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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 26

1930-39

793.94/6521-6680
Nov. 1933-May 1934



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsinan/66 FOR Despatch #50

FROM Tsinan (Stevens) DATED Nov.6,1933
6/// NAME 1-1127 gpo

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Comments on change in --.
Much speculation on this question among leading
officials of the province.

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793.94/6521

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Comment on Change in Sino-Japanese Relations

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The trend of developments in diplomatic quarters lately towards a Chinese rapprochement with Japan have given rise to considerable speculation among leading officials of this province. Opinion seems to be divided on how far Nanking's emissaries have been authorized to go in negotiating directly with the Japanese for a settlement of outstanding questions. Two officials of the Shantung Government expressed a conviction that Nanking has adopted a new policy towards Japan based upon a decision reached at the third Lushan conference, which was attended by General Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Mr. Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛). Although these officials did not appear to know definitely the nature of the new policy, they intimated that it would be such as to open the way for adjustment of the present unsatisfactory state of relations between the two countries and would mean the defeat of a group of Chinese leaders who have been advocating resistance of Japan with the help of Western Powers. The Shantung Commissioner of Education, Mr. Ho Ssu-yuan (何思源), opined that Mr. T. V. Soong would soon have to step down and that he would be succeeded as Minister of Finance by General Chang Chun (張羣), former Mayor of Shanghai. Mr. Chiang Tso-pin (蔣作賓), the Chinese Minister to Japan was also mentioned as one

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By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

who would have to make way for someone whose sentiments were more pro-Japanese. Although Mr. Ho's prophecy has not materialized exactly as outlined, it takes on added significance since the resignation of the Finance Minister.

On the other hand, Mr. C. L. Ch'ai (柴春霖), Councillor of the Provincial Government, who accompanied General Han Fu-chu to Peiping and who was present at the most recent meetings of the Peiping Political Council, informed me with an air of positiveness that the Nanking Government has not authorized anyone at Peiping or elsewhere to enter into negotiations with the Japanese for the settlement of outstanding political issues, such as the status of "Manchukuo."

In an interview on October 24, General Han stated that, although many questions were discussed during his visit to Peiping, no agreement was obtained on important issues. He denied that any agreement was reached on the subject of customs and postal communications with "Manchukuo" but admitted that there was agreement on methods to be adopted in suppressing banditry in the Luantung territory and in establishing through railway traffic on the Peiping-Mukden line. General Han further stated that most of the time at Peiping was devoted to discussing the financial difficulties of the Peiping Political Council.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P. R. Tientsin/65 FOR Despatch # 431.

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED November 1, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Kwantung troops which have been stationed
at Shanhaikwan for some months past were
removed on October 5th to Chinchow according
to the vernacular newspapers.

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793.94/6522

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b. Relations with other countries.

Kwantung troops which have been stationed at Shanhaikuan for some months past were removed on October 5 to Chinchow according to vernacular newspapers. According to information given to a member of the staff of this consulate General by a well informed Japanese, only a small detachment of railway guards belonging to the Tientsin Japanese garrison are now stationed at Shanhaikuan. There are other detachments belonging to the Tientsin Japanese garrison stationed at important places along the Peiping-Shanhaikuan railway line. These detachments were strengthened recently incident to the bandit menace. Chinese representatives have announced that certain "Manchukuo" offices which have been maintained at Shanhaikuan for some months may shortly be withdrawn and that the
desire

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12555 FOR Despatch #2371

FROM China (Gauss) DATED Nov. 8, 1933
//16// NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Retrocession of the demilitarized area: Cir-
cumstances in connection with negotiations
for - . Military situation in demilitarized
area.

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793.94/6523
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./71 FOR Despatch #580

FROM Japan (Crew) DATED November 11, 1933

TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Improvement in Sino-Japanese relations seen in return of
Gen. Chiang Tso-ping, Chinese Minister to Japan on Oct. 11th;
gestures of newspaper JIJI and statement in JAPAN TIMES
of Japan's seeking of an active alliance with China against
Russia, also in fact that General Araki has proposed a con-
ference in which troubles of Far East would be ironed out.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12554 FOR Desp.#2369

FROM China (Gauss) DATED Nov.7,1933.
/tb// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Effect of Soong's
resignation upon - . Discusses this subject.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/62 FOR Desp. #9202

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Nov. 8, 1933.
NAME 1-1127 ***
///

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Current
situation of - .

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b. Relations with Japan: On October 13, 1937, Mr. Akira Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister, accompanied by several members of his staff, left Shanghai for Peiping. It was stated that he would be gone approximately a month. It is believed that Mr. Ariyoshi's visit to Peiping was for the purpose of discussing questions of fundamental importance concerning Sino-Japanese affairs with General Huang Pu and other members of the Peiping Political Council (see this office's confidential telegram of October 13, 5 p.m.). It is known that during Mr. Huang Pu's visit to Shanghai in September he was in very close touch with the Japanese Minister and other members of the staff of the Japanese Legation here. However, according to a Reuter message from Peiping dated October 23th, Mr. Ariyoshi denied that he was engaged in negotiations with the Chinese authorities and stated that Japan did not favor direct negotiations with China but preferred to dispose of Sino-Japanese problems piecemeal. He is reported

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to have said that all the Sino-Japanese negotiations now going on were between the military authorities and between General Huang Fu and the Kwantung Army.

Another high Japanese official, Dr. Yotaro Sugimura, Japanese Minister without accredited post, accompanied by Mr. I. Yemasa Tokukawa, Japanese Minister to Canada, arrived in Shanghai the day before the departure of Mr. Ariyoshi to the north. Dr. Sugimura had been visiting north China and Manchuria and after his arrival in Shanghai he made a trip to Nanking and Hankow and then departed from Shanghai for the south at the end of the month. In a press interview, Dr. Sugimura stated that he is in China merely for the purpose of studying conditions; that he has no formal negotiations to conduct but he seeks to make contacts with Chinese officials for the purpose of adjusting his own views to the actualities. He referred to the fact that the Japanese Government was anxious to see stability in China and that it would welcome the triumph of the Nanking Government over its own difficulties, but he stated that the facts were that Nanking did not exercise more than nominal control over outlying provinces and areas and it was therefore essential for the Japanese authorities to make contacts with Chinese spokesmen who could take full responsibility for the undertakings given.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/71 FOR Despatch #240 to Legn.

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Nov.6,1933
hd/// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Considerable
feeling in Chinese official circles against
Japan, aroused as a result of the abduction by
police officials of the Japanese Consulate General
on October 12th of a Korean by the name of
Poh Yi-pat. Particulars.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan.

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Considerable feeling in Chinese official circles against Japan was aroused as a result of the abduction by police officials of the Japanese Consulate General on October 12th of a Korean by the name of Poh Yi-pat (Cantonese transliteration). According to the Japanese version of the story, instructions were received from Shanghai by the Consul General to interrogate this Korean with a view to obtaining evidence in regard to the

the bomb incident of last year in Shanghai and various Communist activities of Koreans there. The police officials went to his residence and requested him to come to the Consulate General for the purpose of identifying certain photographs and of replying to questions on the basis of documents which had been received by the Consul General from Shanghai. Poh expressed his willingness to go but, after entering the car, he changed his mind and so the police officials resorted to force. While proceeding to Shamen the Japanese Consul General's car had a collision with a bus, which brought a policeman to the scene, at which point the Korean called for help. The driver of the car, then, without heeding the warning of the police authorities to stop, drove off hastily to Shamen. The man was brought into the French Concession, and the Japanese Consul General, on the following day, requested the French Consul to retain him in the consular jail so that he might be held for further inquiries.

The French Consul was in doubt as to what action he might properly take in view of the fact that he had received an intimation from the Inspector General of Foreign Affairs that the Chinese would protest this action on the ground that the Korean was a naturalized Chinese citizen. Subsequently, however,

a Councillor

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a Councillor of the Municipal Government, probably feeling that unless the French Consul held Poh the Japanese would carry him off to the Japanese warship in port, also agreed that the French Consul should hold the man. The French Consul then came to an agreement with the two parties that they were to settle the nationality of Poh without delay and that, when this question was determined he would hand over the man to the side agreed upon by them. The French Consul was influenced in his decision by the possibility that, if he refused to receive Poh and the Japanese took him to the warship, there might be some demonstrations against the Concession by Chinese agitators.

The Chinese presented three demands to the Japanese Consul General: First, that the Korean be released to them; second, that the Japanese police officials be punished for violating Chinese sovereign rights in arresting the man without authority; and third, that guarantees be given against the repetition of the offense. The Japanese Consul General said he orally admitted to the Chinese that his subordinates were at fault in using force and in failing to stop when they were told to do so by the Chinese police. He denied, however, that the man had been arrested, and refused to accede to the three demands mentioned above.

The Chinese

-3-

The Chinese authorities have continued to press the French Consul to release the man to them but he has refused to do so, pointing to his promise to hold him until the Chinese and Japanese came to an agreement among themselves. At the same time the French Consul has continued to urge the Japanese Consul General to expedite his settlement of the affair as he is naturally very much embarrassed at being involved in a matter which might result in public demonstrations against the Concession. Apparently it is the desire of the Japanese Consul General to play a waiting game in the hope that the Chinese will weaken in their demands, and he has refused to accede to the French Consul's proposal that an arrangement be made with the Chinese whereby the French Consul would turn the man over to the Chinese authorities upon obtaining from them an unconditional promise to deliver him up upon receiving a request for the execution of a summons issued by the Japanese Consul General, as Judge of the Japanese Consular Court.

It is difficult at the present writing to foretell how this case is going to end. The Chinese authorities appear to have shown considerable restraint in dealing with the matter and have thus far effectively prevented

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

any demonstrations against Shamen. Some observers fear that the Japanese Consul General is purposely trying to create an incident with the Chinese.

There have been two other incidents which have created a considerable amount of nervousness among the Chinese, who appear to apprehend that the Japanese are contemplating a movement in South China. A Japanese plane, probably from Formosa, was recently observed reconnoitering in the vicinity of Haichow, some sixty or seventy miles east of Canton, and a landing party was disembarked from a Japanese warship on the coast at the head of Bias Bay, also for the apparent purpose of making a reconnaissance.

There appears to have been a change taking place in the enforcement of the anti-Japanese boycott. Since the middle of October the activities of the National Salvation Society have been less in evidence, and there is now practically no publicity to boycott measures. Apparently the authorities are anxious to avoid giving the Japanese any pretext for intervention here.

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By Milton D. Husted NARS, Date 12-18-75

L-39 Diplomatic

Oct. 27, 1933

Ranking Office,
October 20, 1933.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 22 1933

Department of State

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I was glad to receive your letter of October 17, 1933, telling me, for my information and possible guidance in a personal way, of the contacts you have had with Barkoff, the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and with Bogomoloff, the Soviet Ambassador, in the past.

This morning I inquired whether I might return the call of Menkie, concerning whose call on me I wrote you recently, but found that he had just left for Peiping. However, Chenine, the Chinese Secretary of the Embassy, is here and I dropped in for a chat with him. Later, after he had made an appointment for me, I paid the same sort of informal visit to Bogomoloff. In both cases I used a plain card.

Chenine's English was a little limited, although correct as far as it went. He was very pleasant and we indulged in a little chit-chat. As you know, Mr. Bogomoloff speaks excellent English. With his mild, kindly air and intelligent appearance he reminds one of a college professor. He asked me a number of questions regarding

Chinese

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

F/ESP

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese relations with Japan, etc., paying me the compliment of saying that he was sure that I knew the inside of all these matters. Quite truthfully disclaiming this compliment, I returned matter of fact replies, which embodied only those facts that are pretty generally known to everybody who has followed recent Chinese events. He was, naturally, very much interested in the possibility that the present policy of the Peking Government might be to come to an understanding with Japan and he asked me whether I thought there had been a recent change of policy in this direction. I told him I thought there had. Owing to unavoidable circumstances I was unable to talk with Bogomoloff for more than about fifteen minutes, so had no opportunity to ask him any questions in return, but I shall do so in the future and I feel confident that he will give me some sort of well-considered replies. Ingram has told me of a recent conversation he had with Bogomoloff, in which the latter made some interesting observations.

Ingram, by the way, last Saturday (October 14) had a talk in Shanghai with T. V. Soong. He said that T. V. seemed rather generally discouraged about the state of affairs. For one thing, T. V. said that on his return he found the trend of opinion in the Government advanced much further toward the point of direct negotiations with Japan than he had anticipated.

T. V. told Ingram that the Japanese had advanced a definite plan for an economic and military alliance with China. T. V. remarked that, of course, this would

mean

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mean simply that Japan would have liberty to bring troops into China and would try to effect an economic domination of the country. The quid pro quo offered by Japan contained various items which amounted to little, such as the return of one or two concession areas, but also the startling offer of recognition by Japan of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the return of Jehol. He did not specifically mention the cancellation of extra-territoriality. I gathered that T. V. still feels that any rapprochement with Japan would be fatal, but that he thinks that it is rather hopeless for him to try to stem the drift in that direction. However, I also gathered from Ingram's remarks that T. V. admitted the necessity for some sort of a modus vivendi between China and Japan. He gave Ingram the impression that he does not believe that the Japanese Government is consciously following out a cut and dried program for the advancement of the Pan-Asiatic Movement, that is the deliberate execution of one measure after another, the seizure of Manchuria, the seizure of Jehol, then of North China, etc. I told Ingram that this surprised me, for it seemed in such direct contradiction to the statement made to me by Joong during my last interview on October 3, reported in my letter No. L-32, Diplomatic, of October 5, to the effect that he had positive proof that the Japanese were pursuing a deliberate plan of further expansion, one part of which was the alienation of North China. However, in his remark to Ingram T. V. may have had in mind a plan for the domination of all Asia. It would be difficult

for

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for anyone to suppose that the Japanese were consciously embarking on so vast a scheme.

Ingram said that Bogomoloff had told him that he, too, did not think that the Japanese were engaged in carrying out a formulated plan.

Between my two informal visits with the Soviet officials I took luncheon at the Japanese Consulate General, where Sugimura and Tokugawa were the guests of honor. The other guests were the diplomatic representatives in Nanking of the German, British, French, Italian and American Legations. The German Minister, Dr. Trautmann, was there. I did not hear any conversation of political interest. Sugimura, who was formerly the Deputy Secretary of the League of Nations, told an amusing anecdote regarding Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary. He said that the Japanese delegation on one occasion entered a room where Sir John Simon was, and the latter advanced toward the Japanese with much enthusiasm, saying, "That's right. Get together. Get together." He was under the mistaken impression that he was addressing a party composed of both Japanese and Chinese.

This afternoon I accompanied Dr. Schurman who is now my house-guest on a call on Dr. Wang Ching-wei. I took no part in the conversation. Nothing of especial interest was said by Dr. Wang, except that in reply to Dr. Schurman's observation that he had come back to China to see what political advance had been made in the country since his period of residence here as Minister from 1921 to 1925, Dr. Wang remarked that not much progress
had

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had been made of late, owing to the Sino-Japanese controversy. Dr. Wang, apropos of a general discussion of the present European political situation, observed that the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations and the withdrawal of Germany seemed to have been actuated by entirely different reasons, but that Japan was evidently greatly pleased by Germany's withdrawal. He ascribed Germany's withdrawal to the fact that Germany had been "pressed out" of the League by France. Dr. Schurman's replies to Dr. Wang's questions about Germany's international situation were very interesting, but hardly have a place in a letter which is already too long and should, moreover, confine itself to matters relating to the Far East.

I am giving a dinner this evening in honor of Dr. Schurman, to which I have invited the President of the Executive Yuan, the Director of the Political Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan, the Minister of Education, the Secretary General of the National Economic Council and the Director of Customs Administration in the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Schurman has not attempted to make a round of calls, but the guests tonight will give him a fairly comprehensive idea of some of the men who are actually doing things here in Nanking. Dr. Schurman arrived in Nanking on the morning of October 18 and will leave on the morning of October 22. I am greatly enjoying this visit from the Chief with whom I worked very happily in Peking ten years ago. He is wonderfully alert and his comments on current events are very interesting.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I am not attempting to obtain an appointment to call on T. V. Soong during this visit. Presumably nothing has occurred to alter his attitude toward affairs in general since my conversation with him on October 3 and his conversation with Ingram on October 14, which Ingram kindly told me about this afternoon and there seems to be no pending "case" which requires me to see him. He is very busy and, in addition, on this occasion he has brought his family with him, presumably for something in the nature of a rest. I invited T. V. and Mrs. Soong to dinner on October 19, but was informed that they had a previous engagement. T. V. and Dr. Schurman sat at the same table on the steamer crossing the Pacific last August.

Nothing in this letter seemed to me to warrant formal report, but I am enclosing a copy, in case you wish
1/ to send it to Stanley Hornbeck.

Yours sincerely,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure
1/ Copy of letter as stated.

In duplicate to the American Legation.

WRP:HC

A true copy of
the signed original.
HC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

December 12, 1933.



Mr. William O. Scroggs, Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Jacobs.

793.94

Mr. Scroggs was introduced to me this morning by Mr. Hornbeck, who stated that the former wished to ask certain questions in regard to China. Mr. Scroggs then came to my office where, after stating that the information which he sought was to be used for background only and not for publication, he inquired with regard to certain matters, as follows:

1. The Tientsin Truce Agreement:

Mr. Scroggs inquired whether we could confirm rumors to the effect that at the time the Tientsin truce agreement was signed the Chinese agreed to meet the Japanese in regard to a number of points which are not mentioned in the truce agreement itself. I replied that we had no information to that effect, although, as the truce agreement left untouched a number of outstanding problems between China and Japan in North China, it would be reasonable to assume that the negotiators of the truce agreement discussed those problems.

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DEC 18 1933

F/ESP

793.94/6529

- 2 -

2. American Troops at Chinwangtao:

893.0146
Mr. Scroggs stated that, in connection with the disturbances in North China, he had seen a number of references to American troops at Chinwangtao. He inquired what troops we had there and the purpose of their being there. I pointed out to Mr. Scroggs that we, along with certain other powers, were entitled to station troops at certain places in North China under the Boxer Protocol of 1901; that most of the troops so stationed in North China were at Tientsin and Peiping and that the number of American troops at Chinwangtao was very small, a mere handful of men kept there to take care of a rifle range where members of the American military establishments at Peiping and Tientsin repaired during the summer months for target practice.

3. Ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway:

761.77 China
(East)
Mr. Scroggs stated that the Soviet Government had recently alleged that it now owned the Chinese Eastern Railway completely, as China was no longer concerned. He inquired whether we knew of any arguments that might be used in substantiation of this Soviet position. I replied that the question of the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway was rather complicated and that we were not in position to be of assistance in a matter which lent itself so readily to arguments on both sides.

4.

1025

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

893.01-*Manchukuo*

4. Non-Recognition:

Mr. Scroggs inquired whether our policy in regard to the non-recognition of "Manchukuo" still remained the same. I replied that so far as I knew there had been no change in our policy in that connection.

811.33

5. Movements of the United States Fleet:

Mr. Scroggs inquired whether the recent transfer of the fleet to the Atlantic had anything to do with our policy in the Far East. I replied that, so far as I knew, the reasons for the movements of the fleet were separate and distinct from our policy in the Far East. I added that the movements of the fleet were under the control of the Navy Department and, I believed, motivated to ^a much greater degree by technical and domestic considerations than by considerations of foreign policy.

Mr. Scroggs then thanked me for the interview which thereupon terminated.

J.E.F.
JEJ/VDM

SKIT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 22, 1933.

~~WED:~~

~~RCM:~~

~~SJP:~~

Peiping's confidential despatch
No. 2392 under date November 22, 1933,
encloses a memorandum of conversation
between Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Suma, the
First Secretary of the Japanese Legation.

The second paragraph of the Legation's
despatch summarizes the important points
mentioned in the memorandum. With regard
to the rumors of American assistance to
China, mentioned in the last four lines of
the despatch, Mr. Suma stated that rumors
were current in Shanghai and that most of
them emanated from Chinese who hoped
thereby to cause Japanese to believe that
China was getting spiritual and material
aid from the United States.

ETW
ETW/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 2392

Peiping, November 22, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

DEC 19 1933

Copy to FE
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 19 1933
Department of State
W. H. P. 42

793.94

F/ESP

793.94/6550

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

FILED

DEC 26 1933

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, as of possible interest, a memorandum of a conversation held on November 16 between Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, who accompanied his Minister on the latter's recent trip to Peiping, and a member of the Legation staff.


Mr. Suma discussed negotiations at Peiping between Chinese officials and Japanese military and other authorities,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

orities, asserting that negotiations had ceased and would not be resumed until they could be conducted on a solid basis; the separatist movement in Fukien Province, which he interpreted as being principally directed toward ousting certain allegedly pro-Japanese Chinese officials and as possibly having some connection with Mr. T. V. Soong; General Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist campaign, which Mr. Suma does not believe will succeed; and rumors with regard to American assistance to China, which he felt could be allayed to some extent by a freer interchange of information between Japanese and American officials.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

 C. E. Gauss,
 Counselor of Legation.

4 Carbon Copies
 Received --- K.H.C.---

Enclosure: ✓

- 1/ Copy of memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation and Mr. Salisbury on November 16, 1933.

Copy to Tokyo.

File No. 710.

LES:LMK

1025

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 397
Despatch No. 397

Peiping, November 16, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION. SINO-JAPANESE
RELATIONS
Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary, Japanese Legation.
Mr. Salisbury.

When questioned with regard to negotiations between Chinese officials at Peiping and Japanese with regard to the establishment of customs houses along the Great Wall, postal communications, and through railway traffic, Mr. Suma stated that he could definitely say that no negotiations are going on at present and that there will be no negotiations until they can be conducted on a solid basis. By this he apparently meant that negotiations would not be resumed until Nanking officials had clarified their attitude toward negotiations with the Japanese and had studied the proposals discussed at Peiping.

With regard to the reported assembling in Foochow of South China generals, Mr. Suma stated that he interpreted the movement as only another of the periodical threats unfriendly to Nanking originating in the South, only this time it gained significance because of the possible effect on the Nanking Government. Mr. Suma believed the principal objective of the movement to be to oust from office Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Committee of the Executive Yuan, apparently interpreting this situation along lines of pro- and anti- Japanese feeling. With
regard

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

regard to Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Mr. Suma said that he had at present no important support, that he was formerly strong in the Kuomintang but that the latter, since the Tangku Armistice, had been steadily losing influence, Mr. Wang's position thereby being weakened. He added that Mr. Wang Ching-wei, hoping to strengthen his position, had attempted to persuade Mr. T. V. Soong, until recently Minister of Finance, to visit Tokyo last August, while en route from the United States to China, for the purpose of meeting high Japanese officials there but that Mr. Soong refused to follow the suggestion.

Mr. Suma stated that the most important decision reached at the Third Kuling Conference, early in September of this year, was with regard to Nanking's policy toward Japan, a policy not fundamental but temporary.

With regard to General Huang Fu, Mr. Suma said that he had neither arms nor money behind him. In his opinion, if Mr. Wang Ching-wei and General Huang Fu were forced out of office, then the Japanese would be content to have as a substitute for General Huang Fu in the North only some Chinese close to General Chiang Kai-shek. Apparently he anticipated that General Chiang would be able to retain power even if the other two officials went. He added that it was not the man but the man's relations with General Chiang that are important to the Japanese. Mr. Suma said that the Japanese suspected Mr. T. V. Soong of having some connection with General Gh'en Ming-ch'u, the alleged leader of the Foochow movement, the only definite basis for such suspicion being knowledge

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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knowledge that Soong recently sent one million dollars to the South; that an emissary had been going back and forth between Mr. Soong and General Ch'en, and that Mr. Soong had been talking to Mr. Sun Fo, Mr. Sun Fo had been talking to Mr. Hu Han-min, and that the latter had been talking to General Ch'en.

Mr. Suma did not put much credence in the report that the Southern generals intended to enter into an alliance with the communists against General Chiang Kai-shek, as General Ch'en Ming-ch'u was a politician who would scarcely enter into such an alliance, although it was to be remembered that one of General Ch'en Chi-t'ang's subordinate generals is stationed on the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border and has relations with the communists because of the desirability of keeping a buffer of communists between General Chiang and the South.

With regard to General Chiang Kai-shek's communist campaign in Kiangsi, Mr. Suma said that the Japanese have no good information in this regard but that he did not believe the campaign would succeed.

At the close of the conversation Mr. Suma said that he would like to speak frankly with regard to numerous rumors which were current in Shanghai with regard to alleged American aid to the Chinese. He said that although most of these rumors emanated from Chinese, who hoped thereby to cause Japanese to believe that China was getting spiritual and material aid from the United States, he regretted the rumors deeply and thought that it would be advisable for the American and Japanese officials to

exchange

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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exchange information more freely in order that there might be better understanding. Mr. Salisbury concurred that the adoption of this suggestion would be helpful.

LES:LMK

703
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 27, 1933.


JES:

~~ROM:~~

~~SUP:~~

~~S&H:~~

The attached despatch from Nanking under date November 15, 1933, briefly summarizes its two enclosures, memoranda of conversations between the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Peck and Mr. Johnson in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.


ETW/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Nanking Office,
November 15, 1933.

DEC 19 1933

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations; Interviews
with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For			
To field in USA			

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. D-566 of November 7, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Relations", with which was enclosed a report of a conversation held by me with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation held by me with Mr. Tang Yu-jen on November 13, 1933, at a luncheon. In the course of a short talk Mr. Tang observed that China was faced with two difficulties, which could not be dealt with satisfactorily at the same time, i.e. the Communist situation and the Japanese controversy. Mr. Tang made the significant remark that if the Communist forces should succeed in their present attempt to interrupt traffic on the Yangtze River, then Japanese military force would undoubtedly make itself felt in the lower Yangtze.

There is enclosed, also, a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Tang and the American Minister held on November 14, concerning Sino-Japanese relations. While the entire conversation was interesting, the Department will note that Mr. Tang's principal assertions were that the

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
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- 2 -

the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, with the Japanese forces was forced on the National Government by the fact that the Government had insufficient troops with which to fight the Japanese successfully and a losing fight would simply have brought about the occupation of North China by the Japanese; that the concluding of the Truce did not mean any abandonment by China of its rights to Manchuria, the fate of which area was a world question and must be decided by the world, not by China and Japan; that Mr. Tang had pointed out to Japanese authorities the danger to Japan which would be involved in action by Japan in Manchuria which would never meet with the acquiescence of the United States and Great Britain; and that China is relying on the United States to maintain its announced position with reference to Manchuria.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/ Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Peck, on November 13, 1933.
- 2/ Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the American Minister, on November 14, 1933.

In duplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy at Tokyo.

WRP:HC

1034

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 13, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Peck.

At a luncheon given by Admiral Chen, Minister of the Navy, for the American Minister, Mr. Peck had a few minutes of private conversation with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the luncheon table an arrangement had been made for Mr. Johnson to call on Mr. Tang at 3 p.m. on the following day, November 14. In their conversation after luncheon, Mr. Tang expressed a polite desire to call on the American Minister, rather than to receive a call from him. Mr. Peck said that as the arrangement had already been made it had better stand.

Mr. Peck said that he had profited greatly by the conversations he had had with Mr. Tang, which conversations he had already reported to the American Minister. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Peck said, wished to have a conversation with Mr. Tang and Mr. Peck hoped that Mr. Tang would be equally frank with the Minister.

Mr. Tang said he would be glad to have a conversation with Mr. Johnson, especially since he wished to explain China's international position at the present moment. Mr. Tang said, in brief, that China was faced with two difficulties, which could not be dealt with satisfactorily at the same time. One of these difficulties was the

Communist

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Communist situation and the other was the Japanese problem. Mr. Tang said that if the Communist forces succeeded in their present attempt and interrupted traffic on the Yangtze River, then Japanese military force would undoubtedly make itself felt in the lower Yangtze. Consequently it was urgently necessary, Mr. Tang pointed out, to defeat the Communists first. The two problems simply could not be confused one with the other.

Mr. Peck said that he himself felt that this view was entirely reasonable. Mr. Peck said that he might tell Mr. Tang quite frankly that there were certain reports about his, Mr. Tang's, attitude. Mr. Tang interjected quickly that he knew what these reports were, namely, that he was pro-Japanese. Mr. Peck said that this was so but, as he had just said, he quite saw the logic of the views just expressed, to the effect that China could not deal satisfactorily with her political problems simultaneously.

WRP:HC

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 14, 1933.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

The American Minister.

Mr. Peck.

Mr. Johnson called on Mr. Tang at the Foreign Office, accompanied by Mr. Peck. The conversation was interpreted by the latter.

Mr. Johnson inquired whether Mr. Tang would be willing to summarize briefly the present situation of the National Government with reference to its internal and external problems. What follows is the gist of remarks made by Mr. Tang in reference to Sino-Japanese relations. In general, Mr. Tang was not prompted by questions from Mr. Johnson, but proceeded from point to point in a systematic survey.

Referring to the Sino-Japanese controversy, Mr. Tang recalled that just before the Tangku Truce was negotiated (May 31, 1933) the larger part of the Government's forces were in Kiangsi, to oppose the Communists. It is true that there were some 70,000 or 80,000 troops in North China but only four or five divisions, a small portion, could have been counted on to fight against the Japanese, if that course had been decided upon. Under these circumstances, to have fought with the Japanese would have been merely to invite the occupation of North China down to the Yangtze by Japanese troops, who would have come

over

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

over in ever increasing numbers. It was impossible, therefore, for China to fight Japan and the truce was unavoidable.

The Government has been brought to a change in its manner of handling the Sino-Japanese controversy. It adheres steadfastly, however, to the principles it has followed from the beginning. That is, under no circumstances will the Government perform any act which could be construed as recognizing the existence of "Manchukuo" or as admitting that Manchuria has been alienated from China. At the same time, the Chinese Government is willing to negotiate with Japan on small matters not involving fundamental principles. The Government will avoid a contentious attitude in such small matters.

Among the fundamental principles to which the Government steadfastly adheres is that of continuing its free intercourse with Great Britain and the United States. It will not consent to confine its relations to Japan. One reason for the Government's resolute determination in regard to this is the fact that it regards the question of Manchuria as a world question, and not as a Sino-Japanese question. The world must decide the fate of Manchuria, not China and Japan.

Mr. Tang alluded to the fact that he was commonly spoken of as being "pro-Japanese". He said that whatever might be the truth or falsity of that designation, he was on such terms with Japanese civil, naval and military authorities that he could converse with them, and he had pointed out to them unequivocally that nothing whatever would be gained if Japan by force majeure compelled China

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- 3 -

to cede Manchuria to Japan. The United States and Great Britain would never acquiesce in such a transaction, nor would the Soviet Government. The fate of Manchuria involved dangers for Japan, but not because China would in the near future be able to wreak vengeance on Japan. The danger lay in the fact that Great Britain and the United States and especially the Soviet Union would never acquiesce in such a settlement.

With special reference to this phase of the subject, Mr. Tang expressed the hope that the United States would maintain unchanged its announced policy of justice in regard to Manchuria. In saying that China must rely on the United States to safeguard its rights in Manchuria, he did not mean that China had any desire that the United States should fight Japan. It was his opinion, he said, that if the United States maintained its announced policy, Japan would ultimately come to a realization of the mistakes it had committed and would, itself, revise its Manchurian policy.

Replying to the implied question, Mr. Johnson answered that so far as he was aware the American Government had not altered its announced stand in regard to the Manchurian question.

Referring to negotiations between General Huang Fu and General Okamura in Peiping recently, Mr. Tang made substantially the same statements which he had made to Mr. Peck in an interview on November 6 (see despatch No. D-566, November 7, 1933). The point he emphasized was that the National Government would under no circumstances concede anything in principle to Japan in reference to Manchuria.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In this connection, Mr. Tang made a statement the accuracy of which may be questioned. He said that the discussions regarding the "passes" in the Great Wall related only to their military occupation and not to "Customs stations". (In Chinese, ambiguity is possible. Press despatch indicate that Huang Fu and Okamura discussed branch Customs stations at these passes in the Great Wall and that "Customs authorities are reported to have drawn up a list of 36 categories of Chinese goods produced in Manchuria which will be exempt from payment of import duty when entering the Great Wall".) Mr. Tang's statement is somewhat explained by the REUTER message just quoted. What he said was that, however, the establishing of the proposed Customs stations would mean free entry into China for goods from Manchuria and no free entry for Chinese goods into Manchuria, through the Great Wall, a situation which the National Government would not tolerate.

Mr. Tang observed that he was not by profession a diplomat and might be allowed, therefore, to say an undiplomatic thing. This was that, to his regret, Chinese leaders were often classified as "pro-British and pro-American" or "pro-Japanese". These parties, unfortunately, seem to give their attention to schemes for the benefit of the countries to which they are supposed to be partial, instead of to schemes for the benefit of China. What Mr. Tang hoped for, he said, was an ever increasing number of Chinese who would devote their energies to the welfare of China. After all, China must extricate itself from its difficulties by the use of its own resources.

Mr. Johnson thanked Mr. Tang for his lucid and frank

exposition

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

exposition of the political situation in China today. He said that he hoped that Mr. Tang would find time to have a conversation with Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, when Mr. Hamilton should come to Nanking in the course of the next two or three weeks and that Mr. Tang would talk with equal frankness to him. Mr. Tang said that he would be glad to talk with Mr. Hamilton.

WRP:HC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 JAN 2 1934
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 December 28, 1933.

~~JEJ:~~
~~RSM:~~
~~SJT:~~
~~SAT:~~

Nanking's despatch under date November 16, 1933, refers to a previous despatch to the Legation (copy apparently not as yet received by the Department) and encloses a memorandum of a conversation between the American Minister and Dr. Wang Ching-wei in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.

Dr. Wang stated that he and General Chiang Kai-shek had given orders that all questions between China and Japan should be approached with the greatest caution. Provocative acts are to be avoided, but no settlements will be made which may be interpreted as an abandonment of the policy pursued at Geneva. Dr. Wang stated that there was no truth in stories to the effect that the Government intended to adopt a pro-Japanese policy. He also remarked that China was grateful for the friendly and interested attitude which the United States had shown.

ew
 ETW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking Office, November 16, 1933.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 19 1933

Department of State

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations - Statement
by Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of
the Executive Yuan and Concurrently
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For			
	To file in U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Referring to my despatch No.L-68 Diplomatic, of
November 11, 1933, to the American Minister at Peiping,
copies of which presumably have been sent to the Depart-
ment, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Relations: Negoti-
ations at Peiping", I have the honor to enclose a memo-
randum prepared by the American Minister of his conver-
sation on November 9, 1933, with Dr. Wang Ching-wei,
President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Relations".

With my despatch referred to, I submitted a Japanese
statement regarding recent Japanese-Chinese relations,
while the enclosure hereto embodies a statement from the
Chinese Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Depart-
ment will note that Dr. Wang Ching-wei stated emphatically

that

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that while the Chinese Government would do nothing to provoke trouble, it is determined not to make any settlements which might be interpreted as an abandonment of the policy pursued at Geneva.

Respectfully yours,

For the American Minister:


Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation dated
Nanking, November 9, 1933.

In triplicate to the Department of State
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.

800

WRP:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, November 9, 1933.

Conversation with: Dr. Wang Ching-wei.
 Mr. Peck present.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

In the course of a conversation this afternoon, Dr. Wang Ching-wei stated that he wished to explain to me the situation which had arisen in connection with Sino-Japanese relations. He commented upon the fact that there were numerous rumors current to the effect that the Chinese had made arrangements with the Japanese military in Peiping, through General Huang Pu, in regard to certain matters, and that this indicated that there had been a change of policy on the part of the Government in favor of more intimate relations with Japan - a pro-Japanese policy, in other words.

Dr. Wang pointed out that both in and out of the Government there were opinions both for and against a more friendly situation between China and

Japan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japan. He wished to take this opportunity, however, to assure me that there was no ground for these rumors; that both he and General Chiang Kai-shek had given instructions that all questions between China and Japan should be approached with the greatest caution. They, of course, did not want trouble and would do nothing to provoke the Japanese, but on the other hand, they were determined not to make any settlements which might be interpreted as an abandonment of the policy pursued at Geneva. China was grateful for the friendly and interested attitude of the United States throughout this difficulty and he wanted us to know that China would continue to follow the policy which had previously been outlined; that there was no truth in stories to the effect that the Government intended to adopt a pro-Japanese policy.

American Minister.

NTJ:MM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 27, 1933.

~~JED:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~SET:~~
~~S-W:~~

Nanking's despatch No. D-571 under date November 13, 1933, refers to previous despatches in regard to the Sino-Japanese negotiations being conducted by Generals Huang Fu and Okamura and encloses a memorandum of conversation between the American Minister and the Minister of Industries on the subject of the negotiations.

The Minister of Industries stated that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei had instructed Huang Fu not to sign any agreement with the Japanese without the previous instructions of the National Government. Particular reference was made to agreements in regard to railway through traffic, postal arrangements and customs stations, these being the three subjects in regard to which General Okamura had specially come to Peiping. The Minister of Industries also stated that no decision would be arrived at by the National Government on these three subjects until a committee of investigation, which had been organized, had tendered a report.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
- 2 -

In concluding, the Minister of Industries stated emphatically that there had been no change in the policy of the National Government toward Japan although "there might be changes in method of handling matters between China and Japan."

ETW
ETW/VDM


1051
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-571

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Nanking, China, November 17, 1933

793.94
Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations:
Negotiations at Peiping.



F/ESP

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For			
To field			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
In U S A			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

AM 1133
DATE
DEC 19 1933
Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent reports submitted to the Department and the American Legation at Peiping concerning the action of the National Government in sending to General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Adjustment Committee, instructions to refrain from coming to an agreement with General Okamura, of the Japanese Kwantung Army, in regard to railway through-traffic between China and Manchuria, postal facilities, and Customs stations along the border of the Japanese-occupied territory.

The American Minister, now in Nanking paid a call on Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of Industries, on November 9, 1933, and in the course of the conversation Mr. Chen explained some of the circumstances surrounding the sending of the instruction above described. Mr. Johnson's memorandum of the conversation is enclosed herewith.

1/

It seemed clear that the Minister of Industries was not giving a full and frank account of what had

occurred

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JAN 2 - 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

occurred at the meeting of the Central Political Council on November 8, 1933, when the matter of the Peiping negotiations was discussed. His reticence was probably to be explained by the fact that these meetings are supposed to be held in camera.

That instructions were sent either by the National Government or by Dr. Wang Ching-wei and General Chiang Kai-shek jointly to General Huang Fu on November 7 or 8, directing that he refrain from coming to an agreement with General Okamura, is incontestable. The numerous sources from which this office has obtained information have not, however, made it clear whether Wang and Chiang sent a telegram on their own initiative on November 7, whether they sent such a telegram under instructions from the National Government on November 8, or whether Wang and Chiang sent one telegram and the National Government sent another. These details are, perhaps, inconsequential. The result of the flare-up in Nanking on November 7 and November 8 was that the attempt of General Huang Fu and General Okamura to come to a formal agreement in regard to the subjects listed above was suspended before it was successful.

Respectfully yours,

For the American Minister:

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation and
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1/ Mr. Johnson's memorandum of conversation,
dated Nanking, November 9, 1933.

In duplicate to the Department of State
Copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
800
WRP:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, November 9, 1933

Conversation with: Mr. Chen Kung-po, Minister of
Industries.
Mr. Peck present.

Subject: Domestic Situation.

I remarked to Mr. Chen that it was some months since we had met in Peiping and that I had come to pay my respects to him on coming to Nanking.

In the course of the conversation which followed I observed to Mr. Chen that a good many rumors regarding events in the political world had been going about recently. These rumors related to events in Nanking and to the discussions which had been going on between the Chinese and the Japanese representatives in Peiping. I observed that in Peiping there were, likewise, a great many rumors and since the discussions were carried on there in an atmosphere of great secrecy, it was very difficult to get any idea of what was actually going on.

Mr. Chen said that he would be glad to tell me what had actually been transpiring, because many of the rumors which had been published were without foundation.

In brief, Mr. Chen said that on November 7, Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone by airplane

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to Nanchang, Kiangsi, to have a conference with General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, and that they two had had a consultation regarding the growing anxiety of the public occasioned by the report that General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Commission, had come to a definite arrangement in regard to important matters with General Okamura, of the Kwantung Army. As a result of their deliberations Wang and Chiang had jointly sent a telegram to General Huang Fu, directing him on no account to sign any agreement without the previous instructions of the National Government. Dr. Wang and General Chiang particularly directed that no final agreement should be concluded in regard to railway through-traffic with Manchuria, postal arrangements or customs stations, these being the three subjects in regard to which General Okamura had specially come to Peiping.

Mr. Chen confirmed the report that the Central Political Council had held a meeting on the morning of November 8, and had questioned Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the Sino-Japanese negotiations at Peiping. Mr. Tang, in view of the fact that he was merely the "Administrative" Vice

Minister

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Minister, was unwilling to attempt to answer these questions, and attempted, in his capacity of Secretary General of the Central Political Council, to shelve these inquiries until the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ching-wei, should return from Nanchang. The members of the Council were very indignant that a mere officer of the Council, such as the Secretary General, should attempt to interfere with free discussion in this way and Mr. Tang was obliged to give some sort of reply.

Mr. Peck remarked that there had been a report in Nanking that the Central Political Council had passed a resolution at its meeting on the morning of November 8 directing that the National Government send instructions to General Huang Fu to cease all discussions with General Okamura. Mr. Chen Kung-po admitted that a resolution had been passed, but he said that it was not of the nature described by Mr. Peck. He said that the resolution called for telegraphic instructions from the National Government to General Huang Fu and that this telegram directed him to avoid the discussion of railway through-traffic with Manchuria, postal matters and customs stations.

Mr. Chen

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Chen Kung-po informed me that the National Government had organized a committee of the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Railways and Communications to give careful study to the matter of arrangements to be come to with the Japanese in regard to railway, postal and Customs matters in the Peiping area, and no decision would be arrived at by the Government, nor instructions for signing issued, until the report of this committee had been tendered.

(Note. The meetings of the Central Political Council are, in theory, held in secret, and it was natural that Mr. Chen should show some reluctance and reticence in discussing the proceedings with the American Minister. Mr. Chen remarked that he was going to Shanghai on November 10 or 11 and would see Mr. T. V. Soong and other persons there. He remarked that if he and I should meet in Shanghai or in Nanking, after this visit, he would give me a full account of everything which had transpired, to serve as the basis of a report to my Government.)

Mr. Chen particularly assured me that the recent resignation of Mr. T. V. Soong from the post of Minister of Finance had not been occasioned by a difference of

opinion

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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opinion within the Government on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations. He informed me confidentially that the resignation was occasioned by friction between Mr. Soong and General Chiang which had extended over several years. Mr. Chen said, emphatically, that there had been no change in the "policy" of the National Government toward Japan, although there might be changes in method of handling matters between China and Japan.

A.T.S.

American Minister.

WRP:HC:MM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 26, 1933.

~~JEJ:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~RCM:~~

~~SJT:~~

~~SKN:~~

Amoy's despatch No. 188 under date November 11, 1933, reports that Mr. Yotora Sugimura (who states that he is a Minister of Japan without portfolio) recently visited Amoy.

Mr. Sugimura informed Mr. Franklin that he was not calling on the Chinese officials at Amoy as they were rather sensitive about his calling and the time was not ripe to make such calls. He stated that his trip was principally to feel out the strength of the anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese.

Mr. Franklin states that there was an air of anti-Americanism about Mr. Sugimura, but that he appeared to show a marked air of friendliness toward the French Consul which apparently was reciprocated.

Mr. Sugimura is reported to have made substantially the following statements during his visit to Amoy.

(a) It is futile for China to look

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


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to the League and the United States for help. The Japanese are the real friends, historically and racially, of the Chinese.

(b) Japan is at present threatened by two white peoples — the Americans and the Russians. Japan must look to her allies of the yellow race in order to meet such a situation as another world war about 1936 between the white and yellow races.

Mr. Franklin feels that Mr. Sugimura did not succeed in "scaring" the Chinese and that his arguments were not considered logical by the Chinese.

Mr. Franklin concludes by stating that marked cordiality was displayed by the Chinese toward the American Military Attaché and himself during Mr. Sugimura's visit to Amoy.


ETW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 188.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Amoy, China

DEC 19 33

November 11, 1933.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 20 1933

Department of State

SUBJECT: Political Report (Visit of Yotora Sugimura
(Japanese Minister at Large)).

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.

I have the honor to transmit, for the information of
the Department, a copy of my despatch to the Minister,
No. 134, dated November 11, 1933, Subject: "Political
Report (Visit of Yotora Sugimura Japanese Minister at Large)."

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin
Lynn W. Franklin,
American Consul.

200
LWF/T

transmitted in quintuplicate (one copy marked "for the
files of the Commercial Office").

JAN 3 - 1934

FILED

F/ESP

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793.94/6534

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 134.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Amoy, China, November 11, 1933.

Subject: Political Report (Visit of Yotora Sugimura
(Japanese Minister at Large)).

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform the Legation that Mr. Yotora Sugimura, who states he is a Minister of Japan without portfolio, informed me at the dinner given in his honor at the Japanese Consulate, November 6th, last, that he was not calling on the Chinese officials at Amoy as they were rather sensitive about his calling and the time was not ripe as yet to make such calls, but he could see no reason why China and Japan should not be close friends. I must admit that, in spite of his congeniality and apparent wide experience, there was, to me, a feeling of anti-Americanism about him. His attitude towards the French Consul (and it apparently was reciprocated) was of marked friendliness. Mr. Sugimura informed me that his trip was principally to feel out the strength of the anti-Japanese feeling amongst the Chinese.

According to the local vernacular press and statements of prominent Chinese of the community, Mr. Sugimura, during his stay at Amoy, stated at different gatherings where he was present, that it was futile for the Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to depend upon any help coming from the League of Nations and America. He deplored the short-sightedness of the Chinese in seeking assistance from such sources; that the Japanese were their real friends, historically and racially, and that it was illogical to think that "white people" could be their friends.

Several of the more prominent Chinese officials managed to evade the various gatherings where Mr. Sugimura was present. Mr. Sugimura spoke at the local Rotary Club, the Japanese owned Hick Eng School, Formosan Club and International Club.

Among other things, one of the local newspapers reports, Minister Sugimura stated that Japan is at present threatened by two white peoples - the Americans and the Russians - that Japan to keep her position must depend on her allies of the yellow race and that the North-eastern people, the Koreans, the Formosans, and the Japanese must be united and friendly to each other in order to meet such a situation as another world war about 1936 between the "white" and the "yellow" races.

Mr. Sugimura departed for Swatow November 10, 1933, on a Japanese steamer.

Minister Sugimura's visit has created comment in Amoy but it is believed that he did not succeed in "scaring" the Chinese and that his arguments were not considered logical ones by the Chinese.

Marked cordiality on the part of the local Chinese officials and prominent Chinese were displayed towards Colonel Walter S. Drysdale, American Military Attaché, and me, during Minister Sugimura's visit to Amoy, and it is believed that it was an effort on the part of the

Chinese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Chinese to let it be known that the Minister's efforts to instill suspicion in their minds towards America were unsuccessful.

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin,
 American Consul.

800.
 LWF:CCS.

Original to Legation, Peiping.
 In quintuplicate to Department of State, one copy marked
 "For the files of the Commercial Office."
 One copy to American Consul General, Nanking.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./74 FOR Despatch #2386

FROM China (Gauss1) DATED Nov.21,1933
//79// NAME 1-1127 oyo

793.94/6535
1.535

REGARDING: Apprehension of Japanese action in South China:
Cites a number of incidents involving Japanese
or Japanese subjects, which gave rise to uneasiness
on the part of Chinese that Japan intended some
move of a military nature.

fpg

e. Apprehension of Japanese action in South China:

193.94
A number of incidents involving Japanese or Japanese subjects occurred in South China, which gave rise to uneasiness on the part of Chinese that Japan intended some move of a military nature in that area. For example: a Japanese plane, probably from Formosa, reconnoitered at a point some 60 or 70 miles east of Canton;⁹ a party landed from a Japanese warship at the head of Bias Bay, apparently for reconnaissance;⁹ the Japanese Consul General at Canton was regarded by certain observers as intentionally having tried to create an incident with the Chinese in connection with the arrest in Chinese territory at that port, by police officials attached to the Japanese Consulate General, of a Korean allegedly a Chinese citizen;⁹ 20 alleged Formosans attacked the Anti-Japanese Boycott Society at Swatow;¹⁰ and a clash occurred at Foochow between Chinese and members of an organization recently formed there by Formosans under the name of the "Taiwan Young Men's Corps".¹¹ Perhaps as a result of some of these incidents and to avoid giving

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3. Nanking's despatch to Legation No. L-579 Consular of November 7.
 4. Tsinan's despatch to Legation No. 53 of November 6.
 5. Amoy's despatch to Legation No. 133 of November 2.
 6. Canton's despatch to Legation No. 240 of November 6.
 7. Yunnanfu's despatch to Legation No. 81 of November 2.
 8. Swatow's despatch to Legation No. 40 of November 3.
 9. Canton's despatch to Legation No. 240 of November 6.
 10. Swatow's despatch to Legation No. 40 of November 3.
 11. Foochow's despatch to Legation No. 197 of November 1.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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giving the Japanese pretext for intervention, there occurred at Canton a noticeable lessening of the campaign for the boycott of Japanese goods. Perhaps the Chinese were also influenced in their apprehension by knowledge that the defences of Hongkong were being increased¹² because, according to some observers, of the uncertainty of Japan's future actions in South China. Also, the Chinese may have felt that the Japanese realized that by intimidating Canton into abandoning the boycott the entire movement throughout China would probably collapse. However, if the Japanese had any such intention as that ascribed to them by Chinese suspicion, it appeared to have been deflected, perhaps by the concurrently increasing tension between Japan and Soviet Russia.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12570 FOR Despatch #597
FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Dec.1,1933
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Japanese Reaction to the New Fukien Government.
Reports the -, which is not good; situation viewed with
misgivings since province is near Japanese Island of
Formosa and is therefor a potential source of trouble

793.94/6536
1576

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

SPECIAL GRAY

1-1336

FROM

PEIPING VIA N.R.

Dated December 23, 1933

Recd. 7.10 a.m.

Secretary of State
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 26 1933
 Department of State

926, December 23, 11 a.m.

Rumors are again being circulated indicating a belief in many quarters that the Japanese military, dissatisfied with the dilatory tactics of the Chinese with regard to parley questions along the Sino-Manchukuo boundary and encouraged by the deterioration of Chinese leadership in the south, intend to embark upon a new venture affecting the political situation in North China. Thus far the Legation has been unable to substantiate these rumors but there is evident a growing apprehension among the Chinese of possible injudicious action by the Japanese because of the Chinese Government's inability to implement its announced policy of placating Japanese feeling toward China. The Legation is watching the situation closely and will keep the Department informed.

JOHNSON

RR

WWC

F/G 793.94/6537

DEC 29 1933

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12591 FOR Tel.#-9 a.m.

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Dec.23,1933
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Contribution of 25 million Mexican dollars to the Fukien
movement by Soviet to keep Japanese busy in the South;
Japanese have offered like amount and failing acceptance
will cause continual trouble in province.

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793.94/6538
6138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RH

GRAY

FOOCHOW VIA NR

Dated December 23, 1933

Rec'd. 24th, 433am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 23, 9 am

CONFIDENTIAL

My British Colleague tells me the following has been reported to the British Consul General at Canton by the agent of the Imperial British Industries:

"One. Unlikelihood of Canton giving any assistance to the Fukien movement and improbability of any other province (with the exception of the Kiangsi communist element) joining in.

Two. Advances made by Soviet Government to Tsai Ting Kai with object of a new state being formed around Fukien with definite anti-Japanese principle, for which service the new government would receive Mexican dollars twenty five million, of which dollars four million is said to have been already paid. The Soviet object is with a view to embarrassing Japan in the South and so hinder its plans for hostilities against the

Soviet

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28
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107
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of December 23, 9 am from Foochow

Soviet in the North.

The Japanese recognize the dangerous consequences likely to result from this move of the Soviet and it is stated that the military Chief of Staff, Formosa, has arrived in Foochow and made an offer to Tsai Ting Kai of a similar sum to that proposed by the Soviet on the understanding that the new government gives up its anti-Japanese policy and remains neutral, that it is neither for the Soviet nor Japanese. Failing acceptance the Japanese intend to cause continued trouble in Fukien".

My colleague requests that this information be kept confidential, especially as regards the source. He further states that he thinks the amount of the alleged offer at all events should be accepted with reserve.

BURKE

FW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 4, 1934.

~~FRD:~~

~~MPL:~~

~~SRF:~~

~~SRK:~~

The Embassy at Tokyo transmits with its despatch No. 615 of December 15, 1933, a copy of a brochure entitled "Comments on John Bassett Moore's Discussion". I append a translation of the Japanese version of the introduction to the pamphlet, which I think is not without interest.

"On the grounds that the peace of the Orient and even of the entire world was involved in the question of the recognition of the independence of Manchukuo, Japan carried out before the League of Nations its policy based on the foregoing conviction. By a vote of 42 to 1 the League of Nations denied recognition. Under the former president of the United States, Secretary of State Stimson, who was the originator of the doctrine that Manchukuo should not be recognized, adhered to the League's denial of recognition. However, Japanese diplomats, statesmen and scholars may strive to expound Japan's position in granting recognition, it is easy for them to supply the deficient knowledge of the nations members of the League of Nations and of the United States. It is therefore

believed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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believed that the impartial judgment of a neutral scholar of world-wide reputation and influence would be more effective.

"Mr. Matsuoka said last year before the Assembly of the League of Nations that the uninformed opinion which was now attempting to crucify Japan might be likened to the uninformed opinion which hung Christ on the cross two thousand years ago and he predicted that in a few years time there would certainly be a change. Dr. John Bassett Moore, who is universally known as an international lawyer, diplomat and member of the International Court, contributed an article to the July issue of the American magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS and addressed to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives a letter which jointly discusses the Stimson doctrine, the Lytton Report, the Covenant of the League, deficiencies in the Kellogg Pact, failure of the League of Nations Committee of Nineteen to take into account the realities in the Far East, et cetera. The Doctor also excoriated the idea that the United States, situated several thousand miles from Manchuria, should attempt military intervention. The opinions and views expressed by Dr. Moore are indeed of the sort which

will

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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will conduce to the real promotion of friendship between Japan and the United States.

"The judgment of Dr. Moore with regard to the position of Japan is entirely just and impartial; and it is, furthermore, based on law, history and the realities. The fact that Japan has received at this time, when it is facing grave days, the just and impartial verdict of a scholar of international authority will go a long ways toward ~~influencing~~ public opinion in other countries.

(Introduction)

"The reason why the present author has drawn up the following article in English is that he desires to draw the attention of persons living abroad to Dr. Moore's article, and thus to contribute towards supplying the lack of knowledge which prevails abroad on the subject of the article. Dr. Moore's views on the Manchuria question will undoubtedly fortify the resolution of the people of this country."

[Signature]
EHD:H2D

butting right uninformed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, December 15, 1933.


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SUBJECT: Transmitting copy of "Comments on John
Bassett Moore's Discussion".

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8/11/13



JAN 2 1934



Copy of accompanying
documents stamped to be
returned to DOR

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/. I have the honor to transmit herewith, in case the
Department has not received a copy from other sources,
a brochure entitled "Comments on John Bassett Moore's
Discussion", having reference to Dr. Moore's article
entitled "An Appeal to Reason" published in the July is-
sue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, as well as to his letter of Febru-
ary 29, 1933, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
in connection with the hearings on the proposed joint re-
solution of the Senate relating to an arms embargo.

This

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This paper was written by Dr. Seiji Hishida, the holder of a degree from Columbia University where he studied under Dr. Moore. Dr. Hishida has been engaged in different capacities by the Japanese Government for over twenty-five years. He is the author or compiler of most of the "Reports on Progress and Development" which have appeared in the English language in Chosen and Manchuria. He has been attached at one time or another to banks, industrial enterprises and cultural societies whenever it was felt that they needed to be "explained" in English. It may be assumed, therefore, that Dr. Hishida's comments reflect, to a certain extent at least, official Japanese views.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

✓
Enclosure:

1. Copy of Dr. Seiji Hishida's
"Comments on John Bassett
Moore's Discussion".

020.
ELN:g

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6539

January 31, 1934.

Dear Judge Moore:

I assume that a brochure prepared by Dr. Seiji Hishida, at one time an employee of the South Manchuria Railway, reproducing the article entitled "An Appeal to Reason" which you contributed to the July 1933 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS and your letter to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated March 27, 1933, has come to your notice.

I enclose as of possible interest to you a summarized translation made by an officer of this Department of the introduction to the brochure which appears in the Japanese language over the name of Dr. Hishida, setting forth Dr. Hishida's reasons for reprinting the article and the letter.

Yours sincerely,

Enclosure:
 Translation.


The Honorable

John Bassett Moore,

993 Park Avenue,

New York, New York.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INTRODUCTION

"On the grounds that the peace of the Orient and even of the entire world was involved in the question of the recognition of the independence of Manchukuo, Japan carried out before the League of Nations its policy based on the foregoing conviction. By a vote of 42 to 1 the League of Nations denied recognition. Under the former president of the United States, Secretary of State Stimson, who was the originator of the doctrine that Manchukuo should not be recognized, adhered to the League's denial of recognition. However Japanese diplomats, statesmen and scholars may strive to expound Japan's position in granting recognition, it is not easy for them to supply the deficient knowledge of the nations members of the League of Nations and of the United States. It is therefore believed that the impartial judgment of a neutral scholar of world-wide reputation and influence would be more effective.

"Mr. Matsuoka said last year before the Assembly of the League of Nations that the uninformed opinion which was now attempting to crucify Japan might be likened to the uninformed opinion which hung Christ on the cross two thousand years ago and he predicted that in a few years time there would certainly be a change. Dr. John Bassett Moore, who is universally known as an international lawyer, diplomat and member of the International Court, contributed an article to the July issue of the American magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS and addressed to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives a letter which discusses the Stimson doctrine, the Lytton Report, the Covenant of the League, deficiencies in the Kellogg Pact, failure of the League of Nations Committee of Nineteen to take into account the realities in the Far East, et cetera. The Doctor also excoriated the idea that the United States, situated several thousand miles from Manchuria, should attempt military intervention. The opinions and views expressed by Dr. Moore are indeed of the sort which will conduce to the real promotion of friendship between Japan and the United States.

"The judgment of Dr. Moore with regard to the position of Japan is entirely just and impartial; and it is, furthermore, based on law, history and the realities. The fact that Japan has received at this time, when it is facing grave days, the just and impartial verdict of a scholar of international authority will go a long ways toward putting right uninformed public opinion in other countries.

"The

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"The reason why the present author has drawn up the following article (Introduction) in English is that he desires to draw the attention of persons living abroad to Dr. Moore's article, and thus to contribute towards supplying the lack of knowledge which prevails abroad on the subject of the article. Dr. Moore's views on the Manchuria question will undoubtedly fortify the resolution of the people of this country."

- Seiji Hishida.

December 30, 1933.

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Department of State Order, August 10, 1972
By William C. Heston NARS, Date 1/11/82

Comments

on

John Bassett Moore's
Discussion

with reference to

Manchurian Incident, Panbargo and
Neutrality, "Aggressor," Kellogg
Pact, League, American
Birthright, etc.

By Dr. SEIJI HOSHIDA

THE MARUZEN CO., LTD.

TOKYO

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*With the Christmas Greetings
and Complements*

Seiji Hishida

55 Sanchome,

Minamicho, Aoyama,

Tokyo

793.94/6539

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT BE RECORDED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORD.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

Comments
on
John Bassett Moore's
Discussion

with reference to
Manchurian Incident, Embargo and
Neutrality, "Aggressor," Kellogg
Pact, League, American
"Birthright," etc.


By
SEIJI HISHIDA, M. A., Ph. D.
Author of "International Position of Japan as a Great Power,"
Compiler of "Annual Report on Reform and Progress in Korea"
(1907-1917) and of "Report on Progress in Manchuria."

TOKYO
November, 1933

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JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, 1891-1924; Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1921-1928; member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague since 1913; called from time to time by the United States Government to serve either in high and responsible office in the State Department as Assistant Secretary or Acting Secretary of the State or as special envoy or delegate to numerous international conferences; signally honored in many lands; possibly the best of living authorities on international law; Author of *A Digest of International Law* (8 volumes), *A History and Digest of International Arbitration* (6 volumes), *International Adjudications, Ancient and Modern* (4 volumes) and several others.

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John Barrett Moore

This portrait of Judge Moore is a reproduction of one given to the writer on his second visit to the United States in December 1917, when he was despatched by his Government as a member of the Finance Commission headed by Baron Megata.

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FOREWORD

Judge John Bassett Moore and myself have been, I may almost say life-long, colleagues in the *Institut de Droit International*. I enjoyed his acquaintance in particular during my visit to the United States at the time of the Russo-Japanese War which was happily ended through the mediation of the late President Roosevelt.

His recent discussions of the contemplated Arms Embargo measures on the part of the United States and his "An Appeal to Reason" referring to the Manchurian question, the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and other matters, though principally designed to safe-guard the American "Birthright," exhibited a welcome attitude at justice towards the Japanese policy in the Far East, with reference to the recent Manchurian incident. He also makes mention of the attitude of the United States during the Russo-Japanese War under the Administration of Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay—"the practice of courtesy, moderation, and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused," quite contrary to the constant talk in recent years in the United States of having "special sanctions," referring to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, the application of which to the actual case Moore declares to be difficult. I can express the confident opinion, after reading this world-celebrated jurist's discussion of recent international questions, that his statement must contribute to realistic and durable peace not only in the Pacific region, but throughout the world at large.

Dr. Seiji Hishida, who was a pupil of John Bassett Moore at the time of my visit to the United States during the Russo-

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Japanese War, and who was taken into the Civil Service in Korea by the late Prince Ito on my recommendation, has compiled this monograph reviewing the authoritative statement given to the public by his esteemed tutor. His monograph is readable and should prove interesting to the general reader, particularly to those in Japan and America who are closely following recent international developments.

Kuntaro Kaneko.

PREFACE

In treating of the contemplated embargo measures by the United States, Mr. Stimson's "New Psychology," the Manchurian question, the Kellogg Pact, the League of Nations, the term "Aggressor," and the "Birthright" of the United States, John Bassett Moore, who has the world-wide respect as a great, if not the greatest, authority on the International Law, discusses the matter from the realistic point of view for which I have repeatedly and emphatically contended as a representative of the Japanese Government at the time when the Lytton Report on the Sino-Japanese dispute was examined. While in Geneva, I endeavoured to invite the League to pave the way for a conciliatory settlement of the dispute, but I myself found in the atmosphere of the League exactly what this eminent jurist observes: namely the fundamental defect embodied in the warlike devices of the League Covenant which was loosely, excitedly and unavailingly applied in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Dr. Seiji Hishida has just produced a monograph reviewing Judge Moore's letter addressed to the House Committee on the contemplated Embargo Bill, and his article which appeared in "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" under the title of "An Appeal to Reason." I have found his monograph very readable and easy to follow, so that the average reader can easily understand the leading points set forth by that renowned jurist on the most complicated international questions of the day.

Finally, I am quite in accord with Judge Moore's solemn statement—"the true and only foundation of peace" among nations like individuals "can be attained only through the recon-

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ciliation of our conflicting views and our conflicting interests,"
 not through "the warlike devices" of "the new psychology"
 and of the League.



PREFACE

Dr. Seiji Hishida's sound and accurate views on international affairs, which are so evident to all readers of his *International Position of Japan as a Great Power*, were formed under the direction of that eminent master of the Law of Nations, Doctor John Bassett Moore. He has now taken the opportunity of doing a great service to the student of political affairs, as well as of paying a compliment to his old teacher, by reproducing the remarkable utterances of the latter contained in his recent letter to Mr. Fish and in his article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Dr. Hishida has succeeded in giving a very clear and readable summary of what Dr. Moore has to say: the Author's elegant irony and allusive style must have made this by no means an easy task.

Dr. Moore is rightly impatient with the modern slovenliness of thought which prompts not a few publicists to throw to the winds the wisdom of Washington, Jefferson and John Adams, and, proclaiming that—

"They didn't know everything down in Judee!"—, to pin their faith to a supposed transformation of human nature contemporaneous with the Treaty of Versailles, and comparable with anything that was accomplished by Moses at Sinai or the Lord in Galilee. The only outcome of such irrational confidence must be catastrophe. Without realizing it, every nation will incur commitments which will plunge it in inevitable strife. The wide circulation of Dr. Moore's weighty indictment in such a convenient form as the present, is a real contribution towards averting such a catastrophe: and as such if cannot be too warmly welcomed.

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Dr. Bassett Moore's opinions cannot be neglected. His long experience in the State Department in Washington, as an International Judge at the Hague, as the erudite compiler of International Law Digests, and as a teacher of law, make him a unique figure in the world. When legal acumen is added to a severely realistic and practical outlook, the result must command universal attention. Dr. Hishida's enterprise and industry have found an ideal objective.

V. B. G.

Kasumigaseki, Tokio.

序

日本は聯盟に於て滿洲國獨立承認を以て、東洋平和延びては世界平和の根本義である事を強調し、且既定の方針に基き其主張を斷行した。聯盟は四十二對一を以て承認を否定した。米國の前大統領フーズアーの下に於て、滿洲國否認論の急先鋒たるスティムソン國務卿も亦聯盟の承認否定に参加した。承認當事者たる日本の政治家、外交官又は學者が此際如何に適切明晰に日本の主張を力説するも、聯盟諸國又は米國の認識不足を啓發するは容易の事でない、却つて第三者たる世界的權威者の公平なる判斷が最も有効であると思ふ。

松岡代表は客年十二月八日聯盟總會に於て、認識不足の輿論は恰も二千年前狂へる輿論がクリストを十字架に懸けたる如く日本を十字架に懸けんとしてゐるが、其輿論は數年を出すして必ず一變するであろうと豫言した。果然茲にボール以上に正しき人心啓發者が現はれた。國際法及外交史に又國際裁判官として世界的權威を博せるジョン・バセット、ムーア博士は米國のフォレン、アフニア雜誌七月號及米國下院外交委員宛ての書翰に於て、スティムソン主義、リットン報告書、聯盟規約、不戰條約の缺陷及不備を詳細に指摘し、又滿洲問題に關し聯盟十九ヶ國委員及總會が極東の現實を無視し、此等の規定を適用したる錯誤を明かにし、若し十九ヶ國委員なり、總會なりが今少しく親切に和協的に日支紛擾問題を審議したら圓滿に解決したろうと斷言してゐる。更に滿洲國不承認を繼續する事は最近の實例に徴し、却つて地方的に、國際的に平安及秩序の擾亂を惹起するものであると推想してゐる。

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博士は又數千哩を距てたる米國の滿洲に於ける武力干涉を試みんとする考の無謀を罵倒してゐる。斯の如き率直なる議論こそ眞の日米親善の要諦たるものである。

博士の論旨はステイムソン主義又は皮相的平和論者をして、米國を誤らしめざらんとする米國擁護百パーセントに値するが、同時に日本の滿洲問題に關する態度に對し公平百パーセントの斷定を下したものである。而かも其論據は法理的、歴史的、現實的である。方今日本が外交非常時に際し世界的權威ある學者より公平なる批判を受けたるは、海外に於ける認識不足の輿論を矯正するに於て、與つて多大の力あるものと思ふ。

筆者がムーア博士に對する評論を英文にて起稿したるは、同博士の堂々たる正論議論に對し、海外の識者に切實なる注意を喚起し、依て以て、海外一般の認識不足を補はんとする微衷に出たるものである。同時に博士の論議は滿洲問題に關し、吾國民の自信を一層強むるものである。若し夫れ同博士の卓説を邦文に翻譯して、廣く我國民の參考に資するに至つては、自らその人あることを信じ且望んで止まぬものである。

昭和八年十一月三十日

菱 田 靜 治

1. Introduction

Since the Manchurian Incident occurred in the Autumn of 1931, a number of books and articles on the Sino-Japanese dispute have been published in Europe and America. Many of them were written in a sense rather adverse to the Japanese stand. Some of them often allowed themselves to call or hint at Japan as an "Aggressor" or violator of the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the so-called Nine-Power Treaty. At the League Assembly's discussion on the Sino-Japanese dispute Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Delegate, on December 8, 1932, said that if public opinion was against Japan, as "humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth 2,000 years ago," some time "in a very few years" world opinion will be changed and Japan will "also be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth came to be."

There lies before the writer of the present monograph a letter addressed on February 29, 1933, by Judge John Bassett Moore to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs before its hearings on the proposed joint resolution of the Senate relating to the Arms Embargo. His article, entitled "An Appeal to Reason" also appeared in the July number of "FOREIGN AFFAIRS." The main purpose of that article and letter was to give a solemn warning to the United States, with their high interests not to allow their Government to be misled by the "Pacifists," or by such measures as are advocated by certain people, namely, a new interpretation of the law of neutrality, "new psychology," "war to end war," and by international "sanctions" or "boycotts." Subsequently touching on or referring to affairs in the Far East, especially the Manchurian incident, more from a realistic point of view, he exhibits unusual justice and fairness, by pointing out a certain conspicuous defect of the Lytton Report,

the lack of "friendly and impartial good offices" on the part of the League Assembly in approving the report and recommendations on the Sino-Japanese dispute, the difficulties of application of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty to the actual case, and the recklessness of effecting any armed intervention in Manchuria by a distant nation several thousands of miles away,—unless it might happen to be in self-defense. The writer has found that many points made by Judge Moore in his discussion of the Manchurian question, the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact were incidentally similar to those contended for by the Japanese representative at the League as well as in statements made by the Japanese Government, in the form of Observations on the Lytton report and of objection to the League Assembly's report and recommendations. Indeed, his judicious and equitable discussion of one of the most difficult and complicated questions of international affairs of the present day must serve to clarify the short-sighted views on these questions so often indulged in by second rate statesmen, publicists and scholars of International Law.

The writer, as one of the loyal subjects of the Emperor of Japan, and also as a pupil of Judge Moore for several years at Columbia University,—he wrote a thesis, "International Position of Japan as a Great Power" under the Judge's supervision,—not only with the desire to renew his sincere attitude of reverence to his esteemed tutor, but in the belief that such a statement of justice as was made recently by that learned and experienced jurist on international affairs involving an explicit reference to Japan in relation to Manchuria would constitute a real contribution toward the traditional friendship between Japan and America, presents herewith a monograph containing a reproduction of the before-mentioned letter and article of Judge Moore, together with the writer's own brief comments on those papers.

2. Neutrality and Embargo

John Bassett Moore writes books and contemporary articles very seldom. If he writes a book, it is exhaustive, comprehensive and authoritative—indeed an indisputable standard on international law and foreign affairs for jurists, administrators and scholars. When he deals with a contemporary question of international affairs, it is always in a fashion entirely realistic, instructive, dispassionate, sound and sustainable.

At the time that the League of Nations resumed its hearing of the Sino-Japanese dispute in relation to the Lytton report, in the latter part of 1932, an embargo measure against the so-called "aggressor" was much discussed in Europe and America.

In the closing days of the Hoover Administration in February, 1933, the United States Senate passed a joint resolution on the question of an arms embargo, and submitted it to the House of Representatives. This Resolution was intended to afford the President an opportunity to pick out one nation as "an aggressor" and then in combination with other powers, to strangle that particular nation in the name of peace by measures of embargo. When the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House sat for hearings on the bill, Judge Moore submitted a letter addressed to the Hon. Hamilton Fish, one of the Committee, and Mr. Edwin M. Borchard, Professor of International Law at Yale, presenting himself as a witness at the same hearings, said that before introducing his own view, he would like to bring to the Committee "the views of the greatest authority, bar none, on this subject," and that his name itself is one to "conjure with in this country, and very few countries have available a mind such as his." In this letter Judge Moore began by stating that there are some 'pacifists,' possibly as a reaction of the Great European War, who are ready to espouse the shallow creed that international peace

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could best be assured by the use of force or threats of force, rather adopting the supposition that preexisting international law had suddenly become obsolete, and that the world had entered upon a new era in which the general peace was to be maintained by 'sanctions,' by boycotts, and by war, and he said that the proposed resolution before the Committee was essentially based on "the supposition that the law of neutrality no longer exists, and that in future there will be no neutrals." "As a life-long student and administrator of international law," Judge Moore said, he did not hesitate "to declare the supposition that neutrality is a thing of the past to be unsound in theory and false in fact." Reviewing American diplomatic history, he correctly states that the maintenance and defense of neutral rights was the settled and historic policy of the United States. Relating to contraband trade, he observes—"Neutrality, in the legal sense, embraces not only impartiality but also abstention from participation in the conflict," and that if a government bans the shipment of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to an armed conflict and permits it to the other, it "intervenes in the conflict in a military sense and makes itself a party to the war, whether declared or undeclared." Judge Moore very emphatically affirmed that the proposed joint resolution, if adopted, would be "opposed to the settled policy and the highest interests of the United States and also to the provisions of its Federal Constitution."

In conclusion he clearly stated:

"If the real purpose back of the pending resolution is simply to prevent the United States from furnishing implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, non-partisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign power could complain."

3. Stimson's New Psychology

In his article, "An Appeal to Reason," appearing in the July number of "Foreign Affairs," Judge Moore began by commenting on an article of Mr. Stimson, lately Secretary of State, in the April number of the same periodical, and treated more fully the questions of neutrality, arms embargoes, "aggressors," Manchuria, the Kellogg Pact, the American "Birthright," the League and other topics.

Under the heading of "New Psychology," Judge Moore humorously regarded the two articles written by Mr. Stimson and Professor Taussig in the April number of "Foreign Affairs" as a conspicuous exhibition of telepathy, and declares:

"This was very appropriate, as international relations often depend not so much on knowledge, experience and wise maxims as on temporary psychological conditions caused by accident, by oratory, by confused impulses and by craft, against the effects of which statesmen should ever safeguard their countries by avoiding the nebulous commitments and legal uncertainties that so readily contribute to senseless and destructive wars."

He particularly summarized Mr. Stimson's assertion as being a declaration that—

"certain measures adopted since the so-called World War, chief among which are the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, prove the existence of a new psychology, a new will to peace such as the world has never known before."

Although the League Covenant provides for arbitration, judicial settlement, investigation, mediatorial offices and a Permanent Court of International Justice, Judge Moore remarks that the League Covenant "is associated in the public mind probably more with proposed 'sanctions' (Article 16 of Covenant) than with anything else"; and "this is," he ventures to think, "unfortunate," because "war is the dominant note" in the provisions of this Article.

The Kellogg Pact renouncing war altogether as an instrument of national policy, has been criticized as providing no perfect sanction contrary to the League Covenant. It has been said, on the other hand, that the Pact does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force, and rests upon the sanction of public opinion and the will to make it effective. Judge Moore points out that Mr. Stimson still holds that the efficacy of the Pact depends on public opinion and not on force and that "it is only when the sanctions of the Covenant and the alleged decisions of the League are invoked that he welcomes, as agencies of peace, the menaces and measures of war which the Covenant prescribes."

Judge Moore observes that he has no quarrel with Mr. Stimson but he distrusts those methods and measures, characteristic of a certain type of mind and thought, for which he is presenting himself as a spokesman. Praying modestly for peace in his own time, Judge Moore profoundly distrusts such a psychology and such measures because "they have no visible moorings on earth or in the sky," and also because "they have infected many of (his) countrymen with confused notions of law and of conduct which, while they endanger most American vital interests, hold out hopes of partisan intervention that encourage European governments to defer the readjustments which only they can make and which are essential to peace and tranquillity in that quarter."

4. The Manchurian Question

Judge Moore treats of the Manchurian question more from a realistic point of view. With respect to the Lytton report, Judge Moore thinks that its chief defect is that the report at the outset assigns to the improvement of modern means of communication the blame of having induced the flagrant acts of force by

which the isolation of China was broken in upon and her ports opened to European trade, and he cannot share the common habit of thinking of 'isolation' as an antonym of speed, "even though Japan, by a deliberate self-development that embraced the assimilation of all speedy devices, induced her exemplars in speed to renounce their earlier privileges" (of extraterritoriality). Unless all these phases of the matter be fully weighed, says Judge Moore, no one could pass on the dealings between the West and East in such a manner as to well perceive whether the word "nationalism" which the report so often uses, predominantly denotes, in any particular instance, a real aspiration for national unity, or merely an anti-foreign sentiment, and concludes: "the divisions in China largely account for her present plight." He mentions that the Lytton report in treating of Manchuria does not overlook Russia's progressive absorption not only of that province but also of Korea, which caused Japan, in concern for her own national life, to risk the war with Russia thirty years ago. But he points out that "the measures suggested by the report for the adjustment of present conditions are exceedingly complicated and largely depend for their successful application on a cooperation between China and Japan such as the western nations have not shown respecting the limitation of armaments or the readjustment of the balance of power as between themselves, to say nothing of their continued refusal to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China because their surrender would be premature."

As to the report and recommendations of the Committee of the League Assembly, Judge Moore is of opinion that it cannot be highly commended; for

"Japan is not called an aggressor" in this report, "but this is strongly hinted; and references to provisions of the Covenant that contemplate the use of force are rather plentiful."

The Assembly adopted the report. Japan then protested and resigned her membership of the League. On this Judge Moore

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emphatically observes—

"Had the Assembly tendered friendly and impartial good offices, and, as a great Secretary of State of the United States once suggested to an offending government, used 'some kind words,' it might have contributed to the actual and amicable solution of the immense difficulties which the Lytton report so clearly explained."

He mentions that Sir John Simon, on February 23, just before the League Assembly began to discuss the draft report on the Sino-Japanese dispute, "speaking for the British Government to the House of Commons concerning the armed struggle in Manchuria, had declared: 'under no circumstances will this Government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict.'"

Judge Moore then frankly points out that while the British Government, which has vast interests in the Far East, and other European Governments as well, were rather refraining from becoming parties to the armed struggle in Manchuria, "the cries for boycotts, arms embargoes" were heard in America, in contrast to the fact that "the United States" during the Russo-Japanese war, when President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay were in office, "specially enjoined on all its officials, civil, military and naval, the practice of courtesy, moderation and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused."

About the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington, which has been frequently mentioned in the course of the discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute by the League and has been constantly spoken of as having special "sanctity" in America, Judge Moore plainly suggests the difficulty of its application to an actual case, by his remark that

though "a nation's faith (of treaty) should ever be inviolable," "the application of the terms of treaties to actual cases is often disputed and uncertain, and nations are inclined, especially when they are under pressure, to be tenacious of their own opinions."

He also referred to an example of France refusing the proposal

of Great Britain—

"to refer the question of the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr to the Permanent Court of International Justice,"

and added that—

"the many references to arbitral boards show how often nations disagree on questions of interpretation."

Relating to the possibility of armed intervention in Manchuria, he observes:

"The thought of armed intervention by the United States in Manchuria, while glaringly inconsistent with the recent vote to abandon the Philippines, inevitably suggests the possible failure of its object as well as other serious consequences."

If the attempt to occupy the territory should be successful, an international government might be set up. Such an international government in a territory where no efficient government exists, Judge Moore says, "is the worst," pointing out the total failure of the American experiment in international government in little Samoa.

Regarding the Open Door policy, after stating that—

"the phrase 'open door' is often used in a fighting sense, although war might necessitate the door's temporary closure,"—he says "the 'open door' means trade"

and gives simply the trade figures for 1932 as between the United States and Japan and China, which show that the trade of the United States with the former was more than three times as large as the trade of the United States with the latter.

About Manchoukuo, Judge Moore without undertaking at present to suggest what the final attitude of the United States toward the new government of Manchoukuo should be, emphatically stated that—

"the proposal of permanent 'non-recognition' too vividly recalls the uncertainty and failure, and the disorder, local and international, which

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attended the recent trial of that futile and demoralizing process as a means of preventing revolution or other unconstitutional acts in other lands."

Possibly warning the Americans against the unwisdom of intermeddling with the international politics of a far distant continent, he mentioned the tri-partite treaty signed at Paris in 1919 to guarantee the eastern frontier of France, which President Wilson never submitted to the Senate for its ratification, internal order being subsequently perfectly well maintained on both sides of the Rhine.

In conclusion, Judge Moore states that many examples, including the Russo-Japanese war and the unending conflicts which followed exhibit

"what a quagmire Manchuria offers for the swallowing up of blood and treasure, without permanent and uncontested reward to those who take their chances in it."

And he observes:

"the much vaunted annihilation of space and time," as the Lytton report characterizes the influence of communications, "has not yet enabled a nation thousands of miles away to exert its military power as effectively as it may do at home or in its immediate environment. For a distant nation to take the chances of armed intervention in Manchuria, unless in pursuit or defense of a vital interest, would suggest a recklessness savoring of monomania."

5. "Aggressor"

The word "aggressor" has persistently been heard at Geneva of late. There was no doubt that Japan was at the back of the minds of many who, in Judge Moore's words, "made many attempts to define an aggressor, but never with any success."

Dealing with this term "aggressor," Judge Moore says it is dangerous to allow a certain favorite fallacy, specially relating to the recent agitation for the punishment of "aggressors," to

pass unchallenged although its refutation is really superfluous to any thinking mind. Although the word "aggressor" does not appear in the Covenant, many attempts have been made at Geneva to define an "aggressor," as the word has been used "as the technical designation of the nation to which the warlike devices of the League of Nations were intended to apply." Weighing the views expressed on this question by M. Briand whose "delicate and fragmentary suggestions clearly indicate that he did not intend them to be taken seriously as a definition," Judge Moore observes that the "attempt to define aggression for practical purposes has always failed, because, as has been well said, it is impossible to specify beforehand the objective criteria on which the decision whether an act was overt would necessarily depend."

On the other hand, he says, "the taking of a forcible initiative may be in some cases the only means of safety," citing the Portuguese action against the combined forces of France and Spain, 1762, the case of the brig *General Armstrong* in 1814, the *Navarino* case of 1827, and the case of the *Kowshing* (this British vessel carrying the Chinese troops to Korea was destroyed in 1894 by the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa* then commanded by Captain Togo—now Count), a Japanese naval action which was at once justified by eminent British authorities on international law such as Professors Holland and Westlake. The writer of the present monograph may now add the illuminating fact that whereas further provocation was caused and further hostilities carried on, between Chinese and Japanese whilst the League was entertaining the Sino-Japanese dispute, yet since the truce was effected between the Japanese and Chinese military representatives on May 31, 1933 at Tangku in northern China,—(by which the Japanese troops, which had marched very close to Peiping, promptly withdrew to the outside of the Great Wall, the boundary of Manchoukuo, and the Chinese troops to the specified line),—the

Chinese have not only gradually ceased to give provocation, even in southern China, but are reported now to contemplate the despatch of goodwill emissaries to Japan and Manchoukuo.

Judge Moore then expressed the opinion that "experience has conclusively shown that the attempt to decide the question of the aggressor on first appearance is reckless of justice," and it "must rely on an impartial investigation of the facts unless its purpose is unholy." But he says it takes time, as is seen in the case of the League's examination into the Sino-Japanese dispute, which took seventeen months without a final conclusion.

Judge Moore says that "the opposite of self-defense is aggression." The word self-defense assumes particular importance, in consideration of the Kellogg Pact, which is acclaimed by Mr. Stimson as evincing a revolutionary change in world public opinion. The British Government, however, did not accept it until they had carefully reserved their perfect freedom of action as a matter of self-defense in regions that have never been precisely defined. And again it is on the same point of self-defense that the most enthusiastic sponsors of the Kellogg Pact have to be content with expressions that show that they stand on none too firm ground. Then Judge Moore proceeds to say that we are told, as is pointed out by Mr. Stimson, that "the only limitation" to the Pact's "broad covenant" against war is "the right of self-defense"—a right, it is declared, "so inherent and universal that it was not deemed necessary even to insert it expressly in the treaty," and whose "limits are defined by countless precedents." But what are these "countless precedents"? We are never to know. "The attempt so to define self-defense," says the renowned jurist, "that its future application would be clear and practically automatic is just as futile as the attempt similarly to define aggression has been—and must continue to be."

6. The "Kellogg Pact"

Now as to the true character of the Kellogg Pact, which is invoked as the crowning proof of the "world's recent regeneration," Judge Moore reviews the circumstances under which it was made. The first attempt, though unsuccessful, was made in June 1927 when M. Briand proposed to make an exclusive pact between France and the United States renouncing war "as an instrument of their policy toward each other," and pledging the two countries to settle their disputes by pacific means. Six months later Mr. Kellogg suddenly proposed to France a renunciation and pledge in which all principal governments of the world should unite. In the course of the ensuing negotiations, the British Government, in their note of May 19, 1928, concerning the proposed renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, declared that they would not "suffer" any outside interference in certain regions the protection of which against outside attack would be considered as "a measure of self-defense."

The way for "this position of the British Government," says Judge Moore, "had indeed been thoughtfully paved by Mr. Kellogg himself in a public address three weeks before, in which he declared that nothing in the proposed treaty in any way restricted or impaired the 'right of self-defense.'"

This British reservation made on the principle of self-defense, together with other conditions, was mentioned in and attached to the circular note which the United States addressed on June 23, 1928, to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and other governments, formally inviting them to accept the Pact as thus explained, and the Pact was accordingly signed at Paris. Regarding the manner of concluding the Pact Judge Moore declares:

"As the signing of a contract with a mental reservation is both illegal and dishonest, no government can be supposed to have signed the Pact

with an intention to deny or repudiate the recorded conditions on which it was accepted."

Those conditions, in Judge Moore's opinion, were quite satisfactory to France, because "they embraced a concession to M. Briand's demand that the "later renunciation of war should never be asserted to interfere with the full application of the war-making provisions of the Covenant." It means in other words that the Pact carefully provides against interference with the Covenant as a war-making device, as well as against interference with self-defense, and the protection of regional interests.

Be the Pact what it may, Judge Moore says that one can only wish that the parties to it will observe their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and their promise to settle their differences peacefully. He, however, objects when he is told that the renunciation and the promise constitute an epoch in history, and denote on the part of the signatories a radical change in attitude toward war. For was this not what was first proclaimed by Moses, taught by later prophets and again preached by Jesus himself on the Mount? On their teachings great churches have been built, and untold millions still worship at their shrines. "Fundamentally, they all teach brotherly kindness, justice, and peace," says Moore, "and yet, the most heavily armed and most warlike of modern nations have been those that profess the Christian faith. It is these," he asserts, "that brought to the Far East the modern implements of war." He concludes by stating that he would not wish to "destroy the nimbus of the Kellogg Pact," but cannot exhibit a credulity beyond the capacity of common mind when he is asked to believe that—

"the renunciation and the promise complete a moral revolution, said to have begun during the World War, more radical than the commands of the Almighty and the precepts of Christ had been able to effect."

Judge Moore also mentions that "the Kellogg Pact was for M. Briand, before all else, a means to draw the United States, the decisive factor in allied victory, into the League of Nations," as M. Paul-Boncour, M. Briand's great friend, has authoritatively declared. This shows us why the European "Eagles" in the League Council and Assembly, when discussing the Sino-Japanese dispute, were so persistent in desiring the participation of the United States, in spite of constant objection on the part of Japan.

7. The American "Birthright" and the League

In concluding his article, Judge Moore, under the heading of "Our Birthright," makes mention of George Washington's Farewell Address and the neutrality policy sustained by subsequent statesmen. Giving his attention to those who have been talking of American leadership in international affairs as the duty of a "world power," Judge Moore sternly warns his countrymen against such a tendency. At the same time, Judge Moore emphatically enumerated several cases where the United States had acted independently as a "World Power," chiefly to safeguard her neutrality and her interests against European politics or intervention, since the administration of President Washington. He thinks that the United States would be throwing away their birthright by joining such an association as the League of Nations which, he says, in the present state of the popular mind, is characterized by warlike devices. With all due respect for the useful work done by the League of Nations, he says that the League, in dealing with political matters, "suffers from the radical defects of its charter." Then in support of his opinion, he quotes Mr. Elihu Root, who as early as March 13, 1919, prophetically declared that unless the Covenant was very materially amended both in form and in substance, "the world will before very long

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wake up to realize that a great opportunity has been wasted in the doing of a futile thing." This view fully proved on the recent, and by no means rare occasions on which loose, excited and unfulfilled threats of employing the warlike devices of the Covenant have exposed the League to reproach if not to contempt. He does not hesitate to mention as an example—

"the unhappy conflict between China and Japan in which, while warlike words were heard from Geneva, the ministers for foreign affairs of powerful members of the League were disavowing in their capitals any intention to intervene in the armed strife in Manchuria."

The fundamental defect of the League, which, in Judge Moore's opinion, originally had the character of a political club, nations being permitted to enter it only by invitation, "was the creation of the warlike devices on the fantastic assumption that the members of the League would, in making use of those devices, divest themselves of their individual interests and prepossessions, of their historic and instinctive antagonisms, and altruistically unite in enforcing the ideal of impartial justice." This weakness is inherent in the League, and he compares it to the great Confederation of Europe, based on the treaties that ended the Napoleonic War and the Holy Alliance. Although it contained no elaboration of warlike devices for the preservation of peace, it was eventually wrecked because the attempt of subsequent conferences to employ united military action divided the Powers. "Such a result," says Judge Moore, with an eye on the League of Nations, "may be regarded as inevitable."

By entangling themselves in the mesh of European politics, the American people would only be throwing away their birthright. They should never emulate Esau who "sold his birthright for a mess of pottage."

Finally Judge Moore concludes that the ideal of "the true and only foundation of peace" among nations, as among men,

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can be attained only through the conciliation of their conflicting views and their conflicting interests, and declares that although nations or men differ in race and in creed and in colour, they must remove the causes of their discontent, elevate their moral sentiment, inculcate a spirit of justice and toleration, and compose and settle their differences, if they want to keep the peace among themselves.

It may confidently be asserted that if the Nineteen Powers Committee of the League Assembly had observed and exercised the principles that this eminent jurist commands, of justice, tolerance and reconciliation before drafting their report and recommendations on the Sino-Japanese dispute, it would have paved the way toward the settlement of the most difficult and complicated question the League had ever entertained and Japan would never have severed her connection with the League.

8. Conclusion

Today Japan has left the League of Nations essentially on the Manchurian question. The institution of the League exists as before. The United States of America, maintaining the Philippine Islands as a colony in the Far East and having also vast economic interests in this region, specially in Japan and China, though not a member of the League, is a signatory of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and of the so-called Nine-Power and Four-Power treaties of 1922. During the examination of the Sino-Japanese dispute, chiefly as it centred round the Manchurian issue, the League members in their discussions and the Lytton Commission in their report again and again referred to the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Secretary Stimson during the Hoover Administration not only initiated the principle of non-recognition of the new *régime* in Manchuria which was sub-

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sequently adopted by the Assembly, but often concerned himself with or even endorsed the League's movements, possibly influenced by his "new psychology" on which Judge Moore comments in such clear terms. At the time when the Commission of Nineteen of the League Assembly adopted (in February, 1933), the report and recommendations of the Sino-Japanese dispute, the Arms Embargo Resolution was presented to Congress in the closing days of the Hoover Administration, and it was proposed "to authorize the President of the United States, either alone or in association with other Powers, discriminately to prohibit the shipment or sale of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to war, while leaving unrestrained the shipment and sale to the other," as Judge Moore summarizes it.

The writer has now completed this cursory review of the letter addressed by John Bassett Moore to the House Committee on this embargo bill and his article, "An Appeal to Reason," which appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS and himself finds the review unsatisfactory,—partly due to the limited time at his disposal, as he is at present engaged in drafting the Fourth Report on Manchuria, but mainly owing to the fact that Judge Moore's discussions are so comprehensive and realistic that he has found it a most difficult task to condense the essential points without injury to the whole. If the writer should venture to undertake to state his own conclusions, it would possibly only give a misleading turn to a valuable contribution made by a renowned jurist. The writer's conclusions are consequently just those conclusions which general readers will inevitably make for themselves after carefully reading Judge Moore's *ipsissima verba* reproduced herewith.

What steps would the League of Nations take after the Japanese withdrawal? What attitude would be assumed by the new administration of President Roosevelt in the United States towards the Far Eastern question, particularly on the question of

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the eventual recognition of Manchoukuo? To answer these queries is beyond the ability of the writer at the present juncture. He, however, strongly believes that Judge Moore's statements will avowedly have great weight with the State Members of the League and with the United States, and will further prove instructive and suggestive to the disputant parties themselves—Japan and China.

The discussion by this renowned jurist in the field of international law of the present complicated international question, specially referring as it does to the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, the Manchurian question, the Embargo question, the limitation of armaments and real international peace from a legal and realistic point of view elucidated by a wealth of historical illustrations, furnishes a refreshing contrast to the harsh logic, the imaginary new psychology, and the fallacious and fantastic assumptions tending to the active employment of the warlike devices of the League Covenant. It cannot but provide the most valuable and instructive matter for reflection to statesmen, jurists, administrators and students of international law and foreign affairs at the present day.

APPENDICES

1. Letter addressed to House Committee

By JOHN BASSETT MOORE

*Reprinted from Hearings before the U. S.
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, No.
H. J. Res. 93, pp. 14-17.*

2. "An Appeal to Reason"

By JOHN BASSETT MOORE

*Reprinted from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July,
1933, pp. 547-588.*

APPENDIX

1. Letter addressed to House Committee by John Bassett Moore

New York, N. Y., March 27, 1933.

The Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr.,

Member of Congress, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Fish: Although I am unable to appear at the hearing on the so-called arms embargo resolution on March 28, I feel it to be my duty to write you a few lines on the subject. I will first state the objections to the proposed measure as it stands, and will then point out how it may readily be made to conform to international law.

It will soon be 20 years since the outbreak in Europe of what eventually became known as the "World War." Following that unfortunate event there developed, in the ordinary course of things, a war madness, manifested in the exaltation of force and the belittling of the enduring legal and moral obligations which lie at the foundation of civilized life. Peaceful processes fell into disrepute. We began to hear of the "war to end war"; and pacifists, enamored of this shibboleth, espoused the shallow creed that international peace could best be assured by the use of force or threats of force. We were told that preexisting international law had suddenly become obsolete and that the world had entered upon a new era in which the general tranquillity was to be maintained by "sanctions," by boycotts, and by war. But the final stage was reached in the spawning of the notion, now rampart, that peoples may with force and arms exterminate one another without breach of the peace so long as they do not call it war. This may appropriately be called the stage of bedlam. In all this, however, students of history will find nothing new. The development of such manias normally characterizes the progress of a great war, just as their decline marks the return to sanity.

To the final stage to which I have referred belongs the supposition that the law of neutrality no longer exists, and that in future there will be no more neutrals. It is on this theory that the proposed resolution is essentially based. It is true that the resolution does not in terms say so; and it is equally true that less is just now said about this phase of the subject than was said not long ago. But it is only

on this theory that the sweeping terms of the resolution can be defended.

As a lifelong student and administrator of international law, I do not hesitate to declare the supposition that neutrality is a thing of the past to be unsound in theory and false in fact. There is not in the world today a single government that is acting upon such a supposition. Governments are acting upon the contrary supposition, and in so doing are merely recognizing the actual fact. In the winter of 1922-23, there was held at The Hague an international conference to make rules for the regulation of the activities of aircraft and radio in time of war. The parties to this conference were the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands.

I had the honor to represent the United States in the conference and to be chosen to preside over it. We were able in the end to reach a unanimous agreement, which was incorporated in a general report. An examination of this report will show that it was largely devoted to the definition of the rights and duties of belligerents and of neutrals in time of war, and that it treated as still existing the Land War Neutrality Convention, the Convention for Adaptation of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare, and the convention concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime Warfare, all made at The Hague in 1907. The conference by which the report was adopted took place more than two years after the making of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations; the various delegations, it should be needless to state, acted under the authority and instructions of their respective governments; and yet, the idea that the law of neutrality had become obsolete never was suggested. So far as I am aware, not a single party to the Versailles Treaty or a single member of the League of Nations has ever actually taken the position that the law of neutrality is a thing of the past. The principal powers in the League have on occasion taken precisely the opposite position.

The fact is notorious that, after the Greeks were egged on to make war on the Turks and war actually came, Great Britain decided to remain neutral in the conflict, into which Canada and perhaps some of the other self-governing dominions unequivocally announced that they would not be drawn without their consent. In other recent wars Great Britain has pursued a neutral course. Other governments have done the same thing. No government, so far as I am advised, has repealed its neutrality laws. Those of the United States still remain on the statute books; and, if they are to be repealed, it should be done directly and not by implication or by embarking on a lawless course in the name of peace.

We hear much today of the duties of the United States as a "world power," and the supposition seems widely to prevail that we have only lately reached that eminence. I am too good an American to think so poorly of my country and its achievements. The United States has always been a world power. It acted as a world power when, on the outbreak of the wars growing out of the French Revolution, its first President, George Washington, with Thomas Jefferson as his Secretary of State, proclaimed our neutrality. It acted as a world power when, some years later, it suppressed the activities of the Barbary pirates.

It acted as a world power when, in 1812, it went to war in defense of neutral rights. It acted as a world power when it proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. It acted as a world power in extending its trade and opening up foreign countries to its commerce, as it so effectually did by peaceful processes during the presidency of Gen. Andrew Jackson. It acted as a world power when it refused to permit the intervention of foreign nations in our Civil War. It acted as a world power when it forbade the further maintenance of the European empire set up in Mexico by French arms during our Civil War. It acted as a world power when, in the administration of President Grant, with Hamilton Fish as his Secretary of State, it brought about, through the greatest of all international arbitrations, the amicable settlement of the Alabama claims, and in so doing made a signal contribution to the further development of the law of neutrality. It is useless to continue the specification of instances. Nations, like individuals, may increase their power by combining with a due attention to their own business the extension of their friendly offices to brethren in trouble, and by conserving their militant resources for occasions when their vital interests are at stake. A nation that undertakes to meddle with every foreign disturbance is bound to become an international nuisance, to its own detriment as well as to the annoyance of other countries. Power is neither gained nor kept by such methods.

It is obvious that certain recent agitations have been and still are carried on under radically erroneous impressions as to the legal significance of the supply of arms and munitions of war to the parties to armed conflicts. The statement is often made that the trade in contraband is lawful, and the statement is also often made that such trade is unlawful. These statements may seem to be conflicting; but, when properly understood, they are both correct. Because there is much dispute as to what the term "contraband" includes, and because it has so far been deemed proper to limit the burdens to which a neutral

power is subject, international law has not up to the present time required neutral governments to prevent their citizens from manufacturing, selling, and shipping contraband, including arms and munitions of war, in the regular course of commerce. Hence, in the sense that a neutral government is not obliged to suppress such trade, the trade is lawful. On the other hand, however, international law recognizes the right of a party to a war to prevent such articles from reaching its adversary, and, if it seizes them, to confiscate them. In other words, international law, treating the trade as being, in an international sense, intrinsically unneutral and unlawful, permits the parties to the struggle to inflict the penalty, and to this the trader's government cannot object. The trader conducts the business at his peril.

But, while a neutral government is not obliged to suppress the contraband trade of its citizens, it is forbidden itself to supply contraband to a belligerent, and particularly is forbidden itself either to sell or to give to him munitions of war. Neutrality, in the legal sense, embraces not only impartiality but also abstention from participation in the conflict (Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 7, sec. 1288, p. 863). The prohibition of the neutral government itself to supply arms and munitions of war is based upon the unquestionable fact that the supply of such articles to a fighting force is a direct contribution to its military resources, and as such is a participation in the war; and, if a government does this, it virtually commits an act of war. If it does this in behalf of one of the parties, it abandons its neutrality and is guilty of armed intervention; and if it does it for both parties, although it may be said to be impartial, it does what neither of the parties themselves can do, namely, fights for each against the other. It is not long since the United States became, through an inadvertent failure to observe these elementary principles, involved in an unfortunate incident affecting a great and friendly American country, the Republic of Brazil. Happily, the intervention quickly ended, as the government in behalf of which it was committed abruptly disappeared, and in a few days we duly recognized its successor, as 15 other governments promptly did.

From the elementary principles of international law above set forth it necessarily follows that, if a government bans the shipment of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to an armed conflict and permits it to the other, intervenes in the conflict in a military sense and makes itself a party to the war, whether declared or undeclared.

The pending resolution is, I do not hesitate to affirm, opposed to the settled policy and the highest interests of the United States and

also to the provisions of our Federal Constitution. If adopted, it would enable the President (1) to make international engagements of the most far-reaching kind at his will, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and (2) to carry us into war without the prerequisite constitutional declaration of war by Congress. Perhaps it may be answered that by the proposed resolution the Senate would voluntarily abdicate its constitutional powers regarding international engagements, and that the Congress would likewise abdicate its constitutional powers regarding the declaration of war. This argument might be accepted if the Senate and the Congress could constitutionally divest themselves of their constitutional powers and commit everything to the Executive. But, as they were unwilling to do this during the so-called World War, when it was proposed to give the President complete dictatorial powers, I can only suppose that the present extraordinary agitation is due to the misleading and somewhat deafening clamor of those who, in the name of peace, would confer upon the President an unlimited right to engage in hostilities.

I refrain from saying an unlimited right to make war only out of deference to the profound and learned authorities who assure us that war can be abolished either by calling it peace or by refraining from calling it war. This is, I may remark, a favorite notion with those who demand that the Kellogg Pact shall be equipped with "teeth" in order that it may masticate alleged "aggressors," and otherwise benignantly bite and gnaw its way to universal peace and concord. Unfortunately, there are many who appear to have been infected with these confused notions, which have been so industriously propagated in the United States. But, judged by the course of the principal members of the League of Nations during the past 10 years, and by their attitude toward the hostilities lately in progress in the Far East and elsewhere, such notions appear never to have had any real charm for the responsible authorities of the countries which would have been required to make the chief sacrifices in blood, in treasure, and in tears. To say this is not to impeach their wisdom or their sincerity. It may merely indicate that, having had enough of war, they long for real peace and an opportunity to recuperate.

Should the proposed measure become a law, no gift of prophecy is required to foretell what will follow. Groups moved by interest or swayed, consciously or unconsciously, by propaganda will clamor at the White House and at the Department of State for the unneutral application of the ban in favor of those whom they like or approve and

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against those whom they dislike or disapprove. We are assured that we may trust our authorities to resist such importunities, and to refrain from doing things that would involve the country in trouble. In other words, we are told that our authorities may be relied upon to refuse to exercise the powers so sweepingly conferred upon them. This is indeed a singular argument. Couched in the language of irresponsibility, it is not only self-stultifying but also unjust. The burdens and cares resting, especially at the present juncture, upon those who administer our affairs, are already grave and harassing enough, without imposing upon them the pastime of playing with war. Within the terms of the pending resolution, our Government would be asked to set itself up in rash and arrogant judgment upon the acts of other nations and on the merits of their conflicts, with a view to give or to permit military aid to one as against another.

Before committing ourselves to this presumptuous program, spun of the wild and flimsy fantasy that, when nations fall out and fight, the question of the "aggressor," which still baffles students even of ancient wars, lies upon the surface of things, and may be readily, safely, and justly determined by outsiders, of whose freedom from individual interest or bias there is no guarantee, we should reflect upon the fact that, had such a notion heretofore prevailed, we might and in all probability should ourselves have been the victim of it. As a marshaling of all the incidents would unduly prolong this letter, I will call attention to only two.

During our Civil War we were more than once menaced with the possibility of intervention, and, had it taken place, no one can say how fateful would have been the consequences. But, as an American, I share with my fellow country-men, as members of a great and united people, the universal sense that it is well that we were not permanently divided.

On April 6, 1898, there assembled at the White House the diplomatic representatives of six great European powers, who made in behalf of their governments what was called "a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain." We need not question the motives of the governments by which this remonstrance against our armed intervention was made. The President of the United States did not question their motives in his answer; but, with the conscious dignity that became himself as well as his great office, he expressed the confident expectation that the remonstrating powers would equally

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appreciate the effort of the United States "to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable." Two weeks later the Congress of the United States adopted a resolution under which the Government intervened with arms. The governments that had remonstrated against this step evidently did not regard Spain as the aggressor in the unhappy controversy between that country and the United States. The implication was clearly and directly to the contrary; and, according to the theory on which the pending resolution rests, the remonstrants, when the United States forcibly intervened might appropriately have declared an embargo upon the shipment of arms and munitions to this country, while continuing to supply Spain with the implements of war.

All this might, on the new theory, have been done in the name of peace, and, if the United States had exhibited resentment, this might have been treated only as further proof of its malevolent and aggressive disposition. It is better to reflect on such things while the opportunity still exists. It would be inexcusably short-sighted to assume that what has happened before will never happen again. We might also remember that our war for independence was treated by the great majority of powers merely as an act of rebellion against lawful authority. We waged the War of 1812 in support of disputed claims of national right. Many of our own people, including General Grant, have condemned our war with Mexico as an unjust aggression; but I am not aware that any of them has taken the ground that the general interest or the cause of peace would have been advanced if the powers of the world, some of which were not then themselves above suspicion, had combined their forces to oppose or to crush us.

If the real purpose back of the pending resolution is simply to prevent the United States from furnishing implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, nonpartisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign power could complain. There are already various countries which, in accordance with their laws, impose such a ban. This is entirely proper under international law. Whether such an inhibition would, without the cooperation of all other neutral nations, tend to limit the area, the destructiveness or the duration of wars is a conjectural matter on which I do not now undertake to pass. Nor do I intend to discuss the question how far such a policy may

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tend to render weaker nations, financially unable to maintain munitions factories of their own, incapable of asserting or of defending their rights against larger powers. Considerations such as these lie within the domain of policy. The general bans, where they exist, are based upon the belief that, as the supply of arms and munitions constitutes a military aid, it is better and safer to forbid it altogether. In imposing upon itself such a restriction a nation acts within its undoubted rights, and gives no just cause for reproach.

Sincerely yours,
John Bassett Moore.

2. "An Appeal to Reason" by John Bassett Moore

I. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

The April number of FOREIGN AFFAIRS was conspicuous for an exhibition of telepathy, given in its first and second articles. This was very appropriate, as international relations often depend not so much on knowledge, experience and wise maxims as on temporary psychological conditions caused by accident, by oratory, by confused impulses and by craft, against the effects of which statesmen should ever safeguard their countries by avoiding the nebulous commitments and legal uncertainties that so readily contribute to senseless and destructive wars.

The first article, written by Mr. Stimson, lately Secretary of State, says in substance that certain measures adopted since the so-called World War, chief among which are the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, prove the existence of a new psychology, a new will to peace such as the world has never known before; and this, in spite of the daily demonstration throughout the world of a frenzied state of mind rampantly manifested in armed hostilities and in a spirit of intolerance such as is rarely seen.

The second article, written by Professor Taussig, of Harvard, treats of changes which he deems to be necessary in our commercial policy in order that we may bear our proper part in promoting the world's peace and prosperity as well as our own. This article tells us that our tariffs ever since 1901 have dealt with foreign countries "simply and solely on the penalty basis—the threat basis, or, if you please, the holding up of a club;" that they "offered nothing in the way of

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concession;" that the crowning demonstration of what may be called our emergence from "isolation" and our moral regeneration and will to peace—the Tariff Act of 1930—put into the hands of the President the still stronger weapon of the complete exclusion of the products of any country that was conceived to discriminate against us; and that, while flourishing the club with ever-increasing violence, we changed traditional interpretation and application of the most-favored-nation clause in such a manner as to breed "friction, animosity, commercial warfare," particularly among our allies in the late war, and especially with "our nearest neighbor, our best customer," Canada. This sentence of condemnation is the more impressive because it is accompanied with a confession by Professor Taussig of error and change of heart on his own part in certain particulars, and with the declaration that we should now "turn from economic threat and economic war to friendly offer and friendly intercourse." Accepting these statements just as they are made, I forbear to debate certain economic questions which they naturally raise, but will at once proceed to consider the nature of the proof of humanity's alleged rebirth.

Nothing could more convincingly betray the fustian texture of the new psychology and will to peace than the circumstance that among its postulates there is not one which is not contrary to palpable realities, to the teachings of history, and to the formulation, in universal legal principles, of the results of all human experience.

Fortunately, we are able to diagnose the supposedly new state of mind with unusual exactness. It is scientifically traced back to the radical change in human nature which, first manifested in calling the World War a "war to end war," led to the formation of the League of Nations. The League, it is said, has not only prevented war but has "developed, particularly among the nations of Europe, a community of spirit which can be evoked to prevent war." But this was only the first lurch. It was nine years later, we are assured, in 1928, that there was taken the "still more sweeping step," the culminant leap, in the signing of the "Pact of Paris," vicariously known as the Kellogg or Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which sixty-two nations are now parties.

Before this Pact, we are told, international law had largely been "a development of principles based upon the existence of war" and its "legality;" while the law of neutrality imposed upon neutrals the duty not only "to maintain impartiality" between the belligerents but even to refrain from passing "moral judgment" on the rightfulness or

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wrongfulness of the cause of either party, "at least to the extent of translating such a judgment into action." Such is the scant presentment of that unlovely and suddenly obsolete thing known as international law, with its immoral element of neutrality that is now to be transmuted into war in the interest of peace.

But this is only a modest beginning. We are assured that the Kellogg Pact showed a change in "world public opinion toward former customs and doctrines" so revolutionary that many have not been able to grasp it; a "revolution in human thought born of the consciousness that unless some such step was taken modern civilization might be doomed;" a revolution so radical that "war has become illegal throughout practically the entire world." In consequence, war, it is said, is "no longer to be the source and subject of rights;" its very existence "makes one or both parties wrongdoers, to be denounced as lawbreakers;" and that so "many legal precedents" have in consequence been rendered "obsolete" as to impose "on the legal profession the task of reexamining codes and treatises." The Kellogg Pact would, indeed, seem to have overturned almost everything except the Versailles Treaty, which, with the gyroscopic aid of the League of Nations, has continued to ride on an even keel. But, even this proud ship may be facing a compulsory change of course, as Signor Mussolini, holding aloft the Pact as his sextant, is demanding a reckoning. Under all the circumstances, it is no wonder that any cold analysis of what the Pact really is should be deprecated as an attempt to reduce it to a mere gesture and to destroy the faith of the world in efforts for peace. We are therefore properly expected to be content with the information that "the only limitation" to the Pact's "broad covenant" against war is "the right of self-defense"—a right, it is declared, "so inherent and universal that it was not deemed necessary even to insert it expressly in the treaty." But, lest some doubting Thomas might suggest that an "inherent and universal" limitation might prove to be troublesome if not nullifying, we are summarily assured that it "does not weaken the treaty," since the "limits" of the limitation "have been clearly defined by countless precedents." Unsatisfied readers of this assurance have been trying to conjecture what these precedents may be.

But of the exposition of the radical and revolutionary nature of the Kellogg Pact something more yet remains to be told. The Covenant of the League of Nations is associated in the public mind probably more with its proposed "sanctions" than with anything else; and this

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is, I venture to think, unfortunate. The Covenant provides for "arbitration," for "judicial settlement," for investigation, for mediatorial offices, and for a Permanent Court of International Justice, which was established more than ten years ago. But such processes are too insipid. They excite less interest and receive less attention than current local scandals. The "sanctions," which are both economic and military, bulk more largely, as they point towards war, unless war has just now become obsolete. But it is not treated as obsolete by the Covenant. The Covenant is redolent of it. By Article 16 any member of the League resorting to "war" in disregard of certain provisions is deemed to have committed an "act of war" against all the other members, which are then to sever and prohibit all intercourse, financial or commercial, with the Covenant-breaking state, and to unite in military measures on land, on sea and in the air against it. It may also be expelled from the League.

To these provisions, in which "war" is the dominant note, the Kellogg Pact does present a perfect contrast. The Pact, as we are told, "provides no sanctions." But we are asked to tread on highly controversial ground when we are asked to believe that the Pact "does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force" in case it is "violated;" to believe that, resting "upon the sanction of public opinion" and "the will.....to make it effective," "it will be irresistible" if the people of the world "desire to make it effective;" to believe that the "critics who scoff at it have not accurately appraised the evolution world opinion since the World War;" and to believe that the Hoover-McDonald declaration at Rapidan in October 1929 that their governments were resolved to accept the Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge, "marked an epoch." How a declaration of the parties to a pledge that they mean to keep it can be said to mark an epoch, we need not inquire. But the intimation that those who regard the Pact alone as practically futile are unfriendly scoffers can by no means be accepted; for, among those who now insistently demand that it be furnished with "teeth," with which to affright and bite aggressors, the most conspicuous are those who, before it was signed, acclaimed it as a self-enforcing device. Nothing has caused so much scoffing or suspicion as this change of front.

In order to ensure entire precision, I have explained the new psychology in the very words used by Mr. Stimson, its authoritative

exponent and sponsor, in two issues of FOREIGN AFFAIRS." Mr. Stimson, just as might have been expected, has not changed front on the Kellogg Pact. He still says that its efficacy must depend on public opinion and not on force. It is only when the sanctions of the Covenant and the alleged "decisions" of the League are invoked that he welcomes, as agencies of peace, the menaces and measures of war which the Covenant prescribes. I have no quarrel with Mr. Stimson. He is present in my reflections only as the spokesman, and as a sincere spokesman, of a group identified with a certain type of mind and thought, and with a belief in methods and measures which I, who modestly pray for peace in my own time, profoundly distrust not only because they have no visible moorings on earth or in the sky, but also because they have infected many of my countrymen with confused notions of law and of conduct which, while they endanger our own most vital interests, hold out hopes of partisan intervention that encourage European governments to defer the readjustments which only they can make and which are essential to peace and tranquillity in that quarter. As long as we persist in our misguided rôle, so long will discussions of disarmament be dominated by thoughts of war rather than of peace.

II. THE KELLOGG PACT

As the Kellogg Pact is invoked as the crowning proof of the world's recent regeneration, I will now state just what it is. I give it the name of its putative author, as M. Briand neither proposed nor formulated the multilateral agreement that was eventually signed. From time immemorial treaties of amity and commerce have contained a declaration that there shall be "perpetual amity" or a "perfect, firm and inviolable peace" between the contracting parties. The Kellogg Pact does not go so far. Resolved into its elements, it comprises two things: first, a general renunciation of war "as an instrument of national policy;" and secondly, a general pledge to settle all differences by peaceful negotiation.

M. Briand on June 20, 1927, proposed an exclusive pact between France and the United States renouncing war "as an instrument of their policy towards each other," and pledging the two countries to settle their disputes by pacific means. There was also a florid preamble,

1) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Supplement, October 1932; and April 1933.

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very loosely drawn, in which the proposed contractants were spoken of as "two nations that no war has ever divided," the formal and serious maritime war of 1798, which actively continued until September 30, 1800, having been overlooked. But, for reasons of domestic and of foreign policy which may be surmised, M. Briand's proposal of an exclusive renunciation and pledge was not acceptable. There was delay; and six months had elapsed when on December 28, 1927, Mr. Kellogg suddenly fluttered the Eagles in the European dovecotes by proposing to France a renunciation and pledge in which all the principal governments of the world should unite. The Eagles anxiously exchanged notes, but soon found common ground in the discovery that they all had national policies, no matter how divergent they might be. They also remembered that the United States had its Monroe Doctrine. Then there was the Lansing-Ishii agreement, which recognized the "special relations" resulting from "territorial propinquity" and the consequent "special interests" of Japan in China; and which, although formally cancelled in 1923, left a visible trail of implications. Nevertheless, the phrase "national policy" had a dubious history. Even the United States had been charged with having asserted the Monroe Doctrine brusquely, if not aggressively, on occasions which some of the Eagles could hardly have forgotten. It was important that the phrase should be muffled, and this the Eagles proceeded to do.

We need not go into all the notes that were exchanged. We need mention only the one which the British Government, speaking individually but with the loud acclaim of the Eagles, presented on May 19, 1928; a note which, after quoting "the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy," declared that there were "certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which" constituted "a special and vital interest" for that government's "peace and safety," and that, as their protection against attack was "a measure of self-defense," no "interference" with them could be "suffered." The regions, it will be observed, were not named; and complete liberty as to their future designation was thus reserved. Then, in order effectually to preclude subsequent challenge or quibble, there was added this unequivocal condition: "It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect." The way for this addition had indeed been thoughtfully paved by Mr. Kellogg himself in a public address three weeks before, in which he declared that nothing in the proposed treaty in

any way restricted or impaired "the right of self-defense;" that this right was "inherent in every sovereign state" and "implicit in every treaty;" and that each nation "alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

In thus assuring to belligerents, each of which has decided that it acted in self-defense, the right to fight out their differences in peace, the new and regenerated psychology is for once superior to the old. Should it be said that this reduces the Pact to a bare expression of a sentiment and a moral obligation to act upon it, Mr. Kellogg has, much to his credit, dealt with the matter with his usual candor and without evasion. I have always surmised that Senator Borah, as an advocate of the "outlawry of war," played in this transaction a larger part than is generally known, especially as I observed that in the national campaign of 1928 he did not abate his appeals for the maintenance of an effective navy—not, of course, for the purpose of providing the renunciation of war with "teeth," but for the purpose of enabling the United States to exercise the right of self-defense that had been so amply safeguarded.

The notes in which the interpretations and conditions of the signatories were expressed, including that of Great Britain of May 19, 1928, were mentioned in and annexed to the circular note which the United States addressed on June 23, 1928, to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and certain other governments, formally inviting them to accept the Pact as thus explained. It was accordingly signed at Paris on August 27, 1928. As the signing of a contract with a mental reservation is both illegal and dishonest, no government can be supposed to have signed the Pact with an intention to deny or to repudiate the recorded conditions on which it was accepted. By M. Briand those conditions were specially cherished because they embraced a concession to his demand that the later renunciation of war should never be asserted to interfere with the full application of the war-making provisions of the Covenant. This concession was more radical than that made to the demand for the recognition of local special interests. The recognition of such interests rests on a principle as old as mankind: the natural and instinctive principle that peoples are more deeply concerned in what directly affects them and takes place at their doors than in what is remote. The concession made to M. Briand tends to subvert that principle.

No one could do anything but wish the parties to the Kellogg Pact to observe their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy

and their promise peacefully to settle their differences. But when I am told that the renunciation and the promise constitute an epoch in history, and denote on the part of the signatories, or even of any of them, a radical change in attitude toward war and toward the use of the vast armaments which they continue to maintain and show so much reluctance to reduce, I can hardly be reproached for recalling the Law and the Prophets and the Sermon on the Mount. On these foundations great churches have been built, and untold millions still worship at their shrines. Fundamentally, they all teach brotherly kindness, justice, and peace; and yet, the most heavily armed and most warlike of modern nations have been those that profess the Christian faith. It is these that brought to the Far East the modern implements of war. I would not destroy the nimbus of the Kellogg Pact; but when I am asked to believe that the renunciation and the promise complete a moral revolution, said to have begun during the World War, more radical than the commands of the Almighty and the precepts of Christ had been able to effect, I am asked to exhibit a credulity beyond the capacity of common minds.

No wonder that, as M. Paul-Boncour, M. Briand's great friend, has authoritatively told us,²⁾ the Kellogg Pact was for M. Briand, before all else, a means to draw the United States, the decisive factor in Allied victory, into the League of Nations. For, asks the spokesman of M. Briand's thoughts, could it be imagined that when some "aggressor" had torn up the Covenant, and the sanctions of Article 16 were set in motion against him, the United States, the initiator of the Pact, would remain indifferent to its violation and would not "throw into the duel" for peace the weight of the power which, as France had not forgotten, nothing could resist? Evidently it never occurred to M. Briand that France could ever be voted an "aggressor," or that the United States could ever be so voted so long as she fought for France. This was both ingenuous and logical, and worthy of M. Briand's clear intelligence. But, when I reflect on his eagerness to draw permanently into the service of an organization which France and her political allies and sympathizers have so largely dominated the irresistible military power of the United States, I cannot limit my recollections of that great statesman to his efforts for several years before his untimely death to bring about a better understanding between France and Germany; nor does it detract from the merit of those efforts that they

2) The New York Times, April 10, 1932.

were no less in the interest of France than in that of Germany. M. Briand began his political career, as so many other French statesmen have done, as a Socialist; and, while Socialism in France is not just what the American people suppose Socialism to be, it is associated with the idea of benevolence. This quality M. Briand possessed. Nevertheless, I do not forget how, as a member of government in 1911, when diplomatic tension between France and another country suddenly developed, he emerged as a "man of iron," and, calling railway strikers to the colors, compelled them to man the trains. Nor is it conceivable that if called to choose between France, even though she might not be clearly in the right, and the rest of the world, he could for an instant have hesitated to follow the fortunes of his native land, which he loved and served so long and so well.

III. THE LETHAL BLOW OF FACTS

There can be no higher or more convincing proof of the purely imaginary character of the supposed united "will to peace" than that which is furnished by the statement made in Parliament on March 23 last by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, British Prime Minister, on the general European situation, his recent visit to Rome, and the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Mr. MacDonald cannot be charged with unfriendly bias. He believes in peace, and has made personal sacrifices to the cause. He therefore spoke as a friendly witness, and as one having authority, when he ascribed the slow progress and the unsatisfactory results of the Conference to the "extraordinary difficulty" caused by the "diverse interests, diverse points of view, and diverse needs in disarmament" of the many nations concerned; to the "tremendous differences" that separated "delegation from delegation and nation from nation;" and above all to the fact that "the last word in these matters is the political word." It was for these reasons, said Mr. MacDonald, that the British Government had at last submitted a draft of an international convention containing as its essential features "figures regarding various armaments" and a provision for "security."

This plan, apart from details as to armament, suggests the allotment to each of various European countries of an average daily effective armed land force. For Germany it proposes 200,000, for Bulgaria and for Hungary 60,000 each; if we add Austria's unmentioned 20,000 we have a total of 340,000 men for what is left of the former "enemy" countries. Among the victors, France is allowed 200,000 home forces

and 200,000 colonial, in all 400,000; Belgium, 60,000 home, and 15,000 colonial, in all 75,000; Italy, 200,000 home, 50,000 colonial, in all 250,000; Poland, 200,000; Rumania, 150,000; Czechoslovakia, 100,000; Yugoslavia, 100,000; Greece, 60,000. This would give to the victors, exclusive of Great Britain, for whom figures were not submitted, a comfortable total of 1,235,000 as against 340,000 to the vanquished. To Russia, which now stand aloof, it was proposed to allow 500,000. From these figures it would seem that "security" presupposes not equality, but an overwhelming superiority for the victors, even without the persistently sought for "consultative" cooperation of the United States.

But, after all, the question is not so simple as this. There may still be persons who innocently suppose that the victorious Powers, in their common ardor for the good of humanity, completely and forever sank, while waging war together, all national ambitions and all selfish interests. This view could hardly have been shared by those who knew the contents of the treaties (the existence of which was by no means so "secret" as it is often alleged to have been) for the division of the spoils of war; nor should such a view have been entertained by any sensible man. Conflicts of interest, of ambition and of sentiment between nations must continue to exist as long as they exist among the human beings of which nations are composed. No one, therefore, should be surprised at Mr. MacDonald's candid confession that the inability of the Disarmament Conference to agree was due to the fact that the national delegations were kept widely apart by "diverse interests" and "tremendous differences" in regard to which the last word must be the "political word." Equally creditable to Mr. MacDonald was his admission that another and special complication was the fact that they were pledged by the Versailles Treaty, made thirteen years ago, "to give equality to Germany," and that the time had gone by when by a combination of Powers "any European people" could, permanently and without even a gradual mitigation, be kept down by obligations which it regarded "as being inconsistent with its self-respect and its honor." Day after day at Geneva, said Mr. MacDonald, he felt that he was "looking upon a stage with something moving immediately behind the footlights,"—"an ominous background full of shadows and uncertainties." Europe was, he declared, very unsettled, in a very nervous condition; and, unfortunately, "the one thing" that could "save us all," "well-founded confidence in each other," was "more lacking today" than it had been "for a very long time." Referring, then, to recent "events" and "speeches," and, also, anony-

mously, to the peace treaties of which that of Versailles was the first, he said that they all had for months and months been conscious that certain acts done some years ago were coming to flower and fruit, and that on those now living fell "the responsibility of dealing with the ripened event." He then narrated his visit to Rome, made on the invitation of Signor Mussolini. The Italian Premier, he explained, felt that Article 19 of the Covenant, which provides for the consideration of international conditions the continuation of which may endanger the peace of the world, was not meant to become dormant; that, as the Covenant enforced respect for treaty obligations, it contemplated the possibility of a revision of treaties bearing upon such conditions; that, after the lapse of ten years, they had entered on the first period when there should be cooperation in revision; and that, if this view were adopted as an immediate aid to peace and to the solution of Europe's difficulties and dangers, the friendship engendered would have further beneficial consequences.

Mr. MacDonald did not mention the well-known fact that while Great Britain and Italy have no unsettled scores there are outstanding differences and rivalries between France and Italy which no doubt influenced Signor Mussolini in insisting that any reductions of armaments, and particularly of naval armaments, made by Italy should be fully reciprocated by her strongest neighbor. This also has a bearing on his proposal of the Four Power Pact; and if, as some have suggested, such a Pact denotes a rift in the League, the cause must be traced to the League's inability to bring about any substantial amelioration of the conditions of the peace treaties. President Wilson spoke of Article 10 guaranteeing existing territorial boundaries as the "heart" of the Covenant; and so it was. Perhaps Article 19 may be spoken of as the lungs; but, while one may live with only a part of a lung, one cannot live without his whole heart.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEUTRALITY

But it is when we come to consider what is said by some of those who assume to administer or profess to teach international law that the utterances of the new psychology cause the gravest apprehension. International law is condemned for conceding to war "legality," while the part relating to neutrality is rejected as forbidding "moral judgments" and their translation into action. Neither of these assertions can be accepted. On the contrary, they betray not only a total lack of

comprehension of the law of neutrality, but also a fundamental misconception of the nature and function of all law, whether national or international.

Law does not create human activities; it merely recognizes and regulates them. The law of husband and wife neither perpetuates nor increases the propensity to perpetuate the human race; it merely recognizes the fact that the failure legally to regulate such a relation would invite a demoralizing uncertainty and chaos, while a legal ban would be both futile and ridiculous.

The pert retort that war does not perpetuate human life but destroys it would cause me not the slightest embarrassment. Defining civilization as the development of human activities under the restraint of endurable conventions, we must admit that peoples called civilized have constantly sought to increase their own growth and prosperity by war on peoples called uncivilized. War is defined as a contention by force, and, whether it be waged with fists or with frigates, its existence is coeval with the history of man; and, whatever may be its merits and demerits, it has been believed to be to some extent inevitable. An individual who commits an act of violence can readily be subdued; but such is not the case with men in the mass. The teachings of Christ are pervasively peaceful; but those who profess to accept them have seldom exemplified the precept not to resist evil. The early Christian Church beyond all cavil effectively exerted a distinctly peaceful influence, and often prevented wars between the peoples over whose minds and hearts it held sway; but the so-called religious wars, by which the division of the Church was followed, are conspicuous for their fierce and relentless character. The ancient writers on international law and relations evidently were better acquainted with these things, or were more candid with themselves, than are the proponents of our latest philosophy.

Theodore Roosevelt once exclaimed that we must have "Utopia or Hell." But as a consistent advocate of preparedness he apparently remembered that the world had always had the second alternative but never the first. The fathers of ancient as well as of modern international law similarly recognized the preponderance of proof. More than three hundred years ago Grotius, treating as undesirable extremists those who would declare all bearing of arms unlawful and those who regarded all war as lawful, wisely observed that when men urged things too far their authority was apt to be slighted, and their capacity for good diminished or destroyed. Therefore, while denouncing the evils

of war, he did not suppose that he "legalized" it when he enjoined observance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the humane treatment of captives, the sparing of private property, the abolition of its confiscation, the enlargement of the bounds of commercial freedom, and the establishment of rules of decision by which grave disputes have in countless cases been determined and strife and passion allayed. He recognized conquest only so far as the reestablishment of peace made it inevitable. Not with the smallest foundation can he or his enlightened followers, who have formulated rules and treaties mitigating the practices of war, be held responsible for the late World War, or for the acts that have, in violation of their precepts, sown the seeds of future wars. Those who, holding international law in some measure responsible for the recurrence of international wars, would plunge the world into chaos by sanctions and outlawries, must in all charity be supposed to have overlooked the constant recurrence of civil wars, to whose appalling total, which recent years have greatly increased, the United States once made a contribution of the first magnitude. I have been wont to remark that international wars will cease when civil wars end. Within the state there is legal organization and sanction beyond anything yet proposed in the international sphere, while the very phrase "civil" implies that the war is outlawed. Nevertheless, when obliged to characterize the civil strife then raging in the United States, our Supreme Court, after observing that a civil war was "never solemnly declared," but became such "by its accidents—the number, power and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on," learnedly declared that "the laws of war, as established among nations, have their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate the cruelties and misery produced by the scourge of war," and that, in consequence, "the parties to a civil war usually concede to each other courtesies and rules common to public or national wars." And the Court then adopted from Vattel, renowned for his learning and humanity, this profoundly illuminating passage:

The common laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor—ought to be observed by both parties in every civil war. Should the sovereign conceive he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will make reprisals;.....should he burn and ravage, they will follow his example; the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day more destructive to the nation.³⁾

The results of an attempt to deal with insurgents in arms solely

3) The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635,666,667.

on the theory that their conduct is "illegal," and that they must unconditionally submit to force, were perfectly exemplified in the chaos and destruction which led the United States to intervene in Cuba in 1898.

In reality, the current delusion that international law "legalizes" war, and therefore must now yield to the war-tending and warlike processes prescribed by the Covenant, comprising "sanctions," boycotts, and war itself, is merely the legitimate offspring of the new and consoling theory that peoples may with force and arms peacefully exterminate one another, provided they do not call it war.

From the same anarchic womb springs the exultant cry that the law of neutrality, because it blocked the new channel to peace, has been torpedoed, and that the neutral owners gurgled approval as they drowned. This would be a sad tale, if it were true. But it is false. There is not in the world today a single government that is acting upon such a supposition. Governments are acting upon the contrary supposition, and in so doing are merely recognizing the actual fact.

In the winter of 1922-23 there was held at The Hague an international conference to make rules for the regulation of the activities of aircraft and radio in time of war. The parties to this conference, over which I had the honor to preside, were the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. The delegates acted under the instructions of their respective governments. An examination of our unanimous report will show that it was largely devoted to the definition of the rights and duties of belligerents and of neutrals in time of war, and that it treated as still existing the Land War Neutrality Convention, the Convention for the Adaptation of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare, and the Convention concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime Warfare, all made at The Hague in 1907. The idea that the law of neutrality had become obsolete never was broached.

So far as I am aware, not a single party to the Versailles Treaty or a single member of the League of Nations has ever taken the position that the law of neutrality is a thing of the past. The principal Powers in the League have no occasion taken precisely the opposite position. All the judges of the World Court, in the Kiel Canal case, unhesitatingly concurred in the view that the law of neutrality remained unmodified; no one thought of doubting its continuing force. Up to the time of my resignation from the Court in 1928 no such doubt had been whispered; nor am I aware that any has since been suggested. In the war between Greece and Turkey in 1922, Great Britain decided

to remain neutral in the conflict, into which Canada and perhaps some of the other self-governing dominions unequivocally announced that they would not be drawn without their consent. In the statement made in the House of Commons by Sir John Simon, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on February 27, 1933, concerning the embargo (soon revoked) on the shipment of arms to China and Japan, Sir John expressly spoke of Great Britain as a "neutral government," and of the necessity, for that reason, of making the embargo apply to China and Japan alike. In other recent wars Great Britain has pursued a neutral course. France and other governments have done the same thing. On the recent declaration of war by Paraguay against Bolivia, the governments Argentina, Chile and Peru immediately issued declarations of neutrality, thus showing, as they intended to remain neutral, an intelligent respect for international law, to the literature of which some of their publicists have ably contributed.

Governments intending to remain neutral in a conflict do not, it is true, always issue proclamations. In the case of a small or distant conflict, a proclamation may seem to be needless; but the laws stand on the books and are enforced whenever the occasion may arise. Neutrality proclamations are only clarifying warnings. Neutrality always has had, as classical records show, the highly moral and expedient object of preventing the spread of war; and it furthermore prohibits the doing in time of peace of acts designed to contribute to the starting of wars abroad. In the days of the old psychology, before the crafty throat of war began to coo of peace, neutrality was chiefly offensive to war-mongers and war-profiteers. Today, however, and very naturally, it is even more detested by the devotees of the war-gospel of peace through force. But even they should be willing to reflect on the fact that its abolition would make every war potentially a world war, and that its individual repudiation by the United States would, whenever war anywhere broke out, immediately expose us to attack, as well as to claims for damages and to forcible measures of redress for any specific unneutral acts. It would also enable any Power or combination of Powers having an interest so to do to proceed against us as an enemy. Should little Costa Rica or Salvador enter upon the course now urged upon the United States, how long would they be permitted to remain on the map? And might not the United States demand precedence as Lord High Executioner? It is not logical for those who clamor for peace to cry out for measures the adoption of which only a nation commanding overwhelming force could hope to survive.

It is argued that increased population, industrialism, and interdependence, and the increased variety and speed of communications, have made neutrality increasingly ineffective, and have also made it likely that war, when it starts in any part of the world, will envelop the whole. In reality, the better and speedier the means of communications the more effectively can a government enforce its neutrality. That the enforcement of neutrality by the United States became easier and more effective with improvement in communications is as notorious as it was natural. The supposition that the recent great war is entitled to preëminence as a world war, that improved means of communication caused it to become so, and that it shows that every local war is now likely to cover the earth, is remarkably unfounded. It did not begin as a local war, but embraced all the European Great Powers and some of the lesser. It did not exceed the spread of all previous wars, or equal that of some of them. Its extent in no sense resulted from improved means of communication. The numerous local wars that have since occurred, but have remained local, clearly demonstrate that the supposed greater likelihood of spread is fanciful. But, on the evidence before us, it must be admitted that the erroneous belief that every war is now likely to become a world war creates a passion to make it so.

The supposition that the law of neutrality imposes moral indifference to the merits of armed conflicts and makes any intervention in them unlawful, I can only call baseless. The law of neutrality does not require a neutral state to remain so. A neutral state may, should it so desire, enter the conflict; but it cannot be both in and out. The law of neutrality merely applies the rule of common honesty. Parties to an armed conflict are entitled to know who are in it and who are not. No matter how it is viewed, the demand that the law of neutrality shall be considered as obsolete is so visionary, so confused, so somnambulistic that no concession to it can be rationally made.

V. ARMS EMBARGOES

Repugnance to the law of neutrality is justified only on the part of those who, as shown by the original draft of the recent Arms Embargo Resolution before Congress, wish public authorities not legally invested with the power to declare war to be able at any moment, either alone or in association with others, to involve the country in war. This repugnance naturally distinguished those who wish the United States to assist in enforcing the "decisions" of the League of

Nations, pending the fulfillment of their desire that the United States become a member of the League. This object reverberates in the letter of Viscount Cecil, published in the London *Times* of February 21, 1933, on the "very important pronouncements" made by the "Democratic President-elect of the United States" on January 11, and by the "Republican Secretary of State," Mr. Stimson, a month later; pronouncements which, he says, "make it clear that both parties in the United States stand for participation in an arms embargo against an aggressor State," while "the *Republican* Secretary of State declares that in this connection a decision by the League as to which is the aggressor is for practical purposes conclusive!" In still cherishing, as we have seen they do, the law of neutrality, members of the League no doubt regard it as an assurance against becoming involved in the untold wars to which, though neither desired by themselves nor approved by the League, the chaos resulting from the abolition of neutrality would expose them, as well as all other nations.

The Arms Embargo Resolution, as presented to Congress during the late Administration, proposed to authorize the President of the United States, either alone or in association with other Powers, discriminately to prohibit the shipment or sale of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to a war, while leaving unrestrained the shipment and sale to the other. In this form the resolution, unless deliberately designed to disregard existing international law, evidently proceeded upon a complete misconception of the legal significance of the supply of arms and munitions of war to the parties to armed conflicts. The statement is often made that the trade in contraband is lawful, and the statement is also often made that such trade is unlawful. These statements may seem to be conflicting; but, when properly understood, they are both correct. Because there is much dispute as to what the term contraband includes, and because it has so far been deemed proper to limit the burdens to which a neutral Power is subject, international law has not up to the present time required neutral governments to prevent their citizens from manufacturing, selling and shipping contraband, including arms and munitions of war, in the regular course of commerce. Hence, in the sense that a neutral government is not obliged to suppress such trade, the trade is lawful. On the other hand, however, international law recognizes the right of a party to a war to prevent such articles from reaching its adversary, and, if it seizes them, to confiscate them. This essential right we have ourselves always exercised in our wars; and we never should, I suppose,

dream of giving it up. The trader carries on the business at his peril, and his government is forbidden to protect him. But as the supply of arms and ammunition to a fighting force is a direct contribution to its military resources, a neutral government cannot itself supply such articles to the parties to an armed conflict, or permit its citizens to supply them to one party but not to the other, without abandoning its neutrality and making itself a party to the conflict, whether war has or has not been declared. It would therefore be altogether indefensible, whether the resolution be limited to America or extended to the whole world, to pass it in a form that would enable the Executive alone to expose the United States to reprisals and justifiable war by other nations by doing things that in their nature carry a country into war.

Had it from the beginning been agreed that every war was to be treated as a universal war, the course of history might have been changed, but not for the better. Said Cromwell: "Put your trust in God; but mind to keep your powder dry." Napoleon, than whom there could be no higher authority on such a subject, said, "Providence is always on the side of the last reserve, and the truth of this saying was as clearly demonstrated in his final defeat at Waterloo as it was in his previous victories. Moralists now proposing to regenerate the world by violence, without regard to the consequences to their own country or to any other, might also reflect on Lowell's line: "Truth forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne." Dryden spoke of "Worth on foot and rascals in the coach." As our advanced moralists of course expect to ride in the coach, they might do well to consider how they might themselves be classified when the country came to pay the cost of their reckless superiority to law and to the lessons of history.

It is said that our authorities may be relied upon to refuse to exercise the powers so sweepingly conferred upon them. This is indeed a singular argument. Couched in the language of irresponsibility, it is not only self-stultifying but also unjust. The burdens and cares resting upon those who administer our affairs are already grave and harassing enough without imposing upon them the pastime of playing with war.

It is also said that the resolution as originally drafted would merely confer on the President the same power as that conferred on other heads of states, including that of Great Britain. But this statement wholly overlooks our constitutional limitations. The British Crown possesses the power to declare war and to make alliances; the Constitution of the United States denies to the President the power to

do either. On the contrary, the war-declaring power is vested in Congress, and the making of alliances requires the advice and consent of the Senate.

Should the United States desire to prohibit the furnishing of implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, non-partisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign Power could complain. There are already various countries which, in accordance with their laws, impose such a ban. That such an inhibition, without the cooperation of all other neutral nations, tends to limit the area, destructiveness or duration of war I do not now undertake to affirm. Some notably humane writers, such as Westlake, have urged that a total ban might render weaker nations, financially unable to maintain munitions factories of their own, incapable of asserting or of defending their rights against larger Powers. Considerations such as these lie within the domain of policy.

VI. THE AGGRESSOR

It is dangerous to allow a fallacy to pass unchallenged because its refutation should seem to be superfluous. Especially is this so when it may easily be imposed on uninformed or unreflecting minds by appeals to the sentiment of benevolence. These truths are perfectly exemplified by the spread of the recent agitation for the punishment of "aggressors."

The word "aggressor" does not occur in the Covenant, but it has been used as the technical designation of the nation to which the warlike devices of the League of Nations were intended to apply. For this reason many attempts have been made at Geneva to define an aggressor, but never with any success. Among these may be included the delphic effort of M. Briand. "A cannon shot," said M. Briand, "is a cannon shot;" and "you can hear it, and it often leaves its traces." Then, conjectures M. Briand, the League says "Cease fire;" and, "if one of the adversaries refuses, we can surely say that he is not really very anxious about peace." I have great respect for M. Briand, and if this was the best so able a man could do, the case must indeed be desperate. Certainly a cannon shot is a cannon shot. But if the adversary who ceased fire on Geneva's command should then be killed

or disabled, he neither could nor would feel grateful, nor would his example inspire enthusiasm. Besides, even if Geneva had large military forces of her own in Europe, and they were not already preoccupied with exerting a peaceful influence in that quarter, it is a long way, for example, to Singapore; and decisive wars have often been of brief duration.

M. Briand's delicate and fragmentary suggestions clearly indicate that he did not intend them to be taken seriously as a definition. More serious in tone but equally futile is the suggestion made on the part of the United States at Geneva on May 22, 1932, that "the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties." Whether the framer of this definition was or was not thinking of Manchuria, he immediately impaled the sudden seizure and occupation of Vera Cruz by the United States in April 1914, in disregard of the treaty with Mexico of 1848, which expressly provided that neither party should resort to force before trying peaceful negotiation, and, if that should fail, arbitration. The excuse, should it be attempted, that there was no time for discussion, would merely puncture the definition. Moreover, were there no treaty, would an armed invasion cease to be an act of aggression? Might not such an invasion, even if a treaty were violated, be excused as an act of self-defense? In the celebrated case of McLeod, which nearly brought on a war, Great Britain excused her invasion of United States territory on that plea; but as the United States denied that the facts supported the plea, Great Britain made a soothing apology without admitting any wrong. Would, or would not, the new definition justify the landing of foreign troops to preserve order, as has often been done without the consent of the local government? Would it, for instance, make our military occupation of Nicaragua an act of aggression? Furthermore, will it be asserted that the answer to the question whether a treaty has been violated lies on the surface, and may not be a subject of honest difference of opinion, both on the facts and on the law, even among disinterested and impartial judges? Evidently, the draftsman of the definition was less prudent than the knowing M. Briand. It has also been suggested that the aggressor is he who fires the first shot; but the law does not require a man who believes himself to be in danger to assume that his adversary is a bad shot.

Probably it would be unfair to surmise that the persistent effort, after a decade of ghost dancing, to define the "aggressor," always

reflects the desire by means of some formula readily to obtain the military cooperation of the United States nominally in the righteous cause of peace. The thought of restraining aggressors is very ancient; but the attempt to define aggression for practical purposes has always failed, because, as has been well said,⁴⁾ it is impossible to specify beforehand the objective criteria on which the decision whether an act was overt would necessarily depend. Although nations when they go to war always profess to repel overt acts, yet they frequently do not go to war on account of them; but an assurance of associate force would necessarily increase their propensity to do so. Moreover, it is notorious that overt acts are sometimes craftily provoked for the purpose of justifying aggression; and it may be significant that the definition of the "aggressor" peculiarly preoccupies the minds of those who are best prepared to commit aggression.

On the other hand, the taking of a forcible initiative may be the only means of safety; and the importance of this principle is necessarily enhanced by the insistence of nations or groups of nations on maintaining preponderance of military power. Portugal acted on this principle when, in 1762, the combined forces of France and Spain were hovering on her frontier. In many instances the question of aggression remains indeterminate. The Hundred Years' War, which began in 1292, originated in a fist-fight between two sailors, the one Norman and the other English, in the port of Bayonne. In the battle of Navarino which, in 1827, resulted in the destruction of the Turkish fleet by the combined naval forces of England, France and Russia, the first actual shot was fired by the Turks; but English naval writers later candidly admitted that the Ottoman commander probably believed that he was repelling an attack. In the case of the destruction of the armed brig *General Armstrong* by a British squadron in the port of Fayal, Louis Napoleon, acting as arbitrator, held that the brig was the aggressor; but our Congress, believing this decision to be wrong, eventually compensated the brig's owners, officers and crew for their losses. When, in 1894, a Japanese cruiser before war with China was declared sank the British vessel *Kowshing*, carrying Chinese troops to Korea, an immediate outcry took place in England; but the excitement soon died down on the public justification of the cruiser's act by Holland and Westlake, two eminent English authorities on international law.

4) "The Slippery Aggressor," *The World Tomorrow*, June, 1930.

As experience has conclusively shown that the attempt to decide the question of the aggressor on first appearance is reckless of justice, we must, unless our purposes are unholy, rely on an impartial investigation of the facts. But this takes time. The Assembly of the League of Nations assumed jurisdiction of the Sino-Japanese conflict on September 21, 1931; the report of the Lytton Commission was signed at Peiping, China, on September 4, 1932; the Assembly adopted the report of its own committee on February 17, 1933. The actual time covered by the proceedings was seventeen months, and even then a final conclusion was not reached. Decisive wars have ended in less time. Napoleon escaped from Elba in February 1815, and the decisive battle of Waterloo took place in the following June. The war over Schleswig-Holstein of 1864 was brief; the war between Prussia and Austria of 1866 lasted six weeks; the United States declared war against Spain in April 1898, and the peace protocol, which ended the military conflict and defined the basis of peace, was signed in the following August. These are only a few examples.

That intimations that a party to a dispute may be penalized as an aggressor may not have a deterrent effect has just been shown by the course of Peru in her recent dispute with Colombia. The hostilities continued until the sudden death of Peru's Chief Executive brought to the presidency a statesman who happened to have been a diplomatic colleague, at London, of the leader of the Colombian Liberal party. An exchange of personal messages and a journey by aeroplane to Lima resulted in the conclusion of a pact of peace. The friendly human touch quickly obtained what official admonitions had been unable to secure.

Had the principle of preventing aggression been applied one cannot say what might have been the results to the United States. Our War of Independence was generally regarded in Europe as an act of rebellion against lawful authority. In the war of 1812 we appeared as aggressive assertors of the freedom of the seas. General Grant pronounced our war with Mexico of 1846 an act of unjust aggression. The Government of the United States dealt with secession as an act of rebellion. In April 1898 the diplomatic representatives of six great European Powers assembled at the White House and in behalf of their governments made what was called "a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain." They evidently did not regard Spain as the aggressor. President McKinley in his reply

expressed the confident expectation that the remonstrating Powers would appreciate our offer "to fulfil the duty of humanity by ending a situation, the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable." Had they, when we forcibly intervened, declared an embargo upon the shipment of arms and ammunition to the United States, while continuing to supply Spain with the implements of war, we should have resented in appropriate ways their partisan action.

Should we attempt to apply retrospectively the principle of staying or punishing the aggressor we should be obliged to determine the question whether the forcible creation of that great agency of law and civilization, the Roman Empire, or the forcible progress of any other great historic movement, should not have been prevented; whether the formation of the British Empire or the extension of France and her colonial empire should not have been opposed; whether the establishment of the Russian Empire should not have been resisted; whether the world should not have prevented the United States from becoming what it is; also, whether the forcible association in earlier times of the vast aggregation of states now known as China did not result from a neglect by other states of their duties and, perchance, their opportunities.

The opposite of self-defense is aggression. We have been told that the limits of self-defense "have been clearly defined by countless precedents." Students of this subject have remarked that it would be "interesting to know" what these "countless precedents" are, but their curiosity has not been gratified. It will not be. The attempt so to define self-defense that its future application would be clear and practically automatic is just as futile as the attempt similarly to define aggression has been—and must continue to be.

VII. CONSULTATIVE PACTS

In our last presidential campaign the platforms of both the major parties covetously leered towards a consultative pact. Normally, each platform views the other with alarm, and when they agree a general alarm is justified. One can only wonder whether freakish impulse or some cunning Mephistopheles caused the recent amorous accord.

The obtaining of a "consultative pact" has long been on the program of the conference so persistently staged at Geneva in the name of disarmament. To the uninitiated the word "consultative" seems to imply a friendly or platonic communion. Who would refuse to consult?

Who would be so unneighborly as to refuse what is daily done as a mere act of civility? But no one should be deceived by this. Agreements are interpreted according to the subject matter. A reduction of armaments in consideration of a "consultative pact" would necessarily indicate as the subject of consultation the number of men, of ships and of aircraft that should be contributed in order to supply the place of what had been given up. In the present state of Europe, this would tend to increase rather than to diminish the existing tension and danger. While it would please certain countries, it would inflame others. Today Europe is divided into hostile camps. Why should we encourage any of them to strike while the iron is hot? A disinclination to strike might readily be converted into eagerness by reliance on our aid.

An innocent-looking clause in our treaty with the Samoan Islands of 1878 nearly got us into war, although it merely required the use of our "good offices" for the adjustment of differences between the Samoan and any other government. This clause was accepted by the United States in a spirit of pure benevolence, but there was no real Samoan government. One day, when the shadowy government seemed to be menaced, our consul at Apia ran up the American flag and declared a protectorate over the islands. This he was not authorized to do; but it precipitated a quarrelsome consultation which ended in the setting up of an international government that proved to be so calamitous that the United States eventually agreed to divide up the islands and have done with it.

The commitment of the United States to such a "consultative pact" as is desired at Geneva would, I believe, constitute the gravest danger to which the country has ever been exposed, a danger involving our very independence. It seems to be thought that we are an easy mark, and I say this not in any spirit of reproach. We all are human. Lambs are killed by men as well as by lions, but lambs are specially appetizing to the cultivated taste of the old and polished European nations. Younger peoples may act wisely in modestly avoiding banquets at which they may be obliged to consult others regarding what they shall eat or to take the risk of indiscriminate indulgence. It has been intimated that France might pay the overdue instalment on her debt to us if we would compensate her by a "consultative pact." The proposal made by us some weeks ago of a non-aggression agreement seemed to produce a general sense of disappointment, if not of disgust. But, should we enter into a consultative pact for the sake of a pay-

ment due on an old account, we should remember that for every dollar paid us for our amiability we might have to return a million or two for war.

Of all conceivable devices the "consultative pact" is the most pernicious. It operates both as an incentive and as a lure. While it encourages the co-partner to do what he might otherwise refrain from doing, it fails, by reason of its indefiniteness, to deter the co-partner's antagonist from doing what he might not otherwise attempt. Numerous examples might be adduced to show this.

Such an understanding between Great Britain and France, called an *entente*, figures largely in the breaking out of the general war in Europe in 1914. This is clearly set forth by Lord Loreburn, formerly Lord Chancellor of England, in his "How the War Came." In this volume Lord Loreburn shows how, as the result of an agreement with France in the nature of a consultative pact, by which armed support was implied, the British people were brought into the war without previous knowledge of the danger in which they really stood. Acting under the secret understanding, Mr. Asquith, having obtained from Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law an undertaking to assist him in Parliament, gave to France on August 2, 1914, a definite promise of armed naval support against Germany that irrevocably pledged the country to war. Commenting on the settled policy which had had the support of England's greatest statesmen, Lord Loreburn well observes that if England was to abandon her habitual aloofness from "continental alliances," whether "formal or in the infinitely more dangerous guise of 'understandings,'" it was "clearly necessary" that the country also should have had "if not compulsory service, at all events a population trained to arms."

In the draft of a disarmament convention which the British Government, with a view to meet the persistent demands of France and other countries, submitted to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on March 16, 1933, the first part relates to "security;" and it is highly significant that the proposed parties to the convention are the parties to the Kellogg Pact. It is also worthy of notice that the occasion on which the parties are to consult is a breach or threatened breach of the Pact. But the British dominions, although parties to the Pact, are not among the Powers to be consulted. Probably this may be explained by the adverse and independent stand the dominions took in 1922 when it was suggested that they should support British intervention in the war between Greece and Turkey. The object of the conference, when

called, is to agree on action respecting the threatened breach or, if a breach has occurred, "to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible." The word "aggressor" is not here used. The phrase "to be held responsible" denotes a purpose to hold somebody responsible and to allow the greatest possible latitude in the determination of that question, no matter what its nature may be, whether it involves considerations of fact, or of law, or of politics, or of power. Such latitude, it must be admitted, is essential where nations combine to regulate one another's affairs, or to control one another's conduct, or to penalize misconduct. The proposed convention, while candidly recognizing these facts, wisely requires the concurrence of a number of governments; but, while requiring unanimity on the part of the Great Powers, unless one or more of them should be parties to the dispute, it requires the concurrence of only a majority of the smaller Powers. Although it is easy to conceive of questions on which the judgment of the latter would be more likely to be impartial, the proposal savors of the hegemony of the Great Powers, of which so much was said before 1914, when the Great Powers themselves tumbled into an appalling Great War. Conferences may be useful and even necessary; but when nations come to determine, through their political authorities, questions of legality, morality and good faith raised by acts that have happened, or seem likely to happen, and to impose prohibitions or punishments it is idle to conceal from ourselves the fact that they are moving and breathing in an atmosphere of force and of war, and probably without the benefit of that calmness of mind and impartiality which judicial proceedings are intended to assure among nations as well as among individual men.

A commitment more contrary to the vital interests of the United States as heretofore understood could not be conceived of. It would destroy the last vestige of the power to control our own destiny that has heretofore been the most cherished part of our birthright.

In this connection we should not fail to consider the psychology of our own people. Although not military in the sense of keeping large armaments and preparing for war, they are ingenuous, adventurous and militant. They rose and threw off the colonial yoke, although it was milder than that of other countries—the mildest of the time. President Madison, quiet and gentle in spirit, was pressed into the War of 1812. In the Greek war for independence some of our public men warmly advocated our participation. In 1846 Congress declared the existence of war with Mexico without awaiting the printing of the

diplomatic correspondence. In 1852 it required all the sober sense and self-control of our statesmen to resist the popular movement for intervention in Hungary. We drifted into the Civil War in 1861 on disputed points of constitutional law. In our war with Spain in 1898, most of the European Powers regarded our action as aggressive. After the impulse to enter the World War got its stride, President Wilson denounced Senators who opposed it as "willful men." Our demonstrated readiness to go to war, in spite of our impression that we are the most peaceful people in the world, makes it specially dangerous that we should commit ourselves to interested appeals to impulses better understood by others than by ourselves. Nor should we forget how suddenly and unexpectedly wars often break out and the trivial incidents which sometimes precipitate them. I would not abandon my fellow-countrymen to consultative shambles.

VIII. MANCHURIA

Having read the entire Lytton report, I am impressed with its comprehensiveness. The sincerity of its effort to ascertain the truth is shown by this paragraph:

It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.

The report's chief defect is, I think, the importance which at the outset it assigns to "the improvement of modern communication" as having induced the flagrant acts of force which extorted from China the Treaty of Nanking and the cession of Hongkong. Long accustomed to reflect on the trade rivalries and struggles for empire of European Powers in the Far East during preceding centuries, on the gain and loss of vast colonies, the truly world wars that were fought when ships were small and slow, and on the fact that what was done in 1841 only chiseled the margin of China's seclusion and did not break its spirit, I cannot share the common habit of thinking of "isolation" as an antonym of speed, even though Japan, by a deliberate self-development

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that embraced the assimilation of all speedy devices, induced her exemplars in speed to renounce their earlier privileges. Only by taking all these things into account can the attitude of the east toward the west and of the west toward the east be so understood as to help the reader to perceive whether the word "nationalism," which the report so often uses, predominantly denotes, in a particular instance, an anti-foreign sentiment or an aspiration after national unity. The divisions in China largely account for her present plight. In treating of Manchuria, the report does not overlook Russia's progressive absorption not only of that province but also of Korea, which caused Japan, in concern for her own national life, to risk war with Russia thirty years ago. But measures suggested by the report for the adjustment of present conditions are exceedingly complicated and largely depend for their successful application on a cooperation between China and Japan such as the western nations have not shown respecting the limitation of armaments or the readjustment of the balance of power as between themselves, to say nothing of their continued refusal to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China because their surrender would be premature. The "conditions of a satisfactory solution" suggested by the report embrace compatibility with the interests of China and Japan, consideration of the interests of Russia, conformity to the provisions of the Covenant, of the Kellogg Pact and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the recognition of Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria and of her historical associations with the country, a conventional restatement of the respective rights, interests and responsibilities of both China and Japan in that quarter, provision for the prompt settlement of minor disputes, the adoption, consistently with China's sovereignty and administrative integrity, of measures of government and autonomy so drawn and executed "as to satisfy the essential requirements of good government," the establishment of a local gendarmerie effective for the purposes of internal order and security against external aggression, the conventional improvement of commercial and political relations, and, as these various conditions can hardly be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the establishment of a temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China. The report further says that, if an adequate *rapprochement* between China and Japan is not secured, no solution, no matter what its terms may be, can ever be fruitful. The suggestions also propose various declarations and treaties, the details of which are fully elaborated; but foreign cooperation and supervision largely figure in them.

The report of the Committee of the Assembly of the League, to which these suggestions were submitted, cannot be highly commended. Its tone is that of reproof. Japan is not called an "aggressor," but this is strongly hinted; and references to provisions of the Covenant that contemplate the use of force are rather plentiful. The Assembly adopted the report on February 17, 1933, together with recommendations some of which summarily stated definite conclusions; and acceptance of the recommendations as a whole was made a condition of representation of the parties on a special committee which it was proposed to appoint to assist them in their negotiations. Japan then protested and resigned from the League. Had the Assembly tendered friendly and impartial good offices, and, as a great Secretary of State of the United States once suggested to an offending government, used "some kind words," it might have contributed to the actual and amicable solution of the immense difficulties which the Lytton report so clearly explained. On February 27, 1933, Sir John Simon, speaking for the British Government to the House of Commons concerning the armed struggle in Manchuria, had declared: "Under no circumstances will this Government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict."

In view of Great Britain's vast interests in the Far East the foregoing statement is impressive. Other European governments have spoken in a similar sense, and the arms embargo by Great Britain, which was so soon revoked, stood alone. Strangely, it was chiefly in the United States that cries for boycotts, arms embargoes and other measures were heard. These cries reverberated internationally; and there was used in both countries, even in official statements, language that reflected the prevailing excitement. Diplomatic windows are peculiar. They automatically open to bouquets, but never to gravel. A single brick may shatter all the panes. Even a well-intended admonition, if the surface is rough and hard, may have a like effect. During the war between Russia and Japan in 1904, when Theodore Roosevelt was President and John Hay was Secretary of State, the United States specially enjoined on all its officials, civil, military and naval, the practice of courtesy, moderation and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused. The Nine-Power Treaty has constantly been mentioned, and references to it are altogether proper. It enunciates an old principle intended to avoid danger in situations which actual conditions complicate. The parties to it, besides the United States, China and Japan, are Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. In the United States it has constantly been

spoken of as having special "sanctity." No doubt, a nation's faith should ever be inviolable, whether pledged to other nations or to private individuals; nor should a pledge to the latter be less sacred because its violation may be less dangerous. But the application of the terms of treaties to actual cases is often disputed and uncertain, and nations are inclined, especially when they are under pressure, to be tenacious of their own opinions. France, for instance, in 1923 refused the proposal of Great Britain to refer the question of the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr to the Permanent Court of International Justice. On the other hand, the many references to arbitral boards show how often nations disagree on questions of interpretation.

The thought of armed intervention by the United States in Manchuria, while glaringly inconsistent with the recent vote to abandon the Philippines, inevitably suggests the possible failure of its object as well as other serious consequences. Should the attempt to occupy the territory be successful, the perplexing questions whether to hold and administer it, or to turn it over to China, as she would naturally wish, or to some other Power, or to set up an international government, would necessarily have to be determined. Article 35 of the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, relating to protectorates on the coast of Africa, recognized "the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them..... sufficient to protect existing rights, and, the case arising, freedom of trade and of transit on the conditions that they may have agreed upon," and this obligation was pronounced by the highest authorities to be based also on "the nature of the case." Where efficient local government does not exist, the total failure of our trial some years ago of international government in little Samoa indicates that of all kinds of government the international is the worst.

The phrase "open door" is often used in a fighting sense, although war might necessitate the door's temporary closure. The "open door" means trade, but, of course, not in the highly obnoxious sense of "free trade," although a very moderate conventional tariff has long been imposed on China. For 1932 the figures of United States trade with China and Japan are as follows: exports to China \$56,171,000, imports from China \$26,176,000; exports to Japan \$134,537,384, imports from Japan \$134,011,311. Without undertaking now to suggest what our final attitude towards the new state of Manchukuo should be, I am bound to say that the proposal of permanent "non-recognition" too vividly recalls the uncertainty and failure, and the disorder, local and

international, which attended the recent trial of that futile and demoralizing process as a means of preventing revolution or other unconstitutional acts in other lands.

In 1919 President Wilson did not submit to the Senate a tripartite treaty he had signed at Paris to guarantee the eastern frontier of France, although in the long run internal order is maintained on both sides of the Rhine. Many examples, including the war of thirty years ago between Russia and Japan and the unended conflicts that have since occurred, show what a quagmire Manchuria offers for the swallowing up of blood and treasure, without permanent and uncontested reward to those who take their chances in it. The much vaunted annihilation of space and time has not yet enabled a nation thousands of miles away to exert its military power as effectively as it may do at home or in its immediate environment. For a distant nation to take the chances of armed intervention in Manchuria, unless in pursuit or defense of a vital interest, would suggest a recklessness savoring of monomania.

IX. OUR BIRTHRIGHT

Washington, in his farewell address, said:

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.....The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connexion as possible.....Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our interests.....Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

The original draft of this admonition was made by Alexander Hamilton who, like Washington himself, was born a British subject; but their minds embraced the entire world.

Jefferson, not forgetting the Declaration of Independence which he drew, warned his countrymen that their form of government exposed them more than any other to "the insidious intrigues and pestilent influences of foreign nations," and that nothing but an inflexible neutrality could preserve us. Their mutual jealousies and their com-

plicated alliances were, he said, all foreign to us. They were nations of eternal war. His motto therefore was: "Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none."

Sagacious John Adams, who spent many years in Europe and signed our first treaty with Holland as well as the treaty with Great Britain acknowledging our independence, when a European diplomatist remarked that he seemed to be afraid of being made the tool of the Powers of Europe, exclaimed, "Indeed I am;" and when asked "What Powers?" replied "All of them." And he added:

It is obvious that all the Powers of Europe will be continually manoeuvring with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle; and that of all the Powers of Europe, not to desire us, or, perhaps, even to permit us, to interfere, if they can help it.

Nothing more profoundly true was ever said; and this was fully recognized by all our national administrations and by our greatest statesmen down to twenty years ago, when, to the disturbance of our interests and our happiness, we began to swing on the trapeze at international political performances and even to pay for the privilege of so doing.

Not long ago a callow stripling, when I mentioned the name of George Washington, curtly remarked that his ideas were out of date and unsuited to the modern world. This is an essential postulate of the shallow dupes who, prating of our having lately become a "World Power," urge that we blindly don an imported livery of "world service," to be paid for, on demand, in unestimated instalments of blood and treasure. But it is a sad day when the children of a nation are taught to prattle ignorant and perverted slights of the men who, with steady and skilful hands, laid the foundations of its greatness and prosperity; men to whom, by reason of their exemplary valor, integrity and wisdom, an understanding world has awarded the highest place among the immortals. Thomas Jefferson, who spoke with the authority of an intimate official association, and with an intelligence that embraced all times and all climes, declared that in elevation of character, in sureness of judgment, in firmness of purpose, in inflexible justice and in scrupulous obedience to the laws, civil and military, throughout his whole career, Washington furnished an example unparalleled in history. Jefferson himself stands before the world as a great political genius, whose ideas

still stir men's minds. Alexander Hamilton, soldier, jurist, great administrator, of whom Webster said that "he touched the dead corpse of Public Credit, and it sprung upon its feet," is still studied as a profound political theorist, at home and abroad. And what of Benjamin Franklin, discoverer, inventor, philosopher, consummate diplomatist, at home in all lands, of whom Charles Phillips eloquently said that his fame would revive the hopes of men in ages yet to come?

Such are the men whom our vaporers of current sublimities would shelve as fossils in our museums of natural history, on the hasty supposition that by various modern devices, by which men may more rapidly and more frequently communicate, and more quickly hurt or help one another, discordant races and people have been harmoniously united in thought and in action and in brotherly love. Where congeniality is lacking, propinquity does not tend to create affection; on the contrary, it tends to breed hatreds. Where are today the danger spots of the world? They are coterminous countries. The French and the Germans have for centuries lived side by side. No artificial device is needed to enable them quickly to come into contact. The thin line of their common frontier can instantly be strided. For ages they have crossed and re-crossed it in peace and in war; and yet, how much have they learned to love one another? Their recent fierce and desperate conflict, and the unappeased sorrows and resentments by which it was followed, will be accepted as a conclusive answer, except by those who would employ processes of peace that would cause the echoes of war daily to haunt the fireside. The time must be out of joint when a warlike ardor for peace depreciates the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome; when new and untried visions are held superior to the proved philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, of Cicero and Seneca, of Bacon and John Locke; and when the wisdom of great statesmen, heard with reverence only twenty years ago, is suddenly rejected as having no current value.

We hear much today of the duties of the United States as a "World Power," and the supposition seems widely to prevail that we have only lately reached that eminence. But the United States has always been a World Power. It acted as a World Power when, on the outbreak of the wars growing out of the French Revolution, its first President, George Washington, with Thomas Jefferson as his Secretary of States, proclaimed our neutrality. It acted as a World Power when, some years later, it suppressed the activities of the Barbary pirates. It acted as a World Power when, in 1812, it went to war in defense of

neutral rights and the freedom of the seas. It acted as a World Power when it proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. It acted as a World Power in extending its trade and opening up foreign countries to its commerce, as it so effectually did by peaceful processes during the presidency of General Andrew Jackson. It acted as a World Power when it refused to permit the intervention of foreign nations in our civil war. It acted as a World Power when it forbade the further maintenance of the European empire set up in Mexico by French arms during our civil war. It acted as a World Power when, in the administration of President Grant, with Hamilton Fish as his Secretary of State, it brought about, through the greatest of all international arbitrations, the amicable settlement of the Alabama Claims, and in so doing made a signal contribution to the further development of the law of neutrality.

It is useless to continue the specification of instances. Nations, like individuals, may increase their power by combining with a due attention to their own business the extension of their friendly offices to brethren in trouble, and by conserving their militant resources for occasions when their vital interests are at stake. A nation that undertakes to meddle with every foreign disturbance is bound to become an international nuisance, to its own detriment as well as to the annoyance of other countries. Power is neither gained nor kept by such methods. Although megalomania may be sincere, it is noted for its mistakes.

In the French National Convention which met on September 21, 1792, the dominant factor was called the Mountain. This group, comprising the most radical Jacobin element, of which Marat and Robespierre were the chief spokesmen, was always in a state of more or less delirious eruption. During the Reign of Terror, with which the group is identified, the French Government instructed its minister in the United States to bring about "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced." This appeal is similar to that which is constantly heard in the United States today, but it did not move the unfeeling statesmen who then guided our destinies.

Those who oppose our intermeddling with what does not properly concern us are dubbed "isolationists." We should not resent this; we have good ancestral justification. All through her history Great Britain has held aloof from continental alliances except so far as they might seem to be temporarily necessary for her safety. In the Thirty Years' War which convulsed the entire Continent she took no part. At the

close of the wars of the Spanish Succession she dropped her alliances and made her own peace. As is pointed out by Lord Loreburn in the volume heretofore quoted, every single Great Power on the Continent was, during the sixty years preceding 1914, repeatedly engaged in continental war; France thrice, Germany thrice, Russia twice, Austria three times and Italy four times. During the same sixty years Great Britain was involved in continental war only once, in 1854, when in alliance with France she backed Turkey against Russia and committed the mistake later described by Lord Salisbury as "putting her money on the wrong horse." One of Great Britain's reasons for abstention as declared by her statesmen was the prevalence of deadly animosities and conflicts of interest that still survived among the continental Powers. The British policy was to maintain good relations with all her continental neighbors not only with a view to exerting a friendly influence in composing their differences but also to avoid commitments which might compel a participation in foreign wars and deprive the country of its independent control of its own policy. But there was yet another reason; all the great continental Powers had adopted universal compulsory service. Great Britain's cardinal principle was to rely upon an overwhelming superiority at sea. It was these things that led Lord Salisbury, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the close of the last century, to boast of England's "splendid isolation." When an inheritor of the name of Elizabeth's great minister used this phrase it did not occur to Englishmen to reproach him for an abandonment of their "world leadership," or to wail over their neglect of their international duties. On the contrary, when Lord Salisbury spoke of "isolation," Great Britain was still tingling with memories of the Diamond Jubilee, when statesmen coming from the ends of the earth to pay homage to the Great Queen saw without dread the vast fleet that confidently rode the inviolate sea that washes England's shores. Here, the victims of the new psychology use the word "isolation" as a term of opprobrium. It would be as sensible to condemn as an "isolationist" a man who did not tie himself up with unnecessary contracts, and especially of the kind that were likely to impoverish or to ruin him, without benefit to himself and perhaps with injury to others. Such epithets serve only to exemplify the want of knowledge and of understanding of those who employ them.

Conspicuous in the lingo of the past decade is the plea for the continuance of the kind of "leadership" with which we began to bless the world less than twenty years ago. Some of our very eminent men

have urged this plea. But I have often wished that those who use such language would reflect on how it may strike other peoples, in Europe and elsewhere. Why, for instance, should the British, the Dutch, the French, or the Italian people pant for our spiritual, our moral or our political guidance? Why should they regard as superior to them a people whom they benevolently associate with mass production, skyscrapers and prohibition? If they were to express their inmost thoughts would they not confess that such utterances sound to them somewhat boastful, somewhat neglectful of their great historic tradition? How should we ourselves now feel if the eminent foreign statesmen who lately responded to President Roosevelt's invitation to visit him, had, before leaving the United States, intimated that we needed their "leadership," and that any counsels or conditions they suggested should be accepted in that sense? Perhaps it is unfortunate for us that they did not say so. But, having had long experience in leadership, they can well afford to pay a polite deference to those who ingenuously profess to have usurped their ancient prerogative.

We also hear much of the "international mind." Would to God that we had more of it! But in devoutly expressing this wish I do not confine it to my own country, nor do I lack a definite conception of what an international mind ought to be. Having for many years been connected with the administration of foreign affairs, I can truthfully affirm that there is no nation towards which I cherish a feeling of enmity. I have always been a peace-maker; and, as an international judge, I am willing to stand on my record as one who strove to act without fear or favor. But I confess that of all countries I love my own the best. No international mind is, in my opinion, to be desired or to be trusted that is not built on a national foundation. The man who cannot sing his national anthem with a whole heart is not fit to be entrusted with negotiations with foreign Powers. No experienced diplomatist would trust out of his sight an adversary who did not seek to obtain for his own country a square deal. Only those who are disposed to maintain the rights and interests of their respective countries can treat with one another on the basis of mutual self-respect. The best diplomatists are those who are willing to give as well as to take; who can grasp and apply the equitable solution that assures to each that which is justly due; who, in leaving behind them no heartburnings and resentments, conserve the interests of all. It is a pleasure to remember the men of this type with whom I have dealt.

We are told that invention and trade and industrial organization

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cannot be reversed. But nobody wishes or proposes to reverse them. We are told that the world has become too dependent on comforts to be willing to give them up; but, although dependence on comforts is not a sign of strength, either physical or mental, no one is specially advocating their abandonment. But the culmination is reached when we are told that we cannot "retire within our own borders" and lead a life of "isolation." When have we ever done such a thing, or proposed to do it? The late Grand Duke Alexander of Russia, on revisiting the United States in 1928 after an absence of thirteen years, said that on his return the impression he got was that what he had admired as the robustness of American life "had given place to the sickening self-consciousness of an hysterical idealism," and had been superseded by the "same hodgepodge of badly digested ideas" as had characterized the Guards Barracks in St. Petersburg thirty years back. "So this," he exclaimed, "was the American share of the Versailles spoils! It seemed bewildering that any nation should send 2,000,000 men across the ocean, fight for something that did not concern it in the least, tear up the map of the world and lend billions of dollars to its competitors—all for the purpose of acquiring the worst traits of pre-war Europe."

And for what is our birthright to be thrown away? Among other things, for membership in an association which, although established in the name of peace, is in the present state of the popular mind chiefly characterized by warlike devices. I am not opposed to an association of nations for the purposes of peace, and would not disparage any useful work the League has done. But the League, in dealing with political matters, suffers from the radical defects of its charter. My first and consistent opinion of the Covenant fully accords with that so thoughtfully and prophetically expressed by Mr. Elihu Root as early as March 13, 1919, in these words: "The more I study it, the more satisfied I am that it has some very useful provisions, some very bad ones, some glaring deficiencies, and that if it is not very materially amended not merely in form but in substance, the world will before very long wake up to realize that a great opportunity has been wasted in the doing of a futile thing." Most fully has this profoundly prescient comment been justified by the recent and too frequent occasions on which loose, excited and unfulfilled threats of employing the warlike devices of the Covenant have exposed the League to reproach if not to contempt. Nor do I hesitate to mention as an example the unhappy conflict between China and Japan in which, while warlike

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words were heard from Geneva, the minister for foreign affairs of powerful members of the League were disavowing in their capitals any intention to intervene in the armed strife in Manchuria.

Originally, the League had the character of a political club which nations could enter only by invitation. To this phase Argentina long ago intelligently objected. There was a list of original members and a list of states invited to accede. No recent enemy state was on either list, although President Wilson, before going abroad, had declared that Germany would necessarily be admitted, for the purpose of controlling her if for nothing else. Mexico, although never an enemy state, was, because the United States did not then approve her, unbidden to the banquet of peace. Russia, in spite of her vast contribution in blood and in treasure to the Allied cause, had fallen from grace and entered upon courses that were not approved. With absences such as these it could not, even had the United States been present, have been truly said that the voice of the world was heard at Geneva.

But the most fundamental defect of the plan was the creation of the warlike devices on the fantastic assumption that the members of the League would, in making use of those devices, divest themselves of their individual interests and prepossessions, of their historic and instinctive antagonisms, and altruistically unite in enforcing the ideal of impartial justice. In the ordinary administration of the law, persons who have formed prejudgment are peremptorily excluded from the jury as being presumptively incapable of weighing the proofs and rendering a fair and just verdict. The members of the Council of the League of Nations are the delegates of governments; the members of the Assembly also represent governments. It cannot either justly or rationally be expected of such bodies to divest themselves of all prepossessions or consciousness of national interests, to say nothing of the fact that they must inevitably differ in opinion. It is for reasons such as these that where a conflict between nations occurs and the warlike devices of the Covenant are invoked they so readily excite apprehension and distrust. It is very significant that the professed friends of the League are the readiest to censure it for not hastening to employ the warlike devices. On the assumption that such persons accurately represent the spirit of Geneva and are influential in its deliberations, those who do not believe in war as the prime, or as the natural and appropriate, creator of peace cannot help reflecting upon the demonstrated fact that war may as readily be used for unjust as for just ends, for oppression as well as for liberty, for the crushing of some and the exaltation of

others, and for evil as well as for good. No wonder that the League is visibly rocked and rent and the world disturbed and divided whenever an agitation arises for the use of the warlike devices which visionary men in an excited and unsettled time foisted upon those who were wiser and more modest in the estimation of what was practicable and desirable. It was on this rock that the great Confederation of Europe, based on the treaties that ended the Napoleonic War and the Holy Alliance, eventually was wrecked. Although it contained no elaboration of warlike devices for the preservation of peace, the attempt of subsequent conferences to employ united military action divided the Powers and brought to an end their association. Such a result may be regarded as inevitable.

Esau, thinking that he was about to die, sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; but the Bible censures him for having despised his birthright. What would have been the nature of the censure if he had thrown his birthright wantonly away, or had allowed himself to be cheated out of it? Europe is the victim of history, a seething mass of hereditary feuds. They exist in the western part as well as in the eastern, and they are peculiarly bitter in the southeastern, where the war in 1914 originated. The Balkan Peninsula may be likened to a Vesuvius, always in danger of an eruption. Once, when I asked an Albanian to meet a Serbian he did not know, he hissed in reply: "He i-s-s my en-ne-my!" The United States may, if it should unhappily see fit to do so, associate itself with these feuds and henceforth help to fight them out. It may embitter and help to perpetuate them, but it cannot end them.

In my early days I learned from great teachers the unity of human history. Human nature has not changed. Human propensities, human appetites and human passions have not changed. We come into the world in the same way, and our necessities are the same. The struggle for existence still continues and it will go on. As one long and intimately acquainted with men of arms, I may say that they do not share the new view that peace and tranquillity on earth may be promoted and stabilized by boycotts, by playing fast and loose with the law of neutrality, and by the extension of the area of wars. Wars are not brought about by the officers of our Army and our Navy; but wars have often been fomented by agitations recklessly conducted by persons who professed a special abhorrence of war. The motives and objects of war have been various; but, as war is a contention by force, it is waged for victory. The struggle, as it progresses, becomes more and

more intense. Each day brings its tale of death and of desolation. Grievances accumulate; the passions burn more fiercely; the hoarse cry of vengeance grows louder and more insistent; and the cases are rare in which the peace that is extorted does not by humiliating conditions sow the seeds of future wars.

The true and only foundation of peace among men is the concession to each of that which is due. No doubt perfect justice is unattainable in this world. But there is an ideal of justice towards which every nation, every people, every individual should aspire. This ideal can be attained only through the reconciliation of our conflicting views and our conflicting interests. We are not all alike. No two men and no two women are alike. No two nations are alike. We differ in race, we differ in creed, we differ in color; and all differences tend to provoke antagonism. If we would keep men and nations at peace, we must remove the causes of their discontent, elevate their moral sentiments, inculcate a spirit of justice and toleration, and compose and settle their differences.

Such is my message, on which I am prepared to stand before any future Seat of Judgment, in all confidence that no sudden reversal during the past twenty years of the ways of God to man will exclude me from the reward promised to good and faithful servants.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 24, 1934.

~~JEH:~~

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Nanking's unnumbered despatch dated November 28, 1933, on the subject of "Sino-Japanese Controversy; Opinion of Dr. Georges Padoux, French Adviser to the Chinese Government", --

No action required.

The despatch summarizes a conversation between Mr. Peck and Mr. Padoux, French Adviser to the Chinese Government. Mr. Padoux feels that the League and the United States should announce to China that they are without means to give effect to their verdict in the Sino-Japanese dispute and advise China to come to direct arrangements with Japan. He suggests that the League might base this action on a statement to the effect that now, after the lapse of a considerable amount of time, the belief that "Manchukuo" had been created in the face of opposition from the inhabitants of Manchuria appears to be erroneous. Mr. Padoux also believes that the concluding of postal, railway and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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other matters concerned with intercourse between China and Manchuria would not constitute recognition. In this connection he referred to the fact that Japan had numerous dealings, including an exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives, with "Manchukuo" before recognizing that government.

Mr. Peck emphasizes in concluding his despatch that the remarks of Mr. Padoux were made during a social conversation. Mr. Peck feels however that they may be an index of the nature of the advice given by Dr. Padoux to the Chinese Government.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM REGD

LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking Office, November 28, 1933.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 3 1934

Department of State

JAN - 2 34

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy; Opinion of
 Dr. Georges Padoux, French Adviser to
 the Chinese Government.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

At a luncheon given by the French Minister today I had an informal conversation with Dr. Padoux, French, an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the Chinese Government's attitude toward "Manchukuo".

Some of Dr. Padoux's opinions were expressed spontaneously and some were elicited by my questions. What follows is a summary of his remarks:

Dr. Padoux asked me whether I had as yet studied the recommendations of the Special Committee of the League regarding the attitude to be taken toward "Manchukuo". I replied that I had not yet done so.

Dr. Padoux said that he felt that the League and the United States had left China in a situation which was unjust to China. The situation is, briefly, that the League and the United States describe to China what its rights are with respect to "Manchukuo" and tell

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China to do nothing to jeopardize those rights. At the same time, they do nothing, and apparently do not intend to do anything, to safeguard those rights for China. It is obviously impossible for China to recover the Manchurian area at this time by its own unaided efforts; nevertheless, *China must take cognizance of the existence of Manchuria and must continue relations with Japan. What then, is China to do? The position of the League and the United States amounts, practically, to a negation of the existence of "Manchukuo", but "Manchukuo" exists and even other countries, besides China, cannot avoid dealing with "Manchukuo" as a fact.

Pressed for an expression of his personal opinion regarding the appropriate course for the League and the United States to pursue in these circumstances, Dr. Padoux expressed the impromptu opinion that the League and the United States should plainly announce to China that they are without means to give effect to their verdict in the dispute between China and Japan and should advise China to come to direct arrangements, as best she can, with Japan.

I observed that recent statements by Chinese political leaders, made in my presence, indicated that they believed that the only possible means available to China to recover Manchuria is to be found in the pronouncements of policy by the League and by the United States. I questioned whether the Chinese would be happy, therefore, if the League and the United States were to take the course advocated by Dr. Padoux. He replied to this that if a

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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nation of 450,000,000 people had reached the conclusion that it must depend solely upon foreign assistance, rather than its own strength, to protect its just rights, then that nation is doomed and it would be futile to assist it.

I remarked that another consideration probably presented itself to the mind of Chinese political leaders, namely, that if the League and the United States were to inform China that it could no longer place any reliance on the pronouncements of the League and the American Government defining China's rights in and to Manchuria, the Chinese Government itself would be obliged to shoulder the responsibility for the settlement of this question. At the present time the Chinese Government takes the position that it is estopped from direct negotiations with Japan concerning Manchuria by the duty of China to conform loyally to the official announcements of the League and the United States, which deny that any justification has existed for the actions of Japan in Manchuria. Dr. Padoux concurred in the view that the Chinese leaders might be averse to seeing themselves left to deal with this thorny question, since apparent disaster would face them whether they continued to resist Japan or capitulated to that country.

Dr. Padoux suggested, in support of the view that the League and the United States should advise China to rely no longer on the League's resolutions concerning Manchuria, that the League might base this action on the apparent lack of objection to the creation of "Manchukuo"; the League

might

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might state that whereas it had believed that this state had been created in the face of opposition from the inhabitants of Manchuria, it now appeared, after the lapse of considerable time, that the inhabitants of Manchuria in fact entertained no such feelings of opposition.

I observed to Dr. Padoux while China was confronted with great difficulties because of the refusal of Japan to conform to the League Resolutions concerning Manchuria, the League of Nations and the United States, also, by reason of the definite public pronouncements made by them, would also be in somewhat of a predicament if the present political set-up in Manchuria were to continue indefinitely. Dr. Padoux assented to this and pointed out that if the League were to take the course he had suggested the League and the United States would be relieved from this predicament. He remarked that the position taken by the League and the United States in reference to "Manchukuo" was based on "International Law" and that "International Law" is essentially different from law in general, in that it there is no provision for enforcing it. It has only so much practical effect as the nations concerned in a particular controversy care to give to it. This being well recognized, there would be no serious obstacle in the way of the action which he had suggested the League and the United States might take toward China. He said he had, in fact, asked the Chinese whether their reliance on the League for assistance in regaining Manchuria was designed to "save their face" or "save their territory", the implication being that if one were accomplished, it must be at the expense of the

other.

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other.

With regard to the negotiations which, as currently reported, have recently been in progress between Japanese and Chinese authorities in Peiping over railway, postal and other matters concerned with intercourse between China and Manchuria, Dr. Padoux expressed the view that even if such necessary arrangements were concluded, they would not constitute "recognition" by China of the state of "Manchukuo". He observed that from March 8, 1932, to September 14, 1932, the Japanese Government had conducted numerous forms of dealings with "Manchukuo"; that it even exchanged diplomatic and consular representatives. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government specifically stated that by the protocol between Japan and "Manchukuo" of September 15, 1932, the Japanese Government had "recognized" that state. The implication was clear that it did not regard its previous intercourse with "Manchukuo" as having constituted "recognition". Consequently, how much less could mere postal and traffic arrangements be held to constitute "recognition"? Dr. Padoux believed that whatever the recommendations of the Special Committee of the League might be, the world at large would be unable to avoid dealing with "Manchukuo".

It must be emphasized that the observations made by Dr. Padoux, summarized above, occurred in the course of a social conversation. They may, however, be an index to the nature of the advice given by Dr. Padoux to the

Chinese

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Chinese Government and are here reported for such value
as they may have in that connection.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

In quadruplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy at Tokyo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 9, 1934.

EFF:

*Dawson encloses with his report
No. 1354 of December 20, 1933, a French
press article which suggests that
rapprochement between China & Japan
may not be very far off.*

*The article contains no statement
of fact which has not already been
brought to the knowledge of the Division.*

It is not particularly interesting.

ED



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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Paris, December 20, 1933.

JAN 6 34

SPECIAL REPORT
 (No. W.D. 1354)



793.94/6641

To the Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad
 interim forwards herewith Mr. Warrington
 Dawson's Special Report No. W. D. 1354,
 dated December 20, 1933.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, December 20, 1933.

Serial No. W. D. 1354.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: André Duboscq Discusses
 Sino-Japanese Relations

Writing in LE TEMPS of December 18, 1933,
 André Duboscq drew attention to the genuine at-
 tempts which have been made in the last few
 months between Nanking and Tokyo to reach an
 understanding on "a certain number of questions
 relative to 'Manchukuo,'" and he remarked:

"The rulers at Nanking are indeed trying
 to establish with the Japanese practical measures
 concerning 'Manchukuo.' Their policy does not go
 beyond that. But it must be admitted that
 people who seek to agree for ends which they

judge

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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judge necessary, are not as far asunder as some others may allege."

Dubosq adds that much Chinese capital is being invested in "Manchukuo" and the Chinese are a practical-minded people who know what to do with their money.

The original of this article is enclosed.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

Enclosure: (in single copy)

Article from LE TEMPS of December 18, 1933.

In quintuplicate

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WD/DRS

Encl. to S. R. #WD 1354 of December 20, 1933.

From the Embassy, Paris.

Article from LE TEMPS of December 18, 1933.

Questions extérieures

LES RAPPORTS ACTUELS DE LA CHINE ET DU JAPON

Voilà plusieurs mois que les gouvernements de Nankin et de Tokio cherchent à régler un certain nombre de questions relatives au Mandchoukouo. Aucun doute n'est permis à cet égard. Des télégrammes ont donné des précisions. C'est ainsi qu'un télégramme de Pékin du 19 octobre dernier, annonçant tout d'abord l'arrivée dans cette ville de M. Ariyoshi, ministre du Japon à Nankin, énumérait ensuite les points suivants sur lesquels ce dernier allait s'entretenir avec le général Houang Fou, délégué du gouvernement de Nankin dans le nord, et président du conseil politique de Pékin : 1° liberté de la navigation sur la rivière Luán; 2° règlement postal entre l'Etat mandchou et la Chine; 3° création de trains directs entre Pékin et Moukden; 4° occupation par une garnison chinoise des passes de la Grande Muraille; 5° communications par terre et par air; 6° établissement de barrières douanières aux passes de la Grande Muraille; 7° maintien de l'ordre dans la zone démilitarisée.

En somme, depuis la trêve de Tangkou du 31 mai dernier, les relations entre les gouvernements de Nankin et de Tokio se sont améliorées au point que la nécessité d'un accord plus solennel et plus complet ne s'est pas imposée avant le règlement des questions pratiques et urgentes qui viennent d'être énumérées. Le *Journal de Shanghai* du 24 août écrivait à ce sujet, sous la signature d'« Un Chinois » : « Incontestablement, la situation des relations sino-japonaises s'est améliorée et n'a pu l'être que grâce à l'application d'une politique en vue d'arrondir les angles... On ne parle guère, depuis le commencement de l'année, de la Mandchourie, dont le nom figure rarement dans les journaux chinois. Nos confrères s'abstiennent d'employer le mot « ennemi » en parlant du Japon, et les bruyantes associations antijaponaises ont mis depuis plusieurs mois une sourdine à leur propagande pour la reprise du territoire perdu. » Et le rédacteur de l'article écrivait en terminant qu'il voyait chez les Chinois et les Japonais « l'intention d'arriver le plus vite possible à un certain *modus vivendi* avant l'accord définitif » ; c'est-à-dire que la reconnaissance du Mandchoukouo par la Chine n'aurait pas lieu, mais que certaines questions seraient pratiquement traitées comme si cette reconnaissance avait eu lieu.

Depuis l'entrevue d'octobre, Ariyoshi-Houang Fou, il y en eut une autre, à la fin de la première semaine de novembre, entre le même Houang Fou et le général Okamura, sous-chef de l'état-major général de l'armée japonaise de Port-Arthur et de Dairen (armée du Kouan-Toung). Cette entrevue, d'après les dépêches qui en faisaient part, fut consacrée à discuter les annexes à la trêve de Tangkou. Enfin le 2 décembre, c'était l'attaché militaire japonais en Chine qui, avec un délégué du gouvernement de Nankin, se rendait auprès de Houang Fou. « Dans les milieux bien informés, ajoutait le télégramme de Pékin qui annonçait l'entrevue, on estime que les porte-parole de la Chine insisteront pour ignorer le Mandchoukouo et pour traiter seulement avec le Japon. » Cette dernière phrase disait bien ce dont il s'agissait. Houang Fou, d'après une information de Shanghai, a même tout dernièrement « insisté auprès de Nankin sur les inconvénients qu'il y aurait à retarder davantage les pourparlers qu'il a entamés avec les représentants japonais sur les douanes, la poste et les communications ferroviaires, et qu'une forte opposition avait fait interrompre. »

En effet — et ici nous sommes d'accord avec les personnes qui nient tout rapprochement sino-japonais — des éléments chinois d'opposition sont parvenus sinon à faire rompre ou même suspendre officiellement les pourparlers de Nankin, du moins à les interrompre en fait. Pour ces opposants, aucune conversation, par conséquent aucun rapprochement n'est possible avec le Japon. Mais ce serait aller contre l'évidence que de nier l'autre courant, officiel celui-là, qui est pour une conversation, d'ailleurs depuis longtemps commencée, comme on vient de le voir.

A son retour récent de Chine, M. Pelliot, le sinologue professeur au Collège de

Encl. to S. R. #WD 1354 of December 20, 1933.

From the Embassy, Paris.

Article from LE TEMPS of December 18, 1933.

~~Japonais en Chine~~ qui avec un ~~gouvernement de Nankin~~ se rendait auprès de Houang Fou. « Dans les milieux bien informés, ajoutait le télégramme de Pékin qui annonçait l'entrevue, on estime que les porte-parole de la Chine insisteront pour ignorer le Mandchoukouo et pour traiter seulement avec le Japon. » Cette dernière phrase disait bien ce dont il s'agissait. Houang Fou, d'après une information de Shanghai, a même tout dernièrement « insisté auprès de Nankin sur les inconvénients qu'il y aurait à retarder davantage les pourparlers qu'il a entamés avec les représentants japonais sur les douanes, la poste et les communications ferroviaires, et qu'une forte opposition avait fait interrompre. »

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A son retour récent de Chine, M. Pelliot, le savant sinologue, professeur au Collège de France, qui connaît admirablement la psychologie des Chinois, déclarait que le triumvirat Tchang Kai Chek, T.-V. Soung et Quang Tching Quei paraissait s'acheminer vers une politique d'où sortirait vraisemblablement un « rapprochement sino-japonais ». Il fut un temps, qui n'est pas loin, où M. T.-V. Soung, qui avait assez longtemps respiré l'air de Genève, n'était pas enclin à s'acheminer vers cette politique. Les télégrammes parvenus d'Extrême-Orient, au cours de son voyage de retour en Chine, ont plus d'une fois laissé percer les efforts de ses deux collègues pour le rallier à leur raisonnable point de vue.

Toutefois, ce que nous voyons faire aux gouvernants de Nankin c'est simplement essayer de prendre avec les Japonais des dispositions pratiques au sujet du Mandchoukouo. A cela se borne leur politique; mais on conviendra que des gens qui, déjà, cherchent à s'entendre pour des fins qu'ils jugent nécessaires, ne sont pas aussi loin les uns des autres que certains le prétendent. Il existe en tout cas une notable différence entre eux et les éléments chinois d'opposition dont nous avons parlé. Ajoutons, ce qui n'est pas négligeable, que les capitaux chinois se placent actuellement en quantité dans le Mandchoukouo. Le Chinois, essentiellement pratique, sait placer son argent.

Jusqu'où ira le commencement de rapprochement sino-japonais qui se dessine à l'horizon ? Nous le verrons bien. A chaque jour suffit sa peine.

Dans son dernier ouvrage intitulé *Le Japon et son empire*, plein d'enseignements et de sens de l'Orient — qualité si rare ! — et sur lequel nous reviendrons souvent, Mme Andrée Viollis fait dire à son interlocuteur, un « jeune socialiste japonais passé au fascisme » : « Dans la génération de nos pères, qui ont connu des temps de prospérité et d'espoir, il y en a encore beaucoup qui tiennent à cette civilisation occidentale dont la conquête leur a coûté si cher; ils lui demeurent attachés par l'esprit et par le cœur. Mais nous autres, les jeunes, qui en sommes nourris, nous en avons assez, nous nous retournons contre elle. Que nous a-t-elle apporté sinon déceptions et rancœurs ? Puisque l'Europe et l'Amérique ne veulent pas nous comprendre, puisqu'elles nous abandonnent et nous méprisent, nous entendons nous passer d'elles. Nous remonterons aux sources de notre idéal et de notre culture nationale. »

Un peu trop d'amertume peut-être et, parlant, quelque injustice inspire à ce jeune Japonais de pareils propos; mais ces réserves faites, si l'on rapproche le fond de sa pensée de celui des Jeunes Chinois créateurs du « Comité préparatoire de la société panasiatique » qui déclarent vouloir revenir au confucisme et dont nous avons parlé dans un article précédent (*Temps* du 3 août dernier), il faut bien reconnaître qu'il y a pour nous plus d'enseignement à puiser dans cette rencontre que dans l'observation même quotidienne et impartiale de la politique sino-japonaise.

ANDRÉ DUBOCCQ.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.77/2957 FOR Despatch #387
FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Dec.1,1933
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Attempts of Japanese to buy out interest of Belgium
in the Lunghai Railway and to pay for privilege of
managing line for Belgium creditors of that line
is reported by American citizen who quoted Mr.
Rene Naclot, Secretary of the Lunghai Railway.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Amoy/75 FOR Despatch #191

FROM Amoy (Franklin) DATED Dec.1,1933
NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Visit of the Japanese Minister at Large, Yotora Sugimura to Amoy: Reports regarding --. The Minister made a speech on the night of his arrival, summary of which is given.

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793.94/6543
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese Minister, Yotora Sugimura, arrived in Amoy from Poochow on the morning of November 8th. He is said to be a persuasive politician and sent to cultivate international friendship with the Chinese in this district. The Japanese Consul, Mr. T. Tsukamoto, gave a dinner in honor of the Minister and invited the leading Chinese officials, General Gaston Pang, Admiral K. K. Lin, the wealthy merchant Mr. Wei Tjoe, Mayor Hsu, Mr. Lin, the Chief of Police, etc. The first three named refused to accept the invitation. On the following day, the Minister, accompanied by the Japanese Consul, tried to call on the prominent officials and found many of them absent.

On the night of his arrival the Minister made a speech at the Hioh Ying (旭瀛) school owned by the Japanese and Formosans in Amoy. About 300 persons were present at the meeting. The Minister chose as the subject of his speech - "The International Relations at Present." He stated that Japan is at present threatened by two white peoples - the Americans and the Russians - that Japan to keep her position must depend upon her allies of the yellow race and that the North-eastern people, the Koreans, the Formosans, and the Japanese must be united and friendly to each other in

in order to meet the situation.

The Minister left Amoy on November 10 by the Japanese steamer "Deli Maru" for Swatow.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./72 FOR Desp.#607

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Dec.11,1933
//H// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations: Among other things, discusses
the effect of the Fukien Revolt on - .

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793.94/6544

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a) China.

"As a result of America's recognition of Soviet Russia, the Moscow Government has stretched its magic hands to China, especially South China, for the purpose of Bolshevizing the whole of China on one hand, and on the other to place restrictions upon a further expansion of Japan's influence on the Asiatic continent". Thus the YOMIURI explains the recent revolt in Fukien.* While the above explanation tends toward exaggeration it does contain, it is believed, certain elements of truth, namely that the new Government is believed to be communistic. In view of the proximity of Fukien to the Island of Formosa it is this element which is so disturbing to the Japanese and leads them to believe that trouble must eventually be expected from that quarter. Another disquieting feature is the fact that the new revolt adds one more disturbing element with which the Nanking Government must cope and further reduces the prestige of that organization at a time when it seemed as if some progress toward Sino-Japanese friendship was being made. Obviously this renders futile direct negotiations over "Manchukuo" with the Nanking Government as that political body would prove impotent to carry out any agreements which it might enter into with the best of intentions. Though it is not known yet what attitude the new Government will assume toward Japan it is expected that it will be unfriendly, therefore two Japanese warships having been despatched to the district, a policy of watchful waiting has been assumed by the Tokyo Government.

RENGO

* See Telegram No. 180, Nov. 22 and Despatch No. 597, December 1, 1933.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RENGO announced receipt of the usual "report from a reliable source" that the Fukien revolt was not only fomented by the American Navy but is being openly aided by it. Such statements are given little credence by the Japanese authorities as they are a daily fare, and in this very incident both France and Great Britain have also been accused of cooperating with the rebels.

The new Government's announced policy of abrogation of all unequal treaties caused considerable speculation on the part of the local journals as to whether or not the status quo of Fukien, guaranteed by the Chinese to the Japanese in 1898, would be maintained. Official circles, however, do not appear to consider this phase of the question as disturbing as the inclusion in the new Government of many persons whose feelings are known to be anti-Japanese, the most conspicuous amongst whom is the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eugene Chen, whose communistic leanings are renowned.

An announcement from Peiping stating that a new state had been born in Inner Mongolia, with its capital at Tien-chih, was taken by the Japanese as an additional indication that the disintegration of China is well on its way. The officers of the new Government are for the most part Mongolian princes, who claim they have been forced to take action because of the failure of the Chinese Government to regard the demands of the minorities. It is understood that no officials will receive salaries but their families are to be supported on sheep provided by the Government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/72 FOR Desp.#247 to Legation

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Dec.4,1933
fb/// NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan:
Visit of Doctor Yotaro Sugimora, a high Japanese
diplomatic official to Canton: Reports regarding --,
and states little was accomplished by the visit.
Apprehensions are still rife as to possibility of
a forward movement by Japan in South China.

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793.94/6545

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan.

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 Dr. Yotaro Sugimora, a high Japanese diplomatic official, visited Canton for a few days during the month. While here he called on General Ch'en Chi-t'ang and a number of other leaders, but nothing has transpired regarding the results achieved, if any, in these conversations. There is evidence that little was accomplished by him in promoting an understanding here, and, in fact,

he

he is quoted in the Hongkong press as having observed after his visit here that the Chinese idea of Pan-Asianism was different from the Japanese idea.

The case of the Korean, reported last month, has not been settled. It is understood that the French Consul, who undertook to hold the man in the French concession jail pending an agreement between the Japanese and Chinese regarding the disposition to be made of the Korean, is now considering the advisability of notifying both parties that he can no longer be bound by the agreement and that he will set the man free at the border of his concession. Such a step involves the possibility of a Sino-Japanese clash on Shaker road which might affect the security of the concessions as a whole. Efforts to bring about mediation as between the Japanese, Chinese and French authorities have been made by neutral consuls, but owing to the intransigent attitude of the Japanese Consul General no results have been achieved.

Apprehensions are still rife as to the possibility of a forward movement by Japan in South China. The other day one of the leaders here in private conversation spoke with concern of information he had received that there were 20,000 armed Japanese Formosan subjects in the vicinity of Amoy ready to act and that Ch'en Ming-shu, the Fukien leader, was in league with the Japanese.

1 4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.00 P.E. Foochow/71 FOR Desp. #374

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Dec. 4, 1933
fb/// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Agreements between
the leaders of the present regime in Fukien and
the Japanese in regard to the Fukien movement.

fpg

793.94/6546

65-46

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
 793.94

Sino-Japanese Relations.

It is reported that, prior to the recent declaration of independence, the leaders of the present regime in Fukien authorized Mr. Eugene Chen (陳友仁) to approach the Formosan Government for an understanding. It is further reported that as a result of these negotiations the Japanese authorities agreed to remain neutral, provided that there was no boycott agitation, and that General Ch'iu Chao-ch'en (丘兆琛), Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Provincial Capital of Fukien, was removed from office.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~Do~~ January 29, 1934.

~~JRJ:~~

~~RCM:~~

~~SET:~~

Mukden's 866 (to the Legation)
 dated December 5, 1933, transmits
 reliable reports concerning Japanese
 political activity in North China
 and should be read in its entirety.

No action is required.

The despatch states that the
 famous Major General Doihara re-
 turned to Manchuria in October, 1933,
 and is now assigned as Chief of the
 Special Service Bureau at Mukden.
 He is expected to proceed shortly to
 Tientsin, with Tientsin \$4,000,000,
 in order to obtain the support of
 certain former Fengtien leaders for
 an independent "Pei Hua Kuo" move-
 ment in North China. Yen Hsi-shan
 and Chang Tso-hsiang, former Governor
 of Kirin, appear to be favorably
 disposed toward this plan. Huang Fu
 is expected to be the central figure
 of the movement, "with Japanese in

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the background." Myers believes that the return of Chang Hsueh-liang, and the collapse of the Fukien revolt, may postpone the realization of these plans.

The trunk motor roads in Jehol are sufficiently completed to permit regular bus traffic this winter. The extension of the Chinchow-Peipiao Railway to Lingyuan will be opened to traffic in February, 1934, and the further extension to Chengte will be completed in 1934.

awc
AWE:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, Manchuria, December 5, 1933.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Alleged Political Movement in North China.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	VG		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	Myers	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

~~COPIES SENT TO~~
~~ONLY AND MAIL~~

1/-

I have the honor to enclose herewith a
copy of my despatch No. 866 to the Legation
at Peiping, China, dated December 5, 1933,
on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

Enclosure.

1/- Copy of despatch No. 866, as stated.

4

JM
and one extra copy of
enclosure.

F/ESP

793.94/6547

FEB 1 1934

FILED

0151

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 866.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, December 5, 1933.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Alleged Political Movement in
North China.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to foreign press reports regarding the return of Major General Doihara to Manchuria in October 1933 after an absence of only 17 months and to the speculations in regard to what his reappearance here portends. It will be recalled that he is said to be one of the outstanding Chinese experts in the Japanese Army and had served continuously in Manchuria from 1918 to May 1932, during which period he was closely associated with all important Sino-Japanese events. He has frequently been referred to as a "stormy petrel". His present assignment is Chief of the Special Service Bureau at Mukden which office heretofore has been in charge of a colonel or major. A recent press report stated that he will have general direction over similar offices at other provincial capitals. but this report has not yet been confirmed.

According

- 2 -

According to strictly confidential information from a reliable source Major General Doihara is expected to proceed shortly to Tientsin for the purpose of winning over some of the lesser important Fengtien leaders to support the establishment of an independent "Pei Hua Kuo" in North China. He was to have left here on December 1st but as the necessary funds had not been assembled his departure was postponed. A member of his staff with dollars one million in Tientsin notes is said to have left on that date and he is expected to follow as soon as an additional three million in that currency is ready. This information, I am inclined to believe, is deserving of credence.

According to my informant, Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi, and Chang Tso-hsiang, former Governor at Kirin, are favorably disposed toward this plan, or at least are unlikely to oppose it. The Japanese have in the past, according to reports, made repeated efforts to induce Chang Tso-hsiang to return to Manchuria and it is claimed that he has been regularly receiving remittances from his Manchurian investments with the permission of the authorities. It is thought that his relations with the Young Marshal's father has been a deterrent to his return.

Although details are unavailable, it is believed that the present plan of the Japanese is to foster and assist the formation of an independent North China and that the funds are to be spent for securing the support of the Northeastern forces to the scheme.

It

- 3 -

It is expected that Huang Fu will be the central figure with Japanese in the background. The visit to Hsinking of Huang Fu's emissary to Japan who is returning to Peiping via Manchuria - he was last heard of at Hsinking a few days ago - lends color to this report. In this connection it has been learned that one of the first Japanese press protests against the return of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to China emanated from the Japanese garrison at Tientsin. Undoubtedly if this scheme is being fostered in North China, for which the support of the Northeastern leaders is desired, Marshal Chang's early return to China may seriously interfere with plans especially if his former adherents believe that he can help them financially.

Since September 1931 all important Japanese moves in Manchuria except possibly the occupation of Jehol showed that they were primarily aimed at Soviet Russia, first for the eradication of Soviet control of and interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway in pursuance of the Japanese policy of consolidating their influence throughout Manchuria and secondly for the elimination of Soviet authority in Eastern Siberia and Mongolia presumably because of its alleged menace to the safety of the Japanese Empire and its institutions. Although preparations for the generally expected Japanese-Soviet clash have been and are going steadily on, indications are numerous that the Japanese are anxious to avoid it until their preparations are more advanced. However the existing complicated

- 4 -

complicated situation in China which seriously embarrasses the Nanking Government has, in my opinion, tempted Japanese expansionists to take advantage of this seemingly golden opportunity to extend Japanese influence into North China under the guise of an independent North China and to facilitate the establishment of better relations with at least a part of China and between North China and "Manchukuo". Consequently the stiffening of the Soviet attitude toward Japan indicated by Molotov's speech is not welcomed, according to recent visitors to Hsinking, and is apparently giving the military authorities some concern.

As having a bearing on possible developments, reference may be made to the extensive road and railway construction in Jehol Province during 1933. According to the "Manchoukuo News Service" of November 30, 1933, reporting the opening of four new bus lines in Jehol Province, the following roads have either been completed or their construction sufficiently advanced to permit of regular bus traffic at least during the winter:

Peipiao - Chengte	213 kilometers
Chaoyang - Chihfeng	187 kilometers
Lingyuan - Lengkou	130 kilometers
Pingchuan - Hsifengkou	112 kilometers

It will be recalled that there are important gates in the Great Wall at Lengkou and Hsifengkou. Besides several other roads in that province which are under construction, the extension of the Chinchow (Chinhsien)-Peipiao Railway from Peipiao to Lingyuan

via

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

via Chaoyang is expected to be opened to traffic in February 1934. Its construction to Chengte will according to plan be completed in 1934.

As possibly related to the above, this office recently learned from an official source that secret and important negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese were taking place in North China, presumably at Peiping. No intimation of the nature of these negotiations was, however, obtainable.

This office will endeavor to follow developments in this connection and will keep the Legation currently informed of any information that it may secure. The success of this scheme would seem to be closely related to developments in Fukien. If the Fukien movement collapses shortly it is likely that this one will never show its head.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers,
 American Consul General.

Original to Legation.

Five copies to Department (through Legation).

* One copy to Embassy, Tokyo (~~through Legation~~).

One copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

* One Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo
forwarded Jan. 30/34

800

MSM:mhp

A true copy of
 the signed original.
MSM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 833.00 P.R./75 FOR Despatch #2422

FROM China (Johnson) DATED December 22, 1933
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Negotiations at Peiping over Chinese-"Manchukuo" questions
were abruptly suspended by orders from Nanking.

793.94/6548
6548

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huelskamp NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. JAPAN:

a. Negotiations over Sino-"Manchukuo" questions:¹

793.94
 Negotiations between Chinese officials and Japanese military at Peiping with regard to questions involving Chinese and "Manchukuo" interests were abruptly suspended as the result of orders issued from Nanking on November 7 or 8. These orders were apparently due to apprehension on the part of members of the Central Political Council that settlement of the problems concerned would be made at Peiping without reference to the authorities at Nanking and might involve indirectly recognition of "Manchukuo". According to Chinese and Japanese sources, negotiations were not resumed during the remainder of the month as those concerned were awaiting clarification of the attitude of the government at Nanking.

The apparent inability of General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Council and leading Chinese figure in the negotiations with the Japanese, to make any significant decisions without prior reference to the National Government was not agreeable to the local Japanese authorities who were reliably reported to forecast that General Huang Fu would not retain his present position for another six months.

ii

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1. Nanking's despatch No. D-571 of November 15 and Legation's telegram No. 661 of November 17, 4 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

It was felt that Japanese impatience in this regard might result in their exerting pressure at an opportune time to influence the National Government to clarify its attitude in a manner favorable to Japanese interests, one possible sort of pressure being the inciting of disturbances comparable to the Fang-Ch'i rebellion in September and October, 1933, north of Peiping.

b. Apprehension of Japanese action in South China:²

The apprehension in South China that Japan might make some move of a military nature in that area, which was discussed in the Legation's monthly report for October, continued to exist. This uneasiness was not lessened by reports, believed probably to be groundless, that the rebels in Fukien Province had arrived at some sort of an understanding of a military nature with Japan.

c. Relations of a general international character:

1. The visit of Mr. Y. Sugimura to China:

The former Japanese Deputy-General of the League of Nations, Mr. Yotaro Sugimura, concluded a tour of North, Central, and South China. Unconfirmed reports reaching the Legation indicated that during his private conversations with Chinese officials he stressed the advantages to China of "friendship" with Japan and the disadvantages and sinister aspects of cooperation with the United States and other Western powers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 30 1934
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 30, 1934

Rec'd 6:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 30 1934
Department of State

72, January 30, 2 p. m.

Department's 22, January 29, 5 p. m.

I approve.

JOHNSON

793.94/6513

JS

F/ESP

793.94/6549

FILED


JAN 31 1934

116
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S-4
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
February 1, 1934.

~~RCM~~
~~S.F.~~
~~SCM~~
~~END~~



F. M. Suma
Nanking's December 29, 1933,--

In this confidential despatch Mr. Peck sets forth the views of various Chinese leaders in regard to Japanese policies toward China. I feel that this despatch is of sufficient importance to warrant reading in its entirety.

f. e. f.
SKB
JEJ/VDM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Feb. 3, 1934.

~~SECRET~~
I am quite well acquainted with the Mr. Suma mentioned in this despatch. He told me a year ago that he was to be used as a "liaison" officer, traveling between the Japanese posts at Shanghai, Nanking, and Peiping.

Mr. Suma has an alert and vigorous personality, and is a connoisseur of Chinese art, having a large collection of Chinese paintings. Whether or not one calls him an "arch schemer and manipulator" depends, I think, very largely upon one's like or dislike of Japan. I refer to call him a very able Japanese official.

M.F.D.

0161

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECD
 LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking Office,
 December 29, 1933.

JAN 29 34

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Japan's Policies toward China.


Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JAN 30 1934

Department of State

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.



Sir:

Whether Japan's attitude and policies toward China are determined by any one authority in that country or whether, on the other hand, they are the expression of factional views, it is probably impossible for a foreigner to determine. Nevertheless, the impression I have gained from numerous conversations with Chinese official and private persons in Nanking during the last two or three years is that Chinese are unanimous in believing that Japan's policy in China is one of aggression and that Japan consistently endeavors to retard the political stabilization of China.

1/ As an example in point, I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of remarks made by Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, during a conversation with me on December 27. The idea underlying Dr. Kung's observations was that the Japanese military authorities were originally alarmed by the professed anti-Japanese policies of the rebel movement in Fukien Province, but having received from the leaders in that movement assurances that these announced policies

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

policies were designed merely to enlist popular support in China and that the real attitude of the rebel faction is one of willingness to cooperate with Japan, the Japanese military authorities are now friendly disposed to the said rebel faction.

During the same conversation Dr. Kung informed me that the Japanese Government had forbidden the Japanese cotton mills in China to purchase from the Chinese Government any cotton bought in the United States under the credit granted to the Chinese Government by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the reason for this action being the unwillingness of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government should realize any profit from this transaction.

Even those Chinese who advocate nonresistance to Japan do not, in my experience, differ from the general belief that Japan is continuously and actively seeking to weaken China, with a view to the strengthening of Japan's power in this country, but defend nonresistance on the ground that China cannot grow in internal strength if it is engaged in constant struggles with Japan, and must postpone resistance to Japan until there is likelihood of success.

On the morning of December 28 I had a conversation with Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Justice and until August, last, concurrently Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Lo gave a clear exposition of the reasons for believing that Japan has for some years consistently endeavored to keep alive factional dissensions in China.

Dr. Lo recalled the "Tsinan Incident" in the spring and summer of 1928, at which time he was Minister for

Foreign

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Foreign Affairs in Peking, during the last days of the leadership in the North of Marshal Chang Tso-lin. The situation then was that a strong Japanese garrison was astride the Tientsin-Pukow Railway at Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. The Nationalist troops were advancing from the South and Chang Tso-lin, with his formidable army, was prepared to resist their advance. The Japanese Government had issued a general warning that no military activities on the part of either the Nationalist forces or the Northern forces would be permitted at Tsinan and this served as an effective blocking of the northern advance of the Nationalist troops along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

Chang Tso-lin was inclined to regard the presence of the Japanese force at Tsinan as being greatly in his favor, since it constituted an additional obstruction to his enemies, the Nationalist forces. In this situation he called Dr. Lo Wen-kan in for consultation.

Dr. Lo said that he told Chang Tso-lin that he must not confuse a foreign problem with a problem which was essentially a domestic one. He pointed out that if the Japanese were opposing the northward advance of the Nationalist army it was not because they wished Chang Tso-lin's faction to acquire supremacy and the Nationalists to be eliminated, but merely because they wished to keep both factions alive, with a view to perpetuating civil warfare. He also pointed out that the only way in which China could become strong enough to bring about the withdrawal of the Japanese force from Tsinan was for both Chinese factions to unite, and he advised Chang Tso-lin to inform the Nationalist forces that no further resistance

would

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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would be offered to them.

Dr. Lo recalled that his advice to Marshal Chang was followed. Fighting ceased and, very shortly, Chang Tso-lin announced that he and his forces were returning to Manchuria. The refusal of Chang Tso-lin to continue the internecine fight angered the Japanese, and Marshal Chang Tso-lin was murdered by them before he actually reached his capital in Manchuria.

Dr. Lo commented in sardonic vein on the fatuousness of his fellow nationals which blinds them to the necessity of sinking their internal differences in order to unite against Japanese encroachments. At the same time he admitted that the predicament of these factions, and of the National Government itself, is now a difficult one.

Dr. Lo insisted that the situation in Fukien has all the elements to create a second "Tsingan Incident". If the 19th Route Army, which is promoting the insurrectionary movement in Fukien, fails to curry favor with the Japanese military authorities in Formosa and to assure them that the 19th Route Army is actually prepared to cooperate with Japan, the rebel faction will not only find itself constantly hampered and harassed by its powerful neighbor, separated from Fukien by only a narrow strait, but may even see Japanese troops landed in Fukien on some pretext or other, it being commonly believed that Japanese military leaders are impatiently waiting for some excuse to dominate China's coast in that vicinity.

Dr. Lo pointed out that Japan, faced with the imminent danger of a conflict with the Soviet Union, has additional reason at this time to fear growing strength and unity in

China.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

China. On this account, Japan is constantly and successfully seeking to neutralize this danger by instigating internal dissensions, a feat which Japan easily accomplishes by its skillful combination of inducements and threats applied to this or that faction.

In view of the general conviction that Japan is constantly intriguing in China, it is not surprising that Chinese in general attach significance to the removal of Mr. Hidaka, the present Japanese Secretary of Legation and Consul General in Nanking, and to his replacement by Mr. Suma, now Secretary of Legation residing in Shanghai, who is commonly considered the arch schemer and manipulator among Japanese diplomats. The impression among Chinese seems to be that the Japanese Government regards Mr. Hidaka as too much of a conventional diplomat and too considerate of Chinese susceptibilities to make full use of his strategic post in the national capital. It is undeniable that Mr. Hidaka has a most attractive personality and is universally liked, even by Chinese. He came to Nanking from a service of several years in the Paris Embassy.

Very respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In duplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy in Tokyo.

WRP:HC

1 FP

016

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 27, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Japanese Attitude toward the Fukien Revolt.

Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance,
Mr. Peck.

In the course of a conversation at the Nanking Office of the American Legation between Dr. Kung and Mr. Peck, the subject of the appointment of Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, as Consul General and Secretary of Legation residing in Nanking came up for discussion.

Dr. Kung remarked that it was commonly known that the Japanese Foreign Office regarded Mr. Hidaka, the present incumbent of these two positions, as too mild in his attitude toward the Chinese Government, and on this account it had transferred him and appointed Mr. Suma to these posts. Dr. Kung said that when the Fukien revolt started about November 22, the Japanese military in the island of Formosa had been in favor of giving Japanese assistance to the 19th Route Army, which is at the bottom of the movement. Later, however, when the 19th Route Army announced anti-Japanese and pro-Communist policies, the Japanese military faction became a little alarmed and caused the Foreign Office to send Mr. Suma to Foochow to investigate the situation, Mr. Suma then being on the eve of departure for Tokyo for consultation before taking up his new post in Nanking.

Dr. Kung said that a Chinese friend of his is on intimate terms with a Japanese naval officer on duty in

Shanghai

0167

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Shanghai and that through this Japanese informant Dr. Kung's friend had obtained the information just given, as well as further information to the effect that Mr. Suma had reported to the Japanese Foreign Office, after his investigations at Foochow, that the anti-Japanese policies announced by the rebel faction in Fukien had been described by the 19th Route Army as designed merely to enlist Chinese popular support, and were not the bona fide policies of the rebel faction. The informant said that the 19th Route Army had told Mr. Suma that it recognized that the Japanese and Chinese were very closely akin racially, that it regarded the conflict between the 19th Route Army and the Japanese at Shanghai in 1932 as a closed incident, and that the 19th Route Army was prepared to cooperate with Japan in the future. The connection with the Communists was described as being simply a device to protect the 19th Route Army from attack while it conducted its campaign against the Nanking Government.

Mr. Peck inquired whether the threatened hostilities in Fukien had begun and Dr. Kung answered that he thought there already was fighting of a more or less serious character between the 19th Route Army and the National Government's forces. Serious fighting, he added, could hardly be avoided in the circumstances.

WRP:HC:MCL

0168

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

February 7, 1934.

Mr. Fuller:

The writer of the attached letter, Lou Tseng-Tsiang, has had a varied diplomatic career beginning in 1890. He was Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs 1912-13, 1915-16, and 1917-20. In 1927 he retired to Abbaye de Saint André. According to the Department's rules we could not acknowledge the letter direct and on account of the controversial nature of subject of his brochure I doubt whether we should instruct the Consul to acknowledge. I suggest that the letter be filed without acknowledgment.

793.94/6551

E.J.C.
The whole file did not go to 2 copies.
w. to acknowledge *84*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

RECEIVED
Mr. President:

January 4, 1934



1934 FEB - 2 - PM 2:10 to offer to Your Excellency the Brochure

which I am publishing in order to add my voice to that of
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
COMMUNIST CHINA, a country whose just claim has been sanc-
tioned by the Assembly of the Nations which met at Geneva.

It is a very special satisfaction to me, Mr. President,
to refer hereto the very cordial relations uniting the United
States and China, and to recall all the gratitude which we
owe to your people for the continual support which it has
given us.

As for me personally, I keep a deep remembrance of my
reception in the United States, when, in 1919, I crossed your
country on my way to the Peace Conference. The most delicate
attentions were showered on me from the moment of my arrival
at Seattle, where a special train was waiting for me, and
these attentions followed me until my arrival in France on
board the GEORGE WASHINGTON.

In her present trials, China has the inestimable
consolation of seeing her Cause associated with that of
Justice herself, and of knowing that she is supported by all
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dition of peace.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my
highest consideration.

Dom. P. C. Lou Tseng-Tsiang,
For Minister of Foreign Affairs of China.
Benedictine Monk.

To His Excellency
Mr. Roosevelt, President of the
Republic of the United States.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

January 4, 1934.

Mr. President:

Permit me to offer to Your Excellency the Brochure which I am publishing in order to add my voice to that of my whole country, a country whose just claim has been sanctioned by the Assembly of the Nations which met at Geneva.

It is a very special satisfaction to me, Mr. President, to refer hereto the very cordial relations uniting the United States and China, and to recall all the gratitude which we owe to your people for the continual support which it has given us.

As for me personally, I keep a deep remembrance of my reception in the United States, when, in 1919, I crossed your country on my way to the Peace Conference. The most delicate attentions were showered on me from the moment of my arrival at Seattle, where a special train was waiting for me, and these attentions followed me until my arrival in France on board the GEORGE WASHINGTON.

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✕
PAX
ABBAYE DE ST-ANDRÉ
par Lophem-lez-Bruges.

1934 FEB - 2 - PM 2:10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORD

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 5 - 1934
Department of State
Monsieur le Président,

4 janvier 1934

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Permettez-moi d'offrir à Votre Excellence la brochure ci-jointe que je publie ces jours ci afin de joindre ma voix à celle de mon Pays tout entier dont l'Assemblée des Nations réunie à Genève a sanctionné la juste revendication.

Ce m'est une satisfaction toute particulière, Monsieur le Président, d'évoquer ici les relations très cordiales qui unissent les Etats-Unis et la Chine et de rappeler toute la gratitude que nous devons à votre Peuple pour l'appui incessant qu'il nous a donné.

En ce qui me concerne personnellement, je garde un souvenir profond de l'accueil que je reçus aux Etats-Unis lorsqu'en 1919 je traversai votre Pays pour me rendre au Congrès de la Paix. Les attentions les plus délicates me furent multipliées dès mon débarquement à Seattle, où m'attendait un train spécial et elles se poursuivirent jusqu'à mon arrivée en France à bord du "George Washington".

Dans ses présentes épreuves, la Chine a l'indicible réconfort de voir sa Cause se confondre avec celle de la Justice elle-même et de se savoir soutenue par tous ceux pour qui la pratique de la Justice est la condition de la Paix.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.

Dom Pierre Célestin Lou Tseng Tsieing
ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Chine,
Moine Bénédictin.

A Son Excellence Monsieur Roosevelt,
Président de la République des Etats-Unis,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**L'invasion et l'occupation
de la Mandchourie
jugées à la lumière de la
Doctrina Catholique par les
écrits du Cardinal Mercier
publiés par
Dom P.C. Lou Tseng-Tsiang**

Moine Bénédictin
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
PARIS : LES ÉDITIONS DU FOYER

4, rue Madame, 6°

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L'INVASION ET L'OCCUPATION
DE LA MANDCHOURIE
JUGEES
A LA LUMIERE DE LA DOCTRINE CATHOLIQUE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75



LE CARDINAL MERCIER

**L'invasion et l'occupation
de la Mandchourie
jugées à la lumière de la
Doctrine Catholique par les
écrits du Cardinal Mercier
publiés par
Dom P.C.Lou Tseng-Tsiang**

**Moine Bénédictin
Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
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PARIS : LES ÉDITIONS DU FOYER
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Cum permissu Superiorum.

Imprimatur.

Brugis, 7a Nov. 1933.

Jos. VAN DER MEERSCH.

Vic. gen.

PREFACE

L'enquête de la Société des Nations au sujet des conditions dans lesquelles se sont produites et développées l'invasion et l'occupation du territoire chinois par les armées japonaises a établi de façon définitive LES FAITS, qui se sont passés en Chine, dans les provinces de la Mandchourie, après le 18 septembre 1931.

La constitution à peine naissante d'une société internationale organisée se trouve encore trop faible pour obliger un agresseur international bien armé à se conformer aux exigences de la Justice.

Toutefois, l'enquête de la Société des Nations, suivie de la publication des faits constatés et relevés par elle, a obtenu un premier et grand résultat : jusqu'à présent, elle a empêché la reconnaissance de l'état de choses accompli; elle a empêché que l'injustice fut proclamée « justice ».

Je crois accomplir un devoir de Justice, — je crois rendre un service à tous les amis de l'Ordre et de la Paix internationale, à mon propre pays, au Japon lui-même et aux véritables intérêts de ceux qui, hélas! se sont érigés en ennemis de ma patrie, — en rappelant brièvement les rétroactes et les faits principaux du conflit sino-japonais et en publiant, à leur propos, quelques pages extraites des écrits du Cardinal Mercier au cours de l'occupation du pays dont il était le Pasteur spirituel.

Les principes énoncés par le Cardinal Mercier sont immuables et immortels, parce qu'ils sont vrais. Or, la vérité se venge toujours, tôt ou tard, de ceux qui la trahissent. C'est donc rendre un service immédiat et très pratique de publier, à propos de l'invasion sanglante et de l'occupation inique des provinces de la Mandchourie, les exigences inexorables de la Doctrine Catholique, avec tout ce qu'elles comportent de conséquences pour ceux qui ont, actuellement, vis-à-vis de ces provinces occupées par l'ennemi, des devoirs d'état.

J'ai ajouté à ces extraits quelques appréciations que les principes catholiques proclamés par le Cardinal Mercier et appliqués héroïquement par lui ont suscitées. J'ai cru bon de choisir, en premier lieu, celles du Pouvoir occupant et du Gouvernement du pays occupé; puis, celle du Saint-Siège et celles de deux des pays alliés, en particulier, du Japon; enfin, celles des milieux de la Société des Nations.

Toutes ces appréciations s'accordent pour confirmer la vérité des principes et de l'attitude du Cardinal Mercier, pour rendre hommage à la Justice de Dieu, pour encourager les âmes droites, qui, se confiant en cette Justice, savent attendre avec une patience éclairée que cette Justice arrive et savent agir avec une courageuse sérénité pour mériter de Dieu qu'il hâte l'heure de son intervention.

D. Pierre Célestin LOU TSENG-TSIANG, O.S.B.

Abbaye de Saint-André,
par Lophem-lez-Bruges, Belgique.

Quelques Rétroactes et quelques Faits actuels relatifs à l'Invasion et à l'Occupation du Territoire chinois par le Japon

Les conflits internationaux, qui sillonnent l'histoire, s'aggravent et se multiplient dans la mesure où ceux qui les préparent se jugent intangibles, assurés du succès et de l'impunité.

A défaut d'un organisme assez puissant pour exercer efficacement une police internationale, l'opinion publique doit demeurer en éveil, afin que, pour le moins, les partisans de la « primauté de la force » soient découverts et dénoncés en temps utile et que soit arrêtée l'accumulation de leurs procédés douloureusement traditionnels, dont les conséquences s'enchaînent, désastreuses et illimitées.

Le conflit sino-japonais comporte certains rétroactes à rappeler et certains faits actuels, saillants et bien établis; ils permettent de déterminer avec exactitude la situation qui trouble l'Asie et cause, en Europe et en Amérique, de si légitimes inquiétudes.

I.

EN 1894-1895 : LA GUERRE SINO-JAPONAISE

La Chine avait sur la Corée un protectorat remontant au XVI^e siècle. En 1894, le Japon, qui, depuis plusieurs années,

entretenait en Corée une agitation persistante, saisit le prétexte de l'aide militaire légitime que le Souverain de Corée avait demandée à la Chine, pour y opérer un brusque débarquement de troupes. Le 25 juillet 1894, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon coule un transport chinois, chargé de 1,100 hommes; il poursuit les hostilités, bat la flotte chinoise et contraint la Chine à reconnaître « l'indépendance de la Corée » et à abandonner au Japon l'île Formose (3,000,000 d'habitants) et les îles Pescadores. (Traité de Simonoseki, 17 avril 1895.)

II.

EN 1904-1905 : LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE

Les influences russe et japonaise se faisaient concurrence en Corée et en Mandchourie: Le 6 février 1904, le Japon rappelle son ministre à Saint-Petersbourg. Dans la nuit du 8 au 9 février, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon attaque la flotte russe devant Port-Arthur; il bat les troupes russes et coule l'escadre de la Baltique; il obtient, par le traité de Portsmouth, (E.-U.) (5 septembre 1905) la reconnaissance de l'influence exclusive du Japon en Corée, la cession à bail de Liao-Toung et de Port-Arthur et la cession du sud de l'île Sakhaline. — En 1907, le Japon établit officiellement son Protectorat sur la Corée. — En 1910, le Japon annexe la Corée sous le nom de « *Chosen* » : on est loin de l'indépendance!

III.

EN 1915 : LES VINGT ET UNE DEMANDES

Au début de 1915, le Japon présente à la Chine cinq groupes de revendications, constituant « Vingt et une demandes » et tendant à se voir conférer des droits et privi-

lèges exclusifs en Mongolie, en Mandchourie, dans le Chan-toung, dans la vallée du Yang Tse et au Foukien, et à obtenir la haute main sur tout le Gouvernement de la Chine, en particulier, sur la politique, l'armée, les finances, l'éducation, de façon à s'assurer de fait le Protectorat de la Chine. Il stipule que toutes ses exigences seront acceptées en bloc. Le 7 mai 1915, il adresse à la Chine un ultimatum exigeant l'acceptation immédiate de toutes ses revendications.

La guerre européenne ne permettait pas à la Chine d'obtenir à son aide une intervention efficace de l'étranger; le Japon, d'ailleurs, se disposait à emporter aussitôt par les armes tout ce que le droit ne lui conférait pas.

Cependant la Chine parvint à écarter six des sept articles du V^e groupe de demandes. Le seul énoncé de ces articles caractérise nettement les ambitions japonaises :

Art. I. Le gouvernement central engagera des Japonais influents, à titre de conseillers politiques, financiers et militaires.

Art. II. Le gouvernement chinois reconnaît aux Japonais le droit de posséder des terrains dans le but de construire, à dater de maintenant, des hôpitaux, des temples ou des établissements scolaires japonais dans l'intérieur de la Chine.

Art. III. La police, dans les localités où de tels arrangements seront nécessaires, sera placée sous l'administration conjointe de Japonais et de Chinois; ou bien, des Japonais seront employés dans les bureaux de la police de ces localités.

Art. IV. La Chine obtiendra du Japon la fourniture d'une certaine quantité d'armes ou établira un arsenal en Chine, sous la direction conjointe de la Chine et du Japon, et qui sera pourvu d'experts et de matériaux provenant du Japon.

Art. V. Le Japon aura le droit de construire un chemin de fer pour relier Outchang avec le chemin de fer de Kioukiang à Nantchang et les chemins de fer de Nantchang-Hangtchow et Nantchang-Tchaotchow.

Art. VII. Le gouvernement chinois reconnaîtra aux Japonais le droit de prédication en Chine.

Toutes les autres « demandes », lourdes et onéreuses, formulées par le Japon, la Chine fut contrainte par la violence d'en accepter le « Diktat ».

IV.

DE 1931 A 1933...

L'INVASION ET L'OCCUPATION DU SOL CHINOIS

Le 18 septembre 1931, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon envahit la Chine et occupe Moukden. Le 28 septembre, son représentant à Genève annonce que les troupes japonaises ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer. Loin de se retirer, successivement, elles bombardent Kintcheou, engagent une bataille sur la Noni, prennent Tsitsikar, occupent Kintcheou et étendent méthodiquement leur occupation à tout le territoire des trois provinces de l'Est (Mandchourie). Le 28 janvier, l'armée japonaise débarque à Shanghai; le 1^{er} février, elle bombarde Nankin; du 20 au 28 février, elle livre la sanglante bataille de Shanghai. En mars, le Japon constitue les trois provinces occupées en un soi-disant « Etat de Mandchoukouo », dont il prend la direction effective et dont, jusqu'à présent, il demeure seul parmi tous les pays à avoir reconnu l'existence; puis, le 31 mai, il retire ses troupes de Shanghai. En 1933, il envahit le Jehol. Finalement, les hostilités s'interrompent par un armistice entre les autorités militaires japonaises et l'autorité locale chinoise.

Entretemps, et dès le 21 septembre 1931, la Chine avait fait appel à la Société des Nations : l'opinion internationale était alertée et allait avoir le moyen de s'informer. Le 30 septembre, le Conseil de la Société des Nations prévoit l'évacuation de la Mandchourie pour le 16 octobre; le 16 octobre, le représentant des Etats-Unis se joint aux membres du

Conseil; le 10 décembre, le Conseil crée une Commission d'Enquête qu'il envoie sur place et dont il confie la présidence à Lord Lytton.

En février 1932, le Conseil de la Société des Nations envoie au Japon une note énergique déclarant que rien de ce que le Japon aura obtenu par les armes ne sera reconnu. Le 11 mars 1932, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations constitue un comité consultatif, le « Comité des Dix-neuf » et lui confie le mandat de suivre les événements d'Extrême-Orient, de veiller sur les principes, de rappeler aux Japonais qu'ils ont à évacuer le sol chinois, d'envisager le moyen de les y amener et au besoin de les y contraindre. — Le 2 octobre 1932, la Société des Nations publie le rapport de la Commission Lytton. — Le 24 février 1933, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations adopte à l'unanimité (42 voix moins une abstention: le Siam) le rapport et les recommandations qu'après examen du *Rapport Lytton* le « Comité des Dix-neuf » lui avait présentés et elle déclare: « La souveraineté de la Mandchourie appartient à la Chine ». — Le 27 mars 1933, le Japon annonce officiellement qu'il quitte la Société des Nations.

V.

LE RAPPORT LYTTON

Le Bureau de Presse de la Délégation Chinoise à Genève (8, rue de la Cloche) a réuni en une brochure de 75 pages (1 franc suisse, port compris) les extraits les plus importants du *Rapport Lytton*. Nous y renvoyons le lecteur.

Et d'abord, la Commission d'Enquête exprime son opinion sur l'œuvre du Gouvernement national Chinois et sur les « progrès considérables » et les « réalisations déjà nom-

breuses » qu'il a accomplis dans la réorganisation du pays, « en dépit de toutes les difficultés, de tous les délais et de tous les échecs » : « si le Gouvernement central peut être maintenu, en tant que tel, l'administration provinciale, les forces militaires et les finances acquerront un caractère de plus en plus national ». (pp. 15-17.)

La Commission reconnaît le caractère complètement chinois de la Mandchourie, qui compte 30 millions d'habitants, « dont 28 millions sont des Chinois, ou des Mandchous assimilés »; « le nombre des Coréens est estimé à 800,000 ». « Le chiffre global des Japonais, Russes et autres étrangers (à l'exclusion des Coréens) ne dépasse pas 400,000. » — « Sans l'afflux de paysans et d'ouvriers chinois, la Mandchourie n'aurait pas pu se développer aussi rapidement en fournissant au Japon un marché, des denrées alimentaires, des engrais et des matières premières. » — Pour le peuple chinois, la Mandchourie est « partie intégrante de la Chine », sa « première ligne de défense »; elle est « le grenier de la Chine » et « un élément important de sa structure économique ». (pp. 19-23.)

La Commission n'a pas trouvé trace du prétexte allégué par le Japon pour couvrir son invasion et l'on n'a pu établir que l'explosion, qui s'est produite sur la voie ferrée, le 18 septembre 1931, ait provoqué quelque dégât que ce fut. Mais il est établi qu'à ce moment « les Japonais... avaient un plan minutieusement préparé en cas d'hostilités possibles entre les Chinois et eux », et que « les Chinois... n'avaient aucun plan d'attaquer en ce moment et en ce lieu les troupes japonaises, ni de mettre en danger la vie ou les biens des ressortissants japonais ». De même, la Commission fait justice des autres causes alléguées par le Japon pour justifier son intervention; elle s'arrête au massacre des Chinois en Corée: 127 tués, 393 blessés; elle établit dans son vrai jour la

portée des boycottages des marchandises japonaises par les Chinois : « chacun d'eux a son origine dans un fait précis, événement ou incident, généralement de nature politique et interprété par la Chine comme affectant ses intérêts matériels et son prestige national » ; par exemple, le massacre en Corée, l'invasion de la Mandchourie, la bataille de Shanghai, etc. (pp. 27-35.)

La Commission établit la situation dans les trois provinces de la Mandchourie depuis le 18 septembre 1931 et elle observe : « Les Japonais ont coutume de désigner indistinctement sous le nom de bandits toutes les forces qui s'opposent maintenant à eux. » D'autre part, elle retient le témoignage que, « au cours des vingt ou trente dernières années, des agents japonais ont, dans une large mesure, incité les bandits à servir les intérêts politiques du Japon ». (pp. 41 et 47.)

La Commission aborde la constitution de « l'Etat du Mandchoukouo », « conçu, organisé et réalisé » par « un groupe de fonctionnaires japonais, civils et militaires, en service actif ou retraités, ayant d'étroites relations avec le nouveau mouvement politique au Japon ». « Dans le « Gouvernement du Mandchoukouo », les fonctionnaires japonais jouent un rôle prépondérant » ; « les principaux pouvoirs politiques et administratifs sont entre les mains de fonctionnaires et de conseillers japonais ». (pp. 49-53.)

L'attitude de la population des provinces occupées vis-à-vis de ce « gouvernement » ne fait pas de doute pour la Commission : « les Chinois de Mandchourie considèrent le « Gouvernement Mandchoukouo » comme un instrument dans les mains des Japonais » ; « les négociants et les banquiers chinois » avec lesquels la Commission s'est entretenue, sont « hostiles » au « Mandchoukouo ». « Les classes libérales

— professeurs et docteurs — sont hostiles au « Mandchoukouo ». » « Les fermiers chinois — qui constituent la très grande majorité de la Mandchourie — souffrent du nouveau régime, ne l'aiment pas, et adoptent à son endroit une attitude d'hostilité passive. » « L'attitude de la population des villes est un mélange d'acceptation passive et d'hostilité. » (pp. 61-69.)

VI.

UN DERNIER FAIT

Cet exposé se suffit à lui-même.

Il est profondément regrettable que le peuple japonais voie ses dirigeants se prêter à une politique qui, finalement, tourne toujours contre ceux qui l'emploient.

Dans l'ouvrage remarquable où il a réuni les articles publiés par lui sur le conflit sino-japonais, M. William Martin observe : « Ce qui se passe, en ce moment, en Extrême- »
» Orient, cause chez nous la même surprise que les événements de 1914 à l'égard de l'Allemagne... Comment est-il »
» possible surtout que, dans un pays strictement constitutionnel, le gouvernement ait l'air incapable de se faire »
» obéir des militaires?

» L'explication est, dans les deux cas, la même et pour »
» une raison très simple. C'est qu'il y a une similitude frappante entre la constitution du Japon et celle de l'Allemagne impériale. C'est en Prusse que le Japon, au moment »
» de sa modernisation, est venu chercher ses inspirations constitutionnelles, et l'on retrouve, à Tokio, beaucoup des »
» caractères de l'ancien Empire allemand. » (« *Le Japon contre la Société des Nations* », par William Martin. Imprimerie du « *Journal de Genève* », 1932, p. 33.)


« Le trait le plus original de la Constitution japonaise réside dans le fait que le ministre de la guerre et celui de la marine ne sont pas choisis, comme dans les autres pays, par le chef du gouvernement. Deux familles possèdent, par un privilège traditionnel, le droit de les désigner. L'une nomme le ministre de la guerre, l'autre celui de la marine.

» Ces deux ministres ne sont pas non plus responsables devant le Parlement. Ils font partie du cabinet; mais, lorsque celui-ci se retire, ils ne sont pas obligés de démissionner. Il en résulte que chaque fois qu'un conflit vient à surgir entre le ministre de la guerre ou de la marine et ses collègues, surtout celui des finances, ce n'est pas le ministre qui démissionne, c'est le ministère. On imagine aisément quelle force une semblable situation offre aux militaires pour obtenir les crédits qu'ils exigent ou pour diriger la politique étrangère. Tout cela explique le peu d'influence qu'a le gouvernement sur les militaires et la grande influence que ceux-ci exercent sur la conduite des affaires. » (*Ibid.*, p. 34.)

Cette information est le complément nécessaire — et fournit une explication — des faits douloureux énumérés ci-dessus.

Nous pouvons maintenant passer au jugement à porter sur eux. Il suffit, à cet effet, d'exposer les principes de la Doctrine Chrétienne dont le Cardinal Mercier revendiqua héroïquement l'application lorsque, quatre ans durant, son pays envahi et occupé se trouva dans une situation qui, par bien des côtés, présente « une similitude frappante » avec celle qui, aujourd'hui, trouble l'Extrême-Orient.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MA LIANG

Cf. « Le Manifeste de Ma Liang », Hors-Texte, p. 34.

**Quelques Principes
de Doctrine Chrétienne,
relatifs à la Justice et à la Charité,
dans leurs applications
aux pays injustement envahis
et occupés par l'ennemi**

*Extraits des Œuvres Pastorales du Cardinal Mercier,
Archevêque de Malines, au cours de l'occupation de
son diocèse et de son pays (1914-1918).*

I.

LE PATRIOTISME AU POINT DE VUE CHRETIEN

Il y a, en chacun de nous, un sentiment plus profond que l'intérêt personnel, que les liens du sang et la poussée des partis, c'est le besoin et, par suite, la volonté de se dévouer à l'intérêt général, à ce que Rome appelait « la chose publique » « Res publica » : ce sentiment, c'est le *Patriotisme*.

La *Patrie* n'est pas qu'une agglomération d'individus ou de familles habitant le même sol, échangeant entre elles des relations plus ou moins étroites de voisinage ou d'affaires, remémorant les mêmes souvenirs, heureux ou pénibles : non, elle est une association d'âmes, au service d'une organisation sociale qu'il faut, à tout prix, fut-ce au prix de son sang, sauvegarder et défendre, sous la direction de celui ou de ceux qui président à ses destinées.

Et c'est parce qu'ils ont une même âme, que les compatriotes vivent, par leurs traditions, d'une même vie dans le passé; par leurs communes aspirations et leurs communes espérances, d'un même prolongement de vie dans l'avenir.

Le patriotisme, principe interne d'unité et d'ordre, liaison organique des membres d'une même patrie, était regardé par l'élite des penseurs de la Grèce et de la Rome antiques, comme la plus haute des vertus naturelles. Aristote, le prince des philosophes païens, estimait que le désintéressement au service de la cité, c'est-à-dire de l'Etat, est l'idéal terrestre par excellence.

La religion du Christ fait du patriotisme une loi: il n'y a point de parfait chrétien, qui ne soit un parfait patriote.

Elle surélève l'idéal de la raison païenne, et le précise, en faisant voir qu'il ne se réalise que dans l'Absolu.

D'où vient, en effet, cet élan universel, irrésistible, qui emporte, d'un coup, toutes les volontés de la nation dans un même effort de cohésion et de résistance aux forces ennemies qui menacent son unité et son indépendance?

Comment expliquer que, sur l'heure, tous les intérêts cèdent devant l'intérêt général; que toutes les vies s'offrent à l'immolation?

Il n'est pas vrai que l'Etat vaille, essentiellement, mieux que l'individu et la famille, attendu que le bien des familles et des individus est la raison d'être de son organisation.

Il n'est pas vrai que la patrie soit un dieu Moloch, sur l'autel de qui toutes les vies puissent être légitimement sacrifiées.

La brutalité des mœurs païennes et le despotisme des Césars avaient conduit à cette aberration, — et le militarisme moderne tendait à la faire revivre, — que l'Etat est omnipotent et que son pouvoir discrétionnaire crée le Droit.

Non, réplique la théologie chrétienne, le Droit, c'est la

Paix, c'est-à-dire l'ordre intérieur de la nation, bâti sur la Justice. Or, la Justice elle-même n'est absolue, que parce qu'elle est l'expression des rapports essentiels des hommes avec Dieu et entre eux.

Aussi, la guerre pour la guerre est-elle un crime. La guerre ne se justifie qu'à titre de moyen nécessaire pour assurer la paix.

« Il ne faut pas que la paix serve de préparation à la guerre, dit saint Augustin; il ne faut faire la guerre que pour obtenir la paix. » « *Non enim pax quaeritur ut bellum excitetur; sed bellum geritur ut pax adquiratur.* » (Ep. ad Bonifacium, 189, 6.)

A la lumière de cet enseignement, que reprend à son compte saint Thomas d'Aquin, (*Sum. Theol.*, 2. 2, q. 40, art. 1.) le patriotisme revêt un caractère religieux.

Les intérêts de famille, de classe, de parti, la vie corporelle de l'individu sont, dans l'échelle des valeurs, au-dessous de l'idéal patriotique, parce que cet idéal, c'est le Droit, qui est absolu. Ou encore, cet idéal, c'est la reconnaissance publique du Droit appliqué à la nation, l'Honneur national.

Or, il n'y a d'Absolu, dans la réalité, que Dieu.

Dieu seul domine, par sa Sainteté et par la Souveraineté de son empire, tous les intérêts et toutes les volontés.

Affirmer la nécessité absolue de tout subordonner au Droit, à la Justice, à l'Ordre, à la Vérité, c'est donc implicitement affirmer Dieu.

Et quand nos humbles soldats, à qui nous faisons compliment de leur héroïsme, nous répondaient avec simplicité: « Nous n'avons fait que notre Devoir », « l'Honneur l'exige »; ils exprimaient, à leur façon, le caractère religieux de leur patriotisme.

Qui ne sent que le patriotisme est « sacré » et qu'une atteinte à la dignité nationale est une sorte de profanation sacrilège? (Noël 1914, *Lettre Pastorale: « Patriotisme et Endurance »*; *Œuv. Past.*, Tome V, pp. 63-66.)

II.

LE POUVOIR OCCUPANT ET LA VALEUR JURIDIQUE DE SON AUTORITE

Je considère comme une obligation de ma charge pastorale, de vous définir vos devoirs de conscience en face du Pouvoir qui a envahi notre sol et qui, momentanément, en occupe la majeure partie.

Ce Pouvoir n'est pas une autorité légitime. Et, dès lors, dans l'intime de votre âme, vous ne lui devez ni estime, ni attachement, ni obéissance.

L'unique Pouvoir légitime en Belgique est celui qui appartient à notre Roi, à son gouvernement, aux représentants de la nation. Lui seul est pour nous l'autorité. Lui seul a droit à l'affection de nos cœurs, à notre soumission.

D'eux-mêmes, les actes d'administration publique de l'occupant seraient sans vigueur, mais l'autorité légitime ratifie tacitement ceux que justifie l'intérêt général et de cette ratification seule leur vient toute leur valeur juridique.

Des provinces occupées ne sont point des provinces conquises; pas plus que la Galicie n'est province russe, la Belgique n'est province allemande.

Néanmoins, la partie occupée du pays est dans une situation de fait qu'elle doit loyalement subir. La plupart de nos villes se sont rendues à l'ennemi. Elles sont tenues de respecter les conditions souscrites de leur reddition.

... Vous, en particulier, mes bien chers Confrères dans le sacerdoce, soyez à la fois et les meilleurs gardiens du patriotisme, et les soutiens de l'ordre public. (*Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.)

Le Pouvoir occupant s'étant opposé à la diffusion de cette Lettre Pastorale, le Cardinal protesta énergiquement, notamment dans une déclaration faite par lui au Doyen de Bruxelles et communiquée par celui-ci au clergé de son doyenné et de l'agglomération bruxelloise :

... Je ne retire rien de mes instructions antérieures, et je proteste contre la violence qui est faite à la liberté de mon ministère pastoral.

On a tout fait pour me faire signer des atténuations à ma Lettre : je n'ai pas signé. — Maintenant on cherche à séparer de moi mon clergé en l'empêchant de lire. J'ai fait mon devoir : mon clergé doit savoir s'il va faire le sien. (*Ibid.*, p. 79.)

III.

LA DEMANDE D'UNE ENQUETE INTERNATIONALE

A deux reprises, les 24 janvier et 10 février 1915, le Cardinal Mercier avait sollicité « la formation d'un tribunal, qui devait être composé d'arbitres allemands et belges, en nombre égal, et présidé par un délégué d'un Etat neutre » (*Ibid.*, p. 231) en vue d'établir la vérité sur les crimes imputés aux populations envahies vis à vis de l'armée occupante et sur la conduite de celle-ci vis à vis des populations. Ces demandes avaient été vaines. Le 24 novembre 1915, il s'adressa à l'épiscopat catholique des pays ennemis pour lui demander de constituer de commun accord pareil tribunal. Il s'exprimait notamment comme suit :

Nous demandons cette enquête, Eminences et Vénérés Collègues, avant tout, pour venger l'honneur du peuple belge. Des calomnies, parties de votre peuple et de ses plus hauts représentants, l'ont violé. Et vous connaissez, comme nous, l'adage de la théologie morale, humaine, chrétienne, catholique : Sans restitution, pas de pardon : *Non remittitur peccatum, nisi restitatur ablatum*.

... Vous direz, peut-être : c'est le passé. Oubliez-le. Au lieu de jeter de l'huile sur le feu, appliquez-vous à pardonner et unissez vos efforts à ceux du Pouvoir occupant qui ne demande qu'à panser les blessures du malheureux peuple belge.

... L'Allemagne ne nous rendra plus le sang qu'elle a fait couler, les vies innocentes que ses armées ont fauchées; mais il est en son pouvoir de restituer au peuple belge son honneur qu'elle a violé ou laissé violer.

... Le Pouvoir occupant dit et écrit, en effet, son intention de panser nos plaies.

Mais, dans le for extérieur, on juge de l'intention par l'action.

Or, tout ce que nous savons, nous, pauvres Belges, qui subissons passagèrement la domination de l'Empire, c'est que le pouvoir qui s'est engagé d'honneur à nous gouverner d'après le droit international codifié dans la Convention de La Haye, méconnaît ses engagements. (*Lettre des Evêques de Belgique aux Evêques d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie, 24 novembre 1915, Ibid., pp. 232, 238-239.*)

IV.

L'ESPRIT DE JUSTE VENGEANCE EST UNE VERTU

Des catholiques du dehors, qui n'ont pas trouvé dans leur cœur une parole de réprobation contre les armées allemandes lorsqu'elles massacraient nos populations innocentes... : ces mêmes catholiques trouvent, aujourd'hui, des accents pathétiques, pour rythmer des hymnes à la fraternité chrétienne, à l'oubli du passé, à la paix.

Des notions confuses flottent dans l'air au sujet de nos relations de justice et de charité envers l'ennemi de la patrie belge : l'occasion est propice de remettre en mémoire quelques points de doctrine du maître par excellence de la philosophie et de la théologie chrétiennes, saint Thomas d'Aquin.

... « Avoir *la volonté* de venger le mal, en respectant l'ordre de la justice, c'est faire acte de vertu. Vouloir ainsi » le redressement d'un mal moral, dans les limites du droit, » c'est s'emporter contre le mal, c'est faire œuvre de zèle, » agir bien. »

« Mais vouloir désordonnément la vengeance, soit que » celle-ci sorte des limites du droit, soit qu'elle mette l'ex- » termination du coupable au premier plan, et la répression » du mal à l'arrière-plan, c'est agir mal : dans ce dernier » cas, en effet, la souffrance du prochain devient le but de » la vengeance. »

Et comment faut-il juger la participation de *la passion* à cette colère vengeresse? La morale exige-t-elle que la volonté de tirer vengeance du mal soit impassible?

Non, répond saint Thomas, au contraire. La passion est périlleuse, sans doute, à l'heure où l'homme doit se pronon-

cer sur la moralité d'un acte à accomplir; elle peut, en effet, troubler alors la sérénité du jugement. Mais, dès le moment où la justice d'un acte répressif est apparue et que la moralité de la répression a été décidée, la passion de la colère devient l'auxiliaire de la volonté, elle donne plus de vigueur et de promptitude à l'accomplissement de la justice: les passions, ainsi maintenues dans leur rôle, sont, dit saint Thomas, utiles à la vertu, « utiles virtuti ». (*De Malo, Q. XII, art. 1.*)

... Le crime collectif d'une nation qui viole les droits d'une autre nation, est incomparablement plus grave que celui d'un individu que la société envoie au bagne ou à la guillotine.

... Que l'on ne confonde donc pas la haine, un vice, avec l'esprit de juste vengeance, une vertu.

La haine s'inspire d'un instinct de destruction.

La vertu de vindicte s'inspire de la charité. La bravoure lui fraye les voies, en bannissant du cœur l'épouvante... L'épouvante bannie, l'âme droite regarde en face son devoir: l'injure faite à la vérité, à la justice, à Dieu, elle la considère comme faite à elle-même; le péril de ses frères devient son péril; la flamme du double amour de Dieu et de l'humanité s'allume; l'immolation de soi est décidée: tout, plutôt que l'abdication dans le déshonneur.

Voilà la charité et le zèle qui en est la flamme.

... On dira peut-être: Vous avez invoqué le droit strict, et nous le comprenons; mais il y a un autre point de vue, celui de la perfection chrétienne. N'est-il pas plus parfait de rendre le bien pour le mal? Le chrétien ne doit-il pas savoir pardonner?

Rendre le bien pour le mal, soit, s'il ne s'agissait que de torts individuels, subis en secret.

Mais, en réalité, ... C'est l'injure faite à la nation qui a soulevé l'indignation générale et demande réparation. Les attentats à l'ordre public ne peuvent rester impunis. Le prince qui userait systématiquement de clémence envers les malfaiteurs compromettrait la sécurité sociale. Les peuples qui amnistieraient l'injustice ne seraient pas dignes de la liberté.

Certes, l'Evangile incline au pardon. Mais l'Eglise sait à quelles conditions elle peut l'octroyer. Imitons-la. Elle exige du coupable l'aveu de sa faute; le repentir; la promesse de ne pas récidiver et, si la faute est une injustice, la promesse de restituer, suivant la déclaration bien connue de saint Augustin: *Non remittetur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum* (*Epist. ad Macedonium 153, a N° 20*); l'acceptation d'une pénitence, qui satisfasse aux peines dues pour les péchés commis.

Aussitôt que nos ennemis auront rempli ces conditions, l'heure de la miséricorde aura sonné pour eux. (« *Les vertus pastorales de l'heure présente* », Allocution à MM. les Doyens de l'archidiocèse de Malines à l'occasion de leur Réunion Annuelle à l'archevêché, le 29 janvier 1917; *Ibid.* pp. 398-400, 403-405). Sur ce même sujet, voir également la Lettre Pastorale: « Pour nos Soldats », 21 juillet 1916; *Ibid.*, pp. 302-303.)

V.

LE ROLE DU CLERGE EN PAYS VICTIME DE GUERRE ET D'OCCUPATION

1° RECHERCHER ET PROCLAMER LA VERITE ET LE DROIT.

Les résultats religieux de la guerre sont le secret de Dieu, et aucun de nous n'est dans les confidences divines.

Mais il y a une question qui domine celle-là, question de morale, de droit, d'honneur.

... Aussi avons-nous, à l'heure présente, nous évêques, un devoir moral et, par conséquent, religieux, qui prime tous les autres, c'est de rechercher et de proclamer la Vérité.

Le Christ, dont nous avons l'insigne honneur d'être à la fois les disciples et les ministres, n'a-t-il pas dit : « *Ma mission sociale est de rendre témoignage à la vérité. Ego ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati* »? (Joan. XVIII, 37) (*Lettre des Evêques de Belgique aux Evêques d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie, 24 novembre 1915; Ibid., 242-243.*)

... Je vous apporte une parole de paix.

Mais il n'y a de paix possible que dans l'ordre, et l'ordre repose sur la Justice et la Charité.

Nous voulons l'ordre, ... mais le Pouvoir occupant aussi doit vouloir l'ordre, c'est-à-dire le respect de nos droits et de ses engagements.

L'homme a droit à la liberté de son travail. Il a droit à son foyer. Il a le droit de réserver ses services à sa patrie.

Les règlements qui violent ces droits ne lient point la conscience.

Je vous dis cela, mes Frères, sans haine ni esprit de représailles. Je vous dis cela parce que, disciple du Christ et Ministre de l'Evangile, je vous dois la Vérité. Je serais indigne de cet anneau épiscopal que l'Eglise m'a mis au doigt, de cette croix qu'Elle a posée sur ma poitrine, si, obéissant à une passion humaine, je tremblais de proclamer que le droit violenté reste le droit, que l'injustice, appuyée sur la force, n'en est pas moins l'injustice. (*Allocution en l'église Sainte-Gudule à Bruxelles, le 26 novembre 1916; Ibid. pp. 337-338.*)

2° « TENIR TETE AUX TYRANS »; « SURVEILLER ET ARRETER LES TENTATIVES DES PERFIDES QUI FONT CAUSE COMMUNE AVEC L'ENNEMI ».

Est-il bien dans le rôle du clergé de prendre parti dans les conflits qu'amènent la guerre et l'occupation ? L'évêque et ses prêtres ne sont-ils pas exclusivement préposés aux besoins spirituels de âmes ?

L'Eglise n'est pas une société invisible de purs esprits. Les fidèles sont exposés aux besoins et aux périls du corps et de l'âme, du temps et de l'éternité. La sollicitude des pasteurs doit s'étendre à tous ces intérêts. Ecoutez encore saint Thomas d'Aquin : « Les Pasteurs de l'Eglise ne peuvent » pas se contenter de résister aux loups qui font mourir » spirituellement le troupeau; ils doivent tenir tête aussi » aux ravisseurs et aux tyrans qui le font souffrir corporel- » lement. Non pas que les représentants de l'Autorité ecclé- » siastique doivent manier eux-mêmes les armes maté- » rielles, mais ils doivent se servir de leurs armes spiri- » tuelles, c'est-à-dire adresser aux coupables des avertisse- » ments salutaires, prier avec ferveur, frapper d'excommu- » nication les rebelles obstinés. » (*Summa Theol., 2. 2, q. 40, art. 2, ad. 1.*)

... La charité est l'unique inspiratrice et directrice de toute la vie morale et religieuse.

Pas de justice chrétienne sans charité.

Pas de charité sans justice. Et la justice vindicative étant une partie de la vertu de justice, pas de charité sans justice vindicative. Vouloir, sous prétexte d'héroïsme dans la charité, fermer les yeux sur l'injustice, octroyer l'impunité aux crimes de l'ennemi, parce qu'il est l'ennemi, c'est mé-

connaître l'emprise souveraine, nécessaire, de la charité sur l'organisation de la vie morale, individuelle et sociale, de l'humanité christianisée.

... Or, le Gouvernement occupant a la prétention de bouleverser l'administration générale de notre pays : il semble avoir pris pour devise : *divide et impera*.

... Traîtres à la patrie seraient ceux qui seconderaient ces procédés équivoques. Les questions de politique intérieure de la Belgique ne regardent que les Belges, ne peuvent être résolues que par les Chambres Belges, par le Gouvernement Belge, par le Roi des Belges.

Chers Messieurs les Doyens, ayez l'œil ouvert. Ecartez nos fidèles des lectures et des réunions tendancieuses. Surveillez et arrêtez les tentatives des perfides qui font cause commune avec l'ennemi, les entraînements de la jeunesse. La nation a fait face à la violence : qu'elle se garde de la séduction. La piété patriotique est une vertu : vous êtes, par devoir d'état, les gardiens et les prédicateurs de la vertu. (*Allocution à MM. les Doyens, 29 janvier 1917; Ibid., pp. 407-409, 413-414.*)

En d'autres circonstances encore, le Cardinal dénonça ceux qui faillirent à leur devoir, entr'autres en ces termes :

Il s'est produit, ça et là, parmi les nôtres, des faiblesses dont nous avons à rougir; je ne vise pas, en ce moment, — que l'on m'entende bien, — la poignée d'ouvriers épuisés par les privations, raidis par le froid, ou broyés de coups, qui ont finalement laissé échapper de leurs lèvres une parole de soumission : il y a des limites à l'énergie humaine; je

visé à regret ces quelques félons qui se prêtent au rôle lucratif de délateurs, de courtisans, d'espions, ou ces quelques égarés qui n'ont pas honte de spéculer sur la misère de leurs compatriotes. Heureusement, dans le recul de l'histoire, ces taches s'estomperont ... (*Lettre Pastorale : « Courage, mes Frères », 11 février 1917; Ibid., pp. 373-374.*)

3° SOUTENIR LES AMES, POUR QU'ELLES ACCEPTENT CHRETIENNEMENT L'EPREUVE, QUELLE QUE SOIT SA DUREE.

Le Cardinal Mercier ne cessa de revenir sur ce sujet pendant toute la durée de l'occupation de son pays. Il le fit entr'autres en ces termes :

Mes Frères, vous ne pouvez douter de l'amour de Dieu pour vous...

Vous ne comprenez pas, sur l'heure, le pourquoi et le comment de tous les événements que sa Providence ordonne ou permet : ... Dieu veut que vous croyiez, afin que votre foi soit méritoire pour vous, et plus glorieuse pour Lui.

... S'il vous arrive d'être tentés de scepticisme, mes Frères, prenez votre psautier; lisez, méditez quelques psaumes; votre foi se réveillera et, sans que vous vous en aperceviez, vous vous mettrez à prier.

L'homme qui prie, revit. Priez; dites, surtout, la prière par excellence, celle que nous avons apprise à l'école du divin Maître : le Pater. (*Lettre Pastorale : « Courage, mes Frères », 11 février 1917; Ibid., pp. 382-384.*)

4° SE CONFIER EN DIEU ET RENDRE HOMMAGE A SA JUSTICE.

Le 11 novembre 1918, s'écroulait la force brutale contre laquelle le Cardinal Mercier n'avait cessé de

faire appel à la Justice de Dieu. Quatre jours plus tard, l'Archevêque Primat publiait sur l'épreuve qui avait ensanglanté son pays une dernière lettre pastorale, celle-ci religieusement triomphale :

Je veux proclamer en votre nom la Justice de Dieu.

... Non, mes Frères, Dieu n'a pas nos impatiences. Il agit avec force et douceur... Il sait qu'à son heure, Il tirera le bien du mal et que l'iniquité elle-même viendra déposer en faveur de son indéfectible justice.

... La caste militaire prussienne se plaisait à ce défi : Nous luttons, seuls, contre un monde d'ennemis, et c'est nous les vainqueurs ! Pour un peu, elle eut repoussé du pied ses alliés, afin de ne devoir partager avec personne la gloire finale, et de pouvoir dire à l'univers étonné : Moi seul, et cela suffit !

Et la voilà seule, la superbe ! Toute seule, la caste militaire !

Tout à tour, la Bulgarie, la Turquie, l'Autriche-Hongrie, le peuple allemand lui-même se sont détachés d'elle.

Elle est seule, mais, cette fois, en face de ses vainqueurs ! Battue, à plat, réduite à néant !

La devise barbare « La force prime le droit » a reçu le coup de grâce.

Les rêves de domination pangermaniste se sont dissipés comme un gaz asphyxiant qu'un coup de vent emporte.

Seul le Droit est à l'honneur... Gloire à Dieu, mes bien chers Frères, gloire à sa Justice ! Puisse le peuple belge, puissent les vainqueurs et les vaincus se souvenir d'elle à jamais ! (*Lettre Pastorale : « Hommage à la Justice de Dieu », 15 novembre 1918; Ibid., pp. 625-628.*)

VI.
QUELQUES TEMOIGNAGES
RENDUS AU CARDINAL MERCIER
POUR LES PRINCIPES QU'IL SOUTINT
ET POUR LES ACTES QU'IL ACCOMPLIT
DANS SON MINISTERE PASTORAL
AU COURS DE L'OCCUPATION DE SON DIOCESE
ET DE SON PAYS.

1° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU POUVOIR OCCUPANT :

Le jeudi, 17 octobre 1918, le Cardinal Mercier recevait la visite du Baron von der Lancken, Chef du Département politique allemand de Bruxelles, qui lui remit la déclaration suivante :

« Vous incarnez pour nous la Belgique occupée, dont vous êtes le pasteur vénéré et écouté. Aussi, est-ce à vous que Monsieur le Gouverneur Général et mon Gouvernement m'ont chargé de venir annoncer que, lorsque nous évacuons votre sol, nous allons vous rendre spontanément et de plein gré les Belges prisonniers politiques et déportés. Ils vont être libres de rentrer dans leurs foyers, en partie déjà dès lundi prochain 21 courant. Cette déclaration devant réjouir votre cœur, je suis heureux de venir vous la faire, d'autant plus que je n'ai pu vivre quatre années au milieu des Belges sans les estimer et sans apprécier leur patriotisme à sa juste valeur. » (*Ibid., p. 613.*)

2° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU PAYS OCCUPE :

A la parution de la lettre pastorale : « Patriotisme et Endurance » (Noël 1914) le Roi des Belges adressait au Souverain Pontife le télégramme suivant :

« J'exprime au Chef vénéré de l'Eglise catholique romaine mon admiration pour la conduite du Cardinal Mercier, qui,

à l'exemple des glorieux prélats du passé, n'a pas craint de proclamer la vérité en face de l'erreur et d'affirmer les imprescriptibles droits d'une juste cause au regard de la conscience universelle. — ALBERT. »

3° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU SAINT-SIEGE :

Le 4 avril 1924, le Cardinal Mercier célébrait le cinquantenaire de son ordination sacerdotale. A cette occasion, Sa Sainteté Pie XI lui adressa un bref « *Tam praeclara* », dans lequel il s'exprimait comme suit :

« ... Quant à votre vaillance chrétienne, que pourrions-Nous en dire ? Ne se révèle-t-elle pas dans tous les actes de votre ministère sacré ? C'est elle qui, au cours de la guerre inhumaine déchainée sur le monde, vous a dicté « *les paroles qu'il fallait dire pour redresser les volontés chancelantes et raffermir les genoux qui fléchissaient* » (Job. IV, 6.) ; votre âme était « *l'âme du pasteur sur laquelle se modelait l'âme du troupeau* » (I Petri, V, 3.) et, au plus fort des douleurs et des deuils, vos exhortations ardentes commentaient la devise qui vous était familière — *per crucem ad lucem*, par la croix à la gloire — disant à tous comment la souffrance rend l'homme meilleur et l'aide à gravir d'un pas plus léger les degrés de l'élévation morale.

» ... Donné à Rome, près Saint-Pierre, le 25 mars 1924, Troisième année de Notre Pontificat. — PIUS, P. P. XI. »

4° PARMi LES PAYS ALLIES: LE TEMOIGNAGNE DE LA FRANCE:

Le 23 juillet 1919, M. Raymond Poincaré, Président de la République Française, reçu par le Cardinal Mercier dans l'église métropolitaine de Malines, lui disait :

« De même qu'au temps des Barbares, les Evêques étaient les défenseurs des cités, vous avez, du haut de votre siège

primatial, exprimé en formules impérissables, la pensée de la Belgique envahie.

» Vous avez fait plus : vous avez parlé au nom de la justice elle-même et votre voix a retenti dans tout le monde civilisé. »

LE TEMOIGNAGE DU JAPON :

Aussitôt après le décès du Cardinal Mercier, survenu le 26 janvier 1926, un comité présidé par le Comte Carton de Wiart se constitua à Bruxelles aux fins de publier un livre mémorial consacré à sa mémoire (Editions Desmet-Verteneuil, 1927) ; M. Adatci, alors Ambassadeur du Japon à Bruxelles, aujourd'hui Président de la Cour de Justice Internationale, y apporte (p. 236) le témoignage du Japon :

« Le Japon gardera toujours pieusement la mémoire de la plus noble figure contemporaine que fut le Cardinal Mercier, qui a déversé tant de lumières sur tous les continents du globe et dont la disparition prématurée constitue une perte dont l'étendue est incommensurable, non seulement pour la Belgique et le Catholicisme, mais pour l'humanité tout entière. — M. ADATCI. »

5° LE TEMOIGNAGE DES MILIEUX DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS :

Tout au long des œuvres pastorales du Cardinal Mercier, le patriotisme le plus pur s'allie, très naturellement, à un sens international éclairé et élevé, qui, le jour même de la célébration de ses noces d'or sacerdotales, lui faisait demander : « Que, par dessus les » frontières, les peuples s'efforcent à leur tour d'être » unis entre eux. Formons la Société des Nations dans » le respect du droit de chacun et par l'accord dans la » justice. » (T. VII, p. 365.) Il apparaît opportun de relever ici les hommages que, dans le Livre Mémorial

cit  ci-dessus, lui rendirent notamment Sir Eric Drummond, alors Secr taire g n ral de la Soci t  des Nations (p. 289) et M. William Martin, alors r dacteur au *Journal de Gen ve* (p. 331) :

« Cardinal Mercier was a great and enlightened patriot. His patriotism lead him to support the League of Nations as the best method of securing peace in the future for his beloved country. — Eric DRUMMOND, Secretary general, League of Nations. »

« La Soci t  des Nations repose sur la patrie, la justice et la foi. Le Cardinal Mercier, homme de guerre par amour de la paix, a incarn , dans une heure cruelle, sa patrie, la justice invincible et la foi en Dieu. — William MARTIN. Gen ve, ce 29 mars 1926. »

LE MANIFESTE DE MA LIANG

去年九月十八日日本暴
力發動強佔我東北
今年三月又一手演
成滿洲偽國傀儡一
劇一週年紀念河山
變色如此奇恥大
辱國人應奮起自救不
我河山不止 二十一年雙十節
北三雲馬相伯識

還我河山

Porte-parole d'un peuple de quatre cents millions d' mes, qui, en pleine renaissance, se voit trahi par la faiblesse de ses armements et par les ambitions militaires d'un pays fortement arm , Ma Liang, illustre nonag naire et grand lettr , lance   la Chine l' mouvant manifeste dont voici la traduction :

« RENDEZ-NOUS NOS FLEUVES, NOS MONTAGNES !

» Le 18 septembre 1931, la force brutale du Japon faisait explosion et se r pandait dans nos provinces de l'Est et du Nord violemment occup es. Cela n'a pas suffi. En mars 1932, le Japon, de sa propre main, op ra un effet de sc ne et produisit ce faux Etat de marionnettes, dont il tire les ficelles et qu'il intitule : « Mandchoukouo ».

» En une seule ann e, nos fleuves, nos montagnes sont d figur s ! O honte ! O violente insulte !

» Citoyens, levez-vous ! Et que votre courage, pour sauver le pays, se jette en plein danger. — Jusqu'  ce que nos fleuves, nos montagnes, nous soient restitu s !

» En la f te nationale de la 21^e ann e de la R publique Chinoise.

» MA LIANG,

» vieillard de 93 ans. Ci-contre :
» mon sceau. »

Conclusion

Si les directives pastorales du Cardinal Mercier ont pu, en pleine occupation ennemie, être publiées et exécutées, sans que le Pouvoir occupant ait été capable de les interdire, c'est, à n'en pas douter, non seulement à cause de l'éminente personnalité de celui qui les prescrivait, à cause de son héroïque vaillance et des dévouements non moins héroïques qui en opérèrent la diffusion, mais surtout parce que, conformes à la Vérité, inspirées par la Primauté du Spirituel, ressortissant à la compétence du Pouvoir spirituel, elles se sont imposées à la conscience universelle. Et un jour vint, où les événements contraignirent le Pouvoir occupant lui-même à se courber devant elles.

Ces paroles, intransigeantes comme la Vérité, douces comme la Charité, fermes comme la Justice, étaient invincibles.

C'est parce que la haine en est totalement absente que leur vaillance atteignit la plénitude de son objet. La haine, elle, est une faiblesse et elle est un vice.

C'est bien dans ce même esprit de service spirituel que, du cloître où le Seigneur nous appela, nous posons aujourd'hui l'acte de lever la voix pour faire réentendre ce que le verbe justicier du Cardinal Mercier fit retentir jusqu'aux confins du monde. Car sa voix fut entendue par dessus le tumulte des passions et par dessus le bruit des armes.

Beaucoup murmurent : La Chine est faible. Sa cause est une cause perdue. — Nous répondons : Sa cause est juste. A-t-on jamais vu que la Justice n'ait pas le dernier mot?

Le 1^{er} août 1928, le Souverain Pontife Pie XI adressait au Peuple Chinois un message historique. Après avoir revendiqué pour le Saint-Siège d'avoir été « le premier à considérer la Chine, non seulement sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité, mais avec un sentiment de vraie et toute spéciale sympathie », le Pape ajoutait: « Sa Sainteté a pleine confiance que les aspirations légitimes et les droits d'une nation numériquement la plus grande de la terre, une nation de culture ancienne qui a connu la grandeur et les splendeurs, seront pleinement reconnus. Et, si elle sait se maintenir dans les voies de la Justice et de l'Ordre, elle ne manquera pas d'atteindre à un grand avenir. »

Ce qui était vrai en 1928 n'est pas infirmé par les nouvelles injustices que, depuis, le Peuple Chinois a dû endurer. C'est dans notre faiblesse elle-même que Dieu construira notre force.

Et dans notre force, vouée au service de la Vérité, fidèle aux exigences de la Charité et de la Justice, — dans cette force, s'établira la PAIX.

**in virtute tua
PAX**

0195

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Des presses de
Fr. Van Muysewinkel
28, rue de la Consolation
Bruxelles, Belgique.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./73 FOR Despatch #636

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED 1/9/1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations for month of December uneventfull
except in respect to Japan's attitude to the new Fukien
Rebellion. Gives Japanese exports to Shanghai as a sign
that feeling against Japan has died down in China.

esp

793.94/6552
6552

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II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a) China.

79394
 Save for the interest with which the recent formation of a new and independent Government in the province of Fukien has been watched, Sino-Japanese relations for the month of December were uneventful. The new Government is considered communistic and the province being situated so close to the island of Formosa the Japanese authorities are naturally anxious. They feel that the revolution occurring just at this time is particularly unfortunate in so much as a month ago there was every appearance of progress having been made toward Sino-Japanese amicability. The new movement now presents an additional difficulty with which the Nanking Government must cope and further reduces the prestige of that organization and obviously not only complicates negotiations by the Japanese over "Manchukuo" but renders them futile. Two Japanese warships have been despatched to the district and on December 1 the Japanese Minister to China requested the president of the Executive Yuan to see that Japanese nationals be protected and effective steps be taken to prevent the circulation of anti-Japanese propaganda, such as the charges made by some Chinese journals that Japan was associated with the movement.

In this connection the NIPPON of December 5 carried an interesting story to the effect that the Fukien Government was purchasing aeroplanes from the United States in payment for which it would cede to the United States the island known as the Golden Gate, which lies just opposite the

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the port of Amoy.

In spite of the denial of General Chen Ming-shu, chairman of the political section of the military committee, that the Fukien Government was not anti-Japanese in sentiment the feeling at the Japanese Foreign Office is one of pessimism regarding the entire question. This feeling has been augmented by the imposition of special taxes on Japanese products (as well as products of other foreign nations) which it is believed must eventually lead to international complications.

However, while Fukien may present difficulties some encouraging signs of a general improvement in Sino-Japanese relations are evidenced in the fact that Japanese exports to Shanghai for November were greater than any other month since the Manchurian incident and as the anti-Japanese feeling appears to be lessening Japanese trade with China on the whole is stated to be on the up grade.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 4 General Committee/755 FOR 4

FROM Germany (Dodd) DATED Dec. 10, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Ambassador Dodd asked British Ambassador if British Government could give support to United States and Russia in maintaining peace in Far East.

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793.94/6553

6-5-5-3

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 800. A 15 a 4 General Committee/689 FOR Tel 201 4pm

FROM Germany (Dodd) DATED Dec. 10, 1933.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Ambassador Dodd asked British Ambassador if British Government could
give support to United States and Russia in maintaining peace in Far East.

795.94/6554

655-4


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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
February 20, 1934.

~~EDD:~~
~~SJT:~~
~~SKL:~~



Peiping's despatch No. 2470,
January 17, 1934, --

No action.

Mr. Salisbury in the attached despatch reports with regard to a conversation which he had with a Japanese diplomatic officer in regard to Japanese ambitions in China. This Japanese officer seems to feel "very pessimistic" in regard to the "honor" of the Japanese in the Manchuria affair. The despatch is not long and I suggest that it be read in its entirety.

J. S. J.

JEJ/VDM

720

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2470

Peiping, January 17, 1934.

Subject: Japanese Ambitions in China.

793.94

Strictly Confidential

793.94

File
Copy to FB
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 12 1934
Department of State

F/ESP

793.94/6555

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that a member of my staff had a conversation to-day with a Japanese diplomatic officer with regard to Japanese ambitions in China. This officer, who is entirely out of sympathy with the Japanese military, stated that, although he had little actual information about the plans of the military, he had certain opinions which he would express in strict confidence.

This officer stated that he thought it quite probable that Inner Mongolia would before long be a part of Pu Yi's empire. When questioned with regard

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to the possibility of Japanese expansion further west, that is, into Sinkiang, where Japanese agents are now said to be at work, he expressed the view that such expansion, although possible, belongs to the distant future, if it is to occur at all. He does not believe that Pu Yi's capital will be moved from Changchun. Admitting that there are Japanese agents attempting to bribe Chinese leaders in North China to become independent of Nanking for the purpose of expanding "Manchukuo" into this area, he apparently believes that these agents lack sufficient funds for the purpose as well as the support of the proper Japanese authorities elsewhere. His statements indicated that, in his opinion, Japanese leaders are still not in agreement on Japan's policy of expansion on the continent and that he seems to think that the more conservative Japanese leaders would be able to prevent the establishment of an independent North China through Japanese activities and its absorption by "Manchukuo". His own opinion in this connection was that such over-expansion as the absorption of North China would cause the eventual collapse of Japan. Referring to the division of opinion among Japanese leaders, he said that he regarded General Araki as as much of a puppet as Pu Yi and thought that if General Araki were to die there would be no difficulty in finding another military puppet to take his place. He views those younger officers who were responsible for the conquest of

Manchuria

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Manchuria as being still a source of difficulty and danger. In this connection he said that he feels that they were responsible for the death of General Muto, Japan's first ambassador to "Manchukuo", who, being "an honorable and upright man", died as a result of the unhappiness caused him by those younger officers. He himself, he added, was brought up to believe in "honor" but that recent events - referring to the Japanese military - have made him "very pessimistic".

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
Nelson Trusler Johnson.

710

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/67 FOR Despatch #461

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED January 4, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING:

Rumors regarding Japanese activities in China and regarding negotiations of the Chinese and Japanese negotiations for retrocession of Shanhaikuan. Figures furnished by Japanese Information Bureau at Tientsin for number of officers and men lost in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

esp

793.94/6556

655-6

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793.24
 The Japanese Information Bureau at Tientsin stated, during the month, that the War Office at Tokyo had released the following figures regarding the number of Japanese killed during the Sino-Japanese clashes in North China and Manchuria from September 18, 1931, to November 30, 1933: 2 generals, 1 major-general, 2 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 43 majors, 54 captains, 49 first lieutenants, 57 sub-lieutenants, 47 warrant officers, 214 sergeant-majors, 68 sergeants, 773 corporals, 1887 first class soldiers, 131 private soldiers, 4 special ranks, 212 civilians attached to the army; total 3,650. How many of these casualties occurred in Jehol and in the territory inside the Great Wall is not known but it is probable that a large number of those listed above lost their lives during operations in that area.

Reports were current in Tientsin during the latter part of the month that General Doihara had secretly arrived in the city but direct inquiry of Japanese who were in a position to know whether the General, who is sometimes known as the "Lawrence" of Japan, had arrived elicited information that the report was wholly inaccurate. Subsequent reports from Shanhaikuan indicated that General Doihara had arrived there from the west in an airplane en route back to Hsinking. In view of the fact

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fact that General Doihara's movements have always been somewhat mysterious, it is still impossible to say definitely whether he has recently visited Tientsin, but in view of the categorical denial in Japanese quarters here it seems reasonably certain that the reports of his visit are in error.

Reports concerning the negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese authorities for the retrocession of Shanhaikuan continue to be conflicting. Some sources state that an agreement has been reached by which the Japanese troops stationed there will be withdrawn to Suichung next spring upon the completion of Japanese barracks at that place. It is known that workmen have been engaged in erecting barracks just outside the Great Wall north of Shanhaikuan. A foreigner who lives at Shanhaikuan is authority for the statement that the Japanese troops will occupy these barracks as soon as they are completed. The same foreigner has informed me that there are no indications of the Japanese building permanent housing structures in Shanhaikuan at present and it is his opinion that all Japanese troops will be removed from Shanhaikuan next spring.

My informant also stated, in the course of his conversation, that the first anniversary of the fall of Shanhaikuan to the Japanese will be observed on January 3.

Incidentally my Shanhaikuan informant, who has many Japanese and Chinese friends at that place, also stated that he has recently heard considerable talk in Japanese and Chinese circles concerning the possible enthronement

of

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of Pu Yi as Emperor of North China during 1934, the first step in that direction to take place at Hsinking with a subsequent movement into Peiping. He stated that discussions of this possibility are much more frequent now than at any time since the change of Government in Manchuria. Recent newspaper reports from Tokyo indicate that the question is under serious consideration by the Government authorities in that capital.

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By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/1003 FOR Desp.#-

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Jan. 12, 1934
NAME 1-1127 ***

///

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations: Re;ates substance of
a conversation with an official of the Chinese
Foreign Office in regard to - .

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793.94/6557
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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/74 FOR Despatch #-
FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED January 15, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Rumors of Japanese secret agitation for independent
regime in North China; suspension of Sino-Japanese
negotiations in middle of month; clashes on the Hei
River between Chinese and Japanese and Manchukuoan
troops

esp

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2559

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2. China.

193.94
In December rumors arose again that Japan was secretly attempting to effect the establishment of an independent regime in North China. The name of General Doihara was frequently connected with these rumors. In the middle of December General Doihara traveled to Shenhaikuan by airplane and it is quite possible that he may have gone on to Tientsin or Peiping at that time. However, according to reliable information he was not out of Mukden for more than two or three days at a time. The information available in Mukden does not indicate that any concrete progress has been made toward establishing an independent regime in North China. In this connection it may be noted that the Kwantung Army in view of the danger of war with Soviet Russia is eager to have as friendly a regime as possible in power in North China.

According to reliable reports Sino-Japanese negotiations for the settlement of outstanding questions affecting North China and "Manchukuo" continued to be unsuccessful. According to Chinese press reports such negotiations were suspended in the middle of December. Consequently, questions such as the resumption of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway, postal facilities, the operation of customs stations along the Great Wall and the

retrocession

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retrocession of Shanhaikuan and other districts are still unsettled. The construction of buildings for official use and other developments indicate that Shanhaikuan will not be returned to China in the near future.

On December 18th THE PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES reported that a large force of Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops were advancing from western Jehol toward Chahar. The strength of the contingent was estimated to be between 1,000 and 3,500 men. The Japanese military claim, according to the press, that the purpose of the operation was to suppress anti-Japanese troops under Sung Che-yuan in western Jehol and that they had no intention of invading Chahar. Chinese press reports stated that Japan was threatening Chahar in order to force China into a settlement of outstanding questions concerning North China. Other Chinese reports were that Japan desired a strong foothold in Chahar because of the danger of a war with Soviet Russia.

According to the press a minor clash occurred between the Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops and Chinese at the Hai River. A Japanese press report states that having accomplished their object - the suppression of irregulars and bandits - the Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops began to withdraw on December 17th. However, THE PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES reported on December 23rd that although some of the Japanese troops had been withdrawn most of them remained in the vicinity of the eastern border of Chahar.

In

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In this connection it may be noted that Major General Okamura, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, told an American newspaper correspondent that northern Chahar may later be incorporated into "Manchukuo" because the Mongolian banner system prevails there.*

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/64 FOR Despatch #2283

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED January 9, 1934

TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Attitude of Japanese toward new Fukien Government as
expressed to Mr. Wang Ching-wei by Mr. Ariyoshi; Projected
conclave at Shanghai of Japanese military officers
stationed in China to decide Army's attitude toward
China, in view of present situation.

esp

793.94/6559
159

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79294
 b. Relations with other Countries: Relations with Japan: The Japanese Minister, Mr. A. Ariyoshi, visited Nanking at the beginning of the month and is reported to have stated to Mr. Wang Ching-wei in the course of an interview that the Japanese Government regards the Fukien revolt as an internal affair of the Chinese Government and will neither intervene nor extend assistance to the rebels. The Japanese Minister is reported, however, to have called the attention of the Chinese Government to the large number of Japanese resident in Fukien and to have expressed the hope that the Chinese authorities would accord protection to Japanese lives and property.

The Japanese Third Fleet, consisting of the cruiser IDCUMO and two destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral S. Imamura, left Shanghai on December 11th for Formosa. Another destroyer leaving on the same day was scheduled to go to Amoy.

A report has appeared in the Shanghai press of a gathering in Shanghai in the near future of Japanese

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military officers stationed at various places in China. According to this report the main object of the conference is "to decide the army's attitude toward China, especially Fukien, in view of the present situation." The press report states that Japan must do something in Fukien as the new government, whatever its nature, is a "fait accompli." Those who are to attend the conference, according to the press, are the Assistant Military Attaché in Peiping, Lieutenant-Colonel K. Shibayama, and Colonel Iwamatsu from Nanking. Major T. Wachi of Canton, Major H. Makano of Tsinan, Captain S. Sakata of Amoy, and Commander S. Morioka of Hankow were also expected to attend. Major General Isogaya, Chief of the Second Department of the Tokyo General Staff, is said to have arrived in Shanghai at the end of December from Tokyo, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shirokura, Chief Adjutant to the Commander of the Tokyo Gendarmerie, was due to arrive from Japan for the same purpose.

Mr. Y. Suma, formerly First Secretary of the Japanese Legation in Shanghai and recently appointed Japanese Consul General at Nanking, left Shanghai during the latter part of December for Foochow and Formosa on his way to Japan for instructions prior to assuming his new duties. So far as can be learned the purpose of his visit to Fukien was to gather data at first hand of the situation in order to report to his government.

There have been reports during the month that Japan was intending to intervene in Fukien, because it was feared that the Fukien Government was too closely allied to the Communists and hence might be considered to be a

menace

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menace to Japanese interests in Formosa. So far as is known there is little foundation for these rumors beyond the fact that Japan is watching the situation very closely, as the foreign power most deeply interested in what may be the outcome in Fukien.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./77 FOR Despatch #2488
FROM China (Johnson) DATED January 31, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese negotiations were not resumed nor China's
policy toward Japan clarified during month of December.

793.94/6560
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general situation bearing on Sino-Japanese relations.

c. Chinese policy toward Japan and its effect:

798.92
Those Chinese officials in favor of a policy of conciliation toward Japan in order to give China an opportunity for internal recovery were unable to initiate such a policy, due to opposition from dissident Chinese officials and important elements of the people and to preoccupation with the Fukien rebellion. Toward the close of December there were widespread rumors that the Japanese military, dissatisfied with Chinese tactics in regard to Japan and encouraged by the deterioration of Chinese leadership at Peking, were about to embark upon a new venture affecting the political situation in North China.³ This view was not, however, substantiated by events, although there were allegations from presumably reliable sources that Japanese agents were active in North China in attempting to incite Chinese military leaders to action inimical to the Peking Government. (There were also reports, believed to be authentic, that the Japanese had placed military officers, in addition

dition

3. Legation's telegram No. 926 of December 23, 11 a.m.

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- 3 -

dition to the usual complement of their military staff in China, in a number of strategic cities in China Proper, thereby increasing the network of their activities.) Although inimical action was not begun, Chinese belief that Japan intends to keep China internally divided and eventually to dominate more Chinese territory was not shaken; nor was there evidence of less indifference, in North China at least, to further Japanese invasion.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 Shantung/1 FOR Desp.#2490

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Jan.30,1934
NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Instances of Japanese intrigue at Tsinan, and in Shantung Province: Several concrete instances named by General Han Fu-Chu. He stated he had been approached by a high Japanese official, who offered him money and military supplies, and promised to retain him in control in Shantung, if he would cooperate with Japan and "Manchukuo" in establishing a new state in North China.

fpg

793.94/6561
6561

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/68 FOR Despatch #483

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED February 1, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 etc.

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese negotiations do not seem to be any nearer
solution and Shanhaikuan is still in hands of Japanese.
Other activities of Japanese in China.

793.94/6562
6562

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

798.92
Negotiations for the retrocession of Shanhaikuan have been in progress intermittently for some five or six months, and, while assurances of favorable progress are abundant, each succeeding month seems to find the authorities but little nearer to a solution. January was no exception to the rule. Many conflicting reports were current concerning these negotiations, but the fact remains that Shanhaikuan is still in control of the Japanese and that the Chinese Magistrate at that place has not been permitted to assume office.

The new Japanese Barracks constructed in the Tunglo-cheng district, just outside the Great Wall near Shanhaikuan, at a cost of Yuan \$120,000 were formally opened on January 21 with much pomp and ceremony. It will be recalled

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

recalled that the Japanese Kwantung military authorities have for several months offered as an excuse for the delay in returning Shanhaikuan to Chinese control the lack of facilities for quartering the Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops pending the completion of these barracks outside the Great Wall. The construction of these barracks will at least remove a large number of Japanese soldiers to a point outside the Great Wall, but to all intents and purposes it will represent but a slight change in the Shanhaikuan military status.

The Japanese military authorities have kept a watchful eye on areas near the Great Wall north and northwest of Peiping lest there should be an infiltration of Chinese troops into the demilitarized zone or into the area northwest of Peiping which the Japanese themselves appear to have arbitrarily fixed beyond which they will not permit Chinese troops to encroach. A movement of the rebel troops of Liu Kuei-tang, referred to elsewhere in this report, created some concern among the Japanese military authorities as did the alleged presence of approximately 1,000 soldiers of the Chinese 29th Army at or near Chihcheng. A letter received in the course of the month from an American missionary at Chihcheng, Chahar, stated that the Japanese had served notice on the Chinese officials at that place that all Chinese soldiers must be withdrawn by January 17. As a result of this ultimatum the Chinese population became panic-stricken. Bombs were dropped on the

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

the city by Japanese airplanes on January 3 and the mission station, which incidentally was non-American, and in which station the American writer of the letter resided, was slightly damaged. The Japanese Consulate General at Hien-tsin was notified on January 11 of the presence of the American missionary in the mission station at Chihoheng.

The impending enthronement of Henry Pu Yi as Emperor of "Manchukuo", and the renaming of "Manchukuo" as "Manchutikuo", or "Empire of Manchukuo", occupied no small amount of space in both foreign and vernacular newspapers during the past month. It is understood that the date of Pu Yi's ascension of the throne has been postponed from March 1 to March 15, 1934. The rumors to the effect that the capital of "Manchukuo" would be removed from Hsinking to Chengteh as a political and military stepping-stone to Peiping have been categorically denied by "Manchukuo" officials. It is believed that the rumors were the invention of Chinese propagandists.

The invasion of eastern Chahar during the month of December by Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops, as reported on page 10 of the monthly political review of this Consulate General for December, was the source of considerable speculation on the part of the Chinese. Newspaper reports concerning their alleged withdrawal are still conflicting. As previously reported, the move was at first regarded as a strategic move on the part of Japan to sever communications between China and Russia in anticipation of a Russo-Japanese war, but in the light of later developments it is doubtful

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

doubtful whether the move had any significance beyond the mere protection of the Jehol border.

A Japanese military plane flew over Peiping on January 3, creating some misgivings among the Chinese population of the city. This is evidently the same plane that dropped bombs on Chincheng on January 3.

Reports were current in the course of the month, especially in the vernacular press, that the Soviet Government would shortly attempt to regain possession of the ex-Russian concession at Tientsin. These reports are believed to be wholly without foundation. They have doubtless gained circulation incident to efforts which are being put forth by the Soviet Consulate General to regain possession of a part of the consular grounds allegedly sold by the Chinese authorities to a private concern for business purposes after the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia in 1928. The Soviet Consul General recently informed me that he had been experiencing difficulty in repossessing this part of the consular grounds, which part is now occupied by a summer pleasure garden.

Japanese propaganda bureaus continued their campaign of praise of the "Manchukuo" regime's activities in Jehol territory. If their lurid descriptions of the "Manchukuo" regime's progress in that area are to be believed, Jehol is advancing towards a model government with spectacular speed.

c. relations

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Do
To ack??
SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAPANESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1934.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

I am herewith enclosing copy
of a statement given to the New York Times,
regarding the recent rumor of an arrest of
a foreign missionary in Kirin.

Yours very sincerely,

Kirini Saito

(Enclosure)

F/EAP

793.94/6563

793.94

File ack. Feb. 27, 1934
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 27 1934
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REGARDING THE ALLEGED ARREST OF A
FOREIGN CATHOLIC MISSIONARY IN
KIRIN, MANCHOUKUO

With reference to the Mukden dispatch of the New York Times of February 14th, reporting an arrest of a foreign Catholic missionary and his assistants at Kirin on espionage charges, the Japanese Embassy has telegraphically received from the Japanese Government the information that the police authorities of Kirin, upon learning of the presence in the French Catholic Church there, of hand-bills for the propagation of the Three People Doctrine and anti-Imperialism, detained a Manchurian Father by the name of In, of the said Church, and three other Manchurian Catholics suspected of having some connection with the said In.

After the investigation, they were all released on the 12th of February, with the exception of the said In, who is still being held.

No arrest, it is understood, however, of any foreign Catholic missionary was made.

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
793.94/6563

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 26, 1934, with which you were so good as to send me a copy of a statement given to the NEW YORK TIMES with regard to the arrest and detention of certain persons of the Roman Catholic faith.

2 K. H. Handbuch

Ambassador of Japan.

140
FE: EHD: REK



1231

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AND CONSIDERATION

RESPECT Mr. Louis McHenry Howe
FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AND CONSIDERATION Secy. to President

RECEIVED

1934 MAR 12
Mr. Louis McHenry Howe,
Secretary to President Roosevelt,
WASHINGTON D. C.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS RECORDS

March 21 1934.
Feb. 12th. 1934.
Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 12 1934
Department of State
Ack'd
F/E

Dear Mr. Howe,

793.94/6462
6468

not recorded in DCR
On the 9th. Inst., I sent a communication enclosing a
copy of an article I prepared last May on the Manchurian problem,
to the President, Mr. Roosevelt. I understand that all such
things go through your hands, and I take this means to call your
especial attention to that communication.

I am exceedingly desirous for it to get to the attention of
Mr. Roosevelt, as it presents an entirely different point of view
to any so far presented, at least so far as I have been able to
discover.

I beg you to believe that I have no personal concern in the
matter. I am greatly concerned for the outcome of the inter-
ests concerned, and I have ^areason to believe that attention to the
considerations presented would favorably affect the whole situation.

It just happens that I was in a position, and gave the attention, for an understanding that few men have had in this case. My
contact and observations covered practically the whole period, ⁽¹⁸⁶⁷⁻¹⁹²³⁾ dur-
ing which the Manchurian situation was developing. I am there-
fore able to comprehend the whole sequence of facts and events, and
connect them back with the conditions which placed China under
the Manchu control, but never gave China any claim on that territo-
ry. This is of the utmost significance and importance in under-
standing the whole case, and is the one thing that no one has done.
When this is done the whole case is crystal clear, and indicates

F/G 793.94/6564

MAR 12 1934

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

the need for an entire change of attitude on the whole question, a change which removes practically the whole of suspicion and misunderstanding on the part of America toward Japan, and produces a relation which would in all probability allay the present war scare in Manchuria between Japan and Russia - an event which would be most deplorable in its results, no matter how it turned out.

I may say that I have attempted to get the ear of our State Department. I sent a copy of the article submitted to The President, along with a request signed by some half dozen prominent citizens of this city, that I be invited to come to Washington for the purpose of presenting to some responsible member of the State Department valuable information on the Manchurian problem. The State Department replied simply that they had not funds for applying to such purpose, but ^{would} give me a hearing if I came to Washington. That has been impossible for me owing to losses which as you know is a very common condition at this time. So the matter stands.

In case you should be sufficiently interested to wish reference I will give you Mr. B. E. Geer, recently installed President of Furman University of this city. Also Hon. John J. McSwain, House Representatives, Washington, a personal acquaintance. Also Hon. David Fairchild, Washington D. C.

Soliciting your sympathetic attention,

Yours very truly,

T. J. League

from
T. J. League,
230 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

0233

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

March 21 1934:

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/6564.

My dear Mr. League:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from the White House, of your letter of February 12, 1934, addressed to Mr. Louis McHenry Howe, Secretary to the President, in regard to the situation in Manchuria.

The article relating to Manchuria, to which you refer, and which was sent to the Department by Mr. McSwain in September, 1933, was read with care and with interest, and, in acknowledging the receipt of Mr. McSwain's letter, the Department expressed appreciation of your desire to place your knowledge and experience at the disposal of the Government. The whole correspondence has been re-read with care and the Department again assures you that the spirit which prompted you to write
and

Mr. T. J. League,

230 Buist Avenue,

Greenville, South Carolina.

793.94/6564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and your desire to be of service in this connection
 are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:


SMH
 Stanley R. Hornbeck
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

egc.
 FE:183

mmh
 FE

III-19-34

OK
 Mar. 21. 1964



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./74 FOR /004

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED February 6, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Japanese interest in two happenings in China during month;
defeat of revolutionists in Fukien and return of Chang
Hsueh-liang. Describes reaction in Japan.

793.94/6564
1/2
6564 1/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
March 28, 1934.

~~SEE:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~LOK:~~

~~SRN:~~

Tientsin's despatch No. 491 under
date February 12, 1934, --

No action required.

The despatch reports the local press
as stating that the retrocession of Shan-
haikuan took place on February 10, 1934.

The Japanese troops and most of the
Japanese-"Manchukuo" organizations in
Shanhaikuan are stated to have moved their
headquarters to Tungloch'eng, adjacent to
Shanhaikuan and immediately outside the
Great Wall.

It is expected that the retrocession
of Shanhaikuan will be followed by the
return to Chinese control of all the passes
on the Great Wall occupied by Japanese
military. It is reported in the press
that Kupeikou will be turned over on
February 20.

The Chinese in Tientsin appear to
feel that the retrocession of Shanhaikuan
is essentially a concession in form rather
than in fact.

~~ETW~~
ETW/VDM

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 491

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAR 13 1934

Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, February 12, 1934.

SUBJECT: Retrocession of Shanhaikuan.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	G		
	Ward		
	ONI		
	MID		

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy

of my despatch No.588 of today's date, addressed to the
Legation on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, February 12, 1934.


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RSW:w

Original and four copies to Department.

F/G 793.94/6565

APR 20 1934

FILED



0238

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 588

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 471, Dated FEB 12 1934
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, February 12, 1934.

Subject: Retrocession of Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping.

Sir:

893.20 PA - Tientsin / 68

I have the honor to refer to page 3 of the monthly political review for the Tientsin consular district for January, 1934, touching on the above subject, and to report that the city of Shanhaikuan, occupied by Japanese troops since its capture on January 3, 1933*, is now reported in the local vernacular and English press to have been put again under Chinese authority on February 10, the retrocession having taken place in

a simple

*Despatch No. 313 of January 13, 1933 to Legation (No. 237 to Department).

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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a simple ceremony culminating in the raising of the Chinese flag over the city at 11 o'clock that morning. according to the account appearing in the PEIPING CHRONICLES of February 11, Mr. T'ao Shang-ming, representative of the Peiping Political Readjustment Council, officiated on the part of the Chinese, and Major Giga, of the Imperial Kwantung Army, represented the Japanese. The same report states that shortly after the ceremonies Mr. Yuan Tai, District Magistrate of Shanhaikuan and Colonel Su Yu-chi, Director of the Special Bureau of Public Safety of Shanhaikuan, assumed their respective offices, while the Japanese troops had already been withdrawn to their newly constructed barracks in Tunglooh'eng, a suburb of Shanhaikuan immediately north of the Great Wall. Most of the Japanese-"Manchukuo" organizations in Shanhaikuan are stated to have also moved their headquarters to Tunglooh'eng. The reestablishment of the Chinese post and telegraph services is expected soon.

The retrocession thus effected has been the subject of negotiations for over five months, the delay being understood to have arisen from the unwillingness of the Chinese to accept any agreement which left the Japanese garrison within the Province of Hopei whereas the Japanese would withdraw their troops no further than to Tunglooh'eng, which is adjacent to Shanhaikuan

immediately

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

immediately outside the Great Wall and where they were meanwhile busy in the construction of adequate barracks. It would appear from the arrangements which are now reported to have made that the Japanese demands were ultimately met.

On January 31, the TA KUNG PAO (Chinese) reported that the Hopei Provincial Government was in receipt of a telegram from the Japanese military authorities at Shanhaikuan requesting that T'ao Shang-ming, the Administrative Inspector for the Luan-Yu District, proceed to Shanhaikuan to discuss the return of that city to Chinese jurisdiction. The YI SHIH PAO (Chinese), in its issue of February 5, stated that as a result of the negotiations carried on over several months between Mr. T'ao and the Japanese military authorities, the terms upon which Shanhaikuan was to be retroceded were finally settled on January 30. The account referred to listed the terms as: (1) Shanhaikuan to be taken over on February 10, 1934; (2) the civil administration at Shanhaikuan to be restored to its pre-"incident" status; (3) all administrative offices to be transferred back to their former premises on the day the city is to be taken over; (4) all temporary organizations set up in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan during the incident to be abolished; (5) various of the native residents of Shanhaikuan who were engaged in legitimate work for the

municipality

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

municipality during the Japanese occupation might continue to be employed; (6) the offices of such of the Japanese as could not readily be removed at once to be permitted to remain at Shanhaikuen until their transfer could be arranged. The same newspaper, in its issue of January 6, reported that, after conferences in Peiping with General Huang Fu and in Tientsin with General Yu Haueh-chung, Mr. T'ao Shang-ming had on the evening of February 5 entrained for Shanhaikuen. This article stated that the Japanese troops would in the near future be removed to their new barracks outside the Pass. Later reports stated that Mr. T'ao stayed for two days in T'angshan, going to Shanhaikuen on the morning of the 8th. After the retrocession he is said to have returned to Tientsin to report to General Yu.

The retrocession of Shanhaikuen will, it is generally expected, be followed by the return to Chinese control of all the passes on the Great Wall occupied by Japanese military. A report appearing in the TA KUNG PAO of February 12 quotes the Japanese military attaché at Peiping as saying that following a conference which had been held between Governor Yu and Retrocession Commissioner Yin Ju-keng, it had been decided that Kupeikou would be turned over to Chinese jurisdiction on February 20.

It is believed that the retrocession of Shanhaikuen with the possible return at a not-distant date of the other passes along the Great Wall has aroused no particular enthusiasm among well-informed Chinese in Tientsin, who view it as essentially a concession in

form

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

form rather than in fact, valuable only as an indication
that the Japanese are willing to afford the present
authorities in North China such "face" as they may be
able to gain from a restitution of an appearance of
authority along the wall.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800
RSW:w

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department, under cover of Despatch
No. 491 of February 12, 1934.

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 24, 1934.

~~FBI:~~

~~WED:~~ *Very interesting story*

~~MEM:~~

~~SECRET:~~

Peiping's strictly confidential
 despatch No. 2539 under date February 16,
 1934.

No action required.

The despatch reports the following
 information which the Legation believes
 to be on the whole reliable and which
 it has obtained from a well-informed
 Japanese source:

(1) At the recent Shanghai conference of Japanese military officers (previously reported by Shanghai) it was decided that the Japanese military should pursue toward China a unified policy which was to support Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu. The informant considers this as meaning that Japan is given a free hand in North China in return for a promise not to use force against China. He believes that an agreement to this effect has been entered into by General Chiang and that it is primarily a result of Chiang's

suppression

024

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

suppression of the Fukien rebellion. The informant stated that after Huang Fu has consulted with General Chiang in the matter he will proceed to North China and quickly reach agreements (favorable to Japan) with regard to the pending questions in regard to the establishment of postal, telegraph, rail and air services and allied questions. The informant said that as a result of the agreement with General Chiang all civilian clothed Japanese military had been withdrawn from China.

(2) The informant remarked that although some of the headstrong younger Japanese military officers had been withdrawn from China, they were still a danger.

(3) He stated that he did not believe a Russo-Japanese war would take place for some years, remarking that the Commander of the Japanese naval forces in Manchurian waters had led him to believe that the navy was opposed to war with Russia and that the army no longer favored a war in the near future in view of their problem in Manchuria where banditry was still a serious problem and where the people did not favor

Japanese

124^L

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

Japanese control and would work against Japan in the event of war.

(4) With regard to the CER, he felt that Japan was willing to pay half of Russia's original price but was holding out with hopes of a more beneficial agreement which would possibly include the transfer to Japan of North Saghalien.

(5) He was not sure of Japan's policy toward Inner Mongolia but believed that Japanese retired army officers were at work there with the hope of achieving the absorption of that area into "Manchukuo".

(6) In a personal letter to Mr. Dorman, Mr. Salisbury stated that his informant was Mr. M. Yamahara of the Reizo News Agency.

J. E. J.

acw
ETW:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2539

Peiping, February 16, 1934.


Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

Strictly Confidential

793.94



CONFIDENTIAL



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/G

793.94/6566

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report certain information with regard to Sino-Japanese relations and allied subjects obtained in strict confidence from a well-informed non-official Japanese source. As this information corresponds in part with information already available to the Legation and does not run counter to other information heretofore obtained, it is believed that it may be regarded, on the whole, as reliable. The informant has excellent sources as he frequently is in conversation with highly placed Japanese military officers.

APR 21 1934

FILED

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The informant's most interesting statements concerned Japanese policy toward China. An important conference of Japanese military officers was held last month in Shanghai, reference to which was made in Shanghai's despatch No. ^{893.008R-5 Shanghai 164} 7788 of January 9, 1934, to the Legation. Prior to this conference the Japanese military were divided with regard to the proper policy to pursue toward China, some being in favor of a dis-united China and some in favor of cooperation with General Chiang Kai-shek. Among the activities of the former, as the Legation has already reported, were efforts to inveigle war lords in North China to establish in their area a state independent of the Nanking Government. At this conference, however, agreement was reached that the Japanese military should have only one policy and that that should be support of General Chiang Kai-shek and of his representative in North China, General Huang Fu. This policy means, in the words of the informant, that Japan receives, in return for a promise not to use force against China, a completely free hand in North China. The informant believes that General Chiang Kai-shek has already entered into an agreement with the Japanese to this effect. He regards it as primarily the result of General Chiang Kai-shek's successful suppression of the rebellion in Fukien Province which was taking place at the time of the conference at Shanghai. He further stated that General Huang Fu will soon visit General Chiang Kai-shek to discuss matters related to this agreement and that upon his return to Peiping the

negotiations

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negotiations with regard to Sino-"Manchukuo"-Japanese problems which were suspended last November will be resumed and that agreements will quickly be reached favorable to Japan with regard to establishment of postal, telegraph, rail, and air services, and allied questions pending between China and "Manchukuo". When questioned whether General Huang Fu would agree to all that the Japanese want, the informant replied that General Huang would not dare do otherwise as obstruction would mean a renewal of Japan's subversive tactics. The informant concluded his statements in this regard by saying that as a result of the agreement on policy at the Shanghai conference all the civilian clothed Japanese military in China left the country but that of course he is unable to forecast how long this new policy may continue in effect as the Japanese military are capable of rapid changes in policy.

The informant's comments with regard to the headstrong younger Japanese military officers may not be without interest to the Department. Although some of the most enthusiastic have been transferred from the mainland to Japan, he still regards them as a danger. As an example of their impetuosity he remarked that following the conquest of Jehol Province last spring and entry into Hopei Province the officers in the vanguard had every intention of taking North China and were only eventually curbed following the receipt in succession of three telegrams over the signature of an Imperial Prince, Prince Kanin, the Chief of Staff, commanding them to halt. In this connection he also made the statement

that

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that Colonel Nemoto, a Japanese officer who resides in Peiping and who has been believed to have close relations with General Huang Fu, is an adviser of General Huang Fu and was one of that group of officers who plotted in October, 1931, to establish a dictatorship in Japan under the nominal lead of Prince Chichibu and after the assassination of a number of Japan's principal civilian statesmen.

The informant then commented on the possibility of a Russo-Japanese war. He believes it will not take place for some years, although a few months ago it seemed to him imminent. He apparently has been influenced in his opinion by Admiral Kobayashi, commander of the Japanese naval forces in Manchurian waters, who visited Peiping a few days ago. The informant stated that Admiral Kobayashi, to whom he referred as "the leader of Japan's naval fascists", led him to believe that the Japanese Navy is opposed to war with Russia and that even the headstrong army officers in Manchuria are no longer in favor of it in the near future as they realize they have a very large job on their hands in Manchuria where banditry is still a serious problem and where, in case of such a war, the people would work against the Japanese as they do not favor Japanese control. The informant's personal opinion was that Manchuria will not be an asset to Japan for decades yet to come.

He feels that with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway question Japan is employing her present tactics for a purpose as yet unknown. He is convinced that Japan is quite ready to pay half of Russia's

original

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original demand for the railway but hopes to reach an agreement which will be a decided benefit to Japan, possibly including the transfer to Japan of North Saghalien. In connection with this latter suggestion, the informant was unable - or unwilling - to state what might be the quid pro quo for Russia in such a transaction.

When he was questioned with regard to Japan's policy toward Inner Mongolia in respect to the new policy of support of General Chiang Kai-shek, he replied that on this point he was not certain. Although he is sure that there are Japanese military at work in Inner Mongolia in the hope of achieving the absorption of that area by "Manchukuo", he is inclined to believe that they are retired officers without authority from the Kwantung Army. He bases this supposition in part on a statement recently made to him by an important Japanese army officer to the effect that the Japanese working in Inner Mongolia are a great source of annoyance.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Copy to American Embassy,
Tokyo.

710

LES-SC

4 277.
ICC to FI-M

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 3, 1934.

~~FEJ:~~
~~RCM~~
~~EHD:~~
~~MM:~~
 Start: See below + page 8 of enclosure.
 Nanking's confidential diplomatic
 despatch under date February 16, 1934, --

No action required.

The despatch encloses a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Peck and Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. The memorandum contains the following interesting statements by Mr. Tang, who in this case appears to be acting as the spokesman of Dr. Wang Ching-wei:

(a) As a result of informal negotiations at Shanghai before the end of the Fukien revolt the Japanese had agreed to permit Chinese troops to pass through Shanghai en route to the Fukien front and had also agreed that, except in the case of urgent necessity, no naval forces would be landed at Foochow.

(b) Before the suppression of the Fukien revolt many individuals and factions were wavering in loyalty to the National

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Government. The speed with which the Government put down the revolt, however, removed these dangers.

(c) There is no immediate prospect of hostilities between Canton and Nanking.

(d) The Fourth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee had been postponed from the original date set because the Government considered it dangerous to hold the Plenary Session before the suppression of the Fukien revolt as any untoward incident during or after the Plenary Session might have seriously embarrassed the Nanking Government.

(e) There have been no sweeping changes in the Government's personnel or policies, and Government leaders are convinced that peace within China is an absolute essential.

(f) In South and Central China, there are no particular difficulties confronting the National Government.

(g) In the North there are internal and external difficulties. In order to remove the Japanese threat, China must reform the present inefficient administration in the Luantung area. This can be done

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without the use of troops.

(h) In commenting on Japan's relations with China, he blames the Japanese military for exceeding their authority and states that the army's exploits in Manchuria were entered into as a means of increasing the prestige of the army and obtaining popular leadership without resorting to an actual revolution in Japan itself.

(i) China could not entertain a friendly sentiment toward Japan as long as Japan occupied Chinese territory. China's recognition of "Manchukuo" would not better Japan's international position in respect of "Manchukuo".

(j) The increase in the import tariff in May, 1933, was aimed particularly at Japan. A further increase would be of doubtful advantage to China due to the increase in smuggling which would follow, an increase in prices, etc.

(k) In regard to Sino-Japanese trade he remarked that the balance was in favor of China. China would be glad to transfer her trade with Japan to other countries and was anxious to

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improve economic relations with America
and Europe.

(1) China does not consider it
urgently necessary to negotiate a new
commercial treaty with the United States,
but desires to modify some aspects of the
present treaty such as extraterritoriality.

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ETW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunt NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking Office,
February 16, 1934.



793.94
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations; Interview
with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of November
15, 1933, entitled "Sino-Japanese Relations; Interviews
with Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for For-
eign Affairs" with which despatch I enclosed accounts of
conversations with Mr. Tang held by the American Minister
and by me.

I chanced to meet the Administrative Vice Minister
at a social function held at the Japanese Consulate Gen-
eral recently and he told me that he wished to have another
private conversation with me within the next few days.
This conversation, at Mr. Tang's request, took place in
the reception building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on February 14, 1934. There is enclosed herewith a mem-
orandum of that conversation which I dictated immediately
on my return.

On one or two previous occasions Dr. Wang Ching-wei,
President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for
Foreign

F/G 793.94/6567

APR 6 - 1934

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Foreign Affairs, has told me that Mr. Tang, the Vice Minister, has held these conversations with me at his, Dr. Wang's, instruction. There is, therefore, reason to think that Dr. Wang was responsible for the confidential conference which I now have the honor to report and that Dr. Wang's motive in arranging it was to maintain active and intimate contact with the American Legation.

As the Department is aware, Vice Minister Tang is popularly regarded as "pro-Japanese". Nevertheless, the tone of his conversation gave me the impression that he is pro-Japanese only to the extent of recognizing the unavoidable importance of Japan's attitude toward China and Japan's ability to carry out its policies. I did not receive the impression that Mr. Tang is any the less patriotic because of these convictions.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

1 200 Oct 10 1972
In duplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the American Legation at Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy at Tokyo.

WRP:HC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hunsicker NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

February 14, 1934.

Subject: China's Internal Politics and Foreign Relations.

Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Tang remarked that it was some time since he had had the opportunity to give Mr. Peck a bird's-eye view of the political situation. He said that he had sought this opportunity and would, as on previous occasions, speak with perfect frankness. He asked, however, that what he said should be treated by Mr. Peck as confidential. The conversation was in Chinese.

Mr. Tang said that he had been in Shanghai a large part of the time lately, since the beginning of the Fukien trouble, engaged in informal negotiations with the Japanese military and naval authorities in regard to two subjects, (1) the passing through Shanghai of Chinese troops on their way to the Fukien front, and (2) trying to arrange matters with the Japanese so that no Japanese intervention would take place in Fukien. The Japanese military authorities were inclined to stand on the terms of the arrangement concluded in 1932, following the Shanghai Incident, and object to bodies of Chinese

troops

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troops passing through Shanghai on the railway into Chekiang, but Mr. Tang said that he was able to overcome their objections. In regard to the Fukien matter Mr. Tang's discussions were with the Japanese naval authorities. The operations in Fukien were, on the Chinese side, carried out with scrupulous care, so as to avoid any injury to foreign residents, especially to the numerous Japanese and Formosan subjects in Foochow. Mr. Tang said that he obtained an assurance from the Japanese naval authorities that no forces would be landed at Foochow, except in case of urgent necessity. Mr. Tang seemed to think that the Japanese naval authorities were very reasonable in the matter and were not actuated by any aggressive intentions or motives.

Mr. Tang said that before the suppression of the Fukien revolt on or about January 15, 1934, the situation of the National Government had, to speak bluntly, been precarious. There were many individuals and factions wavering in their loyalty to the National Government and willing to cast in their lot with the revolt. The speed with which the Government suppressed the revolt had removed these dangers. In addition to this factor of speed, another circumstance tending to strengthen the Government was the fact that the Government did not make use of more than 14 divisions of troops in suppressing the Fukien revolt, a mere fraction of the total military strength which it could put into the field in case of necessity.

Mr. Peck asked Mr. Tang to comment on the recent newspaper reports that hostilities were impending between

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the Canton regime and the National Government, observing that some theorists argued that the National Government had received such an increase of self-confidence, because of its easy victory over the 19th Route Army, that it contemplated correcting the insubordinate attitude of the Canton regime.

Mr. Tang replied that there was no immediate prospect of hostilities between Canton and the National Government. The Canton regime has learned that it is powerless to confront the National Government in any test of military strength, even if it were able to make an offensive and defensive alliance with the Kwangsi leaders. The attitude of Canton during the Fukien campaign was a little ambiguous, owing to the fact that it was confronted with the danger of a coalition between the 19th Route Army and Kwangsi, but the danger of this coalition is, of course, past.

Mr. Tang called attention to the fact that General Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Wang Ching-wei have recently issued two manifestoes, designed to allay any apprehension on the part of the provinces that the National Government has been encouraged by its Fukien success to apply military force in other regions. These manifestoes have pointed out that the policy of the National Government is not to use military force for the adjustment of political differences and that the Government used force against Fukien, only because the activities of the 19th Route Army made such a course unavoidable.

Mr. Tang said that the Fourth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee had been postponed from

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the earlier date set for its convocation to January 20, because the Government calculated that the Fukien revolt would have been suppressed by the later date. It would have been exceedingly dangerous to hold the Plenary Session before the suppression of the revolt, because there were numerous persons awaiting the opportunity to create serious embarrassments for the Government. It was the determination of General Chiang and Dr. Wang Ching-wei to avoid any untoward incident during and after the Plenary Session and this objective has been achieved. There have been no sweeping changes in the Government's personnel or policies. Leaders in the Government are convinced that in order to make progress in the country's internal affairs and foreign relations, peace within China is an absolute essential.

Surveying the southern and central portions of China, one sees that there are no particular difficulties confronting the Government. In the North, however, there are difficulties, both internal and external. It would be accurate to say that North China, in the inefficiency of its internal administration and in the threat presented to it of Japanese invasion, occupies precisely the same situation in which Manchuria was found just before September 18, 1931. The only method open to China to remove the threat from without is to reform the present inefficient administration of the "Luantung area", i. e., the so-called neutralized zone. Mr. Peck inquired whether this could be done without the use of troops, which have been forbidden to enter this region, and Mr. Tang said that it could; troops are not necessary.

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The mention of North China led Mr. Tang to speak of China's relations with Japan. He observed that to understand Japan's attitude toward China, one must take into account two or three facts. One of these facts is that subordinate military officers in the field often take the initiative and sometimes do not carry out faithfully the orders they receive from their superiors. Moreover, there are many disorderly Japanese characters, "Ronins", smugglers, etc. These military subordinates and adventurers sometimes lead Japan further than the Japanese Government has determined in advance to go.

A more important fact, however, is that the Japanese activities in Manchuria were, in effect, a manifestation of a peaceful revolution in Japan. The Japanese Army felt that Japan was being menaced by financial exploiters and by other economic and political factors. The Army wished to eradicate these dangers, but if it attempted to do so within Japan itself, it might be necessary to remove the Emperor. This the Army did not desire to do. The exploits of the Army in Manchuria were deliberately entered into as a means of increasing the prestige of the Army and obtaining popular leadership, without resorting to an actual revolution in Japan itself.

It is not necessary to suppose that Japan has hostile intentions toward China, since, as has been seen, the Japanese Army has its own internal ends in view in taking the steps which it has taken in Chinese territory.

The circumstance that Japan's aggressive acts toward China have an internal objective does not, of course, make

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the situation any easier for China. Mr. Tang said that Japanese friends had pleaded with him for friendly sentiments on the part of China toward Japan. Mr. Tang remarked to them that it would be impossible for China to entertain a friendly sentiment toward Japan, so long as Japan remained in occupation of Chinese territory. If Japan really desired China's friendship, it should remove the factor which rendered such friendship impossible.

Mr. Tang said that he had pointed out to these same Japanese that it would be quite useless from Japan's standpoint, for China to "recognize" Manchukuo, as the Japanese desired. The creation of Manchukuo had placed Japan in a dangerous position, internationally, but this danger would not be obviated by China's recognition of Manchukuo. Japan's real danger, arising from the creation of the new state, is caused by the fear and misgivings aroused in the United States, in Soviet Russia, in Great Britain and other countries by Japan's action. This fear would in no way be allayed if China were to recognize Manchukuo.

Mr. Tang invited Mr. Peck's attention to the fact that China had never conceded any legality to Japan's aggressive actions. The National Government is determined, he said, never to take any such action and even to enter into discussions with Japan, in view of Japan's objectives, is an impossibility.

With specific reference to the anti-Japanese boycott, Mr. Tang said that in point of fact this boycott had

practically

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practically ceased, although not in theory. The increase in the import tariff which went into effect in May, 1933, was aimed particularly at Japan. Mr. Tang returned a non-committal reply when Mr. Peck asked whether another early increase in the import tariff was contemplated. He said merely that further increase of the import tariff would be of doubtful advantage, since it had been found that China's industries did not respond to such protective measures, smuggling increased, and a greater burden was placed on the consuming public, while even the anticipated increase in revenue often failed to materialize.

Commercial relations between Japan and China are, moreover, not a matter of indifference to China, since China would be very unwilling to lose the market in Japan for various Chinese exports which are important in amount.

Mr. Tang said that China would be very glad to be freed from such degree of economic dependence on Japan as arose from its present relations with that country. This could come about only if other countries were able and willing to absorb the Chinese exports which are now sold in Japan. He pointed out that the balance of trade and commerce with Japan is now in favor of China. In the matter of commerce with the United States, on the other hand, the balance of trade is greatly in favor of the United States and he particularly wondered whether anything could be done to alter that situation, since it now seems to be generally recognized that profitable commercial relations between two countries are predicated upon an exchange of approximate equality between the

exports

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exports of one country to the other and its imports from the same country.

Mr. Tang said that the Chinese Government is very anxious to increase the strength of China's relations with European and American countries and at the present time such relations are generally much more important in their economic aspects, rather than in their political, aspects. The strengthening of economic relations which he mentioned would, he pointed out, free China from a great deal of its present dependence on Japan. He observed that in the negotiation of a new commercial treaty with the United States, these subjects would doubtless receive particular attention.

Mr. Peck agreed with this supposition, and inquired whether the Chinese Government regarded the negotiation of a new commercial treaty with the United States as a very pressing matter. Mr. Peck said that in his opinion there were reasons for not undertaking this task at the present moment but for deferring it to a more suitable time. Mr. Tang said that the Chinese Government did not consider it urgently necessary to negotiate a new treaty at an early date, but the Government felt that there were certainly aspects of the existing treaty which should be modified, such as extraterritoriality, etc.

There ensued some discussion of the matter of Chinese exports to the United States, such as silk, tea, wood oil, hides, bristles, etc., and Mr. Tang expressed regret that Japan seemed to have captured the market in the United States for Chinese silk and tea. Mr. Peck referred to the

attempts

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attempts of the Silk Association of America for some years to improve the methods of Chinese silk production, in order to make Chinese raw silk more suitable for America's needs. Mr. Tang said* that matters of that sort, i. e. improving and maintaining quality of Chinese exports, such as silk, could certainly be attended to by the Government, especially if it solicited the assistance of Chinese financiers.

Mr. Peck suggested that Mr. Tang converse on these subjects with Mr. Julian Arnold, American Commercial Attache at Shanghai.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

March 14, 1934.

~~SECRET~~
 SKH:

Mr. Grew encloses with his despatch No. 681 of February 21, 1934, a copy of a brochure prepared by a Chinese priest, Lou Tsang-Tsiang, entitled "Invasion and Occupation of Manchuria as Judged in the Light of Catholic Doctrine by Cardinal Mercier". There is also enclosed a copy in translation of a letter from the Belgian Ambassador at Tokyo to the Belgian Foreign Office, which in turn encloses a letter from the Belgian Ambassador to Father Lou.

A copy of the brochure was sent by the author to the Department several weeks ago.

I think you will be interested in reading the despatch and the Belgian Ambassador's letters above described.

EHD:EJL

*a. L. L. Foreign
 Affairs & China*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, February 21, 1934.

FE

No. 681.

Subject: Invasion of Manchuria as judged by
the Catholic doctrine.

Strictly Confidential.

793.94

see 793.94/6551

July
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 13 1934
Department of State
copy in FE
END

F/G 793.94/6568

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS
MAR 13 1934

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No distribution
2772

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r :

As of possible academic interest to the Department

- 1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a brochure published by Dom Pierre Célestin Lou Tseng-Tsiang entitled "L'Invasion et l'Occupation de la Mandchourie jugées à la lumière de la Doctrine Catholique par les écrits du Cardinal Mercier". The Department will recall that Lou Tseng-Tsiang was formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic and attended the Peace Conference

at

MAR 26 1934

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at Versailles as the first delegate of his country. He was later my colleague as Minister to Switzerland where I came to appreciate his intelligence, refinement and deep culture. Subsequently he became a Benedictine Monk and retired to the Abbey of St. André - lez-Bruges in Belgium where I have corresponded with him from time to time. With the brochure, Père Lou sent me also a copy of a letter which he had addressed to the Pope on January 1, 1934, also enclosed herewith.

2,3/

The interest of the brochure- if indeed it contains any interest to the Department- is perhaps enhanced by the comments of the Belgian Ambassador to Japan, Baron de Bassompierre, contained in a despatch to Mr. Hymans, covering a copy of a letter from the former to Père Lou, translations of both of which are likewise enclosed herewith, the originals having been sent to me by the Ambassador. It will be seen that Baron de Bassompierre takes issue with Père Lou's comparison of the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931 with the German invasion and occupation of Belgium of 1914, on the ground that while the latter resulted from a war prima facie unjust in itself, since Germany had violated the neutrality imposed upon Belgium and guaranteed by itself, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria was fundamentally legitimate under treaty rights, being the consequence of the negation or the violation of conventional laws by China. He cites the sending of American, French and Italian troops and marines to Hankow and Nanking (several times since the founding of the League of Nations) as comparable. He does not, however, cite the application to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria of either the Nine Power Treaty or the Pact of Paris, of both of which documents

Belgium

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Belgium was a signatory. Baron de Bassompierre does not foresee a future fusion of "Manchukuo" with a united China, but he does envisage the possibility of an eventual federation of Manchuria with a "United States of China".

For myself I have politely acknowledged the receipt of Father Lou's inscribed brochure without comment, not wishing to commence with him a possible political controversy.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

800.

JCG:r:g

Enclosures:

1. Copy of a brochure published by Dom Pierre Célestin Lou Tseng-Tsiang.
2. Comments of the Belgian Ambassador to Japan, Baron de Bassompierre, contained in a despatch to Mr. Hymans and copy of
3. a letter from the former to Père Lou covered by the despatch.

4

JM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2 to despatch
No 661 of February 21, 1934 from the
Embassy at Tokyo;

COPY.

No. 147/64/P 1

5 copies

Tokio, February 3, 1934.

Manchukuo

Le Baron de Bassompierre
Ambassadeur de Belgique à Tokio.

à

Monsieur Paul Hymans,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

The R. P. Dom Célestin Lou of the Abbey of St. André-lez-Bruges who was Minister for Foreign Affairs of China and whose political adviser I almost became in 1912, has sent me under date of January 7 a treatise in which he tries, with more patriotism than success, to demonstrate that catholic doctrine condemns the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops. Father Lou bases his arguments upon remarks of Cardinal Mercier which were aimed at a situation very different.

As I correspond regularly with the author and am on friendly terms with him, I responded in all frankness that I do not at all view the situation from the same angle as he does.

Father Lou having written me that he had sent the King and yourself, Mr. Minister, some copies of his treatise, I am taking the liberty of sending you, attached hereto, two copies of my reply in which I called attention to the profound difference which I see between the German occupation of Belgium and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The latter could be compared to the French occupation of Belgium in 1831 and 1832. In both cases foreign troops were assisting national forces to acquire their independence after secession from a country united to another by circumstances contrary to the desire of the first. The two cases are certainly not precisely identical but it is certain that neither one of them is related to the German occupation of Belgium.

The Japanese troops in Manchuria are there partly in virtue of a conventional law and partly for the purpose of securing respect for conventional laws denied and violated by China. These are the same reasons which made England, France, Italy and the United States on several occasions send troops or marines to Hankow and Nanking, even after the organization of the League of Nations.

(Signed) Bassompierre.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Copy in Translation.

Annexe à la lettre du
3/2, 1934.
No. 147/64/P/1/

Tokyo, February 3, 1934.

My dear Father Lou:

I have received your letter of January 7 with its enclosures and I immediately sent Mr. Grew those which were directed to him.

I have read with much attention and interest the treatise in which you cite extracts of speeches, pastoral letters and other writings of Monsignor Mercier upon the German occupation of Belgium.

I would have many things to tell you upon the part entitled, "quelques rétroactes", but I wish to confine myself to one point. You write, on page 8, that Japan attacked the Russian fleet in 1904 without a declaration of war. The law of nations does not require a formal declaration of war. The intention of Japan to resort to arms had been implicitly but clearly indicated in the ultimatum preceding the outbreak of hostilities. I remember it because between the ultimatum and the attack upon the Russian fleet by the Japanese fleet I attended a luncheon in Brussels for business men and diplomats. The former asked whether the ultimatum meant war; the latter categorically gave an affirmative answer. That was thirty years ago, almost to the day.

As to the application of the remarks of Cardinal Mercier to the Manchurian conflict, permit me, my dear Father Lou, to tell you, in all friendship, that I do not believe it possible.

The two cases are very different in effect. I am going to cite you still another one where the great Cardinal would not, in my opinion, have dreamt of speaking of the occupation of territory by foreign troops in the terms with which he characterized the German occupation of Belgium in 1914-18.

In 1815 the Treaties of Vienna made a single kingdom of the old Low Countries of the North and of the South. During long periods in the past, especially in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries, the union between them had been closer than had ever been the case between China and Manchuria except during the very short period between the annexation of Manchuria to the Chinese Republic and the first declaration of independence of Chang Tso-lin. Before that, the union between China and Manchuria was simply a personal union.

However,

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However, in 1830 Belgium, in spite of the Treaty of 1815, separated itself from Holland. French armies came in 1831 and again in 1832 to assist Belgium in attaining her independence.

I do not believe that Monsignor Mercier would speak of the French army, temporarily occupying Belgium, as he did of the German army in 1914. I do not hold that the case of the Japanese army in Manchuria is absolutely identical to that which I have just cited, but it certainly more nearly approaches it than the case of the German occupation of Belgium.

The latter resulted from a war prima facie unjust in itself, since Germany had violated the neutrality imposed upon Belgium and guaranteed by itself.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria is fundamentally legitimate under a Treaty. Furthermore, it is the consequence of the negation or the violation of conventional laws by China. The sending of troops and marines-American, French and Italian- to Hankow and Nanking (as has been done several times since the foundation of the League of Nations) is at law exactly comparable.

I had the honor to be the pupil in psychology and natural law of the future Cardinal Mercier at the University of Louvain and I believe myself to be able to state that he would not have aimed against this kind of occupation the "cannons" which he directed against the German occupation of Belgium. In 1927 a member of the Chinese Government told me in Peking that he regretted the disappearance of monarchy but that, the dynasty being foreign (Manchu), the Chinese people had been able to support it no longer. To be logical, this personage ought to rejoice today to see so soon the same dynasty remount the throne which was its cradle!

Nothing, it appears to me, better demonstrates the sincerity of the Japanese, when they deny every intention of conquest or annexation of Manchuria than this restoration of the Tsing dynasty.

I agree with you, dear Father Lou, that the Chinese and Japanese ought to understand each other for their mutual good and for the peace of the world.

I believe that they will finish by reaching an understanding, but I doubt very much that the Manchus and the millions of Chinese who have come to Manchuria to escape, above all, the regime of China proper, would wish in the future a fusion again with a united China, which, according to Eugene Chen, is an Eutopian and unrealizable conception and which in any case does not yet exist. In spite of certain attempts of the "Orangistes" at the beginning, the Belgians have never dreamed of reuniting their country with Holland. If one day, however, we make with them a customs union, there would be no shock or miracle performed.

It is

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It is no more impossible, in my opinion, that we should see one day the United States of China, with which Manchuria might wish to federate. God alone sees the future and can know this.

Believe , my dear Father Lou, in constant friendship,

(Signed) Bassompierre.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1 to despatch
 No 681 of 46.21, 1934 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

**L'invasion et l'occupation
 de la Mandchourie
 jugées à la lumière de la
 Doctrine Catholique par les
 écrits du Cardinal Mercier
 publiés par
 Dom P.C.Lou Tseng-Tsiang**

Moine Bénédictin
 Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
 de la République Chinoise

793.94/65-68

PARIS : LES ÉDITIONS DU FOYER
 4, rue Madame, 6°

Le 1 Janvier 1944 .

Abbaye de Saint André.

par Joseph lez-Graves.

Très Saint Père .

Le 29 septembre 1941 , - dix jours après l'invasion du territoire chinois par les armées japonaises , - je me suis permis d'ouvrir mon cœur à Votre Sainteté pour lui demander de daigner , si elle le jugeait bon , donner un conseil bienveillant de modération et adresser à mon propre pays une parole pour calmer son effroiement .

Le 6 octobre suivant , Votre Sainteté daignait me répondre que , prenant en considération mon désir , qui , comme Elle le disait paternellement , me " tient tout à cœur " , Elle ne manquerait pas d'étudier les possibilités de toute action bienfaisante et opportune à cet égard .

Le 24 février 1942 , en réponse à l'hommage d'un recueil de documents diplomatiques , Elle exprimait à nouveau sa sollicitude en disant que " cette importante intention reste au premier plan de ses prières pour que Dieu accorde à la République chinoise , en même temps qu'à la nation voisine , de collaborer au bien-être général dans un esprit de paix " . Et Elle rapoelait " le message de sympathie et de fervents souhaits qu'Elle avait envoyé au Délégué de la Chine à Genève " . En toutes ces circonstances , et bien avant nos épreuves présentes , Votre Sainteté n'a cessé de manifester sa pensée et de porter vers les souffrances de Ses fils lointains un cœur attentif et paternellement affectueux .

Très Saint Père , le Japon , malheureusement , n'a voulu écouter aucun conseil de modération . Occupant injustement nos provinces du Nord , pourquoi encore d'avancer Shanghai ? Pourquoi avoir envahi le Jehol ? Le R . P . Mutton , ancien Supérieur général de Scheut , revenant de Chine , s'affirme que , dans une sphère de plusieurs kilomètres la dév station de Shanghai est semblable à celle de Reims et de Verdun . Tant de vies humaines fauchées , tant de cœurs meurtris , tant de familles en détresse : pourquoi ces forfaits inutiles ? Sinon , pour servir de rien ce : ce qui décapite leur gravité .

Aussi , d'autre part , les Chinois , cessent-ils d'être affolés ? Les récents événements du Foukien , les longs troubles communistes , si utiles aux visées de l'envahisseur , si coordonnés à l'exécution progressive du plan ennemi : comment calmer cet effroiement ? Comment relever les cœurs ?

Très Saint Père , il appartient à tous les fils de l'Eglise d'aider leur mère à penser les plaies de la pauvre humanité et , dans la mesure où ils le peuvent , de rendre témoignage à la vérité , en modérant les superbes , en soutenant les faibles .

Voilà plus de deux longues années que ces épreuves se poursuivent constituant un anneau dans une chaîne d'événements , laquelle remonte à plusieurs décades . De divers côtés , des compatriotes éminents ont

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rapporté comment, en 1915, répondant aux instances réitérées, qui, après l'injonction des "XXI Demandes" japonaises, - me furent adressées par le Président de la République, j'acceptai le portefeuille des affaires étrangères et assumai la grave responsabilité de mener des négociations vouées d'avance à un échec pressenti et désastreux pour le pays; et ils m'ont demandé si une Cause aussi juste et aussi impérieuse, la vie cisastrale m'empêchait dorénavant d'être utile et si elle m'interdisait de joindre ma voix d'ancien diplomate à la protestation de toute la Nation.

J'ai cru que je ne pouvais différer plus longtemps un devoir de justice et de charité. Je dépose aux pieds de Votre Sainteté la brochure qu'avec l'autorisation de mes supérieurs je publie ces jours-ci, à l'occasion même de la Noël et du Nouvel An.

Voine, je ne puis "faire de la politique". Sous-diaque, avec quelle autorité puis-je traiter de la religion? Je ne suis donc borné à un bref exposé des faits et à la réimpression de quelques pages, - sublimes en effet, - du Cardinal Mercier, qui dévoilent le visage de l'Eglise, lorsqu'elle est mise en face de l'occupation injuste d'un pays faible par un pays fort. Ce n'est pas sans une consolation émue que j'ai relaté dans cette brochure le Bref de Votre Sainteté adressé au Cardinal de Malines lui rendant hommage d'avoir eu "plus fort des douleurs et des deuil", prononcé "les paroles qu'il fallait dire pour redresser les volontés chancelantes et raffermir les genoux qui fléchissaient". Je prie Notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ de confirmer à nouveau aujourd'hui ces paroles de Votre Sainteté et, présentement de faire rayonner l'âme bienheureuse du Cardinal Mercier sur tout l'extrême-Orient, comme elle rayonna, il y a près de vingt ans, sur l'univers entier.

C'est dans ce sentiment que je remercie humblement Votre Sainteté de ce que, Pasteur universel, Elle porte, avec nous et pour nous, Toutes les souffrances dont le Seigneur permet que mon pays et que le monde soient abreuvés. Je lui demande, Très Saint Père, de me croire de plus en plus,

de Votre Sainteté,

le très humble fils,

Dom Pierre Célestin Lou Tseng-Tsiang, O. S. B.
Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la
République Chinoise et Voine Bénédictin de
l'Abbaye de Saint André.

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By M. J. J. J. J. NARS, Date 12-18-75

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a Son Excellence
Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Greco
Avec le respectueux hommage
du modeste compilateur
Dom Pierre Chetiv, S.O.

a.s.o.

陸
徴
祥


Janvier 1934.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L'INVASION ET L'OCCUPATION
DE LA MANDCHOURIE
JUGEES
A LA LUMIERE DE LA DOCTRINE CATHOLIQUE

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



LE CARDINAL MERCIER

**L'invasion et l'occupation
de la Mandchourie
jugées à la lumière de la
Doctrin Catholique par les
écrits du Cardinal Mercier
publiés par
Dom P.C. Lou Tseng-Tsiang**

**Moine Bénédictin
Ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
de la République Chinoise**

PARIS : LES ÉDITIONS DU FOYER
4, rue Madame, 6°

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Cum permissu Superiorum.

Imprimatur.

Brugis, 7a Nov. 1933.

Jos. VAN DER MEERSCH.
Vic. gen.

PREFACE

L'enquête de la Société des Nations au sujet des conditions dans lesquelles se sont produites et développées l'invasion et l'occupation du territoire chinois par les armées japonaises a établi de façon définitive LES FAITS, qui se sont passés en Chine, dans les provinces de la Mandchourie, après le 18 septembre 1931.

La constitution à peine naissante d'une société internationale organisée se trouve encore trop faible pour obliger un agresseur international bien armé à se conformer aux exigences de la Justice.

Toutefois, l'enquête de la Société des Nations, suivie de la publication des faits constatés et relevés par elle, a obtenu un premier et grand résultat : jusqu'à présent, elle a empêché la reconnaissance de l'état de choses accompli; elle a empêché que l'injustice fut proclamée « justice ».

Je crois accomplir un devoir de Justice, — je crois rendre un service à tous les amis de l'Ordre et de la Paix internationale, à mon propre pays, au Japon lui-même et aux véritables intérêts de ceux qui, hélas! se sont érigés en ennemis de ma patrie, — en rappelant brièvement les rétroactes et les faits principaux du conflit sino-japonais et en publiant, à leur propos, quelques pages extraites des écrits du Cardinal Mercier au cours de l'occupation du pays dont il était le Pasteur spirituel.

Les principes énoncés par le Cardinal Mercier sont immuables et immortels, parce qu'ils sont vrais. Or, la vérité se venge toujours, tôt ou tard, de ceux qui la trahissent. C'est donc rendre un service immédiat et très pratique de publier, à propos de l'invasion sanglante et de l'occupation inique des provinces de la Mandchourie, les exigences inexorables de la Doctrine Catholique, avec tout ce qu'elles comportent de conséquences pour ceux qui ont, actuellement, vis-à-vis de ces provinces occupées par l'ennemi, des devoirs d'état.

J'ai ajouté à ces extraits quelques appréciations que les principes catholiques proclamés par le Cardinal Mercier et appliqués héroïquement par lui ont suscitées. J'ai cru bon de choisir, en premier lieu, celles du Pouvoir occupant et du Gouvernement du pays occupé; puis, celle du Saint-Siège et celles de deux des pays alliés, en particulier, du Japon; enfin, celles des milieux de la Société des Nations.

Toutes ces appréciations s'accordent pour confirmer la vérité des principes et de l'attitude du Cardinal Mercier, pour rendre hommage à la Justice de Dieu, pour encourager les âmes droites, qui, se confiant en cette Justice, savent attendre avec une patience éclairée que cette Justice arrive et savent agir avec une courageuse sérénité pour mériter de Dieu qu'il hâte l'heure de son intervention.

D. Pierre Célestin LOU TSENG-TSIANG, O.S.B.

*Abbaye de Saint-André,
par Lophem-lez-Bruges, Belgique.*

Quelques Rétroactes et quelques Faits actuels relatifs à l'Invasion et à l'Occupation du Territoire chinois par le Japon

Les conflits internationaux, qui sillonnent l'histoire, s'aggravent et se multiplient dans la mesure où ceux qui les préparent se jugent intangibles, assurés du succès et de l'impunité.

A défaut d'un organisme assez puissant pour exercer efficacement une police internationale, l'opinion publique doit demeurer en éveil, afin que, pour le moins, les partisans de la « primauté de la force » soient découverts et dénoncés en temps utile et que soit arrêtée l'accumulation de leurs procédés douloureusement traditionnels, dont les conséquences s'enchaînent, désastreuses et illimitées.

Le conflit sino-japonais comporte certains rétroactes à rappeler et certains faits actuels, saillants et bien établis; ils permettent de déterminer avec exactitude la situation qui trouble l'Asie et cause, en Europe et en Amérique, de si légitimes inquiétudes.

I.

EN 1894-1895 : LA GUERRE SINO-JAPONAISE

La Chine avait sur la Corée un protectorat remontant au XVI^e siècle. En 1894, le Japon, qui, depuis plusieurs années,

entretenait en Corée une agitation persistante, saisit le prétexte de l'aide militaire légitime que le Souverain de Corée avait demandée à la Chine, pour y opérer un brusque débarquement de troupes. Le 25 juillet 1894, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon coule un transport chinois, chargé de 1,100 hommes; il poursuit les hostilités, bat la flotte chinoise et contraint la Chine à reconnaître « l'indépendance de la Corée » et à abandonner au Japon l'île Formose (3,000,000 d'habitants) et les îles Pescadores. (Traité de Simonoseki, 17 avril 1895.)

II.

EN 1904-1905 : LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE

Les influences russe et japonaise se faisaient concurrence en Corée et en Mandchourie. Le 6 février 1904, le Japon rappelle son ministre à Saint-Petersbourg. Dans la nuit du 8 au 9 février, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon attaque la flotte russe devant Port-Arthur; il bat les troupes russes et coule l'escadre de la Baltique; il obtient, par le traité de Portsmouth, (E.-U.) (5 septembre 1905) la reconnaissance de l'influence exclusive du Japon en Corée, la cession à bail de Liao-Toung et de Port-Arthur et la cession du sud de l'île Sakhaline. — En 1907, le Japon établit officiellement son Protectorat sur la Corée. — En 1910, le Japon annexe la Corée sous le nom de « *Chosen* » : on est loin de l'indépendance!

III.

EN 1915 : LES VINGT ET UNE DEMANDES

Au début de 1915, le Japon présente à la Chine cinq groupes de revendications, constituant « Vingt et une demandes » et tendant à se voir conférer des droits et privi-

lèges exclusifs en Mongolie, en Mandchourie, dans le Chan-toung, dans la vallée du Yang Tse et au Foukien, et à obtenir la haute main sur tout le Gouvernement de la Chine, en particulier, sur la politique, l'armée, les finances, l'éducation, de façon à s'assurer de fait le Protectorat de la Chine. Il stipule que toutes ses exigences seront acceptées en bloc. Le 7 mai 1915, il adresse à la Chine un ultimatum exigeant l'acceptation immédiate de toutes ses revendications.

La guerre européenne ne permettait pas à la Chine d'obtenir à son aide une intervention efficace de l'étranger; le Japon, d'ailleurs, se disposait à emporter aussitôt par les armes tout ce que le droit ne lui conférait pas.

Cependant la Chine parvint à écarter six des sept articles du V^e groupe de demandes. Le seul énoncé de ces articles caractérise nettement les ambitions japonaises :

Art. I. Le gouvernement central engagera des Japonais influents, à titre de conseillers politiques, financiers et militaires.

Art. II. Le gouvernement chinois reconnaît aux Japonais le droit de posséder des terrains dans le but de construire, à dater de maintenant, des hôpitaux, des temples ou des établissements scolaires japonais dans l'intérieur de la Chine.

Art. III. La police, dans les localités où de tels arrangements seront nécessaires, sera placée sous l'administration conjointe de Japonais et de Chinois; ou bien, des Japonais seront employés dans les bureaux de la police de ces localités.

Art. IV. La Chine obtiendra du Japon la fourniture d'une certaine quantité d'armes ou établira un arsenal en Chine, sous la direction conjointe de la Chine et du Japon, et qui sera pourvu d'experts et de matériaux provenant du Japon.

Art. V. Le Japon aura le droit de construire un chemin de fer pour relier Outchang avec le chemin de fer de Kioukiang à Nantchang et les chemins de fer de Nantchang-Hangtchow et Nantchang-Tchaotchow.

Art. VII. Le gouvernement chinois reconnaîtra aux Japonais le droit de prédication en Chine.

Toutes les autres « demandes », lourdes et onéreuses, formulées par le Japon, la Chine fut contrainte par la violence d'en accepter le « Diktat ».

IV.

DE 1931 A 1933...

L'INVASION ET L'OCCUPATION DU SOL CHINOIS

Le 18 septembre 1931, *sans déclaration de guerre*, le Japon envahit la Chine et occupe Moukden. Le 28 septembre, son représentant à Genève annonce que les troupes japonaises ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer. Loin de se retirer, successivement, elles bombardent Kintcheou, engagent une bataille sur la Noni, prennent Tsitsikar, occupent Kintcheou et étendent méthodiquement leur occupation à tout le territoire des trois provinces de l'Est (Mandchourie). Le 28 janvier, l'armée japonaise débarque à Shanghai; le 1^{er} février, elle bombarde Nankin; du 20 au 28 février, elle livre la sanglante bataille de Shanghai. En mars, le Japon constitue les trois provinces occupées en un soi-disant « Etat de Mandchoukouo », dont il prend la direction effective et dont, jusqu'à présent, il demeure seul parmi tous les pays à avoir reconnu l'existence; puis, le 31 mai, il retire ses troupes de Shanghai. En 1933, il envahit le Jehol. Finalement, les hostilités s'interrompent par un armistice entre les autorités militaires japonaises et l'autorité *locale* chinoise.

Entretemps, et dès le 21 septembre 1931, la Chine avait fait appel à la Société des Nations : l'opinion internationale était alertée et allait avoir le moyen de s'informer. Le 30 septembre, le Conseil de la Société des Nations prévoit l'évacuation de la Mandchourie pour le 16 octobre; le 16 octobre, le représentant des Etats-Unis se joint aux membres du

Conseil; le 10 décembre, le Conseil crée une Commission d'Enquête qu'il envoie sur place et dont il confie la présidence à Lord Lytton.

En février 1932, le Conseil de la Société des Nations envoie au Japon une note énergique déclarant que rien de ce que le Japon aura obtenu par les armes ne sera reconnu. Le 11 mars 1932, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations constitue un comité consultatif, le « Comité des Dix-neuf » et lui confie le mandat de suivre les événements d'Extrême-Orient, de veiller sur les principes, de rappeler aux Japonais qu'ils ont à évacuer le sol chinois, d'envisager le moyen de les y amener et au besoin de les y contraindre. — Le 2 octobre 1932, la Société des Nations publie le rapport de la Commission Lytton. — Le 24 février 1933, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations adopte à l'unanimité (42 voix moins une abstention: le Siam) le rapport et les recommandations qu'après examen du *Rapport Lytton* le « Comité des Dix-neuf » lui avait présentés et elle déclare: « La souveraineté de la Mandchourie appartient à la Chine ». — Le 27 mars 1933, le Japon annonce officiellement qu'il quitte la Société des Nations.

V.

LE RAPPORT LYTTON

Le Bureau de Presse de la Délégation Chinoise à Genève (8, rue de la Cloche) a réuni en une brochure de 75 pages (1 franc suisse, port compris) les extraits les plus importants du *Rapport Lytton*. Nous y renvoyons le lecteur.

Et d'abord, la Commission d'Enquête exprime son opinion sur l'œuvre du Gouvernement national Chinois et sur les « progrès considérables » et les « réalisations déjà nom-

breuses » qu'il a accomplis dans la réorganisation du pays, « en dépit de toutes les difficultés, de tous les délais et de tous les échecs » : « si le Gouvernement central peut être maintenu, en tant que tel, l'administration provinciale, les forces militaires et les finances acquerront un caractère de plus en plus national ». (pp. 15-17.)

La Commission reconnaît le caractère complètement chinois de la Mandchourie, qui compte 30 millions d'habitants, « dont 28 millions sont des Chinois, ou des Mandchous assimilés » ; « le nombre des Coréens est estimé à 800,000 ». « Le chiffre global des Japonais, Russes et autres étrangers (à l'exclusion des Coréens) ne dépasse pas 400,000. » — « Sans l'afflux de paysans et d'ouvriers chinois, la Mandchourie n'aurait pas pu se développer aussi rapidement en fournissant au Japon un marché, des denrées alimentaires, des engrais et des matières premières. » — Pour le peuple chinois, la Mandchourie est « partie intégrante de la Chine », sa « première ligne de défense » ; elle est « le grenier de la Chine » et « un élément important de sa structure économique ». (pp. 19-23.)

La Commission n'a pas trouvé trace du prétexte allégué par le Japon pour couvrir son invasion et l'on n'a pu établir que l'explosion, qui s'est produite sur la voie ferrée, le 18 septembre 1931, ait provoqué quelque dégât que ce fut. Mais il est établi qu'à ce moment « les Japonais... avaient un plan minutieusement préparé en cas d'hostilités possibles entre les Chinois et eux », et que « les Chinois... n'avaient aucun plan d'attaquer en ce moment et en ce lieu les troupes japonaises, ni de mettre en danger la vie ou les biens des ressortissants japonais ». De même, la Commission fait justice des autres causes alléguées par le Japon pour justifier son intervention ; elle s'arrête au massacre des Chinois en Corée : 127 tués, 393 blessés ; elle établit dans son vrai jour la

portée des boycottages des marchandises japonaises par les Chinois : « chacun d'eux a son origine dans un fait précis, événement ou incident, généralement de nature politique et interprété par la Chine comme affectant ses intérêts matériels et son prestige national » ; par exemple, le massacre en Corée, l'invasion de la Mandchourie, la bataille de Shanghai, etc. (pp. 27-35.)

La Commission établit la situation dans les trois provinces de la Mandchourie depuis le 18 septembre 1931 et elle observe : « Les Japonais ont coutume de désigner indistinctement sous le nom de bandits toutes les forces qui s'opposent maintenant à eux. » D'autre part, elle retient le témoignage que, « au cours des vingt ou trente dernières années, des agents japonais ont, dans une large mesure, incité les bandits à servir les intérêts politiques du Japon ». (pp. 41 et 47.)

La Commission aborde la constitution de « l'Etat du Mandchoukouo », « conçu, organisé et réalisé » par « un groupe de fonctionnaires japonais, civils et militaires, en service actif ou retraités, ayant d'étroites relations avec le nouveau mouvement politique au Japon ». « Dans le « Gouvernement du Mandchoukouo », les fonctionnaires japonais jouent un rôle prépondérant » ; « les principaux pouvoirs politiques et administratifs sont entre les mains de fonctionnaires et de conseillers japonais ». (pp. 49-53.)

L'attitude de la population des provinces occupées vis-à-vis de ce « gouvernement » ne fait pas de doute pour la Commission : « les Chinois de Mandchourie considèrent le « Gouvernement Mandchoukouo » comme un instrument dans les mains des Japonais » ; « les négociants et les banquiers chinois » avec lesquels la Commission s'est entretenue, sont « hostiles » au « Mandchoukouo ». « Les classes libérales

— professeurs et docteurs — sont hostiles au « Mandchoukouo ». » « Les fermiers chinois — qui constituent la très grande majorité de la Mandchourie — souffrent du nouveau régime, ne l'aiment pas, et adoptent à son endroit une attitude d'hostilité passive. » « L'attitude de la population des villes est un mélange d'acceptation passive et d'hostilité. » (pp. 61-69.)

VI. UN DERNIER FAIT

Cet exposé se suffit à lui-même.

Il est profondément regrettable que le peuple japonais voie ses dirigeants se prêter à une politique qui, finalement, tourne toujours contre ceux qui l'emploient.

Dans l'ouvrage remarquable où il a réuni les articles publiés par lui sur le conflit sino-japonais, M. William Martin observe : « Ce qui se passe, en ce moment, en Extrême-Orient, cause chez nous la même surprise que les événements de 1914 à l'égard de l'Allemagne... Comment est-il possible surtout que, dans un pays strictement constitutionnel, le gouvernement ait l'air incapable de se faire obéir des militaires ?

» L'explication est, dans les deux cas, la même et pour une raison très simple. C'est qu'il y a une similitude frappante entre la constitution du Japon et celle de l'Allemagne impériale. C'est en Prusse que le Japon, au moment de sa modernisation, est venu chercher ses inspirations constitutionnelles, et l'on retrouve, à Tokio, beaucoup des caractères de l'ancien Empire allemand. » (« *Le Japon contre la Société des Nations* », par William Martin. Imprimerie du « *Journal de Genève* », 1932, p. 33.)

« Le trait le plus original de la Constitution japonaise réside dans le fait que le ministre de la guerre et celui de la marine ne sont pas choisis, comme dans les autres pays, par le chef du gouvernement. Deux familles possèdent, par un privilège traditionnel, le droit de les désigner. L'une nomme le ministre de la guerre, l'autre celui de la marine.


» Ces deux ministres ne sont pas non plus responsables devant le Parlement. Ils font partie du cabinet; mais, lorsque celui-ci se retire, ils ne sont pas obligés de démissionner. Il en résulte que chaque fois qu'un conflit vient à surgir entre le ministre de la guerre ou de la marine et ses collègues, surtout celui des finances, ce n'est pas le ministre qui démissionne, c'est le ministère. On imagine aisément quelle force une semblable situation offre aux militaires pour obtenir les crédits qu'ils exigent ou pour diriger la politique étrangère. Tout cela explique le peu d'influence qu'a le gouvernement sur les militaires et la grande influence que ceux-ci exercent sur la conduite des affaires. » (*Ibid.*, p. 34.)

Cette information est le complément nécessaire — et fournit une explication — des faits douloureux énumérés ci-dessus.

Nous pouvons maintenant passer au jugement à porter sur eux. Il suffit, à cet effet, d'exposer les principes de la Doctrine Chrétienne dont le Cardinal Mercier revendiqua héroïquement l'application lorsque, quatre ans durant, son pays envahi et occupé se trouva dans une situation qui, par bien des côtés, présente « une similitude frappante » avec celle qui, aujourd'hui, trouble l'Extrême-Orient.

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



MA LIANG

Cf. « Le Manifeste de Ma Liang », Hors-Texte, p. 33.

**Quelques Principes
de Doctrine Chrétienne,
relatifs à la Justice et à la Charité,
dans leurs applications
aux pays injustement envahis
et occupés par l'ennemi**

*Extraits des Œuvres Pastorales du Cardinal Mercier,
Archevêque de Malines, au cours de l'occupation de
son diocèse et de son pays (1914-1918).*

I.

LE PATRIOTISME AU POINT DE VUE CHRETIEN

Il y a, en chacun de nous, un sentiment plus profond que l'intérêt personnel, que les liens du sang et la poussée des partis, c'est le besoin et, par suite, la volonté de se dévouer à l'intérêt général, à ce que Rome appelait « la chose publique » « Res publica » : ce sentiment, c'est le *Patriotisme*.

La *Patrie* n'est pas qu'une agglomération d'individus ou de familles habitant le même sol, échangeant entre elles des relations plus ou moins étroites de voisinage ou d'affaires, remémorant les mêmes souvenirs, heureux ou pénibles : non, elle est une association d'âmes, au service d'une organisation sociale qu'il faut, à tout prix, fut-ce au prix de son sang, sauvegarder et défendre, sous la direction de celui ou de ceux qui président à ses destinées.

Et c'est parce qu'ils ont une même âme, que les compatriotes vivent, par leurs traditions, d'une même vie dans le passé; par leurs communes aspirations et leurs communes espérances, d'un même prolongement de vie dans l'avenir.

Le patriotisme, principe interne d'unité et d'ordre, liaison organique des membres d'une même patrie, était regardé par l'élite des penseurs de la Grèce et de la Rome antiques, comme la plus haute des vertus naturelles. Aristote, le prince des philosophes païens, estimait que le désintéressement au service de la cité, c'est-à-dire de l'Etat, est l'idéal terrestre par excellence.

La religion du Christ fait du patriotisme une loi: il n'y a point de parfait chrétien, qui ne soit un parfait patriote.

Elle surélève l'idéal de la raison païenne, et le précise, en faisant voir qu'il ne se réalise que dans l'Absolu.

D'où vient, en effet, cet élan universel, irrésistible, qui emporte, d'un coup, toutes les volontés de la nation dans un même effort de cohésion et de résistance aux forces ennemies qui menacent son unité et son indépendance?

Comment expliquer que, sur l'heure, tous les intérêts cèdent devant l'intérêt général; que toutes les vies s'offrent à l'immolation?

Il n'est pas vrai que l'Etat vaille, essentiellement, mieux que l'individu et la famille, attendu que le bien des familles et des individus est la raison d'être de son organisation.

Il n'est pas vrai que la patrie soit un dieu Moloch, sur l'autel de qui toutes les vies puissent être légitimement sacrifiées.

La brutalité des mœurs païennes et le despotisme des Césars avaient conduit à cette aberration, — et le militarisme moderne tendait à la faire revivre, — que l'Etat est omnipotent et que son pouvoir discrétionnaire crée le Droit.

Non, réplique la théologie chrétienne, le Droit, c'est la

Paix, c'est-à-dire l'ordre intérieur de la nation, bâti sur la Justice. Or, la Justice elle-même n'est absolue, que parce qu'elle est l'expression des rapports essentiels des hommes avec Dieu et entre eux.

Aussi, la guerre pour la guerre est-elle un crime. La guerre ne se justifie qu'à titre de moyen nécessaire pour assurer la paix.

« Il ne faut pas que la paix serve de préparation à la guerre, dit saint Augustin; il ne faut faire la guerre que pour obtenir la paix. » « *Non enim pax quaeritur ut bellum excitetur; sed bellum geritur ut pax adquiratur.* » (Ep. ad Bonifacium, 189, 6.)

A la lumière de cet enseignement, que reprend à son compte saint Thomas d'Aquin, (Sum. Theol., 2. 2, q. 40, art. 1.) le patriotisme revêt un caractère religieux.

Les intérêts de famille, de classe, de parti, la vie corporelle de l'individu sont, dans l'échelle des valeurs, au dessous de l'idéal patriotique, parce que cet idéal, c'est le Droit, qui est absolu. Ou encore, cet idéal, c'est la reconnaissance publique du Droit appliqué à la nation, l'Honneur national.

Or, il n'y a d'Absolu, dans la réalité, que Dieu.

Dieu seul domine, par sa Sainteté et par la Souveraineté de son empire, tous les intérêts et toutes les volontés.

Affirmer la nécessité absolue de tout subordonner au Droit, à la Justice, à l'Ordre, à la Vérité, c'est donc implicitement affirmer Dieu.

Et quand nos humbles soldats, à qui nous faisons compliment de leur héroïsme, nous répondaient avec simplicité: « Nous n'avons fait que notre Devoir », « l'Honneur l'exige »; ils exprimaient, à leur façon, le caractère religieux de leur patriotisme.

Qui ne sent que le patriotisme est « sacré » et qu'une atteinte à la dignité nationale est une sorte de profanation sacrilège? (Noël 1914, *Lettre Pastorale: « Patriotisme et Endurance »*; *Œuv. Past.*, Tome V, pp. 63-66.)

II.

LE POUVOIR OCCUPANT ET LA VALEUR JURIDIQUE DE SON AUTORITE

Je considère comme une obligation de ma charge pastorale, de vous définir vos devoirs de conscience en face du Pouvoir qui a envahi notre sol et qui, momentanément, en occupe la majeure partie.

Ce Pouvoir n'est pas une autorité légitime. Et, dès lors, dans l'intime de votre âme, vous ne lui devez ni estime, ni attachement, ni obéissance.

L'unique Pouvoir légitime en Belgique est celui qui appartient à notre Roi, à son gouvernement, aux représentants de la nation. Lui seul est pour nous l'autorité. Lui seul a droit à l'affection de nos cœurs, à notre soumission.

D'eux-mêmes, les actes d'administration publique de l'occupant seraient sans vigueur, mais l'autorité légitime ratifie tacitement ceux que justifie l'intérêt général et de cette ratification seule leur vient toute leur valeur juridique.

Des provinces occupées ne sont point des provinces conquises; pas plus que la Galicie n'est province russe, la Belgique n'est province allemande.

Néanmoins, la partie occupée du pays est dans une situation de fait qu'elle doit loyalement subir. La plupart de nos villes se sont rendues à l'ennemi. Elles sont tenues de respecter les conditions souscrites de leur reddition.

... Vous, en particulier, mes bien chers Confrères dans le sacerdoce, soyez à la fois et les meilleurs gardiens du patriotisme, et les soutiens de l'ordre public. (*Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.)

Le Pouvoir occupant s'étant opposé à la diffusion de cette Lettre Pastorale, le Cardinal protesta énergiquement, notamment dans une déclaration faite par lui au Doyen de Bruxelles et communiquée par celui-ci au clergé de son doyenné et de l'agglomération bruxelloise :

... Je ne retire rien de mes instructions antérieures, et je proteste contre la violence qui est faite à la liberté de mon ministère pastoral.

On a tout fait pour me faire signer des atténuations à ma Lettre : je n'ai pas signé. — Maintenant on cherche à séparer de moi mon clergé en l'empêchant de lire. J'ai fait mon devoir : mon clergé doit savoir s'il va faire le sien. (*Ibid.*, p. 79.)

III.

LA DEMANDE D'UNE ENQUETE INTERNATIONALE

A deux reprises, les 24 janvier et 10 février 1915, le Cardinal Mercier avait sollicité « la formation d'un tribunal, qui devait être composé d'arbitres allemands et belges, en nombre égal, et présidé par un délégué d'un Etat neutre » (*Ibid.*, p. 231) en vue d'établir la vérité sur les crimes imputés aux populations envahies vis à vis de l'armée occupante et sur la conduite de celle-ci vis à vis des populations. Ces demandes avaient été vaines. Le 24 novembre 1915, il s'adressa à l'épiscopat catholique des pays ennemis pour lui demander de constituer de commun accord pareil tribunal. Il s'exprimait notamment comme suit :

Nous demandons cette enquête, Eminences et Vénérés Collègues, avant tout, pour venger l'honneur du peuple belge. Des calomnies, parties de votre peuple et de ses plus hauts représentants, l'ont violé. Et vous connaissez, comme nous, l'adage de la théologie morale, humaine, chrétienne, catholique : Sans restitution, pas de pardon : *Non remittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum*.

... Vous direz, peut-être : c'est le passé. Oubliez-le. Au lieu de jeter de l'huile sur le feu, appliquez-vous à pardonner et unissez vos efforts à ceux du Pouvoir occupant qui ne demande qu'à panser les blessures du malheureux peuple belge.

... L'Allemagne ne nous rendra plus le sang qu'elle a fait couler, les vies innocentes que ses armées ont fauchées; mais il est en son pouvoir de restituer au peuple belge son honneur qu'elle a violé ou laissé violer.

... Le Pouvoir occupant dit et écrit, en effet, son intention de panser nos plaies.

Mais, dans le for extérieur, on juge de l'intention par l'action.

Or, tout ce que nous savons, nous, pauvres Belges, qui subissons passagèrement la domination de l'Empire, c'est que le pouvoir qui s'est engagé d'honneur à nous gouverner d'après le droit international codifié dans la Convention de La Haye, méconnaît ses engagements. (*Lettre des Evêques de Belgique aux Evêques d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie, 24 novembre 1915, Ibid., pp. 232, 238-239.*)

IV.

L'ESPRIT DE JUSTE VENGEANCE EST UNE VERTU

Des catholiques du dehors, qui n'ont pas trouvé dans leur cœur une parole de réprobation contre les armées allemandes lorsqu'elles massacraient nos populations innocentes... : ces mêmes catholiques trouvent, aujourd'hui, des accents pathétiques, pour rythmer des hymnes à la fraternité chrétienne, à l'oubli du passé, à la paix.

Des notions confuses flottent dans l'air au sujet de nos relations de justice et de charité envers l'ennemi de la patrie belge : l'occasion est propice de remettre en mémoire quelques points de doctrine du maître par excellence de la philosophie et de la théologie chrétiennes, saint Thomas d'Aquin.

... « Avoir la volonté de venger le mal, en respectant l'ordre de la justice, c'est faire acte de vertu. Vouloir ainsi le redressement d'un mal moral, dans les limites du droit, c'est s'emporter contre le mal, c'est faire œuvre de zèle, agir bien. »

« Mais vouloir désordonnément la vengeance, soit que celle-ci sorte des limites du droit, soit qu'elle mette l'extermination du coupable au premier plan, et la répression du mal à l'arrière-plan, c'est agir mal : dans ce dernier cas, en effet, la souffrance du prochain devient le but de la vengeance. »

Et comment faut-il juger la participation de la passion à cette colère vengeresse? La morale exige-t-elle que la volonté de tirer vengeance du mal soit impassible?

Non, répond saint Thomas, au contraire. La passion est périlleuse, sans doute, à l'heure où l'homme doit se pronon-

cer sur la moralité d'un acte à accomplir; elle peut, en effet, troubler alors la sérénité du jugement. Mais, dès le moment où la justice d'un acte répressif est apparue et que la moralité de la répression a été décidée, la passion de la colère devient l'auxiliaire de la volonté, elle donne plus de vigueur et de promptitude à l'accomplissement de la justice: les passions, ainsi maintenues dans leur rôle, sont, dit saint Thomas, utiles à la vertu, « utiles virtuti ». (*De Malo*, Q. XII, art. 1.)

... Le crime collectif d'une nation qui viole les droits d'une autre nation, est incomparablement plus grave que celui d'un individu que la société envoie au bagne ou à la guillotine.

... Que l'on ne confonde donc pas la haine, un vice, avec l'esprit de juste vengeance, une vertu.

La haine s'inspire d'un instinct de destruction.

La vertu de vindicte s'inspire de la charité. La bravoure lui fraye les voies, en bannissant du cœur l'épouvante... L'épouvante bannie, l'âme droite regarde en face son devoir: l'injure faite à la vérité, à la justice, à Dieu, elle la considère comme faite à elle-même; le péril de ses frères devient son péril; la flamme du double amour de Dieu et de l'humanité s'allume; l'immolation de soi est décidée: tout, plutôt que l'abdication dans le déshonneur.

Voilà la charité et le zèle qui en est la flamme.

... On dira peut-être: Vous avez invoqué le droit strict, et nous le comprenons; mais il y a un autre point de vue, celui de la perfection chrétienne. N'est-il pas plus parfait de rendre le bien pour le mal? Le chrétien ne doit-il pas savoir pardonner?

Rendre le bien pour le mal, soit, s'il ne s'agissait que de torts individuels, subis en secret.

Mais, en réalité, ... C'est l'injure faite à la nation qui a soulevé l'indignation générale et demande réparation. Les attentats à l'ordre public ne peuvent rester impunis. Le prince qui userait systématiquement de clémence envers les malfaiteurs compromettrait la sécurité sociale. Les peuples qui amnistieraient l'injustice ne seraient pas dignes de la liberté.

Certes, l'Evangile incline au pardon. Mais l'Eglise sait à quelles conditions elle peut l'octroyer. Imitons-la. Elle exige du coupable l'aveu de sa faute; le repentir; la promesse de ne pas récidiver et, si la faute est une injustice, la promesse de restituer, suivant la déclaration bien connue de saint Augustin: *Non remittetur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum* (*Epist. ad Macedonium* 153, a N° 20); l'acceptation d'une pénitence, qui satisfasse aux peines dues pour les péchés commis.

Aussitôt que nos ennemis auront rempli ces conditions, l'heure de la miséricorde aura sonné pour eux. (« *Les vertus pastorales de l'heure présente* », Allocution à MM. les Doyens de l'archidiocèse de Malines à l'occasion de leur Réunion Annuelle à l'archevêché, le 29 janvier 1917; *Ibid.* pp. 398-400, 403-405). Sur ce même sujet, voir également la Lettre Pastorale: « *Pour nos Soldats* », 21 juillet 1916; *Ibid.*, pp. 302-303.)

V.

LE ROLE DU CLERGE EN PAYS VICTIME DE GUERRE ET D'OCCUPATION

1° RECHERCHER ET PROCLAMER LA VERITE ET LE DROIT.

Les résultats religieux de la guerre sont le secret de Dieu, et aucun de nous n'est dans les confidences divines.

Mais il y a une question qui domine celle-là, question de morale, de droit, d'honneur.

... Aussi avons-nous, à l'heure présente, nous évêques, un devoir moral et, par conséquent, religieux, qui prime tous les autres, c'est de rechercher et de proclamer la Vérité.

Le Christ, dont nous avons l'insigne honneur d'être à la fois les disciples et les ministres, n'a-t-il pas dit : « *Ma mission sociale est de rendre témoignage à la vérité. Ego ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati* » ? (Joan. XVIII, 37) (*Lettre des Evêques de Belgique aux Evêques d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie, 24 novembre 1915; Ibid., 242-243.*)

... Je vous apporte une parole de paix.

Mais il n'y a de paix possible que dans l'ordre, et l'ordre repose sur la Justice et la Charité.

Nous voulons l'ordre, ... mais le Pouvoir occupant aussi doit vouloir l'ordre, c'est-à-dire le respect de nos droits et de ses engagements.

L'homme a droit à la liberté de son travail. Il a droit à son foyer. Il a le droit de réserver ses services à sa patrie.

Les règlements qui violent ces droits ne lient point la conscience.

Je vous dis cela, mes Frères, sans haine ni esprit de représailles. Je vous dis cela parce que, disciple du Christ et Ministre de l'Evangile, je vous dois la Vérité. Je serais indigne de cet anneau épiscopal que l'Eglise m'a mis au doigt, de cette croix qu'Elle a posée sur ma poitrine, si, obéissant à une passion humaine, je tremblais de proclamer que le droit violenté reste le droit, que l'injustice, appuyée sur la force, n'en est pas moins l'injustice. (*Allocution en l'église Sainte-Gudule à Bruxelles, le 26 novembre 1916; Ibid. pp. 337-338.*)

2° « TENIR TETE AUX TYRANS » ; « SURVEILLER ET ARRETER LES TENTATIVES DES PERFIDES QUI FONT CAUSE COMMUNE AVEC L'ENNEMI ».

Est-il bien dans le rôle du clergé de prendre parti dans les conflits qu'amènent la guerre et l'occupation ? L'évêque et ses prêtres ne sont-ils pas exclusivement préposés aux besoins spirituels de âmes ?

L'Eglise n'est pas une société invisible de purs esprits. Les fidèles sont exposés aux besoins et aux périls du corps et de l'âme, du temps et de l'éternité. La sollicitude des pasteurs doit s'étendre à tous ces intérêts. Ecoutez encore saint Thomas d'Aquin : « Les Pasteurs de l'Eglise ne peuvent » pas se contenter de résister aux loups qui font mourir » spirituellement le troupeau; ils doivent tenir tête aussi » aux ravisseurs et aux tyrans qui le font souffrir corporel- » lement. Non pas que les représentants de l'Autorité ecclé- » siastique doivent manier eux-mêmes les armes maté- » rielles, mais ils doivent se servir de leurs armes spiri- » tuelles, c'est-à-dire adresser aux coupables des avertisse- » ments salutaires, prier avec ferveur, frapper d'excommu- » nication les rebelles obstinés. » (*Summa Theol., 2. 2, q. 40, art. 2, ad. 1.*)

... La charité est l'unique inspiratrice et directrice de toute la vie morale et religieuse.

Pas de justice chrétienne sans charité.

Pas de charité sans justice. Et la justice vindicative étant une partie de la vertu de justice, pas de charité sans justice vindicative. Vouloir, sous prétexte d'héroïsme dans la charité, fermer les yeux sur l'injustice, octroyer l'impunité aux crimes de l'ennemi, parce qu'il est l'ennemi, c'est mé-

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connaître l'emprise souveraine, nécessaire, de la charité sur l'organisation de la vie morale, individuelle et sociale, de l'humanité christianisée.

... Or, le Gouvernement occupant a la prétention de bouleverser l'administration générale de notre pays : il semble avoir pris pour devise : *divide et impera*.

... Traîtres à la patrie seraient ceux qui seconderaient ces procédés équivoques. Les questions de politique intérieure de la Belgique ne regardent que les Belges, ne peuvent être résolues que par les Chambres Belges, par le Gouvernement Belge, par le Roi des Belges.

Chers Messieurs les Doyens, ayez l'œil ouvert. Ecartez nos fidèles des lectures et des réunions tendancieuses. Surveillez et arrêtez les tentatives des perfides qui font cause commune avec l'ennemi, les entraînements de la jeunesse. La nation a fait face à la violence : qu'elle se garde de la séduction. La piété patriotique est une vertu : vous êtes, par devoir d'état, les gardiens et les prédicateurs de la vertu. (*Allocution à MM. les Doyens, 29 janvier 1917; Ibid., pp. 407-409, 413-414.*)

En d'autres circonstances encore, le Cardinal dénonça ceux qui faillirent à leur devoir, entr'autres en ces termes :

Il s'est produit, ça et là, parmi les nôtres, des faiblesses dont nous avons à rougir; je ne vise pas, en ce moment, — que l'on m'entende bien, — la poignée d'ouvriers épuisés par les privations, raidis par le froid, ou broyés de coups, qui ont finalement laissé échapper de leurs lèvres une parole de soumission : il y a des limites à l'énergie humaine; je

visé à regret ces quelques félons qui se prêtent au rôle lucratif de délateurs, de courtisans, d'espions, ou ces quelques égarés qui n'ont pas honte de spéculer sur la misère de leurs compatriotes. Heureusement, dans le recul de l'histoire, ces taches s'estomperont ... (*Lettre Pastorale : « Courage, mes Frères », 11 février 1917; Ibid., pp. 373-374.*)

3° SOUTENIR LES AMES, POUR QU'ELLES ACCEPTENT CHRETIENNEMENT L'EPREUVE, QUELLE QUE SOIT SA DUREE.

Le Cardinal Mercier ne cessa de revenir sur ce sujet pendant toute la durée de l'occupation de son pays. Il le fit entr'autres en ces termes :

Mes Frères, vous ne pouvez douter de l'amour de Dieu pour vous...

Vous ne comprenez pas, sur l'heure, le pourquoi et le comment de tous les événements que sa Providence ordonne ou permet : ... Dieu veut que vous croyiez, afin que votre foi soit méritoire pour vous, et plus glorieuse pour Lui.

... S'il vous arrive d'être tentés de scepticisme, mes Frères, prenez votre psautier; lisez, méditez quelques psaumes; votre foi se réveillera et, sans que vous vous en aperceviez, vous vous mettrez à prier.

L'homme qui prie, revit. Priez; dites, surtout, la prière par excellence, celle que nous avons apprise à l'école du divin Maître : le Pater. (*Lettre Pastorale : « Courage, mes Frères », 11 février 1917; Ibid., pp. 382-384.*)

4° SE CONFIER EN DIEU ET RENDRE HOMMAGE A SA JUSTICE.

Le 11 novembre 1918, s'écroulait la force brutale contre laquelle le Cardinal Mercier n'avait cessé de

faire appel à la Justice de Dieu. Quatre jours plus tard, l'Archevêque Primat publiait sur l'épreuve qui avait ensanglanté son pays une dernière lettre pastorale, celle-ci religieusement triomphale :

Je veux proclamer en votre nom la Justice de Dieu.

... Non, mes Frères, Dieu n'a pas nos impatiences. Il agit avec force et douceur... Il sait qu'à son heure, Il tirera le bien du mal et que l'iniquité elle-même viendra déposer en faveur de son indéfectible justice.

... La caste militaire prussienne se plaisait à ce défi : Nous luttons, seuls, contre un monde d'ennemis, et c'est nous les vainqueurs ! Pour un peu, elle eut repoussé du pied ses alliés, afin de ne devoir partager avec personne la gloire finale, et de pouvoir dire à l'univers étonné : Moi seul, et cela suffit !

Et la voilà seule, la superbe ! Toute seule, la caste militaire !

Tour à tour, la Bulgarie, la Turquie, l'Autriche-Hongrie, le peuple allemand lui-même se sont détachés d'elle.

Elle est seule, mais, cette fois, en face de ses vainqueurs ! Battue, à plat, réduite à néant !

La devise barbare « La force prime le droit » a reçu le coup de grâce.

Les rêves de domination pangermaniste se sont dissipés comme un gaz asphyxiant qu'un coup de vent emporte.

Seul le Droit est à l'honneur... Gloire à Dieu, mes bien chers Frères, gloire à sa Justice ! Puisse le peuple belge, puissent les vainqueurs et les vaincus se souvenir d'elle à jamais ! (*Lettre Pastorale : « Hommage à la Justice de Dieu », 15 novembre 1918; Ibid., pp. 625-628.*)

VI.
QUELQUES TEMOIGNAGES
RENDUS AU CARDINAL MERCIER
POUR LES PRINCIPES QU'IL SOUTINT
ET POUR LES ACTES QU'IL ACCOMPLIT
DANS SON MINISTERE PASTORAL
AU COURS DE L'OCCUPATION DE SON DIOCESE
ET DE SON PAYS.

1° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU POUVOIR OCCUPANT :

Le jeudi, 17 octobre 1918, le Cardinal Mercier recevait la visite du Baron von der Lancken, Chef du Département politique allemand de Bruxelles, qui lui remit la déclaration suivante :

« Vous incarnez pour nous la Belgique occupée, dont vous êtes le pasteur vénéré et écouté. Aussi, est-ce à vous que Monsieur le Gouverneur Général et mon Gouvernement m'ont chargé de venir annoncer que, lorsque nous évacuons votre sol, nous allons vous rendre spontanément et de plein gré les Belges prisonniers politiques et déportés. Ils vont être libres de rentrer dans leurs foyers, en partie déjà dès lundi prochain 21 courant. Cette déclaration devant réjouir votre cœur, je suis heureux de venir vous la faire, d'autant plus que je n'ai pu vivre quatre années au milieu des Belges sans les estimer et sans apprécier leur patriotisme à sa juste valeur. » (*Ibid., p. 613.*)

2° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU PAYS OCCUPE :

A la parution de la lettre pastorale : « Patriotisme et Endurance » (Noël 1914) le Roi des Belges adressait au Souverain Pontife le télégramme suivant :

« J'exprime au Chef vénéré de l'Eglise catholique romaine mon admiration pour la conduite du Cardinal Mercier, qui,

à l'exemple des glorieux prélats du passé, n'a pas craint de proclamer la vérité en face de l'erreur et d'affirmer les imprescriptibles droits d'une juste cause au regard de la conscience universelle. — ALBERT. »

3° LE TEMOIGNAGE DU SAINT-SIEGE :

Le 4 avril 1924, le Cardinal Mercier célébrait le cinquantième de son ordination sacerdotale. A cette occasion, Sa Sainteté Pie XI lui adressa un bref « *Tam praeclara* », dans lequel il s'exprimait comme suit :

« ... Quant à votre vaillance chrétienne, que pourrions-Nous en dire ? Ne se révèle-t-elle pas dans tous les actes de votre ministère sacré ? C'est elle qui, au cours de la guerre inhumaine déchaînée sur le monde, vous a dicté « *les paroles qu'il fallait dire pour redresser les volontés chancelantes et raffermir les genoux qui fléchissaient* » (Job. IV, 6.) ; votre âme était « *l'âme du pasteur sur laquelle se modelait l'âme du troupeau* » (1 Petri, V, 3.) et, au plus fort des douleurs et des deuils, vos exhortations ardentes commentaient la devise qui vous était familière — *per crucem ad lucem*, par la croix à la gloire — disant à tous comment la souffrance rend l'homme meilleur et l'aide à gravir d'un pas plus léger les degrés de l'élévation morale.

» ... Donné à Rome, près Saint-Pierre, le 25 mars 1924, Troisième année de Notre Pontificat. — PIUS, P. P. XI. »

4° PARMIS LES PAYS ALLIES: LE TEMOIGNAGE DE LA FRANCE:

Le 23 juillet 1919, M. Raymond Poincaré, Président de la République Française, reçu par le Cardinal Mercier dans l'église métropolitaine de Malines, lui disait :

« De même qu'au temps des Barbares, les Evêques étaient les défenseurs des cités, vous avez, du haut de votre siège

primatial, exprimé en formules impérissables, la pensée de la Belgique envahie.

» Vous avez fait plus : vous avez parlé au nom de la justice elle-même et votre voix a retenti dans tout le monde civilisé. »

LE TEMOIGNAGE DU JAPON :

Aussitôt après le décès du Cardinal Mercier, survenu le 26 janvier 1926, un comité présidé par le Comte Carton de Wiart se constitua à Bruxelles aux fins de publier un livre mémorial consacré à sa mémoire (Editions Desmet-Verteneuil, 1927) ; M. Adatci, alors Ambassadeur du Japon à Bruxelles, aujourd'hui Président de la Cour de Justice Internationale, y apporte (p. 236) le témoignage du Japon :

« Le Japon gardera toujours pieusement la mémoire de la plus noble figure contemporaine que fut le Cardinal Mercier, qui a déversé tant de lumières sur tous les continents du globe et dont la disparition prématurée constitue une perte dont l'étendue est incommensurable, non seulement pour la Belgique et le Catholicisme, mais pour l'humanité tout entière. — M. ADATCI. »

5° LE TEMOIGNAGE DES MILIEUX DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS :

Tout au long des œuvres pastorales du Cardinal Mercier, le patriotisme le plus pur s'allie, très naturellement, à un sens international éclairé et élevé, qui, le jour même de la célébration de ses noces d'or sacerdotales, lui faisait demander : « Que, par dessus les » frontières, les peuples s'efforcent à leur tour d'être » unis entre eux. Formons la Société des Nations dans » le respect du droit de chacun et par l'accord dans la » justice. » (T. VII, p. 365.) Il apparaît opportun de relever ici les hommages que, dans le Livre Mémorial

cit   ci-dessus, lui rendirent notamment Sir Eric Drummond, alors Secr  taire g  n  ral de la Soci  t   des Nations (p. 289) et M. William Martin, alors r  dacteur au *Journal de Gen  ve* (p. 331) :

« Cardinal Mercier was a great and enlightened patriot. His patriotism lead him to support the League of Nations as the best method of securing peace in the future for his beloved country. — Eric DRUMMOND, Secretary general, League of Nations. »

« La Soci  t   des Nations repose sur la patrie, la justice et la foi. Le Cardinal Mercier, homme de guerre par amour de la paix, a incarn  , dans une heure cruelle, sa patrie, la justice invincible et la foi en Dieu. — William MARTIN. Gen  ve, ce 29 mars 1926. »

LE MANIFESTE DE MA LIANG

去年九月十八日日本暴
力發動強佔我東北
今年三月又一手演
威滿洲偽國傀儡一
劇一週年紀念山河
變色如此奇恥大
辱國人應奮起自救不
我河山不止 二十一年雙十節
北三雲馬桐伯識

還我河山

Porte-parole d'un peuple de quatre cents millions d'  mes, qui, en pleine renaissance, se voit trahi par la faiblesse de ses armements et par les ambitions militaires d'un pays fortement arm  , Ma Liang, illustre nonag  naire et grand lettr  , lance    la Chine l'  mouvant manifeste dont voici la traduction :

« RENDEZ-NOUS NOS FLEUVES, NOS MONTAGNES !

» Le 18 septembre 1931, la force brutale du Japon faisait explosion et se r  pandait dans nos provinces de l'Est et du Nord violemment occup  es. Cela n'a pas suffi. En mars 1932, le Japon, de sa propre main, op  ra un effet de sc  ne et produisit ce faux Etat de marionnettes, dont il tire les ficelles et qu'il intitule : « Mandchoukouo ».

» En une seule ann  e, nos fleuves, nos montagnes sont d  figur  s ! O honte ! O violente insulte !

» Citoyens, levez-vous ! Et que votre courage, pour sauver le pays, se jette en plein danger. — Jusqu'   ce que nos fleuves, nos montagnes, nous soient restitu  s !

» En la f  te nationale de la 21^e ann  e de la R  publique Chinoise.

» MA LIANG,

» vieillard de 93 ans. Ci-contre :
» mon sceau. »

Conclusion

Si les directives pastorales du Cardinal Mercier ont pu, en pleine occupation ennemie, être publiées et exécutées, sans que le Pouvoir occupant ait été capable de les interdire, c'est, à n'en pas douter, non seulement à cause de l'éminente personnalité de celui qui les prescrivait, à cause de son héroïque vaillance et des dévouements non moins héroïques qui en opérèrent la diffusion, mais surtout parce que, conformes à la Vérité, inspirées par la Primauté du Spirituel, ressortissant à la compétence du Pouvoir spirituel, elles se sont imposées à la conscience universelle. Et un jour vint, où les événements contraignirent le Pouvoir occupant lui-même à se courber devant elles.

Ces paroles, intransigeantes comme la Vérité, douces comme la Charité, fermes comme la Justice, étaient invincibles.

C'est parce que la haine en est totalement absente que leur vaillance atteignit la plénitude de son objet. La haine, elle, est une faiblesse et elle est un vice.

C'est bien dans ce même esprit de service spirituel que, du cloître où le Seigneur nous appela, nous posons aujourd'hui l'acte de lever la voix pour faire réentendre ce que le verbe justicier du Cardinal Mercier fit retentir jusqu'aux confins du monde. Car sa voix fut entendue par dessus le tumulte des passions et par dessus le bruit des armes.

Beaucoup murmurent : La Chine est faible. Sa cause est une cause perdue. — Nous répondons : Sa cause est juste. A-t-on jamais vu que la Justice n'ait pas le dernier mot?

Le 1^{er} août 1928, le Souverain Pontife Pie XI adressait au Peuple Chinois un message historique. Après avoir revendiqué pour le Saint-Siège d'avoir été « le premier à considérer la Chine, non seulement sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité, mais avec un sentiment de vraie et toute spéciale sympathie », le Pape ajoutait: « *Sa Sainteté a pleine confiance que les aspirations légitimes et les droits d'une nation numériquement la plus grande de la terre, une nation de culture ancienne qui a connu la grandeur et les splendeurs, seront pleinement reconnus. Et, si elle sait se maintenir dans les voies de la Justice et de l'Ordre, elle ne manquera pas d'atteindre à un grand avenir.* »

Ce qui était vrai en 1928 n'est pas infirmé par les nouvelles injustices que, depuis, le Peuple Chinois a dû endurer. C'est dans notre faiblesse elle-même que Dieu construira notre force.

Et dans notre force, vouée au service de la Vérité, fidèle aux exigences de la Charité et de la Justice, — dans cette force, s'établira la PAIX.

**in virtute tua
PAX**

. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
gust 10, 1972
RS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/65 FOR #9332
 FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Feb. 7, 1934
 TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Press reports regarding Japan's designs on China and after
 that the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

esp

793.94/6569

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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b. Relations with other countries:

Relations with Japan: Interest in Japanese affairs
 - during January was centered in preparations for the
 coronation in "Manchukuo" of Pu Yi as Emperor the
 resignation of General Araki as Japanese Minister of

War

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

War, and Japanese-Soviet relations. Mr. Hollington K. Tong, writing in THE CHINA PRESS (American incorporated, Chinese owned) of January 7th declared that the aim of Japan in making Pu Yi Emperor is the extension of the boundaries of "Manchukuo" to include the whole of Mongolia and possibly North China. He stated that, through the occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces and of Jehol, Japan has brought the Mongols of four of the Eastern Banners under its control. Japan has also sent numbers of political agents to try to subvert the loyalty of those Mongols not under "Manchukuo" rule.

THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS (British), in an editorial on January 28th, takes much the same position. The leading vernacular newspapers have devoted a number of editorials to discussing this question and are practically unanimous in their belief that the monarchial movement will result in further aggressions by Japan in Mongolia and North China. The CHUNG HUA JIN PAO believes that this is inevitable, in view of the fact that these two areas are strategic points which Japan must take if it hopes to occupy an advantageous position by 1936, which is likely to mark a world crisis, especially in the Far East. The paper believes that with Mongolia in her possession Japan will be able to deal effectively with Soviet Russia and, by controlling North China, Japan could control virtually the whole of the Eighteen Provinces.

The CHEN PAO considers that Japan's aggressions in China have assumed such enormous proportions that Japan now hopes to carry out a successful war against Soviet

Russia

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Russia and the United States in order that it may become the sole mistress of the Pacific.

The CHUNG HUA JIN PAO of January 12th believes that Japanese military activity in Eastern Chahar is not only a violation of the Tangku Agreement but is evidence that Japan has resumed aggressive activities toward China in preparation for a second Russo-Japanese war. The CHUNG PAO, in an editorial on January 13th, hopes the Chinese Government will be able completely to settle the Red menace and the Fukien rebels before March 1st so that it will be in a position to deal effectively with the North China situation as well as the serious international situation which points to the possibility of a second world war in the not far distant future.

In discussing the resignation of General Araki, the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS believes that it is not the intention of Japan to break with Russia, since Japan has secured most of what it wants in Manchuria, and moreover Japan would not be now permitting its protégé, "Manchukuo," to indulge in plans for a monarchy if war with Russia were in immediate prospect. Several of the vernacular papers take the view that General Araki's resignation is due to his desire to avoid embarrassing questions in the Japanese Diet. The press refers to serious conflicts between the advocates of Fascism and the parliamentarians in Japan and between the Japanese military and financial cliques, and believes that Araki has lost the support of the younger members of the military clique. With regard to General Hayashi, the new War Minister, the

Chinese

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.01-Manchuria/1027 FOR NOTE

FROM Chinese Legation (Yung Kwai) DATED March 6, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Pu Yi's Enthronement.

Statement issued by Minister of Foreign Affairs at
Nanking on --.

esp

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6570


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

February 7, 1934

JAPAN. Foreign Minister Hirota states to Liet that Foreign Office and War Office are investigating China National Airways 45 per cent American-owned, and their air bases in Fukien to ascertain whether or not there exists a secret Sino-American treaty and whether or not this constitutes violation of Sino-Japanese agreement of 1898 or Twenty-One Demands of 1915, concerning prohibition of development of Fukien bases by foreign money. He states investigation is also required to ascertain whether the China National Airways is a military or civil project. (PR) Japanese press threats and propaganda for months has failed to stop this line. Hirota's statement fore-shadows direct pressure on China, probably intended to force Pan American out of China altogether. Recent efficiency of Chinese bombing of Foochow has thoroughly aroused Japan against U. S. aviation in China, and Hirota's public statement is intended to throw the U.S. on defensive to cover pressure on China. (PL G-2)



Viscount Okochi in Liet points out that 70 per cent strength of U.S. fleet should satisfy nation whose wealth is only 20 per cent to 30 per cent of that of U.S. (PR)

Foreign Minister Hirota states trouble with Russia is largely propaganda which he hopes to clear thereby reaching an understanding with Russia. (PR)



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 24 1934
 Department of State

Greenville S. C., Mar. 23rd. 1934.

Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief Division Far Eastern Affairs,
 Washington D. C.

April 5 1934

793.94/6564

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

Your favor of the 21st. Inst., received this AM comes very pat with the discovery of an unfortunate slip. I am enclosing herewith a covering letter I took the liberty of addressing to Mr. Roosevelt on Feb. 9th. last, and which by some inadvertence was placed in the wrong envelope and went to a magazine to which I was sending some material, and has only just been returned. I shall ^ugreatly appreciate your reading the letter to Mr. Roosevelt, and if it is practicable to call his personal attention to it as well as to the article in your hands, I believe it might have some beneficial result.

I thank you for your expression of appreciation, but I should of course be much more gratified by some assurance that you had found the point of view which I present, convincing. I made no attempt to justify all the actions of Japan in detail. Manifestly there have been mistakes, but they are only such mistakes as are always the concomitant of dealing with a difficult situation. They appear disproportionally important by reason of the haze of misunderstanding which distorts opinion.

I do so deplore the misinformation fostered by the articles appearing in almost every magazine you pick up. I have just seen, for example, in the March issue of North American Review, an article by Hanson W. Baldwin, in the introduction to which he has the following statement. - "In some twenty two months of intermit-

F/G 793.94/6572

APR 5 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huatagon NARS, Date 12-18-75

tent fighting Japan has changed the map of Asia. Great slices of territory have been lopped from the Chinese body politic and have been sutured by one means or another to the Empire of Japan". In the statement of supposed fact, there is not one single item which is not entirely misinforming. There has been no change in the map of Asia, nor has anything been taken from China, nor anything joined to Japan. Manchuria has never at any time been part of the "Chinese Body politic". It stands as it has done, as a unit distinct and entirely separate from China.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith a short article I wrote lately for a local newspaper which presents some features of the case which will I hope interest you. If I can succeed in convincing you that that Manchuria has always been a separate unit, that consequently the Chinese were the invaders, the whole situation I am sure will shape itself in your mind in a totally different way. If I could have the privilege of seeing you and presenting the whole question in proper sequence, I feel confident that I could satisfy the questions and objections which naturally recur to you.

I may say that there were times during the thirty odd years of my observation of the development of the present situation when the strong friendship I had and have for China, led me to entertain a rather strong prejudice against Japan. I have no prejudices against China - quite the contrary.

I should like to suggest to you the wisdom of discrediting entirely the Russian propaganda against Japan, which is, and has been for some time past, virulent. Japan is of course taking precautions to meet the Russian menace, but that Japan has any intention of attacking Russia is utterly absurd on the face of it.

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 By Milton O. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japan of course resents the attitude of the American press, the hostility of which has been for quite some time, entirely manifest. Fortunately informed Japanese realize that it rests on misinformation and misconception, but it irritates none the less, and of course results in unfortunate misunderstandings - the seriousness of which should be realized.

Recognition of Manchukuo would alleviate most of this and put the whole situation in an entirely different and more favorable atmosphere. Personally I believe that Japan is sincere in her presentations and purposes. But suppose I am mistaken, it still remains that recognition would put our Government in a much more favorable position to deal with whatever might eventuate. It would place Japan in a most awkward dilemma, if after American recognition, she should violate the good faith American recognition had offered. Of course Mr. Stimson's unfortunate pronouncement which manifestly was made on the basis of mere popular conception, makes a somewhat awkward difficulty. But with the evidence so clear, a reversal of his position, should not be a very serious matter.

Thanking you for your favor,

Yours very truly,

J. H. Reagan

FROM
 T. J. League,
 230 Buist Ave.,
 Greenville S. C.

League Thinks Manchukou Recognizable By America

Editor The News:

The News editorial of the 1st. inst., "No Reason for Reversal," calls for comment from at least two points of view. The first of these is the expressed opinion that there has been found no reason for abandoning the position of the Hoover administration that Manchukou "was established as a result of unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory."

To that it should be quite sufficient to point out that there was no invasion of Chinese territory, warranted or otherwise. The Hoover administration along with popular conception had just taken for granted that Manchuria was Chinese territory. The evidence to the contrary is clear and plain to anyone with average intelligence who will take the trouble to follow the sequence of historical events from 1644 by the Manchu rulers of Manchuria and China, as an entirely separate concern. Ownership of land or even the privilege of continuous residence was not granted to Chinese. No fact can be more clearly and certainly established than this.

In 1912, after some determinate military action, the Manchu dynasty was persuaded to abdicate the rule of China, and China took nominally the form of a republic. Actually there has been since that time no central government. Owing to the very excellent Chinese sense of social obligation, and to the long established and splendidly effective local autonomy, the Chinese people have retained in this well nigh total disruption of national control, a degree of order and solidarity which could hardly be equaled in any other part of the world.

It however remains that China subsequent to the Manchu abdication has been in no position to take any effective national action. It is arguable academically, that the Chinese republic which nominally emerged from Manchu abdication, would have been justified in seizing Manchuria by conquest, as the Manchu rulers were in no position to offer any effective resistance. As a matter of plain fact the Chinese republic did not take any such action. Manchuria declared independence under the "freebooter" Chang Tso Lin and maintained it till 1928 in which year Chang Tso Lin was killed.

After Chang Tso Lin's death the rule passed to his son, and after a time he began to entertain proposals from one of the factions of the nominal Chinese republic for the embodiment of Manchuria with the Chinese republic. Chang Tso Lin's son went so far as to allow armed forces from the Chinese republic to occupy certain places in Manchuria with the view of having the Chinese republic eventually acquire control of the territory,—a fact in itself without other evidence, sufficient to show that Manchuria was no part of the Chinese republic at any time. The other evidence is however clear and incontrovertible.

The attitude of the Hoover government and the Stimson pronouncement, which attempted to do for China what China has never done for herself, was totally unwarranted, misinforming, misleading and uncalled for. I yield to no one in my admiration for the sterling and unsurpassed qualities of the Chinese people, but right is right. The Hoover government and the Stimson pronouncement were both unjustified by the evidence of the facts and events which developed existing conditions.

The second point of view has to do with reasons for the recognition of Manchukuo. It is readily recognized that the restoration and protection of a Manchurian government comes from Japan. That however offers no sufficient reason for not recognizing Manchukuo. On the contrary it offers a very real reason for recognition, that is stability for Manchukuo, the lack of which will offer possibilities at least for unfavorable consequences. Any violation of the integrity of the restored Manchurian government would present a ground for real grievance and would not lightly be undertaken by any power. A second reason for recognition is the probable prevention of a menacing war.

A nation toward whom America has extended the hand of friendship would be much less likely to suffer any aggressive move from acquisitive neighbors. In addition the reaction on China would be most wholesome. For the past 40 years at the least, China has been following the "ignis fatuus" of fomenting international disagreements with the hope that some advantage might accrue to them. With the recognition of Manchukuo this flimsy aspiration would be dissipated, and the necessity of putting her own house in order would be strongly emphasized.

The attitude of the Western mind toward this whole question is a striking illustration of the tenacity with which popular opinion holds to quite unauthenticated beliefs. The popular idea that Manchuria was part of China had nothing more substantial to support it than the fact that western cartographers printed their maps with the whole general territory, (China, Manchuria, Tibet, Mongolia), in the same color and labeled it "Chinese Empire." On such slender evidence hangs much of international import.

It is manifest that general opinion is influenced almost entirely by apparent immediate effects, to the exclusion of the historical evidence which should be always the determining factor. An evidence of this is the constant newspaper reference to what they call the Japanese attack on Mukden in 1931. The fact is, Japanese Railway guards have been in Mukden the whole time since the close of the war with Russia. The conclusion is obvious.

A short resume should be useful just to get the sequence of events. In 1895 the treaty was made between the Manchu rulers of China and Manchuria, and Japan, which gave Japan valuable concessions for commercial and industrial developments in Manchuria. Russia interrupted the carrying out of this treaty, but after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan resumed the interrupted operations and carried them on under the Manchu government of Manchuria till the abdication of Manchu rule for China. After the abdication the Japanese carried on under the control of an independent Manchurian government by Chang Tso Lin, till the death of the latter in 1928. A son of Chang Tso Lin succeeded to the rule of Manchuria and after a short while was influenced by overtures from a faction of the nominal Chinese republic, with proposals to incorporate Manchuria with the republic. This was carried to the extent of admitting armed forces of the Chinese republic to various positions in Manchuria. When it became apparent that the son of Chang Tso Lin would not sustain the independence of Manchuria, and that the misrule of the factions of the Chinese republic would be extended to Manchuria, the decision was arrived at to restore the Manchu rule for Manchuria under P'u Yi. The invading troops of the Chinese republic were given notice to retire from Manchuria and failing to do so, were expelled by the Japanese army.

Popular world opinion is very accurately described by Oswald Spengler who says: "He takes flight from history—into some faith or another—buries his head in hopes—it is so, but it ought not to be, therefore it is otherwise!"

Popular opinion knows that Japan has sinister designs against China, and refuses to see any evidence to the contrary. It is quite clear that at any time since the close of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Japan had ample opportunity to have put in operation these supposedly sinister designs against China!

Obviously no possible unfavorable results could follow recognition. On the contrary any violation or attempted violation of the independence of the restored Manchurian government would be a grave offense which any existing government would hesitate to commit. From every point of view therefore, the value of such recognition is scarcely overestimated.

T. J. LEAGUE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Greenville S. C., Feb. 9th. 1934.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
 President United States of America.
 Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. Roosevelt,

I am constrained by the importance of the interests at stake to attempt to call to your attention to the considerations presented in the enclosed brief statement.

It is apparent that owing to a combination of unfavorable representations the case of world and particularly of American attitude toward the restoration of the Manchu government of Manchuria under Japanese sponsorship and protection, is very seriously misunderstood. As a result of this misunderstanding, it is probable that our Government is losing a valuable opportunity for averting a possible war in the East.

American opinion has been influenced by a variety of apparent effects, which have been emphasized by interested propaganda from several sources. Also it has been adversely affected by the pronouncement of Mr. Stimson, that Japan has violated the provisions of the Kellogg Pact, and consequently the restored Manchurian Government should ^{not} be recognized, as it was sponsored and is protected by Japan. In various ways too there is a very common conception, nurtured by various implications, that what Japan has done amounts to virtual annexation of Manchuria.

I have shown clearly in the enclosed discussion that such is ~~not~~ the case. I have shown also that had such indeed been the case, it would not have been a violation of the Kellogg Pact, as Manchuria has never at any time been a part of China. There

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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is however, no sufficient reason for the continued reiteration so prevalent in our American publications of this idea, which manifestly is fomenting an unfriendly spirit toward Japan.

Mr. Stimson manifestly accepted the popular opinion that Manchuria was an integral part of China, without any particular examination of the evidence for that claim. This was a very serious blunder for a responsible officer of the American Government to make, and its results are unfortunate in their misleading effects, as it has acted to prevent others from making the necessary investigations. No one so far as I can discover, has taken the trouble to go back and follow up the sequence of historical events which produced the ^{existing} situation. They have looked only at certain current effects which seemed to offer evidence supporting Chinese claims, but these effects are shown to be apparent only, when viewed in the light of an integrated sequence of events leading up to late happenings.

I am all the more concerned by reason of the fact that the American misunderstandings and misconceptions are endangering what should be as nearly as possible, a perfect understanding between two Governments and Peoples, between which no question of any outstanding importance impends to disturb a valuable connection.

A clear understanding now which would remove the suspicions current in America, and which would permit of the recognition of the restored Manchurian government, would in all probability be a most useful item in preventing any outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan. That Russia covets Manchuria which between 1895 and 1905, she had practically alienated from the control of the Imperial rulers of China, hardly needs argument. That recognition of Manchukuo by the American Government, would give

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that restored commonwealth a standing among nations which Russia would be slow to violate, seems a reasonable proposition. The very desirable results of this are too manifest to need comment.

In the improbable event of the current American conception of the purposes of Japan being well founded, recognition of Manchukuo by our Government, ^{would} create a situation which Japan would hesitate to violate. The reaction on China would be equally beneficial,

With regard to my sources of information, I lived in China from 1889 to 1923, in the Provinces of Chili and Shantung, most favorably situated for observing at first hand the events and developments of that formative period. I had also valuable contacts with Chinese men in particular, who were closely connected with the happenings and control of much which concerned all the ^{developed} problems ~~concerned~~. I lived most happily with the Chinese, and came greatly to admire their many sterling qualities. There is therefore no slightest shadow of unfavorable attitude toward the Chinese.

My apology for intruding on your attention must be my grave concern for the outcome of the involved interests. I feel much as I imagine a common sailor would who saw his superior officer apparently in danger of taking a course which the experience and knowledge of the sailor clearly recognized as likely to produce unfavorable results. I have made a number of unsuccessful attempts to interest men who could bring the case to your attention, hence this personal approach,

Soliciting your sympathetic attention,

Very respectfully,

J. J. League

From
 T.J. League
 230 Buist Ave., Greenville S.C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 5 1934


In reply refer to
 FE - 793.94/6572.

My dear Mr. League:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of March 23, 1934, with its enclosures, in regard to the situation in the Far East.

The views expressed in your letter and its enclosures have been noted with care.

Very truly yours,


 Stanley K. Hornbeck
 Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.


Mr. T. J. League,
 230 Buist Avenue,
 Greenville, South Carolina.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 11, 1934.

~~OTS:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~MUE:~~

~~SKH:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 2557 under
date February 22, 1934, --

No action.

The despatch reports substantively
as follows certain statements which the
Legation has been reliably informed were
made by a personal representative of
Huang Fu who recently returned from a
mission to Japan.

(a) Japan proposed to support
Huang Fu and Chiang Kai-shek in return
for favorable settlement of such
questions as Sino-"Manchukuo" customs,
post, telegraph, telephone, railway
traffic and air lines and also the re-
moval from north China of the chairman
of the provincial governments of Hopei
and Chahar, Generals Yu Hsueh-chung
and Sung Che-yuan, together with their
troops.

(b) The Japanese hope to obtain by
the above proposal a north China under

Huang Fu

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Huang Fu which is practically independent of Nanking and dependent on Japanese direction.

(c) If China does not agree to the above proposal (probably by the end of March, 1934) Japan may consider it necessary to put north China under Han Fu-chu or Yen Hsi-shan if either of these generals can be induced to submit to the Japanese yoke, or failing in this, to set up Pu Yi in Peiping.

The despatch then states that there is considerable evidence pointing toward a policy of "friendship" on the part of Japan and lists nine factors on which this "friendship" policy is believed to be based (see last paragraph on page 6 continued on page 7).

The despatch continues by noting as evidence pointing to China's agreement to the policy proposed by Japan such items as (1) Chiang Kai-shek's apparent desire to avoid using his troops against Japan, (2) Wang Ching-wei's repeated statements that the internal recovery of China is of primary importance--not war against

Japan,

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Japan, and (3) the decline of the boycott.

The despatch concludes by stating that it is not unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek would rather see the Japanese obtain what they want in north China peacefully, leaving it under his nominal control and giving him time to consolidate his strength in the rest of China, than to lose north China by a policy of resistance.

ETW
ETW/VDM

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2557

Peiping, February 22, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

793.94

Casimir F.E.
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAR 26 1934
File

F/ESP 793.94/6573

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

APR 18 1934

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Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Japanese appear to be striving to persuade the Chinese authorities to support a policy of Sino-Japanese "friendship", a policy which would clarify and stabilize, at least for the time being, Sino-Japanese relations, which would increase Japanese authority in North China without resort to subversive or militant activities, and which would relieve Japan of danger from North China in case Japan were to become seriously engaged elsewhere.

The Legation has been reliably informed of statements made recently by a close friend of General Huang

Fu,

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Fu, General Chiang Kai-shek's representative nominally in control of North China. This man was sent to Japan as General Huang Fu's "personal representative" and, while there, conferred with leading military and civilian authorities. (Although the Legation's informant felt constrained to withhold the name of the "personal representative", it is probable that he is Mr. Li Cheh-li who was educated in the Japanese military academy and who was reported in the press as having visited Japan last November, allegedly unofficially.) To a few Chinese friends, one of whom retailed the conversation to a member of the Legation staff, this "personal representative" made certain statements early in the present month which are of interest, especially as there is no reason to believe that they have been reported inaccurately and as their general tenor is in harmony with information reaching the Legation from other sources.

According to this "personal representative", the Japanese authorities whom he met are now agreed in desiring the "friendship" of China - under certain conditions. One proposal and two threats were made to him. The proposal was that Japan would support Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in all necessary ways in return for certain concessions, which may be supposed to include a settlement favorable to Japanese interests of such questions as Sino-"Manchukuo" customs, post, telegraph, telephone, railway traffic, and air lines and which definitely included the removal from North China of General Yu Hsueh-chung,

Chairman

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Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, and General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government, together with their troops, the Japanese apparently viewing these two generals as the most probable source in North China of action detrimental to Japanese interest. (It may be pertinent to recall in this regard that General Sung's troops were among those few which offered any genuine resistance to the Japanese in their occupation of Jehol Province last spring, that Japanese officials have recently made statements indicating dissatisfaction with General Yu Hsueh-chung and his subordinates, and to note that in to-day's press appears for the first time a statement that reports are current that the removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung from Hopei to Chekiang Province is under consideration.)

It was the opinion of the "personal representative" that the Japanese hope to obtain through Chinese compliance with this proposal a North China under General Huang Fu practically independent of Nanking and practically dependent on Japanese direction; in effect, a buffer state subservient to Japan. (The desire of the Japanese to have General Huang Fu in charge, notwithstanding his lack of financial and military backing, is probably due to the fact that he is respected as a man of integrity who is anxious to improve the Sino-Japanese situation and that he is satisfactory to deal with because, having been educated in the Japanese military academy, he understands the Japanese.) The Legation's informant understood that

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a time limit for agreement, probably the end of next month (March), had been set by the Japanese. Failure to agree, the Japanese informed the "personal representative", would make it necessary for them to attempt to follow a second course; namely, the putting of North China under the nominal control of either General Han Fu-chu, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government, or General Yen Hsi-shan, Pacification Commissioner for Shansi Province, if either of these generals could be induced to submit to the Japanese yoke. The "personal representative" was then informed that, if this alternative plan failed, more strenuous action would be undertaken, it being at least inferred that such action might include the transporting of Mr. Pu Yi from Hsinking to Peiping.

The foregoing statements are supported to some extent by other information reaching the Legation. In January there was held in Shanghai a conference of important Japanese military officers. Although their decisions have been carefully guarded, the Legation has learned from unofficial Japanese and Korean sources that the Japanese military are believed to have approved a policy of support of Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in return for an approximately free hand in North China and that, following this decision, a considerable number of so-called Japanese ronin and civilian-clothed Japanese military left China, apparently because with the establishment of such a policy subversive activities which have heretofore been in progress for the purpose of diminish-

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ing the authority of the present government would be unnecessary. What the attitude of General Chiang and other officials with regard to this policy may be is not yet known. It is reliably reported, however, that General Huang Fu's "personal representative" has been urging General Huang not to accede to the Japanese proposal but to resign in order to escape a debacle in North China and the ruin of his career. It may be added that a secretary of the Japanese Legation recently stated that, although the Japanese military have not told him what took place at the Shanghai conference, he believes the foregoing account of it to be accurate.

There is other supporting, though inconclusive, evidence of Japan's efforts toward "friendship". Both the Chinese press and Japanese officers state that General Huang Fu will shortly visit General Chiang Kai-shek, and, according to the former, the Japanese Minister is now on a visit to Nanking, following the conclusion of which he will proceed to Tokyo. Shanhaikwan was nominally returned to China on February 10, "nominally" because the Japanese still control it militarily through their soldiers stationed within the railway zone and north of the Great Wall just outside Shanhaikwan. (According to an officer of the Japanese Legation, practically all public offices at Shanhaikwan have been restored to the Chinese but misunderstanding on the part of the public has arisen because of the fact that a number of "Manchukuo" offices are still retained in Shanhaikwan awaiting completion of new quarters north of the Wall.) Japanese officials

have

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have been very busy making public statements with regard to improved relations between China and Japan and with regard to the importance of further improvement. Within the past few days the Japanese Minister at Nanking and Colonel Nemoto, reputedly Japanese "adviser" to General Huang Fu, have, according to the press, made such statements. It is known also that Japanese officials have been talking along similar lines when in conversation with Chinese officials.

Whether or not Japan is overtly attempting to convince Nanking of the wisdom of adoption of a policy of "friendship", there have been recent occurrences which might well remind the Central Government of its continuing impotence vis-à-vis Japan. Japanese troops invaded Chahar Province in December and again in January without meeting effective resistance; a few thousand bandit troops of General Liu Kuei-t'ang revolted in December in Chahar Province and proceeded southward through North China pillaging as they went without being effectively checked; in January the Japanese military "advised" the Kuomintang organizations in North China to end their activities detrimental to Japanese interests; and Japanese agents have been at work among North China militarists restive under Nanking's nominal control.

It may be conjectured that the desire of the Japanese for the establishment of such a policy of "friendship" with China is based on such factors as: (1) Japan's apprehension that within the near future it may become involved seriously with a third power, in which case a friendly North China, to all intents

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a tributary state, would add to Japan's security;
(2) the advantage of being on stable terms with China before the convening of the approaching naval conference;
(3) the apparently increasing appreciation, even on the part of over-zealous Japanese military officers, of the dangers and costliness of aggression by arms; (4) realization that peaceful penetration of North China would be more economical and less offensive to the Chinese than armed penetration; (5) probable growth of Sino-Japanese trade; (6) financial and economic benefit to "Manchukuo" of resumption of intercourse between it and China; (7) nominal preservation of the unity of China would be advantageous in that there would continue to be a Central Government with which Japan could deal; (8) Japanese control of North China would place Japan in a position of being able to prevent the Nanking Government, in case it might become strong, from injuring Japanese interests; and (9) Japan would be in a position to extend its control further south in China at such time as it might deem desirable.

It would not be surprising were the Central Government to agree to the policy Japan is said to have proposed. Since the beginning of Japan's military occupation of Manchuria General Chiang Kai-shek has shown no inclination to employ his troops against the invaders, not even after the fall of Jehol Province and the advance of Japanese forces south of the Great Wall. There were unsubstantiated reports last May when the Sino-Japanese truce at Tangku was made that General Chiang's representative had promised considerably more to Japan than appeared in the agreement as published.

General

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General Chiang, together with the second most powerful figure in the Nanking Government, Dr. Wang Ching-wei, has stated again and again that the internal recovery of China is of primary importance, not war against an aggressor. It is known that at the conference of Chinese leaders last summer at Kuling General Chiang was in favor of a policy of conciliation of Japan, his position in this regard being strengthened by the resignation last October of Mr. T. V. Soong as Minister of Finance who was the chief opponent to such a policy.

To-day, as a result of his successful quelling of the rebellion in Fukien Province last month, General Chiang can more easily impose his will on other members of the Government than has been possible for some time. If he desires to subscribe to a policy of "friendship" with Japan, he may therefore be met with little opposition. This subservience of Nanking's officials was illustrated by the lack of opposition during the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held last month.

General Chiang is aware, as is the vast majority of thinking Chinese, that China cannot effectively resist Japan. This realization is indicated by the decline of the movement for the boycott of Japanese goods even in South China. The decline of the boycott also shows the short memory Chinese have for wrongs suffered. General Chiang is confronted with such internal problems as the subjection of communist forces, the extension of his control over Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, the pacification of the Northwest. It is not unlikely that

he

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he would rather see the Japanese obtain what they want in North China peacefully, leaving it under his nominal control and giving him time to consolidate his strength in the rest of China than to invite Japan, by a policy of resistance, to sever North China completely from Nanking and to follow a policy even more inimical to his interests.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Copy to American Embassy,
Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/66 FOR Desp.#9354

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Mar.5,1934.
//
NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Little to report
in connection with -, during the month of February,
1934. The Japanese Minister visited Nanking on
February 20th. it is reported that he was instructed
to make representations to Wang Ching-wei regarding
the construction by China of airdromes at Foochow and
Amoy.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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793.94

relations with Japan: There was little of importance to report in Sino-Japanese relations during the month. The Japanese Minister visited Nanking on February 28th. According to reports he had been instructed to make representations to Wang Ching-wei regarding the construction by China of airdromes at Foochow and Amoy. One report was that these air fields were being built with the proceeds of the American cotton and wheat loan. It was stated that Japan considered this a violation of the Chinese declaration of April 26, 1893, concerning the non-alienation of the Province of Fukien and also the exchange of notes of May 23, 1913, between China and Japan whereby the former stated, inter alia, that it had no intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up naval bases or dock yards, et cetera, in Fukien Province. Whether or not the Japanese made any representations in the matter is not known but it is significant that, according to the Kuo Min News Agency

of

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of February 22, an unnamed high military authority in Nanking issued a statement designed, as he said, to clear up any misunderstanding there might have been in regard to the matter. According to this official the anti-bandit campaign in Kiangsi owed much of its success to the air forces and the government therefore decided to push the work of suppressing the bandit groups in Fukien in the same way. As the Foochow airdrome is too small, it is to be enlarged and the airdrome at Amoy is to be removed to a more suitable site, as it is not well adapted to its purpose, being small and surrounded by high mountains. Funds for the purpose will be furnished by the Fukien Provincial Government and the outlay will not be large.

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AUG 17 1934 *File
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PAPERS RELATING TO THE SHANTUNG CONVERSATIONS HELD AT THE TIME OF
THE CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, NOV.12,1921-FEB.6,1922.

GIVEN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY THE HON. CHARLES E. HUGHES

March 8, 1934.

793.94
1. Mr. MacMurray's memorandum of his interview with the
Chinese Minister on December 15, 1921. 793.94 / 1239 1/2

2. Secretary Hughes' memorandum of his interview with the
Japanese Ambassador, January 4, 1922. 793.94 / 1274 1/2

3. Official British memorandum, prepared by Mr. Miles W. Lampson, of the British Foreign Office Section, of a conversation held at Secretary Hughes' home on January 30, 1922, at 10:00 A.M. Those present were: Secretary Hughes and Mr. MacMurray; Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lampson; Mr. Sze, Mr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Wang-chunghui, and Dr. Hawkling Yen. Attached to this memorandum is Mr. Lampson's letter to Secretary Hughes, February 2, 1922, enclosing the memorandum. 793.94 / 1300 1/2

793.94/6574 1/2

F/A

AUG 18 1934

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

M. D. Gustafson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM

August 11, 1939.

DCR
Mr. Salmon



The attached memorandums of 1921 and 1922 are described on the sheet enclosed with them as "Papers Relating to the Shantung Conversations Held at the Time of the Conference on Limitation of Armament, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922. Given to the Department of State by the Honorable Charles E. Hughes March 8, 1934." Dr. ^{Giffen}Griffen of NE, who was formerly chief of the RP Research Section, states that these memorandums were, as he recalls it, among the papers given to Mr. Carlton Savage (at that time of RP) by the secretary of Chief Justice Hughes, probably in 1934, for use in connection with the compilation of Foreign Relations volumes. I believe that they should be filed in DCR.

103-94

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RP:Spaulding:GLW

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/69 FOR Despatch #498

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED March 1, 1934.
/H/// NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Retrocession
of Shanhaikuan: Press comment on the speech made
by Major Gagi of the Japanese Army on this occa-
sion. Preparations for the taking over of
Kupshk'ou and five other small passes reported.

fpg

793.94/6575
1475

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b. Relations with other countries.

793.94 The retrocession of Shanhaikuan to Chinese control on February 10 is fully described in the Consulate General's despatch No. 508 of February 12, 1934 to the Legation (No. 491 of identical date to the Department). Some adverse comment appeared in the local press concerning an ill-advised address made by Major Gagi of the Japanese army on the occasion of the retrocession ceremonies. In the course of his remarks, Major Gagi took occasion to warn the Chinese that there might be a repetition of the Shanhaikuan occupation if any fresh disturbances should arise. There were early in the month conflicting rumors rife to the effect that Kupehk'ou and certain other passes of the Great Wall would in the near future be returned to Chinese

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Chinese control, but no definite information was forthcoming until February 23, when the vernacular press attributed to Yin Ju-kang, Administrative Inspector for the Chi-Mi District, the statement that preparations for the taking over on February 28 of Kupehk'ou and five other small passes had been completed and that, on the designated date, all administrative offices of the "Manchukuo" state would be withdrawn and that a Chinese police force of seventy men, recruited and especially trained in Beijing, would be despatched to the points in question, twenty to be stationed at Kupehk'ou and ten each at the remaining five passes. According to press despatches published today, the resumption of control by the Chinese has been postponed until March 4. The civil administration functions at Kupehk'ou will be formally assumed on that date by the Administrative Inspector for the Chi-Mi District. It is further stated that all temporary organizations established prior to the retrocession will be abolished, but it is significant that the terms of the agreement provide that certain offices which were being maintained by the Japanese at Kupehk'ou will be permitted to remain until such time as means for their transfer are devised. It is also provided that these organizations shall not interfere with the Chinese administration. The exact functions of these Japanese offices are not known and their retention at Kupehk'ou creates some doubt that China will regain on March 4 full and complete control of

all

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all the important passes between Kupehk'ou and Shanghai-kuan. Nominally, such control will have been regained but whether in actual practice this proves to be correct remains to be seen, in view of the Japanese reservations.

The temporary invasion by Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops of eastern Chahar, mention of which was made on pages 10 and 5 of the political reviews for December, 1933, and January, 1934, respectively, appears not to have had any serious aftermath. But little was heard of the matter during February, the region affected being quiet and peaceful, so far as is known.

The impending enthronement of Henry Pu Yi as Emperor of "Manchutikuo" ("Manchukuo") on March 1, 1934, received but scant attention beyond comments concerning the elaborateness of ceremonial plans in process of formulation. The vernacular press has been surprisingly quiet on the political aspects of the coronation.

Coincident with the Consulate General's statement on page 7 of the political review for January, 1934, apropos of the decline in the number of practice marches and manœuvres by the Japanese troops at Tientsin, the vernacular press on February 23, 1934, reported that in consequence of a notification to the Provincial Government by the Japanese military authorities to the effect that Japanese troops would stage field exercises in the vicinity of F'ang-kuan't'un, Taliuchen and Liangwangohuang, along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, on and after March 1, the Chairman of the Provincial Government deputed a representative to call upon

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By Milton O. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Japanese military authorities and convey the former's refusal to the request to hold field exercises outside of the Japanese area at Tientsin. This report has not been confirmed, and it is doubtful that it is true inasmuch as it is the practice of all foreign military contingents at Tientsin to indulge occasionally in cross-country marches.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/76 FOR #-
FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED March 1, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Formal retrocession on February 10, 1934 of Shanhaikwan
by Japan to China.

793.94/ 6576

6576

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2. China:

As a result of protracted negotiations between

Mr.

- 3 -

Mr. T'ao Shang-ming, Administrative Supervisor of the Luantung Area, and Colonel Giga of the Kwantung Army, the city of Shanhaikuan was formally retroceded to China on February 10th. Speaking for the Japanese guests at the retrocession ceremony Colonel Giga warned the Chinese to take precautions to prevent the occurrence of an incident similar to that of January 3, 1933. The Colonel's warning is considered a veiled threat.

In commending on the retrocession the "Manchoukuo News Service" stated that "most of the Manchoukuo and Japanese organs will remain in their present places for the time being." The report continues that the headquarters of the "Manchukuo" police will be moved out of the Wall City but that Japanese gendarmes will be moved into it. It may be noted that as Shanhaikuan is in the "demilitarized zone" Chinese troops may not under the "Tangku Truce" agreement be stationed in the city. The Japanese troops (Kwantung Army), it may be added, have been moved to their new barracks just outside the Great Wall.

According to the press negotiations for the retrocession of Kupeikou and other passes along the Great Wall are now being conducted and it is expected that they will be concluded in the near future.

During February the "Manchoukuo News Service" reported several times that the attitude of the Nanking Government had become less unfavorable to Japan and that negotiations for the settlement of outstanding questions concerning North China, Japan

and

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Japan and "Manchukuo" would be instituted in the near future. Such reports are unconfirmable in Mukden.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.94/720 FOR memorandum

FROM State Department(U) (Phillips) DATED Mar.30,1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese domination of China. Conversation with the Soviet
Ambassador, during which the - was discussed.

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793.94/6577

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94

Hon. Cordell Hull,
U. S. Secretary of State,
Washington D. C.

Greenville




Acknowledged
By Form A
File SS

APR 11 1934

Apr. 8th. 1934.

ss: Ack. by Form A



APR - 6 34

Dear Mr. Hull,

I am venturing again to put before your consideration, some further ~~considerations~~ reflections with reference to the Manchurian problem, and the mooted war between Russia and Japan.

The immediate occasion, is the appearance in the March issue of Harper's Magazine an article written by Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, entitled - "If Japan and Russia Fight". Mr. Peffer was for a number of periods in China as a lecturer in Rockefeller Foundation schools and has written a number of articles about Chinese affairs which show a good degree of penetration, and appreciation of the finer side of Chinese character. His prognostications therefore command respect. I however, have the best of reasons for the opinion that in this article his prognostications are in the main misconceived.

One evidence of this is that he follows the popular conception of Manchuria as "wrested from China" by Japan. You have in your files two ^{copies of} practically identical import, showing clearly that Manchuria was never any part of China, and that Japan was quite within her rights to sponsor the restoration of Manchu rule for Manchuria, and to protect the restored government with force. is constantly charged by American newspapers, that this represents only a ruse in the part of Japan, the intention of which is to add Manchuria to the Japanese Empire. The evidence of forty years of Japanese connection with Manchurian affairs, offer ample reason

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APR 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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for declaring this charge unjustified - a needles affront to a friendly nation.

Mr. Peffer has manifestly come under the influence of Chinese propaganda, which for the past few years has been very violent, and persistent. No reflection is meant to be cast in saying this, as he has abundant company in his attitude. Unfortunately his observations are entirely divorced from the sequence of historical events which run from 1644, marking the entire separate-ness of Manchurian affairs from China, up to the Manchu abdication of the role of China in 1911.

The modern phase of this may be said to date from 1894, when Japan gained from those Manchu rulers, the concessions in Manchuria which she has since been operating. Mr. Peffer^e had no experience of these events which have a most important bearing on the present situation, and consequently it is not at all remarkable that he accepts the popular view of Japanese aggression, as he has missed entirely the proper sequence of events from which alone a different conception is gained.

Mr. Peffer also accepts ^{the current} Russian propaganda at its face value entirely ignoring the fact that Japan has nothing to gain from a war with Russia. What Russia wanted in 1894 when she bluffed Japan into a temporary surrender of treaty rights in Manchuria, was Manchuria itself, with its splendid ice-free ports. Between 1894 and 1904 Russia had taken virtual possession, had begun a large scale development of Dairen (Dalny), had strongly fortified Port Arthur, and had practically preempted Manchuria. By the heroic sacrifices of Japan in the terrific struggle of 1904-5 Manchuria was released from Russian control.

That Russia wanted in 1894, she still wants even more keenly

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in 1934, and is "moving heaven and earth" with propaganda to convince the world that she is menaced by an attack from Japan! Unfortunately American opinion is only too well prepared to accept this Russian propaganda at its face value, and so unconsciously support Russian ambitions. What these are has been made quite clear by the Russian activities in China under Borodin and others who have followed him.

A fact of important significance is that Kiang Kai Sheh, who more nearly represents a united central control of China than any other, took no steps whatever to prevent the restoration of Manchuria rule for Manchuria under Japanese protection. It is quite reasonable to believe that he ^(Kiang) realized that an independent Manchuria with the ancient government restored through the lineal and legitimate heir to that rule, sponsored and protected by Japan, offered no menace to the peace and well-being of China. As indeed it does not. There is quite sufficient reason to believe (I need not repeat these here) that the declared purposes of Japan are sincere. America of all nations has least reason for calling them in question.

Mr. Peffer's idea that it may be necessary for America to go to war with Japan to prevent Japanese domination and economic exploitation of China, is totally unjustified by any evidence in the case. It is the result of Chinese and Russian propaganda which have been so widely accepted by American newspapers.

There is no reason whatever to suppose that Japan would offer any obstacles to the free competition of American goods in the Chinese market. Unfortunately for America, there is no need for such obstacles. The much higher costs of American manufactures and products gives quite sufficient advantage to Japanese

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commerce, and unfortunately again for America, there is no prospect of that condition being altered. The superior sense of the Japanese for economic proportion, the superior industry, thrift and adaptability of her people present advantages which conditions in America offer no prospect of overcoming. Our American news papers ^{low} on parate of ~~good~~ standards of living, starvation wages. There is quite another story to that, but I cannot take your time to go into that. You may however rest assured that the Japanese are quite ^{adequately} ~~adequately~~ concerned for the well-being of their people,

The so-called Chinese boycott I have already dealt with and need not repeat. I will only say that I have every confidence, based on intimate knowledge of causes and influences operative, that American recognition of Manchukuo would go far to preventing any recurrence of that episode.

I beg again to solicit your most sympathetic consideration of the claims of Manchukuo to recognition by our Government. There is reason to believe that in addition to other benefits, such a course by our Government would make a war between Russia and Japan a quite improbable occurrence. It would give notice to Russia that her anti-Japanese propaganda has not proved convincing. It would react on the Japanese, giving to American influence on her international policies a preponderating weight. It would give pause to the anti-Japanese activities of our American newspapers, and offer an opportunity for a better understanding of the issues involved.

I have already dealt with the misinformation and misunderstandings responsible for Mr. Stimson's unfortunate pronouncement, and need not repeat that

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I am keenly aware that my persistence in presenting these considerations to your attention has the appearance of unwarranted presumption. I however feel sure you will acquit me of that in view of my long and unbroken opportunities for observation of the events which in their unfolding have produced the conditions to be dealt with. In view too of the long association with the Chinese, whose sterling worth I appreciate and admire, there is ample evidence that I am influenced by no anti-Chinese sentiment. Quite the contrary in fact.

I believe I am not overstating the case when I express the conviction that no action on the part of any government in the international sphere would have so far reaching and favorable results as American recognition of Manchukuo.

Yours respectfully,



From
T. J. League,
230 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Qualen NARS, Date 12-18-75

W. Hall

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 16, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~WCH:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~SKH:~~

Nanking's confidential despatch of
March 3, 1934, --

This despatch from Mr. Peck summarizes the views of certain Chinese officials in regard to China's political situation and relations of foreign powers. These views were gleaned from conversations occasioned by the visit to Nanking of Mr. William Philip Simms, foreign editor of the United Press Associations. I suggest that the information contained in this despatch is of sufficient importance for the despatch to be read in its entirety.

I invite special attention to the paragraphs marked on pages 3-4 which indicate that Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, does not feel that China should press the foreign powers at this time to give up their special rights in China -- rights which he states China is in no position to utilize.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking Office,
 March 3, 1934.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 11 1934

Department of State

LEGAL ADVISER

APR 11 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that when I recently observed in the newspaper an announcement that Mr. William Philip Simms, foreign editor of the United Press Associations, was in Shanghai I addressed him an invitation to be my guest in the Consulate General, if he should plan to make a visit to Nanking.


Mr. Simms intended to come to Nanking some days ago, but was delayed by the necessity of waiting in Shanghai for interviews with Dr. H. H. Kung and Mr. T. V. Soong and finally arrived in Nanking at 2:20 p.m. March 2, having accepted my invitation. He was met by Mr. C. Yates McDaniel, Nanking representative of the United Press and Mrs. Peck took him on a tour of the principal sights of the capital.

Before Mr. Simms' arrival I had arranged for him to call at the Foreign Office at 5 p.m. and on Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 6 p.m. In the evening, I invited

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to dinner to meet Mr. Simms, Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Li-Sheng-wu, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Foreign Office. At 9 a.m. on March 3 Mr. Simms called upon Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He left Nanking at 10:30 a.m. One reason for my invitation to Mr. Simms was that I had known him when on duty in the Department.

I accompanied Mr. Simms to the Foreign Office and also on his call on Dr. Wang Ching-wei.

For about three-quarters of an hour Mr. Simms put various questions to Dr. Wang, mainly relating to the "enthronement" of Mr. Pu Yi as "emperor of Manchukuo" on March 1, to Sino-Japanese relations, to international relations in Central Asia, and matters of that sort. Dr. Wang answered fully and frankly, apparently to the full extent of his knowledge.

In regard to the new alleged monarchy in Manchukuo, Dr. Wang said, in brief, that there was no such thing racially as "Manchukuo", since the people there were Chinese and the term had a purely geographic significance. The so-called state was merely a creation and instrument of Japanese military policy. He said that China would under no circumstances concede any legal position to this artificial creation. He referred Mr. Simms to a published statement he had made in this regard. A copy of a partial translation of this statement as it appeared in THE CHINA PRESS of March 2, 1934, is enclosed herewith.

Following the dinner at the Consulate, Mr. Simms held a long conversation with Vice Minister Tang, at which

Mr.

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Mr. Li and I assisted. Mr. Tang Yu-jen reiterated many of the views which I reported in my despatch of February 16, 1934.^{753.94/6567} He laid greatest stress on the desirability of increasing the intimacy and volume of trade relations between the United States and China, mainly for the purpose of freeing China from economic dependence on Japan. He stressed that international trade being fundamentally a question of exchange, China could not hope to boycott Japanese imports into China without seriously affecting Chinese exports to Japan, which were important to China. He stated that present Chinese political thought no longer feared the introduction of American capital into China to promote industrial development, but welcomed it, as well as the introduction of American technical supervision. Mr. Simms pointed out the obvious fact that American merchants are governed in selecting their foreign purchases solely by the degree to which China is able to fulfil American requirements. Mr. Tang first suggested that American capital come to China and create the industries necessary to supply products of the sort desired; he added that if American capitalists did not feel willing to take this step, then American experts should come to supervise the efforts of the Chinese themselves and he predicted that Chinese capital in reasonable amounts would be available for the purpose of creating new industries.

In showing the change of mind in such matters, Mr. Tang went so far as to state that he, himself, saw no present advantage in urging the "rights recovery" movement, since he failed to see the benefit to China in demanding from China's friends the "recovery" of rights

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which China was in no position to utilize. He instanced the right of inland navigation, and the right of jurisdiction over foreign nationals.

In the course of our conversation Mr. Tang took pains to tell me that before our interview reported in my despatch of February 16, 1934, he had set forth to General Chiang Kai-shek the views which he had expounded to me and had received General Chiang's hearty commendation of those views. Assuming that General Chiang likewise approves the idea that it would be better to cultivate friendship and more intimate relations with the extraterritorial powers, rather than to irritate them by insisting upon altering the existing treaty status at the present time, one is led to wonder how energetically the Foreign Office will push the matter of treaty revision in the near future. I may observe that Mr. Tang was careful to explain that during the conversation now reported he was not speaking officially.

Various practical expedients for increasing trade between the United States and China were discussed, among them that of preferential tariffs. Mr. Tang did not think that this method could be used by China, firstly, because China was bound by the "most favored nation" clause and, secondly, preferential tariffs presupposed protective tariffs of effective proportions. He did not think that protective tariffs would be feasible for China. In the first place, protective tariffs would cut off customs revenues which are vital to China's credit and, in the second place, the Chinese industries protected by the tariffs would fail to materialize unless other methods were used to aid them.

Mr.

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Mr. Tang referred, as he has done before, to the fact that he is known as a "pro-Japanese" official. He remarked, with what appeared to be entire sincerity, that in spite of the stigma which this description carried with it in China, he welcomed this fact, since it increased his potential usefulness to his country. He made a number of interesting references to conversations he had had with important Japanese, such as Mr. Sugimura, who visited China last autumn, evidently with the object of showing that his ostensible "pro-Japanese" tendencies gave him opportunities which he otherwise would not enjoy of clarifying the misunderstandings between China and Japan.

EE Both in the conversation between Mr. Simms and Dr. Wang Ching-wei and between Mr. Simms and Mr. Tang Yu-jen, the subject of a possible war between Japan and the Soviet Union was discussed. Both gentlemen seemed to regard such a war as not only inevitable, but imminent, and both said that whichever nation might be the victor China would suffer. Dr. Wang Ching-wei pointed out that China must be strictly neutral, since a Japanese victory would mean the loss of a great deal of territory and a Soviet victory would mean an immediate accession of strength to the Communist forces in China. He asserted that following such a war China would be powerless to protect itself, but would have to rely upon world agencies for the upholding of justice. Mr. Tang Yu-jen said that in the event of this war breaking out, or a war between Japan and the United States, China would probably lose command at once of the Kiao-tsi Railway and of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, since those railways would be needed by Japan for

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
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the transportation of troops inward and raw materials outward and Japan would be obliged to ensure that they were not utilized by Chinese forces to attack Japan in the rear.

To report these two long conversations in detail would probably serve no great purpose. Enough has been described to show their general trend.


Very respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In duplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation.
Copy to the American Embassy at Tokyo.

WRP:HC.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE CHINA PRESS, March 2, 1934.

Wang Says Pu Yi Ascension Brings East Nearer War

Government Executive Denounces Coronation As High
Treason In Statement Yesterday

Inherent Puppet Nature Of Rule In Manchuria Declared
Unchanged By Creating Emperor

NANKING, March 1.--(Kuo Min) -- Interviewed by pressmen concerning Mr. Pu Yi's reported enthronement. President Wang Ching-wei, concurrently minister of foreign affairs, made the following statement:-

"The assumption of imperial title by Pu Yi--another act of high treason against the Chinese Republic--has long been heralded and is arousing nation wide indignation in this country.

"However as we look at the situation, the status of the Three Eastern Provinces and Jehol is no other than that of illegal military occupation while Pu Yi and other members of his theatrical troupe are mere puppets controlled by their masters and have no independent personality. Whether Pu Yi's name be 'chief executive' or 'emperor' or whether his illegal regime be 'republican' or 'monarchical' does not affect in the least the inherent nature of the puppet, the changes being mere shifts in the role the puppet plays. Looking from this angle one need not be

greatly

- 2 -

greatly surprised at the farcical comedy that is being enacted in Changchun.

"China's attitude towards the puppet regime has always been the same and shall remain notwithstanding any change in the appearance of the puppet. The same may be said of European and American Powers with whom the principle of non-recognition of 'Manchukuo' has become an iron-clad law of international morality, any deviation from or violation of which will surely reflect on the international personality of the State concerned.

"By this latest act in Changchun the gravity of the Far Eastern problem will undoubtedly be further heightened while the international rivalry and complications in the Far East will be further increased--all pointing to one condition, namely, greater insecurity in world peace. This is most deplorable but the world will know where the responsibility lies."

"Farcical Comedy"

NANKING, March 1.--(Reuters)--Characterizing Mr. Henry Pu Yi's enthronement today as a "Farcical comedy", the Central Daily News in an editorial this morning declares that whatever form the puppet regime in Manchuria may assume, Mr. Pu Yi and his followers will remain Japan's slaves as before.

Nevertheless, the paper continues, Mr. Pu Yi's elevation to the throne represents another step forward in Japan's aggressive designs, it being further confirmation of her intention to keep the four provinces wrested from China by force of arms and in violation of sacred treaties.

Although

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Although China is at present unable to recover her lost territory, the four provinces will eternally remain a part of China.

The editorial declares that the blood which has been shed by the Chinese people in the past two years has not been shed in vain, but will have its reward. The struggle of the Chinese nation will not cease until this object is achieved.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 13, 1934.

Mr. Phillips:

Referring to Mr. Johnson's
164, April 11, 6 p.m., with regard
to the situation in North China,--

It is believed that the in-
formation therein given confirms
conjectures which we have been mak-
ing during the past ten days.

The first of the mail des-
patches to which Mr. Johnson refers
has been received and is here
attached; and it gives excellent
background material indicative of
what the Japanese are about. We
have covered this despatch with a
brief digest which will be found
immediately under the telegram.

SKH ⁷⁴¹

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be Peiping via N.R.
closely paraphrased bc-
fore being communicated Dated April 11, 1934
to anyone. (SG) FROM Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
THE UNDER SECRETARY
Washington.
APR 14 1934

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 12 1934
Department of State

793.94
not read.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
164, April 11, 6 p.m.

My despatch number 2557, February 22; and 2611,
793.94/6573
March 21.

It becomes increasingly evident that the Japanese have conveyed to the Nanking Government the threat that unless the latter reaches a "compromise" with Japan in regard to demand of the North China Manchukuo police authorities the Japanese military will in some manner effect the (?) separation of North China from the nominal control of Nanking and obtain its desires with respect to this area without Nanking's concurrence.

Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
Tang Yu Jen told me on March 19th that the Government could not keep Huang Fu in Peiping indefinitely procrastinating with the Japanese over the question of certain demands concerned with relations between North China and Manchukuo.

General Huang Fu left Peiping for Central China April 3 having delayed his departure for a number of weeks and is now reported to be conferring with General Chiang Kai Shek prosumably urging the wisdom of a policy of

F/G 793.94/6580

APR 18 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 164 from Peiping

of "compromise" or "friendship" with Japan. Huang Fu's delay in going south seems to have been due to the fact that he did not wish to make the visit until the differences of opinion existing among officials at Nanking about Sino-Japanese policy had been more or less resolved. ^{Eventually} Tang Yu Jen, visiting Peiping, probably at the instance of Huang Fu and it is presumed that upon his return to the south he reported on the serious situation existing in North China and the dangers involved in continuing to ignore the wishes of the Japanese military. It is supposed that when Huang Fu finally left for the south he had received some assurance that a settlement of China's policy with respect to Japan was nearing accomplishment.

It is not known whether Nanking officials will be able to reach an agreement on policy. If they do not decide upon a policy of "compromise", which means a solution satisfactory to Japan of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway Line and resumption of postal facilities (and in fact substantial Japanese influence in North China which will be only nominally under Nanking's jurisdiction), it is anticipated that Huang Fu will not return to North China and that the Japanese military will take measures to effect the separation of North China from Nanking's normal control and to obtain from local Chinese militarists those advantages in North China which the Japanese military are determined to

135
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 - No. 164 from Peiping

to have. (END PART ONE).

JOHNSON

MAM
HSM

1358

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ

SPECIAL GRAY

PEIPING VIA H.R.

FROM

Dated April 11, 1934

Recd. 8.30 a.m. 12th

Secretary of State

Washington

164. April 11, 6 p.m. Part two.

It is not believed that the Japanese military will employ Japanese troops in North China to gain their ends; rather it will use persuasion reinforced by money on the local dissatisfied or ambitious militarists. It may be that the Japanese military will attempt to put North China under the control of one complacent Chinese militarist although recent information reaching the Legation indicates that the Japanese may be content to have dealings with the leaders of the various provinces, the provinces no longer having connection with Nanking and no longer having nominal union through the existence of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Committee. If fighting occurs during this readjustment it will be by Chinese troops, not by Japanese troops, if the latter can avoid being driven in as the Japanese military obviously wish to obtain their ends in a manner which they believe appear to foreign government as coming ~~not~~ from the Chinese themselves and as not

being

spontaneously

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

EJ

No. 164 from Peiping

being the result of Japanese use of military force.

Considerable speculation is now current with regard to the visit which Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attache is making General Yen Hsi Shan at Taiyuan. It is believed that Shibayama assured Huang Fu that he would not visit Yen Hsi Shan (to further Japanese ~~policy~~ ^{policy} among local militarists) until it was definitely known that Nanking refused to agree to a policy of "compromise" with Japan. As Shibayama is admitted even by the civilian officials of his Legation who are out of sympathy with the Japanese military to be a man of high character, of comparatively liberal views and opposed in some degree to the headstrong Japanese officers in Tientsin and in the Kwangtung army, it seems reasonable to suppose that his visit to Yen is not for the purpose of creating discord in North China at present but is for the purpose of reminding the officials now conferring in the South of what the Japanese military will attempt to do vis a vis dissatisfied Chinese military leaders in North China in case Nanking officials fail to agree to a policy of "compromise" or "friendship" with Japan.

It is impossible ~~to~~ to forecast what Nanking's decision will be. It is evident that if Nanking agrees

it

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

No. 164 from Peiping

it will retain nominal control over a North China
 where Japanese will obtain all that they desire and
 that if it does not agree it will lose even nominal
 control while Japan will obtain all its objectives in
 North China who will act as the Japanese wish them
 to act.


Copy to Tokyo by mail. (End message)

JOHNSON

WSB


0361

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Greenville S. C., 11th. 1934.

Mr. Stanley M. Hornbeck,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington D. C.



793.94
6462
6468
6564
6577
6578

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

The enclosed letter to the Editor of Harper's
will be self explanatory. It did not occur to me until I
had written a large part of the letter, that there might be some
discourtesy in submitting for publication a copy of a paper sent
to the State Department.

The chances of its publication are very remote, but that does
not affect the principle, and I shall much appreciate a reply from
you as to the way in which your Department would regard it.

I very much appreciate your courtesy as expressed in your ~~note~~
notes to me. It is my conviction of the value of the issues at
stake, and the belief, that my point of view is abundantly sus-
tained by the evidence of the historical sequence of events which
produced the situation to be dealt with, which urges me to contin-
ue my efforts to get this point of view adequately considered.

No doubt there are questions and objections which occur to
you. I am reasonably sure that I could successfully meet
these, and that was the reason why I wished the Department would
make it possible for me to appear in person. I have no means

of my own which I could reasonably devote to a public matter, con-
sequently I was forced to deny myself the pleasure of the opportu-
nity of an interview ^{offered} with a responsible member of the Department
at any time I might be in Washington.

Awaiting your advice,

Very respectfully,

J. J. League

F/G 793.94/6581

APR 25 1934

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Greenville S. C., Apr. 11th. 1934.

Editor,
 Harper's Magazine,
 49 East 33rd. Street,
 New York N. Y.

Dear Sir,

In the march issue of Harper's there appears an article written by Mr. Nataniel Peffer, "If Japan and Russia Fight". I have followed Mr. Peffer's Magazine articles for quite sometime, indeed from the time he began to write on Far Eastern, and especially Chinese subjects, as a result of his lecture experiences in the Rockefeller Foundation schools in China. I recognized with much pleasure the exceptional penetration attained by Mr. Peffer in his presentation of Chinese matters, with which my own contact for a period of some thirty five years, had established a degree of appreciation and understanding.

My disappointment is therefore all the more keen over the misconceptions manifest in the article above referred to. He has accepted the popular view of the relations between Manchuria and China and has presented a consequent series of opinions and prognostications utterly at variance with the real status which the clearly defined historical developments operative since the Manchu succession in 1644 to 1912, and particularly those from 1894 to 1929, clearly establishes.

I am enclosing herewith an article which I prepared about one year ago, in which I state ^{briefly} the sequence of events of the period 1894 to the restoration of Manchurian rule under P'u Yi, sponsored by Japan. I realize your attitude toward unsolicited manuscripts, and fear there is little hope of your being willing to

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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accept this for publication, but I beg that you will carefully read my article, and in any event retain it for your files. It was written a year previously to Mr. Peffer's, and so can have no effect ^{of} a controversial character. The point of view is however so totally at variance, and so supported by sound historical evidence that I hope you will be willing to waive your objection to unsolicited manuscripts and publish it. More especially as Mr. Peffer's opinions, with nothing to suggest a different view, will have an adverse effect on the so very desirable friendly relations between America and the restored Manchurian government, as also that of America and Japan, as a consequence of the unfortunate misrepresentations of practically the whole course of Japan's relation to Manchuria and Manchurian developments.

I may say that I took the liberty some time ago of sending to the State Department in Washington, a copy of the enclosed article which I have followed up with letters dealing with special features of the article such as the probable effects of recognition of Manchukuo by our Government, the relations of Russia to the Manchurian situation, all of which are the result of my thirty five years of intimate contact with the events which culminated in the situation to be dealt with.

My contact has covered the period of what may be called the modern development, in which the sequence of events, cause and effect, have produced the profound conviction that the attitude of American opinion, influenced and embodied by the "Stimson Pronouncement", are founded on an important and grave misconception and misunderstanding of the whole situation.

I shall send a copy of this letter to the State Department at Washington, with the request that they advise me if there is any

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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objection to the article being published, and will inform you of their reply. I have of course received from the Department only a courteous acknowledgment of the receipt of the article and covering letters, with thanks for my interest in this public affair.

I should like to add, that so far as I can discover, no one of those who have been shaping public opinion on this important international affair, has done more than consider certain apparent effects of recent events, taking no account of the all important sequence of happenings which have produced the existing situation. I may say that I ^{had} not only the rare experience of continuous contact with the events from 1889 onward, but had also fortuitously, personal contact with a very able and important Chinese official of the Empire, the Hon. Chao Er Shun, Viceroy of Manchuria for a long period and up to the Manchu abdication of Chinese control. You will see from this that I was not wanting in opportunity, at least, for obtaining valid and well authenticated information.

I should like also to add a word as to the Russian attitude. Their success in bluffing Japan out of the enjoyment of the advantages which should have accrued to them through the operation of treaty rights, from 1894 to 1904, is an open book. The Russian preemption and practical alienation of Manchuria during that ten year period are well established facts. The reason for their purpose to control Manchuria is also clear - their lack of an ice-free port for an outlet ^{in the Pacific} to their immense Siberian interests. That need and the consequent desire are no less acute and operative now than when they successfully bluffed Japan out of a temporary surrender of their treaty rights. It is therefore no unreasonable inference that the existing propaganda so widely prev-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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alent, is of Russian origin, intended to arouse anti-Japanese sentiment among the peoples of America and Europe, for the benefit of Russian interests. Consider, the most that Japan could gain from a ^{successful} war with Russia would be some small portions of the ice bound northern Pacific, with a probable further incitement to unfavorable American sentiment, already unreasonably arrayed against Japan. I submit that there is no reasonable ground for the popular idea being now widely disseminated, of the danger to Russia from Japanese attack. All the credible evidence points to the contrary. Any reasonable inference therefore, is sufficiently obvious.

What Japan needs now is to stabilize the legitimately restored Manchu rule in Manchuria, Pacify China and develop the magnificent commercial advantages which these present, and for which the splendid industry, thrift, courage and adaptability of her people so admirably fit her. As I see it, there is no more important or potentially valuable project than the establishment between America and Japan ^{of} a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly understanding. The reaction of such an understanding on both China and Russia would be most wholesome. It would tend to allay unfounded and inevitably disrupting aspirations of both these nations. The popular conception that Japan has sinister designs on China, has no reasonable grounds for support. I will not undertake now to advance further reasons for this opinion.

Soliciting your sympathetic attention,

Yours very truly,

From

T. J. League,
 230 Buist Ave.,
 Greenville S.C.

0366

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Return to
A-1*

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/6581

April 21 1984

My dear Mr. League:

There has been referred to me your letter of April 11, addressed to Mr. Hornbeck, raising the question whether "there might be some discourtesy in submitting for publication a copy of a paper sent to the State Department" and enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by you to another addressee.

Your courtesy in bringing these matters to our attention and the spirit that prompted you to write are appreciated. Inasmuch as the article to which you refer was submitted by you to the Department of State for our information only, no taking of action on our part in relation thereto being called for or being involved, there would seem to be, in our opinion, no impropriety in your submitting the article to possible publishers. In connection with such submission, however, it is felt that, as the Department does not attempt to express a view either
in

Mr. T. J. League,

230 Buist Avenue,

Greenville, South Carolina.

793.94/6581

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in approval or in disapproval of the article or of any
part of its contents, mention by the author of his
correspondence with the Department in connection with
the article might appropriately be refrained from.


Very truly yours,

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

MMH
APR 21 1974
MMH

FE:MMH:REK
4/20/34

FE
M. M. H.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 17, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~WMA:~~
~~FWD:~~
~~SWA:~~

Foochow's 427, March 17, 1934, --

This despatch from Mr. Burke transmits as an enclosure a summary of certain remarks made by Mr. Li Tse-i, who is reported and believed to be the personal representative of Chiang Kai-shek and the man who actually carried on the negotiation of the Tangku truce. Mr. Li apparently was educated in Japan and knows the Japanese quite well.

The burden of Mr. Li's remarks is that China and Japan, because of their proximity, must get down and settle their own difficulties without western interference. He appears to have, all along, advocated a policy of direct negotiation between Japan and China in regard to their mutual problems.

I believe that you will find the entire enclosure interesting and worth reading.

JEJ/VDM

J. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 427

AMERICAN CONSULATE,


Foochow, China, March 17, 1934.

793.94

SUBJECT: Li Tse-i Speaks.


1-1065 GPO

APR 16 34



F/ESP

793.94/6582



WASHINGTON.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
	GR		
	Burke		
To be filed In U.S.A.			

I have the honor to transmit herewith the notes of an interview I had with Mr. Li Tse-i (李擇一), reliably reported and generally believed to be the personal representative of General Chiang Kai-shek. It is also reliably reported that Mr. Li carried on the actual negotiations of the Tangku Truce.

Throughout the interview Mr. Li used the words "common sense" when referring to the handling of the Sino-Japanese situation; meaning that the realities of the situation required the application of common sense rather than theory or idealism.

Although Mr. Li is sometimes termed a Chinese Profligate (中國浪人), and a spy or traitor (間諜), by his fellow countrymen; still viewing in retrospect the present unhappy plight of China and the ugliness of Sino-Japanese relations, it would


seem

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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seem to an impartial observer that there is at least considerable "common sense" in what Mr. Li has to say. Whether conditions would have been any better had Mr. Li's advice been followed is, of course, open to debate. Still, there is one thing fairly certain, they couldn't have been much worse.

Respectfully yours,


Gordon L. Burke,
American Vice Consul.

1
Enclosure:

1/ Li Tse-i Speaks.

700/800

GLB/HCY

In quintuplicate.

Copy to Legation, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 427 of Gordon L. Burke,
 American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated March 17,
 1934, on the subject "Li Tse-i Speaks."

LI TSE-I SPEAKS.

Li Tse-i.

"I hate more what the Chinese officials are doing
 to China than what the Japanese are doing," declares
 Mr. Li Tse-i (李擇一).

Mr. Li is generally believed to be the personal
 representative of General Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石).
 He is a native of Foochow, but he has spent a great
 part of his life in Japan, where he was educated.
 He is thoroughly familiar with the Japanese language
 and customs, and according to his own statement has
 more Japanese friends than Chinese friends. His No.
 2 wife is said to be a Japanese.

Mr. Li told me, on the occasion of a tiffin
 party given by Mr. Waro Moriya, Consul General for
 Japan, on February 24, 1934, that he desired to call
 on me and to explain some phases of the Far Eastern
 situation with which he had had long experience and
 was very familiar. He called at my home on March 4,
 1934. Mr. T. H. Lo (羅忠誠), Councilor of the
 Fukien Provincial Government, had previously informed
 me that General CH'EN Yi (陳儀), Chairman of the
 Fukien Provincial Government, had asked Mr. Li to call
 on me and explain at length certain important matters.

Mr. Li on China.

"Funds were easily obtainable in China, but
 honest men, not," said Mr. Li. "Chinese returned-
 students, particularly those from America, came

back

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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back to China with a lot of half-baked ideas and grandiose schemes, which in America with its vast natural resources and huge industrial wealth were practicable, but not in China, where the opposite was true.

"I have for long advised Chinese officials that their policy of making promises to foreigners which they never kept or intended to keep, was ruinous, and that such a short-sighted policy should be discontinued at once.

"The Chinese are well known to be good businessmen, as evidenced by their amassing of wealth in well-governed countries, such as the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, et cetera. However, we are entirely incapable of self-government and we are not politically minded.

"I should like to see Roosevelt, Mussolini, Hitler, or Stalin come to China, and endeavor to bring order out of chaos. They would do no better than the Chinese leaders. The problem would be too great for them."

Mr. Li on the Sino-Japanese Situation.

When turning to the Sino-Japanese situation, Mr. Li stated that he had long since advocated that China and Japan should settle their own disputes. "I felt and advised that the Shantung question should be settled by direct negotiations between China and Japan," said Mr. Li. "I believed that foreigners

should

-3-

should be left out of the matter, and that it should not be interjected into the Washington Conference. I went to Tokyo, and there reached a verbal agreement with the then Premier of Japan, K. Hara, in regard to the return of Shantung to China. The assassination, however, of Premier Hara put an end to this oral agreement. I proceeded to Washington with the Chinese Delegation, in the capacity of advisor on Japanese Affairs. But at that Conference, I, with my policy of direct negotiation with Japan, was relegated to the background; whereas men, like Lo Wen-kan and Wellington Koo, et cetera, with their policy of relying upon the Western Powers, were successful. I withdrew from politics when this pro-European-American group won out.

"I have always advised that China was not strong enough to antagonize Japan, and hence it was foolhardy for us to continue in our pin-pricking policy. It would have been far better for us if we had desisted in this long ago. The geographical propinquity of China and Japan makes it necessary for us to arrive at some solution, whereby we can live in peace with one another. It is impossible for us to fight forever. The continuation of the struggle means only loss for both sides.

"I have often told the Japanese that we would welcome them to China as traders, but that they should not bring with them their flag. The Chinese would be glad to do business, but it could not be

expected

0374

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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expected that they should be happy to welcome thousands of 'heroes.'

"I do not believe that the Manchurian affair was premeditated. No doubt, the Japanese War Office had several plans regarding possible action in Manchuria. The action, nevertheless, actually taken in September, 1931, was not premeditated, and did not follow any particular plan which had been drawn up before. The state of affairs just grew from day to day. Had the matter been handled differently and had the Chinese authorities listened to my advice, there would be no 'Manchukou' today.

"The Japanese had no premeditated plan regarding the Shanghai fighting. That affair also just grew from day to day.

"The Chinese authorities through listening to the pro-League clique, who placed their hopes in the support of the Western Powers, and through their foolhardy, exasperating, and pin-pricking policy have brought down on their heads the present deplorable situation.

"Although my policy of cooperation with Japan was exceedingly unpopular and had gone unheeded for years, still, when the Chinese authorities saw that their reliance on the League had failed, they sought my assistance. I informed them that it was then too late for them to expect me to do much, but that I would endeavor to repair, in so far as I was able, the damage already done.

"I

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"I have spent much of my time in Foochow recently in bringing prominent Chinese and Japanese together socially. I tell the Japanese that if each one of the people of Japan will make friends with four Chinese that the Sino-Japanese difficulties will disappear. The Japanese are exceedingly difficult to meet socially, as they are too persistently business-like and always use social gatherings in order to advance their political or business interests. At these social functions they also insist on drinking too much, which results in the 'liquor' talking, instead of the men."

"When meeting Japanese, I frankly inform them that I am desirous of helping them, as well as to advance the interest of my own country," said Mr. Li. "All international intercourse should be on a frank basis. To sum it up, I believe that more can be done through friendly social relations than through forever insisting on so-called rights. However, I believe that Chinese officials must adopt a sincere attitude and desist from their duplicity in foreign affairs. Common sense should be our guiding principle."

Mr. Li on the American-Japanese Situation.

I do not feel that there is any genuine or sound reason for Japan and the United States to quarrel; the reason for which has been China. Japan and the United States should learn to understand one another

through

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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through friendly intercourse. They will then learn really to know one another; thus doing away with any possibility of friction.

"I am often called a spy or traitor (間諜). However, I have never received pay for my information, as it would not be worth much to any one."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 102.81 Shanghai/305 FOR letter

FROM Commercial Attache (Arnold) DATED Mar. 9, 1934
TO Shanghai, China NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.
Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Tang Yu-jen,
Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Mr. Peck, concerning -.

703.04/6583
6583

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Foochow/74 FOR Desp.#422

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Mar. 5, 1934

//19/

NAME

1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Sino-Japanese rapprochement, at least on the surface, has been apparent in Foochow since the arrival of the Nanking appointees of the new Fukien Provincial Government.

fpg

793.94/6584

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huetefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with Other Countries.

1. Sino-Japanese Rapprochement.

793.94
 A Sino-Japanese rapprochement, at least on the surface, has been apparent in Foochow since the arrival of the Nanking appointees of the new Fukien Provincial Government. General CH'EN Yi (陳儀), Chairman of the Fukien Provincial Government's No. 2 wife is reliably reported to be a Japanese woman. The reputed special representative of General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Li Tse-i (李擇一), is also believed to have a Japanese No. 2 wife. The following members of the Fukien Provincial Government all speak Japanese quite fluently. General CH'EN Yi, Mr. Li Tsu-yü (李祖虞), Commissioner of Civil Affairs, Commissioner Lin Chih-yuan (林知淵), who is well known to be pro-Japanese, and Mr. Li Tse-i, General Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative.

On Saturday, February 24, 1934, Mr. W. Moriya, retiring Japanese Consul General, gave a tiffin party, to which were invited General CH'EN Yi, the foreign consuls, prominent members of the Fukien Provincial Government, and certain prominent Japanese officials. The friendly spirit displayed between the Japanese and Chinese on this occasion was quite marked.

2. Japanese Oppose Enlargement of Foochow Aviation Field.

The extension of the Aviation Field in Foochow, according to reports from reliable sources, has

encountered

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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encountered Japanese opposition; the reason assigned being that the fund appropriated for this purpose came from the American Wheat and Cotton Loan. Tokyo, it is said, has drawn the Nanking authorities' attention to the Sino-Japanese Treaties concerning the non-alienation of this province to other foreign powers. General Chiang Kai-shek is said to have taken steps to placate the Japanese in regard to this matter.

3. Anti-Japanese Boycott.

No anti-Japanese boycott has been in evidence for a long time past. There was a slight indication, during the middle of the month under report, of its revival. Some posters appeared threatening the readers of the MIN PAO (閩報), a local vernacular paper published by the Japanese at Foochow. A protest from the Japanese Consul General, however, has eliminated any tendency to revive the boycott.

4. General Hsiao Shu-hsüan Appointed Military Attache to Tokyo.

A further indication of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is the recent appointment by Nanking of General Hsiao Shu-hsüan (蕭叔宣), cousin of Mr. Lin Chih-yuan, the above-mentioned pro-Japanese Commissioner of the Fukien Provincial Government, to be the military attache to the Chinese Legation at Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./78 FOR Despatch #2578
FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 12, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: During month of January there was reason to believe the
Japanese were striving to persuade the Chinese author-
ities to support a policy of Sino-Japanese "friendship".

esp

793.94/6585
1587

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. Japan:

a. Japanese policy toward China:⁹

793.9
 During the month under review there was reason to believe that the Japanese were striving to persuade the Chinese authorities to support a policy of Sino-Japanese "friendship". On the surface such a policy would seem to mean that the Japanese would support General Chiang Kai-shek and his representative in North China, General Huang Fu, and abandon subversive activities in return for a solution favorable to the Japanese of such questions as those which relate to Sino-"Manchukuo" intercourse. Actually it may mean that the Japanese hope to gain practical control of North China through "diplomatic" rather than militant means, a North China nominally under Nanking but in fact under substantial Japanese influence.

This view was lent credence by reports to the effect that important Japanese military officers held a conference at Shanghai during January at which it was decided to approve a policy of support of Generals Chiang and Huang in return for an approximately free hand in North China and that, following this conference, a considerable number of so-called Japanese ronin and civilian-clothed Japanese military left China as their subversive activities would be incompatible with a policy of "Friendship".

There are a number of factors which might well influence the Japanese in desiring such a policy, including (1) Japan's apprehension that within the near future it may become

9. Legation's despatch 2557 of February 22.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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become involved seriously with a third power, in which case a "friendly" North China would add to Japan's security; (2) the advantage of being on stabilized terms with China before the convening of the approaching naval armament conference; (3) the apparently increasing appreciation on the part of the Japanese of the dangers and drawbacks of aggression by arms; (4) realization that peaceful penetration of North China would be more economical and less offensive to the Chinese than armed intervention; (5) knowledge that General Chiang Kai-shek's position has been considerably strengthened by his suppression of the rebellion in Fukien; (6) knowledge that he might rather see the Japanese attain their ends in North China peacefully, leaving it under his nominal control and permitting him to consolidate his strength in the rest of China, than to cause Japan, by a policy of resistance, to sever North China completely from banking and to follow a policy even more inimical to his interests; (7) probable growth of Sino-Japanese trade as a result of peaceful aggression; and (8) financial and economic benefit to "Manchukuo" from intercourse between it and China.

b. Japanese and the Kuomintang in North China:

Some excitement was created by a press report that the Japanese authorities had demanded that the eleven principal Kuomintang offices in North China suspend activities. This report was immediately denied by Chinese authorities, and the Chinese news agency which gave out the report was suspended. The report appeared, however, to have some basis in fact. A Japanese military officer explained to an American well-known to the Legation that the Japanese

military

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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military had "told" the Kuomintang in North China that it "ought to stop its anti-foreign activities". One example of this kind of activity which the Japanese found objectionable was the reported request made by representatives of the Kuomintang in North China to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee that Generals Huang Pu and Ho Ying-ch'iu be removed from North China.

c. Japanese "advance" into Chahar Province:

There occurred in the middle of the month an incident in Chahar which created perturbation. According to Chinese reports, Japanese troops drove Chinese troops from Lungmenso Pass (east of Chihchong) in that part of the Great Wall which runs from south to north in Chahar Province. (It was reported in the preceding monthly report that the Japanese claimed that this part of the Wall was the Jehol-Chahar boundary and not the line to the east of it which appears on Chinese maps.) According to Japanese officials, there was no movement of Japanese troops in this affair, but a junior Japanese army officer stationed east of the pass, who had been ordered to go elsewhere in "Manchukuo", sent word to the Chinese commander at the pass, "as a bad joke", to get out of Lungmenso. This, Japanese officials stated, created panic among the Chinese.

d. Resignation of the Japanese Minister of War:

Although the Chinese press varied in opinion with regard to the real reason of the resignation of General Araki as Minister of War, it agreed that his resignation and the appointment of General Hayashi as his successor would not alter Japan's fundamental policy of aggression toward China.

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c. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Japan, and the
Northeastern troops:

Returning from Europe, apparently improved in mental and physical fitness, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, former leader of the Manchurian forces, reached Shanghai January 6. During the remainder of the month which, with the exception of brief visits to Hanking and Hangchow, he spent at Shanghai, the Marshal was occupied with receiving distinguished Chinese or their representatives, resentment against his loss of Manchuria seeming to have subsided. Meanwhile speculation continued with regard to what post would be assigned to him by General Chiang Kai-shek. By the end of the month it became known that he was to be made Vice Commander-in-Chief of Bandit Suppression Forces in Kueichow, Honan, and Anhwei.

This appointment, it was felt, would be satisfactory to the Japanese who had displayed uneasiness with regard to the possible effect of the Marshal's return on the situation in North China where the Marshal's former troops are stationed. It was also believed that it might enable General Chiang to relieve the situation in the North by making possible the transfer from that area to Central China of some of the Northeastern troops. In this connection it was of interest to hear from a source, believed to be reliable that the Japanese had "requested" General Chiang to remove from North China General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Kopei Provincial Government, and General Sung Cho-yuan, Chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government, together with their troops, formerly under Marshal Chang, the Japanese apparently regarding these two generals as the most probable source in North China of action detrimental to Japanese interests.

f.

038F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 FROM APR 18 1934
 Department of State

Tokyo

Dated April 18, 1934

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

71, April 18, 5 p.m. (GRAY)

One. Fleischer informs me that he has telegraphed to the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE the full text of his translation of the "unofficial" statement released last night by the spokesman of the Foreign Office regarding the Japanese attitude toward the rendering of assistance to China by other countries. This translation has been checked with the Japanese text by the Embassy and found to be substantially correct. An official translation into English is to be issued by the Foreign Office tonight or tomorrow. If the official translation differs in any important particulars from the translation telegraphed to the HERALD TRIBUNE, I shall inform the Department by telegraph.

Two. Although the Foreign Office spokesman at first labelled the statement as "unofficial", he told the correspondent of the Associated Press that it had

received

793.94/6586

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 11 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#71 From Tokyo, Apr. 18, 5 p.m.

received the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This morning he told the newspaper correspondents that the statement "could be considered as official" and that it would be sent to the Japanese diplomatic missions abroad for transmission to the various governments.

Three. This morning the Foreign Office spokesman further stated that if the League of Nations should take any concerted action of political significance in China, such action would be regarded as objectionable by Japan. He also stated that Japan would use force if necessary to uphold its policy. In reply to a question he stated that the policy was not intended to conflict with any existing treaties including the Nine Power Treaty (END GRAY).

Four. While local opinion on the subject has not yet crystallized, some observers believe that this constitutes the most important pronouncement of Japanese policy toward China since the presentation of the 21 demands.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WSB RR

0388

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

April 18, 1934.

COMM

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

51 Your 71, April 18, 5 p.m.

Please follow up by mail with all available pertinent material, especially newspaper comment and your comment.

H. L.

SKH

793.94/6586

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 862u.01/87 FOR Despatch #863

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED April 5, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Sino- Japanese question. Action to be taken on,-.

Sino-Japanese question:

Although it is not anticipated that this matter will come directly before the Council, a meeting of the Advisory Committee is scheduled to take place during the Council session. I have been informed that it is planned to confine the deliberations of the Commission strictly to the problem relating to the Manchukuo postal service and that it is hoped that the meeting may not last "longer than half an hour".

793.94/6587

0391

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to Tokyo

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PT

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated
to anyone (B)

FROM TOKYO

Dated April 20, 1934

Rec'd. 11.50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

72, April 20, 8 a.m.

My 71, April 18, 5 p.m. / 6586

One. I have today received so many conflicting
interpretations of the reasons for Amai's announcement of
Japan's policy concerning foreign "interference" in
China that I do not yet feel in a position to clarify
the matter to the Department. There are those who report
"on reliable authority" that the announcement was made
without the authorization or knowledge of Hirota who is
reported to be angry and distressed at Amai's action,
said to have been taken to please the military with whom
Amai is now working in an endeavor to emulate Shiratori.
I know definitely that Shidehara and other liberals have
called on Hirota and have registered their strong dis-
approval of the statement, which appears to run counter
to the latter's conciliatory policy of cultivating better
relations with China and other nations. On the other
hand, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told Fleisher
today

F/ESP

793.94/6588

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PT

- 2 - No. 72 From Tokyo, Apr. 20, 8 p.m.

today that the announcement accurately represented the policy of the Government.

Two. The enunciated policy is of course open to broad interpretation and in view of all present circumstances it is my opinion and that of most of my colleagues that it will not, at least for the present, be enforced in a way liable to create friction with other countries. It seems to me to be highly probable that the statement has been made with a view to building up Japan's position in the eventual conversations preliminary to the coming Naval Conference.

Three. The only certain method of obtaining a correct interpretation of the announcement is to seek an explanation from Hirota himself. If I should seek an interview at the Foreign Office it would be attended by wide publicity. Hirota has, however, offered to receive me at his residence without publicity if I should at any time so desire. I shall take no (repeat no) action unless instructed by the Department.

Repeated to Peiping by mail.

GREW

HED
 WSB

0392

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PARTAIR
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

April 20, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 72, April 20, 8 p.m. and 71/previous.

Department has read text as printed in NEW YORK

HERALD TRIBUNE and is informed by a press correspondent
that Japanese Ambassador states he has official text
which differs from HERALD TRIBUNE text by only a few
words and that he is making translation and will call
at Department with regard to the matter in due course.
Correspondents have pressed Department for comment, but
Department has declined, Japanese Government having com-
municated nothing to it, to make any comment. Department
feels that neither you nor it should initiate any action
at this ^{stage} ~~time~~ indicative of interest or concern and
approves penultimate sentence of your telegram 72.

793.94/6588

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/6588

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

APR 21 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MP

This telegram must be FROM
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone (D)

Moscow

Dated April 20, 1934

Rec'd 2:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

57, April 20, 4 p.m.

Would deeply appreciate views of the Department on
 Japanese Foreign Office statement with regard to China.

BULLITT

KLP HPD

Division of
 FAR-EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 20 1934
 Department of State

Telegram to
 Moscow, April 20,
 1934.

793.94/6589

MAY 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,
 April 20, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,
 MOSCOW.

47 Confidential
 Your 57, April 20, 4 p.m.

Having had neither in Tokyo nor in Washington any communication from Japanese Government, Department has declined to discuss or comment upon this statement. Department is considering possible ^{procedures} ~~courses of action~~, given certain contingencies. Apparently the action of the spokesman is occasioning controversy in Japanese official circles. Department desires that for the present American officials withhold comment, awaiting developments.

Please ^{report} ~~comment~~ on Soviet reaction, official and unofficial.

Hull
 (Rum)

793.94/6589

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

EE

A-M

Enciphered by SKH

Sent by operator M., 19

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RPC
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Confidential File

0395

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED

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 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

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Charge Department

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Charge to

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Department of State

Washington,
 April 23, 1934.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

123 Tokyo's 71, April 18, 5 p. m., to Department and subsequent telegrams which Tokyo has repeated to you by telegraph or by mail in regard to statement issued by spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office in regard to Japan's attitude toward China.

One. Having had neither in Tokyo nor in Washington any communication from Japanese Government, Department has declined to discuss or comment upon this statement. Department is considering possible ^{course of action} ~~proceedure, given certain contingencies~~ Department desires that for the present American officials withhold comment, awaiting developments.

Two. Department understands that the British press and the British Government ^{are} inclined to take a serious view of the statement.

Three. Please report on Chinese reaction, official and unofficial, together with your comment.

793.94/6589

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

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793.94/6589

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 1934

STATEMENT ISSUED TO THE PRESS BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN
 ON APRIL 17 (OR 18)

Text as telegraphed by Tokyo correspondent of the NEW YORK
 TRIBUNE.

(NOTE: We are informed that the Japanese Ambassador has the official
 text and that the text hereunder corresponds with that text
 except for a few words.)]

Text of Statement

The Foreign Office spokesman's statement follows:

The special position of Japan in relations with China and the doctrines advocated by Japan with regard to China may not agree with the ideas of foreign nations but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost efforts in carrying out her mission in East Asia and fulfilling her responsibilities.

Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because Japan and the League failed to agree about Japan's position in East Asia, and, although Japan's attitude toward China may differ from that of other countries, such differences cannot be avoided, due to Japan's special position and mission.

Japan is endeavoring to maintain and enhance friendly relations with foreign nations, but Japan considers that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, she must act

single-handed, on her own responsibility. Japan considers that no other country except China is in a position to share that responsibility.

Opposes Outside Influences

Accordingly, preservation of the unity of China and restoration of order in that country are two objectives ardently desired by Japan for the sake of peace in East Asia. History shows that unity and restoration of order can only be attained by waking up China.

Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail herself of the influence of some other country to repel Japan, as it would jeopardize the peace of East Asia, and also will oppose any effort by China to resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them.

Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and to realize that technical or financial assistance to China must attain political significance.

Acts of this kind must give rise to complications and might necessitate discussion of problems such as fixing zones of interest, or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and would have the most serious effect for East Asia and, ultimately, for Japan.

Sale of War Planes Opposed

Japan must therefore object to such undertakings in principle. Although she will not object to any foreign country negotiating individually with China regarding propositions of finance or trade so long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations threaten to disturb the peace of East Asia, Japan will be compelled to oppose them.

For example, supplying China with war planes, building air-


dromes and detailing military instructors or advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China, and ultimately would prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude should be clear from the policies Japan has pursued in the past, but, due to the fact of gestures for joint assistance to China and other aggressive assistance by foreign countries becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.

The Foreign Office spokesman said this statement of policy had been communicated to all Japanese envoys abroad for their guidance.

"Japan is at present in a position to maintain peace in the Far East and does not need the help of others," the spokesman said also. "If the League of Nations should take concerted action in China having political significance, it would be objectionable to us."

790.94/65892



SEP 5 1934

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK TIMES - April 20, 1934.

The Japanese warning provoked a question in the House of Commons today concerning its significance. Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, replied:

"All I can say at present is that the statement appears to have been made orally by the press officer of the Japanese Foreign Office (Eiji Amau, Chief of the Intelligence Division). There is some discrepancy in the versions of what was said.

"I have nothing to show whether it was an authoritative declaration, and I must wait for information before I can say anything on the subject."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

From one point of view Japan's action should be welcomed: it sheds a clear light upon a situation which a good many mentally short-sighted or narrow-visioned or astigmatic people have not been able hitherto to see in accurate mental perspective. It should put an end to doubt and disputation with regard to the content and intent of Japan's Asiatic policy. It should make it easier for governments of other countries, especially the Government of this country, to formulate and to proceed with sound courses of action in the premises, courses of action which the public can understand and to which it will give reasonable measure of support.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Stripped, this amounts to the posting, by Japan, along the boundaries of China, of a "no trespass" sign. The sign might read: "Sphere of interest and influence of Japan; trespassing forbidden; by order of the Japanese Army and Navy."

The Japanese Government has proceeded in this matter very adroitly. It has not addressed a notice to China; it has not made representations or addressed warnings to the United States and/or other powers; it has simply made a declaration. Action by it in this manner cannot, technically, be regarded as the addressing to any power of a threat or an ultimatum; and it does not call, technically, for any reply or rejoinder by any government. Any steps which any other country may take officially by way of reply must be steps taken upon their own initiative and must imply that they regard Japan's statement as a challenge and that they choose to accept and to reply to it as such. On the other hand, failure on the part of the powers to voice objection to the posting of this notice will imply that they are not able or do not dare to speak or to act in objection thereto and be taken advantage of by the Japanese as a basis for an assumption and, where they choose to make it, an affirmation, that, by tacit acceptance, the powers admit a right on Japan's part to post this notice. Thus the Japanese have given their action a very clever "set-up".

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In giving thought to this action of Japan, we should at the outset get above and away from technicalities and focus our attention upon the essential facts and the fundamental problems involved.

The Japanese have applied a sword to the Gordian knot and they are prepared to use the sword both in defense of that action and in defense of their position and future action in the situation produced by and which may flow from it. In their opinion, they have at stake vital interests. As to intent, they expect to proceed with the safeguarding and promotion of those interests according to their own lights and by and with agencies and methods of their own choosing.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

If the course of human events could be decided by the opinions and acts of a few men -- those in highest authority at any given moment in each of a number of countries -- it might be possible, given a situation such as now exists in the Far East, for one group to post a country like China with "no trespass" signs and to effect, by virtue of decisions on the part of the other groups to respect that prohibition, an exclusive proprietary domination, by the author of the notice, of the area so posted. However, in a world in which there are more than sixty countries, in each of which there are millions of people, among and between whom there exists a network of treaties and a complicated fabric of established relationships, including international finance, international trade, travel and residence abroad, etc., etc., this is utterly out of the question. In the case under consideration, there existed in China before Japan emerged eighty years ago from her self-imposed isolation and there have continued to exist established interests of several other powers, conspicuously Great Britain, France and the United States. Those interests are today considerable in amount. In the presence of that fact, how will the "no trespass" notice be made effective in practice? Will Japan endeavor to expel those interests? The Chinese population of China approximates 450,000,000. The Chinese wish to purchase,

and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

and they have a right to purchase, from abroad, various commodities, including arms. The Japanese, in connection with the "no trespass" sign, state that arms (from other countries) shall not be permitted to pass into China. But other countries are perfectly willing to sell arms and have a right to sell them -- to anyone who wishes to purchase them, including the Chinese. Will the Chinese cease to purchase arms and other countries cease to sell arms to the Chinese simply because this traffic has been forbidden by Japan?

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

It needs to be understood that the thing to which the Japanese object is not the traffic; that to which they object is the effect, as they see it, of the traffic. They regard the acquisition by China of arms and the building up by China of military strength as a development inimical to the policies of Japan and capable of becoming a menace to Japan's security. Such being the case, they sweep aside considerations such as those of the rights of China and of the other powers under international law and by treaty and they go right to the root of the matter. They desire that China shall not have arms and other instruments which would make her relatively stronger vis-à-vis Japan, they intend that she shall not have these things, and they declare that they are prepared to prevent her acquisition of them. (There is not a little that may be said for their point of view and their procedure).

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Japanese have studied world history -- more or less intensively. Whether they understand or do not understand the facts and the lessons of history is perhaps a matter of opinion. They have studied the growth of empires, both ancient and modern. They have studied the history of the British Empire, British methods, British organization, etc. They have studied the history of the United States and of North and South America. They have certain obvious needs and they have developed certain evolving aspirations. They have noted that once upon a time a president of the United States made a statement, from which there evolved a doctrine, which has been more or less a guide to policy and action in the relations between, on the one hand the United States and Latin America and on the other hand the American continents and Europe; and they have noted that during the ensuing century since that doctrine made its appearance the United States has been the most powerful and most influential among the countries of the American Continents. They appear to have arrived at two erroneous conceptions: they seem to think, first, that President Monroe declared that the position of the United States was and would be that of the director of destinies of the American Continents; and, second, that the growth in power and influence of the United States has been a direct consequence of action upon that principle by the United States with assent thereto by the countries of Europe.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

Europe. They therefore affirm that Japan has today a policy with regard to eastern Asia similar to the policy of the United States with regard to the American Continents; and they ask for "recognition" by the rest of the world of that fact and of a "right" on Japan's part to act in accordance therewith.

The simple fact is that the Monroe Doctrine was based upon a concept of the American people that national groups which had achieved and possessed sovereign and independent statehood are of right entitled to the enjoyment of an independent and secure national existence. The people of the United States were such a group and the people of the Latin American countries were such groups. Monroe served notice that European nations were not to interfere with that right of such groups on the American continents. It does not appear that there is in the minds of the Japanese any such concept whatever or that the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine for Asia" or any of the theories or projects of the Japanese with regard to international relations give any evidence that this concept on the part of others has had or would be given respectful consideration by Japan.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Chute NARS, Date 12-18-75

The other powers must consider to what all this is leading. In 1854 Japan consisted of the islands which are now known as Japan proper. Since then, beginning nearly two decades later, Japan has expanded, taking in the Loochoo and the Kurile Islands, Formosa, the Pescadores and Korea; and she has most recently dismembered Manchuria from China and has assumed physical and political control over that area and an adjacent portion of Mongolia. In this process she has fought wars with China and with Russia. Wherever Japan's control has become effective, the tendency has been for the interests of other powers to be caused to diminish or to disappear. Among these interests have been both those of trade and those of political and cultural influence. Now, Japan is casting eyes upon the pièce de résistance. In China she encounters a substantial and important collection of rights and titles belonging to and enjoyed by other powers. There, during the war, in considerable measure through action by Japan, German and Austrian rights and titles were for the most part eliminated. There, at the present time, Great Britain's rights and titles are second in importance, among those of the foreign powers, to those of Japan. There, the rights and titles of the United States are third in importance. There, there exists today an aggregate of undeveloped resources, including labor, greater than lies in any other one geographical area in the world. Rightly or wrongly, the popular conception throughout the world

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

world is that there exists in China a great potential market. It is scarcely conceivable that the Chinese people and the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States will in practice acquiesce in the long run in political and economic domination by Japan of that area, with such discrimination by the Japanese in their own favor as has inevitably accompanied similar domination by them elsewhere. Sooner or later there will come conflicts out of which, if Japan persists, will come resort to arms.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The question then confronts us: should objection be
voiced - and be voiced now - by other powers to the posting
by Japan of the "no trespass" signs?

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The country to which this situation is of most vital concern is, of course, China. The Chinese are helpless, but they can make a good deal of "nuisance" resistance to the invasion of their premises by the more powerful but less numerous Japanese. Next, the Soviet Union: this matter is of concern to them not because of actual material interests in China but because of physical proximity and political interest. Third, Great Britain: they have substantial investments in China and colonial possessions in Asia and great need of Far Eastern markets. Fourth, the United States: we are the other great power located on and with territory in the Pacific; our line of political gravitation is westward; we hold to certain idealistic concepts with regard to national and international rights and obligations; and we need and will increasingly need markets.

From point of view of the immediate and very near future, the Soviet Union and Great Britain have more need to worry over this situation than have we.

Unless Japan's adventuring onto the Asiatic continent comes to grief because of forces operating in China and forces operating within Japan or both, it is likely that this adventuring will before a great while bring Japan into collision with the Soviet Union or Great Britain or both

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

both. If, however, it does neither of these things,
there will almost certainly develop some day a conflict
of interests and of policy between Japan and the United
States so acute as to bring on war between those two
countries.

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Were the world in position today to demand of Japan that she take down this "no trespass" sign and desist from her own trespassing on the Asiatic Continent, the best possible procedure for the powers would be to do just that. But, in position to do that the world is not. Were the United States in position to do it alone, it would be well for us so to do it. But in such position we are not.

If Japan's challenge cannot be responded to in terms of command, it should not be responded to in terms of any communication addressed to the Japanese Government. There should be, so far as the United States is concerned and involved, no debate, either official or unofficial, between spokesmen of the Japanese Foreign Office and the American Government.

Yet, we should reply to Japan's challenge.

Our reply should take the form of:

- (a) continuation of "business as usual" with and in China;
- (b) making for the moment no change in the disposal of our armed forces on and over seas;
- (c) saying little or nothing;
- (d) avoiding being drawn by the Japanese into any new commitment;
- (e) going ahead rapidly and effectively (and perhaps even ostentatiously) with the building and equipping of our naval and air forces - with the fixed objective of making
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the Navy invincible as a defensive weapon and incidentally of compelling Japan so to expend herself in a naval race that she will not have sufficient energy to proceed effectively with her program of expelling and excluding from China our interests and those of other countries.

Briefly stated, Japan, without addressing any country in particular, has declared China a Japanese 'sphere of interest and influence' and has put up a "no trespass" sign intended especially to warn the United States off and out. We should, without troubling to tear down the sign, (a) give unaddressed notice that we will continue to act within our legal rights, and (b) speed the acquisition by ourselves of a weapon of defense bigger and better than the weapon of offense with which the author of the sign is equipped or may endeavor to equip himself.

SMH

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 23, 1934.

The memorandum here attached related to the action of the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, Mr. Amau, in making a statement to the press on the evening of April 17 and the morning of April 18.

Copies of this memorandum, undated, were handed to the Under Secretary and the Secretary on April 20 or 21.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

JUN
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1934
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DCR - 409

Mr. Vinnette.

Do you have
 the original of
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Original not received in DCB-591

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 10, 1934
April 10, 1934

From one point of view Japan's action should be welcomed: it sheds a clear light upon a situation which a good many mentally short-sighted or narrow-visioned or astigmatic people have not been able hitherto to see in accurate mental perspective. It should put an end to doubt and disputation with regard to the content and intent of Japan's Asiatic policy. It should make it easier for governments of other countries, especially the Government of this country, to formulate and to proceed with sound courses of action in the premises, courses of action which the public can understand and to which it will give reasonable measure of support.

793.94/6539-1
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Confidential File

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Stripped, this amounts to the posting, by Japan, along the boundaries of China, of a "no trespass" sign. The sign might read: "Sphere of interest and influence of Japan; trespassing forbidden; by order of the Japanese Army and Navy."

The Japanese Government has proceeded in this matter very adroitly. It has not addressed a notice to China; it has not made representations or addressed warnings to the United States and/or other powers; it has simply made a declaration. Action by it in this manner cannot, technically, be regarded as the addressing to any power of a threat or an ultimatum; and it does not call, technically, for any reply or rejoinder by any government. Any steps which any other country may take officially by way of reply must be steps taken upon their own initiative and must imply that they regard Japan's statement as a challenge and that they choose to accept and to reply to it as such. On the other hand, failure on the part of the powers to voice objection to the posting of this notice will imply that they are not able or do not dare to speak or to act in objection thereto and be taken advantage of by the Japanese as a basis for an assumption and, where they choose to make it, an affirmation, that, by tacit acceptance, the powers admit a right on Japan's part to post this notice. Thus the Japanese have given their action a very clever "set-up".

0416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In giving thought to this action of Japan, we should at the outset get above and away from technicalities and focus our attention upon the essential facts and the fundamental problems involved.

The Japanese have applied a sword to the Gordian knot and they are prepared to use the sword both in defense of that action and in defense of their position and future action in the situation produced by and which may flow from it. In their opinion, they have at stake vital interests. As to intent, they expect to proceed with the safeguarding and promotion of those interests according to their own lights and by and with agencies and methods of their own choosing.

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If the course of human events could be decided by the opinions and acts of a few men -- those in highest authority at any given moment in each of a number of countries -- it might be possible, given a situation such as now exists in the Far East, for one group to post a country like China with "no trespass" signs and to effect, by virtue of decisions on the part of the other groups to respect that prohibition, an exclusive proprietary domination, by the author of the notice, of the area so posted. However, in a world in which there are more than sixty countries, in each of which there are millions of people, among and between whom there exists a network of treaties and a complicated fabric of established relationships, including international finance, international trade, travel and residence abroad, etc., etc., this is utterly out of the question. In the case under consideration, there existed in China before Japan emerged eighty years ago from her self-imposed isolation and there have continued to exist established interests of several other powers, conspicuously Great Britain, France and the United States. Those interests are today considerable in amount. In the presence of that fact, how will the "no trespass" notice be made effective in practice? Will Japan endeavor to expel those interests? The Chinese population of China approximates 450,000,000. The Chinese wish to purchase,

and

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- 3 -

Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement against
 the Communist Internationale.

On the occasion of today's signing of the agreement
 against the Communist Internationale the undersigned plen-
 ipotentaries have agreed on the following:

- a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will cooperate in a close manner with regard to the exchange of information concerning the activity of the Communist Internationale as well as concerning the measures of information and defense against the Communist Internationale.
- b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will adopt strict measures within the scope of the existing laws against those who are directly or indirectly active at home or abroad in the service of the Communist Internationale or further its work of disintegration.
- c) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities of the two High Contracting States as laid down, a permanent commission will be established. In this commission the further measures of defense necessary to combat the work of disintegration of the Communist Internationale will be considered and conferred upon.

Done at Berlin, November 25, 1936, corresponding to
 November 25th, 11th year of Showa.

(Signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop,
 German Ambassador Extraordinary and
 Plenipotentiary.

(Signed) Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji,
 Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extra-
 ordinary and Plenipotentiary.

FE:JHS/DLY

FE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

RECEIVED
 APR 21 1934
 DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

London

Dated April 21, 1934

Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 21 1934

Department of State

187, April 21, 10 a.m.

Thursday's and Friday's press carries headlines

regarding statement of Japanese Foreign Office spokes-
 man on Chinese, authentic version of which, however,
 has only been thoroughly digested today and all papers
 continue this as front page story, together with the
 attempted modification issued yesterday by Tokyo. In
 general press here interprets Japan's move as a
 "Monroe Doctrine for the East" proposed by Japan at
 a moment of general confusion in the western world.
 The attempted explanations and disclaimers which
 have followed the first statement have, in the view
 of the press, merely underlined and clarified the
 essentials.

In the Houses of Parliament on the 19th Simon
 stated that he must await further information before
 any official statement could be made and official
 spokesmen are maintaining this attitude, although
 Foreign Office Press Section pointed out to cor-
 respondents British treaties particularly the

Nine

F/E/SP

793.94/6590

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#187 From London, Apr. 21, 10 a.m.

Power

Nine ~~(#)~~ Agreement and the earlier Four Power Consortium Agreement of 1920. It is expected an official statement will be made in the House of Commons early next week in reply to questions.

The press and public opinion obviously infer this Japanese statement will, apart from China itself, be regarded very seriously by the British and Soviet Governments but more especially by the United States Government since it threatens the traditional American policy of the "open door". Press assumes United States will take the initiative in consulting with other powers. There is a general sentiment expressed both in the press and in conversation for close Anglo-American cooperation. Lord Cecil states in a press interview he regards this Japanese action as an inevitable consequence of the failure of the League of Nations to stop Japan from seizing Manchuria.

Foreign Office has stated no conversations have taken place as yet between the British Ambassador and American Government on this subject.

BINGHAM

HPD

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone(b)

London

Dated April 21, 1934

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH

188, April 21, 11 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 187, April 21, 10 a.m.

In conversation with Simon yesterday evening
 he read me British Embassy telegram from Tokyo, just
 received, giving the British Ambassador's version of
 the statement of the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman
 in regard to China. Simon said he took a most apprehen-
 sive view of this Japanese move and said that to meet
 it successfully he felt close Anglo American consultation
 and cooperation was necessary, and hoped for his part
 that once the facts were established there might be an
 early exchange of views. I regarded it as significant
 that he made no reference to the League of Nations.

I told Simon I would report his statement to
 me to my Government.

BINGHAM


WCB HPD

F/ESP

793.94/6591

MAY 11 1934

Confidential File



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-388
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Washington,
 April 23, 1934.

6P

B

AmEmbassy,
 London.

156

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 187, and 188, April 21, 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.

We have received neither in Tokyo nor in Washington any communication from Japanese Government. Thus far, Department has declined to discuss or comment upon Japanese Foreign Office statement.

We believe that the essential facts with regard to the issuing of the statement and its substance are now known; that the issuance of such statement naturally causes in the United States and in the other countries which possess rights and interests in the Far East feelings of amazement; and that all such powers would wish in the light of those facts to express views and to make such decisions with regard to action individual or concurrent as they may deem appropriate. For example, we are considering the making by the American Government, for the benefit of the American people, of a statement

Enciphered by HP

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/6591

Confidential File

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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statement containing reference to international law and
 treaties and declaring, with or without detail, our attitude
 and position, but we have not repeat not decided definitely
 that this will be our procedure. In the light of Sir John
 Simon's approach to you, we would give careful consideration
 to any suggestions or proposals which the British Government
 might wish at an early moment to make.

You may inform Sir John Simon ^{1/2 all} of the above and
 say to him that, in acting for the safeguarding of our own
 interests, we are willing to do our part toward the safe-
 guarding of the common interest, but not repeat not to do
 more than our part and that we will welcome any indication
 which he may be disposed to give us, in confidence, at his
 earliest convenience, of the British Government's thought,
 or intentions, in the premises.

A separate telegram follows giving additional data
 information which you may, in your discretion, use in con-
 nection with the above.

FE SKH/ZMK
 WP/AB

Phillips
 Acting.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 50

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

0435

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,
 April 23, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference Department's 156 April 23-6 Pm

As throwing possible additional light on the Japanese Foreign Office statement, we are informed that the Japanese Ambassador here has stated to a press correspondent that this statement of policy was circulated by the Japanese Foreign Office to Japanese missions abroad sometime ago and that the Foreign Office spokesman's statement should not repeat not be regarded as directed against the United States but was made as a warning to an European power (confidentially named) which power is contemplating making to China a loan for financial rehabilitation purposes. If true, the first point is important. Whether or not there is any basis of fact for the second point, these statements are further evidence among various indications that the Japanese Government, having made an affirmation of an intent which challenges rights and interests of other governments and contributes to the creation of the theory of a Japanese hegemony in the Far East, is seeking, by use

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

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0436

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of diplomatic opiates, to induce absence or mildness of
 rejoinder by the powers.

Comment from Tokyo indicates opinion among foreign
 observers there that ~~(Japanese objection to activities of~~
~~League of Nations advisers to China contributed to~~
~~precipitating the Japanese statement; also, opinion among~~
~~some that)~~ the statement was issued with Hirota's endorsement.

Phillips
accy

APR 23 1976

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

0437

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to [Signature]

JS TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C) TOKYO

FROM Dated April 21, 1934
 Rec'd 2:05

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D.C.

APR 3 1934
 DIVISION OF

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 23 1934
 Department of State

F/ESP

73, April 21, 9 p.m.
 My 72, April 20, 8 p.m. and 54 April 20, 6 p.m.

One. The opinion of foreign observers is now tending towards the belief that the Foreign Office statement of policy was issued at the present moment owing to anxiety over the increasing evidence of foreign activity in China. Rajchmann is on his way to Geneva to report to the League of Nations on the question of technical assistance. Monnet also of the League, is reported by my French colleague to be active in Shanghai in endeavoring to organize an international syndicate, with alleged prominent participation of American capital, for the purpose of financing a public works program. The Chinese Government is said to insist upon the exclusion of Japanese from participation in the proposed financing. The German General von Seeckt is reported to have arrived in China with a considerable number of officers to give military instruction, while Americans, Italians, and French are said to be active in selling airplanes. The Legation in Peiping is doubtless in a better position than the Embassy to confirm or deny the foregoing reports. At any rate the combined effect of these

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FILED
 MAY 11 1934
 CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-
From Tokyo, Apl. 21, #73.

these various alleged activities and enterprises lead to Japanese fears of a strengthening China and is believed to have precipitated the recent definition of policy. Observers now believe that the statement was issued with Hirota's full endorsement although none of my colleagues appears as yet to have discussed the matter with him.

Two. On being questioned yesterday as to the method by which Japan proposed to circumvent the delivery of war material and other foreign assistance to China, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told Fleisher that pressure would be brought to bear not on the countries of origin but on the Chinese themselves.

Repeated to Peiping

GREW

//-apparent omission

GW CIB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

April 24, 1934.

CC: AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

Urgent.

Your 73, April 21, 9 p.m., and previous.

Department has still had no communication from any

Japanese source with regard to this matter and has made no repeat no comment. We are informed that Sir John Simon has stated in House of Commons that he has instructed British Ambassador Tokyo to communicate with the Japanese Government with the object of getting light upon certain aspects of the spokesman's statement and to learn what application it might have to Great Britain.

Department desires that you obtain a copy of translation of text as telegraphed by Fleisher to NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE and that you inquire of Hirota whether this is a reasonably accurate translation of the statement. You should not repeat not invite comment or clarification. If Hirota volunteers comment, you should listen attentively but without entering into any discussion of the matter and should report fully and as nearly as possible in his phraseology. Department hopes that you

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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Confidential File

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 PREPARING OFFICE
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will be able to execute this at the earliest possible moment

Two. For your confidential information, a high official of the Department asked Saito to come in this afternoon and be so good as to give us a text. Saito came in and declared that there had been no text but that ~~Amey~~ had made certain statements in reply to questions put to him by press correspondents.

*Philip
 Key*

FE:SKH:EJL

FE

U:BFB

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 3, 1934.

~~JFI:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~MMH:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 2611 under
 date March 27, 1934, --

No action.

The despatch encloses an interesting memorandum of conversation between Minister Johnson and T'ang Yu-jen, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.

The important points brought out in the memorandum are:

(a) Mr. T'ang believed that Huang Fu's presence in North China was a stabilizing influence because Huang Fu had been most successful in "whittling" down the Japanese demands before agreeing to anything and because he represented the Central Government.

(b) Inasmuch as Huang Fu would, in spite of his haggling with the Japanese, eventually have to concede almost everything which China had in the North, Nanking was faced with the necessity of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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deciding whether or not to recall Huang Fu. The decision would rest upon the question as to whether within the next two or three years China could expect the direct assistance of friendly foreign nations in this matter. Mr. Johnson remarked in this connection that he was quite certain that the Japanese would not discuss these questions in the presence of friendly powers.

(c) Mr. T'ang believed that Japan had two objects in view; the greater one being a hegemony over Asia and the lesser one to establish a neutral or friendly rear in the event of conflict with Russia.

(d) Mr. Johnson said that he thought there was little likelihood that the United States would render military assistance to China in any conflict that China might have with Japan. Mr. T'ang replied that he realized this fact and continued by saying that what the Chinese were interested in was obtaining the sympathy of the United States.

(e) Mr. T'ang stated that Nanking did not believe that Japan would send a military force into North China because all that was necessary was to supply arms to the

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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discontented elements in that area and set up a new "Manchukuo".

(f) Mr. Johnson commented on the cost to Japan of her military ventures into China and remarked that if and when Japan's present era of prosperity passed it would not be so easy for Japanese industry to pay these expenses. Mr. T'ang thought the Japanese hoped to pay for their adventures in Chinese money.

ETW
 ETW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2611 Peiping, March 27, 1934.

Subject: Mr. T'ang Yu-jen's views on Sino-Japanese relations.

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy in file
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 23 1934
Department of State
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F/ESP
793.94/6596

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to forward, in strict confidence,
a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on
March 19, 1934, with the Vice Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, Mr. T'ang Yu-jen, who has recently visited Peiping,
with regard to the importance of General Huang Fu's pre-
sence in Peiping, the aims of Japan with respect to China,
and the possibility of China receiving foreign assistance
in the event of certain eventualities.

MAY 7 - 1934

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure: Copy of
memorandum, as stated.
710
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

LES-SC

4

JM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1
2611

Sino-Japanese relations.

Strictly Confidential

Peiping, March 19, 1934.

Conversation with: Mr. T'ang Yu-jen, Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

I asked Mr. T'ang Yu-jen whether he could give me any information as to the present posture of Sino-Japanese relations. Mr. T'ang said that was one of the reasons why he had asked to see me this morning. He wished to tell me of this situation. He began by asking me whether I was not of the opinion that Mr. Huang Fu's presence in North China exercised a stabilizing influence upon the situation here. To this question I replied that it appeared to me that Mr. Huang Fu's presence here was without doubt a stabilizing influence, but that I was somewhat at a loss to explain why this should be the case. Mr. T'ang stated that he thought he could explain to me why this was so, and he proceeded as follows:

He pointed out that the Japanese were constantly making demands, and being here in Peiping it was possible for Mr. Huang Fu at all times to receive the Japanese demands for this and for that and for the other thing, and to discuss these demands with them as they arose. Mr. Huang Fu's attitude in these discussions

was

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

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was invariably one of opposition. When the Japanese presented a demand he would say no, and then they would come back and present their demand again. Mr. Huang Fu by a process of wrangling and whittling would maneuver the Japanese to a point where they would demand less than they had started out with; he would then make a small concession on what originally had been a large request, and the Japanese would go away feeling happy. In other words, Mr. Huang Fu's presence in Peiping assured the Japanese of having some one here representing the Central Government able to negotiate and discuss questions with them and make concessions. Mr. Huang Fu was willing to do this task at the risk of his reputation; he was the only man that was willing to do this. The Japanese, knowing this, would refrain from making incursions into the country.

Mr. T'ang then proceeded to suppose that Mr. Huang Fu should be withdrawn from Peiping. Under these circumstances the Japanese would present their demands to the local authorities, and the local authorities would be afraid either to see the Japanese or to enter into any discussions with them or make any concessions, whereupon the Japanese would take action and set up authorities here that would be prepared to negotiate and accept Japanese dictation. The advantage of having Mr. Huang Fu here was that North China remained under the direct control of the Central Government. But if Mr.

Huang

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Huang Fu were to go, although the flag of China might still fly over North China, to all intents and purposes North China would be governed by authorities not amenable to Nanking. For this reason Mr. Huang Fu's presence in Peiping was a stabilizing influence.

Mr. T'ang then proceeded to say that, while Mr. Huang Fu's presence in Peiping was a stabilizing influence and he was able to haggle with the Japanese over the many questions which were constantly arising, this situation could not continue long, for eventually at this rate Mr. Huang Fu would have to concede almost everything which China had in the North, and the Government was faced with the almost immediate necessity of deciding whether it would continue Huang Fu in Peiping or recall him. He said that the Government's decision to retain Huang Fu in Peiping would rest upon the question as to whether within the next two or three years China could expect the direct assistance of friendly foreign nations in this matter. He asked me what my opinion was as to the possibility of China receiving the assistance of friendly nations.

I said to Mr. T'ang that this question put the whole subject in a very serious light; that I was quite certain the Japanese were not prepared to discuss questions with the Chinese in the presence of friendly powers; that they would insist upon carrying on their negotiations directly with the Chinese and without the intervention

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intervention of any outside power. I said furthermore that it was extremely difficult for one to discover the exact aims of the Japanese in this area, or to know just what assistance the friendly powers could give to China.

Mr. T'ang stated that he realized that Japan would not discuss questions between herself and China in the presence of other powers. As to the question of what Japan wanted, Mr. T'ang stated that he had certain ideas. He expressed it as his opinion that Japan had two objects in view. One, the greater object, was to establish a Japanese hegemony over Asia. The Japanese desired that China have no relations with foreign powers except under the guidance and advice of the Japanese, and that the Chinese market be a Japanese market. This was Japan's Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. He said that there were thinking men in Japan who believed that the present was not perhaps the time for Japan to accomplish this greater purpose, and that the accomplishment of the secondary purpose would be sufficient at this time.

Japan's secondary purpose, Mr. T'ang explained, was to assure herself of a neutral or friendly rear in the eventuality of a conflict with Russia. He stated that in 1905 when Japan fought Russia, although Japan did not receive the active assistance of the Chinese, China was friendly to Japan, for the Empress Dowager

had

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had ordered Yuan Shih-kai to assist the Japanese troops to obtain supplies. He said that at that time there was no feeling between China and Japan, but that now all this was different. The soldiers of China had had contact with Japanese soldiers, and there was present throughout the country a feeling of hostility toward Japan. If hostilities should break out between Japan and Russia, the Chinese would wish to assist the Russians. Japan feared this eventuality and would wish to prevent such a situation arising. Mr. T'ang expressed the belief that the assistance which the Chinese would need would have to be active military assistance.

I said to Mr. T'ang that in so far as the United States was concerned there was little likelihood of America willingly becoming involved in any military intervention here in the East in the next two or three or four years. I said that of course this was my personal opinion and that I was not able to forecast what attitude the United States might take in these matters in the future, but that nevertheless this opinion of mine was based upon convictions which I now had, and I thought there was little likelihood that China would receive in the near future any military assistance from the United States in any conflict which she might have with Japan in this field. I asked Mr. T'ang whether it was his belief, or the belief of those at Nanking, that the Japanese would move into North China.

Mr.

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Mr. T'ang stated that he appreciated the situation in the United States, but he said that what the Chinese were interested in was in obtaining the sympathy of the United States, for where the United States had placed its sympathy in world affairs there the victory was to be found. It was very important for a nation to have the sympathy of the United States in any difficulty which it might have with another nation. China had observed that America's sympathy during the Great War had brought victory to the allied cause. Mr. T'ang went on to say that in Nanking it was not believed that Japan would send a military force into North China for the purpose of occupying this area. This was not necessary; all that Japan had to do was to supply arms to discontented elements in North China and set up a new "Manchukuo" here.

I said to Mr. T'ang that this last statement of his made the whole situation very complicated from the point of view of other powers. I repeated my earlier statement to the effect that there was no sentiment in the United States at the present time which could be relied upon as favoring military intervention in the situation here in the East. I pointed out that the clearest indication of this was to be found in the fact that we were contemplating legislation granting freedom to the Philippines, and while it was true that those favoring such legislation desired to obtain the neutral-
ization

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ization of the Philippines, still the fact that we were discussing seriously such a proposal was clear evidence of lack of interest on the part of America in becoming involved in this area. I stated, however, that the whole situation was such a complicated one that I hesitated to say anything which might be considered as final. In the first place, it was by no means certain that the Japanese could afford to continue traveling the road which they had been traveling the last two or three years; their adventures thus far had cost them a considerable sum of money.

Mr. T'ang stated that he thought the Japanese hoped to pay for their adventures with Chinese money. He also pointed out that Japanese industry was enjoying a great boom at the present time; Japanese industry was making great profits; all of which was enabling Japan to pay for her military adventure.

I said that after all this era of prosperity which the Japanese were enjoying at the moment might pass, and it was certain that then it would not be so easy for Japanese industry to pay for these expenses as it was now doing. Mr. T'ang said that he hoped this might be true. Here the conversation ended.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:EA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~WCH:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~SKH:~~

Peiping's 2622, March 29,
1934, --

This is a brief account
of a conversation which took
place on March 24 between
Minister Johnson and General
Huang Fu in regard to the
general situation in North
China. I believe that you
will find it of interest to
read the entire account which
is not lengthy.

J. F. J.

JEJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2622

Peiping, March 29, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese situation and conditions in China.

APR 21 1934



F/ESP 793.94/6594

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to forward a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on March 24, 1934, with General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Committee, on the subjects of Sino-Japanese relations and conditions in China.

General Huang said that the situation in North China was not entirely without danger as the Japanese were continually "pressing for this and that" but that there was evidence of Japanese efforts to assuage the situation, as, for example, the stationing at Dolonor, Chahar Province, of only a Japanese captain and a few men, press reports of large troop concentration not-

withstanding

MAY 9 - 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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withstanding, and the decreasing of the number of people active about the Japanese headquarters in Tientsin. He believes that Japan can never succeed in Manchuria and that Manchuria will never really solve Japan's population problem because the increasing Chinese population there will be more than sufficient to consume its resources. General Huang Fu was pessimistic with regard to the possibility of such leaders as Generals Chen Chi-t'ang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Han Fu-chu uniting in active support of the Central Government.

Respectfully yours,


Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Enclosure:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation, dated March 24, 1934.

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Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

LES-SC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1st-Japanese situation and conditions
in China.

Peiping, March 31, 1934.

Conversation with: General Huang Fu, Chairman of
Peiping Political Affairs
Readjustment Committee.

General Huang Fu lunched with me to-day, and in the course of conversation after lunch I asked him about the situation here in North China, particularly vis-à-vis the Japanese. He said that one could not say that the situation here was entirely without danger. The Japanese were continually pressing for this and that.

In reply to my question, he said that he did not believe the statement that the Japanese were stationing the Seventh Division at Dolonor. He had been assured by the Japanese that they had no intention of putting the Seventh Division there. Information from his own agents was to the effect that the Japanese had a Captain and a few men at Dolonor, and that the Seventh Division was already taking the place of the Eighth Division at Chengteh and Kupeikow and would have its headquarters at Chengteh. Furthermore, the Seventh Division was on a peace time footing as regards the

number

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

number of men. Additional evidence of the fact that the Japanese were trying to assuage the situation here was found in the fact that there were fewer people active about the headquarters in Tientsin.

Some comment was made upon the fact that the economic situation in China was complicated because of the unwillingness of strong men like Chen Shi-tang, Yan Hsi-shan, Han Fu-chu and others to join hands in support of the Government. A parallel was drawn between the situation in China and the situation in Japan where the genre performed a great service in unification of the country. Huang Fu assented, but remarked: "Tigers will not come out of the hills." He then went on to say that China's domestic troubles had come fifty years too late; he felt that China would have been in a better position to meet the dangers on her boundaries if she could have met these domestic difficulties fifty years ago.

He also stated that he felt Japan could never succeed in Manchuria; that Manchuria could never furnish a real solution to Japan's problem of population, as the increasing Chinese population of Manchuria would be more than sufficient to consume the resources of Manchuria.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

NTJ:RA

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (d)

FROM

MOSCOW

Dated April 22, 1934

Rec'd. 10.25 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

60, April 22, 5 pm

Your telegram No. 47, April 20, 6 pm

Soviet reaction to Japan's announcement in regard to China is one of unalloyed delight. The position of the Soviet Union is regarded as greatly improved since it is considered likely that the United States and Great Britain now will have to oppose Japan openly whereas the Soviet Union will be able to remain discreetly in the background and may thus avoid the war with Japan which has been considered inevitable.

Litvinov, grinning broadly, said to me today: "perhaps your government will realize now that there is no limit to which Japan will not go. Any concession whatever leads merely to further demands. This is equivalent to proclamation of a protectorate over China."

I know that the Japanese Minister in Peiping informed the British and German Ministers in advance. The British

Minister

FILE 793.94/6595

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 60, April 22, 5 pm from Moscow

Minister said he could not assent. The German assented. You will note that the Japanese announcement was not directed against the German instructors of the Chinese army which to my mind means that those instructors are the agents of the Japanese Government rather than of the Chinese Government. The announcement was directed against the United States and against the League of Nations whose committee headed by ^(Rajchman?) ~~Rajchman~~ is about to report.

There is but one way to stop Japan today and that is to call on all powers interested in the Pacific for a joint protest. The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Holland and Italy should be invited to join in a protest".

I asked Litvinov why he did not include Germany. He said that he believed Germany was much too close to Japan at the moment to do anything but make trouble. I asked him if he did not think action should come by way of the League. He replied that the League would take no action; that this was a matter for the Pacific powers. I asked him if he thought words would be of any use unless we were ready to back them up by acts which none of us were anxious to perform. He answered that thus far Japan had only used words and that at the moment words were a fitting reply.

Litvinov

1455

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Moscow No. 69, April 22, 5 p. m.

-3-

Litvinov said: "If you allow this statement of the Japanese Foreign Office to pass without comment the Japanese in the future will insist that it has established a definite policy and that you have acquiesced by your silence."

I made no comment on the foregoing observations but asked Litvinov how his negotiations with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway were progressing. He said that he had submitted another offer to Japan but although the Japanese had promised to discuss it they had not done so.

The Chinese Charge d'Affaires this morning informed me in strictest confidence that early in March of this year the Soviet Government had said to him that if the Chinese Government would declare war on Japan the Soviet Government would enter that war on the side of China. He said that this proposal had been made to him in the most formal manner but that his Government had not taken it seriously and had not replied. The Chinese Charge d'Affaires told me further that neither Litvinov nor any other official of the Foreign Office had discussed the recent Japanese announcement with him; that the Russians were delighted and would attempt to remain completely in the background and permit the United States and England to get into the foreground of opposition to Japan. He expressed the opinion that the note was essentially directed against the United States; that England could

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

From Moscow No. 60, April 22, 3 p. m.

-4-

could not be relied on for anything but hypocritical
opposition to Japan as she was attempting to do in Tibet
precisely the same thing that Japan was doing in Manchuria
and North China.

The Soviet press under orders has refrained from
comment on the Japanese announcement.

WNC HPD

BULLITT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Justen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

GRAY

London

Dated April 23, 1934


Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH

190, April 23, 4 p.m.

URGENT



In reply to several questions in the House of Commons this afternoon Simon stated he had received no notification from the Japanese Government but British Ambassador had sent him text of what was described as translation of an informal statement made to the Japanese press by Minister for Foreign Affairs. The statement appeared to be concerned with certain possible dangers which might arise out of relations between China and Japan. Japanese explained that this statement had been caused by their apprehension of action of certain foreign powers in China. Simon explained he personally felt Great Britain was not referred to and concluded in substance as follows:

The general character of the statement was

such,

F/ESP

793.94/6596

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#190 From London, Apr. 23, 4 p.m.

See 192,
 April 23,
 4 p.m.,
 from
 London.
 M.M.H

such, particularly regarding financial assistance to
 China, that I have felt it necessary to make a friendly
 communication to the Japanese Government with the object
 of clarifying certain aspects of that statement and to
 learn what application it might have to the British
 Government.

In reply to request for assurances that ~~Japan~~ ^{His Majesty's} Government
 would do nothing without the United States Simon side-
 stepped and pointed out that he had already addressed
 this inquiry and further answered that he had read in
 this morning's press the reported interview given by
 Ambassador Saito in Washington.

BINGHAM .

KLP WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED April 20, 1934.

1934 APR 20 PM 3:14

Here attached a copy, from
 the Chinese Legation, of the
 Nanking Government's statement
 "in reply to Japanese statement
 of April 17th".

SKH
 SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

With the compliments of

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Rec'd
10-19-34
 SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chinese Minister

Washington, D.C.

Issued today following informal statement in reply to


Japanese statement of April 17th:

"China is always of the opinion that international peace can be maintained only by the joint efforts of all the members of the family of nations. Especially is it necessary for nations to cultivate the genuine spirit of mutual understanding and remove the fundamental causes of friction in order to establish durable peace among them. No state has the right to claim the exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace in any designated part of the world.

"Being a member of the League of Nations China feels it her duty to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. In her endeavor to attain these ends she has never harbored any intention of injuring the interests of any particular country far less causing a disturbance of peace in the Far East. China's relations with other nations in this regard have always been of such a nature as would characterize the relations between independent and sovereign states.

"In particular China desires to point out that the collaboration between herself and other countries whether in the form of loans or in the form of technical assistance has been strictly limited to matters of a non-political character and that the purchase

of



F/ESP

793.94/6597

FILED

JUN 2 - 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of such military equipment as military aeroplanes and the employment of military instructors and experts have been for no other purposes than national defence which chiefly consists in the maintenance of peace and order in the country. No nation which does not harbor any ulterior motives against China need to entertain any fears concerning her policy of national reconstruction and security.

"In regard to the situation now existing between China and Japan it should be emphasized that genuine and lasting peace between the two countries as between any other countries should be built upon foundations of good-will and mutual understanding and that it would go a long way towards the laying of such foundations when the existing unfortunate state of affairs could be rectified and when the relations between China and Japan could be made to rest on a new basis more in consonance with the mutual aspirations of the two countries."

Waichiaopu 19th

Received April 19, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy

Chinese Minister

Washington, D. C.

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 Japanese statement of April 17th:

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 for maintaining international peace in any designated part
 of the world.

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 a disturbance of peace in the Far East. China's relations
 with other nations in this regard have always been of such
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 pendent and sovereign states.

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 character

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

character and that the purchase of such military equipment as military aeroplanes and the employment of military instructors and experts have been for no other purposes than national defence which chiefly consists in the maintenance of peace and order in the country. No nation which does not harbor any ulterior motives against China need to entertain any fears concerning her policy of national reconstruction and security.

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Received April 19, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

mam

GRAY

LONDON

FROM Dated April 23, 1934

Rec'd 4:50 pm

Secretary of State

Washington

192, April 23, 10 pm.

793.9+

According to the official version reported to me this evening of Simon's statement in Parliament this afternoon, please correct the next to last paragraph of my 190/ April 23, 4 pm, so that it will read as follows:

"The general character of the statement and of certain details in it, such as the reference to financial assistance to China, are of a nature which have made me think it necessary to communicate with the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of His Majesty's Government."

BINGHAM

HLP MAM

F/G 793.94/6598

FILED
 Confidential File
 MAY 11 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1934.

~~RCM:~~

~~WCK:~~

Shanghai's despatch No. 9380,
 March 23, 1934, --

This despatch and enclosure are interesting as they indicate that the Chinese authorities are still complying with the arrangement for the settlement of the Shanghai affair by informing the Japanese with regard to Chinese troops passing through Markham Road Junction and that the Japanese military are still observing these troop movements.



JEJ/VDM


0471

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 9380

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, March 23, 1934.




Ad.
St.

FE
and

F/ESP

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m
793.20




SUBJECT:

Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	M	To fill	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	<i>James ...</i>	In U.S.A.	<input type="checkbox"/>

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/6599

- I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
- 1/ For a self-explanatory despatch No. 7862 of this date, with enclosure, from this Consulate General to the Legation at Peiping in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
 Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

APR 1 - 1934

FT/ED

Enclosure:

- 1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's despatch No. 7862, with enclosure.

800
 PRJ:NLH

In quintuplicate

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7862

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
 Shanghai, China, March 23, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5,
 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops.

The Honorable

Nelson Truider Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

With reference to this Consulate General's
 telegram of November 20, 1933, 4 p.m., regarding the
 movement of Chinese troops through Markham Road
 Junction, Shanghai, and with regard to the Legation's
 confidential despatch to the Department No. 2074
 dated April 25, 1933, on the subject of the possible
 dissolution of the Joint Commission created by the
 Sino-Japanese Armistice Agreement of May 5, 1932, I

- 1/ have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the
 Joint Commission's circular No. 147, circulated
 March 20, 1934, being a copy of a communication from
 the Japanese Consul General and Civil Delegate on the
 Joint Commission regarding the movement of Chinese
 soldiers through Markham Road Junction. It will be
 noted that the Chinese Civil Delegate has given
 advance notice to the Japanese Delegate in regard to
 the passage of soldiers and that the Japanese Naval

Landing

0472

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Landing Party is also observing their movements.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin B. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Joint Commission
Circular No. 147, dated
March 20, 1934.

800
EPJ:MLM *ku*

In quintuplicate to Department
by despatch No. 0.512 of
March 23, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 7862 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated March 23, 1934, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Agreement of May 5, 1932: Movement of Chinese Troops."

JOINT COMMISSION

American Consulate General

(JOINT COMMISSION CIRCULAR NO. 147.)

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT COMMISSION PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO ITS MEMBERS AND HAS THE HONOR TO CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

 (From the Japanese Delegate to the Secretary!)

March 16, 1934.

E. A. Long, Esquire,
 Secretary, Joint Commission,
 Shanghai.

Dear Mr. Long,

I beg to furnish you with information about the passage of Chinese military units through Markham Road Junction with which I have received from the Japanese Naval Landing Party together with advance notices on the same subject given me by Mr. O. K. Yui, Chinese Civil Delegate, both of which are enumerated on the separate sheets enclosed herewith.

Yours faithfully,
 (sd) Itaro Ishii,
 Japanese Civil Delegate.

 Enclosures:

Circulated: March 20, 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Advance notices from Mr. O.K.Yui, Chinese Civil Delegate, on the passage of Chinese soldiers through Markham Road Junction.

 Notice on January 9th reports that 56 officers and men of the 53rd Division will pass here en route to Hangchow at that night.

Notice on January 11th reports that the gendarmerie unit at Nanking will replace the gendarmerie unit hitherto stationed at Lunghua which will be shifted to Chinkiang.

Notice on January 12th reports that 642 soldiers of the 80th Division, who left Nanchang on the 9th inst., are proceeding to Hangchow by way of Nanking and that the 380 soldiers of the 3rd Division who were due to pass Shanghai on January 3rd, passed here en route to Hangchow on January 12th.

Notice on January 14th reports that the plan of shifting the gendarmerie unit from Nanking to Lunghua has been dropped and instead thereof, the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the 2nd Division is expected to come to Lunghua.

Another notice on the same day reports that 600 soldiers of the 80th Division, 200 men of the 88th Division, 50 wounded but cured men of the 9th Division and the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Division are passing here en route to Hangchow.

Notice on January 16th reports that at 2 a.m., 1,200 men of the 89th Division, and at 5 a.m., 200 men of the same Division passed here en route to Hangchow.

Notice on January 20th reports that some 100 engineering soldiers, who are proceeding from Nanking to Ningpo, have passed here.

Another notice of the same date reports that 60 military cadets who left Nanking at 2 p.m. are expected to pass here during the night.

Notice on January 24th reports that some 200 men of the Propaganda Corps of the Kuomintang under the command of General Chiang Kai-shek have passed here en route to Fukien.

Notice on January 25th reports that 300 soldiers of the 4th Division hitherto stationed in Kiukiang are expected to pass here on the 26th en route to Hangchow and that 130 probationary soldiers are proceeding from Nanking to the same destination on the 26th.

Notice on January 26th reports that 300, wounded but cured, men of the 9th Division are passing here en route to Hangchow.

Notice on January 27th reports that 50 soldiers of the 80th Division are passing here at night for Hangchow.

Notice on January 30th reports that 50 soldiers of the 80th Division are passing here in the morning instead of at the previous night, and that some 60 military cadets are expected to pass here for Hangchow on the morning of January 31st.

Notice on January 31st reports that 130 soldiers of the 12th Division are due to pass here for Hangchow on February 4th.

Notice on February 2nd reports that newly recruited 200 soldiers of the 89th Division are expected to pass here for Hangchow on February 3rd, and that 130 soldiers of the 12th Division are due to depart from Nanking en route to Hangchow by way of Shanghai on February 4th.

Notice on February 5th reports that one company of the 2nd Division is due to pass here for Sungkiang on February 6th, while one company of soldiers stationed in Sungkiang are expected to pass here en route to Nanking, and that some 130 of the 12th Division are passing here at night.

Notice on February 10th reports that some 300 wounded soldiers of the 19th Route Army arrived here by sea and proceeded to Nanking by land.

Notice

0474

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Notice on February 14th reports that 50 military cadets of the Central Cadet School are passing here in the afternoon en route to Ningpo.

Notice on February 17th reports that 150 military cadets are passing here for Foochow on this day.

Notice of February 19th reports that 1,500 newly recruited soldiers of the 9th Division have arrived here from Hangchow and sailed for Foochow to-day.

Another notice of the same date reports that 150, wounded but cured, soldiers of the 9th Division are arriving here from Nanking en route to Hangchow to-day.

Notice of February 22nd reports that some 20 soldiers of the Telegraph Corps arrived here by sea on the 20th and are expected to pass here for Nanking to-day.

Report from the Japanese Naval Landing Party.

Jan. 6th:- Some 50 soldiers with war-supplies.
" 8th:- Some 450 cavalymen of the 9th Division and 160
military ponies together with war-shpplies.
Some 400 soldiers of the 88th Division with war-
supplies.
" 9th:-50 soldiers of the 9th Division and some 90 soldiers
of unknown units.
" 10th:-Some 400 soldiers of the 87th Division and some
100 soldiers of unknown units.
" 12th:-Some 300 soldiers of the 3rd Division and 150
military ponies together with some 460 soldiers of
unknown units.
" 13th:-Some 150 soldiers of unknown units.
" 14th:-Some 60 soldiers.
" 16th:-Some 1,550 soldiers of the 89th Division and some
40 soldiers of unknown units.
" 20th:-Some 50 soldiers.
" 21st:-Some 80 soldiers and 30 military ponies.
" 22nd:-Some 55 soldiers.
" 24th:-Some 70 soldiers.
" 26th:-Some 400 soldiers of the 4th Division.
" 27th:-Some 40 soldiers.
" 29th:-Some 30 soldiers.
" 31st:-Some 100 soldiers.
Feb. 2nd:-Some 20 soldiers.
" 3rd:-Some 310 soldiers.
" 9th:-Some 100 soldiers
" 10th:-Some 30 soldiers.
" 11th:-Some 35 soldiers.
" 12th:-Some 10 soldiers.
" 14th:-Some 10 soldiers.
" 15th:-Some 150 soldiers.
" 16th:-Some 40 soldiers and 3 ponies.
" 17th:-Some 150 soldiers.
" 19th:-Some 25 soldiers.
" 20th:-Some 50 soldiers.
" 21st:-Some 60 soldiers.
" 22nd:-Some 30 soldiers.

0 4 7
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PT


FROM SPECIAL GRAY

PEIPING via N.R.

Dated April 24, 1934

Rec'd. 8.15 a.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington



PRIORITY

193, April 24, 7 p.m. 16589

Department's 123 April 23, 2 p.m., has been repeated to Peck at Nanking (one) for communication by air mail to Hankow for the Minister, (two) For report to Department on reaction at Nanking.

As is not surprising in view of the persistent threat of further Japanese aggression particularly in North China there have been no (repeat no) reports of violent popular reaction to the Japanese statement. General tone of Chinese press comment is one almost of consternation at the wide implication of the Japanese statement of policy but the Legation notes a remarkable moderation of expression in most Chinese editorial comment in North China. The TA KUNG PAO, however, describes the Japanese statement as the most audacious challenge that Japan has hurled at ^{China} and at the powers; a challenge based on the belief that no power is prepared to go to war

793.94/6600

MAY 11 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PT - 2 - No. 193 from Peiping Apr. 24, 7 p.m.

war about the question. Some comment suggests that the statement is an effort by Japanese to sound out international opinion as to her claim to hegemony over China and the Far East.

Press telegrams from London today report statement of British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons and the despatch of a British note to Tokyo believed chiefly to reaffirm British position under the Nine Power Treaty.

Press reports from the United States quote Ambassador Saito as saying in press interview that Japan's restatement of policy with regard to China resulted from the American wheat and cotton credit and from sale of American airplanes to China.

Repeated to Pack at Nanking for information and communication by air mail to the Minister.

JOHNSON

WNC
 CSB

(¹¹/₁₇) omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KLP

Geneva

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone. (a)

Dated April 24, 1934.

Rec'd. 2:40 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

55, April 24, 2 p.m.

(GRAY) The Japanese Consul General here last

evening made a formal statement to the press outlining
Japan's Asiatic policy. Although in line with recent
Japanese announcements, the distinct public impression
is that it is addressed particularly to the League and
that it was called forth at least in part by developments
in the League's program of technical assistance to China.

American press representatives tell me that while
they did not transmit complete text (approximately 400
words) they telegraphed extensive quotations of most
significant portions particularly the Associated Press
and the NEW YORK TIMES. If the Department desires full
text or summary please instruct.

Yokoyama informs me that the same general material
embodied in his statement had been telegraphed by Tokyo
to a number of Japanese diplomatic missions including
Washington to be employed with the press for "clarifying"
the Japanese position. He said, however, that his
statement is distinctly designed for Geneva and contains
certain

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 24 1934
Department of State

F/ESP

793.94/6601

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 11 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

certain special phrasing with that end in view. Yokoyama explained that the phrase "responsibility for peace in close collaboration with Asiatic powers" did not include states having interests in the Far East but was confined to native Asiatic states. He said that it naturally applied to Soviet Russia inasmuch as Asiatic Russia was an integral part of the Soviet state. He also added that it would naturally apply to the Philippines should the "Philippine Government" desire it. (END GRAY)

Press representatives have reported that Yokoyama will issue a further statement upon Avenol's return tomorrow interpreting more in detail the application of this expression of Japanese policy vis a vis the League. Yokoyama informed me, however, that this was not his intention. He stated that he would take the matter up direct with Avenol. He would hand him the Japanese statement officially and declare to him its general application to the League and more specially its application to certain League endeavors in which Japan was not represented. These latter were chiefly the consultative committee on the Sino-Japanese affair and the matter of the League's technical assistance to China. He would not suggest to Avenol that the Japanese pertinent position be conveyed to the bodies concerned. His intention was that through these representations to the Secretary General Japan would place its policy formally

on

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

" 3 "

on record with the League. He would at the same time make the added statement that any activities of the League particularly those of the League bodies in question which did not conform to Japanese general expression of policy in the Far East would be regarded by Japan as inimical acts. In this connection Yokoyama made special reference to the question of technical assistance to China stating that the Japanese Government was under the impression that Dr. Rajchman's report involved a program which particularly in its financial elements was either implicitly or explicitly politically antagonistic to Japan.

GILBERT

WSB

KLP

0482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Return to FE

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

FE

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

RECEIVED **Department of State**

Washington,

April 25, 1934.

Epm

AMERICAN CONSUL

COPIES

GENEVA (Switzerland).

30

Your 55, April 24, 2 p. m.

(a)

One. Forward full text by mail.

Two. Department has declined to discuss or comment upon the statement issued by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office in regard to Japan's attitude toward China. Department desires that for the present American officials withhold comment, awaiting developments. Without initiating any action indicative of ^{particular} interest or concern, please report on reaction, official and unofficial, and on developments.

Three. Repeat paragraph two to Paris and Rome.

793.94/6601

H-ll

SK

793.94/6601

FE:MMH:REK

FE

SK

WE

PM

APR 25 1934 PM

Confidential

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

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
FROM

LONDON

Dated April 24, 1934

Rec'd 4:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



196, April 24, 1934
 CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I was unable to obtain an appointment with Simon today due to Suvich's visit and accordingly instructed Atherton to discuss Department's 156, April 23, 6 p. m., with Sir Victor Wellesley. Wellesley stated that he would convey to the Foreign Secretary the Department's statement and gave Atherton his personal viewpoint on the situation, which I repeat merely for background, and request that no reference be made to these personal remarks of a Foreign Office official.

Wellesley stated that the British note to Japan, reported in my 192, April 23, 10 p. m. also referred to the position of both England and Japan under their treaty obligations, and more especially the Nine Power Treaty. He felt that the recent Japanese statement was made by Japan through fear of the development of a united China and an effective military spirit which had been strengthening since the Manchurian campaign. While America and England had

F/ESP

793.94/6602

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#196, From London, April 24, 8 p.m.

had a common interest in a strong and united China, this was the opposite from what Japan wanted. It was all very well, according to Wellesley, for nine powers to sign a paper pact but if no teeth were written into it to make it effective, how many nations were prepared to back up today any unsuccessful representations made to Japan in connection with her China policy. Wellesley was obviously very skeptical that Great Britain would consider any use of threats towards Japan except under provocation of some grave incident and equally doubtful as to how far the United States would go, and under these circumstances was apparently of the opinion that individual action was preferable in the present instance. I may add here that the Foreign Office press officer has given such an opinion to several correspondents today, pointing out that concerted representations to Japan might merely put the Japanese back up and obtain no modification of intention on her part. Wellesley stated, in his own opinion, an exchange of views with the United States would be useful but obviously doubted whether any closely concerted Anglo-American cooperation towards Japan was likely in the present instance since England's attention was more centered in the continental situation. These views Wellesley took care to explain were his personal ones, and that he would ask Sir John Simon to communicate with me as soon as he had had a chance to consider the Department of State's reply.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#196, From London, April 24, 8p.m.

The Chinese Minister called on me this afternoon and gave me a resume of his conversation with Sir John Simon yesterday afternoon which I gather did not contradict the general attitude of Wellesley's remarks to Atherton. Definitely the Chinese Minister stated that Simon felt that the United States concern was probably greater than that of England.

BINGHAM

HAN CIB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MLC

This message must be
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 being communicated
 to anyone. (B)

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 25 1934

Department of State

Tokyo

Telegram to
Tokyo, April 25, 1934

Dated April 25, 1934

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

76. April 25, 7 p.m.

Department's 55, April 24, 6 p.m. / 6572

Owing to the fact that Fleisher's telegram was sent
 in abbreviated newspaper language ("cables E") the pre-
 cise text as published by the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE
 is not available here. His translation of the Japanese
 communication as given out by Amau will have to be com-
 pared by the translation expert in the Foreign office
 who cannot be found this evening. I hope to be able
 to answer the Department's inquiry tomorrow morning.

GREW

HPD
WVC

Japanese spokesman's statement regarding China.

793.94/6603

Confidential File
 FILED

MAY 11 1934

0487

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$ 25.00 10:24

Washington,

April 25, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

56

Your 76, April 25, 7 p.m.

Please see your 71, April 18, 5 p.m., paragraph
 one.

Queries: (1) How was statement QUOTE released UNQUOTE?
 (2) Was there a Japanese text? (3) Was Fleisher's
 translation QUOTE checked with the Japanese text by the
 Embassy and found to be substantially correct UNQUOTE?
 (4) Was QUOTE an official translation into English UNQUOTE
 issued by the Foreign Office? (5) Have you had Japanese
 text or official translation into English by Foreign Office
 or both? (6) Does that translation differ QUOTE in any
 important particulars from the translation telegraphed to
 the HERALD TRIBUNE UNQUOTE?

It is important to Department to have this information
 at the earliest possible moment and, as soon thereafter as
 possible, your report on interview instructed in Depart-
 ment's 55, April 24, 6 p.m., second paragraph.

FE:SKH/ZMK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.


19.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/6603

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
 APRIL 24, 1934.

See 793.94/6729

I asked the Japanese Ambassador to call this afternoon at 4:15 which he did. I said that I felt the need of knowing precisely what Mr. Amau had said in his recent public declaration since, while the substance of the various translations was substantially alike, nevertheless there were slight differences in context, and that I felt sure that by this time the Embassy had received the text and would be in a position to let me have a correct translation. Thereupon the Ambassador took out a sheet of telegrams in Japanese from which he read extracts. One telegram which he read to me rather naively referred to the fact that the Foreign Office had understood that some of the American papers had not received the Amau interview favorably, and the Foreign Office would like him to advise it which papers had held such views. It appeared that possibly a few days before the eighth of April the Foreign Office had sent certain instructions to the Japanese Minister in Nanking which outlined the position of Japan vis-à-vis China. Some days afterwards at a press conference in Tokyo Mr. Amau was asked a number of questions which he attempted to answer orally and in framing his answers he merely had in mind the communication which

793.94/6604

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY

-2-

which had already been forwarded to the Japanese Minister in Nanking. The Ambassador felt confident that there was no record made of Amau's press interview and he intimated that in certain particulars he may have gone too far in his language. The Ambassador referred to the use of the word "responsibilities" in reference to Japanese responsibilities in China, which he said was the wrong word because Japan does not assume independent responsibilities in China but only as shared with other powers. A few days after the Amau interview, on the 22nd to be exact, the Ambassador had received an explanatory communication from his government covering three points, which he at once gave to the Press; and thereupon he handed to me the clipping from the TIMES of April 24th reporting the statement which he had given out under three heads.

I told the Ambassador that this did not help me very much; that what I wanted was the Amau statement, which I understood had the approval of the Foreign Office; and that I would be grateful to him if he would provide me with a copy of it. The Ambassador did not deny the fact that it represented the Foreign Office view but again expressed doubt whether the statement was in any precise form. Again he referred to it as Amau's attempt to answer a series of questions put to him by the correspondents.

I

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY

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I reminded the Ambassador that he himself had given a number of interviews to the Press along the same lines, to which the Ambassador replied that he had been badly reported in these interviews and intimated that they did not represent fairly what he had intended to say in his "poor English".

Mr. Saito then shifted the conversation to China and to the historic attitude of the Chinese in trying to play off one foreign power against another. The present was another instance of China's attempt to use the League in order to make trouble with Japan; that instead of concentrating their efforts on bringing law and order into their own country, they proceeded on the theory that this was not necessary as long as they could keep foreigners, including the Japanese, fighting among themselves. He referred to the difficulties in Manchukuo, to the Chinese people who had many relatives south of the Wall and who had been unable to have direct communication with them because of the absence of direct mail service.

I brought the Ambassador back to the subject in hand by reiterating again and as strongly as I could that the declarations made by Amai, which I understood had the Foreign Office approval, were regarded by us as exceedingly important

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important and that we were studying them carefully.
I said I would offer no comment today because of those
very reasons.



William Phillips.

U:WP:BFB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

New York Times 4/24/34

SAITO SAYS JAPAN WILL HONOR PACTS

Envoy Here Holds Tokyo Seeks
Merely to End Peril to China
and to Far Eastern Peace.

'INCITEMENT' IS DEPLORED

Washington Officials Say Our
Attitude Is Expressed in
the British Note.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
 WASHINGTON, April 23.—Japan is trying to obtain recognition from the Western World as "the stabilizing influence in the Far East," Ambassador Miroshi Saito said today.

He used this expression to explain the Japanese viewpoint in the most recent controversy in the Far East, which flared up last Tuesday after the Japanese Foreign Office had served public notice that it would no longer countenance "meddling" by other countries in Chinese affairs.

At the same time, in an interview today with THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mr. Saito quoted Eiichi Aman, the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokio, as having said recently that "Japan cannot tolerate the judge-like attitude of the powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question, which is often motivated by the self interest of those powers."

But the Ambassador stated flatly that Japan would observe all her treaty obligations.

He declined to comment on the announcement that the British Government was requesting Tokyo to explain further the intent of its pronouncement, a step which the State Department intimated today would not be taken by this government at least for the present. A spokesman for the department said the Japanese pronouncement would not be considered or recognized officially unless a formal communication were sent to this government.

During his explanation of the Japanese position, Mr. Saito interpreted the new stand from his own viewpoint and then translated into English a sheaf of notes in Japanese script which comprised a digest of recent remarks by Mr. Amau.

Peaceful Aims Stressed.

He reiterated that Japan "has no other end in the Far East than the establishment of law and order."

"We are sometimes accused of being aggressive," he added, "but it should be remembered that even the Manchurian question was not motivated by that desire. We want that understood, and then we can shake hands with China and let foreign powers know that that is our real aim."

However, the Ambassador made clear the feeling of the Japanese Government that much preliminary work must be done before that end was achieved, principally because of the feeling in Japan that other powers sometimes incited feeling in China against Japan, although this frequently was done unintentionally.

As for the position of the Japanese Government, Mr. Saito gave a digest of remarks by Mr. Amau, divided into three categories, as follows:

First, Japan has no intention of impairing China's independence or her interests, but sincerely wishes that the integrity, unity and prosperity of China be secured. However, the integrity, unity and prosperity of China are things that can be brought about principally by China's own awakening and realization.

Second, Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of a third party in China. The commerce and trade of a third party with China can be of much profit to China, and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the open door and equal opportunity. Japan will surely observe all the international agreements relating to China.

Third, but Japan opposes any action in concert on the part of foreign powers that is intended to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan shares responsibility with China and other powers in Eastern Asia, and Japan cannot tolerate the judge-like attitude of the powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question which is often motivated by the self-interest of those powers.

Mr. Saito added that Japan had no intention of establishing a protectorate over China, but reaffirmed the desire of the Japanese Government to assist in "stabilizing" Chinese conditions.

He pointed to the creation of

Manchukuo, as an example of the change that could be wrought by the establishment of order and said 1,000,000 Chinese a year were migrating to the new country.

That Great Britain and the United States would stand together in any potential showdown in the Far East is the hope of officials here.

Expert observers are of the belief that any closing of the open door in China would affect Great Britain in even larger degree than this country, and they could see nothing but a perfect community of interest between the two countries should any difficulty arise.

While there was strictly no comment on the British note to Japan, it was authoritatively understood to express the attitude of the United States Government. It is confidently anticipated that no showdown will be required, but should one come, the United States and Great Britain are expected to be aligned together.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

New York Times 4/20/34

PUBLIC OF BRITAIN HOSTILE TO JAPAN

Ready to Consider Any Joint
Action With U. S. to Uphold
Western Rights in China.

PLANE SALES HAVE ENDED

British Have Shipped None to
China in Six Months—Text
of Tokyo Demands Given.

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
 LONDON, April 20.—Public opinion in Great Britain, already irritated by Japanese inroads into British trade, is ripe for favorable consideration of any joint Anglo-American policy to maintain the rights of Western powers in China.

In a new translation of the Japanese warning of Tuesday, obtained today from an authentic source in London, there is specific reference to the fact that Japan forbids other countries to supply China with war planes or to build airdromes in that country.

This part of the warning is considered here to apply particularly to the United States and Italy. The British have built no airdromes in China and exports of aircraft from this country to China, which had been almost negligible since 1932, ceased altogether six months ago.

Text of Tokyo Statement.

The authentic translation made here of the text of the original statement by Eiichi Amau, the Tokyo Foreign Office spokesman, is as follows:

Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her view and attitude respecting matters that concern China may not agree at every point with those of foreign nations, but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and fulfilling her special responsibilities in Eastern Asia.

Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of failure to agree in opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in Eastern Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward China may, at times, differ from that of foreign countries, such a difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's position and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote friendly

relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in Eastern Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility, and it is our duty to do so. At the same time there is no country but China that is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia.

Order Is Desired.

Accordingly, the unification of China and the preservation of her territorial integrity as well as the restoration of order in that country are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself.

We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. We also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical and financial assistance, at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, are bound to acquire political significance.

Undertakings of such a nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate the discussion of problems like the division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune to China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussions upon Japan and Eastern Asia.

Objection Is Voiced.


Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country's negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in Eastern Asia.

However, the supplying to China of war planes, the building of airdromes in China and the detailing of military instructions and advisers to China, or the contracting of a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb the peace and order of Eastern Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past, but on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers, under one pretext or another, are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.

—THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



F. E.

The French Ambassador, during his conversation this afternoon, touched upon the Far Eastern situation and asked me whether we had taken any position as yet in Tokyo; he also referred to the several press interviews which the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had given and said that without a doubt his Japanese colleague was talking too much; when he read one of the early interviews in which the Ambassador was quoted as mentioning an "unfriendly act" he was astounded.

In reply I said that we had not made up our minds as to what our action would be; it was possible that, inasmuch as the Japanese Government had announced publicly through the press its policy with respect to the Far East and had not communicated with other governments, it would presumably not be necessary for us to communicate with Japan; on the other hand, we might feel that a statement to the American people of this Government's views and responsibilities under the treaties with Far Eastern countries might be advisable; possibly if other countries

saw

F/ESP

793.94/6605

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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saw fit to make parallel statements to their own people
of upholding treaty rights, that might have a good
effect.

I told the Ambassador that I was talking to him
frankly in reply to his inquiry and that I could only
emphasize again that we had reached no definite decision.



William Phillips.

U WP/AB

0496

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BC

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 fore being communicated
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
Tokyo

Dated April 25, 1934.

FROM

Received 9:55 AM

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



75 April 25, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 73 April 21, 9 p.m. /6592

During my interview this morning with the Minister
 for Foreign Affairs, reported in my 74, Hirota on his
 own initiative and without my mentioning subject said that
 he wished to clarify to me in confidence the statement given
 out by Amau regarding the Japanese attitude towards foreign
 assistance to China. He said that the statement had been
 given out owing to the pressure of newspaper correspondents
 on Amau but entirely without his own knowledge or approval
 and that it had given to the world a totally erroneous
 impression of the policy of the Japanese Government.
 This policy is complete observance and support of the
 provisions of the Nine Power Treaty in every respect.
 Japan has not the slightest intention of seeking special
 privilege in China nor of opposing the bona fide trade
 of other countries with China nor of interfering with the
 territorial or administrative integrity of China.

Naturally

793.94/6606

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MAY 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 2 from Tokyo # 75.

Naturally Japan is especially interested in the maintenance of peaceful conditions in China owing to her own propinquity to that country and various foreign activities have tended to interfere with those peaceful conditions, but this does not mean that Japan has any intention or desire to seek a privileged position in contravention to the terms of the Nine Power Treaty whose signatories should enjoy equal rights and responsibilities.

The Minister said that his position is a difficult one because the Chauvinist element in the country is constantly pressing for a more aggressive foreign policy. He himself is endeavoring to carry out the precise policy of the Emperor, with whom he is in constant touch, for developing the most friendly relations with all nations, especially the United States. The negotiations with Soviet Russia for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway will recommence tomorrow when Hirota will do his best to bring them to an early successful conclusion. The settlement of this controversy will result in better relations with Russia which in turn will conduce toward better relations between Japan and China which the Minister desires in every way to develop. For Japan to seek special privilege in China would obviously create a situation which would run totally counter to this whole constructive policy of the Emperor and the Japanese Government.

Hitherto

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 3 # 75 from Tokyo.

Hitherto the Minister has managed, he said, to satisfy both the Chauvinistic and the liberal groups in Japan and he would continue to fight for his policy even if it should mean his ~~death~~ ^{death} because he is firmly backed by the Emperor. He likewise has the full support of the Minister of War. He did not know what would happen if he himself should be killed.

The Minister added that certain foreign influences are constantly trying to stir up trouble for Japan both in the press and otherwise. He was very anxious that his attitude towards Amau's announcement should be perfectly understood by the American Government but in view of his difficult position he asked that his remarks to me be regarded as confidential. (In view of possible danger to Hirota's person I cannot too strongly urge that this confidence be most carefully respected). The American Government can rest assured, the Minister concluded, that no action will be taken by Japan in China which would run counter to the provisions or spirit of the Nine Power Treaty or which would purposely provoke friction with other countries.

The foregoing is as close and accurate a report of the Minister's remarks as is possible in view of his somewhat halting command of English. There is no doubt in my mind as to the sincerity of his observations. I did

however

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 4 # 75 from Tokyo.

however remark that the American Government and people are likely to be more impressed by concrete evidence than by statements of policy.

The Minister said that Saito had been instructed to make to you a similar clarification.

The British Ambassador is to see the Minister at 3 oclock today.

The United Press reports a rumor that instructions are on their way to me from the Department to seek a clarification of Amau's statement. If this is true I shall assume that this present telegram answers any such inquiry on the part of the Department and shall not (repeat not) seek a further interview with the Minister unless supplementary instructions based on the present telegram are received.

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

HPD CSB

(#) Apparent omission.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Return to JH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MLC

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 anyone. (A)


FROM

Nanking

Dated April 25, 1934

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



30, April 25, 2 p.m.

Department's 123, April 23, 2 p.m. to the Legation.

6587 6589

One, In a recent conversation with me the Minister
 for Foreign Affairs described the Japanese informal
 statement as violating China's sovereignty and treaties
 relating to China. Another responsible Chinese officer
 summarized Chinese official opinion as follows:

The Japanese statement arrogantly seeks to limit
 China's sovereign right to employ services, purchase
 military materials, and borrow foreign capital. China
 is surprised that foreign governments have not repudiated
 Japan's assumed authority to limit their rights acquired
 by treaty with China. Informant asserted that China
 possessed the right of any independent nation to acquire
 a military establishment and that the Japanese hypothesis
 that all military equipment is designed for use against
 Japan is baseless since it is intended as much for
 establishing

793.94/6607

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MAY 11 1934

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 2 #30 from Nanking

establishing and maintaining internal peace as for foreign defense. Informant stated that Chinese official opinion indignantly and completely rejects the authority assumed by Japan in the statement but he added that it would be only reasonable to include Japan in any international group financial assistance granted China if such is contemplated.

Two. There is no important unofficial opinion in Nanking and inspired official press is more bitterly critical than the remarks quoted above.

Three. An American newspaper correspondent informed me today that Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation in Nanking told him that the Japanese statement incorporated many of his recommendations to the Japanese Foreign Office but Suma criticized the method of the announcement saying that he had been actively endeavoring since April 17 to allay the Chinese apprehensions caused by the statement.

Repeated to the Legation.

PECK

HPD
WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (B)

London

Dated April 25, 1934

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington,

RUSH

200, April 25, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.


Wellesley sent for Atherton this afternoon and after obviously having discussed with Simon the conversation reported in my 196, April 24, 8 p.m., in a brief talk made it quite clear that any suggestion for concerted consideration by the British and American Governments of the recent Japanese statement was not intended to go beyond an exchange of views. Atherton replied that this was perfectly clear and said the substance of the Washington telegrams he has referred to in his conversation with Wellesley yesterday set forth that the State Department would be glad to consider any suggestions Simon had to submit. Wellesley was obviously anxious that the above points were clearly understood. Wellesley continued that he was under no delusion

F/ESP

793.94/6608

MAY 11 1934

FILED
 Confidential File



793.94

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#200 From London, April 25, 6 p.m.

delusion of the final objective of Japanese policy in regard to China but in the present instance he felt Japan had a fairly strong case for defensive argument of her recent statement. He went on to say that "they" pointed out that the wheat loan T. V. Sung had secured in America last year was contrary to spirit of the four power consortium agreement of 1920 (I may add that the Chinese Minister informed me yesterday Simon made vague reference to this fact in his conversation with Quo on Monday). Wellesley continued that "they" also very much resented the activities of League of Nations through Reichman in Shanghai. Wellesley expressed his personal viewpoint that in both these matters which concerned China in which Japan had such a great stake geographically and financially Japan could understandably claim to be consulted. Atherton asked Wellesley to whom he referred as "they" but this he did not answer definitely, leaving the impression, however, he had had a recent conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. Wellesley then went on to add that he personally did not fear that Japan would use force if foreign nations went contrary to spirit of her recent declaration

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-200 From London, April 25, 6 p.m.

declaration but that in thousands of insidious ways
Japanese influence working in China would be against
any foreign project in China not favored by Japan.
The weight of this Japanese influence Wellesley felt
would be a practically insurmountable obstacle.

BINGHAM

WSB KLP

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY.

April 25, 1934.



Department of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
 THE CHINESE MINISTER, MR. SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Japanese statement.

The Chinese Minister called and stated that he had been attempting to see me for some days, under instruction from his government, but that I had been absent since the 20th of April until this morning. He said that his best information was that a representative of China at Tokyo was informed directly, and he thinks accurately, that the statement, recently emanating from Tokyo through a so-called official press representative, in which Japan in effect was announcing her domination of Asia, was given to the press without consultation with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Hirota; that the Minister was only shown the statement after it had been broadcast to the world through the press; and that it was entirely out of harmony with the Minister's plans of placating the United States and other countries and promoting friendly relations, in accordance with announcements and steps heretofore

made

793.94/6609

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

made and taken by the Foreign Office of Japan. The Chinese Minister said he thought this was the truth of the incident. He then stated that his government had instructed him to propound three questions to me. First, what was my reaction to this entire Japanese development? Second what steps did my government contemplate taking with respect to these pronouncements coming out of Japan? Third, whether this government, as a ranking signer of the Nine-Power Treaty, would be disposed to convene the parties to this treaty for purpose of consultation? To all of which I replied that I was industriously proceeding to assemble accurately and as nearly official as possible, all the facts and circumstances pertaining to the entire problem presented, and that in the meantime there was nothing I could say to him with respect to any of his inquiries. He seemed somewhat disappointed and pressed further for some sort of expressions from me, but each time I repeated my first answer to him. He then inquired when he might see me and get something more definite and informative. I replied that it was not possible to be exactly certain as to just what time,

but

150
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

but that he was at perfect liberty to keep in touch
with the Department at any and all times with the view
to availing himself of the benefit of such information
as might be permissible to impart to him.

C.H.

S CH:HR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With the compliments of
SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

CV-21-4

Siet

0509

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

51134
 APR 21 1934
 COPY OF A CABLEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE
 CHINESE MINISTER FROM THE WAICHIANG

Characterizing as most absurd the New York Tribune's Tokyo report alleging that "reliable quarters" indicated Japan's new statement of policy had received Chinese Government leaders' acquiescence before Foreign Office publication a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied most emphatically that the Chinese Government had any knowledge of the contents of the Japanese statement before its publication on April 17 and still less had acquiesced in it.

According to the spokesman the announcement of the baseless doctrine of Japanese hegemony over Asia came just as much if not greater a shock to China as it was to other nations of the world. To believe that the Chinese Government could acquiesce in such a doctrine enunciated by Japan is no less absurd than to believe that a man could acquiesce in his own destruction.

Continuing the spokesman expressed the opinion that the New York Tribune report was presumably inspired by official Japanese sources. "Evidently the object of fabricating and spreading such rumours is to make the world believe that China has already agreed to the Japanese course of action thereby seeking to lessen the opposition from the Powers. Fortunately or unfortunately the world has learned to know Japan too well since Manchurian affair to give credence to such a fantastic tale."

April 21, 1934.

F/ESP

793.94/6610

JUN 2 - 1934

0510

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
April 27, 1934.

RCM:
~~WHE:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~SKH:~~

Harbin's No. 13, March 29, 1934, --

This despatch from Consul Coville reports a rather serious uprising among Chinese farmers along the Sungari River between Hwachwan and Sansing on the Sungari River occasioned by efforts of the Japanese to oust Chinese landholders from their land.

If you have time you will find the despatch interesting and informative.



JEJ/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy in FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 25 1934
Department of State
FE
a/c

No. 13

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN, MANCHURIA, March 29, 1934.

APR 25 34

793.94
note
893.52
Memorandum

SUBJECT: UPRISING OF FARMERS IN LOWER SUNGARI VALLEY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE
APR 30 1934
APR 30 1934

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington D. C.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	<i>VG</i>		
For	<i>Coville</i>		
To field			
In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		<i>ONI-MID</i>	

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:
I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my
despatch No. 7 of even date, addressed to the Legation at
Peiping, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

Cabot Coville

Cabot Coville,
American Consul.

F/ESP 793.94/6611

FILED
MAY 1 - 1934

Original and four copies.

Enclosure

Copy of despatch No. 7, March 29, 1934,
to the Legation at Peiping.

800
CC:av

0 5 1 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN, MANCHURIA, March 29, 1934.

SUBJECT: UPRISING OF FARMERS IN LOWER SUNGARI VALLEY.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Legation that information believed by the Consulate General to be correct has been received to the effect that an agrarian uprising has recently occurred in the portion of the lower Sungari valley extending from Sansing to Hwachwan and Fuchin. By March 10 serious disorder had already occurred with more than a hundred killed, and on March 19 a ten-hour battle between Japanese troops and the aroused farmers at the village of Tulungshan, eight miles east of Sansing, resulted in upward of two hundred killed among the farmers and fifty Japanese casualties including one captain killed. News has been suppressed, but the situation is now apparently under the control of Japanese troops.

The uprising was caused primarily by disputes over title to land. It appears that Japanese in the region had induced the officials to order the Chinese farmers to turn in their land titles for registration. This was probably in the interest of

- Japanese -

0 5 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese who desire to acquire land and who know that Chinese settlers frequently have no clear title to their farms but have merely occupied and worked them from times when these frontier districts first came under cultivation. The Consulate General does not know whether this development has followed steps taken to meet the land requirements of the Japanese colony planted at Chiamussu referred to in despatch No. 2750 (No. 5935 to the Department) of December 30, 1933, but this is a reasonable surmise. Chiamussu is not shown on the Department's map of Manchuria and adjacent regions (1931-1933) but is located on the south bank of the Sungari river about one third the distance from Hwachwan upstream to Sansing, and therefore is in the center of the area affected.

In any event a large number of Chinese settlers were aroused by the fact or fear of being ousted from the lands they occupied, and were sufficiently inflamed to unite against the Japanese, who found it necessary to call in military reinforcements. The Chinese were further incensed by the requirement (stated to be an anti-bandit precaution) that arms be surrendered to the magistrates.

Posters embodying a proclamation of March 11 by the magistrate of Hwachwan betray the seriousness of the popular attitude against the Japanese. One of the posters has come into the hands of the Consulate General. Its translation from Chinese into English follows:

CIRCULAR

This is to inform the public to the following effect:
1. Recently our friends have made purchases of land solely for the purpose of developing natural resources for the greatest benefit of the populace. All that is acquired is the title to the lands so purchased, and the original owners will continue to occupy their houses and cultivate their farms and will not be asked to move away.

- The -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

The prices paid are reasonable and even more favorable than are ordinarily obtainable; and the purchases are limited to sparsely populated areas and cover only portions therein.

2. The surrender of arms is ordered as an indication of peace and order being successfully maintained. No such order should be issued until peace is so well established that arms are no longer required by the resident people; and this office will under no circumstances issue such an order now that brigandage has not as yet been completely stamped out in this district, where arms are still needed for the protection of life and property.

3. Vaccination against small-pox is a sanitary measure taken in all civilized countries in the world to safeguard public health, as an outbreak of small-pox usually results in the loss of great numbers of lives. This office has gone to considerable expense in this connection solely for the purpose of safeguarding public health; and it is trusted that no groundless rumors will be allowed to create confusion in the public mind.

4. In regard to the uprising at Hulungshan, several reconnoitering airplanes have been despatched to that place by the friendly army, and large bodies of troops are being despatched from Harbin. It will not be long before this uprising is put down. Peace and order in this district is too well maintained by the Japanese and Manchukuo military and the local police to admit of any anxiety whatever. All that is required on the part of residents is to follow their pursuits peacefully and not allow themselves to be disturbed by unfounded rumors, so that no agitators coming into this district will be given a chance to create trouble. Should there be any undesirable elements participating in such agitation, they and their families will be put to death, their houses burned, and their property confiscated. Be sure to realize the situation and choose the right way to follow.

March 11th, 1st year of Kang-teh, Manchukuo.

Shan Tso Shan
 Magistrate at Hwachwan,
 Kirin Province.

Japanese practices in the lower Sungari valley have undoubtedly aroused intense opposition from the Chinese farmers, whose feeling is not likely to be soon appeased by the forceful steps taken to put down the uprising.

Respectfully yours,

Cabot Coville

Cabot Coville,
 American Consul.

In duplicate.

In quintuplicate to the Department by despatch No. 13, March 29, 1934.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.

Copy to Consulate, Dairen.

800

CC:av

True copy of
 the original.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone (B)

Tokyo

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

RUSH

77, April 26, 5 p.m.
 Department's 56, April 26, 1 p.m.

One. Statement was first issued orally to press
 correspondents in Japanese and later "unofficially" in
 written English translation.

Two. No (repeat no) written Japanese text was
 issued by the Foreign Office but Rengo distributed a
 Japanese text of the oral statement and the Foreign
 Office has not denied the authenticity or correctness
 of the Rengo Japanese text.

Three. Fleisher's translation of the Rengo
 Japanese text was checked by the Embassy and found to
 be substantially correct.

Four. A translation was issued on the 19th by
 the Foreign Office but was subsequently labeled "an
 English translation unofficially issued by the Foreign
 Office of the unofficial statement issued by the

Foreign

File to Tokyo
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 26 1934
 Department of State

793.94

793.94/6612

FILED
 MAY 11 1934
 Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#77 From Tokyo, Apr. 26, 5 p.m.

Foreign Office on April 17". This translation which consists of 550 words appears to be a substantially identical version of Fleisher's translation which was adopted by the Foreign Office with a few unimportant changes. Copies were mailed to the Department 21st. The complete text will be telegraphed if deemed by the Department necessary or desirable.

Five. The Embassy has copies of the Rengo Japanese text and of the "unofficial" English translation issued by the Foreign Office.

Six. The "unofficial" translation issued by the Foreign Office differs slightly in wording from the translation telegraphed to the HERALD TRIBUNE but does not differ substantially in meaning. In telegraphing his translation Fleisher omitted a few words and phrases which do not appear necessary to convey the meaning.

The Department appears to be endeavoring to obtain an authoritative text of the statement. There is no (repeat no) authoritative text. The best obtainable is the unofficial English translation of the unofficial oral statement made by the spokesman of the Foreign Office to newspaper men. CONFIDENTIAL.

I have good reason to believe however that the Japanese

text

151

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#77 From Tokyo, Apr. 26, 5 p.m.

text as read by Amau was taken from an instruction approved by Hirota for transmission to all Japanese diplomatic missions for their guidance but released by Amau to the press without Hirota's knowledge or consent.

Since the beginning of this affair I have made no (repeat no) statements whatever to the press, taking the position that any information on the subject should emanate either from the State Department or the Foreign Office here.

GREW

WSB CSB

0518

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTAIR
 PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$ 23.00 PM 5:00

Department of State

Washington,

April 26, 1934.

5pm

COMM.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

B

57

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL - FOR INFORMATION ONLY.

Your 77, April 26, 5 p.m.

Yesterday the Japanese Ambassador gave us
 confidentially a text in translation of Hirota's
 instruction to Japanese Minister to China. Amaki's
 statement of April 17, as reported in HERALD TRIBUNE
 text, seems substantially a paraphrase of that
 instruction.

Hull
 ad

FE:BHD:EJL

FE

793.94/6612

Confidential File

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

0519

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)

Tokyo

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

L. B.
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 26 1934
RECEIVED
Department of State

79, April 26, 10 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL. My 75, April 25, 1 p.m.

The British Ambassador has told me in confidence
that his instructions directed him to seek a clarification
of Amau's statement with special reference to the
provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. Sir John Simon
observed that Great Britain has no intention of taking
measures in China contrary to Japan's security or treaty
rights and presumed that Japan likewise has no intention
of infringing the terms of that treaty. Hirota's reply
was along the lines of his confidential statement to
me although it was communicated to Lindley more formally
through an interpreter. The Minister did not (repeat
not) tell Lindley that the statement was issued without
his knowledge or approval but he did say that the
statement failed to interpret correctly the policy of
the Japanese Government. Hirota added that while Japan
is endeavoring to maintain the principle of the open
door

793.94/6613

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#79 From Tokyo, Apr. 26, 10 p.m.

door, China has partially closed the door in Japan's face by the boycott. Lindley expressed confidentially to his government the view that China's policy of excluding Japan from the various projects of assistance is contrary to the interests of the other signatories of the Treaty and is likely to embroil us all with Japan.

The text of Amau's statement which Lindley cabled to his government was the English "unofficial translation of the unofficial statement" issued by the Foreign Office to the press on April 19th. (See my 73).

GREW

WSB RR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

FROM

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 9:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Solo
DEPT. OF STATE
APR 26 1934
LYD

32, April 26, 6 p.m.

793.94

F/ESP

793.94/6614

One. Informal press release by the Chinese Foreign Office April 25 announced attempts by Japanese diplomats in China to explain away points in the Japanese April 17 statement and rebut them. Statement concluded with assertion that China is working for international security and for upholding treaties such as Nine Power Treaty and the League Covenant and that realization of this policy depends largely on the cooperation of the countries concerned.

Two. There are evident indications that China's spirit of resistance to Japan has been revived and strengthened by belief that the effect of the Japanese April 17 statement is to join the Nine Power Treaty signatories with China as victims of Japanese treaty violation. Apparently Chinese Government intends to press this point energetically even to the extent ultimately of heading a conference of treaty signatories if necessary. Repeated to the Legation and the American Minister.

APR 27 1934


Confidential

PECK

CSB

0522

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Copies to Tokyo and Peking, and Nankai

5/1/34 (R/K)
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY
 APR 25, 1934.
 Copies to London, Paris, Bern, Rome, Berlin, and Moscow.
 5/1/34 (R/S)

Memorandum of conversation with the Italian Ambassador, April 25th.

The Italian Ambassador called to inform me that he was in receipt of a telegram from the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to Rome reporting an interview which he had recently had with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office. The Italian Ambassador in Tokyo had apparently gone to the Foreign Office to ask the question whether the Amau statements represented in fact the attitude of the Foreign Office and received an answer in the affirmative; furthermore, the Ambassador had reported to Rome that, in his opinion, the Japanese Government were intent on carrying out the program announced with respect to China and that nothing now would stop them; it appears that he himself regarded the situation as extremely serious and had so reported to his Government; Mr. Rosso asked whether I could give him any information with regard to the attitude of this Government. I told him that we were gathering information, but had not reached any conclusion as to the position which we should take.

WP
 William Phillips.

U WP/AB

100 7. 1934


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F/ESP 793.94/6615

0523

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

Copies to Tokyo, Hankow & Peking
2/13/34
Copy to London, Bern, Paris, Rome, Berlin and Moscow 5/11/34 (REK)
 April 25, 1934.
File

Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese Minister, April 25th.

The Chinese Minister referred to the three questions which he had just presented to the Secretary and to the fact that he was embarrassed vis-a-vis his own Government because of his failure to give them any information as to the attitude of this Government with respect to the Japanese Foreign Office's statements; his Government, he said, were inclined to criticize him for keeping back from them information which he presumably had and he would, therefore, welcome anything which could be given him for communication to Nanking.

I replied that, as the Secretary had undoubtedly told him, we were not in a position to say anything and that we were still gathering facts and information. The Minister asked whether the statements given out by Ambassador Saito were regarded by us as official statements, to which I replied that they were certainly part of the picture, but I would not go so far as to say that we regarded them as official.

WP.

William Phillips.

U WP/AB

F/ESP 793.94/6616

Confidential File

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1524

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 APR 26 1934
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Conversation.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

APR 24 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The British Ambassador
 Sir Ronald Lindsay, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Hornbeck.

April 24, 1934.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 APR 26 1934
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Subject: Problem Presented by Statement of the
Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign
Office.

The British Ambassador called and, saying that he had had no instructions or information from his Government, inquired whether I could tell him anything about the present situation and the views of the American Government in relation to the statement made by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he believed that the essential facts are known from the accounts which the newspapers have given. He then made reference to various statements which have appeared in the press on and since April 18 with regard to events in Tokyo and events in London. He said that we have not received any communication from the Japanese and we have thus far refrained from making any comment. He gave an account of certain points in the telegrams which we have received from London and of points in the instruction which we have sent to London. He said that

F/ESP

793.94/6617

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

that we feel that action by the various governments concerned on parallel lines and with the appearance of a common front would have obvious advantages but that we did not intend to assume or be placed in a position of leadership in initiating proposals for joint or concurrent action. The Ambassador said that the accounts in the press of what had been done by the British Foreign Office were not clear: it appeared that Sir John Simon had sent some sort of a communication to the Japanese Government. Mr. Hornbeck said that it so seemed to him and that the report of language which had been used in the House of Commons indicated that Sir John Simon had made a somewhat ambiguous statement there. The Ambassador said that this was in reply to an interrogation and that "they were usually very 'cagey' in the phrasing of those replies." The Ambassador then referred to statements reported in the press to have been made by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and the Japanese Consul General in Geneva. There followed some discussion of the method which the Japanese have used in this instance, beginning at Tokyo. After that there was discussion of the situation in the Far East and the significance of various items of news from China and from Japan. Toward the ^{end} ~~conclusion~~ of the conversation Mr. Hornbeck said that he wished to make sure that the Ambassador understood that the American

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

American Government is still considering the question of action to be taken by it; we have not decided definitely; and we have told London that we would give careful consideration to any suggestions which the British Government might choose to make. The Ambassador said that he understood, and that he appreciated having been given a clear account of our views and attitude. Mr. Hornbeck said that if the Ambassador received any news or information which he might think would be helpful to us, we would appreciate having them brought to our attention. The Ambassador stated that he would be more than glad to be helpful. And the conversation there ended.

~~SECRET~~

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

GENEVA

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 1:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

59, April 26, 5 p. m.


(GRAY) Department's 30, April 25, 6 p. m.

One. Text of Japanese statement mailed today Consulate's despatch 887, political.

Two. The entire atmosphere of Geneva, official and unofficial, reaction is that of awaiting the position which may be taken by the great powers. Some elements of this situation are discussed in my despatch 885, political, dated April 25. (END GRAY)

Three. In more strictly League official circles I find that this situation rests on uncertainty up to the present time as to what extent the position of the powers will be communicated to the League and as directly related to this as to what extent the League powers may employ the League of Nations as a vehicle for action. I shall endeavor to obtain information on these points under the conditions set forth in the Department's telegram under reference.

Four. A summing up of the foregoing is the difficulty of interpreting Japan's statements, that is, to what degree they



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793.94/6618

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MAY 11 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#59, From Geneva, April 26, 5 p.m.

they represent a fixed unilateral policy or to what degree they merely represent the assumption of a position as a basis for negotiations with the powers. That their meaning is open to question is also lent some color by the conflicting statements made privately in this respect by the Japanese here.

GILBERT

KLP

CSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

TOKYO

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 2:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

78, April 26, 9 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL. Department's 57.

Instructions carried out at earliest possible moment today. Hirota replied that only Amau could answer my inquiry as to whether Fleisher's telegram was a reasonably correct translation of Amau's statement because the latter's statement was oral (see my telegram 77). The Minister's only comment was that Amau had indulged in "high flown language" which as he had told me yesterday had not (repeat not) had his own approval. The Minister, however, added that he himself had approved the supplementary and explanatory statement made orally by Amau in the press conference of April 20, the substance of which was cabled to the American press on that day.


It has been impossible to locate Amau until this evening. He said that his statement of the 17th was oral and informal and did not (repeat not) have the approval of Hirota; that he issued no (repeat no) official text,

either

May 24 1938

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793.94/6619



MAY 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#78, From Tokyo, April 26, 9 p.m.

either in Japanese or English; and that he can authorize as official and authentic only his statement of the 20th referred to above. He refused to verify as a "reasonably accurate" translation of his first statement, the version telegraphed to the HERALD TRIBUNE.

The following was sent to me late this evening by Hirota as the gist of what Amau "said or should have said" on the 20th. The Minister conveyed to me the message that this represents his true policy towards China and that it may be given any publicity deemed desirable.

(GRAY) (Translation) "Japan has not infringed upon China's independence or interests) nor has she the intention to do so. In fact, she sincerely desires the preservation of territorial integrity of China and her unification and prosperity. These ends should, fundamentally speaking, be attained by China herself through her self-awakening and voluntary efforts.

Japan has no intention to trespass upon the rights of other powers in China. Their bona fide financial and commercial activities will redound to the benefit of China which is quite welcome to Japan. She, of course, subscribes to the principles of the open door and equal opportunity in China. She is observing scrupulously all existing treaties and agreements concerning that country.

However,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#78, From Tokyo, April 26, 9 p. m.

However, Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her geographic position, has the most vital concern. Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above circumstances."

Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WSB

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.(B)

GENEVA

Dated April 26, 1934

Rec'd 3:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

File
72
DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 26 1934
Department of State
Exp

58, April 26, 4 p. m.

(GRAY) One. Yesterday evening Hoo, Chinese representative, handed to the press a communique responsive to the Japanese statement of April 23 (Consulate's 55, April 24, 2 p. m.) differing from the procedure of the Japanese representative. Hoo, in meeting the press, confined himself to his written statement and did not accord any explanations or interpretations of value and in particular did not give any intimations respecting Chinese future policy. Any Geneva press reports in this respect are thus presumably purely speculative.

Two. The statement is not here regarded as "strong" being chiefly a reiteration of China's position respecting the maintenance of her sovereignty, her right to the cooperation of the Powers, and her right to grant equality of treatment to the Powers in the Chinese market. Japanese policy is characterized as from the beginning having the intent of assuming sole tutelage over China which policy the recent Japanese pronouncements have only rendered more clear, Japanese policy and action constituting a progressive violation of the Nine Power Treaty.

Three.

F/ESP 793.94/6620

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#58, From Geneva, April 26, 4 p.m.

Three. Copy forwarded by mail. (END GRAY)

Four. In a confidential conversation today with Hoo I gained the very distinct impression that he is as yet without any instructions as to possible Chinese action in Geneva. He and Hoo are strengthened in this matter and will probably transmit suggestions to Nanking. Although China is represented on the Council it will probably not be regarded as expedient to bring this matter directly before the Council. The suggestions which are now only in tentative form are the possibilities of approaching the matter through the Assembly consultative committee or through the council committee on technical assistance. China is not represented on the consultative committee and would thus have to present her case there through the medium of some other power or direct only through a special procedure. The pertinent League procedure would be that such a presentation could not be general but would be limited to some specific question which circumstance should China request to present her case might be employed strictly to limit the scope of the discussion. On the other hand, China could raise the question herself in the council committee as being highly pertinent to the mandate of the committee. The crux of this question lies as to the support which the committee would accord. To
 raise

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#58, From Geneva, April 26, 4 p.m.

raise the question and not being supported by the great powers represented would obviously be more detrimental to Chinese interests than not raising it at all.

The whole question of possible Chinese action thus appears to hinge on the nature of the advance information which they may obtain from the powers as to what positions they would adopt in such contingencies. I also gather that a concomitant element in this is that from the temper of his relations with Nanking Hoo senses a reluctance based on previous experience in Geneva to pursue the question on the League, in any event a definite objection to taking such a step without prior full understandings with the great powers. Hoo points out, however, that he regards the present situation as more susceptible of League action than in the case of the Manchurian affair. In the Manchurian matter Japan was taking material action while in the present instance Japan's declarations could be answered by counter declarations.

GILBERT

WSB
 TTC
 CSB

0535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6620 (C.F.)

April 26, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

793.94/6620

Enclosures:

- No. 88, April 25, 9 a. m., Geneva, from Gilbert.
- No. 323, April 26, 6 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.
- No. 320, April 26, 3 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.
- No. 59, April 26, 5 p. m., Geneva, from Gilbert.
- No. 77, April 26, 5 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.
- No. 32, April 26, 6 p. m., Nanking, from Peck.

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MAY 19 1934

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*Returned
EMJ*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 26, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegram indicated below.

As the telegram was transmitted in one of the Department's Confidential codes, it would be appreciated if it could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosure:

No. 78, April 26, 9 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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*Returned
2/1/77*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 26, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if ^{they} ~~it~~ could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

No. 200, April 25, 6 p. m., London, from Bingham.

No. 79, April 26, 10 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 MAY 19 1934

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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ERM.

0538

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 27, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

Telegram April 27, 11 a. m., Hong Kong, from Jenkins.
No. 195, April 27, 1 p. m., Tsiping, from Gauss.
No. 75, April 27, 4 p. m., Berlin, from White.
No. 326, April 27, 4 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 19 1934
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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EPR*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 30, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegram indicated below.

Enclosure:

No. 213, April 30, 5 p. m., London, from Bingham.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 19 1934
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*Returned
E. R.*

0540

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 30, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

- No. 61, April 28, 11 a. m., Geneva, Gilbert.
- No. 329, April 28, 1 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.
- No. 84, Tokyo, April 30, 1 p. m., from Grew.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 19 1934
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Grew*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 1, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

No. 85, May 1, 5 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

No. 86, May 1, 6 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 MAY 19 1934
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*Turned over
 White House
 E. R. R.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 4, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

- No. 64, May 1, 2 p. m., Geneva, from Gilbert.
- No. 340, May 3, 4 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.
- No. 342, May 4, 11 a. m., Paris, from Straus.
- No. 343, May 4, 3 p. m., Paris, from Straus.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 MAY 15 1934
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*Returned from
 White House
 ERM.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 5, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

No. 66, May 3, 9 a. m., Geneva, from Gilbert.

No. 202, May 5, noon, Peiping, from Gauss.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 19 1934
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*Returned from
 White House
 E.M.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 9, 1934

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegrams indicated below.

As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they would be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

- No. 70, May 9, 5 p. m., Geneva, from Gilbert.
- No. 65, May 11, 3 p. m., Vienna, from Kliefoth.
- No. 359, May 11, 4 p. m., Paris, from Cochran.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 18 1934
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*Returned
from White House
E.H.H.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 12, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegram indicated below.

As the telegram was transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if it could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosure:

No. 92, May 12, 6 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MAY 19 1934
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*Returned from
White House
Rear.*

0546

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (a)

FROM

Hong Kong.

Dated April 27, 1934.

Received 6 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

April 27, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British military and business people in Hong
Kong appear to view present Japanese situation with ap-
prehension. Although commanding General Borrett left
Hong Kong on 25th for customary inspection of British
troops in the posts and North China, I am reliably, but
unofficially informed that he seriously considered post-
poning his departure because of international situation.
American Minister Nanking informed.

JENKINS.

RR

F/ESP

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MAY 11 1934

K

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PT
 This telegram must be FROM
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone (A)

PEIPING

Dated April 27, 1934

Rec'd. 5.45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 26 1934

Department of State

195, April 27, 1 p.m.

Department's 123, April 23, 2 p.m. Following is the
 Minister's comments:

"April 26, 5 p.m.

One. Statement should not be permitted to pass
 unchallenged by governments party to Washington Treaties,
 as it runs directly counter to the spirit and letter of
 Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and policies which
 is part of series of Treaties which must be considered
 as whole. Japan has not given notice that she considers
 Treaty no longer binding but powers should inform Japan
 that abrogation of one of the series of Treaties abrogates
 all.

Two. Policy covered by statement if pursued is
 intended to control our relations, national as well as
 commercial, with a nation which we recognize and have
 dealings with as an independent country. The mere state-
 ment of such a policy may be sufficient to prevent purchase
 of

F/ESP, 793.94/6622

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 MAY 11 1934

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FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PT - 2 - No. 195 from Peiping Apr. 27, 1 p.m.

of banned articles on our markets as Chinese are well aware that the Japanese are able and willing to use force. In this connection remember the effect of Japan's opposition to Federal Wireless contract.

Three. In arriving at a decision as to our action due consideration should be given to attitude which China adopted toward Nine Power Treaty in 1926 in opposing adherence by non-powers. It is not China's independence that interests us so much as our independence of action in the Pacific both now and in the future

Four. Consideration also must be given to situation which eventually must result on our retirement from the Philippines. Independence of Philippines, conferred by the United States, will continue to be matter of concern to the United States. Neutrality of Philippines will be of questionable value in the face of Japanese attitude toward Washington treaties evidenced by present statement."

GAUSS

HPD
 WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copies to Nanking, Tokyo and Chungking
Copies to London, Paris, Bern, Rome, Berlin and Moscow 5/11/34 (R&K)
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 APR 27 1934
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 Department of State
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SECRETARY OF STATE
 APR 26 1934
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April 26, 1934.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
 APRIL 26, 1934.

WORDS

793.94

The British Ambassador called this afternoon and, with reference to the attitude of his government to the Far Eastern situation, said that they were opposed to any concerted action. They believed that each power should state its own views.

Sir Ronald then went on to say that he was prepared to read to me the instructions which had been sent to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and which he understood were delivered yesterday, as follows:

"The Japanese statement is of such a nature that we cannot leave it without comment."
 The Ambassador was told "to point out that the Nine Power Treaty guarantees equal rights to its signatories and Japan is a signatory. His Majesty's Government of course must continue to enjoy all the rights in China which are common to all the signatories or which are otherwise proper, except in so far as they are restricted by special agreements or in so far as Japan has special rights recognized by other powers and not shared by them.

"It

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0551

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

-2-

"It is the aim of His Majesty's Government to avoid all the dangers to the peace and integrity to China on which the statement purports to be based. We could not admit Japan's right to decide alone whether anything such as technical or financial assistance promotes such a danger. Under the Nine Power Treaty Japan has the right to call attention to any action which may appear to her inimical to her interests and this provides Japan with safeguards. We assume that the statement is not meant to abridge the common rights of other powers or to infringe Japan's treaty obligations."

I thanked Sir Ronald for this communication and asked whether it was the intention of his government to give publicity to it. He said that in all probability the substance of these instructions would be given to Parliament; that since nothing had been given today presumably there would be no publicity until Monday when Parliament again meets. He was very anxious that we should keep him advised of any step which we might make; he was leaving for New York tomorrow not to return until

Tuesday;

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

-3-

Tuesday; but in his absence Mr. Osborne would be glad to
communicate any message to him.


William Phillips.

U:WP:BFB

0552

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)



Dated April 28, 1934

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



61, April 28, 11 a.m.

Consulate's 59, April 26, 5 p.m., paragraph
three.

One. I have found the occasion to ascertain privately from Avenol in a manner strictly conforming with the Department's 30, April 25, 6 p.m., paragraph two, his views of League policy vis a vis the Far Eastern situation. The points which he covered are as follows:

(a) He stated that a public misunderstanding had been created which was doubtless somewhat inspired concerning an alleged relationship between the operations of the Monnet consortium and the League project of technical assistance to China. He declared that the relationship which was asserted in some quarters to exist was in any event absolutely without authority on the side of the League and therefore was juridically speaking non-existent. He admitted that in this respect rumors were

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MAY 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#61 From Geneva, Apr. 28, 11 a.m.

were current regarding understandings between Rajchman and Monnet as were also current more general allegations regarding political activities on the part of Rajchman. To dispel any question that the League had improperly associated political action with its technical work he intended to take steps to clarify the entire matter. This clarification would be accomplished either in the meeting in May of the Commission on Technical Assistance at the time when Rajchman presents his report to that body or if it should eventuate that a public discussion of this matter would seem undesirable the question would be adjusted in some other manner outside the Commission. His manner of expressing himself on this point carried the implication that should it be shown that Rajchman had engaged himself politically or undertaken action beyond the scope of his mandate from the League it might become necessary that he be repudiated.

(b) Respecting what Avenol stated to me regarding the position of the League in the face of the current situation in the Far East I will say that it bore no resemblance whatever to the League's attitude at the outbreak of the Manchurian affair in 1931 either technically or in its more general political

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#61 From Geneva, Apr. 28, 11 a.m.

political aspects. Avenol asserted to me that no information had been conveyed to him either specifically or generally regarding the pertinent policy of the League powers and that officially he had no intimations of their policies. His general comment on the policy of the powers did not go beyond current press accounts. Describing the present situation as a "different and greater issue" than the original Manchurian affair he said that he did not perceive that the League was involved in it in any way and that in so far as his control of influence reached it was his intention that the League should not be involved. In particular he would endeavor to avoid that the current issue be linked de jure in any way with the "Sino-Japanese dispute" of which the League of course remained technically seized.

(END SECTION ONE)

GILBERT

CSB

0554
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (C)

FROM

GENEVA

Dated April 28, 1934

Rec'd 1:10 p. m.

RECEIVED

APR 30 1934

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND

61, April 28, 11 a. m. (SECTION TWO)

(d) As a direct corollary of the foregoing he said that it must be admitted that the mandate of the Assembly Consultative Committee on the Sino-Japanese dispute could be interpreted as embodying the current issue as in a broad sense the two were inextricably linked. Any member of the Committee could of course raise the question in that light. He did not believe, however, that any state would do so primarily because he thought that no general support would be accorded such action and incidentally because it would result in doing China a disservice as suggested in my 58, April 26, 4 p. m., paragraph four. The present program for the forthcoming meeting of the Commission was that its deliberations should be confined solely to the postal question which was on its agenda.

(d) In a like manner the members of the Commission on technical assistance with the possible exception of some action for a clarification of its position as discussed

above

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#61, From Geneva, April 28, 11 a.m.
 (Section Two)

above would confine itself to purely technical questions.

The element of positive League policy in the Far East to which Avenol gave utterance was a strong assertion that he was determined that the League would continue to pursue a "modest" program of technical assistance to China and that any interference with such an appropriate activity would be combated.

(e) Regarding China's preoccupations respecting League action as reported in my 58, of which I find Avenol was also generally cognizant he stated that he did not believe that the situation would afford an opportunity to China to raise the question in any way.

Two. In all of the foregoing Avenol expressed himself clearly and unequivocally. While League action rests on the will of League states and while Avenol naturally only spoke as Secretary General I think that it may be reasonably assumed that he has general or special knowledge of the position of the principal League powers vis a vis the League in these respects and that such knowledge was in the background of what he had to say.

Three. Both in its bearing as explanatory of the position of the League in the present issue and as of interest to the Department in other spheres I took the opportunity

which

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#61, From Geneva, April 28, 11a.m.
 (Section Two)

which was presented me to inquire whether this position of the League as he described it respecting the Far Eastern political situation might be considered as illustrative of a more general policy of the League in all political matters. The answer Avenol gave me was naturally not a direct affirmation, it was tantamount to saying that the League for an indefinite future in so far as it could consistently do so would avoid the handling of new political questions and likewise in so far as possible would seek to avoid action in those which were now before it which would jeopardize continued League support by the League states particularly concerned. As is obvious no specific vote or conclusive forecast of League policy in such respects is possible inasmuch as the League's position will undoubtedly be governed by unforeseeable political situations. What Avenol had to say in these respects, however, carried connotations of my discussion of this subject in Consulate's despatches 835 political March 7 and 863 political April 5.

Four. In this general connection on the basis that League action rests upon the will of League states particularly the great powers competent opinion in Geneva presents the Far Eastern question at least in some of its aspects as possibly coming before the League in two ways.

(a) Great

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4-#61, From Geneva, April 28, 11a.m.
 (Section Two)

(a) Great Britain if she finds her interests in the Far East vitally ^{affected (#)} may at some stage seek to employ the League of Nations as an agency to promote her policy.

(b) France with her relations with the Soviet Government in the background and also as associated with the question of Russia's possible approach to the League might bring the question into the League to accomplish a primarily political maneuver (Consulate's despatch 858 political March 27).

The recent anti-Japanese utterances of Mussolini in so far as they may reflect definite Italian policy are also seen as having a possible bearing on the situation.

Five. Avenol requested that I regard his expressions to me as strictly confidential.

(END MESSAGE)

GILBERT

CSB

~~(#)~~ Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Danton (via N.R.)

RECEIVED

Dated April 29, 1934,

APR 30 1934

Recd. 7:28 a m

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

April 29, noon.

793.94
 Consuls at Canton have received for transmission

a declaration dated April 27 by the Southwest Political
 Council addressed to the League of Nations and to the
 Ministers of the signatory powers of the Nine Power Pact.
 This declaration asserts that the statement of policy
 issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17
 threatens the independence of China and the peace of
 the Far East and it calls upon the League and the
 parties to the Nine Power Treaty to discharge their ob-
 ligations under existing instruments aimed at main-
 taining international peace.

Copies by mail. Repeated to the Department,
 the Legation and Nanking.

BALLANTINE


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F/ESP

793.94/6625

FILED
 CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 11 1934



0561

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Sp. Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

VIA NAVAL RADIO
Special Gray

Washington,

May 3, 1934.

6pm

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China)

MR

139

Please inform Canton in reference to its telegram of April 29, noon, as follows: 793.94/6625

In your discretion, you are authorized, on some opportune occasion when you are discussing with members of the Southwest Political Council and other officials at Canton the oil discrimination matter or other cases of discriminatory treatment of Americans at Canton, to refer to the declaration made by the Southwest Political Council on April 27 and to remind them of their obligation to observe treaties between China and the foreign powers.

793.94/6625

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/6625

Full
W

J.B.J.
FE: JBJ/VDM

new

FE

L E

M.M.H.

I W

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

0561

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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Department of State

APR 28 PM 8:44

Washington, *Gray*

April 28, 1934.

AMEMBASSY, CCNY

TOKYO (Japan).

59

RUSH

One. Please call as soon as possible upon the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs and, under instruction
 from your Government, deliver to him an aide memoire,
 as follows:

QUOTE

UNQUOTE

Two. Report delivery immediately by telegraph.

Three. *Thereafter* We expect to make text public here at our
 convenience.

Hull

793.9-1

FE: *143* /ZMK

FE

Enciphered by *143*

Sent by operator *143* M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/6625A

Confidential

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored. Due consideration being given to the circumstances under which these indications have appeared and to their substance, it seems necessary and desirable that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. In international law, in simple justice, and by virtue of treaties, the United States has with regard to China certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with both, together with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

Entered

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Entered into by agreement, for the purpose of regulating relations between and among nations, treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated, -- but only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

In the international associations and relationships of the United States, the American Government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other countries, and it expects on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of the United States.

In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The American Government has dedicated the United States to the policy of the good neighbor. To the practical application of that policy it will continue, on its own part and in association with other governments, to devote its best efforts.

0564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

April 28, 1934.

AMEMBASSY, C.

LONDON (England).

169
 Department's 156, April 23, 6 p.m.

The Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed to deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an aide memoire, as follows:

QUOTE (April 28, 1934)

1. Tokyo

UNQUOTE

~~Repeat to Moscow as Department's telegram No. 156 and forward copies by air mail to Geneva, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Madrid and Warsaw.~~

Please furnish in confidence to Sir John Simon ~~with~~ text of aide memoire.

793.94/6625B

Confidential File

FE: ~~FE~~ ZMK

FE

Enciphered by ~~FE~~Sent by operator ~~FE~~ M., 1934

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

0565

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington.

APR-28 PM 6:44

April 28, 1934.

7 pm

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA) Vca NR

131

Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed to deliver
an aide memoire
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs/~~as follows~~, as
follows:

* QUOTE

UNQUOTE

Repeat to Minister and Nanking.

Hue

* NOTE: See telegram 59 April 28 7pm to Embassy, Tokyo.

793.94

FE:ABW

FE

Enciphered by RS

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1923 1-138

793.94/6625C

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APRIL 30, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9:00 P.M. EASTERN
 STANDARD TIME, APRIL 30, 1934. NOT TO BE PRE-
 VIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

The American Ambassador to Japan under instruction from the Department of State called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 29 and made a statement the substance of which was as follows:

Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored and make it necessary that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. The United States has with regard to China certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with both, together with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

Treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.


In the international associations and relationships of the United States, the American Government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other countries, and it expects on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of the United States. In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The American Government has dedicated the United States to the policy of peace and to the practical application of this policy. It will continue, on its own part and in association with other governments, to devote its best efforts.

0567

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



DOA
file

April 28, 1934.



See
793.94/6625
6625B
6625C

793.94

The drafting in this case has been done with three principles constantly in mind and adhered to: first, that we would endeavor to say nothing which would invite controversy or lay us open to the charge that we had made affirmations which might be controverted; second, that we would endeavor to avoid waving any red flag or giving the Japanese opportunity to say that we are befuddled by theories and blind to facts; and, third, that we would confine ourselves to an affirmation with regard to the rights, interests and views of the United States and refrain from affirmations with regard to the rights, interests and views of China.

So far as practical effect is concerned, we believe that the draft in its present form, with deliberate and conscious omission of any affirmation on China's behalf and of any express mention of the Nine-Power Treaty, would have a better effect in Japan than would be the case if such affirmation or mention were present. If the Japanese can read our statement without a rise in their mental temperatures, and without focusing their attention upon any particular point in it which especially irritates them,

F/ESP

793.94/6625 1/2

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 1 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

they will be much more likely to examine it in its entirety and to digest its contents thoughtfully than would be the case if upon reaching some sentence they have a brain explosion.

As a matter of fact, the exact phraseology, providing there is nothing upon which they can pick for purposes of controversy, will make, in Japan, very little difference. Communications to the Japanese Government from the British, the American, and possibly other governments, may have some retarding effect, but it will not deter the Japanese nation from going on, to the best of its ability, with its China program as disclosed in past acts and in Mr. Amau's statement of April 17. The importance of this communication lies in the fact of its being made rather than in the vigor or lack of vigor, the completeness or lack of completeness, of its contents.

We feel that this Government must speak, because the Japanese have spoken and because the British have spoken and because the American people expect of this Government a statement.

We feel that the statement which this Government makes should be limited to affirmation of rights, obligations, and interests (and opinions with regard thereto) of the United States.

12.7. EHW
 M.M.H.

net

FE:SKH/ZMK

FE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

Tokyo

FROM

Dated April 29, 1934

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington,

RECEIVED

APR 30 1934

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

RUSH

83, April 29, 7 p.m.

Department's 59, April 28, 7 p.m., decoded at
 5 p.m. I delivered aide memoire to the Minister for
 Foreign Affairs at 6:30 p.m. After reading it his only
 comment was that the whole affair had caused "great
 misunderstanding". He said that he would reply to the
 aide memoire in due course.

GREW

HSM

F/ESP

793.94/6626

MAY 11 1934

FILED Confidential File

0570

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *Gray*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

W-30 5:41 *Washington,*
 April 30, 1934.

AMEMBASSY

COMM

TOKYO (Japan)

60

6626
 Your '83, April 29, 7 p.m.

One. Department is 'very much' gratified 'at' promptness
 with 'which' you 'carried out' instruction 'contained' in '
 Department's '59, *6626* April 28, 7 p.m.

Two. Department is 'today' ~~releasing to the press~~ *issuing* for
 publication *here* 'in the morning' papers 'of May 1' a ~~statement~~ *press release*
 which 'begins' as follows:

QUOTE 'The American Ambassador' to Japan 'under' instruc-
 tion 'from the Department of State' called on 'the Japanese'
 Minister for Foreign Affairs' on April '29' and made 'a state-
 ment' the substance 'of which' was 'as follows' UNQUOTE.

Department 'assumes' that 'full' text of ~~press~~ *this* release
 will be 'cabled' to Japan 'by' correspondents 'and will' appear
 there. 'You should make' no 'repeat' no 'release' there. 'In
 case you' think it advisable 'that' Department 'telegraph' you
 full 'text of ~~the~~ *press* release, please' so 'advise' Department.
 Department 'is sending' full 'text' to Peiping 'by' naval 'radio' with
 instructions 'to forward' it 'to you' by mail.

FE:MMH/VDM FE

Enciphered by *MMH*

Sent by operator *MMH* M., 19, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/6626

Confidential File

Hull
WJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./79 FOR #2613
FROM China (Johnson) DATED March 27, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

793.94/6627
177

REGARDING: Japanese attitude of "friendship" toward China and
Chinese attitude toward the Japanese "friendship"
policy. Japanese "pressure" on China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C. Summary:

1. Japanese policy toward China:⁶

793.92
 February, superficially, seemed to be a month of drift in Sino-Japanese relations. There was reason to believe, however, that Japan had not abandoned its efforts to induce "diplomatically" the Central Government to subscribe to a Sino-Japanese policy of "friendship", meaning thereby a North China under substantial Japanese influence. Such a policy would appear to be more consonant with Japan's recent return to "diplomacy" vis-a-vis Russia and the United States than would a further use of military force against China. There was also reason to believe that some sort of crisis was occurring within the Chinese Government as a result of differing views with regard to the advisability of subscribing to Japan's proposals.

B.

-
5. Legation's monthly report for January.
 6. Legation's despatch 2527 of February 22.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

a. Evidences of Japanese "friendship":

Japanese were anxious to persuade Chinese of the former's friendliness. (1) Shanhaikwan, at the eastern end of the Great Wall, was restored to China on February 10, having been under Japanese control since their occupation of it on January 3, 1933.⁷ The retrocession was scarcely more than nominal as the Japanese continued to control it militarily through their troops stationed within the railway zone and north of the Great Wall. This return in form, though not in fact, may, however, have strengthened the position of those Chinese who are attempting to reach agreement with Japan on other questions. (2) Progress was made toward a similarly nominal retrocession of other passes in the Great Wall. (3) Japanese officials made public statements, as well as statements in conversation with Chinese officials, with regard to the "improved" relations of China and Japan and the importance of further "improvement". The Nengo News Agency (Japanese), for example, reported that the Japanese Minister said after his visit to Nanking during the latter part of February that "he could notice that the Nanking authorities are sincerely wishing to see relations between the two countries improved". (4) Japanese officials attempted to persuade the Chinese that the setting up of Pu Yi as "Emperor" in Manchuria did not mean Japanese intention to extend "Manchukuo" south of the Great Wall. (5) The Japanese Minister visited Nanking toward the end of the month and, although the purpose of his visit was not disclosed,

7. Tientsin's despatch to Department 491 of February 12.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

disclosed, there were rumors to the effect that he discussed Sino-Japanese policy and that subsequently he would return to Tokyo. (6) According to press reports from Tokyo, Japanese business leaders approached the Chinese Legation at Tokyo in the hope of evolving plans for an economic rapprochement with China.

b. Chinese attitude toward a policy of "friendship":

How far the Chinese might withhold themselves from "friendship" with Japan, notwithstanding the threats which are alleged to have accompanied Japan's offer of "friendship", it is difficult to determine. (1) General Chiang Kai-shek has long been regarded as without inclination to oppose Japan militarily, viewing as more urgent the consolidation of his position in Central and South China. He might well prefer to retain only nominal control in North China, leaving the real influence to Japan, rather than, through disagreement with the latter, incite the Japanese to activities detrimental to the sovereignty of North China and to his own position at Nanking. (2) Although General Chiang's position in the Government of China was strengthened by his recent suppression of the rebellion in Fukien Province, it is not known how far he may be able to impose on other members of the Government acceptance of a policy of "friendship" with Japan, provided he is in favor of it. (3) There were constant reports during February that General Huang Pu, in nominal supervisory control of North China, would visit Nanking to discuss Sino-Japanese problems. He, however, entered a hospital for a nasal operation and, according to a local official, was subsequently advised by his physicians to rest. Although, in view of the nervous strain incident to his difficult posi-

tion

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

tion here, such a reason for delay may be genuine, it would seem more probable that he hesitates to return to Nanking because he would there become involved in the dispute of the factions upholding and opposing the advisability of "friendship" with Japan and because his absence from Peiping might invite disorder in North China. (4) In the reorganization by General Chiang Kai-shek of the Fukien Provincial Government, following the suppression of rebellion in that province, a number of Japanese-speaking Chinese officials were appointed, among them the Provincial Chairman, two Commissioners of the Provincial Government, and the personal representative of General Chiang. This may have had no more reason, however, than the local desirability of such appointments in view of Japanese interests in Fukien Province. (5) The boycott of Japanese goods continued quiescent.

c. Japanese "pressure" on China:

If Japan desires Chinese "friendship", there occurred during February developments illustrative of the characteristic ineptitude of the Japanese in international relations.

(1) According to a highly placed Chinese official, two representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office demanded of the Chinese Legation at Tokyo the payment of debts owed by China to Japanese amounting to Yen 700,000,000, the excuse for the demand being that the Chinese Government had recently floated loans and that the Japanese obligations had prior right to attention. Apparently three special emissaries were going to visit Nanking in respect to the matter. (2) Ill-feeling

was

-
8. Foochow's despatch to Legation 249 of March 5.
 9. Nanking's despatch to Legation of March 3.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

was created among the Chinese by reports that some 1,000 troops of the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin and some 300 of the Legation Guard at Beijing would hold manoeuvres from March 1 to 5 along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway 15 to 20 miles south of Tientsin.¹⁰ Although such manoeuvres have been engaged in by other foreign military contingents at Tientsin, including the 13th United States Infantry, some Chinese claimed to see in them celebration of the enthronement of Pu Yi, disregard of Chinese official notification withholding permission for the manoeuvres, connection with reports that the Japanese intended ultimately to extend their authority to the Yellow River, and incompatibility with the provisions of the International Protocol of 1901. According to Japanese sources, the manoeuvres were to be held in order that they might be reviewed by Lieutenant-General Nakamura, departing Commandant of the Japanese forces in North China. In view of past tactlessness of Japanese in permitting the occurrence of more or less routine matters at a time when they might readily be interpreted as sinister in significance, it seemed probable that the Japanese explanation was genuine. (3) "Manchukuo" flags were flown (March 1) by Japanese in various places in North China in celebration of the enthronement of Pu Yi. Japanese officials in at least some of these places, however, instructed their nationals to haul the flags down. (4) At the ceremony of the re-cession of Shachaiwan, Major Giga of the Kwantung Army made an address which, in part, was interpreted by

same

15. Tientsin's despatch to Legation 598 of February 18.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

some Chinese as an unnecessary reminder that Japan would
reoccupy that city "in case of necessity".

2. The American occupation of Nanking.

0578

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL PLAIN

Special Gray
 Washington

April 29, 1934

1 p. m.

Ambassy,

London, (England).

170
 RUSH

One. Could you ascertain and inform Department immediately by priority cable whether Foreign Office intends to make public tomorrow (Monday) text of statement made by ~~the~~ British Ambassador at Tokyo, under instruction; to Japanese Foreign Minister on subject of Japanese statements in regard to China?

Two. Please send Department by priority cable substance or text of anything important in questions and replies in House of Commons tomorrow on subject of Japanese statements from April 17 to date, especially anything said by Sir John Simon,

FE:MMH

HULL
 (MMH)

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1923 1-138

793.94/6627A

Confidential File

Sunday, April 29, 1934

Embassy
London

RECEIVED

Special Telegram

APR 29 PM 12:54

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Rush.

immediately

One. Could you ascertain and inform Department, by priority cable whether Foreign Office intends to make public tomorrow (Monday) text of statement made by British Ambassador at Tokyo, under instruction, to Japanese Foreign Minister ~~on subject of~~ Japanese statements in regard to China?

Two. Please send Department by priority cable substance or text of anything important in questions and replies in House of Commons tomorrow on subject of Japanese statements from April 17 to date, especially anything said by Sir John Simon.

Hull

M.D.

FE/MNH.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MLC

GRAY

RECEIVED

APR 30 1934

FROM

London

DIVISION OF

Dated April 30, 1934

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



DOUBLE PRIORITY RUSH 211, April 30, 3 p.m.

Department's 170, April 29, 1 p.m.

793.94

F/G 793.94/6628

One. It is not intended to give out text of statement made by British at Tokyo under instruction. The present intention is to outline in the House of Commons the substance of British Ambassador's remarks to the Japanese Foreign Minister and substance of reply of Japanese Foreign Minister. It will depend on subsequent questions in Parliament whether Simon will read textually the ~~written~~ answer Hirota gave.

official report of

Two. Subsequent to Simon's remarks this afternoon will telegraph again.

BINGHAM

WSB

MAY 11 1934

Confidential File
 FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

Tokyo

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (B)

FROM

Dated April 30, 1934

Rec'd 1:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

RECEIVED

APR 30 1934

Washington

DIVISION OF

84, April 30, 1 p. m.

My 83, April 29, 7 p. m.



F/G 793.94/6629

793.94

Despite previous announcement by the Foreign Office
 spokesman that an official statement clarifying Japan's
 policy in China would be issued this afternoon, Amau said
 at the press conference this morning that no (repeat no)
 such statement would be issued and that he considered the
 affair "a closed incident". No (repeat no) mention was
 made of the American aide memoire presented to the Minister
 by me last evening.

GREW

WP

MAY 11 1934

FILED CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KLP

GRAY

FROM

London

Dated April 30, 1934.

Rec'd. 2 p.m.

ED
 APR 30 1934
 DIVISION OF

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

APR 30 1934

Department of State

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY

213, April 30, 5 p.m.

My 211, April 30, 3 p.m.

Simon answering questions in Parliament stated the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Government assumed that the Japanese statement of April 17th was not intended to infringe the common rights of the other powers in China. The Japanese Foreign Minister had informed the British Government that this assumption was correct and reaffirmed the policy of the "open door" in China.

In reply to further questions Sir John stated that the communication of His Majesty's Ambassador to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs of April 25th was a friendly inquiry and was to the effect that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Treaty, to which Japan

was

F/ESP

793.94/6630

FILED
 Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - #213 from London

was a party, and His Majesty's Government must of course continue to enjoy all rights in China which were common to all signatories, or otherwise proper, except in so far as the rights were restricted by agreement such as the consortium agreement, or in so far as Japan had special rights recognized by other powers and not shared by them. The Ambassador added that the anxiety regarding China expressed in the Japanese statement could not apply to the United Kingdom since it was the aim of British policy to avoid the dangers to peace and the integrity of China to which the statement referred. The British Government could not admit the right of Japan alone to decide whether any particular action such as the provision of technical and financial assistants promoted such danger, if that had indeed been the implication of the statement which they did not believe. In articles numbers one and seven of the Nine Power Treaty Japan had the right to call attention of other signatories to any action in China inimical to her security. That right provided Japan with safeguards and His Majesty's Government therefore assumed that the statement was not intended in any way to infringe common rights of other powers in China, or to infringe Japan's inter-treaty obligations.

In reply the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that His Majesty's Government was correct in this

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 - #213 from London

this assumption and assured His Majesty's Ambassador that Japan would observe the provision of the Nine Power Treaty and that the assumption of the Japanese Government and His Majesty's Government with regard to the treaty coincided. The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in conclusion that Japan continued to attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the "open door" in China, and reaffirmed her acceptance of that policy.

In reply to a question as to the numerous statements issued by the Tokyo press officer and various Japanese officials in Washington and Berlin, and Geneva which seemed to conflict with the latest statement of Hirota, Sir John said one must not assume that information which reaches readers of the press in every press statement is authorized. "I think the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister is reasonably clear and His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is. I would only add that His Majesty's Government are resolved to assist to the utmost possible extent the spirit of international cooperation in the progress of China towards peace and prosperity, and in the maintenance of the spirit of harmony and good will in the Far East".

Official text available tomorrow will be forwarded by the pouch.

BINGHAM

CSB

KLP

0585

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Collect this
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington, May 2, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

176
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One./ Department desires that you make a careful study and analysis of the British Government's attitude and action in regard to the Japanese statements relating to China policy from April 17 to April 30, inclusive. It is believed that you have all the information which is available here with the possible exception of the fact that on April 26 the British Ambassador here read to the Under Secretary the instructions which had been sent by the British Government to the British Ambassador in Tokyo.

Two./ Department desires also that you report as soon as practicable in regard to the reaction in Great Britain to the British Government's attitude and policy.

Three./ The Department desires further that you endeavor discreetly but persistently to ascertain what the Foreign Minister had in mind in his reference to Japan's QUOTE special rights recognized by other powers and not repeat not shared by them UNQUOTE. (See your 213, April 30, 5 p. m.).

793.94/6630

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by KPSent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/6630

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

Gray.

RECEIVED
 MAY - 1 1934
 DIVISION OF

FROM Tokyo.

Dated May 1, 1934.

Received 8.30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 1 - 1934
 Department of State

87, May 1, 8 p.m.

Foreign Office this evening issued to the press
 in Japanese and English a communication containing the
 statement cabled to the Department in the final portion
 of my 78, ⁶⁶¹⁹ April 26, 9 p.m, and also commenting briefly
 on the conversation between the Minister for Foreign
 Affairs and the British Ambassador on April 25. As
 this release will presumably appear in the American
 press I shall not (repeat not) cable the rest of the
 text unless instructed.

GREW.

RR

FILE

F/ESP 793.94/6631

MAY 11 1934

FILED

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

F

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone (A)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated May 1, 1934

RECEIVED


Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

MAY - 1 1934

Secretary of State,

DIVISION OF

Washington.



86, May 1, 6 p.m.

Department's 60, April 30, 6 p.m. Full text published
 here.

In an interview with Fleisher today the Vice Minister
 for Foreign Affairs said that the American statement of
 policy is a frank and friendly one and is received by
 the Japanese Government with same spirit in which it was
 sent by Mr. Hull. The Japanese Government welcomes it
 as giving an opportunity to express its own views in the
 same friendly way and it will therefore be answered with
 the same traditional frankness. The ^{tone} ~~(#)~~, he said, is
 entirely different from that used by Mr. Stimson.

No press comment is yet available but it is possible
 that the newspapers will take their cue from the Foreign
 Office. Repeated to Peiping.

GREW

WSB RR

(S) apparent omission

F/ESP

793.94/6632

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

0588

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy to Paris 5/3/34
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAY 2 1934
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 1 1934
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDER SECRETARY
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 1- 1934
 Department of State
 April 30, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation with the French Ambassador,
April 30th.

The French Ambassador asked me this morning whether I could give him any information regarding any action which we were proposing to take with respect to the Far Eastern situation. I told him that Ambassador Grew had been instructed to make certain observations to Mr. Hirota and to leave them with Mr. Hirota in the form of an aide memoire, that probably within a day or two the substance of Mr. Grew's remarks will be made public here, but that I was uncertain whether the aide memoire would be published textually; I read the Ambassador, for his confidential information, our message to Mr. Grew, but I did not give him a copy of it.

It was apparent that the Ambassador had no information as to what action, if any, the French Government was planning to take.

WP
 William Phillips.

U WP/AB

Confidential File
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 MAY 9 1934

F/ESP
 793.94/6633

0585

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

8 1934d

No. 386

Confidential - For Staff Use Only

The Honorable

Jesse Isidor Straus,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of memorandum of conversation between Mr. Phillips and the French Ambassador, on April 30, 1934, relating to the Far Eastern situation.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum.

793.94/6633

793.94/6633

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

12/18/75
HGG:MLD 5-3-34
5/4/34
PM

[Handwritten signature]

0590

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

April 30, 1934.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (China)

133

Department's 131, April 28, 7 p.m.

One. Department is today releasing to the press for publication in the morning papers of May 1 a statement as follows:

* QUOTE

UNQUOTE.

Two. Repeat to Minister and Nanking.

Three. Forward by mail to Tokyo, and to all consulates in China.

Four. Department desires that no repeat no release be made in China by American officials.

Hull
6/1

* NOTE: See telegram 59/6625a April 28 7pm to Embassy, Tokyo.

FE:MMH/VDM
 Enciphered by

FE

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/6633A

Confidential File

0591

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

48

FOR THE PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE APRIL 30, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL

FUTURE RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9:00 P.M. EASTERN
 STANDARD TIME, APRIL 30, 1934. NOT TO BE PRE-
 VIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

The American Ambassador to Japan under instruction from the Department of State called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 29 and made a statement the substance of which was as follows:

Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored and make it necessary that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. The United States has with regard to China certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with both, together with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

Treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

[Faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]

0592

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL
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Charge Department

OR

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100-107-80-PM 5:41

Washington,

April 30, 1934.

COMM

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (England)

172
Department's 169, April 28, 7 p.m.

Department is today releasing to the press a statement
for publication ^{here} in the morning papers of May 1 giving the
substance of the ^{statement quoted in} Department's telegram under reference.
Department assumes that full text of its press release
will appear in British press. You should make no repeat
no release there.

793.94/6633B

Hull
WJ

FE:MMH/VIDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.


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Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MAY 1 1934

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDERSECRETARY

April 26, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation with the Persian Minister,
April 26th.

793.94

The Persian Minister called to make inquiries about the Far Eastern situation. I told him, in confidence, that we had instructed Mr. Grew to call at the Foreign Office, in order to obtain the exact phraseology of the Amau statements, that in view of the various statements which had been given out in Geneva, Washington and Tokyo, it was confusing to know precisely the Japanese Government's attitude; I said I had not yet had a chance to examine Mr. Grew's reply. I added that we had reached no decision as to what action or stand we were going to take, that the situation which had developed was so important that it required a great deal of care and thought.

WP
 William Phillips.

U WP/AB

F/ESP

793.94/6634

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MAY 1 1934

Confidential File

0594

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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OR

Charge to

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Department of State

RECEIVED

Washington,

May 1, 1934

Amembassy

Tokyo (Japan) ^{CONFIDENTIAL}

61 Substance of Secretary's background talk at press
 conference today, not for attribution to himself or the
 Department, made before the receipt of any reaction to
 our statement, is given for your guidance:

It is and has been the policy of the United States
 Government for many years to cooperate with the efforts
 and professed desire of the Japanese Government to
 strengthen the traditional relations of friendship be-
 tween the two countries. To carry out this policy as
 successfully as possible, it has been our view that the
 less agitation and excitement injected into any differ-
 ences between the conceptions of the two Governments re-
 garding any particular question the more likely would its
 adjustment be satisfactory and in a spirit of better under-
 standing and harmony. With that in view it has been the
 policy of our government to talk as little as possible
 and to discuss the questions that arise in a spirit of
 friendliness in order that their determination might be
 reached in an amicable way. It would be most helpful
 to both countries, in accomplishing this common purpose,

Enciphered by 777Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933

1-138

793.94/6634A

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

0595

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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 or

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

-2-

if we would point to and emphasize the letter and spirit of such communications as those recently exchanged by the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State rather than seek out and rake together various reports and news items emanating from Japanese sources and the reply with respect to them. Our communication was a statement of principles, attitudes and one might say of intentions which we think correctly and properly govern the course of our Government in conducting its foreign affairs. Our statement has a message for China and other countries as well as Japan. The courses of the British and our Governments have been independent but not unnaturally along parallel lines. Each has emphasized the importance of treaties, rights, obligations and interests of each country alike under ~~these~~ treaties.

CI:WAF:GAL

FE

Hull
(HLL)

m.m.h.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

4/24/72
U:
Mr. Phillips:
Both the dispatch
and the enclosures
are interesting.
M.M.H.

0597

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, April 24, 1934.

No. 656.

SUBJECT: Japanese Foreign Office Statement
Concerning China.




MAY - 2 34

F/ESP

793.94/6635

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

Supplementing my telegram No. 187, /6590 April 21, 10 a.m.

giving a summary of the reaction of the British press to
a statement concerning China made on April 17 by the official
spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, I have the honor
1/ to enclose herewith a number of clippings of comment on the
subject to date from the English press. These clippings
are all grouped for convenience as one enclosure, to dis-
tinguish them from the Hansard cuttings mentioned below.

Though/

FILED
MAY 14 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Though all the newspapers have given conspicuous publication to the Japanese statement and subsequent news, there has thus far been comparatively little editorial comment, possibly due to this question being overshadowed by that of disarmament, and, in the case of some newspapers, a reluctance to embarrass the Government which as yet has taken no attitude. There is no doubt, however, that this new phase of the Far Eastern problem is very much in the minds of those persons having interests there.

Such editorials and comments by diplomatic correspondents as have appeared are uniform in their emphasis of the gravity of the Japanese statement, which they describe in terms varying from "a Monroe Doctrine for the East" to a declaration by Japan of "a virtual protectorate for China". The press agree that the statement constitutes an announcement by Japan that the nine-Power agreement is a dead letter. An exception to the foregoing is afforded by the DAILY MAIL which reiterates its editorial policy of "Leave Japan Alone". The Labor DAILY HERALD, and the Liberal MANCHESTER GUARDIAN and NEWS-CHRONICLE, are, as might be expected, the sharpest in their comments.

Since my telegram referred to above, the interviews of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on April 22 and the Japanese Consul in Geneva on April 23 have been published in the press, which as interpreted here merely emphasize Japan's more definite intentions. However, the ultra-conservative MORNING POST in the enclosed

leader/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


-3-

leader dated April 24 takes a somewhat more conciliatory attitude toward the question, and after referring to "the unfortunate abandonment of the British alliance with Japan", alludes to the intervention in Shanghai and Manchuria as forced upon Japan, adding that "England, at all events, should understand the motives upon which she herself acted in India and Egypt".

2/ There is also enclosed a Hansard clipping of the Parliamentary debates of April 23 which gives the text of Sir John Simon's answer to a question concerning a Franco-Japanese consortium designed to promote French trade with Manchuria, signed at Tokio on March 3 last between representatives of the South Manchuria Railway and unnamed French interests. This is of interest in connection with the rumor that a possible French loan to China was one of Japan's motives in announcing her policy at this time.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


 Ray Atherton,
 Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

1. Sixteen editorials and articles from leading English papers between April 19th and April 24th, 1934.
2. Clipping re Manchuria from Hansard of April 23, 1934.
3. " " Japan and China from Hansard of April 23, 1934.

HM/MVB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to 656 APR 24 1934
PAPER DAILY HERALD from the Embassy at London, England.
CITY LONDON DATE April 20, 1934.

ment action, and
ernment aid.

Japan Moves

THE Japanese Government is always quick to seize the opportunity provided by complex situations elsewhere than in the Far East.

Its latest challenge, issued in an inspired Press announcement, will not be taken up. The other Powers are too busy, too indifferent, or too complacent.

Quietly Japan asserts a claim to exercise a control over the financial and economic relations of other countries with China. She declares the Nine-Power Treaty to be "dead."

She claims a right to veto "international projects" for assisting China and to veto further individual assistance which may be used to increase China's military strength.

This claim is the biggest step so far towards the reduction of the Chinese Republic to the status of a Japanese Protectorate.

It flagrantly attacks that "political independence" which is not only guaranteed by the Nine-Power Treaty, but which the other League Powers are sworn to preserve.

But they will do nothing. French devotion to the principles of the Covenant is strictly reserved for use against Germany. Sir John Simon remains convinced that the penetration of China is Japan's historic mission.

The law of the League will once again be quietly set aside.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER DAILY HERALD

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE April 24, 1934.

Japan's Claim

EXACTLY what Sir John Simon has done about the new Japanese claims to over-lordship in the Far East is not very clear. His statement yesterday was a model of evasiveness.

But one gathers that he has hastened to "clarify the position of H.M. Government" by assuring Mr. Hirota that Great Britain will take no action in or about China of the kind to which Japan objects.

Sir John hints at danger to peace from the action of "other Powers." He sees none from the action of Japan.

Perhaps he shares the curious view expressed by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that she is "a small country fighting for her life."

Mr. Saito has taken the new "Monro doctrine" a step farther. He demands that "those who want to deal with China" must consult Japan "before concluding any transaction." Failure to do so will be regarded as an "unfriendly act."

Acceptance of that doctrine and of the claim to a sort of censorship over all Chinese loans abroad implies recognition of a virtual Japanese protectorate over China.

But Sir John apparently regards such a development as complacently, or, indeed, as approvingly, as he regarded Japanese action in Manchuria.

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PAPER MANCHESTER GUARDIAN NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE April 19, 1934.

REF
 LONDON, Wednesday Night.

Tokio Warns the World

It is reported from Tokio that the Japanese Foreign Office has to-day issued a statement virtually warning the League of Nations that if any international loans be floated for China, and if the proceeds be used by China for military ends, then Japan will take action. On this occasion the formulæ used by Tokio are a little stronger than those used by the same Foreign Office last summer in the like context.

Dr. L. Rajchman, Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations, who had acted as liaison between China and the League, was last summer attached for a period of one year to the National Economic Council of China. He has never concealed his personal feelings against Japan as a result of the events of the past few years. At the same time Dr. T. V. Soong was trying to raise European loans for China via Geneva, and the Japanese Foreign Office then made a statement of which to-day's statement is virtually a repetition, put perhaps a little more strongly.

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DATE April 24, 1934.

A British Note

When the Japanese "spokesman" announced that Japan meant to control a large part of China's foreign policy, diplomacy could choose between two modes of action: it could say that nothing "official" had happened and wait, or it could take the view that a new situation had been created which could not be ignored. The British Government, choosing the second, has sent a friendly Note to Japan "with the object of clarifying the position." We have two interests in China, our own and China's, and, as in justice so by treaty, we make the first subordinate to the second. The British Note, whatever it contains, might well call attention to the declared objects of the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922, with Japan among the signatories. The nine Powers agreed—

I. (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

Have not other countries, singly or jointly, the right to carry on with China the normal processes of commercial and financial intercourse? Japan, it seems, would say No.

If the text of the "spokesman's" utterance is examined, the argument comes to this: Japan desires a strong China, no man more so; China must, however, become strong solely by her own efforts; "joint operations" of foreign Powers (as of the League) to assist China, either technically or financially, must at this moment "after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents" have a political significance, or, in plainer terms, be anti-Japanese in their results; therefore Japan will resist them. There is a shorter way of saying the same thing: Japan having failed so far to cow China, a strong China will be anti-Japanese, and therefore Japan will prevent China at all costs from becoming strong. Japan seized Manchuria through China's weakness and will hold it so long as China remains weak and no longer; therefore Japan would resist the idea that China should invite and receive assistance from the League that will make her stronger to face her future. There are implied threats all round in the "spokesman's" words, but they are expressed openly against China. If China needs and requests foreign assistance in the exercise of her normal national rights, Japan cannot in the long run prevent it except by taking action against China herself. She knows that: hence the ominous reference to "discussions of problems like the division of China which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China." Unless China is prepared to be the respectful satellite of Japan, she will become strong at her peril.

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DATE April 21, 1934.

pressed by Congress to agree to inflation through legislation regarding silver, but is likely to resist it. (17)

Japan's Policy in China

On Tuesday the vernacular press in Tokio published an "unofficial" statement by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office; an "unofficial" translation of this "unofficial" statement was provided for expectant diplomats and journalists on Thursday; finally, yesterday the Foreign Office spokesman spoke again, this time in order to disclaim the evil meanings which have been read into what is only known through a translation of a newspaper report of verbal utterances. Why should the press and chancelleries of the world have been excited by a declaration made in such deliberately elusive terms? Whatever sedatives may be applied by way of explanation and interpretation, nothing can alter the outstanding fact that this is far the most important general statement of her policy towards China which Japan has made since she presented her notorious "Twenty-one Demands" in 1915. The moment chosen and the method are in character. As in 1915, the world of Europe and America is up to the eyes in foreign and domestic crisis. That is an excellent reason why the "few just persons" who control Japan should make a small assertion of their "rights." The method chosen does not make it obligatory for the Governments of less just countries to make known their feelings; besides, it leaves the Foreign Office spokesman a considerable latitude in varying the tones and accents of his statement. But can the Governments of Europe and America afford to let the matter go without display of feeling? Some of them have already made it plain that they cannot. Others, of which Great Britain and the Soviet Union are the most important, preserve official silence, but cannot do so for long.

No one outside Japan is likely to obtain an absolutely accurate report of the first "unofficial" statement of the Foreign Office spokesman. That does not really matter. The "calming" explanations and disclaimers which have followed have underlined essentials and made them clear. Japan affirms her right to act alone when she "considers that the peace of the Far East is being endangered." We have heard that, or something very like it, many times before. Japan asks foreign Powers to realise that she opposes all concerted operations in China and that, "even if technical at the outset, they must attain political significance and end in spheres of influence or international control." Japan, of course, knows how these things can happen. Finally, "in view of her position and mission in the Far East" (see the Japanese liturgy for use on all occasions), Japan opposes such undertakings in principle, though she is good enough not to object to "foreign countries individually negotiating with China in regard to finance or trade, provided that their proposals are peaceful and unpolitical." Translated for a third time into English, all this means that Japan asserts a right of veto on all loans to China, whether in the form of cash or of advisers; on the sale of war munitions, more especially fighting aeroplanes, to China; and on construction of facilities like airports and water ports with foreign capital or foreign engineers. Her action will be "calming" that is, she "will only

"own awakening and by her own endeavours, not by selfish exploitation by other Powers. The time has already passed when other Powers or the League of Nations can exercise their influence for the exploitation of China." So Japan defines, explains, interprets, but repeats herself. What is her audience to think and say? China could not do better than take Japanese advice and wake. As Lord Cecil has declared, the "League should tell Japan plainly that if she touches China the League would proceed against her." The wretched precedents of 1931 and 1932 must not be followed. Never was there a better chance of realising unity among the Great Powers, not only at Geneva but also outside it. In 1932 we lost opportunities of co-operating heartily with the United States. Yet both countries desire only the independence, prosperity, and strength of China. They desire a strong China both for China's sake and for their own. Opportunities for co-operation should not be lost again.

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In yesterday's so-called "disclaimer" the spokesman—Are there several or does a single official have to do all this? If so, he should demand a rise in salary—reaffirmed Japan's respect for treaties and the "open door." If it were not sheer waste of time we might remind him and his masters of the Nine-Power Treaty signed by Japan and certain other Powers in 1922. By article 1 the signatories undertook, among other things, "to use their influence . . . to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China." That is a definition of the so-called "open door" in China; the Japanese translation must mean something different. The same official said that "we desire the unification and prosperity of China." But this, about which China and Japan agree, "must be obtained by China."

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NUMBER

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DATE April 23, 1934.

More Spokesmen

The Japanese Government has not been content to leave ill alone. Lest there should be the smallest possibility of error, its spokesmen are still busy, both at Tokio and at Geneva, interpreting and underlining the full import of last Tuesday's declaration touching Japanese policy towards China. This is much more than an experimental kite to test the shifting breezes of opinion. The Japanese delegate to the Disarmament Conference, Mr. Yokoyama, made that absolutely clear on Saturday. While kindly recognising everybody's right to lend and trade in China, Mr. Yokoyama thinks that other Powers should recognise that

Japan has a peculiar competence in Chinese affairs inasmuch as Japan would be the first to suffer from political errors committed in regard to China. When we see Governments or the League of Nations ready to furnish material and financial support which will be exploited against us by certain Chinese parties, we have the right to be suspicious. That is why we hope that in future Japanese interests will be taken more into account by the Powers and the League in dealing with China.

In other words, Japan has been annoyed by the assistance which the League has lent and various foreign firms and individuals have sold to China. She is afraid that projects of financial aid to China may appear before the Council of the League at its May meeting. This, in her eyes, is "exploitation" of the Chinese by foreigners; it must be vetoed so that kind Japan may help the Chinese in her own way on the road to "unification and prosperity." Another helpful spokesman, this time in Tokio, has added other useful glosses. Asked if Japan would allow the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty to decide what constitutes a threat to the peace of the Far East, he said that that was quite out of the question. If, on the other hand, her veto is ignored, Japan "will seek to prevail upon China not to buy abroad rather than on other countries not to sell to China." Japan excels in arguments of this kind. What are the onlookers to say and do?

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER NEWS CHRONICLE

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DATE April 24, 1934.

"Leaving Japan Alone"

Sir John Simon announced yesterday that he had thought it necessary to communicate with the Japanese Government with regard to certain of the remarkable utterances made recently in its name; and he may perhaps be right in thinking that it is better to wait till he knows Japan's answer before saying anything more.

In the meanwhile it is only fair to point out, in view of the voluble exhortations of the pro-Japanese Press to "leave Japan alone," that it is Japan herself who is doing all the talking.

The Japanese Foreign Office cautiously announces that the remarks made by Mr. Saito, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, were made "entirely on his own initiative." But it does not object to them.

Mr. Saito's modest claim is that Japan should be "consulted by those who want to deal with China before concluding any transactions." She is to exercise, that is to say, a right of absolute supervision over all foreign loans to China. There is a certain irony, in view of that claim, in calling upon foreign countries to "leave Japan alone."

The sane course for this country in what is admittedly a delicate and difficult field of policy lies in the closest possible co-operation with the United States. Both countries have a common concern to assure that their complete freedom of action in the Far East shall not be challenged.

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CITY LONDON DATE April 21, 1934.

NEWSPAPER HOUSE, LONDON, E.C. 4.
 Telephone: Central 6800.
 21st April, 1934. 111th Day.

JAPAN AND REALITIES

IN the important telegram from Tokio which we publish to-day, our Special Correspondent deals with the implications of the declaration which Japan has just made regarding her policy in **China's present condition of hopeless anarchy and collapse.**

In effect she has told the world that, because of geographical reasons, **she has the right to exert special influence in China** and she is specially qualified to preserve the peace of the Far East.

As to Japan's geographical advantages there can be no doubt. Vice-Admiral Ballard, who served in the British Admiralty in the war, pointed out some years ago that because of them **an assailant would need for success against her a fleet three times as powerful as hers.** No such fleet exists to-day, nor is likely to exist in the future.

Great Britain's special position in Australasia has always been recognised, as has that of the United States on the American Continent. It is difficult to see then why Japan's preponderance of interest in China should be disputed. **Certainly no sane Government is going to attempt to turn her out of Manchukuo,** whatever the vapourings of our bellicose pacifists.

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DATE April 23. 1934.

Daily Mail

NORTHCLIFFE HOUSE, LONDON, E.C. 4.
 Telephone: Central 6000.

23rd April 1934. 11th Day.

LEAVE JAPAN ALONE

IN the House of Commons to-day, Sir Charles Cayzer is to ask whether the Government has received any notification from Japan "of her intention to redefine her policy in the Far East with the object of claiming a controlling voice over China's foreign policy."

This is a quite reasonable question. But in other quarters excitable pacifists are insisting that the time has come for the British Government to despatch an ultimatum to Japan, or **to join with other Powers in organising against her a "pacific blockade."**

On a previous occasion the British Government was so weak as to allow itself to be influenced by these misguided sentimentalists into imposing an embargo on the export of arms. It thereby injured British industry, and **not a single foreign country followed its example.**

It is strange that **the very people who have been so busy disarming Great Britain and rendering her impotent to defend herself at home would have her rush into measures abroad which would inevitably involve hostilities—and hostilities with a first-class Power, distant from us some 7,000 miles, and placed by geography in an impregnable position.**

Our pacifists must really **leave Japan alone.** She has brought order and prosperity in the Far-East. In Korea, as a British historian tells us, "life and property became secure under her strong administration, and a civilised rule replaced a barbarous and brutal anarchy." **The same feat is being repeated in Manchukuo,** where the brigands have been hunted down, the predatory war-lords ejected, and a growing population of workers given peace and prosperity.

Anarchic China

To snarl at her because she has done this and is continuing her work with growing success is fatuous. She is performing in Manchukuo the same offices as Great Britain in Egypt or India; as the United States in Panama and Haiti; and as France in Morocco.

It will be for the benefit of the whole civilised world, and not least of China herself, if Japan exerts her influence in the Celestial Empire to end the era of anarchy and civil war which has lasted ever since 1912, when the Manchu dynasty was deposed.

The Japanese Government will doubtless be prepared to maintain the open door, which is the chief interest of European and American industry in the Far East. **So long, however, as China is given up to disorder and insecurity, commerce cannot prosper there.** It is a striking fact that the British exports to China, which were

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On behalf of this country it cannot be too plainly stated that we do not mean to allow ourselves to be involved in any action against Japan, who is our former ally and has in the past been a most loyal friend. What line the United States will follow must be left to the American Government. **But we are convinced that the good sense of the American people will be strongly against any policy of adventure in the Far East.**

After all, there is a great deal in the Japanese contentions. The loans which are being made by Europe and America to China are being raided largely by the Chinese war-lords and utilised for their own domestic quarrels or employed in building aircraft to threaten Japan.

In either case the Chinese people are injured, not benefited; and the risk of future Chinese defaults in payment of interest and principal grows with every increase in indebtedness. That Japan will act aggressively or unjustly those who know her past history do not believe. **Nothing is to be gained by threatening or lecturing her.**

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PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH

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DATE April 21, 1934.

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THE DAILY TE

BRITAIN'S VIEW OF TOKIO'S 'WARNING'

NEXT MOVE RESTS WITH AMERICA

"OPEN DOOR" OUR CHIEF CONCERN

By Our DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

Britain has not yet been officially notified by Japan of the change in policy toward China implied by the semi-official declaration issued by the Tokio Foreign Office three days ago.

On the other hand, the British Embassy in Tokio has telegraphed to London the full text of that declaration, together with a summary of Japanese Press comments and relevant observations.

Britain, however, will await an official notification from Japan before giving formal attention to the matter.

Contrary to reports in circulation yesterday, there has been no approach to London by Washington on the subject, although such an approach may be impending.

MISTRUST OF LEAGUE

I gather that Japan's opposition to financial assistance being given to China from ~~certain~~ outside resources relates not merely to recent cotton and other loans by America, but to the plans in that direction which have been under consideration for some time past by the League.

Some of the League's chief officials and ex-officials, including M. Avenol and Sir Arthur Salter, have recently studied the problem on the spot. Sir Arthur is there at the moment.

Tokio's distrust of Geneva assistance for China is no doubt due to Japan's quarrel with the League over Manchuria. This inclines her to the view that any financial and economic support given China by the League would ultimately be used to Japan's detriment, through the better organisation of China's defences.

Tokio demurs equally to the employment by China of foreign military advisers and air pilots—mainly German, but also, in part, American and British.

Still wider issues are raised—the establishment, as I described it the other day, of a kind of Monroe Doctrine for China. This might easily clash with the stipulations of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, concerning the "Open Door" for trade.

If there is a move to be made, however, it is obviously for America, and not for this country, or for the League, to take the lead. Britain's main concern, so it is held, is not ~~political~~ but commercial—the "Open Door."

AMERICAN CONCERN

"CHINA FOR JAPANESE"

From Our Own Correspondent

WASHINGTON, Friday.

In the absence of a formal document from the Japanese Government setting forth "a new Tokio policy" I am informed that there is no likelihood whatever that Washington will take any official steps to clarify the situation as defined by the announcement of the Foreign Office spokesman in Tokio.

Inquiry at the Japanese Embassy here revealed that the Ambassador, Mr. Saito, does not expect any formal communication from his Government to transmit to the State Department. He will, however, call upon the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, to explain some apparent discrepancies which have, he suggests, given rise to misunderstanding.

Despite efforts to pour oil on the

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Open Source

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Despite efforts to pour oil on the troubled waters one finds, in Washington, a very definite belief that Japan, in her latest diplomatic gesture as reported here, is serving notice to the rest of the world that "China is her backyard, and no one else may play in it."

It means, according to one unofficial but highly placed spokesman, "not so much Asia for the Asiatics, but China for the Japanese."

TOKIO'S ASSURANCE TREATIES WITH CHINA TO BE RESPECTED

TOKIO, Friday.

A disclaimer that Japan has any intention of interfering with the interests of other Powers engaging in trade transactions beneficial to China is made to-day by the Foreign Office spokesman.

This was given in explanation of his recent declaration that Japan would oppose any "interference" in China by foreign Powers.

Commenting on the reaction abroad to his statement, the official asserted that Japan had no intention of deviating from the policy of the "open door" and equal opportunity for all nations in China, nor of infringing existing treaties concerning China.

The spokesman declared further that Japan had no intention of interfering with the independence of China, whose unification and prosperity she desired.—Reuter.

GENEVA DISCUSSION NEXT MONTH

From Our Own Correspondent

GENEVA, Friday.

Official circles in Geneva are concerned over the Japanese Foreign Office statement.

It must be remembered that when the League Council meets in May the various Powers will discuss the report of the League Commissioner on the spot on the possibility of establishing a central political and economic Government in China.

The belief prevails here that Japan is alarmed at the possible ultimate success of the Western Powers towards a unified China.

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general line of policy can be reached no
 Naval agreement will be possible.
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STAKING OUT A LARGER CLAIM

LAW AND ORDER A PRIME NECESSITY

(BY OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT)

The announcement by the Japanese Foreign Office to the effect that Japan will brook no foreign interference in China is undoubtedly receiving the serious attention of the British Government.

Actually this new development should not surprise close observers of Japanese policy, as it is only in accordance with the increasing tendency of the Japanese to regard China as their particular sphere of influence, and seems to confirm rumours of their resolve to stake out a larger claim there.

A year ago it was thought that the development of Manchukuo would keep the Japanese occupied for some time to come. So far, however, from this being the case, it does look as though Manchukuo might have been not so much an objective, as a stepping-stone to progressive penetration elsewhere. Attention, it is reported, is at present centred upon Inner Mongolia where significant developments may be seen before long.

Economic expansion, however, is only feasible where law and order reigns. The two conditions of successful penetration in China are a strong and friendly central government with whom the Japanese traders can negotiate and the maintenance of peace in the provinces. As the capacity for warfare depends largely on a good supply of munitions, it is of primary importance to Japan that this supply should not continue. Hardly less important is it that funds for purchasing arms should not be available.

The Japanese accuse both Germans and Italians of sending munitions to China for use in civil war, apart from the arms sent by Russia to the Communists in Kiangsi.

QUESTION IN COMMONS

In the House of Commons yesterday, Mr. Harcourt Johnstone asked the Foreign Secretary if he could make any statement on the verbal declaration made on Wednesday by the Japanese Foreign Office as to the relations of foreign countries with China.

Sir J. Simon replied: All I can say at present is that the statement appears to have been made orally by a Press Officer of the Japanese Foreign Office. There are somewhat discrepant versions of what was said. I have nothing to show whether it was an authoritative declaration, and I must await further information before I can say anything further on the subject.

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SPECIAL RELATIONS

The statement, to which Sir JOHN SIMON referred in the House of Commons yesterday, may have been "informal" and "verbal," but it is evident, nevertheless, that it expresses the policy of Japan in her relations with China, and, in that regard, with the rest of the world. It claims that the "special position" of Japan in her relations with China involves a responsibility for the peace and order of the Far East; it lays down that no country but China is in a position to share that responsibility; it warns foreign nations against working with China, as it warns China against working with foreign nations, against Japan; it expresses itself against certain joint operations by foreign Powers in the way of "technical or financial assistance" to China, and it goes on to cite such examples as the supply of China with war aeroplanes, the building of aerodromes, and the detailing to China of military instructors. At the same time, it disclaims any thought of interfering in questions of finance or trade, "as long as such negotiations benefit China, and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia."

On the feeling which prompts this declaration some light is thrown by Mr. HIROSI SAITO, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, who spoke of Japan as "a small country which is fighting for its life in the Far East"; added that "Western nations knew nothing about Chinese mentality," and went on to say that "to-day the Japanese Government could not obtain popular support in a policy of co-operation with other nations." There is, in fact, as we have noted before, an isolation complex in the Japanese mind at the moment. It is the consequence ~~which we feared from the~~ unfortunate abandonment of the British alliance with Japan, and also from the no less unfortunate ~~Genevan~~ interventions in the matter of Manchuria. As we have endeavoured to point out from time to time, there is some justification for this attitude. Ever since the followers of SUN YAT SEN deposed a traditional government and plunged into their disastrous Republican adventure, China has gone from bad to worse until it is now impossible to say where the seat of authority lies. Rival war lords and provincial governors have trampled upon the peace, the trade, the prosperity and the unity of China; agitators and generals have used crude ideas and dangerous weapons supplied by the West to tear China in pieces. So vast a calamity her neighbour could not regard with indifference, especially when it took a direction hostile to Japan. The interventions both in Shanghai and in Manchuria, ~~whatever may be thought of the methods employed,~~ were invited by China, if not forced upon Japan, through the anarchy and misrule which threatened every foreign interest. England, at ~~all events,~~ should understand the motives upon which she herself acted in India and in Egypt.

0615

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It seems to us, therefore, that there is a certain reasonableness in the claim to prevent the arming of rival factions in China. There the highest interests of the West coincide with the highest interests of the East. There is, however, the danger that Japan, moving from step to step, may be tempted to impose her economic yoke upon China. It is fair to say that she disclaims any such intention, and, if we may credit her with that wisdom of statesmanship for which she has long been renowned, we can hardly suppose that she would desire to concentrate upon herself the just resentment both of the Chinese and those other foreign nations which have great and vested interests in the China trade. Any lurking dubiety on that point will probably be elucidated in the correspondence to which the SECRETARY of STATE referred. As he said, the British Government aims at avoiding those dangers which Japan apprehends. To that purpose, the British Government scrutinises the exportation of arms, and the British Navy has played a great part in maintaining the security of the China seas and waterways. With this concert of aim, it should be possible to maintain, or to restore, a complete accord of sympathy and understanding between the two countries.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER THE OBSERVER

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE April 22, 1934.

Japan and the World. REF

The Tokyo Foreign Office on Wednesday issued another typically rugged intimation that the Far East, in its view, was a primarily Japanese concern. There was nothing new in the substance of what was said. It was all said last summer, when Western loans for China were being canvassed. This time it has had a more provocative effect. In form Japan has a right to be consulted about loans for China. In these matters the form is less important than the diplomatic nerves excited.

The Chain of Nerves.

In one way the repercussion of the Tokyo statement shows the inter-relationship of every field of world diplomacy. It is not only the United States which reacts to the Japanese outlook upon China. The British Empire is directly concerned. Russia's interests are also a European link. DR. RAJCHMAN's unnecessary provocations to Japan were not the best service he could have rendered to the true purposes of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER THE OBSERVER

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE April 22, 1934.

/ JAPANESE AIMS \
 IN CHINA.
 ————— RFA
 THE LARGER WORLD
 OUTLOOK.

(By Our Diplomatic Correspondent.)

It is clear that the real importance attached by opinion in London to Wednesday's announcement from Tokyo is that it brings nearer the inevitable day when European diplomacy must re-make contact with Japan in the process of solving Europe's own problems.

An increasing importance is now attached both in Paris and in London—although curiously enough, Paris opinion seems not yet to be convinced of London's earnestness in this matter—to Russia's entry into the League of Nations. At the same time it is recognised (and was indeed plainly stated by Mr. Stein at the Geneva meeting of the Disarmament Bureau on April 10) that Russia cannot take any part in the solution of the European problem unless Japan be prepared to share any commitment about armaments that Russia may be prepared to make.

In short the inference is being more frankly faced that there is little chance of progress towards any agreement about armaments until the Naval Conference meets next year.

A WAVE OF PROTEST
 IN U.S.

(From Our Own Correspondent.)

NEW YORK, Saturday.

A wave of protest has arisen against the contemplated action of the Japanese Government in supervising foreign loans to China.

Several constructions besides the one of Japan's ambition to dominate Far Eastern Asia are attached to the démarche. Tokyo is said to be afraid of the growth of an American trained and manned air service in China. Experts say that the Japanese have an inferiority complex about their ability in the air.

Another consideration, it is said, may be that suspicions have been created in Tokyo that the new Chinese banking group recently formed in Shanghai is a method for getting non-Japanese money for Chinese development.

The news from Tokyo, incidentally, has aroused far more interest than the disarmament situation.

0618

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE April 24, 1934.

RFA

JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY

"FRIENDLY" BRITISH INQUIRIES

By Our DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

It had been widely suggested (not in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH) that Sir John Simon would make in the House of Commons yesterday an important and vigorous statement of policy on recent declarations by Japan, claiming a right of supervision over China's foreign commercial and financial policy. But, as might have been expected, he approached the question with reserve and caution.

Since no official communication on the subject has so far been received in London from the Japanese Government, Sir John Simon yesterday sent to the British Ambassador in Tokio a message asking him to make "friendly" inquiries of the Foreign Office. Until this further information is available, and it is clearly seen whether or not the first and extreme interpretations placed on the rather confusing semi-official declarations are confirmed, the British Government will adopt a waiting attitude.

Washington, down to yesterday, had not raised the issue with London. For London to propose or to acquiesce in concerted action with the United States, or any other Power or Powers, at this stage, would convey to Japan an impression of political prejudice and unfriendliness which it is desirable to avoid.

Britain's main concern in China is, after all, the "Open Door" for British trade. This is the main aspect on which Britain will seek clarification and reassurance, with, it is hoped, satisfactory results.

SIR JOHN SIMON'S STATEMENT

JAPAN'S "FEARS"

Sir John Simon, in answering a number of questions yesterday in the House of Commons, said that he had received no notification from Japan of her intention to re-define her policy in the Far East. He continued:

"I have, however, received from H.M. Ambassador at Tokio the text of what is described as a translation of an informal verbal statement made to the Japanese Press by a spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The statement appears to have been inspired by the apprehension of certain dangers to peace and to the good relations between China and Japan, and to the integrity of China which might follow from certain action by other Powers in China.

"None of these dangers is to be apprehended from any policy of his Majesty's Government, which aims, in fact, at avoiding them. On the other hand, the general character of the statement, and of certain details in it, such as a reference to the objections to financial assistance to China, are of a nature which has made me think it necessary to communicate with the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of his Majesty's Government."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PAPER

FINANCIAL TIMES

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE April 21, 1934.

country like
 large sum. —Reuter.
“HANDS OFF CHINA.”

JAPAN CLIMBING DOWN.

The Japanese Government has apparently withdrawn slightly from the position originally taken up in her “hands off China” declaration.

The original statement, made by a Foreign Office spokesman, was: “Japan will take positive action if peace and order are disturbed by international co-operation in assisting China. If force is used by others Japan will use force as well.”

The Japanese Foreign Office has now modified this standpoint. Referring to the interpretation abroad of the statement as being tantamount to the declaration of a Japanese “Monroe doctrine” for China, the official asserted that Japan had no intention of deviating from the policy of the “open door” and equal opportunity for all nations in China, nor did she intend to infringe any existing treaties with China.
 —Reuter.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to 656 f.....
 from the Embassy at London, England.
 SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
 House of Commons,
~~23 April 1934~~ 23, April 1934
 London. Page 1358.

MANCHURIA.

14. Mr. CHORLTON asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he has anything further to report with reference to the large order, totalling some £25,000,000 in value, obtained by a French trade representative in Manchukuo.

Sir J. SIMON: According to the Japanese Press, a provisional agreement for the formation of a Franco-Japanese consortium designed to promote French trade with Manchuria was concluded at Tokio on the 3rd March between representatives of the South Manchurian Railway and of certain French interests. This agreement is subject to ratification by the parties concerned. It is not understood to involve orders of any such magnitude as my hon. Friend suggests.

Mr. CHORLTON: Is there no possibility of our coming to some arrangement of the same nature, or is our trade to be entirely lost?

Sir J. SIMON: I sincerely hope not, but the hon. Member will observe that the transaction to which he has directed attention was the result of private enterprise on the part of trading interests in the two countries concerned.

Earl WINTERTON: Is the right hon. Gentleman looking into the question of whether, owing to our non-recognition of Manchukuo, adequate advice and assistance are available through the British Consular service to enable British firms to do business in this way?

Sir J. SIMON: The Noble Lord is quite right in speaking of non-recognition, but that applies to the other country concerned. None the less, I am satisfied that our Consular service in Manchuria operates quite effectively.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to 1 656
 from the Parliamentary Debates

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
 House of Commons,
~~23 March 1934~~. 23 April 1934
 London. Pages 1363-1367 inc.

1361 Oral Answers 23 APRIL 1934 Oral Answers 1366

Garhwali Rifles sentenced to various terms of imprisonment in connection with the disturbances at Peshawar on 23rd April, 1930, as the result of a court-martial at Abbottabad in June, 1930; will he state the individual sentences inflicted on each man; the place of their detention; their present condition of health; whether any of these prisoners have been released, and, if so, which; and whether he will consider the release of any who may be still serving their sentences?

Sir S. HOARE: I am circulating the names of the men and their individual sentences. I have no information regarding the third and fourth parts of the question. Under the normal practice by which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief reviews periodically the sentences of all persons convicted by courts-martial, eight of the men had been released by the end of 1932, and more may have been released since that date; I do not propose to interfere with the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief in the matter.

Mr. MAXTON: Can the right hon. Gentleman get the details that he is unable to give now?

Sir S. HOARE: Yes, Sir, certainly.

Following are the names and sentences:

Rank and Name.	Sentence.
	Transportation for—
Havildar Chander Sing ...	Life.
" Narain Sing ...	15 years.
Naik Kechar Sing ...	10 years.
" Jit Sing ...	10 years.
	Rigorous imprisonment for—
Naik Harak Sing ...	8 years.
" Bhola Sing ...	6 years.
Lance Naik Bhim Sing ...	8 years.
" " Anand Sing ...	5 years.
" " Khusal Sing ...	5 years.
" " Umrao Sing ...	6 years.
" " Hukam Sing ...	8 years.
" " Sundar Sing ...	5 years.
" " Ratan Sing ...	4 years.
" " Jot Sing ...	6 years.
	(granted remission of 1 year).
" " Alam Sing ...	4 years.
" " Bhawan Sing ...	3 years.
" " Mahindar Sing ...	3 years.

TROOPS, BENGAL (CONDUCT).

3. **Mr. MORGAN JONES** (for **Mr. DAVID GRENFELL**) asked the Secre-

tion to the Japanese Government, and I think the House will probably agree that that is the right course.

Following is the text:

"Owing to special position of Japan in her relations with China her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realised that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia. Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude towards China may at times differ from that of foreign countries such difference cannot be evaded owing to Japan's position and mission.

"It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavouring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in East Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for maintenance of peace in East Asia.

"Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity as well as restoration of order in that country are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows these can be attained through no other means than awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself.

"We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the man re-armaments, respectively; and will he forward the information to the British representative on the German debt moratorium for his use at the conference in Berlin on 27th April?

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): As stated in the Reichbank communiqué of the 1st February last, the Gold Discount Bank at Berlin is prepared to purchase scrip from British holders of German external loans at 67 per cent. of its par value. German exporters are allowed in certain cases to purchase the scrip at a correspondingly reduced price from the Gold Discount Bank and to resell it at par to the German Conversion Office. In this way the sterling sums which the British creditors forego are used to promote German exports. They are not available as revenue to cover the expenditure of the German Government, whether on armaments or other-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Enclosure No. 3 to
 from the Embassy at

SOURCE: PARLIAMEN
 House of
~~28 March~~
 London. E

COMMONS Oral Answers 1364

the Japanese Foreign Office regarding affairs in China?

16. Captain **ERSKINE-BOLST** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that the Japanese Government has issued a notification that Japan will in future view with displeasure the employment of foreign advisers to the Chinese Government; and whether, in view of the fact that British advisers have helped materially to build up modern China and are still helping, he will define the attitude of the British Government towards a claim of this nature?

17. Mr. **HARCOURT JOHNSTONE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is now in a position to make any statement on the verbal declaration by the Japanese Government as to the relations of foreign countries with China?

18. Sir **JOHN WARDLAW-MILNE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make a statement on the declarations by Japan in connection with the relations between China and other countries?

19. Colonel **WEDGWOOD** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is in communication with the Government of the United States of America to secure concerted action in connection with the Japanese declaration concerning China and the Far East?

Sir **J. SIMON**: I have received no such notification from the Japanese Government as is referred to by my hon. Friend. I have, however, received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo the text of what is described as a translation of an informal verbal statement made to the Japanese Press by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I will circulate the text in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

The statement appears to be inspired by an apprehension of certain dangers to peace, to good relations between China and Japan, or to the integrity of China which might follow from certain action by other Powers in China. None of these dangers is to be apprehended from any policy of His Majesty's Government, which aims in fact at avoiding them. On the other hand, the general character of the statement and certain details in it such as the reference to technical and

1365 Oral Answers 23 APRIL 193

financial assistance to China are of a nature that has made me think it necessary to communicate with the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of His Majesty's Government.

Sir **C. CAYZER**: Will my right hon. Friend ascertain the views of the other signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty?

Colonel **WEDGWOOD**: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an answer to Question No. 19?

Sir **HERBERT SAMUEL**: In view of the interest in this matter, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he will be in a position to make a further statement before long, particularly having regard to the statement reported in to-day's Press of a declaration by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington? Further, does the right hon. Gentleman intend to communicate with the United States Government on this subject?

Sir **J. SIMON**: I apologise to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) for not having included his question. What I have stated to the House represents what has happened up to the present, and I think it wiser to await the result of the communication which I have made before making a further statement. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel) that a further statement may probably be desirable.

Colonel **WEDGWOOD**: May we take it that no action will be taken by His Majesty's Government in this matter without previous consultation with the United States?

Sir **J. SIMON**: The House will be kept fully informed of everything that takes place.

Sir **A. KNOX**: Would it not be far better to make direct friendly representations to Japan rather than through Washington?

Sir **C. CAYZER**: Is it the right hon. Gentleman's intention to consult the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty?

Sir **J. SIMON**: I have already said that I do not think there is any further statement I can make to-day. The action I have announced is a friendly communica-

JAPAN AND CHINA.

6. Sir **CHARLES CAYZER** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Foreign Office has received any notification from Japan of her intention to redefine her policy in the Far East, with the object of claiming a controlling voice over China's foreign policy?

9. Mr. **HALL-CAINE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office disapproving of foreign loans and other foreign assistance to China; and what steps he proposes to take with regard to this matter?

11. Major-General Sir **ALFRED KNOX** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement regarding the recent declaration by

0 6 2 3

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
House of Commons,
~~23 March 1934~~. 23, April 1934
London. Pages 1363-1367 inc.

" However, supplying China with war aeroplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a

19394/6635

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

A portion of this telegram FROM Peiping
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

Dated May 3, 1934

Rec'd 12:12 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

198, May 3, 11 a. m.

(GRAY) Following from Minister at Nanking May 2,

4 p. m. (END GRAY)

"Hsu Mo informed me today that Chinese Government
had inquired of British Government an explanation of
reference in Sir John Simon's statement on April 30 to
especial rights of Japan 'recognized by the other powers'".

GAUSS

OIB
JS

F/ESP

793.94/6636

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 11 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

FROM ROME

Dated May 2, 1934

Rec'd 4:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

85, May 2, 8 p. m.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

Department's 30, April 25th to Geneva. /6601

In conversation with Suvich this afternoon on other matters I asked him incidentally whether they had made any representations in Tokyo on the subject of the Japanese declaration of February 19th about China. He said that they had not made any representations and that their course would remain unchanged in spite of any Japanese declarations; that he had read with interest the press reported text of the note of the American Secretary of State which he thought was very strong and clear; that Italy along with other countries would benefit by the strong statement of the American Government which was quite explicit and to the point; and that the statement of Sir John Simon in the House was somewhat evasive and was indicative of the political character of Simon, whom he characterized as a compromiser.

LONG

NAM

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F/ESP

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 11 1934

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162F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[Handwritten mark]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

A portion of this telegram FROM
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone (A & B)

Geneva (Part Air)

Dated May 1, 1934

Rec'd May 3, 8:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 3 - 1934
Department of State

773.94

64, May 1, 2 p.m. (GRAY)
Consulate's No. 61, April 28, 11 a.m. /6624(cg)
Paragraph One (A)

One. The current League relationship to the Far
Eastern situation centers almost entirely in the
"Rajchman question" which although very involved largely
comprises the following factors:

(a) The responsible Secretariat authorities main-
tain that the League's assistance to China is solely
of a technical character and concomitantly that any
activities which may have extended beyond the technical
field have not been under the authority of the League
and thus have been improperly conducted;

(b) This matter is, however, thrown into the
political field by allegations against Rajchman which
appear to have been made publicly by the Japanese.
Thus Rajchman emerges as a symbol.

The political angle thus arises from the contention
that

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FILE
MAY 5 1934

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-64 From Geneva, May 1, 2 p.m.

that although the League project of assistance to China was begun before Sino-Japanese dispute arose (Consulate's ^{893.50A/27} despatch 471, political, January 17, 1933) and although Rajchman's present mandate is most specifically technical ^{893.50A/43} (Paris Embassy despatch No. 121, July 20, 1933) the present plan of assistance derives morally from recommendation ten of the Assembly report of February 24, 1933 (Consulate's ^{893.94 Adv. Comm. /22} despatch No. 528, political, February 27, 1933). The basic value of such assistance is thus the promotion of a strong central government in China which it is alleged the Japanese do not desire for political reasons. The burden of proof should therefore be thrown upon Japan for interpreting as political an activity in China which in any other state would be merely an appropriate assistance of value to the rest of the world as well as to the country concerned.

Two. The contentions just presented are supported by a large body of opinion in Geneva including a number of League officials. The possibility of this becoming a political issue nevertheless would apparently lie chiefly in its strong emphasis by the press. A number of press representatives here express the present intention keeping this issue very much alive and their attitude is to brush aside any juridical aspects and take the

broad

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#64 From Geneva, May 1, 2 p.m.

broad position that in face of Japanese demands a repudiation of Rajchman would mean a repudiation of the entire plan of assistance which could only be interpreted as a final abnegation by the League of its entire position Sino-Japanese matter. (END GRAY)

Three. I informally discussed the foregoing with Haas, Secretary of the Council Committee, in the light of press accounts, who informs me as follows:

(a) The Rajchman report has been received in Geneva and will probably be issued by May 7. It will be simultaneously released in Nanking. Rajchman has been advised by the Secretariat to make an advanced copy available to the Department during his stay in the United States. It is not known here whether this has been done.

(b) Rumors current that the Rajchman original report embodying many political aspects has been amended in the Secretariat to circumvent Japanese allegations are completely without foundation. Secretariat has no authority over the report, Secretary General being merely a transmitting agency between Rajchman and the Council committee. Haas characterized

the

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

4-7/64 From Geneva, May 1, 2 p.m.

the report as entirely technical. Its financial clauses solely concern the administration and utilization of funds and contain nothing respecting a source of funds or financial negotiations.

(c) Nothing is known by Secretariat respecting Rajchman's "political" activities in China other than the Japanese allegations.

(d) The atmosphere of the report reflects, however, a broad policy of "emancipating China" and promoting its "self-development".

(e) The exceedingly delicate situation for the League as described in paragraph two above is fully recognized by Secretariat. They, however, perceive it as becoming technically a League issue only through Japan's making formal allegations through a demand by Rajchman for vindication or through some action which the Council Committee might in the circumstances feel impelled to take. The matter is seen, nevertheless, as divorced from the Secretariat itself and one for the powers on the committee who may have pertinent information to present.

(f) Secretariat is unaware of any formal allegations by Japan against Rajchman although press despatches have
 carried

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MP

5-#64 From Geneva, May 1, 2 p.m.

carried implications that statements of that character have been made by responsible Japanese officials.

Four. I am informed that although the Secretary General has been in Geneva for some days Yokoyama has not seen him and has thus not carried out his intentions as expressed to me which I described in my telegram 55, ^{793,94} /6601 April 24, 2 p.m. This might be construed to the effect that Japan will avoid the issue which would be created by making formal allegations. In association with this there is a strong rumor current of broader political interest to the effect that Tokyo has instructed Yokoyama that he went too far in his written statement and particularly in his interview with the press.

GILBERT

WSB CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated May 3, 1934


Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

241, May 3, 3 p.m.

Mayer's 224, January 16, 2 p.m., Consulate's 64,

May 1, 2 p.m.



MAY 10 1934

793.94/6638

Haas tells me that the China Technical Committee will be called during the coming session of the Council in the week beginning May 14 and that only the usual circular notice of convocation will be sent out. As Department has made no comment of second sentence of paragraph one of Mayer's 224, January 16, 2 p.m., I assume that I should attend the meeting in the capacity you prescribed on receiving notice of the convocation. (Chinese-Japanese controversy)

WILSON

RR WWC

See 893.50A/105-

FILED

JUN 4 1934

793.94/6639

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 8, 1934.

Meetings of the League of Nations
China Technical Committee.

On or about May 14 there will take place another meeting of the China Technical Committee of the League of Nations. At two previous meetings of the Committee the American Government has authorized the attendance of a representative in the capacity of "unofficial observer". The new factor in the situation is that recent Japanese declarations have indicated definite opposition to the activities in China of the China Technical Committee.

As it is believed that our general attitude and policy in the light of the Japanese declarations should be "business as usual" and as Geneva's most recent telegram (66, May 3, 9 a.m.) indicates that the forthcoming meeting of the Technical Committee will not be called upon to discuss the Japanese statements, it is believed that Minister Wilson at Geneva should be authorized to attend the meeting in the same capacity as that of the previous American representatives, namely, as an unofficial observer. However, if the Committee should take formal

notice

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

notice of Japanese allegations with regard to political activities of the Committee, it would seem advisable that Minister Wilson withdraw from the meeting.

A memorandum by Mr. Dooman (attached) discusses the origin and history of the China Technical Committee.

893.50A

M. W. W.

MMH/REK

J. E. J.

0634

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge
 \$ This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone. **B**

Washington,
 May 8, 1934.
 10 30

AMDELGAT

GENEVA (Switzerland).

note
 793.50A
 149
 793.94/6639
 Your 241, May 3, 3 p. m.

Upon receipt of invitation or of notice of convocation/
 Department desires that you instruct Mayer to attend meetings/
 of the China Technical Committee in the same capacity as that
 of the previous American representatives, namely, informally,
 and as an unofficial observer. If, however, you have any
 reason to believe that the Committee will, or if after
 convening the Committee proceeds to, take formal notice of
 Japanese allegations with regard to political activities of
 the Committee, you should report to the Department by
 telegraph and Mayer should refrain from attending meetings
 of the Committee until he is again authorized specifically
 to do so.

793.94/6639

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/6639 MAY 10 1934 *pin*

FE:EHD:REK

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1932 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 10, 1934

~~MMR:~~

Rome's Despatch No. 504 of April 20, 1934, outlines an article on the recent Japanese Foreign Office statement that appeared in an Italian paper and which was reproduced not long ago in certain American papers. The article expressed doubt as to the Foreign Office statement being a definite indication of Japanese policy in China, but it expressed the view that statements of this kind might bring about ~~the~~ solidarity, now lacking, between the Western Powers with a view to dealing with a common danger.

~~FE:ER~~:DLY

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ROME, April 20, 1934.

No. 504.

Subject: Japanese Policy in China.

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 11 1934
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 2 - 1934
Department of State

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
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F/G 793.94/6640

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

600.9417/25

With reference to my despatch No. 308 of December 8, 1933, concerning Italian reaction to Japanese commercial expansion, I have the honor to inform the Department that the MESSAGGERO of April 20, 1934, publishes an editorial under the title of "Japanese ideas" in which the recent semi-official statements of the Japanese government concerning its own relations and those of other countries with China are examined for their true significance. According to reports, it is said, Japan by considering itself invested with the right of establishing a virtual protectorate over Chinese territory and of prohibiting other countries

from

MAY 14 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

from maintaining either political or financial relations with it, would establish a kind of Asiatic Monroe Doctrine which would remove from China all European and North American participation and reduce that country to the status of a vassal state.

"Is this the assumption of a purely platonic position, or is it an attempt at strong-arm diplomacy, or is it rather an attempt to exasperate the situation and press it to the extremes of a crisis?" asks that fascist organ, which then goes on to say that, by following the course of logic, such questions, though natural, must be looked upon as superfluous and the communication published in the Japanese press regarded as nothing more than eccentricity, therefore not worthy of serious consideration. That Japan is thinking of imposing on China isolation from the rest of the world in order to subject it to its own interests and dominion by a simple declaration - a sort of journalistic citation - is regarded as beyond the limits of credulity.

According to that newspaper, the interminable wrangling and disunion in Europe, the world depression and the disorganization in the United States are the only circumstances in which Japan would consider such rash projects, but while no consequences are expected to follow the ideas exposed in the Japanese press, it is felt that it would be culpable blindness not to take into account the excessive ambitions and dangers which the actual state of affairs in Europe gives rise to. The unpredictable perils of Japanese policy in the Far East may turn out to be a blessing, according to

that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hufschmidt NARS, Date 12-18-75


-3-

that newspaper, if they should cause the various European states to hearken to the voice of wisdom and of salvation. "Who knows," it concludes, "that a satisfactory solution of the European problem may not be reached and promoted by these very ideas of Japan regarding China?"

Some time ago, it will be recalled, Mussolini warned Europe that only by effecting a minimum of political unity can it hope to resume leadership in world civilization (despatch No. 274 of November 16, 1933).

865.00 F - National Council of Corporations/21

Respectfully yours,



Breckinridge Long.

CAB/eh

710

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ROME, April 20, 1934.

No. 504.

Subject: Japanese Policy in China.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

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Respectfully yours,

Breckinridge Long.


CAB/eh

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY



Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese Minister,
May 3.

The Chinese Minister referred to the statement given out to the press by Mr. McDermott last evening, which denied that anything was said in the conversations between President Roosevelt and Viscount Ishii of a character recognizing the special interests of Japan in China; the Minister was somewhat disturbed about the second paragraph of the article appearing in THE HERALD TRIBUNE, which seemed to be a part of an official denial which might be read to mean that, nevertheless, there was some reference to this subject in the conversation.

I told the Minister that the first paragraph contained the Department's statement and that the second paragraph probably arose in the imagination of the correspondent.

The Minister asked me whether we had heard anything directly from Nanking as to the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the American aide memoire to Japan. I told him that I had not seen anything beyond the references in the press that it was considered "somewhat weak." The Minister said he sincerely hoped the Nanking Government was not going to adopt a spokesman similar to the position held by Mr. Amau in Tokyo.

W.P.

U WP/AB

William Phillips.

F/G 793.94/6641

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6642

State Department Undersecretary From Phillips	May 3, 1934 MEMO
Japan To	May 7, 1934 #515.
China To	May 7, 1934 #1357
France To	May 29, 1934 #414
U.S.S.R. To	May 29, 1934 #100
Great Britain To	May 29, 1934 #411
Germany To	May 29, 1934 #213
FILED IN THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE	
Italy To	May 29, 1934 #217
Switzerland To	May 29, 1934 #2547
Geneva To	May 29, 1934 #-

793.94/6642

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*5/11/34
 MAY 4 - 1934
 Department of State*


May 3, 1934

The French Ambassador told me last evening when we met at dinner that he had just received a telegram from his government indicating that France was going to make some sort of statement to Japan in answer to the Amau statements. The Ambassador had not received any indication as to the nature of the communication to be made beyond the fact that there would be a reference to the Nine Power Treaty.


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WP

William Phillips



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JUN 6 - 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE(ELP)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

May 7 1934.

No.

515

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

Text of statement issued to the press on April 17, 1934, by the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, (as telegraphed by the Tokyo correspondent under Tokyo date line April 18 and as printed in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE April 19, 1934).

Text of informal statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on April 19, as supplied to the Department informally by the Chinese Minister in Washington.

Text of cablegram received by the Chinese Minister in Washington from the Chinese Foreign Office, as supplied to the Department informally by the Chinese Minister on April 21.

Memorandum under date April 25, prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, in regard to recent statements of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to press representatives.

Confidential letter under date April 25 from the Japanese Ambassador at Washington to the Under Secretary of State enclosing (a) the text in translation of the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman on April 20 and (b) translation of the instruction sent by the Japanese

Minister

793.94/6642

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese
 Minister in China.

Memorandum of conversation between the French
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, April 24,
 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the British
 Ambassador and the Chief of the Division of Far
 Eastern Affairs, April 24, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the Japanese
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, April 24,
 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the Chinese
 Minister and the Under Secretary of State, April 25,
 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the Italian
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, April 25,
 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the Chinese
 Minister and the Secretary of State, April 25, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the British
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, April 26,
 1934, containing text of instruction sent by British
 Government to British Ambassador at Tokyo.

Department's press release, April 30, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the French
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, May 3,
 1934.

793.94/6642

The Department desires that you read the enclosures with
 care.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. Walter Moore

Enclosures:
 As listed.



1934
 MAY 10 1934

FE:MMH:REK
 5/5/34

FE
 mmh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CC: Y: J: L

SOURCE: NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,
 April 19, 1934.

TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED TO THE PRESS ON APRIL 17,
1934, BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN.
(As telegraphed by the Tokyo correspondent under Tokyo
date line April 18.)

Text of Statement

The foreign office spokesman's statement follows:

The special position of Japan in relations with China and the doctrines advocated by Japan with regard to China may not agree with the ideas of foreign nations but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost efforts in carrying out her mission in East Asia and fulfilling her responsibilities.

Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because Japan and the League failed to agree about Japan's position in East Asia, and, although Japan's attitude toward China may differ from that of other countries, such differences cannot be avoided, due to Japan's special position and mission.

Japan is endeavoring to maintain and enhance friendly relations with foreign nations, but Japan considers that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, she must act single-handed, on her own responsibility. Japan considers that no other country, except China is in a position to share that responsibility.

Opposes Outside Influences

Accordingly, preservation of the unity of China and restoration of order in that country are two objectives ardently desired by Japan for the sake of peace in east Asia. History shows that unity and restoration of order can only be attained by waking up China.

Japan will oppose any attempt of China to avail herself of the influence of some other country to repel Japan, as it would jeopardize the peace of east Asia, and also will oppose any effort by China to resist foreigners by bringing other foreigners to bear against them.

Japan expects foreign nations to give consideration to the special situation created by the Manchuria and Shanghai incidents, and to realize that technical or financial assistance to China must attain political significance.

Acts of this kind must give rise to complications and might necessitate discussion of problems such as fixing zones of interest, or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and would have the most serious effect for East Asia and, ultimately, for Japan.

Salc

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Sale of War Planes Opposed

Japan must therefore object to such undertakings in principle. Although she will not object to any foreign country negotiating individually with China regarding propositions of finance or trade so long as these propositions are beneficial to China and do not threaten the maintenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations threaten to disturb the peace of East Asia, Japan will be compelled to oppose them.

For example, supplying China with war planes, building airbases and detaching military instructors or advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China, and ultimately would prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude should be clear from the policies Japan has pursued in the past, but, due to the fact of gestures for joint assistance to China and other aggressive assistance by foreign countries, becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies.

The Foreign Office spokesman said this statement of policy had been communicated to all Japanese envoys abroad for their guidance.

"Japan is at present in a position to maintain peace in the Far East and does not need the help of others," the spokesman said also. "If the League of Nations should take concerted action in China having political significance, it would be objectionable to us."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

(with the compliments of
 Sec-As Alfred Sze.
 Received by Mr. Hornbeck
 April 19, 1934.)

Chinese Minister

Washington, D. C.

Issued today following informal statement in reply to
 Japanese statement of April 17th:

"China is always of the opinion that international
 peace can be maintained only by the joint efforts of all
 the members of the family of nations. Especially is it
 necessary for nations to cultivate the genuine spirit of
 mutual understanding and remove the fundamental causes of
 friction in order to establish durable peace among them.
 No state has the right to claim the exclusive responsi-
 bility for maintaining international peace in any desig-
 nated part of the world.

"Being a member of the League of Nations China feels
 it her duty to promote international cooperation and
 achieve international peace and security. In her endeavor
 to attain these ends she has never harbored any intention
 of injuring the interests of any particular country far
 less causing a disturbance of peace in the Far East.
 China's relations with other nations in this regard have
 always been of such a nature as would characterize the
 relations between independent and sovereign states.

"In particular China desires to point out that the
 collaboration between herself and other countries whether
 in the form of loans or in the form of technical assist-
 ance has been strictly limited to matters of a non-
 political character and that the purchase of such military
 equipment as military aeroplanes and the employment of
 military instructors and experts have been for no other
 purposes than national defence which chiefly consists in

the

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the maintenance of peace and order in the country. No nation which does not harbor any ulterior motives against China need to entertain any fears concerning her policy of national reconstruction and security.

"In regard to the situation now existing between China and Japan it should be emphasized that genuine and lasting peace between the two countries as between any other countries should be built upon foundations of goodwill and mutual understanding and that it would go a long way towards the laying of such foundations when the existing unfortunate state of affairs could be rectified and when the relations between China and Japan could be made to rest on a new basis more in consonance with the mutual aspirations of the two countries."

Waichiaoapu 19th

Received April 19, 1934.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

(With the compliments of
 Mr. Alfred So. April 21, 1934.

COPY OF A CABLEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE
 CHINESE MINISTER FROM THE SAICHIAO PU (Nanking).

Characterizing as most absurd the New York Tribune's Tokyo report alleging that "reliable quarters indicated Japan's new statement of policy had received Chinese Government leaders' acquiescence before Foreign Office publication a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied most emphatically that the Chinese Government had any knowledge of the contents of the Japanese statement before its publication on April 17 and still less had acquiesced in it.

According to the spokesman the announcement of the baseless doctrine of Japanese hegemony over Asia came just as much if not greater a shock to China as it was to other nations of the world. To believe that the Chinese Government could acquiesce in such a doctrine enunciated by Japan is no less absurd than to believe that a man could acquiesce in his own destruction.

Continuing the spokesman expressed the opinion that the New York Tribune report was presumably inspired by official Japanese sources. "Evidently the object of fabricating and spreading such rumors is to make the world believe that China has already agreed to the Japanese course of action thereby seeking to lessen the opposition from the Powers. Fortunately or unfortunately the world has learned to know Japan too well since Manchurian affair to give credence to such a fantastic tale."

April 21, 1934.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Department of State

 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 25, 1934.

REPORT OF EVENTS OF THE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY
 IN ASIA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A number of interviews with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject of the recent statement given out by the Japanese Foreign Office have been reported in the press, but they include several which apparently are "rewrites" of reports of "exclusive" interviews. The most complete and important reports are by:

1. Kingsbury Smith, published in the Washington TIMES on April 21st;
2. United Press, published in the New York HAMBURG TRIBUNE on April 22nd;
3. Constantine Brown, published in the Washington NEWS on April 22nd;
4. Universal Press, published in the New York AMERICAN on April 22nd;
5. New York TIMES' correspondent and published in that paper on April 24th;
6. New York TIMES' correspondent and published in that paper on April 25th.

Mr. Saito is reported to have stated on April 23th to Mr. Smith that:

"Japan's declaration of policy was not directed against the United States, but against one of the big European powers which Tokyo learned was about to make a large political loan to China . . .

"Japan, Ambassador Saito said, feared the money would be diverted to military purposes. He said that Japan already had received evidence indicating the Chinese had utilized part of the American governmental cotton and wheat loan for these purposes. . .

"With regard to the sale of military aircraft and munitions to China, Mr. Saito said Japan fears these weapons eventually will be used against her and for that reason is reluctant to see them sold to the Chinese. . .

"However,

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"However, he said, there are half a dozen factions fighting for control in China, many of them of a communist nature; there is no surety how long one government may last, and there is serious risk of powerful weapons of war falling into the hands of irresponsible or fanatical groups.

"This, he said, was the principal reason why Japan declined to see American aviation experts teaching the Chinese how to handle such dangerous weapons as bombing airplanes."

Mr. Brown's report of his interview on April 21st with Mr. Saito states that Mr. Saito, in reply to a question with regard to the consequences of foreign powers ignoring the request of the Japanese Government that foreign powers refrain from making loans or selling aircraft to China, said:

"The Japanese Government would consider such a step as an unfriendly act."

The report continues:

"The real reason for such a step," the Japanese Ambassador in Washington explained, "is that the Western nations have not got the remotest idea as to how to deal with the Chinese. The Japanese government knows China better than any other nation in the world, and the present chaotic situation in that republic is a direct menace to Japan. Consequently, because the Japanese government has an ardent desire to see peace and order reestablished in the territory of its neighbor, it has decided to prevent the furtherance of the present trouble by the loans which Western nations are giving the various Chinese leaders to further their own ambitions."

The excuse for establishing a Japanese protectorate over China was offered to the Tokio government when it obtained information that a French group of bankers were planning to float a comparatively small loan for China on the European money markets.

Intended to Aid Chieftains.

"This news," Mr. Saito stated, "worried my government considerably. It was not meant to help China to improve its internal conditions and to help put down the rebellious factions which are dividing that republic at present, but it was intended to help certain ambitious chieftains. And that the Japanese government cannot tolerate. It was the same thing with the purchase of \$50,000,000 worth of cotton and wheat from the United States. We did not object to that loan, although we knew quite well that most of the imported stuff was sold and the Chinese government purchased with the proceeds of the sale arms and munitions."

"And

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"And what would happen if the Chinese were to disregard the Tokio edict?" he was asked.

"We hope they won't, because the main interest of Japan is China's welfare and to put a stop to the present situation in that country, but should they act in contradiction with our fair requests we may have to do something."

"And what about the countries which have important interests in China? Won't they feel that Japan is unduly interfering with their business in that territory?" he was asked.

"We are not coercing any nation. All that Japan demands is to be consulted before any important transaction between the Chinese government and foreign interests are concluded. We think that we know that country so much better than the Westerners that our advice would be valuable. But should the representatives of foreign business overlook this request, the responsibility would fall on the Chinese government for having overlooked our warnings. All these new airplanes, all these purchases of airplanes are intended by the Chinese to be used eventually against Japan, and we cannot tolerate such things. Japan is a small country and is fighting for its life in the Far East."

Steps Unique in History.

"There may be certain objections raised against this new policy of yours, objections which may lead to trouble. The steps you are by way of taking are unique in history and while there may be something to be said about your precautions, don't you think that it would have been a better plan to establish this control, intended to be beneficial to China, with the assistance of the other powers?" he was asked.

"After what has happened since the Manchurian crisis," the Ambassador replied, "it has become evident to the Japanese people that the Western nations know nothing about the Chinese mentality. Such a collaboration would have been possible sometime ago, but today the Japanese government could not obtain popular support in a policy of co-operation with other nations. Consequently, Japan must act and decide alone what is good for China. Legitimate business won't be interfered with by the Tokio government, but any assistance given to the Chinese which may be considered either to help them to continue their internal wars or to prepare themselves to fight Japan will have to be stopped. Japan is working for peace in Asia. In order to reach this goal it must be in a position to prevent any business transactions which do not tend to really help the Chinese people, but to spread unrest and wars. The Japanese government will deal fairly with all the interests which are really legitimate, and in the end the business people will find it beneficial to consult Tokio before embarking on any adventures in China."

In

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In an interview on April 21st with a representative of the United Press, Mr. Saito in general repeated the statements reported to have been made by him on the two previous occasions. The following statements were reported to have been made by way of amplifying previous statements:

Japan is particularly susceptible to direct or provocative action in China because she is a neighbor and has extensive business enterprises in China, Mr. Saito said. For this reason Japan simply felt it necessary that distant powers be more careful what aid they extend China.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation last year advanced \$20,000,000 for wheat and cotton loans to China, but only about \$10,000,000 was used. Japanese alleged that Chinese politicians derived prestige from the loans, then terminated them because they could not fulfill the terms. The Pan-American Airways and a German air line recently opened services to China and an American airplane assembling plant was established there.

Mr. Saito said many Japanese felt uneasy about these developments because of the peculiar conditions in China. He implied he meant bandits and uncontrolled divisions of government which, Japanese statesmen have alleged, prevented centralization government control. He said Japan had a special responsibility for preservation of peace in the Orient, as explained by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota early this year. The new statement was merely a clarification of that, he said, and not a blow at any treaty.

The statements attributed to Mr. Saito in the Universal service press report published in the New York AMERICAN of April 22 are substantially along the lines of the statements in the reports above mentioned. Mr. Saito is reported in this interview to have stated inter alia, that -

"The money is destined to be used to stir discontent in China against Japan. My country seeks to restore peace in the Far East, and to maintain it once it has been restored."

He would not divulge what nations planned the Chinese loans, but it was learned in official circles France was one of those involved. Saito added: "Japan sincerely seeks to keep peace in China. We shall maintain her economic integrity and respect the open door policy of trade."

Japan has no intention, Saito said, of interfering with United States Commerce in China, although he expressed alarm at large sales of American planes to China.

He

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he expressed the fear any war equipment sold to that country might eventually be used by China against Japan.

An interview given by Mr. Maeto to a correspondent of the New York Times on April 23 quotes a number of statements attributed to Mr. Maeto by way of explaining or amplifying the statements of the Foreign Office spokesman. Mr. Maeto, after making an observation critical of the attitude of the League of Nations, vis-a-vis Japan, and stating flatly that Japan would observe all her treaty obligations, is quoted as follows:

"We are sometimes accused of being aggressive," he added, "but it should be remembered that even the Manchurian question was not motivated by that desire. We want that understood, and then we can shake hands with China and let foreign powers know that that is our real aim."

However, the Ambassador made clear the feeling of the Japanese Government that much preliminary work must be done before that end was achieved, principally because of the feeling in Japan that other powers sometimes incited feeling in China against Japan, although this frequently was done unintentionally.

As for the position of the Japanese Government, Mr. Maeto gave a digest of remarks by Mr. Maeto, divided into three categories, as follows:

First, Japan has no intention of impairing China's independence or her interests, but sincerely wishes that the integrity, unity and prosperity of China be secured. However, the integrity, unity and prosperity of China are things that can be brought about principally by China's own awakening and realization.

Second, Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of a third party in China. The commerce and trade of a third party with China can be of much profit to China, and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the open door and equal opportunity. Japan will surely observe all the international agreements relating to China.

Third, but Japan opposes any action in concert on the part of foreign powers that is intended to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan shares responsibility with China and other powers in Eastern Asia, and Japan cannot tolerate the judge-like attitude of the powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question which is often motivated by the self-interest of those

powers.

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powers.

The report of the correspondent of the New York Times on Mr. Saito's call at the Department on the afternoon of April 24 does not contain any direct quotation of statements by Mr. Saito, but it attributes to him the following views:

He says the Japanese understand China and its problems better than any Western nation possibly could and that Japan should be consulted by Western would-be regenerators of China. Such consultation would, in his opinion, be a matter-of-course procedure were it not for the suspicions the outside world harbors concerning Japan's intentions toward China.

The policy announced on April 17 is not, in Mr. Saito's opinion, a move toward the exclusion by Japan of other countries from China. He has expressed the opinion that the open-door doctrine, guaranteed under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, is not afflicted, even by implication, in the statement of Mr. Aso except in so far as traffic in potential military materials is concerned.

The report of the correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune of the same matter contains the statement:

"After leaving Mr. Phillips, Ambassador Saito said he had placed before the Under Secretary cabled extracts of articles from Japanese newspapers giving both text and interpretation of the pronouncement which had issued from the Japanese Foreign Office. . . . The Ambassador said he had left no official document"

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30PY

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

JAPANESE EMBASSY

Washington, April 25, 1934.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with my promise yesterday, I am sending you a careful translation of the documents referred to in my conversation. I marked Mr. Hirota's instruction to the Japanese Minister in China as confidential since it was not written for the purpose of publication but simply as guidance for him in his negotiations. The phraseology would have to be more carefully selected, if it were to be made public.

With best wishes, I am

Yours sincerely,

HIROSI SAITO

(Enclosures)

The Honorable William Phillips,
Under Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

0655

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JOFFY

TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR. ARAU, CHIEF
OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE
TO FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ON APRIL 20, 1934.

1. Japan has no intention whatever of impairing China's independence or her interests but sincerely wishes that the integrity, unity and prosperity of China be secured. However, the integrity, unity and prosperity of China are things that can be brought about principally by China's own awakening and natural development.
2. Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of a third party in China. The economic and commercial transactions of a third party with China can be of much benefit to that country and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is not only desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity but she will fully observe herself all the international agreements relating to China.
3. Japan, however, opposes any joint action on the part of foreign Powers that tends to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan wishes to share responsibility with China and other Powers in that region and she cannot tolerate the judgelike attitude of foreign Powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question which is often motivated by the self-interest of the Powers concerned.

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CONF

DECLARATION OF MR. HIRATA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER IN CHINA

1. In relation to the Chinese question Japan had to differ with other Powers in her views and standpoint and was obliged to withdraw from the League of Nations. Thereupon Japan has come to feel the necessity of exercising her best efforts to carry out her mission in Eastern Asia regardless of the attitude or opinion of other Powers.

Needless to say Japan will take the most conciliatory attitude toward all Powers and will earnestly seek friendship with them by coordinating interests. However, as to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia the recent developments of affairs have brought about a situation in which Japan will have to undertake it upon her own responsibility and even singlehandedly. Japan is determined to fulfill this mission.

2. In order to fulfill that mission Japan desires to share with China the responsibility of maintaining peace in Eastern Asia. Japan therefore most earnestly desires that the integrity, unification and order of China should be secured. And that this can only be attained through the awakening and endeavors on the part of China herself has been clearly demonstrated by history. From this point of view Japan will always endeavor to defeat all of China's maneuvers to utilize foreign Powers through her traditional policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians", as well as of anti-Japanese movements.

3. In view of the situation prevailing after the Manchurian

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Manchurian and Shanghai affairs, if foreign powers are to take a joint action vis-a-vis China, no matter what form it may take, financial, technical, or otherwise, it will surely come to bear a political significance and the result will be to introduce unfortunate impediments to the awakening and integrity of China, if not directly entailing the international control of China, her partition or the establishment of spheres of influence. Japan has to oppose such joint action in principle.

4. It goes without saying that all powers are free to negotiate with China separately from the economic and commercial points of view, even if their actions should become of practical aid to China, so long as they do not militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. If, however, these actions were of a nature to prejudice peace and order in the Far East, for instance, the supply of military aeroplanes, the establishment of aerodromes, the supply of military advisers or political loans, Japan will have to oppose them.

5. From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan's hands through using the influence of foreign powers.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 THE UNDER SECRETARY

April 24, 1934.

1.1.

The French Ambassador, during his conversation this afternoon, touched upon the Far Eastern situation and asked me whether we had taken any position as yet in Tokyo; he also referred to the several press interviews which the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had given and said that without a doubt his Japanese colleague was talking too much; when he read one of the early interviews in which the Ambassador was quoted as mentioning an "unfriendly act" he was astounded.

In reply I said that we had not made up our minds as to what our action would be; it was possible that, inasmuch as the Japanese Government had announced publicly through the press its policy with respect to the Far East and had not communicated with other governments, it would presumably not be necessary for us to communicate with Japan; on the other hand, we might feel that a statement to the American people of this Government's views and responsibilities under the treaties with Far Eastern countries might be advisable; possibly if other countries saw fit to make parallel statements to their own people of upholding treaty rights, that might have a good effect.

I told the Ambassador that I was talking to him frankly in reply to his inquiry and that I could only emphasize again that we had reached no definite decision.

William Phillips.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CC:Y:RJE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 24, 1964.

Conversation.

The British Ambassador,
 Sir Ronald Lindsay.

Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Problem presented by statement of the
Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign
Office.

The British Ambassador called and, saying that he had had no instructions or information from his Government, inquired whether I could tell him anything about the present situation and the views of the American Government in relation to the statement made by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Mr. Hornbeck said that he believed that the essential facts are known from the accounts which the newspapers have given. He then made reference to various statements which have appeared in the press on and since April 16 with regard to events in Tokyo and events in London. He said that we have not received any communication from the Japanese and we have thus far refrained from making any comment. He gave an account of certain points in the telegrams which we have received from London and of points in the instruction which we have sent to London. He said that we feel that action by the various governments concerned on parallel lines and with the appearance of a common front would have obvious advantages but that we did not intend to assume or be placed in a position of leadership in initiating proposals for joint or concurrent action. The Ambassador said that the accounts in the press

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press of what had been done by the British Foreign Office were not clear: it appeared that Sir John Simon had sent some sort of a communication to the Japanese Government. Mr. Hornbeck said that it so seemed to him and that the report of language which had been used in the House of Commons indicated that Sir John Simon had made a somewhat ambiguous statement there. The Ambassador said that this was in reply to an interrogation and that "they were usually very 'eager,' in the phrasing of those replies." The Ambassador then referred to statements reported in the press to have been made by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and the Japanese Consul General in Geneva. There followed some discussion of the method which the Japanese have used in this instance, beginning at Tokyo. After that there was discussion of the situation in the Far East and the significance of various items of news from China and from Japan. Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Hornbeck said that he wished to make sure that the Ambassador understood that the American Government is still considering the question of action to be taken by it; we have not decided definitely; and we have told London that we would give careful consideration to any suggestions which the British Government might choose to make. The Ambassador said that he understood, and that he appreciated having been given a clear account of our views and attitude. Mr. Hornbeck said that if the Ambassador received any news or information which he might think would be helpful to us, we would appreciate having them brought to our attention. The Ambassador stated that he would be more than glad to be helpful. And the conversation there ended.

SKH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

April 24, 1934

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
 APRIL 24, 1934.

I asked the Japanese Ambassador to call this afternoon at 4:15 which he did. I said that I felt the need of knowing precisely what Mr. Amai had said in his recent public declaration since, while the substance of the various translations was substantially alike, nevertheless there were slight differences in context, and that I felt sure that by this time the Embassy had received the text and would be in a position to let me have a correct translation. Thereupon the Ambassador took out a sheet of telegrams in Japanese from which he read extracts. One telegram which he read to me rather naively referred to the fact that the Foreign Office had understood that some of the American papers had not received the Amai interview favorably, and the Foreign Office would like him to advise it which papers had held such views. It appeared that possibly a few days before the eighth of April the Foreign Office had sent certain instructions to the Japanese Minister in Nanking which outlined the position of Japan vis-à-vis China. Some days afterwards at a press conference in Tokyo Mr. Amai was asked a number of questions which he attempted to answer orally and in framing his answers he merely had in mind the communication which had already been forwarded to the Japanese Minister in Nanking. The Ambassador felt confident that there was

no

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no record made of Amai's press interview and he intimated that in certain particulars he may have gone too far in his language. The Ambassador referred to the use of the word "responsibilities" in reference to Japanese responsibilities in China, which he said was the wrong word because Japan does not assume independent responsibilities in China but only as shared with other powers. A few days after the Amai interview, on the 22nd to be exact, the Ambassador had received an explanatory communication from his government covering three points, which he at once gave to the press; and thereupon he handed to me the clipping from the TIMES of April 24th reporting the statement which he had given out under three heads.

I told the Ambassador that this did not help me very much; that what I wanted was the Amai statement, which I understood had the approval of the Foreign Office; and that I would be grateful to him if he would provide me with a copy of it. The Ambassador did not deny the fact that it represented the Foreign Office view but again expressed doubt whether the statement was in any precise form. Again he referred to it as Amai's attempt to answer a series of questions put to him by the correspondents. I reminded the Ambassador that he himself had given a number of interviews to the Press along the same lines, to which the Ambassador replied that he had been badly reported in these interviews and intimated that they did not represent fairly what he had intended to say in his "poor English".

Mr. Saito then shifted the conversation to China and to the historic attitude of the Chinese in trying to play off one foreign power against another. The present

was

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was another instance of China's attempt to use the League in order to make trouble with Japan; that instead of concentrating their efforts on bringing law and order into their own country, they proceeded on the theory that this was not necessary as long as they could keep foreigners, including the Japanese, fighting among themselves. He referred to the difficulties in Manchukuo, to the Chinese people who had many relatives south of the Wall and who had been unable to have direct communication with them because of the absence of direct mail service.

I brought the Ambassador back to the subject in hand by reiterating again and as strongly as I could that the declarations made by Amai, which I understood had the Foreign Office approval, were regarded by us as exceedingly important and that we were studying them carefully. I said I would offer no comment today because of those very reasons.

William Phillips.

W:EP:BBB

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 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 THE UNDER SECRETARY

April 25, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese Minister,
April 25th.

The Chinese Minister referred to the three questions which he had just presented to the Secretary and to the fact that he was embarrassed vis-a-vis his own Government because of his failure to give them any information as to the attitude of this Government with respect to the Japanese Foreign Office's statements; his Government, he said, were inclined to criticize him for keeping back from them information which he presumably had and he would, therefore, welcome anything which could be given him for communication to Hanking.

I replied that, as the Secretary had undoubtedly told him, we were not in a position to say anything and that we were still gathering facts and information. The Minister asked whether the statements given out by Ambassador Saito were regarded by us as official statements, to which I replied that they were certainly part of the picture, but I would not go so far as to say that we regarded them as official.

William Phillips.

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 THE UNDER SECRETARY

April 25, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation with the Italian Ambassador,
April 25th.

The Italian Ambassador called to inform me that he was in receipt of a telegram from the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to Rome reporting an interview which he had recently had with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office. The Italian Ambassador in Tokyo had apparently gone to the Foreign Office to ask the question whether the Aian statements represented in fact the attitude of the Foreign Office and received an answer in the affirmative; furthermore, the Ambassador had reported to Rome that, in his opinion, the Japanese Government were intent on carrying out the program announced with respect to China and that nothing now would stop them; it appears that he himself regarded the situation as extremely serious and had so reported to his Government; Mr. Roscoe asked whether I could give him any information with regard to the attitude of this Government. I told him that we were gathering information, but had not reached any conclusion as to the position which we should take.

William Phillips.

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 THE SECRETARY

April 25, 1934.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE CHINESE MINISTER, MR. HAO-KE ALFRED SEE.

Japanese statement.

The Chinese Minister called and stated that he had been attempting to see me for some days, under instruction from his government, but that I had been absent since the 20th of April until this morning. He said that his best information was that a representative of China at Tokyo was informed directly, and he thinks accurately, that the statement, recently emanating from Tokyo through a so-called official press representative, in which Japan in effect was announcing her domination of Asia, was given to the press without consultation with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Hirota; that the Minister was only shown the statement after it had been broadcast to the world through the press; and that it was entirely out of harmony with the Minister's plans of placating the United States and other countries and promoting friendly relations, in accordance with announcements and steps heretofore made and taken by the Foreign Office of Japan. The Chinese Minister said he thought this was the truth of the incident. He then stated that his government had instructed him to propound three questions to me. First, what was my reaction to this entire Japanese development? Second what steps did my government contemplate taking with respect to these pronouncements coming out of Japan? Third, whether this government,

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as a ranking signer of the Nine-Power Treaty, would be disposed to convene the parties to this treaty for purpose of consultation? To all of which I replied that I was industriously proceeding to assemble accurately and as nearly official as possible, all the facts and circumstances pertaining to the entire problem presented, and that in the meantime there was nothing I could say to him with respect to any of his inquiries. He seemed somewhat disappointed and pressed further for some sort of expressions from me, but each time I repeated my first answer to him. He then inquired when he might see me and get something more definite and informative. I replied that it was not possible to be exactly certain as to just what time, but that he was at perfect liberty to keep in touch with the Department at any and all times with the view to availing himself of the benefit of such information as might be permissible to impart to him.

C.H.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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April 26, 1934.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
 April 26, 1934.

The British Ambassador called this afternoon and, with reference to the attitude of his government to the Far Eastern situation, said that they were opposed to any concerted action. They believed that each power should state its own views.

Mr. Ronald then went on to say that he was prepared to read to me the instructions which had been sent to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and which he understood were delivered yesterday, as follows:

"The Japanese statement is of such a nature that we cannot leave it without comment."

The Ambassador was told "to point out that the Nine Power Treaty guarantees equal rights to its signatories and Japan is a signatory. His Majesty's Government of course must continue to enjoy all the rights in China which are common to all the signatories or which are otherwise proper, except in so far as they are restricted by special agreements or in so far as Japan has special rights recognized by other powers and not shared by them.

"It is the aim of His Majesty's Government to avoid all the dangers to the peace and integrity to China on which the statement purports to be based. We could not admit Japan's right to decide alone whether anything such as technical or financial assistance promotes such a danger. Under the Nine Power

Treaty

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Treaty Japan has the right to call attention to any action which may appear to her inimical to her interests and this provides Japan with safeguards. We assume that the statement is not meant to abridge the common rights of other powers or to infringe Japan's treaty obligations."

I thanked Sir Ronald for this communication and asked whether it was the intention of his government to give publicity to it. He said that in all probability the substance of these instructions would be given to parliament; that since nothing had been given today presumably there would be no publicity until Monday when Parliament again meets. He was very anxious that we should keep him advised of any step which we might make; he was leaving for New York tomorrow not to return until Tuesday; but in his absence Mr. Osborne would be glad to communicate any message to him.

William Phillips.

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FOR THE PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APRIL 30, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9:00 P.M. EASTERN
 STANDARD TIME, APRIL 30, 1934. NOT TO BE PRE-
 VIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

The American Ambassador to Japan under instruction from the Department of State called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 29 and made a statement the substance of which was as follows:

Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored and make it necessary that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. The United States has with regard to China certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with both, together with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

Treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

In the international associations and relationships of the United States, the American Government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other countries, and it expects on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of the United States. In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The American Government has dedicated the United States to the policy of the good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy it will continue, on its own part and in association with other governments, to devote its best efforts.

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Department of State

THE UNDERSECRETARY

May 3, 1934.

The French Ambassador told me last evening when we met at dinner that he had just received a telegram from his government indicating that France was going to make some sort of statement to Japan in answer to the Annu statements. The Ambassador had not received any indication as to the nature of the communication to be made beyond the fact that there would be a reference to the Nine Power Treaty.

William Phillips

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

May 7 1934

No. 1357

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

Text of statement issued to the press on April 17, 1934, by the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, (as telegraphed by the Tokyo correspondent under Tokyo date line April 18 and as printed in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE April 19, 1934).

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Minister

793.94/6642

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese
 Minister in China.

Memorandum of conversation between the French
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, April 24,
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Memorandum of conversation between the British
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 Eastern Affairs, April 24, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the Japanese
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Department's press release, April 30, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the French
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, May 3,
 1934.

The Department desires that you read the enclosures with
 care.

A copy of this instruction, with enclosures thereto, is
 enclosed for transmission to the Consul General at Nanking.


Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. Walton Moore

Enclosures:
 As listed.

MAY 7 1934
MMH



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793 94/6642

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 20 1934

No. 100

The Honorable

William C. Bullitt,
American Ambassador,
Moscow.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

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793.94/6642

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Department's press release, April 30, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation between the French
 Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State, May 3,
 1934. 793.54/6642

The Department desires that you read the enclosures
 with care.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 29 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 414

The Honorable

Jesse I. Straus,

American Ambassador,

Paris.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

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Very truly yours,

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
William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MAY 29 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 411

The Honorable

Robert Worth Bingham,

American Ambassador,

London.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6642

MAY 29 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 213

John C. White, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
 Berlin.

Sir:

Referring to recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China, there are enclosed for your information copies of documents as follows:

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793.94/6642

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.

APR 30, 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6642

MAY 29 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 217

The Honorable

Breckinridge Long,

American Ambassador,

Rome.

Sir:

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.

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 5/11/34

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6642

29 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2547

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,
 American Minister,
 Bern.

Sir:

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Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/6642

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 29 1934

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

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
For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosures:
 As listed.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

VOLUNTARY POLITICAL REPORT.



For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	(M)		
Pos			
Name			

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

LOCAL COMMENT ON JAPAN.

From: Joseph Emerson Haven,

Joseph Emerson Haven
American Consul.

Florence, Italy, Date of preparation: April 10, 1934.

Date of mailing: April 10, 1934.

Several years ago there was established in Florence by the Hotelkeepers Association, a weekly periodical printed in the English language and entitled "The Florence Weekly". This periodical was intended to give an outline of local events for the benefit of tourists and it eventually received the support of the Official Tourist Bureau.

The name of this periodical was changed to "Florence and Tuscany" which title it maintained for about one year and has recently changed its designation for the third time, it now being known as "Central News."

While still carrying forward its object of being

of

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MAY 7 - 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

of help to visitors to the city from the standpoint of acting as a chronicle of events, its front page is now devoted frankly to national political propaganda.

There is herewith quoted an article which appears in the issue of this publication for the current week, and since all articles printed are "inspired", the views which appear herein may be presumed to be semi-official.

"BEWARE OF THE EAST."

"The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Hirota, has "allowed" himself to be interviewed by an Italian correspondent, to whom he has spoken in unequivocal terms of a desire for world peace, and friendship with all nations. These declarations would be very interesting did they not coincide with the fact that a group of international bankers are offering to finance China to enable the country to regain its economic prosperity, an operation against which Japan is protesting energetically, on the ground that the only nation competent to deal with the affairs of China is that of the rising Sun. At the same time the official Press at Tokio is conducting an energetic campaign against England's consolidation of her naval base at Singapore.

"Taking these things into consideration, M. Hirota's kind expressions in favor of peace cannot but recall those with which the wolf in Aesop's fable approached the lamb on the bank of the stream.

"It would not be a bad thing if Europe instead of wasting so much time in diplomatic conferences, were to keep her eyes turned towards the towering peak of Fuji-yama, a volcano capable of producing a strong eruption."

5 copies of this report have been sent to the Department of State.
 1 copy to the Supervising Consul General.
 1 " " " Commercial Attaché.

800.

JEH.af.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (B)

Paris

Dated May 4, 1934

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

MAY 5 - 1934

342, May 4, 11 a.m.

Yesterday evening Leger talked with Marriner about the background of the French reply to the Japanese note of explanation with regard to their attitude toward China which had been communicated by the Japanese Ambassador here to the French Government. The reply was handed to the Japanese Ambassador yesterday morning and released for the press of this morning.

Leger said that the French Government had been slow in making any statement on the subject not because its intentions were in doubt but because they felt that the first interests in this subject lay in the United States and in England and they wished to be sure that any attitude they might adopt would be insofar as possible in accord with the policies of these two countries. He said that up to the present the British attitude had not been made perfectly clear but that

when

File
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 4 - 1934
 Department of State
H. to Paris

F/G 793.94/6644

FILED
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#342 From Paris, May 4, 11 a.m.

when the matter was called officially to the attention of the French Government by the note of explanation of the Japanese Ambassador they felt it was essential that France's position as an upholder of the existing treaties should be made absolutely clear. He feels that the French reply makes it plain that France does not regard Japan as having any different relation to China than that of the other signatories of the Washington agreements and would expect any question arising to be settled by the friendly procedure specified in Article 7 of the agreement of February 6, 1932. Mailed London, Geneva.

STRAUS

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

MAY 4 - 1934

Paris Upholds 9-Power Pact In Tokio Note

Gives Out Memoranda Ex-
changed With Japan on
'Hands-Off China' Policy

Open Door to Stay Open

But Nipponese Bar Ex-
ploitation by 3d Parties

By Leland Stowe

From the Herald Tribune Bureau

Copyright, 1934, New York Tribune Inc.

PARIS, May 3.—Following a conference between Naotake Sato, Japanese Ambassador to France, and Louis Barthou, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the French government tonight made public the texts of Tokio's note to Paris regarding Japanese policy in the Far East and the French reply. It is believed here that Japan's memorandum to France virtually duplicates the one already delivered to London, although the British government has not yet published its correspondence on the subject.

While recognizing the Open Door policy in the Far East, the Japanese memorandum ends on a strong note regarding the activities of third parties in China, repudiating the idea that "Chinese problems should be exploited by third parties" without regard to Japanese interests. The French reply expresses satisfaction and the "belief" that Japan would consult under the terms of the nine-power treaty in the event of a Chinese crisis.

Text of Japan's Note

The full text of the Japanese note, dated May 1, follows:

Japan has taken no action against the independence of China or her interests and has no intention of doing so. On the contrary, Japan sincerely desires the maintenance of the territorial integrity, unity and prosperity of China. These ob-

jects should in principle be attained by China herself, thanks to the awakening of her national energies and her own efforts.

Japan has no intention of transgressing the rights of other powers in China. If pursued in good faith, financial and commercial activities can have only happy effects for China, and Japan considers this result with satisfaction. Japan naturally subscribes to the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunities in China. She scrupulously observes all treaties and agreements now in force concerning that country.

Nevertheless, Japan cannot remain indifferent to the possible intervention of third parties which, under whatever pretext it were made, might be prejudicial to the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East and in those regions where Japan, if only because of her geographical situation, has interests of vital importance.

Consequently, Japan cannot admit that Chinese problems should be exploited by third parties with a view to pursuing an interested policy without regard for the conditions indicated above.

French Send Reply

The French reply, dated today, begins by referring to the "official interpretation" which Tokio has given to the declaration of April 17 by the Foreign Office spokesman regarding Chinese affairs. After paraphrasing the Japanese note, the French memorandum continues:

It is with satisfaction that the French government notes the affirmation thus given by the Japanese government of its fidelity not only to the general principles of international law but to the conventional statutes which now regulate the relations of China with the foreign powers.

From the last part of the note mentioned above, it appears that Japan cannot remain indifferent to interventions which might prejudice the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East.

If such events should occur in China the French government believes that the Imperial (Japanese) government would seek, in concert with the other powers, to find a lawful solution in conformity with the principles which inspire the acts of Washington, and notably by application of the conciliatory procedure laid down in Article 7 of the treaty of February 6, 1922 (the nine-power treaty). It is in fact only in this

framework and in this form, in the opinion of the French government, that an equitable and satisfactory solution of Chinese questions can be found.

It is stated here that neither of these documents was signed by representatives of the respective governments, and the are therefore regarded as "verbal notes," less official than notes in character. In any case the French government has taken pains to link Japan's Far Eastern policy to the nine-power treaty even more clearly in its reply.

Regarded as "Verbal" notes

It is noteworthy that the initiative for publication of the Japanese government's declarations regarding China was taken in Paris and not in London. This heightens the impression previously held here of the French willingness to act as intermediary, particularly, in the future, between the Soviet Union and Japan.

The French policy can be summed up by a desire not to meddle too much in the Far Eastern situation, however; and the French satisfaction over Tokio's explanations is believed to have been accelerated by the declaration of Sir John Simon, British Foreign Sec-

retary, that the British government was satisfied to let the matter rest.

Tokio Undecided on Note to U. S.

TOKIO, May 3 (AP).—A high government source admitted today that little progress had been made in discussions regarding the nature of Japan's reply to the United States' statement of position in the Orient. Several days of consultations will be necessary, one of those participating in the talk said, before Foreign Minister Koki Hirota will be ready to draft a memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The official said the point at issue was whether to dismiss Secretary Hull's statement with a brief, courteous acknowledgment, or send Washington a full restatement of Japan's claims to a special position as the keeper of the peace in the Far East and the guardian of China's foreign contacts.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 4, 1934.

On the evening of May 2 the French Ambassador told Mr. Phillips at dinner that the French Government was sending a communication to the Japanese Government in regard to the Amai statements. The Ambassador said that he did not know the precise nature of the communication other than that it would contain some reference to the Nine Power Treaty.

MMH/REK

m.m.H.

0698

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

☒ CONFIDENTIAL CODE

☐ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PARTIAL

PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to

S

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidence.
 It should be destroyed after transmission.
 Not to be communicated to anyone.

7-5-PM 1:02

Washington,

May 4, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

PARIS, (France).

Your, 342, May 4, 11 a. m.

Please forward Department by mail, complete texts of
 communications, exchanged, between the Japanese and French,
 Governments.

Department desires that you make a careful study and
 analysis of the French Government's attitude and action,
 including the reaction in France to the Japanese statements
 and to the French Government's attitude and action.

Thull

793.94/6644

793.94/

FE:MMH:REK

FE

m.m.h.

PM
WE
HA
5/4/34
encl.

May 4 1934

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

0695

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
☒ NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Washington,
 May 3, 1934.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

For your information.

1. Referring to statement in American papers that the NICHU NICHU has declared editorially that QUOTE the statement of Secretary Hull violates the pledge made by President Roosevelt to Viscount Ishii in Washington last May, recognizing Japan as the stabilizing influence of the Far East--UNQUOTE, officials of the Department, in reply to inquiry, categorically denied that the President gave any ~~secret~~ pledge to Viscount Ishii.

2. *An American paper, in reporting the denial,*
~~The American press, which also reports the denial,~~ states that QUOTE It is also pointed out here that any profession of respect for Japan as a stabilizing influence in the Far East would have no reference to the present diplomatic discussion, in which the potentially disturbing influence of Japan as a result of the recently announced Tokio policy has been the subject under consideration UNQUOTE. No repeat no such statement as that quoted above was made by the Department.

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

FE

m.m.H.

MAY 3 1934 PM

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

0700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PARTIAL
 PLAIN

Charge to
 \$

WY-8-PM 4:42 Washington,

May 3, 1934.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

bp
 Naval Radio

135

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 result of the recently announced Tokio policy has been the
 subject under consideration UNQUOTE. No repeat no such state-
 ment as that quoted above was made by the Department.

Three. Repeat to Nanking.

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1933 1-138

793.94/6644B

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS

Department of State

McL

A portion of this message
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (a)

FROM

Peiping,

Dated May 5, 1934.

Received 2.50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

202, May 5, noon.

(gray) Legation's 198, May 3, 11 a.m.

Following from Minister at Nanking dated May 4,
3 p.m. (end gray)

"Hsu Mo informed me May 3 that the Chinese Minister at London had reported that he had been informed by the British Government that 'special rights' meant Japanese concessions and the railway zone in Manchuria. Hsu Mo stated that the Chinese Government was dissatisfied with this reply and had informed its Minister to make further inquiries". For the Minister.

GAUSS.

WSB

F/ESP

793.94/6645

FILED


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MAY 11 1934

0702

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Geneva (part air)

Dated May 3, 1934

Rec'd 7:08 a. m., 5th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

66, May 3, 9 a. m.

793.94/6638

Consulate's 64, May 1, 2 p.m., paragraph 4.

One. Yokoyama called on me last evening and

said that he would be glad to tell me of the pur-
port of a conversation which he had had the evening
before with Avenol. Yokoyama informed^{me} in substance
as follows:

(a) - He handed to Avenol the statement cited
in my 55, April 24, 2 p.m., ⁶⁶⁰¹ and made oral explana-
tions along the general lines described in the final
paragraph of that telegram.

(b) - He made no specific reference to the con-
sultative committee inasmuch as he understood that
the deliberations would be confined to the postal
question and were "thus of no political importance".

(c) - Respecting the committee on technical
assistance, he informed Avenol that Japan desired
that the League take steps to guard against the
"misuse in China" of technical assistance for

political

793.94/6646

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#66 from Geneva (part air)
May 3, 9 a. m.

political dissimulation.

(d) - In response to Avenol's inquiry whether the Japanese Government could furnish him with any evidence that political activities had been associated with the technical work or carried on by any technical officials, Yokoyama replied that he would make no reference to the past but that his statement only concerns the future.

(e) - Expanding on the foregoing Yokoyama informed me that he had made no allegations against Rajchman and that Japan would take no position respecting allegations or his return to China other than that his and all other League activities in China must be strictly non-political.

(f) - Answering my inquiry he said that while he had not employed with Avenol the term "inimical acts" he felt that he had "satisfactorily conveyed the impression".

(g) - As he outlined them to me Avenol's statements to him appeared to have been of the general tenor with certain obviously necessary omissions of what Avenol said to me as reported in my 61, April 28, 11 a. m., paragraph one (a) and (d). Avenol stressed

6624

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-//66 from Geneva (part air)
 May 3, 9 a. m.

stressed to him the limited character of the program of assistance to China and its complete disassociation from political undertakings and asked him to transmit these assurances to the Japanese Government.

Two. Yokoyama carefully explained to me that neither his written statement nor his explanations were in any respect "representations" but that he had given them to the Secretary General solely for his information. The distinction was, however, very subtle.

Three. Yokoyama's statements to me and likewise his statements to Avenol as he related them to me denoted a complete avoidance of any commitments or of any assertions of specific intentions on the part of Japan. There was in particular an avoidance of any definition of the term "political activity". The only definition of Japanese policy in any direction was a general reference to the criterion of Japan's public statements of policy with the implication that Japan will advance a specific interpretation in any given instance as it might arise.

Four. The Avenol-Yokoyama conversation appears at present to "stabilize" the Japanese relations to the League's in this matter with the exception of possible developments as discussed in my 64.

WSB-HPD

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *WE*
THE UNDERSECRETARY
Aug, 2
SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 4 1934
NOTED
The Secretary
to Mr. Star
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 4 1934
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *U*
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS *FE/H*

May 2, 1934

U
Mr. Phillips:
This is most
interesting.
M. M. H.

0704

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U
AEK

London, April 24, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.




F/ESP

My dear Stanley:

I am sending you two copies of a memorandum I have prepared of my conversation with Wellesley referred to in the Embassy's telegram to the Department of State, April 24, 8 p. m.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. R. [Signature]




793.94/6647



Enclosure:

2 copies of Memorandum dated April 24, 1934.



Stanley K. Hornbeck, Esq.,
 Department of State,
 Washington, D. C.

April 25th There are rumors this morning
 Federation of British Industries
 has requested Govt to delay
 opening official trade negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL.

Memorandum for the Ambassador from Mr. Atherton.

I had a conversation with Sir Victor Wellesley today and discussed the recent Japanese Foreign Office statement. At the moment of our conversation the early afternoon editions of the papers were carrying the Tokyo Cabinet's confirmation. Sir Victor knew that the Ambassador had had a short conversation on this subject with Sir John Simon and I told Sir Victor that according to the Department's instructions up to the present time the American Government had made no announcement on the matter and had reached no definite decision of policy; that, however, this Embassy had telegraphed last night the statement made by Sir John in the House of Commons (see my telegram No. 192, April 23, 10 p. m.). Sir Victor then informed me that the substance of the note contained a little more than Sir John stated in the House of Commons, since in inquiring as to how this Foreign Office statement of Japanese policy affected England, reference was made to the position of both England and Japan under their treaty obligations, and especially the Nine Power Treaty.

Wellesley then read me a letter he had just received from Drummond in Rome which stated that last year in conversation with Matsuoka in Geneva the Japanese had stated as the definite aim of Japanese policy in the Far East an alliance between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and that these three Powers would control the ~~Far~~ East and the ~~Far~~ Eastern markets. Wellesley said that, while the recent statement of Japan, although not directly addressed to any Government, was very provocative, he felt that it clearly indicated

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

indicated the long end objective they had in mind as regards dominating the East. One could not feel Japan was bound by any convention, since she would go just so far as it suited her policy in obtaining her long end objective and then she would go off on her own, to come back again perhaps later. At this particular time, Wellesley said, he felt that the Japanese pronouncement was made through fear of a strong and united China, which had increased since the Japanese adventure in Manchukuo had gone on. He said a strong and united China was of course the antithesis of what Japan wanted, and also a chaotic China was entirely contrary to Japanese control of China and China markets. What she wanted was something in between. The only basis for international unity, he went on, against Japan was community of interests. England and America, he said, had community of interests in having a strong and virile China, which State would be not only a buffer to Japan in the Far East, but a country with which trade might be undertaken profitably; but, Wellesley continued in almost a soliloquy, how far at the present time were England and America to pursue a common course in this common interest. It was very well, Wellesley added, some years ago to write out on paper such an agreement as the Nine Power Treaty, but what was to keep it in force? In fact, how could any treaty be said to be kept in force today?

I interpolated that I felt we must not look at this merely from the angle of today, but if Japan were given her head in this matter, without any concerted opposition a serious situation might confront the whole western

world

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

world vis-à-vis the East in five or ten years. Wellesley replied that in five or ten years, with Germany rearming and the western situation what it was, there might be no western opposition to Japan. He held out very little hope for any concerted Anglo-American action that would be the least effective against Japan unless the two Governments were willing to agree that in case due consideration was not paid to their representations the employment of force was obviously in their mind. He felt contemplation of any such action on the part of Great Britain was entirely out of the question at the present time. He doubted the United States reaction. He then continued that, in his opinion, if every nation, separate or together, should protest against this statement, Japan would probably withdraw it or modify it without, however, changing her purpose or objective. Eventually in the carrying out of Japanese policy towards China, however, some incident would arise which would give occasion to the western world to decide whether they would accept an additional rebuff or whether the provocation warranted forceful action. Wellesley said that such an incident might arise if Japan tried to interfere with some foreign nation carrying out negotiations with China which the Japanese felt were against their recent declaration. He said really until such a concrete case presented itself, merely on the strength of the present Japanese declaration he did not feel there was any possibility of concerted action that would further the case of the western world versus Japan. He said Japan never could conquer China, and that her present policy would antagonize China more and

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-4-

and more.

In conclusion, Wellesley added he would discuss the matter with Sir John Simon and would communicate to me, or Sir John to the Ambassador, the result of their conversation. I felt this expression of Wellesley's personal opinion, which was only for my personal and strictly confidential ears, was indicative of the Government's present view in that the world situation is such that England does not want to create a new crisis in the Far East which she was unprepared to meet at present, either singly or by international agreement. Wellesley felt informal exchange of views, however, might gradually lead to common policy between the United States and England in the event of a grave situation.

The slant which the press section of the Foreign Office is giving correspondents is of possible interest, since it is at the present time believed that concerted action vis-à-vis Tokyo might merely react in putting up the back of the Japanese rather than getting them to reconsider their position. I venture to reiterate again that the London press has probably an unconscious reaction that this Far Eastern situation is of far more worry to the United States than it is to Great Britain, and that therefore the initiative should be left to Washington.

It may be well to add here that private interested opinion has never fully understood the exchange of notes effected between the United States Secretary of State and Mr. Hirota at the time Ambassador Saito took office.

also

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- 5 -

> Also why, if since an exchange of notes was to be made, England was not privately advised beforehand. Also certain opinion here professes to find the wheat and cotton loan of the United States to China violates the Consortium Agreement of 1920. Indirectly Sir John Simon mentioned this in his conversation with the Chinese Minister, reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 196, April 24, 8 p. m.

London, April 24, 1934.

0712

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Also why, if since an exchange of notes was to be made, England was not privately advised beforehand. Also certain opinion here professes to find the wheat and cotton loan of the United States to China violates the Consortium Agreement of 1920. Indirectly Sir John Simon mentioned this in his conversation with the Chinese Minister, reported in the Embassy's telegram No. 196, April 24, 8 p. m.

London, April 24, 1934.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~WA~~ ~~PM~~ ~~at~~
~~U. my P. L. L. P.~~

~~F. E. T. O. W. T. E.~~
~~S. M. H.~~

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 WJ

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

SCR
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May 29, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Ray:

Referring to the memorandum of your conversation on April 24 with Sir Victor Wellesley, copies of which were forwarded under cover of your letter of that date to me, I note the statement in the last paragraph that "private interested opinion has never fully understood the exchange of notes effected between the United States Secretary of State and Mr. Hirota at the time Ambassador Saito took office. Also why, if since an exchange of notes was to be made, England was not privately advised beforehand. Also certain opinion here professes to find the wheat and cotton loan of the United States to China violates the Consortium Agreement of 1920."

1. With regard to the exchange of messages between the Secretary of State and Mr. Hirota, the facts -- so far as we know them -- are as follows:

On February 21, Mr. Saito, who had a few days previously presented his letter of credence, called on the

Secretary

Ray Atherton, Esquire,

Counselor of American Embassy,

London, England.

793.94/6647

Confidential File

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Secretary and left with him a statement bearing the legend, "Informal and personal Message from Mr. Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as Telegraphed to Mr. Saito, the Japanese Ambassador." The Secretary, having received this statement, felt, in accordance with usual practice and procedure, called upon to make a reply. This reply was, on March 3, 1934, handed by the Secretary to Mr. Saito. The question of publication of the notes was not raised until some time later, when Mr. Saito, referring to a conversation at Tokyo between Mr. Grew and Mr. Hirota, endeavored to make an (imaginary) American proposal for publication the basis for an agreement to proceed with publication. It is clear from the record, however, that the first move toward publication of the notes, as well as toward initiation of the correspondence, came from the Japanese.

So far as the Secretary of State, the Department and the American Government were concerned, they took no initiative in the matter. There was presented to them a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a foreign government, and the natural course of action was that reply should be made. The exchange of notes represented no new demarche on the part of the American Government. If anyone should have ^{informed} ~~advised~~ the British Government beforehand, it would seem logical that Japan, as the initiator, should have given that ~~advice~~ ^{information}.

If an opportune occasion should arise, we would have

no

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no objection to your informing the British Foreign Office, in strict confidence, in regard to the facts of the matter as set forth above.

993-48
2. With regard to the American wheat and cotton credit to China, I think that you are aware of the fact that the principal purpose of the American Government in granting this credit was to aid the domestic price situation and to remove from the American market surplus stocks of cotton, wheat and flour. With regard to the question whether the extension of that credit is in conflict with the provisions of the Consortium Agreement of 1920, attention is invited to the text of the Agreement, Section 2 thereof, which reads in part as follows:

"This Agreement relates to existing and future loan agreements which involve the issue for subscription by the public of loans to the Chinese Government."

The cotton and wheat credit was not in fact a "loan" to China nor did it involve "subscription by the public". It is our understanding that representatives of the various national banking groups that are members of the China Consortium have expressed views indicating that they do not regard this transaction as being in conflict with the provisions of the Agreement.

It is of course true that in concluding the Consortium Agreement of 1920 the interested banking groups (American, British, French and Japanese) were assured of the full support
of

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
- 4 -

of their respective governments and that they did not contemplate encountering competition from the concerned governments in the granting of loans to China. We are aware of the fact that it has been contended by Japan, and by others, especially British officials, that the cotton and wheat credit violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Consortium Agreement.

We do not desire that the Embassy take an initiative in the matter of discussing with British officials the question of the cotton and wheat credit. If, however, this question should be presented to the Embassy, the Department would have no objection to the Embassy pointing out tactfully and orally the points mentioned in the first paragraph of section 2 of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel R. Howland



MMH/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL.

May 9, 1934.

Dear Ray:

When your confidential letter of April 24 arrived, Stanley Hornbeck was just on the point of leaving Washington for some ten days and consequently turned the letter over to me with the request that I send you an acknowledgment. This I am now doing. All of us here, including the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Pierrepont Moffat, have been very much interested in reading the account of your conversation with Wellesley.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. W.

94/6647/C-6

793.94/6647

Ray Atherton, Esquire,
Counselor of American Embassy,
London, England.

FE:MMH/ZMK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

May 11
The Secretary
as of interest.
UP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 10, 1934

~~U:~~
ALL FE.

There is attached Tokyo's Despatch No. 751 of April 20, 1934, on the subject of the recent statement of the Japanese Foreign Office with regard to Japan's China policy. The Despatch is an important one and should be read in full.

The Despatch requires no comment. I should like to point out that any doubt which may have existed with regard to advisability of this Government issuing a rejoinder to the Japanese statement should be allayed by the statement referred to in the first paragraph of page 6 -- to the effect that the Foreign Office's statement was "issued as a sort of preliminary to the forthcoming naval conference, which would be a success if Japan's thesis regarding assistance to China is accepted by the other powers and which would fail if the thesis is not accepted." If the Japanese official to which this statement is attributed was correctly understood, the Japanese intend to propose an acceptance by the United States and the other powers

of

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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of Japan's claim to paramountcy in the Far East in exchange for an acceptance by Japan of a naval ratio acceptable to the other Powers. The issuance by the American Government of its rejoinder should facilitate our rejection of any such Japanese proposition if and when made.


FE:RHD:OLY

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
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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 Tokyo, April 20, 1934

No. 751.



Subject: Japanese Policy in regard to
 Assistance to China.



F/ESP

793.94/6648

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For Distribution-Check			
Grade	To	In U.S.A.	Out of U.S.A.

793.94

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 71
 of April 18, 5 p.m. ^{15 71} and to the Department's telegram
 No. 51 of April 18, 6 p.m., regarding the statement
 issued by the Foreign Office defining Japanese policy
 toward the rendering of assistance to China by other
 1/ countries, and to enclose herewith a copy of the
 English translation of the statement, issued by the
 Bureau of Information and Intelligence of the Foreign
 Office. It will be observed that this translation does
 not differ in any essential respect from the translation

cabled

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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cabled to the New York HERALD TRIBUNE by its correspondent in Tokyo. The translation issued by the Foreign Office is labelled as "An English translation unofficially issued by the Foreign Office of the unofficial statement issued by the Foreign Office on April 17".

The story of the statement, as far as the embassy can ascertain, is as follows: On the afternoon of Tuesday, April 17th, some newspaper correspondents questioned Mr. Amau, the Chief of the Bureau of Information and Intelligence of the Foreign Office, regarding the reported opposition of the Japanese Government to assistance from other countries to China. Mr. Amau went to his files and produced a document in Japanese which appeared to one of the correspondents (Mr. Sabb, of the Associated Press) to be in the form of an instruction addressed to the Japanese Minister in China. Mr. Amau then made, orally, a rough translation of the document into English. He stated that his translation was unofficial, but that the document had received the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later that evening, he issued to the Japanese press a statement in Japanese, labelled "unofficial", which was translated and cabled to various newspapers by correspondents in Tokyo. As reported in my telegram No. 71, the Tokyo correspondent of the New York HERALD TRIBUNE cabled a complete translation of the statement to his newspaper. On the morning of Wednesday, April 18th, in reply to questioning by the correspondents, Mr. Amau

elaborated

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elaborated somewhat on the subject and observed that the statement issued the night before "could be considered as official", and that a summary would be sent to Japanese diplomatic officers to be conveyed to the governments to which they are accredited "if necessary". He then promised the correspondents a translation into English of the statement, as translations of Japanese into English may easily differ considerably and thereby convey a wrong impression. On the morning of the 19th the translation was issued, but, as stated above, as "an English translation unofficially issued by the Foreign Office of the unofficial statement ..."

The Embassy's impression is that the statement as issued conveys the true policy of the Japanese Government toward activities by other countries in China, but that the Foreign Office is somewhat fearful of the effect of the statement abroad and therefore is carefully maintaining a position where it can deny that such a statement was ever officially issued. This view is borne out by a conversation which a member of the staff of the Embassy had with an under official of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office on the 19th. According to this official, the essential basis of the announcement, namely, that the Japanese Government feels that it should be consulted by other governments before they take any action in China, is the actual opinion of those in charge of Japan's relations with China. The official stated that the statement of policy should be interpreted in a negative rather than a positive way; that Japan did not contemplate

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contemplate any single-handed action in China but only wanted the other powers to recognize Japan's right to be consulted when they contemplated any activity in China. The official did not state how this policy could be reconciled with Japan's recognition, in the Nine-Power Treaty, of the administrative integrity of China.

It has been apparent for some time that the Japanese Government has been developing such a policy as is outlined in the statement unofficially released by the Foreign Office on April 17th. There was considerable resentment, official and unofficial, of the American wheat and cotton loan to China, and for months past the Japanese have viewed with a suspicious and resentful eye the activities of American airplane companies in China. Even the activities of Dr. Rajchmann, of the Health Bureau of the League Secretariat, in China have called forth considerable criticism in Japan. On April 9th, in commenting on rumored plans for international cooperation in giving economic assistance to China, the spokesman for the Foreign Office stated that such attempts have always ended in failure in the past; that the repercussion from failure in Japan was much greater than in other countries; and that for these reasons Japan would not only not join in such international cooperation but would definitely oppose any plans for international cooperation. The statement issued on April 17th is undoubtedly an elaboration and elucidation

of

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of the policy mentioned on the 9th, but the question which has been agitating foreign circles in Tokyo is not why the Government issued such a statement, but why the Government issued the statement at the present time, when everything possible is being done to conciliate foreign countries. The under-official of the Foreign Office with whom a member of my staff conversed stated that he knew of no reason for issuing the statement of policy at the present time, but seemed to be inclined to ascribe the move to a desire on the part of Mr. Amau to create a sensation, such as Mr. Shiratori, when in the same position in the Foreign Office, was inclined to create. This interpretation, however, seems somewhat strained. Baron Shidehara, when questioned by one of the newspaper correspondents, expressed surprise that the statement should be issued just at the moment when Japan's relations with other nations appeared to be improving. An explanation which most observers agree seems to be the most reasonable is that the Japanese suspect that Dr. Rajchmann, of the League Secretariat, now on his way to Geneva from China, where he has been conducting investigations for some months past, is carrying with him some plan for international technical and economic assistance, supervised by the League of Nations, to China, and that the Japanese Government wishes to forestall any such move by the League.

There are various reports, some of which seem to be reliable, regarding the impelling force behind the issuing of the statement. One is that the action was taken at the

instigation

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instigation of the military, who have always advocated a strong attitude toward China and who induced Amau to issue the statement without the authorization of Mr. Hirota, thereby placing him in a most difficult position, as the policy enunciated in the statement is not in accord with his conciliatory policy, and as he cannot withdraw the statement without incurring the enmity of the military. On the other hand, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, according to most reliable information, thoroughly endorses the statement, asserting that it forms a part of Japan's fixed policies, and that it will be carried out regardless of the opposition of other nations of the world. Mr. Amau himself, in a private conversation, asserted that the statement was issued as a sort of preliminary to the forthcoming naval conference, which would be a success if Japan's thesis regarding assistance to China is accepted by the other powers and which would fail if the thesis is not accepted.

Amau, in the press conference of the morning of April 20, made an impromptu translation of a typewritten document. According to his translation of the document, Japan has no intention of interfering with the legitimate interests of other powers in China; Japan will object only when the action of a third power threatens Japan's position; Japan has no intention of interfering with the independence of China or of infringing on the interests of China; and Japan has no intention of deviating from the established policies of the Open Door and equal opportunity, or of infringing existing treaties. This statement was apparently

issued

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issued after it was seen that the original statement had excited much adverse comment abroad, and was intended to calm the fears of other nations. It will be observed, however, that while it modifies the tone of the original statement somewhat, it does not alter the basic policy.

According to the TOKYO NICHU-NICHU of April 19, 1934 (Japanese Edition), the Army authorities unqualifiedly support the stand envisaged in the statement issued by the Foreign Office in regard to international assistance to China. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931, the military authorities have viewed all attempts at or consideration of political and economic assistance to China as being injurious to the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. This was demonstrated by Japan's refusal to accept the conclusions of the Lytton Report, which contemplated assistance to China. The Japanese military authorities believe that European and American nations should not endeavor to interfere in Oriental affairs, because of their lack of adequate knowledge of conditions and factors making for the maintenance of peace in the Orient. The maintenance of peace devolves only upon Japan and China, and there can be no argument on this point. They hold that it is shown by actual developments that the Nine-Power Treaty aiming to bring about peace and order in China has no practical value in its application to actualities, and that it is reasonable to conclude that it has practically been invalidated. Under these circumstances, they say, Japan should refrain from participating in the next naval conference if it is proposed that

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that the conference touch upon Oriental problems in addition to matters directly concerned with naval limitation, and if the conference should proceed to consider the political problems of the Orient, Japan should immediately withdraw from the conference, as Japan's policy in this regard is settled and unshakable and no discussion can be permitted. Therefore Japan should object to any agreement which will hamper co-operation between Japan and China, if any such agreement is proposed at the next naval conference, according to the military authorities.

In regard to the statement issued by the spokesman of the Foreign Office, the Embassy desires to invite the attention of the Department to the fact that the term "Toa" (Eastern Asia) is used in the statement. As a rule, the Japanese formerly used the term "Toyo" (Eastern Seas, or the Orient, as distinguished from "Seiyo", Western Seas or the Occident) or "Kyokuto" (Extreme or Far East) in designating the Far East generally. The term "Eastern Asia" has a somewhat different and more precise connotation and is probably meant to include parts of China.

So far four vernacular newspapers, the TOKYO ASAHI, the JIJI, the CHUGAI SHOGYO and the HOCHI, have published editorials on the subject of the statement issued by the Foreign Office. They all endorse the principles contained in the statement, although the ASAHI doubts that cooperation between Japan and China will be possible for some time to come, because of opposition among some elements in China. The HOCHI, while not disapproving of the statement, believes that the phraseology was too abstract, resulting in misunderstandings abroad.

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abroad, and was issued at the wrong time, before an understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels with other nations. The JAPAN ADVERTISER of April 19th published an editorial on the subject, expressing doubt that other nations will be prepared to subscribe to the Japanese thesis regarding assistance to China. Newspaper clippings containing these five editorials are enclosed herewith.

In my opinion, the implications contained in the Foreign Office statement are very serious. If the policy as therein outlined is adhered to and carried out strictly, it will constitute an element in international affairs as important as, if not more important than, the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. It goes much further than the Monroe Doctrine and places China in a state of tutelage under Japan. In view, however, of the declared policy of the present Minister for Foreign Affairs to use every means in his power to better Japan's relations with other nations, I do not believe that any attempt will be made at the present time to enforce the policy outlined in the Foreign Office statement in a provocative manner.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
 Joseph C. Grew.

- ✓ Enclosures:
 Newspaper clippings
 1.2. Copy of statement.

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Copy to Legation, Peiping
 Copy to Legation, Berne.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. / to despatch
 No. 751 of Apr 20 '34 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

The following is an English translation unofficially
 issued by the ^{Japanese} Foreign Office of the unofficial
 statement issued by the Foreign Office on
 April 17; ¹⁹³⁴ known as in "Asian Statement."

Owing to the special position of Japan in her
 relations with China, her views and attitude respecting
 matters that concern China, may not agree in every point
 with those of foreign nations: but it must be realized
 that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in
 carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special
 responsibilities in East Asia.

Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League
 of Nations because of their failure to agree in their
 opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving
 peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward
 China may at times differ from that of foreign countries,
 such difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's posi-
 tion and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is
 endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations
 with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it
 only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia,
 we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is
 our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no
 country but China which is in a position to share with
 Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in
 East Asia. Accordingly, unification of China, preservation

of

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of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself. We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan: We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to pro-

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vide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2 to despatch
 No 751 of 4/20/34 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

JIJI
 April 19, 1934.

Editorial
 (Translation)

International Control Feared

JIJI

It goes without saying that Japan left the League of Nations because of the fundamental difference of opinion between them regarding peace in East Asia. Since giving notice of withdrawal, Japan has resolved to maintain peace in this part of the world on its responsibility. It believes that recognition of Manchukuo and its sound development offer the best basis for permanent peace in the Orient and has framed its national policy accordingly. At the same time, Japan is deeply concerned about the integrity and rehabilitation of China. Since the signing of the Tangku truce last May, the situation in North China has gradually stabilized. The Chinese people, alive to the failure of the policy of relying on the League and other foreign influences, are beginning to understand the realities of their position more fully, and they realize the need of restoring friendship with Japan when opportunity offers. If any outside force hinders this trend toward peace, Japan, which has assumed the role of the sole guardian of peace in East Asia, must reject it.

An unofficial statement issued on Tuesday by the Foreign Office says that Japan will oppose any concerted efforts by foreign nations to extend financial and certain other forms of assistance to China, such as the furnishing of airplanes, the establishment of aerodromes and the supplying of military advisers. Japan's policy, according to the announcement, rests on its responsibility for keeping peace in East Asia.

The stand taken by the Foreign Office is supported fully by the Japanese people. The League of Nations has blundered in dealing with China. Technical or financial assistance to China from the League, according to the Foreign Office, will simply strengthen the anti-Japanese elements among China's statesmen. Japan is also afraid lest such assistance lead to international control. It is quite reasonable to voice opposition to help to China from the Powers, and the Foreign Office must make its policy known to the rest of the world whenever an opportunity offers.

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Enclosure No 2 to despatch
 No 75/ of 4/20/34 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

ASAHI
 April 19, 1934.

Editorial
 (Translation)

settle problems in the Far East without regard for China or through efforts exerted solely in the direction of improving relations with the United States or Great Britain.

The present unsatisfactory state of relations between Japan and China is not entirely the fault of China. The trouble has been China's policy pitting foreign countries against one another. But Japan is responsible, to a certain extent, for this practice of China. Japan has in the past attached undue importance to relations with European and American countries, to the neglect of its affairs with China. China has occupied second place in the minds of those in charge of Japan's foreign relations. This undue stress laid by the Japanese authorities on policy toward Europe and America has helped not a little the traditional policy of China to benefit by aggravating feelings between foreign countries.

The Foreign Office statement has made it clear that there is to be liquidation of the foreign policy which has been pursued by the successive Governments in Japan, a policy which was devoted to the promotion of friendly relations with European and American countries. The statement promises a return to a policy based on promotion of peace in East Asia. Such a policy is the ideal. It is also a natural development. It ushers in a new era in Japan's diplomacy.

The new foreign policy indicates the direction in which Japan wants events in East Asia to move. Whether it will succeed depends on the extent to which China is willing to co-operate with us. We wait to know the attitude of China toward the share of the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in this part of the world which Japan wants it to bear, as well as the firmness of the resolve of China to do its bit.

There are increasing indications that the leaders in Chinese politics are coming to realize the mistake of playing foreign countries against one another and are beginning to think seriously of adjusting relations with Japan. It is becoming increasingly clear that at the recent conference in

Nanchang General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and acting Foreign Minister, acquiesced in the views of Mr. Huang Fu, chairman of the Peiping Political Council and North China leader, who has been in favor of co-operation with Japan, on Chinese policy toward Japan. This gives rise to hope of improvement in various problems pending between Japan and China. But we must be on our guard against optimism about the future of relations between the two countries. There is within the ranks of the Nanking Government a strong body of opinion opposed to the idea of adjusting the situation in North China by negotiation with Japan. This coupled with the fact that the South-eastern faction is maneuvering to prevent the carrying out of the commitments made at the Nanchang conference, causes us to doubt if Mr. Huang's program for solution of pending problems will go through without a hitch. We have our own doubts about general improvement of the situation between Japan and China. Certainly no one can tell when Japan's aspirations finding expression in the latest Foreign Office statement, will come to fruition.

But Japan has laid its cards on the table. It has no choice except to shape its course in accordance with its latest pronouncement and pursue it with determination, hoping for all it is worth to come to an understanding with China on the terms laid down in the statement. It develops that China is about taking a course in the right direction. Here is a chance for adjustment of relations.

Let us see how far the internal condition of China will permit of such adjustment.

Ideal Policy Formulated

ASAHI

On Tuesday the Foreign Office issued a statement on Japanese policy toward China. It was informal. Yet that did not detract from its value. It deserves great attention, if only for the great interest it has aroused among the Powers and in China.

Cut short, the statement says that it is the mission of Japan to preserve peace and order in East Asia. For the successful fulfillment of this mission, Japan must have the close co-operation of China. As for the restoration of unity and order in China, it is a task for China itself. If China wishes to accomplish this, it must wake up and learn to rely on itself. From this point of view, Japan is determined to oppose any policy on the part of China designed to benefit it by playing foreigners against other foreigners. Japan is opposed as a matter of principle to foreign assistance to China, whether financial or technical, which has political significance and which opens the way to or promotes the setting up of spheres of influence in China, international control or partition. Japan is opposed to the practice of foreign countries, in evidence of late, of supplying China with airplanes for military purposes, of sending military instructors and advisers to the Nanking Government and of making political loans. It is opposed because it believes that such practice will lead to ill blood between Japan and foreign countries, with the result that the seeds of future trouble in East Asia will be sown.

The statement made plain the basis on which the policy of independence, which Japan has been following for the past two or three years, as well as the direction the policy will take in the future.

It goes without saying that China is the country around which Japan's foreign policy should revolve. It is working at the wrong end to try to

0739

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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751 4/20/34

CHUGAI
April 19, 1934.

Editorial
(Translation)

Peace of Orient Menaced

CHUGAI

The statement of the Foreign Office regarding Japan's policy toward China takes on special significance in coming at a time when Sino-Japanese relations are about to witness important developments. Relations have unavoidably been very unfavorable since the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents. Because they have been unfavorable, an opportunity has been given to foreign Powers to engage in reckless activities in China, and the result has been intensification of their unfavorable nature. Simply because of its feelings against Japan, China has sought the assistance of the Powers, disregarding its own future in a shocking fashion. The Powers, quick to take advantage of the chaos, have made restoration of Sino-Japanese amity difficult by extending assistance to China directly and indirectly. The whole internal situation in China has thereby been made perilous, and the peace of the Orient has been menaced.

No one can deny that under the fair name of technical and financial assistance the Powers have been indulging in political recklessness in China since Japan said that it was quitting the League. Japan might not object to mere economic help to China in connection with trade, but much would depend on the extent of the help. When it is of such a nature that the Oriental situation is likely to be jeopardized, Japan has no other course than to oppose it. The hands of the Powers have spread widely over China. They are not very active on the surface, but underneath they are acting recklessly. If their activities come to the surface, the situation will be not unlike that prevailed prior to the Boxer outbreak in 1900, when the ambitions of the Powers threatened to split China into twos and threes. Thus we cannot but feel great concern.

It takes no great imagination to see that the Powers are counting on profits in connection with their assistance to China. When apprehension is voiced at the possibility of their assistance taking on political significance, the establishment eventually of spheres of influence is meant. This, if carried too far, would result in international control and division of the country among the Powers. Such a possibility cannot be overlooked by Japan, which must be ever mindful of China's territorial integrity and rehabilitation and of the maintenance of peace in the Orient. Japan is ready at any time to act against any country that means to disturb peace in this part of the world, and it will ask no one else to help it. It is prepared to make any sacrifice for this purpose.

Japan and China must equally bear responsibility for keeping the Far East peaceful. It is up to China's own efforts and conscientiousness, however, to see that its territorial integrity is not violated. Unfortunately, however, it does not realize this. Taking advantage, the Powers are spreading over it their venomous hands. As their policy will simply encourage China in its opposition to Japan it cannot be tolerated. It threatens the peace of the Orient. As long as the Powers give assistance in military preparations, China will continue its anti-Japanese policy. There are no few instances of armaments being provided for China by certain Powers, and they are abetting China's anti-Japanese feeling. We sincerely trust that the Powers will appraise correctly the situation in China and Japan's mission and policy regarding that country.

THE JAPAN ADVERTISER
APRIL 19, 1934.

Japan's China Policy

The statement on Japan's policy toward China issued to the press by the Foreign Office spokesman on Tuesday night comes as a complete surprise for there had been nothing to indicate that such a momentous declaration would be forthcoming. It will naturally be read with the reports coming simultaneously from China, of Mr. Ariyoshi's conversation with Mr. Huang Fu and observers will tend to link these events in their minds.

Whether there is actually any connection between the statement issued in Tokyo and the Shanghai conversations or not, it would hardly seem likely that the Japanese Foreign Office would make such a declaration unless encouraged to do so by the trend of the Shanghai negotiations, for otherwise it might well prove prejudicial to further conversations, for it cannot be supposed that the Chinese on the whole will take kindly to the statement. High Chinese officials have no doubt long realized that the better policy for China would be to befriend rather than antagonize Japan, but they have not dared say so because the temper of public opinion in China would not suffer them to declare themselves so openly.

The Foreign Office statement—notwithstanding denials here to the contrary—will necessarily be interpreted abroad as something of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia, for by this declaration, Japan assumes the responsibility for the preservation of peace in Asia and this is said to be the business of Japan and China alone.

This is a thesis which has found favor in official circles here for a number of years past, but which has never been so forcefully stated or so clearly defined as in the latest Foreign Office statement. The idea of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia has witnessed a gradual evolution. It was first preached by Viscount Ishii when he was in the United States as special war-time Ambassador prior to the signing of the famous Ishii-Lansing agreement, later abrogated at the Washington Conference; Viscount Kaneko in an article in 1932 attempted to show that the idea originated with the President Theodore Roosevelt; while the late Kaku Mori openly favored it and urged it in the Diet two years ago. Since then both Count Uchida as Foreign Minister and Mr. Hirota have put it forward, and each time with added clarity. It can thus be said to have been taking shape gradually but surely.

Count Uchida, in his speech to the Diet on August 25, 1932, declared that "the day is not far distant when Japan, Manchukuo and China, as three independent Powers closely linked together by the bond of cultural and racial affinities, will come to cooperate, hand in hand, for the maintenance and advancement of the peace and prosperity of the Far East." This was a very non-committal statement which required something of a stretch of the imagination to earn the appellation of a Monroe Doctrine declaration, but an intimation of it was seen by the newspapers abroad in the prophesied Far Eastern co-operation.

In addressing the Diet again on January 21, 1933, Count Uchida however became much more specific, when he said in part:

"The League of Nations Covenant very wisely provides that regional understandings shall be respected. In this sense, our government believe that any plan for erecting an edifice of peace in the Far East should be based upon the recognition that the constructive force of Japan is the mainstay of tranquility in this part of the world." Count Uchida quite obviously had in mind article 21 of the League Covenant providing that the Covenant shall not be deemed to "affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." This was the article which was inserted at the insistence of President Wilson to preserve the integrity of the American policy of the Monroe Doctrine.

That this idea of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia is being adhered to was

made evident by Mr. Hirota's first speech to the Diet last January, more conciliatory in tone than his predecessor's but no less revealing as to its intent. Mr. Hirota, in referring to America-Japan relations, asked the American people "to perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia." (This was the first time that the term "East Asia" came to replace "Far East"). And further he said: "We should not forget for a moment that Japan, serving as the only corner stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities. It is this important position and these vast responsibilities in which Japan's diplomacy and national defense are rooted."

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751 4/20/34

And it is this note which runs through the whole of the Foreign Office statement. Japan takes upon herself the responsibility for the peace of the Far East, and is serving notice to other nations that she will not admit of their interference in the affairs of China in any way which she may consider detrimental to herself. This means that other countries are not to supply China with war planes, or to build airdromes in China, or to send military advisers to that country, or to make loans to China which might be used for political purposes because Japan "would oppose such projects."

Now it can hardly be supposed that other countries will be prepared to subscribe to this thesis. Japan has extensive interests in China but so have the United States, Great Britain, France and all the other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and it cannot be assumed that they will abandon the rights for their nationals to trade freely with China, be it in airplanes, armaments, or other commodities, or that other governments will cease to loan money to China if they consider that this money can be profitably invested in a legitimate way.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2
 757 4/20/34

HOCHI
 April 19, 1934.

Editorial
 (Translation)

Gaimusho Statement

HOCHI—The Gaimusho statement which was informally issued the other day enunciating Japan's policy towards China has elicited quite a phenomenal echo throughout the world. The salient points of the statement in question were:

1. Japan is prepared, upon her own single responsibility, to maintain peace and order in East Asia.
2. For maintenance of her integrity and restoration of her internal order China has nothing to depend upon but her own self-awakening.
3. All policies and movements calculated to culminate in the international control of China or in the establishment of "spheres of influence" in China by the Powers should be discarded. (Even financial or technical aids to China must be objected to by Japan as a principle in view of their political nature).
4. Japan will make no objection to economic and commercial aid to be separately given China by Powers, but must stand against either the conclusion of political loans or the supply of airplanes and appointment of military advisers as being conducive to disturbance rather than promotion of East Asian peace.

The statement in question thus amplifies in part the principles underlying the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty and the existing Nine-Power Agreement. The greatest portion, however, enunciates Japan's China policy more positive than what has hitherto been made public by the diplomatic authorities.

Such declaration as received by Powers, seems, therefore, to point towards the conclusion that it asserts "establishment of Japan's protective right for China" and that it spells abrogation in effect of the Nine-Power Agreement so far as Japan is concerned. The most typical of such foreign impressions may be found in the editorial appearing in a recent issue of the New York Herald Tribune.

But the question is whether the Gaimusho statement under review indicates so seriously ambitious a policy as foreign critics interpret.

To confess the truth, the statement was rather too abstract in phraseology. The substantial views of the Japanese authorities on problems of practical importance were somewhat couched in terms more sentimental than informative. This rendered it difficult for the reader to grasp any tangible points with precision, and seems to account for the foreign mis-impression as if the statement in question were inconsistent not only with the line of efforts thus far followed by the Japanese Minister to China, but also with the guiding diplomatic policy declared by Foreign Minister Hirota in the preceding session of the Diet.

Because we trust that the diplomatic policy defined in the Diet recently was the most authoritative and fundamental, we are inclined to feel, with every confidence, that the present statement ought to be interpreted within that range and scope.

There is another point to which we want to call attention in association with the above misimpressions among Occidental critics. We refer to the question of tact in dealing with such declaration.

Whether Japan ought to hold herself singly responsible for maintenance of order in East Asia is a question which dissolves itself into another and more practical question of Japan's real power and of the world's credit therein. When these two conditions are duly satisfied, the world will voluntarily entrust the Japanese Empire with the task in question. On the other hand, it is equally plain, that without satisfaction of those conditions, a mere declaration of an intention to take such responsibility would be little better than a paper claim, and therefore ought to be reserved.

It is a fact, indeed, that the precarious condition of China as at present causes no small anxiety to Japan and other Powers, and therefore the Japanese are unanimous in entertaining sympathy towards China in desiring to extend their helpful hand. So long as such aid is given to China for the stabilization of the world's condition, Japan will be most willing to participate therein, be the helper America or France. If Japan were to take exception to such aid, the result would surely be further estrangement between China and this country and the more reliance on the part of China upon foreign powers in false quest of solution to pending Sino-Japanese problems.

If the Gaimusho statement were issued with a view to oppressing China, the consequence would surely be contrary to the desired end. If the statement were intended to be a warning to Powers, it would have fallen with very poor effect upon the latter, since it would be far wiser to resort to diplomatic operations with Powers separately than to an abstract statement.

We repose our profound confidence in, and pay our sincere respects to, the Hirota diplomacy which is permeated with the spirit of peaceful cooperation, and accordingly expect that, following the statement, steps will be taken towards the better enunciation of the Japanese policy.

0742

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 8 1937

In reply refer to
FM

793.94
762.94

My dear Mr. Crawford:

In response to a request made by telephone from your office on April 2, 1937, there are enclosed a copy of "An English translation unofficially issued by the Foreign Office of the unofficial statement issued by the Foreign Office on April 17", 1934, known as the Amau statement, and an unofficial translation (from the German text) of the German-Japanese agreement signed at Berlin on November 25, 1936. There is also enclosed for your information a copy of a press release issued by the Department on April 30, 1934, shortly after the appearance in the press of the "Amau statement".

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:
As stated.

The Honorable
Fred L. Crawford,
House of Representatives.

793.94/6648
APR 6 1937

FE:WTT/DLY
4-5-37

FE

APR 6 - REC'D
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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94/6648

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

F/FG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Unofficial translation made in the Department of State from
 the REICHSGESETZBLATT (Official Gazette) of January 15, 1937.

Agreement against the Communist Internationale.

The Government of the German Reich

and

the Imperial Japanese Government,

In the realization that the aim of the Communist Internationale, called the Comintern, is the disintegration and oppression of the existing states with all means available,

In the conviction that the toleration of interference of the Communist Internationale in the domestic relations of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being but also menaces the peace of the world in general,

Have agreed on the following in the wish to cooperate together in defense against Communist disintegration:

Article I

The High Contracting States agree to inform each other reciprocally concerning the activity of the Communist Internationale to consult concerning the necessary measures of defense and to carry these out in close cooperation.

Article II

The High Contracting States will jointly invite third states whose domestic peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communist Internationale to adopt measures of defense in the spirit of this agreement or to participate in this agreement.

Article III

For this agreement both the German as well as the Japanese text are to be regarded as originals. It goes into effect on the day of signing and is to be in force for a
 period

3744

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 9, 1934.

~~ROM:~~
~~MDH:~~

Peiping's 2657 of April 11, 1934, --

This despatch transmits a memorandum of conversation between Minister Johnson and the new British Minister in regard to the difficult position of General Huang Fu in North China, during the course of which the British Minister stated that he had informed certain Chinese authorities that China could not count upon Great Britain becoming involved in a war between Japan and Soviet Russia.

J. E. J.

JEJ/VDM

0745

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2657

Peiping, April 11, 1934.

Subject: British attitude toward
war.

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MAY 10 1934
COPY IN E.E. 776-000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
MAY 15 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 1 1934
Department of State

MAY - 5 34

F/ESP

793.94/6649

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on April 3 with Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Minister to China, in which, after I had given him certain information already reported to the Department (despatch No. 2611 of March 27, 1934) with regard to the difficult position of General Huang Fu in North China, Sir Alexander made some comment with regard to the attitude of Great Britain in case a war between Japan and Soviet Russia should break out.

Sir Alexander, while recently in Nanking, was asked by Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive

Yuan

MAY 15 1934

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, what Great Britain would do in case of such a war and Sir Alexander replied that China could not count upon Great Britain's becoming involved in any such war. Dr. Wang informed him that in case of a Russo-Japanese war China would remain neutral. Sir Alexander gained the impression that the Chinese were all very desirous of such a war.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

one copy to A-M

Enclosure:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan, April 3, 1934.

710

LES-SC

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

0 7 4 -

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huetefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

2657

General Huang Fu.

Peiping, April 8, 1934.

Conversation with: Sir Alexander Cadogan.

In the course of conversation Sir Alexander stated that he had just met General Huang Fu. He wondered what I could tell him about local conditions.

I said that I found General Huang Fu a very pleasant person in so far as personal relations were concerned, although there was little of an official character in our dealings one with another. I told him that in so far as I could see conditions seemed to be and promised to remain peaceful.

I told him, however, of a conversation I had some time ago with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, from whose statements to me I reached the conclusion that General Huang Fu was the only Chinese who had occupied a responsible place in Government who was willing to come to Peiping and act as the Government's representative in meeting the Japanese. I said that General Huang Fu was naturally risking his reputation among his own people by doing this, because of the prevalence of an unfriendly feeling toward the Japanese and a belief among the Chinese that any one who had contacts

with

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

with the Japanese was guilty of traitorous conduct.

I told him that Mr. Tang Yu-jen had made certain statements to me, and I wondered whether he had been the recipient of similar statements either here or in Nanking. I said that Mr. Tang Yu-jen had practically stated that General Huang Fu's remaining here in Peiping as the representative of the Government was dependent upon the attitude of the friendly powers. I explained Mr. Tang Yu-jen's statement by saying that General Huang Fu was here for the purpose of haggling with the Japanese until eventually he would yield a fraction of what the Japanese wished, but ultimately, Mr. Tang had stated, this yielding of a little bit at a time must result in the yielding of everything, and naturally the Chinese Government could not keep Mr. Huang Fu here forever under such circumstances. Mr. Tang Yu-jen had asked me directly whether I thought the friendly powers would come to China's assistance in this matter, saying that China would expect assistance of a material character. I replied that the Chinese could not expect the United States to come to their aid in any material way in this matter, for we did not care to become involved in a war with Japan or with any one else at the present time.

I said to the British Minister that I did not know whether Mr. Tang Yu-jen was trying to tell me that the Government was preparing to remove General

Huang

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Huang Fu or not, for Mr. Tang had said that, if General Huang Fu did leave, the Japanese would put some one in here that they could deal with.

The British Minister stated that no one had made any such statements to him at Nanking, and he was not aware that any had been made to the Legation here at Peiping. He told me that shortly before he left Nanking Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Mr. Hsu Mo had invited him and Sir Eric Teichman to dine privately with them, and that in the course of this dinner Wang Ching-wei had put the question directly to him as to what Great Britain would do should war break out between Russia and Japan. Sir Alexander had replied that China could not count upon Great Britain becoming involved in any such war. Sir Alexander stated that apparently the Chinese were all very anxious to have war break out between Russia and Japan. In case of such a war, Wang Ching-wei had stated that China would remain neutral.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

NTJ.EA

0750


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)



Tokyo

Dated May 7, 1934

Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

91, May 7, 7 p.m.

I am informed by the British Charge d'Affaires
that Sir John Simon, in replying to interpellations
in the House of Commons on Japan's China policy, did
not (repeat not) mention the last paragraph of Hirota's
statement (contained in my 78, April 26, 9 p.m.) because
previously Hirota had made an oral pronouncement along
the same lines to the British Ambassador in strict
confidence and therefore Sir John was uncertain as to
the wishes of the Japanese Government in regard to
giving publicity to this part of Hirota's statement.
The Charge d'Affaires was assured by the Foreign
Office today that the entire statement could be made
public. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs also
~~made~~ ^{told} the Charge that the Foreign Office was undecided
as yet upon the matter of replying to Mr. Hull's
statement of policy, but that if a reply is made, it
will only be Mr. Hirota's above mentioned statement

"on

F/ESP

793.94/6650

FILED

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0751
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#91 From Tokyo, May 7, 7 p.m.

"on another piece of paper".

Repeated to Peiping by mail.

GREW

WWC HPD

0 7 5 2

DATE: _____
TIME: _____

50

[illegible]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 May 12, 1934.

~~LES:~~

EHD:

~~ROM:~~

~~MMH:~~

Shanghai's despatch No.
 9412 under date April 9,
 1934, --

No action.

The despatch encloses a
 copy of a report prepared by for
 the Institute for the Study
 of Japan in regard to Japan
 in Manchuria and North China.

I suggest that the
 covering despatch be read
 but not the report.

ETW/VDM

~~MT~~
~~MMH~~
 EHD:
 This may be of
 help for reference.
 Note on pages 5 + 13
 reference to the
 South Manchuria Power
 Co. concerning which
 we were looking for
 information some
 6 ago. ~~ETW~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 9412

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, April 9, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY - 7 34

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 8 - 1934

Department of State

SUBJECT:

Transmission of Report on Japanese
Activities in North China and
"Militarism vs. Capitalism for Control
of Manchuria: Conflict over SMR Re-
organization Question."

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith two copies
1/ of a report prepared for the Institute for the Study
of Japan, and which was obtained by the Intelligence
Officer of the Fourth Marines stationed at Shanghai
and incorporated as a supplement to his reports.
The letterhead of the Institute for the Study of Japan
carries the following list of personnel:

President: Ma Hsiang-peh
Vice President: Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei
General Secretary: Chen Pen-ho
Directors: Chu Ching-lai, Sun Fo, Yeh Kung-cho,
Chang Po-lin, Shih Liang-chai,
Wang Yun-wu, Dr. Timothy T. Lew,
and Chen Pen-ho.

It is understood that the Institute intends to
get out a series of pamphlets on the Far East dealing
with Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R., the United
States, and Great Britain, and that they hope to make
these studies available to such organizations as the
World Peace Foundation and the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, working through Chi Meng of the China Institute

in

F/ESP

793.94/6651

FILED

MAY 17 1934

0754
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

in America.

It is understood that copies of these documents
have been forwarded direct to the American Minister
at Peiping by the Intelligence Officer of the Fourth
Marines.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Two copies of Report, as stated.

800
PRJ:NLH

No

JM

075F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INT/JMMCH-jop

Fourth Marines, MCEF, Shanghai, China

CHINA
March, 1934

POLITICAL FORCES

100 - Political Forces
200 - Policy
102 - Internal Political
Situation

The following is the third special report to be obtained from "The Institute for the Study of Japan." In the explanatory paragraph accompanying the first two such reports forwarded last week a sentence was inadvertently omitted. The donor of these reports was formerly employed by one of the leading American newspaper correspondents and is now privately forwarding copies of these memorandums to this correspondent for his personal information.

CONFIDENTIAL:

March 16, 1934.

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA - GENERAL

This will be the beginning of a series of reports on Japanese plans and activities in North China, including the Peiping-Tientsin area, Shansi (Yen Hsi-shan), Shantung (Han Fu-chu), Suiyuan (Fu Tso-yi) and Chehar (Sung Che-yuan), from the standpoint of preparations for war against the U.S.S.R. The present report is largely a background; hence it is more interpretative than informative. Important developments in the situation will be covered in further reports.

In the territory of North China, there are at present four distant groups of Chinese leaders: the Huang Fu-Ho Ying-chin group, Shansi group, old Kuominchun (Shantung and Chehar) group, and the remnants of the former Northeast Army. In this regard, reference is made to the report of March 8, 1934, "Struggles Among Political-Military Factions".

1. Nanking-Tokyo Rapprochement Concerning North China

Ever since the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were strained, the Tokyo authorities have persistently endeavored to seek an "amicable" understanding with the Nanking government.

As Huang Fu, one of the extremely pro-Japan leaders in the Nanking camp, was sent to North China in the capacity of Chairman of the North China Political Rehabilitation Committee, the Nanking faction manifested its willingness to meet the Japanese halfway. A further amelioration in the relations was made possible by the visits of Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Japanese Foreign Minister and one of the liberal leaders, and others to Nanking and Peiping on the mission of cultivating friendly relations with the Chinese leaders.

The Japanese overtures of friendliness have further been exemplified by the restoration to Chinese control of territories inside of the Great Wall, although they have never overlooked to guard their steps against permitting the Chinese to exercise genuine control over the returned cities and towns which would be detrimental to their plan of re-occupation, if and when necessary. In fact, therefore, the Japanese authorities have so arranged the "return" that they may "take back" again whenever they want.

Japanese Activities in North China - General, (Cont'd)

Nevertheless, it is an open secret that a rapprochement has been reached between Nanking and Tokyo concerning North China. Some of the more anxious forerunners under Huang Fu - such as Yin Tung and Shen Chang, Managing Directors of the Peiping-Mukden and the Peiping-Suiyuan Railways, respectively - have tried to negotiate for restoration of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway line. However, this plan is at present prevented from being carried out by bitter opposition on the part of the Sun Fo and T.V. Soong factions, which maintain that the move would unfortunately commit China into virtual recognition of the fait accompli in Manchuria and would thus embarrass her position at Geneva.

2. Japanese Orientation in North China

Following the rapprochement in question, the Japanese have lost no time in making their orientation in North China. It is reliably reported that Tokyo has adopted the policy of "economic and cultural exploitations" in this territory. The so-called North China Council has been organized at the instance of Japanese authorities and Chinese traitors, with Yoshizawa as the actual head of the organization. This Council is financed by an appropriation of \$3,000,000 from the Japanese share of the Boxer Indemnity payments which have been at the disposal of the Japanese government. For the time being, the activities of this organization will be limited to (a) accomplishing "economic cooperation" between the Chinese and Japanese in North China; (b) "buying up" all Chinese returned students who were educated at Japanese schools and now live in North China; and (c) cultivating close connections with Chinese military and political leaders who live in retirement in North China.

Simultaneously, it must be pointed out, the Japanese have endeavored to seek an understanding with Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi with a view to transforming that province as well as Suiyuan and Chahar into a base for military operations against the Soviet Union when war breaks out. The Japanese activities in Shansi will be reported separately and will be touched upon in the present article only where it is necessary.

Significant sidelights are thrown by the establishment in Suiyuan of a "Diplomatic Office", branch of the North China Political Rehabilitation Committee.

3. Japanese Activities Regarding Railway Construction

As the network of transportation and communication arteries in Manchuria is nearing completion, the Japanese have commenced to extend their activities of railway construction to North China. They have formulated an elaborate system of new railway lines which will be reported later on. At present, the Japanese are redoubling their efforts to carry out only the most important part of their plan having to do with strategic needs.

Military transportation in the Northwest of China will be centered upon the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, which will become a trunk line of the system embracing Chahar, Suiyuan, Kansu and Ninghsia.

Since the terrain between Nankow and Chinglungchiao on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway is too slopy, and as the present track of the railway is very curvy, it is proposed that the line will be reverted to the route from Chaitang to Shacheng direct. This will require an outlay of \$20,000,000.

Japanese Activities in North China - General, (Cont'd)

The Kuankou section of the railway will also be improved with an outlay of \$10,000,000.

Further, it is planned that a number of feeders will be constructed to connect the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway with the Peiping-Hankow Railway. These links will be built in accordance with strategic needs.

Aside from the proposed extension and improvement of the trunk line in question, the following railways have been projected and will be built in the immediate future:

- (a) From Paotou to Ninghsia, 1,200 miles
- (b) From Pingtichuan to Pangkiang, 200 miles

The area to be served by the proposed system of railways is comparatively of little economic value, at least, for the time being. However, with auxiliaries, such as highways and air lines penetrating through Jehol and Chahar, the system of railways in North China will cooperate with the network in Manchuria, thus enabling the Japanese to move troops from Japan, Korea and Manchuria to the Chinese-Soviet border in much shorter time than previously.

4. Highways, Navigation and Air Routes

A number of highways are also planned in this area. But, the first line to be constructed is that between Kalgan and Tihwa (Sinkiang).

In addition, the following two air lines will also be operated in the near future:

- (a) From Dalainor (Chahar) to Kalgan, via Dolonor and Kuyuan, 360 miles
- (b) From Pangkiang to Pingtichuan, 320 miles

Although not closely related to the above system, a navigation line on the Yellow River is also planned. The route will be from Chungweihsien (Ninghsia) to Paotou and Hokoucheng, via Shihchutzu and Tengkou.

In general, it is readily apparent that the Japanese have, through "economic cooperation", attempted to seize those important arteries of transportation of particular strategic value.

The information herein contained was obtained from an important official who has recently returned from Peiping. Of course, he has not made an exhaustive study of the situation and his remarks are, while unquestionably factual, of a casual nature.

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Fourth Marines, MCLF, Shanghai, China

JAPAN

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POLITICAL FORCES

100 - Political Forces
200 - Policy
102 - Internal Situation

The following pamphlet was prepared in Chinese by Mr. Chen Pen-ho, General Secretary of "The Institute for the Study of Japan", Shanghai. The original English translation has been forwarded to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City. The Chinese version is reported as being featured at present in the Ta Kung Pao, Tientsin.

MILITARISM vs. CAPITALISM FOR CONTROL OF MANCHURIA:

CONFLICT OVER SMR REORGANIZATION QUESTION

By

Chen Pen-ho

INTRODUCTION

The international aspect of the conflict between Japanese militarists and capitalists over control of Manchuria as envisaged by complications concerning the S.M.R. reorganization question, cannot be overlooked. For over twenty-seven years, the South Manchuria Railway Company, chartered and operated by the Japanese government, has served as a "nucleus" of Japan's structure for exploitation of Manchuria. Following the Manchurian uprising of September 1931, an acceleration has occurred in the work of the Japanese for permeating of their "continental policy". Thereupon, the South Manchuria Railway has become the objective of militarists and capitalists in their struggle for control of the enormous resources of Manchuria and Mongolia.

The South Manchuria Railway Company has from the first been in the grip of capitalists, who are represented by political parties. Subsequent to the Manchurian uprising, militarism has tended to overshadow partisan politics in the Japanese government. It has machinated towards establishment of a dictatorship. The militarists consider that it is necessary for them to take over the control of the South Manchuria Railway Company from the capitalists, in order to effect an early consummation of the so-called Japan-Korea-Manchuria Bloc for the purpose of consolidating Japan's national defence in preparation for the "1936 Crisis" (or international wars in the Far East). In other words, they are prompted by the desire to use Manchuria, and possibly Mongolia, also, as bases for further aggressive, nationalistic activities.

The conflict between militarism and capitalism has assumed considerable proportions ever since the Diet came into session in the latter part of January, 1934. The hostilities between them have caused a serious upheaval in the Japanese government.

The reorganization question has thus brought to light the motives of the Japanese leaders in seeking territorial aggrandizement on the mainland of Asia as well as their plans for economic subjugation of Manchuria. It reflects also upon the internecine disagreement between the two important political forces in that country, having a far-reaching effect upon the situation in the Far East.

1. GENERAL BACKGROUND

In the course of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, Japan seized the South Manchuria Railway (then an extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway) from Russia. The following year witnessed the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty (September 1905) between Russia and Japan through the good offices of the United States government. By virtue of Clause Six of this Treaty, Japan's control of the railway and its branch lines was "legalized". This clause implied, also, the transfer to Japan of all rights and privileges, properties and mines in the railway zone.

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Militarism vs. Capitalism For Control of Manchuria, (Cont'd)

Thereupon, the Japanese government organized the South Manchuria Railway Kaibushiki Kaisha (Company, Limited) in order to undertake the enterprise on a large scale. The new corporation was officially established at Tokyo on January 27, 1906, but it was moved to Dairen on April 1, 1907, - the Tokyo establishment having been relegated to a branch office.

Throughout its existence of twenty-seven years, the South Manchurian Railway Company has consistently exploited the enormous resources of Manchuria. Its influence has been interwoven into the textile of Manchuria's economic life. In other words, it has served as the backbone of Japan's continental operations.

The nature of the South Manchuria Railway Company is succinctly depicted by Dr. Sabtairo Okamatsu's statement, as follows:

"The Japan-Russia treaty and the Japan-China treaty justified our lease of the Kuantung territory, the South Manchuria Railway and its concessions. The Japanese government has hoped to use these as a basis for the development of Manchuria. Should, however, an official organization be set up to exploit openly the entire territory, it would not only arouse foreign opposition, but would also entail enormous expenses. As a result, the Japanese government, following the example of the colonial policy of other countries, has endeavored to carry out its plan of exploitation under the cover of a commercial undertaking. While outwardly a commercial firm, therefore, the South Manchuria Railway Company is in reality an organ of the Japanese government for colonization of Manchuria." (The Oriental Review, published in Japan, December 1933, pp 7.)

In this connection, it is recalled that, in 1906, imperial order, No. 142, of Meiji, contained instructions defining the nature of the new organization thus:

"The South Manchuria Railway Company shall be a legal body to be engaged in managing commercial undertakings and the local administration. It will be the vanguard of Japan in seeking to carry out her colonial policy in Manchuria and Mongolia."

Evidently, the South Manchuria Railway Company has never been a purely commercial organization, but it has served as a pseudo-administrative organ for colonization of Manchuria and Mongolia. It is a commercial enterprise in name only.

Due to the special character of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Japanese government has consistently endeavored to prevent capitalistic influence from monopolizing this organization, largely through the holding of over half of its capital stock and by taking upon itself all of the prerogatives concerning the personnel and important affairs of this railway company. In general, the South Manchuria Railway Company is a government enterprise in a broad sense.

The gigantic organization of the South Manchuria Railway Company underwent many changes following its formation. According to latest information, the system of the present organization is as follows:

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General Management Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secretariat Documentary Section Personnel Section Foreign Intercourse Section Research Section Shanghai Branch New York Branch Peiping Agency Taonan Agency Tsitsihar Agency Chengkaitun Agency Kirin Agency
Supervision Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inspection & Improvement Office Affiliated Companies Office
Treasury Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finance Office Accounting Office
Railway Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General Affairs Office Railway Accounting Office Traffic Office Through Traffic Office Train Operation & Mechanical Engineering Office Maintenance-of-Way Office Harbour Office Electric Engineering Office Dairen Railway Division Office Changchun Railway Division Office Wharf Office Hotel Office Railway Works Special Kawasaki Construction Office
Local Administration Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General Affairs Section Local Affairs Section Education Section Commerce & Industry Section Agriculture Section Sanitation Section Construction Works Section Local Administration Offices at Wafangtien, Tashihchiao, Yingkow, Anshan, Liaoyang, Mukden, Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Ssuepingkai, Kungchuling, Changchun, Penchiu & Antung. Hospitals at Dairen, Wafangtien, Tashichiao, Yingkow, Anshan, Liaoyang, Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Ssuepingkai, Changchun, Kirin, Penchiu, Antung & Fushun. Manchuria Medical College Manchuria Teachers' College South Manchuria Technical College Middle Schools Dairen Library

Militarism vs. Capitalism For Control of Manchuria, (Cont'd)

Board of Directors (President and Vice- President)	Mukden Library Agricultural Experiment Stations Animal Disease Research Institute Manchuria-Mongolia Resources Museum Hygienic Institute
Sales & Supplies Department	General Affairs Office Sales (Coal) Office Pig Iron Sales Office Purchasing & Stores Office Dairen District Sales Office Changchun District Sales Office Keijo District Office Dairen Delivery Office Fushun Delivery Office
Technical Board	General Affairs Office Supervisory Section Central Laboratory Bureau of Technology Geological Institute
Tokyo Branch	General Affairs Office Accounting Office
Mukden Branch	Local Administration Office Railway Office General Affairs Office
Harbin Branch	Transportation Office General Affairs Office
Fushan Coal Mines	Works Section Coal Mining Section Accounting Section General Affairs Section Powder Magazine Research Institute Oil Factory Machinery Factory Powder Plant Engineering Office Transportation Office Mining Offices at Lungfeng, Laohutai, Yangpehpao, Tunghsiang, Tashan and Kuchengtze.
Anshan Iron Works	Works Section Manufacturing Section Mining Section General Affairs Section Engineering Office Workshops Water Power Plant Cast Iron Factory Assortment Factory
Economic Investigation Office	

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The activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company have multiplied from time to time. According to latest statistics, the investments of the South Manchuria Railway Company in direct undertakings are as follows:

	Capital Investment (Units of Yen 1,000)	Percentage
Railways (including railway workshops)	278,637	36.8
Harbour and wharves	85,146	11.2
Coal mines	115,799	15.3
Iron works	29,234	3.9
Hotels	4,533	0.6
Oil shale plant	8,710	1.1
Chemical fertilizer plant	51	---
Municipal undertakings (including education and sanitation)	184,369	24.3
Others	52,134	6.9
	<u>758,614</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The investments under the last two items of the above table are not for profit-making purposes. Besides the initial investments above stated, the South Manchuria Railway Company appropriates about twenty million yen each year for their maintenance.

In addition to the above direct investments, the South Manchuria Railway Company also holds control over the following affiliated companies, according to Masamichi Royama's report:

Name of firm:	When established:	Capital: (Yen)	S.M.R. investment
South Manchuria Power Co.	May, 1926	25,000,000	22,000,000
South Manchuria Gas Co.	July, 1925	10,000,000	9,300,000
Dairen Porcelain Co.	July, 1925	1,200,000	1,200,000
Ta Hwa Porcelain Co.	Oct., 1920	87,275	144,167
Chang Kwan Glass Co.	April, 1925	3,000,000	1,200,000
Mukden Exchange & Trust Co.	July, 1921	875,000	437,000
Kaiyuan Exchange & Trust Co.	Oct., 1915	2,000,000	32,700
Kungchuling Exchange & Trust Co	Aug., 1919	500,000	125,000
Changchun Exchange & Trust Co	March, 1916	1,000,000	125,625
Tiehling Exchange & Trust Co	Nov., 1919	500,000	62,500
Ssapingkai Exchange & Trust Co	Aug., 1919	500,000	62,500
Manchuria Emporium Co.	Aug., 1916	400,000	50,000
Changchun Emporium Co.	May, 1917	50,000	15,000
Fushun Emporium Co.	May, 1918	100,000	2,500
Wafangtien Electric Light Co	Oct., 1914	500,000	20,625
Tashinchiao Electric Light Co	July, 1916	50,000	20,625
Ssapingkai Electric Light Co.	April, 1917	35,000	71,250
Kungchuling Electric Light Co.	Aug., 1916	25,000	51,870
Fankaitun Electric Light Co.	Nov., 1920	50,000	750
Liaoyang Electric Light Co.	May, 1912	200,000	100,000
Tiehling Electric Light Co.	Nov., 1910	150,000	144,500
Yingkow Water & Power Co.	Aug., 1909	2,000,000	1,263,500
Dairen Steamship Co.	Jan., 1915	10,000,000	4,750,000
Fushun Coal Sales Co.	April, 1923	3,000,000	150,000
Manchuria Dock Co.	April, 1923	2,000,000	1,000,000
Foo Chang Leather Co	Oct., 1926	1,800,000	1,400,000
Anshan Iron Works Co	Mar., 1926	---	---
Chichien Railway Agency	---	750,000	399,000
Dairen Oil & Grease Co.,	April, 1916	250,000	90,000
Dairen Petroleum Co	Sept., 1918	3,000,000	6,125

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Manchuria Textile Co.	Mar., 1923	5,000,000	625,000
Dairen Industrial Co.	April, 1918	500,000	107,000
Japan-Manchuria Match Co.	Oct., 1907	300,000	1,800
Manchuria Flour Mills Co.	Dec., 1906	5,750,000	20,375
Manchuria-Mongolia Wool Co.	Dec., 1918	3,000,000	102,375
South Manchuria Flour Mills Co.	Dec., 1916	10,000,000	220,575
South Manchuria Mining Co.	April, 1918	375,000	194,900
Manchuria Mines Co.	April, 1919	1,000,000	12,500
Asia Tobacco Co.	Oct., 1919	1,500,000	7,500
Manchuria Brush Co.	May, 1919	500,000	25,000
Ta Hwa Electric Plating Co.	Mar., 1918	---	150,000
Chosen Railway Co.	Sept., 1923	52,500,000	37,500
Manchuria-Chosen Sleeper Co.	Dec., 1919	3,000,000	600,000
Dairen Fire & Marine Insurance Co	July, 1922	2,000,000	166,250
Kirin Warehouse & Finance Co.	Aug., 1918	48,000	15,000
China-Japan Industrial Co.	Aug., 1913	5,000,000	60,000
East Asia Industrial Development Co.	Aug., 1909	60,000,000	25,000
Manchuria-Mongolia Cold Storage Co.	April 1922	1,000,000	1,250
Chamei Lumbering Co.	June, 1922	6,000,000	2,222,000
Manchuria Nichinichi Shimbun Co	Oct., 1908	5,000,000	500,000
Yuanshan Beach Co	June 1923	150,000	100,000
East Asia Building & Construction Co	Sept 1921	5,000,000	47,500
Tokushi Hotsprings Co	Mar., 1920	2,000,000	31,250
Anshan Realty & Trust Co	Oct., 1921	1,000,000	426,300

From the two preceding tables, it is noted that the investments of the South Manchuria Railway Company in direct undertakings and affiliated companies amount to approximately ¥758,600,000 and ¥100,000,000 respectively.

Besides, the South Manchuria Railway Company has also made large loans to the following four railways constructed by the Chinese authorities in Manchuria, totalling about ¥100,000,000: (1) Ssuningkai-Taonan Line, (2) Taonan-Angangchi Line, (3) Kirin-Changchun Line, and (4) Kirin-Tunhwa Line.

Following the September 18th uprising in Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway Company immediately embarked upon a plan for further expansion, and its activities have penetrated through every vein of Manchuria. The development of railway construction and other economic enterprises is described below.

Upon establishment of the puppet "Manchoukuo" regime in March 1933, the South Manchuria Railway Company has obtained control of the following railways in Manchuria through the "entrustment agreement":

<u>Railway:</u>	<u>Length:</u> (Kilo- meters)	<u>Cost of</u> <u>construction:</u> (Unit of Yuan 1,000)	<u>S.M.R.</u> <u>Investment:</u> (Unit of Yen 1,000)	<u>Profit:</u> (1931) Yuan
Kirin-Changchun & Kirin Tunhwa	348.1	33,967	36,300	902,900
Ssuningkai-Taonan	426.0	25,183	49,000	2,126,700
Taonan-Angangchi	225.0	12,592	28,800	1,896,000
Tsitsihar-Koshan	230.7	8,908	---	1,454,800
Taonan-Solun	87.2	466	---	16,200 (Loss)
Hulan-Hailun	221.1	12,066	---	1,444,200
Mukden-Chaoyang	319.9	14,502	---	575,800
Kirin-Chaoyang	183.4	27,079	---	439,600
Mukden-Shanhaikuan - Section of the Peiping-Mukden Railway	887.1	48,429	(British loan of £1,212,450)	2,487,000

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To sum up, the cost of construction of the above lines amounts to a total of approximately Yuen or \$185,000,000. The aggregate mileage of these lines is 3,042 kilometers, occupying about 51 percent of all railways in Manchuria (5,924 kilometers), and about three times of the original mileage of the South Manchuria Railway. In addition, the newly constructed lines - Tunhwa-Tumenkiang, Lafa-Harbin, and Hailun-Koshan - have also been placed under the control of the South Manchuria Railway Company. The manipulated expansion of the railway administration necessitated establishment, in Mukden, of a separate Railway Bureau in order to handle the new lines entrusted to it.

As a further step towards forwarding Japan's continental policy, the railways in North Korea connecting Rashin, a new base of Japan's continental operations, with the network of railways radiating from the Kirin-Hweining Railway have also been entrusted to the South Manchuria Railway Company. The lines in question are: Seichin-Sanho (134 kilometers), Sanho-Yuki (180 kilometers) and Yuki-Sinkelin (11 kilometers).

In the realm of industrial enterprises, the South Manchuria Railway Company has also acquired control of the following companies:

- Manchuria Air Service Co.
- Manchuria Telegraph & Telephone Co.
- Osaka-Kobe Realty & Construction Co.
- Showa Iron & Steel Works
- Manchuria Chemical Industries Co.
- Japan-Manchuria Magnesium Co.
- Manchuria Cotton Co.
- Manchuria Cotton Association
- Mukden Arsenal
- Weight & Measurement Manufacturing Co.

In addition, there are also the following projected undertakings:

Manchuria Petroleum Co.
(Capital ¥5,000,000, of which the puppet "Manchoukuo" will invest ¥1,200,000 and the South Manchuria Railway Company will invest ¥2,000,000.)

Manchuria Gold Mines Co.
(Capital ¥12,000,000, which will be raised by the "Manchoukuo", the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the East Reclamation Bank. This company will undertake to open the gold mines located in Heilungkiang, Kirin and along the Khingan Mountain Range.)

Chien Kuo Power Co.
(Capital ¥100,000,000. The new organization will take up the present power plants of the South Manchuria Railway, the South Manchuria Power Company and all other public and private power companies located at important points in Manchuria, in order to maintain a monopoly of the power system of the entire territory.)

Ta Tung Forestry & Lumbering Co.
(Capital ¥5,000,000. It will control the forest stations located along the Kirin-Tunhua and the Tunhua-Tumenkiang Railways as well as a portion of the private forests owned by the South Manchuria Railway and private persons in Manchuria. It will develop the forests and lumbering enterprises of Manchuria on a large scale, eventually to control the forests of entire Manchuria.)

Manchuria Collieries Co.
(Capital ¥16,000,000, to be raised in equal shares between "Manchoukuo" and the South Manchuria Railway Company. The present Shinchu Coal Mines owned by the South Manchuria Company will be incorporated into the new company at the assessed value of ¥5,000,000. In addition, the South Manchuria Railway Company will invest ¥3,000,000 in cash, in order to make up its share of fifty per cent of the capital stock of the new company. "Manchoukuo" will raise its share of the capital by surrendering the present coal mines located at Peipiao, Yolikan,

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Mouling, Sian, Fuchow, Weiminshan and Paitachao at the assessed value of ¥8,000,000. Generally speaking, the proposed Manchuria Coalieries Company will control all of the coal mines in Manchuria with the exception of the Fushun, Chefoo and Panshihu mines owned by the South Manchuria Railway Company.)

Aluminum Manufacturing Co.

(The mines of aluminum ores located at Kinchow and Fuchow have recently been developed, through the surplus electric power of the Fushun Colliery, with satisfactory results. In 1934, the South Manchuria Railway Company will allot the amount of ¥350,000 to establish an experimental factory at Fushun. If this enterprise is successful, it is proposed that the new company will be organized with a capital of ¥30,000,000.)

Many other projects for expansion of the influence of the South Manchuria Railway Company in Manchuria are also under consideration.

Originally, the South Manchuria Railway was only 1,125 miles, but its present mileage, including railways entrusted to it by the puppet regime in Manchuria, is about three times of the original mileage. Taking into account the necessity of additional capital for various industrial undertakings, the South Manchuria Railway Company is in need of a total of ¥711,000,000. After deducting the amount raised during 1932-1933, the company still needs ¥636,000,000. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is necessary for the South Manchuria Railway Company to raise its capital to the amount of ¥800,000,000, in order to carry out all of its new projects.

2. PRELUDE TO THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT


In view of its importance to Japan, the South Manchuria Railway Company has been the objective of struggles between political parties. Under the continental policy for invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia, sponsored by Hikado Meiji, the Japanese government has had no consistent procedure of action, but has readjusted itself to changes in the cabinet. For example, the Seiyukai regimes professed an aggressive policy, while the Minseito regimes advocated an evolutionary policy. This state of affair has been fully demonstrated by the vicissitudes occurring from time to time in the administration of the South Manchuria Railway. The organization underwent many changes, and its control has passed through many hands.

Immediately following the September 18th coup d'etat in Manchuria, the Japanese government fell into the hands of militarists, and the policy of exploitation in Manchuria and Mongolia made another drastic turn.

The South Manchuria Railway Company was originally controlled by the Kwantung Government, with Shinpe Goto as the first president of the railway administration. When the Tairo Katsura cabinet was set up in 1912 and Goto became Minister of Communications, the control of the South Manchuria Railway Company was shifted to the Ministry of Communications. In 1928, Premier Tanaka established the Ministry for Overseas Affairs. The Kwantung Government was placed under this Ministry, and, in turn, the South Manchuria Railway Company was also transferred into the jurisdiction of the said Ministry. Clause One of the organic law governing the organization of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs stated that: "The Minister for Overseas Affairs shall exercise control over the Kwantung Government as well as the South Manchuria Railway Company." Shortly afterwards, however, the system of control was changed into this:

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Finally, the South Manchuria Railway Company has again been placed under the control of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs. Simultaneously, the system of a Supervisory Board has been introduced, with a personnel consisting of officers of the Colonial Bureau of the Home Affairs Department in the Kwantung Government.

In general, however, the changes in the past were merely the result of squabbles between political factions, unlike the present movement looking to a fundamental dissolution of the entire administration of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

As the scope of exploitation in Manchuria has been enlarged after the September 18th uprising, the South Manchuria Railway Company, which is the "spear-head" of Japan's continental operations, has become the focus of attention of the Japanese government and people. It is generally recognized by government and public circles alike that it is absolutely necessary to reorganize the existing system of the South Manchuria Railway Company, as its original form has proved exceedingly unfit for the present important task.

The aggressive elements among Japanese leaders urged the immediate dissolution of the South Manchuria Railway Company. But, as conditions gradually returned to normalcy, the dissolution theory laid in abeyance until official recognition of the puppet "Manchoukuo" by Japan and conclusion of the so-called Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, when the Japanese grip upon Manchuria was further strengthened under the "Trio Administration" system. General Nobuyoshi Muto, as Special Envoy Plenipotentiary to the puppet regime, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory, took upon himself all prerogatives of the three important branches of Japanese suzerainty in Manchuria. Apparently, this system has been actuated by a desire of the War Ministry to grab all political and economic control of Manchuria. At the inception of the trio system, it was merely suggested that the South Manchuria Railway Company should be expanded with additional capital, and that the organization should continue to serve as Japan's vanguard for economic exploitations in Manchuria. No step was taken to ards reorganizing the South Manchuria Railway Company. Under this situation, the 64th Session (1933) of the Japanese Diet passed a resolution providing for the increase of the capital of the South Manchuria Railway Company. In an attempt to prevent leading financiers from monopolizing the new capital in question, small investments by private capital were encouraged. The additional capital of 1,200,000 shares was subscribed by the Japanese public in a comparatively short period; and the first payments were completed on October 2, 1933. At this moment, however, the plan for fundamental reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company was, for the first time, sponsored by the Kwantung Army.

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3. REORGANIZATION PLAN PROPOSED BY THE KUANTUNG ARMY

The present plan for reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company proposed by the Kuantung Army is most significant, in that it implies a fundamental dissolution of the existing system. It is recalled, in this connection, that a plan similar in many aspects to the one now brought up was recommended during the Tanaka regime at the so-called Conference on Eastern Affairs held in June 1927 for the purpose of discussing questions concerning Japan's continental policy for exploitation of the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia. It was then proposed that various undertakings of the South Manchuria Railway Company should be made independent establishments and that the said company should be engaged solely in the management of the railway and mines located in the railway zone. However, due to complications in the Tanaka cabinet, this plan was not put into effect.

The present plan of the Kuantung Army is more or less in line with the spirit of Tanaka's continental scheme. It deals not only with the South Manchuria Railway Company alone, but also with the entire machine of Japan's exploitations in Manchuria and Mongolia. All of these activities are to be readjusted in due course. As a backbone of the entire structure, the South Manchuria Railway is to receive predominant attention.

In order to understand the nature of the Kuantung Army's proposal, the general outlines of the reorganization plan are reproduced below:

Tentative Plan for Reorganization of
the South Manchuria Railway Company

Orientation of "Manchoukuo": In the lapse of about a year and a half following establishment of "Manchoukuo", improvements were obtained in the fields of finance, public safety, military preparations, communications, education, industries, and cultural work. In order to cope with the new situation, an adequate system of Japanese activities should be instituted in Manchuria.

Improvement of the Trio System: The "trio system" is merely a liaison to bridge over the gap between a conservative past and an aggressive future. Therefore, the leading Japanese institutions in Manchuria have made a thorough study of the methods for the readjustment of the existing system. From this investigation, the following results are obtained:

- (a) For the purpose of carrying out the monistic scheme of administration, it is necessary to abolish the present trio system, and to concentrate all powers upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army.
- (b) In order to bring satisfaction to the economic construction of the "Manchoukuo", it is necessary to organize an Economic Staff Department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army, to make research and investigation as well as to give direction to the native population.
- (c) The subordinate organizations and officers under the Special Envoy Plenipotentiary should be placed directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army.
- (d) Action should be taken to renounce extraterritoriality and close up all consulates and police organizations in Manchuria.
- (e) The Kuantung Government should be reduced to a minimum size - to be merely a local organization in the Kuantung Leased Territory. The police rights of the South Manchuria Railway concessions outside of the Kuantung Leased Territory should be returned to "Manchoukuo".

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- (f) The South Manchuria Railway concessions should be returned to the "Manchouuo" as early as possible.
- (g) Consular jurisdiction should be abolished as soon as an efficient judicial system is established in Manchuria.

Reorganization of the S.M.R. The system of the South Manchuria Railway should be fundamentally reorganized, so that it may be in a better position to carry out the task of economic exploitation.


- (a) The "department-store plan" of the South Manchuria Railway Company of the past must give way to the "holding company" system. The various undertakings of the South Manchuria Railway Company should be made independent branches. For example, the railway department of the South Manchuria Railway Company should become a separate organization.
- (b) The proposed holding company should be responsible directly to the Kwantung army. In order to increase efficiency and systematization, a merger should be effected of the Special Service Department of the Kwantung army and the Economic Investigation Office of the South Manchuria Railway Company. The new organ will be called the "Economic Staff Department", to be placed under the direct control of the Kwantung army.
- (c) Affiliated companies and new subsidiaries to be formed in the future should be under the supervision of the holding company.
- (d) For the time being, Japanese domestic capital should invest in the holding company only, but arrangements will be made for direct investment in the independent enterprises. The holding company should temporarily be the mother-organization, exercising control over all economic and industrial activities in Manchuria. Simultaneously, efforts should be made to transfer the control of all independent companies to the hands of domestic industrialists in Japan.

To sum up, the reorganization plan is aimed at overthrowing the so-called trio-administration system. The powers of the Japanese Special Envoy Plenipotentiary in Manchuria and the Kwantung Governor-General will be materially curtailed. The former will devote his time to diplomatic and other similar dealings with the puppet regime, and the latter will handle administrative affairs of the Kwantung Leased Territory only. All of Japan's military and economic activities in Manchuria will be placed under the direct control of the Kwantung Army, and Japanese undertakings in Manchuria will be directed by the new organization - the Economic Staff Department of the Kwantung army. The original South Manchuria Railway Company will be changed into a new holding company for the sole purpose of absorbing domestic capital. This company will be responsible to the Economic Staff Department - not the Ministries for Overseas Affairs, Communications and Foreign Affairs, or the Kwantung Government. The affiliated or subsidiary undertakings of the South Manchuria Railway will be made independent branches according to their respective nature.

The new system as suggested by the Kwantung Army's plan is shown by the following chart, quoted from the "Diamond", Japanese edition, Vol. 21, No. 35, of November 21, 1933, pp 29:


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According to the preceding chart, the Economic Staff Department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army virtually operates the Holding Company. On basis of a trust system, the Holding Company controls sixteen independent enterprises under which are placed subsidiary companies. The Holding Company, however, is concerned only with the matter of capital investment, and the actual authority rests entirely in the hands of the Economic Staff Department. This is to say, this Department is empowered to appoint or dismiss the boards of directors, to determine the distribution of profits and to formulate working plans of the independent companies.

In the opinion of the Japanese War Ministry, the Economic Staff Department is created for the following purpose:

"As the Japanese political system has been overshadowed by bureaucracism, the government usually lacks the spirit of decisiveness and, what is worse, it falls into the folly of political factions engaged in struggles for power and privileges at the expense of national interest. Principal among the reasons for this situation is the fact that the prerogatives of the government branches have been usurped by capitalists and bureaucrats. Only in the army and navy are the General Staff and the Ministry of Military Orders able to maintain freedom of action, which has been responsible for the significant development in Manchuria, securing for Japan a better position among the nations. Therefore, it is only logical that the Japanese economic system in Manchuria, which has been mismanaged by capitalists and partisans, should be placed into the hands of the Economic Staff Department, so that it may be free from political struggles and make healthy progress."

"Further, in view of the fact that Manchuria is virtually important to Japan from the standpoint of national economy and defense, it is necessary to establish a system of close cooperation between Japan and Manchuria. To attain this end, it is necessary to give up the complicated system originally employed by the Japanese in Manchuria, or the trio-administration system adopted following establishment of the puppet regime, and to place all of Japanese activities under the monistic control of the Kwantung Army. Only after this plan is carried out will a strong economic bloc be effected between Japan and Manchuria."

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4. MOTIVES OF KUANTUNG ARMY'S PLAN AND COMMENTS

The plan of the Kuantung Army for reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company has been actuated largely by motives which may be found in the following excerpts of declarations issued by the Kuantung Army:

- (1) As "Manchoukuo" has become an independent state (This is merely an excuse; is it not Japan the master of "Manchoukuo"?), the Ministry for Overseas Affairs, which is in charge of colonial affairs, has lost its hold on the Manchurian situation.
- (2) Following the independence of "Manchoukuo", it was generally considered expedient to place all of Japanese interests in that region under the control of high military authorities.
- (3) The decentralization of the Japanese government is reflected by the present complicated system in Manchuria. It will be impossible, under this situation, to develop new undertakings in the recently established "Manchoukuo".
- (4) The military campaign for restoration of peace in Manchuria has come to conclusion. Hereafter, it is necessary to enforce close cooperation in economic development, and the monistic system under a high military authority will be best adapted to the situation.

The underlying purpose of the Kuantung Army's plan, as pointed out by Yamaka Nishikura (nom de plume of a spokesman of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs, who has bitterly criticized the stand of the War Ministry concerning the reorganization plan) in his article, "Outlook on the South Manchuria Railway Company's Reorganization", appearing in the "Nikon Kokusaihiron" of December 1933, is as follows:

"As expressed by the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, the military, political, economic and other phases of Japan and 'Manchoukuo' cannot be separated from each other. The Japanese government finds it necessary to exercise control over 'Manchoukuo' in order to carry out the continental policy. From conditions prevailing in Manchuria, the control must be exercised under a monistic system.

"On basis of the same protocol, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army is not only responsible of military command and war plans, but he is also to control the railway and other communication systems which are the arteries of national defence. The iron, coal, petroleum, light metals, cotton and other industries, vitally important to national defence, must also be placed under the military commander. For the sake of expediency, therefore, the control which the Japanese government exercises over the 'Manchoukuo' should be delegated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army. Industries other than those directly connected with national defence must also be placed under the Kuantung Army.

"In view of the heavy responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kuantung Army, there should be organized under him the Economic Staff Department, in addition to the military staff.

"The reorganization movement should not be centered entirely upon the South Manchuria Railway. Steps should also be taken to accelerate economic construction in Manchuria, thereby making Japan and 'Manchoukuo' a single economic group in order to stand the economic war of the world and to consolidate their national defence.

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"As order has been gradually restored in Manchuria, Japanese capital is needed for the development of the enormous natural resources in this territory. Under the present activities of economic construction, the department-store system of the South Manchuria Railway Company will prove detrimental to Japan's interest. On the eve of the 1936 crisis for the Japanese empire, the Japan-Manchoukuo economic bloc should be completed without further delay, and important undertakings in Manchuria should entirely be placed under Japanese control. In particular, the Tel graph and Telephone Kaisha, the Showa Iron and Steel Works, the Manchuria Chemical Industries Kaisha, Gold Mines Kaisha, Aluminium and other light metals manufacturing establishments should either be consolidated or brought into being at once.

"Under these circumstances, therefore, the War Ministry maintains that it is necessary to make a thorough reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company."

In this connection it is interesting to note the comments of civilian leaders, who are invariably in the grip of capitalist influence, upon the reorganization plan. The consensus of opinion is along the following lines:

Firstly, it is believed that the dissolution of the South Manchuria Railway Company is prompted by a desire to achieve the economic control over Manchuria. At present, the South Manchuria Railway Company has apparently monopolized all of the economic and industrial enterprises in this territory. In addition, the coal, iron and navigation enterprises of the South Manchuria Railway Company have even endeavored to compete with domestic industries. If this situation remains, it will not only be impossible to bring about the desired economic control, but will also make it difficult to absorb Japan's domestic capital for the exploitation of Manchuria. As a result, it is necessary to dissolve the existing organization by severing from it the various undertakings, in which domestic capital may be directly invested, thus leading to complete coordination of capital between Japan and "Manchoukuo". However, it is to be noted that many of the new undertakings under the South Manchuria Railway Company are making no profit. Except the railway and coal mines, the affiliated companies of the South Manchuria Railway Company are actually losing large amounts of money every year. Meanwhile, a total of two hundred million yen has been invested in local institutions, and an annual allotment of ¥20,000,000 is required for their upkeep. Under such circumstances, it appears impossible for those undertakings which are not on a self-supporting basis, continue to exist after the dissolution. Further, such undertakings as are not destined for profit-making but of considerable value in Japan's exploitation of Manchuria, will never be able to stand on their own feet.

The Japanese capitalists consider it advisable to maintain the status quo of the South Manchuria Railway Company as the backbone of Manchuria development, since it is probably in a better position to attract Japanese domestic capital. Even should the dissolution be inevitable, they suggest that only a number of specific undertakings be separated from the mother-organization, as nobody would be willing to invest in undertakings other than those which are making profits.

As regards the undertakings competing with domestic industries, the opinion is advanced that the competition will probably not be avoided merely by a change in the control of the administration.

Should the different enterprises in Manchuria be classed according to their nature and operated by domestic industrialists, they believe that economic control through industrial capitalism may be effected. In this case, however, it will be against the wishes of

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the War Ministry which has opposed the autocracy of capitalists and which has aspired to become the head of the monistic system.

Secondly, from the viewpoint of Japan's national defence, the economic and strategic value of Manchuria is paramount importance. Japan has considered 1936 as a year of overwhelming crisis, with her national interest at stake. Besides raising enormous amounts of "red-figure" loans for armament expansion, she has made every effort to prepare for an economic mobilization. Inasmuch as Manchuria occupies an vulnerable position in the supply of sinews of war for Japan, the War Ministry has attempted, by all means, to place various enterprises in Manchuria under military control. According to the reports of the Economic Investigation Office of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the value of Manchuria to Japan's economic and military position is shown below:

	<u>Quantity</u> <u>Needed by</u> <u>Japan:</u>	<u>Quantity</u> <u>Needed by</u> <u>Manchuria</u> <u>& Japan:</u>	<u>Japan's</u> <u>Supply:</u>	<u>Manchuria's</u> <u>Supply</u>	
				<u>Present:</u>	<u>Future:</u>
Coal	33,000	40,000	30,000	10,000	20,000
Pig iron	1,780	2,000	1,300	370	740
Steel	2,400	2,600	2,300	---	40
Petroleum	550,000,000 (gallons)	550,000,000 (gallons)	80,000,000 (gallons)	17,000,000 (gallons)	---
Lumber	75,000,000 (piculs)	80,000,000 (piculs)	58,000,000 (piculs)	4,500,000 (piculs)	31,500,000 (piculs)
Aluminium	12	12	---	---	20
Copper	75	80	80	---	---
Cotton	700	350	30	12	70
Wool	55	65	---	---	22
Hemp	130	212	60	32	---
Silk	8	10	43	---	---
Rice	14,500	15,000	14,000	500	17,000
Corn	1,100	3,000	700	2,200	---
Wheat	1,220	3,000	840	1,400	---
Soya beans	1,000	2,500	850	5,000	---
Beansake	1,200	---	---	---	---
Salt	1,000	1,600	950	600	1,200
Sugar	900	1,000	960	---	100
Beef	68	100	48	40	---

(Unless otherwise indicated, the unit used in this table is 1,000 tons).

For example, the item of petroleum oil contained in the preceding table shows that Japan supplies herself with 80,000,000 gallons a year. In ordinary times, she consumes about 550,000,000 gallons. Again, the item of aluminum which is vitally important to the munition industry, shows that Japan is entirely dependent upon Manchuria for its supply. As shortage in the supply has occurred even at peaceful times, the situation at the time of war will be still worse.

Since Japan adopted the trio-administration system in 1932, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army is concurrently the Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory. In fact, therefore, the Kwantung Army has already assumed supervision and direction over all enterprises in Manchuria, without awaiting a dissolution of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Moreover, the Japanese government's plan for general mobilization will also try to obtain the desired result without remodelling existing foundations of industrial enterprises.

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5. REACTIONS TO THE REORGANIZATION PLAN

As previously stated, the present proposal of the Kwantung Army is aimed at a fundamental dissolution of the entire machine, instead of a factional reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company system. If the plan is carried out verbatim, it will inevitably lead to serious consequences. In the first place, the dissolution will necessarily cause unemployment to a large portion of the original personnel of the South Manchuria Railway Company; secondly, as the Kwantung Army endeavors through the reorganization plan to secure control of the holding company and the independent undertakings, the authority of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs and the Kwantung Government will undoubtedly be impaired; thirdly, the Kwantung Army's proposal is nothing short of an open challenge to capitalists, hence the latter's activities in Manchuria will be handicapped in the future; and lastly, since a number of new undertakings are unable to stand on their own feet, the shareholders concerned will suffer seriously.

As a result, when the proposal was brought up by the Kwantung Army, it caused a strong sensation and aroused opposition on the part of many interested parties. The reactions come chiefly from the following directions:

(a) South Manchuria Railway's Employees

Reticent on previous occasions when steps were taken to reorganize the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Association of S.M.R. Employees, with a membership of about 30,000 men, has strongly protested against the present dissolution plan which threatens the members' means of living. On October 27, 1933, a special committee for ways and means against the reorganization plan was organized at the Association's tenth annual meeting held in Dairen. On the same day, a meeting was held in camera at the S.M.R. Club. According to information obtained later, the Association decided upon the following measures:

(1) In order to place the nation's economic policy on a solid foundation, it is necessary to consolidate the organization and activities of the Association of S.M.R. Employees consisting of 30,000 peaceful workers.

(2) Under the present reorganization movement, the Association must express its concrete opinion.

(3) A special standing committee must be organized in order to cope with the extraordinary situation caused by the reorganization movement.

After a general meeting on October 28th, the Association issued a declaration stating that:

"The South Manchuria Railway Company has been an important inheritance of Hidako Meiji and the crystal of our forefathers' flesh and blood. It has shouldered the responsibility for twenty-seven years of executing the continental policy. Under the present crisis in the East Asia, its task has been enlarged, and the members of this organization must endeavor their best to handle all of the exigencies in order to meet the general expectations of the Japanese people.

"The reconstruction of Manchuria is Japan's task, and the South Manchuria Railway Company, as backbone of Japan's structure for exploitation, must exert to carry out her plan. We are strongly opposed to those who endeavor to play the important affairs of the state into their own hands."

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On basis of a decision reached at the meeting on October 20, 1933, the Association formed a special standing committee for the purpose of meeting out plans against the reorganization movement, including preparation of the Association's own proposal for the reorganization. On November 30, 1933, a secret meeting was held at Dairen by about forty representatives of the Association from various parts of Manchuria. The proposal drafted by the special standing committee was adopted and shortly afterwards presented to the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

Insofar as ascertainable, the Association's proposal recommends institution of the following system:

The governments of Japan and "Manchoukuo" should jointly organize a Japan-"Manchoukuo" Economic Committee to function as a central political organ.

They should also organize an All-Manchuria Controlling Company as a central economic organ.

The Japan-"Manchoukuo" Economic Committee should comprise of Japan's Special Envoy Plenipotentiary, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Director of the General Affairs Boards*, and Ministers of Communications and Industry of "Manchoukuo". Both countries should agree to abide by and act upon the decisions of this Committee.

*N.B. The General Affairs Board is a special cabinet branch of "Manchoukuo" - the directorship being held by Ryusaku Endo, a Japanese subject.

The All-Manchuria Controlling Company should be comprised of the South Manchuria Railway Company. In order to meet current developments in the Manchuria situation, the present organization of the South Manchuria Railway Company should undergo the following changes:

- 1) The Local Affairs Department should be made a separate organization.
- 2) The Sales & Supplies Department should also become a separate company.
- 3) Subsidiary undertakings should be severed from the Mother-organization, if necessary.
- 4) An economic planning bureau should be established.
- 5) The administration of railways should be systematized.
- 6) The administration of coal mines should also be systematized (including all coal mines in Manchuria entrusted to the South Manchuria Railway Company).
- 7) A system of executive secretaries should be adopted in order to avoid interference by government authorities.
- 8) The supervision system of the South Manchuria Railway Company should be placed on a monistic basis.

This proposal differs from that of the Kwantung Army, in that it suggests organization of a Japan-"Manchoukuo" Economic Committee as the highest organ of control, and opposes to the establishment of an Economic Staff Department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. It advocates preservation of the original South Manchuria Railway Company and the combination of coal mines and railways, in order to maintain the credit of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

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
The attitude of the Association is of considerable significance. If it persists in its opposition against the Kuantung Army and maintains a non-cooperation policy, a grave situation will obtain. The Retired Members' Club of the South Manchuria Railway has also actively supported the stand of the Association.

(b) Ministry for Overseas Affairs

The Ministry for Overseas Affairs, as direct superior of the South Manchuria Railway administration, is also strongly opposed to the Kuantung Army's plan. According to the Tokyo Nichinichi of October 30, 1933, the attitude of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs is as follows:

- 1) As the capital stock of the South Manchuria Railway Company is owned jointly by official and private interests, the Japanese government should raise at least ¥3,000,000,000 before proceeding to change the original system of the South Manchuria Railway Company into a Holding Company.
- 2) The nature of the South Manchuria Railway Company, as charatered by the government is a "railway operating corporation" under the restrictions of the Railway Law; hence, if it is to be reorganized into a "holding company", it will necessarily upset all previous commitments. Thus, it is not a reorganization, but a dissolution of the entire machine.
- 3) In view of the present need for raising additional company loans, it appears premature for the South Manchuria Railway Company to be reorganized into a holding company.
- 4) The question concerning separation of the subsidiary or affiliated undertakings should be carefully studied. The pros and cons should be weighed before coming to a final judgment. For instance, the transportation of coal by railway practically renders the Fushun Coal mines dependent upon the South Manchuria Railway.
- 5) If the reorganization is carried out, it will benecessary to readjust all forms of political and economic relations between Japan and "Manchoukuo". This question falls into the realm of the authority of the Privy Council.
- 6) According to recurrent reports, the reorganization has been opposed not only by the employees of the South Manchuria Railway Company but also by the stock market. If the plan is actually put into effect, it will lead to further complications.

In view of the fact that the activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company have multiplied and since the domestic and international economic conditions and the Japan-"Manchoukuo" economic control have reached a stage of emergency, the Ministry for Overseas Affairs, while opposed to the Kuantung Army's plan, has nevertheless considered it advisable to make modifications of the original system. Therefore, the Ministry has also brought up a plan for the reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company, suggesting that the sytem should be changed as follows:



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As indicated by the above chart, the Ministry for Overseas Affairs maintains that the South Manchuria Railway Company should be divided into the Departments of Transportation and Enterprises to be controlled by the South Manchuria Railway Administration, so as to uphold the credit of the South Manchuria Railway Company and to enable it to exercise its great economic influence. In addition, a Supervisory Board should be established under the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company to serve as an advisory organ.

The Ministry declares that the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army is merely a military suzerainty and that its attempt to seize the control of the South Manchuria Railway tends to violate the administrative power in contravention of the Constitution. Moreover, The South Manchuria Railway Company has cooperated with domestic industrial enterprises; and, in order to consolidate the economic bloc between Japan and "Manchoukuo" and to bring about harmony between domestic industrial policy and the economic conditions in Manchuria, the Ministry for Overseas Affairs should be in control of the South Manchuria Railway Company.

In regard to rendition of the South Manchuria Railway Concessions, it is considered that, under the present difficult condition of public finance, "Manchoukuo" cannot afford to pay at least ¥200,000,000 a year as expenses for the maintenance of education and sanitation undertakings in the concessions. The Ministry considers that it is impossible for "Manchoukuo" to take up the heavy responsibility as recommended by the Kwantung Army.

(c) The South Manchuria Railway Company Executives

In the course of the present complications concerning the reorganization, the attitude of the executives of the South Manchuria Railway Company is attracting public attention.

According to recurrent reports, the Kwantung Army's plan was originally drafted by General Huto who had obtained an understanding with the railway executives prior to his sudden death. Further, Lieutenant-Colonel Numata (Nemoto?), one of the important leaders of the South Manchuria Railway Company, declared that: "The Kwantung Army and the South Manchuria Railway Company executives have reached a full understanding concerning the reorganization plan, and it is now necessary to take steps for its execution". On October 28, 1933, Numata returned to Manchuria from his mission to discuss the reorganization plan with the Japanese government, and held a meeting with Vice-President Yata in order to decide a concrete plan for future action. On basis of the holding company system suggested by the Kwantung Army, the executives made a thorough and independent investigation of the problem. Shortly afterwards, the Board of Directors of the South Manchuria Railway Company brought up the following proposal:

- 1) The control of the South Manchuria Railway Company should be transferred from the Ministry for Overseas Affairs to the Kwantung Army. The Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army should be the monistic head of all Manchurian activities.
- 2) The Economic Staff Department should be established under the Commander in Chief, to serve as an advisory board. It should engage in the execution of Japan's continental policy, including investigation, research, planning and execution of measures concerning the economic control.

Militarism vs. Capitalism For Control of Manchuria, (Cont'd)

- 3) The Economic Staff Department should be attached to the main offices of the South Manchuria Railway Company.
- 4) The South Manchuria Railway Company should be a "tool" for execution of the continental policy, so as to establish an economic control in Manchuria and to consolidate the Japan-"Manchoukuo" economic bloc.
- 5) The South Manchuria Railway Company should be empowered to administer the railways (including those entrusted by "Manchoukuo") and concessions in railway zones.
- 6) An additional capital investment of ¥1,600,000,000 should be raised. The capital stock of the company will not be enlarged, but the additional investment is to be raised through company loans.
- 7) Industrial enterprises, other than the Local Affairs Department, should be made independent firms, in which the South Manchuria Railway Company should be permitted to make investments. It should also be allowed to control their capital stocks and activities.
- 8) In regard to the railways entrusted with it, the South Manchuria Railway Company should seek an agreement with "Manchoukuo" authorities, with a view to securing concessions along the railway lines.

It is readily seen, therefore, that the executives of the South Manchuria Railway Company have compromised with the Kwantung Army. The principal difference between the proposals of these two parties lies in the suggestion by the former that the Economic Staff Department should be attached to the South Manchuria Railway administration and that it should merely be an advisory organ. The controlling power of all economic activities in Manchuria is to be retained with the South Manchuria Railway Company, or the Holding Company, ~~xxxxxx~~ upon reorganization. The Local Affairs Department will continue to be operated by the railway company, and additional settlements should be obtained from "Manchoukuo" railways entrusted with it.

(d) The Kwantung Government

The stand maintained by the Kwantung Government is centered upon a consolidation of the trio-administration system. On November 11, 1933, ~~KhenKung~~ Kwantung Government brought up the following proposal concerning the reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company:

- 1) The organization for control of Manchuria should, under the present trio-administration system, be divided into two branches - military and administrative, with the military branch under the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army and the administrative branch under the Kwantung Government.
- 2) As the Special Service Department of the Kwantung Army will be discontinued next year, it is advisable to incorporate its personnel with the present organization of the Kwantung Government, in order to form a purely administrative organ of high order and to exercise great influence in the execution of the continental policy.
- 3) The new organization, regardless of its name, should be founded with the Kwantung Government as its backbone.
- 4) The Local Affairs Department of the railway company should be transferred to the Kwantung Government. In connection with the new "Manchoukuo" railways entrusted with the South Manchuria Railway Company, steps should be taken to conclude a new agreement, whereby the railway zones should be marked out as concession to be placed under the direct control of the new organization.


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- 5) When the new administrative organization is established, the South Manchuria Railway Company should also be placed under its control.
6) The funds needed for the new organization should be defrayed by local revenues.

The system suggested by the Kuantung Government is clearly indicated by the following chart:



(e) Association of Commerce & Industries

The association of Commerce and Industries is a representative body of large enterprises in Japan, more or less in the nature of a national chamber of commerce. When the Kuantung Army's plan was brought up, this Association issued a declaration stating in part as follows:

"Ever since its establishment, the South Manchuria Railway Company has achieved wonderful results in carrying out Japan's continental policy. Particularly, the services and sacrifices of the South Manchuria Railway during and after the Manchurian incident have won the heartfelt gratification of the people. Although under the existing system the South Manchuria Railway Company is inclined to become top heavy with subsidiary enterprises which should be separated, and many other reforms are necessary, it is utterly unwise to change the fundamental basis of the organization. The dissolution plan will not only waste the efficacy and advantages of the present system, but will also tend to shatter the confidence of capitalists, thus proving detrimental to the various enterprises for economic exploitation of Manchuria. Should this situation occur, the execution of Japan's continental policy will be handicapped, and, what is worse, the interest of over 67,000 shareholders and about a same number of creditors will be seriously crippled. Therefore, when changes in the system are proposed, it is necessary to consult carefully with the opinion of authorities and persons interested materially, in order to reach at a safe plan, which will at least serve to uphold the credit of the South Manchuria Railway Company."

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Although no substantial plan was suggested by the Association of Commerce and Industries, it appears apparent that it opposes the stand of the Kuantung Army. It reflects clearly the apprehension of domestic capitalists in Japan concerning the dissolution plan.

Among government leaders, Premier Saito is also opposed to the reorganization plan recommended by the Kuantung Army, and his attitude may be seen from the following statement:

"I have received no official report from the Minister for Overseas Affairs in regard to the question of S.M.R. reorganization. As it is now necessary to stimulate domestic capital for the development of Manchuria, any internal complications which tend to check the flow of capital will be a very disadvantageous factor." (Asahi Shimbun, Osaka, November 5, 1933)

6. OUTLOOK ON THE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT

At the beginning of 1934, the reorganization movement has gained considerable momentum. It is particularly significant to note that the South Manchuria Railway Company executives have surrendered to the stand maintained by the Kuantung army.

The organization plan was formally brought up by the Kuantung army on December 4, 1933, on which date Commander in Chief Hishikari officially presented the Kuantung army's proposal to Vice President Yata of the South Manchuria Railway Company. This was immediately followed by a joint meeting for investigation of the proposal. The opinion of the South Manchuria Railway Company executives was incorporated into the original proposal, thus bringing about an accord between the two parties.

On December 12 and 13, 1933, a joint meeting of the representatives of the Kuantung army and the South Manchuria Railway Company took place in Changchun for the purpose of discussing the final plan of reorganization to be brought up by them. This meeting virtually determined the destiny of the South Manchuria Railway question. The reorganization plan approved at this meeting is in the nature of a joint proposal of the Kuantung army and the South Manchuria Railway Company, which has been referred to subsequently as the "Local Plan for Reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway". According to the evening edition of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun of December 14, 1933, the outlines of the new proposal are as follows:

Local Plan for Reorganization of
the South Manchuria Railway Company

High administrative organ in Manchuria:

(a) Pending decision of the Tokyo government, the Japanese administrative organ in Manchuria will continue to be the trio-system. However, the monistic system should be adopted as early as possible. The new organization should control all Japanese administrative and economic activities in Manchuria as well as the command of the Kuantung Army.

(b) The power of supervision of the holding company should be changed from the original dual system to the monistic system, by severing the South Manchuria Railway Company from the control of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs and placing it under the absolute authority of the Commander in Chief of the Kuantung Army.

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(c) The present organization of the Special Service Department should be enlarged and changed into the Economic Staff Department in order to serve as an advisory board.

Holding company:

(a) The present South Manchuria railway Company should be reorganized into the holding company, which should invest in the various existing and projected enterprises to over fifty per cent. of their respective capital stocks and should exercise control over the finances and activities of these affiliated firms. The main subsidiaries of the holding company in question will be:

(1) Railway Company: The South Manchuria Railway line will be the backbone of this company, to which should also be incorporated all of the railway administrations in Manchuria and North Korea, now entrusted with the South Manchuria Railway Company. The new company will serve to unify all of the railways, to do away with previous abuses resulting from decentralization.

(2) Coal mine company: The Fushun coal mines will be the foundation of this new company. The coal mines located at Panshihu, Cheefo, Laotoukow, Yolikang, Mishan and Peipiao should also be amalgamated with this company, so that it would exercise control over all of the coal supply in Manchuria.

(3) Other companies: There should also be the Iron Works Company (with the Showa Iron & Steel Works as center), petroleum company, gold mining company, light metals company, chemical industry company, forest development company, agricultural development company, power plant, arsenal (with the Mukden arsenal as center), aviation company, sales and trust company and other industries connected with national defense.

(b) The holding company may also invest in enterprises, other than above mentioned, which are concerned with national economy and industrial development.

Question of nationality:

(a) The holding company should be a special legal body of Japan, under the charter of the Japanese government, which should guarantee a fixed rate of dividend (on basis of the present guarantee regarding the South Manchuria Railway). The subsidiary companies should be legal persons of the "Manchoukuo" or Japan as the case may be with respect to the nature of enterprise and conditions of capital and finance.

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Auxiliary enterprises::

- (a) Before rendition of extraterritorial rights by Japan in Manchuria, the local Affairs Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company should be operated by the holding company as auxiliary enterprises.
- (b) Within the holding company, an investigation and/or research organization should be established, if necessary, in order to assist the company executives in formulating plans for development of various enterprises in Manchuria.

Working System:

- (a) Insofar as possible, the power of supervision exercised by the Japanese government should be delegated to the holding company.
- (b) For the purpose of cooperation concerning the economic control of Manchuria, the managers and/or directors of the subsidiary companies should be appointed from among the directors of the holding company. Further, as the coal mines and the railway are closely associated, the managerial position of both companies should be held by a single individual in order to ensure satisfactory operation of both enterprises.
- (c) Sinking funds, surplus funds and other deposits of the subsidiary companies should be, insofar as feasible, placed under the custody of the holding company, in order to maintain the credit of the holding company and to protect the interest of shareholders and creditors.

This plan represents the product of the agreement reached between the Kwantung army and the South Manchuria Railway Company executives. Following the Changchun conference, both parties have submitted reports to their direct superiors. The Kwantung army reported to the War Ministry. In the case of the South Manchuria Railway Company, President Hiroto Hayashi personally presented its report to the Minister for Overseas Affairs. The reorganization plan has, therefore, been placed in the hands of the War, Overseas Affairs and Finance Ministries.

In this way, the complicated problem of the South Manchuria Railway raised by the Kwantung army and others concerned has been shifted from local authorities to the government in Japan.

The contention between the three Ministries may be glanced from the following reports. On December 17, 1933, the Nippon Dempo reported that:

"Minister Nagai for Overseas Affairs, following a meeting with President Hiroto Hayashi and Vice President Yata of the South Manchuria Railway on the night of December 25, 1933, declared that he was strongly opposed to the fundamental reorganization of the system. According to his opinion, the government has traditionally used the South Manchuria Railway Company to effect economic development of Manchuria and, thus, to maintain economic control in this territory. The South Manchuria Railway Company will, in order to meet the new situation, endeavor to increase its own efficacy through reforms and expansion, so as to bring about an early fulfillment of its important mission. Furthermore, the company possesses a capital stock of ¥800,000,000 which should be spent wisely under strict supervision. Even should the present machine be reorganized, caution must be taken to avoid destroying the fundamental system thereby weakening its

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position and causing uneasiness to the public and, in turn, rendering circulation of finance difficult. Under the present situation, it is imperative that steps be taken to meet the precarious position of the company by stimulating capital and enabling the employees to devote their energies to their work, in order to achieve the original plan of economic development of Manchuria within the designated period. This is the important question of the moment."

Thus, it is seen that the Ministry for Overseas Affairs is strongly opposed to a fundamental change of the present system of the railway company, although it believes that reforms and extension may be considered.

Again, the Rengo report of December 20, 1933, stated that:

"The Minister for Overseas Affairs is, in the first place, positively opposed to the reorganization plan proposed jointly by the Kwantung army and the South Manchuria Railway Company; and, in the second place, he maintains that, if the reorganization is necessary, the plan should be formulated by the Ministry for Overseas Affairs. He will adhere to these two principles in his action. The Ministry of Finance is also strongly opposed to the fundamental reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company. As the War Ministry advocates to put through the joint plan of the Kwantung army and local authorities, it is quite possible that a clash will occur between the Ministries in question, which will eventually affect the general political structure of Japan."

From these reports, it is obvious that a grave situation is caused by the differences between the Ministries in regard to the reorganization question. The Ministry for Overseas Affairs is bitterly opposed to the interference by the War Ministry in the administration of the South Manchuria Railway and affiliated enterprises, and declares that the Ministry for Overseas Affairs alone has the right of formulating any plan for reorganization if such is necessary. On the part of the War Ministry, however, it is considered absolutely necessary for it to grab the control of all industrial enterprises in Manchuria concerned with national defense, in order to consolidate the joint front of Japan and "Manchoukuo" in the event of war. As a result, it has proposed to obtain legislative recognition for the reorganization plan at the 65th session of the Diet in order to bring about an early realization of its scheme. Its determination is further fastened by the threatening situation on the Pacific and the strained relations between Japan and Soviet Russia.

At this juncture, it is significant to note that, as a result of the compromising attitude of the South Manchuria Railway Company executives, the actual control of the railway and affiliated enterprises has already been shifted into the hands of the War Ministry. Although the reorganization plan is still awaiting action by the legislation, steps are already taken locally to effect the reorganization. The recent removal of the Economic Investigation Office from Dairen to Changchun marks a further move in this direction.

In spite of the fact that the aggressive activities of Japanese militarists from September 1931 to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, have rendered her more isolated from the family of nations, the militarists have persistently endeavored to "hypnotize" the people with the slogan of "extraordinary emergency". Being comparatively enlightened and aware of the international situation, the capitalists believe that Japan is drifting towards a most dangerous pitfall, but they have been unable to do anything but submit to the egoism of militarists. Lately, however, the Japanese people have begun

Militarism vs. Capitalism For Control of Manchuria, (Cont'd)

To realize the folly of the militarists. They have come to understand that the so-called extraordinary emergency was created by the militarists themselves. The anti-militarist movement is, therefore, gradually gaining momentum, and the capitalists who have been under the yoke of the militarists ever since the September 18th uprising in Manchuria, now commence to pull themselves together for a counter-attack upon the militarists. Under the situation, War Minister Araki is compelled to resign from office, and Senjuro Hayashi is appointed as successor. As the resignation occurred on the eve of the 65th session of the Diet, it has justified the renewed attack upon militarists by the political parties, chiefly the Seiyukai and the Minseito, which are the representatives of Japanese capitalists.

According to present indications, it is believed that the scheme of the Kwantung army to try to get legal sanction for the reorganization plan has been, temporarily at least, frustrated. On January 19, 1934, the Osaka Mainichi reported that:

"The War Ministry, after investigation into the local plan for the reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company, has considered that there are still many shortcomings and defects in the proposal, so that it will probably not meet with the approval of the government. Therefore, the Ministries of War, Overseas Affairs, and Finance will revise the reorganization plan on basis of the proposal of the local authorities; and discussions between the Ministries are now in progress. The development of the reorganization is carefully watched by the public. Slight understanding may lead to fabrication which will eventually affect financial circles. As a result, the interested parties have decided not to call any formal meeting, and, instead, to straighten out their differences through informal conversations. The question as to whether the proposal will be brought up at the present session of the Diet is uncertain due to the sickness of War Minister Araki. But, it is believed, it will probably not be brought up at the present session of the Diet."

This statement throws interesting sidelights upon the modification in the War Ministry's former stand. Although the Kwantung army's proposal has not been included in the agenda since inauguration of the 65th session of the Diet, the members of the House have raised many questions concerning it. Kumeshiro Kato, member of the House, interrogated as to what has been the attitude of the Ministers of War and Overseas Affairs and Premier Saito concerning the reorganization plan. The debate between these leaders, as published on January 29, 1934, is as follows:

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|----------|---|
| Kato: | Does the military administration contemplate to aid the so-called local plan for reorganization of the South Manchuria Railway Company? |
| Hayashi: | This plan is now being investigated, and no decision has been reached as yet. In general, it is hoped that on basis of the local proposal, a revised plan will be obtained. |
| Kato: | As regards the reorganization plan, does the Minister for Overseas Affairs favor a fundamental reorganization? |
| Nagai: | If the reorganization is prompted by a desire to stimulate capital and to make the employees devoted to their work, it is considered necessary. But, the time has not arrived as yet. |

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Kato: It is reported that the Premier, in his interview with newspaper reporters at Uyama, stated that he was opposed to transfer of the South Manchuria Railway Company into the hands of the Kwantung army. Is this a truth? Does the Premier still think that he maintains this view?

Saito: I have this idea, so that is what I told the newspaper reporters.

In view of the above interrogations by the House, it is apparent that, although the War Ministry has not abandoned its hope of carrying out the proposed reorganization plan, it will probably let the plan lie in abeyance for the time being. In short, the War Ministry has considered it necessary to guard its own steps because of the attack by political parties.

However, it must be pointed out that the temporary retrenchment of the War Ministry is nothing but a tactics to avoid the strong assaults of capitalists. As soon as the situation permits, the War Ministry will at once bring up the reorganization plan again. Minister Hayashi will never change the traditional policy of absorption of the Tanaka and Araki administrations. In fact, he is a faithful executioner of his predecessor's ideas.

Under the present situation, it seems that partisan politics has again raised its head in Japan. However, this will probably again be a "flash in the pan". The undercurrent of Japan's military dictatorship is continually progressing. Moreover, the War Ministry has endeavored to establish another fait accompli by putting its scheme into effect locally, without seeking legislative sanction.


February 15, 1934.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY



April 26, 1934.

Memorandum of conversation with the Swedish Minister,
April 26th.

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The Swedish Minister called to make inquiries about the Far Eastern situation. I told him, in confidence, that we had instructed Mr. Grew to call at the Foreign Office, in order to obtain the exact phraseology of the Amau statements, that in view of the various statements which had been given out in Geneva, Washington and Tokyo, it was confusing to know precisely the Japanese Government's attitude; I said I had not yet had a chance to examine Mr. Grew's reply. I added that we had reached no decision as to what action or stand we were going to take, that the situation which had developed was so important that it required a great deal of care and thought.

WP
 William Phillips.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2. T.V. Soong and the Northwest

It is reported from a reliable source that the basic purpose behind Mr. T.V. Soong's forthcoming inspection trip to the Northwest is his conviction that it is only a question of time before Japan dominates all of China's seaports along with the commercial and industrial activity therein and that he therefore considers it imperative that China commence at once to develop her hinterland as an off-set.

In this connection a prominent foreign correspondent interviewed both Mr. Soong and Mr. Suma separately and on successive days last week while these gentlemen were in Shanghai. Each referred to conversations had with the other in Nanking during the week of March 5th and in each case the accounts of the discussion tallied except as regards the degree of heatedness which the discussion attained. Mr. Suma referred to it as a 'mild' difference of opinion and Mr. Soong as the other extreme. The correspondent thought the true degree lay somewhere in between with Soong less violent than he averred and Suma more positive than he claimed to have been. The gist of the discussion, related to the economic development of China and was as follows:

The Japanese continue to be annoyed at the large number of foreign advisors employed by China and desire that Japanese help to the extent of at least 50% of this technical assistance shall be accepted. Suma endeavored to impress Soong with the remarkable progress that has been made in Japan in recent years and the inevitability of China's ultimate dependence upon Japan for economic growth. He likewise dwelt on the necessity of China accepting Manchoukuo as a fait accompli and quickly agreeing to the negotiation of outstanding questions

in order that China's development may thereby be commenced without delay. He invited Soong to make an inspection trip to Japan and see the progress there for himself. The remarkable point is that Soong, in speaking of this and his refusal of the invitation, did not speak of it as something distasteful and impossible from a standpoint of principle, but indicated rather that he would like to accept the invitation were it not for the inevitable public misconstruction and condemnation that would follow.

Mr. Suma's frank description of Japanese purpose is believed to indicate the main trend of Japanese policy at present - namely, the gradual economic penetration and domination of China.



*Excluded from Report
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(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
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Department of State
Division of Current Information No. 94

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1934.

At the press conference this morning Under Secretary Phillips said that Secretary Hull had gone to the capitol to make a statement before the Senate Finance Committee. Copies of this statement are available to the correspondents.

JAPAN

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A correspondent said that he was interested in Japan this morning. Mr. Phillips in reply asked the correspondent if he cared to specify his special interest in detail. The correspondent then asked whether the Under Secretary would permit him to state definitely, as coming from authoritative sources, that the United States has taken no definite action nor has sent any official communication to Japan or to the Governments signatory to the Nine-Power treaty regarding Japan's recent statement of policy regarding China. The Under Secretary said that the correspondent's statement was perfectly correct and that he might use it as coming from authoritative sources. The correspondent then asked if the Under Secretary would clarify Ambassador Grew's call yesterday on Foreign Minister Hirota. He continued by saying that his despatches from Tokyo, which apparently are similar to other despatches, say that Ambassador Grew called at the Foreign Office for a copy of the text of the statement which the spokesman of the Foreign Office is alleged to have made. The correspondent continued by saying that the news despatches from Tokyo also indicate that Ambassador Grew was under no instructions to discuss the matter with the Japanese Foreign Minister. FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY, Mr. Phillips said that he was making no statement beyond the fact that Ambassador Grew did call on the Japanese Foreign Minister under instructions. Asked then if he cared to state what the instructions contained, Mr. Phillips said that he preferred not to do so.

Referring to the statement above, to the effect that our Government has sent no formal communications to other Governments regarding the Far Eastern situation, a correspondent asked if there had been any unofficial or informal discussions with the various diplomatic representatives in Washington of other Governments. AGAIN FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY, the Under Secretary said that he did not want to dignify casual conversations by calling them "discussions". He then added that when one meets another on the street, for example, there are bound to be conversations but there have been no exchange of views or informal "discussions" with anybody.

Asked if China had requested us to take any action in connection with the Far Eastern situation, Mr. Phillips said that he preferred not to comment beyond what he had just said.

Asked if Secretary Hull expected to see the President today, Mr. Phillips said that he really did not know. Another correspondent then volunteered the information that the Secretary of State will have lunch today with the President.

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A correspondent asked if Ambassador Grew obtained the text of the statement made by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office. In reply Mr. Phillips said that he had not seen anything from Mr. Grew along that line. The correspondent then asked if there had been anything along that line from other sources. AGAIN FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY, Mr. Phillips said that we had not received anything definite beyond what had appeared in the press. Observing then that the Department had not seen anything from Ambassador Grew containing the text of the Japanese declaration and also observing that, according to press reports, the Ambassador asked for an authentic copy of the document, a correspondent asked if that meant that the Japanese Government does not have one. In reply the Under Secretary said that, in the absence of definite information from Ambassador Grew, he preferred not to comment thereon.

Another correspondent then said that he wished to sum up as regards one point. He then asked if he might say as coming from authoritative sources, that the United States Government has taken no action officially with Japan or the other signatories of the Nine-Power treaty. The Under Secretary replied in the affirmative. The correspondent then said that, in view of this fact, he presumed that Ambassador Grew's call at the Foreign Office in an effort to obtain a copy of the document was not an official action. The correspondent continued by saying that he was not referring to the matter of obtaining the text of the statement but to discussions of policy. Mr. Phillips in reply said that the correspondent's statement was correct.

Another correspondent then asked if the Department expected further explanation or a note from the Japanese Ambassador as a result of his recent visit to the Department of State. Mr. Phillips in reply said that we might possibly have something further from the Ambassador. The correspondent then asked if he might say that we are expecting a further communication from Mr. Saito. The Under Secretary in reply said that he would not go so far as to say that, but that he would say that the Japanese Ambassador is always in a position to communicate with us at any time. Asked then if Mr. Saito had an appointment at the Department of State, Mr. Phillips replied in the negative.

Another correspondent then asked if the situation was still in such a state of flux that there might be visits of various and sundry people before it is clarified. Mr. Phillips in reply said that he did not know precisely what the correspondent meant. He then added, FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY, that it takes time to study the situation that has arisen; we have to be very careful; we have to get all the facts; and we have to know precisely what is behind the various alleged statements and communications before we can make a statement--if we do make one.

Another correspondent then asked if there is "any such thing in international law as acceptance by default". He continued by asking if, provided the United States and other Governments ignore this statement from Japan, there was any likelihood that the Japanese might say that, since no one protested, the policy had been accepted. Mr. Phillips in reply said that he

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preferred not to discuss that point as much depends on all of the circumstances and there are too many angles to the question. The correspondent then said that he had asked the question because Ambassador Saito, while in the Department of State recently, told the correspondents that he was somewhat puzzled at the reaction by the various foreign Governments. Ambassador Saito also said that the Foreign Minister of Japan had said the same thing in his recent speech before the Diet, that it met with no protest at that time and that the Japanese Government had taken it for granted that the policy was well known. Mr. Phillips in reply said that he would not undertake to answer the question.

Another correspondent asked if the Under Secretary cared to say whether he asked the Japanese Ambassador, during his recent visit to the Department, to furnish our Government with more information. Mr. Phillips in reply said that he preferred to make no statement one way or another on that point.

CUBA.


A correspondent asked if the Department of State had been approached by the Cuban Government concerning the extradition of ex-President Machado. The Under Secretary replied in the negative.

M. J. McDermott.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR THE PRESS



APRIL 30, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9:00 P.M. EASTERN
STANDARD TIME, APRIL 30, 1934. NOT TO BE PRE-
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The American Ambassador to Japan under instruction from the Department of State called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 29 and made a statement the substance of which was as follows:

Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored and make it necessary that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. The United States has with regard to China certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with both, together with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

Treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

In the international associations and relationships of the United States, the American Government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other countries, and it expects on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of the United States. In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The American Government has dedicated the United States to the policy of the good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy it will continue, on its own part and in association with other governments, to devote its best efforts.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 885 Political.

copy in we **AMERICAN CONSULATE**
 Geneva, Switzerland, April 25, 1934

file
 JUN 11 1934
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MR. MOORE

MAY 8 34

Office of Economic Adviser
 JUN 8 1934
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 8 - 1934
 Department of State

Act
 DESP,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
 JUN 11 1934
 MR. MOORE

SUBJECT: The Recent Japanese Pronouncement Respecting
 Asiatic Policy - Reaction in Geneva; Relationship
 Assistant Secretary of State
 of State

AUG 16 1934		For Distribution-Check	
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THE HONORABLE
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 2 1934
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 SIR:
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

793.94/6656

I have the honor to inform the Department that immediately following the recent pronouncement in Tokyo on the part of the Japanese Government respecting its policy in Asia with particular reference to Japanese policy regarding China, the representatives of the press at Geneva received inquiries from their respective newspapers regarding the reaction of the League thereto. The articles which appeared in the American press responsive to these inquiries, were undoubtedly noted by the Department.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
 AUG 17 1934

The general reaction in Geneva is that which presumably took place in national capitals, in effect, an acceptance that the pronouncement of policy represents Japan's serious intentions. In discussing this matter with League officials, the form of their expression of opinion was naturally related to the League's position. It was in substance that the present action of Japan was simply a link in the chain of Japanese policy since her first military action in Manchuria in 1931.

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It was

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It was likewise a direct descendent of the fundamental policy implicit in the twenty-one demands. The protests which Japan now makes respecting not having the intention of exercising a protectorate over China should, in the estimate of these League officials, be given no particular credence in the light of analogous statements followed by action inconsistent therewith made by Japan from time to time in the progress of the Manchurian affair. These officials likewise declare with considerable bitterness that Tokyo's present position is adopted in view of the circumstance that the "moral condemnation" of Japan in 1933 was followed by no material action.

Opinion has not, however, crystallized to a degree to be given consideration as to the effect of this Japanese policy on the future of Japan's relations to the League and to the future of China's relations to the League. It is also a matter of speculation whether these developments will be reflected in the deliberations of the forthcoming meeting of the Consultative Committee for the Sino-Japanese affair. In both these respects a more specific indication is awaited of the reaction of the great powers with whom, it is felt, this entire matter will chiefly rest. League officials, moreover, find themselves handicapped in reaching a considered opinion, particularly respecting the Chinese elements in the situation, through being at a loss in estimating the policy and authority of the various factions in China.

With respect to the estimate of the "serious" character

of

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of Japan's pronouncements, of which I have spoken above, political officials in Geneva who are inclined to regard international affairs on what is usually termed a "realistic" basis, state that they feel that the Japanese pronouncements are not only to be taken seriously but that her intentions are obvious. Based upon data that Japan's industrial situation is such that approximately twenty per cent of her population are now engaged in industries dependent on export trade for their existence, Japan seeks in China a definite and controlled outlet for a large share of this surplus of production over domestic consumption and she likewise contemplates increasing such trade to the greatest extent possible. She therefore proposes to employ China for this purpose, purchasing Chinese raw materials and requiring that China in turn accord preferential, or even exclusive, treatment to Japanese manufactured products. The aim of such a Sino-Japanese trade arrangement is seen as eventually placing Japan in a self-contained Far Eastern position respecting commerce. While trade with the rest of the world, particularly with the United States and Great Britain, is at present of essential importance to her, Japan, in the light of past experience, does not anticipate an economic boycott. On the other hand, she is prepared in general to pass through a very difficult period economically, if this should prove necessary to attain her ultimate objective. It is believed that, with the possible exception of a necessary adjustment with Soviet Russia, Japan will pursue this policy unless prevented by armed force,

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force, that in the present world political and military situation armed force is out of the question, and that Japan thus regards her policy as an entirely safe and practical one to pursue. These officials feel furthermore that this should be considered as the fundamental issue and that any statements which may be made by the League in this connection, which perhaps may be necessary in view of the League's technical position, may be discounted.

I furthermore took occasion to discuss this expression of Japanese policy with Mr. Yokoyama, confining myself, however, to its more specific relationship to Geneva. Mr. Yokoyama gave me his opinion on two points in particular which I raised with him.

In the first place he told me that the Japanese policy of endeavoring to retain, upon the occasion of Japan's withdrawal from the League, equal representation with League states on League ad hoc bodies, was still maintained. This I discussed at length in my despatch No. 858 Political dated March 28, 1934. Upon my raising the point that the League, in the light of Japan's new policy, might not be so ready to accede to the desires of Japan in this connection, Mr. Yokoyama responded that possibly that might be the case.

I then asked Mr. Yokoyama whether he regarded Japan's policy respecting China as having a bearing on the League's program of technical assistance to China. Mr. Yokoyama


replied

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replied that, although Japan's policy was in no way aimed against the League, it most emphatically did embrace objections to the program of technical assistance, inasmuch as this program, particularly in its financial aspects, had political connotations which Japan must naturally oppose. He likewise characterized Dr. Rajchman's activities as having many elements of a political nature to which Japan must make objection. I have been informed by reliable sources that Dr. Rajchman, who, as the Department is aware, is now on his way to Geneva, is bringing with him a report embodying an elaborate programme of assistance to China. I have also been given to understand that either implied or expressed in these suggestions are matters of a distinctly political character. In my conversation with Mr. Yokoyama I gained the distinct impression that the Japanese Government had followed very closely Dr. Rajchman's activities in China and that it is fully cognizant in general, if not in particular, of the content of Dr. Rajchman's report. I feel that undoubtedly the Department from its sources in the Far East has likewise knowledge of this matter.

Respectfully yours,


 Prentiss B. Gilbert
 American Consul.

PBG/GdeW/EW

Original and 3 copies to Department of State.
 1 copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.
 1 copy to American Legation, Peiping, China.
 1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 10, 1934

~~TOP~~
SECRET

The interesting part of Geneva's Despatch No. 887 of April 26, 1934, is the first inclosure, which describes the impressions of a journalist who was present while the Japanese Consul General issued his statement on Japan's Asiatic policy.

FE:ED JULY

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 887 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1934

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 5 1934
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 MAY 12 1934
 MAY - 8 34

SUBJECT: Statement Concerning Japanese Asiatic Policy
 Made on April 23, 1934, by the Consul General
 of Japan at Geneva.

1-1066 GPO
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Responsive to the Department's telegram No. 30, of

April 25, 6 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith a

1/ 2/ copy of the complete text in French with an English trans-
 lation (prepared in this office) of the declaration of Asia-
 tic policy made by Mr. Yokoyama, Consul General of Japan at
 Geneva, to the press on April 23, 1934.

3/ In addition, there are also enclosed copies of a record
 of the interview granted to the press on the occasion of the
 issuance of this declaration, which was made by a member of
 the press who was present at the interview. Although this
 is not a stenographic record, I am assured that it consti-
 tutes an accurate account of the more significant statements
 made by Mr. Yokoyama in explanation of his declaration, and
 particularly in answer to specific questions put to him.
 In addition, there is adjoined to this record, for whatever

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value

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4/ value it may have, a statement of the impressions of this member of the press concerning the interview.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert

American Consul.

Enclosures:

- No.1: Text of declaration, in French.
- No.2: id., English translation.
- No.3: Record of interview.
- No.4: Impressions concerning the interview.

CTE/EW

Original and 3 copies to Department of State.
1 copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.
1 copy to American Legation, Peiping, China.
1 copy to American Legation, Bern, Switzerland.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure # 4
 with No 887 P.L. 61
 Apr. 26 1934

IMPRESSIONS

Seldom does one listen to as far reaching a declaration as that made yesterday by Mr. Yokoyama. The dominant note was one of quiet self-assurance; his attitude reflected consciousness a man might have who is burning his boats behind him, a certain feigned levity which badly masked the alert watchfulness for the reactions which his words might have on the more experienced international journalists present. When referring to Japan's "warning" to other Governments, Mr. Yokoyama did so in the tone of a man who knows that he will not be brought to book by the people he warns off his special preserves.

His list of countries which made up the "geographical definition of Asiatic Powers", with whose collaboration Japan had the firm intention to maintain peace in the Far East, was startling! It omitted Indo-China - though no explanation for this omission was given - and, rightly or wrongly, one had the impression of the desire not to bring French interests within the sphere of the declaration.

It was less the Governments than the peoples with whom Japan, apparently, wanted to collaborate. This makes the declaration approximate very closely to an affirmation of the policy: Asia for the Asiatics! A distinct warning: "Keep off the grass, unless we have first approved the type of shoes you wear! We do not demand that you submit to us the pattern of your shoes before you walk on the grass, but we have warned you, - we will decide whether they are unjurious to our turf, and if we consider them so, well, you will have had your warning!"

The declaration is virtually an offer to China to choose between cooperation with Japan and cooperation with foreign Powers. The offer has, probably, been made because - after the show of determination on the part of Japan, and that of weakness by the States Members of the League of Nations, and other Governments - Japan feels that there is a chance that these declarations may influence the course of events in China and help Japan to win out in her campaign for direct negotiations and recognition of "Manchukuo".

The interview was evidently well prepared. The replies to questions unhesitating. The parts of the multigraphed declaration likely to inspire questions must have been well rehearsed. The answers were ready.

Well prepared, well performed, the interview was a further proof of that meticulous care for detail, that appreciation of the value of proper publicity, which the Japanese have always shown and which they keep up because they find it valuable.

Obviously, Mr. Yokoyama was trying to obtain publicity for statements which went beyond the two-page declaration distributed and read to the Press, while remaining responsible only for the declaration as circulated.

Apparently,

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Apparently, no stenographer was present to take down a verbatim report of the statements made by Mr. Yokoyama, although - under the circumstances in which these were made - they undoubtedly had an official value. With no verbatim report available, it seems impossible to take official exception to them. Yet, Mr. Yokoyama's enumeration of the countries considered by Japan as Asiatic countries with which Japan counts to maintain peace in the Far East, included India, Siam, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, and cannot but have the greatest importance for the Governments of Great Britain, Siam, the Netherlands and the United States of America.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 3
 with No 807 Pd. of
 Apr. 26 1934

COPY.

NOTES ON THE INTERVIEW GRANTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS
 AT GENEVA BY CONSUL GENERAL YOKOYAMA ON APRIL 23, 1934.

As porte parole of the Japanese Government, but on his own responsibility - which, he stated, was official - Mr. YOKOYAMA read the text of a declaration which he had distributed to the Press present on his invitation at the Hôtel Metropole.

He began by referring to the statement recently made by the porte parole of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tokio, which had been reproduced all over the world and which - he claimed - had been misinterpreted by many. So many questions had been asked him, Yokoyama, that he wanted to give explanations and information as to the Tokio declaration.

He then quoted part of the declaration made by the Japanese delegate at the time when Japan withdrew from the League, fourteen months ago, just before the adoption of the Report on the Sino-Japanese Conflict. He declared that the divergence of views, then existing between the other Governments and Japan, was now even more pronounced than at that time. This despite all that Japan had done for peace in the Far East by setting up "Manchukuo" "and all that".

In China, there were two parties, one which thought that China should fight Japan to the end, and the other which believed in negotiations.

Japan came as a friend of China, and it is as a friend that she gave an "avertissement" - a "warning".

There were people in China who recognized that Japan had bettered conditions in Northern China, and people responsible for law and order agree with Japan's views on the subject. However, China is, unfortunately, made up of different parties, and there are those who think that they can best solve China's problems by setting one country against another. Jealousy makes them seek aid, material aid, elsewhere.

Japan did not want to see that help given one day to China, to persons on one side, should, the next day, be put to wrong ends. Japan did not want to dominate, but she wanted to have her special position understood.

Japan recognized that China was independent, and that, as an independent country, she could negotiate with Japan.

If other Governments want to help China, that help must not be of a kind that could be put to wrong uses, and become harmful ("nuisible") to Japan.

The

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The most interesting feature of Mr. Yokoyama's declaration was the replies to questions put to him by Press representatives.

These questions and answers elucidated certain statements the meaning of which was not clear from the multigraphed copies of the declaration which Mr. Yokoyama had read. They went beyond that multigraphed declaration and, in an unmistakable manner, brought out the true import of that declaration.

For instance, the declaration simply speaks of "la ferme volonté du Japon d'assumer la responsabilité de la paix en Asie orientale en étroite collaboration avec des Puissances asiatiques, notamment la Chine...". In reply to a direct question as to what Japan considered to be the "Puissances asiatiques" with whom she intended to collaborate, Mr. Yokoyama said that by "Puissances asiatiques" he meant "Manchukuo", of course, India, Siam, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. When further pressed as to whether or not Japan considered the U.S.S.R. to be an Asiatic country, he said that Japan considered Russia was half-and-half, but, for the purpose of his declaration, is an Asiatic Power. Of course, the term "Asiatic Powers" was merely a geographical definition.

Asked who was to decide whether any assistance given to China was, or was not, harmful to Japan, Mr. Yokoyama replied that it would be Japan who would decide.

In reply to a question as to whether the Japanese declaration was to be construed as a criticism of the League of Nations, Mr. Yokoyama replied in the affirmative, that it was meant as a warning to the League, concerning her scheme of cooperation with China.

Asked whether the Japanese declaration was to be considered as the equivalent of a declaration of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Yokoyama replied that, although it was difficult to find a real definition of what was the Monroe Doctrine, as interpretations varied, nevertheless, what was meant by Monroe-Doctrine was known to the average man, and Japan's declaration was the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, but Japan would not define it.

Urged to state whether this included League cooperation, Mr. Yokoyama said it did.

His definition of assistance to China well employed - against which Japan had no objection - was assistance which was not employed against Japan. For instance, if the money lent to China were employed to foment boycott of Japanese goods, it would be considered harmful by Japan.

When asked whether Japan demanded that she be consulted as to the manner in which assistance should be rendered to China, Mr. Yokoyama after having answered "no" - drew a

picture

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picture of China - a sick man - and all the Governments as doctors. Japan which claimed to know the patient better than the other doctors, would not go out of her way to demand that the others consult her, but would give her advice if consulted; if not consulted, her warning to Governments remained.

This reiteration of the idea of a warning brought out the statement that these declarations were the only manner of warning the League of Nations open to Japan. Mr. Yokoyama reminded the Press that Japan was out of the League and that, as she did not take part in the sessions of the Council or of the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese Conflict, she considered that this was the only way of making known her warning. Mr. Yokoyama did not think that similar declarations would be made at the different capitals simultaneously. He recalled his position as liaison officer between the League and Japan, and this was the reason for his declaration concerning Japan's attitude towards League cooperation with China.

Mr. Yokoyama knew that there had been a report made by Mr. RAJCHMAN, and stated that Japan had no blind objection to any plan. It would depend on the plan. If reasonable, there would be no objection. If too idealistic, there would be objection. Japan would pass judgment on the plan, and the other Governments would, of course, have Japan's warning.

The difficulty of telling whether cooperation, in road building, for instance, was, or was not, harmful to Japan, was raised by a representative of the Press, who reminded Mr. Yokoyama that roads could both, develop a country and facilitate the transport of goods, and be used for the transport of troops. Would road construction be considered harmful? Mr. Yokoyama hesitated, then stated that he had recently sat in the Transit Committee and had seen the plan for road building in three Chinese provinces, which was to be extended subsequently to seven other provinces surrounding the original nucleus of three, and that he wondered whether this would be possible, given the difference of political color of the authorities in the different provinces in question. He did not make a direct reply to the question put to him.

Referring to the existence of parties in China, and of the possibilities of negotiations between China and Japan, he declared that, at the present moment, Japan has almost confidence in Nanking ("presque confiance en Nanking").

During the interview, Mr. Yokoyama reverted to his statement that he was making his declaration on his own responsibility, but immediately followed it by stating that he was an official, and hence, he took official responsibility for his declaration.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2
 with No 887 P.d. of
 April 26 1934

DECLARATION OF ASIATIC POLICY MADE BY MR. YOKOYAMA

TO THE PRESS ON APRIL 23, 1934.

(TRANSLATION)

Geneva, April 23, 1934 .

Japan is more than ever convinced that sincere and friendly cooperation between two of the great Asiatic families, Japan and China, with a view to the unification and prosperity of the Celestial Republic, is the keystone of peace in Eastern Asia. Japan is striving to establish this cooperation on a solid basis of reciprocal good will and mutual understanding.

But the fact must be remembered that the work of pacification and unification of China commenced by the Government of Nanking is far from being completed. The salutary work of national reconstruction is frequently handicapped and disturbed by the continual internal political struggles or by civil wars. The hostile partisans usually do not hesitate, in order to maintain their struggles, to have recourse to foreign aid either in the form of loans or in other forms of economic or technical collaboration.

Today it is to be feared that the partisans in favor of the anti-Japanese movement, persisting in their distrust of the good will of Japan, may resort under these divers forms to the assistance of third powers for the purpose of obtaining means of promoting the struggle against their political adversaries or against neighboring countries, which constitutes a latent danger for the maintenance of domestic peace and the peace of Eastern Asia.

It was in the presence of this situation that the declaration of the spokesman of the Foreign Office of April 17 defined the attitude of Japan. It intended above all to emphasize the firm will of Japan to assume the responsibility for peace in Eastern Asia in close collaboration with the Asiatic powers, notably China, while warning Chinese or foreign leaders against the danger of undertakings which might encourage the fomentation of interior or exterior troubles. That does not signify in any manner that Japan has changed anything whatever in its policy with respect to the open door and the sovereignty of China, where all friendly and interested peoples may freely engage in peaceful commerce.

It is only foreign aid, in whatever form, which might prove harmful to or susceptible of disturbing the maintenance of peace and order that Japan feels obliged to oppose in order to fulfil her duty as natural defender of the peace in Eastern Asia. It goes without saying that Japan does not have the intention of arrogating to itself the right to take arbitrarily under its tutelage an independent

country

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country with which it desires, on the contrary, to share amicably all the responsibility of the maintenance of this peace, indispensable to the general prosperity.

OTE/EW

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
 with No 887 P.L. of
 April 26 1934

DECLARATION OF ASIATIC POLICY MADE BY MR. YOKOYAMA
 TO THE PRESS ON APRIL 23, 1934.

Genève, 23 avril 1934.

Le Japon est plus que jamais convaincu que la coopération sincère et amicale entre deux des grandes familles asiatiques, Japon et Chine, en vue de l'unification et de la prospérité de la République céleste, est la clé de voûte de la paix en Asie orientale. Il s'efforce à ce que cette coopération soit établie sur une base solide de bonne volonté réciproque et de compréhension mutuelle.

Mais il faut se rappeler le fait que l'oeuvre de pacification et d'unification de la Chine commencée par le Gouvernement de Nankin est loin d'être achevée. L'oeuvre salutaire de reconstruction nationale est fréquemment handicapée et troublée par les continuelles luttes politiques intérieures ou par les guerres civiles. Les partisans aux prises n'hésitent pas le plus souvent, pour alimenter leurs luttes, à avoir recours aux aides étrangères soit sous forme d'emprunts soit sous d'autres formes de collaboration économique ou technique.

Il est à craindre aujourd'hui que les partisans en faveur du mouvement anti-japonais, persistant à se méfier de la bonne volonté du Japon, ne recourent sous ces diverses formes à l'aide de tierces Puissances aux fins d'obtenir des moyens de lutte contre leurs adversaires politiques ou contre les pays voisins, ce qui constitue un danger latent pour le maintien de la paix nationale et de la paix de l'Asie orientale.

C'est devant cette situation que la déclaration du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères du 17 avril a précisé l'attitude du Japon. Elle veut affirmer avant tout la ferme volonté du Japon d'assumer la responsabilité de la paix en Asie orientale en étroite collaboration avec des Puissances asiatiques, notamment la Chine, en mettant en garde les dirigeants chinois ou étrangers contre le danger d'entreprises qui favoriseraient la formation de troubles intérieurs ou extérieurs. Cela ne signifie nullement que le Japon vient de changer quoi que ce soit à sa politique du respect de la Porte ouverte et de la souveraineté de la Chine où tous les peuples amis et intéressés peuvent se livrer librement au commerce pacifique.

Ce n'est qu'à ces aides étrangères qui, sous n'importe quelle forme, s'avèreraient nuisibles au maintien de la paix et de l'ordre ou susceptibles de le troubler, que le

Japon

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Japon se croit être obligé de s'opposer pour remplir son devoir de défenseur naturel de la paix en Asie orientale. Il va sans dire que le Japon n'a pas l'intention de s'arroger le droit de prendre arbitrairement sous sa tutelle un pays indépendant, avec lequel il désire au contraire partager amicalement toute la responsabilité du maintien de cette paix, indispensable à la prospérité générale.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 4, 1934.

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file
m.m./h.



Mr. Jerome D. Greene,
and Mr. Hamilton.



Mr. Jerome Greene called and had a talk with Mr.

Hamilton in regard to the general situation with regard to Japan. He said that he felt very much depressed about recent happenings in Japan but that he thought that the only way to handle the present situation was to allow time to play upon the situation to the end that the more liberal elements in Japan might come again to the front.

He asked to be remembered to Mr. Hornbeck.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

May 8th, 1934.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In our conversation yesterday we touched on the phrase in the British statement to Japan concerning special rights possessed by Japan in relation to China which have been recognised by other Powers and not shared by them. Last night I received a telegram from Sir John Simon in which he gives me the text of the answer he had returned in the House of Commons to a parliamentary question on the phrase quoted above. The answer is in the following terms:-

"The phrase which my honourable friend
has quoted was employed for the purpose of
indicating that any particular policy of His

Majesty/s

The Honourable

Cordell Hull,

Department of State,

Washington, D.C.

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JUN 6 - 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

"Majesty's Government in China or any particular activity of British subjects could only be successfully challenged by showing that such policy or such activity infringed some special Japanese right recognized by other Powers and not shared by them.

"They are not rights of a general character that would fall within category indicated by my honourable friend. Japan however, like other countries, has no doubt acquired special rights in China recognized by other Powers but not shared by them by virtue of agreements relating to particular enterprises. An example would be the Japanese concession in Hankow. I am not in a position to give a list of such agreements nor do I think/

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

"think it necessary to do so, since the responsibility of proving that this or that right comes within the category in question does not rest on His Majesty's Government."

I think that this statement by Sir John Simon has a considerable bearing on the conversation which we had.

Believe me,

My dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

R.C. Lindsay

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 11 1934

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your note of May 8, 1934, quoting the text, as sent to you in a telegram from Sir John Simon, of the answer made in the House of Commons by Sir John Simon to a parliamentary question in regard to the phrase in the British statement to Japan concerning special rights possessed by Japan in relation to China which have been recognized by other powers and not shared by them.

I have read with care the text of the answer made by Sir John Simon and I appreciate your courtesy in sending it to me.

I am, my dear Sir Ronald,

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency

The Honorable Sir Ronald Lindsay,

P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O.,

Ambassador of Great Britain.

793.94/6659

FE:MMH/ZMK

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huefem NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 9 - 1934
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE UNDERSECRETARY
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 APR 27 1934

APR 28 1934
 DIVISION OF
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1934.

*not sent to Phillips
 by direction of Mr. Phillips
 MB.*

Memorandum of conversation with the Rumanian Minister,
 April 26th.

F/ESP
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793.94

The Rumanian Minister called to make inquiries about the Far Eastern situation. I told him, in confidence, that we had instructed Mr. Grew to call at the Foreign Office, in order to obtain the exact phraseology of the Amau statements, that in view of the various statements which had been given out in Geneva, Washington and Tokyo, it was confusing to know precisely the Japanese Government's attitude; I said I had not yet had a chance to examine Mr. Grew's reply. I added that we had reached no decision as to what action or stand we were going to take, that the situation which had developed was so important that it required a great deal of care and thought.

WPH
 William Phillips.

U WP/AB

CONFIDENTIAL FILE
 FILED
 MAY 11 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

May 18, 1934

MMH MAY 16 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 18 1934

NOTED

There is transmitted with London's Despatch No. 675 of May 2, 1934, the text of the statement made by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on April 30 regarding the action taken by the British Government on the Japanese Foreign Office announcement of April 17. The report also contains the text of Simon's statements on international cooperation to render technical assistance to China, which also should be noted.

The Despatch also incloses editorials of the leading British newspapers on the British handling of the Japanese announcement. As stated in the covering despatch the papers friendly to the British Government are disposed to "whitewash" the matter by accepting the assurances of the Japanese Government at face value. The LONDON TIMES points out that the incident has had at least some value: The resentment aroused in various parts of the world against the statement of Japanese policy in the Far East "must have convinced the Japanese

Government

081

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

Government that what has in practice been reluctantly tolerated in the remote and semi-detached provinces of North-Eastern China would find no countenance farther south, where the interests of the Central Chinese Government and of other nations are far more immediately affected." The Labor and Liberal papers take, of course, an opposite view. The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN observes that "far from an incident being closed, a chapter has been opened."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, May 2, 1934.




No. 675

SUBJECT: The Japanese Foreign Office Statement concerning
China.

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793.94/6661

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

JUN 7 - 1934

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Referring to the Embassy's telegram No. 213, April 30,
5 p.m. giving Sir John Simon's statement in Parliament on
that date concerning the conversations in Tokyo between the
Japanese Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador, I
1/ have the honor to enclose herewith a single copy of Hansard,
which publishes the official text of the statement, as well
as the questions made at the same time.

I/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2-7/

I also enclose herewith editorials published subsequently commenting on the Foreign Secretary's statement. In reviewing the attached editorials, it may be of interest to note in those papers generally favoring the Government (TIMES, DAILY TELEGRAPH and MORNING POST) that the tendency is to whitewash the intent of Japanese policy through the alleged satisfactory assurances that have been received by the British Ambassador at Tokyo.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Ray Atherton
 Ray Atherton, Jr.
 Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from Hansard, April 30, 1934.
2. Editorial from the TIMES, May 1, 1934.
3. " " " DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 1, 1934.
4. " " " MORNING POST, May 1, 1934.
5. " " " MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, May 1, 1934.
6. " " " NEWS CHRONICLE, May 1, 1934.
7. " " " DAILY HERALD, May 1, 1934.

RA/MVB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 675 of MAY 2 1934
 from the Embassy at London, England.

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
 House of Commons,
 30 April 1934.
 London. Pages 13-16 inc.

13

Oral Answers

30 APRIL 1934

Oral Answers

14

in this country and in India who have been at pains to suspend judgment on matters now before the Joint Select Committee by provocative statements made towards the end of their term of office by high officials, who are of necessity in the closest touch with the Viceroy?

The PRIME MINISTER: As I say, I have only had a telegraphic summary of the speech, and in that I do not see anything that would really justify the words and the implied censure of my hon. and gallant Friend.

CHINA.

JAPANESE STATEMENT (BRITISH COMMUNICATION).

9. **Sir CHARLES CAYZER** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state the nature of the communication which he has made to the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the statement made to the Japanese press by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the question of Japanese interests in China; and whether he has received any reply from the Japanese Government?

17. **Mr. HARCOURT JOHNSTONE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can now make a statement on the reply of the Japanese Government to the inquiries addressed to them by His Majesty's Government on Tuesday last?

Sir J. SIMON: The communication of His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25th April, which, as I informed the House the other day, was a friendly inquiry, was to the effect that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, to which Japan is a party, and that His Majesty's Government must, of course, continue to enjoy all rights in China which are common to all signatories or are otherwise proper, except in so far as their rights were restricted by agreements such as the consortium agreement, or in so far as Japan had special rights recognised by other Powers and not shared by them.

Sir Francis Lindley added that the anxieties regarding China expressed in the Japanese statement could not apply to the United Kingdom, since it was the

aim of British policy to avoid the dangers to peace and the integrity of China to which the statement referred. His Majesty's Government naturally could not admit the right of Japan alone to decide whether any particular action, such as the provision of technical or financial assistance, promoted such a danger, if that had indeed been the implication of the statement, which they did not believe. Under Articles 1 and 7 of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan had the right to call the attention of the other signatories to any action in China inimical to her security. This right provided Japan with safeguards and His Majesty's Government therefore assumed that the statement was not intended in any way to infringe the common rights of other Powers in China nor to infringe Japan's own treaty obligations.

In reply Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, indicated that His Majesty's Government were correct in this assumption. He assured His Majesty's Ambassador that Japan would observe the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that the policy of the Japanese Government and of His Majesty's Government in regard to the treaty coincided. His Excellency stated, in conclusion, that Japan continued to attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the open door in China and re-affirmed her acceptance of that policy.

Mr. JOHNSTONE: Has our Ambassador at Tokyo asked for, or obtained, any kind of explanation of the numerous statements issued by the Press Officer of the Japanese Foreign Office or by the Ambassadors of Japan at Washington and Berlin, and the representative also at Geneva, which seem to conflict with the statement of Mr. Hirota?

Sir J. SIMON: One must not assume that the information which reaches readers of the Press and every Press statement are authorised. I think that the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister is reasonably clear, and His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is. I would only add that His Majesty's Government are resolved to assist to the utmost possible extent the spirit of international co-operation in the progress of China towards peace and prosperity, and the maintenance of the spirit of harmony and good will in the Far East.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch N
 from the Embassy at London, E

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY
 House of Commons
 30 April 19
 London. Page

15 Oral Answers HOUSE OF COMMONS Oral Answers 16

EXTRA-TERRITORIAL PRIVILEGES.

12. **Sir WILLIAM DAVISON** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any representations have been received recently from the Chinese Government as to the extra-territorial privileges possessed by Great Britain in China; and to what effect?

Sir J. SIMON: No, Sir.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION.

15. **Mr. D. GRENFELL** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government regard themselves as still bound by the findings and recommendations of the Assembly Report of 24th February, 1933, which recommends that the League of Nations should continue to afford China the technical assistance in modernising her institutions which the Government may request, with a view to enabling the Chinese people to reorganise and consolidate the Chinese State and to set up a strong central Government?

Sir J. SIMON: The recommendation of the report to which the hon. Member refers was that the League should afford technical assistance to China as one of the methods of the policy of international co-operation initiated at the Washington Conference. International co-operation in China is governed by the terms of the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922, which expressly safeguards the principle of equality of opportunity for all nations. The Council of the League have laid down that the functions of their agent in China are of a purely technical and entirely non-political character.

NINE-POWER TREATY.

16. **Mr. D. GRENFELL** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which are the Powers which have accepted the obligations of Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922; what are the specific obligations contained in this article; and whether the Nine-Power Treaty is still valid?

Sir J. SIMON: The obligations of the Nine-Power Treaty were accepted by the United States, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal in addition to the British Empire. I will circulate the text of Article 1 in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

The Treaty is still in force.

Following is the text:

Article 1.—The Contracting Powers (other than China) agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

FOREIGN ADVISERS.

21. **Mr. D. G. SOMERVILLE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if his latest information from Tokyo indicates that the new Japanese pronouncement will prohibit the employment by China of foreign advisers to whom Japan may object?

Sir J. SIMON: No, Sir.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

MANCHURIA.

11. **Sir W. DAVISON** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in view of the consolidation of Manchukuo as an independent State under the Emperor Pu-Yi and the proposed early withdrawal of armed Japanese forces, the Government will take steps to secure the reconsideration of the present position by the League of Nations with a view to diplomatic recognition being granted to the new State under the altered circumstances which have now arisen?

Sir J. SIMON: I am not in a position to add anything to the reply which was returned to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, West (Mr. Donner), on the 6th March.

Sir W. DAVISON: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise how prejudicial to British trade is the present state of affairs in Manchukuo?

SAAR TERRITORY (PLEBISCITE).

13. **Sir C. CAYZER** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to 675
 from the Embassy
 PAPER THE TIMES
 England,
 NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE May 1, 1934.

German bonds, Gold
 (p. 22)

JAPAN AND CHINA

SIR JOHN SIMON'S statement in the House of Commons sets recent expositions of Japanese policy in proper perspective; and it is now clear that the original declaration by a spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign Office, and the variations upon it of the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and Berlin, were indeed expressions of the official mind but were not definitions of official policy. Every one who has had dealings with the Press bureau of a Government office knows the distinction that exists between the official importance of a statement made by one of its officers and a statement made by the responsible Minister himself. The one shows the trend of the official mind; the other defines the Government policy. It may now be accepted therefore that it is not the policy of Japan to act single-handed, or to oppose international projects for assisting China, whenever she herself deems the peace of the Far East to be imperilled. Nor is Japan committed to the principle of opposing concerted financial operations by other Powers, or of preventing assistance which, even though technical at the outset, might in her opinion attain political significance or end in spheres of influence and international control. In short the attitude so frankly propounded in the Tokyo Foreign Office, and readily repeated (with slight modifications) by two Ambassadors in distant posts, does not correspond with the policy actually practised by the present Japanese Government. That Government has assured the British Government, whose inquiries have been amply justified, that Japan adheres to, and will observe, the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. The countries having interests in the Far East undertook in that instrument to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China (as she existed in 1922), and to use their influence for effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. In order the more effectually to apply "the principle of the open door," they further agreed not to seek any arrangement which might purport to establish any general superiority of rights with regard to commercial or economic development in any designated part of China. Japan therefore officially remains within the fold of cooperation with the other Powers in China; and by the terms of the Treaty, as SIR JOHN SIMON reminded the House, she enjoys the right to call the attention of the other signatories to any action in China inimical to her security.

The whole episode, which the British Government prefers now to regard as closed, has at least had the satisfactory result of enlightening world opinion about the general trend of Japanese policy. The statements of three or four responsible spokesmen had roused general misgivings, and something more than misgivings in China, the United States, India, and this country. The repeated references to Japan's "mission," to her "special responsibilities," and to her "duty to act alone" created natural fears that Tokyo was contemplating an extension to still vaster stretches of the Far East of the policy successfully inaugurated in Manchuria; and the strong reaction of resentment must have convinced the Japanese Government that what has in practice been reluctantly tolerated in the remote and semi-detached provinces of North-Eastern China would find no countenance farther south, where the interests of the Central Chinese Government and of other nations are far more immediately affected. Nobody denies that Japan stands in a special relationship to China; but the accumulated interests of other Powers in Central China

fears of external aggression and the imminent perils of internal strife, quiet progress is being made in Central China with the help of foreign experts, many of whom have been supplied, not by an individual nation, but by the League of Nations—which might perhaps with advantage impress upon all its technical agents the importance of abstaining from any political activities whatsoever. Over the vast expanse of inland China roads are being built and freely used by crowded public motor-vehicles; aeroplanes and electric light are penetrating to remote towns; and a new industrial consciousness is growing in places far removed from the treaty ports. Modern Chinese business men and bankers are showing a new ability and enterprise. The Chinese are determined to play a leading part in their own economic development. They do not refuse the help of the understanding foreigner; but the conditions for him naturally become less sheltered and more difficult as the principle of equality becomes more surely established and the claims of nationalism more insistent. Moreover this emergence of the Eastern nations means for the European that he is faced with the competition of more or less equal efficiency with lower standards of living and therefore with lower costs of production. But, as greater security is established and the peaceful organization of the country progresses, the Chinese market is seen to be almost illimitable. The British interest, there as elsewhere, lies in promoting by every possible means peace, security, and economic development. The expansion of the markets of China would at once pacify her people, ease the economic strain in Japan, and increase the prosperity of the Western world. Something will have been gained from the recent alarms of the chanceries and the Press if the reaffirmed identity of Japanese and foreign policies can lead to a restoration of confidence, and divert to more constructive purposes the energies now being expended by the Far Eastern nations upon preparations against external menace.

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"mission," to her "special responsibilities," and to her "duty to act alone" created natural fears that Tokyo was contemplating an extension to still vaster stretches of the Far East of the policy successfully inaugurated in Manchuria; and the strong reaction of resentment must have convinced the Japanese Government that what has in practice been reluctantly tolerated in the remote and semi-detached provinces of North-Eastern China would find no countenance farther south, where the interests of the Central Chinese Government and of other nations are far more immediately affected. Nobody denies that Japan stands in a special relationship to China; but the accumulated interests of other Powers in Central China far outweigh those of Japan; and the only effective way to reconcile them all is to keep within the terms of treaties solemnly concluded. Sir FRANCIS LINDLEY—whose departure from Tokyo brings to an end a career of public service never officially rated at its full value—told the Japanese Government that the anxieties in regard to foreign enterprises in China which were expressed in the original Japanese statement could not apply to Great Britain, since it was the aim of British policy to avoid those dangers to peace and the integrity of China to which the statement referred. The Foreign Minister, Mr. HIROTA, concurred in this description of British policy, and agreed that Great Britain must of course enjoy all the rights in China which were common to the signatories of the multilateral treaties. Mr. HIROTA further reasserted emphatically the devotion of the Japanese Government to the policy of the open door. Sir JOHN SIMON on his part, in concluding his statement to the House, reaffirmed the British policy of assisting the progress of China to the utmost possible extent in the spirit of international cooperation and working for the peace, prosperity, and harmony of the Far East.

There was never more need than there is to-day to work for these objects in China in a spirit of open dealing and equality. A long series of delicate adjustments is necessary before foreign activities can be completely reconciled with the new spirit of nationalism in the Eastern nations. If any one country tries the discarded method of domination, then the smooth development of Chinese prosperity must be indefinitely retarded. Even now, behind the vague

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 675 of MAY 2 1934
from the Embassy at London, England.
PAPER DAILY TELEGRAPH

CITY LONDON
at quarter past 12, 12.41 a.m. to-morrow
at water London Bridge 1.39 a.m.; 4.1 p.m.

DATE May 1, 1934.

"THE OPEN DOOR" IN CHINA

SIR JOHN SIMON's statement in the House yesterday did not clear up the mystery attaching to the origin of the "unofficial" declaration of Japanese policy made on the 18th ult. Indeed, it is deepened by its tacit withdrawal and by the unexpected decision of the Japanese Government to postpone since the promised "official" explanation. A withdrawal, of course, is not a recantation, and what has been said, even unofficially, cannot be wholly unsaid. A certain impression remains, and it is of a somewhat disquieting character. Nevertheless, what most matters is that the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office yesterday declared the incident to be closed, and Sir JOHN SIMON said that the British Government are "content to leave this particular question where it is." That is the prudent course, and in other capitals than London there will be a feeling of sincere relief.

The British Foreign Secretary is most warmly to be congratulated on having reaffirmed with equal tact and firmness the rights of this country which seemed to be rudely threatened by the "unofficial" declaration of Japanese policy. They are the rights common to all the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, who pledged themselves to respect the sovereignty, integrity and independence of China. Inasmuch as Mr. HIROTA has assured the British Ambassador at Tokio that the recent declaration was not intended in any way to infringe these common rights, that British and Japanese policies with regard to the Treaty "coincide," and that Japan continues to attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of "the open door," there could have been no object in Sir JOHN SIMON pursuing his friendly interrogatories further. The wisdom of not stirring up quiet deeps is peculiarly applicable to foreign policy.

The explanation of the indiscretion, whether calculated or not, is almost certainly to be sought in the Dualism which obtains in Japanese Government circles. The policy of the Foreign Office is often sharply at variance with that of the military chiefs in the Cabinet. It may well be, therefore, that it seemed to someone a favourable opportunity to fly a kite, in view of the preoccupation of Europe and the United States with their own troubles. The kite is now returned to its box, before its points could be accurately determined. Yet this at least is certain, that all the vague claims of the unofficial statement were based on Japan's special relationship towards China as guardian of the peace of the Far East. To challenge or deny this on the ground that she can produce no strict legal title deeds will not do. The special relationship exists in fact, as it does in a score of other instances round the

interests of the other eight. If this delicate matter is raised again we hope that the definition will be entrusted to an official, and therefore more dexterous hand. In that case we may look for a statement more in consonance with Tokio's high tradition of clear-sighted statesmanship.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

tion of Europe and the United States with their own troubles. The kite is now returned to its box, before its points could be accurately determined. Yet this at least is certain, that all the vague claims of the unofficial statement were based on Japan's special relationship towards China as guardian of the peace of the Far East. To challenge or deny this on the ground that she can produce no strict legal title deeds will not do. The special relationship exists in fact, as it does in a score of other instances round the world. But the rights of others demand respect, and treaties must not be torn up by unilateral action. Nor, again, can a vast country like China, whose prosperity and continued independence are of vital interest to the commerce of the whole world, be treated as though she were a small and insignificant State chiefly important to her powerful neighbour because of the strategic position. Japan's special interest in China is obviously infinitely greater than Portugal's—another of the Nine Power signatories. But it does not override the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to Dispatch No. 675
From the Embassy at London England.

PAPER MORNING POST

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE May 1, 1934.

SOME KIND WORDS

We may be allowed to congratulate the SECRETARY of STATE on the manner and on the result of his diplomatic intervention in the Far East. The special claims which were made on behalf of Japan in regard to China might easily have led to an awkward imbroglio: to ignore them was impossible; to deny them dangerous. Sir JOHN SIMON has approached Japan as one friend to another: he has put the case in the form of a friendly inquiry, and he has been rewarded with a reply which smooths out this gathering frown on the face of the world. Our FOREIGN SECRETARY owes his success not only to his method of approach, but to the fact that he had already established a title to the confidence of Japan. When the League of Nations inclined to threats of "sanctions" and "economic blockades," Sir JOHN SIMON put an end to that perilous nonsense by his public statement on Manchuria, that "under no circumstances will this Government authorise this country to be a party to the conflict." Thereby the situation was immediately eased, as when ANDROCLES drew the thorn from the paw of the lion, and the reply of Japan in the present case suggests the happy result. Over and above these personal relations, there is the old friendship between the two island empires, which has established a credit fund of good feeling, not yet exhausted.

It was in this spirit that his Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo put the British case, basing himself on the strong ground of equal rights in China guaranteed by the Nine Power Treaty. Sir FRANCIS LINDLEY was able to add, with more than a diplomatic measure of sincerity, that the whole aim of British policy was to maintain the peace and integrity of China, the end professed by the statement at issue. These preliminaries, as well as the record and the interests of Great Britain in China, gave cogency and weight to the contention that there could be no right of one Power alone to govern the action of other Powers in China, the less as Japan has the right under the Treaty to refer to the other signatories anything inimical to her interests. The reply of Mr. HIROTO left nothing to be desired, since it admitted the British case and reaffirmed, on behalf of Japan, the maintenance of the open door. Sir JOHN SIMON proposes to leave the matter there, and the success of his intervention reminds us of certain words used by Dr. BASSETT MOORE, a great American authority on International Law, in regard to the breach between Japan and the League of Nations:

Had the Assembly tendered friendly and impartial good offices, and, as a great Secretary of State of the United States once suggested to an offending Government, "used some kind words," it might have contributed to the actual and amicable solution of the immense difficulties which the Lytton report so clearly explained.

When a case is strong it suffers nothing from the friendly spirit in which it is presented, nor does it gain anything from threats of "sanctions."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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When a case is strong it suffers nothing from the friendly spirit in which it is presented, nor does it gain anything from threats of "sanctions."

The SECRETARY of STATE has rendered a service, not only to his own country but to the other Powers concerned. As for Japan, she has shown what is called in her native science of jiu-jitsu, the "willow-bending spirit." When she discovered that the claims advanced were concentrating upon her a unity of opposition, she has had the good sense to bow before the storm. The incident, we hope, will be a lesson to both sides: it should teach the Western Powers the danger of isolating Japan; and Japan it should teach the danger of isolating herself. It also reminds us of the danger of a derelict China, the anarchy of which is the justification of her neighbour. For any extravagance in the statement of a claim should not blind us to the fact that Japan cannot be indifferent to the arming of forces which have brought ruin upon China and involve the whole East in the consequences of their misrule. We notice that the League of Nations has a programme for the reconstruction of China on its agenda for the Council Session of 14th May: it has been singularly unfortunate in its handling of the question in the past, and we hope it will not be allowed to re-embroil us in the future.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5

675

PAPER from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

NEWSPAPER

CITY LONDON

DATE May 1, 1934.

Twenty-four leaders of the Bombay mill strike have been arrested. The strike has now lasted for a week. About three-quarters of the operators are idle.

Japan's Reply

The Japanese Foreign Office has decided not to publish the text of the official answer which it handed to the British Ambassador in Tokio last Thursday in answer to the "friendly inquiry" which he had made touching Japanese policy in China. The Japanese Foreign Office knows how to stand mute and leave it to ambassadors to be garrulous. The gist of Britain's question and Japan's reply must be derived from Sir John Simon's statement in the House of Commons yesterday. Though an inquiry and friendly, Sir F. Lindley's questions, as repeated by the Secretary of State, take on a form which must have exercised Mr. Hirota's talents in reply. They were "to the effect that" Britain "must of course continue to enjoy the rights in China which are common to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty" and that she "could not admit the right of Japan alone to decide whether any particular action, such as the provision of technical and financial assistance," promoted any danger to "the peace and the integrity of China." Neither in form nor in substance are these what are ordinarily called inquiries: they are statements, and so much the better. Sir Francis Lindley also pointed out that articles 1 and 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty give Japan "the right to call the attention of the other signatories to any action in China which is inimical to her security," and that this "right provides Japan with safeguards." (Article 7, in particular, lays down that "whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves . . . the stipulations of the present treaty, there shall be full and frank communication between the Powers concerned.") So far Sir Francis Lindley, as reported in the House of Commons, and so far so good.

We are not to be honoured with the written text of Mr. Hirota's verbal answers to these statements or inquiries. The Foreign Secretary's summary, however, gives us all that we require. The British Government was right, Mr. Hirota said, in the assumption which it has considerably made, that Japan will not infringe "the rights of other Powers in China or . . . her treaty obligations." Japan, he added, would observe the Nine-Power Treaty and "attached importance to the maintenance of the 'Open Door' in China"; her policy coincided with the British in regard to the Nine-Power Treaty. Whatever this last cryptic sentence means, the substance of Mr. Hirota's answer is as easy and evasive as might be expected. It leaves unanswered the specific questions put by the Ambassador and finds a reply in general statements. When we have swallowed and digested the Hirota answer, what remains? As Mr. Harcourt Johnstone asked, what of the statements made by two Ambassadors, a Consul General, and a number of Foreign Office spokesmen in Tokio? Did our Ambassador ask for or obtain an explanation of their language, which in its weight and its precision differed strikingly from Mr. Hirota's? The Foreign Secretary replied that Mr. Hirota had been "reasonably clear," and that "his

April 20 and April 25. The sponge cannot be drawn across the blackboard in this way. Either these Japanese officials spoke or they did not. If they did speak, they should be disavowed specifically or should themselves deny the statements which have been attributed to them. If they did not speak, a detailed denial is a matter for typewriters. The general form of Mr. Hirota's and the Japanese Foreign Office's calming statements cannot satisfy the heart of Sir John Simon or the minds of anyone who troubles to look up the references. Japan, it seems, assumes the "incident closed." It is obviously not closed. The conflict between Japan's formal assurances and the informal but concerted warnings and threats of her various "spokesmen" is too great. China may gain in strength. Japan cannot tolerate the idea of China gaining in strength, except as a vassal. So far from an incident being closed, a chapter has been opened.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In one of his metamorphoses, the Tokio spokesman has, for instance, said that it was "quite out of the question" for Japan to allow the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty to decide what "constitutes a threat to peace in the Far East." Is that compatible with Britain's affirmation of the seventh article of the Nine-Power Treaty or with Japan's assurance that she will observe it? Can we seriously pretend that we are satisfied with that? Again, Mr. Hiroshi Saito, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, has been reported as announcing that Japan does not intend to close the "Open Door" "entirely." Mr. Yokoyama, Japanese Consul General at Geneva, has affirmed "Japan's peculiar competence in China." It is, of course, true that the Japanese Foreign Office blandly settles with these awkwardnesses by informing him who runs that there have been no statements touching Japanese policy in China between

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6 to despatch No. 675 of MAY 2 1934
 from the Embassy at London, England.

NEWS CHRONICLE

NUMBER

CITY

LONDON

DATE May 1, 1934.

Advertisements: 72/3, Fleet Street, E.C.4.
 Telephone: Central 6000 (40 Lines).
 MANCHESTER: 8, Derby Street, Cheetham.
 Telephone: Blackfriars 1101 (6 Lines).
 Leeds: 25, York Place. Tel. Leeds 27387.
 Paris: 100, Rue de Richelieu.
 Berlin: 13, Bregenzerstrasse.
 New York: Room 307, Evening Post Building,
 75 West Street, New York City.

The Kite Comes Down

Sir John Simon's statement yesterday confirms Mr. Vernon Bartlett's anticipation that Japan "will now use the soft pedal."

The British Government indicated to Tokio that, as has been pointed out in these columns, the Japanese claim to forbid technical and financial assistance to China was inadmissible under the Nine Power Treaty; and that if Japan wishes to make this or any similar claim the course clearly prescribed by the Treaty is to call the attention of the other signatories to action which she considers inimical to her safety.

The Japanese Foreign Minister has replied that it is not Japan's intention to infringe the common rights of other Powers in China and has "reaffirmed the policy of the open door."

There, for the time being, this matter rests. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. It is clear that the challenge was deliberate and organised. The Japanese representatives in Washington, in Berlin, and at Geneva—not to speak of semi-officially inspired Japanese newspapers—could not all have begun to say the same sort of thing at the same time without any apparent provocation, by pure accident.

Japan has now retired, at least formally, to the safe shelter of the Nine Power Treaty. The Powers must, of course, accept her assurances; but they will show themselves singularly unteachable if they do not profit by the respite won to get together and concert a joint policy which will either prevent a recurrence of these dangerous alarms and excursions or provide an effective and prompt reply to them if they are repeated.

It becomes increasingly clear, year by year, that a strong China, capable of maintaining her own rights, is the first essential of real peace in the East.

Realising this, the natural aim of the Western Powers' policy will be to support vigorously the Nanking Government in the hope that it may become strong enough to end the anarchy which is an invitation to the spoiler from without. The task is not hopeless; some progress with it has already been made; and it is so important that neither Japan nor anybody else can be permitted to interfere with it.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch No. 575 of 1111
 from the Embassy at London, England
 PAPER DAILY HERALD NUMBER
 CITY LONDON DATE May 1, 1934.

"Content"

SIR JOHN SIMON is "content" with Mr. Hirota's statement that Japan will observe the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty.

To the ordinary man the assurance would be more convincing if the Government which gives it had not been, for over two years, busily engaged in violating the said Treaty.

Sir John, at the time, was quite "content" with Japanese assurances that her troops in Manchuria would be withdrawn within the railway zone "as speedily as possible."

Since that pledge was given they have conquered four Chinese provinces and are threatening two more.

Mr. Hirota now promises to observe the Treaty: but he neither withdraws nor modifies the claims which he, his diplomats and his "official spokesmen," have made to something like suzerain control over the Chinese Government.

The Japanese Government will be only too delighted to continue giving such assurances and to be told that Sir John is "content."

It gives them confidence that they can push ahead with their plans for the domination of China without fear of any "diplomatic complications."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 18

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Hague, Netherlands,
April 30, 1934.

FE
WE

SUBJECT: COMMENT OF NETHERLANDS PRESS CONCERNING
JAPANESE STATEMENT RE CHINA.

MAY 9 34

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAY 11 1934
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 10 1934
Department of State

F/ESP
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Per	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the recent official but unwritten statement made by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office has brought forth considerable comment from the Netherlands press.

Most of the editorials which have appeared are critical but not lacking in caution. This last may be explained by the fact that the exact nature of the Japanese statement or, rather, its official status was a question of some doubt. However, considering the generally conservative...

MAY 12 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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conservative nature of the press of Holland the attacks on this new démarche of the Japanese Government are certainly impressive.

I quote herewith a few excerpts:

ALGEREENSE HANDELSBLAD - April 24th
 (Amsterdam - Liberal)

"The Japanese Government is again pursuing its well-known tactics.....Now it wishes to prove that the Foreign Office statement of April 17th was not significant, since the statement has met with serious opposition in American and English circles....It is, however, to be observed that the Japanese warning has had its effect in that its intentions cannot any longer be subject to misunderstanding, the only question now being how and when they will be realized."

MAASBODE - April 24th
 (Rotterdam - Catholic)

"However greatly Europe and America may be occupied with all kinds of problems of internal and international significance, the Japanese intentions and plans in the Far East, as disclosed this week so openly and impudently, caused a severe shock in all white countries. Japan, in order to test how far it may go, proclaimed its policy via a semi-official method. This has resulted in an agreeable surprise and now the Cabinet in Tokyo has approved officially what was set forth in the non-official statement. The communication contains the most stringent and challenging sentences."

NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSCHE COURANT - April 25th.
 (Rotterdam - Liberal)

"The sleight of hand said to be characteristic of Far Eastern diplomats seems to be unknown to the Japanese. They are brusque in all their movements. In most unexpected ways they arouse fears of war and then equally suddenly they turn a pacifist face. These nerve-racking movements accompany all shifts of policy and the grinding of the cogs can be heard. This does not seem to be in keeping with tradition. It was the silent and patient preparation of wars that made Japan

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
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a great power.....Japan was always unheard when it went about achieving its purposes. In reality the Japanese are a nervous people and their policy reflects that characteristic.....Japan can never be relied upon; all its actions are followed by counter tactics. The feeling aroused by the Japanese statement is now being commented away but things are not just as if nothing had occurred. The work of conciliating China now must be abandoned. The military party in Japan has caused great anxiety to the world."

It should be added that the Socialist press has attacked the Japanese policy in the usual strident tone, but I do not think it worth while to quote from their editorials. In none of the press comment is any mention made of the situation in the Netherlands East Indies, where the aggressive Japanese policy has had considerable effect and where Japanese economic penetration is proving a problem of great importance.

Respectfully yours,


 Grenville T. Emmet.

File No. 710

In quintuplicate

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 10, 1934

~~EIN~~
~~MDS~~

Warrington Dawson sends with his report of April 26, 1934, a rather interesting résumé of comments in the French press on the recent announcement of the Japanese Foreign Office. The views of the French press are interesting not because they put forward any novel ideas but because they largely re-echo the views expressed in the United States.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 26, 1934.

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


SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1404)



MAY 9 1934

To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
1404, dated April 26, 1934.



JUL 25 1934

FILED.

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W.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 26, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1404.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and Far Eastern Questions

The declaration of Japanese policy in regard to China, recently given out in Tokyo, was the subject of a leading article published in LE TEMPS of April 22, 1934, by Roland de Marès, who remarked that general surprise had been caused by the method of informing the world by a press communiqué of intentions having so grave a bearing, instead of resorting first to diplomatic conversations with other Governments. He went on to remark:

"The fact that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo was authorized to complete this communication with a verbal commentary on some of the most delicate points, has further increased the sense of uneasiness provoked by this initiative. If it is true that the question has not so far

been

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been the subject of any official 'démarche' of the Japanese Government with the other Powers concerned, it is none the less certain that the publication by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of a veritable 'exposé' of the Japanese point of view concerning a possible intervention in favor of China, has now been brought to the attention of the world."

De Marès regards this as being a new development of utmost importance for the entire Far Eastern problem, and he goes on to remark that Japan, being the only Power in a position to take effective action, knew very well that the other Powers would never have agreed to confer upon it a mandate to this end. Japan therefore "seems to have profited by the present disturbed condition of the entire world, the tension in Europe and the crisis in the United States, which took the thoughts of the Powers off of any far-away adventure, in order to assume such a mandate on its own authority." De Marès remarks in concluding that international opinion has reacted very sharply, especially in Washington and London where Japan is accused of deliberately pursuing "a policy of the accomplished fact." But it remains to be seen whether England and the Americans are resolved to act otherwise than by means of solemn protests.

In LE TEMPS of April 26th, Roland de Marès reverted to the question of "Japan and China," commenting upon the

statement

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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statement given out in Tokyo relative to the original declaration concerning Japanese action in China. Roland de Marès remarked:

"The declaration made on April 18th took note, in substance, that only collective action of the Powers to bring financial or technical aid to China might have political consequences leading to complications relative to the delimitation of the Zone of influence or even international control or the partition of China. Therefore Japan, concerned over the part it was to play and which consists in opposing any action of a nature to compromise peace in the Far East, would not object to financial or commercial settlements provided they could not imperil the cause of peace. But the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs made it clear in his commentary that Japan, because of its special position, was the chief judge whether a measure taken by China or by a foreign Power was or was not dangerous for peace, and that whenever Japan felt it necessary to protest it would be by positive measures. This either has no meaning at all or it signifies that Japan is appointing itself the protector of China, proclaiming in its own interest a veritable Monroe Doctrine for that portion of Continental Asia. In consideration of the stir made by this declaration, Tokyo attempted to explain that there was no thought of damaging the principle of the Open Door. But such explanations have not in any way modified the base of the questions which is the essential consideration."

The

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The situation created by the original declaration therefore stands, in the opinion of de Marès, particularly as concerns the declaration that Japan alone can judge of the potential dangers of the negotiations in which China may engage. He goes on to say:

"The question of the limitation of treaties is now under discussion in London, where it is asked how this attitude of the Tokyo Government can be reconciled with existing treaties and agreements, if Japan claims to assume the right of discrimination among the various financial and economic transactions of the Powers with China. The English would like the Tokyo Government, prior to any discussion, to define its juridic position with reference to the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty, which formally binds the signatories as concerns a maintenance of the Open Door and of the territorial integrity of China. The British Ambassador in Tokyo held yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hirota, a long conversation no communiqué about which was issued to the press. It may be concluded from this that the British Government intends to act only very prudently, and that before concerting with Washington on a common attitude which may possibly be adopted, as is desired in certain English circles, it wishes to get exact information as to the intentions of Japan and the limits which may be put upon its action in China and its part as protector of the Peace in the Far East."

Writing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Writing in L'ACTION FRANCAISE of April 23rd, J. Delebecque remarks that it could readily be understood that the position taken by the Japanese Government should have aroused deep emotion, first in China, then in Geneva, and also in Russia, in England, and especially in the United States. Having thrown their bomb, the Japanese, according to their custom, appear to be greatly surprised at all the noise which followed. For they explained that they did not object to the independence of China, that they had no intention of violating the treaties, and that they were merely promoting the development of Chinese prosperity. But beneath all this fine style they maintain that the time has passed where any other Powers, even the League of Nations, can exercise an influence in order to exploit China.

Delebecque concludes by remarking that America in particular has good reason to understand this language which recalls that of President Monroe concerning the Monroe Doctrine in his message to Congress "on December 2, 1923" (sic), which marked the end of America's vassalage to Europe.

In a series of articles published April 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, L'HUMANITE dealt with the entire Far Eastern question, declaring that the Japanese offensive might soon start a war in the Pacific and holding the League of Nations as largely responsible for the situation which has arisen.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The originals of the articles quoted are enclosed.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

6 ✓ Enclosures: (in single copy)

1. Extract from LE TEMPS, April 22, 1934;
2. LE TEMPS, April 26, 1934;
3. L'ACTION FRANCAISE, April 23, 1934;
4. L'HUMANITE, April 21, 1934;
5. L'HUMANITE, April 22, 1934;
6. L'HUMANITE, April 23, 1934.

In quantuplicate

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Copy to E. I. C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 1 to S. R. #WD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS of April 22, 1934.

BULLETIN DU JOUR

EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Les termes dans lesquels la politique du Japon à l'égard de la Chine vient d'être définie à Tokio même font l'objet de nombreux commentaires dans les milieux internationaux particulièrement intéressés par la situation générale en Extrême-Orient. On semble avoir surtout été surpris par le procédé qui consiste à notifier au monde par une communication à la presse des intentions d'une portée aussi grave avant toute conversation par la voie diplomatique avec les autres gouvernements. Le fait que le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères à Tokio ait été autorisé à compléter cette communication par un commentaire verbal qui en précise les points les plus délicats a encore accentué le malaise provoqué par cette initiative. S'il est exact que la question n'a fait jusqu'ici l'objet d'aucune démarche officielle du gouvernement du Japon auprès des puissances intéressées, il n'en est pas moins certain qu'elle se trouve posée devant l'opinion internationale par la publication d'un véritable exposé du ministre des affaires étrangères du point de vue nippon en ce qui concerne une éventuelle intervention d'assistance en faveur de la Chine.

Il ressort de cet exposé, auquel la presse nipponne a donné la forme d'une véritable déclaration, que le gouvernement japonais considère que la restauration de l'ordre et de l'autorité en Chine est une affaire purement chinoise, mais que l'empire du Soleil-Levant étant le défenseur naturel de la paix en Extrême-Orient, il a le devoir de s'opposer à toute action de nature à créer un danger pour le maintien de cette paix. Sa thèse est que toute action collective des puissances étrangères pour apporter une aide technique ou financière à la Chine doit avoir fatalement des conséquences politiques pouvant entraîner des complications, la délimitation de zones d'influence, le contrôle international, voire même la division de la Chine. Le Japon ne fera néanmoins pas d'objection, est-il dit, à des négociations particulières avec la Chine en vue de régler des questions commerciales et financières si de tels règlements sont avantageux pour la Chine et ne portent aucun préjudice à la paix en Extrême-Orient. On ne manque pas d'en conclure généralement que le Japon s'affirme comme seul gardien vigilant de la paix dans cette partie du monde, comme seul protecteur qualifié de la Chine, pays où il n'admettra plus aucune intervention collective des puissances, et qu'il entend exercer un contrôle sur toutes les conventions que le gouvernement chinois viendrait à conclure avec les pays étrangers. D'une part, protectorat de fait de l'empire du Soleil-Levant sur la République chinoise; d'autre part, proclamation d'une véritable doctrine de Monroe pour cette partie du continent asiatique où aucune intervention des puissances ne serait plus tolérée par les Nippons : telle est la politique qu'on peut dégager de cette déclaration.

Le commentaire du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères, à Tokio, tend à confirmer cette interprétation. En effet, il affirme que le Japon assumant la responsabilité du maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient est mieux placé que n'importe quelle autre puissance pour juger si une mesure prise par la Chine ou par une puissance étrangère comporte un danger pour la paix, et pour protester par des « mesures positives », sur la base des traités existants, chaque fois qu'il estimera nécessaire de le faire. Le Japon s'arrogerait ainsi le droit d'apprécier si les négociations commerciales ou financières particulières de telles ou telles puissances avec la Chine comportent des avantages ou des inconvénients pour le maintien de la paix, ce qui reviendrait à dire qu'il se réserve de contrôler les relations extérieures de la République chinoise. Afin que nul ne puisse s'y tromper, le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères a même ajouté que le principe fondamental de la politique adoptée par le Japon ne dérive pas des droits résultant des traités, mais de la position spéciale de cette puissance en ce qui concerne la sauvegarde de l'ordre en Extrême-Orient. La

nécessité chinoise, à l'impuissance des comités politiques, au désordre de toutes les ambitions et de tous les appétits déchainés, cela crée un péril permanent pour le monde extrême-oriental. Par sa position géographique et par ses moyens militaires, le Japon est seul en mesure d'agir efficacement contre cet état de choses. Comme on ne se serait jamais mis d'accord pour lui confier un mandat à cet effet, il semble profiter du trouble actuel dans le monde entier, de la tension en Europe et de la crise aux Etats-Unis, qui détournent toutes les puissances d'une aventure lointaine, pour se donner de sa seule autorité ce mandat.

Les réactions de l'opinion internationale sont naturellement assez vives, surtout à Washington et à Londres, où l'on accuse le Japon de poursuivre délibérément une politique du fait accompli; mais il reste à voir si les Anglais et les Américains sont décidés à réagir autrement que par de solennelles protestations. Tout porte à penser que la sensationnelle déclaration dont le gouvernement de Tokio a dû peser toutes les conséquences avant de se résoudre à la faire publiquement est une riposte directe au rapprochement des Etats-Unis et de la Russie soviétique. Il n'est pas certain que la mise au point faite par le gouvernement de Tokio pour assurer qu'il ne se propose pas de porter atteinte au principe de la porte ouverte en Chine doive rassurer les autres puissances sur les conséquences directes ou indirectes de cette politique nouvelle. Il y a aussi la protestation du gouvernement chinois contre l'hégémonie nipponne en Asie; mais on ne saurait oublier que la Chine en manœuvrant à Genève avec l'appui des puissances contre le Japon n'a su empêcher ni la création du Mandchoukouo, ni la perte du Jehol. De toute manière, quelque chose de nouveau commence dans l'Orient lointain; et il faut bien constater que la situation internationale est telle que les Japonais, si audacieuses que soient leurs initiatives, ont des chances de mener le jeu à leur gré.

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La Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 porte By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75
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Qu'il y ait dans tout cela un fait nouveau d'une importance capitale pour la situation générale en Extrême-Orient, c'est bien évident. Le Japon voudrait imposer sa tutelle politique à la Chine, et s'opposer par des « mesures positives » à toute intervention collective ou particulière des autres puissances dans un domaine dont il prendrait délibérément le contrôle. Il entendrait défendre la Chine contre les autres et, au besoin, contre elle-même. Si on voit les choses en arriver à ce point, la faute en est surtout à l'anarchie chinoise, à laquelle la politique concertée des grandes puissances n'a pas su remédier efficacement, paralysée comme elle l'a été par la diversité des intérêts et la rivalité des influences. L'immense pays jaune avec ses 400 millions d'habitants livrés aux menées des bolchevistes, aux querelles des gé-

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from the proposed 'sale'.

INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE

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Encl. 2 to S. R. #WD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.
 Extract from LE TEMPS of April 26, 1934.

LE JAPON ET LA CHINE

Le gouvernement de Tokio vient de confirmer officiellement l'avertissement donné il y a quelques jours par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais au sujet d'une action collective ou particulière des puissances en Chine. Parce qu'aucune démarche par la voie diplomatique n'avait eu lieu, et qu'il semblait pour le moins étrange que le cabinet japonais pût prendre une attitude si nouvelle et si catégorique sans en discuter au préalable avec les puissances particulièrement intéressées à la situation en Extrême-Orient, on supposait, dans certains milieux internationaux, qu'il ne s'agissait là que d'une initiative dont le gouvernement impérial ne prenait pas officiellement la responsabilité et qui, de ce fait, n'avait pas la portée qu'on voulait lui attribuer. Or, voici que le cabinet de Tokio, réuni en conseil, vient de confirmer les déclarations faites le 18 avril par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères et qui, on le sait, ont provoqué un assez vif émoi à Washington, à Londres et, naturellement, à Nankin. Le gouvernement chinois a élevé une protestation contre les prétentions du Japon de s'arroger le droit de contrôler les relations de la Chine avec les autres puissances. Répondant à des questions qui lui étaient posées à la Chambre des communes par des députés des trois partis, Sir John Simon annonça qu'étant donné le caractère de la déclaration japonaise il avait cru nécessaire de demander des éclaircissements au cabinet de Tokio. Le communiqué publié hier par le gouvernement japonais constitue de toute évidence une première réponse indirecte à la note envoyée à ce sujet par Londres.

La déclaration du 18 avril constatait, en somme, que toute action collective des puissances pour apporter une aide financière ou technique à la Chine pouvant avoir des conséquences politiques entraînant des complications, la délimitation de zones d'influence, voire le contrôle international ou la division de la Chine, le Japon, soucieux de son rôle, qui est de s'opposer à toute action de nature à compromettre la paix en Extrême-Orient, ne ferait pourtant pas d'objections à des règlements financiers ou commerciaux ne portant pas préjudice à la paix. Mais le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères crut devoir préciser dans son commentaire de cette déclaration que le Japon, en raison de sa position spéciale, est le principal juge pour estimer si une mesure prise par la Chine ou par une puissance étrangère est dangereuse ou non pour la paix, et que chaque fois qu'il croira devoir protester il le fera par des « mesures positives ». Ou cela n'avait aucune signification, ou cela voulait dire que le Japon s'instituait le protecteur de la Chine et proclamait à son profit une véritable doctrine de Monroe pour cette partie du continent asiatique. En présence de l'émotion provoquée par cette déclaration, on s'est efforcé à Tokio d'expliquer qu'on ne songeait nullement à porter atteinte au principe de la porte ouverte; mais ces mises au point n'ont en rien modifié le fond des choses, ce qui constitue l'essentiel du problème ainsi posé.

Le communiqué que vient de publier le gouvernement japonais souligne qu'il n'y a dans tout cela qu'un développement de la politique que le ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Hirota, exposa le 23 mars dernier à la Diète, politique qui n'est pas en opposition avec le principe de la porte ouverte ni en contradiction avec le principe de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine. Il précise que le Japon n'entend pas faire d'objection à tout appui dénué de caractère politique que les puissances voudront assurer à la Chine pour des questions purement financières et commerciales, mais qu'il formule l'objection la plus expresse à tout appui financier ou technique qui aurait une signification politique. « Le Japon ne peut admettre sans protester, est-il dit, l'importation d'avions militaires et d'armes étrangères en Chine, car ces transactions contribueront, un jour ou l'autre, à troubler la paix et l'unité de la Chine. » Pour formuler cette objection de principe, le Japon fait état de sa position spéciale, de ses responsabilités en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. En réalité, il ne veut pas que l'aide aux Chinois permette à ceux-ci de s'armer, soit les uns contre les autres, soit contre une autre

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 Chinois permette à ceux-ci de s'armer, soit les
 uns contre les autres, soit contre une autre
 puissance, qui ne pourrait guère être que
 l'empire du Soleil-Levant. Tokio veut contrôler
 l'armement de la Chine, lequel peut constituer
 une grave menace pour le Japon, et pour
 exercer efficacement ce contrôle, il réclame
 un droit de regard sur toutes les négociations
 du gouvernement chinois avec les autres puis-
 sances. Cela n'équivaut peut-être pas à l'éta-
 blissement d'un véritable protectorat, mais les
 Américains, qui suivent de très près l'évolu-
 tion de la situation en Extrême-Orient, sou-
 tiennent que par le contrôle des relations de
 la Chine avec les autres pays les Japonais
 auraient, en fait, la direction de la politique
 extérieure de la République chinoise, et qu'ils
 devraient être consultés même pour les mesu-
 res d'ordre intérieur que prendrait le gouver-
 nement de Nankin.

Il ne semble pas, dans ces conditions, que
 le communiqué publié à l'issue du conseil de
 cabinet tenu avant-hier à Tokio soit de nature
 à modifier sensiblement l'impression produite
 par la première déclaration nipponne et par
 le commentaire qu'en fit le porte-parole du
 ministère des affaires étrangères. Il y a sur-
 tout l'affirmation que seul le Japon est juge
 d'estimer si des négociations de la Chine avec
 les autres puissances sont dangereuses ou non
 pour la paix, et qu'au besoin les protestations
 de l'empire du Soleil-Levant prendront la
 forme de « mesures positives », il est vrai
 « dans la limite des traités ». Or, c'est préci-
 sément la question de la limite des traités

qu'on pose à Londres, où l'on se préoccupe de
 savoir comment cette attitude du gouvernement
 de Tokio peut se concilier avec les traités et
 accords existants, alors que le Japon prétend
 s'arroger un droit de discrimination entre les
 diverses transactions financières et économi-
 ques des puissances avec la Chine. Les Anglais
 voudraient qu'avant toute discussion le gouver-
 nement de Tokio définit sa position juridique
 à l'égard du traité des neuf puissances de 1922,
 lequel engage formellement ses signataires en
 ce qui concerne le maintien de la porte ou-
 verte et de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine.
 L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Tokio
 a eu, hier, un long entretien avec le ministre
 des affaires étrangères, M. Hirota, entretien à
 l'issue duquel aucune communication n'a été
 faite à la presse. On peut en conclure que
 le gouvernement britannique n'entend agir
 qu'avec prudence, et qu'avant de se concerter
 avec Washington sur une attitude commune
 à adopter éventuellement, comme le réclament
 certains milieux anglais, il veut s'informer
 exactement des intentions du Japon et de la
 limite qu'il entend fixer à son action en Chine
 et à son rôle de gardien de la paix en Extrême-
 Orient.

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Encl. 3 to S. R. #WD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.
 Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE of April 23, 1934.

La nouvelle doctrine de Monroe

Nous nous demandions l'autre jour si l'éclaircie dans les affaires d'Extrême-Orient et la détente entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis n'étaient pas plus apparentes que réelles. L'événement n'a pas tardé à justifier notre scepticisme. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais vient de publier dans la presse indigène une sorte de communiqué, composé, dit-on, par M. Hirota lui-même, et qui, bien que conçu en termes assez vagues, peut être regardé, dit un observateur aussi avisé que le correspondant du *Times* à Tokio, comme « l'exposé le plus important de la politique japonaise à l'égard de la Chine qui ait été fait depuis de nombreuses années ». Le journal officieux *Asahi* y voit, de son côté, « le point de départ d'une nouvelle époque ».

La déclaration proclame le droit du Japon d'agir seul en Chine « quand il estimera la paix de l'Extrême-Orient en péril ». Elle ajoute que sa situation particulière et sa « mission » en Asie imposent au Japon une « responsabilité » et qu'il s'opposera « en principe » aux entreprises et aux opérations étrangères en Chine, parce que celles-ci, techniques au début, prennent par la suite « inévitablement » une signification politique et finissent par se traduire par la création de sphères d'influence. Ni l'assistance financière « concertée » à la Chine, ni l'aide militaire, par exemple sous forme de ventes d'avions, de construction d'aérodromes, d'envoi d'instructeurs étrangers, ne sont plus admissibles, toujours « en principe ». Quant à l'application du nouveau principe, le Japon se réserve d'y passer suivant les circonstances et quand il le jugera bon. Il considérera chaque cas comme un cas d'espèce. Ce qui lui importe aujourd'hui, c'est d'affirmer son droit spécial, son privilège en Chine. Le reste suivra en son temps.

On conçoit que cette prise de position ait provoqué une grosse émotion en Chine d'abord, puis à Genève, en Russie, en Angleterre et surtout aux Etats-Unis. Le gouvernement de Nankin a rappelé qu'en tant que membre de la Société des Nations, il avait le devoir de travailler au maintien de la paix par le moyen de garanties internationales; il a contesté que la collaboration entre la Chine et telle ou telle puissance étrangère sous forme de prêts financiers ou d'aide technique ait jamais eu aucun caractère politique. A Moscou, on dénonce avec violence l'impérialisme japonais, qui « jette le masque ». A Londres, on se rend bien compte qu'il s'agit d'une manifestation marquant que le Japon sent désormais assez fort pour abattre ses cartes et pour dire tout haut que rien ne doit plus se passer en Extrême-Orient sans sa permission. Dans ces conditions, et tout en prenant les mesures de précaution imposées par la dureté des temps (base de Singapore ajoutée à celle de Hong-Kong), le plus sage ne serait-il pas de s'accommoder du fait accompli et de sauver ce qui peut encore être sauvé, c'est-à-dire les immenses intérêts britanniques en Chine ? A Washington enfin, on constate avec inquiétude que les Japonais, pour hausser le ton, profitent du moment où la tension européenne s'accroît et où les Etats-Unis sont en proie à de graves embarras intérieurs. L'Amérique va-t-elle se trouver un jour prochain dans l'alternative de choisir entre l'abandon des dogmes de la « porte ouverte » et de l'intégrité de la Chine et la résistance, avec les risques que cette attitude comporte, aux prétentions japonaises ? Dans ces conjonctures délicates, et devant le développement des ambitions navales du Japon, on cherche à prendre contact avec l'Angleterre pour l'adoption d'une politique commune. Le fait que, pour parler au Japon, l'Amérique ait besoin de se sentir épaulée est à lui seul un signe des temps. Il en dit long sur la transformation qui s'est opérée dans le Pacifique : les rapports entre les forces

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Ayant lancé leur bombe, les Japonais ont, comme il est de règle, paru s'étonner du bruit causé. Ils expliquent qu'ils n'en veulent pas à l'indépendance de la Chine, qu'ils n'ont nullement l'intention de violer les traités et qu'ils poursuivent seulement le rétablissement de la prospérité chinoise. Mais, derrière ces clauses de style, ils maintiennent — et c'est là le point essentiel — que le temps est passé, où soit d'autres puissances, soit la S. D. N. pouvaient exercer leur influence pour exploiter la Chine.

L'Amérique, en particulier, a toutes raisons pour comprendre le sens de ce langage. C'est à peu près celui que tenait, avec plus de brutalité, le président Monroe, dans son message au Congrès du 2 décembre 1923, en déclarant que « les Etats-Unis regardaient les continents de l'Amérique du Nord et de l'Amérique du Sud comme ayant cessé d'être ouverts à la colonisation européenne et que toute tentative européenne pour contrecarrer un gouvernement américain indépendant rencontrerait l'opposition des Etats-Unis ».

Cette affirmation a marqué, a-t-on dit, la fin de la vassalité américaine à l'égard de l'Europe. Ce qui se passe aujourd'hui pourrait bien, *mutatis mutandis*, avoir une signification aussi grave. Les Japonais, et derrière eux les autres peuples d'Asie, ont cessé de croire à la supériorité de la race blanche. Et ils en tirent les conséquences.

J. DELEBECQUE.

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Encl. 4 to S. R. #VD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.
 Extract from L'HUMANITE of April 21, 1934.

21-1-34

EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT COMME EN EUROPE LE DANGER DE GUERRE GRANDIT AVEC RAPIDITÉ

L'offensive du Japon peut allumer bientôt le conflit du Pacifique

L'impérialisme japonais a commencé son offensive en Mongolie intérieure, préparée par les mouvements de troupes que nous avons déjà signalés.

Une armée nipponne de 18.000 hommes avance dans la province du Tcha-har. 20.000 hommes des troupes mandchoues-mongoles participent à l'avance qui a pour objectif l'occupation de toutes les provinces de Mongolie intérieure.

C'est une menace directe contre la Mongolie extérieure soviétisée, une étape nouvelle dans la préparation de l'agression antisoviétique : nous avons dénoncé récemment les intrigues des agents provocateurs nippons aux frontières de la République populaire mongole, en liaison avec les bandes de gardes-blancs russes.

Et cette offensive en Mongolie, en même temps que les préparatifs, près de la Grande-Muraille de Chine, en vue d'un coup de force dans les provinces de la Chine du nord, sont opérées par le Japon au moment où il lance son défi provocateur aux Etats-Unis.

La presse américaine réagit avec violence contre l'exposé fait le 18 avril au ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon. A Washington, on parle ouvertement de provocation. L'émotion est grande en Angleterre. La presse italienne considère comme « incroyable et absurde » que le Japon veuille isoler la Chine du reste du monde et pense qu'il s'agit là d'une tentative de coup de main diplomatique et « d'exaspérer la situation pour la porter à ses conséquences extrêmes. »

Mais, naturellement, la presse impérialiste française soutient le Japon. Pertinax, dans l'Echo de Paris, félicite les auteurs de guerre nippons « décidés à mettre fin à toutes les intrigues et manœuvres qui, selon lui, tendent à prévenir la consolidation de ses intérêts politiques et commerciaux dans la république du milieu. La Russie des Soviets et les Etats-Unis sont assurément visés », ajoute-t-il.

Et Pertinax s'en prend à la S.D.N. qui n'aurait pas suffisamment laissé les mains libres au Japon, et présidé aux plans de dépècement de la Chine entre les puissances contre le Japon qui veut dominer dans tout l'Extrême-Orient.

On comprend que le journal de l'état-major soutienne le Japon, quand le Comité des Forges et la Banque franco-japonaise sont directement intéressés à la politique d'aventures du Japon !

De son côté, le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon a fait hier de nouvelles déclarations pour « expliquer » ses précédentes. Il affirma — on le savait — que la communication du 18 avril n'était que le développement du discours d'Hirota prononcé le 22 janvier à la Diète. Il ajouta :

« L'unification et la prospérité doivent venir d'un réveil de la Chine et de sa propre initiative, non pas de son exploitation par les autres puissances. Le temps n'est pas pour les pays étrangers ou pour la S.D.N. de se servir de leur influence pour asservir la Chine aux intérêts de leur commerce. »

C'est l'affirmation nouvelle de la poursuite de l'exécution du plan Tanaka : écraser les Etats-Unis, conquérir la Chine, chasser les Soviets de la Sibérie, conquérir le Pacifique.

Et la presse japonaise écrit ouvertement, comme le Nichi-Nichi...

« Le traité des neuf puissances qui garantit l'intégrité de la Chine est maintenant caduc. »

« Si les grandes puissances persistent à se mêler des affaires d'Extrême-Orient qui intéressent avant tout la Chine et le Japon, nous ne serons pas surpris que le Japon refuse de prendre

La tension internationale est considérablement aggravée

Mais « le Peuple » de Bruxelles félicite l'impérialisme français

Il faut citer largement l'opinion émise sur la note française par le Peuple de Bruxelles, journal socialiste, organe de Vandervelde, président de la II^e Internationale.

Alors que, dans le monde entier, les protestations s'élèvent contre le coup brutal de l'impérialisme français, alors que Léon Blum (division du travail, n'est-ce pas ?) accuse le gouvernement d'Union nationale d'abandonner le désarmement, voici ce qu'écrit le journal du Parti Ouvrier belge :

« La réponse française à l'Angleterre donne une lueur d'espoir, écrit le Peuple, à la cause du désarmement universel qui avait été presque irrémédia-



PILSUDSKY
chef du fascisme polonais que va
rencontrer Barthou

blement compromise par les manœuvres conjuguées des gouvernements italien, britannique... et belge. Il est permis d'espérer que l'attitude prise maintenant par le gouvernement français arrêtera l'Europe sur cette pente fatale et tragique. Ce qui nous réjouit dans la réponse française, c'est qu'elle ne contient pas un mot qui puisse être interprété comme un assentiment possible de la France à un réarmement, même partiel de l'Allemagne, sous quelque condition que ce soit. Il n'est pas besoin de souligner que, pour nous, ceci est et a toujours été l'essentiel. Aucun traité de garantie, aucun papier signé à Genève, à Londres ou à Washington, ne saurait compenser, au point de vue de la sécurité et de la paix, la reconstitution progressive de la puissance militaire de l'Allemagne.

Ajoutons que la Nation Belge, journal de même nuance que l'Action française est tout à fait du même avis que Le Peuple.

En Angleterre, le mécontentement s'affirme de plus en plus. Le New-Chronicle écrit :

« Mais que dire de l'attitude adoptée par la France ? Si le gouvernement français avait dit que les dernières revendications allemandes, dès son réarmement, qui maintenant n'est plus caché, renforçaient la cause des garanties adéquates contre une violation de la conférence du désarmement, nous aurions été portés à en convenir, mais la France nous a adressé une note qui, du même coup, administre une brusque rebuffade au gouvernement britannique et ferme la porte à tout espoir, même d'une limitation des armements. »

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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C'est l'affirmation nouvelle de la poursuite de l'exécution du plan Tanaka : écraser les Etats-Unis, conquérir la Chine, chasser les Soviets de la Sibérie, conquérir le Pacifique.

Et la presse japonaise écrit ouvertement, comme le *Nichi-Nichi* :

« Le traité des neuf puissances qui garantit l'intégrité de la Chine est maintenant caduc. »

« Si les grandes puissances persistent à se mêler des affaires d'Extrême-Orient qui intéressent avant tout la Chine et le Japon, nous ne serons pas surpris que le Japon refuse de prendre part à la conférence navale de 1935. »

Il est à craindre que la situation chaque jour aggravée conduise à la conflagration mondiale avant la convocation de cette conférence qui ne ferait, d'ailleurs, que précipiter son déclenchement. — M. M.

Ajoutons que la *Nation Belge*, journal de même nuance que l'*Action française* est tout à fait du même avis que *Le Peuple*.

En Angleterre, le mécontentement s'affirme de plus en plus. Le *New-Chronicle* écrit :

« Mais que dire de l'attitude adoptée par la France? Si le gouvernement français avait dit que les dernières revendications allemandes, dès son réarmement, qui maintenant n'est plus caché, renforçaient la cause des garanties adéquates contre une violation de la conférence du désarmement, nous aurions été portés à en convenir, mais la France nous a adressé une note qui, du même coup, administre une brusque rebuffade au gouvernement britannique et ferme la porte à tout espoir, même d'une limitation des armements. »

En Italie, on considère que la note Barthou a sonné le glas de la conférence du désarmement.

DE CLASSE AU VILLAGE

EXEMPLE: CLOU PIERRE/LOT OF VORSTI ST' TONT'
 FROM THE EMPRESS' LITIA.
 ENGJ. & TO P. H. AND IVOC OF VORSTI ST' TONT'

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 5 to S. R. #WD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITÉ of April 22, 1934.

La guerre qui vient

**L'ULTIMATUM
 DU JAPON AUX PUISSANCES
 RÉSULTAT DES CRIMES
 DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS**

Dans les cercles de l'institution impérialiste de Genève, on affecte d'être atterré par la manifestation insolente et provocatrice de la politique de guerre et d'hégémonie en Extrême-Orient du Japon. Mais n'est-ce pas la S.D.N. qui a permis — Briand présidant au nom de l'impérialisme français — l'expansion par le fer et le sang de l'impérialisme nippon en Chine? N'est-ce pas la S.D.N. qui élaborait, à la suite du fameux rapport Lytton, les projets de « coopération internationale » en Chine, pour restaurer le pays et lui donner un gouvernement fort, c'est-à-dire pour partager la Chine entre les puissances et aider la réaction du Kuomintang à lutter contre la révolution et les soviets chinois? N'est-ce pas sur cette base que l'Allemagne, l'Amérique, l'Angleterre, la France, l'Italie arment Tchang-Kai-Shek — qui est lui-même un instrument du Japon?

C'est que les puissances espéraient que le Japon pourrait rapidement et victorieusement agresser l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques et « écraser le bolchevisme dans les plaines sibériennes » (*Liberté* de Camille Aymard-Staviski).

Les puissances veulent dépecer la Chine (où le pouvoir des Soviets englobe un territoire plus grand que la France et l'Allemagne réunies, avec près de 100 millions d'âmes). Mais le Japon veut dominer entièrement et seul sur le continent asiatique, veut être le maître sanglant du Pacifique. Il intime aux puissances — et en premier lieu aux Etats-Unis, principal adversaire — de cesser leurs intrigues qui le gênent, d'avoir à lui laisser la domination et la conquête de la Chine. Et les fauteurs de guerre japonais profitent de la situation des plus tendues et des plus menaçantes en Europe, après la note Barthou sur les armements, pour lancer leur défi aux Etats-Unis : « Quittez la Chine, abandonnez vos îles du Pacifique, détruisez vos bases navales : nous voulons être les maîtres et nous ferons tout pour cela. »

Voilà à quelle terrible conjoncture de guerre a mené la Société des Nations soutenue par la social-démocratie. — M.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 6 to S. R. #WD 1404 of April 26, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.
 Extract from L'HUMANITE of April 23, 1934.

23-4-34

Le conflit du Pacifique

LES ETATS-UNIS « IGNORERAIENT » LA DÉCLARATION JAPONAISE

LA déclaration du ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon, revendiquant pour cet Etat un véritable protectorat sur la Chine, a provoqué une vive émotion dans le monde.

Le Japon, qui a arraché à la Chine la Mandchourie, dont il a fait un Etat vassal, le Mandchoukouo, et le Jehol, prétend maintenant, sur le plan économique comme sur le plan politique, tout régenter dans l'immense pays chinois.

Sa prétention heurte les intérêts impérialistes de l'Angleterre, des Etats-Unis, de la France, etc. Elle constitue, contre l'U.R.S.S., une nouvelle menace singulièrement provocatrice.

L'Etat prolétarien s'étend jusqu'aux rives du Pacifique et, quand les ministres du mikado proclament une « doctrine de Monroe pour l'Asie », c'est-à-dire qu'ils prétendent exclure de cette partie du monde tout pouvoir non asiatique, il est clair qu'ils menacent l'U.R.S.S., à la fois grande puissance en Asie et en Europe.

Actuellement, les déclarations du ministre japonais semblent provoquer des réactions particulièrement vives aux Etats-Unis.

On télégraphie de Washington que le gouvernement américain continuera ses échanges avec les Chinois et ignorera les avertissements de Tokio.

D'autre part, on annonce que l'ambassadeur nippon à Washington aurait fait à la presse la déclaration suivante :

« Toute nation ignorant la demande du Japon de consulter le gouvernement de Tokio avant de conclure des affaires avec la Chine sera considérée comme ayant commis un acte inamical envers le Japon. »

D'après certaines informations, le projet américain d'une construction d'usine d'aviation à Hang-Tchéou inquiéterait particulièrement le Japon.

Il est à remarquer que l'impérialisme japonais qui, depuis trente ans, a participé à toutes les agressions internationales contre la Chine et qui lui a volé la Mandchourie et le Jehol, se pose maintenant en défenseur des Chinois.

Il est à remarquer également que l'impérialisme japonais dénonce la S. D. N. qui, dit-il, sous le couvert des grandes théories humanitaires et pacifistes, tend à maintenir en Chine un état d'anarchie favorable aux entreprises des capitalistes européens.

Sans doute, les deux reproches sont justifiés.

Le régime des traités inégaux a livré l'immense pays à une exploitation sans frein des hommes d'affaires d'Europe. Sans doute les grandes nations capitalistes : Angleterre, Amérique, France, se sont efforcées, en achetant les généraux chinois, en corrompant les chefs du Kuomintang, d'entretenir en Chine le désordre.

Il n'y a qu'une force qui soit capable d'unifier et d'ordonner la Chine, en agitation continuelle depuis 1911. C'est celle des soviets chinois !

Mais c'est précisément de cette force-là que le Japon est l'ennemi implacable, comme il est celui de l'Union soviétique

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Justifiés.

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Mais c'est précisément de cette force-là que le Japon est l'ennemi implacable, comme il est celui de l'Union soviétique elle-même.

Ses diatribes contre les menées des capitalistes étrangers en Chine, contre les intrigues de la S.D.N., n'ont d'autre but que de cacher ses propres violations des droits du peuple chinois.

A l'aggravation soudaine de la situation en Europe, la déclaration du Japon vient ajouter celle du conflit d'Extrême-Orient, celle du grand problème du Pacifique.

En Asie comme en Europe, la guerre menace de plus en plus. — D. R.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for Department of State.

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Voluntary Political Report.
 (Original submitted to Legation)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 A-C/C
 APR 30 1934
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY
 OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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 DIVISION OF
 EASTERN AFFAIRS

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 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 1 - 1934
 Department of State

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793.94/6664

JAPANESE POLICY RESPECTING CHINA

From Philip Adams, American Consul,
 Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada.

Date of Completion - April 26, 1934.

Date of Mailing - April 26, 1934.

It is presumed that the Legation will be interested in receiving copies of editorials appearing in the Saint John Telegraph-Journal of April 23 and April 26, respectively, respecting the Japanese "hands off" policy in China.

Enclosures:

1. Clipping from Saint John Telegraph-Journal of April 23, 1934.
2. Clipping from Saint John Telegraph-Journal of April 26, 1934.

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A true copy of
 The signed original

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE

SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

Saint John Telegraph-Journal of April 23, 1934.

Saint John Telegraph-Journal of April 26, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Voluntary Political Report
from Philip Adams, American Consul, Saint John,
N. B., dated April 23, 1934, entitled "Japanese
Policy Respecting China."

SOURCE: Saint John, N. B.,
Telegraph-Journal,
April 23, 1934.

From Day to Day

THE first news covering Japan's "re-statement of policy" in the Far East seemed perfectly plain and not very unreasonable. The despatches that have followed through United States channels give it a sinister twist that it does not appear to deserve. To begin with, it is not new. The emphasis on Japan's assumption of responsibility for preserving order in the Far East is merely a little deepened. This will not worry Great Britain and is very unlikely to cause diplomatic tension. The United States may not like it, but the United States has always taken China's part. This is easy to do on sentimental grounds, but Japan, living next door to an unstable neighbor who flirts with bolshevism, is compelled to take a practical view, and it is not surprising that Tokio should issue a warning to those who provide training and war machinery to a nation that is in its every action unprogressive and obstructive.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Voluntary Political Report
 from Philip Adams, American Consul, Saint John,
 N. B., dated April 26, 1934, entitled "Japanese
 Policy Respecting China."

SOURCE: Saint John, N. B.,
 Telegraph-Journal,
 April 26, 1934.

Japan's Trial Kite

JAPAN'S recent announcement of what has been, with some exaggeration, likened to the Monroe Doctrine, has now the semblance of a trial kite flown to test the international air currents. If so, Japan now probably has the information she requires. The United States went right up in the air over it; scarcely anybody else was ruffled. Russia, as a matter of principle, expressed disapproval; but even Russia who, without avowing it, is Japan's competitor for control in the Far East, could not simulate realistic surprise and indignation. The United States reaction was, on the other hand, perfectly genuine and has completely given away the true sentiments of the country as reflected in its press. Of late official Washington had, generally speaking, seemed to be inclined to view with greater sympathy than before, Japan's assumption of the role of policeman of the Far East; but ~~that the~~ popular feeling is unchanged is very evident from the press response to Japan's announcement.

It is interesting to note how that announcement was issued. It came from an official of the foreign office and, if the powers generally had objected, there would have been no difficulty about explaining it away or even repudiating it. It was not an Imperial manifesto. Since then Japan has considered whether it should be nailed to the mast or whether to rest content with the information gleaned from her trial kite. Apparently Japan feels justified in confirming her stand.

There are certain facts to be borne in mind in relation to the Far East: Territorially the powers concerned are China, Russia and Japan, with Manchukuo in alliance with the last named. The European powers and the United States have small Far Eastern possessions and are interested in China to the extent of their investments and markets. Japan promises observance of the open door and preservation of peace, claiming, however, a free hand to keep order. Japan does not claim to control China, but states a desire to co-operate with China; but China is chaotic and Russia is Communist. There is little doubt that if Russia could, she would actually attempt to control China. Taken all in all, is Japan unreasonable?

Great Britain apparently does not think Japan asks too much, wanting, however, an explanation of how British interests in China stand, and asserting British adherence to the Nine-Power Treaty that guarantees China's independence. That is unlikely to raise complications, as Japan has already declared that she has no designs on China's autonomy. In short all Japan wants is order in the Far East and, since Japan is the obvious power to preserve order, if and when necessary, she proclaims her intention of doing so

at her own discretion and she warns those who aid disorderly elements that they must reckon with her.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Claus NARS, Date 12-18-75

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THIS MEMORANDUM IS NOT TO BE CHARGED
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MISSION OF MR. SALMON, OR IN HIS ABSENCE, THE
SECRETARYS OFFICE.

Let me see the file
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Koback

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Very Confidential

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May 7, 1934.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
 THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR RONALD LINDSAY.

Statement of Sir John Simon.

The British Ambassador called and first stated that in conversation with an important United States official, not of the State Department however, he had indicated a violent state of mind in criticizing the recent statement of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons regarding the British attitude towards the statements about control of the Orient emanating from various Japanese sources during past weeks. The Ambassador said that he had called to inquire whether the State Department felt specially disappointed at the nature and the substance of this statement of Sir John Simon. I replied that the statement had not called for any special conference here in the Department on the part of myself and associates; that there was, naturally, some comment and speculation with reference to the clause in Sir John's statement which proposed to make exception to some kind of rights of Japan in Manchuria or other portions of China. I stated that I myself was frankly somewhat disappointed

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

disappointed to find this exception clause, which seemed somewhat enigmatical, in Sir John Simon's statement, and that so far as my impression went the matter was viewed by my associates with the same state of mind; that while there had been no general expressions in the way of adverse comment in the United States, I had observed from London press dispatches that the press of England was generally critical of this phase of Sir John's statement. The Ambassador said that that was another matter which he was not dealing with, but that he was making his inquiry of me with respect to American sentiment and especially the state of mind of the State Department. I again told him that all in all the Department was not and had not been exercised about the matter; that England being more interested materially in the Orient than the United States, it was her fullest privilege to treat the Japanese publicity as her judgment thought best; that it was true all of the governments signatory to treaties operative especially in the Orient were in the same boat with respect to their observance; that I myself felt that since none of the countries such as Great Britain and the United States

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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were planning pronouncements in any event that would call for the use of force, unequivocal and clearcut statements from each government relative to their rights, interests, and obligations, in the Orient - such statements being made separately and independently by each of the governments - would offer the best possible method of dealing with these Japanese utterances by arousing the moral sentiment of the world; that I would have been delighted if each of the governments signatory to such treaties had thus spoken out, but unfortunately only Great Britain, the United States and France had done so. The Ambassador said that it was thoroughly justifiable for Sir John Simon to insert the exceptional clause in his statement about the rights of Japan. My reply to this was that in stating a broad fundamental position relating to the rights, interests and obligations of all the nations signatory to the treaties involved, there was not any occasion whatever for singling out some one of numerous, purely minor or local conditions for the purpose of making an exception in favor of Japan and in favor of Japan's alleged rights.

The Ambassador seemed entirely content when I stated to him that this government was not exercised

or

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

or disposed seriously to complain at the particular or
exceptional clause above referred to in Sir John Simon's
statement.

C.H.

See also memo re: Factor Case.

S CH:HR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 April 19, 1934.

The letter to Mr. Moley
 has not yet reached the Depart-
 ment, according to the Mail
 Room and FA. If and when it
 arrives, FE will be notified.

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


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After 5 days, return to

F. J. League

230 Buist Ave.

GREENVILLE, S. C.




Mr. Stanley H. Hornbeck,
 Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
 Washington D. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Greenville S. C., Apr. 18th. 1934.

Mr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
 Chief of Division Far Eastern Affairs,
 Washington D. C.



APR 21 1934

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

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I have taken the liberty of addressing a letter to Prof. Moley, C/o the State Department. I shall much appreciate your assistance in securing its delivery to Prof. Moley, as I understand he is to be in Washington till Friday evening.

Prof. Moley is to be in Greenville Saturday the 21st. Inst., and I have written him asking the courtesy of an interview for the purpose of presenting to him my conception of the Manchurian, and the Russo-Japanese problems. I understand that while Prof. Moley has no official connection with the Government, ~~oboto~~ he is in such relation that his opinions have a fair chance of being considered. At all events it seemed to me worth while making the effort to come in personal contact with him and ^{present} the case in its logical sequence, on the chance that he will find it convincing, and offer a possible future source of information.

Should the idea meet with your approval I am sure it will facilitate my purpose, that you express, if the opportunity offers, to Prof. Moley, your approval of my wish to see him.

Thanking you for all your courtesies,

Very respectfully,

J. League

From
 T. J. League,
 230 Buist Ave.,
 Greenville S. C.

APR 23 1934

FTD:PCJ

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 21, 1934.

My dear Mr. League:

There has been referred to me your letter of April 18, addressed to Mr. Hornbeck, stating that you would appreciate Mr. Hornbeck's assistance in connection with the delivery to Professor Moley of a letter which you have addressed to him in care of the Department of State.

The offices of the Department which take care of mail matters have been consulted and state that the letter addressed to Professor Moley has not as yet arrived. The normal procedure in such cases would be, I understand, for those offices to forward such a letter, upon its arrival, in accordance with instructions left by Mr. Moley with the Department. In this particular instance, however, we asked those offices to get in touch with this office immediately upon receipt of the letter.

With

Mr. T. J. League,

230 Buist Avenue,

Greenville, South Carolina.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter,
Mr. Hornbeck did not have occasion to see Professor Moley
during his recent visit to Washington.

Very truly yours,


Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.




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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAH:

SKA:

There is an
 interesting article
 in this issue - pages
 1-18 - on "Rights &
 Privileges Acquired
 & Consolidated by the
 Japanese in Manchuria
 since Sept. 18, 1931".

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



BULLETIN

ON



CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

(AND PUBLIC EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST)

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**RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES ACQUIRED AND CONSOLIDATED BY THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA
SINCE SEPTEMBER 18, 1931.***

Wang Koo-lu (王古魯)

I. INTRODUCTION:

Following the occupation by the Japanese of the Three Eastern Provinces in 1931, the Japanese have resorted to various methods in consolidating their rights and interests in Manchuria. In China Proper, the Japanese Navy and Army, first in Shanghai and then in North China, had made use of every possible pretext in bringing military pressures against China. The purpose of these pressures was to compel China to abandon her policy of permanent resistance, and also that of recovering the lost territories. Outside of the Great Wall, the Japanese have used strong military force in eliminating, one by one, the individual groups of volunteer corps which caused considerable difficulty for the Japanese in grasping control over their coveted land. At the end, they succeeded in creating the puppet state "Manchukuo," which could be easily ordered by the Japanese to grant to them whatever rights and privileges. General Araki, in his official report to the Japanese Emperor, showed great satisfaction over his successes in his aggressive acts in Manchuria.

After the signing of the Tangku Truce Agreement, China was practically debarred from talking anymore about the policy of resistance and early recovery of lost territories. On the other hand, the Japanese felt that their military manoeuvres in China have come to a conclusion and they should go ahead with their reconstruction program in Manchukuo. In July of this year, General Araki, the Minister of War, based on the reports received by the war ministry, summarized the political and economic gains of Japan in Manchuria for Emperor Hirohito. This summary was published on August 6th by the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. It is believed that, since the military were responsible for the aggressive acts in Manchuria, their announced figures and facts are to certain extent reliable. It may be worth while for us to make an analysis of this report, for it will give us a systematic review of the subject.

The Araki Report as published in the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun was divided into five sections: (1) the consequences and results of the Mukden Incident of September 18th, 1931; (2) the confirmation and extension of Japanese special rights and interests in Manchuria; (3) the increase of Japanese import and export trade in Manchuria; (4) the present conditions of the Japanese gains in Manchuria; and (5) conclusion. In the first section, General Araki greatly emphasized the Japanese success in the Mukden Incident as equivalent to the Japanese victory over Russian in 1904-05. In it, he recalled the national spirit of the Japanese people in fighting for justice

and national self-sufficiency. The second section was devoted to a description of the Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria based upon treaty agreements. He was attempting to convince his people that after September 18, 1931, the Japanese people have made tremendous gains of interests in Manchuria. The figures and data in sections three and four, which show the Japanese gains, represent the actual acquisitions of the Japanese in Manchuria as referred to in section two. In the conclusion of the report, General Araki gave a table of the military expenses since September 18, 1931.

**II. THE JAPANESE VERSION OF THEIR
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA
BEFORE SEPTEMBER 18, 1931.**

In the Araki Report, there was listed a total of twenty-eight kinds of rights and interests secured by the Japanese in Manchuria. General Araki divided these rights and interests into four groups: (a) those treaty rights which have been, to the fullest extent, enjoyed by the Japanese; (b) those which have no treaty basis but which have been actually enjoyed by the Japanese. (c) those treaty rights which have, for one reason or another, become completely inapplicable; and (d) those treaty rights which have been voluntarily renounced by the Japanese during the Washington Conference. The following, according to the Araki Report, is a summary of the Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria before September 18, 1931:

**A. TREATY RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN
SATISFACTORILY ENJOYED BY THE
JAPANESE.**

1. *The Stationing of Railway Guards.*- In the Treaty of Portsmouth concluding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, it was agreed, without the knowledge of China, between Russia and Japan that "The High contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer within that maximum number."¹

In the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the same year at Peking, the Chinese delegates, in the second meeting of the delegates of the two countries, maintained that ".....regarding railway guards, Chinese Government should have the right and privilege of fulfilling her responsibility, according to the Sino-Russian

*Figures and data are based upon the report made by General Araki to the Japanese Emperor, published on August 6, 1933 by the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*.

1. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China* Vol. I, p.526 See Additional Articles I to Article III

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treaty of 1896, in protecting the railway and its officials. China shall send the best of her troops to station along the railway, at the rate, of five soldiers per Chinese li (about a third of a mile)."¹

The Japanese delegates were firm in their position and insisted on including in the treaty of December 22, 1905 between China and Japan the following article: "Article II. In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible, and in order to meet this desire, the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps simultaneously. When tranquillity shall have been reestablished in Manchuria and China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia."²

Before signing the said treaty, the Chinese plenipotentiary asked that the following declaration be recorded in the protocol of the conference. "Although the Japanese Government has agreed to the conditions governing the stationing of troops from Changchun to Port Arthur the Chinese Government still regard them as unsatisfactory and like to put in record the intention of China's protest against such conditions."³

The Japanese delegate asked, China to withdraw this statement. It was finally agreed that the agreement was not complete and should be so recorded in the protocol of the Conference. In the meetings of the Far Eastern Commission of the Washington Conference. Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese delegate, declared that the Chinese Government did not agree to the stationing of the railway guards along the south Manchurian Railway. It is therefore clear that the Japanese guards should evacuate the railway zone under any of the three following conditions:

(a) When Russian guards withdrew from the Chinese Eastern Railway; (b) When order and tranquillity are restored in Manchuria; and (c) When China and Japan agree to

a satisfactory arrangement for the withdrawal. As Russian guards had already evacuated their zone, there is no reason that the Japanese guards should continue to patrol the railway and that the Chinese Government should be prevented from exercising its power of protection.

2. Treaty Rights Concerning Local Order in Manchuria.

In the Sino-Japanese Conference at Peking, the Japanese delegates proposed two articles for the additional agreement regarding Manchuria.

"1. According to article III of the Russo-Japanese treaty, as soon as the Japanese and Russian troops are withdrawn from Manchuria, the Chinese Government shall establish administrative organs there in order to preserve peace and order.

"2. The Chinese Government shall put through reforms in Manchuria and assume the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of aliens residing there" (translation)⁴

The Chinese delegate felt that these two articles would lead to an intervention by Japan into China's internal government; therefore they should be suppressed. The Japanese delegates consequently declared that Japan had no idea of interfering with the internal government of China. The Chinese delegates thereafter declared in the protocol of the Conference:

"China, following the evacuation of Russian and Japanese troops, shall voluntarily establish local self-government in those evacuated areas and the government will be thoroughly improved in order to make the Three Eastern Provinces safe for the Chinese citizens and foreign residents. As to the policy and methods of reform, the Chinese government will make the decision for itself (translation)⁵."

Based on this voluntary declaration of the Chinese Government, the Japanese Government had once and again warned China against any disturbance of the internal order in Manchuria. When the nationalist army nearly reached Peiping in 1928, the Japanese minister to China submitted simultaneously the following notice to the Nationalist Government at Nanking and General

Chang Tso-ling at Peiping.

"The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria has been a matter of serious importance to the Imperial Government of Japan. Should there be any act of disturbance or threat to the peace and order in Manchuria the Japanese Government would apply all the means at its disposal in preventing it. When, therefore, the civil war gradually extends from Shantung to Tientsin and Peiping, the Japanese government, means of preserving peace there."¹

The protocol of the Sino-Japanese Conference in 1905 could hardly be regarded as a treaty agreement having the binding obligation according to international law. Mr. Wang Yuin-seng, the editor of the *Ta Kung Pao* at Tientsin, in his book *A History of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations during the Past Sixty Years*, (Vol. IV) has made it clear that the Chinese delegates did not recognize any right of the Japanese in interfering with the internal government of China, but they intended to verify the Chinese government attitude toward the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria. What a distortion of treaty rights by misinterpretation!

3. The Right to Construct and Develop the South Manchurian Railway.

The South Manchurian Railway was built by the Russians as a branch line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan provided:

"The Imperial Russian government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial government of Japan, without compensation and with consent of the Chinese government, the railway between Chang-chun (Kuan-cheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway."²

As the Chinese government was unable to resist the pressure brought about by the victorious Japanese, it reluctantly consented to the provisions of the said article. On the contrary, however, the Japanese government engaged to "conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia. In case any question arises in the future on these subjects, the Japanese govern-

ment will decide it in consultation with the Chinese Government." Should the Japanese government observe her obligation under the Russo-Chinese agreement of 1896 concerning the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, China then at the end of eighty years could have the railway and all its appurtenances restored to her free of charge, and at the end of thirty-six years she would have the right to buy back the railway. In the famous Twenty-One Demands on China, Japan had compelled China to extend the period of restoration from eighty to ninety-nine years and the right of China to buy back the railway at the end of thirty-six years was not recognized.

4. The Right to Construct and Manage for China the Line from Chang-Chun to Kirin.

In the Sino-Japanese Conference of 1905, Japan desired to have all the rights to build the railway from Changchun to Kirin. The Chinese Government rejected this demand, but it finally agreed to a greatly modified contract. The Chinese Government would build the railway itself. In case of any need of capital, China would raise a loan in Japan which should not be more than half of the capital and she would repay it in twenty-five years. The contract was formally signed in 1907, and in 1909 Japan advanced to China the needed loan (2,150,000 Yen) for building the said railway, amounting to half of the capital. In the same Twenty-one Demands, Japan demanded the right of controlling the Changchun - Kirin railway for ninety-nine years. In signing the treaty of 1915, China promised to revise the railway contract according to other contracts concluded for other railways built in China Proper. In 1917 a new contract was concluded between Japan and the Peking Government by which Japan would loan to China \$6,500,000 mex. and the South Manchurian Railway Company was given the right to manage the railway for thirty years.

5. Coal Mining Rights at Fushun and Yentai.

Japan had contemplated to snatch the two coal mines at Fushun and Yentai as her own at the end of the Russo-Japanese war. But as a result of China's persistence, the case remained unsettled until 1909, when the Sino-Japanese agreement concerning the then "five case" in Manchuria was signed. Article III of the agreement, cited below, provided for the adjustment of the case:

1. Wang, Yuin-seng, *History of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations During Past Sixty Years* (in Chinese) Vol. IV, p. 266.
2. & 1 MacMurry, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 551 See Additional Agreement Article II.
3. J. Shinobu, *Japanese Special Rights and Interests in Manchuria and Mongolia* p. 455
4. Wang, Yuin-seng, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 254-5
5. Wang, Yuin-seng, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 308

1. Shinobu, J.; *Japanese Special Rights and Interests in Manchuria and Mongolia* (in Japanese), p. 198
2. MacMurry, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 77

"In regard to the coal mine at Fushun and Yentai, the Governments of Japan and China are agreed as follows.

"(a) The Chinese Government recognizes the right of the Japanese Government to work the said coal mines.

"(b) The Japanese Government, respecting the full sovereignty of China, engages to pay to the Chinese Government tax upon coals produced in those mines. The rate of such tax shall be separately arranged upon the basis of the lowest tariff for coals produced in any other places of China.

"(c) The Chinese Government agrees that in the matter of exportation of coals produced in the said mines, the lowest tariff of export duty for coals of any other mines shall be applied.

"(d)...

On the basis of this agreement, Japan seized these two mines as her own monopolistic enterprises. The outputs of these mines are abundant, the Fushun mine being particularly valuable. Its area, according to Japanese report,¹ amounts to 18,200,000 "tsubo" (a "tsubo" equals 406 Japanese square feet); the average thickness of the coal seam is 130 feet; and the estimated deposit of coal is said to be between 900,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 tons. The quality of the coal is excellent and is noted for its volatility. Moreover, Japan was entitled to the lowest tariff rate in accordance with Article II of the Detailed Regulations for the two mines, signed in 1911 which says:

"The Company (S. M. R. Co.) agrees to pay to the Chinese maritime customs for the coal of the two mines exported from a point of maritime navigation an export tax which shall be computed at one-tenth of a Haikwan tael per ton."²

It was further provided in Article XIV that "these detailed regulations shall be effective for sixty years from the date of their enforcement". Thus in 1931, when the Commissioner of the Customs House at Dairen was instructed by the Inspector General of Customs at Shanghai to notify the South Manchuria Railway Company that thereafter the export tariff duty on the coal outputs of the two mines should be 0.34 Haikwan tael per ton for shipping abroad and 0.15 Haikwan tael per ton for shipping to China ports, the Company objected and made a protest against the attempt of the National Government to put

in effect the new tariff rate. The National Government, however, insisted on enforcing the new rate and regarded the revision as a matter of course, since the duty on the Fushun coal heretofore had been too low and tariff autonomy of the Chinese Government had been recognized. It became an impending case before the Mukden Incident of September 18th, 1931.

Another thing to be noted about the Fushun colliery is the production of oil shale as its most important by-product. It is the material for extracting oil. The total deposit of oil shale in the colliery is about 5,000 million tons. The South Manchuria Railway Company, utilizing the Fushun oil shale to carry on the business of oil distillation, can obtain from 50,000 to 70,000 tons of oil annually. The Japanese navy looks upon it as its most valuable property. In 1930, both the Northeastern authorities and the Central Government of China protested against the operation by the Company of mines of minerals other than coal, which in fact violated treaty stipulations as well as Chinese mining laws, but it became of no effect.³

6. *Right of Operation by Joint Undertaking the Penhsihu and Anshan Mines.*

The two mines will be separately treated as follows:

I. The Penhsihu mine. The Penhsihu mine had been worked by the Japanese firm, Okura and Company, after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1910, Han Kuo-Chun, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Mukden, signed an agreement with K. Okura by which a Company was to be organized by the name of the Penhsihu Colliery and Iron Works, with a capital of \$2,000,000. Its capacity for the production of iron is 120,000 tons per year, but recently it was restricted only to approximately 50,000 tons owing to unfavorable market conditions. Its capacity for the production of coal is around 500,000 tons per year. The area in which the Company might open coal and iron mines, according to Article XII of the agreement, was to be assigned to the Company after careful surveying and detailed mapping had been made by official surveyors despatched by the governors of the Three Eastern Provinces. Later, the Company happened to have operated mines outside of the assigned region which the Chinese authorities in those provinces regarded as a violation of the stipulations of the agreement and asked Okura and Company to pay

for recompense a sum of Yen 400,000. No result, however, was reached.¹

II. The Anshan Iron Works. The South Manchurian Railway Company had discovered iron deposits in the neighborhood of Eastern and Western Anshan in 1911 and had contemplated to establish iron works there. But its effort of negotiating with the Chinese authorities to this effect were fruitless. Later, when Japan threatened China in to signing the treaty of 1915, Japan, by an exchange of notes was allowed to take up mining activities in South Manchuria which included Anshan Chan region (from Liaoyang to Penhsi) in the list. In 1916 an agreement was signed by Kamada, a Japanese representative, with Yu Chung Han, representing Mukden, which provided for the establishment of a Sino-Japanese Joint Developing Company with a capital of yen 140,000. The Company further contracted with the South Manchurian Railway Company for the supply of ores. Thus the large iron works was established between Anshan Chan and Lihshan Chan with an investment now reaching yen 45,000,000. Its annual output of iron amounts to about 200,000 tons. The total deposit of ore is said to have excelled 300,000,000 tons.²

7. *Lumbering Rights along the Yalu River*

It was stipulated in the additional agreement attached to the Treaty of Peking of 1905 that "The Imperial Chinese Government agrees that a joint-stock company of forestry composed of Japanese and Chinese capitalists shall be organized for the exploitation of the forests in the regions on the right bank of the River Yalu and that a detailed agreement shall be concluded in which the area and term of the concession as well as the organization of the company and all regulations concerning the joint work of exploitation shall be provide for the Japanese and Chinese shareholders sharing equally in the profits of the undertaking." The "regulations" as mentioned in the above article were agreed upon in Peking in 1908, in which the area reserved for exploitation by the company was defined to include "the right bank of the Yalu, extending from Moershan to Ershi-tsu-taoku and measuring 60 li inland from the main stream."³ The Sino-Japanese joint stock company known as the Yalu River Lumbering Company was

established with a capital of \$3,000,000 (Chinese), each country to contribute \$1,500,000. The term of the agreement was to continue for twenty-five years with the privilege of renewal if the Chinese Government should be satisfied with the working of the company. It was further provided that five per cent of the net profit, after the expenditure of the company has been deducted from the receipts, shall be appropriated to the Chinese Government, and the remainder shall be distributed among the shareholders of the two countries. This enterprise is regarded by Japan as one of the most important special privileges.⁴

8. *Preferential Rights in respect to Loans for Mining and Forestry in the Provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin.*

An agreement for a loan of yen 30,000,000 was concluded by the Twan Chi-Jui Government with the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan of Japan in 1918. The gold mines and national forests in the Heilungkiang and Kirin Provinces, together with the Government revenue from the said mines and forest were offered as security. It was provided in the agreement that China should first consult the above-mentioned banks for loans in developing mines, and building up native forests. This loan is one of the so-called "Nishihara loans" which has never been recognized by the Chinese people, and yet Japan considered it as one of her special rights.

9. *Right of Joint Undertakings in Agriculture and its Auxiliary Industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.*

For long Japan had directed its ambition toward Mongolia, thus the term "Man-mon" had often used in referring to Mongolia and the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China. In 1915 when presenting the "Twenty-one Demands" to China, Japan associated here and there Eastern Inner Mongolia with South Manchuria, which were put on the same footing in respect to questions of land lease and purchase, of residing in interior places, of operation of mines, etc. Serious objections were raised on the part of China, and, at last Eastern Inner Mongolia was kept separated with South Manchuria in the revision made by Japan on May 26, 1915. But with the pressure of an ultimatum, the right of joint undertakings in agriculture and its auxiliary

1. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 343-8.
2. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 343-8
3. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.* p. 351

1. *Ibid* pp. 352-3
2. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 353-4
3. MacMurray, *Op. Cit.* Vol. 731 See Agreement for a Chinese-Japanese Joint Stock Lumber Company for the Exploitation of the Yalu Timber May 14, 1908
Ibid p. 732 Article X
4. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 360-1

industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia was included in Article IV of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which says:

"In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permission."

10. *Right to Reside and Travel and to Engage in Business in the Interior of South Manchuria.*

Japan had asked for the right to reside and travel and to engage in business and manufacture in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia in presenting the "Twenty-one Demands" to China in 1915. Then the Yuan Shih-Kai Government objected to these demands, for it might turn South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia into Japanese colonies; also it might lead to further complications as the Japanese people enjoy the right of consular jurisdiction. Meanwhile it sought to separate questions of Eastern Inner Mongolia from those of South Manchuria. After all it was provided in Article III of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, that "Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever." Thereafter Japan took for granted that China had recognized her right of residing in the interior places of South Manchuria.

11. *Jurisdiction in Kwantung Leased Territory.*

At the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the Treaty of Shimonoseki provided for the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. But the latter had to retrocede it to China owing to the three Powers' intervention. Russia, one of the three, taking advantage of the occasion, asked for the lease of the Peninsula as China's reward, and in March 1896 a convention to that effect was signed between China and Russia.

"Article I. For the purpose of ensuring that the Russian forces shall have an entirely secure base on the littoral of northern China, H. M. The Emperor of China agrees to place at the disposal of the Russian Government, on lease, the Ports Arthur and Talien-wan, together with the water areas contiguous to these ports. This act of lease, however, in no way violates the sovereign rights of H. M. the Emperor of China to the above-mentioned

territory.

"Article II. The frontier of the territory leased on the above specified basis, will extend northwards from the Bay of Talien-wan for such distance as is necessary to secure the proper defense of this area on the land side. The precise line of demarcation and other details respecting the stipulations of the present convention will be determined by a separate Protocol which shall be concluded at St. Petersburg with the dignitary Siou-tzu-cheng (Chinese Minister to Russia) immediately after the signature of the present convention. Upon the determination of this line of demarcation, the Russian Government will enter into complete and exclusive enjoyment of the whole area of the leased territory together with the water areas contiguous to it."

Again in May, 1898, China and Russia signed at St. Petersburg an additional agreement of six articles defining the boundaries of the leased and neutralized territory. Article I specified that,

"In accordance with Article II of the Original Treaty the northern territory leased and yielded to Russia - Port Arthur, Talien-wan, and the Liaotung Peninsula - shall commence from the north side of Ya Tang Bay on the west coast of Liaotung and shall pass through the ridge of Ya-tang Mountain (the mountain ridge being included in the leased ground) to the east coast of Liaotung near the north side of the Pi-tzu-wu Bay. Russia shall be allowed the use of all the water adjacent to the leased territory and all the islands around it. Both countries shall appoint special officers to survey the ground and determine the limits of the leased territory."

The above article defined in general the boundaries of the territory. According to Article V of the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded at the end of the Russo-Japanese war;

"The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease. The two High Contracting parties mutually engage to

obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation."

Japan later obtained China's consent for the transfers in the Treaty of Peking. (1905).

"Article I - The Imperial Chinese Government consent to all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Article V and VI of the Treaty of Peace above mentioned.

"Article II - The Imperial Japanese Government engage that in regard to the leased territory as well as in the matter of railway construction and exploitation, they will, so far as circumstances permit, conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia. In case any question arises in the future on these subjects, the Japanese Government will decide it in consultation with the Chinese Government." According to Article II of the treaty, the original Sino-Russian convention is also binding on Japan, who should therefore conform to Article III of the original convention, which specifies,

"The term of the lease shall be twenty-five years from the date of the signature of the present agreement and may be prolonged subsequently by mutual consent of both governments."

In other words, the term should have expired on March 27, 1923. But Japan considered the territory as her own. Therefore, in 1911, the Japanese Ambassador to England, Komei Kato, tried to secure the understanding of Sir Edward Grey by making the following explanation:

The Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dairen was ceded by the Manchu Empire to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese war. It was due to the improper intervention of the three Powers that Japan was compelled to restore that area to China. By a fateful war with Russia, Japan again secured the control of that territory. . . Japan has since determined to hold permanently Port Arthur and Dairen and the whole of Kwantung Territory. This policy will not be changed by the Japanese Government in the future. The fact that the Japanese people have planted trees in Kwantung area is an evidence of their determination to stay there. In order to continue their hold of this area, the Japanese must try to secure the recogni-

tion of the Chinese concerning Japanese rights in Manchuria. Although it is hard to say when and how such a negotiation will be conducted with China, it is definite that the Japanese people will carry out their policy anyway.

The term of the lease will expire within ten years; it is therefore a little bit too early to mention this matter before you. My purpose is to let the authority of our ally know the will and intention of Japanese people beforehand, so that there will be no misunderstanding between us when the said policy is carried out."

Such was the ambition of Kato. It is no wonder that in the "Twenty-one Demands" presented to Yuan Shih-kai in 1915, Kato who was himself the Foreign Minister, asked for a "Further" extension of the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen to ninety-nine years. When China was forced to accept the group two of the demands, Japan agreed to cancel the word "further", and the term of the treaty instead of beginning with the date of the signature of the present treaty, should naturally begin with the signing of the original Sino-Russian convention."

Though it was provided in the original convention that the act of lease which should in no way violate the sovereign right of the Emperor of China, Japan, being ambitious to obtain the title of perpetual occupation, has regarded the convention as an act of cession. So far as Japan's jurisdiction is concerned, Japan governed this leased territory as if it is her own. One might question: "Is this not a violation of the sovereign rights of China?"

12. *Jurisdiction in South Manchuria Railway Areas.*

The term "railway areas" has been used to designate "lands for the use of the South Manchurian Railway" by Japan who aimed continuously at the infringement of the territorial sovereignty of China. The purchase of lands by the South Manchurian Railway Company for the use of the railway should be done in conformity with the provisions Article VI of the Sino-Russian contract for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway of 1896. It was stipulated that "The lands actually necessary for the construction, operation, and protection of the line, as also the lands in the vicinity of the line necessary for procuring sand, stone, lime,

1. Wang, Yui-Seng, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 218
 2. Wang, Yui-Seng, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 221

1. Wang, Yui-Seng, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 238
 2. Ibid., p. 239
 3. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 218
 4. The Gaiko Jiho, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 225-231 (a Japanese magazine)
 5. Shinobu, J. Op. Cit., p. 157

etc., will be turned over to the company freely, these lands are the property of the State; if they belong to individuals, they will be turned over to the company either upon a single payment or upon an annual rental to the proprietors, at current prices. The lands belonging to the company will be exempt from all land taxes. *The company will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands.* The company will have the right to construct on these lands buildings of all sorts, and likewise to construct and operate the telegraph necessary for the needs of the line. The income of the company, all its receipts and the charges for the transportation of passengers and merchandise, telegraphs, etc., will likewise be exempt from any tax or duty. Exception is made, however, as to mines, for which there will be a special arrangement.¹

Thus the right of land acquisition by the Railway is limited to a certain extent. Article V of the same contract further provided:

"The Chinese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the railway and of the persons in its service against any attack. The company will have the right to employ at will, as many foreigners or natives as it may find necessary for the purpose of administration, etc. Criminal cases, lawsuits, etc., upon the territory of the railway, must be settled by the local authorities in accordance with the stipulations of the treaties."²

From the above article, it is evident that China did not give up her jurisdiction even over the railway proper. Thus it is easily inferred that she would not give up her jurisdiction over "lands for the use of the railway." No question arose during the ten years' management under Russia. As soon as Japan took over the South Manchurian Railway, she distorted the meaning of Article VI and insisted that the company was to have absolute and exclusive right of "political" administration in the railway areas. Not only the usurped China's sovereignty in the lands already acquired, but also seized new lands to form a sort of special area and called it "Railway Areas", over which she exercised jurisdictional rights just as she did in the leased territory. Meantime Japan encouraged Russia to establish a municipal administration in Harbin in 1908, and utilized it as a pretext for her own benefit. The Chinese Government then based on article V of the convention, made a protest to Russia. Other Powers also raised objections in this respect. The American Government, in November 1909, presented a note

to Russia declaring:

"Adverting to the French text of the contract, it is to be observed that the land which is the subject of the provision of Article VI thereof is precisely.

"Les terrains rielement necessaires pour le construction, exploitation et protection de la ligne, ainsi que les terrains aus environs de la ligne, necessaires pour se procurer des sables, pierres, chaux, etc."

The second paragraph of Article VI reads.

"La Societi aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terraus."

The word "administration" has been used loosely its interpretation is therefore confusing. In English the word "administration" is quite commonly used representing all sorts of business administration. In French and also its equivalent in Chinese, the word is used in contract; meaning business and non-governmental administration. Indeed the French word "administration" is so very commonly used in business management that its absolute meaning in a given case would be wholly determined by its context. After reading the whole contract the second paragraph of Article VI does not give any semblance of "political administration."³

The explanation of the American Government serves enough to refute the Japanese interpretation of the article. Russia was obliged to reaffirm in the preliminary agreement in regard to municipal administration in the Chinese Eastern Railway, signed with China in 1911, with the provision that the sovereign rights of China are recognized on the lands of the Railway Company, and they shall not be prejudiced in any way. This serves as a further guarantee of China's sovereignty in the Railway areas. Such supplementary articles are naturally applicable to the lands used by the south Manchurian Railway, since the original Sino-Russian convention is equally binding on Japan. How could Japan then deny Chinese sovereignty in the Railway areas! Japan nevertheless turned a deaf ear to this agreement. She even enlarged the so-called railway areas by acquiring more lands and encroached upon Chinese jurisdictional rights therein. In Manchuria, Japan had acquired a total area of approximately one hundred square miles of land on the eve of the Mukden Incident. She acquired lands stretching along the tracks of the Changchun-Dairen line (438m.) the Mukden-Antung line (161m.), as well as the Yingkow,

Yentai, Fushun, Liushutun lines (700m. altogether). Also she occupied lands in the municipal towns and the large mining areas at Fushun and Anshan; which have been regarded as belonging to the South Manchurian Railway areas. To sum up, the Japanese acquired lands in the following ways:⁴

- (a) Lands transferred to Japan by Russia.
- (b) Lands belonging to Chinese were confiscated for military use by the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese war, and they were later transferred to the South Manchurian Railway Company.
- (c) Lands bought from Chinese people.
- (d) Lands leased from Chinese people.
- (e) Lands in the settlements at treaty ports.
- (f) Lands, which, though not possessed by the company, were regarded as lands within the Railway Areas over which it exercised its administrative rights.

13. *The Right to Observe and to take part in Judicial Decisions at the Local Court in Manchuria and Mongolia.*

Japan obtained the right of consular jurisdiction from the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded in 1896. The following are some of the important points. Article 20 secured for Japan the right of jurisdiction over the persons and property of Japanese subjects in China. The Japanese consuls would all cases brought against Japanese subjects or property by Japanese subjects, or by the subjects or citizens of any other power, without the intervention of the Chinese authorities. Article 21 provided that if the Chinese authorities or a Chinese subject would have any charge or complaint of a civil nature against Japanese subjects, or in respect of Japanese property in China, the case should be heard and decided by the Japanese authorities. In like manner, all charges and complaints of a civil nature brought about by Japanese authorities or subjects in China against Chinese subjects, or in respect of Chinese property, should be heard and determined by the Chinese authorities. Japanese subjects as provided in article 22, charged with the commission of any crimes or offenses in China should be tried, and, if found guilty,

punished, by the Japanese authorities according to the laws of Japan.⁵

In like manner, Chinese subjects charged with the commission of any crimes or offenses against Japanese subjects in China should be tried, and if found guilty punished, by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China.⁶

Article 4 of the treaty made it clear that Japanese people should have no right of the freedom of travel, residence, and trade outside the treaty port. But the Japanese fully enjoyed the privileges in treaty ports on the basis of the three articles cited above. In group two, of the Twenty-one Demands, it was demanded that the Japanese people should have freedom of travel, residence and trade in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. At that time, Mr. Tsao Ru-ling, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others submitted to President Yuan Shih-kai a memorandum pointing out that "consular jurisdiction is extended to the place where the Japanese people are found in China. This will mean not only increase of diplomatic complications but also the loss of sovereign rights."⁷ Mr. Tsao's opinion is quite commendable.

In 1915, the Chinese Government also gave assent to the demands that in Eastern Mongolia, the Japanese people might partake with the Chinese people in joint enterprises in agriculture and auxiliary industries. In South Manchuria, the Japanese people were given freedom to travel, reside and trade. Article 5 of the Treaty of 1915 respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia stated:

"The Japanese subjects, according to the three above mentioned articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, to must be subject to the police regulations and pay taxes to Chinese Government.

Civil and criminal cases in which the Japanese are defendants shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consuls; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. In mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land the litigation shall be made by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage.

1 & 2 Wang, Yui-seng, Op. Cit., Vol. III, p. 134

3. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 219

1. Shinobu, J. Op. Cit., pp. 238-9

2. Wang Yui-seng, Op. Cit., Vol. III, p. 188

3. MacMurray, Op. Cit., p. 73

4. Wang Yui-seng, Op. Cit., Vol. IV, p. 93

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When the judicial system in the said region in completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects should be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts.

14. *The Sino-Japanese Telegraph Treaty.*

During the Russo-Japanese War, both Japan and Russia, for convenience of communications, had established a number of telegraph stations. At the close of the War, the Chinese government requested them to return this communication service to China. Russia assented, and China purchased from her the telegraph lines outside the territorial limit of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Negotiation with Japan was not successful. Not until 1908 was a Sino-Japanese treaty of Telegraph concluded, providing that Japan should borrow from China the use of the telegraph lines between stations in the area of South Manchuria Railway on one side, and Antung, Newchwang, Liaoyang, Mukden, Tientien and Changchun on the other side. Telegraph lines outside the area of S. M. R. were sold to China for fifty thousand dollars. The period of the borrowing of those line should expire in 1923, and Japan later demanded that it be prolonged to the end of 1930 and other articles in the Treaty of Telegraph of 1908 be revised. In view of lack of satisfactory settlement, Japan extended the period of control of these lines indefinitely.¹

The above Sino-Japanese Telegraph Treaty provided also a Port Arthur, but later taken by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. It was agreed that Japan controls the line 7½ miles north of Chefoo; and China controls the line beginning with the point 7½ miles south Chefoo. The Chinese Government permitted that the cable might be directly connected with the Japanese Post Office in Chefoo, and Japanese official and private news might be sent through this cable between Chefoo and Japan, and those telegrams should be sent in the Japanese language. Japan promised to prevent the transfer of telegrams from one place to another in China through the Chefoo station, and no cable line shall touch Chinese territory outside of the territory and railway areas. Japan also recognised that she should not establish telegraph lines on land or build wireless stations.²

What have been mentioned above should have gone with the expiration of the terms of the treaty, but Japan still tried to retain these privileges.

1. Shinobu J. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 368-70

1. Shinobu J. *Op. Cit.*, p. 370

15. *Right of establishing the Means of Communication Territory Adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway.*

Japan interpreted the treaty in a manner most beneficial to her, saying that she had the absolute and exclusive administrative power over the area along the South Manchurian Railway, and in it the post offices, telegraph, and telephone services should be under the control of the Kwantung Government. At the Washington Conference, the Chinese delegate demanded the abolition of foreign post offices in China because they had been derogatory to China's territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity. The Japanese delegate was opposed to the application of this proposal in leased territories and in lands adjacent to the S. M. R. Her protest was not successful, for other powers did not side with her in this case. The Sino-Japanese negotiation concerning the withdrawal of foreign post offices continued till a settlement was made in December 1922. But the problem of Japanese post offices in areas adjacent to the S. M. R. remained as it was before.

In regard to telegraph matters, the telegraph treaty had already expired, but Japan continued to hold the privileges without change until September 18, 1931. About wireless telegraph, China at the Washington Conference requested that the foreign powers should unconditionally give up their wireless stations in China. The powers refused to comply with such demand, but agreed to observe certain restrictions stipulated in the Conference. In regard to leased territories and areas of S. M. R., the question should be dealt with by the Chinese government and Japan directly. The Chinese delegation consequently made a statement to the effect that China would never recognise this special right. Japan held that before any negotiation concerning the matter was completed with China, the establishment of wireless stations along the railway areas was an unchallengeable right.

16. *China's Promise of No Cession of Ports, Bays and Islands.*

Group IV of the Twenty-one Demands stated:

"The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbour or bay or island along the coasts of China." The Yuan Shih-kai Government recognised that such a declaration was in harmony with the sovereign right of a state. China therefore should make it voluntarily. On May 13, 1915, the Chinese Government announced, in

the official paper, that following the decisions of the political council, the ports, bays, and islands along the Chinese coasts should not be leased or ceded to any other country. Japan interpreted this statement as applicable to Manchuria.

17. *Treaty Governing the Neutral Zone in the north of the Kwantung Leased Territory.*

The area north of the Kwantung leased territory was regarded by Japan as a neutral zone, according to the convention of Peking, signed on March 27, 1898, between China and Russia concerning the lease of Port Arthur. Article 5 of the treaty provided that a neutral zone should be established north of the leased territory. The frontiers of this zone would be fixed by the Chinese Envoy and the Minister of foreign affairs of Russia. Within this specified neutral zone the civil administration would be entirely in the hands of the Chinese authorities; Chinese troops would be admitted to this zone only with the consent of the Russian authorities. Concerning the boundary of the neutral zone and the rights of Russia additional articles to the convention of Peking of May 7, 1898 were inserted which provided: "To the north of the boundary fixed in article 1, there should in accordance with article V of the Peking Treaty, be a neutral zone, the northern boundary of which shall commence with the west coast Liaotung Peninsula at the mouth of the Kai-chou River, shall run north of Yu-yen-cheng to the Ta-yang River and shall follow the left bank of the river to its mouth, this river was included in the neutral territory."

The Chinese government agreed in article V: (1) that without Russia's consent on concession in the neutral zone would be made to the subjects of other powers; (2) that the ports on the seacoast east and west of the neutral ground should not be opened to the trade of other powers (3) and that without Russia's consent no road and mining concessions, industrial mercantile privileges should be granted in the neutral territory.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan obtained this right according to Article VI of the Portsmouth Treaty, and also according to Article I of the Treaty concerning Manchuria, concluded by China and Japan at the Peking Conference of 1905.

B. *RIGHTS WHICH HAVE NO TREATY BASIS HAVE BEEN ACTUALLY EXERCISED BY THE JAPANESE.*

1. *Quartering of Garrisons along the Antung-Mukden line.*

1. MacMurray, *Op. Cit.*, p. 552 Article VI

2. Wang Yui-Seng, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. V, p. 209

The Antung-Mukden line runs from Mukden to Antung on the Yalu River. In 1904 when the Russo-Japanese War took place. Japan ordered railway guards to build a light railway on the Chinese soil. In the Manchurian Convention of 1905, it was provided that "The Chinese Government agree to the military railway constructed between Antungcheng and Mukden being transformed into a line for the transmission of merchandise of all nationals and conducted by the Japanese Government. The term in which the railway will be conducted by the Japanese to be fifteen years from the date on which the transformation of the line is completed, the final term of concession being the 49th year of Kuang Hsu (1923.) Upon the expiry of the term the railway will be sold to the Chinese Government, its value being decided by the experts, one to be appointed by each of the contracting parties. During the time the line is under the control of the Japanese, Chinese troops, arms and provisions will be transported according to the terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway Treaty. In effecting the transformation of the railway, the Japanese authorities in charge will consult with commissioners to be appointed by the Chinese Government. The Chinese government appoint a special official to supervise the railway business as in case of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Rates of freight on goods belonging to the Chinese Government or private individuals will be specially arranged."

According to the provision of this treaty, whenever Japan intends to improve the construction of this railway, she must get the consent of the Chinese government. Japan disregarded the treaty obligations, which she secretly carried on the new works and improvements of the railway. In places near Penhsihu, she built barracks to house railway guards at the expense of buildings of the Chinese inhabitants. In 1909 Japan first discussed with China about the Antung-Mukden question. Mr. Si-liang, the Viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces, ordered the commissioner of foreign affairs to give the Japanese consul a diplomatic note, suggesting ten measures, one which ran as follows; "Japan shall, according to Peking Agreement, immediately withdraw her railway guards along the Antung-Mukden line. The Chinese Government shall send troops to protect the railway." The Minister of Foreign Affairs of China in a note to Japan also stated, that the guards are for the Port Arthur-Changchun line, and should not be stationed on other lines.

Finally, Japan, in a form of ultimatum, notified China that she would build the railway anyway. The Japanese troops had prepared to mobilize. China at last was forced to give no further protest.

2. *The Occupation by the Japanese of the Land Adjacent to the Antung-Mukden line and the Assumption of the Powers of Administration and Police therewith.*

The Antung-Mukden line, as mentioned above, was originally a light railway built for military purpose by Japan during the period of the Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese troops during and after the War arbitrarily occupied people's lands. The Chinese Government never gave due recognition to such arbitrary act. Mr. Si-liang's note in 1909 also referred to the Peking agreement, saying that with the exception of acquiring land absolutely necessary for the railway, should not secure lands for other purposes.

In the same year, regulations governing the purchase of lands by the Antung-Mukden Railway were promulgated, which provided that land purchasable in Manchuria might include lands for rails, stations, etc.

Therefore, the Antung-Mukden Railway could only purchase lands for the use of the railway. At that time, the Japanese consular-general at Mukden also emphasized in his official dispatch that the purchased lands were merely used for the railway, not for other purposes.¹ Despite the provisions of the treaty and announcement of the consular-general, the Antung-Mukden Railway bought large tracts of land, along the railway and also in towns and cities. Japanese police officer were stationed in such districts, and China's administrative authority was not allowed to extend control over them. The question remained unsettled when the crisis came in September 1931.

3. *Police Forces of the Japanese Consulate in Manchuria and Mongolia,*

Before September 18, 1931, the total number of police officers under the control of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was nine hundred and thirty five. Except one inspector-general for Siam, the other police officers were scattered in various parts of China and more than three-fifths of them were in Mongolia and Manchuria.² This was another instance of Japan's violation of the sovereign rights of China. At the Washington Conference, the Chinese delegates demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese police forces; they were of no effect.

1. Shinobu, J., *Op. Cit.*, p. 265
2. Shinobu, J., *Op. Cit.*, p. 435

4. *The Establishment of Wireless Station.*

Of all foreign powers which maintain wireless stations in China, Japan certainly ranks foremost in number. As early as 1911, Japan already established a wireless station in Dairen with the purpose to facilitate shipping business between Shanghai and Dairen. Branches of this station were later installed at other ports. At the Washington Conference, China had demanded the unconditional abolition of all foreign wireless stations; on the ground that these stations jeopardized China's administrative integrity. This demand as we all know, was accepted by the Conference and became one of the important agreements reached at Washington. Soon after the Conference, Japan started at Niu Shuh-tung a station having power of 33 Kw. with the up-to-date equipment. At Dairen another station was established. The one established in 1911 is now solely operated for maintaining maritime communications, and it has become a branch of the Dairen wireless station. Other branches are installed at Antung, Heven-Chwen, etc. This problem of wireless stations thus becomes one of the unsettled cases between China and Japan before September 18, 1931. Let us notice that even Japan realize that this action is without any treaty ground, and she could only venture to claim it as a *fait accompli*.

C. JAPAN TREATY RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BECOME INEFFECTIVE.

1. *The Agreement on the Construction of Parallel lines to the South Manchuria Railway.*

Article 8 of the protocol of 1905 Peking Conference between China and Japan, relating to the Three Eastern Provinces, contains the statement that China should not build parallel lines to the S.M.R. The Japanese have frequently employed this statement to frustrate the plan of the Chinese Government in building railways in Manchuria. That a mere memorandum of a Conference could not have binding effect as of a treaty is a well known fact. Mr. Wang Yui-seng in his fourth volume of *"History of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations. During the Past Sixty Years,"* has pointed out very definitely that the points reached in this protocol of the Conference were at its best preliminary understanding which in order to have binding force, must be supplemented by a formal treaty. This principle was well proved by the signing of separate treaties at a later date on several points contained in the protocol of the Conference. That no formal treaty was ever concluded on the problem of parallel lines shows

clearly that the memorandum should not have a binding effect on the parties. It is also true that the problem of rights to navigate on the Sugari River, was suggested in the protocol of the Conference, but it has not become effective because it was not embodied in the treaty. Japanese look upon these Conference minutes as having binding force and complain that they have not become effective.

2. *The Problem of Kirin-Hwei Ning Railway.*

The Kirin-Hwei-ning Railway connecting Northern Manchuria with Korea was to give the Japanese a powerful instrument in their invasion into Manchuria. The road has incomparable economic and military value, especially in war times. The extreme importance of this road is vividly described in the so-called a seriously questioned authority see S.M.R. report for year previous. Tanaka memorandum, As far back as 1907, when the Chinese Government signed the treaty relating to Mukden-Hsingningfu Railway and the Kirin-Changchun Railway, a statement was included which signified that should China undertake to build any branches or extensions of railway lines and in case of lack of funds, a loan for this purpose would be extended by Japan. And in 1909 the Japanese Minister at Peking brought up the so-called "Chien-Tao" question, and in his note to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he explicitly demanded that the Kirin-Changchun line be extended to Hwei-ning, Korea. When the treaty delimiting the boundary between China and Korea boundary was signed, it was understood that in case the line was extended, it would follow the example of the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The date of operation was to be jointly determined by the Chinese and Japanese Governments.

Later on, Japan has for several times brought up the question of providing the fund and starting the work. But the Chinese Government, realizing the danger involved, has delayed the project. It was as late as 1918 when the notorious Nishihara loan was made that a tentative contract was drawn up with the Japanese Industrial Bank, relating to the line in question. This contract, as it was provided that the Bank would furnish 1,000,000 dollars, to be guaranteed by the entire property and income of the line. The draft also prescribed that the formal treaty should be signed within six months. But when the question was brought up the next year, Japan demanded that the entire power of control over the administration and finance of the line be entrusted to a Japanese national in the official capacity as chief treasurer, and also the entire engineering and construction

work be entrusted to a Japanese engineer. It was at this time that the student movement of 1919 took place, and the cabinet was forced to resign. The change of the cabinet had upset the whole matter, and the problem in question was temporarily dropped. But it soon reappeared in a different form. The Japanese government, in order to escape from the attention of the Chinese, had secretly induced the local government to build with Japanese capital two short lines: one connecting Kirin and Tung Hwa, the other Tu Mien River and Tung-fusze. A glance of the map would show clearly that these two lines are exactly the western and eastern sections of the proposed Kirin-Hwei-Ning line. And if Tung-hwa and Tung-fusze are connected by a railway line, the three lines would naturally merge into one line between Kirin and Korea. And this is just the situation before September 18, 1931, which led the Japanese to claim that this is another case where a treaty right has not been carried into effect. And soon after the coup d'etat, the above mentioned connection was effected and consequently became beneficial to Japanese military transportation.

3. *"Mining Rights As Provided in the Twenty-one Demands."*

Article IV of the treaty relating to Manchurian questions signed in 1909, read that all mines along the Mukden-Antung Railway and the main line of the South Manchurian Railway, excepting those at Fushun and Yentai, shall be exploited as joint enterprises of Japanese and Chinese subjects, upon the general principles which the viceroy of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Governor of Mukden agreed upon with the Japanese consul general in the 40th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 33rd year of Kwang-shu...

When this was made known, the minister of the United States in Peking questioned the Chinese Government whether or not this clause meant to grant to the Japanese the monopoly of rights to all mines in the said region. It was replied that no such monopoly or exclusive rights was implied. Provided that a grant is secured from the Chinese Government nationals of a third country might also acquire the right to mining in the said area. Similar notes were exchanged between the American Ambassador and the Japanese Government at Tokyo, in which the Japanese government stated that the said clause did not imply any exclusive rights to Japanese nationals, that nationals of a third country might also acquire the right, provided the grant from the Chinese government was secured.

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cured. It was only prescribed that neither China nor Japan would undertake the business alone.

This is the first time that Japan's hand was laid on matters relating to mining in South Manchuria. It is worthy to note that Japan had no idea to monopolize the whole business at the time. But when the Twenty-one Demands were presented: article 4 group 2 read: "The Chinese government agrees to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly."¹

In this we find that not only the accessible mining area is extended to the whole of South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, but also the right to open mines is to be granted exclusively to Japanese subjects. Fortunately when the Chinese Government was compelled to sign the treaty, the clause was not included. Only in the exchanged notes, certain mines in Fengtien and Kirin were designated for this use, but it was made explicit that they should abide by the mining regulations of China. After this grant was made Japan started mining work along the Anshan region, while in other places, Japan has not yet started the work or was stopped because the mining regulations have not been abided by. This another case in which Japan claimed that her treaty right has not become effective.

4. *The Right to Rent Land from the People in South Manchuria.*

One of the Twenty-one Demands (article 2, group II) deals with the right of the Japanese subjects to own or to rent land in South Manchuria and East Mongolia for the purpose of erecting buildings for factories or for the purpose of agricultural cultivation. The Chinese government made an effort to drop East Mongolia out of the clause and consented under the pressure of an ultimatum, that Japanese subjects have the right to rent land in South Manchuria and East Mongolia. In the exchanged notes between China and Japan, it was agreed that the term of rent should not exceed a period of thirty years, which however might be renewed without condition. China on her part has declared a law that any individual who signs without authorization a contract with any foreigner to the effect of encroaching upon the rights and interests of the country would be considered as an act of high treason and must be subject to heavy penalty. This was evidently to guard the people from being induced by Japanese to make contract in illegal and dishonorable

ways. The Ministry of Interior had also published a guide book for renting land to Japanese on the basis of consent, which was distributed in Fengtien and Kirin. In this guide it is pointed out (1) that to rent a piece of land does not imply that it was mortgaged or sold, and that it is limited to the utilization and the profit accrued thereby, and that the ownership of the land belongs to the original owner. The guide also points out (2) that to rent by consent means securing consent from the land owner by peaceful means, any compulsory action necessarily nullifies the legality of the contract; (3) that the length of the term of rent may be determined by the party concerned but it should not exceed the period of thirty years and the contract should expire freely were the owner not willing to renew the contract at the end of the term, and (4) that the land utilized in erecting buildings or for cultivation should never exceed the area or the degree of application and need contracted for the purpose.¹ While it is clear that Japanese might rent land in South Manchuria, it is a fact that they have, through various ways, acquired and owned many acres of land in these provinces. Yet the Japanese still feel unsatisfied and grumble that this treaty right has not become effective.

5. *Treaty Ports in Eastern Mongolia.*

One of the Twenty-one Demands stipulated that the Japanese subjects should have the right and freedom of residing, travelling, and doing business in Eastern Mongolia as well as in South Manchuria. In the final statement which the Chinese Government was compelled to sign, it was provided that Eastern Inner Mongolia should be opened for commercial purposes.

But the subsequent change of the Chinese Government had delayed the matter, and Japan did not urge the Chinese Government to carry out the plan either; probably because the Japanese were not interested in opening a port for all foreign nationals. Japan always feels that she has a right to make a claim in, Mongolia, and therefore says that the treaty has been neglected.

6. *Protection of Koreans in Manchuria, including Chien-tao.*

After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan has induced the Koreans to cross the boundary and to cultivate the Chinese land. This is the beginning the Chien-tao question and soon it developed into a question of boundary between China and Korea and also question of the legal status of Koreans in the Three Eastern Provinces. In the treaty relating to

the boundary between China and Korea, a provision governing the residence of Koreans has been made.

It is evident that Japan has no right to protect the Koreans north of the Tu-men River, for they are all under the protection of the Chinese government. Now there were about 1,000,000 Koreans in Manchuria before September 18, 1931. A large number of these resided at Chien-tao, while others were scattered at Mukden, Antung, Harbin, Kirin, etc. The Chinese Government denied the right to own land to those un-naturalized Koreans. And Japan claimed that the law of the Japanese nationality is inapplicable to the Koreans, with the consequence that those Koreans who are already naturalized are still regarded by Japan as Japanese subjects, and thus caused a great deal of trouble. On the other hand, Japan had announced at the time of annexation of Korea that all Koreans were hereafter Japanese subjects and should enjoy all the rights and privileges pertaining to a Japanese national. Consequently, Koreans could enjoy the right of extra-territoriality in China. But the Chinese government, according to article 4 of the treaty of 1915, claims that Koreans should not be given the right of extra-territoriality and should be subject to Chinese laws and regulations. China never recognized that Japan was to have the right of protecting Koreans in Manchuria. Japan on the other hand, insisted on her treaty right and grumbled that the right was not enjoyed.

D. JAPANESE RIGHTS RELINQUISHED AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE JAPANESE SERVE IN CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

China first agreed to employ Japanese nationals in Chinese Government service according to an agreement reached between Mr. Hart, Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, and Mr. Hiyashi, the Japanese Minister to China, which provided for the employment of a Japanese Inspector of the Customs at Dairen. In the Twenty-one Demands, it was demanded that the Chinese Government should employ Japanese as advisors in political, financial and military affairs. In the final settlement of that negotiation, it is changed to the effect that in case the Chinese government would employ foreigners as advisors in military, political, financial and police offices in South Manchuria. Japan would be given the right of first consideration. This right, however, was relinquished by Mr. Yoshihara in his announcement at the Washington Conference in 1921-2.

III. RIGHTS AND INTERESTS ACQUIRED BY JAPAN SINCE SEPTEMBER 18, 1931, AS SEEN IN A TABLE PREPARED BY THE PRESENT JAPANESE WAR MINISTER.

I hope that I have tried to make clear what Japan meant by special rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia before September 18, 1931. I have also endeavored to discuss on what ground these so-called special rights and interests are supposed to have been based. If we read the table of rights and privileges acquired by Japan during the last two years in Manchuria, prepared by the war minister, we will realize what an expansion- indeed what an exploitation it is!

Classification	Special Rights acquired	Consolidation of Rights under Manchukuo	Extension of the Japanese rights and privileges after 1931.
Military and police	1. Right to station troops along the Railway zone. 2. Right to station troops along the Antung-Fengtien railway. 3. Right to demand for peace and order in Manchuria.	Recognized in the "Japan-Manchukuo agreement."	1. Alliance for national defence with the Manchukuo. 2. Right to station troops all over Manchuria.
Railways	4. Right to conduct and maintain the South Manchuria Railway. 5. Right to be entrusted with the administration & maintenance of the Kirin-Changchun line. 6. Agreement not to construct parallel lines to the S. M. R. 7. Agreement on the construction of the Kirin-Hweining line.	" "	3. "The Manchukuo government" has commissioned the S. M. R. company to administer all railways in Manchuria. All unsettled problems solved.
Mines and Mining	8. Right to mining in Fushun and Chefoo. 9. Right of partnership in the mining of Penghsihu and An-Shan. 10. Right of mining obtained in group I of the so-called Twenty-one Demands.	" "	4. It is now in the midst of planning to organize Japanese Manchukuo joint partnership companies to conduct such business.
Other Industries	11. Right of slumping in the forests on Yalu River. 12. Right of first claim to any forest and mining loans in Kirin and Heilungkiang. 13. Right to joint partnership in agriculture in East Mongolia. 14. Right to reside, travel, and to do the interiors of Manchuria. 15. Right to rent land by consent in South Manchuria.	" "	5. The definite establishment of the right to 'rent by consent' by Japanese Subjects in Manchukuo territory, registration of the land rented by consent, published June 14, 1933.

1. Shinobu, J. *Op. Cit.*, p. 392

Administrative and Judicial	16. Administrative rights in Kwangtung leased territory.	6. Numerous Japanese are employed by the Manchukuo Government in their service according to unofficial agreement, and occupy position in the administration of that country
	17. Administrative rights within the S. M. R. zone.	
	18. The control and administration and police within the territory of the Antung-Mukden Railway zone.	
	19. The right of taking part in court proceedings in Manchuria & Mongolia.	
	20. Police force in the consulates in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.	"Manchukuo" on her own initiative employs Japanese as her officials.
	21. Employment of Japanese subjects in certain political posts.	
Aviation and Mail	22. The connections between Chinese & Japanese telegraphic systems by treaty.	7. Plans are drawn up for the establishment of a "Manchukuo" telegraph and telephone company.
	23. The establishment of wireless stations	
	24. The right of administration of mails in S. M. R. zone.	
Others	25. A declaration that no Harbours or island on the coast would be leased or ceded to other country.	8. The establishment of a Japan-"Manchukuo" joint partnership aviation company open to business in Nov. 1932.
	26. Agreement relating to the neutral zone North of the Kwangtung leased territory.	
	27. The opening up of parts in Eastern Inner Mongolia.	
	28. The protection of Koreans in Manchuria and Chien-tao	

IV. ACTIVITIES OF JAPAN IN MANCHURIA DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS

Prior to September 18, 1931, Japanese immigrants in Manchuria were not quite successful, due to the restrictions of the "regulations of the lands." The import of Japanese goods was also checked by the new custom tariff of China. However, with the establishment of the puppet state, "Manchukuo," the situation has been totally changed. Japanese interests and rights in Manchuria have been unlimitedly augmented simply by signing the Japan-Manchukuo protocol which established closer relationship between the two nations. Araki remarked that Manchuria is now much more accessible to the Japanese than before.

By this he means the cancellation of all the prohibitions and restrictions disadvantageous to the Japanese, such as the removal of the anti-Japanese officials, the making of better regulations for the lease of land, and the revision of the "high tariff." So far we have not yet known anything about the "new regulations of the lease of land by the Japanese" which was proclaimed in June 14, 1933. But according to Araki, it gives the Japanese the greatest advantage possible. The minister also asserts the adoption of a unified currency which would protect the Japanese petty business men in Manchuria from suffering heavy losses due to the fluctuation of prices. The Manchukuo customs give preferential tariff to the Japanese goods under the pretense of independent administration.

Secondly, Araki pointed out that conditions necessary for the Japanese immigration into Manchuria have been positively established. Probably he referred to the increase of Japanese troops in Manchuria, the extension of the activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company in taking over the control over other railways in "Manchukuo." The increase of Japanese staff in the S. M. R. Company can best be illustrated by the following figures: (a) the company employed 67 graduates of the Railway College in 1931, 88 in 1932; and 182 in 1933 (b) Through the Ministry of Railways the number of recruits to be employed by the S. M. R. is 101 in 1932, and 444 in 1933. Besides, Japan has obtained in Manchuria many concessions in minings, telegraphs, telephones and aircrafts. So the outlook for the Japanese in Manchuria is tremendously bright.

As a result of the foregoing statement, what Japan has really obtained in Manchuria can be enumerated as follows:

A. THE INCREASE OF JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS IN MANCHURIA:— (all came from Japan, immigrants from Kwantung not counted)

District settled	End of 1931	March, 1933	Increase
The Treaty Ports	12,626	23,392	10,766
S. M. R. zone	97,558	115,521	17,965
Railway zones in North Manchuria	428	1,878	1,456
Other districts	2,930	9,361	6,431
Total	113,540	150,152	36,318

This is formulated according to the investigations of the Japanese consuls: those made by the armies are not included.

It must be clearly explained that the above figures do not include any Japanese coming from Kwantung leased territory in which the number of Japanese settlers increased from 119,770 in 1931 to 125,935 in 1932; i. e., an increase of 6,165 within one year. The aggressiveness of Japan in her colonization in Manchuria can also be vividly shown by the fact that the total number of increase

of Japanese immigrants from the outbreak of the Incident to last year (about 42,000) is equal to that for the period of eight years before September 1931. Below are some more statistics showing the increase of Japanese populations in Manchuria (according to the investigation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

Reports of the Consulate in	1931	March 1933	Increase
Mukden	47,567	61,235	13,668
Changchun	17,464	25,040	7,576
Harbin	4,151	7,718	3,567
Tsitsihar	368	2,975	2,607
Chientao	2,426	4,418	1,992
Chinchow	—	1,465	1,465
Kirin	948	2,626	1,678
Antung	12,570	13,776	1,206
Chehfeng	—	910	910
Tiehling	5,884	6,740	856
Newchwang	10,514	11,215	701
Manchuli	174	484	310
Chang Chia Dun	262	750	488
Liao-yang	11,212	10,810	402 (decrease)
Total	113,540	150,162	36,622

B. THE EXPANSION OF JAPANESE TRADE. As accurate statistics of the total foreign trade of "Manchukuo" are not available, Araki made his observation on the basis of the Dairen Customs report. (Dairen handles one more than half of the "Manchukuo" foreign trade.) Japan-"Manchukuo" trade in Manchuria (according to the commerce section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Japan trade with "Manchukuo."

	1931 (unit 1000 yen)	1932	Increase	%
Export	54,894	139,563	84,669	154
Import	85,700	126,219	40,519	47
Balance	30,806	13,314	44,150	
	(excessive import)	(excessive export)		

Of the imports from "Manchukuo," the increase of the quantity of bean residues valued at 20,000,000 yen and that of Soybeans valued at 3,000,000 yen, and those of beans, Kaoliang and iron ores each valued at 2,000,000 yen.

The Main exports to "Manchukuo" are a follows:— (according to the Commerce section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Products	1931 (unit 1000 yen)	1932	Increase
Cotton goods	5,587	21,155	15,568
Cotton	4,789	11,390	6,601
Construction materials	3,802	9,530	5,728
Flour	2,147	9,824	7,677
Sugar	2,690	7,959	5,269
Papers	1,948	3,692	1,744
Jutes bags	1,742	3,472	1,730

C. THE EXPANSION OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES IN MANCHURIA. According to the following tables, Araki predicted that the capacity for future development of Japanese enterprises in "Manchukuo" is unlimited.

Statistics of Japanese investments in Kwantung and its vicinities (according to investigations made of the S. M. R.)

Minds of Enterprises	1930 Number Capital of Companies	1931 Number Capital of Companies	1932 Number Capital of Companies
Agriculture	28 yen 25,720,000	28 25,482,500	30 27,683,500
Fishery	7 " 1,007,100	8 1,307,100	8 8,307,100
Commerce	759 " 121,789,749	806 117,842,849	877 122,137,849
Industry	340 " 91,816,822	356 91,036,622	382 92,409,622
Mining	16 " 8,599,300	16 8,599,300	16 8,599,300
Transportation	92 " 351,684,820	97 351,860,280	97 351,860,280

D. INCREASE OF PROFITS OF THE S. M. R. In 1931, the total increase of its profit has enabled the S. M. R. to meet a deficit of about 4,000,000 yen. Last year its net profit was over 18,000,000 yen. In addition to 42,000,000 yen made in its investments in other Manchurian railways before the recognition of "Manchukuo," the Company had made a net profit of over 61,000,000 yen in 1932. The following table shows the activities of the Company in detail. (unit 1,000 yen)

Kinds of enterprises	1931	1932	Increase or decrease
Railways	A receipts 85,476	103,846	—
	B expenditures 31,478	32,406	—
	C profit 53,998	70,440	16,442
Hotels	R 1,303	1,827	—
	E 1,394	1,803	—
	P 91	14	105
Harbours	R 8,357	11,406	—
	E 6,119	7,108	—
	P 2,228	4,298	2,070
Minings	R 52,731	55,086	—
	E 52,706	54,945	—
	D 25	141	116
	R 3,360	4,191	—
Oil Industry	E 3,070	3,652	—
	D 290	538	148
	R 7,708	10,710	—
Iron Metallurgy	E 10,688	14,615	—
	Loss 2,980	3,900	920

Araki explained that the increase of profits of the S. M. R. was due to (1) its control of all railways in Manchuria, thus avoiding the loss due to competition, (2) prompt payment by "Manchukuo" of the interests of its investments in other railways, thus enabling the company to have an additional capital of 119,000,000 yen.

E. THE RENEWED ACTIVITIES OF INVESTMENTS OF THE TOYO TAKUSHOKU KABUSHIKI KAICHA IN MANCHURIA. Toyo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha was, at first, a special organization chartered by the Japanese government for the development and exploitation of Korea. In 1915, its organic laws were amended so as to extend the scope of its activities to Manchuria. Having Japanese government as its background, the investments of the Company in Manchuria went mainly to land, forestry and mining; the operations of which often involved the disputed question of Chinese sovereignty. So before the Incident of September 1931, its enterprises could not be successfully carried on because of the opposition of the Chinese people. With the protection of the Japanese military régime the Company now resumes its work smoothly.

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F. EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BANK OF KOREA. It is well known that the main Japanese financial organization in Manchuria is the Bank of Korea. Since September 1931, this Bank has established additional sub-branches almost all over Manchuria and Jehol places such as Tsitsihar, Chinchow, Cheng-teh, Chehfeng, Hailar and other places. By the end of last April, the total deposits in its branches and sub-branches in Manchuria reached the amount of 125,000,000 yen (i. e. an increase of 74,000,000 yen over that of October 1931, such an enormous increase was due to the deposits of the Central Bank of "Manchukuo," and of the S. M. R. etc.) On the other hand, the total loans made all over Manchuria, up to last April reached the amount of 48,860,000 yen (i. e. an increase of 13,300,000 yen over that of October, 1931.)

G. THE INCREASE OF JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN MANCHURIA. From the outbreak of the Incident to the end of 1932, the increase of Japanese investments in Manchuria was only about 5,000,000 yen. However, Araki thinks, from this year onward, the economic development of Manchuria by means of Japanese capital would go on by leaps and bounds. So

BIG ISSUES OF PRESENT-DAY CHINESE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

L. C. Cheng

In a time when every nation is facing a fiscal deficit in its national budget, China is not an exception. It was estimated that the Chinese Government revenue for the year 1933 is \$580 million and expenditure \$800 million, the annual deficit being \$143 million and the monthly, \$12 million.

It is under the threatening of such financial difficulties that Mr. T. V. Soong, despite his achievements and creditable efforts towards the balancing of the government budget, resigned from his posts as Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the Executive Yuan. It is to overcome these difficulties that Dr. H. H. Kung, Soong's successor, assumes the responsibility of devising new measures to bring the national finance into a better position. Therefore, it is the purpose of this article to survey briefly the financial problems confronting the country.

Military Expenditure

Like all other countries, military expenditure remains the largest item of the government outlay and its percentage to the nation's total expenditure is growing in this country. Budgets of recent years reveal that military expenditure of the government has increased from \$210 million, in 1918, to \$416 million, in 1933, with its percentage to the total national expenses growing from 43.3% to 50.2% respectively. Owing to the anti-Communist campaign and suppression of bandits and judging from the constant requests from the military leaders in the past, we shall see the national expenses for military affairs actually much higher this year.

far, enormous capital is to be invested in (1) The Manchuria Chemistry Kaisha with a capital of 25,000,000 yen, (2) Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Kaisha with a capital of 50,000,000 yen, (3) Increase of the capital of the S. M. R. by subscribing 180,000,000 yen from the Japanese people (4) Investment in the "Manchukuo" government bonds (the first loan to "Manchukuo," May 1932, was 20,000,000 yen; and last Spring the "Manchukuo" construction bonds totalled 30,000,000 yen.

V. CONCLUSION.

By means of her military conquest since September 1931, the Japanese have at last realized their cherished desire in exploiting Manchuria. According to Araki, the total military expenditures of Japan in Manchuria, from the outbreak of the Incident up to the present fiscal year was 360,000,000 yen. Of this amount, he said, about 210,000,000 yen or sixty per cent thereof, had been directly or indirectly used in developing the national economy of Japan. So this is the sum Japan has paid for the development of the abundant natural resources in Manchuria.

Moreover, public loans have constantly been floated by the National Government for the sole purpose of meeting the nation's military expenditure and others connecting with civil warfare. According to an official estimate, loans for such purpose have accumulated to an amount of \$448 million, not including the \$4 million Short Term Loan for the relief of the devastated areas in the War Zone in North China issued this August. If expenses for these loans would be added, the amount of the nation's military expenditure must be much more enormous and the percentage to the total expenditure undoubtedly higher.

The embarrassment created by huge military expenditure, however, does not cease with this. To compare the government expenditure for warfare and public debt with the three main sources of national revenue—customs, consolidated and salt taxes, the following picture will be presented for the last three years:

Year	Revenue from customs consolidated & salt taxes	Expenditure for warfare & public debt	Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)
1931	\$653,707,645	\$623,352,310	+\$20,355,335
1932	549,889,884	559,071,408	- 9,181,516
1933	598,386,119	657,441,804	- 59,061,685

Economy is always a condition of public finance; and it is nowhere more needed than where incomes are small and national wealth is not abundant. The unrestricted expansion of military expenditure, even in Western countries, is a rising problem; and here, as in many other matters, China is confronting a much more complex difficulty.

Readjustment of Salt Taxes

Salt taxes have always been an important source of revenue for the Government and an income that the local governments have greatly depended upon. Owing to the retention of salt revenue by "Manchukuo" backed with Japanese military forces, last year, the Government suffered a loss of an amount as great as \$33 million. Therefore, a readjustment of the salt taxes with a view to securing uniformity of rates throughout the country and, consequently, raising the total income from them, was called for by the National Government in identical orders to the Executive and the Legislative Yuan. The proposal was adopted by the Central Political Council on the recommendation of Mr. T. V. Soong, then Minister of Finance.

In his proposal, Mr. Soong declared that the primary object of readjusting the salt taxes was to secure uniformity. After careful study of relevant circumstances, the Ministry of Finance had drawn up a new schedule which provides for reduction of the tax in those districts where it had been excessive and an appropriate increase of the tax in districts where it had been too low, so that a general uniformity might be gradually attained. The proposal having been approved by the Central Political Council, the National Government has instructed the two Yuan concerned to take the necessary measures for the enforcement of the proposal as well as the revised schedule.

According to a recent report, salt revenue has greatly increased since the enforcement of new regulations. The monthly net receipt reaches an amount of \$5 million, not including those going to provincial treasuries, in comparison to \$2 million of old days.

New Treasury Bond

During the past several months, especially the greater part of last spring and summer while fighting went on in North China, when the Government was hard pressed for military funds, money was advanced by Chinese banks to enable the Administration to meet the situation. As a result of this, the issue of a new national treasury bond, primary as security against advances to the Government from the bank, was again proposed by Mr. T. V. Soong. The bonds, to be known as the 22nd Year Customs Treasury Bonds and amounting to \$100 million, were issued on Oct. 1st to be redeemed in 150 months at 98% with interest at 5 per mille per mensem. To meet interest charges and redemption of principal payments, a portion of the Customs revenue will be paid to the National Loans Sinking Fund Commission. For the time being, it was understood between the Government and the banks that these bonds will not be put into circulation, in order to prevent a drop in the price of other bonds.

As the bonds were given to the banks as security for the loans that the banks had extended to the Government, a large portion of them were used for the payment of old debts. What remains after the payment is being used as security for new loan to meet the immediate needs of the Government. According to a report on Oct. 14, the Minister of Finance arranged with the bank circle of Shanghai an advance of \$15

million of which five sixths has been put up by large banks, like the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, etc., and the attempt is being made to raise the balance from the native banks in the city.

The Cotton and Wheat Loan

In regard to the cotton and wheat loan which Mr. Soong concluded on behalf of the Chinese Government with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of America, the Government has decided in principle to use the money derived from the sale of these commodities in the Chinese market primarily for reconstruction work in the country. Requests after requests had been sent to the central government from different provinces or special ministries, departments, organizations, or others, for a portion of this fund, so as to enable them to carry out their construction plans, before the Government assigned the whole fund to the newly reorganized National Economic Council.

As it was arranged, the total Amount of the U. S. \$ 50 million is being spent to purchase American cotton and wheat. The purchase, in order to prevent drastic effects on Chinese cotton and wheat markets, has so far been advancing very slowly. Up to date, it is reported that about 5,200 bales of cotton have been bought in America while the amount of wheat purchase is still not revealed.

Duty on Imported Rice

China, being an agricultural state, remained economically selfsufficient for several thousands of years, although famine was not unknown to the people. With an effective system of storage, however, each famine was passed without much hardship. It was about 1722, that a great famine again occurred in Fukien and Kwangtung and, in order to relieve the food tension, rice at extremely low price was imported from Siam. Since Fukien and Kwangtung are two of the provinces where rice crop is not so very bountiful but its consumption very great, a system of exemption of duty on rice imported to that area was then established. Such practice was gradually extended to other areas and not a long while after it was applied to the whole country. Later, such right was even assured to most countries by the yielding of unfavorable Commercial treaties.

From then on, rice was imported in great quantity at first and dumping followed later. On the other hand, market for home-grown rice was greatly effected and constantly suffered a setback. A recent study reveals that the wholesale price of the imported rice in Shanghai is much lower than the home-grown one, particulars being as the following:

A COMPARISON OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF FOREIGN AND HOME-GROWN RICE IN SHANGHAI, THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1933

Home-Grown Rice:

Chiang-shu product	\$10.62 per picul
Soochow product	9.47 " "
Kiangsi product	8.85 " "
Hunan product	8.49 " "

Foreign Rice:

Saigon rice (1st grade).....	9.00	per picul
" " (2nd grade).....	7.92	" "
Rangoon rice (1st grade).....	8.43	" "
" " (2nd grade).....	8.03	" "
" " (3rd grade).....	6.95	" "

As a result of such difference in prices, many of the rice growers in the country have been on the verge of bankruptcy and more actually ruined for the past year, even though harvests have been generally quite bountiful. This only aggravates the crisis in villages which is a much discussed problem in the country to-day. With a view to the stabilization of the price of home-grown rice, a duty on imported rice is quite essential; so that such a duty was proposed by the Government as a check to the act of dumping of foreign rice exporters.

At first, oppositions were raised from many provinces where supply of rice is usually lacking. Notwithstanding these oppositions, Canton was the first city declaring the imposition of a tax on foreign rice by an order from the South-West Political Council with Swatow and Fukien following their example, before the National Government formally contemplated the imposition of such a duty. By an order addressed to Houses of Customs throughout the country except a few in Kwangtung, Fukien and Kwangsi, the Government properly declared that the imposition of such tax shall begin by Dec. 16, the levy amounting to \$1.98 a picul.

Minister Kung's New Deal

As successor to Mr. Soong, Dr. H. H. Kung, the present Minister of Finance and concurrently Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, has devised new measures to place the Government Treasury into a sound position, besides the incomplete work carried over from the ex-Minister, since he was formally inducted into office in Nov. 6. Dr. Kung's policy is clearly indicated in four words, "Opening resources, curtailing outlay," by which the Minister means the development of new sources and economy in expenditure. To explain his policy, he said, "To develop new sources we must develop productive forces which are closely related to political stability and communication facilities..... Tax collections should be improved, but I shall not increase the burden upon the general public. Even their present responsibilities must be made equitable. We hope that they will shoulder only a light burden, while the nation will be benefited with an ample financial supply. This will be my policy in brief."

Having a brief idea of the new Minister's policy toward the Government finance, let us now turn our attention to Dr. Kung's records during his short term in service and see how closely his work follows the policy.

Increased Taxes on Cigarettes, Cement and Matches An order issued by the Ministry of Finance, increasing the consolidated taxes on rolled tobacco, cement and matches became effective on Dec. 5. The new tax on cigarettes is: Grade "A", selling over \$300 per case of 50,000 pieces, \$160, and Grade "B", selling under \$300, \$80. New revenue stamps must be affixed to all products before permits to leave a factory will be granted. The sale of products bearing stamps dated before Dec. 5 will not be affected, and old stamps may be exchanged for new ones within thirty days from date of the enforcement of the increased tax. The new rates on matches are: (1) Lucifer matches: 48 x 33 x 14 mm, boxes containing 75-80 pieces, \$10.80 per case, 43 x 34 x 16 mm, containing 100-105 pieces, \$13.50; (2) Safety matches: 48 x 34 x 16 mm, boxes containing 75-80 pieces, \$13.50 per case; 59 x 38 x 18 mm, containing 100-105 pieces, \$17.40; 59 x 40 x 48 mm, containing 115-120 pieces, \$21. The new rate for cement is \$1.20 for barrel of 170 kilograms; or cement packed in other forms the new rate is double the former tax. All these represent an increase from 33 to 50%.

Expected Inheritance Tax The institutions of an inheritance tax is now under consideration by the Ministry of Finance. It is only understood that the rates of the proposed new tax, according to the measures prepared by the Ministry, will be on a sliding scale, proportionate to the value of property left by the deceased; the larger the value, the heavier will be the rate.

Land Tax Adjustments With a view to the principle of equity as he outlined, Dr. Kung is making a proposal, concerning the adjustment of land taxes, to be submitted to the Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committee of Kuomintang on January 25, 1934. An increase of land taxes in urban districts in proportion to the assessed value of lands, and a decrease of those in the interior farming districts are highlights of the proposal. The suggested action is expected to be a measure to wipe out various kinds of surtaxes on farmers levied by local governments which have caused extreme sufferings from the farming populace, and also designed as a step in realization of the doctrine of livelihood handed down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

RUSSO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE FAR EAST

K. T. Wu

Since David R. Francis, last America Ambassador to Russia, stepped out of the U. S. Embassy and made his departure from Petrograd on Feb. 27, 1918, formal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia have been held in abeyance. This long estrangement of 16 years between the two nations, which are separated by the profound contrasts between capitalistic and socialistic systems, has at last

terminated, thanks to the effort of President Roosevelt of the United States and M. Maxim Litvinoff, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The anticipated recognition of Soviet Russia was made known with the signing on Nov. 17 of an agreement between the two statesmen whereby formal relations between the two countries was resumed. Under the present agreement all outstanding questions of

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indebtedness and claims between the two nations are expected to be settled satisfactorily while mutual safeguards for religious freedom and legal protection have been guaranteed. Mr. William C. Bullitt has been appointed as the first American Ambassador to Soviet Russia and has already proceeded to Moscow to assume his new post. With his past experience as head of a special mission to Russia in 1919 at the age of 28 to obtain information for the Big Four at the Versailles Peace Conference, it is hoped that Mr. Bullitt will help to strengthen the bond of friendship between the two countries. In Moscow it was announced that M. Alexander Troyanovsky, former Ambassador to Japan was appointed as the first Soviet Ambassador to the United States and that he will take up his new post in December.

Since the news was made public, the world has been rife with speculations, not only as to its significance in world politics but also as to its repercussions and effect on Far Eastern politics. On the whole the world's reaction toward this political move, as evidenced by press comments emanating from various countries, has been favorable. Both the nations concerned expressed profound satisfaction with the resumption of normal relations, which were long overdue.

In Berlin it has been generally thought that the reunion is a diplomatic defeat for Japan. A Havas dispatch from Germany, for example, gives the comment of *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*: "Japan is the godfather of the new Russo-American friendship, although it is certain that Japan didn't want the result that has now transpired. Pressure has produced its inevitable reaction. Japan's policy of expansion brought Russia and America together in a pacific community of interests." In Vienna the *Reichpost* writes: "By securing American recognition, the Soviet Union has effected a definite moral consolidation of her position in the Far East and the United States has secured a new diplomatic weapon for intervention in Far Eastern affairs, both now and after the possible outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the U. S. S. R. For Moscow, the Washington agreement is a fortunate counterpoise to certain tendencies in Europe which favor a Japanese offensive. Recognition of United States affords Moscow a strong moral consolidation of her position in Asia. This accord cannot fail to exert indirect influence on the Russo-Japanese conflict." In France, the semi-official organ, *Le Temps*, attributes the American decision to the general anxiety over Japan's expansionist movement to the confines of Soviet territory. In a similar vein the *Sunday Times* of London commented that the renewal of friendly relations of the two powers is prompted by the advantages of closer relations in view of the precarious situation in the Far East.

It is quite within expectation that the Japanese received the news with a nonchalance which is quite characteristic of their art of disguise, albeit on little anxiety and perturbation were hidden under the veil. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the general tone in Japan was that "the recognition comes quite as expected and occasions no cause for surprise." Although the Japanese affected indifference to the fact that the United

States has accorded Russia recognition, Mr. Bronson Rea, the Manchukuo counsellor on foreign affairs stationed at Washington, seemed to have expressed the true thoughts of the Japanese people, when he declared that the new engagements into which America has entered may intensify the difficulties in the Pacific, hinting that Japan may be estranged by the action now taken by Washington.

In China, the news has been received with a mixed feeling of optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the event will lead to a steadying effect on the world situation and to consolidation of the peace of the Far East as well as of the world in general; on the other, there are those who are of the opinion that it may prompt the Japanese to hasten the outbreak of a world war.

The former group thinks that the *rapprochement* will be an outstanding factor in effecting a stabilization of peace in the Far East in that it may serve as a moral suasion in bringing Japan back to reasoned justice. The concerted surveillance and action on the part of the United States and Soviet Russia will help to guard against aggressive measures of diplomatically isolated Japan. Should this fail, there is the remote possibility of the collaboration of the land forces of Soviet Russia and the naval forces of the United States, together with China's resources of human power. Furthermore, Great Britain has not been of late on very friendly terms with Tokyo and will likely cooperate with the United States and Soviet Russia in checking Japan's wild actions. With this union, Japan, in the eventuality of war, will be sandwiched and doomed to disastrous defeat. Foreseeing this possibility the Japanese warlords will likely slacken their pace of unrestrained aggressiveness.

Of the latter group the editorials are all unanimous in thinking that the Soviet-American *rapprochement* will usher in a restoration of the balance of power in the Pacific which has been destroyed by Japan's aggression and will likely expedite the Japanese preparations for a second world war; and should such a conflagration ever occur, the battleground will in all probability take place in Chinese territory, and China will be the one to suffer in the long run. It behooves China, therefore, immediately to make necessary preparations to cope with the situation.

While it has been generally admitted in China that the American recognition of the U. S. S. R. has been primarily due to the economic exigency of American and Russia, and incidentally perhaps to the tense, political atmosphere in the Far East, it goes without saying that the importance of repercussions and reactions on China can hardly be overemphasized. We do not subscribe to the unduly optimistic attitude of the former group; nor do we agree with the unwarranted pessimism of the latter, although we fully endorse their idea of preparedness for eventualities. Whatever predictions one may have to offer, it is next to impossible to ascertain what China will ultimately gain, but resignation to fact has been a great blunder in Chinese diplomatic history that should never again be countenanced. Similarly, to

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rely entirely upon outside help without exerting oneself is an unpardonable crime. Admitting that China may be benefited by the international situation, one should realize that salvation can be attained only through China's own effort plus the cooperation and moral support of friendly nations. She should restore her own house to order and should embark a program of national reconstruction.

At the moment of writing the Fukien separatist movement has come to the fore. Nothing could be more disappointing than this. The crisis, serious as it is, has been further aggravated by the red menace in Kiangsi and elsewhere as well as troubles in border provinces, let alone external difficulties. It is up to China to awake to the realities of the conditions she is in, and only then can she make effective use and take advantage of the situation for the recovery of her lost territories. Otherwise, if the country is embroiled in internal disturbances it will be futile to hope for any advantages in the international situation.

Now that the anticipated Russo-American *rapprochement* has become a reality, the Japanese will feel diplomatic isolation more acutely. It has been reported that a large number of Japanese troops have been withdrawn from the Great Wall area and Shanhaikwan, not

because of the negotiations with China but because Japan wants to increase her military strength against Russia in North Manchuria. Reports are current in Peiping that realizing that the *rapprochement* would be tantamount to a death blow to her military diplomacy, Japan offered to abolish the puppet state of Manchukuo in exchange for a Sino-Japanese alliance somewhat along the lines of the Japan-Manchukuo protocol signed on Sept. 15, 1932. This bait to regain China's friendship indeed a very clever device to offset Japan's complete in world affairs. The international situation is growing increasingly unfavorable to Japan; hence she desires to relieve herself of the tension by making active preparations for war on one hand and sending Minister Ariyoshi and General Okamura to induce China to join hands with her on the other. Cognizant of this background, China should not play into the hands of the Japanese by adopting a conciliatory attitude that will be detrimental to her own sovereignty. Any move that may imply China's recognition of the puppet state should be eliminated. The present Soviet-American *rapprochement* even if it accomplishes nothing materially in China's favor, should at least give an instructive lesson to these elements in China which are inclined to give in to the Japanese on the Manchurian issue.

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No. 888 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1934.

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 10 1934
SUBJECT: Far Eastern Question - Chinese Press
Communique of April 25, 1934.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

- With reference to this Consulate's telegram No. 58 of April 26, 4 p.m., paragraph 3, I have the honor to forward to the Department herewith enclosed copies of the original text in French of the press communiqué issued by the Chinese Delegation here on April 25. There is likewise transmitted under this cover copies of an English translation of this press release which has been prepared by this office.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert

American Consul

Enclosures:

- No.1: Copy of press communiqué.
No.2: Translation of communiqué.

JWR/EW

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.

1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/ESP

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FILED

MAY 18 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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Enclosure #1
 with No 888 Pol 3
 Apr. 26 1974

25 avril 1934.

Le Gouvernement chinois, par une déclaration du 19 avril déjà communiquée à la presse, a défini son attitude à l'égard de la déclaration japonaise du 17 avril. Nos légations à l'étranger ont, en plus, fait paraître à ce sujet le communiqué suivant :

" La déclaration de la politique du gouvernement de Tokio en ce qui concerne la Chine démontre une fois de plus la politique traditionnelle d'agression et d'expansion du Japon sur le continent asiatique et plus particulièrement ses desseins contre la Chine; elle prouve une fois de plus les désirs de ce pays de contrôler - au préjudice des droits souverains de la Chine et à l'exclusion des intérêts légitimes des autres pouvoirs - les immenses ressources naturelles de l'Asie orientale et les énormes possibilités du marché commercial chinois.

Une telle politique est opposée à l'intérêt de la paix et de l'ordre en Extrême-Orient.

Le peuple chinois, conscient de ses droits et de ses obligations en tant que nation souveraine et indépendante, n'acceptera pas cette doctrine de l'hégémonie japonaise en Asie, et reste certain que les autres puissances ne seront pas obligées de l'accepter.

Le gouvernement chinois a déjà donné les instructions à son ministre à Tokio en lui demandant de soumettre cette affaire au gouvernement japonais et de demander une explication.

Depuis trente ans la paix en Extrême-Orient n'a été troublée que par la politique d'extension continentale du Japon développée dans le mémoire Tanaka, et qui a donné lieu à de nombreux incidents, et particulièrement à l'attaque soudaine de Moukden en septembre 1931, au bombardement de Shanghai en janvier 1932 et, depuis, à l'occupation de toute la Mandchourie et de la province du Jehol.

La plus sûre garantie de la paix en Extrême-Orient ne consiste pas dans l'abandon de la collaboration amicale et utile des puissances de l'Ouest avec la Chine, mais dans l'abandon par le Japon de sa politique impérialiste en Asie et dans son respect scrupuleux de ses obligations contractées par traités."

Les explications qui ont été données ensuite à la déclaration japonaise du 17 avril par les représentants japonais

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à l'étranger, ne changent rien à sa portée. Cette déclaration d'ailleurs, suivant une information de l'agence Reuter publiée aujourd'hui, a été approuvée hier par le Gouvernement japonais.

Le représentant du Japon à Genève, dans ses explications du 23 avril n'a fait, en somme, que confirmer le plan japonais de domination de l'Asie et du Pacifique et révéler une fois de plus les convoitises de l'Empire nippon. Ce n'est plus seulement à la Mandchourie, au Jehol, à la Chine du Nord que se limitent la "situation spéciale du Japon" et l'ambition japonaise. C'est sur toute la Chine, sur la vie nationale de la République Chinoise tout entière et sur ses relations avec la Société des Nations et les Puissances étrangères que le Japon veut s'arroger un droit de regard et de veto. Bref, nous en sommes à l'étape de la politique nipponne qui, d'après le fameux mémoire Tanaka, doit suivre celle déjà accomplie par suite de l'occupation de la Mandchourie et du Jehol. Voici le passage du mémoire Tanaka qui se réfère à la conquête de la Chine après celle de la Mandchourie et à la lueur duquel certaines déclarations japonaises peuvent être plus facilement comprises :

".....Mais pour conquérir la Chine, il nous faudra conquérir d'abord la Mandchourie et la Mongolie. Pour conquérir le monde entier, la conquête de la Chine est une condition préalable. Si nous parvenons à conquérir la Chine, les autres pays en Asie et ceux de la mer du Sud nous craindront et se rendront à nous. A ce moment-là, le monde verra que l'Asie Orientale nous appartiendra et n'osera plus violer nos droits. Ceci est le projet que l'Empereur Meiji nous a légué, dont la réalisation est essentielle à notre existence nationale."

Les explications japonaises, comme de coutume, invoquent des principes qui semblent acceptables mais leur donnent une interprétation qui en défigurent complètement le sens. Voici les observations qu'elles suscitent:

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En ce qui concerne la "coopération" entre le Japon et la Chine, on peut affirmer que nul pays n'est plus désireux que la Chine de vivre en paix et bonne entente avec ses voisins, mais nous ne pensons pas qu'elle doive être seule à en supporter les frais et à faire preuve de "bonne volonté réciproque et de compréhension mutuelle". Nous trouvons que le fait pour un pays d'occuper et de vouloir détacher des provinces entières d'un autre pays peut être difficilement considéré par celui-ci comme un témoignage de "bonne volonté réciproque et de compréhension mutuelle". Si des preuves tangibles, irréfutables, sans arrière-pensée du désir de "coopération sincère et amicale" nous étaient données, nous serions les premiers à nous en réjouir et à leur donner suite.

Pour ce qui est de la "pacification" et de "l'unification" de la Chine mentionnées par le représentant du Japon, les événements douloureux qui se sont déroulés en Chine depuis septembre 1931 ont grandement contribué à la réaliser. C'est précisément pour consolider et développer l'oeuvre entreprise avec succès par le Gouvernement chinois qu'il s'est assuré la collaboration technique de la Société des Nations et cherche à coopérer avec les Puissances étrangères qui ont réellement à coeur leurs intérêts communs avec la Chine.

D'ailleurs, l'idée de la collaboration technique avec la Société des Nations était née et des techniciens ont été envoyés, à cet effet, en Chine bien avant le déclenchement du conflit sino-japonais. En outre, elle a été entièrement approuvée par le rapport de l'Assemblée Extraordinaire du 24 février 1933 dans les termes suivants:

"10. Coopération internationale pour la reconstruction de la Chine.

"Puisque l'instabilité politique actuelle en Chine

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constitue un obstacle à l'amitié japonaise et inquiète le reste du monde, le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient étant une question d'intérêt internationale, et puisque les conditions énumérées ci-dessus ne peuvent être remplies que si la Chine possède un gouvernement central fort, la dernière condition pour une solution satisfaisante est une coopération internationale temporaire pour la reconstruction intérieure de la Chine, ainsi que l'avait suggéré le Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen."

Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, la Chine pas plus qu'aucun autre pays ne peut compter sur ses seules forces et sur ses seules ressources pour faire face aux difficultés d'ordre économique et autres et pour mener à bien sa tâche de réorganisation nationale. En tant que membre de la Société autant que de la communauté des Nations, la Chine estime de son devoir de favoriser la collaboration internationale, garantie de paix entre les peuples. Il est de son devoir d'assurer à son peuple les bénéfices d'une telle collaboration et aucune nation ne nourrissant pas de visées inavouables à l'égard de la Chine ne pourrait prendre ombrage de la reconstruction nationale chinoise. Une Chine prospère, avec une faculté d'achat accrue, avec son marché immense mis en état d'absorber ce que les autres pays, placés sur un pied d'égalité, auraient à lui offrir, contribuerait non seulement à résoudre la crise économique, mais par cela même deviendrait un facteur important de la paix mondiale. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple : Si la capacité d'achat de marchandises étrangères de chaque Chinois était accrue d'un dollar par mois, cela représenterait pour toute la Chine 5 milliards de dollars par an, ce qui équivaut à la totalité des exportations américaines en l'année la plus prospère, c'est-à-dire en 1929.

Or, c'est précisément une Chine prospère dont le marché serait ouvert à tous les pays sans discrimination que les déclarations japonaises semblent ne pas vouloir. Et alors,

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elles prêtent à la coopération sino-étrangère des dangers qu'elle n'a pas et ne peut pas avoir. Elles prétendent que cette coopération pourrait nuire à la "pacification et l'unification" de la Chine, alors que tout le monde sait que cette coopération, loin de nuire à la Chine, constitue au contraire un des moyens de sa reconstruction nationale.

Ensuite, le représentant du Japon, tout en déclarant que son pays "n'a pas l'intention de s'arroger le droit de prendre arbitrairement sous tutelle un pays indépendant" voudrait cependant lui attribuer le droit de "s'opposer aux aides étrangères (à la Chine) qui s'avèreraient nuisibles au maintien de la paix et de l'ordre ou susceptibles de la troubler". Et, naturellement, le Japon veut être seul juge de la question de savoir quelles sont les aides étrangères "nuisibles" auxquelles il s'opposerait. Donc, en fin de compte, malgré toutes ses assurances contraires, il veut se tailler en Chine une situation privilégiée incompatible avec les droits souverains de la Chine et en violation des traités internationaux dont il est signataire. En effet, l'Art.1 du Traité de Washington stipule expressément ce qui suit:

"Article premier.- Les Puissances contractantes, autres que la Chine, conviennent :

1.- De respecter la souveraineté et l'indépendance ainsi que l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine;

2.- D'offrir à la Chine, de la manière la plus complète et la plus libre d'entraves, la possibilité de s'assurer les avantages permanents d'un gouvernement stable et efficace;

3.- D'user de leur influence en vue d'établir effectivement et de maintenir en application sur tout le territoire de la Chine le principe de la chance égale pour le commerce et l'industrie de toutes les nations;

4.- De s'abstenir de tirer avantage des circonstances en Chine pour rechercher des droits ou privilèges spéciaux susceptibles de porter atteinte aux droits des ressortissants d'Etats amis; elles s'abstiendront également de favoriser toute action constituant une menace pour la sécurité desdits Etats amis."

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La politique suivie jusqu'à présent par le Japon et celle annoncée dans sa déclaration du 17 avril violent chacun des 4 paragraphes de cet art.1 du Traité de Washington. Le Japon voudrait maintenant, sans l'avouer, abolir d'un coup tous les principes dont les Puissances avaient convenu à Washington de s'inspirer en ce qui concerne leur politique à suivre dans les matières intéressant la Chine.

En résumé, les déclarations japonaises révèlent clairement que le Japon, soi-disant au nom de la paix en Extrême-Orient, qu'il a été le seul à troubler depuis 30 ans, et au nom de la coopération internationale sino-étrangère à laquelle au fond il s'oppose, poursuit une politique qui en est la négation la plus complète. Les explications de sources japonaises prétendant le contraire ont la même valeur que les déclarations japonaises bien connues affirmant que le Japon n'a pas violé le Pacte de la Société des Nations ou que l'établissement du soi-disant " Mandchoukouo " répondait à la volonté populaire.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No ²
 with No 888 Pol
 Apr. 26 1934

STATEMENT

OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION IN GENEVA,
 OF APRIL 25, 1934.

The Chinese Government, by a declaration of April 19, which has already been communicated to the Press, has defined its attitude respecting the Japanese statement of April 17. Our Legations abroad have, moreover, issued the following communiqué on this subject :

" The declaration of the Tokyo Government on its Chinese policy is another demonstration of the traditional policy of aggression and expansion of Japan upon the Asiatic continent and more particularly of its designs against China; it again proves the desire of this country to control - to the prejudice of the sovereign rights of China and to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of other Powers - the immense natural resources of Eastern Asia and the enormous possibilities of the Chinese commercial market.

Such a policy is opposed to the interest of peace and of order in the Far East.

The Chinese people conscious of its rights and its obligations as a sovereign and independent nation will not accept this doctrine of Japanese hegemony in Asia and remains convinced that the other Powers will not be obliged to accept it.

The Chinese Government has already given instructions to its Minister in Tokyo to take up this affair with the Japanese Government and to demand an explanation.

For thirty years the peace in the Far East has only been troubled by the Japanese policy of continental expansion developed in the Tanaka mémoire, which has given rise to numerous incidents, particularly the sudden attack upon Mukden in September 1931, the bombardment of Shanghai in January 1932, and, since that time, the occupation of all of Manchuria and of the province of Jehol.

The surest guarantee of peace in the Far East does not consist of the abandonment of the friendly and useful collaboration of Western Powers with China but is found rather in the abandonment by Japan of its imperialistic policy in Asia and in its scrupulous respect of its obligations contracted under treaties."

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The explanations which have been subsequently given of the Japanese declaration of April 17, by Japan's representatives abroad change in no way its import. This declaration, besides, according to a despatch of the Reuter Agency published to-day, was approved yesterday by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese representative at Geneva, in his explanations of April 23, has only, in fact, confirmed the Japanese plan of domination of Asia and of the Pacific, and has revealed once more the covetous designs of the Nipponese Empire. The "special situation of Japan" and Japanese ambition are no longer limited solely to Manchuria, to Jehol, and to Northern China. It is rather upon all China, upon the entire national life of the Chinese Republic and upon its relations with the League of Nations and foreign Powers, that Japan wishes to arrogate to itself a right of control and of veto. In brief, we are at this stage of Nipponese policy which, according to the famous Tanaka mémoire, should follow that already accomplished by the occupation of Manchuria and of Jehol. There follows the passage of the Tanaka mémoire which refers to the conquest of China after that of Manchuria, and in the light of which certain Japanese declarations can be more easily understood :

"....But in order to conquer China it will be necessary for us first to take over Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the entire world, the conquest of China is a preliminary condition. If we succeed in our conquest of China, the other Asiatic countries and those of the Southern Seas will fear us and surrender to us. At that moment, the world will see that Eastern Asia belongs to us and will no longer dare to violate our rights. This is the project that the Emperor Meiji has willed to us, whose realization is essential to our national existence."

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The Japanese explanations, as usual, invoke certain principles which seem acceptable but they give to them an interpretation which completely alters the sense. There follow the observations which these explanations have provoked:

In so far as the "co-operation" between Japan and China is concerned, it can be affirmed that no country is more desirous than China of living in peace and good understanding with its neighbors, but we do not think that China ought to be the only one to bear the expense and to demonstrate the "reciprocal good will and mutual comprehension." We find great difficulty in considering the occupation and separation of entire provinces as an evidence of "reciprocal good will and mutual comprehension". If tangible and irrefutable proofs without mental reservations of the desire for "sincere and friendly co-operation" were given to us, we should be the first to rejoice and to follow them up.

With reference to the "pacification" and the "unification" of China mentioned by the Japanese representative, the unfortunate events which have succeeded one another in China since September 1931, have largely contributed to its realization. It is precisely in order to consolidate and develop the work undertaken with success by the Chinese Government, that it has effected its technical collaboration with the League of Nations and seeks to co-operate with foreign Powers which have really at heart their common interests with China.

Furthermore, the idea of technical collaboration with the League of Nations had been conceived and experts had been sent for this purpose to China well before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Moreover, it was entirely approved by the report of the Extraordinary Assembly of February 24, 1933, in the following terms:

"10.

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"10. International co-operation in Chinese reconstruction.

"Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

In the world to-day, China no more than any other country can only count upon its forces alone and upon its resources alone in order to face economic and other difficulties and successfully to consummate its task of national reconstruction. As member of the League as well as of the community of Nations, China believes it its duty to favor international collaboration, the guarantee of peace between peoples. It is its duty to assure to its people the benefit of such a collaboration and no Nation which does not cherish unavowable designs with regard to China could take umbrage at national Chinese reconstruction. A prosperous China, with an increased purchasing power, with its enormous market put in state to absorb what other countries, placed upon a footing of equality, would offer it, would contribute not only to solving the economic crisis, but by these means would have become an important factor in world peace. To cite only one example : If the purchasing capacity of foreign merchandise of each Chinese was increased by one dollar per month, this would represent for all of China 5 billions of dollars per year, which is equal to all American exports in the most prosperous year, i.e. 1929.

But, it is precisely a prosperous China, whose market would be open to every country without discrimination, that the Japanese do not seem to desire. And then, the Japanese read

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the Sino-foreign co-operation dangers which it does not and cannot have. They pretend that the co-operation could damage the "pacification and the unification" of China, when everyone knows that this co-operation, far from damaging China, constitutes on the contrary one of the means of its national reconstruction.

Subsequently, the Japanese representative, while declaring that his country "does not intend to arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrarily an independent country under its tutelage", would like, however, to attribute to Japan the right of "opposing foreign assistance to China which would prove damaging to the maintenance of peace and of order or susceptible to troubling them." And, naturally, Japan wishes to be the sole judge of the question of what is "damaging" foreign assistance to which it might be opposed. Therefore, finally, in spite of all assurances to the contrary, Japan wishes to construct in China a privileged situation incompatible with the sovereign rights of China and in violation of international treaties of which it is a signatory. In fact, Art. 1 of the Treaty of Washington stipulates expressly as follows :

"Article I.- The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree :

- 1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of China;
- 2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
- 3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- 4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions

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
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in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.


The policy pursued up to the present by Japan and that announced in its declaration of April 17, violates each one of the four paragraphs of this article 1 of the Treaty of Washington. Japan now would like, without acknowledging it, to abolish in one stroke all of the principles which the Powers had agreed upon at Washington as a basis for their policy in questions regarding China.

To summarize, the Japanese declarations clearly reveal that Japan, in the so-called name of peace in Far-East, which it has been the only one to trouble for 30 years, and in the name of Sino-foreign international co-operation, to which, in reality, Japan is opposed, continues a policy which is the most complete negation of it. Explanations emanating from Japanese sources pretending the contrary have the same value as the well-known Japanese declarations affirming that Japan has not violated the Covenant of the League of Nations, or as the statements that the establishment of the so-called "Manchukuo" was in response to popular will.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



April 25, 1934.

Mr. Phillips:

Mr. Secretary:

The contents of Mr. Grew's telegram 75, together with certain other bits of circumstantial evidence, point to the conclusion or at least suggest by hypothesis that the Japanese Foreign Office is being hard pressed by the Japanese Navy. If this conjecture has any value, it gives us another factor to keep in mind in connection with our consideration of the contents-to-be of the statement of position which we contemplate making.

At the same time, it is well to note, in connection with Mr. Grew's statement that Hirota told him (Grew) that he (Hirota) "has the full support of the Minister of War", the fact that, according to news despatches which have been accepted at face value by editorial writers in this country, the spokesman of the Japanese War Office affirmed last week that the Nine-Power Treaty is no longer in effect.

It would seem that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hirota, is not only in a difficult position vis-à-vis the controlling element (which is militaristically minded) in his own country ^{but} has so little real authority in regard to external affairs that other foreign offices should be on guard against being mislead, in their appraisal of the situation,

F/ESP 793.94/6669

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

0895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

situation, by assurances and evidence that he (Hirota) is personally well disposed and is officially committed to a program of friendliness in Japan's foreign relations. On the Janus head of Japan's foreign policy, the face which looks eastward with a smile is much smaller and much more refined in feature than is the face which looks westward (upon China and Russia) with the expression of an Attila.

What Japan actually does in her external relations in the near future and for a good while to come will be done by decision and direction of the military element in Japan (or adherents of that element abroad) and not upon decision or by direction of the "liberal" elements either in or outside of the Japanese Foreign Office.

This, it seems to me, the fact that in dealing with Japan we are dealing with a military and militant state, we need to have in mind every step of our way.

2744.
→

FE:SKH/ZMK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 8 1934
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 3 1934
NOTED

April 26, 1934.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 8 - 1934
Department of State

Mr. Secretary:

In the Japan matter, the simple facts in simple outline, as so far disclosed, are as follows: a few weeks ago the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent to Japan's Minister in China an instruction giving the principles of what might be called Japan's "China policy". The contents of that instruction were made known at that time to Japan's missions in various other countries. On April 17, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, Mr. Amau, a responsible official, made a statement to the press, which statement was based upon and followed closely the contents of the instruction referred to above. The novelty about that statement lies^{not} in its contents but in the fact that it was made. Mr. Amau's statement to the press was not a declaration of policy; it was a disclosure of policy. As a disclosure it simply shows what Japan's "China policy" is; it confirms estimates long since made by unprejudiced outside observers of what it has been; and it shows that the Japanese Foreign Office consciously and deliberately reduced to writing and circulated its representatives abroad, at about the moment when Mr. Hirota was writing you his letter of February 21, 1934, the principles to be followed in pursuit of that policy, in relations with China.

F/ESP

793.94/6670

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1934.

The concluding paragraph in the instruction which the Japanese Foreign Office gave its Minister to China reads as follows:

"5. From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan's hands through using the influence of foreign Powers."

5144

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/75 FOR #438
 FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED April 4, 1934
 TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Efforts of Mr. Li Tse-i, personal representative of Chiang Kai-shek, toward cementing relations between Chinese and Japanese in Foochow.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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B. Relations with Other Countries.

Japanese.

793.96
Mr. Li Tse-i (李擇一), personal representative of General Chiang Kai-shek, prior to his departure from Foochow, did much in cementing friendly relations between Chinese and Japanese. On his initiative, a Sino-Japanese social meeting was held at the Japanese Club on March 6, 1934. Among those present were Commissioner Lin Chih-yuan (林知淵) of the Fukien Provincial Government, Messrs. J. Y. Liu (劉愛其) and Lin P'ien-min (林天民) of the Foochow Electric Company, Mr. Lo Mien-hou (羅勉侯), former Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Uzuhiko Usami, Japanese Consul General at Foochow, and some prominent Japanese and Formosan merchants. Mr. Li informed me that he was advising Chinese and Japanese merchants to organize a society for the promotion of friendly relations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/67 FOR Despatch #9416

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Apr.13,1934.
 1146111 NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Reports
 Chinese press comment on possibility of
 war between Japan and Soviet Russia and on
 the coronation of Pu Yi as Emperor of "Manchukuo".

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

713.94
 c. Relations with other countries.

Relations with Japan Japanese-Soviet relations

was the subject of an interesting article by Hollington

H. Tong in the Peking Daily (Chinese independent daily).

American

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Memorandum registered of March 2, 1934, in which he stated that the apparent calmness of the Japanese War Office and Japanese statesmen in the face of recent Soviet provocations is explainable only by the fact that Japan has become convinced of the Soviet Government's preparedness for war, both from a military and a diplomatic standpoint. He states that this does not mean that war between the two countries will be avoided in the future but only that Japan is playing for time in order to make its war preparations more complete.

While the coronation of Henry Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo which took place on March 1st received wide comment, particularly in the local vernacular press, there was little comment worthy of note. The general opinion expressed was that the form of government which the Japanese established in Manchuria was of little importance and whatever the form the Japanese decided to give to the "Manchukuo" regime, it should be merely a puppet state until such time as the Japanese decided openly to annex it.

On March 13th the Government at Peking issued an official statement on the Manchurian situation in which it was stated that the puppet leader (Pu Yi) was liable to punishment and that both he and others who had lent their support to the "Manchukuo" regime, or who were engaged in secret subversive activities, if apprehended and arrested would undoubtedly be prosecuted and punished by the Government.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./332 FOR Despatch 7853

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED April 16, 1934
 TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Japanese venture in Manchukuo. Statement of Lord Lytton
 at Conference held by the League of Nations Union in regard to
 shock to the feeling of confidence in the world which, - in
 1932 administered.

fp

793.94/6673
 1673

1907

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./76 FOR 745
FROM Japan (Grew) DATED April 16, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Efforts on part of Japanese Government and Japanese industrialists to bring about a better understanding between China and Japan and to establish an economic bloc between two countries.

esp

793.94/6674
157

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 18 -

(e) China - Anti-Japanism Lessening.

79394
 There has been a renewed effort on the part of the Japanese Government to bring about a better understanding between Japan and China, beginning with Minister Akira Ariyoshi's conference last month with Mr. Wang Ching-wei, president of the Executive Yuan in Nanking, wherein the problems detrimental to good relations were discussed. There is still a great deal of anti-Japanese feeling in China which must be combated if friendship is to be re-established. The press reported that General Chiang Kai-shek, in an interview with the Japanese Military Attaché, stated his eagerness for Japan's moral, if not financial, support for the Nanking Government. Mr. Tomita, Japanese financial commissioner has recently conversed with many prominent Chinese, and he is reported to have the conviction that Chinese financiers believe in the necessity for closer economic cooperation with Japan. Their political situation is so unsettled, however, that it is difficult to accomplish any rapprochement. Mr. Tomita's visit to China is said to have had a very beneficial effect in making Chinese business men realize the uselessness of continuing an anti-Japanese attitude. Their economic and financial situations are so precarious now that their policy may perforce undergo a change in regard to Japan, whose aid is sorely needed.

Japanese industrialists appear to be eager on their part to establish an economic bloc with China, in addition to the one with "Manchukuo". China offers a much larger consumer market, and improved relations would come as a great boon to Japanese industry. Of course says the JIJI SHIMPO of March 15, the China Loan Consortium, a group of Japanese creditors, must be successful in absorbing or readjusting the ¥800,000,000 outstanding.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 19 -

outstanding, in order that new investments from Japan can be made. It is understood that customs surplus receipts will be employed, and that many years will be needed to liquidate the indebtedness.

The Hull-Hirota exchange of friendly notes has apparently caused some apprehension in official Chinese circles. It is feared that with the strengthening of relations between the United States and Japan, there is the possible implication that the former will not disapprove of further Japanese penetration of China. The situation provides another obstacle to the furtherance of Sino-Japanese accord.

190

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 858.00 P.R./165 FOR #159

FROM Sweden (Steinhardt) DATED Apr. 27, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

The Japanese Statement of Policy.
Press reports concerning-Quotes.

ro

793.94/6675
6675

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. THE JAPANESE DECLARATION OF POLICY:

The press in general carried accounts of Japan's recent declaration of policy with regard to China, but in Stockholm only SVENSKA DAGBLADET (Conservative) on April 18, 1954, devoted an editorial to the subject. Various statements in particular were commented upon and in conclusion certain general observations, which are quoted in part below, were made.

"These words have an extremely wide scope as they may be applied to even the most far-reaching demands that one power may direct against another."

"All this automatically suggests the application of the phrase: An Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Here it should be noted, however, that neither at its inception nor later has it had such an aggressive character as the declaration now presented. Even during the time when the Monroe Doctrine was supposed to include the 'manifest destiny' of great parts of North and Central America ultimately to be absorbed by the United States, the slogan did not have such a purport by far as it now takes on in this instance, when the exemplification presents itself through China's recent experiences and when the expansion of Japanese exports influences the situation in all parts of the world."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (A)

FROM FAR EASTERN AIRMAILS
MAY 11 1934
Department of State

Geneva (Part Air)

Dated May 9, 1934

Rec'd May 11, 7:10 am.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

70, May 9, 5 p.m.

In a confidential conversation today Hoo informed me as follows:

(1) - He had telegraphed for instructions to Nanking submitting suggestions in line with those discussed in my 58, April 26, 4 p.m. / 6470 C-1 paragraph four. Nanking did not reply.

(2) - Avenol advised him that the best position for the Chinese in the technical assistance committee would be to ignore the Japanese public declarations and to proceed on the assumption that the assistance to China would continue as planned. Hoo stipulated that in such event the League issue a communique revealing the decisions of the committee should they be to that effect. Hoo believes that this course will be followed.

(3) - The Chinese hope is that this may force the Japanese

F/FPg

793.94/6676

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#70 From Geneva, May 9, 5 p.m.

Japanese to define their objections to the assistance project more specifically or respecting some elements of the work which would give China the opportunity to raise the moral issue (Consulate's 66, May 3, 9 a.m. paragraph three). Hoo admitted, however, that it would probably be difficult to get the Japanese to do this. 6646

(4) - The Chinese have in the present situation given up any idea of raising the general Far Eastern question in the Council or having it raised in the consultative committee.

(5) - Hoo will represent China in the forthcoming meetings of League bodies.

GILBERT

WSB CSB

0911
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./333 FOR #657

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Apr. 23, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ..

REGARDING:

Relations between China and Japan.

Japanese warning, issued last week, to effect that Japan would oppose international projects for assisting China, as well as private enterprises or services which, in Japan's opinion, prejudice Far Eastern peace, has proved an international sensation. Press comments.

793.946677
677

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan.

The Japanese warning, issued last week, to the effect that Japan would oppose international projects for assisting China, as well as private enterprises or services which, in Japan's opinion, prejudice Far Eastern peace, has proved an international sensation. In the House of Commons this afternoon Sir John Simon stated that he had received no intimation from the Japanese Government of Japan's intention to reexamine her policy in the Far East with the object of claiming a controlling voice in China. He had, however, received from the British Ambassador in Tokyo the text of a translation of an informal verbal statement made to the Japanese press by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general character of the statement, he said, was of a nature which made him think it necessary to communicate with the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of His Majesty's Government. Until the receipt of a reply to the British Government's note it is not expected that any further official announcement will be made.

The press as a whole views with considerable alarm the Japanese declaration, and it has been described as 'a Monroe doctrine for China.' The ECONOMIST says that this latest announcement from Tokyo amounts to a declaration that as the Western Powers have allowed Japan to cook a pretty kettle of fish in Chinese territory, Japan now intends to sit down where she is and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated May 12, 1934

Rec'd 6:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

92, May 12, 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

I am informed by my French colleague that about ten
days ago the French Foreign Office handed to Ambassador
Sato a memorandum setting forth the French Government's
views on Japan's China policy. The text or the substance
of the memorandum has not (repeat not) been published here
and my French colleague has not (repeat not) received the
text but he tells me that it has caused embarrassment to
the Japanese Government because it specifically calls
attention to the stipulations of Article 7 of the Nine
Power Treaty, with which the recent statements of Japanese
policy would appear to conflict. My French colleague
thinks that when the French newspapers containing the text
of the memorandum arrive in Japan it will be published
and will cause a reopening of the discussion of Japan's
policy.

Repeated to Peiping by mail.

GW CSB

GREW

F/ESP


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793.94

793.94/6644



0914

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-122
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

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Department of State

Washington,

May 12, 1934

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO

7/GRAY

Your 92, May 12, 6 p.m.

The substantive portion of the French note, as reported in press despatches from Paris, is as follows:

QUOTE It is with satisfaction that the French government notes the affirmation thus given by the Japanese government of its fidelity not only to the general principles of international law but to the conventional statutes which now regulate the relations of China with the foreign powers.

QUOTE From the last part of the note mentioned above, it appears that Japan cannot remain indifferent to interventions which might prejudice the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East.

QUOTE If such events should occur in China the French government believes that the Imperial government would seek, in concert with the other powers, to find a lawful solution in conformity with the principles which inspire the acts of Washington, and notably by application of the conciliatory procedure laid down in Article 7 of the treaty of February 6, 1922. It is in fact only in this framework and in this form, in the opinion of the French government, that an equitable and satisfactory solution of Chinese questions can be found. UNQUOTE (ENDGRAY)

at Paris

CONFIDENTIAL The Embassy was informed by the Foreign Office that the French Government had delayed its note until action had been taken by the United States and Britain, for the reason that the French Government wished to be sure that any attitude that it might adopt would be in accord

Enciphered by 33

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-128

793.94/6678

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138

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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 - AMEMBASSY TOKYO MAY 12, 1934

in so far as possible with the policies of the other two
 countries, whose interests in the issue raised by the
 Japanese were conceived to be greater than those of
 France.

Hull
WZ

FE:END-DLY

FE

mm/H
 ✓
 MAY 12 1934

Enciphered by PT

Sent by operator

M.,

19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

0916

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

FROM GREEN

GENEVA

Dated May 15, 1934

Rec'd 7:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS

251, May 15, 11

Your 149, May 10, 3 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 15 1934

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

793.94

F/G 793.94/6679

Inquiry reveals no intention that formal notice shall be taken of Japanese allegations regarding political activities of the Committee. However, there seems to be a certain amount of dissatisfaction with Rajchman's alleged political activities in China and if this dissatisfaction finds expression in the Committee a debate of a political character may ensue. Mayer will, of course, have your instructions constantly in mind. Meeting set for Thursday afternoon.

WILSON

JS

Confidential File

FILED

JUN 1 - 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~MMH~~ May 15, 1934.
~~SKH~~

The enclosures are well
worth reading.

282

0918

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 270

Buenos Aires, May 4, 1934

Sent by air mail May 5.
 Copy by steamer.

LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

MAY 15 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON JAPANESE
 POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

793.94



11:11 AM

For Distribution Check	
Genl.	13 MAY 15 1934
Spec.	10 MAY 15 1934
MID 300	

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the local press
 has given considerable prominence to despatches from
 Washington, London and Tokyo concerning the
 statement recently made by an official of the
 Japanese

F/ESP

793.94/6680

11:11 AM

0915

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Japanese Foreign Office regarding Japan's policy
as to China, and the reaction thereto.

1/ As of possible interest to the Department, there
2/3/ are enclosed summaries of editorials from LA PRENSA
of April 25 and LA NACION of April 30 and May 3,
respectively, which generally condemn the position of
the Japanese Government and support that of the
United States. LA PRENSA and LA NACION are newspapers
of very high standing and are considered by many to
be the two most important journals of Latin America.

4/ There is also enclosed a copy of an editorial
from the BUENOS AIRES HERALD of May 1 which supports
the position of Great Britain and the United States
in this controversy and pleads for Anglo-American
solidarity. This paper is the largest English daily
published in the Argentine and is perhaps the most
important English language daily of Latin America.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Eugene M. Hinkle
Eugene M. Hinkle,
Second Secretary of Embassy.

4 ✓
Enclosures - As stated

Qn.
800
JCS:NA

0920

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure No. / in Despatch No. 270)

SUMMARIZED TRANSLATION OF EDITORIAL
PUBLISHED IN LA PRENSA, APRIL 25,
1934.

NO STATE IS THE EXCLUSIVE GUARDIAN
OF PEACE

The reaction of the entire world caused by the statement made by a Japanese official to the effect that his country is the guardian of peace in the Far East is fully justified.

After commenting on the details of the incident, LA PRENSA declares that it is not possible to admit the pretensions expressed by the Japanese official, adding that even if the Nine-Power Treaty or any other treaty did not exist, the principles of international law would suffice to condemn the Japanese theory.

The reign of foreign interventions has been definitely terminated and the example set by the United States serves to demonstrate that the equality of all sovereignties has been finally imposed against pretended tutorships on behalf of no one knows what providential mission.

Events in the Far East must be governed by a common volition and not through the submission of all before one that appears to be backed by the possession of material force. The existing treaties cannot be converted into dead letters or be substituted by the recognition of dictatorial powers in any State, no matter how great its political and economic interests may be throughout Asia.

Tr:AA

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure No. 2 in Despatch No. 270)

SUMMARIZED TRANSLATION OF EDITORIAL
PUBLISHED IN LA NACION, APRIL 30,
1934

THE DECLARATIONS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Referring to declarations recently made by the Japanese Government officials concerning the policy that their country proposes to follow in the Far East, LA NACION considers those declarations to be semi-official inasmuch as they were formulated not only in a merely officious and verbal manner, but they were made by officials whose category and responsibility are not in keeping with the magnitude of the problems they set forth.

It is easy to understand the uncertainty and the deep perturbation felt by the Chancelleries of the different countries in view of the attitudes successively assumed within such a short space of time by the Japanese authorities. What is the authentic version of the attitude that Japan proposes to adopt?

It will soon be known whether these simple verbal and officious statements were made by Japan solely as a feeler or whether they respond to a firm, deliberate purpose.

Be that as it may, there is no doubt that this incident will not dissipate the feeling of anxiety prevailing in international life to-day.

Tr:AA

0922

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Enclosure No. 3 in Despatch No. 270)

SUMMARIZED TRANSLATION OF EDITORIAL
PUBLISHED IN LA NACION, MAY 3, 1954

REPLY TO JAPAN

Referring to the reply of the United States Government to Japan, LA NACION states that the Washington Government naturally considered it unnecessary to specify the sense and the scope of the treaties referred to. It deemed it sufficient to recall that such treaties cannot be modified or annulled through the will of only one of the countries concerned. The tone of the declaration of the Washington Government is serene and firm at the same time. It may be inferred from it that the United States is prepared to demand that the fundamental bases which governed the policy of the different powers in the Far East for the last thirty years remain unchanged.

The "Open Door" régime already has an almost secular tradition as ancient as Occidental relations with China.

As for the British declaration, LA NACION states that it coincides with that of the United States Government in so far as the Nine-Power Treaty is concerned, but the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs introduced a reservation the scope of which is not clearly perceived. This has to do with special rights that may have been granted to Japan by other powers and not shared by them. What are these rights?

In conclusion LA NACION states that the enunciation of principles on the part of Japan is confronted - in a different manner and a different tone - with another enunciation of principles. Although the position on each side is not yet quite defined, the lines of a new policy are now spread and problems that are probably closely connected with this policy will be considered in Geneva within a few days and it will then be possible to perceive the conduct that Japan proposes to follow in the affairs of the Far East.

Tr:AA

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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COPY FROM THE
BUENOS AIRES HERALD, MAY 1, 1934

TOKIO TALKS

At last Japan has replied to Great Britain and the United States, and the reaffirmation of her acceptance of the policy of the Open Door in China, clears the air and restores what was becoming a piquant situation to normality.

The common-sensed nature of Japan's reply, and the conciliatory tone which she most prudently adopted, will bring a sigh of relief from a world which had every reason to display an increasing concern and anxiety over a position that was fraught with consequences that could not be dwelt on with anything but a definite feeling of universal gravity and widespread perturbation.

The news from the Far East was received with considerable gratification by the British House of Commons yesterday, when Sir John Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, communicated its import to a crowded Chamber.

Sir John intimated that the request of Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador, made to Kikimoto, the Japanese Foreign Minister, was a "friendly enquiry" and took the form of a recapitulation of the obligations imposed by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, to which Japan herself was a party.

Sir John Simon pointed out that Japanese interests were safeguarded in that instrument by Articles 1 and 7, which conceded the right to Japan to call the attention of the other signatories to any action in China which was inimical to her own security.

In view of this, His Majesty's Government assumed that the statement originally made in Tokio concerning Japan's foreign policy in regard to China, was not intended in any way to infringe the common rights of the other Powers in China, nor to repudiate Japan's own treaty obligations.

But words have only one true meaning, although in the world of diplomacy there are occasions when it is somewhat difficult to ascertain what is definitely meant. But there was no ambiguity about the Tokio utterance, which unequivocally asserted what Japan's intentions towards China were at that time.

If, as Kikimoto indicated, His Majesty's Government was correct in the assumption specified by Sir John Simon, and that the policy of the Japanese Government and the British Government in regard to the Treaty coincided, why was the statement by officials of the Japanese Foreign Office in the first instance allowed to be made at all, with all its mischievous implications?

It would appear that the manner in which those officials, who remained nameless and anonymous, were permitted to chatter with such deplorable freedom on a matter of such grave moment, leaves something to be very much desired in the administration of the Japanese Foreign Office. Matters of policy should be expressed only by the proper man whose duty is responsibility alone qualifies him for the task, and that is the Foreign Minister himself.

If officials of Foreign Offices were permitted to talk with the irresponsible freedom that was the case in Tokio the other

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other day, this world of ours would very soon be in a hopeless state of bedlam.

Sir John Simon's concluding sentiment yesterday was both statesmanlike and admirably chosen, and only what we expect from the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Great Britain and the United States have seen eye to eye with each other in this matter, and there is little doubt that fact has exerted considerable influence over Japan.

The substance of the statement made to the Japanese Government by the American Ambassador, which we publish this morning, was a powerful-worded declaration that was unanswerable in its convincing forcibleness.

In a weighty passage the American Government stated:

"In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of other Sovereign States.

"The American Government has dedicated the United States to a policy of good neighbourship, and to the practical application of that policy it will continue to devote its best efforts."

In those fine resounding and lofty words, which might well have fallen from a Lincoln, we perceive the inspired pen of President Roosevelt himself.

One wonderful fact stands out in the whole of this business of Japan and China, and its importance can not be overestimated.

It is simply this. That the greatest moral power in the world to-day is Anglo-American solidarity. In that mighty concordat, which should be brought into permanent existence at the earliest possible moment, lies the only future hope and salvation of the world.

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