreign trade from such activities, or from projects undertaken with Chinese on a cooperative basis. I might remark that the trip referred to at the outset of this letter was in response to an invitation from Mr. T. V. Soong and the Minister of Railways to consult with them about the possibilities of such cooperation in developing automotive transportation in China.

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By Milton D. Leighton NARS, Date 12-18-75

2.

With best wishes in this significant undertaking which has so unexpectedly opened up to you and you are so vigorously following up,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. LEIGHTON STUART

JLS C

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(copy)

Directors Corporation of Yaddo

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* Deceased

YADDO
To Aid The Creative Arts
SPENCER AND KATRINA TRASK
Founders
1900 - 1926

Saratoga Springs
New York

Executive Director
Mrs. Elizabeth Ames

February 9, 1933.

My dear Mr. William:

I am grieved to find how much time has elapsed since my receipt of your highly esteemed favor of January 6th. I realize my loss during this period as I this morning, for the first time, have been able to go through the correspondence which you have done me the honor to enclose.

I am writing you now before I have been able to make the time to read copy of your last letter to Professor Gies - I will have to take that up later - but I can gather from the reading of the rest of your most interesting enclosures the gist of that letter as a more detailed confirmation of your position which I find most clear throughout.

When I discovered last year the article by my friend, Dr. Shotwell, of your relation to the principles of Sun Yat-Sen, I was deeply interested and at once sent for your book, "Sun Yat-Sen Versus Communism." I was interested because of my clear conviction held for many years that close relations with China were of first importance to the United States and as well as to the world.

You are quite right in your thought, and I am cheered by it, that my interest would be in no sense casual in the matter you submitted to me. If I were younger, I should think it safe to let out more links and endeavor to undertake a practical furtherance to some extent, at any rate, of the program outlined in your correspondence which profoundly interests me.

I have very high esteem for Dr. Shotwell and rate my friend, Norman Davis, highly as a man doing large service to the world. I presume that he naturally had no leeway in time or opportunity to speak to the President-elect of your thought. I am wondering whether you and Dr. Shotwell have had occasion at all to discuss the matter with Professor Moley. I have not met him but his frequent opportunity with the President-elect

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Mr. Maurice William - 2

for discussion, would offer the best occasion for bringing the conviction, you now hold as to the opportunity of the United States in China, definitely before the mind of Mr. Roosevelt. I have known him well for many years and am quite clear, when his mind shall be free from the immediate duties he must perform, he will be deeply interested in your thought. I have no doubt of his high esteem of Dr. Shotwell and I wonder whether it might not be possible for a small group to outline a somewhat concise program for the new Administration along the lines of your thought. It should be in shape to discuss with the ~~new~~ Secretary of State promptly I think.

I do not often go to New York now but may stop over for a day or two if I shall go to the Inaugural for a few days. I should like, if possible, to have then the privilege of meeting you and possibly Dr. Shotwell if he should be in the City. I assure you that I shall have it in mind.

I am wondering whether Mr. Lippmann has had occasion to deal with the question you so properly have at heart or whether you have found occasion to bring it to the attention of Newton D. Baker or Owen D. Young, two of our strongest minds. I have not met the present Secretary of the League of Nations Association in New York but I gather from what I learn that he is of keen mind and I should think this would be a most suitable subject and program for their practical consideration.

I feel quite sure my friend, Mrs. James Lees Laidlaw, would be likely to respond quickly and possibly be in position to put a good deal of the extraordinary energy she has exhibited into developing the program; and her closely associated friend, Mrs. Frank Day Tuttle, might be in position to undertake a vigorous cooperative effort.

I am rather sorry that Mr. Jerome D. Greene has had to leave the country but as his successor in the work for Pacific Relations is Newton D. Baker, he would naturally be one to take hold of the matter after March 4th. Apparently he is not being discussed as a Member of the Cabinet but there seems to be basis for the suggestion that he be Ambassador to Great Britain. If so, with his extraordinary oratorical power, he might well be of the largest service if his mind were rightly oriented to the program you have in mind. I do not think of anyone on the Pacific Coast today who stands in the position of my friend, David Starr Jordan, as regards both local and world-wide influence from the California section of our country.

President von Kleinsmid of the Southern California University, I am in correspondence with from time to time as being very actively concerned. He has a lay friend who, at one time, had in mind devoting a large sum of money to special efforts for World Peace through education. I do not know whether his money has disappeared, as so many have had reason to find, or not.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr. Maurice William - 3

I feel confident that the President-elect will respond to a well defined presentation, as concise as possible, and hope that you and Professor Shotwell and Professor Gies may deem it worthwhile to undertake the presentation of such, to be presented perhaps through Norman Davis in association with Professor Moley possibly.

I am
Very truly yours,

Mr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York City.

(Signed) George Foster Peabody

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE CAUSE AND CURE
Of The
SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
New Evidence For The League Of Nations
submitted by
MAURICE WILLIAM

Author of SUN YAT-SEN VERSUS COMMUNISM:
New Evidence Establishing China's Right
To The Support Of Democratic Nations; 1932.

THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY:
A Refutation Of The Marxian Economic
Interpretation Of History; 1921

Copyrighted By

MAURICE WILLIAM
1932

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
630 West 168th Street, New York
Department of Biological Chemistry

November 12, 1932

Dr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th St.,
New York City.

Dear Dr. William:

The Lytton Commission has presented its Report. On November 21 the Council of the League of Nations will convene to receive and discuss this Report. World attention will be focussed upon these deliberations, for it is generally conceded by students of international affairs that not only the existence of the League of Nations but also the fate of civilization itself may be at stake. Clarence K. Streit, the New York Times correspondent at Geneva, seems to have sensed the momentousness of the situation. His cable to the Times opens with these significant words: "Lytton Data Held Key to World Fate; Geneva Tensely Awaits Action Which May Decide Peace or War for All of Us." (October 9, 1932).

The findings of the Lytton Commission are presumably receiving your close attention. Let me emphasize here some of the conclusions in that Report, which, by virtue of the part your book played in winning Nationalist China away from Communism, bring to you a new, a world, responsibility in international affairs, which you cannot del gate and therefore should not shirk. I quote from the Report:

"It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion about them." (No italic in original.) (Chapter IX, page 126.)

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Dr. William, 11/12/32

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If your own researches, to which you have devoted the past five years, support these conclusions, do they not suggest also the corollary that in this critical hour the League of Nations has a claim not only on the opinions of its own Commission but on the opinions of "anyone" who may possess "an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background?" You cannot escape this responsibility, since you are not only in possession of an intimate knowledge of all the facts, but you have also played a decisive part in the creation of the historical background. Your duty is even more strikingly brought out in the following conclusion in the Lytton Report:

"It is impossible not to realize that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China and the future to which it is tending." (Page 131). (No italic in original.)

This plainly indicates Japan's fear that China's future political development is tending toward Communism. Since this fear "lies at the heart of the problem for Japan," and since it has been established by such scholars as Professor James T. Shotwell, Professor John Dewey, Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, and many others, that toward the last months of his life Dr. Sun Yat-sen repudiated Communism in favor of your "Social Interpretation of History"--and that in response to Dr. Sun's mandate, modern China is basing her social, political, and economic program upon your anti-communist principles--are you not under obligation to supply to the League of Nations proof of modern China's anti-communist development? You would thus help the League to solve a major problem, the presence of which provided Japan's militarists with a plausible excuse for their activities against China.

I draw your attention to another important statement in the Report:

"Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with

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Dr. William, 11/12/32

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the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. Those conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression." (Chapter 1, p. 13.)
 (No italic in original.)

The investigations of the Lytton Commission have disclosed that Chinese civil wars are no longer a local problem, but instead a menace to world peace and adverse to the return of world economic security. No doubt this fundamental discovery explains the Lytton Commission's extensive study of Chinese civil wars. Since your own volume "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" aims to point out the cause and suggest a cure for civil wars in China, and since eminent scholars have emphasized the responsibility you must assume for the part your "Social Interpretation of History" has played in precipitating the conflict between the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, how could you discharge your responsibility more fittingly than by placing at the service of the League of Nations your "intimate knowledge of all the facts" concerning the underlying causes of recent Chinese civil wars, which in turn led to the present conflict with Japan?

The League is seeking light upon a very complicated problem. With July 1914 in mind, let me urge you to see that no one in a position to shed light has a moral right to withhold it.

I should be glad to cooperate in an effort to bring to the attention of those most concerned the facts you may wish to present.

Yours cordially,

(Signed) William J. Gies

WJG:H

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

200 West 57th Street,
 New York, N. Y.

November 19, 1932.

Professor William J. Gies,
 Columbia University,
 New York City.

Dear Professor Gies:

Your letter of November 12th was read with a great deal of interest. You are assuredly right. The meeting of the Council of the League of Nations opening on the 21st of this month, may decide whether the nations of the world have learned to live in peace or will be destroyed in war.

The Lytton Commission has done a splendid piece of work. In presenting its findings it followed the fearless method of the research student whose sole concern is the soundness of the evidence upon which he must base his conclusions.

I too am greatly impressed by the keen insight shown by the Commission in discerning the fundamental part that civil wars have played in inciting the present trouble between China and Japan. The clarity of vision evinced by the Commission regarding the underlying cause of the conflict between China and Japan is strikingly revealed when a number of its observations are brought together. Here are a few:

"It has been shown how seriously the rights and interests claimed by Japan have been affected by the weakness of the authority of the Central Government of China....the present political instability of China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world.....
it is impossible not to realize that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China and the future to which it is tending.....
 The relations between China and Japan are those of war in disguise and the future is full of anxiety.

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We have reported the circumstances which have created these conditions..... Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. These conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and, until remedied, will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression.... Serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun..... It (the Central Government) has been forced by recurrent civil wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by a billion dollars (silver) since 1927..... The danger of civil war must continue to exist so long as the Central Government lacks the material means to make its authority swiftly and permanently felt all over the country..... The recrudescence of civil war favored the growth of Communist influence in the period between 1928 and 1931.... Japan's anxiety to safeguard the life and property of her subjects in China caused her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war..... Such action was bitterly resented by China..... This issue however though affecting Japan to a greater extent than other Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue alone."
 (No italic in original)

These citations convincingly show that the Commission's conclusion - that China's Civil wars are at the bottom of the dispute between China and Japan - are the result of an exhaustive study of the subject. To what degree will these findings contribute to a solution of the problems which brought the Commission into being? Will it tend to expose and break down the validity of Japan's defense? Will it weaken Japan's case before the League? From the utterances of Japan's official spokesmen, the Japanese seem confident that, far from weakening her cause, the Commission's conclusions regarding China's civil wars will actually strengthen Japan's position before the League.

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Through her attack upon Shanghai and her schemings in Manchuria, Japan has very largely forfeited the good will of the world. Many regard her as an international outlaw. While fully aware of her unhappy position in the family of nations, the one and only excuse she has consistently offered in justification of her unprecedented actions is the persistence of civil wars in China.

A fair idea of the defense Japan proposes to offer is to be found in the address by Count Yasuya Uchida, Foreign Minister of Japan, delivered before the House of Peers, at the opening session of the Imperial Diet, August 25, 1932. Count Uchida spoke in part as follows:

"It is an indisputable fact that the chaotic condition of China and the so-called revolutionary policy carried on by China under the enthralling influence of extravagant political dogma have been principally responsible for the unfortunate turn that international relations have taken of recent years in the Far East...it is admitted by those conversant with actual conditions in China that no remedy can be effected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed "machinery of peace"..... I regret to say that the growing disturbance in her (China's) domestic administration coupled with rampant activities of Communist bandits throughout an extensive area in the Yangtze Valley and South China is casting a gloomy shadow on the path of the National Government..... Truly our deep sympathy is due the Chinese people who have to suffer under these troubled conditions. To allow such conditions to persist as they are, I am firmly convinced, will not only be deplorable for China herself but will constitute a constant danger of bringing about a serious menace to the rights and interests of foreign powers. On the contrary, the whole world will rejoice should China realize the gravity of the situation, cast aside her ill-advised foreign policy and adopt in earnest a constructive program of devotion to the task of internal readjustment. It goes without saying that Japan, always conscious of the general interests of the Far East, will spare no effort to afford all possible assistance to China." (New York Times - August 25, 1932)

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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A further indication that the persistence of civil wars in China will constitute Japan's main defense before the League has been disclosed by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Chief of the delegation that is to represent Japan at the Geneva discussions of the Lytton Report: "If Chinese civil war had not led to a state of things in which national obligations were ignored we should have had no cause to interfere. But as in the last analysis, Chinese chaos is the cause of the trouble in Manchuria, a settlement which would leave the door open for the re-entry of the disturbing influences would be useless." (New York Times, November 6, 1932) (No italic in original)

Please note that these views are substantially those arrived at by the Lytton Commission and quoted in your letter. I repeat the quotation: "Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government have been the characteristics of China since 1911. These conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace." This is sweeping support for Japan's major contention that Chinese civil wars are a menace to world peace, and that in her effort to put a stop to civil wars she is really serving the cause of world peace.

It might be argued of course, that since the Report points out that "these conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact," and since none of the other nations has interfered in China's

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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internal affairs, why should Japan? In extenuation we may confidently look for Japan to make the most of the following statement in the Report: "So far as Japan is China's nearest neighbor and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions described in this chapter." (No italic in original)

From the foregoing it would seem safe to assert that Japan's morale has been greatly heightened through the Commission's vindication of her contention that civil wars are responsible for the trouble between the two countries. Her improved position may easily lead Japan to take the offensive against the Commission and the League. The substance of her argument may follow some such line as this: "We have been charged with invasion and occupation without provocation, and we pointed to Chinese civil wars as a menace to our rights and interests which we were fully justified in defending. Your own investigations have now confirmed our claim as to the cause of the conflict between us. Your only remaining objection is to the method we adopted in dealing with the cause. Is it fair to criticize unless you can propose a more constructive means of dealing with the problem?" Japan will seek vindication for her strong-arm method of dealing with Chinese civil wars by attempting to show that the League is not qualified to deal with this problem, and that the remedies suggested by the Lytton Commission will fail to yield the desired results. This is the meaning of Count Uchida's statement: "It is admitted by those conversant with actual conditions in China that no remedy can be

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affected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed 'machinery of peace' ". (New York Times, August 25, 1932)

And this view is supported by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's chief delegate to Geneva, who expresses himself as follows: "I think our colleagues of the League should ask themselves if the peace machinery is quite perfect when it fails to provide a remedy for the encroachments and attacks we have suffered for many years, as a result of the warfare of rival Chinese military leaders... If the peace machinery had been capable of dealing with the internal situation of China there would have been no incident of the 18th of September and none of its distressing consequences....The anarchy into which China has fallen is the greatest question before the world today. The restoration of peace and order to China is humanity's greatest task in the twentieth century."

(New York Times, - November 6, 1932)

And so it has been made quite obvious that in the discussions at Geneva next week Japan will take advantage of every weak point in the proposals of the Lytton Commission, in order to justify her own method of dealing with "humanity's greatest task of the twentieth century."

Here, at last, is the real issue. It has been stated by Japan's official spokesmen. It pushes the issues between China and Japan into the background.

This is no longer a conflict between China and Japan; it is a conflict between the eighteenth and the twentieth

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century. Japan denies to the twentieth century the capacity to solve its problems in its own way. Only through the methods of the eighteenth century, implies Japan, can we solve the problems of the twentieth century. "The anarchy into which China has fallen is the greatest question before the world today;" says Mr. Matsuoka, but "no remedy can be effected by having recourse either to the covenant of the League of Nations or to any other organ of what may be termed the 'machinery of peace' " says Count Uchida. Hence, the machinery of war, the remedy of the eighteenth century, is the only solution "to humanity's greatest problem of the twentieth century!"

Upon what grounds does Japan justify her sweeping rejection of the methods of peace to which the twentieth century is dedicated? Has she exhausted every peaceful means of solving her problems with China, before resorting to the sword? If Japan is fully fortified with evidence showing that no means had been overlooked in an effort to achieve a peaceful solution of her dispute with China, such evidence would constitute complete vindication for the drastic methods to which she ultimately resorted. Naturally, I am not in a position to know whether Japan, in defending her case before the League, will produce such evidence, which of course would be conclusive and a complete triumph for Japan. Pending the presentation of such evidence before the League Council next Monday, I have only the views of Japan's spokesman to guide me.

In his statement in the New York Times of November 6, 1932, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka is quoted as saying: "Our recogni-

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tion of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder. My primary mission at the Assembly is to explain the situation.... If Chinese civil war had not led to a state of things in which national obligations were ignored, we should have had no cause to interfere. But as in the last analysis, Chinese chaos is the cause of the trouble in Manchuria, a settlement which would leave the door open for the re-entry of the disturbing influences, would be useless." (No italic in original) Now, here we have the heart of this grave international problem, as seen by Japan's own spokesman. Japan's recognition of Manchukuo was due, according to Mr. Matsuoka, to one fundamental cause, the continuance of civil wars in China. Thus the entire Sino-Japanese question once again, leads back to the same original source.

At this stage of our discussion, Mr. Matsuoka's opening words, quoted above, should be given due consideration. "Our recognition of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder. My primary mission at the Assembly is to explain the situation." We may therefore look for Mr. Matsuoka to "explain" to the League how Japan had arrived at the unqualified "conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder." Since it is Japan's contention that Chinese civil wars have been responsible for the en-

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time trouble we can anticipate the form Mr. Matsuoka's explanation will take. He will no doubt undertake to prove (1) that Japan had made an exhaustive study of the underlying cause of Chinese civil wars and (2) she had made every peaceful effort to give the Chinese the benefit of her findings in order to assist in ridding their country of the curse of civil wars. How could it be otherwise? Assuming that instead of civil wars China had suffered from an epidemic of Bubonic Plague. Assuming further that the Chinese had lost control of the situation and that the disease threatened the lives and interests of Japanese living in Manchuria, how would Japan have dealt with this menace? Would she have applied to that dangerous condition the drastic measures she used in dealing with China's civil wars and then sent Mr. Matsuoka to Geneva, to "explain" to the League that "Our recognition of Manchukuo was due to our conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder?" (Plague?) Certainly not! It is safe to assume that Japan would instead have instructed her medical experts to make an exhaustive study of the cause for the spread of Bubonic Plague in China and to suggest a cure. The findings of the Japanese experts would no doubt have been offered to China in the hope that it might prove of aid in ridding that country of the menace of Bubonic Plague. Surely Mr. Matsuoka must understand that until he can produce the proof that Japan had spared no effort to find the cause and cure for Chinese civil wars, the world will be justified in making its own interpretation of the sincerity behind Japan's

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"conviction that the situation was beyond any remedy except the complete separation of Manchuria from Chinese disorder." "Disorder" must have a cause and until every effort to find and remove the cause had been exhausted, eighteenth century methods, as a short cut, will never be justified by twentieth century world opinion.

One wonders whether the Lytton Commission would not have been in a far stronger strategic position to meet the attacks of its Japanese critics had it taken Japan's strongest defense as its point of departure. From the citations already noted, it is safe to assume that in defending her actions before the League, Japan will seek to place the blame upon Chinese civil wars. Since the Commission also recognizes the vital part civil wars have played in this Sino-Japanese conflict, would not the Commission's position have been infinitely strengthened if she had by example shown Japan the twentieth century method of dealing with Chinese civil wars? This would have resulted in a much more intensive study of the cause and cure of Chinese civil wars than is to be found in the Report.

Moreover, a more comprehensive study would have been quite in the spirit of the Commission's mandate from the League Council. This is plain from the following quotations:

"The Council! . . .

Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends!"

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In introducing the resolution, the President, M. Briand, made the following declarations:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you, provides for action on two separate lines (1) to put an end to immediate threat to peace (2) to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries...."

"Paragraph 5 provides for the institution of a Commission of Enquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the Commission are wide. In principle, no question which it feels called upon to study will be excluded"......

The Commission's own understanding of its mandate was as follows: "(1) An examination of the issues between China and Japan which were referred to the Council including their causes development and status at the time of the inquiry; (2) A consideration of a possible solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute which would reconcile the fundamental interests of the two countries." (No italic in original)

"This conception of its mission determined the programme of its work." (pp. 10) (No italic in original)

These quotations seem to show that the Commission was aware that it was the intent of the Council that the Commission should concentrate upon causes and suggest how they might be removed. In other words, the test to which the Commission's Report is ultimately to be submitted has been determined in advance by the League Council itself; the degree to which the

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findings of the Commission will "facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries."

(No italic in original)

With the Council's specific instructions to the Commission in mind, a brief study of Chapter I of the Report, "Outline of Recent Developments in China" may prove useful.

Following a clear summary of historical back-ground and of the conflicting forces in China, the Commission arrives at these conclusions:

"From this summary description it appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful. The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers. Although there are, nowadays, a number of leaders who have risen above particularist sentiments, it is evident that a national outlook must be attained by a far greater number of citizens before real national unity can result." (page 17)
(No italic in original)

Does the Commission intend this to represent its views as to the cause of Chinese civil wars? Since in no part of the Report can a more definite statement on this basic question be found, we must regard this as the final opinion of the Commission. And yet even these conclusions are to a large degree vitiated by the contradictory views presented on the very next page. I am referring to the paragraph on Nationalism which I quote in full:

"The nationalism of modern China is a normal aspect of the period of political transition through which the country is passing. National sentiments and aspirations of a similar kind would be found in any country placed in the same position. But, in addition to the natural desire to be free from any outside control in a people that has become conscious of national unity, the influence of

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the Kuomintang has introduced into the nationalism of China an additional and abnormal tinge of bitterness against all foreign influences, and has expanded its aims so as to include the liberation of all Asiatic people still subject to 'imperialistic oppression.' This is partly due to the slogans of its early communistic connection. Chinese nationalism today is also permeated by memories of former greatness, which it desires to revive. It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other not purely commercial rights exercised by a foreign agency in railway areas, of administrative rights in concessions and settlements, and of extra-territorial rights which imply that foreigners are not amenable to Chinese laws, law courts and taxation. Public opinion is strongly opposed to the continuance of these rights, which are regarded as national humiliation." (page 18)

Here we see that the Commission's conclusion on the cause of civil wars (on page 17) is this: "It appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful. The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers." But on page 18 this conclusion is discarded in the discussion of Nationalism, where we read: "The nationalism of modern China is a normal aspect of the period of political transition.....a people that has become conscious of national unity..... Chinese nationalism today is also permeated by memories of former greatness which it desires to revive....."

These obvious contradictions seem to bring out the discouraging fact that the Commission's search for the cause of Chinese civil wars has not brought forth the desired results.

The Commission's confusion and inability to comprehend and explain the recurrent conflicts in modern China is fur-

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ther proof that it has failed to grasp their underlying cause. Let us note some of the observations in the Report and see how much we are told as to their cause.

'.....the Kuomintang Army.....by the end of 1928, succeeded in producing a nominal unity for the first time in many years and a measure of actual unity which lasted for a time.....In 1927 a Central Government was established in Nanking. It was controlled by the party.....The party was now ready to put into operation its schemes of political and economic reconstruction but was prevented from doing so by internal dissensions, the periodical revolt of various Generals with personal armies and the menace of Communism. In fact the Central Government had repeatedly to fight for its existence. For a time unity was maintained on the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved when powerful war lords concluded alliances amongst themselves and marched their armies against Nanking. Though they never succeeded in their object, they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that war against the Central Government was an act of rebellion. It was in their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and another one which happened to reside in the national capital and to be recognized as the Central Government by foreign Powers. This lack of hierarchical relations is all the more dangerous because serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun. The new schism has

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led to the estrangement of influential Southern leaders, who retired to Canton, where the local authorities and the local branch of the Kuomintang frequently act independently of the Central Government." (pp. 16-17)

The motive of the powerful war lords is implied but where is the explanation for the "serious dissensions in the Party itself which has weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun"? Where, too, is the explanation for "The new schism has led to the estrangement of influential Southern leaders, who retired to Canton, where the local authorities and the local branch of the Kuomintang frequently act independently of the Central Government"? It would seem that the one blanket explanation offered by the Commission for all recent activities in modern China is the one already noted: "The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their own country and foreign Powers."

Now turn to the solution recommended by the Lytton Commission. Item 10 of "the general principles to which any satisfactory solution should conform" reads as follows:

"International Cooperation in Chinese Reconstruction:
 Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government

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in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen." (pp. 131)

It is most unfortunate that after nine months intensive study of a grave international problem the solution proposed by the Commission should be couched in terms so vague as to make it difficult to sense its meaning and practical application. The Commission's solution calls for serious consideration. We are told that "the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world" and that "the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China" therefore, "the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen", but we are not told what form "temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China" must take in order to give China "a strong Central Government" so that it may effectively deal with "the present political instability in China". Does this mean an international military force placed at the service of the Central Government to be used against its opponents? If so, what would be the consequences? Would not the present divided opposition unite against the Central Government for betraying China into the hands of the "imperialists?" How long could a "strong Central Government" last under the fury of a united opposition? The Commission

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should be mindful of its own admonition to Japan regarding the stabilization of Manchuria! "Nor do we consider unreasonable her demand for the establishment of a stable Government which would be capable of maintaining the order necessary for the economic development of the country. But such conditions can only be securely and effectively guaranteed by an administration which is in conformity with the wishes of the population and which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally is it only in an atmosphere of external confidence and internal peace, very different from that now existing in the Far East, that the capital which is necessary for the rapid economic development of Manchuria will be forthcoming." (pp. 128) (No italic in original). Do not these sound convictions apply with equal force to China proper?

As to the suggestions of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen; what were those suggestions? In the introduction to his "The International Development of China" Dr. Sun says: "The confidence of the Chinese people must be secured in order to gain their cooperation and enthusiastic support.... foreign bankers entirely disregarded the will of the Chinese people and thought they could do everything with the Chinese Government alone... Had the foreign bankers gone in the right way of first securing the confidence of the Chinese people and then approaching the Government for a contract, many things might have been accomplished without a hitch! Therefore in this International Project we must pay more attention to the people's will than ever before."

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But if the Commission is thinking of economic and not military aid when it suggests "temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China" as "the final requisite for a satisfactory solution," what is to be understood by the term "temporary"? Does it imply five, twenty five or fifty years? Dr. Sun, upon whose suggestion the recommendation of the Commission is based had this to say: "The world has been greatly benefited by the development of America as an industrial and commercial nation, so a developed China with her four hundred millions of population will be another new world, in the economic sense. The nations which will take part in this development will reap immense advantages." (Introduction, "International Development of China", by Sun Yat-sen.)

We note that there was nothing "temporary" in Dr. Sun's suggestion. He was aware that American economic development from which the world greatly benefited was the result not of "temporary" but of prolonged international cooperation. Foreign capital investments in America were repaid only since the World War. China's greatest need is capital investments and this obviously cannot be of a "temporary" nature.

The Commission tells the League very frankly "Our work is finished" and yet Japan's sole justification for waging a "war in disguise" against China remains unchallenged. Japan claims all her disputes with China are due to civil wars and we have noted that the Lytton Report supports this claim. This is a distinct victory for Japan. World opinion which has been skeptical of Japan's excuses can no longer question them. Japan's position

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is thus made and must remain impregnable so long as her method of dealing with China's civil wars remain unchallenged. Here is where the Commission missed its supreme opportunity. Japan should have been challenged to justify her military methods by providing the evidence that she had made a sincere effort to study the cause of Chinese civil wars and that her rejection of a peaceful solution was the result of this study.

My investigations of the cause of recent Chinese civil wars suggest that Japan could not meet such a challenge. Should this prove true, how would it affect Japan's case before the League? If a study of the cause of civil wars in China should bring to light a peaceful remedy as the only practical and permanent means of unifying China, Japan's case would collapse. Manchukuo as an "independent" State would collapse. All of Japan's well-laid plans affecting China would collapse. The prestige of the League of Nations would be greatly enhanced, and the cause of international peace immeasurably advanced.

It would seem that with so much at stake we should be justified in undertaking an independent investigation of Japan's claim that China's civil wars cannot be solved by peaceful measures. Without a thorough investigation of their cause it would obviously be impossible to determine whether civil wars in China might yield to peaceful measures or whether Japan's method of the sword is the only solution.

The Lytton Commission's contribution to this vital question has already been noted and found inconclusive. Let us recall the Commission's own words: "The cause of this lack of cohesion is the

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Considerable light is thrown on these questions by another paragraph in the Report: "It is provided in the Provisional Constitution of China, promulgated on June 1st, 1931, that 'the Three Principles of the People (by Dr. Sun Yat-sen) shall be the basic principles of education in the Republic of China.' The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution." (page 19)

This explanation helps to clarify the points raised by the former paragraph. Why the opposing factions should seek to inherit the cloak of Dr. Sun Yat-sen is becoming increasingly clear. Dr. Sun is the revered national leader. His ideas are taught in the schools and dominate the thought of the nation. In seeking popular support each faction aims to capitalize Dr. Sun's hold upon the people by claiming that it is the only true interpreter of Dr. Sun's ideas. Thus we see that the real leaders of present-day China are not those in control of the Central Government at Nanking, nor of the opposing faction at Canton, nor Madam Sun Yat-sen or Eugene Chen at Shanghai - the real leaders are the ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Were Dr. Sun alive we should, in view of these facts, turn to him as the one person best qualified to interpret his own ideas. Since Dr. Sun is no longer here, we are compelled to resort to the one alternative of studying the interpretations of his successors, as well as of those who question the Central Government's title to be the successors of Dr. Sun, in the hope that such a study will

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This will take a few days when I shall send you a second statement, in continuation of this one.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Maurice William

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200 West 57th Street,
New York, N. Y.

December 5, 1932.

Professor William J. Gies,
Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Professor Gies:

The supplementary statement mentioned in my letter of the 19th of November is presented below. Use it as you may wish for the promotion of peace and good will.

The Lytton Commission's study of China's internal problems disclosed the fact that "the (Nanking) Government has....been forced by recurrent civil wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by about a billion dollars (silver) since 1927." (page 18)

Dr. Sun died on March 12, 1925. Two years later saw the beginning of the "recurrent civil wars", which by 1932 cost the Nanking Government alone a billion dollars (silver). What these conflicts cost the opposing factions will perhaps never be known, but it is safe to assume that it was a very large sum. This financial waste, great as it is, by no means tells the whole, or even the worst part of the story of modern China. Who, for example, would undertake to say what the internecine wars of the past five years have cost in terms of human life? And yet herein lies the real tragedy of China's recent history.

Is it conceivable that a national conflict upon a major scale, which has persisted for more than five years and which exacted such a heavy toll in blood and treasure, can be entirely devoid of a discernible cause? Has the opposition to the Central

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Government developed without specifying any reasons for its opposition? Japan would have the world believe that conflicting interests of selfish war-lords is the sole explanation for Chinese civil wars. No evidence is provided in support of this sweeping accusation. The Lytton Commission, on the other hand, suggests that the conflict is due to traditional ties of family and of locality. Now let us see what we can learn from the Chinese themselves as to the underlying cause of the conflict.

We have been informed that China's Provisional Constitution requires that Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People" shall be "the basic principles of education in the Republic of China." Does not this extraordinary provision seem to suggest that the interpretations of the ideas presented by Dr. Sun in his "Three Principles of the People" may have furnished the basis for the conflict between the Central Government and those who question its title to be the successor of Dr. Sun?

Western students may disagree in their interpretations of Modern China; but when it comes to the question of the hold Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People" have upon the hearts and minds of modern China, there is little difference of opinion among them. The following quotation gives some idea of the part the "Three Principles" play in the life of modern China.

"Since the Nationalists are in power, scarcely a day passes by without an official edict of the Government adding its stone to the grand edifice of the future nation, a nation to be built anew entirely upon the rock foundation of the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). If China 'awakens' -- so speak the Chinese themselves -- if she is convinced that she must

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develop her industries, her education, her administration, her Government -- in a word, everything -- she believes that all this is impossible unless it is based on the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). The password, the touchstone of everybody and of everything is in this 'ism', and this 'ism' alone. When there is question of incorporating into the Party those who yesterday were enemies or of planning reforms and mapping out the future, hardly any other question is asked but: "Are you in favor of or opposed to the Triple Demism?" (Three Principles of the People); Does that law, that plan conform to the Triple Demism?" (Three Principles of the People) Things have gone so far that sentences of death or of life imprisonment have been contemplated against all anti-revolutionists, meaning thereby all those who would be bold enough to hold a doctrine opposed to the Triple Demism (Three Principles of the People). (Pages 543-4, "The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen". An original translation of the Three Principles of the People from the Chinese into French and English by Paschal M. D'Elia, S. J.; 1931.

From the foregoing it would seem that we should focus our attention upon the interpretations of the "Three Principles of the People", if we would determine the basis for the opposition to the Central Government.

Madame Sun Yat-sen voiced the views of the opposition in the following language:

"Rest assured that no one considers the Nanking Government as representative of the Chinese people".*

"With the withdrawal of Borodin, his chief Chinese adherents withdrew from Hankow. Mme. Sun left for Shanghai and shortly for Moscow, declaring that with the stoppage of the agrarian and social revolution and the attacks being made on peasants and laborers, the revolution started by her husband had been betrayed and that there was nought but counter-revolution. In an impressive statement on the political situation issued in July (1927) she declared:

"To guide us in the Chinese revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies...twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of revolution that would change the status of

* Hallett Abend: Tortured China, Page 60.

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the Chinese peasant. Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If the leaders of the Party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers and the Party is no longer a revolutionary party.'"*

In support of the interpretations of the Central Government we have the views of Madame Sun Yat-sen's brother-in-law, General Chiang Kai-Shek: "Dr. Sun clearly explained that Chinese industry is still in its infancy and that Marxian methods of revolution cannot be applied in this country....In his lectures, Dr. Sun said that all nations differed in their conditions of economic development so that the problems concerning the people's livelihood must be solved in a different way...Such a clear statement should not be interpreted otherwise".** The conflicting interpretations of these leaders are typical of the interpretations of the opposing factions.

General Chiang Kai-Shek seemed fully aware of the hopelessness of uniting China on the basis of interpretations of Dr. Sun's ideas. In his Statement of Resignation from the Post of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army of China, General Chiang said: "The people are overwhelmed with sorrow because in territory brought under the revolutionary banner there has been dissension and because while all professed devotion to the San Min principles (The Three Principles of the People) the followers of the Great Leader appear to separate themselves into two camps."***

What is the lesson to be drawn from this discouraging picture? We cannot escape the conclusion that the interpretations

* Harley Farnsworth MacNair: China in Revolution, Page 123.

** Manifesto to the People: China Year Book, 1928; Page 1366.

*** China Year Book 1928; Page 1381.

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of his ideas as a means of promoting peace and unity among Dr. Sun's disciples have proved a hopeless failure. The seven years following Dr. Sun's death have developed two schools of opposing interpretations -- a Left and a Right school. Each seems able to support its own interpretation with copious quotations from Dr. Sun's teachings.

For the present, the proponents of Right interpretations are in control of the Nationalist Government, but so long as such influential figures as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen, and others are striving for the downfall of the Nationalist Government, civil wars will menace the peace of China. Who can say that the fortunes of war may not again bring the government under the control of the Left Wing and thus restore the Left program which dominated China between 1923 and 1927? It is plain that little is to be gained from blinking the fact that there can be no unity and peace so long as China remains half Left and half Right.

Much comfort is to be derived from the hope that both the Left and Right factions, contrary to the general belief, may be equally loyal to Dr. Sun. Such loyalty may well serve as the foundation for unity in China. For it seems safe to assume that were Dr. Sun here to clarify his position, both factions would prove their loyalty by following his instructions. It remains therefore for the living to take up the task death deprived Dr. Sun of the opportunity to complete.

It would seem that the first step in a program of constructive service for China should consist of an investigation of the claim made by the leaders of both factions that their

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Interpretation is based upon Dr. Sun's own teachings. Can it be possible that Dr. Sun's book "The Three Principles of the People" contains evidence that could justify and support both Left and Right interpretations of his theories? An examination of Dr. Sun's volume cannot fail to disclose the astounding fact that the conflicting interpretations are directly traceable to Dr. Sun's own teaching. His lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy-- the first two segments of his Three Principles of the People-- are developed from the view point of a Left, a Marxian ideology. However, in the treatment of his Third Principle -- the Principle of Livelihood -- Dr. Sun seems to have made a complete right-about and presents the views of an anti-Marxian. It thus becomes clear that it was Dr. Sun's anomalous position - his Left and Right ideology - which gave rise to his Left and Right disciples, proving beyond peradventure that both groups are essentially honest, since their conflict springs from a desire to continue their loyalty to a departed leader.

How did Dr. Sun come to hold conflicting views is the natural question to suggest itself at this point. To find the answer we shall have to give due consideration to a matter of some importance but which, strangely enough, has been completely overlooked by most commentators. I refer to the fact that Dr. Sun, after giving his series of six lectures each on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, (which he delivered at weekly intervals between January 27 and April 26, 1924) for some

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mysterious reason discontinued his lectures. He did not give a single lecture on his Three Principles during the months of May, June and July, 1924. It was not until August 3, 1924, that he delivered the first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood. There must have been some explanation for Dr. Sun's sudden and strange silence. What was the explanation? Dr. Sun said in his preface, "...it now happens that the Kuomintang is being reorganized and our comrades are beginning to engage in a determined attack upon the minds of our people. They are in great need of the profound truths of "San Min Chu I" (The Three Principles of the People)as material for propaganda. So I delivered one lecture a week". Yet, in spite of the "great need", Dr. Sun discontinued his lectures and waited more than three months before delivering the first of the series on the Principle of Livelihood. Why? What was absorbing Dr. Sun's attention during those three months? The stated views of eminent scholars may help to shed light upon this question.

The following is quoted from "China in Revolution" by Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago:

"Two facts related to the "San Min Chu I" have not received the attention they deserve; first, that a period of more than three months elapsed between the presentation of the two series of six lectures each on the Principle of the People's Nationalism and the Principle of the People's Sovereignty and the last four lectures on the Principle of the People's Livelihood; and second, that during this period a book entitled "The Social Interpretation of History" by an American scholar, Dr. Maurice William of New York City, fell into Dr. Sun's hand which profoundly affected his philosophy of history and revolution as presented in the analysis of the third principle." (Page 88)

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Dr. James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University; Director of Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, and member of the Research Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, writes as follows:

"The reading of 'The Social Interpretation of History' by Dr. Sun Yat-sen may yet turn out to have been one of the most important single incidents in the history of modern Asia, for the consequences were immediate and far-reaching and have only just begun to show their full extent in the orientation of China. This may seem like an extravagant statement and yet it seems amply justified by a study of the facts in the case....In August, 1924, Dr. Sun gave the third of his Three Principles, that which deals with social reform, in the terms set forth by Dr. William." From an article entitled "Sun Yat-sen and Maurice William", Political Science Quarterly, March, 1932.

Dr. Jeremiah W. Jenks, Research Professor of Government, New York University; Honorary Economic Advisor, Nationalist Government of China, in a lecture on "Why China Repudiated Bolshevism", delivered at New York University on February 6, 1929, spoke in part as follows:

"In the latter part of his book (The San Min Chu I), he (Sun) changed his views quite decidedly and that change was apparently brought about by there falling into his hands in some way (we do not know how) an American book written by Dr. Maurice William of New York City. It is entitled 'The Social Interpretation of History'. Dr. Sun read this book with a great deal of care and in the latter part of his own book he adopted Dr. William's principles. In many cases, he adopted them so completely that Dr. Sun's book is almost a transcript of William's."

Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior; Past Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations, said:

"The interaction of mind upon mind shown by the effect of Mr. William's 'The Social Interpretation of History' upon Dr. Sun is dramatic if not epochal....The points in Mr. William's book found hospitable lodgment in his (Sun's) mind and, interpreted by him, they have become of great significance in the unfolding of the new China." From Foreword to "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" by Maurice William.

In a personal letter dated April 10, 1928, Dr. John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, wrote me as follows:

"At a memorial meeting to him (Sun Yat-sen) last winter a year ago, where I spoke, I called attention to his use of your book....I congratulate you upon the growing public recognition of the book. I am always glad to bear witness to its value."

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Mr. L. T. Chen, Editor of the Frank W. Price English translation of the "San Min Chu I", wrote to Miss Mary van Kleeck of the Russell Sage Foundation, as follows:

"I learned from a personal friend of Dr. Sun that the 'Social Interpretation of History' was a constant companion to him" (in the last months of Dr. Sun's life).

The facts presented by these scholars bring to mind two very interesting questions:

1. Is there any relation between Dr. Sun's study of the "Social Interpretation of History" and his conflicting views?
2. Is there any relation between Dr. Sun's study of "The Social Interpretation of History" and the conflict between his disciples?

We must go back to January, 1924, if we would trace the answers to these questions.

It should be recalled that Dr. Sun delivered his first lecture on the Principle of Nationalism on January 27, 1924. By April 26, he had completed the twelve lectures, six on the Principle of Nationalism and six on the Principle of Democracy. We have already noted that Dr. Sun did not lecture on his Three Principles during May, June and July. The delivery of his first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood was delayed until August 3, 1924. We have also noted that during those three months, Dr. Sun had evidently made an intensive study of "The Social Interpretation of History". But it cannot be claimed that Dr. Sun's study of "The Social Interpretation of History" was responsible for his conflicting views unless we can prove four major points:

1. There is no conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples regarding the correct interpretation of the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy because
2. There is no conflict between Dr. Sun's lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and the Principle of Democracy and the views he held on these subjects during the preceding twenty years. These lectures were delivered before he studied the "Social Interpretation of History".
3. That the conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples centers exclusively around the correct interpretation of the lectures on the Principle of Livelihood because
4. Dr. Sun's lectures on the Principle of Livelihood do conflict with the views he held on this subject during the preceding twenty years. These lectures were delivered after Dr. Sun had made a study of "The Social Interpretation of History".

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How can we prove these four points? The only proof worthy of consideration is the testimony of leaders of both factions of Dr. Sun's followers. The first is that of Mme. Sun Yat-sen. She says:

"It is the third principle, that of the Livelihood of the People, that is at stake at this time." (China in Revolution, by Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Page 123)

"It is with regard to the third principle, the Principle of Livelihood, that the greatest trouble has arisen." (From the "Inner History of the Chinese Revolution", by T'and Leang-Li).

"It is particularly on the third of Dr. Sun's Three Principles, namely, The Principle of Livelihood of the People that the cleavage between the two wings of the Kuomintang is most clearly brought out." (T.C.Woo, in "The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution").

"Some say the Min-Sheng principle (Principle of Livelihood) which is that of socialization of social and economic organizations has the same theoretical basis as communism." (General Chiang Kai-Shek.)

These citations could easily be multiplied, but this is obviously not the place for an all inclusive statement. Enough has been quoted to establish through authoritative sources that the conflict between the opposing groups centers about the Principle of Livelihood. On the other hand, the literature of the conflicting groups fails to disclose any evidence of a conflict over the correct interpretation of the Principle of Nationalism or the Principle of Democracy.

Since the evidence seems to establish that the conflict between Dr. Sun's disciples centers exclusively around the Principle of Livelihood, an effort should be made to determine the nature of that conflict. What is the basis for the strife between Dr. Sun's followers and upon what grounds does each side justify its opposition to the other - an opposition which takes the form of civil war? Let us again turn to the testimony of those best qualified to throw light on these questions. Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago, in his "China in Revolution", presents Mme. Sun's position as follows:

"With the withdrawal of Borodin, his chief Chinese adherents withdrew from Hankow. Mme. Sun left for Shanghai and shortly for Moscow, declaring that with the stoppage of the agrarian and social revolution and the attacks being made on peasants and laborers, the revolution started by her

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husband had been betrayed and that there was nought but counter-revolution. In an impressive statement on the political situation issued in July (1927), she declared:

'To guide us in the Chinese revolution, Dr. Sun has given us his Three Principles and his three policies... twenty, thirty years ago Dr. Sun was thinking and speaking in terms of revolution that would change the status of the Chinese peasant. Dr. Sun's policies are clear. If the leaders of the Party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no longer Dr. Sun's true followers and the Party is no longer a revolutionary party.' " (Page 123)

Professor Arthur N. Holcombe in his "Chinese Revolution" states:

"The leaders of the Left Wing contended that the success of the Northern Punitive Expedition made it possible to resume the original revolutionary program. No longer, they argued, should the needs of the workers and peasants be neglected upon the plea of military necessity. They demanded that the workers' and peasants' unions be revived and that the social revolution proceed along with the political."

The Foreign Policy Association reports as follows:

"The Reorganizationists comprise the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. They claim that Nanking has not sufficiently stressed Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle, that of the People's Livelihood, and therefore has neglected the interest of the workers and peasants. This charge is upheld by Mme. Sun Yat-sen....if the Left wing leaders are able to carve out a sphere of influence in south China, however, they will have the chance to put their interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's principles to the test of practice." (From News Bulletin, May 8, 1931)

The above states the position of Dr. Sun's Left disciples. What is the position of the Right Wing?

"Nanking declares itself to be the only real exponent of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party principles. It denounces one faction of its opponents as 'old style feudalists'; another clique it denounces as 'semi-communist', and still another is labelled 'reactionary'. It is noteworthy, however, that the opposing factions being called these hard names by Nanking have not changed their principles." (From "Tortured China" by Hallett Abend, Page 48.)

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General Chiang Kai-shek says:

"Some say that the Min-sheng Principle (Principle of Livelihood), which is that of socialization of social and economic organizations has the same theoretical basis as Communism....The Principle of Min-sheng does not come from materialism. Dr. Sun clearly explained that Chinese history is still in its infancy and the Marxian methods of revolution cannot be applied in this country....(Manifesto to the People, April, 1927.)

C. C. Wu says:

"We come now to the Third Principle, namely, Livelihood. As Dr. Sun has said, Livelihood is the centre of government, of economics and of all historical movements....A misconception which gained considerable currency at one time was that the economic principles of the Kuomintang were Communistic...." (The Nationalist Program for China.)

These conflicting interpretations of Dr. Sun's Principle of Livelihood are directly responsible for a state of confusion in which "every faction of the opposition declares its loyalty to the principles of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party; everyone of the armies fighting against Nanking is flying the Kuomintang Party flag and also the flag of the Nanking Government-the flag of China. The Party is hopelessly disrupted." (Hallett Abend, "Tortured China", Page 47), and this report is supported by Chiang Kai-shek who says:

"The people are overwhelmed with sorrow because in territory brought under the revolutionary banner there has been dissension and because while all professed devotion to the San Min principles, the followers of the Great Leader appear to separate themselves into two camps." (Statement of Resignation from Post of Commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army of China, August 12, 1927.)

What is behind this tragic situation? Can it be possible that neither Mme. Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek has misrepresented Dr. Sun? Are their conflicting interpretations merely a reflection of Dr. Sun's own conflicting interpretations of his Principle of Livelihood? These questions can be answered only through an examination of some of Dr. Sun's own definitions of his Principle of Livelihood.

In his lecture delivered on April 13, 1924, Dr. Sun said:

"After the Franco-German War, there were in the world not merely democratic but economic struggles. What was the outcome of the gradually receding democratic fever? Socialism. That 'ism' is what I advocate under the name of Principle of Livelihood."

And in an address delivered in June, 1921, Dr. Sun said:

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"The Principle of Livelihood is the socialism of the present day." (No italic in original)

These definitions support Mme. Sun's interpretation of the Principle of Livelihood, but refute Chiang Kai-shek's.

But on August 3, 1924, in his lecture on the Principle of Livelihood, Dr. Sun said:

"Our Kuomintang has been advocating the Principle of Livelihood for over twenty years; we have not championed socialism but the Min-sheng principle." (page 382)

Plainly this refutes Sun's earlier definition (which, however, is still upheld by Mme. Sun) and gives full support to Chiang Kai-shek's interpretation.

How did Dr. Sun happen to hold conflicting definitions of his Principle of Livelihood is the next question that must be determined. We have just seen that in August, 1924, he said:

"Our Kuomintang has been advocating the Principle of Livelihood for over twenty years."

Let us see if we can trace the origin of and the definition he gave to this principle during all those years. In "The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution", by T'ang Leang-Li, we find the following explanation of the origin of the Principle of Livelihood:

"From London he (Sun) went to the Continent to get into touch with the leaders of the Opposition Parties, notably with the Labour and Socialist Parties, which were becoming a factor of some importance in the national politics of the different European states. The First International was dead, but a new Socialist International came into existence in 1889, and Sun came into contact with their leading members such as Longuet and Lafargue, who also introduced him to the study of Marxism. (No italic in original)

"During his sojourn in America and Europe, Sun came into contact with social contrasts and inequalities which made a deep impression upon him. In Europe especially Sun noticed the active struggle of the working classes to improve the conditions of their existence, and to bring the capitalistic order of society ultimately to an end. It became clear to him that, although the advanced Western countries were politically powerful and the people were nominally sovereign, the broad masses were far from happy. The problem of the liberation of the Chinese people, Sun realized, would be a more complicated question than the mere overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic. The political situation

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was not enough; it was only the first step towards the social and economic solution. The French Revolution of 1789 against monarchical authority ignored the problem of the distribution of wealth, and as a consequence, the establishment of a capitalist and plutocratic system of society was made possible. On the other extreme, Marxism gave an economic solution to the problem of capitalist exploitation, but ignored the vital principle of nationality. Finding either solution by itself unsatisfactory, Sun thus conceived the idea of the simultaneous settlement, by means of the revolution, of the questions of national independence, popular freedom and of the people's livelihood. To the lineal descendant of the T'ai-P'ing and the inheritor of the traditions of the secret societies the idea of a social revolution and of Socialism was nothing novel, far less something dreadful....In explaining the Third Principle, that of Livelihood, Sun Yat-sen adopts a frankly socialistic attitude.... "We want the social revolution because we don't want a handful of rich people to monopolize the whole wealth of the country."* (No italic in original)

In a speech published in his "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionist", Dr. Sun confirms this pro-Marxian version of his Principle of Livelihood as follows:

"Our Party is revolutionary....When in the last years of the Tsing Dynasty, we were forced to establish ourselves in Tokyo, we determined the following as the fundamental principles of our party; Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism...." (No italic in original)

"We must firmly know and remember that so long as all three principles have not been carried into real life (even if one of them had been completely realized), there can be no stable conditions of existence." (No italic in original)

"The theory of socialism has become known in China comparatively recently. Its chief advocates usually limit their knowledge of this tendency to a few empty words without having any definite program. By long study, I have formed a concrete view of this question. The essence of socialism amounts to solving the problem of land and capital. Those who discuss the question of the brotherhood of peoples in America and Europe have in view only two problems-labor and capital; but European conditions are very different from our own. The thing is that in Europe and America all their misfortunes arise from an extremely unfair distribution of products, whereas in China there is general poverty, since there are no

* See "Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionist", by Sun Yat-sen for a fuller presentation of Sun's pro-Marxian definition of the Principles of Livelihood.

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large capitalists. But this, of course, should not serve as the reason for not advocating socialism; this would be a great mistake. If we see mistakes in Europe and America, we are bound to correct them; disproportion in the distribution of products; both in America and Europe, are a bad example for us. Therefore, I agitate for socialism, the socialization of land and capital.... We must admit that the degree of sacrifice required for the social revolution will be higher than the political.... Now, the time is approaching to carry into effect our great Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism. Only by the transformation of all three principles into reality can our people live and develop freely." (No italic in original)

Not only are the preceding quotations fair examples of Dr. Sun's original pro-Marxian version of the Principle of Livelihood, but they are typical of the version which he had consistently taught his followers from 1907 to April, 1924, at which time he reaffirmed his faith in his original version in the following clear statement:

"Socialism is similar to the Principles of the People's Livelihood which I have been advocating. When the people got hold of the theory of socialism they began to give up their eager fight for democratic rights and to struggle instead for economic rights. This war was a class struggle between the workers and the wealthy class. You all know of the great socialist Marx...." (Principle of Democracy, Lecture IV, (No italic in original))

It should be recalled that Dr. Sun did not lecture on his Three Principles during May, June and July. It has already been suggested that he made a close study of "The Social Interpretation of History" during those three months. His first lecture on the Principle of Livelihood was delivered on August 3, 1924. Does Dr. Sun in this lecture reaffirm his pro-Marxian definition of the Principle of Livelihood? After so thorough a drilling, covering nearly a score of years during which his disciples had the benefit of being trained by their master himself in every shade of its meaning, Dr. Sun's opening words introducing his lecture on the Principle of Livelihood were not what might have been expected. His audience must have been amazed to hear Dr. Sun say:

"The subject of my lecture today is Min-sheng Chu I, the Principle of the People's Livelihood. Min-sheng is a worn phrase in China. We talk about Kou-shin min sheng, national welfare and the People's Livelihood, but I fear that we pay only lip service to these words and have not really sought to understand them. I cannot see that they have held much meaning for us. But if in this day of scientific knowledge we will bring the phrase into the

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realm of scientific discussion and study its social and economic implications, we shall find that it takes on an immeasurable significance. I propose today a definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood." (No italic in original)

Now, since Min-sheng "is a worn phrase in China", --worn because Dr. Sun had been explaining and defining its meaning for almost twenty years-- why did he find it necessary to tell his disciples "I propose today a definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood"? Does it not seem clear from Dr. Sun's own language that what he proposed to give "today" was in fact a new definition for Min-sheng, the People's Livelihood? He had evidently arrived at the conclusion that his old definition, which had satisfied him for twenty years, was unscientific and therefore should be discarded. So he proposes "in this day of scientific knowledge, we will bring the phrase (The Principle of Livelihood) into the realm of scientific discussion."

What could have caused Dr. Sun to discard his old definition as unscientific and to have proposed "Today" a new definition? Was the new definition based upon the old Marxian ideology or did it constitute a repudiation of the old ideology? Is there any relation between Dr. Sun's new definition of the Principle of Livelihood and the conflict between his Left and Right disciples? Many scholars have made a study of these questions and the following is quoted from their conclusions:

Dr. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, University of Chicago, in his work on "China in Revolution" says:

"The lectures on the first and the second principles were delivered between January 27 and April 26, 1924; those on the third principle were given between August 3 and August 24. In the first two series the ideology, as well as the criticism of the great powers, presents the viewpoint of a follower of Marx; in the third series, however, a definite change of view is indicated. In point after point he cites Marx only to criticize the latter's arguments and conclusions, and to advocate in their stead the theories which he had somewhat gropingly been developing for several years and which he found carefully and precisely formulated by the American thinker in the volume mentioned. In paragraph after paragraph Dr. Sun either quoted, almost word for word, or paraphrased, the arguments which he had found in "The Social Interpretation of History". He now repudiated in reality several of his own earlier theories, without, however, directly calling attention to the fact, and rejected Marx's materialistic conception of history, the necessity for the class struggle, and the theory of surplus values, substituting therefore the system of thought which he had recently discovered in Dr. William's work....The conflict of theory to be traced between parts of

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the earlier and the later writings of Dr. Sun accounts in part for the split between his adherents which followed his death....From the viewpoint of the Russians and the significance of the spread of their Communistic doctrines in China, the Kuomintang leader died not a moment too soon; it would have been better had he passed from the scene at the end of April, 1924. There would have been fewer grounds for controversy among his followers." - Pages 88-89 (No italic in original)

Dr. James T. Shotwell, Professor of History, Columbia University; Director of Division of Economics and History, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in his article "Sun Yat-sen and Maurice Williams", published in the March, 1932 issue of Political Science Quarterly, says:

"Although in his earlier writings there were passages which might be interpreted as socialist in the orthodox sense, and at the moment he sorely needed the practical help which the Soviets were offering, yet questions of expediency were boldly set aside in the framing of his gospel of social reform. The American critic of Karl Marx and not Marx himself furnished the text in which he shaped his own individual thinking and so set the course of the new China definitely away from Communism....Some of the early associates of Sun Yat-sen do not accept any such interpretation of his thinking. To some of them at least the protest against exploitation by capitalism, both foreign and native, means that class warfare must still be made on Marxian terms. The division therefore between the Left wing of the republican movement in the Kuomintang and the middle class leadership of the government in Nanking finds its doctrinal center in the interpretation of those pages of Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle which were based upon or quoted from Dr. Williams's book. The important question for both present-day China and for future history is the interpretation of these passages. What effect did Dr. Williams's book have upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mind and how much is the Chinese Republic to base its social philosophy upon these passages alone?....There are few problems in the political thinking of today more important or more compelling than this one....It would be a mistake to conceive of it merely in terms of personalities. Behind both Dr. Sun and Dr. Williams lay two conditioning forces, China and America; as the England of the Industrial Revolution lay behind the philosophy of Marx. Viewed from this angle, the acceptance of Williams's text in the "San Min Chu I" is itself a justification of his theory of the social interpretation of history. That theory discovers the clue to the movements of politics, not in a class warfare of producers against

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exploiters, but in the dominant need of the whole social body, that is to say, of the mass of the consumers.... In his denial that the proletariat must emancipate itself by overturning the capitalistic state, Dr. William was giving expression to the experience of America where the emancipation is taking place within the State itself. This was also the process which Dr. Sun envisaged for China, and so the principle of "Livelihood" was definitely substituted for that of socialism or communism, which had been loosely used by Dr. Sun as synonyms for his Third Principle before he had read Dr. William's book. Viewed in this light we have not merely the meeting of two minds but of two civilizations; the American and the Chinese.... It would seem that the time has come to recognize the mediating work of Dr. William which Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself recognized in the "San Min Chu I". How great the service he rendered, only history will show." (No italic in original)

Fr. Jeremiah W. Jenks, Research Professor of Government, New York University; Honorary Economic Adviser, Nationalist Government of China, in a lecture on "Why China Repudiated Bolshevism", delivered at New York University on February 6, 1929, says:

"In the latter (Principle of Livelihood) part of his book, Sun seems no longer to believe in the class-struggle.... If the country had gone Communist, it could not have counted on any foreign help beside that of Russia.... There was a long struggle between these forces, but apparently the anti-Communists have triumphed, due practically entirely to the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been intellectually convinced by Dr. William's book." (No italic in original)

Dr. Arthur W. Hummel, Chief, Division of Chinese Literature, Library of Congress, writes:

"It is astonishing to see how a book like your "Social Interpretation of History" could so radically alter the views of a powerful leader on another continent. This needs to be recorded in detail for historical if no other reasons."

Dr. J. J. L. Dyvendak, Professor of Chinese, Leyden University, Holland in a personal letter to me, said:

"It is certainly necessary to make more widely known how much of his ideas on the Third Principle Dr. Sun derived from your book, which is decidedly anti-Marxian. That in spite of the constructive element in the doctrine of the Three Principles, the general impression, as left by the first two parts, is that they are chiefly destructive and that in the propaganda this feature has certainly been much emphasized. Dr. Sun left these two

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sides of his teaching unreconciled, thereby laying the
germ for conflict within his own party. Seeing how great
 the hold is, which his name and his doctrine have on the
 Chinese people, it is the more desirable to bring out and
 emphasize the constructive element in his teaching, which
 may counteract some of the harm done by the other."
 (No italic in original)

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, President, Yenching University, Peiping,
 writes:

"It is certainly curious that an American should have
 turned the whole current of political thought for the man
 whose writings at present are the bible of the dominant poli-
 tical party of this country....This volume, Sun Yat-sen vs.
 Communism, ought to have wide circulation in China and I
 trust will lead to a Chinese translation....I should like
 to add my own admiration of the interpretation you have
 given in refutation of that of Karl Marx and my delight
 that this should have come to the notice of a man whose
 writings are virtually molding the political thought of
 this country at so critical a time....You are unquestionably
 rendering a timely service in carrying the original
 influence upon Dr. Sun to this extension of the inquiry
 into his change of attitude. You are also quite right
 in attributing the division among his followers, in large
 measure at least, to misunderstanding of what it was he
 stood for in relation to communism, and some alternative
 to the philosophy of economic determinism. I have no
 special suggestions to make regarding the manuscript.
 Your work has been so thorough, and your appreciation of
 the issue so remarkably sensitive for one living at such
 a distance from this country, that there is very little
 to add.

Mr. Grover Clark, Consultant on Far Eastern Affairs, writes:

"I have just finished going over rather carefully
 your "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" and find it of very
 extraordinary significance. The earlier suggestions as
 to the part which your "Social Interpretation of History"
 played in changing Sun's thinking--which I had from the
 material which you were good enough to show me last
 winter--are very much more than confirmed and you give
 the only really convincing explanation of the contradiction
 in the "San Min Chu I" which I have seen. My thought
 of the turn against Communism has been that it was in
 large part due to objection to the methods and attitude
 of the Russians in China at the time."

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"These I still think had a very great deal to do with the final break in 1927-but there seems to be no doubt that the change which your book brought in Sun's ideas paved the way for that break and very definitely gave the anti-Communists the possibility of justifying the break out of the mouth of the founder of the Kuomintang. That was a contribution which you, through your "Social Interpretation of History", made to the development of China - a contribution of far-reaching importance."

"Sun took the Marxian slant in his earlier Three Principles' lectures and yours in the later ones. It would be interesting to know how far back into his thinking the Marxian point of view had its roots. In any case, your "Social Interpretation of History" had and is having a great deal of influence." (No italic in original)

To Summarize: Interpretations of Dr. Sun's social philosophy have not proved helpful in promoting peace and unity in China. Left interpretations are acclaimed by Dr. Sun's Left disciples, but only embitter the Right. Right interpretations are acclaimed by Dr. Sun's Right disciples but only embitter the Left. These conflicting interpretations are directly responsible for recent civil wars.

Instead of concentrating upon interpretations, something constructive might possibly be achieved from an effort to determine the underlying causes for Left and Right interpretations of Dr. Sun's teaching. Such an investigation, I believe, would establish that for nearly twenty years Dr. Sun had consistently taught a Left, revolutionary version of his Principle of Livelihood. His earlier disciples were given ample opportunity throughout all those years to become thoroughly saturated with Dr. Sun's original version. But in the last months of his life Dr. Sun repudiated this version (August, 1924) and in its stead accepted the one presented in the "Social Interpretation of History" and which is based upon diametrically opposite principles- evolution through harmony of interests between capital and labor as against revolution through

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conflict of interests. The name, Principle of Livelihood, was all that Dr. Sun salvaged from the original version which he now discarded. Naturally, this made for confusion. The Left wing can justify a Left version since this was the version Dr. Sun had consistently taught for twenty years. The Right wing can justify its Right version on the ground that this was Dr. Sun's final mandate to his disciples. The publication of his conflicting versions in the same volume, the "San Min Chu I", made for more confusion. Although Dr. Sun's lectures were not published in book form until after his death, his opposing views, which he had no opportunity to reconcile, laid him open to the unjust charge of mental instability.

Had Dr. Sun died after completing his lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and before he had made a study of "The Social Interpretation of History," there would have been no basis for the present conflict over the correct interpretation of the Principle of Livelihood. His original Left interpretation which had served him for nearly twenty years would have remained unchanged. Thus there would have been no confusion leading to civil war between Left and Right disciples. We would have seen a united China, united on the basis of Dr. Sun's unrepudiated Left version of his Principle of Livelihood. A united Left China would have meant a sovietized China, perhaps united with Russia against the democratic nations and for the World Revolution.

On the other hand, if Dr. Sun had lived long enough to revise his Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and his earlier Left version of his Principle of Livelihood, to conform with

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his final views, this reconciliation in Sun's ideas could not have failed to bring about the reconciliation of his Left and Right disciples who aim to apply Sun's ideas. Such revision would have paved the way for a united, peaceful, China dedicated to evolutionary progress through the methods of democracy.

But Dr. Sun is dead. His principles remained unreconciled. Dozens of volumes have been written in an effort to interpret Sun's views. They have failed of their purpose. They failed because they did not present a complete and therefore a true picture of Sun Yat-sen. Some presented his Left and some presented his Right side. These volumes are just propaganda. They take sides. No statement giving only one side of Sun's opposing views can hope to reconcile the opposing groups. The tragic proof of the hopeless failure of such attempts lies in the fact that both sides prefer to fall back upon the method which, to them, seems far more convincing, the method of the bullet.

What does this situation teach? It indicates that nothing is to be gained by disregarding facts. Sun's writings are a public record. We should state all the facts and seek to reconcile the opposing views in Sun's writings. Only by this means can we hope to reconcile the differences between the Left and Right wings and bring peace to distracted China. Dr. Sun's prestige could not suffer through a presentation of the unvarnished truth. On the contrary, a close study of his writings would enhance his prestige as an open-minded student, ready at all times to change his views as new facts indicated the need for revision. This rare trait in Dr. Sun is fully recognized and evaluated in Part I of "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism".

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It is the existing confusion regarding his thinking which has caused some writers to ridicule Dr. Sun as a thinker and has led one writer to disparage his "San Min Chu I" as "social and political chop suey". Such unkind thrusts are not without their influence, world opinion of Dr. Sun and of those who follow Dr. Sun is largely shaped by these superficial writings. But when the truth becomes more generally known, it will not redound to the credit of these writers. The public will learn that Dr. Sun's pro-Marxian views as presented in his lectures on the Principle of Nationalism and Principle of Democracy, and his anti-Marxian views as presented three months later in his lectures on the Principle of Livelihood, were assembled and published in the same volume only after his death. It is plain that the appearance of his conflicting views in the same volume is a matter over which Sun had no control and should not therefore be held against him. To cite the conflicting views in the "San Min Chu I" in justification of the charge that Dr. Sun was "mentally unstable" and inclined to "leap from philosophy to philosophy", is to betray an easy readiness to defame the character of a man who is no longer here to face his detractors.

Unquestionably, Dr. Sun did change from a pro-Marxian to an anti-Marxian position. But is that proof of "mental instability and intellectual immaturity"? Quite the contrary! Openly to renounce a philosophy he had accepted for over twenty years and to publicly proclaim his renunciation at a time when the success of his Party was wholly dependent upon Russian aid, called for qualities of greatness. Dr. Sun's courageous act established his place among the great men of our times.

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Other leaders had espoused Marxian for equally as many years and their experience too forced them ultimately to reject it as a philosophy and as a program. In France, Briand was an outstanding example. In England, MacDonald and Snowden have recently rejected the class struggle philosophy. In America, there are any number of high-minded men and women who before the World War held the pro-Marxian position originally advocated by Sun Yat-sen.

Would it be fair to accuse Briand, MacDonald, and Snowden of "mental instability and intellectual immaturity" because they had repudiated Marxism? Yet none of these had to take the risks Dr. Sun was compelled to take when he rejected Marxism.

Dr. Sun's repudiation of his earlier identification of his Principle of Livelihood with Marxian Socialism is not of itself responsible for the confusion regarding his position. It was his untimely death less than eight months following his repudiation which led to the general confusion. There can be no confusion regarding the position of Briand or MacDonald because both had been given an opportunity to explain their reasons for rejecting Marxism. But had these former Marxians died before explaining their position, the confusion which now centers about Sun's final views would also have arisen regarding their final views. Having repudiated their former Marxian position, it is clear that no amount of interpreting could possibly reconcile Briand and MacDonald's former pro-Marxian with their final, anti-Marxian views.

Dr. Sun's rejection of Marxism shortly before his death gave rise to civil war between his own followers. This unhappy result is due, as we have seen, to the fact that his earlier disciples

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remain true to his earlier revolutionary views, while his later disciples support his final views.

For four years I have been a silent but heart-sick observer of the tragic results flowing from this anomalous situation. Every year I saw renewed civil wars and the useless sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives. The Chinese Finance Minister reported in a public statement that eighty-seven percent of the income of the Nationalist Government had to be appropriated for military purposes because of civil wars. I read the harrowing details of the frightful flood which was one of the greatest disasters in all history, bringing suffering and death to untold millions. Every observer is aware that this ghastly toll was directly traceable to expenditures for civil wars, leaving no funds for the proper upkeep of dykes. Stunned by these cruel events, I came to realize that I must share the responsibility for every drop of blood shed through honest misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers.

By virtue of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in embracing the views presented in my "Social Interpretation of History" in the last months of his life, I have come to feel that it is mandatory that I discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun and to the Chinese people by leaving nothing undone which could aid in realizing Dr. Sun's dream of a united peaceful China to the attainment of which he gladly laid down his life.

I confidently predict that when the reason for the present misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers shall have been revealed and the misunderstanding removed, China will present a concrete demonstration of her extraordinary vitality and capacity

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for unity which will confound her enemies and arouse the admiration of her friends. Such a demonstration of latent power will be China's conclusive answer to those who contend that "for her own good China should be dismembered or controlled by foreign powers because her leaders are incapable of unity and her people lack the capacity for self-government."

The facts I have made an effort to present regarding the cause of recent Chinese civil wars are not a hidden secret. On the contrary, they have been cited from public records as freely available to Japanese as they are to any other students. Why Japan preferred to ignore them only Japan can explain. While she has shown little disposition to study the cause of Chinese civil wars she has, on the other hand, shown every disposition to place upon China all the blame for the present dispute. "I think our colleagues of the League should ask themselves" says Mr. Matsuoka, "if the peace machinery is quite perfect when it fails to provide a remedy for the encroachments and attacks we have suffered for many years as a result of the warfare of rival Chinese military leaders....If the peace machinery had been capable of dealing with the internal situation of China there would have been no incident of the 18th of September and none of its distressing consequences."

Thus does Mr. Matsuoka proclaim to the world Japan's utter helplessness in the ways of peace. For a peaceful "solution of the internal situation of China" Japan needs the aid of the "peace machinery"; but when it came to creating the incident of the 18th of September and its distressing consequences, Japan felt that her own machinery was "quite perfect" and therefore did not need to ask for outside aid!

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Should Japan ultimately decide to trace the history of China's recent civil wars she will discover that instead of being due to the selfish interests of rival war lords, as Japan would have the world believe, China's civil wars have but one explanation--they are the direct result of an extraordinary sense of loyalty to a departed leader--Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The literature of the Left and Right factions makes this very clear. Each faction stands by its own interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. The Chinese people love peace, but they regard disloyalty to their departed leader too high a price to pay for peace. Japan will have to study China if she really wants to aid in bringing permanent peace to that distracted country.

I have made an effort to comply with your request for a statement upon the cause and cure of Chinese civil wars. Lack of time made difficult the adequate preparation the importance of the subject demands. I venture the hope, however, that the data provided in this statement may prove useful to the League of Nations in her search for a permanent solution to the Sino-Japanese problem.

The Anti-Civil War League recently formed in Shanghai suggests itself as a practical medium through which the League of Nations might aid China in solving her civil war problem. An advisory Commission cooperating with the local Anti-Civil War League should prove an effective and practical agency to maintain contact with the situation.

Let me emphasize once again that the only permanent solution of the Sino-Japanese problem lies through a peaceful solution

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of China's civil wars. This in turn can result only from a clear understanding of their underlying cause. These convictions suggest the conclusion that behind the immediate problem confronting the League of Nations -- the Sino-Japanese conflict -- is the fundamental problem of Chinese civil wars. A practical and permanent solution to these civil wars lies not in force but in the promotion of unity and peace through understanding. Can the League promote unity through understanding? The answer to this question is the key both to the future of the League of Nations and to international peace.

I should be happy to learn that America had been privileged to facilitate the quest for this key.

Cordially yours,

(Signed) Maurice William

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FOREMOST CHINESE STRONGLY ENDORSE NEW ANTI-CIVIL WAR MOVEMENT

W. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, Nationalist Government of China:

"Today, the Government, convinced that unification of China by force is neither possible nor desirable, seeks to solve local disputes by the exercise of the moral sanctions aided by the growing force of public opinion. The League Against Civil Wars which is composed of the sound elements of the nation is gaining rapidly in power and strength and will soon become an important factor in outlawing the use of military force to solve political problems." The China Weekly Review, November 12, 1932.

Dr. Hu Shih, From Address Delivered at the Inaugural Meeting of the Peiping Branch of the National Anti-Civil War League:

"If the Anti-Civil War League had been organized ten years earlier, China probably would not have been in such a sorry state as she is today. Lord Lytton calls the League of Nations the life-line of modern civilization. The Anti-Civil War League may be regarded as the life-line of modern China." The North China Herald, November 9, 1932.

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C O P Y

March 13, 1933

The Joint Savings Society
Affiliated with the
Yienyieh - Kincheng - Continental - China & South Sea Banks
Shanghai, China

Dr. Maurice William,
200 West 57th Street,
New York City,
U. S. A.

Dear Dr. William:

In acknowledging your letter of February 13th, I wish to thank you for sending me a copy of your recent study "Sun Yat-Sen Versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations." I am particularly interested to learn that it was your writings which had done so much to influence Dr. Sun's thoughts during his last days.

You may be interested to know that I have written a critique of Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People which I hope will be rendered into English some day for the benefit of our foreign friends who are interested in Dr. Sun's writings.

As for the activities of the Anti-Civil War League, we are bending all our energies toward the consummation of our goal, for which we crave the sympathy and support of all democratic nations.

With best wishes, believe me

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Wu Ding Chong

(Note: Wu Ting Ch'ang is Chairman of the National Anti-Civil War League; Former President Ta Ching Bank and Bank of China; Director of Tientsin Mint; 1919, Associate Delegate to Shanghai Peace Conference. 1920, Vice-minister of finance. President, Salt Bank Peking, since 1925.)

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From
 THE LITERARY DIGEST (October 8, 1932)

CHINA'S ANTI-CIVIL-WAR LEAGUE

Bitter reproaches against the Chinese for their continual outbreaks of civil war will no longer be heard if China's National Anti-Civil-War League proves efficient.*

Five Hundred delegates representing 401 public bodies and 1,075 individuals of every walk of life lately sat at the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on a hot autumn day, to try to find a solution and ban civil war forever.*

These delegates came together of their own free will, "to use the ambiguous phrase," remarks the Shanghai China Critic, and they formed an association called the Anti-Civil-War League. It was in April that the idea was first announced by some one, and it was well received,* apparently, for two or three months later the League was formally inaugurated.

This weekly is convinced that the swift growth of the Anti-Civil-War movement into a permanent organization evidences the anti-war spirit of the Chinese public, and it proceeds:

"It is twenty-one years since the establishment of the Republic. But there has not been a single year in which some sort of warfare has not taken place.* For twenty-one years people suffered. But twenty-one years passed without producing any one daring enough to sound "the call to arms."

"There may have been journalists, authors, and cynics who made it a profession of theirs to denounce war; but a definite anti-war organization is the first of its kind.*

"Hence, cordial wishes for the League's success! Mr. Wu Ting-chang, chairman of the conference, in his address before the meeting sounded the key-note of the League. He declared that the League would devote itself exclusively to the Anti-Civil-War movement, and would not carry on any other movement or engage in any other activities.

"This is a note of relief. Far too often there have been organizations tinged with political affiliations. Let this be an independent league, voicing the opinions and ideas of the people, people as individuals and not as biased groups. Mr. Wu also stated that while the existence of an anti-war league was unnecessary in a country where conditions remain stable, the work of such a league was urgently required in China.* However, it is tentatively fixed by the League's draft regulations that the League shall function for five years only."

It is hoped, The China Critic explains, that by the end of that time conditions will be so stable in China, the existence

* Italics not in the original.

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of such an organization will be no longer needed. It is pointed out further that altho the league is designated an Anti-Civil-War League, its object is "to stop war without war, in other words, to prevent fighting through the application of peaceful measures." We read then:

"Here is the League of Nations in miniature form. However, while the idea of the League of Nations is worthy to be copied, let not the inconvenience and cumbersomeness of its functioning exist also in the miniature league. Dissension is something that can not be tolerated in an antidissension organization.

"As was said above, the Anti-Civil-War League is formed by individuals. May these individuals unite into a strong body so as to bring pressure to bear on those persons responsible for any civil war. Just how this League is to function remains to be seen."

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From China Press, August 27th, 1932.

Anti-Civil War Conference Begins Two-Day Session Here (Shanghai).

400 Delegates From All Parts of Nation to Discuss Means for
Ridding China of Civil War.

"Charged with the important mission of eliminating further civil wars in the country, more than four hundred delegates, representing some two hundred public organizations throughout the nation, will meet today and tomorrow for a national anti-civil war conference to be held at the local Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

Much significance is being attached to the conference. It is the first time a national group has ever convened for the purpose of studying means for ridding China of internecine strife.

Movement Began Here (Shanghai).

The anti-civil war movement which has been an undercurrent in the popular mind, precipitated this spring when the four leading organizations in the country, namely, the National Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, the Shanghai Bankers Association, the Shanghai Native Bankers Association, took the lead by issuing a circular telegram calling the attention of the nation to the futility of civil war and urging the civil and military leaders to unite for a common purpose of internal peace.

Shortly after the inception of the organization this spring, the movement was brought to face an acid test in the naval conflict between General Chen Chi-tang and Admiral Chen Chak in Kwongtung. The movement lost no time in taking up the challenge and sent General Chu Ching-lai, Mr. Cheng Yi-ting, and Mr. Cha Liang-chao to Canton to persuade the opposing military leaders to adopt pacific measures in settling the dispute. The fact that the conflict was later settled short of serious armed clash was generally attributed to the efforts of the three peace envoys.

Will Take Pledge

This morning, the first item on the agenda of the conference will be the formal establishment of a National Anti-Civil war Federation, when all delegates will be required to make a solemn oath pledging their whole-hearted devotion and support to the peace movement....

More than one hundred proposals have been received so far at the office of the federation. One of the important items of business to be transacted this morning will be the foundation of a special committee to study and classify the proposals before their presentation at the mass meeting for general discussion....Throughout this after-

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noon and tomorrow the attention of the delegates will be engaged in discussing proposals by the special committee. These resolutions will be incorporated in a manifesto to be issued as a formal conclusion of the conference.

In order to have a permanent secretariat to look after the progress of the movement when the mass meeting of the Anti-Civil War Federation is not in session, there will be appointed a standing executive committee which will have its office in Shanghai.

'How to stop war without war, will be emphasized in the general discussion', declared Mr. K. H. Ling, secretary-general of the National Bankers Association. Mr. Ling expressed his regret that the conference is only to sit for two days, which he considered too short a period for matters of such great importance as the diminution of civil wars in the country."

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March 16, 1932

Mme. Sun Ching-ling
 Shanghai, China

Dear Madame Sun:

The enclosed personal statement of my intellectual relations to your late and revered husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has been forwarded to a number of leaders of both factions of the Kuomintang. I feel, however, that I owe you a further word of explanation of my position.

If it be true that China's civil wars are due to conflicting interpretations of Dr. Sun's teachings, then those who are in a position to throw light upon this tragic situation are vested with a grave responsibility. By virtue of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in embracing the views presented in my Social Interpretation of History in the last months of his life, I have come to feel that it is mandatory that I discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun and to the Chinese people by leaving nothing undone which could aid in realizing Dr. Sun's dream of a united, peaceful China to the attainment of which he gladly laid down his life.

But Dr. Sun's loyal followers are not living in peace. On the contrary, they are at war, and not because either side is opposed to Dr. Sun's principles, but because of an honest disagreement as to the correct interpretation of his principles. How to remove the basis for this disagreement is the great problem which all who are loyal to Dr. Sun's memory must bend their energies to solve.

You, who were closest to Dr. Sun and therefore his immediate and logical successor, and I must share a sacred responsibility to Dr. Sun's memory. Our combined effort may largely determine whether a united, peaceful China, striving to promote the well-being of the Chinese masses, is to emerge ultimately as a fitting memorial to Dr. Sun's sacrifices in behalf of the Chinese nation. Every drop of blood innocently shed through misunderstanding is our common concern and combined responsibility. Dr. Sun's mandate precludes our taking anything for granted. Human life is too precious to be gambled with. Loyalty to Dr. Sun calls for a re-examination of his writings in order to make certain that from a commendable zeal to carry out his wishes, we do not place ourselves actually in opposition to his final instructions.

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Mme. Sun

May I therefore appeal to you, who have given such remarkable proof of your devotion to Dr. Sun's ideals, to re-examine Dr. Sun's final revision of his Principle of Livelihood in order to determine and, let us hope, remove the cause of the misunderstanding which has been responsible for the tragic civil wars between Dr. Sun's loyal followers?

The next page of China's history must be largely of your writing. Is it to be the history of conflict and blood or of unity, peace, and a prosperous China, fulfilling the dream of your illustrious husband? I know how deeply you feel your responsibility and I want you to believe that I stand prepared to render what aid lies within my power to enable China to reach the heights envisaged for her by your departed husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. I should be glad to have you suggest in what concrete form I could best discharge my obligations to Dr. Sun, to you, and to the Chinese nation.

With deep respect, I am,

Cordially yours,

MW:H
Enc.

(signed)

Maurice William

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COPY

March 16, 1932

This statement was addressed to all leaders
of both factions in the Kuomintang

It is my pleasure to forward to you, under separate cover, a copy of my new study, entitled "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations".

This volume is the result of four years intensive research. It is my hope that this work may prove helpful in two directions: (1) promote better understanding and good-will between China and America; (2) throw some light upon the possible causes underlying the strife between Left and Right factions which has stood in the way of peace and unity in China.

An effort to determine the extent of the relationship between my earlier work, "The Social Interpretation of History" and Dr. Sun's "Principle of Livelihood" called for a searching examination not only of all Dr. Sun's writings available in English, but also of the conflicting interpretations of his writings as found in the literature of the Left and Right groups. This investigation revealed a devotion and loyalty to a departed leader probably without parallel in history. The striking feature of the conflict is that neither side would be outdone by the other in whole-hearted loyalty to Dr. Sun. Each believes its own to be the only correct interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. Each seems ready to sacrifice unity, peace, home, life itself, from a sense of loyalty to a revered leader. This remarkable situation convinced me that foreign criticism of the leaders of the Left and Right Wings of the Kuomintang was unjust and based on ignorance. It became clear that civil wars in China are due not to conflicting interests of selfish war lords, but quite the contrary; they are directly traceable to self-sacrificing loyalty to a departed leader.

It is plain that were Dr. Sun alive today, there could be no civil war in China arising from conflicting interpretations of his teachings. I thus became aware that Dr. Sun's untimely passing has placed a heavy responsibility upon those who had a share in the formulation of his final views. He accepted the philosophy he had discovered in my "Social Interpretation of History" only eight months before his death. His sudden passing deprived him of an opportunity to reconcile his earlier with his final views. This resulted in his leaving two opposing schools of disciples; a Left school made up of those who accept the Left views held by Dr. Sun prior to August 1, 1924, and a Right school made up of those who accept the Right views held by Dr. Sun after August 1, 1924. Both are equally loyal to the teachings of their late leader.

For four years I have been a silent but heart-sick observer of the tragic results flowing from this anomalous situation. Every year I saw renewed civil wars and useless sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives. The Chinese Finance Minister reported in a public statement that eighty-seven percent of the income of the Nationalist Government had to be appropriated for military purposes because of civil wars. I read the harrowing details of the frightful flood which was one of the

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greatest disasters in all history, bringing suffering and death to untold millions. Every observer is aware that this ghastly toll was directly traceable to expenditures for civil wars, leaving no funds for the proper upkeep of dikes. Stunned by these cruel events, I came to realize that I must share the responsibility for every drop of blood shed through honest misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers.

Today, I am compelled to witness Japan's military attack upon a weakened China on the pretext that the opposing leaders are self-seeking militarists incapable of loyalty to country and with no desire to bring peace and unity to China. I am availing myself of every opportunity to refute Japan's unjust charges against China's leaders. In this connection, I quote the following from my reply to a personal letter received from Secretary of State Stimson:

"If Japan would trace the history of China's recent civil wars, she would discover that instead of being due to the selfish interests of rival war lords, as Japan would have the world believe, China's civil wars have but one explanation--they are the direct result of an extraordinary sense of loyalty to a departed leader--Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The literature of the Left and Right factions in China makes this very clear. Each faction stands by its own interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. The Chinese people love peace, but they regard disloyalty to their departed leader too high a price to pay for peace. Japan will have to study China if she really wants to aid in bringing permanent peace to that distracted country."

China's critics are promoting an active propaganda aiming to turn world opinion against China. They point to civil wars which form so conspicuous a part of recent Chinese history and argue that these civil wars prove their contention that the Chinese people are incapable of unity and that the conflicting interests of self-seeking war lords is the sole explanation for constant civil wars in China.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to counteract this mischievous propaganda by presenting the facts as the Chinese understand them. The truth cannot fail to heighten the American people's respect for the spiritual qualities of the Chinese people, qualities which put loyalty above all personal and other considerations. A few of us in America are making an effort to call attention to and emphasize the realities as we understand them, for we recognize the value to both countries of a better understanding by the American people of China's actual difficulties and problems.

I confidently predict that when the basis for the present misunderstanding between Dr. Sun's loyal followers shall have been removed, China will present a concrete demonstration of her extraordinary vitality and capacity for unity, which will confound her enemies and arouse the admiration of her friends. Such a demonstration of latent power will be China's conclusive answer to those who contend that "for her own good, China should be dismembered or controlled by foreign powers because her leaders are incapable of unity and her people lack the capacity for self-government."

In the last analysis, therefore, unity based on understanding is

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China's fundamental problem. Should my recent study, "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations", prove of some help in promoting unity through understanding, I shall feel that I had, in some slight measure, proved worthy of the great honor which Dr. Sun conferred upon me in accepting the philosophy presented in "The Social Interpretation of History", and, to some degree, had discharged the responsibility which fell to me as a result of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's untimely death.

If you can suggest any further service which I might render that would hasten the realization of Dr. Sun's dream of a united, peaceful, prosperous China, I should regard it a privilege to strive in so constructive, so inspiring a cause.

With fraternal greetings,

Cordially yours,

MW:H

(signed) Maurice William

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

SUN FO
10 Rue Moliere
Shanghai, China

May 10, 1932

Dr. Maurice William,
130 West 57th Street,
New York City.

Dear Doctor William:

Mr. Sun has received your new study of Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism which he is reading with great interest. He has asked me to write you an acknowledgment and also to convey his thanks and appreciations for your interest and valuable efforts in attempting to bring about better understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings. China is passing through a very critical period of its life history and she needs the understanding and sympathetic interest of the West especially of America.

In closing Mr. Sun wishes you success in your work and hope that your book will serve its intended purpose.

Yours truly,

(signed) Yui Ming
Secretary

NOTE: Mr. Sun Fo is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's only son; he has held many important positions in the Chinese Nationalist Government.

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COPY

383 Route de Sieyes

Shanghai

May 23rd, 1932

Mr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City

My dear Mr. William:

I wish to thank you for your kind letter of March 15 as well as your thoughtfulness in sending me your new book entitled "Sun Yat-sen versus Communism: New Evidence Establishing China's Right to the Support of Democratic Nations", which I have read with unusual interest and admiration.

You may rest assured that I appreciated this work, since it is such an extensive study of the man with whom I had the privilege of associating my life work besides being related to him by marriage and of the ideals and principles which Humanity must uphold if it is to perpetuate!

I can not give you better advice than to ask you to continue your good work by writing and speaking on the very things which you enunciated in your admirable book so that the American public may have a more sympathetic understanding of my country and our leaders and pave the way for international co-operation and world peace!

Wishing you every success, I am

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

H.H.Kung

NOTE: Dr. Kung is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's brother-in-law, Mrs. Kung being a sister of Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Kung had held important positions in the Chinese Government.

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COPY

18 Rue Ch. Galland
Geneva,
March 29, 1932

Dear Dr. William:

I beg to thank you for sending me your new book "Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism" and for the explanatory letter which accompanies it. I am sure your new work will help to bring about a better understanding between China and the U.S.A.

With assurances of my esteem.

Yours very truly,
(signed) W.W.Yen

Dr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City
U.S.A.

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COPY

1 Cleveland St.
Cambridge, Mass.
August 22, 1932

Dr. Maurice William
130 West 57th Street
New York City

My dear Dr. William:

Being a faithful adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen for years, I have found a great comfort in reading your recently published book, "Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism". Many of my comrades, who are now in China, have early complained to me that Dr. Sun's principles are not very consistent, and that his Principle of Livelihood cannot lead to a permanent solution of the economic problems of the State. Some of them have already tacitly bolted the Kuomintang and intended to join the Communist Party, apparently with the belief that Marxism or Leninism is more "valid" than the Principle of Livelihood. The publication of your book is indeed very timely, and I will invite their attention to it. The value of your book convinces me that a translation of it into Chinese is not only servicable but also indispensable. I wonder if anyone has already undertaken the work. If not, I would like very much to do it, either alone or in collaboration with others, when your (or the publisher's?) authorization is granted.

As to the link between your earlier book and Dr. Sun's third principle, I wish to inform you that had the avoidable error not been made in the translation of your name from Chinese into English, Miss Mary van Kleeck's work would have been much more facilitated. The fact is that when Dr. Sun mentioned your name during his lectures, he did not say "Williams" but "Mr. William". The word (Chinese character) which sounds like "s", means "Mister" (or Mrs.), used when referring to a third person. This may be made a little clearer to you by the fact that the stenographer used the word (Chinese character), which has the same sound as (Chinese character), to denote "x" of "Marx". This frivolous point may not be worthy of your attention, but I doubt very much that Dr. Sun could make the mistake of saying "Williams" for "William" whose book had become his good companion. My conclusion in this matter is based on the Chinese text of "San Min Chu I".

I have some interesting observations on the significance of the Principle of Livelihood as well as on its connection with your "Social Interpretation of History", but I do not think I am warranted to make them here, because I am afraid that this letter itself will waste more of your valuable time than it deserves. Of course, I shall be very glad to write you more if you are patient enough to read my poor writing.

Before closing, may I briefly introduce myself to you? I am a graduate student in the Department of Government at Harvard. I came to this country in the summer of 1930 immediately after my graduation from a Chinese college in Tientsin, and am now interested in the constitutional system of your country.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed)

Shu-chin Tsui

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SUN YAT-SEN AND MAURICE WILLIAM

By
James T. Shotwell

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SUN YAT-SEN AND MAURICE WILLIAM

The originality in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings, the unique peculiarity which marked them out from those of any other nation or revolutionary movement, lay in the fact that he combined into a single doctrine three principles which do not easily harmonize and yet represent the three dominant forces in the modern world. These are nationalism, democracy and a third principle which he termed "Livelihood". This is apparently not a good translation of the Chinese term, but comes nearest to it. The first two principles present no difficulties to the Western reader; but the third of the three interlocking principles of the Chinese revolution has no exact parallel in Western thinking and therefore no single term exactly covers it. In Sun Yat-sen's early writings he frequently identified it with socialism, because that was the nearest approach among Western nations to the social reform movement which he had in mind, namely a thoroughgoing protest against exploitation of the poor by the rich, of labor by capital. Now the chief contribution of Sun Yat-sen lay not in the analysis of each of these principles but in the synthesis which grouped them into a single doctrine. The Western nations had linked the first two together from the days of the American or the French revolution, but socialism came into the world as a revolt against nationalism. It was also a suspicious rival of nationalist democracy. The task of harmonizing these historically allied principles of nationalism and democracy with a principle apparently hostile to them and welding them all into a single trilogy was Sun Yat-sen's contribution to political thought of the modern world as well as the thought of China. It was, however, forced upon Sun Yat-sen by the situation of China itself. The building of factories and railways was as much a part of his program of the modernization of the country as the erection of a republican form of government or the recovery of full territorial rights from foreign nations. Indeed in his program drawn up just after the war, economics seems to prevail over political problems. He had the vision of China rapidly taking the leadership of the world of science and industry, avoiding the blunders and mistakes from which Western nations have suffered in the course of their evolution. He looked for China, with its vastness of resources and of man-power, to become supreme in the modern age, leaving Europe ultimately far behind. It was a vast and magnificent faith, but it called for a solution of China's internal, social and economic problems along with its assertion of nationalist independence of the rest of the world. Now this internal question of social justice had been stated in the West in terms of socialistic doctrines which were not only contrary to the historical development of China, but were singularly foreign to Chinese ways of thinking. On the one hand, therefore, he had to fit in Karl Marx with Bismarck and Lincoln; on the other hand he had to face squarely the issue of communism in China.

This fundamental problem came to a head in the final statement of Dr. Sun's philosophy which has become the secular bible of the Chinese Republic, the Three Principles, or San Min Chu I, a volume compiled from notes of lectures delivered in the year 1924. Now, strange as it may seem, the solution which Dr. Sun accepted and incorporated in his text in the section on the third principle, that of "Livelihood", was phrased by an American thinker whose work remains almost entirely unknown in his own country and whose contribution to China itself has

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so far been recognized only in a single reference of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a one-line footnote by the editor of Dr. Sun's text. Of all the strange chapters in the history of East and West there can be none stranger than this, that the founder of the Chinese republic and the spiritual leader of the new China found in the writing of an unknown American author so clear a statement of the solution of the hardest problem in his political philosophy that he made the American formulation his own. The book in question is The Social Interpretation of History and its author Dr. Maurice William of New York City. It was written just after the close of the world war and was known to few outside of the socialist circles in which Dr. William then moved and to which the book was addressed. One can hardly imagine anything less likely to appeal to the post-war reading public in America than an essay by a socialist criticizing Karl Marx's theory of the class war. Even inside the Socialist Party the author wrote as a mere private in the ranks, "a Jimmy Higgins" as he humorously called himself, who was, however, already a veteran in the socialist service, having been an active socialist for twenty-five years. Under the best of conditions his criticism of orthodox socialist theory would have little interest for the American public, but there was still less chance for it in the first years following the war when the socialist movement in America was at its lowest ebb and the shattered structure of the capitalist world seemed to have begun an almost miraculous reconstruction. In any case the essay remained obscure and relatively unknown even to students of the social sciences.

Somehow or other, however, it reached Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the critical year 1924 just as he was formulating his Three Principles in the lectures at Shanghai; and, with a quickness of perception which marks great leadership, Dr. Sun saw at once in the arguments of Dr. William a confirmation of his own innate tendencies with reference to socialism, for which he had hitherto found no statement in terms of logical and systematic reasoning. Dr. William supplied him with a conception of socialism which renounced the class war as historically and economically false, and in the text of the San Min Chu I whole passages of Dr. William's book were embodied en bloc. Dr. Sun himself gave credit to Dr. William for his use of his material although it was so embedded in the structure of Dr. Sun's text that it is only by a careful comparison of the two that one can realize the full extent of citation. A foot-note in the first edition of the English translation gave the reference wrongly to Mr. Whiting Williams. In the second edition, however, Mr. L. T. Chen, the editor, has corrected both text and footnote to give the credit to Dr. Maurice William, and is authority for the statement that Dr. Sun kept Dr. William's volume constantly with him from the time when he became acquainted with it. How the American treatise came into Dr. Sun's hands has not yet been explained; but he was a thorough scholar, well read in economics and politics and had a library richly stocked with the literature of these subjects. However it came about, the reading of The Social Interpretation of History by Dr. Sun Yat-sen may yet turn out to have been one of the most important single incidents in the history of Modern Asia, for the consequences were immediate and far-reaching and have only just begun to show their full extent in the orientation of China.

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This may seem like an extravagant statement and yet it seems amply justified by a study of the facts in the case. It would be equally true, whether the American treatise converted Sun Yat-sen from Marxian orthodox socialism to a denial of its fundamental principle, as some have claimed, or whether, as seems to me the case, it furnished him with a justification for his own doubts as to the theory of the class war, and offered him a better statement than he had yet worked out of the application of his own philosophy. In either case the fact remains that in August 1924 Dr. Sun gave the third of his Three Principles, that which deals with social reform, in the terms set forth by Dr. William. To catch the full importance of this we must recall that the first phase of the Chinese republican movement had, through no fault of its own, become deeply involved with Russia and communism. The help which Dr. Sun had vainly sought from the capitalist nations came freely and efficiently from Moscow. It required more than an ordinary act of courage for the leader of the revolution at a time that was still critical to come out frankly and fearlessly in contradiction to the militant philosophy of the one section of the Western world which was ready to support whole-heartedly the movement for Chinese emancipation from Western exploitation. Nevertheless this was just what Dr. Sun did in the shaping of the doctrine for republican China. Although in his earlier writings there were passages which might be interpreted as socialist in the orthodox sense, and at the moment he sorely needed the practical help which the Soviets were offering, yet questions of expediency were boldly set aside in the framing of his gospel of social reform. The American critic of Karl Marx and not Marx himself furnished the text in which he shaped his own individual thinking and so set the course of the new China definitely away from communism.

This at least is the way it looks to anyone who studies both the situation in China in 1924 and the text of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. But the situation as it exists today is much more complicated than this historic incident, for some of the early associates of Sun Yat-sen do not accept any such interpretation of his thinking. To some of them at least the protest against exploitation by capitalism, both foreign and native, means that class warfare must still be made on Marxian terms. The division therefore between the left wing of the republican movement in the Kuomintang and the middle class leadership of the government in Nanking finds its doctrinal center in the interpretation of these few pages of Sun Yat-sen's Third Principle which were based upon or quoted from Dr. William's book. The important question for both present-day China and for future history is the interpretation of these few passages. What effect did Dr. William's book have upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mind and how much is the Chinese Republic to base its social philosophy upon these passages alone? To attempt to answer these questions is to venture greatly, for the writing of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the record of his speeches have become almost like sacred books within a canon which impedes the acceptance of critical analysis. In addition, an oral tradition like that of early Christianity has already grown up among the disciples of the lost leader, in the light of which the texts are interpreted. Under these circumstances it is certainly taking risks for a mere outsider, familiar only with translations, to attempt the task of higher criticism. But while the

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Western student of Sun Yat-sen may fail to appreciate the bearings of Dr. Sun's philosophy upon Chinese habits of thought, he may on the other hand detect more readily the different strains of thought which are drawn from Western sources. There are few problems in the political thinking of today more important or more compelling than this one. It would be a mistake to conceive of it merely in terms of personalities. Behind both Dr. Sun and Dr. William lay two conditioning forces, China and America, as the England of the Industrial Revolution lay behind the philosophy of Marx. Viewed from this angle, the acceptance of William's text in the San Min Chu I is itself a justification of his theory of the social interpretation of history. That theory discovers the clue to the movements of politics, not in a class warfare of producers against exploiters, but in the dominant needs of the whole social body, that is to say, of the mass of the consumers. Socialism, in Dr. William's eyes, is not the emancipation of a single class but the achievement of social justice for all. The democratic state, therefore, is the proper home for social evolution; for it is by evolution and not by revolution that the old injustices will be got rid of. The process, as he sees it, is fundamentally political and cannot be left to economic forces alone. The consumers must unite politically and if they do, since they form the whole body politic, we shall "witness not a class struggle, not a civil war, nor one portion of the people against the other but a common united movement composed of every useful member of society using its organized power through the State against a class--the profit-making class" (page 195 of the Social Interpretation of History).

Now here was a statement, clear-cut and forceful, of a philosophy of social welfare as thoroughgoing and far-reaching as orthodox socialism but avoiding the revolutionary attack upon the state which played so large a part in Karl Marx's scheme. In his denial that the proletariat must emancipate itself by overturning the capitalistic state, Dr. William was giving expression to the experience of America, where the emancipation is taking place within the state itself. This was also the process which Dr. Sun envisaged for China, and so the principle of "Livelihood" was definitely substituted for that of socialism or communism, which had been loosely used by Dr. Sun as synonyms for his Third Principle before he had read Dr. William's book. Viewed in this light we have not merely the meeting of two minds but of two civilizations: the American and the Chinese. In both cases the consumer rather than the producer is the determining element. This, of course, would be news to many in America, where the capitalistic argument for protective tariffs has so completely subordinated the interests of the consumer to the producer. Nevertheless the fact remains that Dr. William's philosophy was another facet of that fundamental principle of which Mr. Henry Ford has been the most outstanding apostle in recent days, namely, that the motive force in society is the pressure exerted by the mass of those who would make their own the products of nature and industry, that is to say, the great consuming public. Whereas Karl Marx, writing from the environment of the new factories in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, concentrated his attention upon the workers whom the machines were displacing and made production the center of his philosophy, Dr. William turns the tables the other way round and concentrates upon the consumer. It is easy to see how such a reversion of the Karl Marx theory would appeal to

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a Chinese social reformer, for his main problem was to improve the lot of the mass of the Chinese people, a people upon the whole so pitifully poor and so continually exploited. The industrial workers, whose fate stirred the pity and indignation of Karl Marx, form only a very small fraction of the vast population of China. Even if, as Dr. Sun proposed, the industrial process should substantially repeat that of the West, nevertheless the basis of the social problem remained in his eyes the betterment of the great mass of the consumers.

Stated in these terms "socialism" can be made to harmonize with nationalism and democracy. The exploiter against whom one should be especially on guard is the same as nationalism recognized for its enemy, that is, the foreign capitalist, exploiting Chinese, whether laborers or consumers. Nationalism, therefore, is not a conservative doctrine opposed to the radical tendencies of socialism, as in the West, but fits in with Dr. William's brand of socialism which puts the accent on achieving justice for the whole social body instead of for the industrial worker alone through a class warfare.

Unfortunately this last phase of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thinking is not readily intelligible to those who think in the doctrinaire formulae of either nationalism or socialism. It is a comprehensive, unifying conception which finally stands out like a modern restatement of the old teaching of Confucius that mankind is one great family and the state itself a sort of family organization on a smaller scale. In such a conception there is no real place for the Marxian theory of a class war; but it can make its own the formulation of those socialist ideals of economic justice for the common man which have an equal appeal in America and China. It would seem that the time has come to recognize the mediating work of Dr. William, which Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself recognized in the San Min Chu I. How great the service which he rendered, only history will show.

Columbia University

James T. Shotwell

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COPY

July 6th, 1932

Professor James T. Shotwell,
 Carnegie Foundation for International Peace,
 405 West 117th St.,
 New York City

Dear Doctor Shotwell:

Three replies have been received from Chinese leaders. I enclose copies. You will note from the cordial tone of these letters that our fears of arousing controversy were quite groundless. This is true at any rate of those who were closest to Dr. Sun.

In my letter addressed to Chinese leaders, I voiced the hope that my new volume might prove helpful in two directions: (1) promote a better understanding between China and America; (2) throw some light upon the possible cause of the conflict between Dr. Sun's loyal followers and suggest a cure.

Mr. Sun Fo's expressions of appreciation of my "valuable efforts in attempting to bring about better understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings" indicate: (1) a recognition of my intellectual relationship to his father; (2) that the understanding and interpretation of Dr. Sun's teachings constitute a major problem for China; (3) that Dr. Sun's disciples have failed to understand and correctly interpret Sun Yat-sen's teachings; (4) that he welcomes my aid in promoting a better understanding and interpretation of his father's teaching. Mr. Sun goes on to wish me success in my work and expresses the hope that my "book will serve its intended purpose."

Dr. Kung is even more cordial and bids me "to continue your good work by writing and speaking on the very things which you enunciated in your admirable book so that the American public may have a more sympathetic understanding of my country and our leaders and pave the way for international co-operation and world peace".

When I recall that for Dr. Sun's intimates, the facts revealed in my volume partake of the nature of "a bolt from the clear", and involve the acceptance of a stranger in their house, you will understand why I am filled with a sense of the deepest gratitude for so generous a welcome and why I should be possessed of a feeling of overwhelming responsibility.

Now that this Sino-American intellectual relationship has been so graciously acknowledged, should not this advantageous situation be made to count in the interest of both countries? "I claim that friendship is the greatest trade asset a nation can have," said Captain Robert Dollar. His ripe experience adds weight to his opinion. "All things being equal, price and quality acceptable, business goes to our friends", Mr. Wallace M. Alexander told the Nineteenth Convention of

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the National Foreign Trade Council at Honolulu last May. "The attitude of our government (continued Mr. Alexander), "the extent to which it assumes a spirit of friendship and cooperation will play a part, the importance of which cannot be overestimated, in assisting China to achieve the political stability so imperative to the expansion of international trade. I am sure you will agree with me when I say that the first and most important step in this direction is the creation of good-will."

And there can be no good-will without understanding. China has rejected Russian in favor of American principles as the basis for her political, social, and economic program. Could she have given more concrete evidence of her desire for American good-will? Can it honestly be said that America has given China the recognition and encouragement her momentous actions deserves?

Since China has chosen an American program, America alone is qualified to understand China's efforts to apply it. Sympathetic co-operation at this time would yield its reward in good-will which could not fail to take the concrete form so essential to the restoration of American prosperity.

This is not to be construed as a desire to exclude other countries from receiving their share of China's trade. International trade is the basis for international prosperity and to deprive a country of foreign markets would mean to deprive ourselves of a prosperous customer.

But European nations seem more alive to the possibilities of the Chinese market, than America. Germany is reported to have sent a trade delegation to investigate commercial and industrial possibilities in China. According to the New York Times, the delegation's object is "to increase trade between Germany and China and to investigate the possibility of German financial assistance and Sino German co-operation in the industrial development of China."

Great Britain is also taking steps to expand her trade with China. An editorial comment in the New York Times of May 29th, 1932, draws attention to "the formation by some of Great Britain's leading engineering firms of a joint enterprise for the promotion of Chinese industrial development. The associated companies represent a capitalization of £30,000,000. They are proceeding in the belief that the much-harassed country is winning through to stability and will soon be an active customer for railroads, bridges, power stations, harbor improvements, and factories."

But what is America doing to capitalize her good-will in China? I have been assured by those who know the methods of these countries that were I a Britisher or a German, either of those countries would have been quick to capitalize China's acceptance of a British or German social, political, and economic program. They would have sent by this time, a good-will committee to co-operate with China in the practical application of that program.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Prof. Shotwell-3

What a peaceful, united China could mean for America is perhaps best illustrated by the sale last year of 15,000,000 bushels of wheat to China.

The New York Times of September 7, 1931 reported: "WHEAT FOR CHINA. AIDS NORTHWEST BUSINESS" * -- mills, railroads and shipping lines at the port cities will benefit. Huge shipments of flour and grain to China...are major factors in what appears to be an increase in business activity in the Pacific Northwest. Flour mills, labor and railroads will receive \$3,000,000 for handling the export of 15,000,000 bushels of Farm Board wheat to China, half of it ground into 1,800,000 barrels of flour by Tacoma Seattle and Portland mills. The total milling cost of the flour is estimated at an excess of \$1,250,000 most of it going to mill labor, much of which has been employed only on part time. With the usual domestic and other export trade handled by the mills, full-time operation of plants is expected for six months or more. The cost of moving the wheat from warehouse to mill and from mill to shipside, with other incidental expenses connected with loading, is estimated at \$250,000 or more. The fourth item of benefit that will result from the movement of this vast volume of grain to the Orient is seen in the freight paid to the railroads to bring in new grain to take the place of the old wheat shipped across the Pacific. On a conservative basis, \$1,500,000 in railroad costs will be involved in transportation from interior points to tidewater. Plainly, America has an important stake in the peace and stability of China.

There have been no indications that would lead one to believe that America is fully alive to her possibilities. And yet, Mr. Grew, our Ambassador to Japan, has recently stated: "Few if any problems concern the American people more than the problem of the Far East."

Would that this were so! The grave domestic problems which today are America's chief concern are largely the penalty we must pay for our lack of concern in Far East problems. There can be no permanent solution to our domestic problems without a permanent solution to Far Eastern as well as to European problems.

I am aware of course that there is nothing new in all this for you. Nevertheless, I am glad to get these thoughts "off my chest". Perhaps we ought to draw the attention of some business executives such as Mr. James A. Farrell, Chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, or Mr. Wallace Alexander to this Sino-American intellectual relationship. They might be glad to follow up its possibilities in the interest of both countries.

With kindest personal regards,

Cordially yours,

(signed)

Maurice William

* Italics not in the original.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12355 FOR Tel.#-4pm.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED May 30, 1933
tb// NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Reaction to peace with Japan: Southwest Policital Council is reported to have telegraphed Nanking to ask about the actual terms reached with Japan. At memorial meeting on May 29, 1933, Tsou Lu denounced Chiang Kai Shek's alleged traitorous surrender to Japan and demanded his unishment. Hu Han Min issued statement condemnatory of Chiang Kai Shek and peace with Japan.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RH

GRAY

CANTON VIA NR

Dated May 30, 1933

Rec'd. 10.30 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 30, 4 pm

Tension in political circles appeared to be developing as a result of the efforts of Hu Han Min and certain other civilian leaders to launch a new anti Chiang Kai Shek movement. It is still uncertain what turn events will take from reports but according to the best information available the military leaders particularly are opposed to an overt separatist movement unless strong support is assured from anti Chiang elements in the north.

On May 27, Southwest Politic Council is reported to have telegraphed Nanking inquiring about the actual terms reached with Japan.

At the memorial meeting yesterday Tsou Lu denounced Chiang Kai Shek's alleged traitorous surrender to Japan and demanded his punishment. Today's press contains a lengthy statement by Hu Han Min condemnatory of Chiang and peace with Japan which he foresees will lead to the disintegration of China. Repeated to the Legation and Nanking.

OSB

Ballantine

note
7/13/94

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