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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 27

1930-39

793.94/6681-6840
Apr. 1934-Jan. 1935



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 7, 1934.

~~REF:~~ → END
MMH:

Nanking's political despatch under date April 25, 1934, --

No action.

This despatch in regard to the Japanese "Informal Statement of April 17, 1934" contains an adequate digest. (see tag).

ETW
ETW/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 876 Paris, May 8, 1934.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 21 1934
L. J. GUN OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Transmitting exchange of
correspondence between the
Japanese Embassy in Paris
and the French Foreign Office
in regard to Japan's attitude
towards China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 15 1934
RECEIVED
JUN 15 1934
JUN 15 1934
JUN 15 1934

Division of
FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 15 1934
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 31 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	To Field	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
For	In U.S.A.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

JUN 26 1934

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
telegram No. 342 of May 4/11 a.m., and in connection
therewith to enclose the original, and translations,
of a communication dated May 1st, transmitted to the
French Foreign Office by the Japanese Ambassador in
Paris

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Paris, and the reply of the Quai d'Orsay thereto, dated May 3, 1934.

A perusal of the French reply shows that its contents are in accord with the information conveyed on May 3rd by M. Léger, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Marriner, Counselor of Embassy. France, according to this Note, does not regard Japan as having relations with China which are in any sense different than those of the other signatories of the Washington Agreement, and specifies Art. 7 of the Agreement of February 6, 1922, for the settlement, by friendly procedure, of any question arising.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador

Theodore Marriner
Counselor of Embassy.

in quintuplicate.

Enclosures:

- No.1 - Text of communication from the Japanese Embassy to the French Foreign Office;
- No.2 - Translation of above;
- No.3 - Reply of the French Foreign Office to Nol;
- No.4 - Translation of above.

710.

SPT/hsb

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

enclosure No. to despatch No. 876
of May 8, 1934, from the
Embassy - Paris

1er Mai 1934

Texte communiqué par l'ambassade du Japon
au Ministère des Affaires étrangères -

Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine, ni à ses intérêts et n'a nulle intention de le faire. C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine. Ces buts devaient, en principe, être atteints par la Chine elle-même, grâce au réveil de ses énergies nationales et à ses propres efforts.

Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit, naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

Pourtant, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans des régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 876 of May 8, 1934.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Text communicated by the Japanese Embassy to the French Foreign Office:

Japan has not threatened China's independence, nor her interests and she has no intention of doing so. On the contrary, Japan sincerely hopes for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, for her unification and prosperity. Theoretically, these aims should be achieved by China herself, owing to her own efforts and to the awakening of her national energies.

Japan has no intention of violating the rights of the other Powers in China. Financial and commercial activities, if carried on with firmness, could be nothing but beneficial to China - a result that Japan considers with satisfaction. Japan, of course, subscribes to the principle of the "open door" and "equal chances" in China. It is faithful to all the existing treaties and records concerning that country.

Nevertheless, Japan cannot remain indifferent to the eventual intervention of a third party, which intervention, no matter what cause it invokes, would be harmful to the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East, in those regions where, if only on account of its geographical position, Japan has vital interests.

Consequently, Japan cannot consent that "third parties" should deal with Chinese problems with a view to an "interested" policy which would not take into consideration the facts mentioned previously.

Encl. No. 876 to despatch
of
the Embassy at Paris.
Embassy - Paris

ponse du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à
l'Ambassade du Japon -

3 Mai 1934

L'Ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le Gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 Avril dernier par le porte-parole de l'aimisho concernant la politique japonaise au regards des affaires de Chine.

Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le Gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

C'est avec satisfaction que le Gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le Gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les Puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note susvisée, il résulte enfin que la Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le Gouvernement français a la conviction que le Gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Les principes dont s'inspirent les notes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 8 février 1922. Ce n'est en effet que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du Gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 876 of May 8, 1934.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Reply of French Foreign Office to the Japanese Note:

The Japanese Embassy kindly forwarded to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of the note in which the Imperial Government states precisely the official interpretation to be attributed to the declarations formulated on April 17 by the representative of the Gaimusho concerning the Japanese policy with regard to affairs in China.

It is obvious from the tone of this communication that, far from threatening the independence or the interests of China, Japan sincerely desires the maintenance of the territorial integrity, the unification and the prosperity of that country. Not wishing to disregard the rights of the other Powers, the Imperial Government believes on the other hand that financial and commercial activities would be highly beneficial to China. It confirms, at the same time, its adhesion to the principle of the "open door" and "equal chances" as well as its respect of the existing treaties and accords relative to China.

It is with satisfaction that the French Government takes note of the assurance given by the Japanese Government of its faithfulness, not only to the general principles of international law, but also to the conventional statute that governs actually the reports of China with the other Powers.

From the last part of the note in question, it transpires that Japan cannot remain indifferent to interventions that would be harmful to the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East. If such eventualities were to take place in China, the French Government has the conviction that the Imperial Government would try, in agreement with the other Powers, to assure them a de jure solution, following the principles that inspire the acts of Washington and notably by applying the amicable procedure provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty of February

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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6, 1922. It is only on this basis and in that form that
can be found, in the opinion of the French Government, an
equitable and satisfactory solution to Chinese affairs.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 7, 1934.


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SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1407)



F/ESP



MAY 15 1934

To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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for
H/AR

The American Ambassador forwards
herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special
Report No. W. D. 1407, dated May 7, 1934.

793.94/6682

MAY 21 1934

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(W.D.)



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 7, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1407.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and
Far Eastern Questions

The French press has published during the past two weeks or so a large number of editorials discussing the Far Eastern situation, all being of interest but few appearing to have outstanding importance.

The entire collection, in connection with which I am indebted to Mr. H. Stewart Beers, of the Embassy press room, for his valuable assistance, is forwarded unsummarized as enclosures.

The editorial published by Roland de Marès in LE TEMPS of May 5th deserves, however, special mention, for it gives his considered opinion of the situation as it has been developing in the Far East subsequent to the Japanese pronouncements regarding China.

De Marès

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De Marès declares that France, as one of the chief Powers who are active in the Far East and is signatory to the Treaty for the Open Door in China, was very "attentive" to this entire incident, having a care for "the duties imposed upon her in her capacity as a great Power and also the duty to make co-operation possible in the Far East without systematically jarring Japan." De Marès goes on to say:

"France did not remain inactive. She made the necessary contacts, reserving the privilege to ask in a friendly spirit for explanations when the appropriate time should come. The question had not, indeed, so far been placed on the diplomatic plane. It was a question merely of declarations, which were imprudent, to say the least, made by a high official of the Japanese Foreign Office whose action had not been officially disavowed. Even the precisions subsequently given out did not commit the Japanese Government. But now that Government has officially taken its stand in a spontaneous statement to which Monsieur Louis Barthou, Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied, stating with complete frankness the doctrine of the French Government.

"The French reply to the Tokyo Government takes note of the official interpretation given to the unofficial declaration made on April 17th by the spokesman of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and it expresses satisfaction at the assertion made by the Japanese Government about its fidelity to the

principles

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principles of international law and also to the conventional situation which now regulates the relations between China and the foreign Powers."

As for the declaration that Japan could not be indifferent towards interventions prejudicial to the maintenance of order and justice in the Far East, de Marès remarks that the French reply is "of capital importance" in this respect, defining for the future the doctrine which will be applied by the Government of the Republic.

The passage in question is the one in which Foreign Minister Louis Barthou declares that if there occurred in China any intervention of the kind specified, "the French Government is convinced that the Imperial Government would seek, in concert with the other Powers, to assure a de jure solution, in conformity with the principles inspired by the Acts of Washington and notably in application of the amicable procedure foreseen in Article 7 of the Treaty of February 6, 1922."

De Marès considers that this "shows clearly that in the event of a menace against public order in China, France could not admit of any de jure or de facto procedure except in application of a consultation by the Nine Powers."

In conclusion, de Marès says that the position of the Tokyo Government, as now officially defined, marks a slight retreat as compared with the unofficial declarations of April 17th, and there is cause for congratulations since all threats of complications are thus removed. Japan is now in the grip of too many

domestic

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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domestic difficulties, socially, financially, and economically,
to be prepared to leap deliberately into any great adventure.
Her policy is clearly defined as concerns the Asiatic Continent
and is commanded by imperative necessities but is not to be
jeopardized by any hasty and inopportune action, the Japanese
Government being bent upon safeguarding its interests while
preparing the future and retaining a keen sense of political
realities limiting all efforts to the possibilities of the
moment.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

Copy to E. I. C.

WD/drs

Enclosures

-5-

3 6 ✓
Enclosures: (in single copy)

1. Extract from LE TEMPS, May 5, 1934 (summarized)
2. LE JOURNAL, April 21, 1934;
3. LA REPUBLIQUE, April 24, 1934;
4. FIGARO, April 24, 1934;
5. L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 24, 1934;
6. L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 24, 1934;
7. FIGARO, April 24, 1934;
8. L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 24, 1934;
9. JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE, April 25, 1934;
10. L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 25, 1934;
11. LA REPUBLIQUE, April 26, 1934;
12. LE JOURNAL, April 26, 1934;
13. L'INTRANSIGEANT, April 26, 1934;
14. FIGARO, April 26, 1934;
15. LE JOUR, April 26, 1934;
16. LE TEMPS, April 26, 1934;
17. L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 27, 1934;
18. L'INFORMATION, April 27, 1934;
19. LE TEMPS, April 27, 1934;
20. LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, April 27, 1934;
21. L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 27, 1934;
22. LA DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, April 28, 1934;
23. POPULAIRE, April 29, 1934;
24. L'ERE NOUVELLE, April 29, 1934;
25. L'ECHO DE PARIS, April 30, 1934;
26. L'ECHO DE PARIS, May 1, 1934;
27. LE JOURNAL, May 1, 1934;
28. LE PETIT PARISIEN, May 1, 1934;
29. FIGARO, May 1, 1934;
30. LE TEMPS, May 2, 1934;
31. LE JOURNAL, May 2, 1934;
32. LE JOURNAL, May 2, 1934;
33. LE TEMPS, May 2, 1934;
34. LA REPUBLIQUE, May 2, 1934;
35. L'HUMANITE, May 2, 1934;
36. LE JOURNAL DES DEBATS, May 2, 1934.

WD/drs

Encl. 1 to Special Report #WD 1407 of May 7, 1934.

From the Embassy, Paris.

Article from LE TEMPS of May 5, 1934.

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LE JAPON ET LES PUISSANCES

On est enfin fixé sur le véritable sens et la portée réelle de l'attitude adoptée par le Japon à l'égard de la Chine et des relations de ce pays avec les autres puissances. La communication officielle faite le 1^{er} mai au gouvernement français par l'ambassadeur du Japon apporte dans le débat un texte précis émanant directement du cabinet de Tokio, qui engage la responsabilité de celui-ci et projette la pleine clarté sur une controverse que certaines réactions de l'opinion internationale risquaient de compliquer singulièrement. Par un geste dont nous ne pouvons qu'apprécier la courtoisie, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Paris a été chargé de donner communication de ces précisions au gouvernement français, encore que celui-ci ne fût pas encore intervenu officiellement, comme le firent l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, à propos des récentes déclarations nippones.

Ce n'est pas que la France, qui est une des principales puissances actives en Extrême-Orient et qui est signataire des traités stipulant la porte ouverte en Chine et le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale de ce pays, n'ait pas été attentive à l'incident. Soucieuse, conformément à sa politique constante, des devoirs que lui impose son rôle de grande puissance et de cet autre devoir qui est de rendre la coopération possible dans l'Orient lointain en ne heurtant pas systématiquement le Japon, elle n'est pas restée inactive. Elle a pris les contacts nécessaires, se réservant de demander amicalement des explications au moment qui lui paraîtrait opportun. L'affaire, en effet, n'était pas portée jusqu'ici sur le plan diplomatique. Il s'agissait uniquement de déclarations, pour le moins imprudentes, d'un haut fonctionnaire des affaires étrangères nippon, lequel n'était d'ailleurs pas officiellement désavoué. Même les mises au point faites après coup n'engageaient pas le gouvernement japonais. Or, voici que ce gouvernement prend officiellement position par une communication toute spontanée, à laquelle M. Louis Barthou, ministre des affaires étrangères, a répondu en précisant avec une entière franchise la doctrine du gouvernement de la République.

Une première remarque s'impose : si les versions des déclarations faites le 17 avril à Tokio, de source officieuse, ont pu être interprétées comme marquant l'intention des dirigeants de l'empire du Soleil-Levant de proclamer une doctrine de Monroe pour le monde jaune et de contrôler effectivement les relations de la Chine avec les pays étrangers, même lorsqu'il s'agit de simples accords financiers et techniques, c'est que les termes de ces déclarations, tels qu'ils furent transmis à la presse du monde entier, prêtaient à équivoque. Dans la communication officielle faite au gouvernement français il n'y a nulle trace d'une intention de cette nature. Au contraire, le Japon se défend énergiquement d'avoir porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine; il souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays, et il souligne que ces buts devraient être atteints par la Chine elle-même, par l'effet de ses propres efforts et du réveil de ses énergies nationales. La doctrine à laquelle le Japon entend s'en tenir en ce qui concerne la Chine est ainsi clairement définie, et les arguments par lesquels Tokio justifie son attitude en découlent logiquement. Le Japon donne l'assurance formelle qu'il n'a pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, qu'il considère que, pour suivre de bonne foi, l'activité financière et commerciale ne peut avoir que des effets heureux, qu'il souscrit naturellement au principe de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale pour tous en Chine, enfin qu'il observe rigoureusement les traités et les accords en vigueur.

Du point de vue de la politique générale cette déclaration donne entièrement satisfaction, comme Sir John Simon l'a déjà constaté à la Chambre des communes. Elle dissipe tout malentendu sur les principes et sur les faits; elle répond à ce qu'exige le respect des traités en vigueur. Mais le gouvernement de Tokio déclare qu'il ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers si cette intervention devait être préjudiciable au maintien de

Amplified

vie de bonne loi, l'activité commerciale ne peut avoir que des effets heureux, qu'il souscrit naturellement au principe de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale pour tous en Chine, enfin qu'il observe rigoureusement les traités et les accords en vigueur.

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La réponse de la France à la communication du gouvernement de Tokio prend acte de cette interprétation officielle des déclarations officielles faites le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon, et elle enregistre avec satisfaction l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité « non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères ». Quant à la déclaration que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la jus-

tice en Extrême-Orient, la réponse française comporte à son sujet un passage d'une importance capitale, où se trouve précisée pour l'avenir la doctrine du gouvernement de la République. C'est le passage où M. Louis Barthou dit que si de pareilles éventualités [des interventions préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient] devaient se produire en Chine, « le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington, et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922 ». Cela revient à indiquer clairement qu'en cas de menace pour l'ordre en Chine la France ne saurait admettre d'autre procédure applicable en droit et en fait que celle de la consultation des neuf puissances.

Que la position officielle définie maintenant par le gouvernement de Tokio et qui engage sa responsabilité soit quelque peu en retrait de celle qu'annonçaient les déclarations officielles du 17 avril, c'est évident; et on ne peut que s'en féliciter, car toute menace de complications est ainsi écartée. Le Japon est actuellement aux prises avec trop de difficultés intérieures, d'ordre financier, économique et social, il est travaillé sur son propre terrain national par des tendances trop opposées les unes aux autres pour qu'il veuille se jeter délibérément dans quelque grande aventure. Il a une politique nettement arrêtée en ce qui concerne le continent asiatique, politique commandée par des nécessités impérieuses pour lui, mais il est trop prudent pour risquer de compromettre ses chances par une action hâtive et inopportune, et son gouvernement, tout en veillant à la sauvegarde de ses intérêts et en préparant l'avenir, a un sens trop aigu des réalités politiques pour ne pas mesurer son effort aux possibilités du moment.

Encl. 2 to Special Report No. 7. D. 1467 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of April 21 1934

Une nouvelle phase de la politique du Pacifique

**Ce n'est pas la domination de l'Asie
que réclame le Japon
mais la fin des intrigues qui encouragent le désordre**

Ce n'est pas le moindre avantage de la nouvelle attitude prise par la France d'en finir avec les équivoques d'une convention qui cherche à éluder les problèmes au lieu de les résoudre. La faillite de cette méthode est plus éclatante encore dans le Pacifique qu'en Europe.

Qu'est-ce que le problème du Pacifique, sinon la rivalité des puissances autour de l'anarchie chinoise, et, en particulier, le duel des Etats-Unis et du Japon ? Pour amortir cette querelle, on a multiplié les conventions : gentlemen's agreement, accords navals, accord des neuf puissances, covenant de Genève, sans arriver à l'apaisement.

Récemment nous avons enregistré un appel du ministre des affaires étrangères japonais, M. Hirota, pour une franche explication, et la réponse réticente de M. Cordell Hull. Faut-il s'étonner, dans ces conditions, que le gouvernement japonais juge opportun de préciser les directives de sa politique ? On dit que ces directives constituent l'affirmation d'une doctrine de Monroe asiatique. Pour justifier la définition, il faudrait d'abord s'entendre sur le sens de la doctrine de Monroe. Proclamée il y a plus de cent ans, comme un programme de défense du Nouveau Monde contre les emprises européennes, la doctrine de Monroe a dévié au point de devenir l'évangile de l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis. Si c'est dans ce sens que l'on interprète le programme japonais, on déraile. La formule de M. Hirota se rapproche beaucoup plus de la version originale de la doctrine de Monroe. Le Japon s'élève contre les entreprises de certaines puissances qui, sous prétexte de soutenir la Chine, cherchent surtout à la dresser contre l'Empire du Soleil Levant. Peut-on dire que ce reproche soit injustifié, quand on constate que des Américains organisent l'aviation chinoise, que la Société des nations elle-même n'a pas eu un mot de blâme pour les provocations des nationalistes chinois, que les missions envoyées par la ligue en Extrême-Orient n'ont pas peu contribué à stériliser les tentatives de réconciliation.

Certes, le Japon proclame hautement qu'il est le champion de l'ordre et de la civilisation en Asie et qu'il est qualifié pour prêcher le bon exemple. Il ne s'élève contre aucune entreprise légitime des autres puissances. A une condition, c'est que ces entreprises respectent les intérêts particuliers qu'il tient des situations géographique, politique et économique. Les Américains et les Anglais ont-ils jamais eu une autre conception de la nuance qui sépare l'expansion légitime de l'impérialisme ? — SAINT-BRICE.

UNE EXPLICATION OFFICIELLE de la déclaration japonaise

TOKIO, 20 avril. — Le porte-parole du ministre des affaires étrangères, en témoignant sa surprise de la réaction provoquée par sa récente déclaration, ajoute que dans le discours qu'il a prononcé devant la Diète, le 23 janvier, et qui fut alors favorablement accueilli par la presse étrangère, M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, avait affirmé que « conscient des graves responsabilités que lui impose le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient, le gouverne-

ment nippon était fermement décidé à ne pas oublier un seul instant que le Japon devait, comme la seule pierre angulaire de l'édifice de la paix, porter tout le poids de telles responsabilités, et que la politique du Japon et sa défense nationale devaient reposer sur les énormes responsabilités que lui impose son importante position. »

Le porte-parole du ministre des affaires étrangères a ensuite déclaré :

« Le Japon ne cherche nullement à léser les intérêts des tierces puissances ou leur droit à entretenir des rapports commerciaux profitables à la Chine. Nous sommes, au contraire, très favorables à une semblable politique et nous ne désirons aucunement contrecarrer la politique de la porte ouverte en Chine ni porter atteinte aux traités en vigueur. »

Cependant, le Japon s'oppose à toute action de la part d'autres puissances qui serait susceptible de compromettre la paix en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon partage avec les pays asiatiques et, en particulier avec la Chine, les responsabilités du maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. Le temps n'est plus où les puissances étrangères ou la S.D.N. pouvaient poursuivre une politique n'ayant d'autre but que l'exploitation de la Chine. »

Les raisons déterminantes de la politique japonaise

TOKIO, 20 avril. — On apprend de source sûre que deux raisons ont amené le porte-parole du ministre des affaires étrangères à faire à la presse la récente communication concernant la politique du Japon à l'égard de la Chine.

La première de ces raisons était de mettre les Etats-Unis en présence d'une situation et d'une détermination nettes dont ils seront obligés de tenir compte lors des pourparlers préliminaires à la conférence navale de 1935. La seconde était d'obliger les dirigeants de la politique chinoise à se rallier à l'opinion de M. Houang Fou, président de la commission politique du Nord, qui est partisan d'une stabilisation de la situation politique en Chine, d'une lutte à outrance contre le communisme.

On estime, dans les milieux bien informés de Tokio, que le Japon désire mettre en évidence devant les puissances sa position prépondérante en Extrême-Orient et sa mission pour la protection et le maintien de la paix.

Certains estiment que la récente communication du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais constitue un véritable manifeste auquel le Japon se référera constamment dans l'avenir — s'il ne se trouve pas contraint d'y renoncer devant la réaction des puissances — comme les Etats-Unis se réfèrent à la doctrine de Monroe.

Une action diplomatique va s'ouvrir

WASHINGTON, 20 avril. — Le ministre de Chine à Washington a remis au gouvernement américain une protestation de son gouvernement contre la déclaration japonaise précisant la nouvelle politique du Japon à l'égard de la Chine.

Au même moment, M. Saito, ambassadeur du Japon, affirmait que le Japon ne visait pas à imposer sa domination à la Chine, mais qu'il cherchait à réaliser une complète coopération avec la Chine en vue du maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

« Il y a une grande différence entre l'hégémonie et la coopération », a déclaré M. Saito.

M. Saito venait de recevoir la copie des instructions adressées par son gouvernement, au ministre du Japon à Nankin.

Au département d'Etat, on s'abstient de tout commentaire tant que le département ne sera pas en possession du document que M. Saito doit lui remettre.

Dans les milieux bien informés, on se trouve d'accord pour estimer que la remise de ce document marquera le début d'une série d'échanges diplomatiques.

Encl. 3 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris
Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE of April 24 1934

LE FAIT DU JOUR

Le problème du Pacifique se présente mal...

Republique 4/27

Je veux simplement dire qu'il est à craindre aujourd'hui que ce problème ne trouve d'autre solution que la guerre.

De toute évidence, cela ne fâcherait pas le Japon, mais l'Amérique n'y tient pas, l'Angleterre non plus, l'U.R.S.S. non plus, la Chine non plus, pas davantage la France et la Hollande et les Philippines sont inquiets de voir la tournure que prennent les choses, ce qui ne saurait nullement nous étonner.

Il faut avouer qu'en l'espèce les Anglais et les Américains se sont conduits comme des enfants et qu'il n'y a pas à être surpris le moins du monde de l'attitude du Japon.

Comment ? Voilà un Etat que l'Angleterre instruit dans le jeu de toutes les armes de guerre, et à qui elle construit une marine après que les vaisseaux américains, bombardant les ports japonais, ont forcé le paus à s'ouvrir aux exportations et aux cultures étrangères !

Tout naturellement, sous l'œil bienveillant des Anglais et des Américains, le Japon bat la Chine en 1894 et prend pied sur le continent. Que fait l'Angleterre ? Prend-elle peur ? Du tout. Elle s'allie avec le Japon.

Le beau résultat c'est qu'avec une flotte construite par les Anglais, avec des matelots instruits par les Anglais — pour ne rien dire de l'armée — le Japon, dix ans plus tard bat les Russes et s'installe en Mandchourie.

C'est alors que la gravité de la chose apparaît à Washington et à Londres. Il est bien tôt.

A peine la grande guerre déclarée, le Japon enlève Kiao-Tchéou à l'Allemagne, élimine l'Allemagne de l'Extrême-Orient. Un peu plus tard, il tente d'imposer son protectorat à la Chine. Dès que la Révolution russe éclate, il

en profite ; un instant il poussera jusqu'au Baikal. Quand la guerre est finie, le Japon, reposé, pourvu d'une bonne marine, non seulement est plus fort que la France sur mer, mais se trouve si bien armé qu'à la Conférence de Washington il peut obtenir 66 pour 100 du tonnage cuirassé de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis, 70 pour 100 du tonnage en croiseurs de ces deux puissances.

Depuis, on l'a vu profiter de chaque occasion pour s'imposer à la Chine. C'est l'intervention au Chantoung, l'intervention à Changhaï, plus récemment l'occupation de la Mandchourie et la marche sur Pékin qui ne fut arrêtée que par la capitulation de la Chine.

En même temps, le Japon installait des bases navales dans les îles du Pacifique sur lesquelles il a un mandat et qu'il n'a pas le droit de fortifier, et ses espions, ses agents, ses commerçants se répandaient aux Philippines, à Hawaï, jusqu'en Malaisie, préparant le terrain, suivant la formule classique, aux marins et aux soldats.

Il y a quarante ans que le Japon a fait ses débuts dans la grande politique ; il a bien marché depuis, mais il n'a si bien marché que parce que l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis — l'Angleterre sur tout — ont facilité ses premiers pas. Aujourd'hui, ces deux puissances s'en mordent les doigts et l'une en est réduite à fortifier hâtivement Singapour, tandis que l'autre abandonne courageusement les Philippines à leur sort, et se replie sur Hawaï.

Trop tard encore une fois. Qui sème le vent récolte la tempête. Les dés sont jetés. L'enjeu est de taille. C'est le plus beau du monde. C'est la Chine.

Pierre Dominique.

Encl. 4 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from FIGARO of April 24 1934

La politique du Japon en Chine inquiète l'Amérique

Figaro

4/21

On s'est vivement ému, à Washington, de la transmission à M. Hull, secrétaire au Département d'Etat, du texte d'un mémorandum adressé par le gouvernement japonais au gouvernement chinois, pour l'informer que le Japon ne tolérera pas, en Chine, une immixtion quelconque de pays étrangers.

Les cercles officiels de Washington se demandent si cette communication du gouvernement de Tokio n'équivaut pas à une volonté affirmée d'établir un protectorat nippon sur la Chine comme sur le Mandchoukouo.

Le ministre de Chine à Washington a remis au gouvernement américain une protestation à ce sujet.

Au même moment, M. Saito, ambassadeur du Japon, affirmait que le Japon ne visait pas à imposer sa domination à la Chine, mais qu'il cherchait à réaliser une complète coopération avec la Chine en vue du maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

« Il y a une grande différence entre l'hégémonie et la coopération », a déclaré M. Saito.

Un télégramme de l'Agence Rengo, de Tokio, exprime l'étonnement du gouvernement nippon au sujet des interprétations données à sa note au gouvernement de Nankin.

« Le monde entier, déclare le porte-parole de M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, sait bien que le Japon ne cherche nullement à léser les intérêts des tierces puissances ou leur droit à entretenir des rapports commerciaux profitables à la Chine. Nous ne désirons aucunement contrecarrer la politique de la porte ouverte en Chine ni porter atteinte aux traités en vigueur.

» Cependant, le Japon s'oppose à toute action de la part d'autres puissances susceptible de compromettre la paix en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon partage avec les pays asiatiques et, en particulier, avec la Chine, les responsabilités du maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. »

A Londres, où les deux communications japonaises sont parvenues au Foreign Office, on considère que la seconde de ces déclarations, marquant l'attachement du Japon à la politique de la porte ouverte, affaiblit considérablement la portée de la première, qui semblait être un avertissement, qui semblait être un avertissement n'a été suivi d'aucune communication officielle à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, le gouvernement anglais ne poursuivra, dit-on, pas plus loin son enquête.

Il semble donc que (malgré les récriminations de lord Robert Cecil et des fanatiques de la S. D. N.) le gouvernement de M. Macdonald soit fort peu disposé à mettre le doigt entre l'arbre et l'écorce, dans la contestation nippo-américaine.

Par ailleurs, les milieux officiels japonais affirment que le Japon souhaite collaborer avec les Etats-Unis sur le plan commercial, dans le Pacifique, en Chine et en Mandchourie, collaboration basée sur le fait que les industries japonaise et américaine ne se font pas concurrence.

La Fédération économique du Japon a décidé à cet effet de créer un comité spécial, composé de six représentants japonais et de six Américains.

M. Roosevelt, circonvenu par de nombreux adversaires de la politique d'expansion japonaise en Chine, cherchera-t-il, entre Tokio et Washington, un dérivatif à ses difficultés intérieures ?

St-R.

Encl. 5 to Special Report No. W.D. 1007 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LHM of April 24 1934

Le désarmement limité et la situation en Asie

par Arturo LABRIOLA

Il faudrait souhaiter que des hommes politiques et des journalistes ayant la possibilité d'exercer une influence quelconque sur l'opinion publique, voulussent examiner la thèse avancée par certains milieux responsables de la Grande-Bretagne, d'après laquelle on pourrait essayer d'établir du moins une modeste convention de désarmement, bien que limitée aux puissances européennes.

Cette proposition paraît faire double emploi avec l'autre ouverture anglaise, relative à la défense contre les bombardements aériens, qui impliquait l'acquiescement à ces bombardements dans des régions « éloignées » et dans le but d'une répression antirévolutionnaire.

On connaît la sensation désagréable que la proposition de cette réserve anglaise produisit un peu partout. En tout cas, elle se ralliait à la nette opposition qu'autant les Américains que les Britanniques avaient faite à la proposition japonaise et chinoise d'inscrire en son temps, dans le traité de Versailles, le principe de l'égalité des races. Avec tous leurs bons sentiments démocratiques, les Anglo-Saxons restent fidèles à la théorie du réactionnaire Burke, lorsqu'il écrivait à Mirabeau : « Nous aussi nous voulons les « droits de l'homme », mais pour les Anglais et non pas pour tout le genre humain... »

La thèse d'une convention de désarmement « limitée aux puissances européennes » peut, éventuellement, correspondre à certains intérêts anglais du moment; en tout cas, elle n'avantage pas sensiblement la cause de la paix internationale. Peut-être, représente-t-elle un grand danger, car elle semble laisser en dehors de son influence l'organisme le plus fragile et le terrain le plus branlant des relations internationales. Tout le monde sait qu'une catastrophe approche de l'Extrême-Orient. Mais si le Japon ne doit pas être compris dans une telle convention, à quoi bon la faire ?

Ajoutons qu'il y a le cas de la Russie. Elle est Europe et elle est Asie, en même temps. Doit-elle être incluse ou doit-elle être exclue d'une telle convention ? Doit-elle désarmer ou peut-elle rester armée ? Mystère.

Tout récemment, les *Izvestia* étudiaient certains courants d'opinions qui allaient s'élargissant et se gonflant au Japon.

En outre, elles citaient une série d'articles du *Nihon* (japonais), où M. Natsumaki Kaméiti, un des porte-parole de l'état-major nippon, écrivait : « Pour démontrer devant le monde entier com-

Evidemment l'Angleterre a tout intérêt à voir le Japon conserver son attitude menaçante vis-à-vis de ses rivaux. Un tel Japon est sans danger pour les Détroits malais et pour l'Australie; et une Russie menacée par le Japon est une Russie qui renonce à sa pression sur l'Asie centrale et sur l'Inde.

D'autre part, l'alliance réelle entre le Japon et l'Angleterre s'est remise à fonctionner.

Tout récemment, le *Manchester Guardian Commercial* (27 janvier 1934) remarquait qu'une des difficultés qui s'opposent à des mesures de protection du marché anglais contre le « dumping » japonais, c'est l'attitude favorable au Japon du Foreign Office.

« L'office colonial — remarquait le journal — pourrait faire quelque chose, mais il est douteux que le ministère des affaires étrangères considérerait avec bienveillance une action quelconque que pourrait entreprendre l'office colonial pour l'augmentation des taxes douanières contre le Japon. »

Si même dans une affaire qui intéresse directement le marché anglais, le Foreign Office est impuissant en face du Japon, que pourrait-il faire dans les autres domaines ? C'est pour cela que ces mêmes milieux désireraient très sincèrement une « petite » convention de désarmement qui n'englobât que les puissances européennes, mais qui voudrait laisser libre le Japon de continuer ses préparatifs militaires en Extrême-Orient; ce qu'il fait chaque jour d'avantage.

La mentalité anglaise — moitié naïve et moitié astucieuse — peut même s'imaginer que les affaires d'Extrême-Orient sauraient être circonscrites localement. Le moindre bon sens montre que c'est absurde ou trop commode pour une seule partie. Je signale que Mussolini, depuis quelque temps, a fait la découverte de l'Asie et du rôle possible de « médiateur » pour Rome dans les « problèmes » de ce continent.

Le Japon proclame son protectorat « moral » sur la Chine, et les gens se demandent encore si la guerre couve chez nous ou existe déjà virtuellement en Extrême-Orient. Il est vrai que le « porte-parole » du ministre des affaires étrangères à Tokio appelle cette guerre « conservation de la paix ». Confucius avait depuis quelques milliers d'années expliqué que les plus grands malheurs tombent sur les pays « lorsque les paroles ne correspondent pas aux choses ». Mais Kouang-tee était Chi-nois.

même temps, doit-elle être incluse ou doit-elle être exclue d'une telle convention? Doit-elle désarmer ou peut-elle rester armée? Mystère.

Tout récemment, les *Izvestia* étudiaient certains courants d'opinions qui allaient s'élargissant et se gonflant au Japon.

En outre, elles citaient une série d'articles du *Nihon* (japonais), où M. Natsouaki Kaméiti, un des porte-parole de l'état-major nippon, écrivait : « Pour démontrer devant le monde entier combien sont clairs et justifiés les actes du Japon, il est nécessaire d'adresser à la Russie rouge la note suivante, la dernière. » Un ultimatum, donc! Suivent les « conditions », qu'il est inutile d'indiquer tout au long. Après avoir remarqué qu'une de ces « conditions » est ainsi libellée : « Retrait de l'armée rouge jusque derrière... l'Oural » avec l'unique concession de laisser des garnisons en Sibérie, afin d'y assurer (dans l'intérêt du Japon?) la « sécurité intérieure ».

Naturellement, M. Natsouaki Kaméiti n'est pas tout le Japon, mais le Japon est soumis à une dictature militaire et féodale de type fasciste, qui ne permet pas d'imprimer la moindre chose non conforme à ses directives, ou tout au moins à ses intentions.

A part cela, la situation en Extrême-Orient est telle qu'elle finira par imposer une solution. Le Japon, qui, par les voies de l'air, est à la merci d'une puissante attaque de la Russie, tend à transférer son centre militaire en Mandchourie. Mais la situation stratégique de la Mandchourie — encerclée par la Mongolie intérieure, la Chine et la Sibérie — n'est pas brillante et l'état-major nippon, le véritable maître du Japon, pourrait bien être tenté de briser ce cercle d'un côté quelconque. Il semble s'y préparer.

« moral » sur la Chine, et les gens se demandent encore si la guerre couve chez nous ou existe déjà virtuellement en Extrême-Orient. Il est vrai que le « porte-parole » du ministre des affaires étrangères à Tokio appelle cette guerre « conservation de la paix ». Confucius avait depuis quelques milliers d'années expliqué que les plus grands malheurs tombent sur les pays « lorsque les paroles ne correspondent pas aux choses ». Mais Kouang-tsee était Chinois...

Encl. ① to Special Report No. A.D./61 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ERE of April 24 1934

La Chine dénonce l'impérialisme japonais

La légation de Chine à Paris communique la note suivante :

La déclaration de la politique du gouvernement de Tokio en ce qui concerne la Chine, démontre une fois de plus la politique traditionnelle d'agression et d'expansion du Japon sur le continent asiatique et plus particulièrement ses desseins contre la Chine ; elle prouve une fois de plus les désirs de ce pays de contrôler — au préjudice des droits souverains de la Chine et à l'exclusion des intérêts légitimes des autres pouvoirs — les immenses ressources naturelles de l'Asie orientale et les énormes possibilités du marché commercial chinois.

Une telle politique est opposée à l'intérêt de la paix et de l'ordre en Extrême-Orient.

Le peuple chinois, conscient de ses droits et de ses obligations en tant que nation souveraine et indépendante, n'acceptera pas cette doctrine de l'hégémonie japonaise en Asie, et reste certain que les autres puissances ne seront pas obligées de l'accepter.

Le gouvernement chinois a déjà donné les instructions à son ministre à Tokio en lui demandant de soumettre cette affaire au gouvernement japonais et de demander une explication.

Depuis trente ans, la paix en Extrême-Orient n'a été troublée que par la politique d'expansion continentale du Japon développée dans le mémoire Tanaka, et qui a donné lieu à de nombreux incidents et particulièrement à l'attaque soudaine de Moukden en septembre 1931, au bombardement de Changhaï en janvier 1932 et, depuis, à l'occupation de toute la Mandchourie et de la province du Jehol.

La plus sûre garantie de la paix en Extrême-Orient ne consiste pas à l'abandon de la collaboration amicale et utile des puissances occidentales avec la Chine, mais à l'abandon par le Japon de sa politique impérialiste en Asie et de son respect scrupuleux de ses obligations contractées par traités.

La légation publie un télégramme de Nankin déclarant :

Comme absolument absurde l'information de la N Y Tribunes de Tokyo selon laquelle la déclaration ridicule du Japon aurait été approuvée par les chefs du gouvernement chinois avant sa publication. On dément formellement au ministère des affaires étrangères de Nankin avoir eu connaissance de la teneur de la déclaration japonaise avant sa publication. On est d'avis que la déclaration de la doctrine de l'hégémonie japonaise sur l'Asie frappe aussi bien la Chine, sinon à un degré plus élevé que les autres nations du monde. Croire que le gouvernement chinois puisse consentir à une doctrine pareille n'est pas moins stupide que d'imaginer qu'un homme puisse approuver sa propre destruction. On incline à croire que l'information de la N Y Tribunes a été probablement inspirée par les milieux officiels du Japon. Le but de cette falsification et de faire circuler des rumeurs de ce genre tendant sans nul doute à faire croire au monde que la Chine a déjà consenti à l'action du Japon et de tenter ainsi de diminuer l'opposition des autres puissances. Mais le monde connaît par trop bien les façons d'agir du Japon depuis l'affaire de la Mandchourie pour que l'on puisse prêter l'oreille à une telle histoire.

Encl. 7 to Special Report No. A.D. 1407 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from FIGARO of April 24 1934

A la Chambre des Communes il a été question hier de la politique du Japon

Figaro 4/24

LONDRES, 23 avril. — Les déclarations faites récemment par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais sur la politique d'intervention des puissances dans les affaires de Chine ont fait cet après-midi l'objet de sept interventions à la Chambre des communes. Cinq députés conservateurs, un député libéral et un député travailliste ont interrogé sir John Simon, tant pour obtenir une définition de l'attitude du gouvernement en présence de cet exposé de politique japonaise que pour savoir si le secrétaire du Foreign Office se proposait de consulter sur la question l'administration américaine.

Sir John Simon déclare qu'il a demandé à Tokio quelques éclaircissements

« Je n'ai reçu aucune note officielle du gouvernement japonais, a répondu sir John Simon, mais notre ambassadeur à Tokio nous a adressé le texte de la traduction d'une déclaration officieuse et verbale faite à la presse japonaise par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères.

» Cette déclaration paraît inspirée par l'appréhension de certaines menaces à la paix et aux bonnes relations sino-japonaises, ou à l'intégrité de la Chine, qui pourraient procéder de certaines actions des puissances étrangères en Chine.

» Aucun de ces dangers n'est à redouter du fait de la politique du gouvernement anglais qui a, au contraire, pour objet de les éviter. Par contre, le caractère de la déclaration et certains de ses détails, tels que l'allusion à des objections soulevées par l'appui financier à la Chine sont tels que j'ai jugé nécessaire de me mettre en communication avec le gouvernement japonais afin d'obtenir les éclaircissements qui nous sont utiles. »

Le ministre peut-il dire qu'il va consulter les autres signataires du Pacte des Neuf ? Le ministre veut-il répondre à la question concernant un échange de vues éventuel avec le gouvernement des Etats-Unis ?

Ces questions et plusieurs autres qui les appuyaient en substance sont parties de divers bancs de la Chambre des Communes dès que le secrétaire du Foreign Office eût achevé sa déclaration.

« Ce que je viens de dire à la Chambre, a répliqué sir John Simon, est le compte rendu des événements à la date d'aujourd'hui. Je crois qu'il serait plus sage d'attendre le résultat de la communication que j'ai adressée avant d'en indiquer davantage. »

Après des interventions des députés Clement Wedwood, sir Alfred Knox et sir Charles Cayser, le secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office a conclu ainsi :

« Je crois avoir déjà dit qu'il ne me paraît pas utile de faire aucune autre déclaration à l'heure actuelle. L'action que je viens d'annoncer à la Chambre consiste en une communication amicale avec le gouvernement japonais. La Chambre admettra, j'en suis sûr, que c'était là la meilleure méthode à employer. »

Un mouvement d'opinion en faveur d'une intervention

La discussion a été close, mais le nombre des questions et interventions qui ont marqué la séance de cet après-midi témoigne assez de l'importance qu'on attache, à Westminster, à « l'avertissement » aux puissances donné par le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon. A cet égard, il est notable que le désir d'atténuation qui apparaît dans les déclarations du ministre n'a pas effacé chez les députés l'impression produite par cet avertissement et qu'un fort mouvement se dessine en faveur d'une intervention soit par la méthode directe, soit de concert avec les signataires du Pacte des Neuf et en particulier les Etats-Unis.

Une déclaration du consul nippon à Genève

GENÈVE, 23 avril. — Exprimant l'opinion du gouvernement japonais, M. Yokoyama, consul général du Japon à Genève, a déclaré aujourd'hui que le Japon est plus que jamais convaincu que la coopération sincère et amicale entre deux des grandes familles asiatiques, le Japon et la Chine, en vue de l'unification et de la prospérité de la République céleste, est la clé de voûte de la paix en Asie orientale.

« Mais il faut se rappeler le fait, a dit M. Yokoyama, que l'œuvre de pacification et d'unification de la Chine, commencée par le gouvernement de Nankin, est loin d'être achevée. L'œuvre salutaire de reconstruction nationale est fréquemment handicapée et troublée par les continuelles luttes politiques intérieures ou par les guerres civiles.

» C'est devant cette situation que la déclaration du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères nippon, du 7 avril, a précisé l'attitude de son pays. »

Enfin, M. Yokoyama a dit que le Japon n'a pas l'intention de s'arroger le droit de prendre arbitrairement sous sa tutelle un pays indépendant.

Encl. 8 to Special Report No. W.D. 1007 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO of April 24 1934

Les déclarations japonaises sur la Chine provoquent de multiples questions aux Communes

*Sir John Simon évite avec
soin toute réponse
compromettante*

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 23 avril. — Sir John Simon a répondu, ce soir, aux Communes, à un grand nombre de questions relatives à la politique du Japon en Extrême-Orient. Sept députés (5 conservateurs, 1 libéral et 1 travailliste) ont interrogé le chef du Foreign Office.

On s'attendait à un exposé important de la politique anglaise; mais, une fois de plus, le gouvernement britannique a esquivé la difficulté sous le prétexte qu'aucune communication n'a été encore reçue officiellement du gouvernement de Tokio.

Dans ces conditions, le gouvernement anglais a fait une démarche amicale auprès du gouvernement japonais pour le prier de définir exactement ses intentions.

Le gouvernement de Londres, dont la préoccupation primordiale demeure en somme de sauvegarder le principe de la porte ouverte en Chine, cherche à éviter de donner l'impression d'une action concertée avec le gouvernement américain, ce qui pourrait donner ombrage à Tokio. C'est pour cela qu'il n'y a eu encore aucune consultation officielle entre Londres et Washington.

Sir John Simon a déclaré exactement qu'il a reçu, cependant, de l'ambassadeur britannique à Tokio un texte qui est donné comme la traduction d'une déclaration officielle d'un porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères à la presse. Cette déclaration semble, a dit le ministre anglais, inspirée par l'appréhension de certains dangers qui menacent la paix et les bonnes relations entre la Chine et le Japon, aussi bien que l'intégrité de la Chine, menaces qui résulteraient de certaines initiatives de la part de puissances étrangères en Chine.

Le ministre anglais a protesté que la politique anglaise, pour sa part, ne peut pas produire de dangers pareils, puisque précisément son but consiste à les éviter.

Pourtant, en ce qui concerne les objections japonaises à l'assistance financière à la Chine, le gouvernement britannique estime nécessaire de demander des explications au Japon.

Le gouvernement anglais semble devoir mettre tout en œuvre pour éviter des complications fâcheuses. Cependant, il est certain que dans quelques milieux, notamment les milieux navals anglais, on est quelque peu irrité de l'attitude du Japon qui a laissé entendre audacieusement, il y a quelques semaines à peine, que l'aménagement de la base navale de Singapour par les Anglais lui déplaisait.

D'autre part, le Japon a fait connaître qu'il exigerait la revision du traité naval de Washington.

La puissance de la flotte japonaise

Les milieux navals anglais ne doutent pas de la supériorité de la flotte sous-marine japonaise à laquelle sont inférieurs les navires anglais et américains de même classe. Les experts américains eux-mêmes, admettent que leurs meilleurs sous-marins ne pourraient rivaliser qu'avec ceux de la dernière catégorie japonaise.

Les Américains, qui ont décidé en principe l'abandon des Philippines, dans un délai de dix ans il est vrai, seraient donc réduits à la défense de leurs côtes en raison du faible rayon de croisière de leurs navires et même avec Hawaï comme base, aujourd'hui ils auraient grande difficulté pour s'avancer jusque dans les eaux japonaises. Par contre, tous les navires japonais sont capables de se rendre à Hawaï et d'en revenir sans escale. Les meilleurs d'entre eux pourraient même aller à San Francisco et au canal de Panama d'une seule traite.

On conçoit donc que l'opinion publique anglaise soit opposée à un conflit avec le Japon. Pourtant, les milieux politiques anglais sont grandement préoccupés : les Etats-Unis ont fait savoir à plusieurs reprises, notamment dans la lettre adressée par M. Stimson, il y a plusieurs mois, au sénateur Borah, que si le Japon violait le pacte Kellogg et le traité des neuf puissances, qui affirme le principe de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, le traité naval se trouverait annulé automatiquement. Dans ce cas, le gouvernement de Washington se considérerait libre d'augmenter à son gré ses armements navals. Il en résulterait que les Anglais seraient obligés de leur côté, afin de maintenir leur parité navale avec les Etats-Unis, d'augmenter parallèlement leur flotte sous peine de voir leur prestige sérieusement ébranlé dans l'empire britannique.

Enfin, au cas, qui, espère-t-on ne se produira pas, où un conflit entre l'Amérique et le Japon se produirait, le Canada, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande, inquiets des ambitions japonaises, risqueraient de se ranger du côté américain et la Grande-Bretagne, sous peine de voir se rompre l'unité impériale péniblement maintenue à Ottawa, se trouverait obligée de marcher aux côtés de ses Dominions et de soutenir les Etats-Unis. — R. L.

Encl. 9 to Special Report No. W.D./407 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LA JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE of April 25 1934

Journee Industrielle
CHOSSES DE GENÈVE
4/25
**Les projets d'équipement
économique et financier
de la Chine
et l'attitude du Japon**

(De notre correspondant particulier
de Genève)

Dans notre numéro du 22-23, M. Jean Pupier a exposé avec clarté le caractère et la portée des déclarations « sensationnelles » faites la semaine dernière à Tokio par les porte-parole officiels du gouvernement japonais. Il n'est pas douteux que ces déclarations, qui n'ont pas été démenties, au contraire, ont à nouveau assombri l'horizon dans l'Extrême-Orient. La Chine officielle proteste, les Etats-Unis manifestent leur colère, l'U. R. S. S. observe — et le reste du monde s'inquiète.

Que veut le Japon ? Quel est le mobile qui le fait ainsi braver la plus grande partie de l'opinion mondiale ? Qu'on nous permette une explication — et d'abord un souvenir.

Nous avons publié ici même, il y a quelques mois, des renseignements inédits sur les projets d'équipement économique et financier élaborés par la S. D. N. et la Chine, à l'instigation de cette dernière. Rappelons qu'il s'agit, grosso modo, d'une sorte de plan quinquennal visant des entreprises de gros travaux publics intéressantes principalement l'hygiène en Chine : adductions d'eau, lutte contre les inondations, amélioration de la culture, des ports ; construction d'hôpitaux, formation et échanges de médecins, prêts de professeurs européens, création de banques agricoles, etc.

Voilà bien six années que les dirigeants de Nankin ont demandé le concours de la S. D. N. et de ses organisations techniques. Or non seulement la S. D. N. ne s'est pas fait prier, mais on dit qu'elle a favorisé singulièrement le zèle des dirigeants chinois, et c'est là un des reproches les plus sérieux que Tokio adresse à Genève. Ce zèle n'est-il pas allé en effet jusqu'à favoriser la résistance armée de la Chine lors des affaires de Mandchourie et de Changhaï qui se sont terminées par la sécession du Japon de la Société des Nations ?

Il y a un an, un des plus hauts fonctionnaires de la S. D. N., le docteur Racjman, directeur de l'organisation de l'hygiène, à qui les Japonais, à tort ou à raison, attribuent une large responsabilité dans le conflit sino-japonais, s'embarquait pour la Chine. Il s'en allait, mandaté par le conseil, c'est-à-dire par les grandes puissances, travailler sur place au développement de la coopération internationale avec la Chine, sur le terrain que nous avons défini plus haut.

A peu près dans le même temps, deux spécialistes financiers, MM. Jean Monnet et Denis — le premier, homme de confiance de la Banque Morgan ; le second, ancien membre de la section financière de la S. D. N. — partaient pour la même destination.

Or c'est au moment où le docteur Racjman, retour de Nankin, allait réintégrer Genève et proposer ses plans que le Japon s'est livré à l'éclat que l'on connaît. Bien mieux, le représentant du Japon à Genève, M. Yokoyama, a tenu à déclarer sans détour à la presse qu'il y a entre les projets genevois et les déclarations de Tokio une relation de cause à effet.

Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon que le Japon voit d'un très mauvais œil les efforts tentés, sur le plan international, pour fortifier la Chine avant que cette dernière n'ait accordé au Japon toutes les satisfactions que celui-ci demande ? Or le Japon n'a pas encore atteint tous ses « objectifs ». Il a créé un Etat nouveau, qui s'appelle le Mandchoukouo, mais cet Etat est séparé de la Chine par une barrière politique, économique et douanière plus élevée que la fameuse muraille de Chine. Une telle situation nuit au développement de l'Etat protégé par Tokio ; le Japon entend y mettre fin. Pour cela, que fait-il ? En premier lieu, il négocie avec les politiciens de la Chine du Nord et il prétend à ce sujet avoir obtenu leur assentiment. Il fait en sorte qu'une normalisation des rapports entre la Chine du Nord et l'Etat Mandchoukouo aboutisse nécessairement à une reconnaissance officielle de cet Etat.

En second lieu, il prétend jeter le trouble dans le gouvernement de Nankin et libérer les conseils de ce gouvernement de la tutelle du Kuomintang, centre de la résistance à une entente directe sino-japonaise. Enfin le Japon n'hésite pas à prévenir les puissances étrangères que tout concours donné à la Chine officielle, c'est-à-dire aux partis anti-japonais, est et sera considéré avec défaveur par lui-même, parce qu'il estime posséder en Chine une sorte de droit particulier de regard sur toutes les affaires chinoises.

Voilà pourquoi le Japon manifeste contre les plans de coopération économique et financière de Genève ou d'ailleurs, qui n'ont pas reçu son agrément préalable ; voilà pourquoi, si ces plans sont approuvés et exécutés sans lui, le Japon n'hésitera pas, à notre avis, à faire entendre la grande voix — celle du canon, s'il le faut — dont retentissent encore les plaines de Mandchourie et les faubourgs de Changhaï.

FOURNIER-MARCIGNY.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 10 to Special Report No. W.D. 1007 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO of April 25 1934

Le Cabinet japonais proclame officiellement la doctrine de Monroe En Asie 1/25

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 24 avril. — Trois événements d'une importance capitale pour l'Extrême-Orient se sont produits aujourd'hui.

Le cabinet japonais a officiellement approuvé l'exposé de politique étrangère qui fut fait officiellement le 18 avril et qui signifie aux puissances étrangères de se désintéresser de la Chine.

En second lieu, le Japon a décidé de doubler ses forces aériennes d'ici trois ans. Actuellement, l'aviation japonaise compte 646 appareils de première ligne, elle doit être augmentée de 500 appareils répartis en 18 escadrilles, et il en coûtera à la Trésorerie japonaise une somme équivalant à 5 millions 600.000 livres.

Enfin, en troisième lieu, le gouvernement japonais a fait déclarer par son ambassadeur à Londres que le gouvernement de Tokio est décidé à abolir la disparité navale. En conséquence, le Japon doit obtenir des garanties pour sa sécurité basées sur l'égalité des armements navals. Sir John Simon se verra donc contraint de faire demain un nouvel exposé à la Chambre des communes.

D'ailleurs, à la suite d'un Conseil de cabinet, qui a eu lieu aujourd'hui à Tokio, un communiqué officiel japonais déclare que, bien que le Japon ne fasse pas d'objections à l'assistance de caractère non politique qui pourrait être prêtée à la Chine, il n'admettra jamais l'importation d'avions militaires et d'armes. Il paraîtrait qu'un groupe de financiers français seraient visés par cette déclaration; d'après ce que disent du moins les commentateurs britanniques.

L'opinion anglaise est très divisée sur l'attitude de temporisation morale adoptée prudemment par le gouvernement de Londres à l'égard du Japon. La presse de gauche s'enflamme contre le Japon, tandis que le *Daily Mail* et la presse conservatrice en général se déclarent japonophiles ou, en tout cas, décidés à ne pas intervenir.

R. L.

Encl. H to Special Report No. W.D. 1107 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE of April 26 1934

LE FAIT DU JOUR

Où le Japon jette le masque

Il y a huit jours, le ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais faisait tenir par un porte-parole officieux quelques propos assez étranges, commentés aussitôt par nous, et d'où l'on pouvait conclure que le Japon tendait à mettre sur pied une doctrine de Monroe asiatique. Car « la politique d'harmonie » de M. Hirota revenait à cela. En somme, le Japon, considérant qu'il était la seule grande puissance en Extrême-Orient, s'improvisait instituteur, éducateur et protecteur de la Chine, entendait que sur le terrain chinois rien ne se fit que par lui.

Au premier moment, on souligna en Europe et en Amérique le caractère officieux des déclarations, mais le cabinet japonais vient d'approuver officiellement l'exposé en question. Et ceci au moment précis où la flotte américaine passe du Pacifique dans l'Atlantique, ce qui est assez adroit.

Nous sommes donc en présence d'une politique qui s'était déjà affirmée dans les faits depuis longtemps — puisque sans remonter à la guerre de 1894, il ne faut pas oublier qu'en 1915 le Japon a carrément tenté de mettre la main sur la Chine — mais jusqu'à ce jour la tranquille proclamation de la primauté nipponne en Extrême-Orient n'avait jamais été trompétée ainsi à tous les échos.

Ce n'est pas tout. Le Japon annonce qu'il va, dans les trois ans qui viennent, doubler son aviation.

Il annonce enfin qu'il ne pourra plus, à la prochaine Conférence navale (1935) se contenter de la flotte que lui avaient attribuée les Conférences de Washington et de Londres. Le Japon demande l'égalité navale. Or, l'égalité, à lui qui tient sa flotte tout entière concentrée dans les eaux d'Extrême-Orient, lui donne la domination non seulement des côtes de la Chine, mais de toutes les eaux qui vont de Panama à Singapour, du détroit de Behring à la Nouvelle-Zélande.

En somme, protecteur de la Chine, le Japon entend être aussi le maître du Pacifique.

La France, l'U. R. S. S., la Hollande et la Chine elle-même n'ont pas grand'chose à dire dans le débat. C'est à l'Amérique et à l'Angleterre de parler. L'Angleterre s'est peu à peu, depuis déjà trente ans, retirée de l'Extrême-Orient. Hong-Kong est bien désert. L'avancée de l'Empire, c'est en somme Singapour, mais Singapour n'est que la porte du Pacifique. On ne voit guère l'Angleterre la dépassant beaucoup.

Quant à l'Amérique, les Philippines vont du coup lui paraître singulièrement aventurées, sinon perdues d'avance. Il est difficile à une flotte américaine de se battre avec derrière elle le canal de Panama qui peut si facilement être obstrué. Et pourtant ! Maintenir la flotte dans l'Atlantique, il n'y faut point songer ; c'est les Philippines, Hawaï, la côte de la Californie livrées à l'adversaire. Quant à diviser la flotte en deux, ce serait courir au désastre.

C'est pourquoi le Japon est dans une excellente situation stratégique d'une part, diplomatique de l'autre (celle-ci tenant surtout à son relatif isolement, à la défaite de l'Allemagne, à la neutralité de la France, à la relative faiblesse de l'U. R. S. S. et de la Chine et au repliement de l'Angleterre sur Singapour).

Il est vrai que sur le tableau économique et financier, les cartes du Japon sont moins bonnes. Mais tout de même... l'Empire du Mikado compte 80 millions d'âmes dans l'archipel, 40 millions sur le continent en comptant la Mandchourie, qui pratiquement est protégée par Tokio. D'ailleurs, les Japonais sont prudents. S'ils avouent leurs ambitions, c'est qu'ils se sentent de taille à les satisfaire.

Pierre Dominique.

Republique

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. A to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of April 26 1934

Anglais et Américains
Journal s'inquiètent ^{4/26}
de l'action japonaise en Chine

LONDRES, 25 avril. — Sir Francis Lindley, l'ambassadeur britannique au Japon, a été reçu pendant une heure aujourd'hui par le ministre des affaires étrangères, à Tokio, M. Hirota, qui, ayant précisé l'attitude japonaise à l'égard des affaires de Chine, s'est déclaré « satisfait de la conclusion de l'entretien ».

D'autre part, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Washington, M. Saïto, a rendu visite au sous-secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Phillips, et lui a déclaré que son gouvernement ne désirait pas fermer « complètement » la porte aux puissances étrangères, au regard des affaires de Chine, mais qu'il insistait sur son droit d'être consulté au préalable lorsque les étrangers envisageraient d'aider la Chine de façon quelconque et notamment en lui consentant des prêts financiers.

M. Saïto a aussi informé des intentions de son gouvernement l'ambassadeur britannique à Washington, sir Ronald Lindsay, et l'ambassadeur de France, M. Lefebvre de la Boulaye, qui tous deux eurent ensuite un entretien avec M. Phillips.

La presse américaine était ce soir très montée et, dénonçant en termes véhéments l'attitude du Japon, elle recommandait au gouvernement des Etats-Unis de faire front commun avec la Grande-Bretagne et de formuler des représentations énergiques. Mais l'Angleterre attend encore avant de se prononcer sur le sujet et sir John Simon, répondant cet après-midi à un député des Communes, a déclaré qu'il n'était pas en mesure de préciser dès aujourd'hui les intentions du Japon. — (Journal.)

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 13 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT of April 26 1934

AU FIL DES HEURES

La menace japonaise ^{Intran} 4/26

Les Japonais viennent de faire connaître qu'ils ne toléreraient pas l'ingérence des puissances étrangères dans les affaires de Chine. Cette communication est peut-être la première flamme de l'incendie qui couve en Extrême-Orient. On s'en émeut à Londres, où sir John Simon fera peut-être aujourd'hui une déclaration. On s'en émeut aussi à Washington, et le gouvernement de M. Roosevelt va demander des précisions à Tokio.

La politique japonaise, nos lecteurs la connaissent, car ils n'ont pas oublié les articles limpides que notre collaboratrice Titayna écrivit récemment pour eux. Ils savent que le Japon étouffe dans ses îles et a besoin, pour vivre à l'aise, d'étendre son Empire. Ils savent aussi que, produisant toutes choses à un prix d'une faiblesse invraisemblable, il met en péril tout le commerce occidental. En même temps, il a augmenté formidablement son appareil militaire et il entend continuer. Il va notamment doubler en deux ans son armée aérienne. Les fonds nécessaires ont été votés pour la construction de 500 nouveaux avions. Ce n'est pas tout. Il réclame la parité navale avec l'Angleterre, et si on ne la lui accorde pas, on peut être certain qu'il se l'adjugera lui-même.

L'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis supporteront-ils ce développement de la puissance japonaise? Se laisseront-ils sans mot dire chasser du marché chinois? Verront-ils avec indifférence se constituer en Orient un immense Empire jaune qui, avant un quart de siècle, dicterait sa loi au monde? On ne le croit guère. Nous allons entrer dans la période des représentations diplomatiques, encore courtoises et pacifiques. Mais il n'est pas difficile d'en prévoir la conclusion finale. Le Japon est inébranlablement résolu à s'étendre et à régner. Il discutera aussi longtemps qu'on voudra, avec la décevante politesse orientale. Mais il ne cédera pas. Il résistera aux sommations des puissances comme il a résisté naguère à celles de la Société des Nations. Et nous verrons la guerre dans le Pacifique. Guerre sans doute longue et acharnée, dont l'approche préoccupe en ce moment toutes les chancelleries d'Europe.

GALLUS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 11 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from FIGARO of April 26 1934

Figaro 4/26

L'EXPANSION JAPONAISE EN CHINE

La décision prise par le gouvernement japonais de s'opposer à toute intervention politique des puissances étrangères en Chine a suscité une vive émotion à Londres et à Washington.

Sir Francis Lindsay, ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Tokio, a fait, hier, une démarche auprès de M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, à qui il a communiqué les vues de sir John Simon sur le récent exposé de la politique nipponne en Extrême-Orient. L'entretien a duré 40 minutes. Aucun communiqué n'a été publié.

Interrogé à la Chambre des communes, au sujet de la démarche de sir Francis Lindsay à Tokio, sir John Simon a répondu qu'il lui était impossible de faire une déclaration quelconque avant d'avoir reçu la réponse du ministre japonais des affaires étrangères.

La prompt réaction du gouvernement britannique a un peu déconcerté le gouvernement américain. M. Cordell Hull a consulté tout d'abord sir Ronald Lindsay, ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Washington. M. Philipps, sous-secrétaire au Département d'Etat, a eu une longue conversation avec M. Roosevelt. Il a ensuite convoqué M. Saito, ambassadeur du Japon, qui, à la suite de cette entrevue, a déclaré à la presse que son gouvernement n'avait pas l'intention « de fermer entièrement la porte ouverte sur la Chine », le traité des neuf puissances stipulant clairement l'égalité complète des signataires sur le plan commercial. M. Saito a laissé entendre que, si des crédits étaient consentis à la Chine sans le consentement du Japon, les bailleurs de fonds pourraient très bien courir le risque de ne pas revoir leur argent.

Malgré la circonspection dont on fait preuve au département d'Etat, il est peu vraisemblable que les Etats-Unis ne voient pas, dans la politique du Japon, une tentative de mainmise sur la Chine et ne se prononcent pas contre cette politique.

Une dépêche de Changhaï aux *Central News* annonçait, dans la soirée d'hier, que le gouvernement japonais avait fait parvenir au gouvernement de Nankin une communication, déclarant :

1° Le Japon n'a nullement l'intention de porter atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine ;

2° Le Japon, respectant les traités, espère que la Chine, en vertu du principe de la porte ouverte, accordera des facilités égales à toutes les puissances en matière économique ;

3° Le Japon s'opposera à toute action concertée des puissances pouvant troubler l'ordre et la paix en Extrême-Orient, pour le maintien desquels il se considère solidaire de la Chine.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 15 to Special Report No. W.D. 100 of May 7 1934
 from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOUR of April 26 1934

Jour 4/26

LE DÉSARMEMENT EUROPÉEN

Et la bataille pour la Chine

La temporisation que met le cabinet de Londres à agir et à réagir dans les affaires européennes, ses contradictions en matière de désarmement, les concessions qu'il fait à l'Allemagne, sa répugnance à la solution saine d'une entente défensive avec la France, tout cela donne une impression de faiblesse et d'aveuglement.

Cette impression n'est pas entièrement juste. Les Iles Britanniques ne sont qu'une province dans un empire fédératif mondial et quand, sûrs d'avoir raison, nous criions à nos amis de Londres que leur frontière militaire est sur le Rhin, ils nous répondent qu'ils le savent bien, mais qu'ils ont une autre frontière plus immédiatement menacée du côté de Singapour.

Ou plutôt ils ne nous répondent rien, laissant leurs actes parler pour eux. Au moment même où les entretiens Simon-Suvich aboutissent une fois de plus à la politique dite d'expectation, le Foreign Office engage contre le Japon, à propos de la Chine, une partie diplomatique où les notes (et quelles notes ! quelle fermeté !) se succèdent juste avec le délai requis pour la lecture et pour la rédaction. Les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes s'ébranlent moins vite et regardent avec curiosité cet emballement épistolaire des deux autres « principales puissances intéressées ».

En bref, le Japon, sous couleur de faire respecter en Chine le principe de non-intervention, voudrait interdire la collaboration financière et économique que le gouvernement de Nankin a déjà obtenu de plusieurs puissances blanches : tout cela, affirme-t-il, la Chine ne s'en sert que pour renforcer son armée.

La Grande-Bretagne riposte en maintenant ses droits commerciaux et il est piquant de voir nos amis qui, en Europe, voudraient bien jeter un grand filet sur les aviations trop audacieuses, soutenir là-bas que les avions qu'ils livrent à Nankin ne menacent ni Jehol, ni Moukden, ni Tokio.

A tort ou à raison, Londres ne pense pas que l'Allemagne songe, dans les années qui viennent, à provoquer une guerre européenne. En lui donnant satisfaction en matière d'honneur, d'égalité, au besoin de canons, on peut même peut-être allonger un peu ce répit. Cela durera ce que cela durera. Après, il sera temps d'aviser. Et, en attendant, on aura pu donner au front d'Extrême-Orient l'attention et les efforts qu'il exige.

Malgré notre Indochine, nous ne sommes pas, « mondiaux », à ce point. Et quand nous voyons l'Angleterre rétive aux évidences européennes, nous nous impatientons, comme ces généraux auxquels, pendant la guerre, on refusait des renforts urgents parce que, à cent ou deux cents kilomètres, une bataille plus sévère allait s'engager.

Georges MARCEY.

Encl. 16 to Special Report No. W.D. 1467 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS of April 26 1934

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LE JAPON ET LA CHINE

Temps 4/26
Le gouvernement de Tokio vient de confirmer officiellement l'avertissement donné il y a quelques jours par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais au sujet d'une action collective ou particulière des puissances en Chine. Parce qu'aucune démarche par la voie diplomatique n'avait eu lieu, et qu'il semblait pour le moins étrange que le cabinet japonais pût prendre une attitude si nouvelle et si catégorique sans en discuter au préalable avec les puissances particulièrement intéressées à la situation en Extrême-Orient, on supposait, dans certains milieux internationaux, qu'il ne s'agissait là que d'une initiative dont le gouvernement impérial ne prenait pas officiellement la responsabilité et qui, de ce fait, n'avait pas la portée qu'on voulait lui attribuer. Or, voici que le cabinet de Tokio, réuni en conseil, vient de confirmer les déclarations faites le 18 avril par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères et qui, on le sait, ont provoqué un assez vif émoi à Washington, à Londres et, naturellement, à Nankin. Le gouvernement chinois a élevé une protestation contre les prétentions du Japon de s'arroger le droit de contrôler les relations de la Chine avec les autres puissances. Répondant à des questions qui lui étaient posées à la Chambre des communes par des députés des trois partis, Sir John Simon annonça qu'étant donné le caractère de la déclaration japonaise il avait cru nécessaire de demander des éclaircissements au cabinet de Tokio. Le communiqué publié hier par le gouvernement japonais constitue de toute évidence une première réponse indirecte à la note envoyée à ce sujet par Londres.

La déclaration du 18 avril constatait, en somme, que toute action collective des puissances pour apporter une aide financière ou technique à la Chine pouvant avoir des conséquences politiques entraînant des complications, la délimitation de zones d'influence, voire le contrôle international ou la division de la Chine, le Japon, soucieux de son rôle, qui est de s'opposer à toute action de nature à compromettre la paix en Extrême-Orient, ne ferait pourtant pas d'objections à des règlements financiers ou commerciaux ne portant pas préjudice à la paix. Mais le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères crut devoir préciser dans son commentaire de cette déclaration que le Japon, en raison de sa position spéciale, est le principal juge pour estimer si une mesure prise par la Chine ou par une puissance étrangère est dangereuse ou non pour la paix, et que chaque fois qu'il croira devoir protester il le fera par des « mesures positives ». Or cela n'avait aucune signification, ou cela voulait dire que le Japon s'instituait le protecteur de la Chine et proclamait à son profit une véritable doctrine de Monroe pour cette partie du continent asiatique. En présence de l'émotion provoquée par cette déclaration, on s'est efforcé à Tokio d'expliquer qu'on ne songeait nullement à porter atteinte au principe de la porte ouverte; mais ces mises au point n'ont en rien modifié le fond des choses, ce qui constitue l'essentiel du problème ainsi posé.

Le communiqué que vient de publier le gouvernement japonais souligne qu'il n'y a dans tout cela qu'un développement de la politique que le ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Hirota, exposa le 23 mars dernier à la Diète, politique qui n'est pas en opposition avec le principe de la porte ouverte ni en contradiction avec le principe de l'intégrité territoriale de

la Chine. Il précise que le Japon n'entend pas faire d'objection à tout appui dénué de caractère politique que les puissances voudront assurer à la Chine pour des questions purement financières et commerciales, mais qu'il formule l'objection la plus expresse à tout appui financier ou technique qui aurait une signification politique. « Le Japon ne peut admettre sans protester, est-il dit, l'importation d'armes militaires et d'armes étrangères en Chine, car ces transactions contribueront, un jour ou l'autre, à troubler la paix et l'unité de la Chine. » Pour formuler cette objection de principe, le Japon fait état de sa position spéciale, de ses responsabilités en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. En réalité, il ne veut pas que l'aide aux Chinois permette à ceux-ci de s'armer, soit les uns contre les autres, soit contre une autre puissance, qui ne pourrait guère être que l'empire du Soleil-Levant. Tokio veut contrôler l'armement de la Chine, lequel peut constituer une grave menace pour le Japon, et pour exercer efficacement ce contrôle il réclame un droit de regard sur toutes les négociations du gouvernement chinois avec les autres puissances. Cela n'équivaut peut-être pas à l'établissement d'un véritable protectorat, mais les Américains, qui suivent de très près l'évolution de la situation en Extrême-Orient, soutiennent que par le contrôle des relations de la Chine avec les autres pays les Japonais auraient, en fait, la direction de la politique extérieure de la République chinoise, et qu'ils devraient être consultés même pour les mesures d'ordre intérieur que prendrait le gouvernement de Nankin.

Il ne semble pas, dans ces conditions, que le communiqué publié à l'issue du conseil de cabinet tenu avant-hier à Tokio soit de nature à modifier sensiblement l'impression produite par la première déclaration nipponne et par le commentaire qu'en fit le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères. Il y a surtout l'affirmation que seul le Japon est juge d'estimer si des négociations de la Chine avec les autres puissances sont dangereuses ou non pour la paix, et qu'au besoin les protestations de l'empire du Soleil-Levant prendront la forme de « mesures positives », il est vrai « dans la limite des traités ». Or, c'est précisément la question de la limite des traités

qu'on pose à Londres, où l'on se préoccupe de savoir comment cette attitude du gouvernement de Tokio peut se concilier avec les traités et accords existants, alors que le Japon prétend s'arroger un droit de discrimination entre les diverses transactions financières et économiques des puissances avec la Chine. Les Anglais voudraient qu'avant toute discussion le gouvernement de Tokio définisse sa position juridique à l'égard du traité des neuf puissances de 1922, lequel engage formellement ses signataires en ce qui concerne le maintien de la porte ouverte et de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine. L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Tokio a eu, hier, un long entretien avec le ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Hirota, entretien à l'issue duquel aucune communication n'a été faite à la presse. On peut en conclure que le gouvernement britannique n'entend agir qu'avec prudence, et qu'avant de se concerter avec Washington sur une attitude commune à adopter éventuellement, comme le réclament certains milieux anglais, il veut s'informer exactement des intentions du Japon et de la limite qu'il entend fixer à son action en Chine et à son rôle de gardien de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

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Encl. 17 to Special Report No. W.D. 1005 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE of April 27 1934

A L'EXTERIEUR

Les ambitions japonaises et la démarche anglaise

L'approbation donnée à M. Hirota n'est pas pour calmer les appréhensions causées par la déclaration du ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon.

L'Amérique qui est bien la puissance la plus visée se renferme dans un silence ne permettant pas de présumer l'attitude qu'elle compte adopter.

Le département d'Etat à Washington s'est contenté jusqu'à présent de conférer avec les représentants des Etats signataires du traité des neuf puissances ou d'autres pays intéressés.

Il est vrai que dans le même temps la zone du canal de Panama était mise en état de guerre et que toute la flotte américaine se rendait dans l'Atlantique, comme si les hostilités avaient éclaté, en moins de quarante-sept heures, ce qui constitue, à l'actif de cette dernière, un joli record.

D'autre part, comme le note le *News Chronicle*, « les derniers événements en Extrême-Orient ont eu pour résultat immédiat de rapprocher un peu les diplomaties anglaise et américaine ».

« L'ultimatum japonais, écrit un autre journal anglais, le *Daily Express*, vise avant tout les Etats-Unis, principal fournisseur de la Chine. Il vise ensuite l'Empire britannique au commerce duquel il porterait une sérieuse atteinte. »

Le gouvernement britannique l'a ainsi compris et le Foreign Office a fait réclamer devant le malaise accru par la nouvelle de l'augmentation des prévisions budgétaires de l'aviation nipponne des explications à Tokio.

D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, sir Francis Lindley, s'est rendu auprès de M. Hirota avec lequel il s'est longuement entretenu et à qui il a remis une note demandant des précisions sur la politique japonaise en Chine.

Il semble s'être agi seulement d'une démarche verbale ne revêtant pas le caractère d'une protestation.

C'est ce que M. Hirota a laissé entendre après qu'elle eût été effectuée et le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon a même cru devoir en relever la forme toute amicale.

Il n'importe. Les intentions japonaises ne sont pas très claires ou plutôt elles ne le sont que trop à l'égard de la Chine.

Les représentants de la Chine en Europe et en Amérique ne sont pas les derniers à s'en plaindre.

Quant à l'U. R. S. S., elle s'est vainement efforcée jusqu'ici d'obtenir un règlement de la question des chemins de fer de l'Est chinois.

Pour sa session les délégués soviétiques à la conférence de Tokio réclamaient 250 millions de roubles contre 50 millions de yens qui leur étaient offerts sous prétexte que son exploitation avait perdu de sa valeur. A quoi ceux-ci avaient pu opposer qu'en 1933, malgré une situation troublée l'Est chinois avait donné un bénéfice net de 11.500.000 roubles or.

Aux dernières nouvelles, on annonçait que M. Hirota venait de recevoir au sujet de cette vente l'ambassadeur des Soviets Yourenév, un sûr indice que la politique japonaise ne se soucie pas de rencontrer à la fois les Etats-Unis et l'U. R. S. S. dans la réalisation de ses desseins à une plus ou moins longue échéance.

C'est la situation, que décèlent en Extrême-Orient les ambitions japonaises, qui inquiète les Anglais et qui les a amenés à vouloir être fixés avant toute autre action sur les intentions actuelles du Japon.

Louis GRESSE

Encl. B to Special Report No. A.D. 1007 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'INFORMATION of April 27 1934

L'INFORMATION DU 27 AVRIL 1934

L'impérialisme économique et politique du Japon

Les prétentions japonaises relatives à la Chine, venant après la mainmise sur la Mandchourie, semblent indiquer que l'impérialisme politique et territorial du Japon est plus dangereux que son impérialisme économique, en dépit du redressement de plus de moitié des exportations japonaises en deux ans.

La nécessité de l'expansion japonaise

L'introduction de la science moderne, qui permet d'accroître à la fois la population — en diminuant la mortalité surtout infantile — et la production — en améliorant le rendement du travail humain — explique largement le « phénomène japonais ». Il faut y ajouter cependant les croyances traditionnelles qui ont empêché, d'une part, que le « contrôle des naissances » annule les effets d'une meilleure hygiène générale et, d'autre part, que l'augmentation des loisirs ne compense trop largement l'amélioration du rendement. Il faut aussi se rappeler que l'émigration japonaise est limitée par les lois humaines et celles des climats.

La population japonaise est aujourd'hui de quelque 70 millions d'habitants contre 54 au début de la guerre. Elle avoisine 100 millions si on comprend la Corée, Formose et les autres possessions. Elle s'accroît, net, de près d'un million d'habitants par an.

La production nationale ne satisfait pas tous ses besoins. C'est moins le déficit agricole qui est en cause — quoique 18 0/0 seulement de la terre soit cultivable — que l'insuffisance des matières textiles : coton, laine et de produits minéraux de base : métaux, charbon, pétrole, outre les produits fabriqués des industries textile, chimique et mécanique. Pour ces derniers, le Japon cherche et parvient peu à peu à se suffire à lui-même ; ce sera fait cette année pour les engrais chimiques. Pour les matières premières, la tâche est plus difficile : il faut trouver des succédanés, découvrir ou établir des sources nouvelles. En attendant il faut continuer d'acheter et, pour acheter, exporter.

Le redressement de 1931-1933

De 1929 à 1931 les exportations japonaises ont fléchi de 2.306 à 1.147 millions de yen. Puis, après l'abandon de l'étalon d'or, un coup de fouet est donné au commerce extérieur : les exportations remontent à 1.410 millions de yens en 1932 et 1.861 en 1933, sans que les prix unitaires aient suivi la baisse du yen.

Ce dernier chiffre ne représente cependant que quelque 8 milliards de francs pour 70 millions d'habitants, soit un peu plus de 100 francs par tête, alors qu'en France ou en Allemagne le chiffre correspondant est d'environ 500 francs. Il ne constitue pas, par ailleurs, 5 0/0 du commerce mondial. L'émotion que provoque le progrès des exportations nipponnes vient de ce que :

1° L'exportation japonaise s'est redressée de 53 0/0 en deux ans, en pleine période de crise ; 2° ce redressement s'est concentré plus particulièrement sur certains produits (tissus, bonneterie, outillage électro-mécanique courant) et sur certains marchés (Asie, Afrique occidentale et méridionale outre l'Amérique centrale et l'Amérique du Sud) ; 3° les Japonais vendent à des prix auxquels la concurrence est impossible et qui étaient d'ailleurs indispensables pour forcer les barrières douanières étrangères et vaincre rapidement la routine et l'hostilité des acheteurs étrangers.

Les moyens de l'expansion

pourrait bien, lui-même, limiter l'expansion de ses exportations.

Il faut se rappeler, en effet, que la balance des comptes du pays — compte tenu des frets, commissions, remises d'émigrants, etc. — est en excédent. Même en 1931 ce sont uniquement des exportations massives de capitaux qui ont provoqué les rentrées d'or et la chute, sans doute délibérée, du yen.

Un accroissement systématique des exportations supérieur à ce qui est nécessaire par le paiement des importations conduirait donc le Japon, soit à accumuler de l'or, ce qui est sans profit, soit à devenir largement créancier de l'étranger, ce qui n'est pas sans risques. Il contribuerait aussi à indisposer plus encore le monde contre la politique internationale du Japon, alors que des procédés différents et plus sûrs d'expansion ne l'irriteraient peut-être pas davantage.

Ces considérations ne sont sans doute pas étrangères à la nouvelle loi japonaise destinée à limiter les exportations par le contrôle des quantités et des prix et qui prévoit pour faciliter ce contrôle la réunion obligatoire des exportateurs en associations, avec sanctions pénales contre les dissidents.

(Certains ont espéré que le Japon allait également limiter le dumping de change en rétablissant le yen à la parité actuelle. Mais il semble bien que son attitude dépendra de celle des Américains.)

Autarchie, impérialisme et militarisme

Même s'il limite ses ventes extérieures au niveau nécessaire pour le règlement des importations, la croissance de sa population et l'élévation du niveau de vie pourraient amener le Japon à accroître ses ventes en même temps que ses achats, n'étaient sa politique d'autarchie, qui tend à faire produire ou manufacturer dans le pays la plus grande partie de ce qu'il lui faut, et la politique impérialiste, qui tend à lui faire acquérir ou contrôler les territoires mêmes qui produisent des matières premières nécessaires tout en lui fournissant des débouchés.

C'est la politique impérialiste qui inspire l'étonnante déclaration que vient de faire le ministère des Affaires étrangères de Tokio, relativement au droit de contrôle que le Japon entendrait se réserver sur l'action économique et politique des puissances en Chine.

Que ces déclarations visent ou non des faits précis comme des projets de crédits américains à la Chine ou des tentatives d'organisation économique et militaire sous le contrôle de la S. D. N. — dont le Japon est sorti — elles semblent prouver que, contrairement à certains espoirs, les militaires qui ont provoqué la naissance et dirigé la mise en valeur du Mandchoukouo, conservent la direction de la politique extérieure. Ils accepteraient sans doute, pour la Chine, comme ils le font pour la Mandchourie, le concours des capitaux étrangers — mais sous le contrôle japonais.

Préparent-ils, par ces prétentions exorbitantes, la mainmise sur la Chine, première étape d'un « affranchissement » de l'Asie sous la direction japonaise ? Ou se contenteraient-ils d'une « doctrine de Monroe » asiatique excluant seulement la mainmise étrangère sur la Chine indé-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1° L'exportation japonaise s'est redressée de 53 0/0 en deux ans, en pleine période de crise; 2° ce redressement s'est concentré plus particulièrement sur certains produits (tissus, bonneterie, outillage électro-mécanique courant) et sur certains marchés (Asie, Afrique occidentale et méridionale outre l'Amérique centrale et l'Amérique du Sud); 3° les Japonais vendent à des prix auxquels la concurrence est impossible et qui étaient d'ailleurs indispensables pour forcer les barrières douanières étrangères et vaincre rapidement la routine et l'hostilité des acheteurs étrangers.

Les moyens de l'expansion- dumping et organisation

Les concurrents du Japon ont naturellement crié au « dumping ». Ils ont à la fois tort et raison.

Parle-t-on du dumping par vente à perte? Les Japonais répondent — ce qui est vrai — que les entreprises exportatrices donnent des dividendes.

S'agit-il alors du « dumping social » des bas salaires, qui sont pour une journée de neuf heures, sans repos hebdomadaire, de l'ordre d'un yen et demi, soit, moins de 8 francs par jour? Mais les Japonais répondent que le standard de vie du personnel des grandes industries exportatrices est — compte tenu des avantages en nature fournis par le patron — supérieur à celui des travailleurs de l'agriculture et des anciens métiers et qu'il correspond aux goûts et aux besoins de l'ouvrier japonais.

Les Japonais ajoutent, au surplus, que leurs progrès sont largement dus à l'excellence de leur outillage, à la « rationalisation » et à la concentration de l'industrie — possédée en majeure partie par les deux grands trusts Mitsui et Mitsubishi et contrôlée par l'Etat, qui impose au besoin les fusions nécessaires.

Pratiquement, d'ailleurs, il suffit de considérer le fait que les conditions de production à bas prix du Japon sont inégalables en Occident — doublé par le fait, non moins décisif, que la dépréciation monétaire au Japon atteint plus de 60 0/0 par rapport à celle des pays à monnaie-or et près de 30 0/0 par rapport au bloc dollar-sterling sans hausse intérieure appréciable du coût de la vie.

Comment arrêter

l'expansion économique japonaise

Les défenses individuelles sont insuffisantes, d'une part, parce que le protectionnisme n'est possible que pour le marché national des pays concurrents du Japon, et non pour les marchés tiers, d'autre part parce que les pays concurrents mais fournisseurs de matières premières ou d'objets fabriqués au Japon craignent d'entrer en conflit commercial avec ce gros client. Tel est le cas de l'Inde, qui lui vend du coton, et de l'Australie, qui lui vend de la laine.

Par ailleurs, les tentatives d'accord concerté de défense des pays à haut standard de vie contre les produits japonais, n'ont jusqu'ici abouti à rien.

Cependant la logique et les faits permettent peut-être de penser que le Japon

restera sous le contrôle de la S. D. N. — dont le Japon est sorti — elles semblent prouver que, contrairement à certains espoirs, les militaires qui ont provoqué la naissance et dirigent la mise en valeur du Mandchoukouo, conservent la direction de la politique extérieure. Ils accepteraient sans doute, pour la Chine, comme ils le font pour la Mandchourie, le concours des capitaux étrangers — mais sous le contrôle japonais.

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Le problème financier

Certains observateurs font valoir toutefois que le Japon n'a pas encore les moyens financiers et industriels nécessaires pour réaliser seul la mise en valeur de la Chine.

Déjà les combats de Shanghai, la guerre de Mandchourie, puis la mise en valeur de ce pays lui ont imposé un effort budgétaire considérable. Cet effort s'est ajouté aux dépenses de secours et de « valorisation » faites en faveur des agriculteurs — et notamment des sériciculteurs (lesquels, auparavant, avaient été, au contraire, les principaux pourvoyeurs du budget, l'Etat favorisant l'industrie nouvelle à leur détriment). Il en résulte que le budget qui avait été réduit de 2 milliards de yens en 1928-1929 à 1 milliard et demi en 1931-32, a été reporté à quelque 2 milliards en 1932-33 et 2 milliards 200 millions l'année suivante. Une légère réduction apparaît dans les prévisions pour 1934-1935, mais il est vraisemblable qu'elle restera théorique. Les dépenses militaires avouées représentent à peu près le quart du budget total et vont s'accroître largement.

Pour faire face à cet accroissement de dépenses et à la diminution de capacité fiscale de l'agriculture, le gouvernement a eu recours à l'emprunt: 1 milliard de yens environ en 1933-34 contre quelque 700 millions l'année précédente. La dette publique intérieure dépasse 6 milliards de yens contre 2 milliards et demi il y a dix ans. Les banques ont, jusqu'ici, absorbé les émissions du Trésor dont le placement a été facilité par une politique officielle d'argent bon marché et des opérations « open market » de la Banque Nationale. Il n'a pas été nécessaire de recourir à l'inflation fiduciaire pour besoin du Trésor. La baisse du yen n'ayant été accompagnée d'aucune hausse appréciable des prix, les besoins monétaires du commerce n'ont pas, de leur côté, augmenté.

Cependant, des signes de lassitude ont été donnés récemment par le marché des fonds du Trésor. Le ministre des Finances a aussitôt déclaré qu'il obligerait au besoin, les banques à les souscrire.

CONCLUSION

Mais, quelque besoin que le Japon puisse éventuellement avoir du concours des capitaux étrangers, il paraît bien que, s'il nourrit réellement des visées impérialistes, il ne se laissera pas arrêter par de simples obstacles financiers.

H. S.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 10 to Special Report No. W.D. 404 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS of April 27 1934

LE JAPON ET LA PAIX EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Les griefs du Japon

Notre correspondant particulier de Londres nous téléphone jeudi matin 26 avril :

La déclaration japonaise de principe relative à l'action des puissances en Extrême-Orient continue de préoccuper les milieux parlementaires et l'opinion publique. Une nouvelle question a été posée hier à ce sujet à Sir John Simon qui a répondu qu'il n'avait pas encore reçu de communication de l'ambassadeur britannique à Tokio et qu'il n'était pas en mesure par conséquent de faire une déclaration nouvelle. Mais l'on a appris que Sir Francis Lindley, ambassadeur britannique à Tokio, avait eu hier un entretien d'une heure avec M. Hirota, ministre japonais des affaires étrangères. Ce dernier, d'après le correspondant du *Times* à Tokio, a affirmé que le Japon reste fidèle au principe du traité des neuf puissances et à l'égalité des droits des puissances pour leur activité en Chine (principe de la porte ouverte). Le ministre japonais aurait assuré à son interlocuteur qu'il n'est pas question de restreindre l'influence de la Grande-Bretagne en Chine et que l'amitié des deux pays ne sera pas compromise par des conflits d'intérêts.

M. Hirota, suivant ce même correspondant, n'a pas parlé de vente d'armes et de munitions à la Chine ni d'aucune autre action étrangère dans ce pays, excepté de certains projets d'emprunts internationaux pour lesquels le gouvernement de Tokio n'a pas été consulté, et qui lui ont paru contraires au consortium des puissances conclu en 1920. Ces projets d'emprunts avaient fait l'objet de rapports émanant de Shanghai au début d'avril et la déclaration à la presse japonaise a eu seulement pour but de répondre aux questions des journalistes japonais. Il semble, d'autre part, que les inquiétudes du Japon aient été excitées non seulement par les rumeurs relatives à d'importants emprunts internationaux pour la Chine, mais encore par d'autres formes d'une activité plus grande des nations étrangères en Chine, en particulier par l'envoi de conseillers militaires dans ce pays et par le développement d'entreprises d'aviation.

Sir John Simon a indiqué, hier, à la Chambre des communes qu'il devait maintenir une attitude d'attente et qu'il ferait une déclaration dès qu'il aurait reçu le rapport de Sir Francis Lindley.

L'opinion bien informée en Angleterre paraît tendre aujourd'hui à conseiller la prudence et la réflexion. Les explications fournies à Washington par M. Saito, ambassadeur du Japon, et celles de M. Hirota à Tokio donnent, en effet, à penser que les inquiétudes du Japon ne sont pas dénuées de fondement.

L'attitude des Etats-Unis

On télégraphie de Tokio :

L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Tokio a eu une entrevue avec M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon.

D'autre part, on télégraphie de Washington :

M. Roosevelt et M. Hull vont étudier la situation créée par l'attitude prise par le gouvernement japonais à l'égard du problème chinois. On ignore si l'opinion du gouvernement des Etats-Unis sur ce problème sera rendue publique après cette conférence.

Un autre télégramme de Washington dit :

Le département d'Etat a eu de nombreux entretiens avec les diplomates des pays signataires du traité des neuf puissances et avec ceux d'autres pays intéressés. M. de Laboulaye, ambassadeur de France, M. Rosso, ambassadeur d'Italie, M. Sze, ministre de Chine, figurent parmi ceux qui se sont rendus au département d'Etat pour conférer soit avec M. Hull, soit avec le sous-secrétaire d'Etat M. Phillips.

Communication du Japon à la Chine (?)

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Le Communisme chez les Jaunes

Le Jaune apparaît à la plupart des voyageurs comme le plus patient, le moins nerveux, le plus apte à la souffrance, le plus conservateur des hommes. Surtout le Chinois, car le Japonais serait fortement métissé de Malais.

La Chine a enduré beaucoup d'invasions brutales, elle a été la proie de vainqueurs féroces et pillards, subi la domination d'une longue série d'empereurs mandchous. Mais elle finit toujours par faire triompher sa mentalité et sa civilisation. Sa puissante vitalité luttait victorieusement contre tous les massacres, contre tous les fléaux aussis, et quels fléaux ! Des ères de famine ont souvent fait périr des millions d'hommes, de formidables inondations ont été presque aussi meurtrières.

Les Chinois souffrent d'une nutrition très insuffisante : ils ont faim depuis vingt siècles. Les faibles succombent, les résistants demeurent. Misérable sélection, sélection tout de même.

Les mêmes cultes, taoïsme et confucianisme, celui-ci surtout dans les hautes classes; le respect farouche des ancêtres; la crainte singulière, mais angoissante, de manquer de cercueil à l'heure de la mort.

Avec cela, très matérialistes, dit-on, trafiquants astucieux et habiles, jouisseurs effrénés quand ils sont riches autant que résignés à la férocité des vainqueurs quand ils sont pauvres.

Ce peuple, ou plutôt cette masse humaine mal coordonnée, se montre particulièrement perméable à la propagande bolcheviste, ce qui peut paraître singulier chez des gens aussi conservateurs. C'est plus naturel qu'on ne pense. Encore que mêlée de tyrannies atroces, leur civilisation est d'essence grégaire. Tout le monde sait qu'ils sont antimilitaristes. Le taoïsme est démocratique, les fonctionnaires étaient élus et indépendants du souverain.

Enfin, le Chinois s'avère éminemment propre aux ligues de toute sorte. Voyez les hordes de mendiants et les associations de braves.

Les brigands ne sont pas moins solidaires : à peu près chacun de nous a pu lire quelque livre où il est question de leurs exploits, des tortures qu'ils infligent à leurs victimes. A ceux qui leur payent tribut, ils accordent une protection efficace qui s'étend parfois sur de vastes districts.

Le bolchevisme a trouvé de nombreux adhérents dans la masse chinoise. Il a suscité des massacres formidables, des supplices à la chinoise, qui sont parmi les plus terribles. Des dizaines de millions d'hommes ont été convertis à la religion de Moscou.

Le programme comporte, naturellement, l'éviction de tous les propriétaires du sol, devenu domaine de la communauté, la confiscation des capitaux, la destruction de la famille, l'enrôlement des individus valides dans l'armée communiste, la suppression du mariage, l'exécution en masse des parasites : les malades, les vieux, les bonzes, etc.

Les nationalistes réussirent d'ailleurs à vaincre partiellement le communisme, ce qui donna lieu à de merveilleux massacres, mais la victoire est incertaine, la propagande continue.

Comme on sait, l'Annam connut la contagion bolcheviste, non seulement entraîné par la propagande moscovitaire, mais aussi par celle des étudiants et des soldats jaunes qui combattirent avec nous, ou travaillèrent dans nos usines, pendant la grande guerre. Les étudiants rapportèrent en Annam l'orgueil de la science et de la philosophie acquises dans nos écoles.

Outre l'esprit grégaire des habitants, la situation économique de l'Annam favorisa la révolte.

M. de Pouvoirville, spécialiste éminent des questions asiatiques, fait à ce sujet une remarque curieuse : l'amélioration de l'hygiène, en diminuant la mortalité infantile, aurait accru la population dans des proportions ruineuses pour les pauvres gens, annulant l'heureux effet produit par nos réformes économi-

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**LA DOCTRINE DE MONROE
ASIATIQUE**

Encl. 4/27

**La thèse japonaise
a été officiellement exposée
à l'ambassade d'Angleterre**

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 26 avril. — On a reçu à Londres, aujourd'hui, un rapport de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Tokio qui rend compte de son entrevue avec le ministre des affaires étrangères japonais. Ce dernier n'a modifié en rien sa première attitude au sujet de la Chine.

Dans les circonstances actuelles, on ne croit pas que Tokio estime nécessaire de répondre par écrit à la communication verbale anglaise.

L'ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Washington a eu, de son côté, une nouvelle conversation avec les départements d'Etat au sujet de l'attitude japonaise. Cependant, on affirme à Londres qu'on ne doit pas interpréter cette démarche comme témoignage du désir de l'Angleterre d'engager une action diplomatique concertée avec les autres signataires du pacte des Neuf puissances.

Par contre, il est indéniable que l'opinion publique, en Angleterre, commence à s'agacer des ambitions japonaises signalées avec arrogance. L'article officieux du *Times* est symptomatique: le grand journal anglais relève avec un mécontentement marqué que le Japon vient de choisir étrangement son moment pour annoncer son intention de doubler sa flotte aérienne. Il ajoute que les déclarations de M. Saïto semblent confirmer les soupçons d'après lesquels le Japon veut profiter des difficultés où se débattent l'Europe et l'Amérique, tout comme en 1915, il profita de la guerre européenne pour présenter ses fameuses vingt-et-une demandes qui, si elles avaient été acceptées, auraient fait de la Chine un véritable protectorat japonais.

Le *Times* rappelle sèchement au Japon que les intérêts des grandes puissances ne peuvent être traités à la légère; plus d'un tiers des navires qui entrent dans les ports chinois battent pavillon anglais. Hong-Kong est colonie britannique. A Shanghai, les intérêts britanniques ne le cèdent en importance qu'à ceux du Japon. Le commerce américain en Chine est considérable. La proximité de l'Indochine française ne doit pas être oubliée, pas plus que l'importance de la concession française de Shanghai et l'influence de la France en Chine.

Bref, le Japon a droit, peut-être, à une place particulière dans la conférence internationale qui discutera des affaires chinoises. Toutefois, il ne saurait prétendre à un monopole d'influence. Telle est, évidemment, l'attitude que le gouvernement britannique a enjoint à son ambassadeur à Tokio d'exposer au gouvernement japonais. — R. L.

Encl. 11 to Special Report No. W.D./1007 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LA DEPECHE of April 28 1934

IDÉES ET DOCTRINES

La Paix et l'Extrême-Orient

4/28
Dépêche
Par une innovation assez curieuse sur les pratiques traditionnelles de la diplomatie, le gouvernement japonais vient d'informer la presse du monde entier de la politique d'hégémonie qu'il entend suivre en Extrême-Orient, notamment à l'égard de la Chine.

Cette politique peut se résumer brièvement : Le Japon se considère comme chargé de maintenir la paix en Extrême-Orient, tout au moins dans cette partie du continent asiatique que borde le Pacifique, et de contrôler les relations de la Chine avec toutes les puissances. Sans doute proteste-t-il de sa volonté de maintenir le principe de la porte ouverte et de la liberté commerciale, mais il considère que les relations, soit individuelles, soit collectives des gouvernements étrangers avec la Chine n'ont eu que des buts égoïstes et des résultats anarchiques, et il annonce qu'il s'opposera désormais, par les moyens pratiques qui sont en son pouvoir, à la continuation de ces errements ainsi qu'à toutes tractations susceptibles de compromettre la paix.

On ne sait si l'on doit admirer davantage les formules enveloppées de ces prétentions ou l'audace d'une telle conception. Pour parler clair, il s'agit à la fois de l'affirmation d'une sorte de protectorat sur les peuples qui font partie de la République chinoise et qui dépassent 400 millions d'individus — et d'une nouvelle doctrine de Monroe relative à l'Asie du Pacifique. Il est naturel que le gouvernement de Nankin ait répliqué par une protestation officielle rappelant que la politique de paix du Japon est une politique d'impérialisme qui lui a déjà coûté la Mandchourie et le Jehol. Il est naturel également que le gouvernement américain ait envoyé une note réclamant des explications à Tokio, cependant qu'en Angleterre une certaine émotion s'est manifestée aux Communes et s'est traduite dans les questions posées au gouvernement.

Cette politique du Japon ne saurait cependant surprendre. Elle est la continuation logique et fatale de celle que les puissances européennes et la Société des Nations n'ont pas su empêcher, et l'on est tenté de reprendre ici le mot que Molière met dans la bouche du pauvre dupé : « Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin ! »

Ce sont les successives abdications des puissances membres du Conseil de la S. D. N. dans le conflit sino-japonais qui portent maintenant leurs fruits. A partir du moment où le gouvernement de Tokio a compris qu'on ne ferait aucune pression collective efficace pour l'empêcher de mettre la main sur la Mandchourie, il devait nécessairement répudier la solidarité internationale et rompre avec Genève pour profiter de la carence des cabinets de Londres, de Paris et de Washington.

Nous avons fait plusieurs fois remarquer à cette époque avec quelle habileté Tokio avait su profiter de l'impuissance et des difficultés des autres pays. C'est le même jeu qui

se heurtent dans le monde actuel. D'après l'une, il est réservé aux forts d'établir la paix par leur hégémonie en faisant triompher à la fois leurs intérêts et leur puissance dans les zones où ils sont capables de le faire. D'après l'autre, la paix doit être le résultat d'un accord collectif sur l'intérêt général et la formule du droit, accord librement débattu entre tous les intéressés, quelle que soit la disparité de leurs forces. La première conception fut celle de la féodalité dans les Etats et de la souveraineté hégémonique dans les relations internationales. La seconde est celle de l'état de Droit dans les nations, et de la Société des Nations dans les rapports entre Etats. On se doutait que les gouvernements qui ont abandonné délibérément Genève et sa politique étaient les partisans de la première conception, c'est-à-dire d'une régression vers les temps périmés où la force fondait le droit et garantissait la paix au moins d'une façon précaire. Le Japon vient d'en fournir la preuve.

Nous ne prétendons pas que la doctrine de force comme fondement du droit ait été dans les temps passés sans utilité et sans résultat. C'est elle qui était à la base de la paix romaine. Nous disons seulement que l'humanité semblait avoir franchi, à la suite de la grande guerre, une étape nouvelle qui constituait une étape de progrès. D'après les conceptions wilsoniennes, qui n'étaient qu'une expression de la doctrine démocratique, la force n'était plus appelée à fonder le droit, mais à défendre la règle de droit basée sur les déductions rationnelles tirées de l'intérêt général et de la nécessité sociale. Ce qu'il y a de déprimant et de désolant dans l'attitude de certaines grandes puissances, et en particulier du Japon, c'est que cet immense progrès de la civilisation humaine est désormais remis en question.

La doctrine de la force, comme fondement du droit est, en effet, extrêmement dangereuse. La paix romaine et partielle que le Japon entend pratiquer en Extrême-Orient ne peut être, en effet, qu'une paix précaire et momentanée, fondée sur un équilibre instable. Elle disparaîtra avec lui. Tokio reprend à son compte les expériences d'Alexandre, de César et de Napoléon. Peut-il raisonnablement espérer que l'immense Chine supportera indéfiniment son contrôle et que les difficultés qui assaillent l'Amérique, l'Angleterre et l'Europe n'auront point de fin ? Un jour viendra où l'oscillation des forces qui joue en sa faveur se retournera contre le Japon. Il n'aura alors d'autre moyen de maintenir son hégémonie que de recourir à la guerre ou de céder à la pression. Ce jour viendra certainement, comme il est venu pour toutes les puissances qui n'ont fondé leur empire que sur l'intérêt et l'orgueil.

En attendant, les cabinets de l'Europe balkanisée doivent tirer une leçon et un avertissement de la politique extrême-orientale. Si l'anar-

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IDEES ET DOCTRINES

La Paix et l'Extrême-Orient

Depêche
4/28
Par une innovation assez curieuse sur les pratiques traditionnelles de la diplomatie, le gouvernement japonais vient d'informer la presse du monde entier de la politique d'hégémonie qu'il entend suivre en Extrême-Orient, notamment à l'égard de la Chine.

Cette politique peut se résumer brièvement : Le Japon se considère comme chargé de maintenir la paix en Extrême-Orient, tout au moins dans cette partie du continent asiatique que borde le Pacifique, et de contrôler les relations de la Chine avec toutes les puissances. Sans doute proteste-t-il de sa volonté de maintenir le principe de la porte ouverte et de la liberté commerciale, mais il considère que les relations, soit individuelles, soit collectives des gouvernements étrangers avec la Chine n'ont eu que des buts égoïstes et des résultats anarchiques, et il annonce qu'il s'opposera désormais, par les moyens pratiques qui sont en son pouvoir, à la continuation de ces errements ainsi qu'à toutes tractations susceptibles de compromettre la paix.

On ne sait si l'on doit admirer davantage les formules enveloppées de ces prétentions ou l'audace d'une telle conception. Pour parler clair, il s'agit à la fois de l'affirmation d'une sorte de protectorat sur les peuples qui font partie de la République chinoise et qui dépassent 400 millions d'individus — et d'une nouvelle doctrine de Monroe relative à l'Asie du Pacifique. Il est naturel que le gouvernement de Nankin ait répliqué par une protestation officielle rappelant que la politique de paix du Japon est une politique d'impérialisme qui lui a déjà coûté la Mandchourie et le Jehol. Il est naturel également que le gouvernement américain ait envoyé une note réclamant des explications à Tokio, cependant qu'en Angleterre une certaine émotion s'est manifestée aux Communes et s'est traduite dans les questions posées au gouvernement.

Cette politique du Japon ne saurait cependant surprendre. Elle est la continuation logique et fatale de celle que les puissances européennes et la Société des Nations n'ont pas su empêcher, et l'on est tenté de reprendre ici le mot que Molière met dans la bouche du pauvre dupé : « Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin ! »

Ce sont les successives abdications des puissances membres du Conseil de la S. D. N. dans le conflit sino-japonais qui portent maintenant leurs fruits. A partir du moment où le gouvernement de Tokio a compris qu'on ne ferait aucune pression collective efficace pour l'empêcher de mettre la main sur la Mandchourie, il devait nécessairement répudier la solidarité internationale et rompre avec Genève pour profiter de la carence des cabinets de Londres, de Paris et de Washington.

Nous avons fait plusieurs fois remarquer à cette époque avec quelle habileté Tokio avait su profiter de l'impuissance et des difficultés des autres pays. C'est le même jeu qui continue.

Dans un article très documenté et significatif d'André Duboscq, le Temps signalait l'importance politique que revêt aujourd'hui la décision du gouvernement américain de reconnaître l'indépendance des Philippines et de transporter aux îles Hawaï la puissante base militaire et navale de Manille. C'est un repliement des Etats-Unis sur eux-mêmes, correspondant à la politique générale de récipiscence qu'ils suivent aujourd'hui en opposition à leur impérialisme de jadis. On sait que le gouvernement de Washington prépare également l'évacuation de Haïti après celle du Nicaragua. On ne saurait qu'approuver et admirer cette sagesse. Mais en ce qui concerne l'abandon éventuel des Phi-

tions inverses qui se heurtent dans le monde actuel. D'après l'une, il est réservé aux forts d'établir la paix par leur hégémonie en faisant triompher à la fois leurs intérêts et leur puissance dans les zones où ils sont capables de le faire. D'après l'autre, la paix doit être le résultat d'un accord collectif sur l'intérêt général et la formule du droit, accord librement débattu entre tous les intéressés, quelle que soit la disparité de leurs forces. La première conception fut celle de la féodalité dans les Etats et de la souveraineté hégémonique dans les relations internationales. La seconde est celle de l'état de Droit dans les nations, et de la Société des Nations dans les rapports entre Etats. On se doutait que les gouvernements qui ont abandonné délibérément Genève et sa politique étaient les partisans de la première conception, c'est-à-dire d'une régression vers les temps périmés où la force fondait le droit et garantissait la paix au moins d'une façon précaire. Le Japon vient d'en fournir la preuve.

Nous ne prétendons pas que la doctrine de force comme fondement du droit ait été dans les temps passés sans utilité et sans résultat. C'est elle qui était à la base de la paix romaine. Nous disons seulement que l'humanité semblait avoir franchi, à la suite de la grande guerre, une étape nouvelle qui constituait une étape de progrès. D'après les conceptions wilsoniennes, qui n'étaient qu'une expression de la doctrine démocratique, la force n'était plus appelée à fonder le droit, mais à défendre la règle de droit basée sur les déductions rationnelles tirées de l'intérêt général et de la nécessité sociale. Ce qu'il y a de déprimant et de désolant dans l'attitude de certaines grandes puissances, et en particulier du Japon, c'est que cet immense progrès de la civilisation humaine est désormais remis en question.

La doctrine de la force, comme fondement du droit est, en effet, extrêmement dangereuse. La paix romaine et partielle que le Japon entend pratiquer en Extrême-Orient ne peut être, en effet, qu'une paix précaire et momentanée, fondée sur un équilibre instable. Elle disparaîtra avec lui. Tokio reprend à son compte les expériences d'Alexandre, de César et de Napoléon. Peut-il raisonnablement espérer que l'immense Chine supportera indéfiniment son contrôle et que les difficultés qui assaillent l'Amérique, l'Angleterre et l'Europe n'auront point de fin ? Un jour viendra où l'oscillation des forces qui joue en sa faveur se retournera contre le Japon. Il n'aura alors d'autre moyen de maintenir son hégémonie que de recourir à la guerre ou de céder à la pression. Ce jour viendra certainement, comme il est venu pour toutes les puissances qui n'ont fondé leur empire que sur l'intérêt et l'orgueil.

En attendant, les cabinets de l'Europe balkanisée doivent tirer une leçon et un avertissement de la politique extrême-orientale. Si l'anarchie de l'Europe, comparable par beaucoup de points à celle de la Chine, persiste et s'étend, si la guerre civile endémique règne sur notre continent comme elle règne sur le continent asiatique, le jeu japonais pourra non seulement continuer mais s'amplifier. L'impérialisme de Tokio pourra déborder le Pacifique et le continent oriental, en asservir les populations et prétendre régler même les relations des Européens et des Américains entre eux. Le péril jaune pourra n'être plus une vaine imagination et notre civilisation occidentale se trouvera menacée par l'apprenti sorcier à qui nous en avons imprudemment révélé les secrets.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dans un article très documenté et significatif d'André Duboscq, le *Temps* signalait l'importance politique que revêt aujourd'hui la décision du gouvernement américain de reconnaître l'indépendance des Philippines et de transporter aux îles Hawaï la puissante base militaire et navale de Manille. C'est un repliement des Etats-Unis sur eux-mêmes, correspondant à la politique générale de récipiscence qu'ils suivent aujourd'hui en opposition à leur impérialisme de jadis. On sait que le gouvernement de Washington prépare également l'évacuation de Haïti après celle du Nicaragua. On ne saurait qu'approuver et admirer cette sagesse. Mais en ce qui concerne l'abandon éventuel des Philippines et le transfert de la base de Manille, il n'est pas douteux qu'il y a là, sur l'échiquier diplomatique, un recul vis-à-vis du Japon, et que celui-ci avance ses pions en partant de la grande île de Formose où il s'est solidement établi et fortifié. En même temps, nous apprenons que les négociations avec la Russie, au sujet de l'acquisition de l'Est asiatique chinois par le Japon, ont repris et qu'une entente est en voie de se réaliser. Là encore, Tokio marque un point et constate qu'à Moscou, comme à Washington, on semble contraint à lui céder du terrain.

Reste à savoir pourquoi, devant ces succès répétés, le gouvernement du mikado a éprouvé le besoin de se livrer à des déclarations solennelles et audacieuses qui ne peuvent, semble-t-il, que compromettre une situation qui grandit d'elle-même ?

On peut en chercher l'explication dans le fait que la Société des Nations, depuis plusieurs mois, s'emploie à fournir au gouvernement chinois une collaboration technique de nature à lui permettre de régénérer son administration et par là de remédier à l'anarchie matérielle qui est à la base de l'anarchie politique de la République. C'est au courant de mai que le Conseil de la S. D. N. doit prendre à ce sujet des résolutions importantes. Il est probable que le gouvernement de Tokio a entendu signifier qu'il s'opposerait à cette intervention concurrente de la S. D. N. pour autant tout au moins que cette intervention se ferait en dehors de lui. On peut hésiter sur le point de savoir si son intention est d'y opposer un veto formel, ou s'il essaiera de négocier par ce moyen une sorte de levée de l'interdit que la Société des Nations a jeté sur la reconnaissance du Mandchoukouo.

Quoi qu'il en soit, cette politique japonaise pose une question de principe essentielle en ce qui concerne l'organisation de la paix. Ce sont en réalité deux concep-

beaucoup de points à celle de la Chine, persiste et s'étend ; si la guerre civile endémique règne sur notre continent comme elle règne sur le continent asiatique, le jeu japonais pourra non seulement continuer mais s'amplifier. L'impérialisme de Tokio pourra déborder le Pacifique et le continent oriental, en asservir les populations et prétendre réglementer même les relations des Européens et des Américains entre eux. Le péril jaune pourra n'être plus une vaine imagination et notre civilisation occidentale se trouvera menacée par l'apprenti sorcier à qui nous en avons imprudemment révélé les secrets.

Georges SCELLE.

ENCLOSURE

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ENCLOSURE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. B to Special Report No. W.D. 1007 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE POPULAIRE of April 29 1934

Populaire

**La diplomatie
japonaise marque
un temps d'arrêt**

La réaction produite à Londres et à Washington par la déclaration du 17 avril, a obligé le gouvernement japonais à quelque prudence. Sans désavouer formellement la note communiquée par le bureau de presse du ministère des Affaires Etrangères, note qui s'opposait à toute aide collective des puissances à la Chine, le gouvernement japonais a cherché d'en atténuer les termes.

Les demandes d'explication de la part de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique l'ont amené à déclarer qu'il aurait respecté le principe de la porte ouverte et l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Chine. Londres et Washington se contenteront pour l'instant des déclarations de M. Hirota, même si elles ne leur inspirent qu'une confiance très limitée. Il ne faut pas oublier que pour la Mandchourie, le Japon avait déjà fait les mêmes déclarations, et l'on sait ce qu'il en est resté, du principe de la porte ouverte et de l'indépendance dans le territoire du Mandchou-Kuo.

Que fera le Japon ? Sans se heurter directement aux puissances, il essaiera d'atteindre ses buts par des pourparlers directs avec la Chine. Le Japon compte à Nankin des amis, et on sait que Tchang Kaï Chek ne lui est pas hostile, loin de là. La méthode des tractations directes a déjà parfaitement réussi au Japon, en Mandchourie et il voudrait bien l'appliquer aussi en Chine. Mais les intérêts anglais et américains qui sont engagés en Chine sont trop importants pour que le Japon puisse réaliser en Chine le même plan qu'en Mandchourie. Même s'il trouvait un autre empereur fantôme, le Japon n'arriverait à l'installer que par la guerre qui, cette fois, ne serait plus une simple promenade militaire, comme celle qui, commencée par l'attaque de Moudken, lui a donné le contrôle de toute la Mandchourie.

André LEROUX.

Encl. 1 to Special Report No. W.D. 147 of May 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ERE of April 29 1934

L'erreur japonaise

par Arturo LABRIOLA

Etc 4/29

La thèse nippone prend un double aspect. D'un côté, le Japon s'octroie le monopole de la défense de la « paix » en Extrême-Orient; de l'autre, il pose au défenseur de l'Asie contre la « conquête ». Que ces deux thèses présentent une contradiction, c'est l'évidence même. Mais ce n'est pas de cela que nous voulons nous occuper.

L'« ordre » en Extrême-Orient est un fait; et comme tous les faits il ne réalise aucun idéal. Il faut le prendre tel quel. Cinq siècles et demi après l'arrivée de Vasco de Gama aux Indes, cet ordre est tel que l'ont façonné la rencontre entre des peuples guerriers et des peuples non-guerriers, et les problèmes des arrangements de ces peuples guerriers entre eux. « L'histoire est tout le contraire de la vertu récompensée » disait Renan (*Histoire d'Israël*, 1887, I, p. 412). Se proposer de ne reconnaître que ce qui est « vertueux », c'est se proposer de ne reconnaître dans l'histoire la moindre chose.

Renan ajoute : « Les saints et les soldats représentent des côtés opposés du développement humain et font rarement ensemble bon ménage » (*Ibid.*, II, p. 404). Ici il y a toute l'histoire des rapports — en Asie — entre les gens du pays et les « Occidentaux »; et tout le secret des rapports entre Asiatiques et Européens. Naturellement, puisque le « saint » a pour fonction de se résigner, on peut comprendre quel fut l'« ordre » établi en Asie après l'arrivée de Vasco de Gama sur les côtes du Malabar en mai 1498.

Pour comprendre le reste, il ne faut pas oublier que l'héritage portugais et français en Asie fut recueilli par les Britanniques, qui, aux dires d'un des plus grands philosophes anglais, Buckle, avaient largement pratiqué le cannibalisme jusqu'au quatorzième siècle (*Hist. of civ. in England*, III, p. 17, note).

Cet « ordre » pourra-t-il être changé ? Ce n'est pas la question que j'entends traiter. Celle que je me pose est la suivante : si un changement doit arriver, ce sont les Japonais qui en pourront prendre l'initiative, les Japonais, c'est-à-dire les gens de la caste féodale qui les gouverne.

Le problème des rapports entre Asiatiques et Occidentaux consiste aujourd'hui — d'une manière très générale — dans la revendication par les élites culturelles asiatiques de la direction, médiate ou immédiate, des affaires de leurs pays. Cette revendication ne coïncide pas toujours avec celle de l'« indépendance », là où elle a été perdue. Il y a des graduations, qui dépendent dans une très large mesure de la sagesse et de l'humanité des gouvernements métropolitains. Dans l'Inde néerlandaise et dans l'Inde anglaise, la question de

Orient est celle qu'il a imposée à la Corée, au Kiao-Tchéou et maintenant à la Mandchourie. Les peuples asiatiques la craignent à un degré bien supérieur à la condition que leur ont faite les Européens, là où ceux-ci ont des colonies. Le Japon n'est entré dans l'histoire mondiale qu'à la phase de l'impérialisme capitaliste. Il ne peut donc offrir aux gens de son continent que soumission militaire et exploitation sans bornes. Une comparaison entre les salaires que l'on paie dans une « concession » européenne en Chine et les salaires imposés à l'ouvrier japonais — après la totale suppression des syndicats sous l'éternel prétexte du communisme — n'est pas de nature à encourager les classes pauvres de l'Extrême-Orient à favoriser les tendances japonaises...

Il s'ensuit que la prétention japonaise de représenter une espèce de doctrine de Monroe à l'usage des Asiatiques n'a pas la moindre probabilité d'inspirer de la confiance aux peuples d'Extrême-Orient. On peut comprendre qu'ils tournent les yeux vers la Russie soviétique. Il serait fantastique de supposer qu'ils soient disposés à prendre au sérieux les avances japonaises. Du reste, où y a-t-il un « Japon » maintenant ? Tout le monde sait que les vieux clans féodaux se sont transplantés dans l'armée et dans la marine, et que les états-majors, officialité de celles-ci, la cour et l'empereur dominant inflexiblement leurs sujets.

L'avenir du Japon sera, évidemment, celui que sa force et la faiblesse ou la sottise des autres aura voulu. Pour ce qui est de la sottise, l'attitude de l'Angleterre reste la plus étonnante énigme de cet ensemble. Mais il ne vaut pas la peine de compliquer les choses par des prétentions absurdes ou mensongères. Le Japon, c'est la guerre en Mandchourie et la conquête de la Chine. Pourquoi dire qu'il est l'« ordre » sur le Pacifique et la revendication de l'« indépendance », pour les peuples d'Asie ? A la difficulté des choses, pourquoi ajouter le mensonge des mots ?

Toute action du Japon en Chine n'a fait qu'aggraver la douloureuse anarchie de ce pays, qui pendant des milliers d'années avait connu l'ordre le plus exemplaire. Toute « concentration » des pays du Pacifique sous la main de fer de la caste féodale japonaise est la guerre en permanence. On voit bien, maintenant, si le rapport Tanaka était une fable ou une réalité ! Et tant pis pour ces diplomaties dont l'esprit de prévision consiste à ne voir les faits que lorsqu'ils sont épuisés.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Comment apprécier la politique du Japon en face de ces faits ?

Peut-il prétendre représenter la tendance asiatique des élites culturelles au *self-government* ?

La réponse n'est pas difficile. Le Japon est, peut-être, le seul des pays asiatiques qui n'ait jamais représenté une civilisation indépendante et autochtone. En face du miracle chinois ou du miracle hindou (peut-être les deux seules civilisations qu'on puisse ranger à côté de la grecque), il n'a jamais figuré comme un phénomène culturel ou comme un phénomène de progrès. Même en le comparant au phénomène malais duquel demeure comme un trait l'énorme diffusion territoriale (de Madagascar à la Mélanésie) il nous apparaît comme une manifestation inférieure.

C'est ce défaut d'un caractère particulier qui a permis aux Japonais de s'eupéaniser, dans la forme caricaturale américaine, si complètement.

L'indépendance « asiatique » que le Japon offre aux peuples de l'Extrême-

tion » des pays du Pacifique sous la main de fer de la caste féodale japonaise est la guerre en permanence. On voit bien, maintenant, si le rapport Tanaka était une fable ou une réalité ! Et tant pis pour ces diplomates dont l'esprit de prévision consiste à ne voir les faits que lorsqu'ils sont épuisés.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 25 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO of April 30 1934

Aujourd'hui, sir John Simon rappellera le Japon aux engagements de l'accord de Washington

Euro

4/30

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 29 avril. — La déclaration que sir John Simon doit faire demain aux Communes, au sujet de la politique japonaise en Extrême-Orient, est attendue avec un très vif intérêt. Il n'est pas sûr pourtant que le ministre soit en mesure de faire un exposé définitif.

Cependant, d'après de nombreux indices, il se confirme que le cabinet anglais, bien que désireux d'éviter une controverse désagréable avec le Japon, est décidé à lui rappeler les engagements souscrits lors du traité des Neuf puissances, signé à Washington le 6 février 1922 et dont les signataires s'engageaient dans l'article 4 « à ne pas profiter des événements de Chine pour y obtenir des droits ou des privilèges spéciaux ».

On n'a pas manqué, en effet, de constater à Londres que le gouvernement japonais s'était bien gardé de répudier les termes de la déclaration du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais, qui envisage « la position particulière du Japon dans ses relations avec la Chine » comme justifiant le fait que le Japon devait exercer le monopole du maintien de l'ordre en Asie.

Le gouvernement britannique fera donc savoir qu'il ne peut admettre la prétention du Japon à obtenir une situation particulière par rapport à la Chine.

Par ailleurs, le gouvernement anglais surveille étroitement la réaction du gouvernement de Washington. Ce dernier, en proie à de nombreuses difficultés, incline plutôt à abandonner l'initiative à l'Angleterre.

L'attitude de l'Australie

Ici, les événements d'Extrême-Orient sont interprétés à travers un double prisme, celui des Indes et celui des Dominions. Si le Japon était laissé libre de poursuivre sa poussée économique et politique en Chine, on fait remarquer à Londres, dans les milieux politiques, que son influence en Asie deviendrait telle que celle de l'Angleterre se trouverait évincée, et la réaction se ferait sentir immédiatement aux Indes et dans tout le Pacifique. L'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Canada lui-même ne manqueraient pas d'être sensibles à cette influence nipponne.

Et à vrai dire, déjà des indices graves se manifestent. C'est ainsi que l'on a été très sensible à Londres à l'attitude adoptée par l'Australie. Le Japon, depuis plusieurs mois, presse le gouvernement australien de lui envoyer un ministre et d'accepter également un ambassadeur. Bien plus, des banques australiennes ont profité déjà de la situation pour adresser à la métropole une sorte d'ultimatum: ou l'Angleterre achètera davantage sur les marchés australiens ou l'Australie se détournera vers le Japon, qui est déjà son meilleur client.

L'avertissement qui vient d'Australie est d'autant plus grave que lorsque les accords d'Ottawa vont se terminer, dans peu de temps, il lui faudra reviser tous ses rapports économiques avec ses Dominions.

La visite du roi de Siam

Enfin, on attribue une grande importance dans les milieux politiques anglais à la visite du roi du Siam. Elle n'est évidemment pas sans rapport avec le développement de la politique japonaise.

On assure, en effet, que le Japon a joué un rôle important dans les derniers mouvements révolutionnaires du Siam, et on lui attribue l'intention de provoquer des troubles dans ce pays, qui lui permettraient d'intervenir avec sa flotte et d'occuper l'isthme de Kra pour le fortifier et constituer là une base destinée à neutraliser celle de Singapour. — R. L.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 26 to Special Report No. W.D. 407 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO of May 1 1934

Sir John Simon se déclare

Emu satisfait 511

des explications du Japon

(De notre correspondant particulier)

Londres, 30 avril. — Sir John Simon a fait, ce soir, aux Communes, la déclaration si attendue relativement à la politique japonaise en Extrême-Orient. Il a donné communication des explications fournies par le ministre des affaires étrangères japonais, d'où il résulte que le gouvernement de Tokio met tout en œuvre pour calmer les inquiétudes provoquées en Angleterre par les discours récents.

Le gouvernement anglais est trop heureux d'accepter les protestations amicales et pacifiques de Tokio, ce qui lui évite de donner suite à l'incident.

Le 25 avril, le gouvernement anglais priait son ambassadeur à Tokio de réclamer des explications amicales au ministre des affaires étrangères et de lui rappeler que le principe des droits égaux en Chine était garanti explicitement par le traité du 9 février 1922, dont le Japon est signataire. Le gouvernement anglais a signifié qu'il entendait continuer à jouir en Chine de tous les droits exercés par les autres signataires. L'ambassadeur d'Angleterre fut chargé d'ajouter que l'inquiétude au sujet de la Chine exprimée dans la déclaration officielle japonaise ne pouvait pas être provoquée par l'attitude de l'Angleterre, dont le seul souci reste d'éviter de troubler la paix et de maintenir l'intégrité de la Chine.

Le gouvernement anglais faisait dire enfin qu'il ne pouvait admettre le droit du Japon à décider seul si telle action particulière, comme l'octroi d'assistance technique ou financière, était de nature à menacer la paix ou l'intégrité de la Chine. Il rappelait également qu'en vertu des articles 1^{er} et 7 du traité de 1922, le Japon avait simplement le droit d'attirer l'attention des autres signataires sur les événements de Chine qui sembleraient menacer sa sécurité.

Le gouvernement japonais a répondu fort civilement que l'interprétation anglaise était exacte. Quant à lui, il observera les clauses du traité et continuera à attacher grande importance au maintien du principe de la porte ouverte en Chine. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que les nombreuses déclarations du chef du bureau de presse japonaise et des ambassadeurs japonais à Washington et à Berlin ainsi que du représentant japonais à Genève, ne s'accordent pas tout à fait avec cette déclaration du ministre des affaires étrangères.

On conclut à Londres que le sondage des Japonais a démontré que, pour l'instant, le traité des Neuf puissances ne peut être dénoncé sans danger pour le Japon, mais également que la Grande-Bretagne, aussi bien que les Etats-Unis, sont incapables de prendre des mesures actives pour le faire respecter. — R. L.

704

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 1 to Special Report No. W.D. / 407 of May 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of May 1 1934

SIR JOHN SIMON

expose aux Communes
l'attitude de l'Angleterre
dans les conflits du Pacifique
Journal — 5/1

LONDRES, 30 avril. — L'exposé de l'attitude du gouvernement britannique au regard de la situation sino-japonaise et de la récente déclaration du Japon était attendu aujourd'hui, à la Chambre des communes, avec le plus vif intérêt.

Depuis plusieurs jours, en effet, nombre de députés demandaient au secrétaire du Foreign Office de préciser les intentions du gouvernement et toujours sir John Simon remettait à plus tard sa réponse. Il avait seulement informé la Chambre qu'un rapport devait être rédigé par l'ambassadeur britannique à Tokio, après que celui-ci eût obtenu du ministre japonais des affaires étrangères tous les éclaircissements désirables sur les prétentions émises au regard des affaires de Chine.

M. Hirota avait remis les choses au point en modifiant quelques points de certaine déclaration officielle antérieure, apparemment lancée dans le but de sonder la réaction à l'étranger.

Muni du texte même « mis au point » et aussi du rapport rédigé par l'ambassadeur britannique après l'entrevue cordiale qu'il eut avec M. Hirota, sir John Simon se trouvait donc à même aujourd'hui de faire face à ses interlocuteurs de la Chambre des communes. Mais les câbles des agences et des correspondants de presse l'avaient devancé, en sorte que la déclaration attendue n'apporte rien de très nouveau. Elle confirme seulement que le point de vue du gouvernement britannique tend à considérer désormais l'incident comme clos.

Sir John Simon a insisté cependant sur le caractère tout amical de l'enquête dont fut chargé sir Francis Lindley auprès du ministre japonais.

— Le gouvernement britannique, a-t-il dit, ayant rappelé à Tokio que les deux pays avaient en Chine des droits égaux que conférait le traité des neuf puissances de 1922 et qu'il ne pouvait reconnaître aux Japonais des droits spéciaux ou discrétionnaires sur les affaires de Chine, il lui fut répondu explicitement, par l'intermédiaire de son représentant, que le Japon n'avait aucun désir de porter atteinte aux droits des co-signataires de ce traité de 1922, ni aucune intention d'empiéter sur les droits du privilège commun aux autres puissances.

M. Hirota donna aussi l'assurance que son pays ne songeait pas à outrepasser ses droits de co-signataire et qu'il entendait, au même titre que la Grande-Bretagne elle-même, respecter les obligations prévues au traité.

Le ministre japonais, dit en concluant sir John Simon, a souligné toute l'importance que le Japon attachait au maintien du principe de la porte ouverte, et il a formellement réaffirmé son acceptation de cette politique.

On voit que sir John Simon n'entend tenir aucun compte des déclarations diverses attribuées à des personnalités japonaises plus ou moins officieuses et qu'il s'en tient aux énoncés — les seuls officiels — de son collègue des affaires étrangères, le ministre japonais. — (Journal.)

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 28 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN of May 1 1934

Un débat aux Communes sur l'attitude du Japon ?? en Extrême-Orient

Londres, 30 avril (dép. Petit Parisien.)

Sir John Simon a fait aujourd'hui aux Communes la déclaration qui y était attendue avec intérêt au sujet de la politique du Japon en Chine. Après avoir rappelé qu'à la suite de la déclaration du porte-parole du ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais sir Francis Lindley, ambassadeur britannique à Tokio, avait été chargé de faire une démarche amicale auprès de M. Hirota, le secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office a ajouté :

— La communication britannique avait pour objet de rappeler que le principe de l'égalité des droits en Chine est garanti d'une façon explicite par le traité des neuf puissances de 1922, auquel le Japon est partie, et que le gouvernement britannique doit tout naturellement pouvoir continuer à jouir en Chine de tous les droits qui sont communs aux autres signataires.

Au cours de son entrevue avec M. Hirota, sir Francis Lindley a observé que l'anxiété exprimée par les déclarations japonaises au sujet de la Chine ne pouvait pas s'appliquer à la politique de la Grande-Bretagne.

L'ambassadeur britannique a eu toutefois soin d'ajouter que le gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne ne pouvait pas admettre les droits du Japon de décider seul si une action particulière, telle que par exemple celle qui prévoit une assistance technique ou financière à la Chine, contenait en substance le danger auquel il est fait allusion dans la déclaration japonaise.

Sir Francis Lindley a enfin rappelé que les articles 1 et 7 du traité des neuf reconnaissent au Japon le droit d'attirer l'attention de ses cosignataires sur toute action accomplie en Chine qu'il jugerait contraire à sa sécurité.

En réponse à l'ambassadeur britannique, M. Hirota a déclaré que les suppositions du gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet des intentions du gouvernement japonais étaient exactes. Il lui a donné l'assurance que le Japon observerait strictement les dispositions du traité des neuf puissances et que sa politique au sujet de ce traité coïncidait avec celle du gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Après ces explications, un député, M. Johnsons, a demandé au secrétaire du Foreign Office si l'ambassadeur britannique à Tokio avait sollicité certains éclaircissements sur les nombreuses déclarations faites par le porte-parole du ministre des Affaires étrangères japonais ou par les ambassadeurs du Japon à Washington et à Berlin ou par le représentant du Japon à Genève, déclarations, a souligné l'interpellateur, qui semblent en contradiction avec les assurances données par M. Hirota.

Sir John Simon s'est borné à répondre que les explications du ministre des Affaires étrangères japonais lui paraissent suffisamment claires.

Encl. 29 to Special Report No. W.D. 1406 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from FIGARO of May 1 1934

PREPARATIFS DE GUERRE EN ASIE ORIENTALE

Figaro — 511

Si l'on avait encore quelque doute sur la gravité de la situation dans le Pacifique et ses répercussions fatales sur la paix en Europe, il n'y aurait qu'à se tourner vers l'Angleterre et considérer ses décisions récentes au sujet d'un des grands points d'appui de son empire colonial ainsi que de sa maîtrise des mers, une base dont elle veut faire aujourd'hui un bastion de sa puissance, un réduit à toute épreuve. Il s'agit de Singapour, à la limite de deux océans : l'Indien et le Pacifique ; un grand port, un nœud de routes maritimes où de tous les points de l'horizon convergent paquebots, cargos ou croiseurs.

Singapour est, en effet, un véritable emporium commercial, mais non moins un centre stratégique de *primordiale* importance, puisqu'il se trouve à la croisée de tant de voies et constitue un point de ravitaillement unique en vivres et combustible. C'est de pareille base qu'en cas de danger les croiseurs anglais peuvent patrouiller les routes vers le nord, vers la Chine ; les routes vers l'est, vers l'Australie ; les routes vers l'ouest, vers la Birmanie et l'Inde. Ils couvrent, protègent ainsi les mouvements de toute une flotte éparpillée de cargos chargés de vivres et de matières premières à destination de l'Angleterre, flotte qui traverse, d'un bout de l'année à l'autre, l'Océan Pacifique comme l'Océan Indien. Naturellement, il faut à cette flotte une garde toujours prête ainsi que l'ont prouvé les raids des croiseurs allemands en 1914. Aujourd'hui, c'est la silhouette des croiseurs japonais qui se profile sur ces mers comme une menace latente.

L'Angleterre a donc d'immenses intérêts à sauvegarder, non seulement dans l'Inde, en Malaisie et dans ses Dominions du Pacifique, mais encore à Hong-Kong et dans l'immense Chine où ses comptoirs commerciaux sont pour elle de vitale importance. Or, géographiquement, quel est le centre d'action, celui d'attaque et de riposte de toute cette immense zone maritime et territoriale ? Singapour, sans aucun doute. L'Australie n'offre aucun port ayant la même valeur stratégique de rayonnement. Il y a bien dans la mer de Chine la base navale de Hong-Kong, mais elle se trouve en l'air, trop près de Formose qui peut devenir un centre très dangereux, et trop loin de l'Océan Indien (1.500 milles environ), et aussi de l'Australie.

Singapour, peu de temps après la guerre, fut donc considéré comme la base idéale, et un plan de travaux étendus, docks et fortifications, fut conçu et mis en œuvre dès 1923. Mais ces travaux ont été plusieurs fois interrompus, en particulier sous le gouvernement travailliste, qui se portait garant d'une paix définitive dans ce monde. Cependant, il a fallu s'éveiller à l'évidence, c'est-à-dire à une menace réelle de guerre dans le Pacifique, surtout depuis le jour où les Etats-Unis

ont reconnu les Soviets et fait un pacte avec eux, visant le Japon sans aucun doute. Or, en supposant même que l'Angleterre ne se laisse pas entraîner par ses Dominions du côté des Etats-Unis, à l'heure d'un conflit avec le Japon, il s'ensuivrait de tels troubles de l'ordre commercial, une telle entrave aux communications maritimes, que la flotte de croiseurs anglais devrait se concentrer dans les eaux de Singapour.

D'ailleurs, l'Angleterre est si peu sûre de pouvoir conserver la neutralité dans les années qui viennent, qu'aujourd'hui elle se hâte *fébrilement* de développer et d'armer la base de Singapour. En effet, en janvier dernier, un comité d'amiraux réunis dans ce port a reconnu urgent de précipiter les travaux de défense et d'outillage, en particulier ceux de la construction de deux vastes bassins de radoub : l'objectif principal est d'y pouvoir caréner les plus grands *battle-cruisers*, lesquels autrement ne trouveraient de bassin qu'à Malte.

On prévoit aussi l'aménagement de vingt aérodromes à répartir sur l'étendue de la péninsule malaise. Ce comité a même poussé la prévoyance jusqu'à convoquer le rajah de Sarawack (Bornéo) pour organiser la défense des puits de pétrole de son territoire.

L'Angleterre, toutefois, s'éveille un peu tard : elle s'est trop longtemps abandonnée au mirage du pacifisme ; elle reste même toujours gouvernée par un Macdonald. Elle risque donc de payer cher en Asie, comme en Europe, sa foi dans les ténors et grands comiques de la Société des Nations, si ignorants du monde vivant et de ses réactions. Nous ne parlerons toutefois que de l'Asie.

Pour être complètement équipée, la base de Singapour exige plusieurs années. Or, aux Etats-Unis, on se prépare pour un conflit prochain : l'entente avec Moscou en est une preuve, non moins que la pression faite, dès l'an dernier, sur l'Angleterre et même la France pour amener ces deux pays à faciliter, par leur flotte, un blocus du Japon.

Cependant, toute une presse — actionnée par qui ? — dénonce sans répit l'« impérialisme japonais », présenté comme le grand danger de l'heure, l'unique. Or, seul un Japon prêt à toute éventualité peut faire réfléchir les fauteurs de guerre et empêcher une mêlée qui serait un cataclysme pour l'humanité entière. Heureusement aussi, l'Amérique, pour agir dans les mers de Chine, manque de points d'appui suffisants aux Philippines : elle devrait, par suite, les chercher en Indochine française, et mieux, à Singapour, base plus sûre. Il y a bien les ports russes de Sibérie, mais ils seraient vite bloqués par le Japon.

Donc, à la France et à l'Angleterre de comprendre leur devoir, qui est de paix, à pareille heure de crise sociale et économique. Il y a aussi pour la France la menace du côté du Rhin ; qu'advient-il pour elle le jour où l'Angleterre *besognerait au loin* sur les côtes du Pacifique avec une partie importante de sa flotte et de son armée ?

Docteur A. Legendre.

Encl. 30 to Special Report No. W.D. 1661 of May 1 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS of May 2 1934

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LE JAPON ET LES PUISSANCES

Temps 5/2
Les déclarations faites hier à la Chambre des communes par Sir John Simon dissipent dans une certaine mesure le malaise créé par la déclaration du Japon au sujet des relations générales de la Chine avec les puissances intéressées aux affaires d'Extrême-Orient. L'attitude du gouvernement de Tokio a provoqué, on le sait, un vif émoi à Londres et à Washington, la prétention du Japon de contrôler, sous prétexte de sauvegarder la paix en sa qualité de puissance ayant une position spéciale dans cette partie du monde, même les accords financiers et économiques que la Chine viendrait à conclure avec les pays étrangers apparaissant aux Anglais et aux Américains comme une menace pour le principe de la porte ouverte. L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a été chargé de faire une démarche à Tokio pour demander des précisions sur les intentions du gouvernement nippon et, de son côté, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis a exposé dans une note à M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères de l'empire du Soleil-Levant, le point de vue du gouvernement de Washington.

La thèse américaine est que les relations des Etats-Unis et de la Chine sont basées sur les principes généralement admis du droit international et des traités en vigueur. Le gouvernement américain a, en ce qui concerne la Chine, certains droits et certaines obligations. Les traités unilatéraux et les traités plurilatéraux auxquels les Etats-Unis sont partie contractante ne peuvent être modifiés qu'avec le consentement de tous les signataires, aucune puissance ne pouvant agir de sa seule volonté à l'égard d'un Etat souverain là où sont en jeu des droits, des obligations et de légitimes intérêts d'autrui. C'est une doctrine conforme au droit; cependant on n'ignore pas que le Japon soutient volontiers que le principe fondamental de sa politique ne dérive pas des droits résultant des traités, mais de la position tout à fait spéciale de cette puissance pour le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient. En somme, à s'en tenir aux termes de la déclaration faite le mois dernier à Tokio, le Japon, en raison de son devoir de maintenir la paix, entend exercer un droit de regard sur les engagements de la Chine avec les autres puissances et prendre au besoin des « mesures positives » pour protester, s'il le juge nécessaire, contre toute aide financière, économique ou technique qui serait prêtée à la Chine et qui lui paraîtrait de nature à constituer un danger pour la paix. On ne pouvait qu'en déduire que le Japon s'instituait le protecteur de la Chine et proclamait en fait une véritable doctrine de Monroe pour cette partie de l'Asie, ce qui, on doit en convenir, serait difficile à concilier avec les accords en vigueur.

Des explications fournies hier par Sir John Simon à la Chambre des communes il ressort que la Grande-Bretagne a la même doctrine que les Etats-Unis en ce qui concerne les principes. Elle fait valoir que l'égalité des droits en Chine est explicitement garantie par le traité des neuf puissances de 1922, dont le Japon est signataire, et qu'elle entend continuer à bénéficier de ces droits communs, exception faite du cas où ces droits sont limités par des accords spéciaux admis et reconnus par les autres puissances intéressées. Sir Francis Lindley, ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Tokio, a donc reçu mission de faire connaître au gouvernement japonais que l'inquiétude, en ce qui concerne la Chine, exprimée par la déclaration nipponne ne pouvait viser l'Angleterre, puisque la politique de celle-

ci tend précisément à écarter toutes les menaces à la paix et à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine. Le gouvernement britannique ne saurait donc admettre le droit du Japon de décider seul si quelque action particulière, d'ordre financier ou technique, est de nature à créer une telle menace. Le traité des neuf puissances permet au Japon d'attirer l'attention des autres signataires sur toute action menée en Chine qui serait dangereuse pour la sécurité de celle-ci, mais rien de plus. En conclusion, l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a indiqué que son gouvernement présumait que la déclaration japonaise n'avait pas pour objet de faire obstacle aux droits des autres puissances ou de transgresser les obligations résultant pour le Japon des traités.

La réponse du gouvernement de Tokio, telle que l'a rapportée Sir John Simon, écarte toute interprétation qui serait de nature à compliquer les choses. En effet, non seulement M. Hirota a donné à Sir Francis Lindley l'assurance que le Japon observerait les clauses du traité des neuf puissances de 1922 et qu'il attachait la plus grande importance au maintien du régime de la porte ouverte en Chine, mais il a confirmé son adhésion formelle à cette politique. C'est ce qui a permis à Sir John Simon, applaudi par la Chambre des communes entière, de déclarer que cette réponse du Japon le satisfait pleinement, et que le gouvernement « laisserait les choses où elles en sont ». Qu'il y ait là un succès pour la diplomatie britannique, on ne saurait le contester. La Grande-Bretagne avait le devoir d'élever une protestation contre la doctrine nouvelle exposée dans la déclaration japonaise. La démarche était délicate à faire, et il est certain qu'on a su lui donner une forme habile en se bornant à rappeler les principes définis dans les traités au bas desquels se trouve la signature du Japon. On peut considérer que l'incident est clos et que la politique de

négociations pénibles avec Tokio est évité, du moins pour l'instant. Mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que le communiqué officieux du gouvernement japonais, aggravé par un commentaire très net du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères, subsiste. Il n'a été ni retiré ni désavoué officiellement jusqu'ici.

Le Times explique ce fait en disant que les récentes déclarations du porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères à Tokio et des ambassadeurs du Japon à Washington et à Berlin exprimaient bien ce qu'on pense dans les milieux officiels japonais, mais qu'elles ne constituaient pas une définition de la politique officielle du Japon. Si telle est la réalité, elle est moins rassurante pour l'avenir qu'on voudrait le faire supposer en laissant, suivant les paroles de Sir John Simon, « les choses où elles en sont ». Aussi le Times croit-il devoir ajouter que l'incident a pour résultat d'éclairer l'opinion internationale sur la tendance générale de la politique nipponne, et que la vive réaction provoquée à l'étranger a dû convaincre le cabinet de Tokio que ce qui a été supporté, en pratique, à contre-cœur, dans la Chine du Nord-Est ne sera pas toléré au Sud, où les intérêts des autres puissances seraient plus directement affectés. Les réactions des Japonais en présence de cet avertissement anglais seront intéressantes à constater, mais il n'est guère probable qu'avec les tendances qui prévalent actuellement dans les cercles dirigeants de Tokio l'orientation de la politique nipponne à l'égard de la Chine puisse en être sensiblement modifiée.

Encl. 31 to Special Report No. W.D. 11607 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of May 2 1934

**LES POSITIONS DES PUISSANCES
envers le problème du Pacifique**

L'Angleterre se montre
beaucoup plus prudente
que les Etats-Unis
à l'égard du Japon

Dès la publication de la déclaration japonaise du 17 avril, nous avons indiqué que ce document avait un caractère essentiellement défensif et que si, à certains égards, il prenait l'allure d'une doctrine de Monroe asiatique, c'était à la première manière de la doctrine qu'il se rattachait, celle par laquelle les Etats-Unis avaient prétendu sauvegarder l'indépendance des Etats américains.

Ce manifeste a été interprété par beaucoup comme contraire au fameux traité des neuf puissances, conclu à Washington en 1922 pour garantir l'intégrité de la Chine. Cela prouve que l'on connaît bien mal ce traité. Deux de ses articles reconnaissent formellement au Japon le droit d'attirer l'attention des autres signataires sur tout acte qui pourrait avoir un caractère inamical ou menacer l'intégrité chinoise. Les Japonais ont-ils fait autre chose ?

Ils ont tenu à donner un avertissement et un coup de sonde. Un avertissement : pourquoi ? Parce que, dès que l'opération de Mandchourie a été réglée, les Japonais ont travaillé activement à un rapprochement avec Nankin ; ils ont eu l'impression de se heurter à autre chose qu'à l'anarchie chinoise ou même à l'activité brouillonne de la Société des Nations. Un coup de sonde : pourquoi ? Pour prendre la mesure de la résistance américaine et surtout pour savoir jusqu'à quel point Londres subit l'entraînement de Washington.

Et voici que la réponse vient de Londres comme de Washington. Du reste, ce n'est pas par hasard que les deux manifestations sont simultanées. Les Anglais ont agi avec beaucoup de prudence. Ils ont demandé discrètement des explications à Tokio, et sir John Simon a attendu, pour exposer le cas à la Chambre, de pouvoir affirmer sa satisfaction. Il a reçu des assurances formelles concernant le maintien de la porte ouverte, le libre développement des affaires et le respect de l'intégrité de la Chine. Les Anglais font donc figure de conciliateurs.

Les Américains, au contraire, s'érigent en juges, et en juges sévères. Leur note, très sèche, ne se contente pas de protester contre la prétention d'une nation de donner des interprétations unilatérales des traités ; elle ne revendique pas seulement les droits et les intérêts des Etats-Unis ; elle invoque des devoirs envers la Chine. Cela ne veut rien dire si cela ne signifie pas aussi la protection. Les Chinois ne peuvent-ils donc échapper à la protection des Japonais qu'en tombant sous la tutelle des Américains ?

— SAINT-BRICE.

Encl. 32 to Special Report No. W.D./404 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of May 2 1934

Le Journal

2 -- 5 -- 34

NOUVELLES D

LES POSITIONS DES PUISSANCES envers le problème du Pacifique

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— SAINT-BRICE.

La note américaine

WASHINGTON, 1^{er} mai. — L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Tokio agissant d'après les instructions du département d'Etat, a rendu visite, hier, au ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon et lui a remis une lettre pour préciser la position des Etats-Unis à l'égard des droits et intérêts du Japon et des autres pays en Chine.

En voici les passages essentiels :

Les relations des Etats-Unis avec la Chine, tout comme nos relations avec les autres pays, sont régies par les principes généralement acceptés de droit international et par les dispositions des traités auxquels les Etats-Unis sont parties. Les Etats-Unis ont à l'égard de la Chine certains droits et certains devoirs. De plus, il se trouve qu'ils sont signataires simultanément avec la Chine ou avec le Japon ou avec les deux et avec d'autres puissances, de traités multilatéraux traitant des droits et des devoirs des nations en Extrême-Orient.

Les Etats-Unis sont également signataires d'un grand traité multilatéral auquel ont adhéré presque toutes les nations du monde.

Ces traités ne peuvent être légalement modifiés ou abrogés que par une procédure prescrite reconnue ou acceptée par les parties auxdits traités.

Dans les obligations et les relations internationales des Etats-Unis, le gouvernement américain s'efforce toujours de tenir un juste compte des droits et des légitimes intérêts des autres pays, et il s'attend à voir les autres gouvernements tenir un juste compte des droits et des légitimes intérêts des Etats-Unis. Selon l'opinion du peuple et du gouvernement américains, aucune nation n'a le droit de s'efforcer, sans le consentement des autres nations intéressées, de transformer sa propre volonté en loi, là où les droits et les légitimes intérêts des autres nations souveraines sont en jeu. Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'applique à poursuivre une politique de bon voisinage et continuera aussi bien pour sa part que d'accord avec les autres gouvernements, à s'appliquer à la réalisation pratique de cette politique. — (Havas.)

Réponse nipponne

TOKIO, 1^{er} mai. — En ce qui concerne la note des Etats-Unis, le service de presse du ministère de la guerre a déclaré au représentant de l'agence Havas :

Le communiqué officiel du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais, du 17 avril, définit clairement la politique japonaise vis-à-vis de la Chine. Le ministre de la guerre affirme que la politique fixée depuis longtemps restera absolument invariable et ne pourra être modifiée en aucune façon par les réactions des puissances étrangères. Les milieux militaires ont éprouvé de la satisfaction en constatant l'attitude de certains organes français qui ont compris les véritables intentions du Japon. Nous croyons que les autorités américaines finiront également par comprendre. — (Havas.)

Encl ²³ to Special Report No. W.D. ¹⁴⁰ of May ⁷ 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS of May 2 1934

LE JAPON ET LA PAIX EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Note des Etats-Unis au Japon

Le département d'Etat communique :

L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Tokio, agissant d'après les instructions du département d'Etat, a rendu visite au ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon. Il lui a remis une note dont voici les points essentiels :

Les récentes déclarations sur l'attitude du gouvernement japonais à l'égard des droits et intérêts du Japon et des autres pays en Chine sont venues de source si autorisée qu'il est impossible de les ignorer. Aussi, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis se voit-il obligé, avec la franchise qui a toujours caractérisé ses relations avec le gouvernement du Japon, d'affirmer derechef la position des Etats-Unis à l'égard des droits et intérêts en question.

Les relations des Etats-Unis avec la Chine, tout comme nos relations avec les autres pays, sont régies par les principes généralement acceptés de droit international et par les dispositions des traités auxquels les Etats-Unis sont partie. Les Etats-Unis ont, à l'égard de la Chine, certains droits et certains devoirs. De plus, il se trouve qu'ils sont signataires simultanément avec la Chine ou avec le Japon, ou avec les deux, et avec d'autres puissances, de traités plurilatéraux traitant des droits et des devoirs des nations en Extrême-Orient. Les Etats-Unis sont également signataires d'un grand traité plurilatéral auquel ont adhéré presque toutes les nations du monde.

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La réponse japonaise à la démarche anglaise

Notre correspondant particulier de Londres nous téléphone mardi matin 1^{er} mai :

La réponse de Sir John Simon, hier à la Chambre des communes, touchant la récente déclaration politique du Japon, a été d'accord avec ce que l'on avait prévu. Il a souligné cependant le caractère amical de la démarche dont Sir Francis Lindley avait été chargé à Tokio, mais il a fait entendre que la Grande-Bretagne a représenté avec force que les droits des puissances consacrés par le traité des neuf puissances de 1922 ne sauraient être mis en question.

L'Angleterre a maintenu avec une égale fermeté que le Japon ne saurait décider de façon unilatérale si telle ou telle initiative, comme par exemple une assistance matérielle ou financière, constitue un danger pour la paix et pour l'intégrité de la Chine.

Par ailleurs, le gouvernement anglais a dit qu'il se refuse à croire que le Japon a voulu insinuer une pareille chose. C'est ce que l'on avait généralement compris après l'exposé à la presse japonaise, le 17 avril, du porte-parole du ministère nippon des affaires étrangères.

Sir John Simon a rassuré la Chambre des communes en annonçant que la réponse japonaise formulée par M. Hirota avait confirmé la supposition du gouvernement de Londres, à savoir que le Japon ne songeait aucunement à enfreindre les droits des autres puissances en Chine et qu'il maintenait le principe de la « porte ouverte ».

« Le gouvernement anglais, conclut Sir John Simon, est résolu à aider dans toute la mesure possible l'esprit de coopération internationale dans le progrès de la Chine vers la paix et la prospérité et dans le maintien d'un esprit d'harmonie et de bonne volonté en Extrême-Orient. »

La protection du commerce japonais

On télégraphie de Tokio :

C'est le 1^{er} mai qu'entreront en vigueur les mesures votées par le Parlement en sa dernière session pour assurer la protection du commerce japonais.

Une note officielle explique que cette loi a été nécessitée par les tendances, de plus en plus gênantes pour la liberté des échanges, qui se manifestent dans de nombreux pays, en particulier dans tous ceux qui cherchent à supprimer les importations de produits étrangers par l'imposition de droits très élevés.

La nouvelle loi stipule que chaque fois que cela paraîtra nécessaire pour restaurer le commerce japonais ou le protéger contre certaines mesures prises par d'autres pays, le gouvernement japonais pourra, par voie d'ordonnance impériale et avec l'assentiment de la commission d'enquête des tarifs, imposer des droits additionnels sur certains articles spécifiés et pour un temps déterminé.

Temps 5/2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl 94 to Special Report No. W.D. 1407 of May 7 1934
 from the Embassy Paris
 Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE of May 2 1934

LE FAIT DU JOUR

LES PUISSANCES CONTRE LE JAPON

Republique SN

L'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis se sont enfin aperçu que le Japon était en train de les mettre à la porte de la Chine, et de s'installer en maître dans le Pacifique occidental.

L'Angleterre a fait une démarche à Tokio et les Etats-Unis ont envoyé une note. La démarche était courtoise et la note l'était aussi. On ne sait pas encore ce que le Japon répondra à la note, mais on sait déjà que M. Hirota a reçu fort gentiment l'ambassadeur du gouvernement britannique, et que sir John Simon se contente des explications qui ont été données à l'ambassadeur.

Bien entendu, M. Hirota, qui savait parfaitement ce qu'il faisait lorsqu'il jetait à l'opinion publique les quelques rudes vérités que toute l'opinion publique mondiale a commentées, s'est replié sur ses positions. En somme, il donne toutes les garanties possibles, mais verbales, et l'on peut être sûr qu'il ne modifiera pas sa politique d'un iota.

Déjà les milieux politiques chinois craignent que le Japon ne renforce la pression qu'il exerce dans la Chine du Nord. Qu'importe, après cela, que les journaux américains se félicitent du ton très ferme, paraît-il, de la note américaine ? Certains vont jusqu'à souligner que l'Amérique ne cédera pas, ne reconnaîtra pas le Mandchoukouo, continuera d'accorder des crédits à la Chine et de lui envoyer des armes, des munitions, des avions. Peut-être, en effet, mais le Japon s'en tirera en marchant sur Pékin.

D'ailleurs, le service de presse du ministère de la Guerre japonais a déclaré que la politique japonaise restera invariable et qu'elle ne pourra être modifiée en aucune façon par les réactions des puissances étrangères.

Méditons ces paroles. Elles viennent du ministère de la Guerre, c'est-à-dire du centre de commandement non pas seulement militaire, mais politique. Elles signifient que le Japon considère la Chine soit comme une colonie, soit comme une alliée possible, mais qu'il entend dans tous les cas constituer le tandem Japon-Chine, direction japonaise.

Est-ce que par hasard nous ne nous souviendrions plus de la politique de Bismarck à l'égard de l'Autriche ? Bismarck en 1866 battit l'Autriche, se garda de pousser jusqu'à Vienne, et, quelques années plus tard, il nouait l'alliance austro-allemande. A dater de ce jour, l'Autriche fut théoriquement l'alliée de l'Allemagne et les droits des deux peuples s'équilibraient. Mais lors de la Conférence d'Algésiras, Guillaume II ne put tenir sa langue et parla du brillant second. Et durant la guerre, le brillant second fut pratiquement aux ordres de l'Allemagne. La Chine est trop pacifique pour ne pas être aux ordres d'un Japon militariste si jamais une alliance — alliance forcée peut-être — se noue entre les deux Etats. Et cette alliance est le rêve d'un certain nombre de partisans de la Plus Grande Asie, japonais pour la plupart, quelques-uns chinois.

Pierre Dominique.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. to Special Report No. W.D. 1007 of May 7 1934
 from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'HUMANITE of May 2 1934

Evitez les Contrefaçons

CONTRE L'IMPÉRIALISME JAPONAIS

Partisans et paysans mandchous combattent par milliers, les armes à la main

Une région au pouvoir des insurgés Violents combats dans la Mandchourie et le Jehol

Il y a en ce moment un renforcement considérable du mouvement insurrectionnel antiimpérialiste en Mandchourie et dans le Jehol, ces deux pays envahis, conquis par les armes, par l'impérialisme japonais.

Nous signalâmes hier les combats acharnés qui ont eu lieu dans la province du Jehol entre les troupes japonaises et les insurgés chinois. Aux derniers combats qui durèrent trois jours prirent part sept mille soldats japonais, soutenus par de l'artillerie et des avions de bombardement. Les troupes japonaises subirent de très lourdes pertes, mais les moyens modernes de mort des Japonais ont fait un millier de morts parmi les insurgés.

Cette révolte armée des populations du Jehol s'accompagne de véritables soulèvements en masse des paysans en Mandchourie, surtout dans le Nord. Nous avons récemment noté les engagements sanglants qui eurent lieu dans cette région, où plusieurs détachements japonais furent anéantis.

La Mandchourie insurgée

Les journaux de Shanghai et de Pékin rapportent que c'est dans la vallée inférieure de la Soungari (affluent de l'Amour) que la révolte gagne en étendue et en force.

Là, les autorités nippomandchoues confisquent les terres pour y installer des colons (réservistes) japonais.

On annonce de Kharbine que dans le cours moyen de la Soungari également, a lieu un soulèvement de paysans contre les occupants japonais.

Au cours de combats entre les insurgés et les troupes japonaises dans cette région, fut anéanti un détachement « punitif » de Japonais.

Sous le commandement du capitaine Indzouki, on annonce aussi de nombreuses autres batailles où les troupes japonaises subirent de sérieuses pertes. Les combats entre les troupes japonaises et les partisans unis aux paysans insurgés et aux soldats mandchous passés de leur côté, continuent.

L'agence Asiatic annonce que dans le nord-est de la province de Kirin opère une armée de 7.000 partisans qui occupe un certain nombre de localités de cette province. La lutte contre les occupants japonais ne cesse pas dans la province de Moukden, malgré de nombreuses « expéditions punitives ».

Les détachements de partisans sont maîtres en fait de toute la partie orientale de la province à l'exception des villes à proximité du chemin de fer de Moukden-Hailoun.

Dans cette région jusqu'à la frontière coréenne, des détachements insurrectionnels COREENS opèrent en contact avec les partisans mandchous sous le mot d'ordre : « Libération de la Mandchourie et de la Corée de l'impérialisme japonais ».

Mesures terroristes inopérantes

Le gouvernement nippomandchou

rialistes, entraînant les larges masses de paysans affamés et spoliés, dans la lutte armée contre l'impérialisme nippon, montre que la Mandchourie et le Jehol, comme la Corée sont conquis mais non soumis et que la lutte pour la libération nationale y est engagée à mort.

Le Japon prêt à tout

Cette situation constitue une entrave un rempart contre les plans d'agression contre l'Union soviétique, en même temps que contre les projets d'hégémonie nippone en Asie.

Mais, cependant, le Japon est décidé à tout, à tenter la grande aventure qui allumera la guerre mondiale.

L'ambassadeur japonais en Argentine, Yamasaki, déclara récemment, dans un entretien avec les représentants de la presse :

« Le monde doit nous permettre de réaliser notre expansion par la voie pacifique, sinon nous serons obligés de le faire par des moyens violents. »

C'est là un commentaire juste de la fameuse déclaration-défi du 18 avril.

Violente opposition des Etats-Unis

Mais si l'Angleterre, par l'organe de Sir John Simon avant-hier aux Communes, donne quitus au Japon — alliance oblige — contre l'U.R.S.S. et les Etats-Unis, après avoir reçu satisfaction quant à ses prérogatives en Chine, il n'en va pas de même des Etats-Unis.

Le gouvernement américain a donné l'ordre, dimanche dernier, à son ambassadeur à Tokio, de faire savoir au gouvernement japonais que Washington oppose une fin de non-recevoir aux prétentions nippones et que l'Amérique professe qu'« aucune nation ne peut prétendre à l'hégémonie, imposer sa volonté dans une situation réglée par traités ».

Et l'opinion prédominante aux Etats-Unis est que la déclaration du 18 avril devra rester lettre morte, ou alors l'Amérique agira en conséquence.

On peut mesurer par ce ton acerbe toute la gravité de cette situation tragique où l'antagonisme nippo-américain arrive à son point culminant. — M. M.

EN MALAISIE

Grève générale des chemins de fer

Singapour, 30 avril. — Les cheminots de toutes les compagnies de chemin de fer de la Malaisie, à l'exception de ceux de l'Etat de Kedah, se sont mis en grève.

Les compagnies et les autorités s'efforcent de briser la grève par l'emploi « de volontaires », mais le service est entièrement désorganisé.

L'Humanité May 2

Encl. 35 to Special Report No. W.D./107 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'HUMANITE of May 2 1934

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Mesures terroristes inopérantes

Le gouvernement nippomandchou a décidé d'appliquer dans les villages le système de responsabilité solidaire : chaque groupe de dix familles répondra solidairement l'une pour l'autre et risqueront leur vie pour la moindre résistance aux autorités de la part d'un seul membre d'une de ces dix familles. Ces mesures draconiennes ne pourront cependant pas empêcher les paysans de s'engager dans les détachements de partisans, souvent par villages entiers.

Ce nouvel essor du mouvement insurrectionnel des partisans antiimpé-

rialistes, entraînant les larges masses de paysans affamés et spoliés, dans la lutte armée contre l'impérialisme nippon, montre que la Mandchourie et le Jehol, comme la Corée sont conquis mais non soumis et que la lutte pour la libération nationale y est engagée à mort.

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Aggravation de la guerre en Arabie

L'Angleterre envoie des navires

Le Caire, 1^{er} mai. — L'Iman du Yemen a déclenché une contre-offensive contre les troupes du roi du Hedjaz, Ibn Séoud. Un télégramme de Sana annonce, en effet, que de grandes quantités de munitions sont arrivées dans la ville, que des navires de guerre britanniques ont été envoyés de Hodeida vers les ports séoudistes et que des avions se dirigent vers le front.

Humanité May 2

Encl 36 to Special Report No. W.D. 146 of May 7 1934
from the Embassy Paris

Extract from DEBATS of May 2 1934

Le Japon, la Chine et les puissances

La Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis ont fait à Tokio des démarches à peu près simultanées mais non pas concertées. On sait de quoi il s'agit. Le 18 avril dernier, un porte-parole du ministère japonais des affaires étrangères avait déclaré que le Japon s'opposerait à toute aide accordée à la Chine, plus particulièrement à toute aide financière ou technique, qui serait considérée comme de nature à troubler la paix de l'Extrême-Orient. Il ajoutait que le Japon se réservait le droit de juger de chaque cas et que, si cela était nécessaire, il protesterait par des « mesures positives ». Quelques jours plus tard, à la suite de l'émotion causée par cet étrange avertissement, le gouvernement japonais publia un communiqué, qui, en réalité, en accentuait plutôt la portée. S'il disait bien que son intention n'était pas de violer les traités existants, de s'attaquer au principe de la porte ouverte et de menacer l'intégrité de la Chine, il affirmait cependant hautement son droit et sa volonté de contrôler les relations de la Chine et des autres puissances, et d'empêcher notamment tout concours qui aurait pour effet de fortifier militairement la Chine. Il est naturel que l'attitude adoptée par le Japon ait suscité quelque inquiétude à l'extérieur. Il est clair que la politique ainsi définie ne tendait à rien de moins qu'à l'établissement d'une sorte de protectorat japonais sur la Chine, où les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France et d'autres pays encore ont de grands intérêts.

Les Etats-Unis, auxquels cette imitation de la doctrine de Monroe ne saurait sourire, ont réagi en faisant remettre au gouvernement japonais, par leur ambassadeur, M. Joseph C. Grant, une note où ils rappellent que leurs relations avec les autres pays sont régies par les principes généralement acceptés de droit international et par les dispositions des traités auxquels ils sont partie. Ils se réfèrent au traité dit des neuf puissances, signé en 1922, et affirment qu'aucune nation n'a le droit de s'efforcer, sans le consentement des autres Etats intéressés, de transformer sa volonté en loi. La communication faite à Tokio, le 25 avril, par Sir Francis Lindley, ambassadeur d'Angleterre, et dont Sir John Simon a rendu compte hier à la Chambre des Communes est analogue. Le

Cabinet de Londres, se fondant aussi sur le traité des neuf puissances, dit que le « gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut naturellement pas admettre le droit du Japon seul à décider si quelque action particulière, telle que les dispositions prises pour assurer un appui technique et financier, est de nature à créer une menace pour la paix ou pour l'intégrité de la Chine ».

On ne connaît pas encore la réponse faite par le Japon aux Etats-Unis, mais on est renseigné sur celle que l'Angleterre a reçue. M. Hirota a déclaré que l'interprétation faite de la politique japonaise est inexacte et que le Japon, attaché au maintien du régime de la porte ouverte, observerait le traité des neuf puissances, à l'égard duquel sa politique est la même que celle du gouvernement britannique. Sir John Simon a dit hier aux Communes que, dans ces conditions, il était satisfait et que « le gouvernement de Sa Majesté laisserait les choses où elles en sont ».

Provisoirement, l'incident est donc clos au point de vue diplomatique, mais il est évident que, pour le fond, rien n'est réglé. On s'en rend parfaitement compte à Londres. Le *Daily Telegraph* écrit ce matin que le gouvernement japonais ne s'est pas expliqué sur la déclaration officielle du 18 avril et que, s'il a l'air de la retirer, ce qui a été dit subsiste, de même que l'inquiétude qui en est résultée. Pour le *Times*, cette déclaration « exprimait bien ce qu'on pense dans les milieux officiels, mais ne constituait pas une définition de la politique officielle ». Ce journal ajoute : « L'incident que le gouvernement britannique préfère considérer comme clos a eu du moins pour résultat satisfaisant d'éclairer l'opinion mondiale sur la tendance générale de la politique nipponne ». C'est en effet probablement le but qu'a visé le gouvernement japonais. Il a lancé une sorte d'avertissement, mais, pour des raisons d'opportunité, il n'insiste pas pour l'insistant.

La situation de l'Extrême-Orient demeure donc ce qu'elle était, c'est-à-dire fort trouble. Si la France est demeurée silencieuse, ce n'est pas qu'elle n'ait pas voix au chapitre. Les intérêts qu'elle a dans ces régions sont considérables. Mais ceux que possèdent l'Angleterre et l'Amérique étant encore plus grands, le gouvernement a eu raison de laisser celles-ci intervenir. Une attitude de vigilante observation est la plus indiquée pour nous.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Debats
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(NOT FOR THE PRESS) RECEIVED
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE) MAY 16 1934

Department of State
Division of Current Intelligence and Records NO. 98

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1934

JAPAN

At the press conference this afternoon, a correspondent asked if the Department had received any reply from the Japanese Government to the statement which was delivered to the Japanese Foreign Minister on Sunday by Ambassador Grew. The Secretary replied in the negative. Asked then if he expected a reply, the Secretary said that he had not taken the matter up either pro or con. Another correspondent then asked if our instructions, which were sent to Ambassador Grew on Saturday to make the statement to the Japanese Foreign Minister, were sent after the receipt of the so-called Japanese explanatory statement. The Secretary, in reply, said that he did not recall at the moment.

FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY, the Secretary said that he wished to call to the attention of the correspondents one or two general phases that might illuminate the matter. In the first place, it has been for many years and still is the policy of the United States Government to cooperate with the efforts and the professed desire of the Japanese Government to strengthen the traditional relations of friendship between the two countries. In order to carry out this policy as successfully as possible, it has been our view that the less agitation and less excitement that might be injected into any differences between the conceptions of the two Governments in regard to any particular question would permit its adjustment much more satisfactorily and in a spirit of better understanding and harmony than otherwise. It is in line with that view that it has been the policy of our Government to talk as little as possible and to discuss the questions that arise in the spirit of friendliness in order that the determination of the question might be reached in an amicable way. Mr. Hull added that he thought that it was clear that to be most helpful to our country, as well as to both countries in fact, in accomplishing this common purpose, we could point to and emphasize the letter and the spirit of such communications as were exchanged between the Foreign Minister of Japan and the Secretary of State a few weeks ago rather than to seek out and rake together the various reports and news items emanating from various Japanese sources and the reply that has been made to them or with respect to them by our Government. The Secretary said, furthermore, that the correspondents had no doubt observed that the statements contained in the communication of our Government are statements of principles that are really applicable to any and all situations. They are statements of principles and of attitudes and one might say of intentions which we think correctly and properly govern the course of our Government in conducting its foreign affairs. In our statement, there is a message to China and to other countries, as well as to Japan.

The courses of the British Government and of our Government have been independent so far as each is concerned but, not unnaturally, they have been along parallel lines. Each has emphasized the importance of treaties and the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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importance of rights, obligations and interests of each country alike under those treaties.

A correspondent asked if, in view of the fact that we have formally commented on what is termed recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government, it was a fair assumption that the Department had received some authentic text or version of what was referred to in the statement as "indications." In reply, the Secretary said that he had tried to suggest in the statement which he had just made for background purposes that various reports have emanated from various Japanese sources, and that we have undertaken to get the true purport of all of them as best we could and to base our statement on the sum total thereof. The correspondent then said that he was puzzled as to whether the statement refers to the original so-called statement by the Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office or to the later so-called explanatory statement or whether it refers to some other statement concerning which he was not informed. Mr. Hull, in reply, said that he could only repeat that there had been various reports from various Japanese sources and that, like the correspondents, we have done the best we could to ascertain the nature and the extent of them and their true purport and meaning. The Secretary added that he did not know whether or not we had obtained everything in existence concerning the matter. ALL OF THE ABOVE PRESS CONFERENCE IS FOR BACKGROUND PURPOSES ONLY.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ROME, April 30, 1934.

No. 519.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

793.94



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

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~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~ MID

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 504 of April 30, 1934, concerning Japan's policy with respect to China, I have the honor to inform the Department that the MESSAGGERO published in its edition of April 27th another editorial on recent developments in the Far Eastern situation in which it points out that Japanese foreign policy has been characterized in the past by such marked continuity that an understanding of its latest attempts to control China's relations with other powers requires a glance at its development since the sixteenth century.

- The article then gives a brief historical review of events

in

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MAY 24 1934

-2-

in the Far East beginning with Japanese attempts to conquer the Asiatic continent and continuing with a delineation of its lapse into a secular sleep and final rise to a position of dominance in the Far East as a result of wars with China and Russia and more especially as a consequence of World War conditions which left it in full command.

The recent declarations of Japan, says that newspaper, are equivalent to the proclamation of a new Monroe Doctrine in favor of Japan in the Far East, but the situation is quite different from the one created by President Monroe in his historic declaration of 1823, since the latter was an effective action by the United States favoring the independence of the South American countries before Spain, whilst the former is an attempt on the part of Japan to lay its hands on China against its will and in order to prevent action by other powers looking toward Chinese unification and independence.

The article then goes on to say that, under the influence of the economic crisis, the general desire for world peace at the present time is tending to favor the ambitions of countries like Japan in those sectors which are not of immediate importance to the rest of the world. "In Japan's case," it says, "we are witnessing an episode of real international anarchy made possible by the fact that hitherto all international attempts to ensure peace and organize relations among nations have been unsuccessful. Moreover, while Japan's naval forces are numerically inferior to those of the United States and Great Britain, they have the great advantage of being on the spot while the ships of her adversaries are thousands of miles away.

Thus


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Thus Great Britain is using great tact in her dealings with Japan."

That Asia will take her place finally in the comity of nations during the twentieth century is certain, declares the article, since Asiatic emancipation is in full swing and cannot be stopped. It views as no less dangerous for Asia than for Europe any process tending toward a rupture with Europe, whose collaboration is regarded as more than ever necessary to it for both material and moral reasons. At the same time it is felt that Asia's emancipation cannot take the form of submitting to any one power, even though that power be Asiatic, and the example of the American states is cited wherein they have all consistently affirmed their independence not only with respect to Europe but also with respect to any one of themselves. While the Monroe Doctrine is still existant, the fact that it has undergone a change in aspect is pointed out as an admonishment for any nation in Asia that might desire to adopt it for its own benefit, and it is added that if Europe desires to protect its legitimate interests and pursue its work of organization and education in the Far East, it must begin to find on its own initiative the way to peace and concord.

Respectfully yours,


Breckinridge Long.

CAR/eh

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



*The Secretary
to note as of
official interest
WJ*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 18, 1934

WE

U: Mr. Phillips.

I suggest that the Secretary
would be interested in reading
the attached despatch from London.



FE:MMH:DLY

mmh

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 17, 1934

~~U.~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

The attached Despatch No. 686 of May 7, 1934, from London, entitled, "British Policy in the Far East", is a reply to the Department's telegram No. 176 of May 2, 4 p.m., calling for a "careful study and analysis of the British Government's attitude and action in regard to the Japanese statements relating to China policy from April 17 to April 30."

I regard this as an excellent despatch. Mr. Atherton has summarized chronologically action and events, so far as the British were concerned, subsequent to the Japanese statement of April 17, he has touched upon the reaction of the British press, and he has enumerated and explained the controlling considerations of the British Government in determining its attitude toward Japanese action and policy in the Far East.

In my opinion the concluding portions of Mr. Atherton's despatch are accurately reflective of the views of the class now controlling Great Britain.

Your

See next p.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

Your attention is also drawn to the first enclosure, an editorial from the ECONOMIST of May 5, written in Layton's characteristically trenchant style, and to the second enclosure, a cartoon by Low.

There is also attached a draft instruction to London, acknowledging receipt of the despatch.

*Copies are being forwarded
to Tokyo and Peking.*

FE  DLY

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 686

London, May 7, 1934.

SUBJECT: British Policy in the Far East.

793.94

AM REC'D



VERY STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



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F/G 793.94/6685

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:



I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 176, May 2, 4 p. m., asking for an analysis of the British Government's attitude and action with regard to the Japanese statement on April 17th.

Before discussing the motivating forces formulating the British attitude on this question it seems desirable, even at the risk of repeating to some extent information previously reported by telegram, to summarize chronologically the events subsequent to April 17th.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The first mention of the Japanese statement appeared in the London press on April 19th, and I saw the Foreign Secretary on April 20th (see my No. 183, ⁶⁵⁹⁰April 21, 10 a.m.) who had just received a report from the British Ambassador at Tokyo. Obviously at that time Sir John Simon personally took an apprehensive view of what Japan might have in mind, and he anticipated, once the facts were established, an early exchange of views with the United States Government. I cannot but feel that Sir John Simon's personal attitude as expressed to me underwent considerable modification by the time he made his statement in the House of Commons (my No. 190, ⁶⁵⁹⁶April 23, 4 p. m.), since in this statement he took pains to emphasize that the British Government had already made "a friendly inquiry" at Tokyo (which instruction to the British Ambassador in fact had only been drawn up on the previous evening) with the object of "clarifying certain aspects" of the Japanese statement; and in response to questions addressed to him regarding cooperation with the United States he was obviously anxious to avoid making any definite answer.

The statements of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington were reported in the press here, as also were the remarks of the Japanese Consul General at Geneva and the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. Ambassador Nagai's assertions were particularly scrutinized in an attempt to estimate whether in fact Japanese and German officialdom, both outside the League of Nations, were in any accord. It may also be well to point out that in general the press carried very full reports of the United States attitude towards this policy of Japan, particular reference being

- 3 -

being made to the gravity with which it was viewed in Washington.

While naturally press despatches from abroad were much featured in the daily newspapers, the London Foreign Office, through its spokesman, was consistently pointing out that until Japan's intentions were definitely ascertained, and until it was determined how far, if at all, Great Britain was affected, it would be a mistake to assume that this statement of policy was as serious as a first casual reading might indicate. Consequently there was rather limited editorial comment, and it was not until April 26th that THE TIMES published its first editorial reviewing the situation to date. This editorial started off with the sentence: "The latest developments at Tokyo suggest that to condemn Japanese policy towards China unheard is just as premature as to applaud it." But it is the last paragraph which is of particular interest, in that it pointed to the prosperous British colony of Hong Kong and to the extent of British investments in Shanghai (which the Secretary of the China Society in London later stated were even underestimated in that editorial, for while "the Japanese population (in Shanghai) "exceeds the British, the total of British capital invested there, as shown by a recent investigation of a neutral economist of repute, is three times as large as that of Japanese capital. Moreover, as Shanghai does more than half China's foreign import trade, and the value of the British exports to China (excluding Manchuria) last year exceeded Japan's, there is ground for claiming that commercially also our interests in the port are larger than her's.")

On

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On April 30th THE TIMES also carried the text of a statement telegraphed by its correspondent in Tokyo as the only version of the official spokesman's oral statement of April 17th for which responsibility was accepted by the Tokyo Foreign Office. The text is as follows:

"Japan has no wish to infringe the independent interests or prosperity of China. As regards Manchukuo, we ask the other Powers to recognize the fair and free actions of that country. Neither in Manchukuo nor in China have we any territorial ambitions. Japan is geographically in the position to share in trade profits if China is united and developed, but the unification and prosperity of China must be attained by her own awakening, not by the selfish exploitation of other Powers.

"We have no intention to interfere with the interests of third parties. If other Powers engage in trade with China for the benefit of China we welcome it. We have no desire to deviate from the policy of the open door and equal opportunity, or to infringe treaties, but Japan objects to any action whatsoever by other Powers that may lead to disturbance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan bears the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia with other Asiatic Powers, particularly China. The time has passed when other Powers or the League can exercise their policies only for the exploitation of China."

The press on April 30th carried in general a long report of the American position, intimating that President Roosevelt himself took a serious view of the situation. That afternoon Sir John Simon made his second statement in the House of Commons, the text of which was contained in my telegram No. 230, April 30, 3 p. m. Editorial opinion subsequent to the Foreign Secretary's statement of April 30th was forwarded in the Embassy's despatch No. 675, May 2, 1934, which pointed out that the general tone of the responsible daily press (likewise prevalent in conversations) was an attempt to whitewash the intent of Japanese policy because of the alleged satisfactory assurances that have been received in reply to inquiries made at Tokyo and especially because

- 5 -

- because of specific assurances that in any event Japanese policy was not directed against Great Britain. A contrary
- 1/ view is expressed in THE ECONOMIST of May 5th (copy attached).
 - 2/ An EVENING STANDARD cartoon (copy attached) is also an unconscious endorsement of this contrary point of view.

Sir John Simon's statement to the House of Commons on April 30th contained the reference which gave rise to question 3 in the Department's telegraphic instruction No. ⁶⁶³⁰176, May 2, 4 p. m. When a written question is asked of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons it is submitted to the geographical department of the Foreign Office to frame a reply in the first instance. The present head of the Far Eastern Department, Mr. Orde, is away on leave and his assistant apparently drafted the reply Simon made (my No. ⁶⁶³⁰213, April 30, 5 p. m.). Since then the Chinese Legation and the press have been closely questioning the Foreign Office as to the particular significance of the phrase. In every case it has been pointed out that the phraseology had no hidden meaning and was intended merely to describe certain rights and concessions which Japan enjoyed and were not shared by other Powers, as, for instance, Japanese concessions in Hankow and Tientsin and certain policing rights with railways (i. e., the South Manchurian Railway was tentatively mentioned on one occasion; on another occasion the Kiukian Railway). When the Acting Chief of the Far Eastern Department was asked by a member of my staff about this particular phrase he was obviously pervious on this point and conveyed the impression that he had in truth framed the draft reply for Sir John Simon to read in the House of Commons.

"Obviously

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"Obviously the phrase was an unfortunate one, but not intended to cover any special significance, for", said this Acting Chief, "Great Britain has certain rights in China that are not shared by other countries, as we know France has, etc., and we wanted merely to make clear that whatever Japan had in this category of rights were also excepted."

The above, I believe, is the correct interpretation of this phrase and, in my opinion, no particular significance should be attached to it.

In presenting this chronological diary of official statements and press reports on the Japanese statement I venture also to set forth certain points of view that have been expressed repeatedly as considerations the Government had in mind in reaching its determination of policy.

The two compelling problems before the British Government are, first, the uncertainty of the European situation, particularly as regards the rearmament of Germany and the general breakdown of disarmament negotiations; secondly, the necessity of fostering Great Britain's progress to economic and financial recovery. The first problem needs no elaboration. The requirements of the second problem, which are equally evident, were authoritatively explained in the budget speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he took pains to point out that, whereas the first impetus to increased British trade had come from the home market, further recovery depended entirely on the improvement of world conditions and world trade (and it so happened that this speech announcing reductions in the British income tax and remissions in the emergency cuts of 1931 was made on the very day the Japanese spokesman made his initial

- 7 -

initial statement in Tokyo). The export of cotton and woolen textiles is not the least important part of British foreign trade, and the problem of Japanese competition in this and other fields has for some months been receiving the serious attention of the Cabinet, as has been reported by this Embassy in earlier despatches. There is no doubt that the Cabinet, at the moment of formulating its position on the Japanese statement, had clearly in mind the fact that there would be announced shortly a scheme of colonial import quota restrictions directed in the main against Japanese goods. In view of the Empire's favorable balance of trade with Japan, such a policy would defeat its object if the moderate amount of support which can be given Lancashire by drastic action in the Empire would create deep trade hostility or provoke open or disguised Japanese retaliation. For, in the last analysis, the market for British textiles, as is the case with most British exports, is the world, not the colonial market. So it follows that in determining its attitude at the present time the British Government was not inclined to consider any immediate policy to add political fuel to the conflagration shortly to be augmented by the arbitrary restriction of Japanese imports into British colonial possessions. (See my despatch of today's date).

Therefore, except in the fact of a direct and pressing menace to the Empire in the Far East, and in view of other considerations enumerated previously, it is unquestionably the British view that the present is not the propitious moment to press the Japanese question, especially since

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- 8 -

it is reasoned that the United States and Russia will adopt such an attitude at the present time as to defer a crisis.

Then, too, there has been an element in this country traditionally friendly to Japan which has for some time pointed out that a strong China in the Far East was not necessarily a favorable factor to England, since Chinese nationalism has bred British boycotts, the Shanghai situation of 1930, agitation for the abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions resultant, for instance, in the recession of Weihaiwei and the demand for the renunciation of Hong Kong. This British element with Far Eastern interests is opposed to antagonizing the Japanese politically for the following reasons:

(1) Such a policy would cause Japanese retaliation against British trade, not only in Japan, but also in China, since the Japanese would certainly institute more or less effective propaganda and indirect controls against British-Chinese trade.

(2) Such a policy, which would tend to strengthen the militarist element in Japan, might lead to an issue at a time when the Singapore Base, as revealed in the Admiralty conference of last autumn, is almost two years from completion.

(3) Should England eventually decide upon a policy of resistance to Japan it must be calculated upon cooperation with the United States which will not be truly effective unless the public will of the United States is back of the Government in a policy of aggressive resistance. Such an exchange of notes as Mr. Hull and

Mr. Hirota

- 9 -

Mr. Hirota recently completed and the withdrawal of the American fleet from the Pacific are both cited as instances that the American Government wants to play down the Japanese situation.

Paradoxically, the conclusions of this group are tacitly reinforced by the attitude of the strong anti-war element in this country. This group is entirely dissatisfied with the Government's Japanese policy and with its supine acceptance of Japanese explanations. But while it is in principle opposed to the use or threat of force, in such a case, to suppress aggression it is somewhat at sea in this situation since its former panacea in such circumstances, the League of Nations, seems to offer no solution in the present crisis, as it was unable to enforce its will in the Manchurian situation.

These, then, are arguments which have been given consideration in determining policy here, obtained incidentally in conversations with high Government officials (other than those reported in my No. 196, ⁶⁶⁰² April 24, 8 p. m., and my No. 200, ⁶⁶⁰⁸ April 25, 6 p. m., together with the memorandum forwarded by letter dated April 24, 1934, ⁶⁶⁴⁷ to Mr. Hornbeck). I venture also to outline a little more fully than in my telegram No. 228, May 7, 11 a. m., to Mr. Norman Davis, the very definite conclusions I have reached regarding British policy.

The British Government has made up its mind to run no risk so far as the Far Eastern situation is concerned at this time and to concentrate all its efforts in trying to keep peace in Europe and to rehabilitate its economic life. England considers that the seriousness with which the Japanese statement of policy of April 17th was viewed

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the United States, in Russia and in China is sufficient to deter Japan from taking any provocative action at the present time; that for the moment no threat to the British Empire lies in the Far Eastern situation, nor is Japan likely to provoke a war in the Far East unless Germany precipitates a war in Europe. For the time being England will endeavor to refrain from any provocative action

*important
up*

vis-à-vis Japan (which purely economic considerations do not demand) which would tend to increase tension in the Far East or more particularly between Japan and England. For this reason, although until the Japanese statement of April 17th the British Government was prepared to join with the United States Government in exploratory conversations for the forthcoming naval conference, this policy is now under review by a special Cabinet Council and no decision has as yet been reached. This accounts for the recommendation in my telegram to Mr. Norman Davis (No. 228) that no further inquiries be made of the British Government regarding Anglo-American naval conversations until the outcome of the British Cabinet's decisions is known.

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I have learned from usually well informed sources that it has even been suggested in the present Cabinet Council discussions that this was not a particularly happy moment, from a purely British viewpoint, for a renewal of the London Naval Treaty discussions, provided in these discussions England would attempt to maintain parity with the American navy and by Anglo-American cooperation to force Japan into the maintenance of an inferior position she was not willing to accept. Predicated on the fact that the American navy would never be used against

- 11 -

against Great Britain, it was a question for study whether England would not do better to consider her requirements vis-à-vis her European neighbors, the defence of her sea routes, and especially her Far Eastern requirements, outside the compromise of a possibly unsatisfactory future naval treaty.

From the long term point of view, I am certain the British are under no illusions as to the objective of Japanese policy in regard to China from the twenty-one demands of 1915 to date; that this policy will not be carried forward aggressively whenever world indifference or world disturbances permit. The English realize that ultimately this situation will have to be met, preferably side by side with the United States; but for the present, with the uncertain conditions in Europe, and economic adjustments to be made at home, they do not want to jeopardize the Far Eastern status quo or England's comparatively advantageous position in China by any appearance of such Anglo-American cooperation, coercion or preparedness as would put Japan back again in the hands of her militarists and force an issue thereby, which for the time being the British Empire does not want to meet.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Ray Atherton
Counselor of Embassy.

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Enclosures:

1. "Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States", THE ECONOMIST, May 5, 1934.
2. "The 'Open Door' Policy in China", (Cartoon), EVENING STANDARD, April 25, 1934.

RA/ER

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 686 May 7, 1934
from the Embassy at London, England

Copy of article from THE ECONOMIST of May 5, 1934.

JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.

From the Japanese point of view, the state of Japanese statements on Japan's policy in the Far East has been well worth while, for it has demonstrated, experimentally, the persistence of the previous disharmony between American and British reactions towards Japanese gestures of aggression. It was the manifestation of this Anglo-American discord, immediately after the Japanese stroke of September 18, 1931, that encouraged the Japanese in Manchuria to go to the lengths to which they have actually gone with impunity. Now that the Japanese have widened their field of aggressive action to the whole of China, and perhaps to the whole Far East, it is to be feared that like reactions may produce like effects. The essence of present British policy towards Japan is that His Majesty's present Government in the United Kingdom, and the rank and file of the Conservative Party, have advertised to Japan their intention to avert their eyes from what Japan is doing, while lending their ears to Japanese professions. The point is made clear in Tuesday's leading article in THE TIMES, in which "expressions of the official mind" in Japan (i.e. actual Japanese intentions) are distinguished, with a Byzantine refinement, from "definitions of official policy" (i.e. what the Japanese officially say). In the House of Commons on Monday, Sir John Simon expressed the same satisfaction at the answer which he had invited from the Japanese as he used to express over similarly reassuring Japanese answers-according-to-plan in 1931 and 1932. The

practical /

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

practical outcome, for Japanese purposes, is that "His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is." And this setting of the colloquy between the British Ambassador at Tokyo and the Japanese Foreign Minister sadly detracts from the face-value of the words that were exchanged. This British determination to accept the letter and overlook the intention is not shared by the Government of the United States. The Americans have not put a question to Japan (with a whispered "Won't you please answer this way?"); but on April 29 the American Ambassador made a statement to Mr. Hirota, reaffirming the position of the United States because "recent indications of the attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored." Thus Mr. Hull grasps the nettle, while Sir John Simon declines to admit that he has been stung.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

File No. 686 May 7, 1934

PER EVENING STANDARD NUMBER

CITY LONDON DATE April 25, 1934.



THE "OPEN DOOR" POLICY IN CHINA.

(Copyright in all countries.)

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 391

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

May 21 1954

The Honorable

Robert W. Eingham,
 American Ambassador,
 London.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your Despatch No. 686 of May 7, 1954, entitled, "British Policy in the Far East", which has been read with interest.

The Department desires to express its appreciation of this informative and careful study of the British Government's attitude toward the recent statement of Japanese policy with regard to the Far East.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

793.94/6685

793.94/6685

FE:END:DLY
 5-17-54

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 [Handwritten initials and signatures]

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

MAY 21, 1954

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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78

No. 1365

May 21 1934

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,
American Ambassador,
Peiping.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of Despatch No. 686, dated May 7, 1934, from the
American Ambassador at London, entitled, "British Policy
in the Far East".

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosure:

London's Despatch
No. 686.

793.94/6685

FE:EHD:DLY


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793.94/6685

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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MAY 21, 1934



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 525

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

May 21 1934

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of Despatch No. 686, dated May 7, 1934, from the
American Ambassador at London, entitled, "British Policy
in the Far East".

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips


Enclosure:

London's Despatch
No. 686.

793.94/6685

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5-17-34

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MAY 21, 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Copy to Ripping
 5/12/34
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 MAY 8 1934
 Department of State
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 II
 FILE

Conversation.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
 MAY 11 1934
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman.

Mr. Hamilton, 16 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 MAY 16 1934
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

May 9, 1934.

MAY 15 1934
 May 16 1934
 FILE

Dr. Schurman, former American Minister to China and

later American Ambassador to Germany, called. In the
 course of a conversation relating particularly to the
 situation in the Far East he made a number of interesting
 comments which are briefly outlined as follows:

The United States in its foreign relations today is
 confronted by two problems of outstanding importance:
 the situation in regard to international trade and the
 situation in the Far East. Conditions under which inter-
 national trade is carried on are changing rapidly and
 the tendency today is toward economic nationalism. It
 may be doubted whether there will ever again be a situa-
 tion where foreign trade will be carried on according to
 the old concepts and standards. In the future it seems
 likely that foreign trade ^{will} ~~will~~ be carried on on the
 basis of quota arrangements or something similar thereto.
 Nations are becoming more and more industrialized with
 the result that there is no longer in the world any great
 undeveloped area where there may occur a tremendous
 expansion of foreign trade.

The

F/G

793.94/6686

FILED

MAY 21 1934

793.94

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The only Far Eastern nation today of importance is Japan. The recent statements by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office indicated nothing new in Japan's policy and attitude toward eastern Asia; those statements merely took the mask off the situation. Japan's recent "gobbling up" of Manchuria from China made Japan an entirely new political and economic factor in the Far East. Japan will probably be successful in her program in Manchuria. She may be successful in extending her control over China as far south as the Yellow River. When she moves on to the Yangtze valley, she may encounter definite opposition from other nations interested in trading there. If she should not encounter such opposition, it is difficult to see what can stop her from extending her control over all of China and moving even farther south.

The United States is interested in China economically and sentimentally. In its manifestation of sentimental interest in China, it would be well for the United States always to make it clear to the Chinese that in expressing that sentimental interest the United States has no thought of using armed force to fight China's battles for China. China never has been a great market for American goods and there is little reason to suppose that she ever will be.

After

708

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

After a nation has achieved a spectacular success such as Japan has in Manchuria, the natural tendency is for outsiders to overestimate the strength of the nation which has been successful. It may reasonably be doubted whether Japan is actually as strong or as invincible as her conquest and acquisition of Manchuria would indicate.

With regard to the Washington Conference Nine-Power Treaty, it must, of course, be recognized that the treaty does not accord with all the actualities existing today. China has not made the progress hoped for when that treaty was signed. Japan by her acts has flouted the provisions of that treaty. Yet it would be unwise for the United States to take the initiative in denouncing that treaty. Japan still pays lip service to the provisions of the treaty and thus satisfies to some extent the diplomatic proprieties. Most important of all, the fact that Japan remains associated with other nations as co-signatories of that treaty keeps Japan to some extent within the family of nations. The abrogation of the treaty would serve further to isolate Japan and to exacerbate the situation now obtaining in respect to Japan's isolation from the rest of the world.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

In regard to the naval treaties, it would seem unwise for the United States to take the initiative in denouncing them. It appears that Japan will insist upon a higher ratio than that which she now has. If Japan takes the initiative in denouncing the Washington Conference Naval Treaty or if the question of the revision of the London Conference Naval Treaty is imminently before us, it would then be advisable for the United States to ask Japan frankly what is the minimum that would satisfy her. If that minimum is not acceptable to the United States, the United States should then frankly inform Japan that it would not be able to agree to the Japanese proposal and that a conference on the matter would serve no useful purpose.

Dr. Schurman said that his sympathies had always been and remained with the Chinese but that he thought that it would be a century before the Chinese attained stability and order.

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FE m.m./.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 15 1934

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No. 1360


To the American Minister,

Peiping.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the American Minister at Peiping a copy of a memorandum of conversation, under date May 9, 1934, between Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman and an officer of the Department, containing comments by Dr. Schurman in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Enclosure:
 Copy of memorandum
 dated May 9, 1934.

793.94/6686



FE:MMH:REK
 5/12/34

May 14 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./334 FOR #677

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Apr. 30, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Japan and China. Inquiry addressed to Tokyo by the British Government reminding the Japanese Government of the principle of equal rights in China established for all the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. Further statements.

re

793.94/6687

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan and China.

In the House of Commons today, Sir John Simon explained that the friendly inquiry addressed to Tokyo by the British Government on April 25th reminded the Japanese Government of the principle of equal rights in China established for all the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. It stated that the British Government could not admit the Japanese right to decide alone whether any action such as the provision of technical or financial assistance was a danger to the peace and integrity of China. The British inquiry concluded

by/

-3-

by assuming that Japan had not intended to infringe the rights of other Powers in China or to deny her own treaty obligations. The Japanese reply, Sir John Simon continued, was that this assumption was correct. Japan's view of the Treaty of 1922 was the same as the British view, and the Japanese Foreign Minister added that Japan continued to attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the "open door" in China, and reaffirmed her acceptance of that policy. Sir John Simon then said that he considered the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister as reasonably clear, "and His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is."

"The whole episode," says the TIMES, "which the British Government prefers now to regard as closed, has at least had the satisfactory result of enlightening world opinion about the general trend of Japanese policy....Nobody denies that Japan stands in a special relationship to China; but the accumulated interests of other Powers in Central China far outweigh those of Japan; and the only effective way to reconcile them all is to keep within the terms of treaties solemnly concluded." (See Embassy's telegrams No. 211 of April 30th, 3 p.m. and No. 213 of April 30th, 5 p.m. A separate despatch is now under preparation.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Mukden/77 FOR Despatch #-

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED Apr. 17, 1934.
Hf// NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: China takes
over sixteen Great Wall passes; Japanese seeking
Settlement of Pending Issues; Jehol-Chahar Border;
Nanking's Mandate outlawing Manchurian traitors, ex-
pectee to impair relations between China and Japan,
which recently had been improving.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

C. CHINA:

1. Chinese Take Over Great Wall Passes:

According to a Chinese official statement, as reported in the press of March 10, sixteen passes along the Great Wall had up to that date been taken over by the Chinese Authorities.

2.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

on that border then prevailed. That the Japanese are interested in the situation in that province through which passes one of the main roads leading to Outer Mongolia and Siberia is evident and has been admitted in responsible Japanese circles.

4. Nanking's Mandate Outlawing Manchurian Traitors:

The local press, it may be mentioned, published the gist of the Chinese Government's mandate of March 11, 1934, declaring that Emperor P'u Yi is guilty of "lese majeste" and that he and his associates in the Manchurian Government are punishable as traitors. The general tenor of the comment was that this order will tend to impair the relations between China and Japan which recently had been improving.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

2. Japanese Seeking Settlement of Pending Issues:

The proposed visit of General Huang Pu, Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee, Peiping, to Nan-king in the early part of April was the subject of much speculation on the part of the Japanese press late in the month. It was expected that the question of peace preservation in the demilitarized zone would be taken up and that a settlement of through railway traffic (between Peiping and Mukden), postal relations with Manchuria and Customs matters would be pressed. Colonel Seiya Giga, Chief of the Military Mission at Shanhaikuan, is reported to have said during the latter part of March, according to private information, that these questions would be settled in about two months' time. Recent press despatches, it may be added, indicate that there was apparently some foundation for the statement. In this connection, General Doihara stated to one of my Colleagues that the matter of postal relations between China and Manchuria was arranged some time ago but that the Chinese Government is loth to implement the arrangement.

3. Jehol-Chahar Border:

The situation along the Jehol-Chahar border was obscure. Chinese press reports alleged that Japanese troops were in occupation of towns within the limits of Chahar Province while Japanese official sources here denied these reports. However, a press report published by THE Peking & TIENTSIN TIMES under date line of Peiping, March 28, stated that it was officially reported that normal conditions

on

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*See tel 264 from London
April 30, 1934*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY

FROM

London

Dated May 18, 1934

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH URGENT

265, May 18, 4 p.m.

Simon made statement in reply to questions


in the House of Commons this afternoon, official text of which will be available tomorrow when I shall telegraph again if I deem necessary either correcting or amplifying American press reports which I understand are full. Following is brief summary of what press is cabling tonight.

Simon said he believed in friendship with Japan and recalled the principle of equal rights in China as guaranteed in the Nine Power Treaty and Japan's solemn assurance in this respect. Any doubt of Japanese good faith was, in his opinion, very unlikely to produce a friendly conclusion. "I think it is just as well that we should quite clearly understand it was not true that we or, as far as I know, anybody else had ever signed a treaty with China in which we had pledged ourselves to use all our forces to preserve the territorial integrity

and

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793.94/6689



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#265, From London, May 18, 4 p.m.

and political independence of China".

Replying to the opposition that Great Britain embark on a policy of economic sanctions in an effort to forestall any war, Simon replied "Economic sanctions cannot be applied without the risk of war and we cannot undertake any system of sanctions or effective actions of this type unless the United States cooperates."

While extensively praising the American aid to the League "which I heroby gratefully and publicly recognize" Simon said "The Commons must understand, however, the limitation under which the United States is likely to act". He intimated that Great Britain is willing to participate in an international policy of sanctions in specific cases provided the United States as well as other nations interested formally agree; "Nevertheless it must be recognized that a policy of sanctions cannot be set up like a bottle of medicine for dosage when and where needed. It is a matter necessitating full review in each individual case and before action of any power of this nature all interested must formally agree".

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

8-#265 From London, May 18, 4 p.m.

agree".

500 A1524
Simon reaffirmed at some length Great Britain's desire to reach an agreement at Geneva on disarmament; said that Great Britain has already set the example for the reduction of armament and it is now up to the other nations to follow suit.

Complete text by pouch.

BINGHAM

WSB CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

GRAY

London

Dated May 19, 1934

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



267, May 19, 1 p.m.

It seems advisable to amplify my 265, May 18,
4 p.m. and American press reports by quoting verbatim
official text of that portion of Simon's statement
dealing with sanctions in which he referred to
American cooperation.

"It is absolutely no use talking about economic
pressure unless you make certain that it is going to
be effective. So far as the principal countries of
Europe are concerned, you cannot, as a matter of
fact, make a system effective unless the United
States actively cooperate. We all in this country
acknowledge with every possible gratitude the con-
tributions which the United States is able to make
towards the improvement of international affairs.
The United States was in fact one of the principal
authors of the Covenant, and it was a matter of
great regret to the rest of us that when the time
came the United States was not prepared to join

the

793.94/6691

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MAY 22 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

the League.

It is not a matter for us to reproach anybody with. It merely is to be observed as a fact. But notwithstanding that the United States have constantly made the most valuable contributions towards the work which the League of Nations is trying to do. Either by appointing an observer, or sometimes by nominating an Ambassador at large, sometimes through diplomatic channels, the Americans, although not members of League, have joined in a great deal of the good work, and certainly I would be the very last not to recognize gratefully and publicly the service which America has done for the world. But realizing there is no sort of good in our pretending not to observe the limitations within which the United States is likely to act, I am going to give the House an illustration. The House may remember that in the course of the discussions on the British draft convention at Geneva, we attempted to draft in the best possible form the articles in the convention to deal with security. We tried to put in articles what is called the consultative pact to provide that if there were anything of a threat of a breach of the Kellogg Pact, there should be a
consultation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

consultation between signatories and that action should then be discussed and decided upon, and we would endeavor to act together. I, myself, was responsible for the final form in which those articles were drafted. I might say that I drafted them with Mr. Stimson's declaration before my eyes, because my object was to present, on behalf of the British Government, something which, as far as I could see, was exactly in the form most likely to secure American support. When the matter came to be discussed, the American representative, Mr. Norman Davis, made a very careful declaration, and I should like to read a couple of sentences from the declaration in order that we may see for (that?) ourselves what it is foolish not to face - to estimate what is the measure of the promise of help in respect of such things as consultative pacts and action thereupon which we might hope to get from the great Republic on the other side of the ocean. This is what Mr. Norman Davis said 'we are willing to consult with other states in case of a threat of peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the states in conference determine that a state has been guilty of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

4-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which the states may thus make to restore peace'. Nothing could be clearer than that. I certainly am not going to invite anybody to deny that it is valuable, but it is "absurd to pretend that that declaration, solemnly made with the authority of the American Government at Geneva, encourages us to believe that America would take full part in economic sanctions. If I call attention to two passages in that declaration, I do hope that the House will believe that I do not do it with any desire to minimize the value of the declaration, but I do it for the purpose of clearness. In the first place, if all the conditions here are satisfied, what is it that the United States are good enough to say their government would do? It is this, 'we will refrain from any action' - not 'we will take any action' - 'tending

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

5-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

'tending to defeat such collective effort'.

Whose collective effort? Not a collective effort in which the United States take part, but a collective effort of other people, 'which the states, - not the United States - 'may thus make to restore peace'.

My honorable and learned friend the member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight) has lately said that it is a declaration, and I would be the very last to say it is not because it means this: suppose there arose what I may perhaps call a flagrant case in which the American nation was deeply stirred and suppose that the states of Europe or the other states of the world had the means by which they could put some pressure upon what is here called 'the violator' and suppose we will insofar as to do it, it is a very material thing to know that if such action commended itself to the United States we might be sure that the United States Government would do nothing whatever to encourage its own citizens or to defend them if they tried to break the ring. It is a very material thing, and corresponds in some degree with the situation which developed at one stage of the war. But it is a very different thing the
saying

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

6-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

saying 'here are economic sanctions waiting to be adopted if it were not for the pusillanimity of the British Government, and if only the critics in the House formed a government we would have economic sanctions before you could say 'Jack Robinson''".

Following Simon, Baldwin pointed out that in his opinion limitation was probably the only practical form of disarmament in air, that it was difficult to see how sanctions could be avoided against a transgressor and "if we go in for the collective maintenance of peace, it is no good going in for it unless we are prepared to fight in will and also in material. Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world or a more cruel deception of our own people than to say we will guarantee peace by arms, but not be ready for information. There is no doubt that if we are going to enforce a collective guarantee or collective sanction, it means we have to make this country a great deal stronger than she is today".

Baldwin then referred to his recent pronouncement on air policy (despatch No. 566, March 16)

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

7-#267 From London, May 19, 1 p.m.

and stated that the required preliminary work to strengthen the air force was being done so that no time should be lost if his pledge had to be implemented.

BINGHAM

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 19, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President copy of the telegram indicated below.

F/W/ 793.94/6691

Enclosures:

No. 267, ^{793.94/6691} May 19, 1 p. m., London, from Bingham.

E. R. M.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 26, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~MMH:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~SKH:~~

Nanking's despatch of April 16, 1934,
in regard to Sino-Japanese relations, --

This despatch relates to a press
item appearing in papers published at
Shanghai and Tokyo to the effect that
the Japanese army will demand the estab-
lishment of a new national defense policy
with immediate and clear-cut action on
the "Manchukuo" problem.

Mr. Peck mentions this fact because
this political motive of the Japanese
army coincides with certain opinions in
regard to the political activity of the
Japanese army stated to Mr. Peck by Mr.
Tang Yu-jen of the Chinese Foreign Office.
I believe that you may care to read the
entire despatch which is only about two
pages in length.

2
J. C. G.
JEJ/VFM


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking Office, April 16, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations; Reported
Pressure by the Japanese Army on
the Japanese Government.




F/ESP

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.



I have the honor to enclose herewith a clipping from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of April 15, 1934, entitled "Tokyo Army Wants Action". The item is a UNITED PRESS despatch dated Tokyo, April 13, and states that on April 16, when the Japanese Premier names the new Minister of War, the Army will demand the establishment of a new national defense policy with immediate and clear-cut action on the "Manchukuo" problem; the despatch adds that

"Besides the national defense question, the Army will request complete relief for the distressed agricultural villages, improved education facilities, extermination of dangerous thoughts and quick adjustment of the present political disorders."

I am inviting the Department's attention to this news despatch, because of the fact that its substance more or less corroborates statements made to me recently by Chinese Government officials.

On the evening of April 14 I gave a small dinner party at which one of the guests was Mr. Peng Sho-peï,

Director

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JUN 4 - 1934

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Director of the Political Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan. In the course of a conversation Mr. Peng told me that from information received by the Chinese Government from Tokyo, the resignation of General Hayashi from the War Ministry was not, in reality, occasioned by the conviction of his brother of fraud during the latter's tenure of office as Acting Mayor of Tokyo, as reported in the press, but was brought about by demands on the part of the "Young Military Party" in Japan that the Japanese Government take "positive action" for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy; General Hayashi did not believe that the Japanese Government should force the issue with China in this way, and, consequently tendered his resignation.

The report received by the Chinese Government regarding the reasons for General Hayashi's resignation as Minister of War may not, of course, be reliable; nevertheless, it seems to be borne out somewhat by the enclosed press despatch from Tokyo.

The second reason for bringing this news item to the attention of the Department is the similarity between the last paragraph of the despatch, indicating that the Japanese Army will demand of the Government various forms of economic and political reform, and the second paragraph on page 5 of the enclosure with my despatch of February 16, 1934, entitled "Sino-Japanese Relations; Interview with Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs".

The

- 3 -

The description of the political motives and objectives of the Japanese Army, as given to me by Mr. Tang Yu-jen, of the Chinese Foreign Office, who is generally classified as a "pro-Japanese" official, seems, again, to be corroborated rather strikingly by the enclosed news despatch.

It will be observed that the purport both of the news despatch and of the information reaching the Chinese Government is that the Japanese Army is attempting to force on the Japanese Government a policy which includes such diverse problems as the solution of the Manchurian dispute, the relief of distressed agricultural classes in Japan and the adjustment of internal political disorders.

Yours respectfully,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

1 Enclosure:

1/ As stated.

In duplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy at Tokyo.

800
WRP:HC:MCL

1 Carbon Copy

Received

5871

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Department of Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Legation, Nanking Office, dated April 16, 1934, entitled "Sino-Japanese Relations; Reported Pressure by the Japanese Army on the Japanese Government".

THE NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS, April 15, 1934.

TOKYO ARMY WANTS ACTION

New National Defence Policy Demanded

Tokyo, Apr. 13.

Establishment of a new national defence policy with immediate and clear-cut action on the Manchoukuo problem will be demanded of the Government by the Army on Monday when the Premier, Viscount M. Saito, names the new Minister of War, it was indicated in reliable sources today.

It is expected that the high command of the Army will present certain definite demands to the Government in connection with the new appointment. Although the exact nature of the demands is not known, the Army was expected to seek a clearly defined policy with regard to internal and foreign questions that the nation can cleave to during the forthcoming "emergency period" in 1935 and 1936.

Besides the national defence question, the Army will request complete relief for the distressed agricultural villages, improved education facilities, extermination of dangerous thoughts and quick adjustment of the present political disorders.--United Press.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Division of Nanking Office, April 25, 1934.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 21 1934

Department of State

Subject: The Japanese "Informal Statement
of April 17, 1934."

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

AM REC'D



MAY 1934

As a matter of incidental interest in connection with present discussions over the Japanese "informal statement" of April 17, 1934, I have the honor to state that I have ascertained from an apparently reliable source that when REUTER NEWS SERVICES distributed its bulletins in Nanking on April 17 carrying a summarized version of the "informal statement", this was not brought immediately to the attention of Dr. Wang Ching-wei, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the following day however, he attended the weekly meeting of the Central Political Council and the matter was brought to his attention. The message was discussed at the meeting, and it was agreed that the National Government should take some action. The same afternoon Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, was commissioned to draft a rejoinder. This he did and, being quite in the dark regarding the general opinion of the Chinese official world in regard to the significance of the "informal statement", he was obliged to make his draft

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a very mild one. Nevertheless, this statement was released by the Chinese Foreign Office on the evening of April 19. Either on the same day or on the following day, according to my informant, the Foreign Office telegraphed instructions to the Chinese Ministers in the important capitals directing them to bring the Japanese statement to the attention of the Governments to which they were accredited, and to point out that one effect of the statement was to curtail certain of their rights, acquired through treaties, of dealing with China. It was expected that, in this way, foreign reaction against the "informal statement" would reenforce Chinese opposition. I may add that if instructions to foreign diplomatic representatives abroad were despatched by the Chinese Foreign Office, as stated above, this fact serves to explain a remark made to me by an important Chinese official that the Chinese Government was somewhat surprised at the failure of the American Government to "say anything" about this aspect of the Japanese statement.

On April 21 Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, was summoned to the weekly meeting of the Legislative Yuan, of which Dr. Sun Fo is President. At the meeting Dr. Wang was questioned in regard to, first of all, the pending question of railway through traffic and postal arrangements with Manchuria. Dr. Wang assured the meeting that although the Japanese were insisting on the restoration of railway through traffic and of postal

communications


- 3 -

communications with Manchuria, the Chinese Government would take no step which could be remotely interpreted as even de facto recognition of "Manchukuo".

Dr. Wang was questioned, also, in regard to the steps taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the Japanese "informal statement". He informed the meeting of the Chinese "informal statement" issued on April 19th in reply to the Japanese statement of April 17th and of the instructions sent to Chinese diplomats abroad. The meeting criticized the Chinese statement as being too mild in tone and criticized both steps as being entirely inadequate to the crisis presented by the Japanese statement. Dr. Wang replied, in self defense, as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that there was nothing further which the Chinese Government could do at the moment and, apparently, the members of the Legislative Yuan acquiesced in this contention.

As the Department is aware, the present Government in Nanking is fighting for its existence on the basis of its handling of the Japanese controversy. The Canton regime, in particular, has already accused the Government of failing to protect China against Japanese encroachments and certainly will not refrain from utilizing any further grounds which may present themselves for attacking General Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Wang Ching-wei on this score.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Heck,
Counselor of Legation.

In triplicate to the Department
Copy to the Legation, Peiping.
WRP:HC:MCL

D I G E S T

Despatch of April 25, 1934.

From: Counselor of Legation, Nanking, China.

To: The Department of State.

Subject: The Japanese "Informal Statement of April 17, 1934".

Despatch.

The abbreviated report of the Japanese "informal statement" of April 17 as brought to Nanking by REUTER NEWS SERVICES on that day did not immediately come to the attention of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was discussed at the meeting of the Central Political Council on April 18. Dr. Hsu Mo, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, was instructed, according to information reaching the Nanking office of the American Legation, to prepare a draft rejoinder.

The rejoinder of the Chinese Government to the Japanese "informal statement" was released on the evening of April 19 and on the following day instructions were telegraphed to Chinese diplomatic representatives at important capitals directing that they invite the attention of the Governments to which they were accredited to the fact that the rights of those Governments acquired through treaties were violated by the Japanese "informal statement".

The Chinese Government is reported to have been surprised by the failure of the American Government to indicate its dissent from this aspect of the Japanese statement.

The Legislative Yuan on April 21 informed Dr. Wang Ching-wei that it was not satisfied with the steps taken by him to meet the crisis caused by the Japanese "informal statement".

The Chinese Government is on trial before the Chinese public in its handling of the Japanese controversy.

WRP:HC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 15, 1934.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
M.H:

Shanghai's despatch No. 9440
under date April 25, 1934, --

No action.


The despatch encloses and summarizes clippings from the Shanghai newspapers concerning Japan's declaration of April 17, 1934, with regard to China.

The despatch points out that the greater part of the comment, both in the Chinese and foreign-owned press, bitterly denounces the Japanese for their high-handed declaration.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Hunsaker NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 9440



Handwritten initials: FE, H, CK

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, April 25, 1934.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
JUN 18 1934
JUN 18 1934

Subject: Reaction to Japan's Declaration
April 17th with regard to China.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND W.D.



For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
To field	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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I have the honor to state that the informal

statement issued by the Tokyo Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, with regard to Japan's role in maintaining peace and order in the Orient and objecting to other powers providing China with military airplanes, military instructors and political loans has aroused the widest possible comment in Shanghai, both in the press and elsewhere. The greater part of the comment, both in the Chinese and foreign owned press, bitterly denounces the Japanese for their high-handed declaration. This was of course to be expected from the Chinese-owned press but the British and American owned papers in Shanghai are almost equally severe in their condemnation. This is possibly not so surprising when one considers the tone of the press comments from Europe and America which have been cabled to Shanghai.

There

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RECEIVED

JUN 21 1934

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There are transmitted herewith several editorials from among the large number which have appeared within the last few days, which are typical of the comment made.

THE SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY (American) believes the statement is an empty threat and that Japan can and will do nothing to make good its threat against the western powers, and moreover that the latter will not wait for permission from Tokyo to continue to supply military airplanes to China. The paper states that the Japanese leaders consider a statement of this kind is necessary to prove to their own people that huge and ruinous military budgets are necessary for Japan's existence.

- 1/ There is enclosed an editorial from the issue of April 20th setting forth the comments outlined above. A further leading article on April 21st states:

"The fact is that what Japan fears is not disorganization in China but unification in China. The Japanese would like to hinder, not help, in China's work of rehabilitation. We speak now not of what Japan says but of what Japan's actions clearly prove. Japan wants to obtain complete domination in China before the Chinese can grow so strong that this is not possible."

In an article in the same issue by Kwei Chung-Shu, a Chinese contributor, the latter states that the Japanese threat is directed both at Nanking and at Geneva; that Japan's threat of positive action may serve to forestall any definite step that may be adopted by the League to effect a semblance of just settlement between the two countries. He believes that whether the threat will be translated into positive action will depend on the future policy of the League.

THE

-3-

- THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) in its
- 2/ editorial of April 21st, a copy of which is enclosed, believes that the statement which has startled the whole world is not altogether unexpected, since it has been a part of Japan's policy for some years to regard itself as gifted with a special mission to maintain peace in the Far East. However, its enunciation at this time, when strenuous endeavors are being made to secure better relationships between China and Japan, is singularly inept. It appears as though Japan were anxious to force China to refuse its recent demands regarding through railway traffic, et cetera, thereby laying the basis for further Japanese action in North China, the possibility of which has been only thinly veiled for sometime past. The paper states that Japan desires to create in China only one sphere of influence which would be under its own domination and that this holds a grave menace to the interests of the other powers. THE NORTH CHINA believes that Japan would make good her threat of using force against China and states that the very fact that Japan is in an unenviable diplomatic position is a direct incentive toward the imposition of Japan's will on the Chinese nation.
- 3/ There is also enclosed from the same issue of THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS a copy of a letter from its Washington correspondent, dated March 21st, commenting on the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister.
- 4/ There is also enclosed an editorial by Mr. Hollington K. Tong in THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese independent daily,

American

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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American registered) of April 20, 1934, in which he states that the ultimatum issued by the Tokyo Foreign Office to the powers is regarded in Chinese circles as the most serious development since the Mukden incident, if not since the 21 demands of 1915, and that the Chinese people will now strenuously oppose any form of settlement of the outstanding questions with Japan which are the legacy of the Tangku Truce Agreement. These are, through traffic on the Peking-Mukden Railway, the restoration of postal communication, and Customs Houses along the Great Wall. He states that it has long been expected that there would be a ban placed by Japan on international cooperation with China but it was not expected that it would come so soon. It is absurd for Japan, he states, to assume that even with international assistance China will be able to measure her strength against Japan within the next twenty or thirty years, and the only explanation of the declaration is that Japan wishes to keep China perpetually in a backward state so that when the Japanese have consolidated their position in Manchuria and Jehol, China will be incapable of offering resistance to their further encroachments within China proper. He states that the powers must sooner or later take up this issue with Japan, because if the latter is to dictate what they should refrain from doing in China, not only will their interests in Asia be placed in serious jeopardy, but their prestige throughout the world will suffer irremediably.

The

-5-

5/ The only one of the foreign papers which has attempted to explain the Japanese position is THE SHANGHAI TIMES (British daily) in its editorial of April 20th, a copy of which is enclosed. That paper states that the Japanese statement is interpreted in League of Nations circles as being the "logical outcome of Japan's striving towards hegemony in the Far East," and that it implies a policy of the "Closed Door" in China with eventual monopoly by Japan as the fruit of the Manchurian adventure. The paper goes on to state that the above seems to be a misinterpretation which overlooks the enormously difficult position of Japan, surrounded as that country is by growing unfriendliness on the part of so many people; that if any honest critic were to place himself in Japan's position and ask himself what he would do in such circumstances his answer would be not very different from that which is being made in Tokyo. Peace and order in the Far East must be Japan's paramount consideration. China is struggling against internal disorder but slowly evolving into a power of importance, and in China there are all manner of foreign influences at work, mainly in the hands of men who are not friendly toward Japan. China is being armed and modernized from the west and the temporary estrangement between China and Japan is in danger of becoming permanent through the attitude of the Geneva doctrinaires. The paper states:

"China's opposition to Japan has as its main bulwark the Geneva complex and although we feel it is wrong to represent Japan as being opposed to Geneva's assistance

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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in the social and economic rehabilitation of China, it is obviously of greatly disturbing moment to Japan to find China the happy hunting ground of those who would sell her munitions, airplanes and loans and at the same time join in a chorus more or less anti-Japanese in character. Truly is the peace of the Orient threatened in consequence."

The Chinese vernacular press has devoted numberless
6/ editorials to the subject. There is enclosed a clipping from THE CHINA PRESS of April 20th giving the substance of the leading editorials in the vernacular press on the previous day. Numbers have appeared since that time but beyond the fact that they bitterly denounce the Japanese attitude and declare it to be an open threat, not only to China but to the western powers, these editorials contain little worthy of reproducing here.


In regard to the statement which had been made in Tokyo, that the proceeds of the American cotton and wheat loan were being used for military purposes, Dr. H. H. Kung, in the course of an interview published by the Kuo Min News Agency on April 23rd, stated that the proceeds of this loan were to be devoted entirely to productive purposes and that appropriations to date have been as follows:

\$1,800,000 for repatriation of farmers in the Communist-bandit areas in Kiangsi.

\$300,000 for relief offamine in Szechueh; and

\$4,000,000 for reconstruction work of the National Economic Council.

Respectfully yours,


Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6 ✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Editorial from SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY of April 20, 1934.
- 2/- Editorial from THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of April 21, 1934.
- 3/- Washington correspondent's letter published in NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of March 21, 1934.
- 4/- Editorial by Hollington K. Tong, from THE CHINA PRESS of April 20, 1934.
- 5/- Editorial from THE SHANGHAI TIMES of April 20, 1934.
- 6/- Clipping from THE CHINA PRESS of April 20, 1934.

800
PRJ MB

In Quintuplicate.

Copy to Legation.

Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April
25, 1934, on the subject: "Reaction to Japan's Declaration
of April 17th with regard to China."

SOURCE: SHANGHAI EVENING POST &
MERCURY (American), April
20, 1934.

Editorial.

Chip on the Shoulder.

SHANGHAI, April 20, 1934.

Chip On The Shoulder

BOMBASTIC Tokyo utterances are too old a story to merit great attention. It must be admitted, however, that the by no means pleasing novelty of threat toward other Powers is embodied in the Foreign Office's statement of Tuesday, though the Foreign Office spokesman was careful to name no names.

Interpreted, this statement appeared to say (we choose our words with care because diplomacy and non-modifiable verbiage seldom march hand in hand) that Japan considers herself appointed by God to run the Far East; that China is a silent partner in this matter; that if other Powers do anything for China such as providing military airplanes and instructors or political loans—shades of Nishihara!—Japan will be "forced to object," and that all this claptrap is deemed necessary because of rumors of "proposed joint assistance of other Powers to China."

The last part evidently refers to the reported international financial enterprise which recently attracted much attention in the Moscow press, according to a Tass News Agency dispatch upon which we commented at the time. Here in Shanghai and up in Nanking there was deep dense silence, but Tokyo seems to think there has been something in it.

The remainder of this valuable *vox Dei* effusion is worth precisely the paper on which it has been printed, no more and no less. It is no news that Japan looks with disfavor on activities by anyone else in China. It is a good deal of news if this fact means anything but addition to the Chinese unrest and turmoil which Japan hypocritically affects to deplore.

Supply of military airplanes to China, the Japanese may be assured, will not wait upon any permission from Tokyo. Neither will any other legitimate aid which occidental nations can furnish the Chinese either for putting their house in order—the short-lived Fukien rebellion was a striking endorsement of the value of the airplane in suppressing civil uprising—or for legitimate national defense. Tokyo is as well aware of this as we, and probably much better, but it costs nothing (in the present state of Japan's international prestige) to emit a tentative irresponsible roar or two by way of seeing how much the welkin will ring.

It all boils down to the old picture of Japan as the neighborhood smart boy, putting a chip on his shoulder and daring the world to knock it off—carefully avoiding meeting any other boy's eye directly.

If the challenge brings no response, the boy's self-esteem goes up and he struts more proudly. But it is well to bear in mind that many people quite able to meet such a

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It all boils down to the old picture of Japan as the neighborhood smart boy, putting a chip on his shoulder and daring the world to knock it off—carefully avoiding meeting any other boy's eye directly.

If the challenge brings no response, the boy's self-esteem goes up and he struts more proudly. But it is well to bear in mind that many people quite able to meet such a challenge if there were any gain in the matter are not inclined to involve themselves in either controversy or something more serious so long as nothing is to be gained.

Two facts are clear: Japan is not likely to move beyond "sound and fury" against any major Power at present, and Japan is due for a terrible mopping-up if she does. All this the real leaders in Japan know. But they feel it necessary to exhibit bad manners as a proof to their own people that the nation moves forward fearlessly and that ruinous budgets are necessary to oil the military and naval machine.

Those who understand this general situation can philosophically endure a great deal more Tokyo blackguarding than has even yet been forthcoming—and it may be expected, so long as militarism stays in the saddle. But those who inspire such utterances are not casting defiance in the face of foes of Far East peace. If any such foes now exist, it is assuredly themselves and none other.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April
25, 1934, on the subject: "Reaction to Japan's Declaration
of April 17th with Regard to China."

SOURCE: THE NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS
(British), April 21, 1934.

Editorial.

A Grave Issue.

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL
APR 21 1934 71.2.10.72
A GRAVE ISSUE

The informal statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on Tuesday regarding the relationship between China and Japan, startling the whole world as it appears to have done, was not entirely unexpected. It has been part and parcel of the Japanese policy for some years past to regard that nation as gifted with a special mission to maintain the peace in the Far East, to the exclusion of other Powers who undertook that responsibility long before Japan was in a position to do so. Its enunciation is but the logical result of developments during the past three years and helps in the final interpretation of much that has happened during that period. What is singular about the whole matter is the fact that, at a time when strenuous endeavours are being made to secure better relationships between the two countries, this moment should have been chosen for issuing a statement calculated to stiffen the Chinese attitude, if not to stir up an indignation which can do nothing but prolong an unfortunate state of affairs which never would have existed but for Japan's own actions. If it has the effect of putting an end to the negotiations for the lifting of the postal blockade and the re-establishment of through traffic on the Peking-Mukden Railway no one will be surprised. Indeed it would almost seem as though Japan were anxious to force China to refuse her demands, thereby laying a basis for further Japanese action in North China, the possibility of which has only been thinly veiled for some time past. A more cynical statement it is difficult to conceive. On the one hand Japan declares the joint responsibility of herself and China to maintain peace in the Far East; on the other she does it in such a manner as to provoke a breach of that peace for which she appears to have such a tender regard.

China, in the eyes of Japan, is a dangerous country: if attacked it is likely to defend itself, and consequently objection is registered against provision by other countries of military aeroplanes, and military instructors, and the making of political loans. More, even, can be read into the statement. China has the task of restoring order within her borders. It is her own responsibility and the Japanese attitude, that she shall receive no outside aid in doing something the necessity for which has been universally recognized, is calculated to prevent that progress of which China has been showing satisfactory signs. What is apparently sought is the establishment

several officers from H.M.S. Cumberland, Col. Pelly and a number of officers of the Garrison and the wives; General Macnaghten, Lady Wheeler, Mrs. Edward Ezra and Mr. Denzil Ezra, Mr. George, Mr. J. I. Jones, Mr. Ronald McDonald, Co. Beaumont, Commander and Mr. Doyle, Mr. and Mrs. Reader Harr and Capt. Warren. The Brigadier's A.D.C., Mr. Ronald Wood, looked after everyone most attentively, and the hostess, looking very smart in black satin, spent a busy evening greeting arriving and departing guests.

Reception at A.W.C.

Another event of the week which chiefly concerned Shanghai's American community was the reception given by Mr. and Mrs. T. O. Schmidt and Mrs. C. H. Raven, Sr. at the American Women's Club last night. The occasion was to celebrate the arrival, or rather, return, of Mrs. C. H. Raven, Jr., who was formerly Miss Vivian Schmidt, and was the guest of honour at last night's party. Mrs. Raven, Jr., is the daughter of the hostess and has just returned from



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
American Consul General at S
25, 1934, on the subject: "
of April 17th with Regard to

SOURCE:

Ed

A Gray

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL
APR 21 1934 W.C. 10 92
A GRAVE ISSUE

The informal statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on Tuesday regarding the relationship between China and Japan, startling the whole world as it appears to have done, was not entirely unexpected. It has been part and parcel of the Japanese policy for some years past to regard that nation as gifted with a special mission to maintain the peace in the Far East, to the exclusion of other Powers who undertook that responsibility long before Japan was in a position to do so. Its enunciation is but the logical result of developments during the past three years and helps in the final interpretation of much that has happened during that period. What is singular about the whole matter is the fact that, at a time when strenuous endeavours are being made to secure better relationships between the two countries, this moment should have been chosen for issuing a statement calculated to stiffen the Chinese attitude, if not to stir up an indignation which can do nothing but prolong an unfortunate state of affairs which never would have existed but for Japan's own actions. If it has the effect of putting an end to the negotiations for the lifting of the postal blockade and the re-establishment of through traffic on the Peking-Mukden Railway no one will be surprised. Indeed it would almost seem as though Japan were anxious to force China to refuse her demands, thereby laying a basis for further Japanese action in North China, the possibility of which has only been thinly veiled for some time past. A more cynical statement it is difficult to conceive. On the one hand Japan declares the joint responsibility of herself and China to maintain peace in the Far East; on the other she does it in such a manner as to provoke a breach of that peace for which she appears to have such a tender regard.

China, in the eyes of Japan, is a dangerous country; if attacked it is likely to defend itself, and consequently objection is registered against provision by other countries of military aeroplanes, and military instructors, and the making

be seriously imperilled, and it may very well be that in the course of time, if ever such a policy were allowed to exist, they might be completely obliterated. In it may be seen the first overt step towards the doctrine of Asia for the Asiatics with Japan as the sole arbiter in its affairs. That "Japan will take positive action if peace and order are disturbed by international co-operation in assisting China" and that "if force is used by other nations, Japan will resort to force," further statements of a Foreign Office spokesman, may be taken as an indication of the lengths to which the military elements in Japan are again influencing that country's foreign policy. It is but natural that a storm of indignation should be sweeping over China for its sovereign integrity is being menaced in a manner which it has never before experienced, but as has already been pointed out in connection with the negotiations concerning the North, it will be foolish if, as one Chinese spokesman suggests, hope is placed in any doubt as to whether Japan would resort to force if resistance is offered to her plans. That the country is in an unenviable diplomatic position, far from being a factor contributing towards the maintenance of peace, is a direct incentive towards the imposition of Japan's will upon the Chinese nation. Those who professed to see everything good in Japan's actions regarding China during the past three years; have now been given an opportunity to realize that not only are the Japanese injuring the interests of China alone, but that a very definite threat has been made against the interests of those who so unthinkingly have given their moral support to the aggressions that have occurred since the Mukden Incident. The statement of a new policy such as that under notice possesses grave potentialities for China and also the rest of the world.

Cunningham,
April
claration

Y NEWS
1934.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

...and military instructors, and the making of political loans. More, even, can be read into the statement. China has the task of restoring order within her borders. It is her own responsibility and the Japanese attitude, that she shall receive no outside aid in doing something the necessity for which has been universally recognized, is calculated to prevent that progress of which China has been showing satisfactory signs. What is apparently sought is the establishment of a Japanese hegemony in the Far East, in which this country shall be condemned to a state of political and industrial helotry, to create, instead of the old spheres of influence which caused so much heart-burning in the past, one sphere which shall be that of Japan to the exclusion of all others. It is a much bigger programme than was originally believed and involves not the dominance of North China alone, but of the whole of this enormous country; it aims at control not only of China's foreign policy, but also of her domestic, and reduces the country to a scantily concealed vassalage which is contrary to all the principles adopted by the whole world since the Great War for its rehabilitation. What will be the attitude of the Powers in connection with this development in Japanese policy will not be fully appreciated until the communication which it is anticipated Japan will address to them on the subject has been fully considered. It is believed that the world will reject any doctrine which puts their interests in this country subject to the consent of the Japanese and there is then a grave danger that this "hands-off-China" declaration will have created a major Far Eastern issue. If the opinion of the Tokyo "Asahi" is to be accepted as reflecting the true state of the Japanese mind, it is obvious that this Ishmael amongst the nations no longer intends to worry about the opinions of others, but proposes to follow a clear-cut policy in Japan's best interests.

The situation that will be created will be undoubtedly grave. By the Japanese action the interests in China of all the other nations will

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Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 25,
1934, on the subject: "Reaction to Japan's Declaration of
April 17th with Regard to China."

SOURCE: THE NORTH CHINA DAILY
NEWS (April 21, 1934).

Letter from Washington Correspondent.

Washington Letter

THIRD PHASE OF "NEW DEAL"

Some of Its Happenings Review Now It is All Over:
Comment on Mr. Hull's Note to Japan

APR 21 1934 FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT *M. C. D. M.*

Washington, Mar. 21.

The fact that in November the whole of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate must seek reelection has coloured the political activities of the past month. Congressmen with an eye on the ballot box rather than on the future have found it harder than the President to preserve the farsighted view. They have voted for what would be ideally desirable for the country. Future generations have no present vote; neither from the point of view of the individual congressman have residents in other sections of the United States.

President Roosevelt, with all his prestige has been unable to overcome the very human instinct of the average Congressman to pass measures which will buy him votes when the time for his reelection nears. That is why no President's "honeymoon" lasts beyond his midterm. President Roosevelt's has lasted longer than most, owing to his flair for political management and his ability to appeal directly to the public over the heads of their elected representatives. Congressmen, even when deserting him have felt it expedient to do so while loudly singing his praises. The defeat of the Saint Lawrence deep waterway treaty, the passage of the bill for printing off two billion dollars to pay the veterans their bonus certificates in advance of their maturity, the restoration of civil servants salary cuts and disabled veterans compensation pay are a few of the more important checks from which the President has suffered. They show that his task in "putting on the brakes" and checking rising Federal expenditures will be considerably harder than starting those expenditures.

Sectional Interests

The defeat of the Saint Lawrence waterway treaty with Canada in the Senate showed the power of sectional interests. Senators from the Mississippi valley feared they would get less pork from the Federal barrel if a rival with so large a capacity for devouring funds as the Saint Lawrence scheme appeared on the scene; the Senators from the Eastern states feared they would be unpopular with the inhabitants of the small Atlantic ports if an alternative sea route were encouraged. There were many small segments of the country active in expressing their disapproval of the treaty and no similar segments actively in its favour. So a measure which the Administration felt would have benefited the country at large went by the board. The restoration of pay cuts and the bonus vote (which the Senate will kill) showed the temptation to buy votes by passing measures benefiting strongly organized

the strident thunderings of the two-fisted General grew in volume till it commanded the all but undivided attention of the President. Once or twice (while the General paused for breath) it had been heard before, as for example on July 3 when the economic conference was told to stop talking stabilization; but the monetary side of the President's policy during this period was distinctly subsidiary. With the rise of Professor Warren it became paramount, and N.R.A. receded into the background along with its more modest brother A.A.A. Neither industry nor agriculture had improved sufficiently by planning and control alone, so the President was prepared to try the Warren theory of taking a short cut to prosperity by way of currency manipulation. There had moreover been considerable political pressure for inflation from the beginning which the President had headed off for a time by asking (and receiving) special powers from Congress to cut the dollar 50 per cent. and issue up to three billion of paper money at his discretion. When the powers were voted it was never for a moment believed that they would be used almost to the full.

Third Phase Ended

This third general phase of the President's New Deal has just come to an end. Monetary manipulation failed. Professor Warren returned to Cornell and America to the gold bullion standard. Looking back over the past the Administration saw a wonderful improvement in the country's morale, but a material improvement which fell far short of the promise of last spring. Perhaps it was because the projects of last spring had been too hastily abandoned. Once again therefore great emphasis has been laid upon N.R.A. General Johnson's voice is heard exhorting industry to employ more men and increase purchasing power by increasing wages. The difference between the present emphasis on N.R.A. and the former emphasis on N.R.A. is that now it is accompanied by a realization that a restoration of world trade is essential to American recovery. The President has, therefore, asked for special powers over tariffs. He may not get them in the form he wants them, for a Congressman faced with the necessity of being reelected in November dare not supported a measure which might threaten a local industry. Nevertheless restoration of trade has been placed in the forefront of the Administration's programme. There may be yet another swing of the pendulum and the President may try inflation once again, but for the moment international agreement on currency stabilization and international arrangements for increasing trade are the objectives.

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the scene; the Senators from Eastern states feared they would be unpopular with the inhabitants of the small Atlantic ports if an alternative sea route were encouraged. There were many small segments of the country active in expressing their disapproval of the treaty and no similar segments actively in its favour. So a measure which the Administration felt would have benefited the country at large went by the board. The restoration of pay cuts and the bonus vote (which the Senate will kill) showed the temptation to buy votes by passing measures benefiting strongly organized political minorities. The redemption of an outstanding government obligation (such as the bonus certificates) by issuing non-interest bearing notes (such as the greenbacks proposed in Congress) might be defended under special circumstances, providing the notes thus substituted were gradually retired. But the President fears, one might almost say knows, that once the practice had started it would be impossible to stop. The immoral union of printing press and polling booth would breed nothing but trouble for the country.

New Administration Methods

Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether the Administration will in the immediate future be able to carry its plans into effect, the past month witnessed profound change in the administration's method of attacking the depression. There have been many of these changes. The President entered the White House pledged to Recovery, Retrenchment and Reform. His first efforts were directed to bringing national income into line with national expenditure and putting the banking and financial structure of the country on a sound basis. Many of his Democratic colleagues considered that he should have stopped there. They felt convinced that America, on the basis of a reformed banking system and a balanced budget, would be able to draw full benefits from the world revival the first signs of which had appeared in the previous July, though they had been later obscured by the banking crisis. Allied to this policy of conservative reform was the project sponsored by the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, of overhauling the American Tariff and leading the world in the removal of trade obstacles.

Umbrellas in Repair

At this point the embattled professors came charging down upon Washington vigorously waving their umbrellas. (The President once remarked, when twitted for relying so much upon the Brains Trust that the professors had at least seen the storm coming and kept their umbrellas in repair). Retrenchment was squeezed to death between the upper and lower millstones of recovery and reform, and a planned national economy, with the plans drawn up by the professors, became the main objective of the administration. The President was all the more ready to borrow the Professors' umbrellas as the emergency banking legislation which he had put into effect immediately upon entering the White House had been prepared by Mr. Ogden Mills and President Hoover and left lying on his table. The professors now provided him with a plethora of plans of which no Republican had ever dreamed. Adequate planning would save the country, and a revival of foreign trade, as a means of recovery, was held of minor importance. The "National Industrial Recovery Administration" became the "National Recovery Administration" and the vigorous personality of General Johnson, head of the N.R.A. thrust itself well to the foreground of the country's panorama. The Radio, Movies and Street Parades all played their part, while a special N.R.A. stamp was designed, the first time any government department had a stamp issued in its honour. When the tumult subsided and the dust had settled everything was seen to be very much as it was before. The trenches had been improved but little ground gained. Now the still small voice of Professor Warren which had been all but drowned by

asked for special powers over tariffs. He may not get them in the form he wants them, for a Congressman faced with the necessity of being reelected in November dare not support a measure which might threaten a local industry. Nevertheless restoration of trade has been placed in the forefront of the Administration's programme. There may be yet another swing of the pendulum and the President may try inflation once again, but for the moment international agreement on currency stabilization and international arrangements for increasing trade are the objectives.

Japan and America

The most significant recent international event in the United States was undoubtedly the exchange of notes between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Mr Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State. On the surface the notes were just an exchange of courtesies, which itself was of some importance after a period in which it would have been truer to speak of relations between the two countries being characterized by an exchange of discourtesies. The Japanese note referred to the "traditional" friendship and peaceful relations which had existed between the two countries. pointed out the opportunities which existed for mutual trade, affirmed Japan's intentions to remain at peace with the world and rejoiced that there were no outstanding questions which the two countries could not settle by peaceful means. The American Secretary of State agreed, and his language reflected the new outlook on Far Eastern problems which the present Administration have adopted. The severe moral lecturing of Mr. Stimson has been abandoned and all problems are looked at from a realistic point of view.

The Japanese note had at any rate secured from Mr. Hull an official statement which bore out the reality of this change in attitude, which would be of value for Japanese home consumption. Earlier in the year Mr. Litvinoff had visited Washington and left behind the impression that the United States and Russia had almost formed a united front against Japan. This could now no longer be affirmed. The American government was equally friendly with the Japanese, and a series of conversations might be expected to remove any outstanding causes of friction.

The notes, however, are even more significant if read between the lines, or rather if the American note is read between the lines. Mr. Hull, in accepting Mr. Hirota's assurances that there are no outstanding problems which, if looked at in their proper perspective (a phrase inserted with deliberate intent) were not capable of peaceful solution, showed that he considered these questions fell into two divisions—those which concerned America and Japan alone and those which concerned all countries interested in the Pacific. The first (such as immigration and trade) Mr. Hull showed himself ready to discuss and asked the Japanese government to show its hand and make definite proposals. The second, Mr. Hull clearly intimated, must be discussed with all interested countries. It was clear, reading between the lines of his letter that Mr. Hull was thinking of a Pacific conference at which China and Soviet Russia would be represented, and of course Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal—the nine powers of the nine power pact plus the Russians who were unrecognized in 1921. Political problems and disarmament would be considered in relation to one another, as they were at the Washington conference, all would be put into the common melting pot. The recognition of Manchoukuo would be the key to the problem. America has never categorially stated that she would not recognize Manchoukuo; she has merely stated that she would uphold the Stimson doctrine. If China herself recognized Manchoukuo, in return perhaps for a series of new non-aggression pacts, the American difficulty would be over. The recognition of Manchoukuo might lead to the abandonment of the Japanese demand for naval equality. America would then feel more inclined to

give way on the Pacific naval bases, especially as they would prove a bone of contention with the Independent Republic of the Philippines and all would be for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 25, 1934, on the subject: "Reaction to Japan's Declaration of April 17th with regard to China."

SOURCE: THE CHINA PRESS
(Chinese independent daily), April 20, 1934.

Editorial by Hollington K. Tong.

Ultimatum on Hands-off Policy Seen as Direct Gage Daring West to Interfere with Plans.

Ultimatum On Hands-Off Policy Seen As Direct Gage Daring West To Interfere With Plans
APR 20 1934 *China Press*
By HOLLINGTON K. TONG

The ultimatum issued by the Tokyo foreign office to the powers on April 17 that Japan would oppose on her own responsibility their sale of military airplanes, their despatch of military instructors, their loaning of money and their rendering of other forms of assistance to China is regarded in Chinese circles as the most serious development since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on the fateful evening of September 18, 1931.

Some even consider this ultimatum as ranking in importance and gravity with the presentation by the Japanese government of the 21 Demands in 1915. The unprovoked Japanese attack on Shanghai two years ago fades into insignificance in comparison with the sweeping claim of Japan to exercise complete sovereignty over the whole of China. The Shanghai outrage, though distressing and humiliating, was in one sense a local catastrophe.

More They Get, More They Want
The nation-wide indignation that has since been created by the Tokyo statement is nullifying Nanking's efforts to improve Chinese-Japanese relationship. It is a certainty that the Chinese people will now oppose any form of the settlement of the three outstanding questions between China and Japan which are the legacy of the Tangku truce. They are confirmed more than ever in the belief that the more China concedes the more will Japan demand.

The recent circulation of the news that there exists a good chance for the early settlement of the questions of through traffic with Manchuria, the restoration of postal communications and the establishment of Customs houses along the Great Wall as a result of the Nanchang conference, in the opinion of observing Chinese, has led Japan to advance this presumptuous and utterly unwarranted claim.

Conferences of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the military council, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, president of the Executive Yuan, and General Huang Fu, chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Commission, at Nanchang, have come to some conclusion. The general impression abroad is that upon his return to North China, General Huang will reopen negotiations with the Japanese looking towards a solution of the three questions.

Japan's Chiefs Hurl Defiance At Big Powers
APR 20 1934 *China Press*

Ultimatum On Hands-Off Policy In Asia Seen As Direct Challenge

Japanese Ambitions On Continent Explained

(Continued from Page 9, Col. 8.)

appears to be exasperated by the slow progress that is being made in the building up of a world empire.

The arbitrary statement of the Tokyo foreign office, besides warning the powers against helping China in any way, is illogical and contradictory. The pith of it is found in this part of the statement: "In view of the fact that the restoration of order in China depends on China herself, Japan cannot help opposing any of China's measures which might be contrary to peace in the Orient. Furthermore, Japan will be forced to object to any measures on the part of other powers which are likely to lead to disturbance of peace in the Orient. For example, providing China with military airplanes and military instructors and giving her political loans are among the measures which are doomed to be met with opposition from Japan."

Based On No Facts

What does this all mean? Are China's purchase of airplanes and her engagement of foreign instructors to teach her sons military science among the measures "which are likely to lead to disturbance of peace in the Orient?" At the present time China is not borrowing any money from any country, but if she should conclude a foreign loan, that cannot be construed as a measure which will disturb peace in the Orient.

It is absurd for Japan to assume that even with international assistance China will be able to measure her strength with the island empire for the next 20 or 30 years to come. Japan is quite well aware of this fact, but what is her object in opposing China's creation of an efficient military air service to fight bandits in the interior? Is she worrying over the present success of the anti-communist campaign in Kiangsi and Fukien?

Whatever technical assistance China has been able to obtain through the League of Nations is contributing to the improvement of

by the Japanese diplomats and military men that, if the Chinese officials fail to resist it, there will be a general reduction of the imports of foreign arms and ammunition and military planes.

The immediate excuse used by the Japanese foreign office for the announcement of Japan's new China policy was the rumor from Shanghai that a movement is under way to organize international economic co-operation for China in her task of rehabilitating the country. Of course there was no truth in the report. Anyone who is slightly acquainted with the distressed economic conditions in all parts of the world knows that no nation today is able to accord any financial assistance to China.

Direct Challenge Flung

Japan, however, seized upon this unfounded report and proceeded to

expound her new policy. As early as April 9, one spokesman of the Tokyo foreign office declared to a group of press correspondents that "Japan is against any scheme for international co-operation in China." He continued that Japan "will not only reject any proposal that it participate in such co-operation, but also opposes efforts of others to arrange co-operation."

He, however, did not explain why Japan had suddenly assumed such a menacing attitude. All he said on this point was that "Japan's chief objection is that international co-operation would be bad not only for the interests of China, but also for the maintenance of peace in the Far East." Beyond these vague utterances, he left the pressmen who had interviewed him to draw their own conclusion concerning Japan's aspiration for the conversion of China into a virtual protectorate.

What will be the repercussions from the League of Nations, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and even Germany, to the Tokyo ultimatum? The ultimatum is a direct challenge to all of them. What will they have say to the Japanese threat: "Japan is in a position to do her best to carry out her mission in the Orient, and though there may be a divergence of opinion between the position of Japan and that of other nations towards China, such as led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, nevertheless Japan deems it natural to maintain peace in the Orient by herself, and on her own responsibility."

The gage of defiance has been flung in the world's face. Will the world or any portion of it, be content to be so recreant as to pretend to misunderstand the contemptuous challenge?

sumptuous and utterly unwarranted claim.

Conferences of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the military council, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, president of the Executive Yuan, and General Huang Fu, chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Commission, at Nanchang, have come to some conclusion. The general impression abroad is that upon his return to North China, General Huang will reopen negotiations with the Japanese looking towards a solution of the three questions.

New Demand Made

The Japanese foreign office, well informed on the matter and in anticipation of the early disposal of the pending problems, has confronted the Chinese government with a new set of demands as embodied in its ultimatum. The Chinese see in the Tokyo announcement renewed evidence that Japan will not be satisfied with anything less than the complete surrender of China's sovereignty. Even a prospect of the possibility of their compliance with one demand serves as an occasion for more demands from Japan.

Such a paper ban against international co-operation with China was anticipated long ago, but it was not expected that it would be promulgated so soon. Like the Japanese cherry trees in Washington, D. C., which were in full bloom on April 11 this year, much to the surprise of the experts who had predicted their blossoms one week later, the government of the island empire was simply too impatient to wait for a more opportune movement to reveal its imperialistic program in all of its splendor. It

(Continued on Page 14, Col. 1)

that even with international assistance China will be able to measure her strength with the island empire for the next 20 or 30 years to come. Japan is quite well aware of this fact, but what is her object in opposing China's creation of an efficient military air service to fight bandits in the interior? Is she worrying over the present success of the anti-communist campaign in Kiangsi and Fukien?

Whatever technical assistance China has been able to obtain through the League of Nations is contributing to the improvement of rural conditions and public utilities in the cities. This assistance has been utilized in combatting the recurrent flood menace and in promoting public sanitations in all parts of the country. Foreign technical experts are also engaged in tackling Chinese agricultural problems. None of these activities is in the slightest degree calculated to lead to disturbance of peace in the Orient.

Seeks To Retard China

The only explanation of Japan's opposition to international co-operation with China is that she wishes to keep this country perpetually in a backward state so that when she has consolidated her position in Manchuria and Jehol, she will find China less capable of offering resistance to her further encroachment upon Chinese territory. That is why the news about the early termination of the bandit menace in Kiangsi and Fukien is extremely unwelcome to the Japanese government.

The grave nature of the ultimatum is too apparent to warrant further discussion of details. It remains for the Chinese government to challenge Japan's claim to the exercise of such rights over China. The claim, if unchallenged immediately, will have the most serious effect upon this country. Experts in international affairs agree that the Executive Yuan should issue without delay a statement to reiterate that China enjoys full sovereignty and that she can not and will not tolerate any interference from any country, near or far, either in her domestic affairs or in her foreign policy.

There is little or no doubt that the leading powers of the world will sooner or later take up the issue with Japan. If that country were to be permitted to dictate to them what they should refrain from doing in their relationship with China, not only would their interests in Asia be placed in serious jeopardy, but their prestige throughout the world would suffer irremediably.

No Conflict With Treaties

The attempt made by a spokesman of the Tokyo foreign office on April 18 to clarify "the peace and harmony" policy of his foreign minister, Mr. Hirota, has incidentally disclosed the Japanese plan to enforce the decision to prevent international assistance to China. "Japan will not ignore her treaty obligations," this spokesman explained. He added: "The principle enunciated in the statement will be applied with such effect as not to conflict with existing treaties, and cases will be dealt with according to their merits."

This means that Japan is going to attempt to coerce the Chinese government into acquiescence with her policy. It is predicted that in the future such pressure will be exercised upon the Chinese officials

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch
American Consul General at
1934, on the subject: "Re"
of April 17th, with regard

towards hegemony in the Far East,"
and that it implies a policy of the
"closed door" in China, with an event-
ual monopoly of Japanese rights as
the fruit of the Manchurian adventure.
This seems to us a misinterpretation
which overlooks the enormously diffi-
cult position of Japan, surrounded as
that country is by growing unfriend-
liness on the part of so many people.
Let any honest critic place himself in
Japan's position and ask himself what
he would do in her present circum-
stances, and his answer would, we
think, be not very far different from
that which is being made in Tokyo.

Peace and order in the Far East must
be Japan's paramount consideration;
nothing else matters quite so much. To
other Powers war out here would be a
sideshow; to Japan it would be a
matter of life or death. As her near-
est neighbour she has the great
sub-continent of China, struggling
against internal disorder, but slowly
and surely evolving into a Power of
importance. In China there are to-
day all manner of foreign influences
at work, mainly in the hands of men
who are not exactly friendly in their
dispositions towards Japan. China is
being armed and modernised from the
West—aeroplanes, military advisers,
and what not. A temporary estrange-
ment between China and Japan is in
danger of becoming fed to permanence
by the Geneva doctrinaires. China's
opposition to Japan has as its main
bulwark the Geneva complex, and
although we feel it is wrong to re-
present Japan as being opposed to
Geneva's assistance in the social and
economic rehabilitation of China it is
obviously of greatly disturbing moment
to Japan to find China the happy
hunting ground of those who would
sell her munitions, aeroplanes and
loans, and at the same time join in a
chorus more or less anti-Japanese in
character. Truly is the peace of the
Orient threatened in consequence.

Ed:

Vital Is

The Shanghai Times

Shanghai, Friday, April 20, 1934

VITAL ISSUES IN THE FAR EAST

During the past few days there
has been a recrudescence of discussion,
from several angles, of what is the
most important question in the Far
East—Sino-Japanese relations. These
discussions have arisen out of the
visit to Nanchang of General Huang
Fu, where conferences were held
with Nanking leaders on the questions
of through railway and postal com-
munications between North China and
Manchoukuo, and out of General
Huang's visit to Shanghai where he
has had conversations with Mr. A.
Ariyoshi, the Japanese Minister to
China, who is now in Nanking where
he has conferred with Mr. Wang
Ching-wei, China's Minister for
Foreign Affairs and head of the
Executive Yuan. All these comings
and goings have given rise to ex-
pressions of opinion between the two
schools of thought in China—the one
which is really desirous of pacifying
the North and of easing tension
without going so far as to accord
anything in nature of *de jure*
recognition to Manchoukuo, and the
other which is implacably opposed to
relations of any kind whatsoever or to
a restoration of better feelings with
Japan. General Huang Fu, than whom
no-one understands quite so closely the
real situation in the North and the
 dangers inherent in the present very
unsatisfactory condition of affairs, is
obviously on a mission of education
and persuasion, desirous of presenting
realities and asking for an orientation
of policy to suit. It would appear that
in General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr.
Wang Ching-wei he has had sympa-
thetic hearers, but there are others in
the Government, notably men like Mr.
Sun Fo, who do not agree. This split
in Chinese opinion is at the moment
not seriously disturbing the surface of
things, but it has to be regarded as a
disturbing factor of great potentiality,
if not actually in Nanking itself then
most certainly in the North where the
great majority of opinion is undoubt-
edly in favour of a working arrange-
ment with the new State. It is to be
hoped that matters will be amicably
settled.

In another part of this issue will
be found reprinted parts of an article
written by M. Henry Casseville in
what is one of the leading magazines
of the world—the "Revue des Deux
Mondes," published in Paris. There
one finds the idea elaborated of a con-
flict between Japan and the United
States being inevitable, and among
other things it is suggested that
America could transport her troops
safely across the Atlantic and through
the Suez Canal to French Indo-China
and then march overland through China
to the scene of conflict. M. Casseville
assumes that France and Britain would
be on the side of America. This is no
sensationalist writing for a "penny
blood and thunder"—it is serious
discussion. What must be the effect
of such in Tokyo, coming as it does at
a time when China is being politically
stiffened and militarily armed in an
atmosphere of hostility to Japan? Let
plain commonsense give the answer.
M. Casseville says that the more one
studies the Pacific problem the more
it seems that there is no solution. He
is wrong. The only possible solution
and the one for which everyone should
strive is the re-establishment of full
and friendly relations between China
and Japan, the acceptance of what has
happened in the spirit of inevitable
reorganization, and the collaboration
of these two countries in the task
which is rightly theirs of ordering the
political development of the Far East
along mutually beneficial lines. It
would be a grave disservice for the
West to split the East into hostile
camps, arming, training and financing
the one to the irritation and danger of
the other. Japan's cry of "Hands off
China" in that sense is more than
justified.

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 25,
1934, on the subject: "Reaction to Japan's Declaration
of April 17th, with regard to China."

SOURCE: THE SHANGHAI TIMES (British
Daily), April 20, 1934.

Editorial.

Vital Issues in Far East.

The Shanghai Times

Shanghai, Friday, April 20, 1934

VITAL ISSUES IN THE
FAR EAST

During the past few days there has been a recrudescence of discussion from several angles, of what is the most important question in the Far East—Sino-Japanese relations. These discussions have arisen out of the visit to Nanchang of General Huang Fu, where conferences were held with Nanking leaders on the questions of through railway and postal communications between North China and Manchoukuo, and out of General Huang's visit to Shanghai where he has had conversations with Mr. A. Ariyoshi, the Japanese Minister to China, who is now in Nanking where he has conferred with Mr. Wang Ching-wei, China's Minister for Foreign Affairs and head of the Executive Yuan. All these comings and goings have given rise to expressions of opinion between the two schools of thought in China—the one which is really desirous of pacifying the North and of easing tension without going so far as to accord anything in nature of *de jure* recognition to Manchoukuo, and the other which is implacably opposed to relations of any kind whatsoever or to a restoration of better feelings with Japan. General Huang Fu, than whom no-one understands quite so closely the real situation in the North and the dangers inherent in the present very unsatisfactory condition of affairs, is obviously on a mission of education and persuasion, desirous of presenting realities and asking for an orientation of policy to suit. It would appear that in General Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Wang Ching-wei he has had sympathetic hearers, but there are others in the Government, notably men like Mr. Sun Fo, who do not agree. This split in Chinese opinion is at the moment not seriously disturbing the surface of things, but it has to be regarded as a disturbing factor of great potentiality, if not actually in Nanking itself then most certainly in the North where the great majority of opinion is undoubtedly in favour of a working arrangement with the new State. It is to be hoped that matters will be amicably settled, that General Huang Fu will be able to go back to Peiping, where he has done such splendid work, armed with authority to conclude at least a local agreement for a removal of the friction-making disabilities now being suffered. Those who talk most freely of and resent what they call Japanese pressure in this connection would

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MARKET;
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plain commonsense give the answer.
M. Casseville says that the more one
studies the Pacific problem the more
it seems that there is no solution. He
is wrong. The only possible solution
and the one for which everyone should
strive is the re-establishment of full
and friendly relations between China
and Japan, the acceptance of what has
happened in the spirit of inevitable
reorganization, and the collaboration
of these two countries in the task
which is rightly theirs of ordering the
political development of the Far East
along mutually beneficial lines. It
would be a grave disservice for the
West to split the East into hostile
camps, arming, training and financing
the one to the irritation and danger of
the other. Japan's cry of "Hands off
China" in that sense is more than
justified.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chemical	91	98	are given exclusively by
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most certainly in the North where the great majority of opinion is undoubtedly in favour of a working arrangement with the new State. It is to be hoped that matters will be amicably settled, that General Huang Fu will be able to go back to Peiping, where he has done such splendid work, armed with authority to conclude at least a local agreement for a removal of the friction-making disabilities now being suffered. Those who talk most freely of and resent what they call Japanese pressure in this connection would do well to appreciate a little more closely the feeling in North China itself. To ignore that is going to spell further trouble.

Let us leave the purely Chinese situation just there for the moment and proceed to consider Japan's relationships with China in the light of the very important statements which have just emanated from Tokyo. In an informal statement issued by the Foreign Office on Tuesday, it was pointed out that Japan was desirous, in conjunction with China, of sharing responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in the Orient. Opposition was expressed to any action which might be taken on the part of any other Powers likely to disturb the peace, and the examples were cited of providing China with military aeroplanes, military instructors and the making of political loans. This statement has been characterized in Tokyo as a clarification of the "peace and harmony" policy of Mr. Hirota, while it has been described in Shanghai as an extension of Japan's role of policeman over China. In League of Nations circles, the statement is interpreted as being "the logical outcome of Japan's striving

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 6 to despatch No. 9440 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated April 25,
1934, on the subject: Reaction to Japan's Declaration of
April 17th, with regard to China."

SOURCE: THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese
independent daily), April
20, 1934.

Japan's Chiefs Hurl Defiance to Powers in New
Challenge.

Japan's Chiefs Hurl Defiance To Powers In New Challenge

APR 20 1934

Threat To World Seen Here In Foreign Office Statement

Local Vernacular Dailies Agree On Motives Underlying Nipponese Bid For Eastern Power; Japan's Ambitions Exposed

Strong editorial comments yesterday in the China Times, supported by those in several other local Chinese dailies, lay bare the unreasonable, selfish, imperialistic ambitions of Japan as embodied in the informal statement issued by the Tokyo Foreign Office on April 17 which is tantamount to an open threat to world powers against their co-operation for the economic development of China.

Desiring to keep China economically and politically under her own lordship, the China Times points out Japan has long been uneasy over the economic co-operation between China and the League of Nations. At first she only created rumors intended to undermine such co-operation by saying that co-operation will lead to international control of China, but now she is openly telling the world powers to keep hands off China.

Precedent Followed

In helping China in her economic development, the China Times continues, the League of Nations is merely following past precedent of helping Austria, Hungary and various Balkan states as well as those in South America, and it has no ambition whatsoever for territorial gains. It is gratifying that China has fully appreciated the sincerity of the League and has not been side-tracked by Japanese rumors and neither will she be intimidated this time by the Tokyo Foreign Office statement.

Commenting on Japan's oft-declared desire to maintain peace and order in the Orient, the China Times' editorial says "Japan must have forgotten that it was no other than herself who occupied China's territory by military force and thereby violated the unification of China. Herself a breaker and violator of Oriental peace, Japan is now blaming peace-loving China who is now busily engaged in self-reconstruction, and China's well-wishers—friendly world powers—who are lending her a hand in her time of need with the sincere hope of helping her attain her own aspirations for economic development."

Powers Shown Door

"What respect has Japan for international law?"

World Threat Seen In Tokyo Hands-Off Plan

APR 20 1934 *China Press*
(Continued from Page 9, Col. 6.)

organ of the Kuomintang, is more vigorous in its editorial attack on the statement of the Foreign Office at Tokyo. "If Japan had ever deemed it natural to maintain peace in the Orient by herself, why should she have occupied Manchuria by military force on September 18, 1931, invaded Chapei on January 28, 1932, seized Jehol and created war in North China during the spring of 1933?" asks the paper.

Independence Unrecognized

Most anxious to maintain peace to develop industries and commerce, the paper points out, China, remembering the humiliations inflicted upon her, would be least ready and willing to look for help in such matters from her aggressor. And

under reciprocal terms and not to the loss of its sovereign rights, China welcomes co-operation from any quarters in her task of national reconstruction along economic lines.

The Sin Wan Pao limits its comments on Japan's opposition to exportation by foreign countries of airplanes and sending of military and aviation instructors. It is pointed out that the engagement of foreign legions in China has had a history of more than 50 years. After the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, General Chang Wen-hsiang, tupan of Kiangsu Province, engaged a group of German military advisers to train the so-called "Self-Preservation Corps". No opposition from any quarters had then been expressed. In denying China her right to engage foreign military advisers, the paper points out, Japan is not recognizing China as an independent nation.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

than herself who occupied China's territory by military force and thereby violated the unification of China. Herself a breaker and violator of Oriental peace, Japan is now blaming peace-loving China who is now busily engaged in self-reconstruction, and China's well-wishers—friendly world powers—who are lending her a hand in her time of need with the sincere hope of helping her attain her own aspirations for economic development.

Powers Shown Door

"What respect has Japan for international peace and goodwill, equality of opportunities and an open door policy in the Far East? Japan has now thrown the door of the Orient wide open for all western powers who take interest in China's economical and cultural advancement—to get out. And it is only less than a month after her exchange of the goodwill notes with the United States that Japan issues this order virtually intended to drive all foreign Powers from the East."

The Morning Post, another Chinese daily in Shanghai, is more specific in its editorial comments on the subject by singling out the United States and Great Britain as the direct target of Japan's Foreign Office statement on the "hands off" China policy.

Great Britain, the Morning Post continues, has won the jealousy of Japan because of the influence the former played in bringing about League of Nations' economic-operation with China. The organization of a huge finance corporation in China to look after the finances of economic projects is mentioned as another factor contributing to the issuance of a threat by the Tokyo Foreign Office because, it is pointed out, Dr. L. Rajchman, League expert, as reported to the Japanese Foreign Office, has helped in drawing up plans for the finance corporation.

Co-operation Watched

Japan has long watched with jealous eyes the relations of the United States with China, the paper further states: the conclusion of the U.S.\$50,000,000 (now reduced to U.S.\$20,000,000) cotton and wheat loan and the fact that many American fighting planes were purchased and many American aviators are engaged in aviation departments and schools in this country.

The Chung Hwa Jih Pao, an
 (Continued on Page 14, Col. 3)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

James L.
The Secretary will
write to read this
on his return.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, May 4, 1934.



No. 771.

Subject: Japanese Statement of Policy Toward Foreign
Assistance to China.

CONFIDENTIAL

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


MAY 11 1934



*Letter to Lord, Paris
and General*

For Distribution-Check			
Mr. Tolson	Mr. E.A. Tamm	Mr. Clegg	Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd	Mr. Nichols	Mr. Rosen	Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson	Mr. Coffey	Mr. Hendon	Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn	Mr. Nease	Mr. Gurnea	Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr	Mr. Winterrowd	Tele. Room	Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy			



JUN 9 - 1934

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

793.94/6695

Reverting to my despatch No. 751 of April 20,
1934, as well as to my telegram No. 71 of April 18,
5 p.m., and subsequent telegraphic correspondence con-
cerning the "unofficial" statement issued to the press
by the spokesman of the Foreign Office on April 17
regarding

-2-

regarding the Japanese attitude towards the rendering of assistance to China by other countries, I have the honor to submit the following report more as a record of the facts and developments than as an appraisal of their results. Such an appraisal and a general survey of the situation can, I feel, better be made after the domestic and foreign reverberations from the affair have run themselves out.

From information gathered from many sources I am now convinced that the background of Mr. Amau's statement was as follows:

The Japanese Government for some time had been increasingly anxious over the reports of foreign activity in China. Mr. Rajchmann was reported to be on his way to Geneva to report to the League of Nations on the question of technical assistance. Mr. Monnet also of the League of Nations was said to be active in Shanghai in organizing an international syndicate for the purpose of financing a public works program in China. A considerable number of officers with the German General von Seekt were understood to have arrived in China for the purpose of giving military instructions, while foreign firms were active in selling to the Chinese Government airplanes, automobiles and other potential accessories of warfare. From all of these activities Japanese interests were at the insistence of the Chinese Government understood to be excluded. Accordingly an instruction was sent with the

-3-

the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister in China, conveying the attitude of the Japanese Government toward these various activities in particular and to the relations of foreign countries with China in general. (I have been informed from a reasonably reliable source that the instruction, before being sent to Mr. Ariyoshi, also received the approval of the Cabinet.)

For some time past Mr. Amau, the spokesman of the Foreign Office and Chief of the Bureau of Information and Intelligence, had been pressed by Japanese newspaper correspondents for a statement of the attitude of the Japanese Government towards these various activities. This pressure appears to have come to a head on April 17 when Mr. Amau with the approval of Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave to the Associated Press correspondent the gist of the instruction, in a rough oral translation. Later on the same day he gave to the Japanese correspondents the text or substance of the instructions to Mr. Ariyoshi, and on the 18th he made for the foreign press correspondents a written translation into English of the same document. This translation was at first given out on Foreign Office stationery as an official communication, but it was later labelled "unofficial" and all but a few copies, one of which is now in possession of the Embassy through the courtesy of Mr. Fleisher, correspondent of the NEW YORK HERALD

TRIBUNE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TRIBUNE, were recalled. At first Mr. Amau stated to the Associated Press correspondent that his statement (or the diplomatic instruction on which it was based) had received the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it will be observed that later* he modified this assertion by stating to Mr. Dickover that his oral statement of April 17 did not have the approval of Mr. Hirota. I myself am now convinced that while Mr. Hirota had approved the original instruction to Mr. Ariyoshi, he was not consulted before Mr. Amau's statement of April 17 was given out and in view of his policy and efforts to improve Japan's relations with other countries, I doubt very much if he would have approved of the issuance of this public statement at the present time. Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Amau seem to have had no conception of the effect which it would produce abroad. There are others who believe that the announcement was a carefully considered step taken with the full approval of Mr. Hirota who later was obliged to make Mr. Amau the scapegoat. I do not share these views and find that most of my colleagues now agree with me on this point. Mr. Hirota's confidential statement to me of April 25**to the effect that the statement had been issued without his own knowledge or approval and that an erroneous impression of the Japanese

*Embassy's telegram #78, April 26, 9 p.m.

**Embassy's telegram #75, April 25, 1 p.m.

-5-

Japanese Government's policy had thereby been given to the world, impressed me as being sincere. In such a case one can only be guided by one's personal impressions. My impressions of his sincerity were quite clear. My British colleague who at first reported to his Government that the announcement had been made with Mr. Hirota's approval, later altered his opinion and cabled his Government accordingly.

Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no doubt that Mr. Hirota has been placed in a difficult position. There are many among the Japanese themselves who consider that the Foreign Office committed a thoroughly awkward blunder which was not helped by its subsequent awkward handling. But Mr. Hirota is, so to speak, between the devil and the deep sea because of the chauvinists and the military on the one hand and the moderates on the other and it would have placed him in a thoroughly dangerous position to have publicly disavowed Mr. Amau's statement. The word "assassinations" has been used in the comments of some observers. The Minister, however, said to me in confidence but in apparently complete frankness* that the policy of the Government is complete support and observance in every respect of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that Japan has no intention of seeking special privilege in China nor of opposing the bona fide trade

of

*Embassy's telegram #75, April 25, 1 p.m.

-6-

of other foreign powers nor of interfering in any way with China's administrative or territorial integrity.

This he said is the precise policy of the Emperor, which he himself is doing his best to carry out and that he intends to do so even at the possible cost of his own life. He added that in carrying out this policy he has the full support of the Minister of War. Mr. Hirota went on to say that naturally the maintenance of peaceful conditions in China is especially important to Japan in view of her own propinquity and that certain foreign influences, which he did not specifically mention, are constantly trying to stir up trouble for Japan. His endeavor, he observed, is to counteract these influences so far as possible while fully respecting the rights and legitimate interests of other countries.

The further steps in the affair have been fully dealt with in the various telegrams from this Embassy. The doubts and misunderstandings which arose with regard to the precise nature of the spokesman's original statement can be explained only by the shifting positions taken by Mr. Amau himself. The facts have been explained to the Department as clearly as possible*.

The Department's aide memoire** was decoded at 5 p.m. on April 29, and although the Foreign Office was closed

owing
*Embassy's telegrams #77, April 26, 5 p.m. and
#78, April 26, 9 p.m.

**Department's telegram #59, April 28, 7 p.m.

*Then why
did Hirota
oppose the
instructions &
Aizawa's -
which in-
struction is
the important
item in the
whole story!*
S/est

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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*Grew says
 nothing about
 being said
 'nearly
 expected'
 (which Saito
 has said that
 Grew said).*

owing to that day being both Sunday and the anniversary of the Emperor's birthday, I was fortunately able by writing an urgent personal letter to obtain an interview with the Minister at his residence at 6.30 when I presented the aide memoire. The Minister's only comment after reading it was that the whole affair had caused "great misunderstanding". He said at that time that he would reply in due course, but according to conflicting press reports it does not yet appear to have been definitely decided whether a reply will be made or not. The chauvinistic elements appear to desire to leave the matter as it is. They claim that Japan has stated her policy and that that settles the matter. The more reasonable elements, however, realize that the matter can never be settled or "closed" as long as Japan's views are so at variance with those of other countries in general and of the United States in particular. They therefore believe that it would be better to discuss the question further and if possible to remove the seeds of future discord. In any case there are indications that the authorities are considering their next step, if any, with the greatest care and it will probably be discussed not only by the Cabinet but by the Privy Council in view of the importance which the matter has now assumed.

For my own part I may say that the substance and tone of the Department's aide memoire have my full concurrence and admiration. I believe that it was absolutely called

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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called for by the circumstances and that it was expressed with a clarity and moderation which not only puts our Government on precise record without giving needless offense, but which will undoubtedly sink into the Japanese consciousness whatever the public reactions may be.

I was last night informed by my French colleague that his Government has handed to Mr. Sato, Japanese Ambassador in Paris, a communication setting forth the views of the French Government in the light of the situation which has arisen from Mr. Amau's statement of April 17, but this communication has not yet been published here.

At a later date the Embassy will no doubt be in a better position to appraise the significance and results of this whole affair and to report thereon to the Department.

Respectfully yours,



Joseph C. Grew.

710.

Copy to Legation, Peiping.

Copy to Legation, Berne.

X

3 Carbon Copies
 Received 27-71

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 29 1934

No.

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Hugh R. Wilson,

American Delegation,

General Disarmament Conference,

Geneva.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of Despatch No. 771, dated May 4, 1934, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo with regard to the statement of policy toward foreign assistance to China issued, on April 17, 1934, by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

Enclosure:

Copy of Tokyo's Despatch
 No. 771, dated May 4, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 29 1934

No. 417

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Jesse Isidor Straus,
American Ambassador,
Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information
a copy of Despatch No. 771, dated May 4, 1934, from the
American Ambassador at Tokyo with regard to the statement
of policy toward foreign assistance to China issued, on
April 17, 1934, by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign
Office.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
William Phillips

793.94/6695

Enclosure:

Copy of Tokyo's Despatch
No. 771, dated May 4, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAY 29 1934

No. 414

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR STAFF USE ONLY.

The Honorable

Robert Worth Bingham,
American Ambassador,
London.

Sir:

There is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of Despatch No. 771, dated May 4, 1934, from the American Ambassador at Tokyo with regard to the statement of policy toward foreign assistance to China issued, on April 17, 1934, by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

793.94/6695

Enclosure:

Copy of Tokyo's Despatch
No. 771, dated May 4, 1934.

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Jan. 1 1934 P.A.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 25, 1934.

~~ROM:~~
~~WES:~~
~~SKH:~~

Peiping's 2688, April 26,
1934, --

This despatch summarizes
several conversations between
Mr. Peck and persons at Nanking
in regard to the problems at
issue between China and Japan.
I suggest that you read the
despatch itself -- only two
and one-half pages -- which
adequately summarizes the
enclosures which need not be
read.

~~JFJ~~ VDM





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2688

Peiping, April 26, 1934.

Subject: Conversations of the Counselor of
Legation at Nanking on various
political subjects.

793.94



F/ESP

793.94/6696

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1-3/

I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest to the Department, copies of three despatches from the Counselor of Legation at Nanking reporting conversations upon various subjects affecting the political situation in China.

In his despatch No. 282-Diplomatic, April 18, 1934, in connection with a discussion of the German military advisers, Mr. Peck reports Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, as stating that "the Japanese Government 'was displeased' at the employment of these eminent

JUN 11 1934

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- 2 -

eminent German military men by the Chinese Government".

In discussing the situation in North China, Mr. Suma

is reported to have expressed the belief that the Japanese authorities would not take strong measures there for the time being.

In his despatch No. 285-Diplomatic, April 21, 1934, Mr. Peck, in reporting a personal conversation with Mr. Suma, quotes him as saying that Wang Ching-wei felt that arrangements covering through traffic and postal communications could be made within one month. However, in view of the attitude of the press and various Chinese organizations, Mr. Peck expresses the belief that "no official of the National Government, even Chiang Kai-shek, would dare to lend countenance to any such arrangement at the present time". Mr. Peck feels that such action would be the signal for a "vehement and simultaneous attack on the National Government from all quarters", and expresses the belief that the National Government is "entirely at a loss how to handle this problem and is hoping that before a decision is precipitated some event will occur to give it a 'way out'".

There is also enclosed a copy of Mr. Peck's un-numbered despatch of April 20, 1934, enclosing a copy of the Chinese Government's "informal statement" in reply to the Japanese statement opposing the supply to China of military airplanes, military instructors and


political

- 3 -

political loans. Mr. Peck comments upon the restrained tone of this reply which "even goes to the length of offering an explanation of the foreign loans, technical assistance and military equipment obtained from foreign countries".

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:



C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

3 ✓
Enclosures:

1. Copy of Nanking Counselor of Legation's despatch No. 282-Diplomatic, April 18, 1934, to Legation.
2. Copy of Nanking Counselor of Legation's despatch No. 285-Diplomatic, April 21, 1934, to Legation.
3. Copy of Nanking Counselor of Legation's unnumbered despatch of April 20, 1934, to Legation.

710

LC:DH

Carbon Copy
Received 

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-282 Diplomatic

688

Nanking Office, April 18, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Attitude of the Japanese Government
toward Foreign Military Advisers in
China.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Dear Mr. Minister:

Mr. McDaniel, American newspaper representative in
Nanking, called today and said he had had a long talk
with Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation, on
April 16.

Among the subjects discussed by Mr. Suma was the
recent arrival of General von Seeckt, who has come from
Germany to be Military Adviser to General Chiang Kai-
shek. Mr. McDaniel mentioned having seen General von
Seeckt in Shanghai and he inquired frankly what the
attitude of the Japanese Government was toward the
employment of German military advisers by General Chiang.
Mr. Suma said that he had no instructions to make any
representations on this subject to the Chinese Govern-
ment, but he knew positively that the Japanese Govern-
ment "was displeased" at the employment of these eminent
German military men by the Chinese Government. The
reason for this was that the presence of these persons

in China

- 2 -

in China led to speculations on the part of the Chinese public concerning the possibility of training up an efficient army in China, able to resist Japan.

Mr. Suma said that General Li Tsung-jen, of Kwangsi, is becoming more and more closely bound with Mr. Hu Han-min in political matters. (The implication was that this would militate against the effort of the National Government to do away with the independence of the Canton regime. WRF) Moreover, the financial inducements held out by the National Government to the Canton regime are proving to be less attractive in actuality than the hopes which were raised.

Mr. Suma made the interesting observation that General Li Tsung-jen had purchased a large shipment of arms and munitions from French Indo-China, on credit. There had been some suggestion by General Li Tsung-jen, intended merely as a compliment to the French, that he could make use of the services of French military advisers. This suggestion had been taken by the French as a genuine offer and three prominent French military men had been named to General Li Tsung-jen as possible candidates for these positions, greatly to the embarrassment of General Li, who did not wish to appear to be entering into competition with the National Government, which engages German military advisers. General Li is said to be feeling considerable embarrassment at this phase of his relations with the French.

Mr. Suma told Mr. McDaniel, with pledges of great secrecy, that the American Government had sent a "third

note"

- 3 -

"note" to the Chinese Government in regard to the revision of the 1903 Commercial Treaty. Mr. Suma said he did not know, but he felt pretty sure that this third note offered the relinquishment of the right of inland navigation and, perhaps, of extraterritorial jurisdiction, in exchange for arrangements by the Chinese Government in regard to the protection of trademarks and patents which would be satisfactory to the American Government.

Knowing that Mr. McDaniel would be greatly interested in the nature of this mysterious "third note" and realizing that if nothing were said to dispel this myth, Mr. McDaniel might suppose there was something in Mr. Suma's conjecture, I thought it advisable to tell Mr. McDaniel what was actually the substance of the Legation's note of April 10 to the Foreign Office. It will be recalled that this note merely stated that the Department is giving consideration to the views expressed by the Foreign Office in a note written in January, last.

Mr. McDaniel said he asked Mr. Suma about the situation in North China and Mr. Suma expressed the opinion that the Japanese authorities would not take any strong measures in North China for the time being, either in connection with the railway and postal matters, or in any other connection, but would let matters gradually settle themselves. He said that the Japanese Minister was intending to come to Nanking before many days had passed, but his visit would be purely one of courtesy and probably no important matters would be discussed. The Japanese Minister would, as a matter of course, take his leave of the Chinese authorities before

proceeding

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

proceeding to Japan on the visit which has attracted so much notice in the newspapers.

For purpose of convenient reference in connection with Mr. Suma's reference to General von Seeckt, there
1/ is enclosed herewith a copy of a REUTER news despatch dated Tokyo, April 17, 1934, as published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, Shanghai, of April 18, 1934. It will be observed that this despatch quotes what purports to be "an informal statement" by the Japanese Foreign Office made on April 17 which remarks inter alia that

"the providing of China with military aeroplanes and military instructors, and the giving of political loans are among the measures which are doomed to be met with opposition from Japan".

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

1/ As described.

In triplicate to the American Minister.

WRP:HC:MOL



Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Legation No.L-282
Diplomatic of Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Legation,
Nanking Office, dated April 18, 1934, entitled "Attitude of the Japanese Government toward Foreign Military Advisers in China".

NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, Wednesday, April 18, 1934

TOKYO OPPOSES AID TO CHINA

Japan Determined to Carry Out her Mission

Tokyo, Apr. 17.

In connection with the relationship between China and Japan, Foreign Office issued an informal statement today.

It said, "Japan is in a position to do her best to carry out her mission in the Orient, and though there may be a divergence of opinion between the position of Japan and that of other nations towards China, such as led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, nevertheless Japan deems it natural to maintain peace in the Orient by herself, and on her own responsibility.

"She also will share simultaneously with China the responsibility in maintaining peace and order in the Orient.

"In view of the fact that the restoration of order in China depends on China herself, Japan cannot help opposing any of China's measures which may be contrary to peace in the Orient.

"Furthermore, Japan will be forced to object to any measures on the part of other Powers, which are likely to lead to disturbance of peace in the Orient.

"For example," the statement added, "the providing of China with military aeroplanes and military instructors, and the giving of political loans are among the measures which are doomed to be met with opposition from Japan.

"We deem it necessary to clarify Japan's position towards China upon hearing of the proposed joint assistance of other Powers to China."--Reuter.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

L-285 Diplomatic

2
2688
Nanking Office,
April 21, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy; Postal
and Through Traffic Arrangements.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of a conversation held by me with Mr. Suma on April 20, 1934, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Controversy; Postal and Through Traffic Arrangements".

The Legation will note that Mr. Suma told me confidentially that Mr. Wang Ching-wei had told the Japanese Minister recently that he, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, thought that arrangements could be made within one month's time to restore through traffic between North China and Manchuria.

The authorities of the National Government, as is indicated by frequent items in the press, have received many resolutions and demands from Chinese organizations insisting that no through traffic arrangement shall be permitted by the National Government, on the ground that such an arrangement would be tantamount to de facto recognition of "Manchukuo". Mr. McDaniel, an American news correspondent residing in Nanking, informed me on April

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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20 that he had questioned Mr. Peng Shopei, Director of the Department of Political Affairs of the Executive Yuan, whether the National Government had reached any decision under which authorization would be given for the resumption of through traffic between North China and Manchuria, and that Mr. Peng had emphatically denied that any such decision had been reached.

From conversations held by me with various Chinese persons in Nanking, I am of the opinion that no official of the National Government, even General Chiang Kai-shek, would dare to lend countenance to any such arrangement at the present time. The difficulty seems to be that such action would be the signal for a vehement and simultaneous attack on the National Government from all quarters. At the same time, the National Government seems to feel that the Tangku Truce of May 30, or May 31, 1933, was negotiated, on the Japanese side, by the Kwantung Army and that this Army believes that failure to permit the resumption of through traffic will be a breach of faith by the Chinese which will justify the Kwantung Army in restoring through traffic under armed guards, if necessary. It may be supposed that the National Government realizes that if the Kwantung Army took these military steps to restore railway traffic, the National Government would be confronted with the necessity of submitting without armed opposition, thereby "losing face" with the rest of China, or of resisting with armed force, the consequence of which might be the occupation of the Peiping area by Japanese military forces.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The impression I have gained is that the National Government is entirely at a loss how to handle this problem and is hoping that before a decision is precipitated some event will occur to give it a "way out". In the meantime, the Government is publicly denying that it intends to authorize the resumption of through railway traffic.

President Wang Ching-wei went so far a few days ago as to proceed to the Legislative Yuan in person and answer interpellations on this subject. It is reported in the press that he gave the most positive assurances that the National Government would take no step construable as recognition of "Manchukuo".

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ as stated.

In triplicate to the Legation.

WRP:HC

A true copy of
the signed original.
He.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 20, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy; Postal
and Through Traffic Arrangements.

Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Suma, in the course of a general conversation, recalled that Mr. Hwang Fu and Mr. Wang Ching-wei had recently gone to Nanchang to talk over with General Chiang Kai-shek the situation in North China. Mr. Suma said that, from information reaching him, Mr. Hwang Fu was quite ready to come to some arrangement with the Japanese authorities for resumption of postal communication and railway through traffic with Manchuria; in fact, such arrangements had almost been consummated in November, 1933. However, the "so-called National Government" had refused to authorize Mr. Hwang Fu to conclude these arrangements and Mr. Hwang Fu had become very annoyed. Mr. Suma said that Mr. Hwang Fu intended to remain in Shanghai for about a month, or until he should receive from the National Government authorization to finish the arrangement in the North. Mr. Suma said, also, that during a recent conversation between Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Mr. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister, Mr. Wang had told the Japanese Minister that he thought this matter could be settled within one month's time.

Mr. Peck said that he understood that the National Government feared internal repercussions if it authorized any arrangements in regard to postal and railway matters

with

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

with the Japanese authorities. Mr. Suma concurred in this. Mr. Peck asked whether the Japanese did not regard the postal and railway arrangements as natural consequences of the "Tangku Truce" of May 30, 1933. Mr. Suma said that when the May 30, 1933, arrangement was made, it was understood that a conference would be held at a later date to arrange postal and railway communications between North China and Manchuria. This conference was held, in November 1933, but, as already stated, the National Government had not sanctioned the understandings which were come to.

WRP:HC

116

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

3
2688
Nanking Office,
April 20, 1934.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. L-262
Diplomatic of April 18, 1934, on the subject "Attitude
of the Japanese Government toward Foreign Military Ad-
visers in China" with which I enclosed a copy of a news
despatch giving an "informal statement" said to have been
issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17 setting
forth the opposition of the Japanese Government to the
providing to China of military airplanes, military in-
structors and political loans.

On April 19, 1934, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued a similar "informal statement" commenting
on the statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office.
A copy was sent to me by the Chinese Foreign Office and
1/ is enclosed herewith.

It will be noted that the Chinese rejoinder is very
restrained in tone and that it even goes to the length

of

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of offering an explanation of the foreign loans, technical assistance and military equipment obtained from foreign countries; the concluding paragraph of the statement mildly suggests that genuine and lasting peace between China and Japan should be built upon "foundations of good-will and mutual understanding and that it would go a long way towards the laying of such foundations when the existing unfortunate state of affairs could be rectified".


Very respectfully yours,

Willis R. Leck,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
 1/ As stated.

In triplicate to the American Minister.

WR:HC



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Waichiaopu issued today following informal statement in reply to Japanese statement of April 17th:

"China is always of the opinion that international peace can be maintained only by the joint efforts of all the members of the Family of Nations. Especially is it necessary for nations to cultivate the genuine spirit of mutual understanding and remove the fundamental causes of friction in order to establish durable peace among them. No State has the right to claim the exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace in any designated part of the world.

"Being a member of the League of Nations, China feels it her duty to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security. In her endeavor to attain these ends, she has never harbored any intention of injuring the interests of any particular country, far less causing a disturbance of peace in the Far East. China's relations with other nations in this regard have always been of such a nature as would characterize the relations between independent and sovereign states.

"In particular, China desires to point out that the collaboration between herself and other countries, whether in the form of loans or in the form of technical assistance, has been strictly limited to matters of a non-political character and that the purchase of such military equipment as military aeroplanes and the employment of military instructors and experts have been for no other purposes than national defence which chiefly consists in the maintenance of peace and order in the country. No nation which does not harbor any ulterior motives against China need to entertain any fears concerning her policy of national reconstruction and security.

"In regard to the situation now existing between China and Japan, it should be emphasized that genuine and lasting peace between the two countries, as between any other countries, should be built upon foundations of good-will and mutual understanding and that it would go a long way towards the laying of such foundations when the existing unfortunate state of affairs could be rectified and when the relations between China and Japan could be made to rest on a new basis more in consonance with the mutual aspirations of the two countries."

Nankin, April 19, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 535

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, April 18, 1934

LEGAL ADVISER
MAY 25 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of Mr. Kautto by authorities
of the Kwantung Army for repairs made
necessary by bombardment of Church of
Brethren Mission at T'ai'owying.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 648 of April 18, 1934, addressed to
the Legation, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ To Legation, April 18, 1934.

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RSW:ti

Original and one copy to the Department.

F/G

793.94/6697

MAY 25 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 648

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, April 18, 1934.

Subject: Reimbursement of Mr. Kautto by
authorities of the Kwantung Army
for repairs made necessary by
bombardment of Church of Brethren
Mission at T'ai't'owying.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegrams of
793.94/6101 793.94/6183
March 27, 1933 12 noon, and April 17, 1933 10 a.m.,
to the Secretary of State and the Legation, describing
the bombing, on March 24 and April 13, 1933, respectively,
of the town of T'ai't'owying and the damage caused there-
by to the property of the Church of the Brethren Mission,
an American missionary organization in that place, and
to state that in a despatch dated June 13, 1933, I
transmitted to the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin
the statement of the Reverend Charles O. Kautto, the
missionary in charge of the Church of the Brethren
Mission, of the amount of the expenses incident to the
repair of the damage done to the property of the mission
by that bombing. In a second despatch dated February

12,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
12, 1934, the matter was again brought to the attention of the Japanese Consul General, and in his reply of April 11, 1934, he enclosed, on behalf of the authorities of the Kwantung Army, a check of the Hsinking Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank drawn against the Peiping Branch of that bank in the amount of Yuan \$194.86, the full sum claimed by the Mission. This check was sent under registered cover to the Reverend Kautto with the request that he receipt for it, and an appropriate acknowledgment was made to the Japanese Consulate General.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

400
RSW:ti

Original and 1 copy to the Legation.
Two copies to the Department.

A true copy of
the signed original.
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

SEE 845.00/849 FOR #677

FROM Calcutta (Keith) DATED Apr. 26, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Indian reaction to Japanese announcement of
"Hands off in China". Excerpts from Indian
press regarding-.

793.94/6698

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
RECEIVED

Conversation. May 12, 1934

May 15, 1934.

1934
MAY 17 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Chinese Minister,
Mr. Sao-ke Alfred Sze.
RECORDS
Mr. Hornbeck.

*Copies sent to
Peking & Tokyo*

F/ESP

MAY 21 1934

Subject: Meeting of the League Committee
on Technical Cooperation with
China.

The Chinese Minister called and said that the meeting of this committee was to be held in Geneva on Thursday next (May 17). He said that his Government was very much concerned with regard to this meeting and hoped that the American Government would take an active part. He wished to know whether we were going to be represented and what, if anything, we had in contemplation.

Mr. Hornbeck replied that it was his understanding that Mr. Wilson (or Mr. Mayer) would be present at the meeting of the committee. The Minister said that he hoped he would take an active part. Mr. Hornbeck said that he did not see how the American Government could take part actively in the affairs of the committee in which it had not membership of an organization of which it was not a member. The Minister said that this meeting was of vital importance to China. Mr. Hornbeck observed that China is a member of the League and is in position to take whatever action the Chinese Government may choose to take. The

Minister

793.94/6699

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Minister still insisted that the United States should
be "active". Mr. Hornbeck indicated that it was not to
be expected that it would do so.

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FE:SKH/ZMK

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 21 1934

No. 524

To the American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith for the information of the American Ambassador a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of May 15, 1934, between the Chinese Minister and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to the meeting of the League Committee on Technical Cooperation with China.

793.94/6699

Enclosure:
Memorandum of
conversation,
May 15, 1934.

FE:ECC:EJL
5/19/34

FE

May 21, 1934

A true copy of
the signed original.
MTH

0175

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 1364

May 21 1934

To the American Minister,
Peiping.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith for the information of the American Minister a copy of a memorandum of a conversation of May 15, 1934, between the Chinese Minister and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to the meeting of the League Committee on Technical Cooperation with China.

An extra copy of this memorandum is enclosed for the information of the Consul General at Nanking.

793.94/6699

Enclosures:
2 copies of
memorandum
of conversation,
May 15, 1934.


FE:EGC:EJL
5/19/34

MAY 21 1934
CR
FE
m.m.h.

A true copy of
the signed original
enclosed.
[Signature]

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 20, 1934

Statement Issued to the Press by the Japanese Foreign Office Spokesman, Ostensibly Outlining Japan's Policy with Regard to China.

My preliminary views in regard to the question of the American Government's attitude toward and action with regard to Japan's ~~press~~ declaration of policy are as follows:

1. We should avoid any formal statement discussing the points raised in the Japanese declaration point by point. We should address our attention to the fundamental philosophy and attitude forming the basis of Japan's declaration.

We might, however, by informal and definite use of the injunction "Not for attribution to the Department or to any official thereof" call the attention of American press correspondents to a number of historical facts bearing upon certain statements contained in the Japanese declaration, as follows:

(a) Japan's record in regard to so-called "political" loans to China is so notorious that it is preposterous for her to point the finger of censor at other nations. For instance, witness the Nishihara loans and the whole record of Japanese financial transactions with China during the present century;

(b) Japan has in the past made agreements to supply military and naval instructors to China. There might again

be

F/ESP

793.94/6700

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

FILED

MAY 21 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

be made available to the press correspondents the facts in regard to the presence in China of American aviation instructors, emphasizing that these instructors are not personnel of the United States Army or Navy and that they are private citizens.

Attention might also be called to the fact that China now employs a large number of German military advisers; that in an effort to expand aviation trade with China, the British, the Italians and the French have sent special air missions or attachés to China, and that such trade as has accrued to the United States has been gained through open competition.

There might also be made available to the press the background of the American cotton and wheat loan to China, emphasizing that the action taken was dictated purely by domestic considerations in the United States and was absolutely in line with action taken in respect to the sale of American commodities to other nations of the world.

2. The question of whether the Department should make any reply to the Japanese declaration depends, in my opinion, largely upon the procedure followed by the Japanese Government. In case we receive through official channels a copy of the Japanese declaration, we shall have to decide whether to ignore it and to file the incoming communication without acknowledgment, or to acknowledge it. If it be decided that acknowledgment should be made, that acknowledgment should, in my view, be very brief and should indicate merely that we
purpose

- 3 -

purpose to continue in our traditional and consistent course of conducting foreign relations in accordance with the developing principles of international law and the treaties to which the United States is party.

In case we do not receive through official channels a copy of the Japanese declaration, we shall have to make the same decision whether to take no notice of it or to take notice of it by means of making some public statement. If it be decided that a public statement should be made, I think that it should be along the lines indicated in the preceding paragraph.

April 25.

In the light of what has happened up to the present, I personally favor making no reply to the Japanese statement, for reasons as follows:

1. It appears that no other government is prepared to take a strong position against the Japanese statement. The British Government has apparently taken the matter up with the Japanese Government and has called attention to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. If we are to take any action, it is suggested that we merely parallel the British action. If we were to take action in addition to that, such as for example the issuance of a public statement, we would place the United States again, as it has been since September 18, 1931, in advance of other nations in registering objection to Japan's actions. American interests in China are not, in my opinion, any more important than, if as important as, the interests of Great Britain, Russia and possibly France. I do not think that the United States should "stick out its neck" and become the spearhead in opposition to Japan. *Let us await the unfolding of the situation in the Far East as between Russia and Japan and as between Great Britain and Japan.*
2. In

- 4 -

2. In Japan we are dealing with a military minded and militant country. Words have no favorable effect upon Japan unless those words are manifestly accompanied by a determination to use force, if necessary, to put those words into effect. I do not believe that the American Government is prepared or should be prepared to use force in opposing Japan at this juncture.

3. Failure to make any public statement will have the advantage of not disclosing to the Japanese our intentions. In dealing with Oriental countries, it is sometimes of advantage to "keep them guessing".

It seems to me that the best course of action for the United States to follow is to ignore the Japanese statement and "to carry on business as usual". At the same time, it is suggested that the American Government should build its Navy up as rapidly as possible to full treaty strength and should also give thought to working out and implementing some course of action in relation to our naval treaties which would place Japan at a disadvantage.

Actions speak louder than words. It is dangerous to use words in the Far East unless willing to back up those words by action. Confronted by the Japanese statement, it seems to me that the most dignified and advisable course for the American Government to follow is, to say nothing and to act along the lines indicated above.

NOTE: Up to the present the number of "fan" letters received by the Department in regard to the Japanese statement does not indicate that the American public is taking any great interest in the Japanese statement.

MMH/REK

H. W. H.

118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
June 5, 1934.

W:
Dp:

I wonder whether it
might not be a good plan for
us to send Grew a telegram
telling him something of
what Simon said to Davis in
connection with Davis' ap-
proach to him on this subject.

~~SKH~~

SKH:EJL

Del. sent June 6, 1934

** 91 to Tolayr*
Sub A15 a5/75 (c)


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)




Tokyo

Dated May 23, 1934

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



98, May 23, 3 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I respectfully invite attention to the following points which collectively may be significant.

One. Sir John Simon in the House of Lords minimized the importance of the recent statement of Japan's policy toward foreign assistance to China.

Two. Sir Roger Keyes was reported on May 18 to have said that Japan is destined to play a great part in the future of the East and will go toward her destiny with unswerving determination. He is further reported to have advised the British Government to come to a good understanding with Japan.

Three. The British Naval Attache in Tokyo has recently said to several friends at the club that England sees no reason to oppose Japanese naval parity or to thwart Japan's naval ambitions.

Four

F/G 793.94/6701

Confidential File

FILED

793.94
with
741.94

600-12-25

MP

2-#98 From Tokyo, May 23, 3 p.m.

Four. The Netherlands Minister informs me confidentially that Sir Frederick Dreyer, in command of the British Asiatic Fleet, stated to the Chief of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs in Java, subsequent to the recent British Naval Conference in Singapore, that England would not (repeat not) oppose Japanese naval parity and sees no (repeat no) reason why a "crisis" should occur in 1935-36.

Five. Sir Robert Clive, the new British Ambassador to Japan, is reported to have said to the press before departing from London that in his opinion the interests of Great Britain and Japan in China are identical.

Six. Several days ago the Japanese press was full of vituperative comment on England's proposed system of trade quotas which was held to be aimed against Japanese interests. This unfavorable comment suddenly ceased and has now taken a distinctly friendly tone.

I submit as worthy of consideration the theory that the British Government, on the possible initiative of the Admiralty, may conceivably be considering or even negotiating some kind of a rapprochement with

Japan

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

3-#98 From Tokyo, May 23, 3 p.m.

Japan on the basis of an agreement on policy in China
in return for England's support of Japanese claims
to naval parity.

Repeated to Peiping by mail.

GREW

WSB CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

RECEIVED
 Department of State

1934 MAY 25 PM 5:48

Washington,

May 25, 1934.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
 RECEIVED before

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

213

The following telegram from Ambassador Grew at
 Tokyo is repeated herewith for your strictly confidential
 information only:

(Here quote text of telegram No. 98 of May 23, 3 p. m.
 from Tokyo).

793.94/6701

Confidential File

FE:
 M.W.H.

RE: NIT: NNB

MAY 25, 1934 PM

Enciphered by CIB

Sent by operator M., 1934

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

RECEIVED
 Department of State

1934 MAY 25 PM 5:48

Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
 May 25, 1934.
 7P

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

213

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 Tokyo is repeated herewith for your strictly confidential
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793.94/6701
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 from Tokyo).

793.94/6701

Confidential File

FE:
m.w.H.

RE: RIT. NNE

MAY 25, 1934 PM

Enciphered by PKL CIBSent by operator M., 19

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

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to anyone (C)

Tokyo

Dated May 23, 1934

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

98, May 23, 3 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.~~

Quote

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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3-#98 From Tokyo, May 23, 3 p.m.

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—Repeated to Peiping by mail.

~~GREW~~

WSB CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 23, 1934.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegram indicated below.

As the telegram was transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if it could be return to the Department at the President convenience for appropriate disposition.

F.W.

/93.94/6701

793.94/6701 (c.f.)

Enclosure:

No. 98, May 23, 3 p. m., Tokyo, from Grew.

ERW.

-2-

"If they were put on their own feet," he declared of the Russians, "and did not import engineers, workers and machines, we probably should see Russia collapse."

LONDON HOLDS U.S. TO BLAME IN CHACO STRIFE

(London, AP) Aggressive measures against Bolivia and Paraguay to force the South American republics to stop their jungle war are being considered by a group of world powers, including the United States and Great Britain.

The campaign against the Chaco war, it was stated yesterday, would involve political, financial and economic pressure, "aimed at both governments equally."

The plan is being considered here, in Geneva, where the League of Nations Council has before it a report on the war, and in Washington.

Economic and financial noncooperation with the combatants, and political ostracism were mentioned as possible steps.

Stanley Baldwin told the House of Commons that when the matter was under discussion, the United States had called attention to the fact that an act of Congress was necessary for an embargo by that country.

"Is the failure (to impose the embargo) due to the refusal of the United States?" asked Sir Percy Harris.

"The House can draw its conclusions," Baldwin replied.

BIG FOUR WHEAT PACT CONFERENCE ENDS

(London, AP) Ten days of private negotiations between the Big Four wheat delegates ended last night, leaving in doubt the question whether Argentina can be prevented from breaking the 1933 wheat agreement.

A report of the deliberations was being sent to the governments concerned, including the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina.

ARGENTINE WILL PAY \$1,052,437

(Buenos Aires, AP) The Argentine government yesterday instructed its embassy at Washington to make a \$1,052,437 service payment on its debt to the United States. At the same time the embassy at Madrid was instructed to pay Spain 1,760,000 pesetas.

SAITO REPEATS JAPAN'S EDICT OF 'HANDS OFF'


(Washington, AP) The Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Hiroshi Saito, last night reiterated Japan's position in Far Eastern affairs as being such that she could not "remain indifferent to any action prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in east Asia."

In an address broadcast by the National Broadcasting Co., the Ambassador said the idea proposed by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota, in his recent notes to the United States and British Government, conveyed the following idea:

"That Japan sincerely desires the preservation of territorial integrity of China and her unification and prosperity; that Japan has no intention to trespass the rights of other powers in China; that Japan is observing scrupulously all existing treaties and agreements concerning that country; but that Japan can not remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in east Asia."

F/ESP

793.94/6702



MAY 21 1934

FILED

-3-

Saito said he believed the term "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" was a misnomer. He quoted Hirota as saying "there never has been a man named Monroe in Japan."

NAVY RACE IS SEEN AS PERIL TO JAPAN

(Tokyo, N. Y. Times, Hugh Byas) In addressing a meeting yesterday of the Minseitō (chief minority party), Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, former Premier, who was Japan's chief delegate to the London Naval Conference, declared renewal of competitive naval building would put Japan in serious financial straits.

He disagreed with Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi's view that deficits should be met by borrowing and said they were much too large and that increases in taxation were urgently necessary.

While Baron Wakatsuki was careful not to oppose the present naval expenditure, he pointed out that it was inconsistent to support an armament program but refuse the increased taxation it necessitated.

Prince Fumimaro Konoye, president of the House of Peers, sails for San Francisco today. After a brief visit with his son, who is graduating from the Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, Mass., he will go to see Ambassador Hiroshi Saito, who is arranging his American good-will tour.

Prince Konoye hopes to see President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and leading politicians, publicists and scholars, less for the purpose of enlightening them than to learn American views on Far Eastern questions.

Mr. Saito is expected to leave Washington early in June for an important consultation here with Koki Hirota, the Foreign Minister. Upon the nature of Mr. Saito's report on American opinion Mr. Hirota will frame his policy for regaining American confidence and good-will.

The form that policy will take depends on Mr. Saito's report, but Mr. Hirota hopes it will be possible to take positive and constructive steps that will facilitate a naval agreement and have a tranquilizing effect on the entire Far Eastern situation.

SOVIET TO TEACH HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY IN 'BOURGEOIS' WAY

(Moscow, AP) Hitherto barred as too bourgeois for the minds of Soviet school children, factual history and geography are now for the first time to be taught under the Bolshevik regime.

In joint decrees issued yesterday Joseph Stalin, general secretary of the Communist party, and Vyacheslav Molotov, President of the Council of Commissars, ordered that ancient and modern history and elementary geography be added to the subjects taught in primary and secondary schools, beginning the next semester. Heretofore these subjects have been taught only with relation to their revolutionary significance.

RURAL WORKERS IN GERMANY WILL BE BARRED FROM CITIES

(Berlin, Baltimore Sun, Special) The familiar theme, as in Horatio Alger tales, of the country boy coming to the city to win fame and fortune will not be enacted in the Third Reich in future, thanks to the law restricting immigration of farm labor to industrial centers which took effect for Berlin yesterday. Berlin is the first, but Hamburg and other large German municipalities are expected to follow suit soon.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF THE MORNING NEWSPAPERS, THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1934

FASCISTS SEIZE LATVIAN REINS

(Riga, Latvia, UP) A swift coup placed this little republic bordering Soviet Russia in the hands of the Latvian Fascists yesterday.

The garrison at Riga, on the Baltic, was mobilized in the maneuver which added the nation to the growing list of Fascist-controlled states in Europe.

Public buildings, including parliament, were occupied by troops. Police, reinforced by tank units, patrolled the streets. Martial law was proclaimed "to forestall unrest."

Troops armed with machine guns surrounded headquarters of the Socialist party, removed the red flag and hoisted the Latvian state flag. Several Socialist leaders were arrested, including Speaker of Parliament Kalnin. Weapons were alleged to have been found in Kalnin's villa.

Fascist leaders said political parties and parliament would be suspended pending enforcement of constitutional reforms. Newspapers were censored.

BRITISH TURN DEAF EAR TO JAPANESE PROTESTS

(London, AP) Britain turned a deaf ear yesterday to Japan's protests, and resolved to go ahead with the trade war that has broken out between the two nations.

"We are continuing our program," a Downing street official announced tersely in answer to reports that new objections were on their way here from Tokyo.

GENEVA PARLEY ACTS TO FORCE FRANCE'S HAND

(Geneva, AP) A proposal to abandon the disarmament conference and report its failure to the League of Nations Council was tentatively launched last night by conference leaders.

Although the idea has not been formally presented, it is known to be under consideration by statesmen seeking to inject new life into a desperately ill patient.

Encouragement for friends of disarmament came at the same time in a statement of France's foreign minister, Louis Barthou, that he had not given up hope of an agreement, and in reports that Germany is considering returning to the conference.

The entire disarmament situation is becoming a swift game of poker.

FRENCH MASS TROOPS IN SAAR BORDER AREA



(Metz, France, AP) A division of French infantry and a cavalry brigade massed in the Saar frontier region gave rise to reports yesterday that France is attempting to discourage Nazi activities in the Saar region.

Troops were sent to the frontier from Metz. Military authorities described the operations as "normal maneuvers." Reports persisted the movement was in response to Nazi demonstrations.

COMMUNIST IDEALS JEERED BY HITLER

(Berlin, AP) Chancellor Adolf Hitler derided the Soviet Union yesterday for importing talent and machinery and compared it with a man wandering through a swamp clinging to the hand of a capitalist on a solid road beside him.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FOR OFFICIAL USE
 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

6-4
 2657-A 244
 26
 3800-

G-2 Report.

JAPAN (Political).

Subject: Statements of Sir John Simon Relative to Japan.

F/ESP

793.94/6703

In the House of Commons on April 30th, Sir Charles Cayser asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can state the nature of the communication which he has made to the Japanese Government with the object of clarifying the position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the statement made to the Japanese press by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the question of Japanese interests in China; and whether he has received any reply from the Japanese Government?

Mr. Harcourt Johnstone asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can now make a statement on the reply of the Japanese Government to the enquiries addressed to them by His Majesty's Government on April 28th?

Sir J. Simon: The communication of His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25th April, which, as I informed the House the other day, was a friendly enquiry, was to the effect that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, to which Japan is a party, and that His Majesty's Government must, of course, continue to enjoy all rights in China which are common to all signatories or are otherwise proper, except in so far as their rights were restricted by agreements such as the consortium agreement, or in so far as Japan had special rights recognized by other Powers and not shared by them.

Sir Francis Lindley added that the anxieties regarding China expressed in the Japanese statement could not apply to the United Kingdom, since it was the aim of British policy to avoid the dangers to peace and the integrity of China to which the statement referred. His Majesty's Government naturally could not admit the right of Japan alone to decide whether any particular action, such as the provision of technical and financial assistance, promoted such a danger, if that had indeed been the implication of the statement, which they did not believe. Under Articles 1 and 7 of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan had the right to call the attention of the other signatories to any action in China inimical to her security. This right provided Japan with safeguards and His Majesty's Government therefore assumed that the statement was not intended in any way to infringe the common rights of the Powers in China nor to infringe Japan's own treaty obligations.


In reply, Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, indicated that His Majesty's Government were correct in this assumption. He assured His Majesty's Ambassador that Japan would observe the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that the policy of the Japanese Government and of His Majesty's Government in regard to the treaty coincided. His

From: M.A. London.

Report No. 35878.

Date: May 4, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FOR OFFICIAL USE
 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

6-4
 2657-A 24434
 26
 3800.

G-2 Report.

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F/ESP

793.94/6703

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From: M.A. London.

Report No. 35678.

Date: May 4, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 ONLY

Excellency stated, in conclusion, that Japan continued to attach the greatest importance to the maintenance of the open door in China and re-affirmed her acceptance of that policy.

Mr. Johnstone: Has our Ambassador at Tokyo asked for, or obtained, any kind of explanation of the numerous statements issued by the Press Officer of the Japanese Foreign Office or by the Ambassadors of Japan at Washington and Berlin, and the representative also at Geneva, which seem to conflict with the statement of Mr. Hirota?

Sir J. Simon: One must not assume that the information which reaches readers of the Press and every Press statement are authorized. I think that the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister is reasonably clear, and His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is. I would only add that His Majesty's Government are resolved to assist to the utmost possible extent the spirit of international cooperation in the progress of China towards peace and prosperity, and the maintenance of the spirit of harmony and good will in the Far East.

Mr. D. Grenfell asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which are the Powers which have accepted the obligations of Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922; what are the specific obligations contained in this article; and whether the Nine-Power Treaty is still valid?

Sir J. Simon: The obligations of the Nine-Power Treaty were accepted by the United States, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal in addition to the British Empire. I will circulate the text of Article 1 in the Official Report. The Treaty is still in force.

Following is the text:

Article 1. - The Contracting Powers (other than China) agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

From: M.A. London. Report No. 35678. Date: May 4, 1934.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ONLY

Mr. D.G. Somerville asked the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs if his latest information from Tokyo
indicates that the new Japanese pronouncement will prohibit
the employment by China of foreign advisers to whom Japan may
object?

Sir John Simon: No, Sir.

793.94/6703

From: M.A. London. Report No. 55678. Date: May 4, 1934.

CORSTLANDT PARKER,
Lt. Col., F.A.,
M.A., London.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

April 11, 1934.

7E.
Fier
W

Ellery Walter, correspondent of THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, touched upon the following points in his conversation with me today:

That the Military Party is in descendent and the Civilian Party in ascendent; that there is no intention on the part of the Japanese to advance against Russia or against China; the Japanese will be satisfied with dominating all of North China, including Peiping and Tientsin; that, therefore, occupation of Manchukuo and of their interest in probable extension of influence into Eastern Inner-Mongolia is to form a buffer state between Soviet Russia, China and Japan.

The Japanese are intensely hostile to Sovietism; Inner-Mongolia is very important to them as a buffer state; the Mongolian princes are leaning towards Manchukuo since the establishment of the Emperor because they have now something to look up to and to worship; since they have no leaning towards China they may very easily be brought into the Manchukuo fold.

Emperor Pu-yi is a phlegmatic but intelligent oriental

793.94/6704

FILED

MAY 24 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

2

oriental; some of the junior Manchukuo officials are intensely hostile to Japanese control of the various departments.

Araki, former War Minister of Japan, said that the recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States was a natural procedure and that Japan had no possible criticism of it, since the Japanese themselves had already recognized the Soviet regime.

Walter thinks that we will have to abandon commercial efforts in North China and should concentrate all efforts in the Yangtze Valley, wherein lies the main wealth of China; he is not satisfied that American officials or American representatives of business interests are sufficiently active; if we would concentrate our efforts in this section there would be an ever increasing of American business; he believes that eventually we will abandon the American Legation in Peiping and move it to Nanking and that all other powers will do the same.

A handwritten signature, possibly "WP", with a long horizontal flourish underneath.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./80 FOR 72076

FROM China (Johnson) DATED April 23, 1954
TO NAME 1-1127 GPO

REGARDING: Resume of Sino-Japanese relations for month of March;
strong evidence that Japan is endeavoring to persuade
Nanking Government to a policy of Sino-Japanese "Friend-
ship".

esp

793.946705
6705

3. Japan:

a. The Japanese intention:⁷

79394
The significance of the efforts of the Japanese authorities to gain "diplomatically" the adherence of the Nanking Government to a policy of Sino-Japanese "friendship" became increasingly evident. It appeared on the surface that

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4. Yunnan's despatch 128 of March 21.
 5. Yunnan's despatch 125 of March 16.
 6. Yunnan's despatch 130 of March 22.
 7. Legation's telegram 164 of April 11, 6 p.m.

- 4 -

that the Japanese were urging upon Nanking a solution of the problems affecting the relations of "Manchukuo" and North China, such as the resumption of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway and postal service. It was thought, however, that actually the Japanese military intended through these and other concessions to obtain substantial influence in the control of North China, failing which the Japanese would effect a separation of North China from the nominal control of Nanking through manipulation of dissatisfied and ambitious Chinese militarists in North China who could be persuaded to give the Japanese military those objectives which they are determined to obtain. Observers believed that the Japanese would attempt to gain their ends without the movement of Japanese troops into North China in order to lead foreign governments to regard alterations in the situation as coming spontaneously from the Chinese concerned therewith.

March saw no solution of the dilemma in which the Nanking Government was placed by the Japanese. General Huang Fu, the representative in North China of General Chiang Kai-shek, continued to postpone his visit to Central China for conference with Nanking leaders on the questions of policy toward Japan. (The Japanese Minister delayed his return to Tokyo.) Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Peiping from March 14 to 20, probably at the instance of General Huang Fu who hoped to convince Mr. Tang -- and through him the Nanking Government -- of the serious situation

- 5 -

situation existing in North China and of the dangers involved in continuing to ignore the wishes of the Japanese military in respect thereto. Following Mr. Tang's return to Nanking, where it was anticipated he might prepare the ground for General Huang Fu's representations of the necessity of "friendship" with Japan, it became apparent that General Huang Fu's trip would not be postponed much longer and that the Nanking Government would have to decide upon its policy in the near future.

b. Japanese activities in North China:

(1) Japanese manoeuvres in the Tientsin area:

The manoeuvres of Japanese forces along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, described in the Legation's monthly report for February, which aroused the suspicion and ill-feeling of Chinese, were carried out without incident. They were apparently a routine procedure.

(2) Visit to Peiping of Mr. Araki, Diplomatic Agent:⁸

Mr. Araki, a "diplomatic" agent attached to the Japanese Army Headquarters at Tientsin, called during the first week of March on various foreign missionary organizations in Peiping requesting information about the location of mission property in Hopeh Province in order, he alleged, that it might be protected in the event of any future "trouble". Not unnaturally this exceptional behavior caused, in view of the critical situation in Sino-Japanese relations, uneasiness among Chinese. When it was made public in the press, the local office of
the

⁸ Legation's despatch 2617 of March 27.

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the Japanese Military Attaché issued a statement repudiating Mr. Araki and claiming that he had no relation whatsoever with the Japanese authorities, a claim of doubtful veracity as the fact was well established that Mr. Araki was what he represented himself to be. The repudiation served to end Mr. Araki's interrogations and to indicate again a reported lack of harmony between the office of the Japanese Military Attaché and the Japanese Army Headquarters at Tientsin.

(3) Return of passes in the Great Wall:

Kupeik'ou and five smaller passes in the Great Wall were returned March 4 by the Japanese to the nominal control of China. In reality, at Kupeik'ou only that part of the town south of the actual pass through the Great Wall was turned over to the Chinese, "Manchukuo" Frontier Police remaining between the pass and the south part of the town.

c. The coronation of Pu Yi:

The Japanese effected on March 1 the coronation of Pu Yi as emperor of "Manchukuo", Japanese dignitaries being much in evidence at the ceremonies which were obviously directed by Japanese officers and which passed off, contrary to the evident Japanese apprehension, without untoward incident. There was, however, little indication of enthusiasm on the part of the populace, Japanese reports notwithstanding. The coronation was not accompanied by any fundamental change in the organization of the regime nor were peerages created, although an Imperial Household

Office

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Office was established.⁹

In China Proper, the National Government issued a mandate declaring Lu Yi guilty of lese majesty and punishable under the law governing acts of treason against the Republic. The Southwest Political Council was reported to have issued an indignant circular telegram which was not, however, sent to foreign governments, apparently on the advice of Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan. Unofficial comment was, on the whole, restrained, editorial writers seeing in the enthronement preparation by Japan either for ultimate annexation of "Manchukuo" or for further penetration into China.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R. 777 FOR #758
FROM Japan (Grew) DATED May 1, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 gpo

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations and the effect of the Japanese
statement of her Chinese policy on the 17th April.

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793.94/ 6706
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II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES:

(a) International

1. Japan's Chinese Policy Statement

793.94
With reference to section I regarding the Foreign Office's statement of Japan's Chinese policy and its relation to the United States, it is interesting to note the effect of the statement upon other countries, as well as certain newspaper comments and criticisms.

The British Ambassador was instructed by London to request that the Foreign Minister elucidate Japan's intentions and clarify the meaning of the April 17th statement. In his conversation with Hirota on April 25th, according to the ADVERTISER, Sir Francis Lindley enquired whether the Nine Power Treaty would be observed and pointed out certain privileges that were legally enjoyed by Great Britain in China. As a result of the interview it was announced that there was no disagreement between the two Governments and that the Foreign Minister's explanation was satisfactory.

2
The French Government, although apparently greatly interested, announced that it would make no declaration at present but would wait until the American and British policies had been announced.

The Chinese Minister also went to the Foreign Office, on April 26th, and protested that the Japanese statement was prejudicial to Sino-Japanese relations, but on being reassured by Mr. Hirota, is reported to consider the statement less hostile. The Nanking Government is reported to have reconsidered its previous decision to urge the signatories

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of the Nine Power Treaty to call a conference in connection with Japan's policy statement. It now apparently plans taking no further action unless future developments demand it.

Representatives of other countries contented themselves with asking for accurate translations of the original statement.

Foreign Minister Hirota, seeing the fragile edifice of his recent good work in improving foreign relations about to totter, met the situation with the explanation that Japan had no desire to infringe the Open Door Policy in China, and expressed his regret that the statement had been so badly phrased that it was misunderstood by most of the foreign Powers. He is understood to have interpreted the statement as a mere announcement that Japan would like to be consulted or at least advised by any foreign power before that power takes any action in China, and that Japan wants its influence in East Asia recognized.

The local press observed that both the United States and Great Britain were anxious over the statement, and advanced no real reason for the issuance of such an announcement at this time, merely reprinting foreign criticisms without comment. It is somewhat confusing and contradictory to read that all concerned confirm that Japan has no idea of violating the Nine Power Treaty, and then to learn that "Japan must control the situation in Eastern Asia because that is its prerogative". Mr. Hirota strove ably to soothe the feelings of the perturbed nations through trying to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies in the statement. He maintained that while perhaps badly expressed, there

was

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was no fundamental change in Japan's policy as often propounded in the Diet. He was surprised at the extraordinary effect the statement had on foreign powers and expressed regret that Japan's peaceful policy had been misunderstood.

RENGO stated that apparently the United States and Great Britain objected to Japan or any other nation deciding for them whether or not making a loan to China or rendering other assistance constitutes a danger to the peace of East Asia.

The Fukuoka NICHU NICHU, commenting on European reaction to Japan's announced Chinese policy, says the real reason for the statement is that Japan opposes any action, military or financial, which is prejudicial to peace in Eastern Asia, and which is likely to make China anti-Japanese; that it is natural that Japan, which assumes the whole responsibility for peace in Eastern Asia, cannot ignore such actions. The reference is, of course, to recent and contemplated loans to China, as well as to sales of airplanes and supplying of military instructors.

The Kobe CHRONICLE of April 21st had the temerity to state in its editorial, "The Tokyo Foreign Office 'unofficially' has announced its intention to disregard the Nine Power Treaty altogether. Only by prompt and vigorous protest will the Powers prevent this statement being translated into action. Such a possibility would have sounded absurd three years ago, but the Manchurian intervention has since shown how treaty obligations and the most solemn of international covenants can be disregarded when the circumstances so conspire. There can be

little

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little doubt that Japan's practical victory at Geneva has paved the way to the present crisis -- for crisis it is."

In view of the necessity of maintaining good relations with the two other large naval powers because of the coming naval conference, the JIJI SHIMPO of April 24th states that the Foreign Minister has determined to voice the following policy at every opportunity: 1. That the intelligent and fair-minded members of foreign powers recognize Japan's special position and responsibility in Eastern Asia, and that if others shut their eyes to that fact, solution of Far Eastern issues will be difficult. 2. That at the forthcoming Naval Conference Japan wishes to limit the discussion to naval matters, to the exclusion of Far Eastern questions, such as that of the abrogation of the Nine Power Treaty. 3. That Japan's Chinese policy has been consistent ever since the Manchurian event occurred, and will not be permitted to be altered under any circumstances.

The consensus of opinion among foreign officials, newspaper correspondents and even many Japanese officials appears to be that foreign powers have been unduly antagonized, and that an unfortunate impression has been given by the April 17th statement of the China policy. Foreign Minister Hirota is generally given full credit for trying his best to maintain diplomatic waters smooth, but there are rumors to the effect that he has not been fully backed by his Government, and that the military influences have forced him to cause

the

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the statement to be issued, in their zeal for a more aggressive international policy.

II.

I. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

- (a) Statement issued by the Foreign Office defining Japanese Policy with regard to China and China's Relations with Other Countries.

193.94
By far the most important event affecting American-Japanese relations that has occurred since the invasion of North China in the autumn of 1931 was the issuance by the Foreign Office spokesman, Mr. Amau, on April 17, of an "unofficial statement" which sets forth Japanese policy with respect to China and China's relations with other countries. The Foreign Office statement contains the following paragraphs, among others:

" Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

" However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects."

In view of the above quoted statements, if Japan should attempt to enforce this policy in concrete instances, a number of American enterprises and interests in China might be affected thereby, including airplane manufacturers, such as Curtiss-Wright and Douglas; the China Aviation Corporation, a Chinese-American company that has constructed aerodromes in connection with the establishment of civilian air lines; United States Government loans to China, such as

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Wheat and Cotton Loan, in the event that Japan decided that such loans were for the purpose of providing "funds for political uses"; and American automobile manufacturers who sell their products to the Chinese Government, such as the Reo and Studebaker Companies, who have recently entered into contracts with the Chinese Aviation Department for the sale of trucks and passenger automobiles. Since, according to the statement, Japan will oppose negotiations with China on "questions of finance or trade" if such negotiations do not "benefit China" or are "detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia", it is quite conceivable that the interests of many other American concerns, such as oil companies and cotton exporters, might be adversely affected by any concrete action on the part of the Japanese Government to carry out its purpose.

The Japanese press strongly endorsed the principles expressed in the statement. However, the OSAKA ASAHI of April 27th stated that America's reaction to Japan's statement on China had "given Japan a good lesson, that the American-Japanese clash would be unavoidable in case Japan were to pursue a policy which runs counter to the Far Eastern policy of the United States"; that the United States was not insistent on her policy so far as the Manchurian "incident" was concerned but that there was no reason to justify the belief that the same lack of insistence will obtain in the present instance, since the United States has much greater economic interests to guard in the case of China proper. On the morning of April 19th, an English translation of the "unofficial statement" of Japanese policy was "unofficially" issued by the Foreign Office. On April

25th

-3-

25th the Ambassador called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made representations concerning the American oil companies in Dairen. During this interview, Mr. Hirota, entirely on his own initiative, stated that he wished to clarify in confidence the statement given out by Amau regarding the Japanese attitude towards foreign assistance to China. The Foreign Minister's "clarification" was the object of the Embassy's long confidential telegram No. 75 of April 25th. Acting under instructions from the Department, on April 26th, the Ambassador called on Mr. Hirota and inquired of him whether the translation of the statement telegraphed by Mr. Fleisher to the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE was a reasonably accurate translation. The Foreign Minister replied that only Amau, who had issued the statement orally, could answer the Ambassador's inquiry.* When approached by a member of the Embassy staff, Mr. Amau refused to verify as a reasonably accurate translation of his statement of April 17th the version telegraphed to the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE and also refused to verify as accurate the Japanese text as distributed by SHIMBUN RENGO, a Japanese news service.

The Foreign Minister sent the Embassy a copy of a translation of Mr. Amau's second statement, made on April 20th, and stated that this represented his (Hirota's) true policy toward China.* *

In accordance with the instructions contained in the Department's telegram No. 59 of April 23th, 7 p.m., the Ambassador delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

the

* Embassy's telegram No. 75 of April 26th.

** Embassy's telegram No. 78 of April 26

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the aide memoire specified in the Department's telegram. The only comment made by the Foreign Minister after reading the aide memoire was that the whole affair had caused "great misunderstanding". He apparently refused to recognize the aide memoire as clear proof that there had been no "misunderstanding" of the affair on the part of the United States Government.*

As the month closed, there appeared to be a distinct tendency on the part of the Foreign Office to modify very considerably the tone of the original statement. While the substance of the statement had undoubtedly been approved by Hirota in the form of an instruction to the Japanese Minister in China, it is open to doubt whether he approved or had previous knowledge of its issuance by Amau to the press. In view of the chauvinistic elements in the country Hirota cannot very well deny the policy enunciated by Amau, but he is without doubt gradually toning down the statement in order to quiet the unfavorable reaction created in other countries by the statement.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 31, 1934

~~SECRET~~
ATTN: ~~SECRET~~

Attention is invited to the last paragraph of London's Despatch No. 705 of May 15, 1934, in which the Embassy reports that the Foreign Office has asked whether this Government has received a reply from the Japanese Government to our Aide-Mémoire of April 28. In response to an inquiry from the Foreign Office, the Embassy stated that it had no knowledge of any reply. The Embassy now asks whether it "may convey any information in this relation to the Foreign Office".

It seems likely that the Japanese Government will not make any reply. That, however, is conjecture.

Rather than have the Embassy at London inform the Foreign Office of the present status of this matter, which of course might be altered at any time, it is suggested that Mr. Hornbeck invite an officer of the British Embassy at Washington to call and, after referring to the inquiry of the British Foreign Office, state to the officer that no reply has as yet been received.

Your attention is also drawn to the enclosed clipping from HANSARD, in which Sir John Simon's statement in Parliament with regard to Japanese "special rights" is reported.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, May 1934.

No. 705

SUBJECT: Japanese Foreign Office Statement
Concerning China.



F/ESP

793.94/6707


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JUN 8 - 1934

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JUNE 8 1934

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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For			

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Adverting to the Department's telegram No. 176 of May 2, 4 p.m., directing me to endeavor persistently to ascertain what Sir John Simon had in mind in his reference in Parliament on April 30 to Japan's "special rights recognized by other Powers and not shared by them", I have the honor to enclose herewith a single clipping from Hansard, which publishes the Foreign Secretary's answer to a question in the House on the same subject. It will be noted that Sir John stated that "there are no rights of a general character which fall within/

-2-

within the category indicated" in the phrase quoted above, and mentioned the Japanese concession in Hankow as an example of the special rights possessed by Japan.

The same clipping also publishes the Foreign Secretary's reply to a question touching on the contents of a communication from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador, a copy of which was subsequently given to the British Ambassador.

In compliance with the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 169, April 28, 6 p.m., a copy of the Aide-Mémoire which was handed to the Japanese Foreign Minister by the American Ambassador at Tokio was furnished in confidence to the Foreign Office, which expressed its appreciation. In a recent conversation with a Foreign Office official, the Embassy was asked whether it had received a copy of a reply from the Japanese Government to that Aide-Mémoire. The official was informed that the Embassy had not received copies of any such document but an inquiry would be made. Should you deem it advisable, I shall be grateful if you would inform me whether I may convey any information in this relation to the Foreign Office.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Ray Atherton,
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosure:

1. Clipping from Hansard, May 7, 1934.

HM/MVB

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No 705 of May 15, 1934,
from the Embassy at London, England.

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
House of Commons,
7 May 1934.
London. Pages 710-712 inc.

709

Oral Answers

7 MAY 1934

Oral Answers

710

INDIAN ARMY (CADETS).

6. **Duchess of ATHOLL** asked the Secretary of State for India the number of Indian cadets who passed successfully out of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, into the Indian Army, and the number of these now holding commissions in that Army?

Sir S. HOARE: The numbers are 153 and 139 respectively, the latter including officers commissioned to the Unattached List for the Indian Army pending their final posting to that Army.

Captain CAZALET: Is it the intention of the Government that in future Indian cadets should go to the Sandhurst in India, and not to a military college here?

Sir S. HOARE: Yes, that is the intention of the Government.

PUNJAB CIVIL SERVICE (JUDICIAL BRANCH).

7. **Duchess of ATHOLL** asked the Secretary of State for India if he will place upon the Table of the House the rules drawn up by the Punjab Government requiring the judges of the Punjab High Court, when appointing judges to the subordinate courts, to allocate nominations to the various religious communities irrespective of the places secured by the candidates in the qualifying examination?

Sir S. HOARE: I understand from the Punjab Government that there are no formal rules. For many years it has, however, been the general policy of the Punjab Government to avoid an undue preponderance of any one class or community in the public services, and since 1900 there has been a convention that out of every 11 appointments to the Judicial Branch of the Punjab Civil Service, four should go to Hindus, four to Mohammedans, two to Sikhs and one to members of other communities.

Duchess of ATHOLL: Does not the convention which my right hon. Friend mentioned amount, in fact, to rules sufficiently well understood to have been the subject of a question to the Home Member of the Punjab Government last July, which was referred to in the Civil and Military Gazette of 1st August?

Sir S. HOARE: I do not know whether that is so or not. If my Noble Friend will send me particulars of her supple-

mentary question, I will look into them. My information goes to show that there are no formal rules.

CONSTITUTION (POLICE FORCE).

8. **Duchess of ATHOLL** asked the Secretary of State for India if he will lay upon the Table the memoranda which, following on the publication of the report of the Statutory Commission on Indian Constitutional Reform, the All-India Police Association and the Bengal branch of the association sent to the Secretary of State protesting against the Commission's recommendation to transfer the police force to a responsible Indian Minister?

Sir S. HOARE: These documents were received by my predecessor in 1930. Since then the Indian Police Association have submitted a representation to the Joint Select Committee, and have been examined upon it. I do not, therefore, propose to publish these memoranda.

Duchess of ATHOLL: Is it not the case that Bengal officers of police have not been examined by the Joint Select Committee, and in that case would it not be well that a strong expression of opinion against the recommendation should be made known?

Sir S. HOARE: I do not think so. The police evidence given to the Select Committee was given by the police organisations. There was no pressure put on anybody as to the evidence they should give. The particular memoranda to which my Noble Friend refers were sent to me four years ago. I should have thought that the recent memoranda were more up-to-date.

Duchess of ATHOLL: Will my right hon. Friend answer the question whether the officers of the Bengal police were heard by the Joint Select Committee along with the others?

Sir S. HOARE: It is essentially a matter for the police organisations. They settle what evidence they shall give.

JAPAN AND CHINA.

10. **Mr. HARCOURT JOHNSTONE** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the reasons why the third Japanese principle, which Mr. Hirota

Enclosure No. /... to despatch
from the Embassy at London,

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY
House of Commons
7 May 1934.
London. Page

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Oral Answers

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Oral Answers

712

[Mr. Johnstone.]
stated to Sir Francis Lindley, namely,
that Japan is opposed to any foreign
activity in China prejudicial to the peace
and order of East Asia, was omitted
from the Government statement?

The SECRETARY of STATE for
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon):
The principle quoted by the hon. Mem-
ber was not contained in the official state-
ment by the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs to Sir Francis Lindley,
the whole substance of which I gave to
the House on 30th April. It appeared
in a later declaration which was, I
understand, communicated to the United
States Ambassador, and a copy of which
was also given subsequently to His
Majesty's Ambassador.

Mr. JOHNSTONE: Is it the opinion
of the right hon. Gentleman that the
reservation made by the Japanese
Government does in fact weaken the de-
claration they made to our Ambassador,
Sir Francis Lindley?

Sir J. SIMON: I think that the state-
ment made was a complete statement,
and I reported it most faithfully to the
House.

Mr. JOHNSTONE: That is not the
question I asked. It was whether the
supplementary statement made by the
Japanese Government to the United
States Ambassador in fact weakened the
declaration—which, I accept, was fully
reported to the House—made to Sir
Francis Lindley?

Sir J. SIMON: I am primarily con-
cerned with the statement made to the
representative of our own Government,
and the statement of our Government to
Japan. I will add, in answer to the sup-
plementary question, that if what is
desired is to oppose what is prejudicial
to peace and order in East Asia, I should
have thought that was the common
object of all the signatories of the Nine-
Power Treaty.

12. Major Sir ALAN McLEAN asked
the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether the reassurances given to
him recently by the Japanese Government
in respect of Japanese policy in China
included any reference to the purpose for
which the additional accommodation for

Japanese troops is being provided by new
barracks now under construction at
Shanghai?

Sir J. SIMON: No, Sir.

Sir A. McLEAN: May I ask whether
inquiries have been made of the
Japanese Government as to the peaceful
purpose likely to be achieved by the
erection of barracks for 9,000 Japanese
troops?

Sir J. SIMON: No, Sir. I think Japan
has had barracks in Shanghai ever since
1927.

9. Sir JOHN HASLAM (for Captain
ERSKINE-BOLST) asked the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs the special
rights possessed by Japan in relation to
China which have been recognised by
other Powers and not shared by them?

Sir J. SIMON: The phrase which my
hon. Friend has quoted was employed
for the purpose of indicating that any
particular policy of His Majesty's Gov-
ernment in China or any particular
activity of British subjects could only be
successfully challenged by showing that
such policy or such activity infringed
some special Japanese right recognised by
other Powers and not shared by them.
There are no rights of a general charac-
ter that would fall within the category
indicated by my hon. Friend. Japan,
however, like other countries, has no
doubt acquired special rights in China
recognised by other Powers but not
shared by them, by virtue of agreements
relating to particular enterprises. An
example would be the Japanese conces-
sion in Hankow. I am not in a position
to give a list of such agreements nor do
I think it necessary to do so, since the
responsibility of proving that this or that
right comes within the category in ques-
tion does not rest on His Majesty's Gov-
ernment.

THE YEMEN.

13. Colonel WEDGWOOD asked the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
whether he has any information as to
the situation at Hodeida and in the
Yemen?

Sir J. SIMON: On 1st May, His
Majesty's Ship "Penzance" reported
that the Yemeni civil and military authori-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Shusterman NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 423

June 8 1934

The Honorable

Robert Worth Bingham,
 American Ambassador,
 London.

Sir:

With reference to the last sentence of your despatch No. 705, dated May 15, 1934, entitled "Japanese Foreign Office Statement Concerning China", you may in your discretion, as on your own initiative and not as transmitting a message from the Department, orally and informally state to the Foreign Office that this Government has not received from the Japanese Government any reply to the aide-memoire handed on April 29, 1934, by the American Ambassador at Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Also, for the information of the Embassy, attention is called to the fact that the aide-memoire conveying the American Government's views to the Japanese Government was of a character that did not call for and would not invite a reply.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

793.94/6707

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6/7/34

JUN 8 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 17, 1934.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 4 1934
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1409)




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To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The American Ambassador forwards here-
with Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report
No. W. D. 1409, dated May 17, 1934.

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JUN 4 - 1934

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, May 17, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1409.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and
Far Eastern Questions

LE MERCURE DE FRANCE published on May 1, 1934,
an article by Doctor A. Legendre, one of the few
French newspaper specialists on Far Eastern questions,
entitled "The Struggle for the Domination of the
Pacific."

He began by saying that as a consequence of the
economic war which had already lasted for several
years, the political situation on both sides of the
Pacific was disturbed to an exceptional degree but
this was true most especially of the Far Eastern
shore, where he represented the very great Powers,
Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, and

Japan

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Japan, as aspiring to economic if not political domination over an anarchistic China which could no longer defend itself and which would consequently fall a prey to the strongest.

Great Britain was represented by Doctor Legendre as standing aloof for the present, while keeping a formidable naval base at Singapore and vainly courting the Government clan in Nanking which was in fact a mere reed.

The three Powers remaining active in the struggle were the United States, Japan, and Russia. Japan particularly considered that its very existence and its future as a great nation were now at stake, as a consequence of the recent accord between Moscow and Washington which Japan considered as a "pact of aggression."

Doctor Legendre, who is always critical of America, and sometimes openly hostile, went on to remark:

"Is there not cause for anxiety, and not for Japan alone, in seeing America, the author of the Kellogg Pact, put its all-power in the service of a régime which destroys the political and social order? That is what Washington calls 'a great example of international solidarity.'

"In spite of his constant errors in political

and _____

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and economic matters, the American thus persists in leading the world and settling our destinies for us. How well he has succeeded so far! This time, he will certainly lead the peoples to definitive peace and to widespread fraternity by dealing with Moscow and consecrating, with the whole world as witness, the virtues of Bolshevism, a doctrine which Mussolini, a well-informed man, recently described as 'a social infection against which Europe must struggle with all its might.'

"Similarly, in China, the American has been totally lacking in prudence and has thus contributed greatly towards increasing disorder and retarding in a remarkable way the hour at which peace may be hoped for. Overbubbling with a zeal which is political and social as well as religious, he has wished to be an apostle, a redeemer for humanity. But this 'leader' has made the serious mistake of forgetting biological laws and their inexorable determinism. He has fancied that the brain of a Chinaman could be developed so as to make a commander of him, and that an old race retarded by conceptions which are thousands of years out of date could be transformed from one day to the next. Setting to work therefore to break up the social structure of China and traditions whose utility

had been

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had been proved by experience, he preached ardently the precept of integral democracy embellished ~~with~~ with universal brotherhood. We know the result: a political and social collapse, the Bolshevik and Xenophobic tendencies of the Young Chinese, civil war for the past twenty years, and ruin spread over the vast territory of China, particularly among the rural masses which represent eighty-five per cent of the population.

"But it is not only in China that the American has wished to 'democratize,' as he expresses it, before the proper biological hour has struck. He has attempted the same operation in India and Indochina, meeting however with a firm resistance there, so that his ardor for liberation, or rather for upheavals, had to calm down. If it had not, where should we all be today? The political and economic crisis would hold us even more severely in its grip."

Further down, Doctor Legendre continued:

"Whither is Washington therefore leading us, especially in accord with Moscow? The Bolshevik is already arming himself in Eastern Siberia, where veritable zones are established along the entire Manchurian frontier under the guard of twelve picked

divisions

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divisions. Furthermore, big aerodromes have been organized at strategic points which have been provided with hangers and workshops. There can be no doubt that Moscow considers the aeroplane as its principal offensive and defensive weapon on the shores of the Pacific. But that is not all. Vladivostok is being transformed into a powerful naval base, and reliable information allows us to assert that Moscow is getting submarines in readiness there, a great threat against Japan which depends on the freedom of the seas. But what causes even more anxiety in Tokyo is the bombing plane with its bases on the Siberian shore within reach of the military and urban centres of Japan and its great industrial sites whose wooden houses make them very vulnerable.

"This situation was made even graver, last fall, by a special clause in an accord signed between Washington and Moscow to the effect that the principal aeroplane manufacturers in the United States, with the approval of the chiefs of the American Army and Navy, undertook to exploit patents in Russia itself, building necessary aeroplanes and motors while directing a Soviet personnel. A vast output of aeroplanes will thus be effected in Russia, thanks to Washington.

Needless

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Needless to say, Japan considers itself to be aimed at directly by this singular agreement, which increases its risks to the very maximum because it is particularly vulnerable by air. Since the United States, on the pretext of developing its industry, has thus armed the Soviets, thereby dangerously strengthening the latter's political aims, how can we feel surprised that Japan, which by the verdict of the League of Nations is unfavored and isolated, should seek support, turning towards Germany whose military and scientific genius it has always admired?"

Doctor Legendre goes on to complain of "the great shadow of Uncle Sam" which continues to be cast upon Geneva, asserting the American wish for domination. He also calls attention to the American navy and aviation as increasing while the rearmament of both Russia and China is being encouraged.

He ends with an appeal on behalf of Japan as providing the best counterpoise for the action of Moscow in Asia, calling upon Americans above all to support Japan, since America was the very first to denounce the dangers which the red wave from Moscow presented for civilization.

The

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The original of the article quoted is enclosed.

Other recent articles dealing with the Far East,
for most of which I am indebted to Mr. H. Stewart
Beers of the Press Room, are forwarded unsummarized.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson.

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

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Enclosures: (in single copy)

1. Extract from MERCURE DE FRANCE, May 1, 1934;
2. LA LIBERTE, May 3, 1934;
3. LE MATIN, May 4, 1934;
4. L'ERE NOUVELLE, May 4, 1934;
5. LE JOURNAL, May 4, 1934;
6. EXCELSIOR, May 4, 1934;
7. FIGARO, May 4, 1934;
8. L'ECHO DE PARIS, May 4, 1934;
9. LE PETIT PARISIEN, May 4, 1934;
10. L'INFORMATION, May 4, 1934;
11. LE JOURNAL, May 5, 1934;
12. LE TEMPS, May 5, 1934;
13. LE POPULAIRE, May 5, 1934;
14. L'ECHO DE PARIS, May 5, 1934;
15. LE TEMPS, May 5, 1934;
16. LE JOURNAL, May 9, 1934;
17. JOURNAL DES DEBATS, May 11, 1934;
18. LA REPUBLIQUE, May 12, 1934;
19. LE MATIN, May 12, 1934;
20. L'ECHO DE PARIS, May 14, 1934;
21. LE JOURNAL, May 16, 1934;
22. LE TEMPS, May 16, 1934;

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LUTTE POUR LA DOMINATION DU PACIFIQUE 511

LA LUTTE POUR LA DOMINATION DU PACIFIQUE

Jamais la situation politique n'a été plus trouble qu'aujourd'hui sur l'ensemble des deux continents. La guerre économique sévit depuis des années déjà, ...en attendant l'autre malheureusement, si les gouvernants ne se rendent enfin compte des dangers qui menacent leurs peuples par suite d'erreurs accumulées comme celle si grave, par exemple, d'un pacifisme outrancier, doublé du dogme wilsonien de la « self determination », dont les méfaits ne sont plus à démontrer. L'internationalisme, la fraternité universelle en marche, tous les peuples se donnant le baiser de paix sous l'égide de la S. D. N., ainsi que l'avaient prédit certains cénaclés? Réverie, hélas! C'est l'Europe, comme l'Asie, cultivant l'égoïsme, la haine et non la générosité, l'amour; c'est partout le « struggle for life », plus rude qu'à aucune époque.

Mais c'est en Extrême-Orient surtout, sur les bords du Pacifique occidental, que la lutte est âpre, risque d'embraser l'univers entier, puisqu'elle met aux prises quatre des plus puissantes nations: l'Angleterre, les Etats-Unis, la Russie soviétique et le Japon, grands pays qui aspirent tous à la domination économique, sinon politique, de la Chine, d'une Chine anarchique, incapable de se défendre et qui, de ce fait, sera la proie du plus fort.

Pour le moment, l'Angleterre se tient prudemment dans la coulisse, tout en créant une formidable base navale à Singapour et faisant sa cour — bien inutile — au clân de Nankin, misérable roseau toujours prêt à se rompre.

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Restent sur la scène, en pleine évidence et se préparant pour une étreinte qu'ils croient fatale, les Etats-Unis, le Japon et la Russie. Le Japon, en particulier, considère qu'il joue à cette heure son existence, son avenir de grande nation, du fait de l'accord récent entre Moscou et Washington, accord qu'il qualifie avec juste raison de « pacte d'agression ». N'est-il pas inquiétant, en effet, et pas seulement pour le Japon, de voir l'Américain du pacte Kellogg venir ainsi mettre sa toute-puissance au service d'un régime destructif de tout ordre politique et social? C'est ce que Washington appelle « un grand exemple de solidarité internationale ».

Malgré ses erreurs constantes dans l'ordre politique et économique, l'Américain persiste donc à « lead the world », à régler nos destins; il a si bien réussi jusqu'ici! Cette fois, il va certainement conduire les peuples à la paix définitive, à la grande fraternité, en traitant avec Moscou, en consacrant, à la face du monde entier, les vertus du bolchevisme, d'une doctrine que Mussolini — un homme renseigné — vient de qualifier d'« infection sociale, contre laquelle l'Europe doit lutter de toutes ses forces ».

De même, en Chine, l'Américain a manqué de toute prudence et ainsi a contribué largement à y accroître le désordre, à éloigner singulièrement l'heure de la paix. Débordant de zèle, d'un zèle aussi politique et social que religieux, il a voulu être un apôtre, un rédempteur d'humanité. Mais ce « leader » a commis la grave faute d'oublier les lois biologiques, leur déterminisme inexorable. Il s'est imaginé que le cerveau du Chinois pouvait évoluer au commandement, qu'il est possible de transformer du jour au lendemain un vieux peuple attardé dans des concepts millénaires. Donc, s'attelant à briser des cadres sociaux, des traditions qui avaient fait leurs preuves, l'Américain prêcha avec fougue les préceptes de la démocratie intégrale, embellie de la fraternité universelle. Le résultat, on le connaît : un effacement politique et social, la jeunesse chinoise bolchevisante, xénophobe; et, depuis vingt ans, la guerre civile : des

ruines partout sur l'immense terre de Chine, en particulier parmi la masse rurale : 85 % de la population.

Mais ce n'est pas seulement la Chine que l'Américain a voulu affranchir avant l'heure biologique, « démocratiser », comme il dit : il a tenté la même opération dans l'Inde et l'Indochine, mais ici il a trouvé une ferme résistance, si bien que son ardeur de libération, de bouleversement plutôt, a dû se calmer. Sinon, où en serions-nous aujourd'hui? La crise politique et économique nous étreindrait plus durement encore.

Dans le trouble qui a suivi l'imprudente ingérence américaine en Asie, le Bolchevik a vite trouvé sa voie, acquis toute facilité pour exercer sa malfaisance. Est-ce que Moscou ne dispose pas aujourd'hui d'une *armée rouge chinoise*, celle d'un véritable gouvernement soviétique qui se baptise « République socialiste de Chine », possédant un drapeau et une monnaie à l'effigie de Karl Marx et de Lénine? Son armée, solidement encadrée par des officiers formés à Berlin et à Moscou, sont très supérieurs — affirme un colonel allemand au service de Tchang Kaï Chek — à ceux des troupes mercenaires de Nankin. Ces hordes rouges sont en outre fortement secondées par de puissantes bandes de paysans ruinés, de « Jacques » qui jouent le rôle d'éclaireurs et couvrent à la fois l'attaque et la retraite. Ces bandes sont redoutables par leur facilité à s'« égailler », à remplacer leur fusil par une houe. Elles se forment non moins vite pour la bataille.

Jusqu'ici, l'armée rouge chinoise n'opérait qu'en Chine centrale; mais, depuis l'an dernier, un groupe important de cette armée a envahi l'Ouest, la riche province du Setchouen. Ses progrès ont été d'autant plus rapides que le peuple, si spolié par les toukiun, en est venu, si étrange que cela paraisse, à regarder le bolchevik chinois comme un libérateur. Il promet d'ailleurs le pain ou le riz quotidien à tous les miséreux, — lesquels sont légion, — ainsi que le partage en leur faveur de la terre des riches. Les paysans deviennent donc les auxiliaires des hordes rouges.

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From the Embassy, Paris.
Extract from *MERCURE DE FRANCE*, May 1, 1934.

L'invasion du Setchouen ne devrait pas laisser la France indifférente, car le Yunnan est limitrophe de cette province. Le chemin de fer français sera vite menacé, et même la frontière du Tonkin, sans compter celle de Birmanie.

Donc en Chine, anarchie, *régression* indéniable (il faut le répéter pour ce monde de Genève si aveugle), que cette révolution de 1911, la création d'une pseudo-république qui n'a servi jusqu'ici qu'à porter au pouvoir les éléments les plus troubles de la population. Mais ce qui apparaîtra grave, c'est que Moscou dispose en Chine d'une force militaire redoutable et des plus actives, qu'elle cherche à développer par tous les moyens, même en utilisant Vaillant-Couturier et autres bolchevisants de toute nationalité qu'elle prit soin, l'automne dernier, d'envoyer en Chine pour y transmettre des directives et parachever ainsi l'organisation communiste. La ténacité, la fixité de la politique destructive soviétique, sont donc indéniables et aussi apparentes que jamais, malgré toutes les déclarations pacifistes de Litvinoff et les pactes auxquels il s'est prêté.

Ce qui est non moins menaçant pour la paix, ce sont les tendances militaristes, de plus en plus marquées, du clan politique de Nankin, le « spoiled child », l'enfant gâté des Etats-Unis et de l'Angleterre, ainsi que de la S. D. N.

Quels sont, dans ce sens, les actes récents de ce clan? On n'ignore pas que la malheureuse Chine possède déjà plus de deux millions de mercenaires, sans compter les bandits organisés et les hordes rouges. Sur ce total, Tchang Kaï Chek, à lui seul, en compte 600.000 à sa solde, qu'il qualifie « soldats nationaux »! Or, ces armées de reîtres sont jugées insuffisantes: le gouvernement de Nankin a promulgué en effet, l'année dernière, une loi établissant le système de la *conscription* pour la Chine entière. Tout citoyen de la république chinoise, est-il formulé, sera désormais soumis au service militaire. En plus de l'armée active, sera constituée une armée de réserve. Une nouvelle loi suivit, ainsi conçue:

Pour donner toute efficacité au système de la conscription, l'instruction militaire sera obligatoire dans chaque école, collège ou université. La connaissance de l'art de la guerre figurera aussi sur le programme d'admission aux grandes écoles.

Il y a mieux: un décret de Nankin, du 4 août 1933, décide que les « méthodes de la guerre chimique seront l'objet d'études spéciales dans les universités de Chine. Ces études porteront surtout sur les *gaz mortels et les bombes incendiaires* ».

Et dire que le docteur Yen, le délégué de Nankin à Genève, ne cessa de proclamer le pacifisme de la Chine! Dire aussi que la S. D. N. a toujours soutenu cette faction de Nankin et que la commission Lytton fit de même, sous le vain prétexte de récupérer la Mandchourie, qui n'a jamais été une terre chinoise.

Bref, on est obligé de constater, non sans inquiétude, que la Chine est devenue la proie du *militarisme*, et non moins du *communisme* dont l'influence s'étend sur un territoire de plus de deux millions de kilomètres carrés. Toutes les ressources de la pauvre Chine sont aujourd'hui employées, malgré son peuple, à des armements intensifs. Donc, qu'on songe, par suite de la conscription, à l'énormité des forces qui peuvent être mobilisées, forces que couve Moscou. Il y a aussi l'Allemand, devenu l'instructeur des reîtres de Tchang Kaï Chek. Quelle réserve de hordes inépuisables! Aucun doute qu'il n'y ait là un redoutable danger si la S. D. N. continue d'auréoler la dangereuse faction de Nankin, si xénophobe, en la maintenant dans son Conseil. Quant aux gouvernements d'Europe, ont-ils songé à ceci? Que si les hordes mongoles encadrées par les cavaliers blancs d'Attila ou de Genghis Khan purent autrefois, du fond de l'Asie, montées sur leurs petits chevaux, se ruer sur l'Europe, elles disposeraient aujourd'hui du Transsibérien et autres voies ferrées russes.

Donc, gouverner, c'est prévoir. Mais encore faudrait-il que la S. D. N. cessât d'autoriser la vente d'armes of-

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fensives à la belliqueuse faction de Nankin, des armes telles que canons, tanks et avions. Ces avions ont été utilisés tout récemment au Fou Kien par Tchang Kai Chek contre des compétiteurs, des toukiun comme lui. Deux grandes cités, Tchang Tcheou et Fou Tcheou, ont été bombardées, et l'on a parlé de milliers de morts dans la population civile. Ces avions, jamais Nankin n'osa les utiliser contre les Japonais : ils servent uniquement à massacrer des Chinois. Mais ce qui fait la gravité de cette lutte de féodaux, ruineuse pour le marché de Chine, c'est que des étrangers s'en mêlent : ainsi quatre des avions qui bombardèrent Fou Tcheou étaient pilotés par des Américains. Est-il admissible que des pilotes de notre race s'engagent pour pareille besogne de massacre d'innocents ? Mais il y a mieux : la Curtis-Wright Corporation, la plus grande fabrique d'avions américaine, vient de s'entendre avec Nankin pour fourniture progressive de milliers de ces engins. Elle consacre un capital de 5 millions de dollars pour la construction d'une vaste usine en Chine centrale. Nankin s'en assure toute la production.

C'est donc l'Amérique s'empressant d'équiper une faction politique de Chine avec le plus terrible engin de destruction connu ; c'est l'Amérique favorisant la guerre civile et non moins la guerre étrangère, donnant ainsi raison à ceux qui pensent que son objectif, en armant Nankin, est d'utiliser la Chine contre le Japon, avec, en plus, le renfort soviétique. En un mot, *Moscou et Nankin au service des Etats-Unis pour la domination du Pacifique*.

Or, qui a le plus chanté sur tous les tons l'hymne à la paix, sinon l'Américain ?

Aussi, le malheureux peuple chinois, qui réclame du pain et non la guerre, que peut-il bien penser de l'accord Curtis-Tchang Kai Chek ? Il songe que la pitié est bannie de ce monde et que les cénacles pacifistes ne comptent que des sycophantes aux belles paroles démenties par leurs actes.

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Où nous mène donc Washington, surtout en accord avec Moscou ? Déjà, le Bolchevik s'arme en Sibérie orientale, où des zones fortifiées sont établies tout le long de la frontière mandchoue et gardées par douze divisions d'élite. En outre, de larges aérodromes sont aménagés aux points stratégiques et pourvus de hangars et d'ateliers. Il n'y a aucun doute que Moscou considère l'avion comme son principal atout offensif et défensif, sur les rives du Pacifique. Ce n'est pas tout : Vladivostok se transforme en une puissante base navale, et des renseignements sûrs permettent d'affirmer que Moscou y procède au montage de sous-marins, menace sérieuse pour le Japon, si dépendant de la liberté des mers. Mais ce qui davantage inquiète Tokio, c'est l'avion de bombardement avec ses bases sur le littoral sibérien, donc à portée des centres militaires et urbains du Japon, de ses grandes cités industrielles, si vulnérables par leurs constructions en bois.

Or, cette situation s'est encore aggravée, l'automne dernier, par l'existence d'une clause spéciale de l'accord conclu entre Washington et Moscou. Qu'on en juge ! Cette clause est ainsi conçue :

Les principales fabriques d'avions aux Etats-Unis, avec l'approbation des chefs de l'armée et de la marine américaine, s'engagent à exploiter en Russie même leurs brevets, à y construire avions et moteurs nécessaires, tout en formant un personnel soviétique.

Donc, une gigantesque production d'avions va se réaliser en Russie par les soins de Washington. Inutile d'ajouter que le Japon se sent ici directement visé par cet étrange contrat, qui accroît ses risques au maximum puisqu'il est surtout vulnérable par l'air. Aussi, du moment que les Etats-Unis, sous le couvert de développer leur industrie, arment ainsi la Russie soviétique et, de ce fait, favorisent dangereusement ses buts politiques, comment s'étonner que le Japon, autour duquel la S. D. N., depuis son verdict, s'emploie à faire l'isolement, cherche un appui, songe à se tourner vers cette

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Allemagne dont il a toujours admiré le génie militaire et scientifique?

Mais quelles sont les nations qui sont la cause première de cet isolement du Japon? L'Angleterre et la France, qui s'entendirent à Genève pour y faire condamner le Japon, en février 1933.

En ce cas, à quel mobile ont donc obéi sir John Simon et Paul-Boncour, surtout qu'ils ne pouvaient se méprendre sur la valeur réelle du rapport Lytton, sur son incohérence? Pourquoi aussi cette comédie de la défense de la démocratie? La défense de quelle démocratie? La jaune, celle de Nankin, cette fiction? La vérité est que ces deux nations ont été fascinées, paralysées par la grande ombre de l'Oncle Sam, laquelle s'est toujours projetée sur Genève. Une fois de plus, la volonté de domination des Etats-Unis s'affirmait. Aujourd'hui, dans ce même but, ce grand pays ne craint pas de fraterniser avec le Bolchevik et d'accroître ainsi la capacité de malfaisance de celui-ci.

Mais, pendant que les Etats-Unis facilitent l'armement de la Russie et de la Chine, quels préparatifs guerriers font-ils chez eux? En dehors du renforcement de leur flotte, c'est l'aviation surtout, son développement considérable qui les préoccupe. D'après les derniers renseignements, le chiffre actuel de 1.800 appareils sera porté rapidement à celui de 4.800! En même temps, se construisent d'énormes navires porte-avions, lesquels sont un objet de sérieuse inquiétude pour le Japon. Aussi, le *Times* lui-même observe-t-il avec découragement que les Etats-Unis tendent plutôt à développer qu'à diminuer leurs armements (7 février 1934). Un amiral japonais leur prête même l'intention d'attaquer son pays par la voie des airs et par trois routes convergentes :

1° En partant de l'Alaska et côtoyant la chaîne des îles Aléoutiennes et Kuriles, route la plus courte sinon la plus facile pour atteindre le Japon (Lindbergh, lors de sa traversée du Pacifique Nord, aurait étudié cette route);

2° En encourageant des raids de l'aviation russe basée sur Vladivostok et en utilisant, pour des appareils américains, les aérodromes de la côte sibérienne;

3° En obtenant l'aide de Canton et de Nankin, dont les forces aériennes ont été constituées et s'accroissent par les soins de l'Amérique.

Le Kouo Mink Tang se prêterait certainement, sans peine, à pareille entente, les Etats-Unis étant le plus solide appui des toukiun actuellement au pouvoir. Canton, Amoy, Fou Tcheou, Shanghai, formeraient d'excellentes bases d'attaque contre Formose, la Corée et le Japon.

Etonnez-vous donc que le Japonais tende aujourd'hui ses nerfs et se prépare pour un assaut qui n'a malheureusement rien de chimérique. Il sentait d'ailleurs venir l'orage et s'est hâté de renforcer sa situation en Mandchourie, solide terrain qui lui permet contre le Bolchevik une prompte riposte. Cet effort du Japon s'est trouvé singulièrement facilité par l'adhésion à sa politique des masses paysannes mandchoues, un moment séduites par les mensonges des politiciens du Kouo Ming Tang, mais vite revenues à leurs traditions, à ce symbole de vie, de *pérennité nationale*, de paix aussi et de prospérité qu'était le *Tientze*, ou Fils du Ciel, le grand Empereur. C'est un fait indéniable qu'à pareille heure tout le peuple chinois regrette la disparition de l'ancienne dynastie, le régime dit républicain n'ayant apporté, avec la guerre civile, que misère et massacres. Aussi, depuis que Pou Y, descendant de la grande dynastie Tsin, règne en Mandchourie, tous les Chinois du Nord, 90 millions d'êtres, regardent ardemment vers le Mandchoukouo, car ils y voient l'ordre rétabli, la paix à nouveau dans les champs et les cités. L'attraction devient irrésistible, surtout depuis le sacre de Pou Y. Toutes les provinces chinoises du Nord tendent donc à se rallier autour de ce noyau politique solide qu'est le Mandchoukouo. En particulier, la masse pullulante des campagnes songe au bonheur de ces paysans mandchous qui n'ont plus à craindre de voir saisir leurs

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. 1 to C. R. /WD 1409 of May 17, 1934.
From the Embassy, Paris.
Extract from MERCURE DE FRANCE, May 1, 1934.

grains, de voir enlever leur femme ou leur fille par des reîtres et bandits.

Aussi le Mandchoukouo est-il appelé à devenir, d'ici peu, un puissant Etat-tampon, un Empire qui, grâce au Japon, formerait une barrière infranchissable pour le Bolchevik et obligerait celui-ci à renoncer désormais à *soviétiser* cette Chine dont il a rêvé de faire le formidable outil de son impérialisme destructeur, à renoncer aussi à soviétiser l'Indochine et autres colonies étrangères.

Mais cette barrière, sauvegarde de toute paix en Asie, est-ce que les Etats-Unis vont vraiment aider Moscou la Rouge à la détruire? Vont-ils aussi continuer d'armer la Jeune-Chine, ses féodaux, et de les pousser à de folles attaques contre le Japon? Vont-ils, avec les Allemands, déjà au service de l'armée de Nankin, faire de la vieille Chine pacifiste une dangereuse machine de guerre, inquiétante même pour tous les peuples, s'ils vont jusqu'à lui fournir des cadres avec des armes? En outre, est-ce que la France elle-même, qui s'agite autour du Bolchevik, songerait à contracter une alliance avec lui, aidant ainsi à *resserrer le cercle* que Washington entreprend de former autour du Japon, depuis deux ans déjà, sans réussir toutefois à entraîner jusqu'ici notre pays, ni l'Angleterre? Le Bolchevik s'est assagi, dit-on. Mais ne veut-on pas comprendre que tous les pactes de non-agression signés récemment par Moscou ne sont qu'une manœuvre pour *couvrir ses derrières* en Europe, en vue d'amplifier son œuvre néfaste en Asie et paralyser ainsi la seule nation qui fait obstacle à cette œuvre : le Japon!

Où les politiciens mènent-ils donc les peuples, vers quel terrible engrenage? Ne voient-ils pas que, par leur incompréhension, c'est une mêlée générale qu'ils préparent? Car si le Japon, devant le danger d'encerclement, vient à la parade, à la riposte préventive contre Moscou et Washington, qu'arrivera-t-il? Jusqu'où la France, par exemple, sera-t-elle entraînée, et de quel prix paiera-t-elle l'imprudence de ses bergers? La paix?

Combien lointaine elle apparaît aujourd'hui; de même s'évanouit aussi la confiance des peuples. Les doctrinaires de la S. D. N. n'apparaissent vraiment plus aux masses que comme de faux prophètes, les adorateurs d'une fausse idole : la fraternité des nations. L'espérance? Ces doctrinaires sont en voie de la bannir des âmes, de celles de centaines de millions de pauvres gens en Europe comme en Asie, lesquels voient à nouveau poindre des hécatombes. On a voulu faire plier les événements, les nécessités à l'absolutisme de formules juridiques étayant de pures mystiques, des dogmes en conflit flagrant avec les réalités. Qu'en est-il résulté? Des réactions dangereuses, en particulier la réapparition brutale des égoïsmes nationaux et des impérialismes un moment masqués.

Mais les gouvernants, comme la S. D. N., pensent-ils nous illusionner sur la répercussion fatale qu'aurait en Europe une lutte en Extrême-Orient où tout de suite entrent en ligne Etats-Unis, Russie et Japon? D'ailleurs, pourquoi une coalition contre le Japonais, pourquoi vouloir malemort à ce vaillant peuple qui a déjà tant de peine à s'assurer le riz quotidien et dont le rôle sur l'échiquier mondial est si important en tant que facteur de stabilité, de conservation sociale, aussi bien que d'équilibre politique? N'est-il pas, à l'heure présente, le meilleur contrepoids à l'action débordante de Moscou en Asie? Cette terre nipponne, mais c'est un flot de paix, de sécurité, au milieu de la tourmente qui secoue l'univers entier. N'y touchons pas! Soutenons son peuple au contraire, l'Américain le premier, lui qui tant de fois a dénoncé Moscou, « la vague rouge menaçant de submerger notre civilisation ».

D' A. LEGENDRE.

Encl. 1 to C. R. /WD 1409 of May 17, 1934.
From the Embassy, Paris.
Extract from *MERCURE DE FRANCE*, May 1, 1934.

DU NOUVEAU SUR UN VIEUX PROJET DE PAIX PERPÉTUELLE

L'abbé de Saint-Pierre, né en 1658, à Saint-Pierre-Eglise, près de Barfleur, vint s'installer à Paris, en 1680. Il fréquenta chez la marquise de Lambert et, en 1695, sur bonnes recommandations, il fut élu à l'Académie française. Aumônier de Madame, mère du futur Régent, il avait noué des relations nombreuses dans le monde des écrivains et fonda le célèbre Club de l'Entresol. Il mourut, dans un âge avancé, le 29 avril 1743.

Le nom de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, « qui avait, dit Saint-Simon, des lettres et des chimères », demeure attaché à son projet de Paix perpétuelle. Toute sa longue existence fut consacrée à répandre, sous différentes formes, cette idée devenue chez lui un sujet de véritable apostolat.

Dès l'année 1712, il avait publié un gros ouvrage: *Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1), mais on trouve le système à son point de perfection dans l'*Abrégé du projet de paix perpétuelle* (2), paru en 1729.

L'abbé de Saint-Pierre est un écrivain de style médiocre. Il aime à présenter ses idées sous une forme scientifique, par raisonnement déductif, en poussant jusqu'aux extrêmes limites tout principe posé par lui.

(1) *Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (par l'abbé C. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre). Cologne, J. Le Pacifique, 1712, in-12, 448 pages.

(2) *Abrégé du projet de paix, perpétuellement inventé par le roi Henri le Grand, approprié à l'état présent des affaires générales de l'Europe*, par M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Amsterdam, J. D. Beman, 1729, in-8°, 227 pages.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 2 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

From the Embassy, Paris

Extract from LA LIBERTE of May 3 1934

REMARQUES DU JOUR

Les Japonais attendent aussi une "légalisation"

Le Japon fait connaître qu'il se charge de rétablir l'ordre dans le monde chinois. Il ne souffrira pas que d'autres puissances y entretiennent une anarchie qui ne profite à personne. Il affirme ainsi un droit de prééminence sur toute la Chine après avoir créé l'Etat mandchou dont il a le protectorat.

Comment cette déclaration est-elle accueillie par les gouvernements des autres pays ?

Ils feignent de croire que le Japon viole le principe de la « porte ouverte » qui est consacré par les traités. Remarquons d'abord que les Chinois protestent au nom de la liberté et de la justice contre ces traités qui disposent d'eux comme d'une marchandise à vendre.

Mais la République chinoise n'est que brigandage et décomposition. Elle offre un tableau pitoyable dont l'attention finit par se détourner. Le principe que les puissances rappellent au Japon ne signifie plus rien, car cette fameuse « porte » n'est « ouverte » que sur le chaos. Appliqués en pandæmonium chinois, des privilèges économiques n'ont aucun sens.

Si le Japon remet de l'ordre dans cette énorme fourmilière, le reste du monde n'aura pas à s'en plaindre. Seulement, il est trop naturel que le Japon ne se charge pas de cette tâche pour rien. Et l'on comprend très bien que les principaux avantages seront pour lui en cas de succès.

Mais quoi ! Les Japonais ont tout ce que les Anglais et les Américains n'ont pas, c'est-à-dire non seulement une flotte et une armée, mais l'esprit qu'il faut pour s'en servir. On le sait à Londres et à Washington, et c'est pourquoi, si l'on est inquiet des progrès de la politique japonaise, on ne proteste qu'avec prudence.

Le Japon observe silencieusement et avance pas à pas. La proposition de « légaliser » le réarmement de l'Allemagne n'a pas été perdue pour lui. Il en conclut avec raison qu'on finit toujours par « légaliser » l'état de choses qu'ont obtenu la volonté et l'énergie.

Si l'on ne veut pas du règne de la violence dans le monde, il ne faut pas accorder de prime aux violents.

JACQUES BAINVILLE.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 3 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

From the Embassy, Paris

Extract from LE MATIN May 4 1934

LA POLITIQUE DU JAPON A L'ÉGARD DE LA CHINE

Un échange de communications
 franco-japonaises

Matin 5/4

A la demande des gouvernements anglais et américain, le gouvernement de Tokio avait précisé l'interprétation officielle qui devait être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères concernant la politique japonaise en Chine. Par courtoisie, l'ambassade du Japon a fait spontanément parvenir au Quai-d'Orsay copie de la note officielle d'interprétation qui déclare notamment que le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine, et que, poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit naturellement aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays, mais ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Le gouvernement français a, de son côté, par une communication publiée hier exprimé la satisfaction avec laquelle il enregistrait l'affirmation donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note japonaise, il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est, en effet, que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

Une nouvelle note de Tokio aux puissances

LONDRES, 3 mai. — Téléph. *Matin*. — On mande de Tokio que la presse nipponne publie ce soir de violentes attaques contre le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à l'occasion de l'accueil défavorable que ce dernier a réservé à la formule japonaise « pas d'intervention » de puissances en Chine ».

M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, a eu aujourd'hui de longues entrevues avec le sous-secrétaire d'Etat à la guerre et à la marine et a ensuite commencé la rédaction de la note qui sera adressée à toutes les puissances occidentales pour définir une nouvelle fois la politique nipponne.

On croit savoir que ce document, tout en évitant d'entrer en conflit ouvert avec l'attitude adoptée par l'administration de Washington, réaffirmera le désir du Japon de voir les puissances s'abstenir de toute intervention en Chine.

Encl. No. 4 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE May 4 1934

Le cabinet de Paris expose au Japon Ere les principes ^{5/4} de sa politique au sujet de la Chine

Le gouvernement français a répondu hier, dans les termes suivants à une communication japonaise en date du 1^{er} mai :
« L'ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au ministre des affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du Caimusho concernant la politique japonaise au regard des affaires de Chine.

« Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale, comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

« C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

« De la dernière partie de la note sus-visée, il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les Actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est en effet que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises. »

Communication japonaise

« Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine, ni à ses intérêts, et n'a nulle intention de le faire.

« C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine.

« Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets sur la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit, naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

« Toutefois, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

« En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

1238

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 5 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL of May 4 1934

**La France prend acte
de la déclaration sur la politique
du Japon en Extrême-Orient**

Journal — *5/4*
Nous avons publié et commenté la déclaration japonaise du 17 avril qui fixe les directives de la politique de l'Empire du Soleil Levant en Extrême-Orient, les explications données à l'Angleterre et à l'Amérique sur leur demande, les réponses — cordiale de Londres plus réservée de Washington.

Le gouvernement japonais a tenu à donner spontanément connaissance de ces directives au gouvernement français, qui avait eu la sagesse de les tenir pour ce qu'elles disent et non pas pour ce qu'on prétend leur faire dire. A cette communication en date du 1^{er} mai, que nous jugeons inutile de reproduire parce qu'elle est déjà connue, M. Barthou a répondu par la communication suivante :

L'ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au ministre des affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du Gaimusho concernant la politique japonaise au regard des affaires de Chine.

Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale, comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note susvisée il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saura rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est, en effet, que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

Ce qu'il faut retenir de la communication française, c'est la conclusion qui exprime la conviction que le Japon agira toujours de concert avec les autres puissances, suivant les principes posés par l'accord des neuf puissances de Washington de 1922. N'est-ce pas ce qu'il a fait en définissant publiquement sa politique ? — S.-B.

1235

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 6 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'EXCELSIOR of May 4 1934

LA POLITIQUE DU JAPON Excelsior EN CHINE 514

Une communication japonaise au gouvernement français

Bien que le gouvernement français, signataire du traité des dix-neuf puissances, n'ait pas fait faire, par son ambassadeur, de démarche à Tokio au sujet de la politique japonaise en Chine, le gouvernement japonais, par un souci de courtoisie apprécié à Paris, a fait parvenir au Quai d'Orsay la communication suivante en date du 1^{er} mai.

Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine, ni à ses intérêts et n'a nulle intention de le faire. C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine. Ces buts devraient, en principe, être atteints par la Chine elle-même, grâce au réveil de ses énergies nationales et à ses propres efforts.

Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités en accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

Toutefois, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Le gouvernement français a répondu à cette communication japonaise en prenant acte des déclarations du gouvernement de Tokio :

C'est avec satisfaction, dit cette réponse, que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No; 7 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from FIGARO of May 4 1934

POLITIQUE NIPPONE EN CHINE

Le Japon précise
 ses intentions

Figaro 574

On vient d'avoir connaissance d'une communication qui a été faite au Quai d'Orsay, le 1^{er} mai, par l'ambassade du Japon, sur la politique du gouvernement de Tokio en Chine. Les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre avaient déjà été informés de l'attitude du Japon, à la suite de démarches diplomatiques récentes.

La note nipponne est une interprétation officielle des déclarations faites, le 17 avril, par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères. Ces déclarations, qui avaient provoqué un vif émoi, avaient été considérées comme exprimant la volonté du Japon d'établir son protectorat sur la Chine. Le cabinet de Tokio fait savoir que cette interprétation est erronée. Le Japon entend respecter l'indépendance de la Chine et les droits que les traités ont reconnus dans ce pays aux autres puissances. Il souscrit au principe de la « porte ouverte ». Il reconnaît que les activités d'ordre financier et commercial poursuivies en Chine peuvent être utiles. Mais il ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient.

C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français a pris acte de ces explications. Sir John Simon, à la Chambre des communes, s'est également déclaré satisfait des résultats de la démarche qui a été faite à Tokio. Il faut souhaiter que les déclarations nipponnes reçoivent un accueil aussi favorable à Washington.

Le Japon se trouve dans une situation tout à fait spéciale. En présence de l'anarchie chinoise, il essaya en vain, il y a deux ans, d'amener les puissances à intervenir pour rétablir l'ordre. Les Etats-Unis refusèrent. On sait ce qu'il en résulta. Le Japon agit lui-même, créa le Mandchou-kuo, se retira de la Société des Nations.

Aujourd'hui, les Etats-Unis se sont rapprochés des Soviets et semblent poursuivre en Chine une action dirigée contre le Japon. Le cabinet de Tokio a tenté en vain un rapprochement avec Washington. Il a ensuite lancé un avertissement énergique. On aurait pu craindre qu'il ne dénonçât les traités existants. Mais il assure qu'il respectera le principe de la « porte ouverte ». Il s'oppose simplement à ce qu'on prépare la guerre à ses frontières. C'est son droit. Si chacun souhaite la paix en Extrême-Orient, elle peut être assurée.

James Donnadieu.

Encl. No. 8 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris
Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS May 4 1934

Un échange de notes entre Tokio et Paris sur la politique japonaise ECHO en Chine 614

L'ambassadeur du Japon a pris l'initiative, il y a deux jours, d'apporter au Quai d'Orsay une interprétation de la déclaration faite le 17 avril, à Tokio, par le porte-parole du ministère des Affaires étrangères.

Voici le texte communiqué mardi par l'ambassade du Japon :

1^{er} mai 1934.

Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine, ni à ses intérêts et n'a nulle intention de le faire. C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité, que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine. Ces buts devraient, en principe, être atteints par la Chine elle-même, grâce au réveil de ses énergies nationales et à ses propres efforts.

Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit, naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

Toutefois, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Le gouvernement français a répondu :

3 mai 1934.

L'ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au ministère des Affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du Gaimusho concernant la politique japonaise au regard des affaires de Chine.

Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale, comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note susvisée, il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est en effet que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

Encl. No. 9 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN May 4 1934

UNE DÉMARCHE COURTOISE DU GOUVERNEMENT JAPONAIS VIS-A-VIS DE LA FRANCE

PP 5/4
Il a spontanément fait communiquer au Quai d'Orsay l'exposé de sa politique concernant les affaires de Chine

Le gouvernement japonais vient de faire auprès du gouvernement français, par son éminent ambassadeur, M. Sato, une démarche de la plus haute courtoisie et dont on ne saurait trop se féliciter car elle souligne très heureusement la cordialité des rapports existant entre Paris et Tokio.

On se rappelle qu'une déclaration officielle japonaise en date du 17 avril dernier avait provoqué à Washington et à Londres une assez vive émotion. On y avait vu, en effet, dans ces deux capitales, l'affirmation par le Japon d'une sorte de doctrine de Monroe applicable à la Chine, alors que le ministre des Affaires étrangères nippon n'avait entendu protester que contre certaines ingérences d'un ordre tout spécial — ouvertures de crédits, approvisionnement de matières premières et fourniture de matériel, par exemple, au gouvernement de Nankin, — ingérences essentiellement égoïstes et de nature à compromettre non seulement la sécurité japonaise, mais le maintien de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

La formule générale employée par le porte-parole officiel de Tokio laissant planer quelque doute quant au respect de l'indépendance de la Chine et à la stricte observation du « régime de la porte ouverte » dans ce pays, les ambassadeurs de Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis furent chargés de demander, par notes verbales, des éclaircissements au ministre, M. Hirota. Ces éclaircissements, dont le caractère est aussi satisfaisant que possible, ont été fournis ces jours derniers aux deux diplomates qui les ont aussitôt transmis à leur gouvernement respectif.

La France n'ayant pas jugé nécessaire d'intervenir directement, le gouvernement japonais a tenu, de son côté, à lui faire communiquer spontanément, le 1^{er} mai, par M. Sato, les précisions données aux cabinets de Londres et de Washington.

Voici ce texte, auquel se sont jusqu'à présent bornés à faire allusion M. Cordell Hull, dans une note à la presse américaine, et sir John Simon, dans une déclaration aux Communes, mais qui n'a pas encore été publié.

La communication japonaise

Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine ni à ses intérêts et n'a nulle intention de le faire. C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine. Ces buts devraient, en principe, être atteints par la Chine elle-même grâce au réveil de ses énergies nationales et à ses propres efforts.

Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit, naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

Toutefois, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Pour reconnaître cette amicale initiative de Tokio et pour fixer en même temps le point de vue de la France, M. Louis Barthou a fait remettre hier à M. Sato la communication ci-dessous

SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE

Réponse française

L'ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au ministère des Affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclarations formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du Gaimusho concernant la politique japonaise au regard des affaires de Chine.

Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale, comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note susvisée, il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est en effet que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

Signalons, en terminant, que, aussi bien aux Etats-Unis qu'à Londres, les milieux politiques et diplomatiques s'accordent à considérer désormais l'incident comme clos.

indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détiendrait des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Pour reconnaître cette amicale initiative de Tokio et pour fixer en même temps le point de vue de la France, M. Louis Barthou a fait remettre hier à M. Sato la communication ci-dessous dont il est superflu de signaler à la fois l'importance et l'intérêt car elle replace toute la question dans le cadre du traité des neuf puissances du 6 février 1922.

A. J.

(La suite à la troisième page.)

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A high-contrast, black and white photograph showing a close-up of a textured surface, possibly a piece of fabric or paper. A prominent, dark, curved line or crease runs diagonally across the frame, creating a strong visual element. The background is filled with a dense, grainy texture of light and dark specks.

[The page contains extremely faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]

EX-150-110N RE BUREAU BUREAU WSA 11-1934

Flow the summary table

Doc. no. 8 to subject below no. 1000 of NSA in 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 10 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'INFORMATION May 4 1934

Le Japon va envoyer
un mémorandum
à toutes les puissances
Information 5/5

Londres, 4 mai (par téléphone) :

La presse de Tokio est unanimement d'avis que le gouvernement japonais ne doit pas laisser sans réponse la note verbale américaine dans laquelle l'Amérique s'élève contre la politique nipponne en Chine. Aussi, s'attend-on à ce que le gouvernement du Mikado publie incessamment, à l'usage du monde entier, un mémorandum dans lequel il réaffirmera sa politique en Chine et ses revendications relatives à la position privilégiée du Japon en Asie.

M. Hirota, après avoir consulté les chefs des ministères des Affaires étrangères et de la Guerre, les a chargés de rédiger ce mémorandum, en ayant soin d'éviter les termes qui pourraient blesser la susceptibilité des autres pays.

M. Hirota a déclaré à une réunion politique que le Japon entend maintenir sa situation de puissance stabilisatrice en Extrême-Orient et assumer toutes ses responsabilités.

324

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 11 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL May 5 1934

IMPORTANTES DÉCLARATIONS

de M. Hirota

Journal Le Journal 5/5

Le ministre japonais
des affaires étrangères
a précisé les buts
de sa politique en Extrême-Orient

TOKIO, 4 mai. — Au cours d'une conférence des gouverneurs provinciaux, M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, a expliqué les buts de la politique étrangère japonaise.

Après avoir souligné que le Japon constituait une force stabilisatrice de la paix en Extrême-Orient et que, de ce fait, il lui incombait la lourde responsabilité de maintenir l'ordre et la paix avec les autres pays asiatiques en Extrême-Orient, M. Hirota a déclaré à nouveau que le Japon désirait sincèrement l'union territoriale intégrale de la Chine que les énergiques efforts et le réveil des peuples chinois devaient permettre d'effectuer.

Cette unification territoriale de la Chine, a dit M. Hirota, ne saurait s'accomplir grâce à quelque intervention étrangère qu'animent des raisons d'intérêt purement personnelles. En conséquence, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à aucune action d'une tierce puissance qui viserait à compliquer la situation sino-japonaise ou à porter atteinte au maintien de l'ordre et de la paix en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon compte surtout sur la cessation prochaine de la campagne anti-japonaise qui agite la Chine.

M. Hirota a constaté avec satisfaction « que certains éléments chinois paraissent commencer à reconnaître la sincérité des intentions du gouvernement japonais », et à comprendre la nécessité fondamentale d'établir des relations amicales entre les deux pays. Puis, il a attiré l'attention des gouverneurs provinciaux sur le fait que le Japon respecte les traités internationaux actuellement en vigueur et leur a confirmé que le gouvernement nippon était tout disposé à entamer séparément avec les puissances intéressées des pourparlers relatifs aux intérêts et droits découlant de ces traités. Mais il s'est élevé énergiquement contre toute répétition « des discussions de Genève pour résoudre les problèmes extrême-orientaux. »

M. Hirota a enfin ajouté que tout acte susceptible de porter atteinte à l'indépendance du Man Tchéou Kouo, qui de jour en jour fait de nouveaux progrès, doit être « réprouvé et évité ». — (Havas.)

Encl. No. 12 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS May 5 1934

LE JAPON ET LA PAIX EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Echange de communications entre les gouvernements français et japonais

L'ambassadeur du Japon en France, M. Sato, a pris l'initiative d'apporter au quai d'Orsay une interprétation de la déclaration faite le 17 avril à Tokio par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères. Voici le texte communiqué mardi par l'ambassade du Japon :

1^{er} mai 1934.

Le Japon n'a pas porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine, ni à ses intérêts et n'a nulle intention de le faire. C'est, au contraire, avec sincérité que le Japon souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de la Chine. Ces buts devraient, en principe, être atteints par la Chine elle-même, grâce au réveil de ses énergies nationales et à ses propres efforts.

Le Japon n'a pas l'intention de transgresser les droits des autres puissances en Chine. Poursuivies de bonne foi, des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine, résultat que le Japon considère avec satisfaction. Le Japon souscrit, naturellement, aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale en Chine. Il observe scrupuleusement tous les traités et accords en vigueur concernant ce pays.

Toutefois, le Japon ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, dans ces régions où le Japon, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de sa situation géographique, détient des intérêts d'importance vitale.

En conséquence, le Japon ne saurait admettre que les problèmes chinois soient mis à profit par des tiers en vue de poursuivre une politique intéressée qui ne tiendrait pas compte des conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

A cette interprétation, le gouvernement français a répondu par la communication suivante :

3 mai 1934.

L'ambassade du Japon a bien voulu faire tenir au ministère des affaires étrangères une copie de la note par laquelle le gouvernement impérial a précisé l'interprétation officielle qui doit être donnée aux déclara-

tions formulées le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du Gaimusho concernant la politique japonaise au regard des affaires de Chine.

Il résulte de cette communication que, loin de vouloir porter atteinte à l'indépendance ou aux intérêts de la Chine, le Japon souhaite sincèrement le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays. N'ayant pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, le gouvernement impérial considère, par ailleurs, que des activités d'ordre financier et commercial ne peuvent avoir que d'heureux effets pour la Chine. Il confirme en même temps son adhésion aux principes de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale, comme son respect des traités et accords en vigueur relatifs à la Chine.

C'est avec satisfaction que le gouvernement français enregistre l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères.

De la dernière partie de la note susvisée, il résulte enfin que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient. Si pareilles éventualités devaient se produire en Chine, le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit, suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922. Ce n'est en effet que dans ce cadre et sous cette forme que peut être trouvée, de l'avis du gouvernement français, une solution équitable et satisfaisante aux affaires chinoises.

Le Japon et la base de Singapour

Notre correspondant particulier de Londres nous téléphone vendredi matin 4 mai :

L'amiral Sir Roger Keyes, membre du Parlement, parlant dans un meeting conservateur dans la cité de Londres, a déclaré que le traité naval de Londres de 1930 a été « la plus grande folie qui ait jamais été perpétrée » parce qu'il a supprimé les sauvegardes assurées à l'Angleterre par le traité de Washington et qu'il a imposé à ce pays des limitations auxquelles d'autres pays se dérobaient. Il a fait allusion en particulier au Japon : « Parlant comme marin, dit l'amiral Keyes, je vous affirme que le Japon est inattaquable. Il faut que nous ayons une base à Singapour pour protéger la Nouvelle-Zélande et l'Australie. Il nous faut cette base navale d'outre-mer pour abriter et réparer nos vaisseaux. Grâce au ciel nous l'aurons dans deux ans environ ».

L'amiral Keyes a conclu en prédisant que la prochaine conférence de désarmement aboutira à un échec et en demandant une forte augmentation des armements navals et aériens de la Grande-Bretagne.

Encl. No. 13 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE POPULAIRE of May 5 1934

Tokio et Paris s'expliquent

A la suite des déclarations du 17 avril, que le gouvernement japonais n'a point démenties, l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis ont demandé à Tokio des explications. Ni d'un côté ni de l'autre, il n'y avait intérêt à pousser les choses trop loin. Ainsi les notes échangées ont permis de considérer l'incident comme clos.

Le gouvernement français n'avait entrepris aucune démarche publique, et c'est peut-être à cause de cela que le Japon vient de lui communiquer par son ambassadeur à Paris les précisions déjà données aux cabinets de Londres et de Washington. La note remise assure que le Japon ne veut porter aucune « atteinte » à l'indépendance ni à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine (et cela après l'annexion de la Mandchourie !), que les intérêts des autres puissances et le principe de la porte ouverte seront respectés, que les traités et accords en vigueur seront « scrupuleusement respectés », etc. C'est à peine si l'on discerne, au milieu de ces formules impeccables, une obscure allusion à « l'intervention éventuelle des tiers » en Chine, que le Japon ne saurait admettre, étant donné qu'il détient en Extrême-Orient « des intérêts d'importance vitale ».

Répetons-le : personne ne peut être dupe d'un tel langage, dont le Japon s'est habituellement servi chaque fois qu'il ne jugeait pas encore venu le moment favorable pour passer à l'exécution de ses plans impérialistes. Même pas le *Temps*, pourtant si indulgent pour Tokio, n'ose s'y méprendre, puisqu'il reconnaît que le Japon, tout en ayant « une politique nettement arrêtée en ce qui concerne le continent asiatique », est trop prudent « pour risquer de compromettre ses chances par une action hâtive et inopportune », et pour ne pas « mesurer son effort aux possibilités du moment ». Le *Temps* reconnaît donc qu'il ne s'agit, de la part du Japon, que d'un temps d'arrêt, en attendant l'occasion plus favorable pour réaliser sa politique pan-asiatique.

Le Quai d'Orsay a répondu à la note japonaise sur le même ton, en prenant acte des assurances qu'elle contient, comme si elles étaient dictées de bonne foi. Mais les derniers paragraphes de la note française, après avoir relevé l'allusion hostile à l'intervention des tiers en Chine, précise que toute contestation à ce sujet ne devrait être cherchée que dans le cadre du traité de Washington.

Ce traité, dit des neuf puissances (Belgique, France, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Etats-Unis, Chine, Japon), conclu en 1922 à Washington, engage les signataires à respecter la souveraineté de la Chine et à des charges pour le commerce et l'in-

dustrie de toutes les nations. Nous y maintenir le principe de l'égalité sommes bien loin donc, on le voit, de la thèse du Japon, qui, le 17 avril, prétendait être le seul juge des intérêts de la Chine et de la paix en Extrême-Orient.

La pause qui a fait suite aux « mouvements divers » provoqués par les déclarations du 17 avril, ne sera pas de longue durée. Le Japon n'a pas renoncé à ses objectifs, et il n'attend que le moment opportun pour les poursuivre, en s'appuyant sur l'une ou sur l'autre clique des milieux dirigeants chinois. Le langage doucereux des notes diplomatiques rappelle plutôt l'accalmie lourde et étouffante qui précède les orages.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 14 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS May 5 1934

Le Japon, la Chine et les puissances

Echange d'explications

Nous avons déjà relaté que le « porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères japonais », c'est-à-dire le fonctionnaire chargé de renseigner la presse, avait, le 17 avril, défini la politique de Tokio à l'égard de la Chine en des termes dont, à Londres et à Washington, on avait aussitôt pris ombrage. « Le Japon, avaient déclaré les journaux américains, est en train de créer une sorte de doctrine de Monroe valable pour l'Asie orientale. Dans cette région, il se constitue en arbitre souverain de ce qui est licite et illicite en fait d'entreprises étrangères ».

En réponse aux demandes d'explication provenant d'Angleterre et d'Amérique, le gouvernement de Tokio a présenté une interprétation authentique des paroles prononcées par le fonctionnaire des affaires étrangères. Il est dit dans ce texte que le Japon « observe scrupuleusement tous les traités en vigueur », mais « qu'il ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle des tiers, intervention qui, sous quelque prétexte que ce fût, serait préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient ».

Sir John Simon s'est déclaré satisfait de cette assurance, bien qu'il eût laissé entendre, dans la question posée à Tokio, le 25 avril, que le Japon ne pouvait agir sans consulter les signataires du traité des neuf puissances qui fut conclu, à Washington, le 6 février 1922, au sujet de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, du maintien de la porte ouverte pour le commerce de toutes les nations et que, sur ce point, il n'eût reçu, semble-t-il, aucun éclaircissement.

Sans doute a-t-il estimé que mieux valait ne pas pousser les choses à bout. Mais les Etats-Unis, eux, n'ont pas été aussi réservés. Le 29 avril, leur ambassadeur à Tokio a déclaré « qu'aucune nation ne peut, sans l'assentiment des autres Etats intéressés, s'inspirer de sa seule volonté dans des situations qui touchent aux droits, aux obligations et aux intérêts légitimes des tiers ». Le gouvernement français, ayant reçu communication, le 1^{er} mai, du memorandum japonais, s'est contenté de faire observer, deux jours plus tard, que le mieux serait, le cas échéant, de recourir aux consultations préalables prévues à l'article 7 du traité de février 1922.

Quand il dénonce « l'intervention des tiers préjudiciable aux intérêts de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient », le Japon, nous l'avons déjà expliqué, vise les manigances de certains fonctionnaires ou délégués de la Société des Nations qui envenimèrent la déplorable querelle de 1931-33 et essaient, en ce moment de détourner le gouvernement de Nankin de cette réconciliation avec Tokio qui est déjà assez fortement ébauchée. Nous touchons, ici, au fond de l'affaire. Genève s'évertue encore, tout au moins par l'intermédiaire de quelques-uns de ses enfants perdus, à tirer vengeance de l'humiliation qui lui fut infligée, en mars 1932 quand Tokio refusa de s'incliner devant ses recommandations. Tant que la querelle mandchourienne ne sera pas réglée, tant que les puissances tiendront en quarantaine le Mandchuoko, nous verrons se dérouler des incidents du genre de celui qui émeut, en ce moment, les chancelleries. Entre le Japon et les autres signataires du traité des neuf puissances, il im-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Si cet accord se dérobe, alors nous ne voyons plus de limites aux répercussions de la controverse. Ou plutôt l'infériorité navale de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis dans le Pacifique occidental marquera seule cette limite. Et, l'an prochain, tous les traités de limitation des armements maritimes, celui de Washington et celui de Londres, dégringoleront à qui mieux mieux.

PERTINAX.



Ion des Etudiants

CT

EXALSOE ULOE T. MOHO DE BUREAU NO. 2 1972

ULOE DE BUREAU NO. 2

EXALSOE ULOE T. MOHO DE BUREAU NO. 2 1972

Encl. No. 15 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS May 5 1934

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LE JAPON ET LES PUISSANCES

On est enfin fixé sur le véritable sens et la portée réelle de l'attitude adoptée par le Japon à l'égard de la Chine et des relations de ce pays avec les autres puissances. La communication officielle faite le 1^{er} mai au gouvernement français par l'ambassadeur du Japon apporte dans le débat un texte précis émanant directement du cabinet de Tokio, qui engage la responsabilité de celui-ci et projette la pleine clarté sur une controverse que certaines réactions de l'opinion internationale risquaient de compliquer singulièrement. Par un geste dont nous ne pouvons qu'apprécier la courtoisie, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Paris a été chargé de donner communication de ces précisions au gouvernement français, encore que celui-ci ne fût pas encore intervenu officiellement, comme le firent l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, à propos des récentes déclarations nippones.

Ce n'est pas que la France, qui est une des principales puissances actives en Extrême-Orient et qui est signataire des traités stipulant la porte ouverte en Chine et le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale de ce pays, n'ait pas été attentive à l'incident. Soucieuse, conformément à sa politique constante, des devoirs que lui impose son rôle de grande puissance et de cet autre devoir qui est de rendre la coopération possible dans l'Orient lointain en ne heurtant pas systématiquement le Japon, elle n'est pas restée inactive. Elle a pris les contacts nécessaires, se réservant de demander amicalement des explications au moment qui lui paraîtrait opportun. L'affaire, en effet, n'était pas portée jusqu'ici sur le plan diplomatique. Il s'agissait uniquement de déclarations, pour le moins imprudentes, d'un haut fonctionnaire des affaires étrangères nippon, lequel n'était d'ailleurs pas officiellement désavoué. Même les mises au point faites après coup n'engageaient pas le gouvernement japonais. Or, voici que ce gouvernement prend officiellement position par une communication toute spontanée, à laquelle M. Louis Barthou, ministre des affaires étrangères, a répondu en précisant avec une entière franchise la doctrine du gouvernement de la République.

Une première remarque s'impose : si les versions des déclarations faites le 17 avril à Tokio, de source officieuse, ont pu être interprétées comme marquant l'intention des dirigeants de l'empire du Soleil-Levant de proclamer une doctrine de Monroe pour le monde jaune et de contrôler effectivement les relations de la Chine avec les pays étrangers, même lorsqu'il s'agit de simples accords financiers et techniques, c'est que les termes de ces déclarations, tels qu'ils furent transmis à la presse du monde entier, prêtaient à équivoque. Dans la communication officielle faite au gouvernement français il n'y a nulle trace d'une intention de cette nature. Au contraire, le Japon se défend énergiquement d'avoir porté atteinte à l'indépendance de la Chine; il souhaite le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale, l'unification et la prospérité de ce pays, et il souligne que ces buts devraient être atteints par la Chine elle-même, par l'effet de ses propres efforts et du réveil de ses énergies nationales. La doctrine à laquelle le Japon entend s'en tenir en ce qui concerne la Chine est ainsi clairement définie, et les arguments par lesquels Tokio justifie son attitude en découlent logiquement. Le Japon donne l'assurance formelle qu'il n'a pas l'intention de méconnaître les droits des autres puissances, qu'il considère que, poursuivie de bonne foi, l'activité financière et commerciale ne peut avoir que des effets heureux, qu'il souscrit naturellement au principe de la porte ouverte et de la chance égale pour tous en Chine, enfin qu'il observe rigoureusement les traités et les accords en vigueur.

Du point de vue de la politique générale cette déclaration donne entièrement satisfaction, comme Sir John Simon l'a déjà constaté à la Chambre des communes. Elle dissipe tout malentendu sur les principes et sur les faits; elle répond à ce qu'exige le respect des traités en vigueur. Mais le gouvernement de Tokio déclare qu'il ne peut rester indifférent à l'intervention éventuelle de tiers si cette intervention devait être préjudiciable au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, région

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La réponse de la France à la communication du gouvernement de Tokio prend acte de cette interprétation officielle des déclarations officielles faites le 17 avril dernier par le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères du Japon, et elle enregistre avec satisfaction l'affirmation ainsi donnée par le gouvernement japonais de sa fidélité « non seulement aux principes généraux du droit international, mais aussi au statut conventionnel qui régit actuellement les rapports de la Chine avec les puissances étrangères ». Quant à la déclaration que le Japon ne saurait rester indifférent à des interventions qui seraient préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient, la réponse française

comporte à son sujet un passage d'une importance capitale, où se trouve précisée pour l'avenir la doctrine du gouvernement de la République. C'est le passage où M. Louis Barthou dit que si de pareilles éventualités [des interventions préjudiciables au maintien de l'ordre et de la justice en Extrême-Orient] devaient se produire en Chine, « le gouvernement français a la conviction que le gouvernement impérial chercherait, de concert avec les autres puissances, à leur assurer une solution de droit suivant les principes dont s'inspirent les actes de Washington, et notamment par application de la procédure amiable prévue à l'article 7 du traité du 6 février 1922 ». Cela revient à indiquer clairement qu'en cas de menace pour l'ordre en Chine la France ne saurait admettre d'autre procédure applicable en droit et en fait que celle de la consultation des neuf puissances.

Que la position officielle définie maintenant par le gouvernement de Tokio et qui engage sa responsabilité soit quelque peu en retrait de celle qu'annonçaient les déclarations officielles du 17 avril, c'est évident; et on ne peut que s'en féliciter, car toute menace de complications est ainsi écartée. Le Japon est actuellement aux prises avec trop de difficultés intérieures, d'ordre financier, économique et social, il est travaillé sur son propre terrain national par des tendances trop opposées les unes aux autres pour qu'il veuille se jeter délibérément dans quelque grande aventure. Il a une politique nettement arrêtée en ce qui concerne le continent asiatique, politique commandée par des nécessités impérieuses pour lui, mais il est trop prudent pour risquer de compromettre ses chances par une action hâtive et inopportune, et son gouvernement, tout en veillant à la sauvegarde de ses intérêts et en préparant l'avenir, a un sens trop aigu des réalités politiques pour ne pas mesurer son effort aux possibilités du moment.

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Encl. No. 16 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1964

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL May 9 1934

JOURNAL 5-9
**FERONS-NOUS LES FRAIS
du conflit anglo-japonais ?**

Pour lutter contre le dumping
les Anglais envisagent
le contingentement général
sur les marchés nationaux

L'industrie française va-t-elle se trouver exposée à faire, partiellement au moins, les frais du conflit économique qui se développe entre le Japon et la Grande-Bretagne ? M. Runciman vient de déclarer, aux Communes, que les gouvernements des colonies britanniques seront invités à fixer immédiatement les contingents d'importation des cotonnades et des soieries artificielles qui s'étendront à toutes les importations étrangères.

Qu'est-ce à dire ? Cela signifie tout simplement que l'Angleterre désire lutter contre le dumping japonais ; mais elle ne veut pas dénoncer son traité de commerce. Plus encore, elle est obligée de ménager les intérêts des dominions pour qui le Japon est un excellent client. Alors, on s'abrite derrière une mesure générale, et, comme toujours, les innocents risquent de payer pour les coupables.

Le plus fâcheux est que la tournure qu'a prise l'affaire ne laisse pas entrevoir une solution rapide. L'origine de la querelle est dans le fait que le Japon produit à des prix défiant toute concurrence. Cela ne provient pas de mesures spéciales de dumping ; la vérité est que les Japonais combinent les avantages d'un matériel de fabrication ultra-moderne et d'une main-d'œuvre exceptionnellement sobre et laborieuse. Il faut ajouter, évidemment, l'essor donné aux exportations par la dévaluation de la monnaie. Mais les Anglais, qui refusent de stabiliser la livre sterling pour se réserver les mêmes profits, sont les derniers à pouvoir reprocher aux Japonais d'agir comme eux.

La concurrence japonaise a pris des proportions qui préoccupent toutes les nations. Aussi pourquoi s'est-on ingénié à priver les Japonais de l'exutoire normal de l'immense débouché chinois, qui se trouve à leur porte ? C'était une combinaison autrement intelligente que de laisser les cotonnades japonaises envahir l'Inde et supplanter partout les produits du Lancashire. Des négociations ont été engagées, il y a bien des mois, pour tâcher de résoudre la crise. Pourquoi ont-elles échoué ? Est-ce parce que les Japonais contestent aux Anglais le droit de réserver leur marché national ? Nullement. Le désaccord fondamental provient du fait que les Anglais voudraient se tailler la part du lion sur le marché mondial. Les Japonais devraient se contenter du reste ; pour les autres, ils s'arrangeraient comme ils pourraient.

Ne serait-il pas infiniment plus sage de chercher à combiner tous les intérêts, comme on vient de le faire pour le caoutchouc ? Ce serait beaucoup plus raisonnable que de se battre sur le dos des autres. — SAINT-BRICE.

Encl. No. 17 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from DEBATS of May 11 1934

Les ambitions à longue portée de l'Italie et l'action du Japon en Chine

(DE NOTRE CORRESPONDANT)

Debats 5/11 Rome, mai.

Ce n'est pas le moindre effet de la note japonaise sur les intérêts de ce pays en Chine qu'elle ait réveillé dans l'esprit du gouvernement italien des appréhensions qui datent déjà de loin, et qu'elle ait, par réaction, fortifié des attitudes qui, gagnant de proche en proche les secteurs les plus éloignés de sa politique extérieure, arrivent à l'influencer touchant l'Europe même.

Nous avons noté, dès le mois de décembre dernier, l'importance donnée par M. Mussolini au Congrès des étudiants asiatiques; son discours, prononcé au Capitole, était extrêmement significatif: « Deux fois déjà, la civilisation du monde a été sauvée, dit-il alors, par la collaboration de Rome et de l'Orient. » Mais il ne s'agissait encore que de faire de Rome « le centre des forces spirituelles, de la culture et de la fonction unificatrices ».

Depuis lors, nous avons eu une longue campagne de la presse italienne contre le dumping commercial japonais; elle se poursuit même encore à présent dans la *Stampa* de Turin. Nous avons eu la réaction italienne contre les tractations des Japonais pour de vastes concessions en Abyssinie, contre le mariage annoncé d'une princesse abyssine et d'un prince japonais...

Dans son grand discours du 18 mars à l'Assemblée quinquennale des chefs du parti national (fasciste), M. Mussolini déclarait: « Les objectifs historiques de l'Italie ont deux noms: Asie et Afrique. Le Sud et l'Orient sont les points cardinaux qui doivent susciter l'intérêt et la volonté des Italiens. Au Nord, il y a peu ou rien à faire; à l'Ouest, pas davantage, ni en Europe ni outre-mer. Nos objectifs ont leur justification dans la géographie et dans l'Histoire. » On peut être certain qu'en Afrique il visait d'abord l'Afrique orientale, je veux dire celle dont les mers baignent également l'Asie.

Quoi qu'il soit difficile, encore actuellement, d'en savoir long sur les résultats du séjour du roi de Siam en Italie, j'ai des motifs de croire qu'il a permis aux deux gouvernements des conversations très poussées, d'où sont nés des accords concrets. Le seul qui soit ouvertement connu est celui de la ligne maritime Trieste-Sumatra-Bangkok, accord qui fait suite et corps avec l'accord italo-hollandais des mois précédents.

Les manifestations japonaises eussent-elles été moins éclatantes touchant l'Empire du Milieu que l'Italie y eût déjà prêté attention: car son commerce et son industrie ont en Chine des débouchés, qui sont vitaux pour certaines branches, telle la soie artificielle; mais, juste au même moment, à cet éclat s'ajoutait un autre facteur: on notait, dans les milieux autorisés italiens, certains indices, petits seulement en apparence, qui prouvaient que le gouvernement japonais se renseignait avec une minutieuse exactitude sur tout ce qui se passait dans les grandes nations européennes — l'Italie comme les autres — au point de vue commercial, militaire, maritime et même ferroviaire!

Bien entendu, il ne s'agit à aucun moment en tout ceci, pour l'Italie du moins, de conquêtes territoriales: M. Mussolini ne peut les vouloir accomplir. Il disait encore, le 18 mars: « Que tous, proches ou éloignés, sachent bien qu'il ne s'agit pas de conquêtes, mais d'une expansion naturelle qui doit conduire à la collaboration entre l'Italie et les nations de l'Orient médiat ou immédiat... d'une action qui doit valoriser les ressources encore innombrables des deux continents. » En somme, cette phrase traite la pénétration industrielle et commerciale dans une direction vigoureusement parallèle à celle où le

aux Etats-Unis soient parfaitement apaisées. On ne serait pas loin, me dit-on à bonne source, de croire que le Japon s'estimerait sous peu assez préparé pour déclencher une action décisive dans le sens de ses besoins réels et de ses traditions les plus vivaces: en peu de mots, on paraît estimer ici, à tort ou à raison, que l'heure H est déjà fixée dans les esprits des dirigeants de Tokio.

A.-E. GUILLAUME.

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Si les visées italiennes sont à lointaine portée en même temps qu'à longue échéance, cela ne doit pas voiler à nos yeux la signification, importante pour les intérêts français, que de pareilles dispositions entraînent.

Dès que les relations italo-françaises ont pris, grâce surtout à la question de l'Autriche, — sur lequel l'Italie ne peut transiger, car faute de la plate-forme centrale des échanges européens que constitue l'Autriche indépendante, on devrait aussi abandonner l'espoir de créer certains des courants vers l'Orient qui sont considérés ici comme vitaux, — une température qui semble permettre d'heureux développements, l'Italie a pensé, assurément, à marcher de concert avec nous dans tout ce qui regarderait la pénétration asiatique.

Cette attitude de M. Mussolini n'est d'ailleurs pas exclusive; nul ne doute qu'il ne songe pareillement à conclure des ententes avec les Etats-Unis, qui viennent d'enlever inopinément aux groupes italiens qui travaillent en Abyssinie les importants travaux du lac de Tana. Les relations politiques de l'Italie avec les Etats-Unis sont excellentes, et, depuis le fascisme, l'Italien a conquis là-bas une situation supérieure non seulement à ce qu'elle était auparavant, mais à celle de beaucoup d'Européens.

Prochainement M. Child, ancien ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Rome, éclairé, dit-on, de la politique de M. Roosevelt, va faire ici un séjour d'une certaine durée. Nul ne doute que M. Mussolini ne trouve là l'occasion de s'entretenir de la question d'Extrême-Orient qui, pour le moment, le préoccupe intensément, avec M. Child.

On ne considère pas, à Rome, que les réponses de M. Hirota soit à l'Angleterre, soit

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LEAD OF LION PAPER IN 1924 IT 100

LEAD OF LION PAPER IN 1924

LEAD OF LION PAPER IN 1924 IT 100

Encl. No. 1A to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE May 12 1934

LE FAIT DU JOUR

SYNCHRONISME GERMANO-JAPONAIS

Quand les amiraux parlent...

La Société des Nations ayant voulu se mêler des affaires japonaises en Mandchourie, le Japon a quitté la Société des Nations.

Un peu plus tard, la Société ayant paru vouloir ne pas placer l'Allemagne sur le même pied que ses voisins, admettre l'idée d'une période d'épreuve avant de l'autoriser à réarmer officiellement, l'Allemagne a quitté la Société des Nations.

Depuis, le Japon a signifié fort poliment à la Société de ne pas se mêler des affaires de la Chine. Et l'Allemagne a déclaré qu'elle continuerait de réarmer si cela lui plaisait et dans la mesure où cela lui plairait.

Aussi, depuis déjà plusieurs mois, les bons observateurs notaient un synchronisme évident entre la politique allemande et la politique japonaise. Et l'U. R. S. S., qui s'arc-boutait sur l'Amour, pour résister à la pesée japonaise, sentait fort bien s'affirmer de l'autre les ambitions allemandes. Moscou insistait sur la présence auprès du maréchal Chang Kai Chek, à Nankin, du général von Seeckt, ancien chef de la Reichswehr et de 70 officiers allemands. Cette mission réorganise l'armée chinoise. Sans doute, mais ce n'est pas contre les Japonais. Deux partis divisent, à l'heure actuelle, les gouvernants chinois, et le clan nipponophile semble l'emporter sur le clan américanophile. Qui ne voit que dans l'affaire le général von Seeckt aurait son jeu à jouer ? Je ne dis pas que l'Allemagne a conçu la mission von Seeckt comme jadis Guillaume II avait conçu les missions du maréchal von der Goltz, puis du maréchal Liman von Sanders, mais il est hors de doute que l'ancien commandant de la Reichswehr peut faire office d'agent de liaison entre Nankin et Berlin d'une part, Nankin et Tokio de l'autre, enfin Tokio et Berlin.

Pour en arriver à l'amiral japonais

Matsushita, qui commande l'escadre dont nos Marseillais admirent la belle ordonnance, il vient d'arriver à Berlin et il y a parlé. Pour dire quoi ? Que l'Allemagne et le Japon étaient dans la même position, luttant l'une et l'autre pour obtenir leur place au soleil.

L'amiral a d'ailleurs ajouté qu'il était inutile d'imaginer pour ces deux problèmes une solution guerrière. Et, en effet, si l'on donne au Japon tout ce qu'il demande, à l'Allemagne tout ce qu'elle exige, pas besoin de guerre. Mais si l'on refuse tout ?

Or, que demande le Japon ?

Que sa flotte soit l'égale des flottes américaine et anglaise ;

Que sa position de protection du Mandchoukouo et d'une partie de la Mongolie soit reconnue ;

Que les puissances veuillent bien désormais considérer que pour traiter des affaires chinoises, il leur faudra passer par les autorités japonaises ;

En somme, il demande la domination du Pacifique et le protectorat de la Chine.

Quant à l'Allemagne, elle se borne à demander que sa liberté d'armements soit égale à celle de ses voisins ;

Que l'Autriche devienne allemande ;

Plus particulièrement que tout ce qui a été allemand le redevenne ;

Que les colonies de l'Allemagne lui soient rendues ;

Sans parler d'une liberté de colonisation du territoire russe (plan Rosenberg) ;

En somme, elle demande l'empire du continent européen.

A moi l'Europe, à toi l'Asie, voilà à peu près comment peut se traduire le synchronisme germano-japonais.

Et voici pourquoi il n'est pas sans intérêt, lorsque les hommes d'Etat se taisent, d'écouter les simples amiraux.

Pierre Dominique.

Encl. No. 19 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE MATIN May 12 1934

Nuages et éclaircie en Extrême-Orient

Le Japon a abandonné, depuis longtemps, les traditions genevoises. Il a sa politique, la suit avec ténacité et sang-froid ; il sait l'affirmer quand cela lui paraît nécessaire. Il vient de donner un coup d'arrêt aux Etats-Unis. Personne ne s'y est trompé, c'est à eux surtout que s'adressent les déclarations successives de M. Hirota, son ministre des affaires étrangères.

Elles ne peuvent surprendre ceux qui suivent les événements d'Extrême-Orient.

Les Japonais, conscients de leur force, de leurs possibilités, animés de hauts sentiments nationaux, n'ont pu admettre d'être placés à Genève sur le même pied qu'une Chine anarchique. Ayant pour voisins l'U. R. S. S. et la Chine, dont les armements sont inconnus à l'étranger, ils ne pouvaient accepter des formules de désarmement déjà difficilement applicables aux pays européens. Seule la Société des nations a pu être surprise par leur départ.

L'action du Japon en Asie, la conquête du Mandchoukouo furent la conséquence des mouvements antijaponais en Asie et des mesures prises à leur égard en Amérique. La déclaration rassurante de M. Roosevelt : « la politique des Etats-Unis s'opposera, dorénavant, à toute intervention armée », a cependant été suivie d'un accroissement formidable de la marine et de l'aviation, d'importantes manœuvres dans le Pacifique, de passages accélérés de la flotte d'un océan dans l'autre. Tout cela ne dénote pas des intentions pacifiques.

Il est difficile aussi d'attribuer à des buts commerciaux la création, en Chine, d'usines d'aviation et de moteurs, l'organisation d'aérodromes, d'écoles militaires, l'envoi d'instructeurs.

Des forces aériennes importantes sont également massées dans la province maritime russe en face du Japon.

Les craintes d'un encerclement par la voie des airs, à l'aide de ces nombreuses plates-formes terrestres, paraissent légitimes. D'autant plus que cette menace d'encerclement est prévue et condamnée par une clause du traité de Washington.

L'archipel du Soleil-Levant n'est-il pas l'objectif des grands hydravions basés aux îles Hawaï, des nombreux porte-avions et de la flotte des Etats-Unis ? Si ceux-ci refusent d'accepter la diminution du tonnage des grands navires (adoptée en principe par les autres marines) n'est-ce pas pour affronter les grandes traversées du Pacifique ? Peut-il davantage se méprendre sur les motifs de la reconnaissance des soviets par l'Amérique ?

Le Japon ne peut plus croire aux sentiments amicaux de l'Angleterre depuis que celle-ci a dénoncé, en 1922, leur traité d'alliance. Le développement de la base de Singapour commande les ravitaillements en combustibles à Bornéo. Les visites des ministres hollandais à Londres préparaient probablement un lien de défense

l'Amérique ?

Le Japon ne peut plus croire aux sentiments amicaux de l'Angleterre depuis que celle-ci a dénoncé, en 1922, leur traité d'alliance. Le développement de la base de Singapour commande les ravitaillements en combustibles à Bornéo. Les visites des ministres hollandais à Londres préparaient probablement un lien de défense navale entre Singapour et les Indes néerlandaises, où sont les sources de pétrole les plus importantes de l'Extrême-Orient. Pour les protéger, les Hollandais y entretiennent la plus belle aviation du Pacifique : 150 appareils de gros bombardement et une escadre de chasse des plus modernes. Cette alliance a son prix.

Les problèmes des combustibles liquides, de l'aviation et des bases dominent la situation en Extrême-Orient.

Sans doute pourra-t-on objecter que chacun n'envisage que sa sécurité, qu'il ne s'agit que de précautions prises contre toute éventualité et non de préparatifs d'intervention armée. Mais ces armements, ces manœuvres et ces mobilisations périodiques entretiennent une psychose de guerre, qui ne paraît pas particulière à l'Europe.

On ne peut être étonné que le Japon ait fait déclarer, par son ministre des affaires étrangères, qu'il ne pouvait admettre que des puissances apportent à la Chine des concours financiers, techniques et militaires de nature à troubler la paix en Extrême-Orient et qu'il entendait contrôler les agissements d'un voisin, hors d'état de se contrôler lui-même et d'assumer ses responsabilités.

Les Etats-Unis affirment, en toutes circonstances, la volonté de faire prévaloir la doctrine de Monroe, tout en prêchant des ententes internationales. Ils ne peuvent s'élever contre une adaptation à l'Asie de leur politique.

Amiral Docteur

SUITE DE L'ARTICLE DE 1^{re} PAGE
DE L'AMIRAL DOCTEUR

Nous ne pouvons oublier l'aide apportée aux alliés par les Américains, mais nos sentiments et nos intérêts coloniaux comportent des relations amicales avec l'empire du Soleil-Levant, dans le cadre des traités existants.

Sir John Simon et M. Barthou ont remis les choses au point.

Cet incident diplomatique ne change rien au fond de la question. Le Japon continuera sa politique : le continent asiatique est nécessaire à son ravitaillement, à son commerce, à son émigration, à sa sécurité, à son existence. Il ne souhaite la guerre avec personne, il a besoin de nombreuses années de paix pour organiser ses possessions d'Asie ; s'il n'entend pas en monopoliser les marchés, il ne consentira pas non plus à tirer les marrons du feu pour les autres.

M. Hirota vient encore de le répéter : « Le Japon s'opposera à toute action concertée des puissances en vue d'exercer une pression sur lui. »

La politique internationale ne peut que gagner à devenir claire, ferme et mesurée.

C'est une nouvelle formule que nous commençons aussi à pratiquer.

Encl. No. 20 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

from the Embassy Paris

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS May 14 1934

Angleterre Etats-Unis et Japon

Querelle politique et querelle commerciale

Dans le mois écoulé, les controverses qui sévissent depuis longtemps entre le Japon, l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis ont encore gagné en amertume. Nous avons déjà commenté la démarche assez hardie à laquelle s'est porté le gouvernement de Tokio relativement aux affaires de Chine. Désormais, il frappera de son veto toute action concertée des puissances susceptible à ses yeux, de compromettre la paix de l'Extrême-Orient, sous prétexte d'équiper à la moderne la grande République. La menace vise, avant tout, les intrigues encore poursuivies à Shanghai par le Dr Rajchmann, que le comité du Conseil de Genève, chargé de dispenser une aide « technique » au gouvernement de Nankin, eut la mauvaise idée d'envoyer à Shanghai.

Le docteur Rajchmann se trouvait déjà à Shanghai, en septembre 1931, quand l'armée japonaise prit possession de Harbin. C'est lui qui fit obstacle à des négociations directes entre les deux Etats, parties au conflit et qui orienta sur Genève la protestation chinoise. Au jugement des Japonais, le docteur Rajchmann, sous le couvert du Conseil, cherche aujourd'hui sa revanche et, quoi qu'il prétende, il se conduit en politicien plutôt qu'en expert. Du reste, comment ce médecin, cet ancien directeur de la section d'hygiène du secrétariat, se découvre-t-il une compétence en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer, les routes, les tissages de coton ? Voilà ce que le consul du Japon à Genève est allé déclarer à M. Avenol, secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

A ce débat politique vient de se superposer le conflit économique anglo-japonais. On sait que, dès la fin de 1931, le Japon a abandonné l'étalon-or. Il a décrété le cours forcé du yen afin de pouvoir surmonter la concurrence britannique sur les marchés d'Extrême-Orient et neutraliser ainsi, en ce qui le concernait, la dévaluation de la livre sterling. Mais, au Japon, les salaires étaient déjà très bas. Ils ont encore diminué, du fait de ce changement. Le dumping d'ordre monétaire a augmenté les effets du dumping d'ordre social. Depuis plus de deux ans, les exportations de marchandises japonaises se sont multipliées. Durant le premier trimestre de 1934, le Japon a équilibré ses achats avec ses ventes, à 65 millions de yen près. Tandis que, depuis 1929, les cotonnades vendues annuellement, de par le monde, ont fléchi de 3 milliards de yards carrés, l'Empire nippon, a accru ses envois de 300 millions de yards carrés.

Les filateurs et tisserands du Lancashire ont demandé secours et avec quelle véhémence contre « l'agresseur » économique, bien qu'en vérité les cotonnades indiennes leur aient infligé plus de dommage que les nippones. Ils sont entrés en conférence avec une délégation d'industriels japonais. Mais l'effort de conciliation s'est brisé sur la prétention des Britanniques de procéder, avec les délégués d'Osaka, à un partage du marché universel, de ne point s'entendre seulement avec eux sur les échanges de marchandises entre les deux pays — thèse repoussée par le Japon qui ne veut point aliéner sa liberté de négo-

Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Pourtant, ce serait s'abuser que d'envisager déjà comme inévitable « la guerre du Pacifique ». Ni l'Angleterre ni les Etats-Unis ne disposent des forces nécessaires, en Extrême-Orient, pour se lancer dans la bataille. Quelques années de préparatifs leur seraient indispensables pour tenir le coup. Et il s'en faut de beaucoup que leurs opinions publiques réagissent en étroite harmonie. Mais si les deux Etats veulent parer aux événements, ils seront contraints de reconnaître tôt ou tard le fait accompli mandchourien et d'en venir à un accord avec Tokio sur les affaires chinoises. Quant aux hostilités commerciales, l'adoption graduelle, en tout pays, du système des contingents a chance d'en venir à bout. La querelle des peuples exportateurs a chance d'être réglée par les excès protectionnistes de tous.



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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 30 TO REPORT NO. 1408 OF THE TAT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 21 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1934

From the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE JOURNAL May 16 1934

LE PROBLÈME DE L'AUTORITÉ ne se pose pas qu'en Europe

Le délégué de la S.D.N. en Chine
reconnaît que les Chinois
doivent avant tout
mettre de l'ordre chez eux

Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera, enseigne la sagesse des nations, qui est très en avance sur celle de la Société des nations. N'est-ce pas exactement ce que soutiennent les Japonais, avec toute l'éloquence de leur propre exemple, quand ils affirment que le relèvement de la Chine dépend avant tout des Chinois. Il est piquant d'en trouver la preuve dans le rapport du fameux docteur Rajchman, envoyé en Extrême-Orient pour organiser la collaboration de la ligue de Genève et de la Chine.

Ce qui frappe avant tout dans ce rapport, c'est la disproportion écrasante entre les besoins et les ressources également immenses de la Chine et le programme de réalisation. Il ne faut tout de même pas oublier que la Chine est une fourmilière de 400 millions d'habitants dont l'équipement est presque entièrement à faire et qui devrait alimenter une activité intense si ses ressources n'étaient pas dévorées par les convulsions intérieures ? Savez-vous à quoi se réduit l'effort envisagé pour 1934 ? A 15 millions de dollars, dont près de la moitié est absorbée par les travaux de route. On peut en conclure évidemment qu'en s'inquiétant de la coopération internationale, les Japonais prennent peur d'une ombre. Mais il y a une chose bien plus évidente encore : c'est que les possibilités d'action qu'offre l'état politique actuel de la Chine sont singulièrement restreintes.

Ce n'est pas pourtant le personnel qualifié qui manque. Le passage de beaucoup le plus intéressant du rapport de M. Rajchman est celui qui rend hommage — et un hommage certainement très mérité — aux multiples activités laborieuses d'un grand nombre de spécialistes chinois, qui travaillent avec persévérance et hors de tout souci de publicité. Ces hommes ont élaboré des plans concrets de reconstruction fort bien conçus. La solide formation qu'ils ont acquise, soit à l'étranger, soit dans le pays même, les qualifie pleinement pour adapter aux conditions particulières de la Chine les expériences occidentales dans tous les domaines : économique et financier, industriel, agricole et social.

L'état-major de la régénération de la Chine par elle-même existe. M. Rajchman est obligé de constater qu'il n'est pas utilisé. La plupart des hommes de valeur sont tenus à l'écart des fonctions publiques. Pourquoi ? sinon parce qu'ils restent en dehors des menées des politiciens, et plus encore parce que ce qui manque le plus à la Chine, c'est l'armature d'un gouvernement fort dont l'autorité soit respectée. La principale tâche de la Chine doit être de mettre de l'ordre dans sa maison et non pas de chercher querelle à ses voisins. Voilà la vraie conclusion. — S.-B.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. No. 10 to Special Report No. 1409 of May 17 1974

From the Embassy Paris

Extract from LE TEMPS May 16 1974

BULLETIN DU JOUR

EN EXTRÊME-ORIENT

L'atmosphère politique change d'un jour à l'autre en ce qui concerne la situation en Extrême-Orient. La semaine dernière on a pu se féliciter sincèrement de la détente déterminée par les explications de Tokio sur les déclarations officielles concernant les relations de la Chine avec les pays étrangers, déclarations qui avaient provoqué un si vif émoi à Londres et à Washington. D'autre part, on avait l'impression d'une accalmie dans la controverse russo-japonaise. Voici qu'un nouvel incident menace de faire rebondir cette polémique. Un télégramme de source nipponne annonce, en effet, qu'un vapeur battant pavillon du Mandchoukouo, remontant le fleuve Amour et se dirigeant sur Taheiho, a subi le feu d'un fort de la rive russe du fleuve. Un marin aurait été tué, un colonel japonais et plusieurs passagers auraient été blessés. Des informations de presse indiquent même que le bâtiment aurait été coulé, ce dont il n'y a jusqu'ici aucune confirmation. Toujours est-il que le gouvernement du Mandchoukouo a adressé une note de protestation à Moscou.

Les incidents de cette nature sont toujours graves, surtout quand ils se produisent dans une atmosphère de tension comme celle qui caractérise actuellement les relations de la Russie soviétique avec le Mandchoukouo et avec le Japon. Il faut attendre de connaître exactement les circonstances dans lesquelles les forts russes auraient ouvert le feu sur le vapeur mandchou. Ce bâtiment naviguait-il dans des conditions régulières? A-t-il transgressé certaines règles du contrôle dans les eaux territoriales? Ou bien l'attaque a-t-elle eu lieu délibérément, sans sommation préalable, sans justification possible? Ce n'est que lorsqu'on sera fixé sur ces points que l'on pourra juger de la portée de l'affaire; mais on ne sait que trop à quelles complications peuvent conduire de tels incidents lorsque les gouvernements intéressés sont engagés dans des négociations difficiles et lorsque, d'une manière générale, leurs intérêts politiques et économiques sont en formelle opposition dans une région déterminée. C'est le cas actuellement pour le Japon, qui assume officiellement la protection du Mandchoukouo, et de l'Union soviétique, laquelle croit avoir des raisons de craindre un coup de force nippon sur les positions russes.

La tension des relations entre Moscou et Tokio pèse depuis de longs mois sur toute la situation en Extrême-Orient. Il y eut des heures particulièrement critiques l'automne dernier. Pourtant, il est apparu, depuis lors, que des deux côtés on a le désir d'éviter un conflit, tout au moins de gagner du temps. La Russie soviétique pourrait difficilement soutenir une lutte armée de longue durée à si grande distance de ses bases. Le Japon est aux prises avec de sérieuses difficultés financières, économiques et sociales; de plus, il doit consolider son établissement en Mandchourie, ce qui est une œuvre de longue haleine. Quelles que puissent être ses vues pour l'avenir en ce qui concerne son expansion sur le continent asiatique et quelles que puissent être ses chances en raison même du trouble général où vivent les puissances occidentales, une guerre russo-japonaise, avec pour objectif la domination en Chine, serait une aventure comportant des risques et dans laquelle un peuple aussi conscient des réalisations immédiates que l'est le peuple nippon ne saurait s'engager qu'à bon escient.

Tout porte donc à penser que le Japon ne se propose pas de troubler la paix pour réaliser certaines de ses ambitions, qu'il ne se résoudra à faire la guerre et à jeter dans la balance sa puissance militaire que s'il y est contraint par les menées communistes dans l'Orient lointain ou par des circonstances particulières de nature à compromettre pour l'avenir ses intérêts spéciaux en Chine, qu'il considère comme ayant une importance vitale pour le développement de sa prospérité. Il n'empêche que malgré toutes les assurances données par Tokio des inquiétudes subsistent à ce sujet dans certains milieux internationaux. C'est ainsi que le *Daily Herald* croit savoir que le département d'Etat américain prend un intérêt de plus en plus grand à la situation dans cette partie du monde et même qu'il aurait fait procéder à des sondages diplomatiques auprès de

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

sa puissance militaire que s'il y est contraint par les menées communistes dans l'Orient lointain ou par des circonstances particulières de nature à compromettre pour l'avenir ses intérêts spéciaux en Chine, qu'il considère comme ayant une importance vitale pour le développement de sa prospérité. Il n'empêche que malgré toutes les assurances données par Tokio des inquiétudes subsistent à ce sujet dans certains milieux internationaux. C'est ainsi que le *Daily Herald* croit savoir que le département d'Etat américain prend un intérêt de plus en plus grand à la situation dans cette partie du monde et même qu'il aurait fait procéder à des sondages diplomatiques auprès de différentes puissances afin de connaître l'attitude qu'elles adopteraient dans l'éventualité d'un conflit. Ce journal ajoute qu'on est bien persuadé aux Etats-Unis que le Japon n'est pas suffisamment prêt pour faire la guerre, mais qu'on a le sentiment que le moindre incident pourrait précipiter les événements. Un incident ou un accident est toujours possible, même quand il s'agit de situations moins tendues que celle qui existe actuellement en Extrême-Orient. Il ne s'ensuit pas que le pire soit à craindre d'une manière permanente de la part d'une puissance qui a, certes, une politique d'expansion bien arrêtée, mais qui sait attendre l'heure la plus favorable pour la réaliser, étape par étape, en mettant de son côté les meilleures chances de succès.

On connaît le principe qui commande la politique extérieure du Japon : étroite coopération avec la Chine, de manière à en finir avec toute agitation antijaponaise dans ce pays. Il est certain que les pourparlers en cours entre Tokio et Nankin progressent et qu'il y a de part et d'autre plus de compréhension récipro-

que. Si les Nippons s'inquiètent particulièrement des tentatives d'autres influences étrangères s'exerçant dans le sens d'une aide financière et économique à la Chine, c'est qu'ils y voient surtout des réactions contre leur propre influence. C'est par là qu'il faut s'expliquer leur doctrine du contrôle des accords que la Chine pourrait être amenée à conclure, doctrine qui vise surtout, semble-t-il, l'action que le docteur Rojchmann poursuit sous le couvert de la Société des nations. En réalité, la diplomatie japonaise a assez bien réussi jusqu'ici à tirer des avantages importants d'une situation de fait extrêmement complexe pour ne pas devoir envisager un recours à la force comme indispensable à la bonne sauvegarde des intérêts de l'empire du Soleil-Levant. Elle a créé le Mandchoukouo, qui existe en dépit du refus des puissances de le reconnaître *de jure*, comme le prouve l'avis émis par le comité consultatif de Genève qui tend à faire admettre que, sans préjuger la reconnaissance de l'Etat mandchou, les frais de transit des correspondances passant par le territoire mandchou doivent être liquidés; elle a réussi à amorcer des négociations avec Nankin; elle a maintenu la position prise quand le Japon a déclaré qu'il est particulièrement intéressé, par souci de sa propre sécurité, à la sauvegarde de l'ordre et de la paix en Chine.

Malgré les chocs et les heurts de ces derniers mois, le gouvernement nippon a pu ainsi marquer plusieurs points dans la partie qui se joue en Extrême-Orient. Il n'a aucune raison de changer de méthode aussi longtemps que celle qu'il emploie lui procure des avantages importants aux moindres frais. C'est le plus sûr argument que l'on puisse faire valoir contre la menace d'un conflit armé, mais cette méthode ne dispense pas de se préparer à faire face à toutes les éventualités, car lorsqu'on joue un jeu aussi serré il importe de veiller à ne se laisser surprendre par aucun événement.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
May 31, 1934.

~~ROM:~~

~~MMH:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~SKH:~~

This gives some very interesting information in regard to the views of the British at Hong Kong on the Japanese declaration and also in regard to what further encroachments the Japanese may have in mind.

JEJ/VDM

J.E.J.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 896

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hong Kong, May 2, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Japanese Declaration Causes Uneasiness in Hong Kong.

1-1221 ***

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

SIR:

The recent announcement of the Japanese Govern-

ment in regard to China caused a great deal of un-

business in Hong Kong. As this office has already

reported, Japanese competition is keenly felt by

British merchants in this colony and the feeling is

growing that Great Britain must inevitably come to

grapple with Japan or surrender the markets for piece

goods and other important manufactures in the Far

East. The Japanese "Hands off China" declaration

naturally intensified this feeling and many Hong Kong

business men were convinced that the crisis was not

far off. The English language press in the colony

took a very serious view of the situation and devoted

a great deal of space to the Japanese statement.

The SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST said editorially that the Japanese declaration "produces an impossible situation, compelling the world to take Japan's orders or sacrifice their (the Powers) peace". The TELEGRAPH, an afternoon paper, declared that "such a doctrine, conflicting as it does with the Open Door policy, to

say

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MAY 23 1934

Department of State

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say nothing of other considerations, can not be permitted to go unchallenged". 792.54/6621

As I telegraphed the Department confidentially on April 27, the British commanding officer in the Far East (General Borrett) thought the situation produced by the Japanese announcement so serious that for a time he considered postponing his customary visit of inspection to Shanghai and North China.

The tension has of course ^{been} eased to a great extent by the subsequent exchange of conversations between the British Foreign Office and the Japanese Government on one hand and the State Department and Japanese authorities on the other. However, well informed circles in Hong Kong still incline to the opinion that the crisis has only been postponed and that grave complications are bound to come sooner or later. It is generally felt that Japanese pressure on China will continue unless it is met by the united opposition of the leading Western Powers.

Chinese residents in Hong Kong are also fully aware of the dangers in the existing political situation. Chinese political and business groups are very apprehensive of Japan's intentions not only in the North but in South China as well. In a conversation I had a day or so ago with General Gaston Wang, who was formerly associated with the Nineteenth Route Army in Fukien, the General declared that although the crisis

seemed

-3-

seemed to have passed for the moment, he was sure the Japanese would renew their demands in the next two or three months. General Wang went on to say that he could tell me confidentially that the recent visit of Hwang Fu (of Peiping) to Nanking was concerned with matters of far greater importance than the mere restoration of railway and postal communications between China and Manchuria. Hwang Fu really went to Nanking, the General said, to inform the Government of Japan's demands that China should take no action in relation to the foreign Powers without Japan's knowledge and approval, and that Chahar should be transferred to Manchukuo. This is probably not news to the Legation in Peiping or the Department. I give it for what it may be worth.

As an indication of the pressure of Japanese competition, it may be interesting to note that the chairman of the board of directors of the local Green Island Cement Company had much to say at a recent stockholders' meeting about Japanese dumping and Japanese competition. He pointed out that the cement factory had been forced to shut down for months because it was impossible to compete with the cheap cement from Japan. In fact, he disclosed that the company was trying to sell a large part of its machinery, although it still hopes to


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

continue operations on a reduced scale.

Respectfully yours,


Douglas Jenkins,
Consul General.

4 . JM

In quintuplicate to Department.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.

800
DJ:ML

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

LONDON



Secretary of State,

Washington.

293, May 31, 6 p. m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

While I feel due consideration should be given to Simon's statement set forth in your 213, May 27, 7 p. m. (textually reported in the Embassy's despatch No. 722 of May 23) I do not feel the sum total of all other pro-Japanese statements should be added together and taken as an indication of a new fixed policy towards Japan. England's policy is in the making and its determination will in the first instance be timed by the results of the present Geneva deliberations on the European situation. When the European situation clarifies the Cabinet can more frankly face the Far Eastern situation. For the rest, England's policy vis a vis Japan is influenced by two schools of thought, equally important: (one) seeking cooperation with the United States; and the other which considers that in 1921 Great Britain had elected to forego the advantages of a Japanese alliance in the hope of pursuing a

793.94/6710

F/ESP

JUN 11 1934

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REP

2-#293, From London, May 31, 6 p.m.

*Latter
to
Attorney
244*

pursuing a joint policy with the United States, but that this expectation had been disappointed by the insistence of the United States upon disassociating itself from even the appearance of joint action during the years 1925 to 1930 when British interests were singled out for attack by Chinese nationalism; although we were later willing to seek British cooperation in defense of the Manchurian thesis with which the American Government had more particularly identified itself.

*with
500A15 as*

In my opinion since England today has not clarified her opinion with regard to Japan but nevertheless on her own initiative has sought these preliminary naval conversations and has informally expressed a hope that no attempt be made to open the Japanese issue before the forthcoming naval conversations, I have let Mr. Davis know that I consider any attempt to raise the Far Eastern problem before he reaches London might be prejudicial to the very objective we seek. I venture to repeat what I have said in former telegrams that at this moment we can well afford to wait and let the British carry the initiative further in these preliminary conferences which they have sought.

Repeated to Mr. Davis.

BINGHAM

HPD-KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FE

~~I.D.H.~~

P.M.

FE

— 9 after P.M.

FE should think
this dispatch would
be both interesting &
helpful to the Embassy
in Tokyo. Would
suggest to FE its
distribution there?

Ru

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 6, 1934

~~SECRET~~
There is enclosed with London's No. 722 of May 23 HANSARD'S report on the debate in the House of Commons on May 18, when Sir John Simon made the reference to Britain's commitments with regard to the integrity of China which so aroused the anger of Mr. Sze.

Atherton's despatch, while brief, is important.

I found the entire despatch extremely interesting and I heartily recommend that it be read in full.

The debate was started by Sir Stafford Cripps, who is regarded as being the ablest member of the left wing of the Labor Party. He outlined the developments arising out of the Japanese Foreign Office statement of April 17, cited the various provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and argued that Britain had not been faithful to its obligation to preserve the integrity of China. He then proceeded to express alarm over the situation in the Far East and over the apparently increasingly close association between Japan and Germany. He concluded his speech by asking four questions of the Foreign Secretary (See page 2061).

Mr. Locker-Lampson

027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

Mr. Locker-Lampson, a conservative, ascribed the failure of the League to the non-membership of four great Powers and to the provision made in the Covenant for the application of sanctions. With the United States standing out of the League, there would be grave danger if sanctions were applied of the League getting into difficulties with the United States.


Recalling Tokyo's recent telegram quoting a statement made by Admiral Keyes, you will be interested to read his speech (page 2078) recommending the British Government "to do all in their power to return to the excellent understanding with Japan which existed" during the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Sir John Simon's reply begins on page 2094. He takes pride in the fact that it was Great Britain "and no other country which proceeded to address Japan on the subject" of the Japanese statement of April 17. He denies that Britain had obligated itself under the Nine Power Treaty to preserve the integrity of China, and implies that so far as Article X of the Covenant is concerned, that Article was intended to be "a very substantial buttress to the boundaries which were laid down in the Peace Treaties." You will also be interested to read his analysis of the declaration made by Mr. Norman Davis with regard to American collaboration with the measures which may be taken by the League against aggressors (page 2107).

FE:END:DLV

AMERICA
JUN 23 1934

London, May 23, 1934

• JK - 34



793.94/6711

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

**COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.Ds**

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 267 May 19, 1 p. m., and to forward herewith the complete text of the remarks of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on May 18th, quoted therein.

I consider these remarks of Sir John Simon of direct importance, first, because he so clearly substantiates what I have reported previously as to the attitude of the official mind towards cooperation with the United States - it may be summed up in one quotation: "Really there is no sort of good in our pretending not to observe the limitations/

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No. 267, JUN 23 1934
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
- 2 -

"limitations within which the United States is likely to act."; and, secondly, I regard this statement of the Foreign Secretary of importance in that his own remarks clearly define his attitude towards the present Japanese situation.

A recent remark to me by a colleague is perhaps worth quoting here: "I cannot help noticing in semi-official quarters probably an unconscious but an increasing desire to explain away as satisfactorily as they can both Germany and Japan".

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Ray Atherton
Counselor of Embassy.

Enclosures:

- / 1. "Foreign Affairs" PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (Commons) May 18, 1934.
2. "Disarmament. Sir John Simon's Review", (1 copy.
- / The TIMES, May 19, 1934.

RA/ER

0275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

722

May 23, 1934

SOURCE: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
House of Commons,
18 May 1934.
London. Pages 2049-2138 inc.

2049

Adjournment—

18 MAY 1934

Foreign Affairs

2050

ADJOURNMENT (WHITSUNTIDE).

Resolved,

"That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn until Tuesday, 29th May."—
[Mr. Baldwin.]

Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That this House do now adjourn."—
[Captain Margesson.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

11.12 a.m.

Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS: I desire to raise a question as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Japan, in view of the very serious threat to the peace of the East, and indeed the peace of the whole world, which is resulting from the actions of Japan during the last two years. I also desire to ask the Foreign Secretary a question as regards the Disarmament Conference. I think it is necessary shortly to review the actions and statements of the Japanese Government in order to appreciate the full significance and dangers of the course on which she has apparently embarked. I do not desire to go into any of the history which precedes the Lytton Report, because that document has, I think, been universally accepted as setting out truthfully and fairly the state of affairs up to the time when the Commission investigated them on the spot in Manchuria. That Report pointed out that the maintenance of the state of affairs which the Commissioners found in Manchuria was incompatible with peace and with the Treaty obligations of Japan, and, as the House will remember, on the 24th February, 1933, the Assembly of the League of Nations considered that Report and came to certain conclusions upon it. In their conclusions, they emphasised the fact that Manchuria was an integral part of China, under Chinese sovereignty, to which the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 fully applied, and they made it clear that the then existing régime in Manchuria was the result of a Treaty-breaking aggression by Japan and was a standing violation of Chinese territorial integrity and political independence, and that it constituted obviously an urgent danger to the peace of the East.

This step of Japan in invading Manchuria, and the incidents which took place at the same time in Shanghai, were

the first step apparently of a design by which Japan should gain preponderating power throughout the whole of the East, and that design in its initial stages succeeded because of the weakness and the vacillation of the Governments which were represented on the League of Nations, in which weakness and vacillation our Government, I think, took a leading part. Since that time Japan has extended here conquests in the North of China. She has withdrawn from the League for the somewhat naive reasons that she cannot agree with the other members of the League as regards the interpretation of treaties and the fundamental principles of international law. In other words, what the whole world had agreed upon as being a breach of a Treaty Japan desired to interpret as no breach at all, and it was because of the unwillingness of the rest of the world associated in the League of Nations to accept the Japanese interpretation of that Treaty and of the fundamental principles of international law that she withdrew from the League of Nations. That reason for her withdrawal and the fact of her withdrawal are matters of very vital importance, because they demonstrate the value that can be attached to Japanese statements as regards the keeping of treaties.

There is a most flagrant breach—so determined by the rest of the world—and Japan still insists that her actions in the case of Manchuria were not breaches of that Treaty but were apparently consistent with the terms of it. Following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan is now engaged upon converting Manchuria and Jehol into a great military base, with strategic roads and railways ready for some fresh adventure. Presumably she is not carrying out a very expensive programme without some policy behind it which she intends to follow in the future. The policy which she intends to follow is being progressively demonstrated by both the actions and the statements of the Japanese Govt. She is penetrating into Northern China with increasing pressure from day to day, and, when the moment seemed opportune, she flew a kite to ascertain the attitude that other Governments were likely to take as regards her claim for a sphere of influence in China. Having flown the kite, and seeing that apparently it did not create the disturbance which it might have

[Sir S. Cripps.]

created, she is now adopting it as the official principle of the Japanese Government.

It is important that we should look at the statements which have been made by the Japanese Foreign Minister and others as to exactly what her purpose and design is. The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary gave the text of the statement of Japanese policy to this House on the 23rd April. If I may remind the House of one or two passages in that statement, I will ask permission to read them. Japan says:

"At the same time we consider it only natural that to keep peace and order in East Asia we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. . . . We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. . . . Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance. . . . Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in East Asia."

Japan thus constitutes herself on her own statement as the judge of what benefits China and as to whether she will permit other countries to engage in technical and financial assistance in that country. Japan concludes with this statement:

"Foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from policies she has pursued in the past"

that presumably is the Manchurian adventure—

"but on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign Powers"

that, of course, is the League of Nations action as regards the rehabilitation of China—

"under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it was deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd April, 1934, cols. 1366-7; Vol. 288.]

That statement was somewhat elaborated in an interview which the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, Mr. Hiroshi Saito, gave to the American Press, which was reported in the "Times" of the

23rd April. These statements are so significant that they ought to be before the House. Quoting from the report the "Times" states this:

"Japan does not desire to interfere with legitimate foreign business in China (said the Ambassador), but it wishes to be consulted by those who want to deal with China before concluding any transactions. And what would happen if the foreign countries with commercial interests in China were to ignore this request of the Japanese Government, he was asked. The Japanese Government would consider such a step as an unfriendly act, the Ambassador replied, with hesitation."

Further down the report, the "Times" says:

"The question whether the control over China which Japan now seeks might not more wisely have been established in co-operation with other Powers brought this reply:—'After what has happened since the Manchurian crisis it has become evident to the Japanese people that the Western nations know nothing about Chinese mentality. Such collaboration would have been possible some time ago, but to-day the Japanese Government could not obtain popular support in a policy of co-operation with other nations. Consequently Japan must act and decide alone what is good for China. . . . The Japanese Government will deal fairly with all interests that are really legitimate and in the end the business people will find it beneficial to consult Tokyo before embarking on any adventures in China.'"

The "Times" correspondent makes this comment:

"How—entirely apart from the attitude of China itself—other sovereign nations can accept this remains to Americans who are now studying the question, a mystery."

That statement of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was shortly before the answer which the Foreign Secretary gave in the House on the 30th April when, after reciting the interviews between His Majesty's Ambassador in China and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 25th April, he stated:

"I think that the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister is reasonably clear, and His Majesty's Government are content to leave this particular question where it is."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th April, 1934, col. 14; Vol. 289.]

I will not read the whole of that answer, because it is long, but, substantially, it may be said that it stated that Japan has given an undertaking or made a statement that she would not interfere with the open-door policy as regards China. The conclusion of the story comes

in the Report from Tokyo on the 1st May, which appears in the "Times" of the next day. It said this:

"Officials offer no comment on Sir John Simon's statement in the House of Commons. . . . The Foreign Office has issued a brief announcement for publication in tomorrow's vernacular Press. This expresses appreciation of Sir Francis Lindley's assurance that Great Britain is avoiding any activities likely to disturb peace, and state that Japan, if only in view of her geographical position, is incomparably more concerned than more distant countries in the peace and order of East Asia. The evening newspapers announce that this version is being published because Sir John Simon omitted to mention the third of the principles which Mr. Hirota stated to Sir Francis Lindley—namely, that Japan is opposed to any foreign activity in China prejudicial to the peace and order of East Asia. The incident thus ends with Japan politely but immovably asserting her primacy of interest in China and indicating certain specific foreign activities to which she objects. Though this position may not be logical under the letter of the treaties, the Japanese suggest that it is reasonable in the actual situation."

That seems to be a curious argument as regards the observation of the terms of treaties. So we are left with the perfectly plain claim and assertion by the Japanese Government that she proposes to continue in her breach of the Nine Power Treaty and proposes to extend that breach throughout Northern China, and apparently the British Government are prepared to "let the matter rest at that point," even although they have before their eyes the experience of what has happened in Manchukuo and Jehol. I think it is worth drawing the attention of the House to the terms of the Treaty of 1922, because perhaps those terms are not fully in the minds of all hon. Members present. The Treaty opens with a first article in these terms:

"The contracting Powers, other than China"

which of course includes Japan—

"agree to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China"

which of course includes Manchuria, for the purposes of this Treaty.

"to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government."

It continues with a provision as regards the keeping of the so-called "open door."

"To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining

the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges."

It is important to notice that the first two sub-Clauses or Article 1 deal with the territorial integrity and independence of China. That is the foundation of the whole of the Treaty. Article 2 is of great importance:

"The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I."

That shows clearly that no Power under this Treaty can now enter into any arrangement of any sort with Japan, Japan having declared a breaker of this Treaty already. Article 3 goes on to say that with a view more effectually to apply the principle of the open door or equality of opportunity the contracting powers agree that they will not seek or support their respective nationals in seeking

"any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China."

That seems to me precisely what the Japanese Government have done with regard to Manchukuo and Jehol. There can be no doubt what the obligations are under that Treaty. A breach of it has been declared and decided by the report of February, 1933, to which I have already referred, and in addition, of course, under Article 10 of the Covenant, we ourselves have an obligation with other countries to preserve the territorial integrity and the existing political independence of China. I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether we are abandoning that Treaty obligation. I find it extraordinarily difficult to understand how it can be said by any one in a responsible position that we are content that Japan intends to respect and is respecting the obligations of the Nine Power Treaty unless we repudiate the report of February, 1933. A question on that point was put to the Foreign Secretary on the 30th April. He was asked whether His Majesty's Government regard themselves as still bound by the finding and recommendations of the Assembly Report of 24th February, 1933; but the Foreign

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Adjournment—

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Foreign Affairs

2056

[Sir S. Cripps.]
Secretary, with that adroitness which everybody knows he possesses, answered the question without answering that point at all. The recommendations of the Assembly state quite specifically that they exclude the maintenance and recognition of the existing régime in Manchuria, such maintenance and recognition, they say, being "incompatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations and with the good understanding between the two countries on which peace in the Far East depends." They continue:

"It follows that in adopting the present Report the members of the League intend to abstain, particularly as regards the existing régime in Manchuria, from any act which might prejudice or delay the carrying out of the recommendations of this Report. They will continue not to recognise this régime either *de-jure* or *de facto*. They intend to abstain from taking any isolated action with regard to the situation in Manchuria and of continuing to concert their action among themselves as well as with the interested states non members of the League."

I understand that a statement has been made by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the effect that we have never given anything in the way of a pledge to support the integrity of China, and I would like to ask the Foreign Secretary what the meaning of that is.

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon):
Where is this?

Sir S. CRIPPS: I understand that statement was made in another place. One cannot refer to the precise terms of the statement, according to the rules of order in this House, and I therefore quote what I understand to be the effect of that statement; and I should be only too glad if the Foreign Secretary denied that that statement was made or that that was the effect of the statement. I would like to know whether we do adopt the attitude that we are responsible and are pledged to support the territorial integrity and political independence of China, or are going to take up the attitude that in view, I suppose, of the greater strength of Japan we must resign those obligations? Apparently the Government are allowing Japan without any protest, to continue in the breach of the obligations both under the Covenant and under the Nine Power Treaty, and

there is very little wonder that, in these circumstances, people in the world to-day demand some very special degree of security before disarmament. With this example of the callous desertion of China as an object lesson of what may happen to any other country which is protected by covenants and treaties it is not surprising to find that people are very insistent upon something more than mere nominal security. The Foreign Secretary, in a speech to the Women's Institutes two or three days ago, said, speaking of the international difficulties

"The disease was fear and unless we could do something to strike at the root of that international disease all the experts in the world would not be able to produce an agreement or international result. Our own Government had done, and was doing, its utmost to promote that feeling of security."

I could imagine nothing more apt to create the feeling of insecurity than the attitude of Japan and the permission to her to continue in her aggression without any opposition whatsoever. This is not merely a question of honour and of treaty-keeping, which apparently has no great appeal to the National Government, who seem to look upon these Treaties as scraps of paper, but it is a question also of expediency. One has to try to see what this will lead to. Obviously, Japan has embarked upon an Imperialist expansion on the best model of the capitalist-imperialist expansion in the Western World in the 19th century. There are two alternatives in the direction in which that expansion may proceed; either Russia or China. At the moment, Russia's strength has apparently modified the desire which was expressed by some of the Japanese militarists not very long ago to make an incursion into Siberia as far as Lake Baikal.

One is a little suspicious of the disturbances which are taking place at the present in Eastern Turkestan and as to how far Japan may be responsible for those in Kashgar and elsewhere. The difficulties that are likely to arise in the stirring up of Mohammedan feeling there is a matter with which the right hon. Gentleman is only too familiar. The alternative apparently is North China where it seems to be generally anticipated that Japan will try to set up Manchuquo No. 2. If that attempt be made, I should like to know from the Foreign Secretary what the attitude of the Government is to be as regards a repetition of the Man-

2057

Adjournment—

18 May 1934

Foreign Affairs

2058

chuquo incidents further south. Are we to continue to acquiesce in the behaviour of Japan? Are we to offer to partition spheres of interest in China between ourselves and other European Western Powers and the Japanese, and, if we do, what will the next step be? Presumably when Japan has digested Northern China she will then be ready to take her bite at Southern China, so that we and other European Powers will be gradually forced out of the East altogether. Surely the time has come to call a definite halt to this type of behaviour.

Three great countries are vitally interested in the Eastern situation besides Japan and China. There is America across the Pacific, Russia in close proximity to the hostile atmosphere, and ourselves with our interests in the East. If the League of Nations are to continue to be able to handle this proposition in the East, or to attempt to handle it, it is extremely desirable that we should try to get as close an association of Russia, and America with the League as possible. I should like to know from the Foreign Secretary whether we are doing anything to bring about that association. Speeches have been reported from Russia showing a renewed interest in the activities of the League, and I suggest to the Foreign Secretary that it might be worth while to make inquiries as to how far there is any real hope that Russia will either join the League or will join with the League in dealing with the Far Eastern situation.

The recent visit of the Japanese Fleet to the Mediterranean does not make one any more happy as regards the international situation. The conversations and mutual congratulations in Berlin are not without considerable significance, nor, indeed, is the visit of the Japanese Admiral to the Turks, where, it is reported, very large promises were held out if Turkey would join in an alliance with Germany and Japan. It seems only too possible that an anti-League combination may easily grow up based upon the Japanese and German strength. It is of vital importance that every step possible should be taken to strengthen the League, and no step could be more fruitful than the inclusion of Russia in the League of Nations. In present circumstances, there is perhaps nothing more vital than that our Government should have the courage to reaffirm, without any

qualification whatsoever, its adherence to the Assembly report of February, 1933. It will be remembered that the United States Government accepted that Report and the Russian Government declared that it was not inconsistent with their own Far Eastern policy. The rest of the nations in the League of Nations adhered to it.

The Government of this country had been warned again and again as to the results which would be likely to flow from a weak and vacillating policy towards Japan. Those consequences are now becoming apparent. It is of first-class importance that we should be prepared to take steps to save the peace of the world. We were not prepared to take any economic steps at the time of the Manchurian crisis to bring pressure to bear upon Japan, but, curiously enough, when Lancashire industrialists suffer in the cotton industry, we are prepared to take very rapid economic measures against Japan. It is a pity, because those steps might have been effective for the preservation of World peace in circumstances of the most vital importance, while for the comparatively less important, though important, fact of the Lancashire cotton industry, we do not mind embarking upon them. It will be remembered that as far back as, I think, January, 1932, when the United States sent a letter with regard to the declaration of non-recognition of Manchuquo, a statement was issued by the Foreign Office that it did not propose to join in the United States declaration because we had received assurances of the preservation of the open door in Manchuria. I should like to know from the Foreign Secretary whether it is our policy under the Nine Power Treaty to allow any country to grab any bit of China they like so long as it gives us an assurance that the open door will be preserved. That would be a strange reading of the Nine Power Treaty, because that Treaty pledges all the signatories to preserve the independence and integrity of China including, of course, Manchuria. When a breach of that Treaty was found by the World Court, it is curious that we should satisfy ourselves by saying that as long as the open door is preserved we have nothing further to do.

It is idle to shut our eyes to the events which are taking place in Manchuquo

[Sir S. Cripps.]
to-day. It will be remembered that Mr. Stimson, in a letter to Senator Borah which was communicated to the League of Nations on 25th February, 1933, pointed out that the Nine Power Treaty was framed in order to prevent a new scramble for concessions and spheres of influence in China leading to attempts to partition to that country, which would give rise to another Great War, and that equal opportunities for trade in China were impossible unless there was respect for China's territorial integrity and political independence. That, of course, is in effect what has appeared quite clearly from Japan's action in Manchuria. Japanese goods enter duty free, and she has in fact every sort of concession as regards the development of that country for her nationals. Pressure is now being applied upon China, especially North China, to try to get a similar position for Japan in that country. As the "Times" put it in a rather remarkable article in September, 1933, the goal of the Japanese is the lordship of the Far East, that is to say, the economic lordship for Japanese capitalism. If one were to judge from the outward appearance of the policy of this Government, I think one would be led to believe that this country is either in league with Japan in her aggression or is turning a benevolently blind eye on her obligations and on the obligations of this country, both under the Treaty and under the Covenant.

As I have already pointed out, all this has a very intimate bearing on the disarmament situation. With Japan armed, and heavily arming, Russia arms because of the danger of Japan, America arms because of the danger of Japan, and so the repercussion goes from country to country right through the whole world; none will accept disarmament because none can find security in the existing state of affairs. It now seems almost a possibility that this Government is going to throw in its hand on the disarmament situation. It has successively retreated on the measures of Disarmament which it has considered to be possible or necessary, because, in our belief, the Government is not prepared to face the realities of the position on the question of security. They talk about security, they say how necessary it is, and how desirable it is; but, by acts such as the acts with regard

to Japan, they make security in fact an impossibility, and as regards Europe they refuse all those measures which other countries, and, indeed, most people, believe to be necessary to give a reality to security as apart from a merely paper security which nobody now believes is likely to be very effective.

We have taken up the attitude in this country that we will not consent to be bound in advance by any decision as to aggression or an aggressor. We are not prepared to agree as regards internationalising air forces or internationalising aviation—[HON. MEMBERS: Hear, hear!] It is all right for hon. Members to say "Hear, hear," but, without some such measures as those, security is impossible. It may be that they do not want security; that is for them to decide; but they must realise that without some such measures it is impossible to create the feeling of security which day after day they are saying is the fundamental necessity as regards disarmament. If this Government does make any advance as regards the security position, it always seems to make the advance after the circumstances have made it too late. Suggestions which two years ago, or three years ago, might have satisfied some countries as regards security, will no longer satisfy them to-day, with the menace of Germany and Japan before them.

In our belief, the Government need to take a more realistic outlook on this problem—not a fatalistic outlook, not a mere acceptance that we cannot get an agreement on anything because nobody is prepared to agree, but a realistic outlook that we must be prepared, if we want disarmament, to create an atmosphere of security by binding ourselves in advance somehow or another to guarantee the security of the world. That, I believe, is the key point of the whole disarmament situation. It does seem at the moment as if possibly there might be a chance that bold steps could do something, even in the deflated condition of the Disarmament Conference. The German-Japanese combination which is developing rapidly at the present moment is undoubtedly creating more fear in the world than there has been even in the last few years. The closeness of the danger of war is becoming more

and more apparent, and a bold move at this moment on a real scheme of pooled security as a basis for disarmament might well be able to lead the world out of the tangle of the present circumstances. But, so long as this Government hold out for and insist upon complete and absolute freedom for themselves and others in every action, so long will it be impossible to regulate internationally the security of the world, and, until that is done, our view is that it is quite idle—and in this I think the Foreign Secretary agrees—to discuss the technical side of disarmament. If only we could give a lead on these lines, there is, I believe, still a chance that something might be accomplished.

Of course, it is obvious that, with intense economic rivalry internationally, it is immensely difficult ever to create any effective peace system, but some palliation of the existing critical circumstances might be possible, and a delay of the next war is better than nothing. The longer we can put it off, the more chance there is of the world coming to its senses before it actually happens. We believe that this Government are throwing away even that chance of postponing war by their rigid refusal to yield any single part of their individual control over these international matters and decisions to the wider world community which was the conception underlying the League of Nations when first it was started. If only that basic step could be taken, we believe that even now some approach might be made towards the organisation of world peace. Finally, I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary to answer these four specific questions, if he would be good enough to do so:

First: Does this country still stand by the Report of the League of Nations of February, 1933, and regard Japan's position in Manchuria and Jehol as a breach of the Nine Power Treaty?

Secondly: Does this country repudiate its obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China, including Manchuria, under the Nine Power Treaty and Article 10 of the Covenant?

Thirdly: Are the Government prepared not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding with Japan in pursuance of the provisions of Article II of the Nine Power Treaty, or do they repudiate that Article as well?

Lastly: What attitude do the Government adopt towards the question of security? Are they prepared to sacrifice any part of this country's independence of action or decision in order to attain international security?

11.54 a.m.

Sir FRANCIS ACLAND: It had been my intention to try to deal with the major question which the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) has just been discussing, namely, the question of the actions and attitude of Japan, and of the inevitable interaction, as I think, of what is happening in the Far East and what is happening in the Near West; but that question has been so fully and clearly dealt with that I will confine my remarks to the second point upon which the hon. and learned Gentleman touched more briefly—the question of disarmament and the possibility of a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference. It was stated in many organs of the Press yesterday, with the same prominence as was given to golf and cricket, that when the Disarmament Conference reassembled it would be announced by the chief nations of the world that the chief nations of the world had agreed that the Conference must come to an end, because nothing more could be done, with, no doubt, a formal face-saving formula, as in the case of the World Economic Conference, which, of course, means nothing at all. I refuse to believe it. If that is true, and if that is what the Foreign Secretary will tell us when he speaks, I think it will be realised in the House and outside that nothing more full of inevitable disaster for the world will have been announced from the Treasury bench since 4th August, 1914.

The breakdown of the Disarmament Conference is one of those things which the civilised world must not allow to happen. If there be a breakdown of this Conference of Governments, which will thereby have declared their incapacity, let there be a new Conference of peoples. Echoing a famous phrase of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, *La Conférence est morte; vive la Conférence*. We must go on. I refuse to believe that the Conference can die without result. Let us think of it and discuss it, if we can, in the spirit of the appeal to the nations of the world made

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[Sir F. Acland.]
in the last few days by the leaders of the Christian churches just issued by the Archbishop of Canterbury and subordinate, as far as we can, all national and party interests to the supreme interest of securing the peace of the world. First, surely it must be realised that each nation that consents, if we do consent, to such a breakdown—that is, after the Treaty of Versailles—will thereby be breaking the assurances that were given to Germany when the Treaty of Versailles was made. The assurance was—not as big as is sometimes quoted—that the reduction and limitation of armaments imposed on Germany was in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations. I know that no pledge was made as to date. I know that no pledge was made to come down to Germany's level. But, if that solemn assurance meant anything at all, it meant that within 15 years, at any rate, there should be general agreement on some scheme of limitation. It seems to me that no nation that gave that assurance can honourably go back upon it. Think, then, of all the efforts that will have been wasted and the opportunities that will have been lost.

How, I wonder, would the leading statesmen of the world, when they started their preparations for the steady working out of schemes of disarmament, now several years ago, have expressed not only their hopes, but their reasonable expectations of the result that would follow. Would they not have said that there would have been by this time, at any rate, an approximation in the armaments of other nations to the standard laid on Germany, that there would be budgetary limitations of some kind and that there would be inspection to see that undertakings were carried out, that there would be an abolition of military aircraft and control of civil aircraft; and would not many of them have said, in addition, that we could and should abolish the private manufacture of those things of which the sole purpose is human death, that canker in Europe, as I see it, working through a controlled Press, and often through controlled politicians, not in one country alone, whose whole object is to nip in the bud and make impossible any growth of international friendship and good feeling. Was not that within the horizon of

the statesmen when they started on this question years ago, and is all that apparently justified hope and anticipation to go for nothing? Surely it cannot be, and it will not be.

Think of the chances which arise and which were missed. Was it not just two years ago that the Lord President of the Council welcomed in language of unusual warmth the offer of the then President of the United States with regard to the disarmament proposals that he had made, and yet within a few weeks of that our Government had allowed their experts to kill that suggestion, and no doubt by the experts of the other nations as well. They went too far, as other suggestions of other countries did, to suit our book. Let us remember the time when Herr Bruening was in office in Germany and Signor Grandi was Foreign Minister in Italy, and when there had been a general election in France which had brought to the top the strongly pacifist feeling of a large section of that people, a feeling which is always there, though it seems sometimes to be submerged with less noble impulses. We let that favourable time go by carelessly—I think criminally. But even if it be only careless and not criminal, does not that fact emphasise my point that, although these chances have been lost, this last chance of getting something accomplished should now be taken. Is all that is to survive of all effort and all those opportunities but a bitter memory and a tragic reflection that

"He who will not when he may,
When he will, he shall have nay."

I know the Government want to do it now. I think they can. We have been reading almost daily in certain organs of the Press that they look upon the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference as a matter not only for complacency but for rejoicing. Those journals rejoice not only in the prospect of the breakdown of the Conference but of the breakdown of that system, built up at the cost of many million gallant lives, under which the nations were to become a great comradeship for good instead of the old rivalries for evil, and break down that system must, as far as major issues are concerned, if the Disarmament Conference fails.

Let me put an argument for those who think that there is any tolerable

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or possible alternative to a collective system of mutual responsibility to think over. Members will be trying, no doubt, if the Disarmament Conference fails, to explain to their constituents that what has happened has been no one's fault in particular. They will be trying to clear the Government of the charge that Lord Cecil brought against them the other day, a just charge as I think, that, although the language of the Government has sometimes been strong, their action has always been weak. They will be explaining that events in Europe made inevitable what is now said to be imminent, a breakdown of all hope for disarmament. Let me take them on that point of the inevitability of what has happened. Will there not be a worse and a more tragic inevitability in the two policies, the policy of alliances or the policy of isolation, which are suggested as the only alternative policies to collective guarantees? If it be alliances that are to be relied on in future, what was the old balance of power supposed to be before the War? Surely, the Triple Alliance against the Triple Entente. Yet one member of the Triple Alliance, Italy, from the first day of the War failed to join with the others, and within a few years had come in on the other side. I remember the days when Sir Edward Grey's room at the Foreign Office was the clearing-house of all the rivalries and suspicions of the world. I remember seeing Ambassadors and Ministers come there in anxiety and leave with renewed hope. I remember how Sir Edward Grey, by the mere fact that all those who distrusted one another yet united in trusting him, kept the great nations of the world from war literally for years, but ultimately all that came to nothing. Any balance of power is as unstable as a drop of mercury balanced on a knife edge. There is no hope there.

If it be isolation that is relied on, and which is I gather to be secured by an enormous increase in our aircraft and other armaments, is there real safety there? That would start competition in armaments. That is just what it means. Will not, sooner or later, the guns go off almost of themselves, as they did when the Great War started? If that happened, are people quite sure that we could keep out of it? Is not, for instance, the Channel getting narrower every year, and therefore our interest in having a completely friendly nation at the other side

of it always increasing? Have those who take the "Daily Mail" view learnt nothing and forgotten everything? Do they not realise that if there was one thing which the Great War disproved once for all and utterly, it was the utter folly and foolishness of the old principle that if you want peace you must prepare for war. Do not people nowadays, all of us, realise that, if there is any connection between cause and effect, and any power in human reason, the very opposite of that is true and remains true, namely, that the only possible principle is the exact reverse of that.

Unless you want war you must prepare for peace, and go on preparing for peace, working for peace all the time in the only possible way—collective guarantees against an aggressor through the system of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is unthinkable that we should let that go. The Government are continually paying lip service to that principle, and some of them, I am sure, really believe it, but it is one of the things that they are prepared quietly to drop overboard and pretend that it really does not matter very much, and that we can get on quite well even with that principle abandoned. No responsible statesman in the world dare do it. No one who is a party to it would dare, I believe, face the judgment of mankind which would fall on him.

I believe that our people, and particularly the younger men and women of this country who have grown up since the War, will not be content to go back to pre-war methods of war prevention or attempted war prevention. Those who believe that it is right and possible to try to treat other nations with understanding and comradeship are very many in all parties. That is their deep faith. Many millions of them are now supporters of the Government because they think that it is incredible that the Government can be a party to allowing the centre of their moral and religious faith in that matter to collapse, as collapse it will if we return to the old system of barbarism in these matters. That was the best we could do before the War.

I have to say this. This Government among others will be held responsible. If there is the collapse which is confidently and hopefully foretold by some of the organs of the press, and I hope and pray that there may not be, we who

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[Sir F. Acland.]
have pointed out in season and out of season the folly of letting chance after chance go by, and of turning down schemes proposed by other countries, not because they did not go far enough for us, but because they went too far, will be justified. I wish for nothing of that kind. If the world finally comes to an end, the man will have a poor consolation and justification who can say, "I told you so." And though the failure of the Disarmament Conference will not be the end of the world, it will surely be the end of all chance of a civilised world. It will be the substitution of fear and suspicion for trust as the motive power of mankind, and where fear and suspicion rule, and where there is an attempt to make out that every action of every country is aimed at some other country and can only be met by increasing the armaments of all other countries—where that comes in real civilisation, I believe, perishes. There will be no need of political campaigns and speeches and propaganda to point the moral. The Cenotaph and every War Memorial in the country will be perpetual witnesses against the Government which allows itself to be a party to the break up of all hope for disarmament—perpetual witnesses, silent, but full of voices.

Surely we can pull ourselves together in this 59th minute of the 11th hour. Surely we can prevent what we are told so definitely is certain to happen. Surely this Empire, which is really peaceful from one end to the other, can use its great power—and it has great power when it chooses to use it—to save the cause of disarmament, which is really the cause of peace. It is very remarkable when one thinks of it what power this country has, if it will act boldly. I am glad that only yesterday, to our credit be it said, that on our behalf the suggestion was made that there should be an embargo on sending armaments to the warring countries in South America. That was very welcome. When we take a great lead boldly great things can be done. But in this matter of disarmament, of course, things are more difficult and risks must be taken. It is not easy, but surely it is well worth taking great risks for peace—

Brigadier-General Sir HENRY CROFT:
We have taken risks the whole time.

Sir F. ACLAND: Seeing how very much greater are the risks of war. The issue, of course, lies between France and Germany, and with both those countries we surely have enormous power and influence if we choose to use them. Dare France, for instance, be responsible for breaking off the Conference by refusing any scheme of disarmament which would start, as is essential, in some way at once and not be delayed by a long probationary period, if she realised that within a few years, as a result of that, she would be face to face with a heavily re-armed Germany, and that as far as we were concerned she would have to face that menace alone, Locarno or no Locarno? Dare Germany refuse to conform to a scheme of disarmament of steady and gradual attainment to equality on a low and controlled basis, if she knew that her refusal would mean the use by us, along with France, of every financial and economic sanction that has ever been suggested within the scheme of the Covenant of the League of Nations? Surely not! When I think of the marvellous structure of peace which might be built, so abiding it might be, so noble, so dedicated to the service of God, I am reminded of how Wordsworth described the inscription of another structure, abiding, noble, dedicated to God's service—King's College Chapel at Cambridge:

"Give all thou canst: high Heaven
rejects the lore
Of nicely-calculated less or more."

If we will only act in the spirit of those great words, surely, even now, the peace of the world can be saved. Will not the Government now, at this last moment, go back boldly, as men of British race have been wont to do in times of difficulty, to the words of the great Book, the great words once spoken by God to Man:

"Be thou bold and very courageous."

I appeal to them. I believe that in courage, and in courage alone, can they find safety in this terrible crisis.

Mr. GODFREY LOCKER-LAMPSON:
I am sure that the whole House regrets the absence of my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), and we can only hope that he will soon be among us once again to give us the benefit of his contributions to our Debates.

The speeches of the late Solicitor-General and the right hon. Gentleman,

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who himself was for many years at the Foreign Office, show the tremendous difficulty in which we are at the present moment, and I think that they show the necessity to do what we can to strike out some new line. When the last Debate on foreign affairs took place in this House I ventured to raise the question of the reform of the League of Nations, and I asked my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary whether His Majesty's Government had yet formulated any policy in the matter, and, if they had done so, whether they could indicate its outline to the House. I also asked my right hon. Friend, if it were the fact that they had not yet thought out any scheme, whether they proposed to do so without delay, seeing that it was really an urgent and vital question for the peace of the whole world.

I do not want to suggest for a moment any want of courtesy on the part of my right hon. Friend that he did not reply to a single question which I put in my speech or refer to any point. I think that at that time my right hon. Friend may have been considering the whole matter, and did not want to make any statement at that date; but I must confess that I was a little disappointed, and also a little surprised, because the reform of the League, to my mind, is bound up indissolubly with the question of disarmament, and I think that the White Paper which was issued not so very long ago on this question proved that quite clearly, for if hon. Members will take the trouble some time to look at the last paragraph in the White Paper, they will find that agreement on disarmament is made dependent on the re-entry of Germany into the League of Nations, and is there any chance of Germany coming back into the League of Nations as long as the procedure and the scope of the League remain what they are to-day?

Since the last Debate to which I have made reference took place, my right hon. Friend who has just sat down, and also the hon. and learned Member, will agree that the chances of general disarmament are greatly worsened, and with it the prestige of the League. I do not think anybody can doubt for a moment that the prospects of general disarmament are less, and that the prospects that the League will be able to achieve the ends it had in view have diminished. Really, this is my only excuse for venturing once

more to raise the question in this House. I want, very respectfully, to ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary—and I do hope that he will give me an answer to-day if he can—whether the Government have yet formulated any policy for the reform of the League, and, if not, whether they will really set about doing so without delay?

The SECRETARY OF STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon):
I should be very sorry indeed if I failed to deal with the matter which my right hon. Friend raised in Debate, I can assure him that no discourtesy was intended; but it would help me and others if my right hon. Friend would indicate in outline what is the kind of reform which he has in mind.

Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: I am going to do it. I say that this matter is one of definite, urgent, public importance for the peace of the whole world. To my mind, the future of the League of Nations is the most important matter for civilisation to-day. It is much more important than the Unemployment Bill, much more important than the reform of the House of Lords and much more important than the Indian White Paper. If the League of Nations fails, the world will be back in the position in which it was before 1914. In spite of the 13 years of its life and activity, and the enormous sums of money spent on the League of Nations, armaments have increased prodigiously during the last decade. In spite of any amount of lip-service paid to the League, international settlements are more and more being arranged outside the League itself, without any previous consultation with the League, or any participation of the League in them. In fact, the old diplomacy is returning. One has only to cite the negotiations and agreements between Germany and Poland, and the recent negotiations between Italy, Austria and Hungary. The League did not come into these important matters. But, far more important, at the present moment Europe is an armed camp.

The whole of Europe to-day, so far as one can see, is preparing for another war, and this country—and this is where I differ very much from the hon. and learned Member who spoke, and also, if I may say so, from my right hon. Friend opposite—is the only country which all along has done its best to disarm, and

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[Mr. Locker-Lampson.] which all along has been a pioneer, has led the way and given an example. France, Italy, Germany, Russia, the United States of America have greatly increased their armaments, and the League of Nations, so far as they are concerned, might never have existed at all. It is obvious, too, that the League has been quite unable to stop big or little wars. It failed even to slow down the war between China and Japan which ran its full course with immense slaughter on both sides, and it failed for a whole two years to stop even the petty war which has been going on in South America. All this is taking place, although a Palace of Peace is being built in Geneva as large as the Palace of Versailles, and is to cost 25,500,000 Swiss francs. It is being built amid incessant speeches, dinners, receptions, conferences and reports.

What, really, is the reason of the failure of the League of Nations in the prime object of its creation? And now I will do my utmost to answer my right hon. Friend. I submit that the reason is self-evident—that four out of the seven great Powers are not members of the League. Only a minority of the great Powers are now members—Italy, France and ourselves—and only the other day Italy gave a great deal more than a hint that unless the League were reformed, she, too, might leave it. The serious feature of the case seems to me to be this. It is not as though the League of Nations had only had three great Powers in it, and that it was doing its best to try to persuade the other four great Powers to come in. The serious feature is that five great Powers used to be members of the League, and two have left, and the other is very uncertain whether it is going to remain. That, to my mind, is a far more serious warning for the future prospects of the League, and in these circumstances one is bound to ask why these great Powers joined and then left, and why the other Powers will not become members.

I want to reiterate once more what I believe to be the two main reasons for this state of things, which I believe my right hon. Friend, with his immense influence in Europe, can help to remedy. I believe the two main reasons to be the dovetailing, the incorporation of the Covenant into the Peace Treaties, and

the sanctions embodied in Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. The Covenant is woven into the very fabric of the Peace Treaties, and until it is decided to divorce the one from the other we shall never get a revision of the Peace Treaties, we shall never get the United States of America to join the League, or persuade Germany to join the League as a willing and working partner. Article 10 of the Covenant, which was mentioned by the hon. and gallant Member opposite, guarantees the existing territorial boundaries of all the members of the League, and although Article 19 provides in a general way for the revision of any Treaty, under Article 5 agreement in the League in such a matter must be unanimous.

I should like to know what possible chance there is of a revision of the Treaties so far as Germany is concerned under this provision. The Covenant almost seems to have been drawn so as to prevent it. In fact, it has been used over and over again to prevent it. Can we wonder that Germany left the League, knowing that it was hopeless ever to obtain any revision? Can we wonder that the United States of America refuse to join the League, when by so doing she would be guaranteeing the very Treaties that she has refused to ratify? I submit that the United States of America will never join the League until these Treaties and the Covenant have been separated one from the other.

The other main reason is the existence of the sanctions under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. Under these Articles any member of the League may be required to use its Army, its Air Force, or its Navy in any part of the world against any Power deemed by the Council of the League to have been a guilty party. To start with, I believe that these sanctions are impracticable to carry out. Is it to be supposed for a moment that we could use our Navy, for instance, to stop the United States of America from sending any neutral goods to any part of the world? If we attempted to do so it would at once mean war between us and the United States. That is not my own opinion. I see that Lord Lothian, one of the greatest authorities on the work of the League in this country, wrote a long letter to the Press the other day and used

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language just as strong as the language I am using. He pointed out that any attempt at coercive sanctions against a great Power, with anything less than a world coalition, would be almost certain to lead to war. It is perfectly true that some vague words were used not long ago by an American statesman, a member of the United States Government, to the effect that the United States would not resist any collective efforts against an aggressor if, and this is a most important qualification:

"The United States happened to agree with the League in its decision."

It would be very foolish to bank on a statement of that kind. We do know for certain that the United States is against all sanctions. The Kellogg Pact contains no sanctions. In drawing up that Pact the United States expressly repudiated any sanctions and said that they would have nothing whatever to do with them. Therefore, so long as the Covenant contains sanctions I believe the United States will never join the League. Lord Cecil—I need not ask the House to remember what qualifications he has to speak about the League of Nations—wrote a letter to the Press a few days ago in which he expressed the hope and the expectation that Germany and Japan would rejoin the League. He mentioned them by name but carefully excluded the United States of America. All that he said was that the United States were showing willingness to co-operate with the League, but always from outside and not from within the League. I am not surprised that Lord Cecil wrote that kind of letter, for there is no hope in that quarter under existing conditions, none whatever.

So long as the United States and the other Great Powers refuse to join the League there is no hope of general disarmament. Disarmament is the chief security against war. The other day we were told by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary that the policy of His Majesty's Government was that disarmament should have priority over the question of the reform of the League of Nations. He told us that he had consulted the Governments of France and Italy on this particular point and that they had agreed. May I ask him this question? Has he since then consulted the Government of Germany, Japan and

Russia? It is very important to know what those Great Powers think about this particular question. The other Powers whom the right hon. Gentleman consulted are in the League, but the other Powers are outside the League. Do they think that disarmament ought to come before the reform of the League? I very much doubt it. Is there any chance that general disarmament can come before the League is reformed? I submit that there is no chance whatever. Trying to get disarmament before reform is trying to build without your necessary materials. The League is the instrument, and the only instrument, by which disarmament can be obtained, but it must be a real League, not a shadow of a League, not a skeleton of a League. It must be a League containing the Great Powers as its Members.

May I say in answer to my right hon. Friend that it may be difficult to amend the Covenant, but it is not impossible. The Covenant of the League has been amended from time to time in years gone by, and in very important respects. The other day the Netherlands Government expressed their consent to consider any revision of the Covenant. Therefore, it is not an impossible proposition, and I urge the right hon. Gentleman to consider it and make up his mind about it. All it requires is statesmanship, determination, goodwill and a lead from this country. I hope the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon will tell us what is the policy of His Majesty's Government. Have they thought out a policy of reform? Do they still adhere to the opinion that the question of disarmament ought to be settled before the question of reform is tackled? So far as disarmament is concerned, the League to-day is largely make-believe and impotent, because of its fragmentary character. But if His Majesty's Government will really face the facts of the situation by their international weight and immense authority all over the world, I believe they can help to convert it into a really live and vital force.

12.37 p.m.

Miss RATHBONE: I desire to draw the attention of the House briefly to a different aspect of this problem, although it is closely allied with it—the question of economic sanctions. It is a curious thing that this subject has attracted very

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[Miss Rathbone.]
 little attention in Parliament and in the press, indeed, one would imagine that Article 16 of the Covenant had dropped out of sight altogether. One would imagine that there is nothing between peace and war in its most dreadful aspects; yet all the events of the last two years, the failure of the League of Nations in the Sino-Manchurian dispute, the failure of the Disarmament Conference itself, the drift towards a policy of isolation and general re-armament all round, points to the fact that the only hope for the future lies in setting up a set of articulated measures which might be put into force before it is necessary to have recourse to war in order to deal with disturbers of the world peace.

The Government have made it plain that they are not willing to go one inch further in giving security to the world through arms than the Treaty of Locarno. The Foreign Secretary in his statement on the 1st February upon the Government's policy, repeatedly reiterated that the Treaty of Locarno would not be put into force as far as this country was concerned until this country itself was satisfied that a case had arisen. That has undoubtedly had the effect of stiffening and hardening the attitude of France towards disarmament. If security cannot be obtained through naval and military commitments, then the only avenue left is that of economic sanctions. All that has been done in regard to this matter in recent years is the statement in the Draft Convention, that, if armed aggression takes place, there will be consultation between the signatories. The statement of the right hon. Gentleman on the 1st February extended that policy to an immediate exchange of views between the signatories to a Disarmament Pact in the case of any violation. There is to be immediate consultation. But does anybody suppose that immediate consultation when a crime has taken place, when a breach has taken place, will be of any use if it has not been prepared for by just as elaborate planning of the sanctions which may be enforced as in the case of the Disarmament Conference, which unfortunately has failed? Sir Arthur Salter, the chief financial adviser to the League of Nations for many years, has repeatedly insisted on this point. As long ago as 1919, he said:

"Economic sanctions cannot be effectively carried out without great loss of time and efficiency unless there has been considerable previous preparation before the time at which action is required."

In a volume entitled "The United States of Europe," which was issued only last year, Sir Arthur Salter makes it perfectly plain that it is still his view that if economic sanctions are to be of any use they must be preceded by some kind of permanent international commission to prepare plans and supervise their execution. Why has that advice been disregarded? That is the question which I want to put to the Foreign Secretary. Many hon. Members no doubt have been studying an admirable memorandum issued by Professor Lindsay Fraser and other Oxford Dons on this subject, in which they outline the history of economic sanctions, the possible forms they may take, and some of the problems connected with them. In spite of these expressions of opinion, there has been, so far as I have seen, very little discussion on this matter. I cannot see that it was referred to at all in the debate the other day in another place.

I claim no expert knowledge on the subject, but perhaps I have more opportunities than other hon. Members of following the opinions of the educative youth of this country. I represent a group of universities, and it may be that other constituencies are not so representative of the youth of the country. I am gravely concerned as to the effect which the impending breakdown of the Disarmament Conference is likely to have on public opinion, unless the hopes which such a breakdown will extinguish are diverted to some other and more fruitful field of action.

The fear of war—perhaps so far as the immediate future is concerned, even an exaggerated fear—is getting a tremendous hold on two sections of the public—the young men, who foresee that they will have to do the fighting, and the wives and mothers of those young men. In every branch of the League of Nations Union, in almost every adult school and debating society, in almost every women's association, questions arising in connection with disarmament—such as the definition of an aggressor, the dangers of private traffic in armaments, the use of bombing aeroplanes, and the possibility of an international police force—have

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become as much the commonplaces of discussion as the means test is in other social circles, or as the pros and cons of Protection and Free Trade were a few years ago. But there are also many who have given up hope of anything being done along these lines, sometimes from a completely cynical disbelief in the present Government, or in politicians generally, sometimes from an excessive idealism, and they are falling back on resolutions for individual resistance to war by refusing to take part in it. May I warn the Government that they will be making a great mistake if they under-rate the strength in this country of that form of extreme pacifist opinion. I do not share it. I have been doing what I could to persuade my constituents and the undergraduate bodies connected with the universities I represent that they will be making war more likely and not less likely, if they create the impression abroad that the youth of England cannot be counted on to help their country to enforce solemn covenants to which it has placed its signature under the Treaties of Locarno and in the Covenant itself. But there can be no doubt that this form of pacifism is strengthened by the belief that the Government are not inclined to take measures for strengthening armaments, that many at any rate who sit behind the Government are not really unhappy at the failure of the Disarmament Conference, because they foresee that the result of its failure in the immediate present will be to create a great demand for armaments, which will bring profit to those who are concerned in that traffic, and that in the future the brunt of war will fall not upon themselves but upon the men of the younger generation, who at present have no influence either on the press or upon governments. What assurance can the Government give to help those of use who are trying to dispel these fears? What assurance would do it better than an announcement that side by side with or in place of the Disarmament Conference, if it should fail, there will be set up an international Commission, including, if possible, not only the members of the League but all signatories to the Kellogg Pact, which will explore the possibilities of economic sanction just as elaborately, just as meticulously and with just as much help from all the expert bodies. Financial, commercial and industrial experts will all

be needed for a full exploration of all the possibilities, such as refusals of credits, embargo on the export and import of munitions or foodstuffs and so forth.

All that cannot be done at the last moment when the necessity has arisen. But I believe it would bring new hope to minds that are almost despairing, if they felt that the Government had set its foot on that new path and was prepared to explore the means of a war to end war, by substituting for armed war another kind of war—a war that will be fought through the pressure of economic and financial forces and not through the arms and sinews and blood of the young. I know that some will say that economic sanctions must have armed sanctions behind them. I do not deny it, as an ultimate resort, but I believe there the force of the economic sanctions might prove so efficacious that, if they were used internationally on a carefully prepared and thought-out plan that armed force might never become necessary. I do beg the Secretary of State to include in his reply some statement as to what the Government are doing or contemplating in this matter.

12.50 p.m.

Admiral Sir ROGER KEYES: First of all, I would like to assure the hon. Lady who has just spoken that we who think differently from her are just as anxious and determined to ensure peace as she is. I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps). I share with him the misgivings about the aims of Japan and our relations to that country, but one thing is quite certain, if the policy that the hon. and learned Member and his friends so often urge is carried into effect, we are bound eventually to be involved in war with Japan. It is difficult to reconcile the hon. and learned Member's attitude with the attitude of the Opposition regarding Singapore. Singapore cannot possibly be regarded as any menace to Japan—no greater menace than Portsmouth is to New York. But it is of vital importance in the link of the defence of Australia and New Zealand. It would be quite easy to score a point here by quoting from the speeches of hon. Members of the Opposition, but I am anxious to see all parties in this House united in a

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 determination that adequate defences are provided for the defence of the Empire.

The hon. and learned Member for Bristol East has given us some recent history. I would go back a bit further. Forty years ago Japan possessed a fleet of small cruisers. She wished to colonise Korea, and challenged China, which possessed a powerful fleet of battleships, cruisers and torpedo destroyers. She destroyed the Chinese Army which was proceeding to Korea in transports. She sank the transports. Japan speedily achieved all her objects, which included the capture of Port Arthur, only to be deprived of that fortress by Germany and Russia, which insisted on it being handed back to China. Not long afterwards Russia seized Port Arthur and Germany Tsing-tao, which she proceeded to fortify heavily, and we acquired Wei-Hai-Wei to keep the balance. We used it only as a recreation place and health resort for our China fleet.

My first intimate association with Japan began in 1898. In 1900 I took part in the capture of the Taku forts and the relief of Peking, with an allied force which included a Japanese squadron and army. I was immensely impressed with the efficiency and military power of that warlike race, but above all with the absolute contempt of death displayed by her gallant soldiers. The statesmen who guided our destinies in those days recognised the value of Japanese friendship and the immense influence which Japan was bound to exercise in the Far East. They formed an alliance with her, which did not succeed in maintaining peace when Japan tried to sink the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur and then declared war. I may mention here that she sank the Chinese troops that were going to Korea in transports before she declared war, and she declared war after trying to sink the Russian fleet. We, by keeping the field, limited the hostilities to those two belligerents. At that time I was in charge of a section of the Naval Intelligence Department which dealt with the Russo-Japanese war, and, as our alliance made it necessary for us to go to her aid in the event of any other nation intervening, my relations with the Japanese Mission in London were very close, and I had an opportunity of gaining a very

intimate insight into the intents and the scope and the aims of that most warlike race.

If the world were astonished at the temerity of Japan in challenging China, it simply ridiculed the idea of Japan declaring war on Russia. I shall not weary the House by giving the details of the struggle. At one time the issue hung in the balance, because Japan had the bad fortune in the early days of the war to lose two of her six battleships in a minefield, and the margin which she had allowed was a very narrow one. I would only remind the House that she carried that war to a successful and glorious issue. She recaptured Port Arthur, destroyed the Russian Fleet and thoroughly humiliated Russia. She owed a debt to us for keeping the ring, and she proceeded to pay that debt by coming to our aid when we were involved in the great War. At the same time she had revenge on Germany by capturing Tsing-tao. Japan is designed to play a great part in the future of the East. I have said sufficient to show that I am convinced that she will go forward to her destiny with unswerving determination. I always thought it a deplorable mistake on our part to terminate that alliance with Japan. It was of immense value to us in the East, it was a guarantee of peace in Eastern waters, and it gave us influence over Japan's actions. She paid great attention to our advice then and would do so again if we gave her the chance. I recommend the Government to do all in their power to return to the excellent understanding with Japan which existed in those days. At least we ought to come to an understanding with Japan on commercial and other matters, and it would be a great benefit to the Empire and our interests in the East if we could come to some thorough understanding with that country.

With reference to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North-East Cornwall (Sir F. Acland), may I say that there are a great many Members in this House, and some millions of people in the country, who share with me the view that the best guarantee of world peace is a strong and properly defended British Empire. The Government have gone to the very limit in disarmament, and, in the interests of peace, I would urge them to

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take thought of the ever-recurring lessons of history and to pursue steadily a policy of maintaining the defences of this Empire in proper order.

12.58 p.m.

Captain CAZALET: I am sure we all recognise the extraordinary difficulty and complexity of foreign affairs to-day. The composition of the National Government itself and the conditions which have always been followed by this country in foreign affairs, make it extraordinarily difficult for the Government to give that lead which so many wish them to give in reference to foreign politics at the present time. I unashamedly rank myself among the loyal supporters of the Government, but I admit that in the realm of foreign affairs I am not so happy as in regard to matters at home. I wish to dissociate myself, however, from those who try to lay the whole blame on the shoulders of the Foreign Secretary, because I think the Government as a whole must be responsible for its conduct of foreign affairs. With regard to our attitude towards Japan, I could not help remembering, during the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps), and also during the speeches which were made when Japan's occupation of Manchukuo was being discussed, that in the War Japan was a very loyal ally of this country. When I thought over past history and some of our own actions in other parts of the world—perhaps not so many years ago—I felt that we were hardly the people to throw the first stone at Japan. It may be true that Japan acted in a very foolish manner and that she could have got all she wanted in Manchukuo by other methods, but it did not seem to me that we could criticise very strongly the action which she took.

What action has been suggested in reference to Japan? Some form of economic sanctions. In my opinion, the application of any economic sanctions to Japan would lead to hostilities not only between this country and Japan, but between this country and the United States as well. It may be asked: What then is to be done? My answer is that you have to treat Japan with great tact. The one thing which you must not do is to try to bully her, to dictate to her or to hold her up to ridicule among the nations of the world. If the League of

Nations has been unable to stop a war between Paraguay and Bolivia, what do we expect them to do in regard to Japan? Personally, I think Japan holds a special position in regard to China, and, if she desires to apply some form of Monroe Doctrine on political lines to China, I think we have to accept that situation.

Sir S. CRIPPS: A breach of the Treaty.

Captain CAZALET: After all, the Monroe Doctrine as applied by the United States to South America has not hindered us from pursuing our trade in that part of the world, and if my hon. and learned Friend will allow me to say so, whenever a Treaty is brought up as evidence, in a particular case, it always seems to me that the signatories can produce their own interpretations to justify their own actions.

Sir S. CRIPPS: A scrap of paper.

Captain CAZALET: What does the hon. and learned Gentleman propose? Does he suggest that we ought to go to war with Japan? Does he suggest that those who disagree with Japan should either go to war with her themselves or pay other people to go? Personally, I am prepared to do neither. These are the facts which we have to face. It is obvious that any action on the lines suggested would lead to great complications, not only for this country but for Australia. I hope and trust that the Government will act with circumspection in their future dealings with Japan.

When we turn to the position in Europe certain things are apparent. One is that this country has disarmed "to the edge of risk" in the words of the Foreign Secretary. It is equally clear that no one else has followed our example. As the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has said, no one outside Bedlam believes that we wish for anything but peace. On the other hand, it is not so certain what we are prepared to do in order to prevent anyone else going to war, or in order to prevent a situation arising which might easily develop into hostilities. There is the difficulty that both in the Government and outside there are two schools of thought. First, there are the isolationists who do not desire that this country should play any part in foreign affairs, but at the same time desire to

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[Captain Cazalet.]
increase our national armaments. Then there are the interventionists who desire to see us playing our part in foreign affairs, but who object to any rearmament on the part of this country and are strongly in favour of disarmament, economic sanctions and action through the League of Nations. I believe in the action desired by the one and the policy put forward by the other. In other words, I believe that it is impossible for us to take up the position that we will neither take part in, nor be interested in nor use our influence in foreign affairs to-day.

The question has been so often discussed at length that I need not proceed to show now how intimately associated we are in this country with everything that goes on in Europe and indeed throughout the world. How can we remain members of the League of Nations and yet be disinterested and fail to take our part and wield an influence in Europe? The United States of America for many months—in fact, years—throughout the Great War tried not to be drawn into it, but inevitably she was. On the other hand, if we are to play an effective part, we must at present increase our Air Force. I do not say this with jubilation—I think it is a confession of failure—but a great many of us support the point of view that, if we are going to play our part and the Disarmament Conference fails, we should turn our attention to an increase in our air arm. On the other hand, it is cheaper than anything else, and, while increasing our Air Force, we can develop civil aviation, which has other uses, permanent uses, apart from military matters; and, by encouraging civil aviation you can, I believe, create that activity in industry at home which will enable you to produce the increased number of aeroplanes which may be wanted at some future date.

With regard to Europe, I think this country has made two fundamental mistakes since 1919. The first is that we have shirked the issue of French security, and, secondly, the League of Nations has always tried to make us believe that small nations are as important as big. I believe that small nations never were as important as big nations, are not to-day, and never will be. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke about the reform

of the League of Nations, in a most interesting and informative speech, pointed out that there are four great nations to-day that are not members of the League. Of the three that are, Italy is intensely suspicious. I believe that Mussolini was on the right lines in the Four Power Pact, but that it was inopportune and was not put forward at the right moment. I am certain, however, that we shall see the whole question of the Four Power Pact raised again, perhaps at a not very distant date. Do not think for a moment that I am arguing against the League of Nations. I am only suggesting that, if it is going to be the force that we wish it to be, some reform is necessary. I believe that on the social side, and through the work of the International Labour Office, the League has justified itself on those grounds alone, and I would agree with the late Lord Balfour, who said that, if you destroyed the existing fabric of the League of Nations, the next day you would have to build up something on similar lines in its place.

One word with regard to French security. It is extremely difficult to view this question dispassionately and without having the accusation and criticism brought against one that one is either pro-French or pro-German, but it has always seemed to me that, if France is attacked again, we have got to come in, and we shall come in, whether we like it or not. Therefore, if that be so, why do we not give to France those guarantees of security for which she has been asking since 1919, which, in fact, together with America, we promised her and she accepted, and on account of which she did not put forward her claims to the whole of the territory along the Rhine? In my view—and I have changed my opinion on these matters many times—we should advocate a close alliance with France and with Italy as well, and, if we did that, I am certain that we should have the united support of the Little Entente. I believe that it would be much fairer all round, and fairer from the point of view of Germany as well, so that Germany would see that it is impossible now or at any time to drive in a wedge between ourselves and France.

It may be said that all this can be done under the Treaty of Locarno, but France does not think so, and, after all, the ordinary man in the street ask: "What

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does Locarno mean?" It was heralded when it appeared, and rightly so, no doubt, as one of the greatest contributions towards peace since the War, but the moment the question of Locarno is raised to-day every Minister hastens down to his constituency to explain that it does not really mean anything at all, that we are to have the deciding voice at the particular moment whether something has or has not happened, and that we are to take the initiative as to whether we do anything or not. I hope I do not misinterpret the very lucid speeches of many of my hon. and right hon. Friends in this respect, but it is clear that France at any rate does not think that she is guaranteed under this particular Treaty. I am prepared to argue—and you have to face facts—that in order to preserve peace, you have to run risks and accept commitments. It was that policy of doubt, of keeping Europe guessing as to what this country might do, that precipitated the last War and that might very easily precipitate a similar situation to-day.

The Government might, quite rightly, say: "How easy it is for any ordinary Member to advocate that, but is it possible to carry it in the country?" I would answer that I believe it is. I believe that if the National Government will give a lead, there are hundreds, thousands, millions of people who are only too anxious for a lead to be given in these matters. Let the Government take the country into their confidence. Is Germany re-arming or not? Are these stories that we hear true? What are the facts? We have had them quoted. My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Cocks) quoted some not long ago, and they have never been contradicted. Are these stories that Field Marshals Weygand and Pétain refused to accept the last memorandum of the British Government because they had some secret information put before them with regard to German re-armament, true? We hear stories of new gases, new rays, of an engine that will run on thick oil, and so on. I am not acquainted with the technical details, but these stories are frequently repeated both inside and outside this House.

All that I would ask is: Are they true or not? If the Government wish the country to follow them and support them, I think these questions should be both

asked and answered, and, if they are not true, let Germany get up and say so. I believe that, if necessary, she would accept, under certain conditions, such supervision and inspection as would prove them to be either correct or false. I do not believe that either Hitler or the majority of people in Germany desire to go to war to-day, but there is no doubt that there is in Germany an element which will sweep them away, as it swept away the Kaiser and the German people in 1914. What is to prevent that element, not this year or next year, but in two or three years' time, saying to Europe: "Unless you do this, that, or the other, you will be faced with a first-class war"? It is a great temptation. There is only one thing that will prevent it, and that is the certainty that if Europe is faced with that proposition, Germany will find, united against such blackmail, England, France, Italy, and the Little Entente, and Germany will realise then that re-armament is not only extremely expensive, but useless to achieve her object.

It is only some three years ago that Members of all parties in this House were advocating in their constituencies the cause of disarmament and trying to rival each other with regard to what had been done to reduce our armaments—how much more the Conservatives had reduced them than the Socialists, and so on. But there is a great change to-day. Why? Let us face it. It is very largely because of the new situation which has arisen in Germany. On the other hand, if the Government carry out any suggestion along these lines, and a close alliance is formed, they should state their views unequivocally on it. I would say to Germany, "We in this country realise that you have a certain grievance and that you have a right to certain assurances." Anyone who read the leading article in the "Times" of the 19th of this month would, I think, agree that it was a very fair representation of what a great many people in this country think are Germany's rights with regard to re-armament. Again, I would say to them, "You have certain financial grievances under the Treaty of Versailles which we recognise." For instance, we recognise that loans have been raised in Germany at rates of interest which are unfair. We recognise that you have certain economic

[Captain Cazalet.]
rights in the overseas markets. In regard to colonies, we do not take up the view that never will we give you anything back." Colonies are expensive things, but, if it is a question of honour, and if the circumstances should arise that Germany were required to accept the mandate, say, of Liberia, I would not refuse to give that mandate.

Sir EDWARD GRIGG: Is the hon. and gallant Member prepared to pay any respect to the wishes of the inhabitants?

Captain CAZALET: Certainly. That is one of the great difficulties which we are up against, but I would never say that, in circumstances where the local inhabitants did not decide on one country or another, we would never hand back any land to Germany. If it were not possible to hand, say, Liberia back in the sense in which the hon. Member means, I would give them in compensation some economic rights in that territory.

Perhaps the most important event in European politics during the past few months is the German-Polish Pact. What does it mean? Does it mean peace in that part of the world for ten years? Any hon. Member who has been to that district and who realises the intensity of feeling that the Germans have always had in regard to the settlement under the Treaty of Versailles are at least doubtful. We may sincerely hope that it does mean peace, but, on the other hand, certain incidents have taken place in Danzig and there has been the arrest of Germans in Silesia, and these events simply give rise to suspicion. Whatever they mean, however, it does not deflect from the great tribute to Hitler's control of public opinion in Germany that he has been able to make them, at any rate, temporarily accept what a year ago I do not think he would have got 5 per cent. of the nation to accept as even a tolerable settlement of the Corridor problem. I understand that Germany has offered the same kind of pact as she has signed with Poland to the Little Entente, but she has not offered it to Austria. I do not know whether it is because she holds out some vague hope that on some future date she may be able to include Austria within the economic union of Germany.

I would like to say a word in regard to Austria. By the Treaty of Versailles we have created Austria an uneconomic unit. If we desire to maintain her independence, we have to see to it that she can live economically. I believe that the independence of Austria to-day is as vital to the peace of Europe as the independence of Belgium was in the last century. The question naturally arises whether she can live alone without the economic assistance which her neighbouring countries and the Great Powers can give her. If Europe as a whole wishes to preserve the independence of Austria, she must give her those economic conditions under which alone she can live. Italy and Hungary have already made great concessions which should considerably help the foreign trade of Austria. I do not think we should welcome this question of Austria becoming merely an Italian affair. I do not think the Italians want it, for they would find it far too expensive. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania have got to play their part, but their attitude is, "We do not want to give to Vienna what to-morrow will be transferred to Berlin. If we believe that the Great Powers will support the independence of Austria, we are prepared to make those economic concessions which will make her an economic possibility."

It may be asked, what do I want the Government to do. I realise that it is difficult for the Government to commit themselves in this matter. All I would ask is that the Foreign Secretary should say that we stand behind the declaration of the 17th February, and should make our position perfectly clear to France and Italy, namely, that we are behind them in this matter. If this succeeds, I believe it will have laid the basis of an economic union in Central Europe extending over an area greater than that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If we can get in a few years over that large area, I do not say free trade, but a freer distribution of goods, we shall have created an atmosphere in which that word "revision," the bugbear of Europe to-day, will become a reality and a possibility and will be welcomed by the victors as well as by the vanquished. I appreciate that the Foreign Secretary can easily say how simple it is for an irresponsible back bench Member of Parliament to talk like this. "We have," he may say, "to deal with very delicate

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diplomatic concerns. You put forward an idealistic plan which is far from simple to carry out." Unless we get some lead upon these particular matters, both abroad and at home, the Government must expect diversity of opinion, dissention and criticism from among the ranks of their supporters, of whom I am proud to be one. There are many, not only in this country but in Europe, who are looking to the National Government of England to give a lead. I believe they will welcome it, accept it and follow it. We look to the Government to give that lead, and I cannot believe that we shall look in vain.

1.22 p.m.

Mr. MANDER: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet) in his interesting speech put forward some rather astonishing propositions. He suggested that the time might come when certain territories in various parts of the world might be handed over to the administration of Germany. He actually named one particular country and thought that in due course that fate may be held out to Liberia. I should have thought that until the German Government learns to treat its own people, its own Jews, its own Socialists and pacifists with some common humanity and decency, it is intolerable that the suggestion should go out from this country that any other people outside Germany should be handed over to the same administration.

Captain CAZALET: I do not want that impression to go out. All I said was that I would not take the attitude that never in any circumstances would I consider this question.

Mr. MANDER: I am sure that my hon. and gallant Friend would not suggest a terrible fate for the Liberians, because they would under the present German regime be worse off than under their present torturers. In regard to the question of Japan, he put forward what would mean a more or less revolutionary change in our present policy. It may be that his is a right policy, but so long as we are committed to our present agreements, the Nine Power Pact and others, it would obviously be necessary to give notice to withdraw from those agreements, as I presume would be my hon. and gallant Friend's desire. I should have thought that we had had sufficient

experience already of the difficulties of dealing with this matter in the Far East, and that it is far better to adhere to our obligations and to make it quite clear that we are not going to depart from them in any way. The unfortunate precedent set by the way in which the Council of the League handled the Manchukuo question has done immense harm, and is responsible for a great deal of the troubles of the world to-day.

An hon. Member asked a perfectly proper question: "What can you do to Japan? What weapons have you got?" The answer is that the League could, if it thought fit, apply economic sanctions to Japan. He may retort, "Would not that involve a possible risk of war?" It might; but life is full of risks, we cannot do anything that does not involve some risk. To take economic sanctions under certain circumstances is infinitely better and involves probably less risk than to insure the certain danger which will come if we allow armed force to walk naked in the world without opposition or obstruction. My hon. Friend dealt with the reform of the League of Nations, and put forward a number of propositions with which I did not find myself very much in sympathy. I think the policy of the Government upon this matter is perfectly right, and that the problem of disarmament is infinitely more important than that of the reform of the League. It is true to say that if the present machinery—and, after all, it is only machinery—is worked by the statesman of the world with goodwill and with a desire to achieve results, that there is not very much wrong with it. It is the personalities and policies and public opinion of the countries that really matter far more than the particular machinery employed. To obtain any change in the structure of the League would require unanimity, so that from a practical point of view there is very little chance of carrying it out. An hon. Friend interrupts me with a remark about Germany. I do want Germany back. It is said that it is necessary to reform the League in order to bring back Germany and Japan. Surely Germany and Japan want to smash up the League. That is their policy. They do not want to reform it in any reasonable way; and I am not at all sure that at certain moments and in certain moods that is not the desire of the Italian Government too.

[Mr. Mander.]

My right hon. Friend dealt with the question of sanctions. He suggested there was great danger in the Council of the League committing us to action in some part of the world when we might not like to take part in it. Of course, that is quite untrue. The Council has no power to commit this or any other country to action. The final decision rests with each particular country. To suggest that the way to reform the League is to cut out all sanctions, all use of force, is the exact reverse of what we want to see done. We are coming more and more to realise that unless there are some effective means of carrying out decisions the League will totally fail to function and that we shall be landed in world war once more; so that is the one vital thing we want to see increased rather than cut out of the League altogether.

My right hon. Friend dealt with the position of the United States. She is co-operating more closely than ever before. By the Stimson doctrine that the United States will not interfere with any action taken by the League when she concurs with the decision of the League an immense advance has been made and the danger that the United States might obstruct or interfere with the action of the League has been removed and a way left open for effective action in the way of sanctions. With regard to the entry of certain Powers into the League I quite agree that we want to get them all in. There is the immediate question of Russia. I cannot help thinking, from the public evidences, to say nothing of anything else, that if Russia were encouraged now, especially if she were told, either publicly or privately, that her co-operation would be welcomed among the great Powers on the League she would join the League, where she would, naturally have a permanent seat. I hope the Government will take such action as is possible to them, either privately or publicly, to encourage Russia to make application to join the League of Nations at the time of the next Assembly.

The right policy for us to pursue is to encourage to the utmost of our power the alliance of all those countries in the world who believe in the doctrine of collective security. After all, that is the League of Nations. It is an alliance of

those who believe in the doctrine of collective security. If we cannot get all in whom we want in let us get in as many as we can, adding to their numbers all the time by persuasion. Personally I think that the effective security which we shall have to rely upon will not really be successful or available at the right moment unless we organise it beforehand, and have something in the form of an international force. It is no good waiting until difficulties arise and then to go round to different Powers asking "What will you do? How many will you send?" We must have something which is ready to act, about which there can be no doubt that it will carry out its functions. If there is no doubt in anybody's mind about the use of force on behalf of the international community in order to preserve order, I venture to say that order is likely to be preserved.

We could not have a better precedent, a more fortunate example, than what has happened in the case of the Chaco. I want to congratulate most warmly His Majesty's Government on the action they took through the mouth of the Lord Privy Seal, at Geneva yesterday. They have focussed the opinion of the world. The report of the Chaco Committee is a very good illustration of how the League functions in the way of publicity. A neutral committee, representing different countries, ascertained the real facts and published them in all their horror to the world. It made an immense impression and enabled the British Government to give a fine lead at Geneva, and to carry with them the whole world, I hope, in putting an end to the odious traffic in arms which has enabled the war between Bolivia and Paraguay to be carried on during the last year or so. I cannot help thinking that the time is coming when we in this country will, in this matter, have to take the same action as we did 100 years ago in regard to slavery, and to say that whatever other countries may do we will keep our hands clean and will not be involved in this terrible arms traffic.

I say to the Government: "Take what you have done at Geneva in the matter of the Chaco as an inspiration and as an example for the bigger Disarmament Conference there. In this matter you have given a splendid lead, you have led the world and have all countries with you. If you take similar action in the matter

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of disarmament on the 29th of this month you can carry all the nations with you in the same way." One would like to see the Government giving a lead in the direction of abandoning within a reasonable period all the weapons forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. I still believe it is not too late to make that effort, but if we cannot go as far as that, and the Government feel that all they can do is that which is set out in their White Paper proposals and in the Draft Convention, let them put behind them all the drive they possess as the greatest Power in the world. I hope that if failure comes we shall not attempt to hide it by passing some resolution, by suggesting that the question has only been adjourned to another Committee, and that in due course something useful may arise. Do not let us end up with a resolution to forbid bombing throughout the world. It would be perfectly futile, it would not be carried out, it would not mean anything at all.

Rather than do nothing at all, I suggest that we ought to consider the possibility of the whole matter of German armaments being raised under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, under which by a majority, the Council of the League have the right to ask for an investigation. I know that the answer would be: What happens if Germany refuses an investigation? We shall have to face this issue some day, and rather than do nothing at all we ought to have a show down. We ought to show where Germany stands in this matter, rather than go in for a policy of drift.

We are at the parting of the ways in the world to-day. I was talking only a few days ago to a man who recently made a tour of nearly every capital in Europe, and he discussed with all the leading statesmen and others in different walks of life the one question, "When is war coming?" They all gave him their view, and they all ended up with this one remark: "In the long run and in the main it depends upon what England is going to do." I hope that this country will make it clear that wherever in the world an aggressor raises a hand the British Government will be there, not alone but with others, to play their part in striking that hand down. I hope that the Government realise that they have behind them the overwhelming support of public opinion in this country for

courageous, realistic action, and that they will go forward on the 29th of this month and give to the world a real lead which will save them from the disaster which otherwise lies ahead.

1.37 p.m.

Sir J. SIMON: Debates of this sort have undoubtedly very great educative value. They call the attention of the public outside to suggestions and points of view which are the more effectively presented because they are very often at once challenged by another speaker. A characteristic of these Debates is, first of all, the expression of that which we all feel, a deep concern in the presence of an international situation which is felt to be full of difficulty and, it may be, very threatening for the future. On the other hand, there is a quite astonishing diversity of remedies which those who have taken part in the Debate so confidently recommend. One hon. Member has explained that in his view the most important thing of all—more important than anything else which he mentioned or could think of—was that we should at once remove all provision as to sanctions from the Covenant of the League. The hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander), who has just spoken, takes the view, on the contrary, that we ought to develop and reinforce the reality of those sanctions. The hon. lady the Member for the Combined English Universities (Miss Rathbone), who made a very good speech in the course of the morning, is strongly of the opinion that economic sanctions should be developed and pursued, but she believes that that might be done without involving anybody in war. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down is of the view that if you join in economic sanctions that might lead this country into war, but he cheerfully observed that, after all, in this life we have to take risks.

There are various ways of facing those difficulties. I will do my best to make a few observations which I am sure will not be as illuminating as much that has been said. There is a difference between the responsibility that rests upon His Majesty's Government in these matters and the very proper freedom which is used by hon. Members of this House—and very usefully used—in a discussion of this sort. First I should like quite briefly to deal with some remarks that have been made in the Debate about

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the Far East. The hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) who opened the Debate made that the principal topic of his speech, and he gave us so far as one can in a very short space of time, a review and a synopsis of what had occurred. He was critical, of course, but what struck me most was that almost the only recent document which he did not think it worth while either to read or to summarise, was the communication which was made by His Majesty's Government to the Japanese Government and the answer which the Japanese Government then gave. I should certainly have thought that that was the principal thing to look at. It is quite true that some semi-official statement which has been made in Japan aroused anxieties and doubts in many quarters, and in other countries besides this, but I take leave to point out that it was ~~this country~~ which has always been told that it never took the initiative and never gave a lead, and all the rest of it—and no other country which proceeded to address Japan on the subject.

What we did was none the worse because it was, as I avowed at the time, a friendly communication. I believe in friendship and in friendship with Japan. We addressed a friendly communication, and it was one which I think was very much to the point. We said that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 to which Japan was a party, and that His Majesty's Government must, of course, insist upon the due observance of the Treaty. We said that the rights which different foreign nations has in connection with China were common to all signatories, except so far as any particular country might have a special right recognised by other Powers and not shared by them. I may interpose to say that there was a little misunderstanding about that last phrase which I quoted. That was not conceding that there was any general claim which would be admitted in favour of Japan, but was merely making manifest the fact that many foreign Powers including ourselves, have certain specially stipulated rights in that part of the world which Japan does not challenge and which are admitted by third parties. For example, certain international settlements or

certain rights in connection with particular railways. This exception, we pointed out, is common to all signatories and the Nine Power Treaty is a Treaty which applies indifferently as between China on the one hand and the other signatories on the other.

We pointed out in the next place, in this Note, that if, as we gathered from this unofficial declaration, the anxiety that was felt in Japan on the subject had anything to do with preserving the peace of China and maintaining good relations between China and Japan, that certainly could not apply to us or our policy, because we were as devoted as anybody could be to both those purposes. We said that the Nine Power Treaty itself contained provisions which would enable any signatory to raise questions of difficulty with the others, and we therefore presumed—I know of no other way in which this country could address a foreign Power—we inferred, and announced that we inferred, that, whatever was being said, was not said in any way because it was intended to infringe the common rights of other Powers in China or to infringe Japan's own treaty obligations.

The first question which seems to me to arise, if anybody is going to review and criticise this matter, is: Was that a proper note to write? It seems to me that it was at once firm and courteous and to the point. The answer was that which I communicated to the House. It was a solemn assurance, given by the Japanese Foreign Minister to His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo, that Japan would observe the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty, that the policy of the Japanese Government and of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Treaty coincided, and that the maintenance of the open door in China was a subject of the greatest importance in the view of Japan as well as of ourselves. If I were to ask what it is suggested that at that stage His Majesty's Government should have done, apparently there are some people who would say that it was quite right to address this Note to Japan—that it was quite right to define the essential claims of this country, that it was quite right to address Japan in perfectly courteous and friendly terms; but that, when you had got the very answer for which you have asked, you should say, "I do not believe you."

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I admit at once that, if that be the right way of conducting our foreign affairs, somebody else ought to be Foreign Minister. I cannot imagine anything less likely to produce either an effective result or a peaceful conclusion than to proceed in that way. Surely, the right thing for us to do was to do what we did, and to ask Japan by a direct and formal communication to take note of the anxiety which we felt with respect to the reported declaration, to define our own position, and to ask whether our view differed from, or agreed with, the view of Japan. We have now got this perfectly formal assurance stating that our view of the matter was the view of Japan. I hope that there will be no dispute about that. I noted that those two essential recent matters, namely, our communication to Japan and Japan's answer, were the two things that were not quoted by the hon. and learned Gentleman when he opened the Debate.

We have had, of course, from him, and, indeed, from other speakers, many comments of a more general kind in connection with this very difficult situation in the Far East, and I gather, not for the first time, that in the view of the hon. and learned Gentleman and some others a great deal of dissatisfaction is felt as to the way in which this matter has been handled. I would ask the House to allow me to point out, if we are going to refer to the Lytton Report, or if we are going to refer to the Resolution of the League of Nations, that neither the Lytton Report nor the League of Nations Resolution on the subject ever proposed that sanctions should be imposed upon Japan. The recommendation in both cases was that the best way was not to proceed by such a method, but a method of conciliation and agreement was urged. I regret as much as anybody that there has not been a greater measure of agreement between China and Japan in the Far East, but it is a complete confusion of ideas to suppose that, in abstaining from recommending or seeking to apply sanctions, anybody was departing either from the Lytton Report or from the recommendations of the League of Nations itself.

I noticed that the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol, in one of his questions, asked me whether this country

repudiated its obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China, including Manchuria, under the Nine Power Treaty and under Article 10 of the Covenant. I am very much obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman for having supplied me with the exact text of his question, because it slightly puzzled me. Let me divide the matter and analyse the question. He asks, does this country repudiate its obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China; and he gives as his first reference the Nine Power Treaty. Really, anybody who heard that question would suppose, and I think the hon. and learned Gentleman must have supposed, that the Nine Power Treaty which we have signed contains some Clause by which this country undertook to respect and preserve the integrity of Chinese territory. It contains no such Clause. I have the Treaty in my hand. Here is the Nine Power Treaty, signed by nine States, and Article 1 says:

"The Contracting Powers other than China agree to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

Therefore, the phrase is not "to respect and preserve" at all. I should, indeed, be very much concerned if, in signing any treaty, this country has pledged itself to use its Army, Navy and Air Force for preserving the territorial integrity of another. There is, of course, as always when so ingenious an advocate as the hon. and learned Gentleman formulates a question, an explanation. The explanation is that he adds at the end of his question a reference, not only to the Nine Power Treaty, but to Article 10 of the Covenant. Article 10 of the Covenant is not an Article which is addressed specifically to the integrity of the territory of China; it is a general Article, which has been much criticised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wood Green (Mr. G. Locker-Lampson), and which, as he rightly says, has really the effect of preserving, subject to one possible variation, the existing boundaries of the world. It is Article 10, undoubtedly, which is regarded by many critics of the Covenant as making it so difficult to alter any boundary, and there is a good deal of reason in the view which my right hon. Friend put, that,

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historically Article 10 of the Covenant must be regarded as a very substantial buttress to the boundaries which were laid down in the Peace Treaties. I would like the House quite clearly to understand that it simply is not true that we have ever signed, or that, as far as I know, anyone has signed, a treaty with China in which we have pledged ourselves to use all our forces to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China, including Manchuria. It is just as well that that should be clearly understood, and I am quite sure that it was not understood when the hon. and learned Gentleman formulated his very carefully drafted question.

Regarding the general view as to whether or not the League of Nations has grossly mishandled this Far Eastern question there will, no doubt, always remain a difference of opinion. My hon. Friend the Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) just now expressed his own view, and I think we have had it also from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Sir F. Acland) from whose speech, if I may venture to say so, although it was undoubtedly of a most fervid character, I was wholly unable to deduce, from the beginning to the end of it, any proposition whatever. My right hon. Friend did, however, express one particular sentiment. He expressed his very great admiration, based upon his personal recollection, for the work which the late Lord Grey did at the Foreign Office. That is a thing which I can certainly confirm. May I just remind the House that if we are going to speak, as I think we ought to speak, with deep respect of that great man, one of the very last announcements of Lord Grey had to do with the handling by the League of Nations of the Far Eastern question, and, in particular, with the action of His Majesty's present Government in that regard? I believe it was the last occasion on which Lord Grey ever made a public speech. In the Albert Hall in, I think, March, 1932, he said this, and it is my answer to those who think that on this subject His Majesty's Government are open to much criticism. Lord Grey said:

"The attacks on the League for its handling of the Far Eastern trouble were not justified. The League had been a restraining influence from the beginning What more could the League have done?"

. . . . Economic pressure could not have been applied on Japan unless it was done in co-operation with the Government of the United States."

This is the view of this experienced statesman of world reputation who speaks with some knowledge of the difficulty of administering Foreign affairs. He goes on to say:

"I am delighted that the United States has joined with the League as much as it has in this conflict, but I do not for a moment believe that the United States Government has been so bashful that it has been anxious to do so much more and has only been waiting to be invited to do so. So far as I am aware the British Government and the League have shown no backwardness in supporting anything which the United States Government proposed, and to have proposed more than the United States Government are ready to co-operate in would not have been effective and would not have been wise."

So far as criticism may be useful I am entitled to say on this much debated question that at any rate I have the authority of Lord Grey, the right hon. Gentleman's former chief, in taking a view exactly opposite to his view, and that the true experienced view is that in a very difficult situation neither the League of Nations nor His Majesty's Government are legitimately exposed to these reproaches.

I should like to turn to the extremely interesting subject which was brought to our notice to-day in the very closely reasoned speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wood Green (Mr. Locker-Lampson)—the question of the reform of the League of Nations. It is true as he said that he has mentioned this subject once or twice before and it may be, though he said it was not so, that I might have seemed to put it aside rather brusquely. I have had doubts as to whether it would be wise to say publicly from this Box anything about it now, as I am faced with the difficulty which constantly faces the Foreign Secretary when replying to a Foreign Office debate. He always has to remember that speaking from this Box he is not simply throwing into the pool a few ideas which afterwards perhaps may be sorted out, but he may be thought to be indicating some definite Government decision which will have reaction elsewhere. I am quite deliberately putting before the House of Commons and anyone else who considers my remarks two or three reflections on the subject be-

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cause I think it is very necessary that we should clear out minds upon it. At present the Covenant of the League of Nations is, it is true, capable of Amendment. It contains, like the rules of a club, an Article prescribing exactly how you can alter the covenant. You can only alter it if there is unanimity among the members of the Council of the League. The opposition of one member could defeat an amendment. Then if you get first of all unanimity in the Council of the League the matter is pronounced upon by the Assembly by a majority. It is Article 26:

"Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly."

Let the House observe what the present structure is. If any State which is a member of the Council objects to the proposed amendment, the amendment cannot be made. It is very material to remember that before we talk too lightly about fundamental changes in the structure of the League. Of course it is true that there have been some Amendments, but they have all been made under that procedure. The particular article to which my right hon. Friend called attention and which he rightly said has a very material bearing on the question of the co-operation of some States in the League is Article 18, and Article 10 in general terms provides that members of the League undertake to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of all members of the League. In other words, under Article 10 all the boundaries of the Peace Treaties would stand as an object to be preserved by members. There is, it is true, another Article which does contemplate the contingency of boundaries being modified, but the Article which provides for that again requires an amount of agreement which unquestionably makes it very difficult. It is Article 19.

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

If the hon. and learned Gentleman or I when I followed the profession of the law had been called upon to draw up an Article which was to provide in the

clearest terms for the revision of boundaries, I think we would have expressed it a little more dogmatically than that. But that is the Article in question and therefore we must all realise exactly what is the nature of the difficulty that is raised when one talks of revising the covenant. The real truth is that as the outcome of the War you find that there are some States whose policy and inclination is to try to keep boundaries as they are and other States whose policy and inclination is to try to alter boundaries and make them different. To a very large extent but not quite universally you find that the boundary is the same between what are called the victorious powers, if indeed after a war there are any victorious powers, and the other powers. That is not an entirely just classification, but you will find that these states fall into one or other of the two categories. Some have a policy which is aimed at keeping boundaries as they are and others may be expected to raise questions as to the legitimacy of this boundary or the other. Here is your problem and I do not see the solution of it. Any help that my right hon. Friend can give will be very gratefully received. But you have to consider how it is impossible to amend the covenant of the League so as to affect these matters so vital to the policy of different nations with the result that you will not lose people from the League, but will bring in others who are at present outside.

He said quite truly that in an earlier Debate I declared my own view and I think it was the view of the Government that it was extremely doubtful whether it was well to enter upon this tremendously complicated and most controversial question side by side with a discussion about armaments, and I took the view—I believe it was the view held by Signor Mussolini although he himself is one of those who would like to see the Covenant of the League reconsidered—that the business of negotiating disarmaments was already such a frightfully difficult task and presented such an enormous number of topics on which people might differ and argue to the world's end that to throw into the arena as a sort of make weight and let us at the same time discuss how we can amend the Covenant of the League of Nations would not be the most likely way of reaching agreement.

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There was a second reason which I will state quite boldly. If you look at the Italian Memorandum you will find that it contains the statement that in the view of the Italian Government—and which Signor Mussolini expressed to me personally—if we could reach an agreement in respect of disarmament which Germany could accept, sign and take part in it really ought to be what he called a fundamental counterpart of such an agreement that Germany should return to the League of Nations. I take the view, and I think that the House will take the view, that if you are going to revise the Covenant of the League, you want to have Germany there in the League of Nations to help in the revision. I think that to attempt to revive the Covenant of the League when Germany is outside of it is a very doubtful excursion. On the one hand, you would always be at a great disadvantage, because one of the Great Powers would not be contributing what it could to the Conference, and, on the other hand, you would be giving to the Power outside an almost unlimited power of pressure, because they would say, "No, we are not going to join unless you alter it so and so." Therefore, I take the view, and I express it to the House, that for these reasons I doubt very much whether this difficult question of reforming the terms of the Covenant can be taken up at the same time as the disarmament itself. All that is subject to review.

The cause of this prolonged disarmament discussion is undoubtedly very disturbing, and it may be—some people think that it is so—that the difficulty of making the progress which we so earnestly want—and which, let me say, the British Government are going to exert themselves to do to the very last minute and the very last ounce—that the difficulties of disarmament may be found to be so great, that we have to consider whether or not we should make the way more easy by raising other questions as well.

I think that there is a good deal of wisdom in the saying that a structure which was so elaborately put together, and indeed which represents such a careful balance, should not be pulled to pieces until you have a pretty clear idea

of what it is you are going to put in its place. Once a general proposition is accepted by everybody that the Covenant of the League, as it stands, will not do, unless you are quite sure that you know rapidly how to get everybody to agree to put something in its place, you may strike such a blow at the whole design of the League of Nations as will only add to the difficulties of the situation. I hope that these remarks will not be interpreted here or outside as designed to indicate some new departure of His Majesty's Government, but I did feel that it was due to the right hon. Gentleman and to the House that I should explain to the House as clearly as I could some of the considerations which really are very much in our minds on this most important subject.

I should like to say one or two words with equal frankness on another matter which has been much mentioned in the Debate to-day. Again, I am not pronouncing some formal cut and dried decision. I am merely contributing to this Debate as well as I can by calling attention to some considerations which may not always be remembered. It is quite true that there is an article in the Covenant which makes a reference to the economic sanctions, and the House may be sure that this class of subject has not been put on one side by His Majesty's Government. I claim that it has received and is receiving as close a study from His Majesty's Government as can possibly be imagined. There are endless considerations connected with it which have not even been hinted at in the Debate to-day, but I will make one or two very obvious remarks.

The first is this. I think the hon. Member for the Combined English Universities, in a very interesting speech on the subject, did not sufficiently allow for this fact. We must not assume that there is something that we may call an economic sanction, as she said, different from war which can light-heartedly be applied to all and sundry without the risk of war. There seems to be a very large number of people, many young people for whom she claims specially to speak, who are, no doubt, most deeply and sincerely interested in this subject, as all intelligent young citizens should be, but all I would ask them to bear in mind is that you do not solve this problem by

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talking rather light-heartedly and airily about financial and economic pressure. You have to ask yourselves, "Suppose this was done, are we sure that the State upon which this pressure is applied will take it like the schoolboy receiving the chastisement or the reproof of his master. Is it not possible that he may say, 'You may explain to me that it is not an unfriendly act, but that it is not my view. My view is that it is' ". That is an extremely elementary reflection, but, having regard to the communications which I get from so many members of the public, it appears to me that most of my correspondents have not thought about that view.

The second reflection is this. I suppose that we are all agreed that we should not approve of some system which, though it can be used with great safety against little people, cannot be used with any safety against big people. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I am glad to have the warm approval of the Opposition for that. It is certainly my view. I am not in the least disputing that if all the Great Powers set to work they might be able to put a great deal of pressure on a small Power without running much risk, but the thing we have to try and consider is, what is the nature of the pressure that can be applied by international action through the League which is really fairly applied as between the great and the small. That, again, is a reflection, which, I am sure, will have occurred to many.

There is a third one. It is not the fact, as some people seem to suppose, that once you have managed to work out a system of economic sanctions you can keep it as if it were a formula in a drawer and have the prescription made up and the dose applied to whomsoever over the face of the earth at the moment happens to need the dose. It is not a specific which can be concocted out of a formula however carefully the formula can be applied. It is a thing which involves infinite commutations and combinations. It depends in each case upon what is the particular state against which you are proposing to put the pressure and, secondly, upon what are the other States which are really and truly going to join in putting on that pressure. Even within the boundaries of Europe the

practical problem is different according to the particular State you happen to take for choice.

But there is a fourth consideration which, of course, we all have in mind. I do not think that there is any harm in stating it quite frankly. It is absolutely no use talking about economic pressure unless you make certain that it is going to be effective. So far as the principal countries of Europe are concerned, you cannot, as a matter of fact, make a system effective unless the United States actively co-operate. We all in this country acknowledge with every possible gratitude the contributions which the United States is able to make towards the improvement of international affairs. The United States was in fact one of the principal authors of the Covenant, and it was a matter of great regret to the rest of us that when the time came the United States was not prepared to join the League.

It is not a matter for us to reproach anybody with. It merely is to be observed as a fact. But notwithstanding that the United States have constantly made the most valuable contributions towards the work which the League of Nations is trying to do. Either by appointing an observer, or sometimes by nominating an ambassador at large, sometimes through diplomatic channels, the Americans, although not members of the League, have joined in a great deal of the good work, and certainly I would be the very last not to recognise gratefully and publicly the service which America has done for the world. But really there is no sort of good in our pretending not to observe the limitations within which the United States is likely to act.

I am going to give the House an illustration. The House may remember that in the course of the discussions on the British Draft Convention at Geneva, we attempted to draft in the best possible form the Articles in the Convention to deal with security. We tried to put in Articles what is called the Consultative Pact to provide that if there were anything of a threat of a breach of the Kellogg Pact, there should be a consultation between signatories and that action should then be discussed and decided upon, and we would endeavour to act together. 1,

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myself, was responsible for the final form in which those Articles were drafted. I might say that I drafted them with Mr. Stimson's declaration before my eyes, because my object was to present, on behalf of the British Government, something which, as far as I could see, was exactly in the form most likely to secure American support. When the matter came to be discussed, the American representative, Mr. Norman Davis, made a very careful declaration, and I should like to read a couple of sentences from the declaration in order that we may see for ourselves what it is foolish not to face—to estimate what is the measure of the promise of help in respect of such things as consultative pacts and action thereupon which we might hope to get from the great Republic on the other side of the ocean. This is what Mr. Norman Davis said:

"We are willing to consult with other States in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the States in conference determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we occur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which the States may thus make to restore peace."

Nothing could be clearer than that. I, certainly, am not going to invite anybody to deny that it is valuable, but it is quite absurd to pretend that that declaration, solemnly made with the authority of the American Government at Geneva, encourages us to believe that America would take full part in economic sanctions. If I call attention to two passages in that declaration, I do hope that the House will believe that I do not do it with any desire to minimise the value of the declaration, but I do it for the purpose of clearness. In the first place, if all the conditions here are satisfied, what is it that the United States are good enough to say their Government would do? It is this.

"We will refrain from any action"—

Not "We will take any action"—

"tending to defeat such collective effort."

Whose collective effort? Not a collective effort in which the United States take part, but a collective effort of other people.

"which the States"—

not the United States—

"may thus make to restore peace."

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Nottingham (Mr. Knight) has just said that it is a valuable declaration, and I would be the very last to say it is not, because it means this: Suppose there arose what I may perhaps call a flagrant case in which the American nation was deeply stirred, and suppose that the States of Europe, or the other States of the world, had the means by which they could put some pressure upon what is here called "the violator," and suppose we went so far as to do it, it is a very material thing to know that if such action commended itself to the United States we might be sure that the United States Government would do nothing whatever to encourage its own citizens or to defend them if they tried to break the ring. It is a very material thing, and corresponds in some degree with the situation which developed at one stage of the War. But it is a very different thing from saying, "Here are economic sanctions waiting to be adopted if it were not for the pusillanimity of the British Government, and if only we critics in the House formed a Government we would have economic sanctions before you could say 'Jack Robinson'."

The subject, however, is vastly more difficult and complicated than many people suppose, and the real reason why there is—and I feel it, and we all feel it—this rather sudden wave of dejection and alarm on the part of the whole population, who are devoted sincerely to disarmament and peace at this hour, is that we have exhausted the time when we could usefully express ourselves in perfectly sincere platitudes, and we are right up against the hard facts of the situation. The only way to deal with the question is by dealing with it in detail, and facing each separate difficulty and finding an answer. That is a terribly hard thing to do. Peace—disarmament—why, it is the subject of every good man's discourse on Sunday and week-day. There was not a sentence in the admirably phrased speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall which would not be perfectly appropriate at any peace meeting whether in a sacred or secular edifice at any time in the last 20 years. Nothing is simpler than to say "Really, is this

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all we can see before us? Is it really the case that we cannot do better than that?" Or, to use the eloquent language of my right hon. Friend, "Really, we must pull ourselves together." By all means let us pull ourselves together, but let us realise that we shall not solve anything at all by quoting magnificent lines from a Wordsworth sonnet to suggest in this connection that it does not matter, that we are merely concerned with nice calculations. It matters everything in the world. This is a perfectly definite case where genuine sentiment will produce the steam without which an engine is perfectly incapable of moving anybody an inch of the way. You can use that genuine sentiment as the steam which drives your engine, but the structure of the engine remains one of the most complicated things in the whole world.

What, then, is to be the position that the British Government take up when we go to Geneva in a few days? As to what the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton said I altogether refuse to take the view that we are at the end of a miserable adventure, that the least said the soonest mended, that we had better shut up shop and say no more about it, and, perhaps, after all, it is just as well. I think it is going to be a frightful disaster for the world if we have to face the fact that nothing effective can be done. If we have to face the fact that nothing effective can be done, there is no sacrifice, no novelty of suggestion that is not worth facing rather than that. I certainly hope that the whole House will agree that it is in that spirit that we ought to return to Geneva. But do not make any mistake as to what the real difficulty is.

The British Government have, in fact, in this matter—I do not say it as a matter of idle boasting or something that has no justification—given a lead to the world. We are the one great Power that, first of all, set an example by unilateral reduction of armaments. We are the one Power at Geneva that has produced a connected scheme. We are the only power at Geneva that has ever dared to mention a figure. It was very gratifying that when that was done a Resolution was passed which approved of the British Draft Convention as the basis of an ultimate agreement, but the fact is, that round that Draft Convention there has

gathered in the course of months objections and reservations almost innumerable. It is really not practicable to pretend that the British Draft Convention has not become surrounded by enormous entanglements of exceptions and doubts which make one's hope of it being adopted much less confident that it was.

What did we do? We did two things. Last Summer the Disarmament Conference, in fact, came to a full stop. It did not know how to go on. It then seemed to the British Government that we ought to take a great responsibility, and we took it. We said: "We do not believe that this method of discussion between 64 nations, every one with its special point—I will not say everyone with its prepared speech—is likely to produce agreement. We must see if we cannot reduce the differences between, at any rate, some of the principal States in Europe." Therefore, with Mr. Henderson's warm approval—I acknowledge, if I may, respectfully and most sincerely all the help that Mr. Henderson has always been willing to give to me at the Disarmament Conference—we started these parallel and supplementary conversations. The House may see the results in the White Paper and may see that the suggestion that the British Government was dilatory, careless or indifferent is not true.

We said that it was necessary to modify the British Draft Convention, and, therefore, we produced, after a great deal of consideration, the Memorandum of the 29th January. We had discussions with the principal Powers in Europe. My hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal went on behalf of the Government to Paris, Berlin, Rome, and again to Paris, and we succeeded in getting what I think is a very significant contribution, namely, we succeeded in getting, and it is printed in the White Paper, a formal statement, approved by the German Government, of what were the modifications in the British proposals which the German Government would be content to accept. It is a very difficult thing to tie people down in black and white as to precisely what is regarded as their requirements.

Having got that statement, we approached other Governments and said: "There. We have done our best, not only to take soundings but to speak with great precision, and these are the results. How far is it possible for you to go?"

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[Sir J. Simon.]
 We have received several answers, which are given in the White Paper. I believe that the French Government on Monday is going to publish a Yellow Book of their own, which will contain the same material, and it may be one or two other documents. I ask any hon. Member to look at the White Paper and the French Yellow Book and see if it is not true that this matter has been pursued with the greatest possible energy and diligence by the British Government.

We are now going to hear at Geneva the views of others. I make no reference to any Foreign Government in particular, but we have asked questions and we shall naturally listen with very great patience to the answers. I do not believe that we ought at this stage ourselves to go to Geneva and start a new initiative. I think we ought to say: "This is the effort we have made. This is what we have done. We have tried to bring it up to date, and now we really ought to know what the other people think about it, and what positive plan they can suggest." That being so, I trust that the high hopes that have been expressed here that some way may be found out of these terrible anxieties and doubts will be realised. I give not my own personal assurance, but the assurance of the Government as a whole, that nothing shall be found wanting in trying to play our full part to save the world from what undoubtedly is going to be a most serious calamity, the breakdown of the Conference and the disappointment of the hopes which we have all entertained for such a long time. But do not let us take the foolish view of supposing that even if that happens it means the end of the world. On the contrary, on the very day that it happens we have all of us to start new efforts for the same purpose. At the moment it is very foolish for people to pronounce these funeral orations, while we may still be able to make something out of the approaching meeting. Be that as it may, I believe that the determination and vigour of this country and of the Government will have its proper reflection.

Sir S. CRIPPS: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the four questions that I put to him?

Sir J. SIMON: The hon. and learned Member asked, first:

"Does this country still stand by the Report of the League of Nations of February 1933, and regard Japan's position in Manchuria and Jehol as a breach of the Nine Power Treaty?"

The answer is, certainly. We should not dream of departing from that position except by giving proper public notice. We should not think of doing anything like that secretly. As regards the second question:

"Does this country repudiate its obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China, including Manchuria, under the Nine Power Treaty and Article 10 of the Covenant?"

We shall certainly so long as we remain bound by the Nine Power Treaty, and other people are bound by it, do our utmost to observe it. As to whether or not this country regards itself as bound by the Covenant of the League of Nations, this country is bound by every Article of the Covenant. The third question was:

"Are the Government prepared not to enter into any Treaty agreement, arrangement or understanding with Japan in pursuance of the provisions of Article 2 of the Nine Power Treaty, or do they repudiate that Article as well?"

I have said already that we do not repudiate that Article. I am not aware that Article 2 does make any such provision, but, if we are asked whether we are proposing to depart from Article 2 of the Nine Power Treaty, the answer is, "No." On the last question with regard to security, I have said all that I am prepared to say on that subject to-day, and I think the diversity of view expressed in the debate abundantly justifies me in taking that view.

2.35 p.m.

Sir E. GRIGG: The Foreign Secretary has dealt very effectively with the record of the Government in regard to the Disarmament Conference and has told us that at the resumption of its work next week they do not propose to take up any new line but to listen to what other Powers have to say. I make no complaint of that. France in her last published dispatch indicated her desire that the Conference should resume its work, and there is no doubt that it is proper that His Majesty's Government should go to Geneva prepared to listen to what France

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may have to say. I do not wish either to pronounce any premature funeral oration upon the Disarmament Conference, but the time is coming when we shall be very anxious for a more definite declaration as to where His Majesty's Government stand. The prospects of the Disarmament Conference are, by general admission, not good at the moment. France has declared that she will not recognise or discuss German rearmament unless Germany returns to Geneva. Germany says that she will not return to Geneva unless France, as a preliminary, recognises her equality of rights. That, apparently, is a complete deadlock. There is no doubt that the action of the German Government in publishing its greatly inflated Service Estimates while these negotiations are going on has had a very sinister effect, and no one can complain that the French Government say that Germany must give more evidence of her readiness to act in a conciliatory European sense if we are to discuss again her rearmament.

Discussions at Geneva, in the absence of Germany, obviously, would be completely useless, and we are, therefore, right up against the point as to whether we shall have to recognise that the Disarmament Conference has in fact broken down. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that no one can blame the British Government for it. Criticism is always possible; I have been guilty of it myself. I have felt that the issue of security might have been raised earlier in the life of the Disarmament Conference. The worst chess player among us when he is watching a game in the smoke room possibly thinks he can see a move which the expert player has not apparently seen, and I am always ready to believe that those who are at the helm are being actuated by considerations and factors which may not be apparent to those who do not know everything. Whether criticism on this or that detail is sound or not, there can be no question about the sincerity and wholeheartedness of His Majesty's Government in the pursuit of disarmament. It has often been impuned by hon. Members of the Labour party, and sometimes by hon. Members of the Liberal party, and I should like to make it perfectly clear that in my opinion the Government of this country have nothing to regret and

nothing to be ashamed of in their record in this matter. The facts speak for themselves. We have pursued a measure of unilateral disarmament to the verge of risk. Our Ministers have laboured and travelled as no other Ministers in this cause, and if, in spite of all this, the Conference is about to break down it is no fault of ours.

If this breakdown occurs, we have at once to face the consequences. The first impression which it suggests is that the contingency arises to which the right hon. Gentleman the Lord President of the Council referred in the Debate on the Air Estimates, that we shall have to increase our defences, particularly in the air, and establish air parity at the earliest possible moment. I should like to express my confidence in his declaration, which was renewed by the Lord President in a public speech he made last week. I have no doubt that he meant what he said and that he intends to carry it out. I should like also to express my appreciation to him for being present this afternoon. We know that he has great pre-occupations which have certainly been very heavy, particularly in the last few days, and Members of the House who feel as I do very keenly on the subject of air defence will particularly appreciate his presence this afternoon. In this connection, and in advance of any decision which may have to be taken in regard to an increase in our Air Estimates, I should like to make a suggestion to the Government. Clearly we have to face the fact that a considerable expansion, accompanied by heavy expenditure, is in sight. It seems to be inevitable, and I, therefore, beg for something more than Departmental planning of the expansion and expenditure which has to be undertaken.

I am sure the Government realise that there is a good deal of anxiety among old members of the Services, of whom there are a great many in the House, about the lack of co-ordination between the Services at the present time. The line of demarcation between land and sea forces is tolerably clear, and we have never had difficulty in the past, but the establishment and development of an Air Force raises questions of overlapping and co-ordination in an entirely new way. There is no clear dividing line between

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[Sir E. Grigg.]
the functions of the Air Service and the Army. The two Services in many respects overlap. Are the Government satisfied that at the present moment there is no unnecessary duplication between the two Services? I have heard it stated that in places where the Air Service has taken over it has found it necessary itself to raise land forces in place of the troops which have been withdrawn. That is an extraordinary duplication, if it has taken place. Hon. Members are aware that a steady duplication of the ancillary services has been taking place. It is difficult to realise the necessity for it if, as one imagines, in most contingencies which may arise the two Services would be acting together. I am referring to such matters as supply, medical services and so on.

There is also a lack of co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force. I do not wish to pursue it this afternoon, but I should like to ask whether the Government are satisfied that our coastal defences are taking adequate consideration of this new factor of attack and defence in the air. The question of coastal attack and defence has certainly been transformed by the development of the Air Force, and it is doubtful whether our coastal defences have taken adequate consideration of it. I should like also to mention the fact that the Navy still seems to show an extraordinary partiality for bases on the east and south coasts. That may be perfectly sound, but one wonders why it is being done, why at a time like this Chatham is so popular and Pembroke Dock closed. One would have thought that it is much better to be on the west than the east coast if you are to have a secure base. Before the War the Navy did not foresee the submarine danger, and the first thing we had to do was to build an adequate base. I hope the Government will assure us that matters of this kind are really being considered.

But there is one question even more serious if we are coming to the expansion of the Air Force, as I believe we shall certainly be coming. There is in the Air Force, necessarily in so young a service, a lack of experienced general staff officers, and if there is to be expansion on the scale which may be necessary, clearly officers will have to be added, brought into that Force from the older services, or else a better system of

co-ordination and co-operation between the services will have to be established. I suggest to the Government that in advance of any decision which they may take about the expansion of our Force in the air, this is an admirable opportunity for reviewing the problems of co-ordination and co-operation. I suggest that in this matter the heads of the service departments, whether they be the political heads or the service heads, are handicapped; they are necessarily tied to some extent to the views of their advisers, they are necessarily bound to represent more or less the views of the service which they represent. The Prime Minister's duty of co-ordination—I repeat this, in spite of all that was said in the Debate the other day—is really more than any Prime Minister can undertake. It is impossible to believe that any Prime Minister can undertake all this work of co-ordination. I hope, therefore, that the Government will consider the advisability of appointing an *ad hoc* committee to go into this matter at once, a committee which can devote all its time to advising and recommending on this matter without further delay.

That is all I wish to say to-day on the question of air defences, and I am not going to speak more than a minute or two longer as I know they are many who wish to take part in the Debate. Before I sit down I would like to make it perfectly clear that, although I am convinced that the time has come when we must look to our own defences and look to them before everything else, we cannot rest content and complacent with them. The present state of the world is by general confession tragic. We have had it stated in many different terms from all parts of the House to-day. It is true, I think, that nationalism, which is the portent of our time, is tearing our civilisation to pieces. I believe that we have an absolutely imperative interest not merely in trying to prevent another war—this is quite obvious—but in doing anything that may be possible to reduce tension in the world, and particularly in Europe.

In the eloquent opening passage of the Budget speech the other day, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was his belief that we had got very nearly to the limit of what we could do by our own efforts, and that the future of our recovery must depend very greatly on con-

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ditions in the rest of the world. Personally, I believe that to be profoundly true. If so, certainly we have an immediate interest, not merely in dealing with the question of future war, but in trying to take action which will reduce the political tension that is making economic recovery so difficult. Further than that, one has to recognise the fact that there is in our people a moral detestation of war, and that our being driven to increase our defences is going to cause the gravest disappointment, and perhaps a good deal of opposition, in this country, unless it can be made quite clear that we are prepared to use those forces, so far as any method can be devised, in some collective system for the maintenance of peace. There is much that might be said about that, but I will not attempt to say it now.

The Lord President in his speech on the Air Estimates mentioned the possibility of an Air convention, by which I suppose he meant a convention which would bind the Powers of Europe at any rate not to use bombing from the air, or perhaps a more limited convention such as was suggested 10 years ago, a convention which would ban the use of bombardment from the air in regard to centres of population and ships of commerce. I hope that the Government will not lose sight of that, and that if, as seems only too likely, the Disarmament Conference breaks down, they will not only come forward with a declaration of what they mean to do in the way of increasing our defences, but that they will also make some proposals which may possibly give us a fresh start towards a system of collective security in Europe, if not in the world.

While I plead for that, I dissociate myself entirely from some of the speeches that have been made to-day, especially by hon. Members above the gangway. The first speech was a case in point. It suggested that our Government should undertake obligations of the gravest kind without any regard for the maintenance of the forces which obviously are needed to back such obligations if we committed ourselves to action of that kind. This country is rightly unwilling to sign cheques which it may not be possible to honour when they are presented at the bank. The action which hon. Gentlemen

on the Labour Benches are always suggesting seems to me to savour of that kind of irresponsibility.

I remember, too, that in past days a Liberal Prime Minister had to protest against a lady, a member of his party, who suggested that it would be good for this Government to take action to protect the people of Armenia from Turkish rule, even if the consequences were the dissolution of the British Empire. I remember that Lord Rosebery replied that as Prime Minister he did not think he ought to take action which might lead to the dissolution of the British Empire, and that the old lady replied, "Your answer saddened me, my Lord." I was reminded of that when listening to the speech of the right hon. Member for North Cornwall (Sir F. Acland). I certainly would be no party to this country undertaking obligations of any kind unless its forces are brought fully up to strength. If that were done, then I think we will make it clear that we intend to use them not only to establish our own security but, if we can, to establish security in Europe and the rest of the world.

2.54 p.m.

Captain GUEST: I intend to occupy only two or three minutes in supporting some of the points made by my hon. Friend who has just spoken. I also want to take this opportunity of saying to the Leader of the House that if we have, perhaps, pressed him and badgered him a little during the last few months, it is solely because we as a Committee have been anxious to strengthen his hands. I for one am perfectly satisfied to leave the great decision as to the strengthening of our Air Force in his hands. He has told us repeatedly in public and in this House, that should the Disarmament Conference fail he will consider it the duty of the Government to bring our forces up to parity. I am quite satisfied that the Government will do so. But I am a little anxious on one point, and I hope that if my right hon. Friend says anything in this Debate he will give us an indication, if not a complete reply. He has led us to believe that should the Disarmament Conference fail an Air convention will be attempted. I gather, as I think the man in the street gathers, that the Air Convention will be a Convention to limit the use of air armaments and to save if possible dense populations

[Captain Guest.]
from air attack. I make this plea—that if the Disarmament Conference fails, the expansion programme should be started and the Air Convention as such left to take shape as and when it may. I submit, in support of that suggestion, that our interest in an Air Convention will be greater if we are stronger than we are to-day and if we are in a better position to urge that various items should find a place in such a Convention. If I had a reassurance upon that point I should be very pleased.

I propose to touch in passing upon two or three matters which I think are fundamental to an expansion programme. I know they are appreciated by the Ministry but it may help the Ministry to know that there are supporters of its policy outside its own doors. I have frequently maintained that the foundation of military aviation is civil aviation and the Minister would be well advised to make the utmost use of the great voluntary effort which is represented by the words "civil aviation". I would then submit this consideration. If it is intended to increase the size of the Air Force, whether the expansion is to be in one year or spread over 2½ years, the most practical method is to begin by increasing the number of cadres—to make the skeleton, before proceeding to deal with the question of equipment and machines. Machines are subject to rapid obsolescence and the organisation of the cadres should be the first consideration. When the cadre has been formed it can await its equipment, machines and apparatus and it will be completed as time proceeds.

The third consideration to which I wish to allude has already been so well developed by the hon. Member for Altrincham (Sir E. Grigg) that I need scarcely do more than say how strongly I support his views upon it. It is that of co-ordination between the services. It is hard for those who have not the inner knowledge of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to say more than that co-ordination appears to have been neglected, but even if it has not been neglected entirely I would point out that co-ordination between the lower ranks of the different services is just as important as co-ordination between the superior ranks in those services. It is no good for a limited

number of generals to get to know each other's views if the lower ranks do not get to know each other's views. I believe that a development of co-ordination upon those lines would bear fruit. In other words the Army must be made air-minded, but equally the Air Force must be made ground-minded. That can only be done by a wider system of co-ordination.

As an example of the way in which co-ordination and economy go hand in hand I mention an instance which has been quoted in the House before and which I see no harm in quoting again. It is the case of the two commands in Egypt, where there is an Army command and an Air command. If I am not mistaken we have there a general and an Army headquarters staff of 33, in control of 10,000 men. We have also an Air Vice-Marshal and a staff of 58 running a unit of six squadrons. We find both those staffs, practically within one city and handling practically the one problem. It seems to me that a little more co-ordination there would make for economy. These considerations are of more value to-day than they were a few years ago. There was a time when there was an agitation in the House of Commons for a Ministry of Defence, but I think the House is now convinced that that is not practical politics for the time being. Earlier we had the argument that the work of the Air Ministry should be divided between the Army and the Navy, and, after long debate, that proposal also has been dropped. By some way in between the two we might get closer co-operation without the risk of these two debatable subjects being reintroduced into discussion.

I do not propose to give the general consideration which have forced us from time to time to press on the Government the need for immediate action beyond saying that other countries seem to think immediate action necessary. The new programmes announced in the last few months indicate that other countries are anxious about the situation. I would only urge what was urged some weeks ago by my right hon. Friend the Member for Epping (Mr. Churchill) that at least we should be strong enough to decide with whom we are going to make friends and of whom we may make enemies. At present we are not able to do one or the other. If that is true, if the

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danger to this country is admitted and to some extent accepted, I would then say something which I am sure would be disapproved of by many but which I believe in as a result of my experience in the House of Commons before the War. Our agreements with other countries were always kept in such close confidence that broadly speaking, hardly any of the electors knew whether we had a friend in Europe or not. I was in the House of Commons before the War and I am prepared to admit that I had no knowledge as a Member of Parliament of our commitments or agreements with France at that time though it transpired that there had been a great deal of coming and going between the two countries.

I think that is a stage of secret diplomacy of which this country would not approve to-day. I think the people would rather be told in simple language exactly what our agreements are with our old Allies of the late War. It is not a popular point of view to take, but I am convinced it is the view which has to be taken. A decision must be made as to how we are going to frame policy not for War but to keep the peace of Europe. If it be evident to almost everybody that the gravest danger to European peace is the increasing desire on the part of Germany to re-establish herself, to say no more than that, then I think it is obvious that the only way in which the peace can be kept is by openly and boldly framing up a peace policy with the Allies with whom we worked during the great War, and I think that we should say so, and say it openly. It is a dangerous thing to say, but I feel it sincerely, otherwise I would not say it.

3.5 p.m.

Mr. SIMMONDS: My right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council, in the course of the Air Debate, referred to the political position internationally in so far as the Disarmament Conference and the air were concerned, and I sincerely hope that now that we are approaching a reassembly of the Disarmament Conference, no right hon. or hon. Member will feel it desirable or necessary to press the Government upon what they may or may not do in the light of the events of the next few weeks. My right hon. Friend has given us the Government's pledge, and we shall see after this reassembly

of the Disarmament Conference in what way they propose to implement it. There is, however, one serious aspect of the present position. The Royal Air Force, no one can deny, is tending to be in a state of suspended animation. It is well known that one must either develop or recede, and I fear that with this inevitable inaction, brought about by my right hon. Friend's promise on the part of the Government, the Air Ministry is not thinking radically and progressively on a large number of matters, which they might reasonably be expected to be considering, in connection with both civil aviation and our air defence.

There is just one aspect of many which I have in mind that I would like to mention this afternoon. It is an unquestionable fact that if there be another war in the air, it will not be fought only by day, but very considerably by night, and I have therefore addressed to my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air and to other Ministers in the course of the last few days two or three questions to obtain some information on this point. I inquired, first of all, from my right hon. Friend the Postmaster-General the number of night air-mail services operating to and from this country, and the number of these services operated by British companies. My right hon. Friend replied:

"The only night air-mail service at present operating to and from this country is that between Croydon and Berlin maintained by the German Air Company."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th May, 1934; col. 1451, Vol. 289.]

There was not one British company in operation. I therefore asked if he could hold out any hope of a British development, and he told me in reply that that was a question for the Air Ministry. So we do at any rate know that this is entirely a responsibility for the Air Ministry. I therefore asked my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air the number of regular night air services operated at present by Germany and by this country, and the hon. baronet the Member for Grantham (Sir V. Warrender), who answered on his behalf, said:

"There are seven German night air services, which are mostly internal and for the carriage of mail and freights only. As regards this country, owing to the shorter distances to be traversed, there is not the same need for purely night air services,

[Mr. Simmonds.]
 and none have so far been developed, but, following on the provision of flood-lighting and other apparatus at certain stations, a considerable amount of night flying is carried out on our Imperial air services."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th May, 1934, col. 1458-9; Vol. 289.]
 On a third occasion I asked my right hon. Friend if it was not a fact that we were virtually giving a monopoly in experience in night flying to Germany, and whether he realised that it was placing this country in a very serious position as far as our air defences were concerned, to which my right hon. Friend replied, to my amazement, that he thought it must depend on the demand. With regard to these German services, my right hon. Friend has told us, that there are seven night air services in operation by Germany. They operate every day of the week, so they have 49 services each week. They operate in both directions, so that they have 98 German air services operating each night of the week. So far as our own Imperial air services are concerned, I am sure my right hon. Friend will agree with me that these are nearly all services operating once only each week in each direction, and possibly if there are six night services by Imperial Airways, that would be quite a maximum. We therefore see that we are almost giving to Germany a monopoly in this experience. In any case, Germany has decided that it is prudent to undertake this development, and I think we, therefore, may examine carefully the reasons that my right hon. Friend has given the House for our not having developed on similar lines.

There are two reasons, as he tells us. One is that there has not been a demand, and the second is that in this country there are shorter distances. I am sure my right hon. Friend will agree that in civil aviation nearly all the services that have been inaugurated have been supported by Governments specifically for the reason that there was not a demand, but that it was desirable to create a demand, and they have therefore subsidised these services throughout the world. It is precisely what the British Government have done in regard to Imperial Airways. If, therefore, it is desirable on national defensive and commercial grounds that we should have these night air services, surely it is not for us to wait until there is a commercial demand, but to create it.

Secondly—and here I hope my right hon. Friend will bear with me in my examination of his reply—he says that in the British Isles distances are too short, and he thinks that is the reason why we need not take any action in this matter. Perhaps I may recall to the House that from London to Belfast is 377 miles, from London to Edinburgh 390 and from London to Glasgow 400; and to other places which I have never visited, but which I believe to be of some importance, namely, Aberdeen, 522 and Inverness 568.

I will give the distances traversed by the German night air services, to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred. From London to Cologne and Frankfurt, which is the route from England to Germany, the distance is 390 miles, approximately the same distance as from London to Glasgow. May I particularly refer the right hon. Gentleman to these internal distances in Germany—Frankfurt to Berlin 250 miles, Frankfurt to Stuttgart 95, Frankfurt to Munich 180, Cologne and Hanover to Berlin 280, Hanover to Malmo 250, Berlin to Königsberg 320. The average for the seven German night air services is 310 miles, compared with the distances to Scotland of between 400 and 600 miles. I regard the present as a serious state of affairs, not only because we are neglecting night air services, which will mean so much to any country in the next war, but particularly because the Air Ministry, having presumably studied this problem, have come to the conclusion, when Germany insists on these night air services for relatively short distances, that we can entirely defer any commencement of night flying activities. I know that it may be said that Germany has to rely for her air activity entirely on civil aviation and that we, on the other hand, have our Royal Air Force and its night flying exercises. If we cast our minds back to the experience in America we remember that a service operating day in and day out, night in and night out, in all weathers was not to be compared in its reliability to the Army Air Corps operating from time to time as it was thought desirable by the staff in control.

I seriously suggest—and I am very exercised about this situation—that we are giving to Germany a monopoly in night air experience which we may very much regret in years to come. There is,

after all, the question of our commerce. If Germany is operating a service at night, as she is from Berlin to London, why should we not share that service and operate the opposite route each day from London to Berlin? Conversely, if that be not desirable, why should we not be flying each night and carrying British commercial correspondence to the centre of Europe? There is here a case needing much greater investigation on the part of the Air Ministry. I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to say that this matter has been investigated further, and that from that point of view we do not propose to remain in this grossly inferior position to one of our nearest Continental neighbours.

3.15 p.m.

Captain HAROLD BALFOUR: From the remarks of the Foreign Secretary I suppose we can assume that we are going to enter upon that period which the Lord President of the Council told us would emerge if and when the Disarmament Conference broke up. The Lord President told us that in that unfortunate event, which I think every hon. Member will look on with abhorrence, he would take immediate steps to see whether an air convention could be entered into. I am sure that every Member who takes particular interest in air questions must welcome the fact that we are still trying to achieve a limitation of air armaments. There are different ways in which we can achieve it, but subject to the preservation of parity—about which I am not going to say anything because we have already had definite pledges on that point with which we are satisfied and for which we are grateful—I am sure all of us will support the Government in every way in trying to secure some form of limitation. What the House would like to know as soon as possible, however, is whether it is to be a budgetary limitation or a numerical limitation or a limitation of utility such as the hon. and gallant Member for the Drake Division (Captain Guest) referred to.

I do not despair of a convention limiting the utility of aircraft, although people say that civilised towns will be bombed in the next war, because in spite of modern movements there is still the same law of civilization, the same

abhorrence on the part of civilized people of unnecessary cruelty. I trust this convention will be drawn on the lines of codifying the laws of air warfare and limiting the use of aircraft, because I believe that such a convention will have a greater chance of success and of escaping the pitfalls which very largely contributed to the breakdown of the present Disarmament Conference than one which tries to limit particular types of aircraft or limit numbers or even achieve a budgetary limitation. The Foreign Secretary told us quite clearly that we are up against hard technical facts in the problem of disarmament and that the time of platitudes had now passed. If that be true of general disarmament it is even more true in the case of air disarmament, where one comes up against technical facts in every direction directly one tackles the problem, and we shall have enormous difficulties with the population of this country in explaining to them the special requirements of this Empire.

References to the internationalisation of civil aviation and our reservation as regards bombing in outlying police areas are bandied about on the Opposition Benches. They are fine political targets at which the Opposition can shoot. But when considering the internationalisation of civil aviation we must not forget the technicalities of the question in the light of the particular needs of this country, with its Imperial communications, and in such an examination one finds that no scheme is yet practicable, and that any scheme suggested would work entirely to the detriment of this country and entirely to the advantage of our European commercial rivals. Again, as regards the bombing of outlying areas, it is difficult to explain to one's electors that a death is a death and a thing to be regretted, however it occurs, but that it is far better to use a particular weapon which is cheap, humane and economical and causes fewer deaths than to rely on the old-fashioned forms of warfare, and the old-fashioned forms of policing our outlying commitments. Those who attack us do not show very great regard to the Imperial commitments that we hold. They are not people who are particularly interested in supporting the maintenance of the British Empire.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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[Captain Balfour.]

I would put forward the suggestion that, when the time comes for the consideration of an aircraft limitation convention, we should use the whole machinery and the whole propaganda, organisation and power of the Government to carry through a programme which will educate the doubtful and ignorant electors who owe allegiance to no political party, but who support the Government at the present time, so that those unpopular reservations, such as the bombing reservations for the policing of outlying areas, and the opposition of this country to the internationalisation of civil aviation, should be fully explained. I am sure that when our national point of view, which is of vital importance to us, and other technical questions, are realised by the people of this country, they will not fail to support a convention which must essentially maintain those reservations in our favour.

3.32 p.m.

Rear-Admiral Sir MURRAY SUETER: The air committee are very grateful to the Lord President of the Council and to the Under-Secretary of State for Air for giving up their afternoon in order to listen to this Debate. I would remind the Lord President of the Council that last November I introduced a Motion in this House drawing attention to our position in the air, and I said that when the War ended we were one of the two great air Powers in the world, and that now we were the fifth Power in the world. We had reduced our Air Forces by the action of successive Governments in the great cause of peace and as a great gesture of peace to the world, and that the reply of other nations was to increase their air armaments. The Lord President of the Council said that we should not increase our Air Forces last November because the situation with Germany was very delicate indeed and that we should mark time with our Air Forces.

Since November, what have the other nations of the world been doing while we have been marking time? Russia has increased her air forces by something like 3,000 fighting machines, and has 750 machines in the Far East. Russia is training a very large number of pilots on a five-year plan. She is going to have thousands of pilots. The reply of

Japan to that is to increase her Air Forces, and Japan now is building as fast as she can her naval and military air forces. Japan is devoting much money to research work, and soon Japan will be a big air Power in the Far East. We all know that America has voted more money this year to increase her military and naval air forces. She also has a tremendous reserve in civil pilots and in factories that can turn out machines that would be useful in wartime. Italy is devoting more money this year for air forces, and the Italian air services are very efficient. We remember the great flight of General Balbo to America and back again. France has reduced the number of her first-line machines, because she is improving and overhauling the whole of her air forces, raising the speed and voting a tremendous amount of money to increase her security in the air.

With regard to Germany, while we have been marking time in the interests of Germany, Germany has created more aerodromes, and has ordered engines and machines from America and engines from this country. The Germans will study the whole technique of the machines and engines they get from America and from this country, and I know sufficient of the German designers to know that they will produce some of the finest machines in the world before very long. Already they have raised their speeds to some 200 miles an hour. We hear a great deal about French security, and we hear a great deal in this House about the security of this country, but what about German security? Germany is ringed in by nations that at any time might be hostile to her; a glance at the map will show how close her great cities are to her frontiers, and how they are all open to aerial bombardment. Very naturally, the Germans want to be secure in the air; we should want to be secure in the air if we were in their situation; and I think it is very unlikely that they will agree to continue in their present position. They will want to have sufficient machines for their air security, and they will say perfectly openly to the countries of the world that they are going to have air security; they will not give in on that question.

The Disarmament Conference is now, perhaps, coming to a conclusion, and I

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feel quite certain that Germany is determined to arm in the air. I feel certain that the other nations, too, will not reduce to our level, and that we shall have to level up to them. I ask the Government to consider, if the Disarmament Conference breaks down, whether we ought not, perhaps, to level up to the other countries in air power, and whether we ought not to bring in an Air Defence Bill and tackle the whole question of our air defences properly. The people of this country will not be content to see their homes unprotected against attacks from the air, or to see our royal dockyards, our shipyards, our great industrial centres, and our great cities unprotected. I ask the Government to tackle this question immediately a decision is arrived at at the Disarmament Conference.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Thanet (Captain Balfour) spoke a good deal about an air convention. If it is decided to go in for an air convention and to appoint delegates to a conference, I hope the delegates will include many airmen, because airmen will get decisions in these air matters far more quickly than diplomatists. They will get decisions in a few weeks, and I feel certain that, if the airmen are got together, they will soon draw up regulations for limiting the areas where bombing should take place. The Viceroy of India has told us that we should retain air bombing for peace services in India and the distant parts of our Empire, and I think he is perfectly right; he is the man on the spot, and we should trust him. It would not be difficult for airmen to get together and agree that they would not bomb open cities where there are no armaments or munition factories or combatants, and I am certain that it would be possible to outline those cities in the daytime by balloons and at night by a single cordon of searchlights. People will say that that would only be making a target which could be bombed, but I am certain that, if the nations agreed to that, they would keep their word, exactly as they refrained from using explosive bullets in the late War. I am certain that that could be done, and the airmen would be the best people to draw up a convention of that nature.

Mr. MANDER: May I ask the hon. and gallant Member if he does not recollect that various restrictions during the War

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with regard to the use of poison gas were totally disregarded? Would not the same thing happen in this case?

Sir M. SUETER: I was talking about explosive bullets and not poison gas. They are rather different.

Mr. MANDER: The point is absolutely the same. Surely you either keep all your promises or none.

Mr. SIMMONDS: Is it not a fact that the nations agreed before the War not to poison wells and running water, and that promise was kept.

Sir M. SUETER: I am basing my argument on the fact that the nations of the world refrained from using explosive bullets. With only a very few exceptions they kept that, and I believe if you outlawed open Cities, you would find that the airmen would respect their signatures to the Convention. I would also remind the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander), who is an airman, that airmen do not want to kill women and children, also that in the late war many German Zeppelin commanders dropped their bombs in fields near Cities, and many bombs were found with their pins in, which showed that they did not want to kill women and children. It may be that some fell in London, but, if you took the whole of the bombs that fell, you would find that what I say is right. Hundreds of bombs were picked up just outside Cities, showing that some of the Germans were not keen on bombing women and children.

I will leave that, if the hon. Member will not interrupt me any more, and pass to the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, the Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps). As I listened to him, I wondered what his feelings were about the Government cutting down in the cruisers to 50. He said, "There you have Japan slicing off great portions of China, first of all Manchuria, then Jehol and so on. Then they are penetrating through the North Wall and perhaps they will get more of China." I am certain that, as the Chinese see law and order produced in Manchukuo and Jehol, some of the Chinese will say, "For Heaven's sake, come in and put law and order into our part of the country and free us from the war lord brigands, who have battered on the

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[Sir M. Sueter.]
 country for hundreds of years," and Japan will do it. There is no getting away from the fact that Japan is going to be the great Power in the Far East. They have practically thrown down the gauntlet. We have a Munroe Doctrine over there, and we cannot get away from it. As Japan is building up as a great Power in the Far East, jealousies will arise and incidents will occur, as happened last week when a Japanese sailor was shot and another wounded by Soviet troops. We ought to be in a position to protect our interests in the Far East. We cannot do that with only 50 cruisers. We cannot protect our interests in the Far East, with 80,000 miles of trade routes and only 50 cruisers, when it took 40 ships to hunt down the "Emden." We want to look into our whole naval position. We ought to set up an Empire Defence Council to settle this question of our naval and air defences.

The hon. Member for East Wolverhampton said that all England was watching us. The whole of England is watching to see what the Government are going to do in regard to building up our air and naval forces. We want England to be strong, and it is better for the peace of the world to have a strong Navy and a strong Air Force than it is to be weak, as we are now. I submit that the Government should take bold action at the Disarmament Conference when decisions are arrived at, in order to put us in a proper position with regard to our naval and air defences.

3.35 p.m.

Mr. Hales: I should like to tell the House what I think we need in the way of armaments. The word Disarmament like the blessed word Mesopotamia is all very well in theory. There was a General some time ago who told us "To trust in God and to keep our powder dry." While I do not for a moment suggest that we should drop every endeavour to bring about disarmament, I should like to tell the House something of what is happening in other parts of the world. One of the greatest blessings which the Dutch residents in the Dutch East Indies enjoy to-day and one which they rely upon more than anything else is the British naval base at Singapore. They are looking forward to the completion of that work with the greatest

satisfaction, for, though they are themselves unprotected, they think that while we have a naval and air base in close proximity, Britain would not stand to see any aggression by Japan in the Dutch East Indies. I heard that significant statement on more than one occasion when travelling through Java and Sumatra.

There is nothing like a little bit of practical experience in bringing home to one the relative dangers of each kind of armament. In my experience during the War in Gallipoli, I was successively sniped at, and shot at by machine guns; I faced high explosives and submarines and experienced aircraft bombardments. I never remember experiencing any real fear, but the nearest I came to it, and that was very close, was when I was sent to guard an ammunition dump on the extreme southern point of Cape Helles in Gallipoli. Two Turkish aeroplanes were endeavouring to bomb that ammunition dump which I was left to guard and I never wanted to go home more in my life than I did on that occasion. One feels when an aeroplane is above you, that you are its immediate objective, and the one thing in the world being aimed at. Aircraft is, and will be, the greatest arm the world will ever know. I think that warships have had their day. Given submarines and aircraft, the warship and the battleship in particular is at the mercy of those craft. I remember a battleship lying off Cape Helles, the "Majestic," with transports on either side making it impossible for torpedo craft to approach it. One of the transports sailed one day, and within two hours the ship had turned turtle and gone down with hundreds of men. It was torpedoed. There was a boat costing millions sunk in half-an-hour. In fact, no battleship can be regarded as safe when it is attacked by aircraft or submarines. When one travels down the coast of Arabia and the Red Sea across those deserted tracks, there is only one arm which is of any use, and that is aircraft.

I do impress upon the Air Ministry that if ever there were a time in the history of this country when aircraft should be encouraged and money spent liberally on that arm, it is at the present moment. To-day the world is arming to the teeth. Someone said that Japan was going to be the great Power in the East.

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Japan is the great Power in the East to-day. Nothing on earth can stop her. The League of Nations is a mere plaything in her eyes. She is going right through, and we shall see, for some reason or other, that China will be in her hands before many months are over. We have to face these matters. At close quarters we see more clearly what is happening. This little island is too remote to appreciate the dangers which beset us, but I do say that if there is one arm upon which we should not show any disinclination for liberal expenditure, it is the aeroplane.

3.41 p.m.

The LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL (Mr. Baldwin): Before making a few observations, I must thank my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham (Sir E. Grigg) for the kind word which he uttered about me at the beginning of the latter part of this Debate. Amazed as I was by it, it was nothing to my amazement when it was followed by an equally kind one from the hon. and gallant Member for Hertford (Sir. M. Sueter). I do not know what is happening to the House. Indeed, it so moved me that I could sit here all night—but I am not going to do so. This has been a kind of pendant to the earlier Debate in which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke, and it will not be expected that I should cover, or even touch, any of the ground which was discussed in the earlier part of the day. I am not prepared for it, and it is perhaps a little bit outside my own peculiar functions. But when I came into the House and learned what the nature of the latter part of the Debate would be, I felt that, though I should have been only too pleased if my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air would have spoken, there were one or two important points of principle raised which would, perhaps, come better from a more senior Member of the Government.

The hon. Member for Altrincham asked us to face the consequences if the Disarmament Conference breaks down. Do not let us assume that it is going to break down, and let us bear in mind what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said. He will have a very difficult task at Geneva, but there are no two men more competent than he and the

Lord Privy Seal in the work they have to do, and every effort that can be made will be made by them. But I would like to utter one word of warning. Do not let us lose all heart and give way to despair if, for the time being, it should break down. Let us remember, after all, that these what I may call concentrated efforts after peace have seldom been made, if at all, in the world until these years after the War, and it is impossible to imagine that you are going completely to change in ten years a habit so ingrained in human nature from the beginning of time. The world is full of people as keen as the keenest of us here to fight this evil of war, and the fight will go on, whatever happens at the Disarmament Conference. But we should be no more depressed because the whole world does not immediately turn from war and provide some means of fighting it, than we should lose our faith in Christianity, which after 2,000 years has not yet covered the world.

I should like to deal with one or two details in the speech of my hon. Friend and other speeches and to give some assurance in regard to coastal defence. The scheme of coastal defence is quite complete by sea and by air. That does not mean that it has all been carried out; that is another matter, but it is under review every year and carefully gone through and is being proceeded with at the very slow speed that our present economic conditions permit. If it became necessary, if it were a matter of vital importance for the defence of the country, if the clouds were so threatening, it could be speeded up. It is rather the economic consideration to-day than one of preparation that delays progress.

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Thanet (Captain Balfour) talked about limitation in the air. It is limitation that we have been asking for in our Convention. Limitation I think is probably—I speak for myself at this moment—the only practicable form of disarmament in air. Those who have spoken have made a point, with which I agree, that if you can get limitation no single Power is in a position of such superiority that the temptation to attack becomes too much. But we must remember that there is the corollary, which I am not going to discuss this afternoon, that if you have some limitation it is difficult to

[Mr. Baldwin.]

see how you can avoid sanctions against anyone who breaks that limitation. The moment you are up against sanctions, you are up against war. I have probably put in as much work on these subjects as any Member of this House for the last 12 years, and one of the many conclusions to which I have been driven is that there is no such thing as a sanction that will work that does not mean war, or, in other words, if you are going to adopt a sanction you must be prepared for war. If you adopt a sanction without being ready for war, you are not an honest trustee of the nation.

I was very much struck during my luncheon interval in reading in the Library, in a Quarterly, an article by Professor Zimmerman, which bears very much on what the hon. Member for East Wolverhampton (Mr. Mander) and the hon. and learned Member for East Bristol (Sir S. Cripps) told the House, and that is that force is the essence of the collective maintenance of peace. If you go in for the collective maintenance of peace, it is no good going in for it first unless you are prepared to fight in will and also in material. Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world or a more cruel deception of your own people than to say, "We will guarantee peace by arms, but not be ready for it." There is no doubt that, if you are going to enforce a collective guarantee or a collective sanction, it means that you have to make this country a good deal stronger than she is to-day. These remarks are perhaps not directly relevant to the matters we are discussing at this moment.

With what my right hon. Friend the Member for the Drake Division (Captain Guest) said, I am in entire agreement. He spoke of the days before the war and said, speaking for himself, that he did not know who our friends were in Europe, that the whole matter was shrouded in the obscurity of secret diplomacy, and that it would be very desirable if this country could say plainly, in the event of the Disarmament Conference failing, where she stood and who were her friends. I think that was the gist of what he said. I think it is very important that this country should make clear to the world and to her own people, where she does stand in Europe. That I regard as of

primary importance. No country which has a democracy—and we are almost the last democracy left in Europe—can successfully wage war unless the people are behind it, and the people will not be behind it unless they are convinced that from their point of view it is a just war. Therefore, I am in entire agreement, generally, with what the hon. and gallant Member said, that our people should be told, and constantly told, what the dangers are in the world, how we think they can best be met, and when or where we think the time may come when, for the security of our own shores and our own political liberties, the country must determine to defend herself.

I come to what is the main point of the discussion. I make no complaint at all, indeed I rather welcome the fact, that the discussion has taken place, because I know the anxiety that is felt in the country with regard to the air, especially if the Disarmament Conference should fail and no air limitation be possible. That is an anxiety that has not been lessened by events in Europe during the last few months. The House will remember the statement which I made on behalf of the Government, and which I repeated in the Albert Hall. That statement stands. Some of my friends, again I find no fault, their anxiety is such, want me to say when and in what circumstances the Government will make a more definite declaration. They must to an extent trust the Government. We are as anxious as any member of the House on this matter, and it is impossible to say yet, with the right hon. Gentleman going to Geneva in a fortnight's time, when the moment will come; but I can say something which will allay their anxieties and the anxieties of the House.

Any Member who is familiar with the Air Force is quite well aware that if Estimates were brought in to-day, or if a statement were made to-day, of any given increase in that force it might well be months before a £ could be spent. An enlargement of the Air Force means an immense amount of detailed preparation in a thousand ways. The waste of time would be if the Government waited until it became necessary to make a decision and announce a decision, and said now we are going to make our preparations. But these points are at this moment under consideration, preliminary work

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is being done, so that, if our fears should be realised and it should be necessary to implement that pledge, not a single day will be lost. It is only right that the Government should do that, because I am certain there is general anxiety on this subject. I am also certain, I have said so before, that there is no danger in the near future before this country. There may be less danger in the future than we imagine, and the preparations we are taking are in more than ample time. But I do realise that on no subject could a panic, and an unnecessary panic, be worked up by unscrupulous people more quickly than with regard to the Air, and such a panic would do nothing but harm to this country.

I think I have touched on all the questions raised. With regard to the speech of the hon. Member for Duddleston (Mr. Simmonds), I merely say that he should

have given notice to the Air Minister that he was going to raise that point. He embarked on a very interesting discussion of a very special subject, civil aviation, and it is impossible for us to-day—I have not the knowledge, nor has my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary come prepared—to reply; but I am sure that the matter would interest the House if my hon. Friend would raise it at some time when the Air Estimates are discussed in Committee of Supply. I conclude with the hope that everyone will have as much holiday as he can get.

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Two Minutes before Four o'Clock, until Tuesday, 29th May, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.

PAPER THE TIMES

NUMBER

CITY LONDON

DATE May 19, 1934.

THE TIMES SATURDAY MAY 19 1934

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Parliament

DISARMAMENT

SIR JOHN SIMON'S REVIEW

ALTERNATIVES TO FAILURE

SECURITY AND SANCTIONS

MR. BALDWIN ON AN AIR CONVENTION

WORK OF PREPARATION BEGUN

HOUSE OF COMMONS

FRIDAY, MAY 18

The SPEAKER took the Chair at 11 o'clock.
The Birmingham United Hospital Bill was read the third time.

NEW WRIT

On the motion of Mr. T. GRIFFITHS (Pontypool, Lab.) a new writ was ordered to be issued for the election of a member to fill the vacancy in Merthyr Division of Merthyr Tydfil caused by the death of Mr. R. C. Wallhead.

MILK-BORNE DISEASES

REPORT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BRIG-GEN. BROWN (Newbury, U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he could now announce if he would publish the report of the scientific committee appointed by the Economic Advisory Council to consider the incidence of milk-borne diseases.

Mr. BALDWIN, Lord President of the Council (Bewdley, U.)—This report was presented in dummy yesterday afternoon, and copies will, I hope, be available shortly after Whitson.

PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE HOUSE

A QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE

Mr. LOVAT-FRASER (Lichfield, Nat.Lab.)—I desire to call your attention, Mr. Speaker, to what I conceive to be a breach of the privileges of this House. It is the law that no person may take a photograph within the House of Commons without the permission of the Lord Great Chamberlain or the Sergeant-at-Arms. I hold in my hand a copy of the *Evening Standard* of May 17, 1934 (yesterday), and it contains a picture which is entitled "One of the Bars of the House of Commons." This photograph, I am informed by one of the persons who appear in it, was taken three years ago, but only appeared yesterday. It represents the bar at the head of the stairs on the Committee floor, a bar which exists for the convenience of the general public and the witnesses attending the Committee rooms, and is never used by members of Parliament. I call your attention to this matter in order that you may take such action if any as you may think proper. (Cheers.)

The SPEAKER.—I would remind the hon. member that there is no law against taking photographs in this House. There is a rule, and it appears that on this occasion three years ago somebody evaded the rule and took a photograph. We can tighten up the rule; that is the only thing we can do.

THE WHITSON ADJOURNMENT

On the motion of Mr. BALDWIN, it was agreed that the House should at its rising this day adjourn until Tuesday, May 29.

DISARMAMENT

been taken in a matter of vital importance when the Government were prepared to undertake them in a matter of comparatively lesser importance.

As *The Times* put it, in a rather remarkable article in September, 1933, "The goal of the Japanese is lordship of the Far East." If they were to judge from the outward appearance of the policy of this Government they would be led to believe that this country was either in league with Japan in her aggression or was turning a benevolently blind eye on her obligations and on the obligations of this country both under the Treaty and under the Covenant. No nation would accept disarmament, because no nation could find security in the existing state of affairs, and it now seemed a possibility that the British Government was going to throw in its hand on the disarmament situation.

The Government talked about security and said how necessary it was, but in fact they made security impossible by their actions with regard to Japan. As regarded Europe, the Government had refused all those measures which most people believed to be necessary to give reality to security as opposed to mere paper security, which no one now believed was likely to be effective.

SECURITY AND GUARANTEES

We must be prepared, if we wanted disarmament, to create an atmosphere of security by binding ourselves in advance somehow or other to guarantee the security of the world. That was the key-point of the whole disarmament situation. There might be a chance that bold steps taken now would do something even in the deflated position of the Disarmament Conference to lead the world out of the tangle of the present situation. But so long as the British Government insisted upon complete and absolute freedom for themselves and others in every action, so long would it be impossible to regulate the international security of the world and useless to discuss the technical side of disarmament. To delay the next war would be better than nothing, the longer it could be put off, the more chance there was of the world coming to its senses.

He would like Sir J. Simon to answer four specific questions. First, did this country still stand by the report of the League of Nations in February, 1933, with regard to Japan's position in Manchuria and Jehol under the Nine-Power Treaty? Secondly, did this country repudiate its obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of China, including Manchuria, under the Nine-Power Treaty and Article 10 of the Covenant? Thirdly, was his Majesty's Government prepared not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding with Japan in pursuance of Article 2 of the Nine-Power Treaty, or did they repudiate that article? And, lastly, what was the attitude of his Majesty's Government towards the question of security; was it prepared to sacrifice any part of this country's independence of action and decision in order to attain security?

A LIBERAL VIEW

"THE LAST CHANCE"

SIR F. ACLAND (Cornwall, N. L.) said that he refused to believe the statements in the Press that when the Disarmament Conference re-assembled it would be announced by the chief nations of the world that they had agreed that the Conference must come to an end because nothing more could be done. If that statement was true it would be realized not only in that House but outside that nothing more full of disaster for the world had been announced from the Government bench since 1914. He refused to believe that the Conference could die. Let them go on in the spirit of the appeal of the leaders of the Church, subordinating all party and national interests to the interest of the peace of the world.

An assurance had been given to Germany that the reduction and limitation of armaments imposed on Germany was in order to render possible a general limitation of the armaments of this country and other countries gave, meant anything at all, it meant that within 15 years at any rate there should be general agreement on some scheme of limitation. (Hear, hear.) No nation which gave that assurance could honourably go back on it. Were all the efforts and the opportunities of the last few years to go for nothing? Surely that could not be, and would not be.

Although chances had been lost, this last chance should be taken of getting something accomplished. Would there not be worse or more tragic inevitability in the only two alternative possibilities, alliances or isolation? Was there safety in isolation? If a competition in arms started, would not sooner or later the guns go off almost by themselves? If that happened, were people quite sure that they could keep out of it? Had those who took the *Daily Mail* view learnt nothing and forgotten everything? Did they not realize that there was one thing only perhaps which raised a hope for the world out of all this? That was the utter hope of the old principle that if they wanted peace they must prepare for war? Our people, particularly those young men and women who had

sanctions. The best way to reassure public opinion in the country would be for the Government to state that if the Disarmament Conference failed they would set up an international commission consisting not only of members of the League but of signatories to the Kellogg Pact, who would carefully explore the possibilities of the refusal of credits, an embargo on munitions or foodstuffs, or even if necessary a blockade as an alternative to armed warfare.

AN UNDERSTANDING WITH JAPAN

SIR R. KEYES'S PLEA

SIR R. KEYES (Portsmouth, N. U.) said that one thing was quite certain, that if the policy which Sir S. Cripps and his friends so often urged was carried into effect this country was eventually bound to be involved in a war with Japan. It was difficult to reconcile the attitude of the Opposition on this subject with their attitude towards Singapore, which was a vitally important link in the defence of Australia and New Zealand.

Japan was destined to play a very big part in the future of the East, and he was convinced that she would go forward to her destiny with unswerving determination. (Hear, hear.) He had always thought that it was a deplorable mistake on our part to terminate our alliance with Japan, which was of immense value to us in the East with a guarantee of peace in Eastern waters. (Hear, hear.) It gave us an influence over Japan's actions; she paid great attention to our advice, and she would do so again if we gave her the chance. He recommended the Government to do all that was in their power to return to the excellent understanding with Japan that existed in those days. We should have to come to an understanding over commercial interests, and it would be of very great benefit to this Empire and to our interests in the East if we could come to a thorough and good understanding with Japan. (Hear, hear.)

He believed that there were many members of that House and some millions of people in the country who shared his view that the greatest guarantee of world peace was a strong and properly defended British Empire, and that the Government had gone to the very limits of disarmament. In the interests of peace he would urge the Government with a thought to the defence of the Empire in proper order. (Hear, hear.)

ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE AND ITALY

CAPTAIN CAZALET (Chippenham, U.) said that he had to treat Japan with great tact and courtesy, and the one thing that he must not do was to bully or dictate to her. Did Sir S. Cripps suggest that we should go to war with Japan? Any action on the lines which he had suggested would lead not only to great complications for this country, but also for Australia.

This country had made two fundamental mistakes since 1919. We had shirked the issue of French security, and the League of Nations had always tried to make us believe that small nations were as important as big ones. If France was attacked again we should come in, whether we liked it or not. If that was so, why did we not give to France those guarantees of security for which she had been asking since 1919? The Government should advocate a close alliance with France and Italy. If they did that, they would have the united support of the Little Entente. It would be much fairer all round, and from the point of view of Germany as well, that Germany should see that it was impossible now or at any time to drive a wedge between ourselves and France. It was the policy of doubt and of keeping Europe guessing as to what this country might do which precipitated the last war and might easily precipitate a similar position to-morrow.

If this close alliance were formed and the Government stated their views unquestionably, we could say to Germany: "We quite realize in this country that you have certain grievances and you have the right to certain amendments." We read the leading article in *The Times* on May 9 would there find a very fair representation of what a great many people in this country thought were Germany's rights in regard to armaments. The independence of Austria was as vital to the peace of Europe as was that of Belgium during the last century. We should stand behind the declaration of February 17 and make our position clear to France and Italy that we were behind them in this matter.

Mr. MANDER (Wolverhampton, E. L.) said that the risk involved in the League's applying economic sanctions was far less than the risk of allowing armed force to stalk naked in the world without opposition or obstruction. The Government were right in their policy of regarding disarmament as infinitely more important than the reform of the League. They had given a splendid lead at Geneva in connection with the Chaco report, and he hoped that they would do the same in regard to disarmament on May 29.

SIR J. SIMON'S REPLY FRIENDSHIP WITH JAPAN

subject of the greatest importance in the view of Japan as well as ourselves. In view of that what was it suggested that his Majesty's Government should do?

Some people would say that it was quite right to address this Note to Japan, and to define the essential claims of this country in courteous and friendly terms, but that when we got the very answer for which we asked we should have said: "We do not believe you." If that was the way we were to proceed in foreign affairs someone else should be Foreign Minister. (Cheers.) Nothing could be less likely to produce a peaceful solution. (Cheers.) He gathered that in the view of the Opposition and some others a great deal of dissatisfaction was felt at the way in which this matter had been handled. He would point out that neither the Lytton Report nor the League of Nations resolution on the subject ever proposed that sanctions should be imposed upon Japan. (Cheers.) The recommendation in both cases was that the best way was to proceed by the method of conciliation and agreement.

QUESTION OF SANCTIONS

He (Sir J. Simon) regretted as much as anybody that there had not been a greater measure of agreement between China and Japan in the Far East, but it was a complete confusion of ideas to suppose that in abstaining from seeking to apply sanctions anyone was departing from the Lytton Report or from the recommendations of the League of Nations itself. As regarded Sir S. Cripps's question anyone who heard that question would have supposed that the Nine-Power Treaty contained some clause by which this country undertook to respect and preserve the integrity of Chinese territory. It contained no such clause. It was not true that we had ever signed, or that anyone else had ever signed, a treaty with China in which we had pledged ourselves to use all our forces to preserve the integrity and political independence of China.

No doubt there would always be a difference of opinion as to the general view that the League of Nations had grossly mishandled this Far-Eastern question. Lord Grey, in one of the very last pronouncements which he made, said that the League had failed in its view of the Far-Eastern trouble were not justified. The League, he said, had been a restraining influence from the beginning. He was entitled to say on this much-debated question that he had the authority of Lord Grey, the leader of Sir F. Acland, in taking a view exactly opposite to his, and that the true view was that in a very difficult situation neither the League of Nations nor the Government were really exposed to these reproaches legitimately.

REFORM OF THE LEAGUE

Turning to the question of reform of the League of Nations, Sir J. Simon said that he had doubts as to whether it would be wise to say anything publicly from that box about it. He was faced with the difficulty which constantly faced a Foreign Secretary when he was replying to a Foreign Office debate. He always had to remember when speaking from that box that he was not simply throwing into the pool a few ideas which afterwards perhaps might be sorted out, but that he might be thought to be indicating some definite Government decision which would have reactions elsewhere. He was quite deliberately putting before the House of Commons and anyone else who considered his remarks two or three reflections on the subject, because it was necessary that they should clear their minds on it.

At present the Covenant of the League of Nations was, it was true, capable of amendment. It contained, like the rules of a club, an article prescribing exactly how you could alter the covenant. You could only alter it if there was unanimity among the members of the Council of the League. One opposition would defeat an amendment. Then, having got first of all unanimity in the Council of the League, the matter was pronounced upon by the Assembly by a majority. If there was any State which was a member of the Council which objected to a proposed amendment, the amendment could not take place. It was very material to remember that before one talked too lightly about fundamental changes in the structure of the League.

It was true that there had been some amendments made, but they had all been made under that procedure. The particular article to which Mr. Locker-Lampson called attention and which he rightly said had a very material bearing on the question of the cooperation of the States in the League, was Article 10, and Article 10, in general terms, provided that members of the League undertook to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of all members of the League. In other words, under Article 10, all the boundaries of the Peace Treaties stood as an object for preservation by members. There was, it was true, another article which contemplated the possibility of boundaries being modified, but that again required an amount of agreement which unquestionably made it very difficult.

QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES

The real truth was that, as the outcome of the War, there were States whose policy and inclination were to try to keep boundaries as they were, and other States whose policy and inclination were to try to alter boundaries. To a very large extent, but not universally, the boundary was the same between what were called

Majesty's Government as could possibly be imagined. There were endless considerations connected with it. They must not assume that there was something that they might call an economic sanction different from war which could lightly be applied to all and sundry without the risk of war. (Ministerial cheers.) There seemed to be a very large number of people who were no doubt most deeply and sincerely interested in this subject, as all intelligent young citizens should be, but all he asked them to bear in mind was that one did not solve this problem by talking rather light-heartedly and airily about financial and economic pressure. They had to ask themselves: "Supposing this was done, are we sure that the State upon which this pressure is applied is going to take it like the schoolboy receiving the chastisement or the reproach of his master? Is it not possible that he may say: 'You may explain to me that it is not an unfriendly act; but that is not my view? My view is that it is.' " (Cheers and laughter.) That was an extremely elementary reflection, but having regard to the communications which he got from many members of the public it appeared that most of his correspondents had not thought about that view.

He supposed that they were all agreed that they would not approve of some system which, though it could be used with great safety against the little people, could not be used with any safety against the big people. He was not disputing that if all the Great Powers set to work they might be able to put a great deal of pressure on a small Power without running much risk, but the thing he had to try to consider was what was the nature of the pressure that could be applied by international action through the League which was really fairly applied as between the great and the small.

Another reflection was that it was not the fact, as some people seemed to suppose, that once they had managed to work out a system of economic sanctions, they could keep it as if it were a formula in a drawer and have the prescription made up and the dose applied to whoever over the face of the earth at the moment happened to need the dose. It was not a specific which could be concocted out of a formula, however carefully the formula could be applied. It depended in each case on what was the particular State against which they were proposing to put the pressure, and, secondly, on what other States were really and truly going to join in putting that pressure.

COOPERATION OF THE U.S.

It was absolutely no use talking about economic pressure unless they were going to make certain that it was going to be effective. So far as the principal countries of Europe were concerned, they could not, as a matter of fact, make a system effective unless the United States of America actively cooperated. We all in this country acknowledged with every possible gratitude the contributions which the United States was able to make towards the improvement of international affairs. The United States was, in fact, one of the principal authors of the Covenant, and, of course, it was a matter of great regret to the rest of them that when the time came the United States was not prepared to join the League.

But it was not a matter for us to reproach anybody with. It merely was to be observed as a fact, but notwithstanding that, the United States had constantly made the most valuable contributions towards the work which the League of Nations was trying to do. There was no good in our pretending not to observe the limitations within which the United States was likely to act. In the course of the discussions on the British Draft Convention at Geneva, the British Government tried to put into the Articles what was called the Consultative Pact, to provide that if there were a threat of a breach of the Kellogg Pact there should be a consultation between the signatories, and that action should then be discussed and decided upon, and they would endeavour to act together.

He was responsible for the final form in which those Articles were drafted. He drafted them with Mr. Stimson's Declaration before his eyes, because his object was to present on behalf of the British Government something which, as far as he could see, was exactly in the form most likely to secure American support. When the matter came to be discussed the American representative, Mr. Norman Davis, made a very careful declaration. He said:—

"We are willing to consult with other States in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the States in conference determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsibility and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which the States may thus make to restore peace."

Nothing could be clearer than that. He was not going to invite anybody to deny that it was

valuable, but it was quite absurd to pretend that that declaration, solemnly made with the authority of the American Government at Geneva, encouraged us to believe that America would take full part in economic sanctions. The subject of economic sanctions was more difficult and complicated than many people supposed, and the real reason why there was this rather sudden wave of dejection and alarm was that we had exhausted the time when we could usefully express ourselves in perfectly sincere platitudes, and we were right up against the hard facts of the situation. The only way to deal with the question was by dealing with it in detail, facing each separate difficulty and finding an answer. That was a terribly hard thing to do. Peace and disarmament were the subjects of every good man's discourse on Sunday and week-day. There was not a sentence in the admirably phrased speech of Sir F. Acland which would not be perfectly appropriate at any peace meeting, whether in a sacred or secular edifice at any time in the last 20 years. (Laughter.) Genuine sentiment could be used as the steam which drove the engine, but the structure of the engine remained one of the most complicated things in the whole world.

POSITION AT GENEVA

THE BRITISH LEAD

What, then, was to be the position that the British Government would take up when they went to Geneva in a few days? He altogether refused to take the view that we were at the end of a miserable adventure. It was going to be a frightful disaster for the world if we had to face the fact that nothing effective could be done.

There was no sacrifice or novelty of suggestion that was not worth facing rather than that. He hoped the whole House would agree that it was in that spirit that they ought to return to Geneva. Do not let them make any mistake as to what the real difficulty was. The British Government had in this matter given a lead throughout the world. They were the one Great Power that first of all set the example by unilateral reduction of armaments, they were the one Power at Geneva which had produced a connected scheme, they were the only Power at Geneva that had dared to mention a figure. It was very gratifying that when that was done resolutions were passed approving the British draft convention as a basis of ultimate agreement. But the fact was that there had been gathered in the course of months objections and reservations almost innumerable, and it would really not be practicable to pretend that the British draft convention had not become surrounded by an enormous entanglement of exceptions and doubts that made one's heart of its being adopted much less confident.

What did they do? Last summer the Disarmament Convention, in fact, came to a full stop. It did not know how to go on. It seemed to the British Government that they ought to take the great responsibility of saying that they did not believe the method of discussion between 64 nations—every one with its special point—was likely to produce agreement, and that they must see if they could not reduce the differences between, at any rate, some of the principal States in Europe. They started, with Mr. Henderson's warm approval—and he acknowledged most sincerely all the help which Mr. Henderson had been willing to give him at the Disarmament Conference—these parallel and separate conversations. The House had seen the results in the White Paper and could see whether the British Government were dilatory, careless, or indifferent in this matter. It was not true.

BREAKDOWN "A CALAMITY"

They thought it was necessary to modify the British draft convention and they produced their memorandum of January 29 last. They had discussions with the principal Powers in Europe. The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Eden) went on behalf of the Government to Paris, Rome, Berlin, and again to Paris, and they succeeded in getting a thing which was a very significant contribution—the formal statement approved by the German Government of what modifications in the British proposals the German Government would be content to accept. It was a very difficult thing to tie people down in black and white as to precisely what they regarded as their requirements. Having got that, they approached other Governments and said:—"We have done with great precision, and here are the results. How far is it possible for you to go?" They had had several replies, which could be seen in the White Paper. He believed that the French Government were going to publish on Monday what they called a Yellow-book, which would contain the same material and, it might be, one

or two other documents. He would ask anyone on examining the British White Paper or the French Yellow-book to say whether it was not true that this matter had been pursued with the greatest possible energy and diligence by the British Government.

They were now going to hear at Geneva the views of others. They had asked questions and they would listen with great attention to the answers. He did not believe that they ought at this stage to go to Geneva and start a new initiative. He thought they ought to say:—"This is the effort we have made; this is what we have done; we have tried to bring it up to date, and we really ought to hear now what other people think about it and what positive plan they can suggest."

That being so (the right hon. gentleman concluded), I trust the high hopes that have been expressed here that some way may be found out of these terrible anxieties will be found. I offer on behalf of the whole Government the assurance that nothing shall be found wanting in trying to continue to play our full part in saving the world from what would undoubtedly be a most serious calamity—the breakdown of the Conference and the disappointment of hopes which we have all entertained for such a long time. Do not let us take the foolish view of supposing that if that happens it means the end of the world. On the contrary, on the very day that it does happen we have all of us to start a new effort for the same purpose. At the moment it is very foolish to announce these funeral arrangements while we may still be able to make something out of the approaching meeting. Be that as it may, I believe that the determination and vigour of the country and of the Government will have its proper reflection. (Cheers.)

AIR PARITY

CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN THE SERVICES

SIR E. GRIGG (Aldershot, U.) said that the Government and the country had nothing to be ashamed of in their record. If the Disarmament Conference broke down the first necessity for this country would be that of increasing our Air Force and establishing air parity at the earliest possible moment. This country clearly had to face the fact that considerable expansion, accompanied by heavy expenditure, was inevitable, and he hoped that there would be something more than departmental planning of that expansion and that expenditure. There was no very clear dividing line between the functions of the Army and of the Air Service, and he desired to know if the Government was satisfied that there was no unnecessary duplication between the two Services.

It was impossible for the Prime Minister to undertake all the work of co-ordination which was necessary at the present time. He urged that the Government should appoint an *ad hoc* committee to go into the question of co-ordination and cooperation in Service matters at once. The personnel of this committee should consist of men who could give the time necessary for such a task. But, although he was convinced that the time had come when this country must look to its own defences before everything else, they could not rest content and complacent with that. The present state of the world was by general confession tragic. Nationalism, which was the portent of our time, was tearing our civilization to pieces. This country had an absolutely imperative interest not merely in trying to prevent war but also in doing anything that might be possible to reduce the tension in the world, particularly in Europe, at the present time. There was among our people a moral detestation of war, and the necessity for increasing our defences would cause a good deal of disappointment and opposition unless it was made quite clear that this country was prepared to use its forces in some collective system for the maintenance of peace. He disagreed entirely with some of the speeches which had been made in the debate suggesting that the Government should undertake obligations of the gravest kind without any regard to the maintenance of the forces which would obviously be needed to fulfil those obligations. (Cheers.)

CAPTAIN GUEST (Plymouth, Drake, U.) said that if hon. members had pressed the Liberator of the House during the last few months they had done so solely because they were anxious to strengthen his hands. He was perfectly satisfied to leave the decision in regard to the strengthening of our air forces in the right hon. gentleman's hands.

The foundation of all military aviation was civil aviation, and the Air Ministry would be

(Continued on next page)



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

an informed by one of the persons who appear in it, was taken three years ago, but only appeared yesterday. It represents the bar at the head of the stairs on the Committee floor, a bar which exists for the convenience of the general public and the witnesses attending the Committee rooms, and is never used by members of Parliament. I call your attention to this matter in order that you may take such action if any as you may think proper. (Cheers.)

The SPEAKER—I would remind the hon. member that there is no law against taking photographs in this House. There is a rule, and it appears that on this occasion three years ago somebody evaded the rule and took a photograph. We can tighten up the rule; that is the only thing we can do.

THE WHITSUN ADJOURNMENT

On the motion of Mr. BALDWIN, it was agreed that the House should, at its rising this day, adjourn until Tuesday, May 29.

DISARMAMENT

SIR S. CRIPPS AND JAPAN

On the motion for the adjournment, SIR S. CRIPPS (Bristol, E., Lab.) said he wished to raise the question of the attitude of his Majesty's Government towards Japan in view of the very serious threat to the peace of the East and indeed the peace of the whole world which had resulted from the actions of Japan during the last year. He also desired to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question in regard to the Disarmament Conference.

The action of Japan in invading Manchuria and the incidents which took place at the same time in Shanghai were the first step of a design by which Japan should gain preponderating power throughout the whole of the East. That design in its initial stages succeeded because of the weakness and vacillation of the Governments who were represented on the League of Nations—in which weakness and vacillation our Government took a leading part. Since that time Japan had extended her conquests in the North of China. She had withdrawn from the League for the somewhat naive reasons that she could not agree with the other members of the League with regard to the interpretation of treaties and the fundamental principles of international law. The reasons for her withdrawal and the fact of her withdrawal were of vital importance because they demonstrated the value that could be attached to Japanese statements with regard to the keeping of treaties. That there was a flagrant breach was determined by the rest of the world, and Japan still insisted that her actions in the case of Manchuria were not breaches of that treaty but were apparently consistent with the terms of it.

Following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan was now engaged in converting Manchuria and Jehol into a great military base, with strategic roads and railways, ready for some further adventure. Japan constituted herself, on her own statement, as the judge of what benefited China and whether she would permit other countries to engage in technical or financial assistance to that country. They were left with the perfectly plain claim and assertion by the Japanese Government that she proposed to continue in her breach of the Nine-Power Treaty and to extend that breach throughout Northern China. Apparently the British Government was allowing Japan to continue in breach of the obligations both under the Covenant and the Nine-Power Treaty. It was no wonder, in those circumstances, that people demanded some very special degree of security before disarming. (Opposition cheers.)

MILITARIST EXPANSION

This was not merely a question of honour and treaty keeping, which apparently had no great appeal for the National Government, but it was also a question of expediency. Japan was obviously embarking upon a policy of militarist expansion, and there were two alternative directions which that expansion might take—either Russia or China. At the moment Russia's strength had apparently modified the desire expressed not long ago by some Japanese militarists to make an incursion into Siberia. The alternative was North China, where it seemed to be undisputed now that Japan would shortly set up a second Manchukuo in the northern parts, and if that attempt was made, what was going to be the attitude of the British Government? Presumably when Japan had digested North China she would be ready to take a bite at South China, and so we and other European States would be gradually forced out of the country altogether.

The time had come to call a definite halt to this type of behaviour. If the League was to continue to attempt to handle the situation in the East, it was extremely desirable that we should try to get as close an association with Russia, America, and the League as possible. It seemed possible that an anti-League combination might easily grow up based on the Japanese and German strength and in that case it was vital that every step should be taken to strengthen the League. No step in that direction could be more fruitful than the inclusion of Russia in the League. The British Government were not prepared to take any economic steps to bring pressure on Japan at the time of the Manchukuo crisis, but they were prepared to take very rapid steps when the Lancashire cotton industry suffered, and it seemed a pity that these steps could not have

anything at all, it meant that within 15 years at any rate there should be general agreement on some scheme of limitation. (Hear, hear.) No nation which gave that assurance could honourably go back on it. Were all the efforts and the opportunities of the last few years to go for nothing? Surely that could not be, and would not be.

Although chances had been lost, this last chance should be taken of getting something accomplished. Would there not be a worse or more tragic inevitability in the only two alternative possibilities, alliances or isolation? Was there safety in isolation? If a competition in arms started, would not sooner or later the guns go off almost by themselves? If that happened, were people quite sure that we could keep out of it? Had those who took the *Daily Mail* view learnt nothing and forgotten everything? Did they not realize that there was one thing only perhaps which raised a hope for the world out of the Great War, and that was the utter folly of the old principle that if they wanted peace they must prepare for war? Our people, particularly those young men and women who had grown up since the War, would not be content to go back to pre-War methods of war prevention or attempted war prevention.

This Government would be held responsible, among others, if there was a collapse, which was confidently and hopefully foretold by some of the organs of the Press. Although the failure of the Disarmament Conference would not mean the end of the world, it would surely mean the end of all real chance of a truly civilized world. It would be the substitution of fear and suspicion, those twin curses of the human mind, for trust as the motive power of mankind. Surely we could pull ourselves together at this fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour and prevent what we were told so confidently was certain to happen. Surely this Empire, which was so peaceful from one end of it to the other, could use its great power in the cause of disarmament. It was well worth taking great risks for peace, seeing how much greater were the risks of war. In courage, and in courage only, could the Government find safety in this terrible crisis.

REFORM OF THE LEAGUE

"OLD DIPLOMACY" RETURNING

Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON (Wood Green, U.) expressed the regret of the House at the absence of Sir A. Chamberlain and the hope that he would quickly recover from the effects of his accident. (Hear, hear.) Continuing, he said that the reform of the League of Nations was bound indissolubly with the question of disarmament. The future of the League was the most important matter for civilization to-day. If it failed, the world would be back in the position in which it was before 1914. (Hear, hear.) In spite of the 13 years of its life and activities, and the enormous sums spent on the League, armaments had increased prodigiously during the last decade. In spite of any amount of lip-service to the League, international settlements were more and more being made outside the League, without any previous consultation with the League, or any participation of the League in them. The old diplomacy was rapidly returning. The whole of Europe was preparing for another war, and ours was the only country which all along had done its best to disarm—(hear, hear)—which had been a pioneer, and which had given an example. (Cheers.)

The reason of the failure of the League in the prime of its creation was self-evident. Four out of the seven Great Powers were not members. Only a minority of the Great Powers—Italy, France, and ourselves—were members, and Italy the other day gave a good deal more than a hint that unless the League was reformed she might leave it. The two main reasons why there were still four Great Powers outside the League were the incorporation of the Covenant in the peace treaties and the sanctions embodied in Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. What possible chance was there of the revision of the treaties as far as Germany was concerned? The Covenant almost seemed to have been drawn to prevent it, and, in fact, it had been so used over and over again. Could they wonder that Germany left the League, knowing the hopelessness of ever obtaining revision? Could they wonder that the United States refused to join when, by so doing, she would be guaranteeing the very treaties she had refused to ratify? So long as the United States and the other Great Powers refused to join the League there was no hope of disarmament. The League was the only instrument by which disarmament could be obtained, but it had got to be a proper League containing the Great Powers as its members.

It might be difficult to amend the Covenant, but it was not impossible. All that it required was statesmanship, determination, goodwill, and a lead from this country. Had the Government thought out a policy of reform, and did they still adhere to the opinion that the question of disarmament ought to be settled before the question of reform?

So far as disarmament was concerned, the League to-day was largely a make-believe, and it was impotent because of its fragmentary character, but the British Government by their immense authority all over the world could help to convert it into a vital force.

Miss RATHBONE (English Universities, Ind.) said that the failure of the League in the Sino-Manchurian dispute, the failure of the Disarmament Conference, and the drift towards isolation suggested that the only hope for obtaining security was through economic

who read the leading article in *The Times* on May 9 would there find a very fair representation of what a great many people in this country thought were Germany's rights in regard to armaments. The independence of Austria was as vital to the peace of Europe as was that of Belgium during the last century. We should stand behind the declaration of February 17 and make our position clear to France and Italy that we were behind them in this matter.

Mr. MANDER (Wolverhampton, E., L.) said that the risk involved in the League's applying economic sanctions was far less than the risk of allowing armed force to stalk naked in the world without opposition or obstruction. The Government were right in their policy of regarding disarmament as infinitely more important than the reform of the League. They had given a splendid lead at Geneva in connexion with the Chaco report, and he hoped that they would do the same in regard to disarmament on May 29.

SIR J. SIMON'S REPLY

FRIENDSHIP WITH JAPAN

SIR J. SIMON, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Spencer Valley, L.Nat.), said that debates of this sort had undoubtedly very great educational value. A characteristic of this debate was first of all the expression of that which they all felt, a deep concern in the presence of an international situation which was felt to be full of difficulty and, it might be, very threatening for the future. On the other hand, there was a quite astounding diversity of remedy which those who had taken part in the debate so confidently recommended.

He would do his best to make a few observations which he was sure would not be as illuminating as much that had been said. There was a difference between the responsibility that rested upon his Majesty's Government in these matters and the very proper freedom which was used by hon. members, and very usefully used, in a discussion of this sort. He wished quite briefly to deal first with some remarks that had been made about the Far East. Sir S. Cripps had made it the principle topic of his speech, and he gave the House a review of what had occurred. Almost the only recent document which he did not think it worth while either to read or to summarize was the communication which was made by his Majesty's Government to the Japanese Government and the answer which the Japanese Government then gave. Although some semi-official announcements had been made in Japan which aroused anxieties and doubts in many quarters, and in other countries besides this, it was this country, which had always been told that it never took the initiative and never gave a lead, which proceeded to address Japan on the subject.

What the Government did was none the worse because it was, as he avowed at the time, a friendly communication. He himself took the initiative, and in friendship with Japan. The Government addressed a friendly communication, and it was one which was very much to the point. They said that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, to which Japan was a party, and that his Majesty's Government must, of course, insist upon the due observance of the Treaty. They said that the rights which different foreign nations had in connexion with China were common to all signatories except in so far as any particular country might have a special right recognized by other Powers and not shared by them. There was a little misunderstanding about the last phrase he had quoted. It was not conceding that there was any general claim which would be admitted in favour of Japan, but it was merely making manifest the fact that many foreign Powers, including our own, had certain specially stipulated rights in that part of the world which Japan did not challenge and which were admitted by third parties—for example, certain international settlements or certain rights in connexion with particular revenues.

THE NINE-POWER TREATY

The British Government pointed out in the next place that if, as they gathered from this unofficial declaration, the anxiety that was felt in Japan on the subject had anything to do with preserving the peace of China and maintaining good relations between China and Japan, that certainly could not apply to this country or its policy because we were as devoted as anybody could be to both those purposes. They said that the Nine-Power Treaty itself contained provisions which would enable any signatory to raise questions of difficulty with the others, and they therefore presumed that he knew of no other way in which this country could address a foreign Power—that whatever was being said was not said in any way because it was intended to infringe the common rights of other Powers in China nor to infringe China's own Treaty obligations.

The first question which seemed to him to arise if anybody was going to review and criticize this matter was: Was that a proper note to write? It seemed to him that it was at once firm and courteous and to the point.

A solemn assurance was given by the Japanese Foreign Minister to his Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo that Japan would observe the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, that the policy of the Japanese Government and his Majesty's Government coincided, and that the maintenance of the open door in China was a

ments made, but they had all been made under that procedure. The particular article to which Mr. Locker-Lampson called attention and which he rightly said had a very material bearing on the question of the cooperation of some States in the League, was Article 10, and Article 10, in general terms, provided that members of the League undertook to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of all members of the League. In other words, under Article 10, all the boundaries of the Peace Treaties stood as an object for preservation by members. There was, it was true, another article which contemplated the possibility of boundaries being modified, but that again required an amount of agreement which unquestionably made it very difficult.

QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES

The real truth was that, as the outcome of the War, there were some States whose policy and inclination were to try to keep boundaries as they were, and other States whose policy and inclination were to try to alter boundaries. To a very large extent, but not universally, the boundary was the same between what were called the victorious Powers, if, indeed, after a war there were any victorious Powers—(hear, hear)—and the other Powers. Some States had a policy which aimed at keeping boundaries as they were, and others might be expected to raise questions as to the legitimacy of this boundary or the other. Here was the problem, and he did not see the solution of it.

They had to consider how it was possible to amend the covenant of the League so as to effect these matters, so vital to the policies of different nations, with the result that they would not lose people from the League, but would bring in others who were at present outside. In an earlier debate he declared his own view, and he thought that it was the view of the Government, that it was extremely doubtful whether it was well to enter on this most complicated and controversial question side by side with a discussion about disarmament, and he took the view—he believed that it was the view held by Signor Mussolini, although he himself was one of those who would like to see the Covenant of the League reconsidered—that the business of negotiating disarmament was already such a frightfully difficult task, and presented such an enormous number of topics on which people might differ and argue to the world's end, that to throw into the arena as a sort of make-weight, and at the same time discuss how they could amend the Covenant of the League of Nations, would not be the most likely way of reaching an agreement.

GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE

QUESTION OF REVISION

There was a second reason. If they looked at the Italian memorandum they would find that it contained the statement of the view of the Italian Government, which Signor Mussolini expressed to him personally. It was that if they could reach an agreement in respect of disarmament which Germany could accept, sign, and take part in, he thought it really ought to be what he called a fundamental counterpart of such an agreement that Germany should return to the League of Nations.

He (Sir J. Simon) took the view that if they were going to revise the Covenant of the League they wanted to have Germany there, in the League of Nations, to help in the revision. To attempt to revive the Covenant of the League without Germany was outside of it was a very doubtful excursion. He therefore doubted very much whether this difficult question of reforming the terms of the Covenant could be taken up at the same time as disarmament itself.

All that was subject to review. The cause of this prolonged disarmament discussion was undoubtedly very disturbing and it might be that the difficulty of making the progress which we so earnestly wanted, and which the British Government were going to exert themselves to do to the very last minute and the very last ounce, might be found to be so great that we had to consider whether or not we should make the way more easy by raising other questions as well. There was a good deal of wisdom in the saying that a structure which was so elaborately put together and, indeed, which represented such a careful balance, should not be pulled to pieces until they had a pretty clear idea of what it was they were going to put in its place. Once a general proposition was accepted by everybody that the Covenant of the League as it stood would not do, unless they were quite sure that they knew rapidly how they could get everybody to agree to put something in its place, they might strike such a blow at the whole design of the League of Nations as would only add to the difficulties of the situation. He hoped that those remarks would not be interpreted as designed to indicate some new departure of his Majesty's Government, but he felt that it was due to the House that he should explain as clearly as he could some of the considerations which were very much in his mind on this most important subject.

SANCTIONS AND WAR

He would like to say a word with equal frankness on another matter which had been much mentioned in the debate to-day, but again he was not pronouncing some formal cut-and-dried decision. It was quite true that there was an article in the Covenant which made a reference to economic sanctions. That subject had received, and was receiving, as close a study from his

to secure American support. When the matter came to be discussed the American representative, Mr. Norman Davis, made a very careful declaration. He said:

"We are willing to consult with other States in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the States in concert determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which the States may thus make to restore peace."

Nothing could be clearer than that. He was not going to invite anybody to deny that it was

the British proposals the German Government would be content to accept. It was a very difficult thing to tie people down in black and white as to precisely what they regarded as their requirements. Having got that, they approached other Governments and said:—"We have done our best not only to take soundings but to speak with great precision, and here are the results. How far is it possible for you to go?" They had had several replies, which could be seen in the White Paper. He believed that the French Government were going to publish on Monday what they called a Yellow-book, which would contain the same material and, it might be, one

the maintenance of the forces which would obviously be needed to fulfil those obligations. (Cheers.)

CAPTAIN GUEST (Plymouth, Drake, U.) said that if hon. members had pressed the Leader of the House during the last few months they had done so solely because they were anxious to strengthen his hands. He was perfectly satisfied to leave the decision in regard to the strengthening of our air forces in the right hon. gentleman's hands.

The foundation of all military aviation was civil aviation, and the Air Ministry would be

(Continued on next page)



Dry—
but not
Acid!

'Which is the way to Slim-well?'
'Just follow the White-way'

WHITEWAY'S DRY CYDER

FOR ladies who are SLIMMING.

FOR men who are BEGINNING TO PUT ON WEIGHT.

FOR sufferers from RHEUMATIC complaints.

FOR the CONNOISSEUR who appreciates a dry wine.

1/- PER SCREW QUART FLAGON

(Bottle Extra and allowed on return)

BOTTLED EXCLUSIVELY AT OUR OWN CELLARS

Parliament

(Continued from page 7)

well advised to make the utmost use of the great voluntary effort which was represented by civil aviation. There should be more co-ordination among the lower ranks of the Services. The Army must be made air-minded, but equally the air must be made ground-minded. Immediate action by the Government was necessary.

NIGHT FLYING

Mr. SIMMONDS (Birmingham, Duddeston, U.) raised the question of night flying and night air services. He said that if there was another war in the air it would be more by night than by day. While Germany had seven night air services in operation, six of which were internal, we had not developed similar services. If it was desirable, for financial and national reasons, to have a night air service, we ought not to wait till there was a demand but should create it. We were giving Germany a monopoly of night air experience which we might very much regret in years to come. There was a case for much greater investigation on the part of the Air Ministry.

CAPTAIN BALFOUR (Isle of Thanet, U.) said that he did not despair of a Convention limiting the utility of aircraft. He hoped the Convention would be drafted on the lines of codifying the rules of aerial warfare. When the time came for the consideration of such a Convention, the whole machinery of the Government should be used to educate those doubtful and ignorant electors who owed no allegiance to any party so that the unpopular reservations with regard to the bombing of outlying areas and the opposition of this country to the internationalization of civil aviation were understood.

*SIR M. SUETER (Hertford, U.) said that while we had been marking time other countries had greatly increased their air armament. Japan was going to be a great Power in the East, and we ought to be in a position to protect our interests there. We could not do that with only 50 cruisers.

Mr. HALEY (Hanley, U.) said that if there ever was a time in the history of this country when money ought to be spent liberally upon the Air Service that time was the present.

"NO CAUSE FOR PANIC"

MR. BALDWIN'S WARNING

Mr. BALDWIN said that it would not be expected that he should touch upon any of the matters which had been discussed during the earlier part of the debate. When he learned of the trend of the latter part of the debate would be he felt that one or two points had been raised which ought to be dealt with by a senior member of the Government. The House should not assume that the Disarmament Conference was going to break down, and should bear in mind what the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said. They should not lose all heart or despair if, for the time being, it did break down, but should remember that concentrated efforts for peace had scarcely been made, if they had been made at all, until the years after the War. It was impossible to imagine that they were going to change the habit which was engrained in human nature from the beginning of time in 10 years. The world was full of people who were as keen as the keenest of those present in the House to fight this evil of war. The fight would go on, whatever happened at the Disarmament Conference, but they should be no more depressed because the whole world was not immediately renouncing war than they should lose faith in Christianity because, after 2,000 years, it did not yet govern the world.

The scheme of coastal defences of this country was quite complete by sea and air, and the schemes were reviewed every year. They were being proceeded with at the very slow pace which the present economic condition of the country permitted. If it became necessary or vitally important to the defences of the country, and if the clouds were threatening, their preparation could be speeded up, but it was rather economic considerations to-day than want of preparation that delayed progress.

LIMITATION OF AIR FORCES
Limitation was probably the only practicable form of disarmament in the air. If they could get limitation no single power was in a position of such superiority that the temptation to attack became too much. But there was a corollary. If there was limitation it was difficult to see how they could avoid sanctions against anyone who broke the limitation. The moment they were up against sanctions they were up against war. (Cheers.) One of the conclusions to which he had been driven as a result of his close study of these questions during the past 12 years was that there was no such thing as a sanction which would work which did not mean war, or, in other words, if they adopted sanctions they must be ready for war, and if they adopted them without being ready for war they were not honest trustees of the nation. (Cheers.)

He had been much struck by an article by Professor Zimmermann which bore out the contention that force was the essence of the collective maintenance of peace, and if they were going in for that system they must be prepared to fight in it and also in material. (Cheers.) Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world, or a more cruel deception of the people of this country than to say that they would guarantee peace by arms and then not be ready to do so. (Cheers.) If this country was going to enforce a collective guarantee or collective sanctions it meant that they must make this country a great deal stronger than it was to-day.

He agreed that it was very important that

(Scotland) (Amendment) Bill passed through Committee.
Petroleum (Production) Bill considered on Report.
Protection of Animals Bill passed remaining stages.

Water Supplies (Exceptional Shortage Orders) and Newport Corporation (General Powers) Bills read third time.

Order made under Sunday Entertainments Act in respect of Egham approved.

WEDNESDAY.—Administration of Justice (Appeals) Bill read first time.

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill agreed to on Report.

Registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages (Scotland) (Amendment) Bill read third time.

Debates on Scottish Educational Endowments and a 40-hour week in industry.

THURSDAY.—Sea Fisheries (Regulation) Bill read first time.

Ramsgate Corporation, Darlington Corporation, South West Suburban Water and Chislehurst Rural District Council Bills read second time.

Petroleum (Production) Bill agreed to on Report.

Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) and Electricity (Supply) Bills read third time.

Royal Assent given to the following Acts:—

Marriage (Extension of Hours), Arbitration, Supply of Water in Bulk, Firearms, County Courts (Amendment), Illegal Trawling (Scotland), Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) (Amendment), Water Supplies (Exceptional Shortage Orders), Protection of Animals, South Metropolitan Gas (No. 2), Church House (Westminster), Cambridge University and Town Waterworks, and Workington Corporation.

House adjourned until May 30.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MONDAY.—Protection of Animals (Cruelty to Dogs) (Scotland), Sunderland and South Shields Water, and South Devon and East Cornwall Hospital, Plymouth, Royal Albert Hospital, Devonport, and Central Hospital, Plymouth (Amalgamation, &c.) Bills read second time.

Palatine Loan (Guarantee) Money Resolution agreed to on Report and Bill read first time.

Stockport Extension Bill agreed to on Report.

Unemployment Bill read third time by 421 votes to 67.

Order made under Sunday Entertainments Act in respect of Egham approved.

TUESDAY.—Newport Corporation (General Powers) Bill read first time.

Supply: Vote for Mines Department considered in Committee.

Birmingham United Hospital Bill agreed to on Report.

WEDNESDAY.—Leave to introduce a Bill to prohibit the wearing of uniforms refused.

Lords' amendments to Protection of Animals and Water Supplies (Exceptional Shortage Orders) Bills agreed to.

Finance Bill read second time by 290 votes to 55.

London Midland and Scottish Railway Bill agreed to on Report.

THURSDAY.—Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) and Mines (Working Facilities) Bills read second time.

Cotton Manufacturing Industry Money Resolution agreed to in Committee.

Land Settlement (Scotland) Bill agreed to on Report.

Assessor of Public Undertakings (Scotland) Bill read third time.

FRIDAY.—New writ ordered to be issued for Metherly.

Birmingham United Hospital Bill read third time.

Debate on Foreign Affairs and Disarmament. House adjourned until May 29.

LIVESTOCK IMPORTS

FARMERS' DEPUTATION TO MR. ELLIOT

Mr. Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, received a deputation on Thursday from the National Farmers' Union of England and Wales, who were accompanied by representatives of the National Farmers' Union of Scotland, with regard to the livestock situation.

Mr. RATCLIFF, the president of the English Union, emphasizing the extreme urgency of the situation with which the livestock industry is faced, asked the Minister if he could give some assurance that after the end of June all imports of meat and livestock would be so regulated as to secure the restoration of a price level that would avert the bankruptcy of the country.

Mr. RATCLIFF also referred to the scheme which had recently been prepared by a sub-committee of the Conservative Parliamentary Agricultural Committee, in collaboration with the National Farmers' Union, embodying a scheme for deficiency payments to home meat producers on the lines of the Wheat Act. Mr. RATCLIFF asked for the Minister's views as to the administrative practicability of proposing on these lines and of the possibility of their acceptance by the Government.

Mr. HUTCHESON, the president of the Scottish National Farmers' Union, supported Mr. RATCLIFF, and referred to a resolution passed by the central executive committee of his union on April 26 requesting the Government to give immediate consideration to the question of the regulation of imports of all classes of meat and livestock irrespective of origin.

Mr. ELLIOT, in reply, said he could not give

Letters to the Editor

COST OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

ELIMINATION OF WASTE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—With the passing of the Unemployment Bill into law, the main reforms which we have advocated for so many years past (and which rest on the belief that uncontrolled expenditure on public assistance involves dangers alike to the national finances and national character) will have been all adopted, at any rate in principle. They are:—

(1) That a statement of the amount so expended annually and estimates of future expenditure should be supplied to the public. This is done in the *Drage Return*, first obtained in 1913; (2) that to eliminate overlapping, fraud, and waste, a register of the beneficiaries should be made with a view to insisting that the household should be made the beneficiary unit through the use of a careful case paper. (Cf. Reports of Ministry of Health, and Cmd. 4,201, p. 94); (3) that the whole subject should be as far as possible removed from the sphere of politics, and this will, we submit, now be done to some extent by the institution (a) of an advisory committee armed with special powers to deal with unemployment insurance, and (b) of an independent board so far as the able-bodied unemployed outside insurance are concerned.

These should help to remove the danger envisaged by Merodotus (Book 3, 81) that democracy "throws public affairs into confusion by irruptions," which in modern slang are called "stunts," and which have had a disastrous effect on every branch of public assistance, including housing, as well as the National Insurance schemes for health, old age and widows' and orphans' pensions.

So far as the House of Commons is concerned, there have, it is true, been anti-waste parties since the Armistice, but these are apt to fade away when the Chancellor of the Exchequer tries to rely on them, as in 1922, and it is remarkable that even after the crisis of 1931 the wave of feeling for economy has so far died down that the subject was not even mentioned in the recent debates on the Budget, though we appreciate the Government's honesty in the matter of the debt upon the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Hansard, May 14, col. 1,580).

For the past we have only to refer to the fact that section 15 of the Unemployment Act of 1920, which provided that in the event of there being a danger to the solvency of the Unemployment Insurance Fund the Treasury and the Minister of Labour shall take action (Cmd. 4185, p. 163, and Hansard, February 12, 1934, col. 1,633), was never put into force, and to the fact that outside the Insurance Fund the disastrous increases of some important branches of public assistance are automatic. But that is not all, for, so far as the House of Commons is concerned, its financial machinery is, as a great authority has pointed out, antiquated and useless. "This machinery has been developed since 1600 as a check on the Crown to see that moneys voted were applied to the purposes for which they were asked, but now that the Executive to be checked is not the Crown but the Cabinet the value of the machinery is 'about 99 parts historical to one part practical.' Hence what is now needed, especially in the case of public assistance, is a check by an outside authority as nearly as possible free from politics (such as the new Unemployment Board) on the extravagance of the House of Commons in legislation and wastefulness in administration.

The public is apparently not aware that, taking civil expenditure alone, only a small part of it (£51,994,000 out of £335,736,000 in 1930-31) is actually voted in detail by the House of Commons (Hansard, July 11, 1932, col. 1,019), and that millions could be saved annually if local expenditure was reduced to the level of the thoroughly efficient districts (Hansard, April 18, 1932), a saving which

NOTING THE HOURS

THE "EXISTING SIMPLE SYSTEM"

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—No case has ever been made out for the displacement in this country of the existing simple system of noting the hours. The Post Office and railway time-tables are mainly quoted in support of the movement, so that the defects, if any, of the 12-hour day should be seen there.

The one great point of contact between the public and the Post Office will be found on the pillar-boxes, where the times of collection of letters are clearly stated, and a.m. and p.m. are put in separate columns, thus preventing any chance of confusion or ambiguity. Time between 12 and 12.30 a.m. or 12.30 p.m. has been mentioned, but there can be no possibility of doubt: time after midnight is a.m. (*ante meridiem*), and time past midday is p.m. (*post meridiem*).

As regards British railway time-tables, journeys are not usually so prolonged as to cause any ambiguity or confusion between a.m. and p.m. Even if they were prolonged there is a simple remedy. In the United States, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, where the 12-hour day is in use, as in Britain, the difficulty is met in their railway time-tables by putting p.m. hours in heavy type or in separate columns by vertical lines.

Referring now to time on the 24-hour system, four figures are required in every case, two for the hours and two for the minutes. Here are a few times on that system, from midnight or zero hour (not 24 as used by the B.B.C.) onwards, which might appear on Post Office pillar-boxes or in railway time-tables:—00.00, 00.08, 01.00, 09.09, 12.00, 17.10, 19.43, 23.07. They afford ample opportunity for confusion and ambiguity to most people.

Experience has abundantly proved that lucidity is achieved by a combination of letters with figures and not by figures alone. Witness the following:—(1) Motor-cars are identified in that way; (2) postal matters are addressed, say, S.W.7; (3) Biblical references are indicated by Roman numerals—i.e., letters, and by ordinary Arabic figures, thus, St. Luke XVI.8.

Arrangements were made with the B.B.C. to employ the 24-hour system as a trial experiment in order to enable listeners to form an opinion on its merits; but it was not intended that the B.B.C. should use its privileged position for propaganda purposes in favour of the change. Reference has already been made in the correspondence to one aspect of this, and I might add another. Last year the Astronomer-Royal gave a broadcast talk in favour of the 24-hour day, while a similar talk in favour of this controversial subject has been refused to an advocate of no change.

Yours faithfully,

ALEXANDER GALT.

The Royal Society Rooms, Edinburgh.

CIVIL LIBERTY OR SEDITION

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—As an original member of the Friends' Service Committee set up in May, 1915, by London Yearly Meeting to advise the young men of the Society of Friends who felt called upon to refuse, whether as Friends or in association with others similarly prompted by conscience, to serve their country by the taking of human life, and as one who was recognized in July, 1916, by the Hammersmith Local Tribunal as a *bona fide* conscientious objector, will you permit me to comment on the identity and methods of those restlessly campaigning against the Incitement to Disaffection Bill?

Men in the Services all over the Empire and public duty everywhere, feeling themselves responsible for the execution of law and the defence of the Realm, may fail to understand what motives inspire those who believe that in no circumstance is it permissible to bear arms. But that does not mean an inability on their part to recognize that the will to suffer for conscience's sake is in no sense different from the honour of an officer and a gentleman. They are enough grounded in the thought common to the inhabitants of Great Britain and of Ireland to feel in every fibre of their being that here is something inexpressible to them as individuals but present in others of their countrymen and springing from the same roots of belief as their own. They will not see the anxiety and eagerness felt for enduring heritages of civil liberty and freedom of conscience by those who carry forward the Puritan tradition here at home. They have no desire to remodel this country upon the pattern of Hungary or Italy, Austria or Germany. They and we have only to meet and thresh this thing out together to know that we are seeking the same end: the unbroken continuity of the national life.

This Bill is aimed not at freedom of conscience but at sedition. I suggest that it is up to us who stand four-square for the former to make it a point of honour to render absolutely harmless the latter. But that will not be done by letting the organization of the public campaign against a Bill we regard as pregnant with peril to civil liberty fall into the control of men and women who are never out of the confidence of the Communists. Yet that is what is happening. Friends of peace and civil liberty have got to

INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

AN "ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURE"

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The letter by Sir Patrick Fagan in *The Times* of May 15 inevitably invites attention to the existing unsatisfactory condition of the Indian judicial administration.

The trouble, as I see it, goes far beyond communal complications. It is deep rooted in a system of legal practice which has never been really suited to Indian conditions. This system has developed on theoretical rather than on practical lines. It has conformed to the needs of a much over-grown legal profession rather than to those of the people and the general administration. It is becoming an artificial structure based on unrealities. Thus the general effect of many High Court decisions on points of law and procedure is to remove justice farther from the common folk, to strengthen the lawyer in his position as mediator between the mysteries of the law and the needs of the public, and to favour unduly the rogue and rascal.

When the man in the street sees these perverse results he naturally blames the indifferent administrator of justice rather than the system which compels or permits them. Especially is this the case when communal considerations appear to be involved. The presence on the High Court Bench of members of the Indian Civil Service with sound practical experience as collectors and magistrates of districts has so far held legal practice and justice together, although in loosening bonds. Were this element to disappear from the Bench, however, Indian Courts, under the present judicial system, would speedily become Courts of law rather than courts of justice. I agree with Sir Patrick that this vital element should be retained. If possible it should be strengthened.

Reform of the Indian judicial system is urgently required and overdue—White Paper or no White Paper! It should take the form of simplification and expedition of legal process. Such reform would certainly meet with the determined opposition of the legal profession and of other powerful vested interests. It is clear that only a Government with popular support could or would tackle the problem. It is my belief that a self-governing Indian Legislature, in which rural interests were fully represented, would be far less inclined to tolerate the tyranny of existing legal practice than is government in its present form.

There remains the communal danger in its relation to High Court personnel. Sir Patrick's statement that it affords ground for serious reflection cannot be disputed. The maintenance of the Indian Civil Service element would make for some degree of safety. An additional safeguard could be provided by the restriction of the term of office of a Chief Judge to a period sufficiently short to minimize the chances of communal mistrust being prolonged into rabid intolerance.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES STEAD.

Cheltenham, May 15.

THE GOLUBATZ FLY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The ravages of the golubatz (or, as it is more usually termed in entomological literature, *columbacz*) fly, as reported by your Vienna Correspondent in your issue of May 12, have been notorious ever since the year 1795, when the insect and the effects of its bite among livestock in the Hungarian Banat were described by the Austrian writer J. A. Schönbauer. The genus *Simulium*, to which the golubatz fly belongs, is very widely distributed

Points from Letters

SCHOOL-LEAVING AGE

I am headmistress of a small country school, and I am certain that the parents of the children here do not want the school-leaving age to be raised. The boys leave at 14 and go into a nearby factory or on a farm, receiving to begin with about 8s. a week, and the girls go gladly into domestic service. In their last year at school they are taught to open and answer the door, lay the table, and make useful things for themselves and their homes. Any child who shows more than average intelligence is given the opportunity of gaining a scholarship at the nearest grammar school. Any alteration in these regulations will not be welcomed, I feel sure, by country parents.

—Mrs. EDITH E. BURCHMORE.

CHARLES LAMB'S GRAVE

Would not a bust of Charles Lamb be a suitable headpiece for his gravestone at Edmonton? It is getting on for 50 years since such a bust was made for me by A. L. Vago, an able Italian sculptor and modeller, which met with the approval of my friends Walter Pater, Alfred Ainger, and later of Edmund Gosse and others to whom I sent copies, some of which must still be in existence, though I know not where the original mould now may be. In the year 1926 or 1927 I took down the bust to a Lamb dinner in the Temple, over which Augustine Birrell presided.—Mr. A. FORBES SIEVEKING, Savile Club, 69, Brook Street, W.1.

TULIPS

As all garden tulips must trace their ancestry to wild tulips it is only rather surprising that this feature of tulips with more than one bloom is not more often reproduced. Many of the original tulip species grow in clusters of two, three, and even four blooms. In the garden here this year there have been fine flowers of the species tulips called *Praestans Dasytemon*, *Turkestanica*, and *Hageri*, all growing with grouped blooms (and no single ones), and there are other kinds which have the same habit. It is a pity that these exquisite wild tulips from Asia and the Mediterranean shores are not more grown by amateur gardeners, as they reveal the true grace and interest of the flower.—Miss T. M. BERNARD, Scot's Field, Copdock, Ipswich.

CANVASSERS FOR ELECTRICITY

Since one of your correspondents on the subject of canvassers for electricity declares that every one in Switzerland uses electricity, "that and nothing else," may a mere gas man say a word? It is true that water power is abundant in Switzerland, while coal has to be imported. Yet the Swiss do nearly three times as much of their domestic cooking and heating by gas as by electricity. Neither gas nor electricity consumption is high in Switzerland compared with that of solid fuel.—Mr. W. D. ROWE, Manager, British Commercial Gas Association, 28, Grosvenor Gardens, Victoria, S.W.1.

THE RESPIRATOR

In *The Times* of May 17 you kindly printed a letter from me appealing for the gift of a respirator to this hospital. A generous lady has offered to supply the respirator, and the thanks of the hospital are due not only to her, but also, Sir, to you.—Mr. H. A. SMITH, Hon. Treasurer, Wingfield-Morris Orthopaedic Hospital, Headington, Oxford.

LECTURERS FOR CRUISES

It seems to me that the shipping companies all fail to supply one thing which would make their cruises more enjoyable and more profitable, i.e., a travelling lecturer. It may be said that the passengers are merely out for a holiday and do not want instruction, but I have visited a large number of these ships during their stay in this port and have always found such passengers as I have talked to avid for first-hand information about the country and the town and usually admitting how little they actually know about either. By sure they would have enjoyed their short stay here much more if they had known more before they arrived.—Mr. C. H. D. GRIMES, Circulo Ecuatore, Barcelona.

BLUEBELLS

In *The Times* of May 16, you published a photograph of a wood in Hampshire with the title, "Bluebell Time." I have personally always been led to believe that these flowers are not bluebells, but wild hyacinths, and that the real bluebell does not appear for some time yet, and is then apparently called the "harebell" in some parts. This opinion certainly seems to be current north of the Border, but is the reverse—namely, the calling of wild hyacinths "bluebells"—as widely held in England?—Mr. R. J. B. SIMPSON, Magdalen College, Oxford.

A ROBIN'S NESTING PLACE

I was much interested in the letter in *The Times* on the subject of robins and their nests. In the garden of a house in which I lived was an old brick summer-house in which hung on the wall a wooden case with a broken glass front containing a stuffed sparrow hawk. A robin built its nest inside the case and within a few inches of its hereditary enemy.—R. B. SUMMERSON, Hall Garth, near-Darlington.

UNWANTED BRITISH SHIPS

I read with regret that out of 52 vessels

IRON AND STEEL IMPORT DUTIES

REMOVAL OF TIME LIMIT

REORGANIZATION SCHEME

The recommendations of the Import Duties Advisory Committee and the Additional Import Duties (No. 18) Order, 1934, under which the time limit to the present Customs duties on iron and steel, due to expire on October 25, 1934, is removed, were published yesterday as a White Paper (Cmd. 4589, Stationery Office, 4d.). The new constitution of the British Iron and Steel Federation is published as an appendix.

In their report the Import Duties Advisory Committee recall that on October 13, 1932, they recommended the continuance for a further period of two years of the temporary duties on iron and steel products, subject to satisfactory progress being made in the preparation of a scheme of reorganization and, in further the approved scheme into force; and the period of the duties was extended accordingly by the Additional Import Duties (No. 8) Order, 1932, until October 25, 1934. A report from the National Committee for the Iron and Steel Industry outlining a scheme for a new central organization, the Iron and Steel Federation, on March 13, 1933, and in a letter dated April 6, 1933, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that he regarded the proposals "as constituting a real step forward in the required direction," but that much remained to be done before the industry could be said to be properly equipped and organized.

He went on to make the following declaration of policy:—"While the Government must necessarily reserve complete discretion as to the precise action, legislative and otherwise, they may deem it expedient to take in any circumstances which may arise, I desire to assure you and the industry that so long as the Government are satisfied of the determination of the industry to set its house in order they will be ready to give such support to its efforts as from time to time appears necessary to enable this great enterprise to be brought to a successful conclusion."

SPECIAL AIMS

On receipt of this letter the National Committee entered upon discussions with the various sections of the industry with a view to completing the scheme and adjusting it more fully to opinion in the industry. A completed scheme in legal form came before a special general meeting of the Federation on April 19, 1934, when a revised constitution was adopted, and it was resolved to give a special direction to the council and executive committee to be appointed under the revised constitution that: "in carrying out their duties, they shall give their earnest attention forthwith to the measures to be taken in collaboration with associations of iron and steel producers to promote the maximum manufacturing and commercial efficiency throughout the industry; (2) to expand the export trade in iron and steel products; (3) to obtain the affiliation of associations."

"Following upon that meeting," the Advisory Committee add, "representations have been made to us by the Federation as to the desirability of an early announcement in regard to the continuance of the present duties. Although the Order of October, 1932, is not due to expire for some six months, it has been urged that the present uncertainty is retarding plans for the better organization of the industry and schemes of capital development of iron and steel plants, and further, that it is encouraging foreign producers to continue to export at a loss to this country so as to retain their footing in this market against a possible reduction in the duty after October next."

"The present scheme, while of a less compelling character than the outline scheme adopted in March, 1933, is on substantially the same lines and it has the support of the great bulk of the industry—a fact which should make for rapid progress in its application. As stated in our letter to members of the Federation of January 22 last, 'it remains in essence a piece of machinery pressing great possibilities of usefulness to the industry and to the nation at large and... its ultimate success, will entirely depend upon the vigour and single-mindedness with which that machinery is used.' The special direction given in the resolution quoted above, passed by the general meeting of the Federation, is an assurance that no time will be lost in completing the new central organization of the industry so that attention can at last be concentrated on the real objects of the scheme as set out in that resolution—namely, (1) to provide the maximum manufacturing and commercial efficiency throughout the industry, and (2) to expand the export trade in iron and steel products."

"It has been our policy throughout the past two years to cooperate with the industry in the pursuit of these objects and they will govern any recommendations we may submit in future, whether for the continuation of the present duties or for their removal."

Limitation was probably the only practicable form of disarmament in the air. If they could get limitation no single power was in a position of such superiority that the temptation to attack became too much. But there was a corollary. If there was limitation it was difficult to see how they could avoid sanctions against anyone who broke the limitation. The moment they were up against sanctions they were up against war. (Cheers.) One of the conclusions to which he had been driven as a result of his close study of these questions during the past 12 years was that there was no such thing as a sanction which would work which did not mean war, or, in other words, if they adopted sanctions they must be ready for war, and if they adopted them without being ready for war they were not honest trustees of the nation. (Cheers.)

He had been much struck by an article by Professor Zimmermann which bore out the contention that force was the essence of the collective maintenance of peace, and if they were going in for that system they must be prepared to fight in will and also in material. (Cheers.) Nothing could be a worse guarantee to the world or a more cruel deception of the people of this country than to say that they would guarantee peace by arms and then not be ready to do so. (Cheers.) If this country was going to enforce a collective guarantee or collective sanctions it meant that they must make this country a great deal stronger than it was to-day.

He agreed that it was very important that this country should make it clear to the world and to the people of this country where it stood in Europe. That was of primary importance because no democratic country—and we were almost the last democracy left in Europe—could possibly wage war successfully unless the people were behind it. The people would not be behind a war unless they were convinced from their point of view that it was a just war. Therefore the people should be constantly told what the dangers were in the world, how they could best be met, and when the time might come when, for the security of our own shores and our own political liberties, this country must determine to defend itself.

He welcomed the fact that this discussion had taken place because he knew the anxiety which was felt in the country with regard to the air, especially if the Disarmament Conference should fail and no air limitation was possible. That anxiety had not been lessened by events in Europe during the past few months. (Cheers.) The House would remember the statement which he made on behalf of the Government and which he repeated at the Albert Hall. That statement stood. The anxiety of some of his friends and he did not find fault with them—was such that they wanted him to say when and in what circumstances the Government would make some more definite declaration.

"TRUST THE GOVERNMENT"

They must to some extent trust the Government. The Government were as anxious as any member of the House in regard to this matter, but it was impossible to say yet, with his right hon. friend going to Geneva within a fortnight, when the moment would come, but he could say something which he thought would allay the anxiety of the House. If Air Estimates were brought in that day, or if a statement was made that day in regard to any increase in the Air Force, it might well be months before a pound could be spent in enlarging the Air Force.

There was an immense amount of detailed preparation to be done in a thousand ways. Time would be wasted if the Government waited until it became necessary to take a decision and announce it before they began the necessary preparations. These very points were at this moment under consideration. Preliminary work was being done, so that if their fears were realized and if it was necessary to implement their pledge not a single day would have been lost. (Cheers.) It was only right that the Government should do that because he was quite certain that there was not only general anxiety on this subject, but there was no danger in the near future before this country. There might be less danger in the future than they imagined. The preparations they were making were in more than ample time.

There was no subject in which a panic and an unnecessary panic could be worked up by unscrupulous people more quickly than in regard to the air, and such a panic could do nothing but harm in this country and in Europe. (Cheers.) "Now I will conclude," Mr. Baldwin exclaimed amid laughter and cheers, "and I hope that everybody will have as much holiday as he can get."

The House adjourned at three minutes to 4 o'clock until Tuesday, May 29.

DIARY OF THE WEEK

Following is a record of the business done in both Houses of Parliament during the past week:

HOUSE OF LORDS

MONDAY.—Weston-super-Mare Urban District Council Bill read first time.

Protection of Animals and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bills passed through Committee.

Water Supplies (Exceptional Shortage Orders) and Electricity (Supply) Bills agreed to on Report.

TUESDAY.—Unemployment and Architects (Registration) Bills read first time.

Summary Jurisdiction (Domestic Procedure) Bill withdrawn after debate on second reading.

Southern Railway Bill read second time.

Registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages

and Wales, who were accompanied by representatives of the National Farmers' Union of Scotland, with regard to the livestock situation.

Mr. RATCLIFF, the president of the English union, emphasizing the extreme urgency of the situation with which the livestock industry is faced, asked the Minister if he could give some assurance that after the end of June all imports of meat and livestock would be so regulated as to secure the restoration of a price level that will avert the bankruptcy of the country.

Mr. Ratcliff also referred to the scheme which had recently been prepared by a sub-committee of the Conservative Parliamentary Agricultural Committee, in collaboration with the National Farmers' Union, embodying a scheme for deficiency payments to home meat producers on the lines of the Wheat Act. Mr. Ratcliff asked for the Minister's views as to the administrative practicability of proposals on these lines and of the possibility of their acceptance by the Government.

Mr. HURTHESON, the president of the Scottish National Farmers' Union, supported Mr. Ratcliff, and referred to a resolution passed by the central executive committee of his union on April 26 requesting the Government to give immediate consideration to the question of the regulation of imports of all classes of meat and livestock irrespective of origin.

Mr. ELLIOT, in reply, said he could not give categorical answers to questions which involved considerations of the utmost importance from the point of view of the agricultural and economic policy of the whole country. He could, however, give a full assurance that the position was being actively considered in the light of present circumstances. The proposals put forward by the sub-committee of the Conservative Agricultural Committee were being closely examined by the Department. He pointed out that the scheme involved very considerable difficulties and uncertainties, both economic and administrative, and even if these could be surmounted, which no one could at present foresee, it would have to be recognized that any such scheme would involve far more drastic control over producers than the Wheat Act.

FINLAND AND DURHAM COAL

It was announced on Newcastle Coal Exchange on Thursday that Helsingfors gas works had negotiated for the purchase of 20,000 tons of Durham coking coals at 16s. 7d. a ton c.i.f., with delivery over the summer season.

From THE TIMES of 1834

TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1834. Price 7d.

The hand of improvement has been so busy of late years, in widening thoroughfares, decorating frontages, and moulding masses of edifices into new and elegant forms, in the western part of the metropolis, that probably, in the judgment of those sober persons who remember London in the middle of the last century, with its snug and crowded avenues, innovation has outstripped the demand for it. Mr. Sydney Smirke, however, has shown in a well-written and readable little work, that we have as yet scarcely crossed the threshold, and that London demands a much more sweeping reform of its edifices and thoroughfares to satisfy the wants and conveniences of the present time, and to place it on a par with the metropolitan cities of the Continent, which exult in their Corso, Strada Nuova, and Herengasse. In his *Suggestions for the Architectural Improvement of the Western Part of London*, he excludes all chimerical projects, confining himself to such as demand a moderate outlay of capital, and involve no sacrifice which may not be met by indemnity or repaid by the improvement itself.

3 per Cent. Cons. 92½ to 4.

STRANDING OF A TRAWLER

Judgment was delivered yesterday by the Hull Stipendiary Magistrate (Mr. J. R. Macdonald) in the inquiry by the Board of Trade into the stranding and total loss of the Hull steam trawler *Scutcoates* off the coast of Llandudno on March 10 last. The Court found that the stranding and subsequent total loss of the vessel were due to the wrongful act and default of the master, Ernest Newton Rust, in setting a dangerous course from an erroneous position when starting out for a fresh position in which to restart fishing operations. The Court found Rust in grave default and suspended his certificate for 12 months. An application by Mr. Lancaster, solicitor, appeared for Rust, that he be granted a mate's certificate during the period of suspension was refused.

BOXER'S SIGHT REGAINED

By means of an operation performed at the Birmingham Eye Hospital, Willie Unwin, the South African heavy-weight boxer, who lost the sight of his right eye while training last Christmas, has recovered his sight. A woman doctor on the staff of the hospital performed the operation. Unwin, who is 22, stated that he had been told not to box again.

pointed out, antiquated and useless. This machinery has been developed since 1600 as a check on the Crown to see that moneys voted were applied to the purposes for which they were asked, but now that the Executive to be checked is not the Crown but the Cabinet the value of the machinery is "about 99 parts historical to one part practical." Hence what is now needed, especially in the case of public assistance, is a check by an outside authority as nearly as possible free from politics (such as the new Unemployment Board) on the extravagance of the House of Commons in legislation and wastefulness in administration.

The public is apparently not aware that, taking civil expenditure alone, only a small part of it (£51,994,000 out of £355,736,000 in 1930-31) is actually voted in detail by the House of Commons (Hansard, July 11, 1932, col. 1,019), and that millions could be saved annually if local expenditure was reduced to the level of the thoroughly efficient districts (Hansard, April 18, 1932), a saving which Parliament should enforce but does not (cf. Ray Report and Hansard, July 6, 1932).

We welcome, therefore, most heartily the new departure of appointing a Board to some extent free from political influence to deal with the able-bodied unemployed outside unemployment insurance, and we look forward to the gradual extension of this principle to cover the whole field of public assistance.

Your obedient servant,

GEOFFREY DRAGE, Chairman
of the Denison House Committee
on Public Assistance.

COW PARSLEY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—Cow parsley is not upright hedge parsley. Popular names are liable to become a source of confusion, since their application may vary in different parts of the country, but there is a standard work on them (Britten and Holland: Dictionary of English Plant Names). Cow parsley is *Chaerophyllum*, better known as *herb*; hedge parsley is *Torilis* (three kinds, the "upright" being *T. Anthriscus*). The plant best known as cow parsley is *C. sylvestre*, the common chervil of our hedges, the rough cow parsley being *C. temulum*, a less common plant, with red spots on its stems. As hemlock is the only other British species with similar red spots the cause of this correspondence was probably *C. temulum*, as your correspondent would know the common chervil. The correct way to settle such matters when fruits are not available for identification from a British flora is to send a specimen to a botanist or to this museum.

Yours faithfully,

A. J. WILMOTT (Deputy-Keeper,
Botanical Department).

British Museum (Natural History), Cromwell
Road, London, S.W.7, May 17.

MOTERING IN FRANCE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—I am at present touring in France in my car, and daily I observe with interest how the French are solving one of our motoring problems—namely, the speed in built-up areas. At the entrance to every town is displayed a sign-board indicating the authorized limit. This varies from 15 to 20 or even 40 kilometres an hour. Also one finds that while the country road surfaces are generally superb, those in the smaller towns are the reverse. Pot-holes necessitate a reduction in speed.

Motoring in France has many advantages. The roads are wide, good, and comparatively free from traffic. They are well equipped with white lines, warnings of cross-roads, level-crossings, and other perils. Every side road, moreover, has a dotted line across its junction with a main road. The drawbacks from the Englishman's point of view are the cost of taking a car across the Channel—say, £5—the expense of French petrol—say, 2.50f. a litre—and the difficulty of discriminating at first between the many unfamiliar brands of petrol sold in the wayside pumps.

Yours obediently,

CECIL A. HUNT.

Hotel du Manoir, Moutier, Doubs, France,
May 10.

Correspondents are again asked to write or type their letters on one side only of the paper.

no circumstance is it permissible to bear arms. But that does not mean an inability on their part to recognize that the will to suffer for conscience' sake is in no sense different from the honour of an officer and a gentleman. They are enough grounded in the thought common to the inhabitants of Great Britain and of Ireland to feel in every fibre of their being that here is something inexplicable to them as individuals but present in others of their countrymen and springing from the same roots of belief as their own. They will appreciate the anxiety that can be felt for enduring heritages of civil liberty and freedom of conscience by those who carry forward the Puritan tradition here at home. They have no desire to remodel this country upon the pattern of Hungary or Italy, Austria or Germany. They and we have only to meet and thresh this thing out together to know that we are seeking the same ends: the unbroken continuity of the national life.

This Bill is aimed not at freedom of conscience but at sedition. I suggest that it is up to us who stand four-square for the former to make it a point of honour to render absolutely harmless the latter. But that will not be done by letting the organization of the public campaign against a Bill we regard as pregnant with peril to civil liberty fall into the control of men and women who are never out of the confidence of the Communists. Yet that is what is happening. Friends of peace and civil liberty have got to pull off their blinkers and face facts. Either they are with the forces for tumult on the streets as a prelude to armed struggles for power in advance of which the soldiers are to be urged to shoot their officers, or else they are for a common front with their own folk, even when already under arms and openly avowing that they feel in duty and, therefore, in honour bound in certain circumstances to shoot to kill.

Muddle-headedness may permit the pacifist or rank insincerity the Communist to confuse the issues. Soon or late, the choice must be made on which side to stand. Isolated outside of prison and "fighting war" away from my colleagues of the Friends' Service Committee I drifted so far that, faced with the logic of events and associations, the Communist campaign of support to the Council of Action needing me to be ready to incite to mutiny, 14 years ago I felt called upon to resign from the Society of Friends. A "good" Communist might now be told to remain close beside or, indeed, inside and manipulate the more glib and generous-hearted pacifists as I see some persons very well known to myself doing at this present juncture.

The times are grave. The need of this country is sympathetic understanding and personal sacrifice in a common cause of external and of internal solidarity. Let us close the front for Freedom.

Yours very truly,

WALTON NEWBOLD.
The Penn Club, 8, 9, 10, Tavistock Square,
W.C.1.

HAWARDEN CHURCH BELLS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The recent letters in your correspondence column with regard to church bells has added considerable information to this interesting branch of church lore. The bells of the ancient parish church of Hawarden present an interesting problem which perhaps some of your readers may help to solve.

Before 1661 the tower of Hawarden had in it five bells. In that year the church wardens of Hawarden were busy (as in other places) putting back into their church the things which had been put out or destroyed by the Puritans. Service books, surplices, font coverings, and hangings for the altar, the King's Arms, painted glass, &c., all needed replacing as recorded in the wardens' accounts. The five bells were taken down and sent to a famous firm of North Country bell founders, Scott, of Wigan, to be recast and for an extra bell to be added. In due course the bells were returned and the expenses recorded in the wardens' accounts.

If you were to visit to-day the little church of Ledsham, in Yorkshire, you would find in the tower three bells, two of them of pre-Reformation workmanship, probably fifteenth century. On one is cast the following inscription in Lombard characters:—"O Sacer et Daniel pro gente Hawarden adora." which I believe may be interpreted as "O Holy One and Daniel pray for the people of Hawarden." and on the other "Sancta Maria." The parish church of Hawarden was founded by St. Deniol (Daniel), a sixteenth-century Welsh Saint. How came the bells to be in this Yorkshire tower?

One suggestion is this, but there may be others. After the Restoration the wardens of Ledsham were evidently doing what the Hawarden and other wardens were. They rebuilt their tower and probably went to Scott about bells. There they found the two Hawarden bells not broken up to be incorporated in the new peal, and took them as they were to hang in the Ledsham tower. There may be other suggestions as to how they got there, but this seems the most probable. I wonder if they will ever come back to their original home.

W. BELL JONES.

Hawarden, May 7.

restriction of the term of office of a Chief Judge to a period sufficiently short to minimize the chances of communal mistrust being prolonged into rabid intolerance.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
CHARLES STEAD.
Cheltenham, May 15.

THE GOLUBATZ FLY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The ravages of the golubatz (or, as it is more usually termed in entomological literature, *columbacz*) fly, as reported by your Vienna Correspondent in your issue of May 12, have been notorious ever since the year 1795, when the insect and the effects of its bite among livestock in the Hungarian Banat were described by the Austrian writer J. A. Schönbauer. The genus *Simulium*, to which the golubatz fly belongs, is very widely distributed, and in the British Isles is represented by some 18 species. Owing to their peculiar bloodthirstiness, the females of *Simulium*, especially when, as is frequently the case, they occur literally in myriads, are a scourge to both man and beast, and it may be that some of the deaths for which they are responsible are simply due to loss of blood.

Your Correspondent's statement that: "The poisonous fluid injected by this fly has the effect of breaking down the red blood corpuscles" is new to me. So far as I am aware, there is no proof that the salivary secretion of any blood-sucking fly is actually toxic: but the subject undoubtedly provides a field for further research. In connexion with an outbreak of *Simulium* in Jutland in 1918, a Danish writer expressed the opinion that the resultant deaths among cattle must have been caused by some poison which especially acts upon the nerves of the heart, much as in poisoning with digitalis.

As stated by your Correspondent, *Simulium* flies "deposit their eggs on stones in river beds"; as a rule, only spots where the water is flowing swiftly are chosen as breeding places, and in the beds of rushing streams in Palestine I have seen the stones so thickly coated with *Simulium* larvae as to appear hairy.

With reference to repellents for the protection of stock against the bites of *Simulium*, A. E. Cameron, writing in the *Agricultural Gazette of Canada*, recommends a dressing of fish-oil, or of a mixture of three parts of fish-oil and one part of kerosine, renewed once a day during the season.

In conclusion, perhaps I may be permitted to say a word as to the identity of the golubatz fly. Described and figured by Schönbauer under the name "*Culex columbaczensis*," it was subsequently transferred to the genus to which it actually belongs; and I am informed by my colleague Dr. F. W. Edwards that he has recently examined females from the typical locality in Hungary, and has found it impossible to distinguish them from those of *Simulium reptans*, which is a common British species.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

E. E. AUSTEN, late Keeper of
Entomology,
Department of Entomology, British
Museum (Natural History), Cromwell
Road, S.W.7.

SCUM ON PONDS

Referring to the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Crisp, the way to remove scum on ponds is to place about three handfuls of copper sulphate crystals in a muslin bag, which should then be tied up and attached by a short string to a rod. By holding the rod the bag may then be drawn across the surface of the water. The operation may be repeated if the first treatment is not sufficiently effective, but care must be taken not to allow the water to be too over-pregnated with copper sulphate, as it will kill the young leaves of water lilies or other water plants. A light treatment of the surface, however, will be quite harmless.—Mr. G. H. BUSHBY, F.R.H.S., Falcon Hall, Wormley, Herts.

they had known more before they arrived.—Mr. C. H. D. GRIMES, Circulo Ecuestre, Barcelona.

BLUEBELLS

In *The Times* of May 16, you published a photograph of a wood in Hampshire with the title, "Bluebell Time." I have personally always been led to believe that these flowers are not bluebells, but wild hyacinths, and that the real bluebell does not appear for some time yet, and is then apparently called the "harebell" in some parts. This opinion certainly seems to be current north of the Border, but is the reverse—namely, the calling of wild hyacinths "bluebells"—as widely held in England?—Mr. R. J. B. SIMPSON, Magdalen College, Oxford.

A ROBIN'S NESTING PLACE

I was much interested in the letter in *The Times* on the subject of robins and their nests. In the garden of a house in which I lived was an old brick summer-house in which hung on the wall a wooden case with a broken glass front containing a stuffed sparrow hawk. A robin built its nest inside the case and within a few inches of its hereditary enemy.—R. B. SUMMERSON, Hall Garth, near Darlington.

UNWANTED BRITISH SHIPS

I read with regret that out of 52 vessels chartered to bring grain from Argentina to Europe as many as 29, or more than half, were Greek, while only 14 were British. As your correspondent pointed out, this is possible owing to the fact that Greek owners purchase at bargain rates the "cast-offs" of British owners, and then, with the aid of low wages and less stringent shipping regulations, are able to operate their vessels at exceptionally low cost. I am no shipping expert, but I cannot help feeling that British owners are adopting a short-sighted policy in selling their unwanted vessels to competitors at any price which they will fetch. Surely, rather than aid their rivals to undercut them, it would be more profitable in the end if they were to break up what tonnage they were unable economically to run.—Mr. W. J. D. LYFORD-PIKE, University of Edinburgh.

EXPORT OF ARMS

I understood from the wireless news bulletin the other night that Mr. Baldwin said in the House of Commons that for England to refuse to send arms to the Paraguay contestants would not be of any service because other nations would still send them. Is there any reason which can be offered to God why England should not act in accordance with St. Paul's injunction, "Come out . . . and be separate . . . and touch no unclean thing" (2 Cor. vi. 17)?—CANON FREDERICK L. LOMAX, Ferryhill Vicarage, Co. Durham.

When the British Government declares that it cannot impose an embargo on the export of arms unless other countries agree it tacitly affirms the right of British citizens to earn wages and receive dividends from the manufacture and sale of these instruments of destruction and mutilation. Armaments are not the only way in which human beings can be mentally and physically injured. Would the Government also grant export licences to those engaged in the drug traffic and the traffic in women and children on the grounds that other countries did the same? And, if not, where is the difference in the sale of armaments?—REV. RONALD ALLEN, St. Christopher's Rectory, Withington, Manchester.

"RITUAL MURDER"

There has never been a shred of trustworthy evidence that orthodox Jews or Christians practised "ritual murder." But there is evidence that apostate Jews did so. In the Prophecy of Jeremiah, Ch. 32, ver. 35, we read that "they built the high places of Baal, which are in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to cause their sons and their daughters to pass through the fire into Molech; which I commanded them not, neither came it into my mind that they should do this abomination, to cause Judah to sin." It is, doubtless, this ancient heathen practice which has been used by modern writers to fix upon modern Jews a stigma they do not deserve.—Mr. A. W. MACKINNON ELLIOT, Muswell Hill, N.10.

SURPLUS FLOWERS

"The Protection of Wild Flowers" is again a question of much-needed consideration and discussion. During the week-end cyclists could be seen turning up with their much-treasured bundles of bluebells, &c., and these will no doubt bring joy and pleasure to many poor homes where gardens are unknown. The flowers give endless joy to poor children, who would otherwise never see them. If country garden lovers would occasionally send their surplus flowers to such poor schools as in Shoreditch they would give untold happiness to our children and help to brighten their sordid lives.—Miss WINIFRED WATSON (Head Mistress, Wenlock Road L.C.C. Infants School, Shoreditch, N.1).

THE WORD "SLUM"

In Professor Wyld's "Universal English Dictionary" it is there stated that the etymology of the word "slum" is 'doubtful, but possibly a form of "slump," in the provincial sense of "swamp," "bog," or "muddy place."—Mrs. ADA L. STREVENSON, St. Clair, Kilmacolm, Renfrewshire.

to continue to export at a loss to this country so as to retain their footing in this market against a possible reduction in the duty after October next.

"The present scheme, while of a less compelling character than the outline scheme submitted in March, 1933, is on substantially the same lines and it has the support of the great bulk of the industry—a fact which should make for rapid progress in its application. As stated in our letter to members of the Federation of January 22 last, 'it remains in essence a piece of machinery presenting great possibilities of usefulness to the industry and to the nation at large and . . . its ultimate success will entirely depend upon the vigour and single-mindedness with which that machinery is used.' The special direction given in the resolution quoted above, passed by the general meeting of the Federation, is an assurance that no time will be lost in completing the new central organization of the industry so that attention can at last be concentrated on the real objects of the scheme as set out in that resolution—namely, (1) to provide the maximum manufacturing and commercial efficiency throughout the industry, and (2) to expand the export trade in iron and steel products."

"It has been our policy throughout the past two years to cooperate with the industry in the pursuit of these objects and they will govern any recommendations we may submit in future, whether for the alteration of the present duties on iron and steel, or for the grant of drawback in particular cases. In this matter we have, of course, a statutory responsibility not only to the iron and steel industry but also to the innumerable industries in this country, consumers of iron and steel products, on whose prosperity the fortunes of the iron and steel industry so largely depend."

"After careful consideration of all the circumstances, bearing in mind the assurances which have from time to time been given to us by the industry and more particularly the terms of the resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities at the recent general meeting, we are satisfied that progress in the industry will be facilitated by removing the time limit to the present duties (October 25, 1934) and we recommend that such an Order be made forthwith."

The Additional Import Duties (No. 18) Order, 1934, is dated May 17, 1934, and provides that "the additional duties chargeable under the principal Order in the case of goods of the classes and descriptions specified in the second column to the principal Order shall be charged without any limit of period."

A summary of the constitution of the British Iron and Steel Federation was published in *The Times* on April 13.

OVER 5,000,000 SLAVES

LADY SIMON'S ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS TO-DAY

Slavery as it exists to-day was described by Lady Simon at the annual meeting of the World's Evangelical Alliance on Thursday. The Rev. W. Talbot Rice presided over the meeting, which was held at Caxton Hall.

LADY SIMON said that this year we were celebrating two great events—the centenary of the emancipation of slaves in British Dominions, and the decision of all civilized nations, under the leadership of Great Britain, to attempt to do for the world what Great Britain did 100 years ago. To-day there were still from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 human creatures enslaved, and calling out for this crime to be wiped out. At the very doors of civilization slavery continued. Slaves were captured in Ethiopia and taken down to the coast; and there was still a "Middle Passage" in the world to-day, as in former times, since at least 5,000 were carried every year across the Red Sea to be sold in the streets of Mecca.

Lady Simon quoted an eye-witness's account of a slave train making this journey only last year, the men, women, and children all chained together and driven like cattle. She also displayed a deed of sale of a Chinese child. Little children could be bought in China, she said, at the rate of 6d. for every year of their life. Two million children were crying from China for help. All slaves were not ill-treated, but there was no security for any of them, and no one was fit to have complete control over any other human being.

ADVERTISING CONVENTION

The Postmaster-General, Sir Kingsley Wood, is to be the guest of honour at the Advertising Convention banquet at Leicester on June 12. Lord Ebbisham, president of the Advertising Association, will occupy the chair.

Among other speakers who will address the convention are Mr. E. Leslie Burgin, Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade, and Mr. Guy H. Locock, director of the Federation of British Industries, both of whom will speak at the manufacturers' session on June 11. The business of the convention will start on Monday, June 11, when the delegates will be welcomed by the Lord Mayor of Leicester, and will end on the following Wednesday.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2703

Peiping, May 1, 1934.

Subject: Political Conversations of the
Counselor of Legation at Nanking.

993.94



JUN 4 34

793.94/6712

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's
despatch No. 2688 / 6696 April 26, 1934, enclosing three
despatches from the Counselor of Legation at Nanking
reporting conversations upon various subjects affect-
1/ ing the political situation in China, and to enclose
for the Department's further information a copy of
his despatch to the Legation No. L-295 Diplomatic,
April 26, 1934.

Mr. Peck encloses a copy of a second statement
to the press issued by the Chinese Foreign Office,
and

JUN 8 - 1934


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- 2 -

and reports having been informed by a Chinese newspaper correspondent that the Chinese Foreign Office had announced an intention of making "a supreme diplomatic effort to oppose the Japanese pretensions embodied in the 'informal statement' of April 17", and that if found necessary, China would ask for a conference of the Powers signatory to the so-called Nine Power Treaty of 1922.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

1. Copy of Nanking's despatch to Legation No. L-295 Diplomatic, April 26, 1934.

710

LC:DH

L-295 Diplomatic

2703

Nanking Office,
April 26, 1934.

Subject: Japanese "Informal Statement" of April 17, 1934.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my letter addressed to the American Minister of April 20, 1934, with which I enclosed a copy of an "informal statement" issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 19, 1934, commenting on the statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17, 1934.

1/ There is enclosed herewith a copy of a second statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office, dated April 25, a copy of which was sent to the Nanking office of the American Legation on April 26.

This second statement opens with a recapitulation of explanations of the Japanese statement of April 17 offered orally to the Chinese Foreign Office by Mr. Suma, Japanese Secretary of Legation in Nanking, on April 24.

Following this recapitulation the enclosed statement comments on the explanation offered by the Japanese diplomatic representative and, in effect, rejects it.

The last paragraph of the statement is especially interesting, in that the Chinese Foreign Office asserts

that

- 2 -

that China "is striving for the maintenance of international security and the upholding of international treaties such as the Nine Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations" and that China is relying "upon the cooperation of all countries concerned".

I have been informed by a Chinese newspaper correspondent that the Chinese Foreign Office has told the Chinese press representatives confidentially that no information regarding the Japanese "informal statement" and events connected therewith is to be published unless approved by the Foreign Office; that China intends to make a supreme diplomatic effort to oppose the Japanese pretensions embodied in the "informal statement" of April 17; that instructions have been sent to Chinese diplomatic representatives abroad to endeavor to enlist the assistance of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922; that if this effort to bring about cooperation on the part of those signatories is not forthcoming in support of the principles embodied in the Nine Power Treaty, China will ask for a conference of the said signatory Powers; and that if these measures all fail, China will not hesitate to recommence hostilities with Japan.

There are indications here that the issuing of the "informal statement" of April 17 has weakened the influence of the party which advocates accepting the loss of Manchuria as a fait accompli and coming to some amicable arrangement with Japan and has revived the spirit of resistance. Apparently the reawakened hope that resistance may be possible is based partly on a belief that the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty have now been joined as parties to the dispute

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

dispute between China and Japan and will take steps which
will further China's cause.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ as stated.

In triplicate to the Legation.
Copy to the American Minister at Hankow by air mail.

WRP:HC

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal. HC

(Received by the Manking office of the American
Legation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
April 26, 1934, 10 a.m.)

With regard to the statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17th, it is now learned that Japanese diplomatic representatives in China have offered on April 24th further explanations to the Chinese Government authorities purporting to elucidate the various points raised in the said statement.

Briefly the explanations offered may be stated as follows:

(1) That Japan does not intend to impair the independence of China or to injure her interests, but sincerely wishes that her integrity, unity and prosperity be secured;

(2) That Japan welcomes transactions between China and foreign Powers arising out of their economic and trade relations, that she would observe the various international agreements relating to China, and that at the same time she hopes that China would faithfully carry out the doctrine of Equal Opportunity as well as the Open Door Policy;

(3) That Japan has no intention to injure the commercial interests of other foreign countries in China, but that in case such foreign powers should adopt concerted action intending to militate against the peace and order in the Far East, she would most

resolutely

- 2 -

resolutely oppose, it being the natural and proper attitude for Japan to take since it is Japan, together with China and other countries of the Far East, that shoulders the responsibility for the maintenance of order and peace in this part of the world. In other words, Japan cannot tolerate any attempt on the part of the Powers and the League of Nations to deal with China with the view to joint-control of her.

Commenting on the above explanations, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry pointed out that the points as mentioned above do not correspond exactly with those contained in the statement of April 17th. Furthermore, although Japanese authorities have for several times both in Japan and elsewhere tried to make explanations which turned out either to be more pretentious than the original statement or to be contradictory to it, they have not in any way and upon any occasion repudiated that statement. It follows therefore that the Japanese Government remains wholly responsible for the same utterance.

As regards the attitude of the Chinese Government it was already stated in the statement issued by a spokesman of this office on April 19th, the Foreign Office spokesman further declared. Now it is only necessary to add that the sovereignty and the independent character of the Chinese Republic does not permit of any infringement by any nation upon whatever pretense. Her relations with other countries and with the League of Nations have always been legitimate and aimed at the promotion of her internal development and external security. This too therefore does not permit of any interference by any nation upon whatever pretense.

Japan

- 3 -

Japan pretends to be apprehensive of the possibility that the Powers and the League of Nations might adopt an attitude of joint control towards China. Leaving aside the point that the Powers and the League do not harbor any such design, the fact that China is an independent State should at once dispell the fear that she would tolerate for a moment to be bound by any form of joint-control. China's opposition to any form of international control is just as strong as her aversion to the domination by any one country. The reasons are too manifest to require elaboration.

Moreover, the technical co-operation between China and the League of Nations began before Japan's announcement of her intention to secede from that body. The Chinese policy of international co-operation therefore had already received Japan's endorsement, not to say that she still is, legally speaking, a member of the League.

With regard to the Japanese hope that China would carry out the principle of Equal Opportunity and the Open Door Policy, the Foreign Office spokesman stated that China in her economic and commercial relations with the foreign Powers has never had the intention of discriminating against any one country. Indeed, the principle of Equal Opportunity and the policy of Open Door are designed to prevent any one country from utilizing its special influence in any designated region for the purpose of creating an economic monopoly to the exclusion of other countries. On the other hand, the Japanese statement seems to reveal a desire on the

part

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

part of Japan to eradicate the legitimate relation existing between China and the other foreign countries. It would appear therefore that the responsibility for any undermining of the Open Door Policy rests with Japan and not with China.

In short, internally China at the present moment is concentrating all her efforts on the eradication of communism and productive rehabilitation. Externally, she is striving for the maintenance of international security and the upholding of international treaties such as the Nine Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations. While the execution of her internal program does not permit of any outside interference, the realization of her foreign policy depends, in a large measure, upon the co-operation of all countries concerned. In this connection, it is to be earnestly hoped that the nations of the world will join in the support of the inviolability of international law and the sanctity of international agreements.

Nanking, April 25, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
June 9, 1934.

~~ROM:~~
~~MEM:~~
~~END:~~
~~SKM:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 2714 of May 8, 1934, reports a conversation between the American Minister and Mr. Suma of the Japanese Legation at Nanking in regard to the American Government's memorandum sent to the Japanese Government in regard to the latter's declaration of policy. It is interesting to note that, according to Mr. Suma, this memorandum required no reply as Ambassador Grew in communicating that memorandum informed Mr. Hirota that no reply was necessary.

It is also interesting to note from the last paragraph of the last enclosure that Mr. Peck, in response to an inquiry from Mr. Suma, informed the latter there had been no change in the status of the question of the revision of the Sino-American Treaty of 1903 and that Minister Johnson had no intention of taking up this matter on his visit to Nanking.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 2714

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, May 8, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations



JUN 4 34



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's
despatch No. 2703, ⁶⁷¹⁴May 1, 1934, and to previous
correspondence upon the subject of the Japanese "in-
1/ formal statement" of April 17, and to enclose for the
Department's information a copy of the Nanking Coun-
selor of Legation's despatch to the Legation No. 309-
Diplomatic, May 3, 1934.

This despatch reports a conversation between the
Minister and Mr. Suma, Japanese Consul General and
Secretary of Legation at Nanking, from which it will
be noted that Mr. Suma assumed that the incident
arising from the "informal statement" was closed
inasmuch as the American Ambassador, when handing an
aide

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JUN 18 1934

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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aide memoire to the Japanese Foreign Office, is
alleged to have "informed the Foreign Minister that
no reply was regarded as necessary".

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1/ Copy of Nanking Counselor
of Legation's despatch to
Legation No. 309-Diplomatic,
May 3, 1934.

LC/jld

1-309 Diplomatic

67143

Nanking Office,
May 3, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations; the Internal
Situation in China; Treaty Revision.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation which took place at the Nanking office of the American Legation on May 3, 1934, between the American Minister and Mr. Yabichiro Suna, Japanese Consul General and Secretary of the Japanese Legation residing in Nanking.

It will be noted that Mr. Suna assumed that the incident arising from the "informal statement" made by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, was closed, inasmuch as the American Ambassador, when handing an aide-memoire to the Japanese Foreign Minister on April 29, had informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that no reply was regarded as necessary.

Very respectfully yours,

For the American Minister:

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In triplicate to the Legation.
No copy to the Department.

A true copy of
the signed original.
H.C.

WRL:HC

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 3, 1934.

Conversation with: Mr. Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Consul
General.
Mr. Salisbury present.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations, the internal
situation in China, and treaty revision.

Mr. Suma called at ten a.m. and, after some conversation on subjects of a non-political nature, commented on the statement made on April 17 by Mr. Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, with regard to foreign assistance to China. He stated that when Ambassador Grew had handed an aide-memoire to the Japanese Foreign Minister on April 29 on this subject, Mr. Grew had informed the Foreign Minister that no reply was regarded as necessary. Mr. Suma therefore concluded that the incident was closed. Mr. Suma described the origin of Mr. Amau's statement of April 17 as follows: "descriptions" of Japanese policy toward China had appeared on April 7 and 9 in Osaka papers; as a result of their publication, foreign press correspondents asked a number of questions of Mr. Amau to which he replied on the spur of the moment; and the various press reports of the "so-called statement" of April 17 had been based on these informal replies of Mr. Amau. Mr. Suma said that he had been busy explaining to Chinese officials the real facts of Japan's policy toward China but that the Chinese press continued to be somewhat excited. Except for this excitement,

Sino-Japanese

- 2 -

Sino-Japanese relations were satisfactory and the political situation at Nanking quiet.

With regard to progress of the campaign against communist forces in Kiangsi Province, Mr. Suma said that he had been informed on April 30 by Mr. Wang Ching-wei that the campaign was progressing satisfactorily. Mr. Suma added, however, that he had received on May 2 information emanating from a Japanese military officer that communists had captured Yenping in Fukien Province. He regarded the success in Kiangsi as causing increased communist advances in Fukien, where, he claimed, the situation was now serious. He mentioned that the Fukien border is the weakest Government line against communist forces, the Kwangtung border being now well defended. Mr. Suma also stated that some of the communist forces in Kiangsi had moved over into southeastern Hunan Province; and he seemed to think that they were intending to go into Szechuan Province.

Mr. Suma enquired about the present status of the question of revision of the Sino-American commercial treaty of 1903 and was informed that there had been no change for some time and that Mr. Johnson had no intention of taking up the matter on his present visit to Nanking and had received no instructions from the Department in that regard.

American Minister.

LES:HC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 7, 1934

~~TOP~~
~~SECRET~~
SKH

Tokyo's despatch No. 792 of May 18, 1934, supplements previous reports on the circumstances arising out of the issuance on April 17 of the Foreign Office statement on China policy.

The despatch states that "there have been practically no noteworthy developments during the past two weeks which would tend to clarify the stand which Japan has taken towards China". Despite various explanations and statements, the Embassy points out that Japan has indicated no intention of receding from the position which it has taken of asserting the right to supervise the foreign affairs of China.

Several excerpts from Japanese press comment on the American and British notes are set forth in the despatch, which states that the unusually restrained tone adopted by the Japanese newspapers in this connection is probably due to official pressure being brought to bear.

You will be interested to read on page 5 a portion of Mr. Hirota's speech before the Conference of Governors which bears on the policy reflected in the Foreign Office statement of April 17. Mr. Hirota stated that Japan intends to respect her treaty obligations but

that,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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that, as her views on Far Eastern questions were rejected by the League, "it would surely be unwise to reproduce a situation such as was encountered at the League meeting". The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs when asked how this statement could be reconciled with the requirement of Japan to engage in "full and frank communication" with the other Powers stated that the Nine Power Treaty did not require that a conference be called and he added that Japan would be willing to communicate with the individual powers.

FE: [Signature] DLY

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Tokyo, May 18, 1934.

No. 792.

Subject: Japanese Statement of Policy Toward Foreign
Assistance to China.

793.94

CONFIDENTIAL.



JUN 4 34



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793.94/6714

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

**COPY SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.**

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 771, dated May 4, 1934, and to previous telegrams and despatches concerning the unofficial statement issued to the press by the spokesman of the Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, regarding the Japanese attitude toward the rendering of assistance to China by other countries. In my despatch No. 771 I stated that

"At a later date the Embassy will no doubt be in a better position to appraise the significance and results of this whole affair and to report thereon to the Department."

There

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JUN 13 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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There have been practically no noteworthy developments during the past two weeks, which would tend to clarify the stand which Japan has taken toward China, and consequently the Embassy is not yet in a position to comment with any degree of certainty in regard to the significance of the Amau and the Hirota statements. It seems certain, however, that a Japanese policy, either in the extreme form announced by Amau, or in the modified and milder form given out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which would imply a degree of control by Japan over the foreign affairs of China, has been gradually developing and now may be considered to be a fixed part of the Japanese foreign policy. It will be noted that the original "unofficial" Amau statement (which almost certainly was taken from a diplomatic instruction to the Japanese Minister to China) has never been denied, either officially or unofficially, and that the later Hirota statement of policy, although much milder in tone than the Amau statement, still enunciated a policy of supervision over certain aspects of China's foreign relations. The American, British and French Governments have all in a way protested against the Japanese policy, in that they have expressed or implied their hope that Japan will respect its treaty obligations in regard to China, but as yet the Japanese Foreign Office has indicated no intention whatsoever of receding from its stand in the matter. As the JAPAN ADVERTISER stated editorially on May 6, 1934:

"It is evident that Japan intends to adhere to this doctrine and hopes that in time the rest of the world will accept it. It is more than a statement of policy, it is a declaration of intent."

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The American statement of policy, as expressed in the aide memoire presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through the Embassy, caused little comment in the Japanese newspapers. Inasmuch as the American statement contains implications at variance with the Japanese policy toward China, it might have been expected that the Japanese newspapers would condemn the American policy and in violent language defend the Japanese policy but such has not been the case. It is probable that the newspapers were given their cue by the Foreign Office and consequently adopted a restrained tone in discussing both the American and British representations (the French representations attracted almost no public attention). The TOKYO ASAHI on May 2 stated editorially that "The British and American statements on Japan's policy for China contain nothing new. They are so commonplace, indeed, that we wonder why they had to be issued." The KOKUMIN, usually a somewhat chauvinistic journal, stated on May 2 that "The United States Government has called our attention to the importance of upholding the sanctity of the Nine-Power Treaty. The American note, however, carefully avoids accusing this country of wrongdoing in connection with China and, important as the American counter-step is, there remains no potential danger of serious trouble over the 'unofficial statement'." The TOKYO JIJI on May 2 commented editorially in the following vein: "Likewise he (Mr. Hull) failed to say anything positive in regard to our determination not to tolerate any acts by foreign Powers in China that are prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and order in China".

"It

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

"It is easy to read between the lines a warning to any party to the Nine-Power Treaty who may violate its provisions." The OSAKA ASAHI on May 3 stated editorially that "Britain seems to have corrected its misunderstanding about the recent 'unofficial statement', but the United States is still suspicious of Japan's sincerity. It is gratifying, though, to see that both Britain and the United States have shown composure and prevented the situation from becoming worse". Later the newspapers advanced the theory that the American statement indicated a return to "Stimson diplomacy" on the part of the American Government. Thus the TOKYO ASAHI on May 7 stated: "The American policy insists on conformity to form after the manner of the Stimson diplomacy and stresses the theoretical aspects of a question."

The above examples will serve to illustrate the restrained tone adopted by the Japanese newspapers in discussing the American and British representations- a tone which is most unusual in Japanese newspapers when discussing acts by other Governments which run counter to Japanese desires. It seems certain that official pressure was brought to bear to prevent acrimonious newspaper discussion of the question.

The only development in the situation during the past two weeks consisted of a paragraph in the speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Conference of Governors on May 4, 1934, which elucidated somewhat the attitude of Japan toward conferences on Chinese affairs. The following is the

JAPAN

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JAPAN ADVERTISER translation of the paragraph in question; this translation has been checked by an Embassy translator with the text as given in reputable Japanese newspapers and found to be substantially correct:

"I need not repeat that Japan without question fully respects all treaties and engagements existing between her and the other Powers, and that she has no thought of trespassing on their rights and interests under existing treaties. Moreover, we have no objection whatever to exchanging views, if necessary, with each individual Power regarding treaty rights and interests. But in view of the fact that on questions of East Asia our views were, as I have said, rejected by the Powers in the meeting at Geneva of the League of Nations, which forced our decision to withdraw from the League, it would surely be unwise to reproduce a situation such as was encountered at the League meeting. We will, therefore, hold to our responsibilities and try to promote understanding with other Powers concerned."

The representative of the Associated Press in Tokyo asked Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, for an explanation of the manner in which the Japanese Government reconciled the above statement of Mr. Hirota with Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides for "full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned". Mr. Shigemitsu claimed that Mr. Hirota's statement did not conflict with the Article mentioned, as Japan was prepared to communicate fully and frankly with each Power concerned individually. He pointed out that the Article of the Treaty did not provide for a meeting and conference of representatives of the Powers concerned, but only for "full and frank communication". He did not, however, explain Japan's probable attitude toward any concerted or collective action or attitude which might be taken by the Powers as a result


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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result of the "full and frank communication", which is
the obvious purpose of such communication.

As stated in my telegram No. 91, of May 7, 7 p.m., the
Foreign Office was undecided at that time whether or not to
reply to the American statement of policy. As far as the
Embassy can ascertain, no decision in regard to this ques-
tion has yet been reached.

Respectfully yours,


Joseph C. Grew.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

U. S. P. 100
S. S. S.



*I believe that
you will wish
to read all of
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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 9, 1934.

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Shanghai's 9470 of May 14, 1934, transmits to the Department several press clippings from Shanghai papers in regard to the American Government's memorandum to Japan on the latter's declaration of policy toward China.

The despatch itself refers in brief to the clippings transmitted and I believe that you should read the despatch.

I have marked a few passages of the press clippings.

J. E. J.
JEJ/VEM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 9470

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, May 10, 1934.

SUBJECT: Press Comment on "Hands off China" Policy,
and Secretary of State Hull's Statement.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND (A. I. D.)

The pronouncement on April 17, 1934, by Japan of its "Hands off China" policy created a critical impression throughout the world. The American Secretary of State's communication to Japan through the American Ambassador was as a general rule welcomed in this part of the world. I have the honor to enclose editorial comments taken from the local foreign press, and a summary of those appearing in the most prominent of the local Chinese newspapers regarding Mr. Hull's statement.

- The American Secretary's statement was commended
- 1/ by the NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of May 2, 1934, as being "just as clear cut as was the original Japanese statement which caused all the trouble." The SHANGHAI
 - 2/ EVENING POST & MERCURY (American) of May 2, 1934, commented that

"..... he has displayed a spirit of moderation and fair play which sets an excellent example for every American interested in the Far East, whether he be on the scene of dispute or in his own land."

In

-2-

- 3/ In the NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of May 3, 1934, a writer of a letter who signs himself "Disgusted," compared the American Secretary's statement most favorably as against the statement of Sir John Simon. "Disgusted's" comment has received a great deal more notice from local occidental residents than letters of this character usually receive. THE CHINA PRESS of May 3, 1934, also points out the difference between the notes of Sir John Simon and Secretary Hull.
- 5/ There is enclosed a running translation of editorials appearing in the local vernacular press of May 3 and 4, 1934, regarding the American note to Japan. While the writers of these editorials commend Secretary Hull's note they are not entirely satisfied, and it is possible that only a declaration of war would, in the Chinese opinion, meet the situation, which is to be regretted. They commend the note very highly but consider that it will be disregarded by Japan.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

5 ✓

Enclosures:

- 1/- Editorial from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of May 2, 1934.
- 2/- Editorial from SHANGHAI EVENING POST & MERCURY of May 2, 1934.
- 3/- Letter from NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS of May 3, 1934
- 4/- Editorial from THE CHINA PRESS of May 3, 1934.
- 5/- Summary of editorials in Chinese Press.

800
ESC:NLH

In quintuplicate
Copy to Legation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 9470 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated May 14, 1934, on the subject "Press Comment on 'Hands off China' Policy, and Secretary of State Hull's Statement."

SOURCE: NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
 (British) of May 2, 1934.

EDITORIAL

TO THE POINT
MAY 2 - 1934 N.C.D.N.
 The statement of the U.S. Secretary of State on the subject of Japan's unofficial declaration regarding China, as since modified officially, is a very forceful summing up of the opposition which was aroused when Tokyo's intentions were first made known. After pointing out that the relations of the United States with China and Japan and also with other countries are governed by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party, the statement refers to the multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East which it insists are terminable or modifiable only by processes prescribed and recognized or agreed to by the parties. Affirming its desire to be duly considerate of the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other countries and the right to expect reciprocal behaviour in this respect on the part of the latter towards the United States, the statement advances the contention that no nation, without the assent of the others concerned, can rightfully endeavour to make conclusive its will in situations in which are involved the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. This latest pronouncement on the matter of Japan's assumption of paramountcy in China is just as clear cut as was the original Japanese statement which caused all the trouble. It appears to call for no reply from Japan, for it is merely a reemphasis of what has been known to be the American policy all along. It will be interesting to see what action the other nations concerned will take in the matter, though it seems to be clear that enough has been said to indicate the intention of all concerned to insist upon the full recognition of their rights in this part of the world.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 9470 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated May 14, 1934, on the subject "Press Comment on 'Hands off China' Policy, and Secretary of State Hull's Statement."

SOURCE: SHANGHAI EVENING POST
& MERCURY, May 2, 1934.
(American daily newspaper.)

EDITORIAL

SHANGHAI, May 2, 1934.

Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury

Mr. Hull Speaks Out

ALTHOUGH Japan had already executed a right-about-face from the extreme position of its Foreign Office statement on April 17, Mr. Cordell Hull's reaffirmation of American policy in the Far East is a vital contribution at this time of international tension.

"The relations of the United States with China," says Mr. Hull, "are governed, as are our relations with Japan and other countries, by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party."

So much for Japan's notion of a special protectorate for China; it is not possible for the United States to recognize any go-between status for Japan or any other nation in this connection. Upon that as base, Mr. Hull continues:

"The United States has, with regard to China, certain rights and obligations. In addition, she is associated with China. Japan, or with both together, and with certain other countries, in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East, and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries in the world are parties.

"The treaties are lawfully modifiable or terminable only by the processes prescribed and recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

"In the international associations and relationships of the United States, the American government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other countries, and expects, on the part of other governments, due consideration of the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of the United States.

"In the opinion of the American people and the American government, no nation can, without the assent of other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations in which are involved the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

"The American government has dedicated the United States to the policy of a good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy, and will continue on its own part, and in association with other governments, to devote its best efforts to that policy."

Certainly there is nothing in the foregoing which is either provocative or in the slightest degree open to question.

It points out the special American position as China's traditional friend, it adds to this the existence of multilateral treaties which America will not ignore however they may be elsewhere flouted, it grants others a due consideration of their rights and "legitimate interests" while exacting similar consideration from them in turn, it politely but firmly rebukes willfull action by one nation striving to override others, and it rededicates the United States to "the policy of a good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy." Nothing new is contained in the foregoing, but it takes on a flavor of novelty when contrasted with recent efforts to break new ground in a different

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

as China's traditional friend, it adds to this the existence of multilateral treaties which America will not ignore however they may be elsewhere flouted, it grants others a due consideration of their rights and "legitimate interests" while exacting similar consideration from them in turn, it politely but firmly rebukes willfull action by one nation striving to override others, and it rededicates the United States to "the policy of a good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy." Nothing new is contained in the foregoing, but it takes on a flavor of novelty when contrasted with recent efforts to break new ground in a very different direction.

We believe Tokyo will receive this statement in the spirit in which it was issued. We hope Tokyo will take it as model for a return to policies on which all can agree.

Mr. Hull has displayed a spirit of moderation and fair play which sets an excellent example for every American interested in the Far East, whether he be on the scene of dispute or in his own land.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 9470 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated May 14, 1934, on the subject "Press Comment on 'Hands off China' Policy, and Secretary of State Hull's Statement."

SOURCE; NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS,
 May 3, 1934 (British daily newspaper)

LETTER TO EDITOR

Comparisons
 MAY 3 - 1934 N.C.D.N.
 To the Editor of the

"NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS"

Sir,—Let us hope that Britons generally in China will deplore the pronounced contrast, in favour of America, between the unequivocal statement of America and that of Sir John Simon in regard to Japan's "Hands off China" policy. The American statement, as your headlines correctly interpret it, is a decision "not proposing to consult Japan—statement of policy given in no uncertain terms." Beside the American statement, that of Sir John Simon is a very poor, pale thing. One sickens at his legal casuistry whenever he is called upon to examine Sino-Japanese issues. Being required to interpret, so that the average Briton may understand, what Japan meant by her statement, he entirely avoids the issue by a meaningless statement to the effect that others in China besides Japan enjoy "rights," but is at pains gratuitously to insert the very dangerous admission that Japan has "special rights," thus leaving the matter considerably more confused and worsened. No wonder Mr. Quo Tai-chi seeks a "clarification" and the New York Herald-Tribune "laments" Sir John's statement. It is significant that as regards the American statement Japanese reports state that the Japanese authorities are "reticent in expressing their opinions"; whilst the British attitude is welcomed with wide-open arms, being interpreted by Japan as "coinciding" with her policy, and being "appreciated" by Mr. Hirota!

One wearies of Sir John's "reluctant tolerance" of Japan's policies towards China. His evasiveness is only deferring the day when Britain will have definitely to decide the question whether to stay in China or recede in the face of Japanese pressure (unless Japan liberalizes her policy). When is Britain going to have a Foreign Minister who will recognize the need of a strong China (equally with a strong Japan) as the first essential to peace in the Far East and who will vigorously support the National Government of China?

DISGUSTED.

Shanghai, May 2.

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cognized the object in the dock as
being the man sentenced to de-
portation in 1929."

Shantung Votes Money Relief For Silk Industry

TSINAN, May 2.—(Kuomin)—The
Shantung Provincial Government,
at a meeting yesterday, decided to
issue a loan of \$400,000 for the re-
lief of the silk industry in the pro-
vince. Regulations governing the
payment of interest and amortiza-

one working perhaps was more
monitory, not to say minatory, than
is suggested by the published ver-
sion. Certainly the fact that Japan
considerably modified her attitude
immediately after its receipt sup-
ports such a belief. This is the
second point of interest, but it is
a side-issue.

When Mr. Hull tells Japan that
the relations of the United States
with China are governed "by the
generally accepted principles of in-
ternational law and the provision
of treaties to which the United
States is a party," it is impossible
to avoid the conclusion that he was
suggesting that Japan had declared
that she was bound by neither. Al-
though it has been denied that there
was any prior discussion between

(Continued on Page 14, Col. 1.)

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
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He Who Laughs Last Laughs Ruefully

Wang is a ricksha coolie with
a sense of humor. Yesterday on
Szechuen Road he was sitting in
his master's private ricksha
dreaming of the good old days in
Ningpo. A ricksha went by Wang
and as it passed there was the
disconcerting noise of a tire
blow-out. Wang awoke, noticed
a flat tire on the passing ricksha.
The other coolies started to laugh,
and Wang joined them. But they
kept laughing, and Wang couldn't
under stand why. Finally he look-
ed at one of his own ricksha
tires—it was flat. His face fell for
a moment, but soon he was laugh-

ing as heartily as the rest of
Sir John Simon's statement in the
expressing qualified approval of
Chinese Minister in London, in
China. Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the
Japan enjoys "special rights" in
mission by Great Britain that
by what is construed as an ad-
caused in certain quarters
has been
CONFERNATION
J.P. CHINA
"SPECIAL RIGHTS" IN
Shanghai, Thursday, May 3, 1934

EDITORIAL

SOURCE: THE CHINA PRESS, May 3,
1934. (Chinese independ-
ent English language daily
newspaper, American regis-
tered).

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 9470 from Edwin S.
Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China,
dated May 14, 1934, on the subject "Press Comment on
'Hands off China' Policy, and Secretary of State Hall's
Statement."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Martin E. Dwyer NAHS, Date 12-18-75

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. Cunningham, American Consul General dated May 14, 1934, on the subject 'Hands off China' Policy, and See Statement."

SOURCE:

EDITORIAL

Shanghai, Thursday, May 3, 1934

"SPECIAL RIGHTS" IN C.P. CHINA

CONSTERNATION has been caused in certain quarters by what is construed as an admission by Great Britain that Japan enjoys "special rights" in China. Mr. Quo Tai-chi, the Chinese Minister in London, in expressing qualified approval of Sir John Simon's statement in the House of Commons on April 30, revealed that he was asking Sir John to elucidate the phrase, "Japan had special rights recognized by other Powers and not shared by them." Mr. Quo Tai-chi added that although the incident must be regarded as officially closed, no Chinese had any illusions regarding Japan's real intentions.

Then there is the criticism of the New York Herald-Tribune, a newspaper whose opinions carry weight. The identical words quoted by Mr. Quo Tai-chi are employed in a leading article in which the journal laments the reference made by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons to "Japan's special rights recognized by other Powers and not shared by them." The Herald-Tribune also expressed the fear that Japan will have to be convinced that the United States is "the only country which does not look complacently on the implementation of her deviously launched new policy."

It is desirable to see whether Sir John Simon actually used the words imputed to him, and if so whether they can bear the interpretation put upon them. Admittedly a cabled summary of a speech can scarcely be regarded as authoritative, but in the case of Sir John's utterance Reuters actually put the passage upon which Mr. Quo Tai-chi and our

argument upon an isolated passage without paying any regard to other passages which distinctly qualify it is not convincing. Japan was plainly told that: "The British Government assumed that the Japanese statement was not intended to infringe upon the common rights of the other Powers in China or upon Japan's own treaty obligations."

The Washington Treaty, as we have pointed out previously, not only did not give Japan "special rights" in China, but expressly withheld them from her as well as from the other signatory nations. And Sir John Simon explicitly and deliberately referred to the "equal rights" in China possessed by the latter. It would appear therefore that the contention that Britain had given recognition to a claim that she had rejected in set terms cannot be upheld.

But there is an even stronger argument. If the words used by Sir John Simon were capable of being interpreted as a recognition of a right by Japan to a privileged position, what nation would jump at the opportunity to proclaim that she had found the powerful support of Britain? Obviously Japan, but it is highly significant that Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs makes absolutely no reference to such support. In his official comment he stated that: "Japan has not infringed upon China's independence or interests nor has she the slightest intention to do so. In fact, she sincerely desires the preservation of territorial integrity of China and her unification and prosperity." Obviously there could be no "special rights" without infringement of independence.

In accordance with expectation, he also found it impossible to avoid the offensive imputations against other nations that have become a feature of recent Japanese official statements in that he said:

"Japan cannot remain indifferent to anyone's taking action under any pretext which is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her geographic position, has the most vital concern. Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions of China exploited by any third party for the execution of a selfish policy which does not take into consideration the above circumstances."

The assumption that Japan is the only nation that has selfish designs and that shudders at the thought of China being exploited will provoke a smile, and is not worth serious comment. The announcement that Japan of course, subscribes to the principles of the "open door" and equal opportunity in China, and that she is observing scrupulously all existing treaties and agreements concerning that country, will gain the amount of credence that Japan has taught the world may safely be extended when she gives such undertakings. Quite opportunely a manifestation of her idea of equal opportunity has just come from Manchuria. The announcement is made that medical men of foreign countries must pass an examination set by "Manchukuo" officials, which of course means by Japanese. Apart altogether from the humorous spectacle of a

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

that these were the actual words used. The portion of the Reuter message pertinent to the present discussion read:

The Foreign Secretary began by saying that the British Ambassador at Tokyo had made on April 25 to Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, "a friendly enquiry to the effect that the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine-Power Pact to which Japan is a party, and that the British Government must continue to enjoy all rights in China which are common to all signatories except insofar as such rights are restricted by agreement, for example the Consortium Agreement, or insofar as Japan had special rights recognized by the other Powers."

The words "and not possessed by them" which seem to have caused the criticism do not appear in the above quotation, though admittedly they may be read into it. But, whether employed directly or by implication, we believe that it is impossible to support the interpretation that has been given. To base an

clusion of medical men with generations of tradition behind them is a plain indication that Japan has slammed the door in Manchuria and intends, if she can, to follow the same policy in China. The American note, to which reference is made in a special article in this issue has told her in unmistakable terms that such procedure would involve considerable peril.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quelefer NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 9470 Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated May 14,
1934, on the subject: "Press Comment on 'Hands off China'
Policy, and Secretary of State Hull's Statement."

C O P Y

Summary of vernacular press comments on the attitude
of the United States on the Japanese declaration
of the "Hands off China" Policy.

SOURCE: THE CHINA TIMES (SHIH
SHIH HSIN PAO), May 4,
1934. (Chinese Kuomintang
daily newspaper).

Secretary Hull's statement is based upon the Powers' rights and obligations in China as provided by international treaties. It is founded on the treaties between China and Japan as well as on the multilateral treaties to which the Powers are parties. It alludes to the fact that such treaties cannot be modified or terminated at will. It calls attention the mutual respect which the United States and other Powers must have for their respective rights and obligations and it emphasizes the impossibility for any one nation to carry out its will arbitrarily to the detriment of the rights and obligations of all others.

✓ In point of justice, candor, comprehensiveness and dignity, Secretary Hull's statement is, therefore, better than Sir John Simon's declaration. Nevertheless, bullies have no respect for equity or frankness while comprehensive statements are wide of the mark. A statement like Secretary Hull's is at best one that may enable the Powers to protect their joint ownership of China and the United States to keep on having a voice in the affairs of the Far East. But what can be done if Japan makes international treaties mere scraps of paper and tramples them under foot? The United States had a stronger voice in the days of Henry L. Stimson but we wonder what its effects have been. Secretary Hull's statement simply deepens the impression that China is not owned by any one nation but by all.

SOURCE: SHUN PAO, May 3, 1934.
(Chinese independent
daily newspaper).

Commenting upon the American note to Japan, THE SHUN PAO declares that a careful interpretation thereof reveals that Secretary Hull's note is a comprehensive statement not only touching upon the recent Japanese declaration on the "hands off China" policy but embracing questions which concern directly the United States and Japan.

Leaving aside the contents of the note, THE SHUN PAO realizes that the mere fact of its having been formally presented through the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo would suffice to make known the real attitude maintained by

President

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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President Roosevelt during the twelve months that have elapsed since his inauguration and to enable persons who concern themselves about the Pacific problem to understand the situation correctly today. The paper believes that the President's silence about the Far Eastern situation in the past has made his unexpected, timely and frank statement more powerful than usual declarations and suggestive of preparedness and determination to carry through his purposes. In the editor's opinion, the note has furnished a collateral proof of the correctness of the assumption that Japan has not as yet changed the position taken in her statement of April 17th. He says that it would be a gross mistake to conclude that, on account of the British and American expostulations, Japan has adopted a conciliatory attitude because, if that were the case, Washington would not have deemed it necessary to issue the latest note.

The editor adds that the American note to Japan is a well written statement implying not only a negative protest but also a positive warning. He likens the note to "a needle prick followed immediately by bleeding" when he announces that Mr. Hirota has readily construed Secretary Hull's statement to mean a re-exposition of the Stimson Doctrine. Coming to that part of the statement where the necessity of reaffirming the position of the United States is explained, the editor says that he has no doubt that the crystallization of that position is in the positive doctrine of Hoover or Stimson which connotes (1st) the possibility of the United States being involved in another world war, and (2nd) the importance of the American naval expansion as a means of re-establishing the Pacific equilibrium.

After pointing out that the use of the word "treaties" in the American note would indicate that the Nine-Power Treaty is not the only agreement that should be brought into play, the editor predicts that, in the 1935 Washington Naval Conference, a serious controversy is sure to arise between the United States and Japan especially in connection with the effect of the Far Eastern situation after the September 18th incident upon the Japanese-American or Japanese-American-British naval ratios. Although Mr. Hirota is anxious to eliminate the Far Eastern affairs or the Sino-American issues from the agenda of a purely naval conference, the editor observes that President Roosevelt has already made a negative reply to the Japanese proposition in that regard.

In connection with the release of the American note, continues the editor, there are two noteworthy points which are (1st) the harmony between the executive and the legislative departments of the United States, and (2nd) the fact that nearly all the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty were consulted prior to its delivery. In his opinion, the first indicates that the position taken by President Roosevelt is strengthened by the sympathy of those Senators who share with the President the power to handle diplomatic issues and the second signifies that the note has the support of at least seven other powers although issued in the name of the United States alone.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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SOURCE: SIN WAN PAO, May 4, 1934.
(Chinese independent daily newspaper).

The SIN WAN PAO asserts that, although Japan regards the recent American note as a reiteration of the Stimson policy, she does not deem it wise to make a retort believing that tacit consent may be secured by adhering to such an attitude as may not incense the United States.

Copied by NLH ^{tu}
Compared with MB ^{Bf}

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 546

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 27, 1934.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 5 - 1934

Department of State

SUBJECT: Editorial Comment on Tokyo
Foreign Office Statement.

AM RECD



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THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of possible
interest to the Department, a copy of despatch
No. 651 of April 27, 1934, addressed to the
Legation on the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, April 27, 1934.

800
FPL:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

For Distribution-Check			
Grade	For	To field	Yes
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F. P. Lockhart		6/11/34	

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

JUN 14 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 651

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, April 27, 1934.

Subject: Editorial Comment on Tokyo
Foreign Office Statement.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest, a copy of an editorial appearing in today's issue of the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES (British) commenting on the recent statement made by the spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign Office on the subject of Japan's alleged preferential position in China. It will be observed that the editorial voices the opinion that the sensation caused by the Foreign Office announcement is due
not so

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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not so much to its novelty as to the manner in which it was sent out and the tone and contents of the message. It is pointed out that it is not in accord with diplomatic courtesies to broadcast grave warnings through minor Foreign Office linguists and the press, the customary method being by a formal note. The writer of the editorial describes the method as "extraordinary and even contemptuous". The editorial also states the very unusual manner in which the Japanese Ambassador to the United States brought so important an issue to the attention of the Secretary of State.

The attention of the Legation is also especially invited to the closing paragraph of the editorial.

- 2/ There is also enclosed, as an indication of the manner in which the Japanese propaganda agencies are handling the Tokyo Foreign Office "unofficial" announcement, a statement (No. 23) issued by the Tientsin Nippon News Agency, on April 26, 1934. The statement purports to describe the interview of Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador to Japan, with Foreign Minister Hirota on April 25. There is also enclosed as of possible further interest, a Nippon Dempo statement issued by the above mentioned news agency on April 26 referring further to the British Ambassador's call at the Foreign Office at Tokyo on

April 26.

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- 3 -

April 26. Particular attention is invited to the statement in the Nippon Dempo article that "more-over the United States comprehends the Nippon policy". Further attention is respectfully invited to the last paragraph of the Nippon Dempo article.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lookhart,
 American Consul General.

3 ✓
 Enclosures:

- 1/, Editorial from PEKING AND TIENSIN TIMES, April 27, 1934.
- 2/, Tientsin Nippon News Agency article, dated April 26, 1934.
- 3/, Nippon Dempo statement issued by the above named agency on April 26, 1934.

800
 FPL:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover of despatch No. 546 of April 27, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 JB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES
 Tientsin, China, April 27, 1934.

Enclosure 1 in Report to
 No. 657, Dated April 27, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

could not be gainsaid and in full friendship with the Chinese they would be entitled to expect a place in the world such as has been won by the Anglo-Saxon peoples—perhaps even greater. The essential weakness of Japanese policy is that it runs entirely counter to the aspirations and the needs of a vast ruling race which is re-awakening to possibilities of greatness, despite the intolerable conditions which this struggle have created. Together they could undoubtedly determine their own destinies. Nor would the West desire to interfere, any more than it obstructed Japan's legitimate progress. Half the trouble in Sino-Japanese relations is the very definite impression that whereas Japan wants to keep China down and prevent her growth to full stature as a modern Power, the West is eager to facilitate that process. And that is essentially the issue posed in the proposed technical co-operation of the League and the other aspects of helpful Western policy.

The sensation caused by the statement is due not so much to its novelty as to the manner in which it was sent out and the tone and contents of the message. It is hardly in accord with diplomatic courtesies to broadcast grave warnings to the Great Powers through minor Foreign Office linguists and the Press. Affairs of this moment are generally conducted in a more dignified way: by a formal Note for instance. The British Government has resorted to this procedure, and presumably Tokio will find it convenient to reply equally formally. It would have been better had Tokio delivered so grave and momentous a warning in this manner at the outset. The Manchukuo military technique can hardly be applied to diplomatic intercourse. Governments have to be pinned down to their policies and statements. We see the reactions in the United States to the extraordinary and even contemptuous method followed in Tokio. One New York paper attacks Japanese policy under the headline "Nippon the Devious," while the important *Herald-Tribune* says that Japan is "resorting to a typically Oriental trick, dishing up a thoroughly insolent challenge throughout the world in scented insinuations, and sending out small boys to deliver it."

Then again, the action of the Ambassador to the United States is similarly remarkable. Asked

Yet there was no real warrant for surprise as to the nature of the policy disclosed. The thesis of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine has been referred to over and over again—though never in direct addresses to other Powers. There was a beginning during the Great War: in the 21 Demands, Group V. of which sought to make Japan a partner with China, not in Japan but in her own house, including virtual control of all the Police in this country; in the Ishii-Lansing negotiations, which mainly referred, however, to the territory outside the Wall; and in the agreements with the Anfuites and the stand taken at the Peace Conference, where Japan insisted that Shantung be restored, not by direct means, but through her. A temporary retreat after the war, and the Washington Conference Treaties, averted a first-class crisis which might well have led to war. Now policy has swung back to the original objectives. No sooner had the occupation of Manchuria been completed than the Monroe Doctrine became uppermost. Count Uchida, in his speech in the Diet on August 25, 1932, declared that

"the day is not far distant when Japan, Manchukuo, and China, as three independent Powers closely linked together by the bond of cultural and racial affinities, will come to co-operate, hand in hand, for the maintenance and advancement of the peace and prosperity of the Far East."

That was a pious hope of which little except sceptical notice was taken. China showed no disposition to co-operate on that basis, nor, in our opinion—however much it may be desired or however tightly China is pressed to the wall—do we believe it is practicable. Moreover, co-operation has a meaning in Japan entirely different from its ordinary meaning. It is a euphemism for domination.

Count Uchida developed his theme more boldly in his speech before the Diet on January 21, 1933, when he declared:—

"The League of Nations Covenant very wisely provides that regional understandings shall be respected. In this sense, our Government believe that any plan for erecting an edifice of peace in the Far East should be based upon the recognition that the constructive force of Japan is the mainstay of tranquility in this part of the world."

Count Uchida was doubtless referring to Article 21—which appears to be more popular in Japan than most of the others—providing that the Covenant shall not be deemed to affect "the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional under-

members of the Japanese Diet. Only in the most indirect sense were they directed to foreign Governments. And naturally little notice was taken of them. A few years ago it might well have been claimed for Japan that she was a major force of stability in Asia, despite her ceaseless activities, open and subterranean, in Chinese affairs. Is it honestly possible to regard her claim to that title with such conviction now? Is she not, even when claiming that rôle, putting it forward in terms which convert her from a factor of stability into a powerful and menacing factor for disruption and conflict? And have the events which she has directed for the past 2½ years been consistent with the claim? There is only one possible answer to that. In fact the whole world situation has been disturbed. Japan has turned the world away from the objectives it was so slowly but seriously pursuing. She has ended for the time being, at any rate, the "international decade," and forced us all back to Imperialism, to each for himself and the devil take the hindmost. That is the greater danger of the present situation. Her policy can succeed only if the world is willing to let it succeed. If it is not, then the history of the next two or three years must move from irritation to irritation, from exasperation to exasperation, from conflict to conflict, and what hope can then finally be entertained of such a policy? Two wrongs can never make a right, but they can make a world war, which nobody wants. It seems to us that Japan is simply playing into China's hands.

Tientsin, Friday, April 27, 1934.

TELLING THE WORLD.

THE Tokio Foreign Office spokesman expressed surprise at the reaction to his statement to the Press. He asserted that it was merely an amplification of the speech made by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, in the Diet, on January 23. To a certain extent that is true. In one speech after another by the present Foreign Minister and his predecessor, Count Uchida, references had been made to the rôle Japan has assumed of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELLING THE WORLD.

THE Tokio Foreign Office spokesman expressed surprise at the reaction to his statement to the Press. He asserted that it was merely an amplification of the speech made by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, in the Diet, on January 23. To a certain extent that is true. In one speech after another by the present Foreign Minister and his predecessor, Count Uchida, references had been made to the new rôle Japan has assumed of arbiter of Eastern Asia. Moreover, most students of affairs in the East are familiar with General Araki's utterances, which were based on the assumption that Japan had been summoned by Heaven and the Meiji Decree to assert her overlordship over the whole of Asia. And over and above this, it was clear that if it seemed difficult to put bounds to Japan's ambitions, the necessities of her new forward policy must drive her ever onward. It is not sufficient to close the seas from Vladivostok to Canton. The land frontiers must also be closed. And here again it is insufficient to close the Manchurian frontiers. The western approach to China must likewise be closed.

This point was stressed in the Lytton Report, which emphasised the ever-enlarging scope and responsibilities required by the logical development of the Continental policy. It is impossible not to admire the immense courage of the Japanese. The spectacular policy of daring the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune rather than dying in a ditch is bound to appeal to the Western spirit of adventure. But Japan was not required to die in a ditch. Even if she had to play second fiddle to China, the future of so energetic a people

ments. we see the reactions in the United States to the extraordinary and even contemptuous method followed in Tokio. One New York paper attacks Japanese policy under the headline "Nippon the Devious," while the important *Herald-Tribune* says that Japan is "resorting to a typically Oriental trick, dishing up a thoroughly insolent challenge throughout the world in scented insinuations, and sending out small boys to deliver it."

Then again, the action of the Ambassador to the United States is similarly remarkable. Asked to call on a high official of the State Department, he makes no formal statement in behalf of his Government, but hands over a series of newspaper clippings, with the text of the declaration and expressions of Japanese Press opinion. His action, he said, was not official but just spontaneous! The pill is a pretty big one to swallow, anyhow. But to administer it in this fashion is simply being provocative and unnecessarily crude. After all, if there was one thing more than another to which we might well look to the races of Asia for instruction it was for a more exquisite technique of polite manners. No wonder that Washington is frankly annoyed at the procedure. It would be all very well if Japan had come to the conclusion that no agreement was possible, and sought a definite breach as quickly as possible—which we do not believe. Moreover, if it is hardly becoming to address "grave warnings" to the Great Powers through petty Press spokesmen, it is still less consonant with normal procedure to accompany such indirect warnings with open threats of force.

Both matter and manner of the pronouncement therefore contributed to the tremendous sensation Tokio has caused.

Covenant very wisely provides that regional understandings shall be respected. In this sense, our Government believe that any plan for erecting an edifice of peace in the Far East should be based upon the recognition that the constructive force of Japan is the mainstay of tranquillity in this part of the world."

Count Uchida was doubtless referring to Article 21—which appears to be more popular in Japan than most of the others—providing that the Covenant shall not be deemed to affect "the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." This Article was inserted (as the *Japan Advertiser* recalls) at the insistence of President Wilson. It was a telling thrust, but it must not be forgotten that the South American Republics have long found the Doctrine irksome, that Washington itself is moving toward a new policy regarding those States, and that in the final judgment all depends on the benevolence, free will, and disinterestedness of the regional associations, in practical if not academic policy. As a means of dominating South America, the Monroe Doctrine is already bankrupt.

In his speech to the Diet in January, Mr. Hirota asked the people of America to "perceive the actual condition of the Orient and realise Japan's rôle as a stabilizing force in East Asia" (a term newly introduced to replace Far East). The Foreign Minister went on:—

"We should not forget for a moment that Japan, serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities. It is this important position and these vast responsibilities in which Japan's diplomacy and national defence are rooted." These were addresses to the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 in L. 1000
 No. 657, Dated April 27, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

BRITISH ENVOY ASSURES HIROTA BRITAIN WILL NOT CAUSE
 DANGERS APPREHENDED BY NIPPON

Nippon Dempo

Tokyo, April 25.- Sir Francis Lindley, British Ambassador to Nippon called on Foreign Minister Hirota at 2.30 p.m. today and interviewed for about one hour.

After saying "in connection with the Nippon Foreign Office statement of sometime ago various interpretations are being made and interpellations may be made at the British Parliament" the British Ambassador expressed his desire to ascertain the real intention of Nippon, and made verbal questions for details.

Foreign Minister Hirota cordially explained the text of the statement by saying that although it was issued informally, the China policy of the Imperial Government is as enunciated in the statement.

Ambassador Lindley assured Foreign Minister Hirota that as declared by Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, before the Parliament the British Government will not cause dangers apprehended by Nippon. In reply Foreign Minister Hirota thanked for the sincerity of the British Government in clearly defining its attitude regarding this point.

Thus by today's interview, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, the misunderstandings between the two parties have been cleared.

Moreover, according to a report from Mr. Saito, Nippon Ambassador to the United States, it is unlikely that the United States Government will issue a communication to the Nippon Government.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

3
 657 April 27, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

POWERS CORRECTLY INTERPRET NIPPON STATEMENT ON
 HER CHINA POLICY

Nippon Dempo

Tokyo, April 26.- The statement on the China policy issued by the Foreign Office sometime ago caused repercussions, which led to secret manouvres of Mr. Kuo Tai-chi, Chinese Minister to Britain. It was once supposed that it will make an unexpected development, such as Britain and the United States may take a concerted action against Nippon or it may be taken up by the League of Nations. However, as the result of efforts of Foreign Minister Hirota and envoys abroad the misunderstandings are being cleared, and the situation is gradually becoming quiet.

By the interview between Foreign Minister Hirota and British Ambassador Lindley yesterday Britain, where the statement caused strong repercussions, understood that although Nippon has no intention in the least either to violate the Nine Power Treaty or to obstruct the Powers' assistance to China, she could not tolerate the sale of arms and others that tend to encourage China's civil strife from the viewpoint of maintenance of peace in the Orient. Moreover, the United States comprehends the Nippon policy. Thus the matter has arrived at an amicable settlement without causing any complications.

Although the statement on the China policy caused repercussions, as made clear by the Foreign Minister's speech before the Diet the established China policy would be strictly adhered to even in the future, and efforts will be exerted to make the Powers recognize that Nippon is the stabilizing force in the Orient.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Although propaganda is being made abroad, the fact that the Government clarified the fair attitude of Nippon to obtain the correct understanding of the Powers will greatly contribute to the future employment of diplomacy.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese press takes the view that he will not abandon
Japan's policy of aggression against China.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 9, 1934.

~~RCM:~~

~~WGT:~~

~~EHD:~~

~~SKH:~~

Nanking's despatch of May 10, 1934, summarizes two conversations, one between Minister Johnson and Wang Ching-wei and the other between the Minister and Mr. Peng Shpei of the Executive Yuan, in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.

It is interesting to note that, according to Mr. Peng, it is expected that the Japanese will shortly present a number of other demands both at Nanking and at Peiping. In this connection Mr. Peck observes that a number of rumors have reached his office to the effect that the Japanese authorities will demand, among other things, (a) the right to build a railroad from the capital of Jehol to Peiping; (b) the right to build a railroad from Kweihua to Taiyuanfu; (c) the right of Japanese to raise cotton in north China; and (d) the right of Japanese to conduct mining operations in northern Shansi.

J. E. J.
 JBJ/VDM


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Nanking Office,
 May 10, 1934.



793.94

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.



JUN 4 34

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2/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum dated May 3, 1934, reporting a conversation between the American Minister and Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a memorandum dated May 4, 1934, of a conversation between the American Minister and Mr. Peng Shopel, Director of the Department of Political Affairs of the Executive Yuan, relating to the present controversy between the Chinese and Japanese Governments.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Wang Ching-wei stated, inter alia, that it had been decided in the conference recently held by him with General Chiang Kai-shek (at which Mr. Huang Fu was present) not to alter China's present policy with regard to the question of postal service between China Proper and Manchuria, but that two possible methods of settlement of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been discussed, the necessity of doing nothing which would prejudice the Chinese policy of non-recognition of the regime in Manchuria being constantly borne in mind. One of the alternative methods

for

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

for conducting through railway traffic without prejudice to the idea of non-recognition of the regime in Manchuria, Dr. Wang said, was to give control of the traffic between Mukden and Peiping to some sort of travel agency.

I have the honor to state, as of incidental interest, that Mr. Y. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation residing in Nanking, a few days ago informed an American newspaper representative that such a method of disposing of this problem would not meet with the approval of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Peng made the interesting statement that he thought the Japanese would present a number of demands in the near future, both to the Nanking and Peiping authorities.

In this relation, it may be observed that a number of rumors have reached this office to the effect that such demands have already been presented by the Japanese authorities, presumably representatives of the Kwantung Army, among them being the right to build a railway from Chengte, in Jehol, to Peiping; the right to build a railway from Kueihua, on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, to Taiyuanfu, capital of Shansi Province; the right of Japanese subjects to raise cotton in North China; the right of Japanese subjects to conduct mining operations in northern Shansi, etc. It has been impossible to find any official basis for these rumors.

Very respectfully yours,

For the American Minister:

Willys R. Peck
 Willys R. Peck,
 Counselor of Legation.

2-
 Enclosures:

- 1/ Memorandum dated May 3, 1934.
- 2/ Memorandum dated May 4, 1934.

In triplicate to the Department.
 Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.

WRP:HC

135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 3, 1934.

Conversation with: Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of
the Executive Yuan.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Mr. Peck, and Mr.
Salisbury present.

Subject: The campaign against Kiangsi com-
munists and Sino-Japanese relations.

Dr. Wang introduced the subject of the recent conference which he had at Nanchang with General Chiang Kai-shek, saying that it had aroused considerable speculation, some people fearing that it presaged an attack against the Southwest. Actually, however, the principal question discussed was the campaign against Kiangsi communist forces, and also the question of Sino-Japanese relations. He added that people, including those in the Southwest, now understood that a campaign against that area was not contemplated.

With regard to the campaign against Kiangsi communists, Dr. Wang stated that it was progressing satisfactorily, progress being due in large measure to the strategy of building blockhouses by Government forces in territory taken from the Reds, the latter being thereby prevented from reentering that territory at a later date. He anticipated that the communist forces would be subdued by August or September of this year. When questioned about reports of advances of communist forces in Fukien Province,

Dr.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Wang admitted that such forces had approached the vicinity of the town of Yenping, but said that it was not significant as the forces which had been pushed back by communist forces were troops under a former bandit leader named Lu Hsing-pang and not troops of General Chiang Kai-shek.

Turning to the question of Sino-Japanese relations, Dr. Wang stated that in the conference it had been definitely decided not to alter China's present policy with regard to the question of postal service between China Proper and Manchuria but that two possible methods of settlement of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been discussed, the necessity of doing nothing which would prejudice the Chinese policy of non-recognition of the regime in Manchuria being constantly borne in mind. The first plan, Dr. Wang stated, was for the South Manchuria Railway Company to control traffic between Mukden and Shanhaikwan, its equipment, however, not to proceed south of the Great Wall, (a plan which would seem to differ very little from the method now in practice). The second plan envisaged control of the traffic between Mukden and Peiping by some sort of a travel agency. Neither plan, he added, had as yet been approved.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

LES:HC:MCL

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 4, 1934.

Conversation with: Mr. Peng Shopai, Director of the
Department of Political Affairs
of the Executive Yuan.
Mr. Peek and Mr. Salisbury present.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations and the cam-
paign against Kiangsi communist forces.

Mr. Peng seemed to be uncertain about recent develop-
ments in the campaign against the Kiangsi communist forces,
but he stated that an encircling campaign against them would
be initiated in June, 1934, at which time the number of
hsien occupied by communist forces would be only three or
four. He apparently anticipated an early and successful
conclusion of the campaign.

Mr. Peng stated that he thought the Japanese would
present a number of demands in the near future both to Nan-
king and to Peiping. He asked the Minister if he thought
that, in case the Chinese should resist the Japanese, Japan-
ese military forces would encroach further on Chinese terri-
tory. The Minister replied that it was impossible for him
to say whether this would or would not be the result of
Chinese resistance.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

LES:HC:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nanking Office,
May 10, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum dated May 3, 1934, reporting a conversation between the American Minister and Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a memorandum dated May 4, 1934, of a conversation between the American Minister and Mr. Feng Shopei, Director of the Department of Political Affairs of the Executive Yuan, relating to the present controversy between the Chinese and Japanese Governments.
- 2/

It is interesting to note that Dr. Wang Ching-wei stated, inter alia, that it had been decided in the conference recently held by him with General Chiang Kai-shek (at which Mr. Huang Pu was present) not to alter China's present policy with regard to the question of postal service between China Proper and Manchuria, but that two possible methods of settlement of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been discussed, the necessity of doing nothing which would prejudice the Chinese policy of non-recognition of the regime in Manchuria being constantly borne in mind. One of the alternative methods

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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I have the honor to state, as of incidental interest, that Mr. Y. Suna, Secretary of the Japanese Legation residing in Nanking, a few days ago informed an American newspaper representative that such a method of disposing of this problem would not meet with the approval of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Peng made the interesting statement that he thought the Japanese would present a number of demands in the near future, both to the Nanking and Peiping authorities.

In this relation, it may be observed that a number of rumors have reached this office to the effect that such demands have already been presented by the Japanese authorities, presumably representatives of the Kwantung Army, among them being the right to build a railway from Chengde, in Jehol, to Peiping; the right to build a railway from Kueihua, on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, to Taiyuanfu, capital of Shansi Province; the right of Japanese subjects to raise cotton in North China; the right of Japanese subjects to conduct mining operations in northern Shansi, etc. It has been impossible to find any official basis for these rumors.

Very respectfully yours,

For the American Minister:

Willis R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:

- 1/ Memorandum dated May 3, 1934.
- 2/ Memorandum dated May 4, 1934.

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.

WRP:HC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 3, 1934.

Conversation with:

Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan.

Dr. Hsu Mo, Mr. Beck, and Mr. Salisbury present.

Subject:

The campaign against Kiangsi communists and Sino-Japanese relations.

Dr. Wang introduced the subject of the recent conference which he had at Nanchang with General Chiang Kai-shek, saying that it had aroused considerable speculation, some people fearing that it presaged an attack against the Southwest. Actually, however, the principal question discussed was the campaign against Kiangsi communist forces, and also the question of Sino-Japanese relations. He added that people, including those in the Southwest, now understood that a campaign against that area was not contemplated.

With regard to the campaign against Kiangsi communists, Dr. Wang stated that it was progressing satisfactorily, progress being due in large measure to the strategy of building blockhouses by Government forces in territory taken from the Reds, the latter being thereby prevented from reentering that territory at a later date. He anticipated that the communist forces would be subdued by August or September of this year. When questioned about reports of advances of communist forces in Fukien Province,

Dr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Dr. Wang admitted that such forces had approached the vicinity of the town of Yenping, but said that it was not significant as the forces which had been pushed back by communist forces were troops under a former bandit leader named Lu Hsing-pang and not troops of General Chiang Kai-shek.

Turning to the question of Sino-Japanese relations, Dr. Wang stated that in the conference it had been definitely decided not to alter China's present policy with regard to the question of postal service between China Proper and Manchuria but that two possible methods of settlement of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been discussed, the necessity of doing nothing which would prejudice the Chinese policy of non-recognition of the regime in Manchuria being constantly borne in mind. The first plan, Dr. Wang stated, was for the South Manchuria Railway Company to control traffic between Mukden and Shanhaikwan, its equipment, however, not to proceed south of the Great Wall, (a plan which would seem to differ very little from the method now in practice). The second plan envisaged control of the traffic between Mukden and Peiping by some sort of a travel agency. Neither plan, he added, had as yet been approved.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 4, 1934.

Conversation with: Mr. Peng Shopel, Director of the
 Department of Political Affairs
 of the Executive Yuan.
 Mr. Dock and Mr. Salisbury present.

Subject: Sino-Japanese relations and the cam-
 paign against Kiangsi communist forces.

Mr. Peng seemed to be uncertain about recent develop-
 ments in the campaign against the Kiangsi communist forces,
 but he stated that an encircling campaign against them would
 be initiated in June, 1934, at which time the number of
 hsien occupied by communist forces would be only three or
 four. He apparently anticipated an early and successful
 conclusion of the campaign.

Mr. Peng stated that he thought the Japanese would
 present a number of demands in the near future both to Nan-
 king and to Peiping. He asked the Minister if he thought
 that, in case the Chinese should resist the Japanese, Japan-
 ese military forces would encroach further on Chinese terri-
 tory. The Minister replied that it was impossible for him
 to say whether this would or would not be the result of
 Chinese resistance.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 444.


AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, April 28, 1934.



Subject: Press Opinion Concerning Japan's
Statement of Policy.

793.94



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

I have the honor to review below the attitude
of the local press concerning the statement of policy
issuing from the Japanese Foreign Office on April
17, 1934.

The HANKOW HERALD, English-language organ of
the Nanking Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in an
editorial on April 21 stigmatized the declaration
as "sheer effrontery to the world powers and
intentional insult upon a neighboring country",
wherein Japan for the first time brought out into
the open its intention, which has been evident for
a long time, to establish its hegemony over the Far
East and make China into another of its dependencies.
The editor continued:

"This 'informal' statement is undoubtedly
mainly directed at the United States. Its
reference to the 'providing of China with
military airplanes and giving of political
loans' can mean no other than the purchases
of aeroplanes from America and the \$50,000,000
(now reduced to \$20,000,000), cotton and wheat
loans granted China by the United States govern-
ment. These are what Japan alleges to constitute
measures 'likely to lead to disturbance of peace
in Orient'...

"It

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JUN 12 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"It is needless to say that there is not the least of ground in the Japanese charges. The airplanes bought from American concerns, of which a large number is for commercial purpose, are urgently needed in China's communist-suppression campaign in Kiangsi and elsewhere. The cotton and wheat loan has all been allotted for reconstruction projects by the government. Every country is now arming to the teeth and Japan heads the list in the armament race in this part of the world. Whatever little military equipments China possesses are not enough to threaten any country, let alone Japan with her huge military machine. In fact it will take generations for China to measure up to Japan in military efficiency.

"What assistance which China has obtained from the League has been technical in nature and for the purpose of improving the material well-being of the people..."

The editor considered that the situation demanded resistance to Japan's threat by both other foreign Powers and China, by the Powers for the protection of their interests in China, and by China if it was to retain its independence.

"The government should lose no time to let Japan and the rest of the world understand once for all that she is the master within the confines of her territory and she has the right to purchase airplanes and contract for political loans for whatever purpose and from whatever country she feels like to. No independent country will allow such interference and one loses its independence once such claim is admitted."

Finally, the editor expressed his regret that such a challenge had issued just at the moment when it appeared that, as the result of the Nanchang conversations, agreement concerning the outstanding issues in the North was about to be reached by negotiation between Huang Fu and Minister Ariyoshi at a "considerable risk of arousing antagonism of a large section of the country".

"The nation-wide indignation, which this utterly unsupported and unwarranted claim over China's rights will surely arouse in this country, will largely

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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largely nullify the government effort. It provides ammunition for the political enemies of the government. They will be able to point out that the friendly gestures of the government only lead to further demands from Japan. It may be true that the Japanese statement was issued as a 'trial balloon' to test the reaction of the powers before she places her formal claim of special position. By doing so, Japan has placed further difficulty to the solution of the many problems between the two countries."

The WUHAN JIH PAO (WUHAN DAILY NEWS), local organ of the Central Kuomintang, in its issue of April 22 carried an editorial voicing strong opposition against the fresh Japanese advance. Noting that the Japanese Foreign Office's declaration had aroused the resentment of other Powers as well as China, the paper contended that:

"The measures adopted by China in its efforts to better conditions may contemplate either development based on China's own capacities or development through international cooperation: China has the inalienable right to proceed along either road, and none may question this right. But Japan contrariwise has issued an open declaration expressing opposition, and has thus created another bad impression in the mind of the Chinese nation in addition to those resulting from the Twenty-One Demands and the September 18 Incident."

It is to be admitted, continued the editor, that China needs foreign capital and modern technical skill for its development, but if Japan were to be successful in the policy laid down in its latest declarations then that Power would have a monopoly for the supply of loans, technique, or military supplies, "and China will follow in the way of the four Northeast Provinces".

"So far as regards the Powers, the Nine-Power Pact provides for an open-door policy and equality of opportunity; and the essence of the Four-Power Pact purposes the preservation of peace and the effective maintenance of a balance of power in the Far East. After the
 . breaking

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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breaking out of the affair in the Northeast and the organization of the puppet Government, the Nine-Power Pact has become a piece of waste-paper and the Four-Power Pact but an empty document. But, the reason why the Powers have thus far been able to adopt a tolerant attitude is that Japan has repeatedly issued declarations to the effect that it would observe strictly the Open-Door Policy and welcome the enterprises of other Powers. But now, within a short time, the Japanese Foreign Office breaks these promises by openly opposing the assistance of China by those other Powers. This is tantamount to compelling the Powers to withdraw from the Far East and sever their relations with China, thus closing still more the gates to the Far East. The declaration made by the Japanese Foreign Office on the 17th is therefore pregnant with the gravest significance, inasmuch as on the one hand there is flagrant interference with China's domestic and foreign affairs and Japan's assertion of a protectorate over China, and on the other hand Japan pushes forward its Monroe Doctrine for Asia and desires that the Powers shall give legal recognition to its position as China's guardian."

The CHANGSHA MIN KUO JIH PAO (CHANGSHA REPUBLICAN NEWS) controlled by the Hunan Provincial Government, developed the subject somewhat differently from either of the other organs. In a long editorial in its April 24 issue the columnist gave initial recognition to the fact that the adoption of a strong attitude by China meant a violent conflict with Japan, but oppositely a complaisant attitude on the part of China would not call forth a reciprocal policy from its ambitious neighbor. In the opinion of the editor:

"The practical means of solution is, finally, very simple. This simple means lies not only in resisting if we have made up our minds to resist, but in reaching a peaceful settlement in the event we decide to agree in that way."

The matter was extremely urgent, continued the writer, and the question of whether or not China could satisfactorily resolve its actual problems depended not upon

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the actions of others to whom China had looked hopefully for so long, but upon China's ability to stand on its own feet and gird its loins for the struggle.

"The declaration that Japan has now made is certainly a composition of falsehood, viciousness, immorality and evasions. Putting it another way, this is Japan's proclamation for the destruction of the world's standards and public principles, put forward without regard to others. It is a proclamation that acts as a stimulus for the second Great War. Therefore all countries, if they wish to maintain the peace of the world and do not care to abandon their former markets here in the Far East, must wake up and permit themselves to be hood winked no longer by Japan's diplomatic smoke-screen of peace. They should from now on recognize clearly that Japan is at present the main obstacle to world peace, and should quickly and sincerely move in concert for the construction of an international front against Japan. Or, the League should be strengthened, and its decisions should be put into effect for the effective control of Japan. Or, an attack should be made against Japan on the basis of the Nine-Power Pact. This perhaps would cause Japan to realize that there is still justice in the world, and perhaps would restrain that country's barbarous lawlessness."

The editor finally, directing his remarks at Japan in the second person, stated that the Japanese aggression had gone far enough, and gave warning:

"You must take heed. You need not think that the reason that our country has retreated so much before you is that we really fear you; you must realize that although the spirit of the Chinese people very much loves peace and is extraordinarily complaisant, still in our bones there exists the character of virile resistance... And we definitely cannot permit you to rule us - this is one of the plainest of facts. And you may know it, if you have the least bit of reason."

The CENTRAL CHINA POST, British-owned and pro-Japanese, in an editorial on April 24 presented Japan's side of the case. It was contended that the policy of the League of Nations has from the beginning obstructed

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the liquidation of what might have been "no more than a temporary estrangement between China and Japan", and that every effort has been made to present Japan to the world public as the guilty scapegoat "while extolling the virtues of Powers which had no direct interest". The editor condemned as unreasonable the belief that Japan desires to monopolize the China market and close the Open Door; and:

"Meanwhile the Western Powers have agents selling military supplies of every nature to the (Chinese) Government and are reaping as large a monetary harvest as possible. No one at Geneva seems to have the common gumption to pause for a while and put himself in Japan's place. If he did, and did it honestly, quite a different picture might be painted for surely the world has evidence enough only in the position existent between France and Germany to realise the attitude of any great Power which sees in a neighbouring state a growth of armaments which can become a threat to itself. Neither Great Britain nor America would act otherwise, and neither would wait so long before taking positive action. It is our considered opinion that not one action of the League since the inception of the trouble has been conducive to peace. Every action taken is translatable as a perpetuation of the enmity of China, to help train her coolie hordes as fighting units and to equip them with as much modern war material as Nanking can pay for. What is this but inviting an explosion even though it may be in the hope it wins China for the west in the fight for trade which many regard as inevitable?"

Japan, according to the editor, was not opposed to the economic reconstruction of China. But he pointed out that:


"When we consider the decline in the trade of China when with the unique advantage of the low ratio of silver through which what market there is in the world for raw material could have been won by this country while in fact the country has been brought to the verge of bankruptcy, and only the scantiest business can be done owing to exorbitant taxation and then examine without bias the cause of this, one cannot escape

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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escape the conclusion that it is the upkeep of these huge armies and the enormous sums spent in modern equipment in pursuit of the present policy that is ruining China today."

Respectfully yours,


Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

In quintuplicate to the Department of State, Washington,
In duplicate to the American Legation, Peiping,
Copy to the American Consulate General, Nanking.

800

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 130.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Colombo, Ceylon, April 27, 1934

SUBJECT: EDITORIAL COMMENT ON JAPANESE POLICY.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON

For Distribution Check			
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Livingston	ONI		

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies

of an editorial which appeared in the TIMES OF CEYLON for April 25, 1934, on the subject of the recent pronouncement of Japanese policy in Asia.

While this editorial appeared before the Japanese Foreign Office's denial that it had given its approval to the "Hands Off" policy, it contains a sufficient number of trite remarks to be interesting.

It is gratifying to note that the editor of the TIMES OF CEYLON believes that "it is impossible to conceive of the Powers acquiescing in the Japanese pronouncement, which, incidentally, possesses no precedent or justification in the Monroe Doctrine."

With reference to the possibility and probability of China appealing to the League of Nations, the editorial points out that if the League again fails China it will have lost all its self-respect and all claim to continued existence. "The United States",

it

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
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- 2 -

it is added, "is in the happy position of being able to wait for the outcome of the painful dilemma in which the League is placed, doubtless rejoicing in the wise caution which prevented its becoming a member of that body."

Editorials such as the one now transmitted to the Department indicate that American opinion is being more and more regarded and that the foreign policy of the United States is being carefully watched, even in such distant spots as Ceylon. However, Ceylon, in the present instance, has a profound interest in the policies of other countries as it is believed that in the event of war the Japanese would undertake operations against Ceylon due to its strategic location and, perhaps, because of the rather anti-British spirit which exists in a certain section of the people.

Respectfully yours,


Brockholst Livingston,
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

No.1. Editorial of the TIMES OF CEYLON
for April 25, 1934.

800
BL:NEP

Distribution:

Original and four copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to Despatch No.130,
 of Brockholst Livingston, American
 Vice Consul, at Colombo, Ceylon,
 dated April 27, 1934, on the sub-
 ject: EDITORIAL COMMENT ON JAPANESE
 POLICY.

SOURCE: Times of Ceylon,
 April 25, 1934,
 Colombo.

EDITORIAL.

A WORLD DILEMMA.

The militarist faction in Japan has triumphed beyond the worst fears of those who took the most alarmist view of the developments which have occurred in the Far East during the past two years. Whatever non-chauvinistic elements existed in Japanese politics must long ago have been discouraged and silenced by the unbroken success which, thanks to the pusillanimity displayed by the League of Nations in the matter of Manchuria, the impotence of Soviet Russia, and the preoccupation of the United States Government with its acute internal problems, has so richly rewarded the policy of aggressiveness, till today they have become as harmless as the Social Democrats in Germany or the Anti-Fascists in Italy. Japan, intoxicated by her previous triumphant defiance of world-opinion, has now boldly announced her plan for establishing a complete hegemony over China. In the midst of their plans for securing permanent peace the chief European and American powers are confronted with a situation which, had it arisen, say, in 1913, would have led to immediate war. What are they to do? Are they going to refuse to accept Japan's challenge, or are they again to put up with humiliation, knowing full well that if they do it will inevitably be followed in a very short time by still greater humiliation. The reservations in the Japanese statement with regard to the maintenance of the Open Door and equal trading opportunities will not blind anyone to the fact that the new policy is only a first step towards the goal of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the whole of the Far East and probably also the Near East, and the ultimate realization of the "Hands Off Asia" slogan which is so popular in Japanese military circles. The League of Nations is at last faced with a definite challenge to its existence. China is a member of the League and will most certainly appeal to it against a proposal which, if accepted, would deprive her of the last vestige or semblance of independence as a nation. If again the League fails China, it will have lost all its self-respect and all claim

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to continued existence. Its elaborate Convention will have become a mockery, and further meetings at Geneva would be sheer farce. It is impossible to conceive of the Powers acquiescing in the Japanese pronouncement, which, incidentally, possesses no precedent or justification in the Monroe Doctrine. The originator of that Doctrine, equally with those who followed him, explicitly repudiated any intention of infringing the independence or sovereignty of any other State, or any attempt to establish a protectorate over it or interfere with its internal affairs. The Monroe Doctrine does not prevent the importation of arms from Europe into any North or South American State or prohibit financial advice. Non-acquiescence in the Japanese declaration, however, need not involve immediate war or even a rupture of friendly relations. Many years may elapse before any occasion arises for Japan to assert the rights which she is now claiming. It is open, therefore, for every European Power individually to shelve the matter for the time being, as the United States is reported to be doing, even though it may fully realise that the crisis is thereby merely postponed. It is in their capacity as members of the League of Nations that the European Powers, except Germany, will soon be confronted with the disagreeable necessity of arriving at an immediate decision. China almost certainly will immediately appeal to the League and will not tolerate any evasion of the question. The United States is in the happy position of being able to wait for the outcome of the painful dilemma in which the League is placed, doubtless rejoicing in the wise caution which prevented its becoming a member of that body. The League is not likely, however, to be successful in preventing the problem being passed on across the Atlantic. The time will undoubtedly come when America, like Europe, will have to decide whether to oppose the monstrous claims which Japan is putting forward or meekly acquiesce in them knowing that even then it will only make the final day of reckoning the more, not the less, inevitable.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


Legation of the
United States of America.

Peiping, May 2, 1934.

793.94
Circular 434

Subject: Relations with China.



To the

American Consular Officers in China.

Sirs:

By direction of the Department, I quote for your information a statement released to the press in the United States by the Department of State for publication on May 1st:

"The American Ambassador to Japan, under instructions from the Department of State, called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 29th, and made a statement the substance of which was as follows:

"Recent indications of attitude on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests of Japan and other countries in China and in connection with China have come from sources so authoritative as to preclude their being ignored and make it necessary that the American Government, adhering to the tradition of frankness that has prevailed in relations between it and the Government of Japan, reaffirm the position of the United States with regard to questions of rights and interests involved.

"The relations of the United States with China are governed, as are our relations with Japan, and our relations with other countries, by the generally accepted principles of International Law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States is a party. The United States has, with regard to China, certain rights and certain obligations. In addition, it is associated with China or with Japan or with

both

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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both together with certain other countries in multilateral treaties relating to rights and obligations in the Far East and in one great multilateral treaty to which practically all the countries of the world are parties.

"Treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them.

"In the international associations and relationships of the United States the American Government seeks to be duly considerate of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other countries and it expects on the part of other governments due consideration of the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of the United States. In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

"The American Government has dedicated the United States to the policy of the good neighbor and to the practical application of that policy it will continue on its own part and in association with other governments to devote its best efforts."

In communicating the foregoing for the information of the Legation and the consular officers in China, the Department stated that it desires that no release be made in China by American officials. You will please be governed accordingly.

Very truly yours, .

For the Minister:



C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ROME, May 23, 1934.

No. 548.

Subject: Far East Situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 3 1934


WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUN 7 - 1934

Department of State

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JUN 6 34

Copy held in WE
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94/6684

With reference to my despatch No. 519 of April 30, 1934, concerning the Italian viewpoint with regard to the situation in the Far East, I have the honor to inform the Department that the Italian press continues to show an active interest in developments in the Far East, not only with respect to Japanese expansion and trade activities but as well with regard to other aspects of the Pacific situation.

Recently the MESSENGER published two editorials on that subject, translations of which are attached hereto.

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The first article, entitled "Analogies", deals with the similarity in the international policies and positions of Japan and Germany and surveys the geographic factors which those countries would necessarily have to take into account in the event they should decide to seek a basis for close political cooperation. Russia's policy vis-à-vis Japan and Germany, which is discussed at some length, is described as being determined by the expansionist tendencies of both Japan and Germany, and it is pointed out that any complications involving the Soviet Government in the Far East would, in all probability, have repercussions in Central and Eastern Europe.

The second article relates particularly to the Pacific situation and the question of naval disarmament. While admitting that land disarmament is above all a European problem, naval disarmament is depicted as chiefly the concern of England, the United States and Japan. As a consequence, the preparations of the United States and of Japan to increase their naval forces to the limits permitted by the treaties, together with Japan's declared intention to uphold its right, upon the expiration of the Washington and London naval accords, to naval parity with the two greatest maritime powers, are looked upon as the defeat of attempts at disarmament and the beginning of a naval race for the dominion of the Pacific from which England cannot remain apart. Neither can France and Italy, it is stated, remain indifferent to those developments. In fact, it concludes, the complicated aspects of the Pacific situation were publicly commented upon by Mussolini some months ago and are of importance to the world at large.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In the meantime, the Italian press continues to publish from time to time long articles on Japanese dumping activities, written by a special correspondent in Japan, in which methods of production and marketing as well as the living conditions of Japanese workmen are described in detail. The manifest purpose of those articles is to keep before the Italian reader the danger of Japanese economic penetration and in its broader aspects to warn the states of Europe that a united continent is the condition precedent to a successful meeting of that menace from the Orient.

Respectfully yours,


Breckinridge Long.

2 Enclosures: Two translations.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 548 of May 23, 1934,
from the Embassy at Rome.

LESSAGGERO, Rome,
May 18th, 1934.

Analogies.

(Translation)

When Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, it was rumored that she had consulted Japan, who had already deserted Geneva, before making up her mind to this step. Authoritative circles in Tokio at the time termed this report too ridiculous to warrant denial. Unquestionably Germany's decision was too closely connected with the whole policy of the Hitler government and the European political situation to have been the result of German-Japanese relations. At the same time this rumor reflected a similarity which really does exist in the international policies and positions of the two countries. This similarity may be expressed by saying that both Germany and Japan find themselves in a position of isolation which is, furthermore, due in both cases to their own initiative and is therefore associated with an extremely active policy.

Today the analogy between the two countries has been brought out by highly authoritative - indeed we may say official - testimony. Vice Admiral Matshita, commander of the Japanese training fleet (now in the Mediterranean) was in Berlin a few days ago and attended a meeting held by the German-Japanese Society of Berlin in honor of the Japanese naval mission. His remarks at this meeting were

noteworthy

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noteworthy. "Japan finds herself in virtually the same position as Germany was in before the war. It is a difficult situation; but the Japanese people is aware that all its efforts must be directed toward the welfare of the country. Although the geographical position and individual conditions of Japan and Germany differ, they have in common the qualities of ability, courage, and perseverance. Thanks to their sense of justice and their fanatical patriotism, both countries hold a special place among the nations. It is not mere coincidence that at this moment both countries are having a number of international difficulties to settle and are working toward a peace founded upon equality of rights." The Japanese statements were replied to by the authoritative POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE: "There is an affinity of spirit and sentiment between Germany and Japan which is expressed by the importance both of them attach to certain moral and social values, as manifested especially in their lofty concept of the mission of the State." These two statements are complementary.

As noted above, the Japanese admiral mentioned the difference in the respective geographical positions of Germany and Japan. Certainly, if one merely considers distance or the individual configuration and position of the two countries, the Admiral was correct as to the difference. Nevertheless if, above and beyond temporary political situations and alongside those moral affinities which the Japanese admiral and the German newspaper mentioned, the two countries should seek a basis for potential future collaboration, it is precisely to geographic considerations that they would have to turn. Germany lies in the

center

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center of Europe, Japan along the eastern edge of Asia; yet these two distant countries, it may be said, are separated by only one state. Russia with her immense territory stretches from the Baltic to the Yellow Sea; developments in the Far east interest her no less than potential complications on the Niemen and the Vistula.

In the Far East it is Japan that represents the source of anxiety to Russian politicians - to present-day Soviets as to their Czarist predecessors. On the western frontier Poland (with her ally, Rumania) was up to a short time ago the Soviet government's chief concern; but today, as in the times of the Czars, it is Germany. Russia and Germany are no longer contiguous as before the war; but Germany is still close enough to remain Russia's principal point of reference as regards western politics.

The countries separating Germany and Russia are Poland and the Baltic States (Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Poland, as stated above, is large enough to interest Russian policy directly, independently of Russo-German relations. However, it is obvious that the Polish factor assumes particular importance for Russia precisely because of the fact that beyond Poland lies Germany. Prior to the advent of Hitler or, better, to the non-aggression pact between Russia and Poland, Russia had no reason to fear any association between Germany and Poland. In Russia's calculations, in other words, the two factors Poland and Germany were subtracted, not added. Today Russia feels that there is some change in this situation, even though Poland consented, like the Baltic states, to extend the non-aggression treaty with Russia to 1945. One of Russia's fears is that an

understanding

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understanding may be reached between Germany and Poland involving a settlement of the Danzig Corridor question, whereby the Corridor would be returned to Germany and Poland would receive Lithuania, whose port of Memel would serve her as an outlet on the Baltic. These plans have been vaguely considered more than once, and they now assume a certain measure of verisimilitude in view of the changes taking place in the central and eastern European situation. It would be risky to regard such an eventuality as probable and imminent; yet it has its importance and Moscow is taking it into consideration and associating it with the old fears as to Poland's supposed aims on the Ukraine and the new fears as to Germany's presumed aims in that same direction.

In such a situation the Baltic countries become more important than ever to Russia. If hitherto she was concerned by an excessive subservience on their part to Poland, Russia is now chiefly troubled by fears of German expansion. Not much attention was paid in the West to Russia's attempt on two occasions (December and April last) to conclude an agreement guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic countries, first with Poland and then with Germany. The failure of the second attempt gave rise to rather heated polemics between the Russian and the German press.

In the light of these anxieties on Russia's part, the above-mentioned affinity of position between Germany and Japan becomes more intelligible. It is clear that Moscow regards possible German expansion in the Baltic countries with practically the same disfavor as she regards Japanese expansion in Manchuria. Undoubtedly there is the possibility to be reckoned with that potential complications involving Russia in the Far East may have repercussions in Central and Eastern Europe, between the Baltic and the Dniester.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 548 of May 23, 1934,
from the Embassy at Rome.

MESSAGGERO, Rome,
May 22nd, 1934.

A Struggle of Imperialisms.

The problem of land disarmament should not make us forget the no less important question of naval disarmament. The Duce mentioned it briefly, but with his customary precision, when he stated in his recent article that news about the Disarmament Conference was becoming more and more infrequent and laconic, "whereas there begins to be an abundance of items regarding land, sea, and air rearmament." If, in fact, land disarmament is an essentially European, or rather continental European, problem, naval disarmament chiefly concerns the sea powers England, the United States, and Japan (and in this statement there is no intention of overlooking or undervaluing the narrower problem of naval armaments in the Mediterranean, affecting particularly Italy and France, who in turn shows signs of an active resumption of naval construction).

Under the agreements reached at Washington in 1922 and subsequently upheld and perfected at London in 1930, the ratio between the British, American, and Japanese fleets is governed by the key numbers 5, 5, 3. There is, in other words, parity between the United States and England, while Japan has three-fifths of the strength granted the other two powers. Heretofore the United States had not taken full advantage of her treaty rights; now, however, a new naval building program has been announced, aimed at filling up this unutilized margin.

On

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On January 9th of this year, Mr. Vinson, Chairman of the Navy Committee of the House of Representatives, presented a bill authorizing President Roosevelt to build nine warships and to replace existing tonnage to the extent required to bring the navy up to the strength envisaged in the treaties. In presenting the bill, Vinson pointed out that Japan had already built her fleet up to the treaty level and that Great Britain would in all probability do the same. The United States, on the contrary, was shamefully and dangerously lacking in modern battleships and would continue to be so even after all the tonnage now laid down had been completed.

Three weeks later, speaking in defense of the bill before the House of Representatives, Vinson affirmed that American influence in the Far East had been greatly shaken by the diminished strength of the United States navy in comparison to Japan and recommended immediate approval of the measures under discussion in view of the slightly reassuring international situation, the prospects of which he said were anything but bright for America, practically alone and friendless in a turbulent world.

Pacifist associations, naturally, agitated against the bill and protested to the White House, but they received a sharp rejoinder from Mr. Rainey, the Speaker of the House. "It is the Government's opinion," Mr. Rainey said, "that the best means of avoiding war is to prepare for it. I hope that there will not be war in the spring between Russia and Japan, but Russia has an army of 800,000 men and is building twenty-five airplanes a day, while Japan has

refused

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refused to accept any sort of non-aggression pact."

At the conclusion of these discussions on January 31, the Senate hastened to approve the bills transmitted by the House for the construction of 102 naval units and 1184 airplanes, designed to bring the American navy up to the maximum level permitted by the Washington and London treaties. The cost of new tonnage contemplated in this program was set at 380 million dollars, with an upward margin of 25 per cent to take care of the probable increase in prices. Ninety-five million dollars were also provided for the construction of the 1184 planes, which will bring the total air force of the navy up to approximately 2200.

To this heavy program, which will be carried out gradually (37 new units are contemplated for the present, 22 of them to be laid down immediately), Japan promptly replied with the announcement that she would demand parity with the two leading naval powers. Only a few weeks ago during the discussions of the Japanese Diet, Minister of the Navy Osuni explicitly declared that at the expiration of the London and Washington treaties Japan would claim the right to build her forces up to the level of the two most-armed powers; and only a few days ago came an authoritative statement from Tokyo, reported by this newspaper on May 9th, stating that "Japan is ready to accept the challenge of the United States to an armament race."

An agreement on the part of the United States and England to any such proposal by the Tokyo government is out of the question, since parity with Japan would spell inferiority for them in the Pacific, to which the United States especially is not disposed to resign herself. There

will

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will result an armament race between the United States and Japan, from which England cannot remain aloof, since she must continue to possess a navy at least not inferior to that of any other power, which is already a serious retrogression from the previous formula of a "Two-Power Standard."

It can scarcely be expected that an armament race of this kind among the three naval powers will find the Mediterranean powers indifferent. We may postpone a consideration of this question, however, to some other time. It is more useful for the purposes of this exposition to consider the changes that are taking place in the Pacific and Far Eastern situation. It will be recalled that during Japan's invasion of Manchuria, many observers predicted that this would lead to tension between Japan and the United States. Washington did, in fact, show great interest in the Manchurian conflict: it was apparently prepared to back up the League's intervention, instigated by China, and when confronted with the creation of an independent Manchuria under Japanese control, it formulated the principle of non-recognition of territorial changes brought about by military means in violation of the Kellogg Pact. This half-hearted activity of American diplomacy, however, soon disappeared (just as the final condemnation of Japan's action by the League of Nations remained platonic) and, particularly after President Roosevelt entered office, nothing further was heard of the matter. This fact, along with the armistice between China and Japan and Russia's dilatory attitude, contributed to a de facto stabilization of the Far Eastern situation and everybody grew accustomed

to

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to the idea of this new state of Manchuria under Japanese protection. In any event, Europe had enough worries of her own.

However, should there really ensue a naval armament race between Japan and the United States leading to an acute struggle for supremacy in the Pacific (it seems that Japan has it in mind to demand American withdrawal from the Philippines and Tientsin if the mandate question is brought up), we may well wonder whether the Near East conflict may not break out again. Here, too, sudden clouds have appeared on the horizon, as demonstrated by the recent incident on the Amur river. Japanese-American tension is followed by a recrudescence in Russo-Japanese hostility, so much so that the possibility is contemplated of a Russo-American alliance against Japan, with a perhaps more than ever divided China in the midst. An article by the Duce a few months ago considered with extreme clear-sightedness the manifold aspects of a situation filled with unpredictable menace. There is no one who fails to see that a conflict in the Far East for the control of the Pacific could not be regarded with indifference by England and other parts of the Asiatic world - that is the whole world.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tientsin/71 FOR #547

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED May 1, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations and negotiations during April 1934.

793.94/ 6722

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b. Relations with other countries.

71394
Japan. The month of April witnessed a gradual but very definite expansion of Japanese political activity in North China, with a corresponding increase in the apprehension felt by Chinese in this district.

On April 3 General Hwang Fu, Chairman of the Political Readjustment Council, left Peiping on his long-delayed trip to the South to confer with the leaders of the National Government on the policy to be adopted vis a vis Japan in North China. The course of General Hwang's various conferences with General Chiang K'ai Shek and Wang Ching Wei in Nanch'ang and Nanking, and his meeting with Ariyoshi, the Japanese Minister to China, in Shanghai, were followed closely by literate classes in Tientsin.

These conferences are said to have been concerned with the questions of through traffic between Peiping and Mukden, the establishment of postal relations between "Manchukuo" and China, so as to permit of the free interchange of mail, and
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the establishment of customs stations on the boundary between "Manchukuo" and China. It is, of course, much to the interest of Japan to force the settlement of these questions, and there are not lacking reports that she has taken aggressive steps toward that end. Under a Nanking date line of April 11, the I SHIH PAO of April 12 reported that a high official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated that the serious situation obtaining in North China had been brought about incident to the demands of the Japanese that these questions be negotiated, the demands having been presented, according to this official, in the form of an ultimatum. Whether such an ultimatum was actually communicated has not been confirmed at Tientsin.

The same report quoted an official of the Ministry of Communications to the effect that the Chinese would not yield either on the demand for the resumption of through traffic or on that for the abandonment of the present postal blockade.

Reports that the postal blockade was in fact being "run" regularly by the various Japanese steamship lines with the cooperation of the Japanese Tourist Bureau in Peiping and Tientsin were persistent throughout the month. A member of the staff of this office was informed by a local official that the Hopei Postal Administration, acting under the instructions of the Ministry of Communications, had lodged a protest against these activities

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activities with the Japanese Consul General here, but that this protest had been met with the response that since the postal blockade was undesirable, no steps would be taken against the violators of it. The employees of the Customs had, however, according to this informant, succeeded in checking to a degree the violation of this blockade by the seizure, where it came under their cognizance, of mail matter addressed to "Manchukuo". A report in the I SHIH PAO of April 9 states that the Japanese Consulate General, in replying to the Postal Administration's protest, denied that the Japanese Tourist Bureau was handling mail to "Manchukuo". This report does, however, corroborate the one above cited in that it also recounts the seizure of several pouches of mail for "Manchukuo" aboard Japanese steamships by Customs Officers.

The vernacular press of April 16 carried a statement purporting to emanate from the Japanese Legation in Peiping to the effect that the abolition of this postal blockade, and the resumption of through traffic were necessary in the interests of the inhabitants of North China, and that since Japan did not insist on the recognition by China of "Manchukuo", a way could surely be found for the solution of these questions which would at the same time protect the dignity of China.

The results of General Hwang Fu's conferences on these questions is not known. A report in the

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the TA KUNG PAO about the middle of the month stated that it had been decided that all diplomatic questions effecting North China would henceforth be dealt with direct by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking. This is not confirmed.

A report of interest in connection with these negotiations is one to the effect that on April 10 Major General Lei Shou-jung, who was a member of the Chinese delegation to the Tangku Truce Conference, reached Shimomseki on his way to Tokyo, where he was said to be planning to stay for several weeks to exchange views with leading Japanese officials relative to the situation in North China.

The feeling of uneasiness in the North occasioned by General Hwang's absence was assiduously played upon by the various agencies of Japanese propaganda in Tientsin, which reported that he had gone to Nanch'ang determined to resign from his post if the conciliatory policy which he favored toward Japan were not adopted, and that if the obdurate policy of Nanking obliged him to resign, a serious situation would develop. At the same time there were persistent and disquieting reports of Japanese troop movements.

On April 4 the vernacular press reported that the Japanese garrison at Kupehhou had recently been reinforced by the addition of three or four hundred men. Troops from this garrison were stated to be making frequent trips to points on the border
 of

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of Hopei and Jehol, and motor roads were reported to have been built connecting Ch'engtch and the various passes along the Great Wall.

There were at the same time persistent reports that the number of Japanese troops at Malanyu had been considerably increased. It was stated that there were originally two battalions of Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops stationed at that village - which is within the Great Wall, and half-way between Chichow and Tsunhua - and at the near-by Eastern Tombs of the Ts'ing Dynasty, but this number is alleged to have been greatly increased, a report in the press of the 7th stating that 23 trucks carrying military supplies had already arrived there, and that the place was daily visited by Japanese aeroplanes, of which there were 29 in the Japanese airdrome there. These reports were never confirmed.

At the opening of the month this apparent concentration of Japanese troops at Malanyu was rumored to be intended as a guard for Pu Yi, the Emperor of "Manchukuo", who, it was then believed in Chinese circles, intended to fly to the Eastern tombs on April 5, there to worship his ancestors. This event did not, of course, transpire.

The reported movement of Japanese troops into Chahar was stated in the vernacular press to be lacking confirmation from official quarters, no despatches to that effect having been received from the Chahar Provincial Government.

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In connection with the long-drawn out labor disputes at T'angshan, the settlement of which had been peremptorily ordered by the Government, the I SHIH PAO (Chinese) of April 9 carried a report to the effect that on April 7 an officer of the Japanese military notified the Chinese authorities that he would not acquiesce in any drastic action which might affect the peace and order of T'angshan.

A further development adding to the tension in North China during the month under review was revealed in the reports which first appeared in the vernacular press of April 10 to the effect that the Japanese General Staff, with a view to investigating the economic and military situation of the several provinces of this area, had recently deputed some hundred-odd retired Japanese army officers, all of whom were well versed in Chinese, to conduct an extensive investigation, thirty of the group being ordered to proceed for that purpose to Shansi, twenty to Chahar, and others to Ninghsia, southern Hopei, Honan, and Shantung. These reports stated that the National Government had ordered an investigation of the matter, and that from the Peiping authorities it had been learned that no passports had been issued to members of such a group. This report was followed by another the following day purporting to come from the office of the Japanese Military Attache in Peiping, to the effect that such Japanese officers as had travelled in the interior
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of North China since the beginning of this year had all secured properly visaed passports and that none of them was traveling on a secret mission.

These reports of a military survey of North China were followed later in the month by statements in the vernacular press that an economic survey of the same area was contemplated by the Japanese Government. This survey would employ, it was said, over a hundred specialists in various branches of science, and its object would be to investigate the physical features of the terrain, the extent of various mineral deposits, the customs of the people, and their feelings on national questions. The account of this projected survey which appeared in the I SHIH PAO noted with pessimism that similar groups had been sent throughout Manchuria before that area was occupied by the Japanese military.

The Japanese military units in Peiping are reported to have held extensive field practices in the vicinity of that city from the 10th to the 13th of the month. Field practices held by Japanese troops at F'angshan, allegedly without formal notification to the Chinese authorities, were reported to have thrown the population there into panic.

The atmosphere of uneasiness and pessimism which had been growing in this district throughout the first part of April became even more marked when, on April 17, the Japanese Foreign Office issued an unofficial statement which, if accepted in its

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full implications, would make China a protectorate of Japan. As a reaction to this statement there would appear to be a definite swing in local opinion toward a more complete support of the National Government in its efforts to meet as best it can this new crisis.

That the fear of Japanese invasion is not restricted to Hopei alone was evidenced on April 26 by the statement reported to have been made by General Ho Ching-wu, a member of the Peiping Branch Military Council and the National Government's representative at the inauguration of the District Autonomous Political Council for Mongolia. He had just returned from Inner Mongolia, which he stated was in a situation as perilous as was Manchuria just before September 18, 1931. He is said to have pointed out that it would be impossible for the three hundred thousand defenseless Mongols to hold the remaining portion of Mongolia against the threatened invasion of the Japanese, and that should the Japanese desire to seize that territory, they could effect its occupation with one or two hundred motor trucks within a week.

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NOTE

SEE 883.00 P.R. Shanghai/00 FOR 7940

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED May 2, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Reaction in Shanghai to the statement of the Japanese
Foreign Office on April 17, 1934

793.94/ 6723

6723

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Relations with Japan: The informal statement

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 issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17th regarding Japan's China policy has created a greater furor in local circles than any other recent pronouncement of a similar character. A summary of the local press reaction was transmitted in despatch No. 9440 of April 25, 1934, to the Department, and No. 7192 of the same date to the Legation.

On April 28th press despatches from Tokyo stated that the Japanese Foreign Minister had informed foreign diplomats that this statement was now "officially non-existent" and a revised statement is said to have been handed to the American and British Ambassadors. In commenting on the Japanese retraction of their statement the CHUNG HUA JIN PAO, in its editorial of April 30th states that the original statement was put out to ascertain international reaction towards the Far Eastern situation and since the result has proved unmistakably that world opposition is unanimous against Japan's claim to hegemony over Asia, the Japanese will doubtless in the future deem it more profitable to continue their aggressions against China by "undeclared warfare" as they have done in the past, rather than to issue any further statements on their China policy.

c. Relations of General International Character:

Nothing to report.

d. Foreign

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NOTE

SEE 888.00 P.E. Tuckson/76 FOR 6455

FROM Tuckson (Duck) DATED May 3, 1954
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations in Fukien Province during April 1934.

793.94/6724

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A vigorous protest was also lodged against the seizure of a vessel flying the American flag without notice to this Consulate.

B. Relations With Other Countries.

Japanese.

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 All of the leading Chinese officials, both civil and military, attended the reception held at the Japanese Consulate General on April 29, 1934, in celebration of the Japanese Emperor's birthday.

Mr. Li Tse-1 (李倬一) (see page 4 of this Consulate's monthly political report for March, 1934), personal representative of General Chiang Kai-shek, at the request of General CH'EN YI (陳儀), Chairman of the Fukien Provincial Government, paid several visits to Foochow during the month under review. It is reported that Mr. Li has been invited to assist the Provincial authorities in negotiating with the Japanese for the restraint of a number of Chinese, naturalized subjects of Japan, and Formosans, who are alleged to be connected with a separatist movement now brewing in southern Fukien (see under "Internal Political Activities" of this report). This plot is rumored to be instigated by the Japanese military clique with the object of creating a new source of trouble in south China in order to enable them to have a free hand in the north.

The MIN PAO (閩報), a Japanese-owned paper published at Foochow, printed the following propaganda in its April 22, 1934 issue:

"AMERICANS

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"AMERICANS HOLDING IMPORTANT POSTS IN THE
HEADQUARTERS OF THE EASTERN ROUTE BANDIT
SUPPRESSION FORCES.

"Secret Treaty Signed by General
Chiang Kai-shek and the United States.

"The principal of an American missionary school in Changchow (漳州), Fukien, according to reports received in Tokyo, has been offered the post of honorary advisor to the Headquarters of the Eastern Route Bandit Suppression Forces. Two other Americans are employed as the director and superintendent in the arms repair department, attached to the Headquarters. Report has it that General Chiang Kai-shek has granted the United States special privileges in Fukien Province. A secret treaty has been entered into whereby the United States will furnish China with weapons valued at \$25,000,000."

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193.94

SEE 841.00 P.R./335 FOR #693

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED May 7, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Great Britain, Japan and China. Sir John Simon explained his reference to special rights possessed by Japan in China. Differences between the American and British attitudes toward Japan's policy in Far East, from ECONOMIST of May 5th.

793.94/6725

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Great Britain, Japan and China.

In the House of Commons today, Sir John Simon explained his reference last week to special rights possessed by Japan in China. He said the phrase was employed for the purpose of indicating that any particular policy of His Majesty's Government in China, or any particular activity of British subjects, could only be successfully challenged by showing that such policy or such activity infringed some special Japanese right recognized by other Powers but not shared by them. "Japan," he continued, "like other countries, has no doubt acquired special rights in China recognized by other Powers, but not shared by them, by virtue of agreements relating to particular enterprises. An example would be the Japanese concession in Hankow."

In speaking of the differences between the American and British attitudes toward Japan's policy in the Far East, the ECONOMIST of May 5th says that "Sir John Simon expressed the same satisfaction at the answer which he had invited from the Japanese as he used to express over similarly reassuring answers-according-to-plan in 1931-32....This British determination to accept the letter and overlook the intention is not shared by the Government of the United States." Then, referring to Ambassador Grew's statement to Mr. Hirota on April 29th, reaffirming the position of the United States, the

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SEE 858.00 P.R./166 FOR #164

FROM Sweden (Steinhardt) DATED May 11, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Japanese Policy. Recent Japanese declaration of
policy made, the subject of a leading article in
regard to-. Quotes ~~extract~~ from article referring
to America's relations with Japan.

793.94 / 6726

6726

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1. JAPANESE POLICY:

On April 27, 1934, both STOCKHOLMS TIDNINGEN-STOCKHOLMS DAGBLAD (Liberal) and the DAGENS NYHETER (Liberal, Stockholm) made the recent Japanese declaration of policy the subject of a leading article. There was little that was new in either article: a brief extract from the article published in the latter paper is quoted inasmuch as it refers to America's relations with Japan:

"The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs initiated an exchange of communications with his American colleague which it is true did not lead to and could not lead to an immediate removal of the American resistance to the Manchukuo policy, but the object of which was obviously to prepare the ground for a compromise regulating the relations between the two Great Powers in respect of this delicate point. The United States' de jure recognition of the Soviet Government and the demonstratively friendly reception of the Russian Foreign Commissar in Washington had not escaped making an impression in Tokyo. But finally Japanese diplomacy sees the horizon brightening."

STOCKHOLMS TIDNINGEN-STOCKHOLMS DAGBLAD stated in part that "a state which cannot carry on negotiations with foreign powers, or borrow money, or buy weapons is no longer sovereign. The time has also actually come when the world and especially the Great Powers must take a stand on the question of the existence of China". The suggestion was also made, however, that perhaps Japan by this recent move was in reality resorting to old style diplomacy, that is demanding one thing, a sort of suzerainty in the Far East, in order to secure something quite different, namely naval parity at the Naval Conference of 1935.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 761.94/748 FOR #49

FROM U.S.S.R. (Bullitt) DATED May 14, 1934
~~XXXX~~ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Litvinoff's impressions of the Japanese policy toward
China.

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793.94/6727

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 49

Moscow, May 14, 1934.

Subject: Relations between the Soviet
Government and the Far East.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, in the course of a long conversation about other matters yesterday, I inquired of Litvinov with regard to his negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He said that he had just personally taken the matter into his hands and had begun fresh discussions with the Japanese Government which, he believed, would lead to a definite result. I asked him what effect this would have on the recognition

- 2 -

recognition of "Manchukuo." He replied in almost the same words that he used when I asked him the same question on March 14, saying: "Our sale of the Railway to the Government of Manchukuo will constitute de facto recognition of the Manchukuo Government." I then asked him if that would be followed by de jure recognition. He said that the matter had not yet come up; that the Japanese had never suggested that the Soviet Union should recognize "Manchukuo."

With regard to the Japanese announcement of policy toward China, he said that he believed that the object of the Japanese move was to prove to China that she could count on no real help from either the United States or Great Britain. He added that he believed that the Chinese would now be obliged to accept any demands which the Japanese Government might present and that he would not be surprised to see both Peiping and Pientsin occupied by Japanese troops during this summer.

As a final comment, Litvinov said: "It is my impression, and I find the impression general in Europe, that the United States and Great Britain are engaged in tossing the ball of responsibility in the Far East back and forth between them, each one hoping that the other will take the lead. So long as that remains the case, the Japanese will be free to do what they want. It is still my belief that the only effective method of restraining the Japanese is to arrange at once joint action by all powers having interest in the Pacific."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
Pacific."

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



April 24, 1934.



Mr. Secretary:

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note
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1. In connection with consideration of attitude and action in rejoinder to the action taken last week by the Japanese Foreign Office, it should be kept in mind that the United States Fleet is now no longer in the Pacific Ocean (NOTE: It is now possible for the jingoes and chauvinists of the Navy faction in Japan to be, if they choose, more audacious than at any time since the spring of 1932).

2. There should be kept in mind the facts that the U.S. cotton and wheat "loan" to China and the extensive sale to China of American airplanes, together with employment by China of American aviation instructors, have figured prominently among the developments in China which the Japanese have viewed with misgiving and of which they complain. The "loan" was made during the present Administration, by the R.F.C., without the approval of the Department of State; and the Far East personnel of the Department went on record at that time with warnings in regard to it. The sale of airplanes to the Chinese and the employing by the Chinese of American aeronautic personnel

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

were actively promoted under the Hoover Administration,
by the Department of Commerce, notwithstanding indications
of misgiving by this Department and definite expressions
of opinion advising against it by Far Eastern personnel
of this Department.

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3. There

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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UNDER SECRETARY
APR 26 1934
OF STATE
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Confidential

JAPANESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

APR 25, 1934.
Copies to Tokyo, Hankow, Shanghai, 5/1/34
and Paris, London, Rome, Bern, 5/1/34
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 26 1934
Moscow 5/1/34 (REX)
Geneva 5/16/34

793.94

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with my promise yesterday, I am sending you a careful translation of the documents referred to in my conversation. I marked Mr. Hirota's instruction to the Japanese Minister in China as confidential since it was not written for the purpose of publication but simply as guidance for him in his negotiations. The phraseology would have to be more carefully selected, if it were to be made public.

With best wishes, I am

Yours sincerely,

Herbert Gold

(Enclosures)

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793.94/6648

The Honorable William Phillips,
Under Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

793.94/6729

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
State letter 7-15-75
By M.D. NARS, Date 1-14-76

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Julianth: State letter 4-14-77
By D. J. G. NARS, Date 2-24-76

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR. AMAU, CHIEF
OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE
TO FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ON APRIL 20, 1934.

1. Japan has no intention whatever of impairing China's independence or her interests but sincerely wishes that the integrity, unity and prosperity of China be secured. However, the integrity, unity and prosperity of China are things that can be brought about principally by China's own awakening and natural development.

2. Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of a third party in China. The economic and commercial transactions of a third party with China can be of much benefit to that country and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is not only desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity but she will fully observe herself all the international agreements relating to China.

3. Japan, however, opposes any joint action on the part of foreign Powers that tends to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan wishes to share responsibility

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

with China and other Powers in that region and she cannot tolerate the judgelike attitude of foreign Powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question which is often motivated by the self-interest of the Powers concerned.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Document

TRANSLATION OF MR. HIROTA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS',
INSTRUCTION TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER IN CHINA.

1. In relation to the Chinese question Japan had to differ with other Powers in her views and standpoint and was obliged to withdraw from the League of Nations. Thereupon Japan has come to feel the necessity of exercising her best efforts to carry out her mission in Eastern Asia regardless of the attitude or opinion of other Powers.

Needless to say Japan will take the most conciliatory attitude toward all Powers and will earnestly seek friendship with them by coordinating interests. However, as to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia the recent developments of affairs have brought about a situation in which Japan will have to undertake it upon her own responsibility and even single-handedly. Japan is determined to fulfill this mission.

2. In order to fulfill that mission Japan desires to share with China the responsibility of maintaining peace in Eastern Asia. Japan therefore most earnestly desires that the integrity, unification and order of China should be secured. And that this can only be attained through the awakening and endeavors on the part of China herself has been clearly demonstrated

by history. From this point of view Japan will always endeavor to defeat all of China's maneuvers to utilize foreign Powers through her traditional policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians", as well as of anti-Japanese movements.

3. In view of the situation prevailing after the Manchurian and Shanghai affairs, if foreign Powers are to take a joint action vis-a-vis China, no matter what form it may take, financial, technical, or otherwise, it will surely come to bear a political significance and the result will be to introduce unfortunate impediments to the awakening and integrity of China, if not directly entailing the international control of China, her partition or the establishment of spheres of influence. Japan has to oppose such joint action in principle.

4. It goes without saying that all Powers are free to negotiate with China separately from the economic and commercial points of view, even if their actions should become of practical aid to China, so long as they do not militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. If, however, these actions were of a nature to prejudice peace and order in the Far East, for instance, the supply of military aeroplanes, the establishment of aerodomes, the supply of military advisers or political loans, Japan will have to oppose them.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5. From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan's hands through using the influence of foreign Powers.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 27, 1934.

The papers hereunder appear to be draft copies of the papers just above, with corrections, presumably made at the Japanese Embassy, from which the clean copy just above was made.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of any other party in China. The economic and commercial ^{a third} ~~discussions~~ ^{from each other} of a third party with China can be of much benefit to that country and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is not only desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity but she will fully observe herself all the international agreements relating to China.

3. Japan, however, opposes any joint action on the part of foreign Powers that tends to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan wishes to share responsibility with China and other

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL.

TRANSLATION OF MR. HIROTA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS',
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7
L Needless to say Japan will take the most conciliatory attitude toward all Powers and will earnestly seek friendship with them by coordinating interests. However, as to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia the recent developments of affairs have brought about a situation in which Japan will have to undertake it upon her own responsibility and even single-handedly. Japan is determined to fulfill this mission.

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them.

5. From the points of view above stated we think our guiding principle should be generally to defeat foreign activities in China at present, not only those of a joint nature but those conducted individually, in view of the fact that China is still trying to tie Japan's hands through using the influence of foreign Powers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

April 28, 1934.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I hasten to acknowledge your note of yesterday with which you were good enough to send me the translation of certain documents referred to in our conversation. Please accept my sincere thanks for this letter.

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

His Excellency.

Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

Ambassador of Japan.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1934.

SHH

The first enclosure to Mr. Saito's letter to Mr. Phillips is not, as you have noticed, the text of the statement made on April 17th by the Foreign Office spokesman. It was one of several statements made by the spokesman by way of amplifying the statement of April 17th.

The text of the April 17th statement, as reported by the correspondent of the HERALD TRIBUNE, does not coincide with the text of the instruction of the Foreign Office to the Japanese Minister in China (second enclosure to Mr. Saito's letter). However, insofar as substance is concerned, the two documents coincide with each other in all important respects.

The April 17th statement can be accepted as a reaffirmation of the policy expressed in the Foreign Office instruction.

It is submitted that the copy in translation of the instruction of the Japanese Government to its Minister in China supplies an authoritative basis of study of the policy of Japan vis-a-vis China.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

April 26, 1934.

Letter, Saito to Phillips, April 25, and Encl's.

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The first enclosure to Mr. Saito's letter is not the text of the statement made on April 17th by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, Mr. Amau; it is a statement made by that spokesman three days later on April 20th, that statement being one of several made by him subsequent to and in amplification or modification of his statement of April 17th.

There is not in this dossier, nor has Mr. Saito given us elsewhere, a text of the statement made by Mr. Amau on April 17.

The text of Mr. Amau's statement of April 17th as printed in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE of April 19th, which text purported to be a text telegraphed by the HERALD TRIBUNE'S correspondent in Tokyo, Mr. Fleisher, differs considerably as to wording and order from the text now supplied, in this dossier, by Mr. Saito, of the instruction given by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (date not supplied) to the Japanese Minister to China. But, the contents of these two documents, as regards substance, resemble each other in all important respects.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It may be accepted that the statement made to the press by Mr. Amau on April 17th was, as Mr. Saito informed you, in your conversation with him of Wednesday, April 25th, based upon the text of Hirota's instruction of earlier date to the Japanese Minister to China. Amau therefore simply disclosed the China policy of the Japanese Government.

It is believed that the copy now supplied by Saito of Hirota's instruction to the Japanese Minister to China gives us a basic document which may be regarded as an official "indicator", supplied by the Japanese Foreign Office, of Japan's policy vis-à-vis China.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

APR 26 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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Paris, Rome
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April 25, 1934.

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RECENT STATEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
TO PRESS REPRESENTATIVES

A number of interviews with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject of the recent statement given out by the Japanese Foreign Office have been reported in the press, but they include several which apparently are "rewrites" of reports of "exclusive" interviews. The most complete and important reports are by:

1. Kingsbury Smith, published in the Washington TIMES on April 21st;
2. United Press, published in the New York HERALD-TRIBUNE on April 22nd;
3. Constantine Brown, published in the Washington STAR on April 22nd;
4. Universal Press, published in the New York AMERICAN on April 22nd;
5. New York TIMES' correspondent and published in that paper on April 24th;
6. New York TIMES' correspondent and published in that paper on April 25th.

Mr. Saito is reported to have stated on April 20th to Mr. Smith that:

"Japan's declaration of policy was not directed against the United States, but against one of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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big European powers which Tokyo learned was about to make a large political loan to China . . .

"Japan, Ambassador Saito said, feared the money would be diverted to military purposes. He said that Japan already had received evidence indicating the Chinese had utilized part of the American governmental cotton and wheat loan for these purposes. . .

"With regard to the sale of military aircraft and munitions to China, Mr. Saito said Japan fears these weapons eventually will be used against her and for that reason is reluctant to see them sold to the Chinese. . .

"However, he said, there are half a dozen factions fighting for control in China, many of them of a communistic nature; there is no surety how long one government may last, and there is serious risk of powerful weapons of war falling into the hands of irresponsible or fanatical groups.

"This, he said, was the principal reason why Japan disliked to see American aviation experts teaching the Chinese how to handle such dangerous weapons as bombing airplanes."

Mr. Brown's report of his interview on April 21st with Mr. Saito states that Mr. Saito, in reply to a question with regard to the consequence of foreign powers ignoring the request of the Japanese Government that foreign powers refrain from making loans or selling aircraft to China, said:

"The Japanese Government would consider such a step as an unfriendly act."

The report continues:

"The real reason for such a step," the Japanese Ambassador in Washington explained, "is that the

Western

-3-

Western nations have not got the remotest idea as to how to deal with the Chinese. The Japanese government knows China better than any other nation in the world, and the present chaotic situation in that republic is a direct menace to Japan. Consequently, because the Japanese government has an ardent desire to see peace and order reestablished in the territory of its neighbor, it has decided to prevent the furtherance of the present trouble by the loans which Western nations are giving the various Chinese leaders to further their own ambitions".

The excuse for establishing a Japanese protectorate over China was offered to the Tokio government when it obtained information that a French group of bankers were planning to float a comparatively small loan for China on the European money markets.

Intended to Aid Chieftains.

"This news," Mr. Saito stated, "worried my government considerably. It was not meant to help China to improve its internal conditions and to help put down the rebellious factions which are dividing that republic at present, but it was intended to help certain ambitious chieftains. And that the Japanese government cannot tolerate. It was the same thing with the purchase of \$50,000,000 worth of cotton and wheat from the United States. We did not object to that loan, although we knew quite well that most of the imported stuff was sold and the Chinese government purchased with the proceeds of the sale arms and ammunitions."

"And what would happen if the Chinese were to disregard the Tokio edict?" he was asked.

"We hope they won't, because the main interest of Japan is China's welfare and to put a stop to the present situation in that country, but should they act in contradiction with our fair requests we may have to do something."

"And what about the countries which have important interests in China? Won't they feel that Japan is unduly interfering with their business in that territory?" he was asked.

"We are not coercing any nation. All that Japan demands is to be consulted before any important trans-

action

-4-

action between the Chinese government and foreign interests are concluded. We think that we know that country so much better than the Westerners that our advice would be valuable. But should the representatives of foreign business overlook this request, the responsibility would fall on the Chinese government for having overlooked our warnings. All these new airbases, all these purchases of airplanes are intended by the Chinese to be used eventually against Japan, and we cannot tolerate such things. Japan is a small country and is fighting for its life in the Far East."

Steps Unique in History.

"There may be certain objections raised against this new policy of yours, objections which may lead to trouble. The steps you are by way of taking are unique in history and while there may be something to be said about your precautions, don't you think that it would have been a better plan to establish this control, intended to be beneficial to China, with the assistance of the other powers?" he was asked.

"After what has happened since the Manchurian crisis," the Ambassador replied, "it has become evident to the Japanese people that the Western nations know nothing about the Chinese mentality. Such a collaboration would have been possible sometime ago, but today the Japanese government could not obtain popular support in a policy of co-operation with other nations. Consequently, Japan must act and decide alone what is good for China. Legitimate business won't be interfered with by the Tokio government, but any assistance given to the Chinese which may be considered either to help them to continue their internal wars or to prepare themselves to fight Japan will have to be stopped. Japan is working for peace in Asia. In order to reach this goal it must be in a position to prevent any business transactions which do not tend to really help the Chinese people, but to spread unrest and wars. The Japanese government will deal fairly with all the interests which are really legitimate, and in the end the business people will find it beneficial to consult Tokio before embarking on any adventures in China."

In an interview on April 21st with a representative of the United Press, Mr. Saito in general repeated the statements

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ments reported to have been made by him on the two previous occasions. The following statements were reported to have been made by way of amplifying previous statements:

Japan is particularly susceptible to unrest or provocative action in China because she is a neighbor and has extensive business enterprises in China, Mr. Saito said. For this reason Japan simply felt it necessary that distant powers be more careful what aid they extend China.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation last year advanced \$50,000,000 for wheat and cotton loans to China, but only about \$10,000,000 was used. Japanese alleged that Chinese politicians derived prestige from the loans, then terminated them because they could not fulfil the terms. The Pan-American Airways and a German air line recently opened services in China and an American airplane assembling plant was established there.

Mr. Saito said many Japanese felt uneasy about these developments because of the peculiar conditions in China. He implied he meant bandits and uncontrolled divisions of government which, Japanese statesmen have alleged, prevented centralization government control. He said Japan had a special responsibility for preservation of peace in the Orient, as explained by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota early this year. The new statement was merely a clarification of that, he said, and not a blow at any treaty.

The statements attributed to Mr. Saito in the Universal Service press report published in the New York AMERICAN of April 22 are substantially along the lines of the statements in the reports above mentioned. Mr. Saito is reported in this interview to have stated inter alia, that -

"The money is destined to be used to stir discontent in China against Japan. My country seeks to restore peace in the Far East, and to maintain it once it has been restored."

He

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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He would not divulge what nations planned the Chinese loans, but it was learned in official circles France was one of those involved. Saito added: "Japan sincerely seeks to keep peace in China. We shall maintain her economic integrity and respect the open door policy of trade."

Japan has no intention, Saito said, of interfering with United States Commerce in China, although he expressed alarm at large sales of American planes to China.

He expressed the fear any war equipment sold to that country might eventually be used by China against Japan.

An interview given by Mr. Saito to a correspondent of the New York TIMES on April 23 quotes a number of statements attributed to Mr. Saito by way of explaining or amplifying the statements of the Foreign Office spokesman. Mr. Saito, after making an observation critical of the attitude of the League of Nations, vis-a-vis Japan, and stating "flatly that Japan would observe all her treaty obligations," is quoted as follows:

"We are sometimes accused of being aggressive," he added, "but it should be remembered that even the Manchurian question was not motivated by that desire. We want that understood, and then we can shake hands with China and let foreign powers know that that is our real aim."

However, the Ambassador made clear the feeling of the Japanese Government that much preliminary work must be done before that end was achieved, principally because of the feeling in Japan that other powers sometimes incited feeling in China against Japan, although this frequently was done unintentionally.

As for the position of the Japanese Government, Mr. Saito gave a digest of remarks by Mr. Amau, divided into

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 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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into three categories, as follows:

First, Japan has no intention of impairing China's independence or her interests, but sincerely wishes that the integrity, unity and prosperity of China be secured. However, the integrity, unity and prosperity of China are things that can be brought about principally by China's own awakening and realization.

Second, Japan has no intention whatever to infringe upon any interest of a third party in China. The commerce and trade of a third party with China can be of much profit to China, and Japan welcomes promotion of such contact. Japan is desirous that China should not act in violation of the principle of the open door and equal opportunity. Japan will surely observe all the international agreements relating to China.

Third, but Japan opposes any action in concert on the part of foreign powers that is intended to militate against the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. As to the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia, Japan shares responsibility with China and other powers in Eastern Asia, and Japan cannot tolerate the judge-like attitude of the powers or the League of Nations in relation to the Chinese question which is often motivated by the self-interest of those powers.

The report of the correspondent of the New York TIMES on Mr. Saito's call at the Department on the afternoon of April 24 does not contain any direct quotation of statements by Mr. Saito, but it attributes to him the following views:

He says the Japanese understand China and its problems better than any Western nation possibly could and that Japan should be consulted by Western would-be regenerators of China. Such consultation would, in his opinion, be a matter-of-course procedure were it not for the suspicions the outside world harbors concerning Japan's intentions toward China.

The

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The policy announced on April 17 is not, in Mr. Saito's opinion, a move toward the exclusion by Japan of other countries from China. He has expressed the opinion that the open-door doctrine, guaranteed under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, is not afflicted, even by implication, in the statement of Mr. Amua except in so far as traffic in potential military materials is concerned.

The report of the correspondent of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE of the same matter contains the statement:

"After leaving Mr. Phillips, Ambassador Saito said he had placed before the Under Secretary cabled extracts of articles from Japanese newspapers giving both text and interpretation of the pronouncement which had issued from the Japanese Foreign Office. . . . The Ambassador said he had left no official document"

[Copies of statements attached]

[Signature]
FE:LED:ABW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

V
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 21, 1934.

FE ✓
Doctor Hornbeck:

Referred to you for
your information and return.

⇒ HAMcB.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RECEIVED

MAY 19 1934

Tokyo, May 2, 1934.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
MAY 24 1934
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MAY 31 1934

SECRETARY OF STATE

DIVISION OF

MAY 21 1934

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 21 1934
Department of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

NOTED

The reverberations from Mr. Amau's statement of April 17 concerning foreign assistance to China have not yet run themselves out sufficiently to justify me in trying to appraise the whole affair in this pouch, so I shall probably wait for a later one when we can make a better survey of the whole situation. I should like, however, to tell you without delay of my admiration of your aide memoire of April 28 and your background talk at the press conference on May 1. It seems to me that your communication was absolutely called for by the circumstances and that it was expressed with a clarity and moderation which not only puts our Government on precise record without giving needless offense, but which will undoubtedly sink into the Japanese consciousness whatever the public reactions may be.

The feeling among intelligent and reasonable-minded Japanese is that the Foreign Office committed

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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Amstall
5/29/34
May 29 1934

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

F/ESP

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

a thoroughly awkward blunder, which was not helped by its subsequent awkward handling, and that your communication of April 28 was fully deserved. The chief unfortunate result of the episode, apart from the disquieting effect which it may have on American and Chinese public opinion, is the fact that it will probably tend to weaken still further the Saito Cabinet and furnish new ammunition to its opponents. But that is their fault, not ours. In any other country, Amau would probably have been transferred, thereby clearing the atmosphere, but Hirota is between the devil and the deep sea - the military and the chauvinists on one side and the moderates on the other - and he has to play his hand carefully.

There are those who still believe that Hirota sponsored Amau's original statement to the press and then took refuge in disavowing it (incidentally, an official of the Foreign Office cannot very well issue an "unofficial" communication). I do not share their views. Undoubtedly Hirota had approved the instructions to the Japanese Minister to China on which the statement was based, but I am convinced that the public issuance

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

of the statement by Amau, while approved by Shigemitsu, was given out without Hirota's knowledge or endorsement. His disavowal to me in our conversation of April 25 rang true, and in such matters we have to rely on our personal impressions. This, however, is rather beside the point. The important thing is that the attitude and policy of the Japanese Government was brought out into the open and we were given an opportunity to meet it. You will perhaps have noticed that in my conversation with Hirota I said to him that the American Government and people are likely to be more impressed by concrete evidence than by statements of policy. I therefore read with great relish the comment in your talk with the press to the effect that it is the policy of the American Government to talk as little as possible and to discuss questions as they arise. There will be opportunities during the next few days to get these thoughts informally and discreetly to the attention of some of the leaders.

With high respect, I am

Sincerely yours,



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huetefer NARS, Date 12-18-75


May 29, 1934.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I greatly appreciate your taking the trouble to send me your note of May second. Background information such as that you have just sent me is most valuable to fill in the gaps which necessarily exist in all official communications. I will be glad to hear further from you whenever you have the time to write me. You are doing a fine job in Tokyo, and I want you to know that we in Washington have every confidence in you.

Sincerely yours,
 Cordell Hull

The Honorable
 Joseph C. Grew,
 American Ambassador,
 Tokyo.



793.94/6731

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

May 31 1934
 59

S HSC:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

June 4
Do -
Do you
suppose Rome
will inform
us, or should
we draft telegraphic
or mail instruction
to Rome?
H.

-2-

BRITISH WRITER ORDERED OUT OF GERMANY

(Berlin, Special to BALTIMORE SUN) Philip Pembroke Stephens, Berlin correspondent of the Daily Express of London, was arrested yesterday by members of the Prussian secret police and ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours.

An official statement issued by Dr. Paul Joseph Gbbels, Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, stated that the Briton, who got into trouble with the authorities two weeks ago, when he was accused of trying to photograph chemical plants closed to the general public, is now being deported because "he reported German affairs continually in a distorted and frivolous manner and thereby grossly abused the hospitality accorded to him here."

ARCHDUKE EUGENE GIVEN HUGE OVATION IN VIENNA

(Vienna, AP) Austria's capital gave an enthusiastic welcome yesterday to Archduke Eugene, 72-year-old member of the Hapsburg family, but his friends emphatically denied persistent rumors the returning royal exile will become President of the country.

HIROTA PROMISES JAPAN WILL OBSERVE TREATIES

(Rome, AP) Assurance that Japan will observe existing treaties have been given to Italy by Koki Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister, the Government announced last night.

The assurance was a reply to a request of the Italian Embassy at Tokyo for clarification of the Japanese statement last month of Asiatic policies.

"Ambassador Auriti", the official announcement says, "has seen Foreign Minister Hirota and has received the same assurances given by the Japanese Government to the United States, Great Britain and France."

NAZI PRESS DERIDES BARTHOU'S SPEECH

(Berlin, Special to BALTIMORE SUN) The German press reacted with the utmost indignation to the speech of Louis Barthou, French Foreign Minister, before the Disarmament Conference day before yesterday. Several newspapers hinted that the policies advocated by M. Barthou were such as to endanger the peace of the world.

The Deutsche Diplontische Politische Korrespondenz, semi-official mouthpiece of the German Foreign Office, responded to the French statesman's questions with a series of counter-questions. Why, this journal asks, has France, using means of pressure still unknown to the public, induced the British to deny certain principles of their own draft convention.

CUBA HOLDS EDITOR IN PLOT ON CAFFERY

(Havana, Special to NEW YORK TIMES) Dr. Guillermo Martinez Marquez, director of the Spanish daily Ahora was arrested at noon yesterday by the military authorities and held incommunicado at Cabanas Fortress.

Lieut. Col. Pedraza, Chief of the National Police, told your correspondent last night: "Dr. Marquez was arrested because I have confidential information from the most reliable sources that he was involved in the plot which resulted in last Sunday's shooting at the residence of United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

S/H

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF THE MORNING NEWSPAPERS, FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1934.

BRITAIN SENDS DEBT PROPOSAL TO WASHINGTON

(London, AP) The British war debt proposal, based on the idea of future bilateral discussions between London and Washington, was authoritatively stated yesterday to have been transmitted to the American capital.

It was categorically denied in the highest possible quarters that Great Britain had approached either France or Italy in the matter, and it was pointed out this country has always opposed the idea of a general conference.

In Rome, the foreign office officially denied Italy had been consulted by Great Britain on the subject or expected to be, and in France, officials made similar statements.

ARMS LEADERS TRY TO PLACATE RIVAL NATIONS

(Geneva, AP) Heavy clouds of pessimism hung over the disarmament conference yesterday as delegates sought some means of saving the situation during the three-day recess.

Arthur Henderson, the ordinarily cheerful president of the conference, had only words of gloom after he talked with representatives of the principal powers.

"The clouds have never hung so low," he said.

He had talked with Sir John Simon, British foreign secretary, and the French foreign minister, Louis Barthou, whose clash yesterday all but ended hope for an agreement.

Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, spent the day working on a plan to turn the conference into a permanent security conference, a plan which Sir John had ridiculed as not accomplishing disarmament.

Delegates from Spain, Denmark, Switzerland and Norway, with whom Henderson also conferred, appeared to have no suggestions to save the conference.

The French insistence against any German rearmament and charges that the Reich already is increasing its war forces stood in the way of any consideration of the British plan, supported by Italy.

SENATE'S FAST VOTE RATIFIES CUBAN TREATY

Moving with unprecedented speed, the Senate ratified the new treaty with Cuba which abrogates the famous Platt amendment. There was no record vote.

ALL CUBAN SOLDIERS HELD IN READINESS

(Havana, AP) Colonel Fulgencio Batista, head of the Cuban army, issued orders last night for all soldiers of the Matanzas Garrison to be held in barracks. Havana police were placed under similar orders. The reason for the action was not made public.

BOLIVIA FIGHTS ARMS EMBARGO BEFORE LEAGUE

(Geneva, AP) Bolivia, in a surprise move yesterday, invoked action by the League of Nations council in the Chaco jungle war. She acted under an article of the league covenant providing for a procedure which may interfere with the league's proposed arms embargo against both Bolivia and Paraguay.

The appeal was under article 15, which authorizes the council to make recommendations for the settlement of disputes without the vote of the disputants.

The Bolivian delegate had insisted the embargo would mean the defeat of his country, saying Paraguay has built a munitions factory.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 221

June 8 1934

The Honorable

Breckinridge Long,

American Ambassador,

Rome.

Sir:

An Associated Press despatch from Rome published in American papers on June 1, 1934, indicates that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the Italian Ambassador at Tokyo, in response to a request for clarification of the statement of Japan's China policy issued on April 17, 1934, by the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, an assurance that "Japan will observe existing treaties".

In the event a report on the matter has not already been sent forward, I should be glad to be furnished with the text of any communications which may have been exchanged between the Italian and Japanese Governments on the subject of the issues raised by the statement under reference of the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman or of any relevant official announcement of the Italian Government, -- provided copies can be obtained, -- together with your comment thereon.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William Phillips

FE: [signature] DLY

FE

WE



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 June 22, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~MM:~~
~~EHD:~~
~~SKN:~~

Nanking's May 21, 1934, --

In this despatch Mr. Peck reports that, according to Mr. Suma, the patience of the Japanese Government is about exhausted over Chinese delay in settling the question of through traffic and postal arrangements with Manchuria; also that the Chinese Foreign Office feels that the action of the League in regard to the question of transportation of mail matter across Manchuria will make it easier for China to come to some temporary arrangement in regard to postal service between China and "Manchukuo".

Attached to this despatch is a Reuter press item which appeared in the Chinese press on May 18, 1934, which contains the following interesting statement:

"The United States representative, Mr. Hugh Wilson, was responsible for a stiffening of its terms when the original British proposal on the subject was being drafted."

JEJ/VDM

J. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Nanking Office,
May 21, 1934.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 18 1934

Department of State

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of May 10, 1934, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Relations" in which I reported that Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, had stated to the American Minister that China would not alter its present policy with regard to postal service between China and Manchuria, but that two possible methods of settlement of the question of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway had been discussed.

The same American newspaper correspondent referred to in that despatch as having talked to Mr. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation resident in Nanking, has informed me that he had a further conversation with Mr. Suma on May 19, 1934, in the course of which Mr. Suma said that the patience of the Japanese Government was about exhausted, in the face of China's delay in settling the controversies relating to through traffic and postal arrangements with Manchuria.

The same informant has told me that on the same day he talked with an important official of the Chinese Foreign Office, who said that the action taken by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on Manchuria on May 16

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

at Geneva had materially assisted China in approaching the postal question, since its resolution had resulted in lifting from individual nations responsibility which otherwise they might have been held to in making temporary arrangements for postal correspondence with Manchuria and in transferring this responsibility to the League. The Foreign Office official said that it was inevitable that China should make temporary arrangements with Japan for through traffic and railway communications with Manchuria and, this being the case, such arrangements would probably be arrived at in the near future.

1/ There is enclosed herewith a copy of a portion of a REUTERS telegram dated Geneva, May 16, in which are reported the decisions taken by the Advisory Committee to which the Foreign Office official referred.

Very respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.

WRP:HC

THE CHINA PRESS, May 18, 1934.

League Committee Meets

GENEVA, May 16.--(Reuters).--The question of postal relations with "Manchukuo" was one of the main topics of discussion at the meeting this afternoon of the advisory committee of the League of Nations on Manchuria.


The committee decided that the postal question was not a matter for consideration by the various governments, but could be settled between the postal departments concerned provided it was made clear that negotiations for postal relations were not to be construed as any measure of recognition of the new state.

The United States representative, Mr. Hugh Wilson, was responsible for a stiffening of its terms when the original British proposal on the subject was being drafted.

The committee took the following decisions:

1. The "Manchukuo" department of communications cannot appeal against the provisions of the Universal Postal Convention.
2. The postal administrations of countries who are members of the League of Nations are not precluded from temporary measures for postal correspondence involving transit through Manchuria.
3. Such measures shall be purely administrative and technical, not as between states or governments.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Nanking's May 25, 1934,--

I suggest that you read the brief despatch which relates to information given Mr. Peck by Mr. Suma in regard to a "friendly explanation" given the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the American Government's aide-memoire to the Japanese Government on April 29.

JEJ/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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LEGATION OF THE
Division of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 18 1934
Nanking Office,
May 25, 1934.
Department of State
file

793.94

Subject: Japanese Reply to the American Statement
to the Japanese Government of April 29, 1934.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.



For	X	In U.S.A.	X
-----	---	-----------	---

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch of May 21, 1934, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Relations".

1/ In this connection, there is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation held by me with Mr. Y. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation residing in Nanking, on May 23, 1934, in which Mr. Suma informed me that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on May 22, 1934, called on the Secretary of State and gave him a friendly explanation dealing with the points raised in the statement made by the American Ambassador at Tokyo to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 19, 1934.

The Department will note the distinct impression I received that Mr. Suma regarded the explanation given by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State as a very friendly gesture and as calculated to bring about thorough sympathy and understanding on the points involved between the Japanese and American Governments.

Respectfully yours,
Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated.
In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation at Peiping.

WRP:HC

793.94/6734

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144

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

May 23, 1934.

Subject: Japanese Reply to the American Statement to
the Japanese Government of April 29, 1934.

Mr. Y. Suma, Secretary of the Japanese Legation residing
in Nanking.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Suma said that he had come to see Mr. Peck primarily because he had received about half an hour before a telegram from Washington stating that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had, on the day before, called on the American Secretary of State and in the course of a very friendly conversation had explained to Mr. Hull the various points dealt with in the statement made by the American Ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Government on April 29, 1934.

Mr. Suma observed that it was true that the statement made by the American Ambassador to the Japanese Government had not been couched in a form which necessarily required a reply, but the Japanese Government had felt that, in view of the cordial relations between the Japanese and American Governments, a friendly explanation dealing with the points raised by the American Government was called for.

Mr. Peck said that he greatly appreciated the courtesy of Mr. Suma in calling to convey this welcome intelligence. Mr. Peck expressed his pleasure, also, at learning that the

Japanese

1441

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese Government had given this friendly explanation to the American Government.

Mr. Suma did not indicate that he was aware of the nature of the explanations given by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, but his whole attitude indicated confidence on his part that the explanations given by the Ambassador had brought about complete understanding by the American Government of the position taken by the Japanese Government and complete sympathy therewith.

WRP:HC:MCL

144

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
June 22, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~MMH:~~

Peiping's 2720 of May 14, 1934,--

This despatch merely transmits to the Department a copy of the declaration of the Southwest Political Council to the League of Nations and to the powers signatory to the Nine Power Treaty in regard to Japan's declaration of policy toward China. The fact that such a statement had been received by Canton was communicated to us in Canton's telegram of April 29, noon (attached), to which we replied in our No. 139, May 7, 6 p.m. (also attached).

No action is necessary.

J. F. J.

JEJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2720

Peiping, May 14, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.

793.94



4281 MP

Check	Yes	No
in U.S.A.	X	

793.94/6735

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Canton Consul General's telegram of April 29, 12 noon / 6625 (C.B.) to the Department, the Legation and the Consul General at Nanking, in regard to the declaration of April 27, 1934, by the Southwest Political Council, and to
1/ enclose for the completion of the Department's files a copy of the Canton Consul General's despatch to the Legation No. 280, April 30, 1934, with which was
enclosed

JUN 27 1934

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

enclosed the Chinese text and translation of that
declaration which was furnished to the Consul General
by the Canton Municipal Government.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1/ Copy of Canton Consul
General's despatch to
Legation No. 280, April
30, 1934.

LC/jld

710

145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 280

2720

April 30, 1934.

Subject: Declaration by Southwest Political
Council to League of Nations and
Signatories.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

- 1/- I have the honor to enclose a translation of a
note dated April 27, 1934, from the Mayor of Canton
in which was enclosed a declaration addressed by the
Southwest Political Council to the League of Nations
and the Ministers of the Signatory Powers to the Nine
2/- Power Treaty. A copy of the declaration, as well as
3/- a translation furnished by the Municipal Government,
is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

3 ✓
Enclosures:

- 1/- Translation of note from Mayor.
2/- Copy of declaration.
3/- Translation of declaration.

In quintuplicate.

800

JWB:GL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(TRANSLATION)

File No. 800 From: Mayor of Canton, Despatch No. 1009,
 Character "Chiao"
 subject: Southwest Political Council's
 Declaration to League and Signatories
 to Nine Power Treaty.

Municipal Government of Canton,
 Canton, April 27, 1934.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that I am now in receipt of an instruction from the Kwangtung Provincial Government, which reads:

"We have received an instruction from the Southwest Political Council of the National Government, reading as follows:

'This Council now desires to send a declaration to the League of Nations and to the Ministers to China of the Signatories to the Nine Power Treaty. You are hereby directed to instruct the Municipal Government of Canton to deliver copies of this declaration separately to each of the Consuls of the said Powers stationed at Canton for transmission to their respective Ministers to China. It is necessary for you to comply herewith'.

"We find it proper to direct the Canton Municipal Government to take action accordingly".

In compliance therewith, besides delivering separately the declaration to all consuls concerned, I now have the honor to enclose one copy of this document, together with a copy of its English translation, for your information, and to request that you will oblige me by transmitting it to your country's Minister to China.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
 Your obedient servant,

Liu Chi-wen (seal)
 Mayor of Canton.

Enclosures:
 One copy of declaration and one copy of English translation.

(SEAL OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CANTON)

The Honorable J. W. Ballantine,
 American Consul General,
 Canton.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SOUTHWEST POLITICAL COUNCIL OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT
 OF CHINA

The Southwest Political Council of the National Government of China, realizing that the statement of policy issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17 not only threatens the independence of China but tends to endanger the peace and order in the Far East guaranteed by international agreements, has to make this statement to the League of Nations, and to the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty which are specially concerned with the peace and order in the Orient.

The statement of the Japanese Foreign Office purports that the friendly relations between China and other powers is subject to the consent of Japan, China is an independent state. She has an inherent right to have free intercourse with other powers and the other powers have the same right to deal freely with China. Interference from a third party can never be tolerated. The Japanese announcement of policy goes far beyond the scope of international practice. It is a flagrant attack on China's independence and a clear evidence of utter disregard of treaty obligations.

The Japanese Foreign Office, in making the statement, professes to be disturbed by the assistance, given to China by the other powers, which tends to endanger the peace and the amicable relations between China and Japan or to impair the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China. Perhaps it is needless to point out that since September 18, 1931, it is Japan and not any other power that is responsible for the breach of peace and straining the relations between the two countries and for the violation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Should Japan be allowed to have her way along the lines of the statement of April 17, the consequences would be, besides the questions of security and independence of China, the ultimate elimination of the "Open Door", the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Briand Kellogg Pact, and other existing systems aiming at maintaining international peace and order.

In the attempt to force the "Monroe Doctrine" upon China, Japan claims her "special position" in the Far East which have never been recognized by China. It may be interesting to note how Japan has made use of the so-called "special position". The chronical instigation to civil wars in China and the recent invasions of the Chinese territory are the typical examples. It can be easily seen that Japan's "Monroe Doctrine" will bring disaster to the Far East and also to the world at large. It devolves on the League of Nations and signatories to the Nine Power Treaty to preserve the peace of the Far East by taking a strong stand vis-a-vis the Japanese statement of policy which seems to prepare the way for the "Monroe Doctrine" of the Orient.

The Chinese people have endeavored to build up a peaceful and unified nation so that China will be better able to discharge her duties among the family of nations. To reach this objective, a movement has been carried on in the past twenty years with a view to eliminating military despotism and establishing a democratic government. But for Japan's interference in stirring up civil wars and in looking for territorial expansion, China's

unification

7454
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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unification might have already been achieved. It is, however, a fact that, due to the resolute efforts on the part of the people, China is now much nearer to unity than was ten years ago.

If it is the interest of the world to see a united China throwing her weight in the scale of peace, it is imperative that Japan's territorial aggression and interference with the internal affairs of China should be immediately stopped. We look to the League of Nations and the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty in exercising their powers and discharging their obligations under these solemn pacts, for making them practical instruments of peace.

The Standing Committee of the Southwest Political Council,
Tong Shao-yi, Shao Fu-shang, Tang Chak-yu, Chan Chi-tong,
Li Tsung-jen, Chau Lu.

A true copy of
the signed original
enc.
3

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~RCM:~~
~~MMH:~~

To note this
conversation between
the Minister & me,
Samar, which is
adequately & briefly
summarized in the
covering dispatch
JH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2722

Peiping, May 15, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations.



7281

Grade		Yes	No
For	X	X	
In U.S.A.			

793.94/6736

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to previous despatches enclosing memoranda of conversations had by the Counselor of Legation at Nanking upon various subjects affecting Sino-Japanese relations, and to enclose for the Department's information a copy of Mr. Peck's despatch to the Legation No. 314-Diplomatic, May 10, 1934.

This despatch contains a memorandum of conversation between the Minister and Mr. Suma of the Japanese Legation, from which it will be seen that the Japanese are "pressing the Chinese authorities very

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

very hard" for a downward revision of those items of the tariff which the Japanese feel are intentionally prejudicial to their interests; that Mr. Suma believes Mr. Monnet's proposed banking corporation will shortly be established; and that the Chinese have approached the Japanese with a proposal that some arrangement for the settlement of debts be made along the lines of the arrangement reached with American interests in the Peking-Hankow Railway.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. E. Gauss
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1/ Copy of Mr. Peck's despatch
to Legation No. 314-Diplomatic,
May 10, 1934.

LC/jld

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L-314 Diplomatic

2722

Nanking Office,
May 10, 1934.

Subject: Chinese Import Tariff.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 265
Diplomatic, of April 10, 1934, on the subject "Chinese
Import Tariff".

1/ In this connection I have the honor to enclose a
memorandum of a conversation dated May 9, 1934, between
the American Minister and Mr. Y. Suma, the Japanese Consul
General and Secretary of Legation residing in Nanking.

Although the conversation was general in nature, the
Legation will note that Mr. Suma volunteered the informa-
tion that Japanese officials have been "pressing the Chinese
authorities very hard" unofficially for a downward revision
of those items of the Chinese tariff which are intention-
ally prejudicial to Japanese interests, mentioning especial-
ly cement, coal, sugar, fish products and piece goods.

Copies of this despatch are enclosed for reference
to the Department of State.

Very respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Willys R. Peak,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

✓
Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In quadruplicate to the American Legation.
Copy to the American Commercial Attache, Shanghai.

WRP:HC

A true copy
of the signed original
inset. *He.*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Memorandum of Conversation

Nanking, May 9, 1934.

Conversation with: Mr. Y. Suma, the Japanese Consul
General.

Mr. Salisbury present.

Subject: The Chinese tariff; proposed Chinese
banking corporation; and the proposed
Yu-Ping railway.

Mr. Suma volunteered that Japanese officials had been "pressing the Chinese authorities very hard" unofficially for a downward revision of those items of the Chinese tariff which are intentionally prejudicial to Japanese interests. He mentioned specifically cement, coal, sugar, fish products, and piece goods. Mr. Suma stated that the matter is now being studied by the Legislative Yuan and that it is felt that favorable action will be taken by the Chinese authorities by June of this year. He added that these very high tariffs have resulted in considerable smuggling into China of the produce affected. When he asked whether Mr. Johnson had taken up the question of tariffs with the Chinese authorities, Mr. Johnson replied that he had not and that he believed the American point of view to be that to press for a revision of unreasonably high tariffs might incite the Chinese authorities further to increase them whereas if nothing were said the Chinese would gradually realize that a downward revision would be to China's own interests.

Mr. Suma anticipated that following the return of Mr.

T. V.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

T. V. Soong from the Northwest, the proposed banking corporation, with regard to which Mr. Monnet, French financial expert, has been active, would be established with a capital of \$10,000,000 by four Chinese financial organizations; namely, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and the Salt Gabelle. Mr. Suma apparently regarded the establishment and activities of this corporation with disfavor in view of the fact that no satisfactory arrangement had yet been made by China with regard to payment of Chinese indebtedness to Japan. In this connection he said that the Chinese had approached the Japanese with a proposal that some arrangement for settlement of the question of debts be made along the lines of the arrangement arrived at with American interests in the Peking-Hankow Railway. Mr. Suma indicated that this proposal was regarded by the Japanese as unsatisfactory.

Mr. Suma also said that the Chinese Government had announced on April 30, 1934, that a railway would be built between Yushan, Kiangsi Province, and Pinghsiang, Hunan Province, with money supplied by Chinese railways. He emphasized the fact that he regarded this announcement as very important and he stated that he thought that it would be regarded with disfavor by China's foreign creditors.

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister.

LES:HC:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 19, 1934

✓
MTH

Dawson sends from Paris in his report of June 5, 1934, a very interesting article by a French journalist, Chevallier, who has been traveling for some time in the Far East.

It is unfortunate that neither Peking nor Tokyo seem to know very much of what is going on between the Japanese and Chinese

JD
FE:DD:DLV

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, June 5, 1934

JUN 10 34

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1414)

For Distribution Check		No.
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To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
1414, dated June 5, 1934.

793.94/6737

JUN 25 1934

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, June 5, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1414.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and
Far Eastern Questions

Continuing his Far Eastern correspondence addressed to LE TEMPS, F. Chevallier sent a letter from Tokyo published in LE TEMPS of May 24, 1934, discussing Chinese politics as viewed from the Japanese angle, and leading to the conclusion that whatever appearances might lead one to think, the truth is that China is turning slowly but surely towards "her former enemy who alone can become her ally and friend tomorrow."

Chevallier goes on to say:

"Negotiations which are important for both parties are being pursued. Today it is the Japano-

Manchou

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Manchou Economic Block whose bases were laid during the visit of the Minister of Finance of the Manchurian Empire and which since then has swiftly become more definite. Tomorrow China will be enveloped with new plans for collaboration in all directions.

"All this is being done while nobody has any exact knowledge about it. Japan is conducting her policy alone, and neither Europe nor America seems to give much thought to it. As a consequence, an Open-Door country like Manchuria or China will find itself some day facing a definite program which has been carefully studied out and which can be applied, and this will determine the economic bases of both countries or of one of them for ten or twenty years to come without anybody having a single word to say.

"The Far Eastern problem remains very grave indeed."

L'HUMANITÉ published on May 24, 1934, an appeal for the recognition of the "Chinese Soviet Republic," declaring that the Soviet territories of Setchouen cover ninety-four thousand square kilometers with ten million inhabitants.

The originals of these articles are enclosed.

Very

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson.

Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

✓
2 Enclosures: (in single copy)

1. Extract from LE TEMPS, May 24, 1934;
2. L'HUMANITE, May 24, 1934.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/drs

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Incl. 1 to Special Report #D 1414 of June 5, 1964.
 From the Embassy, Paris.

Extract from LE LIPS of May 24, 1964.

POLITIQUE CHINOISE

(De notre correspondant particulier.)

Tokio, mai 1934.

Le Japon semble décidément rester, pour le monde, un pays « étonnant » : chacun de ses gestes, chacune de ses paroles apparaissent comme un réflexe inattendu de cette figure impassiblement fermée, que chacun croit avoir définitivement comprise, mais qui, en fait, ne se livre qu'à des intimes.

La déclaration officielle du ministère des affaires étrangères a fait, de par son fond comme de par sa forme, l'effet d'un coup brutal assené au moment même où partout on s'en allait répétant que le ciel était sans nuages et la tranquillité en Extrême-Orient, tant désirée, sur le point d'être définitive.

Ne serait-ce point cependant trop diminuer l'acuité de psychologie des grandes puissances que de laisser croire encore que cette politique a quelque chose de nouveau? Car si dans quelques circonstances ce masque japonais concentré, sans rides et sans expression, a laissé voir ou prévoir ce qu'il pensait, celle-là en est très certainement une.

On peut discuter sur la façon de dire les choses : les Japonais eux-mêmes l'ont fait, et leur presse n'a pas été unanime, loin de là, à approuver celle qui fut employée, mais ceci n'est-il pas plutôt un signe des temps : la politique des peuples ne se peut plus contenter, depuis cette guerre effroyable, depuis « les conséquences économiques de la paix », comme le disait Keynes, de diplomates discourant négligemment sur des principes, ou s'attardant sur des directives et des conceptions de la pensée pure; elle ne veut plus maintenant, et ne peut plus vouloir que des « commerçants et des industriels » au costume sans appareil, mais aux paroles précises et claires, et aux décisions réalistes et pratiques; sous cet angle, la politique énoncée par le gouvernement japonais représente, non seulement celle qui a l'adhésion de tout son peuple, mais encore la seule qu'il lui soit possible de suivre.

Il n'est point besoin d'être observateur remarquable, ni d'avoir suivi de près les rapports du Japon avec la Chine pour se rendre compte du travail patient, tenace que les gouvernements chargés du maintien et du développement de cet empire ont poursuivi depuis de longues années, mais surtout depuis 1932.

Sans se soucier des échecs subis, des répercussions à prévoir, mais cependant sans en méconnaître l'importance, confiants dans l'absolue nécessité de la tâche qu'ils entreprenaient, ils ont affirmé et consolidé la situation du Japon sur le territoire continental asiatique, et ont apporté leur appui entier au nouvel Etat, plus ou moins leur protégé, qui, dès aujourd'hui, leur permet les plus grands espoirs « si toutefois, Dieu lui prête vie »!

Mais leur œuvre ne pouvait pas s'arrêter là : il apparaissait clairement qu'il serait de première nécessité de conquérir les faveurs du voisin et de collaborer avec lui : ingrate mission, œuvre délicate. Le temps a passé, et avec lui le souvenir : lentement, pas à pas, bond par bond, étapes géantes ensuite, la diplomatie japonaise a vu se combler le fossé, d'apparence pourtant infranchissable, qui séparait son pays de la République chinoise : déjà le gouvernement de Nankin avait supprimé le boycott; déjà, il avait « officiellement » donné à Huang Fou un véritable blanc-seing pour discuter et régler certains différends concernant la Mandchourie, en réalité pour tenter de rétablir avec le Japon des relations plus amicales; déjà des négociations sérieuses s'amorçaient pour mettre sur pied une convention portant remboursement progressif des emprunts chinois contractés ici et même envisager de nouveaux investissements japonais. Sans doute, continuait-on à déclarer officiellement, que jamais le nouvel empire du Mandchoukouo ne serait reconnu, que cette « amputation resterait éternellement une plaie », mais chacun savait apprécier la position difficile du gouvernement chinois et comprenait ses mobiles.

La situation semblait donc se développer dans les lignes de la politique tracée quand des bruits commencèrent à courir : la Société des nations envoyait en Chine le docteur Rajchman pour y étudier une réorganisation; les emprunts de coton et de blé faits en Amérique par l'ancien ministre des finances Soong étaient détournés de leur but original et serviraient à des arsenaux et des champs d'aviation; un consortium allait se constituer pour avancer à la Chine des sommes destinées à des travaux indéterminés ou mal précisés.

Dès lors c'était l'écroulement de tout ce bel échafaudage auquel il ne manquait cependant plus rien d'essentiel; temporiser, négocier eussent été chose normale, mais longue; le Japon craignait de n'avoir bientôt plus que la ressource de pleurer sur des ruines : la déclaration est venue, sans formes oratoires, sans ambiguïtés, sans déguise-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Elle affirme à nouveau ce que le ministre des affaires étrangères avait déjà précisé dans son discours à la Diète, que l'empire est et reste la plus grande, sinon la seule force civilisatrice de l'Extrême-Orient et qu'à ce titre, il a la charge, par priorité sur les autres puissances, sinon par exclusivité, d'y assurer la paix et l'ordre; qu'en conséquence, il se trouverait dans l'obligation de s'opposer à toute intervention en Chine qui, directement ou indirectement, aurait pour but de créer une situation pouvant finalement conduire au désordre.

En réalité, et ceci ressort très nettement non seulement des déclarations officielles faites depuis, mais également des nombreux commentaires qu'a consacrés la presse à la question, le Japon a exprimé son mécontentement de voir les grandes puissances s'intéresser activement, sous différentes formes, à une réorganisation de la Chine, sans lui avoir demandé son opinion, ni bien entendu, son concours : il a estimé que tout ce qui serait fait sans lui le serait nécessairement contre lui.

A raisonner un peu, à reprendre la suite des événements diplomatiques qui se sont déroulés depuis l'intervention japonaise de 1932, on ne peut pas ne pas reconnaître un fond réel de vérité pratique dans cette affirmation. L'opposition faite par les grandes puissances au nouvel Etat du Manchoukouo, l'appui apporté par la Société des nations à la Chine dans ses revendications territoriales montrent clairement que l'absence du Japon dans les interventions projetées est voulue et qu'il la doit interpréter comme un acte peu amical, pour le moins, certainement pas, en tout cas, comme un acte totalement neutre.

Nous n'avons aucune qualité pour étudier le problème des relations du monde avec le Japon du point de vue strict des traités, mais il nous semble, par contre, étant donné qu'il s'agit de faits, que nous le pouvons faire sous l'angle des réalités dont nous parlions plus haut.

Un vaste territoire couvrant presque la totalité du continent asiatique indépendant est en période de gestation : la Mandchourie, sous la protection rigide, ordonnée du Japon s'organise méthodiquement : son budget est déterminé, sa banque centrale consolide chaque jour la stabilité de sa monnaie avec un scrupule qui ferait honneur à n'importe laquelle de nos banques d'Etat; les travaux publics sont exécutés ponctuellement suivant un programme bien défini; les voies ferrées se développent d'une façon étonnante et les nouvelles industries absorbent et digèrent avec une progression continue des capitaux dont le montant laisse incrédule.

La Chine, quelque contraires que puissent être les apparences, se tourne lentement, mais sans erreur, vers son ennemi d'hier, qui seul peut devenir demain son allié et son ami.

Des négociations importantes se poursuivent tant avec l'un qu'avec l'autre : aujourd'hui c'est le bloc économique mandchou-japonais dont les bases ont été jetées lors de la visite du ministre des finances de l'empire mandchou et qui depuis se précise rapidement; demain, ce seront de nouveaux investissements en Chine, de nouveaux plans de collaboration dans tous les domaines.

Tout cela se fait sans que personne ne sache rien de précis. Le Japon conduit seul sa politique et ni l'Europe ni l'Amérique ne semblent s'en préoccuper, tant et si bien que dans un pays de porte ouverte comme la Mandchourie ou la Chine, on se trouvera un jour en face d'un programme défini, étudié, réalisable, qui déterminera les bases économiques de ces deux pays ou de l'un d'eux pour les dix ou vingt années à venir sans que quiconque ait jamais eu mot à dire.

Le problème de l'Extrême-Orient reste un grave problème

F. CHEVALLIER.

Incl. 2 to Special Report WD 1414 of June 5, 1954.
From the Embassy, Paris.
Extract from L'HUMANITE of May 24, 1954.

L'HUMANITE

Exigeons la reconnaissance de la République soviétique chinoise !

LES TERRITOIRES SOVIÉTIQUES AU SETCHOEN OCCUPENT 94.000 KILOMÈTRES CARRÉS AVEC 10 MILLIONS D'HABITANTS

Voici la fin des renseignements transmis des territoires soviétiques des provinces du Setchouen et Shensi, en date du 20 mars 1934, par le camarade Tchié-Houm (1).

Cet article montre le développement du mouvement soviétique dans la province chinoise du Setchouen, les grandes victoires de l'armée rouge chinoise sur les armées réactionnaires et l'organisation des Soviets dans les districts libérés.

Il faut soutenir nos frères de Chine en exigeant du gouvernement français la reconnaissance de la République soviétique de Chine et en luttant contre l'intervention contre les Soviets chinois, pour le rappel des forces navales et terrestres d'Extrême-Orient, contre tout envoi d'armes à la réaction du Kuomintang.

La terre aux paysans libérés

Le pouvoir soviétique s'établit dans le Setchouen, de la rive est du Djaling-Kiang à la rive septentrionale du Tschou-Kiang. Au total, le territoire soviétique du Setchouen du Nord au Shensi du Sud comporte 26 districts d'une superficie de 94.235 kilomètres carrés et plus de 10 millions d'habitants. Le rapide développement de la révolution soviétique garantit également une croissance ultérieure rapide du territoire soviétique dans le Setchouen.

Récemment, les soviets furent réorganisés dans le souci primordial de drainer de nouveaux éléments de lutte de classe, de manière à garantir aux soviets une base de classe composée d'ouvriers, de travailleurs des campagnes et de paysans pauvres. Une large campagne fut menée en faveur d'une inspection du pays et d'une vérification du partage des terres d'un point de vue strictement de classe. Les larges masses de la population soviétique prirent part avec enthousiasme et en grand nombre à cette campagne, ainsi qu'à toutes les tâches de l'édification soviétique, de même qu'ils participèrent activement à tous les combats et opérations de leur Armée rouge, soit en prenant part directement au combat, soit en volontaires du service de garde, de reconnaissance ou dans les transports militaires et sanitaires. Aussi, ces masses ne laisseront-elles pas passer la moindre occasion de propager au loin le pouvoir des soviets.

C'est ainsi qu'on jeta dans le Djaling-Kiang des milliers de planches sur lesquelles des mots d'ordre révolutionnaires furent peints et que le courant emporta vers les territoires des blancs.

Lorsque la région était encore sous le pouvoir du Kuomintang, les propriétaires contraignaient les paysans à la culture du pavot, de manière à pouvoir leur soustraire les fonds impôts de l'opium. Cette culture d'opium contribuait naturellement à l'augmentation du nombre des fumeurs d'opium au sein de la population des campagnes au détriment de leur santé. Le pouvoir soviétique prit des mesures pour la liquidation de la culture du pavot et mena une énergique campagne contre l'opium, campagne dont les résultats se firent vite sentir.

Le territoire soviétique est très fertile et riche en différents produits du sol et du sous-sol dont l'exploitation sous le régime du Kuomintang n'était pas encouragée. Sauf les arsenaux et les établissements pour la frappe de la monnaie, cette région ne comporte aucune industrie importante. Mais, après les quelques mois de pouvoir soviétique, le tableau a déjà changé du tout au tout. A Kwang-gan, des dizaines de puits pour l'extraction du charbon ont été ouverts ; à Nankiang, des forges qui livrent du très bon métal, particulièrement utilisable pour la chaudronnerie. Dans le sud du territoire soviétique, on a mis en activité une exploitation de mines de sel, où 10.000 ouvriers sont employés, qui, sous le régime du Kuomintang, étaient en chômage.

Il va de soi que le régime soviétique

doit particulièrement veiller à fournir l'Armée rouge en armes et munitions.



L'emblème de la République soviétique chinoise

Dans l'arsenal du territoire soviétique, l'on produit journellement 120 mitrailleuses et 60.000 cartouches. Les ouvriers de l'arsenal ont établi de leur propre initiative un service de nuit pour satisfaire aux quantités d'armements dont le front a besoin.

Finances et développement culturel

Le 4 décembre 1933, fut inaugurée la banque ouvrière et paysanne. Les prix des aliments et produits de première nécessité furent réglés et stabilisés par le pouvoir soviétique. Quantité de coopératives de production et de syndicats de consommateurs se sont développés. Un bureau du commerce d'exportation fut institué qui régle, d'après un plan établi, les échanges avec les contrées des blancs.

Grâce aux camarades dévoués des commissions culturelles des soviets, de grands progrès furent également réalisés sur le plan de l'instruction. Sous la conduite du parti communiste, on organisa de grandes campagnes pour la liquidation de l'analphabétisme, pour l'instruction politique des larges masses et pour la préparation de nouveaux cadres en vue du développement culturel. La première classe de l'école politique « Pen-Yang » (nommée ainsi du nom des deux chefs ouvriers et paysans assassinés par les brutes du Kuomintang en 1929) vient justement d'achever son instruction. Dans tous les endroits, on a constitué des « écoles populaires Lénine ». Momentanément, par manque de cadres enseignants, cette branche scolaire est quelque peu arriérée, mais on est déjà sur la voie de vaincre cette déficience. Le pouvoir soviétique projette également l'édification d'écoles soviétiques supérieures.

Le gouvernement soviétique et les différentes organisations révolutionnaires éditent toute une série de journaux, qui souffrent malheureusement du manque d'imprimeries et de la pénurie de papier. Les tirages les plus forts reviennent aux journaux : Le Communiste, La Jeune Garde, L'Armée rouge, Les Soviets, Le Drapeau rouge, L'Éducation soviétique, L'Armée soviétique, et à différents journaux illustrés.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 19, 1934

~~SEN~~
~~WFK~~
~~SKH~~

Rome's despatch No. 564 of June 4, 1934, encloses a translation of an apparently official statement of Italy's attitude with regard to the issues raised in the Japanese Foreign Office statement of April 17, as contained in "an officially inspired article" published in an Italian paper. The covering despatch summarizes the entire article.

It will be recalled that we have already instructed Rome to forward, in the event that it has not already done so, a report containing all the information available with regard to the Italian position in the matter.

~~FE:MD:DLV~~

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 ROICE, June 4, 1934.

No. 564.


Subject : Far East Situation.

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AM. REC'D



JUN 11 1934



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The Honorable *6/22/34*
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 548 of May 23, 1934, concerning the Far East situation, I have the honor to inform the Department that an officially inspired article was published in the MESSAGGERO of June 1, 1934, which relates to the statement emanating last April from the Japanese Foreign Office regarding Japan's policy toward China, and after pointing out that Russia and Germany abstained from taking notice of the statement, briefly outlines the viewpoints of the United States, England and France as severally communicated to the Government of Japan on that subject, as well as the responses made by Japan in the premises.

793.94/6738

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JUN 26 1934


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A statement of Italy's attitude on that question is then given in italics, a translation of which is hereto attached. In brief, it summarizes the principles on which, after careful examination of the situation, the Italian Government based its decision to inquire of the Tokio Government regarding its unofficial statement of policy toward China, and declares that the Italian Ambassador received from the Japanese Minister the same assurances that had been given to the other powers. In taking note of the Japanese Minister's declaration giving assurances that existing treaties would be respected, Italy, it is said, feels obliged to state frankly - as between strong nations may quite properly be done - that a monopolistic policy with respect to China would be fraught with danger.

China, the article continues, is of such vast proportions and resources that it affords a limitless field for the humane and civilizing initiative and trade of all, and for that reason the Chinese are certain to realize many benefits in the future as they have in the past. Italy's attitude with respect to China, it concludes, is accordingly one of cooperation which would redound to the benefit of the Chinese people, the economic recovery of the world and general peace.

Respectfully yours,


Breckinridge Long.

✓
Enclosure: Translation.

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710.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 564 of June 4, 1934,
from the Embassy at Rome.

IL MESSAGGERO, Rome,
June 1st, 1934.

(Translation)

Italy is interested in Far Eastern problems not only because as a Great Power she is necessarily concerned over any incident which disturbs or tends to disturb the balance in any part of the world, but also because she believes that any development in the Far East produces - in this now "pocket-size" world - an immediate reaction in Europe and because she does not desire to be placed in a position of inferiority with respect to any other nation in China, where during recent years numerous Italian business enterprises have been built up, while still others are showing a promising start.

After a careful consideration of the situation and on the basis of the principles set forth above, the Royal Ambassador in Tokio was instructed to request that Government to explain its communique. Ambassador Auriti, who called on Minister Hirota a few days ago for that purpose, received the same assurances as those given by the Japanese Government to the United States, Great Britain, and France.

Italy takes note of the assurances made by Foreign Minister Hirota that existing treaties will be respected, and, while expressing her keen admiration of the great Japanese people, she feels it her duty to state with that frankness befitting intercourse between strong nations that a monopolistic policy in China would be dangerous.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 22, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~WBT:~~
~~EMD:~~
~~WBT:~~

Colombo's 136, May 4, 1934, --

This despatch transmits two editorials appearing in a Colombo paper entitled "Mr. Roosevelt and the Far East" and "The Far East".

I suggest that the first editorial entitled "Mr. Roosevelt and the Far East" be read in its entirety as it possibly gives us some information in regard to what the British press in a British dominion such as Ceylon is thinking about our Far Eastern policy.

J.E.f.

JEJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 136.

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Colombo, Ceylon, May 4, 1934.

SUBJECT: PRESS COMMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST.

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 20 1934
Department of State
WASHINGTON

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

AM RECD
JUN 20 1934
DEPT. OF STATE
WASHINGTON

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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Livingston			
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JUN 20 1934

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies

of an editorial entitled "Mr. Roosevelt and the Far East" which appeared in the TIMES OF CEYLON for April 27, 1934. This editorial appeared before the recent American pronouncement on Japan's policy in the Far East but is indicative of the interest with which foreign nations are observing American policies on world affairs.

There are also enclosed copies of a later editorial in which reference is made to the Department's reported attitude toward the Japanese pronouncement.

Respectfully yours,

Brockholst Livingston
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

- No.1. Copy of Editorial from TIMES OF CEYLON dated April 27, 1934.
No.2. Copy of Editorial from TIMES OF CEYLON dated May 4, 1934.

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BL:NBP

Distribution:

Original and four copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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JUL 3 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to Despatch No.136
 of Brockholst Livingston, American
 Vice Consul, at Colombo, Ceylon,
 dated May 4, 1934, on the subject:
 PRESS COMMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY
 IN THE FAR EAST.

SOURCE: TIMES OF CEYLON,
 April 27, 1934,
 Colombo.

EDITORIAL.

MR. ROOSEVELT AND THE FAR EAST.

The European Powers are doubtless eager to know what attitude the United States Government is going to take with regard to Japan's new pronouncement relating to China. President Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy has hitherto been marked by greater conciliatoriness towards Japan than that of his predecessor, so much so that he was recently credited with a desire completely to abandon the position taken up by the previous Administration and to recognise the independence of Manchukuo. The impression created by recent events has been that the United States would not intervene even to save the Philippines from the Japanese. The position in regard to this American colony is now a most curious one. The Filipinos, taking the cue from other "oppressed" nationalities, have for years agitated for self-government. Quite recently Congress passed a measure granting them pretty nearly all which they, or, at least, some sections of them, professed to want. Filipino agitators resemble those in other parts of the world, in not being very easily satisfied - the more is given to them the more they still want - and they rejected the scheme offered to them, much as the Indian Congress are rejecting the White Paper reforms. To their probably secret consternation, the United States Government was said to be seriously considering the desirability not merely of granting the Filipinos their independence, but the responsibility for the defence of their islands, by completely abandoning the Philippine military and naval bases. There is no feeling in America analogous to that which in the British Empire resulted in the Ottawa Agreement. The free entrance into America of commodities from the Philippines is keenly resented by important sections of the population, and there is a widespread feeling that if the inhabitants want to look after themselves they should be permitted to do so, particularly if this would conduce to a better understanding with Japan. The situation, however, has been entirely altered by the

attitude

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

attitude Japan is now taking up. The Japanese Government has now shown quite plainly that it is aiming at establishing a virtual suzerainty over China, and for the United States Government to permit this ambition to be realised would be a complete abandonment of the traditional American policy in the Far East - a policy which alone has justified the maintenance of an American Navy of the present dimensions. If the United States is going to leave both China and the Philippines to the tender mercies of Japan, she will have practically no interests to protect in the Pacific, and no need for a Navy in Pacific waters beyond what would be sufficient for safeguarding a coastline which, it is true, is a very lengthy one, but is an extremely unlikely object of attack. It is conceivable, of course, that American opinion might be reconciled to a step of this kind, but it would mean the abdication of America's present status as a world power. Time after time the United States Government has intervened to show its concern for the integrity and independence of China. When Japan began operations aiming at the complete subjugation of Manchuria it was the Washington Government which gave the lead to the Powers in refusing to recognise the new State of Manchukuo, indicating its opinion that the ousting of the Chinese from Manchuria was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. The United States Government is, however, in a position to temporise in the matter in a manner which will probably not be open to the European States which are members of the League of Nations, and especially those of them who, if reports are true, have commitments in China which, if proceeded with, will be contrary to that which the Japanese Government professes its intention to apply to certain transactions between Europe and China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.2, to Despatch No.136
of Brockholst Livingston, American
Vice Consul, at Colombo, Ceylon,
dated May 4, 1934, on the subject:
PRESS COMMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY
IN THE FAR EAST.

SOURCE: TIMES OF CEYLON,
May 4, 1934,
Colombo.

EDITORIAL.
THE FAR EAST.

Undoubtedly the most satisfactory, as it is probably the only, way out of the impasse created by the proclamation recently made by Japan on the subject of China would be for the two countries themselves to arrive at an amicable understanding on all outstanding questions. Amongst these the most important is, of course, the recognition of Manchoukuo. In foreign countries sentiment on this subject has recently undergone considerable modification, it being felt that the real interests of China herself would be furthered by the acceptance of the accomplished fact. It is felt that if China could secure from Japan as the price of recognition a stabilized frontier between the new State and China, the latter country would be well advised to agree. Moreover, the present situation is a very embarrassing one for those European countries which have trade relations with Manchoukuo, inasmuch as they have no acknowledged authority with whom they can deal. The British Government itself was at a loss recently how and to whom to pay for the transportation of the British mails in Manchoukuo, and foreign merchants in Manchoukuo are prevented from placing their grievances before the Manchoukuo Government or the Japanese by the fact of non-recognition. Even the United States Government, it has been asserted, is anxious to see the end of this question, which is a constant source of embarrassment in its relations with Japan, while the French Government may be said virtually to have recognised the new State when the agreement creating the Franco-Japanese Joint Stock Company to finance the purchase of railway supplies for the South Manchurian Railway was signed. The sole question would seem to be whether Chinese sentiment is as yet ripe for such a settlement. Naturally, Chinese feeling is still very bitter on the subject, although it must be obvious to every thinking person in China that the idea that Manchoukuo will ever be restored is a delusion, unless, of course, Japan were to suffer defeat in a war with the United States or with the European Powers or with both together. It is probable, of course, that Chinese hopes are being encouraged by the firm attitude which the United States has apparently taken up with regard to the Japanese proclamation, but if General Chiang-Kai-shek entertains any misconceptions on this subject he is likely to be disillusioned when

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mittin D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the Chinese diplomats come to discuss the matter with the European and American authorities. The latter are certain to tender China their advice to patch up an understanding with Japan, as war at the present moment is a catastrophe not to be viewed by anybody with any measure of light-heartedness. If, in spite of this advice, the Chinese authorities prove adamant, it will be quite open for Japan, without going so far as to give either America or Europe cause to quarrel with her, to bring pressure to bear on them. The Japanese can easily demonstrate to the Chinese chauvinists, who profess to believe in the possibility of the reconquest of lost territory, that not merely is this out of the question, but that the loss of Manchoukuo may be followed by further Japanese inroads into China and the sacrifice by the Chinese of a large portion, if not all, of the Chinese territory north of the Yellow River. In fact, there are constant rumours in China of impending Japanese advances beyond the Great Wall.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 June 22, 1934.

~~RCM:~~
~~MM:~~
~~END:~~

Tientsin's 556, May 17, 1934, --

This despatch reports that a conference took place on May 14 and 15 at Shanhaikwan between Chinese and Japanese representatives, at which conference it is reported that certain questions were discussed, as follows:

1. Through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway;
2. Maintenance of peace and order in the demilitarized zones;
3. Withdrawal of "Manchukuo" police from Nantienmen; and
4. The retrocession of Malanyu.

The despatch does not contain any information as to whether any agreements were reached at the conference.

JEJ/VDM

J. C. J.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


NO. 556

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, May 17, 1934.

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JUN 19 34



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conference at Shanhaikwan.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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Lockhart ONI-MID

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SIR:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A. L. L. 1934

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of my despatch No. 667 of today's date, addressed to the Legation, on the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/, To Legation, May 17, 1934.

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Original and four copies to Department.

JUL 3 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 536, Dated May 17, 1934
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

No. 667

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, May 17, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Conference at
Shanhaikwan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, according to the vernacular and foreign press, a conference took place on May 14 and 15 at Shanhaikwan between representatives of the Chinese Government on the one side and Japanese railway and military representatives on the other. The exact purpose of the meeting has not been officially announced, but there are reports current, which seem to be well founded, that the conference was called for the purpose of discussing through traffic on the Pei-ning Railway and other pending matters in the Luantung area. According to the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES (British) of May 17, 1934, among those participating in the conference were Mr. Yin Tung,

Managing

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Managing Director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, Messrs. Tao Shang-min and Yin Ju-Keng, Administrative Inspectors for the Luantung and Chihhsien-Miyun districts, respectively, Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Military Attache in Peiping, Colonel Matsui, Japanese Military Director at Chengteh, Colonel Giga, representative of the Kwantung Army at Shanhaikwan and Mr. Ohta, of the South Manchuria Railway and the Shanhaikwan-Mukden Railway. In addition to the above it is known that General Umezu, Commander of Japanese Troops in North China, also attended the conference. The I SHIH PAO (Chinese), in its issue of today, reports that information from an authoritative source states that an agreement on the question of through railway traffic has been reached and that the arrangement contemplates the establishment of a "Sino-Japanese International Travel Service" which will function at Shanhaikwan by way of exchanging through travel facilities and equipment. The personnel which participated in the Shanhaikwan conference leads to the inference that the question of through rail traffic was discussed if not agreed upon, but inquiry this afternoon at Provincial Government headquarters failed to confirm the I SHIH PAO report that an agreement had been reached.

Considerable speculation is being indulged in as regards the scope of the conference and both the vernacular and foreign press have reported that, in addition to the question of through traffic, discussions took place regarding the maintenance

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of peace and order in the demilitarized zone, the withdrawal of the Manchukuo police from Nantienmen and the retrocession of Malanyu. It will be recalled that the Tengkai truce, by which the demilitarized zone was established, was signed on May 31, 1933, and in this connection it is worthy of note that rumors have recently been current in Tientsin that some effort would be made by the Chinese to reach an agreement with the Japanese by which the terms of the truce would be modified. If this report should prove later to be true, it is possible that some of the restrictions laid upon the Chinese by the truce may be used by the Japanese as a trading point to obtain an agreement for through traffic and the exchange of postal facilities.

With reference to the reported presence of several officials of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway at Peitaiho, it is known that the railway is negotiating for the purchase of an electric light plant at that place now owned by the Rocky Point Association. This fact is confirmed by one of the officers of the Rocky Point Association.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

SOC
 FPL:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover of
 despatch No. 556 of May 17, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 576.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ROME, June 14, 1934



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 28 1934
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JUN 27 34

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
6/29/34

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 28 1934
Department of State

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/6738

JUL 3 1934

FILED

In continuation of my despatch No. 564 of June 4, 1934, concerning the Italian Government's warning to Japan that a monopolistic policy with respect to China would be fraught with danger, made in connection with the response of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Governments requesting an explanation of Japan's statement of policy toward China, I have the honor to inform the Department that the MESSAGGERO has published an editorial on that subject, entitled "A Warning", of which a summary has been made and is transmitted herewith.

F/G

Respectfully yours,

Handwritten signature: Breckinridge Long

Enclosure: Summary.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 576 of June 11, 1934,
from the Embassy at Rome.

IL MESSAGGERO, Rome,
June 7, 1934.

(Summary)

A Warning.

Italy's admonishment is significant and timely in that it coincides with the unusually disturbed state of affairs in the Orient. Without attempting to pass upon or condemn Japanese action in Manchuria, it may be said that Japan has accepted the technique but not the spirit of western civilization and has rigorously conserved an insular nationalism which today manifests itself in a nation drawn more than ever within itself for the purpose of marshalling its energy and of making its point of view triumphant in vast areas where it hopes to extend its vital interests.

Any other than a Japanese has the right as well as the duty of examining these phenomena and where one sees a struggle for life itself the other sees an audacious expansion carried on at great speed with a practically limitless program. The history of Japan's annexations and occupations and its present action in Manchuria indicate an extensive program of dominion over China itself and perhaps Siberia, which would mean Japanese hegemony of Asia and the Pacific. While some see in Japan the champion of western civilization struggling against bolshevism and anarchy, only a self-declared dupe of propaganda can overlook the fact that immense territories and resources are at stake, as well as the destiny of an almost boundless country, and by reflex the economic and

military

-2-

military equilibrium of the Pacific, to which must be added the quibbling discussions of this or that clause of a treaty observed or violated by the party directly involved in the dispute. Whoever can see in Japan's actions a transcendent inspiration or spiritual urge akin to the crusades must be looked upon as the victim of hallucinations.

The realities are that colossal interests are at stake, since the markets and resources of the Far East already occupy a large place in the world's economy and will occupy an ever increasing importance. European and American interests in Asia and the Pacific behold a rising tide which is about to overwhelm them. To conciliate the necessities of the Japanese people with so many legitimate interests of others, while maintaining the equilibrium of the situation and peace, is an arduous task but not an impossible one. The warning statement of the Italian Government is consequently opportunely given, since it goes beyond the immediate needs of the situation and takes into consideration the relations of Occident and Orient. The emancipation movement of the Asiatic peoples cannot be stopped and in the end it will mean their elevation to a higher civilization. The process is not only an extremely delicate one but also attended with many difficulties, and that the change may take place without violence or disturbance as well as promptly is in the common interest of all.

In conclusion it may be stated that cooperation without domination is indispensable and necessary rather than useful; that isolation on this planet is impossible; and that Europe's active cooperation, of which Asia has need, will contribute to the welfare and concord of the world.

CAB/eh

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Harbin/66 FOR Despatch #28

FROM Harbin (Coville) DATED May 7, 1934.
//VQ// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Press comment and interest taken by general public
in Harbin, in regard to American reactions to statement
of April 17, 1934, of the Japanese foreign office spokes-
man, popularly referred to as a "hands off" China" warning
to occidental countries. Reports regarding -.

fpg

793.94/6742

6742

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C. Relations between foreign countries.

1. American-Japanese relations.

793.94
American reactions to the statement of April 17, 1934, of the Japanese foreign office spokesman at Tokyo, popularly referred to as embodying a "hands off China" warning to occidental countries, were a matter of active concern in Harbin. The press devoted lengthy articles to the subject. A Japanese in an important position here called on me for the purpose of ascertaining the views of local American interests on the statement. The Consulate General is of the opinion that Japanese officials in Harbin were instructed to report on foreign reactions to the "unofficial" release, and that importance was attached to it as a means of measuring opinion.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Nanking/75 FOR #D-617

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED May 15, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations during month of April 1934.

793.94/ 6743

6743

esp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan.

Through Traffic with Manchuria.

193.92

Early in April General Hwang Fu came south from Peiping ostensibly to visit his ancestral tombs in Chekiang Province during the Spring Festival but actually, it was reported, to confer with General Chiang Kai-shek and other Government leaders with a view to alleviating the strained situation which was developing in North China as a result of continued pressure on the part of the Japanese to force the resumption of through railway traffic between North China and Manchuria and to draw up some sort of postal agreement between "Manchukuo" and China. The National Government found itself on the horns of a dilemma; if Japan's demands were complied with, accusations of playing into the hands of Japan would be hurled at it from all sides and especially from Canton, with which the National Government has been striving to patch up its differences, while if the Government refused to consider Japan's demands it ran the risk of further military activities by

Japan

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Japan in North China, the establishment of through traffic between North China and Manchuria by force, and the removal of the last vestige of control that the National Government had over North China.

The decisions reached by the Government leaders who gathered at Nanchang, who included Hwang Fu, General Chiang Kai-shek, and Wang Ching-wei, were, of course, not made public, but there is reason to believe that the Government, finding itself faced with the imminent danger of further Japanese military aggressions in North China, was prepared to capitulate and to acquiesce in some arrangement whereby it could retain a modicum of "face", as, for example, the establishment of a travel bureau to operate the connecting link and thus avoid the appearance of tacit de facto recognition of "Manchukuo" by China. At this critical point the Japanese issued their now famous statement of April 17 and by so doing gave the Chinese a breathing spell.

Japanese Statement of April 17.

77394
 On April 17 a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement to the press in which he pointed out the vital importance of China to Japan and made the assertion that Japan would oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. He further stated that Japan would oppose any other power supplying China with war materials, military instructors and advisers, and loans of funds to be used for political purposes. This declaration of virtual suzerainty by Japan resulted in strengthening the animosity felt against Japan in China and in creating an atmosphere in which the National

Government

149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Government found it impossible to continue its negotiations looking to the resumption of through traffic with Manchuria and, at the same time, it served a warning on the Powers interested in China.

The reason generally assigned for the issuance of the above mentioned statement seems to have been to feel out the Powers. If this is the case, the net result would appear unfavorable to Japan, as the statement focused the attention of the Powers upon the Far East and induced the larger part of the press of the United States and Great Britain, as well as the Foreign Offices of those two countries, to make statements which proved of assistance to China at a point in the proceedings when China needed help.

On finding that the world was not prepared to accept Japan's assumption of control the Japanese Foreign Office "closed" the incident by modifying its previous statement. It still maintained however the vital importance of China to Japan, because of geographical propinquity, and stated that Japan could not risk the exploitation of China by the Powers and that it would oppose any activities which were likely to disturb peace and order in eastern Asia.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

Confidential File

SEE 500.A 15 a 4 General Committee/983 FOR Tel 144 6pm

FROM U.S.S.R. (Bullitt) DATED June 16, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Conversation with Litvinov regarding Chiang Kai Shek and his relations with the Japanese.

G

793.94/6744

6744

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
SPECIAL GRAY


MED

1-1830

PEIPING via N.R.

FROM Dated June 30, 1934

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.



*773.94
 note
 773-77932 American*

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

#283, June 30, 1 p.m.

Agreement for the institution on July 1st of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway was announced June 28 by Chinese and Japanese. The agreement provides for the despatch of one through passenger train daily from either terminal under the management of a Sino-Japanese concern for the Oriental Travel Service with headquarters at Shanhaikwan.

No (repeat no) strong adverse Chinese reaction to the announcements has appeared as yet. Announcement of the agreement, which was apparently arrived at some time ago, was delayed, it is believed, until the officials of the central government responsible for it felt confident that no serious opposition would accompany it. It is expected that announcements of agreements with regard to restoration of postal facilities, establishment of customs houses and other pending problems will be made hereafter at moments which are regarded as propitious by all concerned.

JOHNSON

WWC:HPD

793.94/6745

JUL 1 1934

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PT

1-1836

GRAY

FROM

TIENTSIN via N.R.

Dated July 2, 1934

Rec'd. 2.45 a.m.

JUL 2 1934
DIVISION OF


Secretary of State,
Washington

July 2, 10 a.m.

Following message has been sent to Legation,
July 2, 9 a.m.

"One. Through rail traffic Peiping - Mukden resumed yesterday as scheduled. Bomb exploded in a third-class coach of first northbound express at point just north of Tangku killing several Chinese but first through train from Mukden arrived this morning without untoward incident and went on to Peiping.

Two. CONFIDENTIAL. Shortly expected further steps in tacit recognition that non-Chinese regime of some permanence exists in Manchuria are effectuation of arrangement for postal relations described in my despatch of June 25 and establishment now definitely planned of five additional Chinese customs stations along the Great Wall mentioned in my despatch June 29 as reported under contemplation. While agreement as to postal arrangement is reliably stated to have been reached date



793.94/6746

FILED

JUL 6 1934

F/G

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PT

- 2 - From Tientsin July 2, 10 a.m.

date of inspection has not been determined. According to authentic information the new customshouses will be set up within three weeks under supervision Chinese Commissioner station^{ones} at Peiping who has already arrived in that city for the purpose of organization."

ATCHESON

WSB
HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHARGE SLIP

File No. 793-94.

ENCLOSURE	CHARGE TO—	DATE	CLERK'S INITIALS	REMARKS
10747	RR. Reid	6-1-45	J. P. H.	
10748	Net Rd	7/30/52	B	

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~JJJ:~~

~~RCM:~~

~~MMH:~~

Nanking's June 8, 1934, reports that in the course of a conversation with the Consul General, Mr. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister to China, stated that through railway and postal arrangements with Manchuria are merely part of the armistice agreement of May 30, 1933, should be attended to by military authorities and bear no relation to the question of recognition of "Manchukuo."

No action

JKB



REC'D
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking Office,
June 8, 1934.

793.94
Subject: Through Traffic and Postal Arrangements
with Manchuria.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	X		
To field			
In U S A.			

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum
of a conversation held by me with Mr. Ariyoshi, the Jap-
anese Minister.

The Department will note that in the course of a
general conversation I casually introduced the matter
of through railway traffic and postal arrangements with
Manchuria and that the tenor of the Minister's observa-
tions was that these matters were merely a part of the
armistice agreement of May 30, 1933, and should be at-
tended to by the military authorities of Japan and China.
He expressed the opinion that they were no concern of
the two Governments and bore no relation to the question
of recognition of "Manchukuo".


Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck
Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated.

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.

WRP:HC



793.94/6748

FILED

F/ESP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

June 8, 1934.

Subject: Through Traffic and Postal Arrangements
with Manchuria.

Mr. Akira Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister.

Mr. Peck.

Mr. Ariyoshi came to Nanking on the morning of June 7 and plans to leave on the night train June 8. His published interviews assert that he has no special business to discuss with the Chinese authorities during this visit, which is primarily for the purpose of attending the banquet to commemorate the opening of the Foreign Office building which is to be held on the evening of June 8.

Mr. Peck paid a courtesy call on the Japanese Minister at 11 a.m. and in the course of a general conversation remarked that he had been reading with great interest the published interviews of Mr. Ariyoshi since his return from Japan. Mr. Peck remarked that he had gathered from these published interviews that Mr. Ariyoshi did not intend to take up with the Chinese Government the matter of through railway traffic and postal arrangements in the North.

Mr. Ariyoshi said that this was true. He said that putting into effect through railway traffic and the making of postal arrangements with Manchuria were, in effect, merely part of the execution of the armistice agreement of May 30, 1933. He said that this was an arrangement between the military officers of the two countries, was purely local and did not affect the question of recognition of "Manchukuo". He observed that military officers

were

150

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

were apt to be rather strict in carrying out such agreements and he intimated that the Japanese army authorities were getting a little impatient. However, these things did not involve the respective Governments although, as he pointed out, the establishing of Customs stations along the Great Wall and the reopening of the Customs at Shan-haikwan, now in suspense, would seem to be the duty of the Chinese Government. It mattered very little to Japan whether these Customs stations were in operation, or not, but it would apparently be greatly to the advantage of the Chinese Government to have them function.

Mr. Ariyoshi said that there seemed to be confusion between the authority granted to Mr. Huang Fu and to General Ho Ying-ching and neither of them seemed to have sufficient authority from the National Government to handle matters in the North.

Mr. Ariyoshi said he understood very well the situation of the Chinese Government, namely, that it was apprehensive of an attack from Canton if it reinstituted railway and postal relations with Manchuria.

Mr. Ariyoshi remarked that the Chinese were not, in other respects, performing their duties under the armistice agreement. For example, the Japanese forces were being withdrawn from Chinese areas, but the Chinese had not apparently made the necessary arrangements for taking over control of the areas affected. He thought it was desirable that the Chinese should go on with these arrangements, since this would promise peace and order in those regions. Mr. Peck observed that he had not noticed in the press any reports of disorders in the North following the

termination

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

termination of the military activities in the Suiyuan area and Mr. Ariyoshi expressed the opinion that conditions were, in general, peaceful.

Mr. Peck said that he had noticed that General Yen Hsi-shan seemed to be intent on developing Shansi Province economically and Mr. Ariyoshi replied that General Yen seemed to have declared a "Shansi Monroe Doctrine". Mr. Peck observed that the term "Monroe Doctrine" seemed to have a number of different interpretations in the Orient.

Mr. Peck questioned Mr. Ariyoshi casually in regard to the latter's recent visit to Tokyo and Mr. Ariyoshi said that he had been very busy talking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other persons. He said that Vice Minister Shigemitsu seemed to have recovered his strength and was working very busily in the Foreign Office.

Mr. Ariyoshi expressed himself as very appreciative of Mr. Peck's courtesy in calling upon him.

WRP:HC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE (379)

Nanking Office,
 June 8, 1934.

Subject: Through Traffic and Postal Arrangements
 with Manchuria.

The Honorable

Sino-Jap Railway & Roads

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum
 of a conversation held by me with Mr. Ariyoshi, the Jap-
 anese Minister.

The Department will note that in the course of a
 general conversation I casually introduced the matter
 of through railway traffic and postal arrangements with
 Manchuria and that the tenor of the Minister's observa-
 tions was that these matters were merely a part of the
 armistice agreement of May 30, 1933, and should be at-
 tended to by the military authorities of Japan and China.
 He expressed the opinion that they were no concern of
 the two Governments and bore no relation to the question
 of recognition of "Manchukuo".

Respectfully yours,

Willis R. Peak,
 Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:
 1/ As stated.

In triplicate to the Department.
 Copy to the American Legation, Peiping.
 Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.

WRP:HC

A true copy of
 the signed orig-
 inal. *HC*

193.94/6748

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with Manchuria.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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termination

1500
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

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WRP:RC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, June 26, 1934.
DEPT. OF STATE
COMM. AFF.

ZE
WE
AC

793.94

JUL 6 34

SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1421)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-C/C
JUL 1 1934
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 11 1934 PM
H.M. LONDON OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 7 1934
Department of State

Copy hereof to be sent to
Copy also to
and

To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Copy transmitted by air
Commercial Office (A-C/O)
To *Carpenter*
Lokyo

793.94/6749

The American Ambassador forwards herewith
Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special Report No. W.D.
1421, dated June 26, 1934.

7/13/34
CP

FILED
JUL 16 1934

enclosure

WD/drs

F/G

CCP



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, June 26, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1421.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and Far
Eastern Questions

André Duboscq, foreign editor of LE TEMPS, discussed in the issue dated June 7, 1934: "The New Life in China and the Relations with Japan."

He represented China as now attempting, under the impetus given by Tchang Kai Chek, to bring about a praiseworthy moral restoration and economic reconstruction, the position of the General-in-Chief among the people being such that very few obstacles would stand in his way if he aspired to a real Dictatorship. But the task which he has undertaken for reducing the Red or Bolshevik armies scattered over a great portion of China would require a long time, and in order to succeed with it he would have

to be

-2-

to be freed from all other preoccupations. Meanwhile, the moral recovery which he is effecting has already improved both private and public morals in China.

Japan, on the other hand, has meanwhile made a great effort but finds herself in the grip of difficulties which for some time to come will put a check on further activities. Events have not borne out those who attributed to Japan aggressive intentions against either the Soviet Union or China. Quite the contrary, the conversations which had been interrupted when the United States recognized the Soviets have been resumed with the Soviet Union for the sale of the Northern Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern). On the other hand Dubosq says there is reason to believe that conversations are being carried on successfully between the Japanese Government and Peking for settling the litigation left in suspense by the Kang-Kou Armistice; attempts are even being made to reach a financial accord.

Dubosq warns short-sighted rulers against any action of a nature to precipitate a tragedy in the Far East where conditions are difficult enough as they are, while Americans and Japanese find themselves compelled to seek openings there.

Dubosq

-3-

Duboseq concludes:

"With the Turkestan affairs which are now developing and Thibetan affairs which have just been added to them, the task of reconstruction is causing enough trouble to China for her to understand that it is in her interest to reach an agreement with Japan if possible. This has been understood in reasonable political circles."

L'ERE NOUVELLE published on June 24th an editorial entitled "Une Détente en Extreme Orient?" discussing a seeming modification in the attitude of Japan towards the Soviets. The increase of "economic and intellectual exchanges" between the Soviets and both Europe and the United States, as well as Japan, is applauded.

The originals of the articles quoted are enclosed.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson
Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

Enclosures:

1. Extract from LE TEMPS, June 7, 1934;
2. L'ERE NOUVELLE, June 24, 1934.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/drs

Encl. 1 to Special Report No. WD 1421
of June 26, 1934. From the Embassy, Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS of June 7, 1934.

Questions extérieures

LA VIE NOUVELLE EN CHINE et les relations avec le Japon

La Chine est en train de tenter, sous l'impulsion de Tchang Kai Chek, un effort de redressement moral et de reconstruction économique des plus louables. La situation du généralissime est telle que certains assurent que s'il ambitionnait réellement la dictature, peu d'obstacles se présenteraient devant lui en ce moment. La victoire qu'il a remportée contre les troupes révoltées du Foukien lui a facilité sa victoire politique sur les délégués du Sud-Ouest à l'assemblée plénière du conseil central exécutif du Kouomintang, qui eut lieu à Nankin du 20 au 25 janvier. Peu après, M. Ouang Tching Ouei, président du yûan exécutif, signait avec lui une déclaration qui affirmait leur unité de vues. L'arrivée en Chine du « jeune maréchal » Tchang Sue Liang, retour d'Europe, a encore renforcé sa position militaire, et le remplacement de M. T.-V. Soung, au ministère des finances, par M. H.-H. Koung a supprimé également les désaccords qui subsistaient sur le terrain financier. « Qu'on le veuille ou non, écrit le *Journal de Shanghai*, il a la puissance parce qu'il avait les qualités nécessaires à l'acquisition de la puissance. Qu'il ajoute aux fonctions qu'il exerce ou qu'il continue à se contenter d'être le président du conseil militaire, il n'en restera pas moins l'homme fort et le cerveau politique de la Chine. »

Mais la tâche qu'il a assumée de réquiescer les armées bolchevisées, dites armées rouges, disséminées sur une grande partie du territoire, est une tâche de longue haleine et que ne doivent pas gêner d'autres préoccupations. Il s'est rendu compte que les forces militaires centrales et provinciales ne pourraient y suffire, et il suggéra au gouvernement central, nous dit la *Revue nationale chinoise* d'avril, l'adoption d'une mesure de sécurité en vigueur du temps de l'empire : le « pao-chia », garantie collective d'un certain nombre de districts pour maintenir la sécurité dans les limites de leurs territoires. Les notables qui étaient responsables vis-à-vis des autorités mandarinales avaient tout intérêt à leur signaler ce qui pouvait troubler la paix locale, quand ils ne pouvaient ou ne voulaient pas intervenir eux-mêmes. Le système du pao-chia avait favorisé les relations entre les districts dont tous les hommes, en état de manier une arme quelconque, s'organisaient, dans le sud de la Chine notamment, en associations défensives contre les attaques possibles des bandits. Le pao-chia a été remis en vigueur dans les provinces où les chefs militaires qui les gouvernent l'ont jugé moins coûteux et plus efficace que l'emploi des forces régulières.

L'œuvre de redressement moral créée par Tchang Kai Chek sous le nom de la « Vie nouvelle » tend à améliorer les mœurs privées et publiques de la Chine. Par le moyen de l'association qui se charge de la réaliser, elle peut être utilisée en politique comme un parti, et il est trop évident que cette utilisation n'a pas échappé à Tchang Kai Chek. Toujours est-il qu'elle peut porter des fruits si celui-ci a le moyen de s'y intéresser personnellement pendant un assez long temps.

A l'action de « l'homme fort » dans le sens de la renaissance chinoise, s'ajoute autre chose. Le concours des spécialistes que lui envoie la Société des nations est évidemment très précieux pour la Chine. Le Japon s'est expliqué sur le sentiment que lui inspire ce concours. Il n'en redoute qu'une chose, c'est qu'il ne comporte un acte contre lui comme le serait l'envoi d'armements, d'avions de guerre en particulier, et d'argent destiné à l'achat de tels engins. Mais ces réserves, que l'amiral Docteur, dans un récent article de presse, trouvait très compréhensibles, une fois faites, le Japon ne songe à s'élever contre aucune entreprise légitime des puissances en Chine.

Le Japon vient d'ailleurs d'accomplir un effort considérable et les difficultés auxquelles

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Le Japon vient d'ailleurs d'accomplir un effort considérable, et les difficultés auxquelles il devra fatalement faire face pour tirer parti de ce qu'il a acquis l'occuperont assez pour lui ôter l'envie, s'il l'eut jamais, de tenter un nouvel effort. Cependant, d'aucuns lui prêtent depuis de longs mois des intentions agressives tant contre l'Union soviétique que contre la Chine ; les événements ne leur ont pas, jusqu'ici, donné raison. Loin de là : d'une part, les pourparlers interrompus lors de la reconnaissance des Soviets par les Etats-Unis ont repris entre l'Union soviétique et le Japon pour la vente du chemin de fer Nord-mandchou (Est-chinois) ; d'autre part, des conversations se poursuivent à Tokio, avec succès, croyons-nous, entre le représentant du conseil politique de Pékin et le gouvernement japonais, pour régler les litiges que l'armistice de Tang-Kou a laissés pendants ; on recherche même un accord financier. La presse chinoise s'agite beaucoup à ce propos. Celle du Nord se montre généralement favorable à un rapprochement avec le Japon ; celle du Sud, opposée.

Il semble pourtant que quiconque souhaite sincèrement la paix en Extrême-Orient devrait faire des vœux pour ce rapprochement. En tout cas, les puissances européennes qui se plaignent de la concurrence des Japonais et de leur conquête des marchés, qualifiée improprement dumping, doivent le souhaiter. Dresser la Chine contre le Japon, contribuer à fermer à celui-ci le marché chinois, serait de leur part aussi maladroit au point de vue économique qu'au point de vue politique. Le Japon a été obligé de s'industrialiser à cause du refus des puissances d'accueillir ses émigrés, afin de pouvoir nourrir sa population toujours croissante. Devant le fait inéluctable de cet accroissement qui, à un rythme sûr, forge le sort du monde, toute politique qui, au lieu de s'employer à trouver des arrangements particuliers ou collectifs, consisterait à s'entêter dans un veto systématique et exaspérant, serait une politique imbécile et criminelle. La fatalité pèse déjà assez sur l'Extrême-Orient, où Japonais et Américains sont dans la nécessité de chercher des débouchés sur la même fraction du globe, pour que des gouvernants à courte vue ne s'ingénient pas, en outre, à précipiter, comme à plaisir, la tragédie.

Quant à la Chine qui a besoin d'acheter au dehors, d'autres soins que de fermer son marché aux Japonais la sollicitent en ce moment. Nous avons parlé, à plusieurs reprises, de sa position dans ses possessions extérieures, qu'elle tient évidemment à conserver. Elle cherche à y instaurer, à cet effet, une politique nouvelle. La Mongolie, le Turkestan, le Thibet l'occupent et la préoccupent à juste titre. Des télégrammes récents de source anglaise sur lesquels nous reviendrons un jour, et qui sont datés de Shanghai, montrent les Anglais impatients de remplacer, au Thibet, feu le Dalaï Lama par un personnage qui soit à leur dévotion autant que le fut celui-ci pendant plus de vingt ans et jusqu'à sa mort, qui arriva, comme l'on sait, à la fin de l'année dernière.

Avec les affaires du Turkestan qui sont en cours et les affaires thibétaines qui viennent s'y ajouter, sa reconstruction donne à la Chine assez de soucis pour qu'elle comprenne que, s'il est possible de s'entendre avec le Japon, elle a tout intérêt à le faire. Les milieux politiques raisonnables l'ont d'ailleurs compris.

ANDRÉ DUBOSQ.

Encl. 2 to Special Report #WD 1421
of June 26, 1934. From the Embassy, Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE of June 24, 1934.

Une détente en Extrême-Orient ?

Ere 6/24

Il suffit de se rappeler l'histoire de ces années dernières pour constater qu'il y a quelque chose de changé dans l'attitude des milieux dirigeants japonais à l'égard de l'Union des Soviets. Les temps semblent révolus où le mémorandum Tanaka, les déclarations belliqueuses des chefs militaires de Tokio et les mouvements des troupes dans le voisinage immédiat de la frontière soviétique laissaient prévoir une répétition prochaine de 1904 de sinistre mémoire.

S'étant mépris sur le pacifisme des Soviets, le Japon était tenté de l'imputer à leur faiblesse. Il s'est vite aperçu qu'une politique attachée au maintien de la paix n'exclut point l'appui de la force.

L'effort considérable poursuivi par le gouvernement de Moscou en présence de la menace japonaise a eu pour résultat le renforcement sérieux de la puissance militaire des Soviets en Extrême-Orient. Une solide « armée spéciale de l'Extrême-Orient » fut créée. Elle dispose de bases de ravitaillement sur place. Elle est dotée d'un outillage technique de premier ordre. Elle ne manque ni d'artillerie, ni de tanks, ni d'aviation. En ce qui concerne cette dernière, les exploits récents et désormais légendaires des Lapidevsky, Levonievsky, Molokov, Kamanine, d'autres encore, lors du sauvetage du Tchélioussine, ont démontré la grande valeur des appareils et la maîtrise incomparable des aviateurs soviétiques. Il est certain que tous ces faits ont produit une forte impression au Japon.

Les dernières dépêches de Tokio nous apprennent que M. Hirota, ministre des affaires étrangères, vient d'avoir une longue et amicale conversation avec l'ambassadeur de l'U.R.S.S., M. Yourénev. On est un peu étonné d'apprendre que le chef responsable de la politique étrangère niponne a jugé utile de demander à cette occasion, à son interlocuteur, si les Soviets ne nourrissaient aucune pensée agressive à l'égard du Japon. Il n'était pas difficile de deviner la réponse de M. Yourénev. Il y a belle lurette que le gouvernement de Moscou a proposé à Tokio un pacte de non-agression.

Néanmoins, quelle que soit la faiblesse de la position diplomatique de Tokio à l'égard de Moscou, on ne peut que saluer la détente que l'entretien entre MM. Hirota et Yourénev semble annoncer dans les rapports entre l'U.R.S.S. et le Japon. La cause de la paix dans le Pacifique, de la paix tout court, ne peut qu'y gagner.

Et si nous disons « la paix tout court », ce n'est point parce que nous croyons, comme d'aucuns le prétendent, que l'U.R.S.S. engagée en Extrême-Orient soit forcée de négliger les affaires d'Europe. Cette conception de la politique de Moscou a reçu ces temps-ci maints démentis éclatants.

Il serait d'ailleurs erroné, nous semble-t-il, de croire que c'est la situation en Extrême-Orient qui oblige les dirigeants soviétiques à lutter pour la sauvegarde de la paix sur leurs frontières occidentales. Il ne faut pas, semble-t-il, oublier que quelle que soit l'importance de l'enjeu sur les rives du Pacifique, les intérêts vitaux de l'U.R.S.S. sont surtout liés avec l'Occident. Aucun nerf vital de la Russie ne peut être atteint par le Japon. Les échanges économiques et intellectuels que l'U.R.S.S. s'efforce de développer avec l'Europe et l'Amérique le prouvent incontestablement. Et qui dit « échanges » dit « paix ».

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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La France pacifique, qui a inauguré, sous la sage impulsion du président Herriot, une politique nouvelle à l'égard des Soviets, politique de rapprochement et de collaboration, ne peut que s'en réjouir sincèrement.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500.A 15 a 5/59 FOR Tel 201 2pm

FROM _____ (_____) DATED May 24, 1934.
TO France NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Comments relative to statement made by Sir John Simon in the House
of Commons relative to the importance of the recent statement of Japan's policy
toward foreign assistance to China.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/72 FOR 7500

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED June 2, 1934.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations and negotiations between Chinese and Japanese
during May 1934, in the Tientsin Consular District.

793.94/6751
~~893.7967~~

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b. Relations with other countries.

Sino-Japanese relations, notwithstanding a somewhat improved tone over the previous month, came in for considerable attention and speculation in the course of the month. Attention was focused principally on the subject of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway. It will be recalled that no through trains have been run between Peiping and Mukden since early in January, 1932, the prolonged suspension having been an aftermath of the Mukden incident of September, 1931, and the taking over of Shanhaikwan by the Japanese early in January, 1932. As reported in my despatch No. 667 of May 17, 1934, a conference was held in the course of the month at Shanhaikwan at which there is every reason to believe preliminary discussions took place looking to an agreement for the operation of through trains between Peiping and Mukden. Reports of the last few days tend to confirm that negotiations have now progressed to the point where it may be expected that a definite agreement will be signed in the near future. According to a Reuter telegram from Nanking published by the HUA PEI JIH PAO on May 30 a tentative plan was approved at a meeting of the Central Political Council on that date. Mr. Yin Tung, Managing Director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and the Japanese director of the Shanhaikwan-Mukden Railway at Shanhaikwan were said to have negotiated

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negotiated the terms, the principles governing the plan being as follows:

- (1) That the locomotives of the South Manchuria Railway shall be used for through trains on the Peiping-Mukden Railway;
- (2) That the railway stations at Mukden and Peiping shall continue to sell tickets as far as Shanhaikwan only;
- (3) That an international travel agency shall be organized to handle through passenger and goods traffic between Peiping and Mukden and other related matters;
- (4) That the question of the number of through trains to be run each day shall be decided by a technical conference;
- (5) That the rolling-stock of the Peiping-Mukden and Shanhaikwan-Mukden Railways may be exchanged;
- (6) That there shall be separate accounts for through traffic so as to facilitate settlement and division of the revenue therefrom;
- (7) That through trains shall not hoist any flag or post any proclamation;
- (8) That separate railway guards shall be organized for the two sections of the railway, namely the extramural section and the Peiping-Shanhaikwan section; and
- (9) That Chinese and Japanese railway experts shall be employed in the international travel agency which shall have its headquarters at Shanhaikwan with branches at Peiping, Tientsin and Mukden.

At this writing railway officials of both lines are believed to be negotiating to complete all technical arrangements for the through service on the basis of the above tentative scheme. Notwithstanding recent denials by Chinese officials, it is confidently expected that by the middle of June through traffic will be resumed and that in doing so the Chinese, with the assent of the Japanese, will take precautions to avoid any direct or implied recognition of "Manchukuo". If this arrangement is perfected there is every reason to believe that the Japanese will

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then broach the subject of a plan for reciprocal postal facilities, but this subject would seem to offer more complications than that of through train service inasmuch as the International Postal Convention might prove to be a factor which would bring forth in a new form the subject of recognition of the new state of "Manchukuo". It is probably safe to say, however, that there is more real demand for the restoration of normal postal service than there is for through passenger traffic. The business community of Tientsin would welcome some modus vivendi by which mail can be exchanged between this area and "Manchukuo", thus avoiding the present uncertainties, added expense and invariable delay.

Many reports were current in May indicating activities on the part of the Japanese in the direction of economic expansion in this area. A well known local foreign business man who recently returned from Shansi reports considerable Japanese investment in that province and increasing sales of Japanese goods. He reported that the Chinese show no reluctance whatsoever towards the purchase of Japanese goods and that the employment of Japanese capital in the development of enterprises is not uncommon. Another foreign business man has informed me that he was surprised at the friendliness displayed towards the Japanese by Chinese business men during a recent trip to the interior west and southwest of Tientsin. It is known that within the past three months many representatives

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representatives of Japanese industrial enterprises have visited various parts of China, particularly North China, with a view to exploring the possibilities of economic expansion and the development of direct markets for Japanese goods. This activity has been so pronounced that in some quarters it is believed that the Japanese may have substituted a policy of economic penetration for the military policy so actively pursued up to a few months ago. This new policy (if it is a new one) appears to be in line with Japanese economic expansion in other parts of the world. Reports are constantly coming to this office of fresh evidence of Japanese economic expansion and industrial development in North China. Specific instances are not wanting and it is not uncommon to hear Americans and other foreigners state with satisfaction that they are turning to the purchase of Japanese goods because of their cheapness compared with other foreign goods and because of the fact that they have improved their quality to meet the needs of foreign consumers.

In the course of the month minor incidents took place in the demilitarized zone between members of the so-called Peace Preservation Corps, or Special Police Force, and the Japanese troops. Japanese soldiers are still in occupation of Malanyu although through efforts made by Colonel Hayashida, Commander of the Japanese units in occupation at Chihhsien, and Mr. Chu Shih-ho of the Special Administration
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for the Miyun-Chihhsien area, Japanese troops were withdrawn on May 19 from Chihhsien, leaving there a force of ten Chinese policemen, a force which no doubt is entirely inadequate for the preservation of order. The occupation of Chihhsien by Japanese troops was brought about through an incident which occurred on the night of May 5 when a group of soldiers escorting ten cart loads of military supplies from outside the Great Wall to Malanpu by way of Chihhsien were fired upon, supposedly by Chinese Special Police. No satisfactory explanation of the firing having been made to the Japanese, two companies of troops were ordered to the immediate vicinity of Chihhsien. Two machine guns and several small field pieces were seized by the Japanese troops. It was only after several days of direct negotiation that the Japanese were willing to withdraw.

Still another subject upon which negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese took place was the proposal of the Chinese to dispatch a special police force comprising 8,000 men to the demilitarized zone to take the place of the special police now on duty in that area under the Tangku truce. The need for a new special police force in the demilitarized zone appears to have arisen from the fact that the force now there has given much trouble and many incidents have been attributed to the lack of discipline among the men composing the force. A number of villages have been looted, clashes have occurred

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between the police and the local militia, and relations with the Japanese military have not been pleasant. The negotiations recently reached a stalemate on the question of whether the new special corps should possess "heavy weapons". The Hopei authorities desired to provide the new force with 100 light machine guns and a number of small artillery pieces. Objection was entered by the Japanese against this plan and they also insisted that the number of the new force should not exceed 8,000, whereas the Chinese have insisted upon a special force of 8,000. As regards the question of machine guns and small field pieces it is now learned a compromise has been reached by which the Chinese have agreed to leave the machine guns and field pieces at Tientsin and will employ them only when outbreaks of large proportions occur. It had been hoped that the present untrained and undisciplined force in the demilitarized zone would be replaced on June 1 by new men, but this has not been accomplished because of the customary wrangle between the negotiating officials. At this writing no agreement has actually been signed.

An incident which gave promise of developing into one of considerable importance occurred on the bund at Tientsin on May 24 when a number of Japanese, designated as members of the "Youth Alliance in China", arrived on a steamer from Dairen and attempted to
 prevent

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prevent the Chinese customs officials from searching their baggage. The Japanese wore badges inscribed "Youth Alliance in China" and carried sticks. Notwithstanding the customs officers drew a cordon on the bund with ropes and endeavored to restrain the members of the alliance, their refusal to permit search of their baggage was so persistent that the customs officers finally abandoned the effort. A similar effort was made a few days later on the arrival of the CHOEI MARU from Dairen but the members of the Alliance who disembarked submitted, in a disgruntled manner, to search of their baggage, due in all probability to the presence of additional police and a senior foreign officer of the Maritime Customs. The incident of May 24 appeared to be an organized attempt to ignore the authority of the Chinese Maritime Customs, and except for the precautions mentioned the rough shod tactics of the Japanese youths would have been repeated.

There was a noticeable increase in the course of the month in Japanese military maneuvers outside their concession, but it is believed that this related only to the customary training which, in the case of the Japanese soldiers, is more intensive than for other foreign military contingents stationed here. Field practices were held in the vicinity of the East Arsenal on May 21, 22 and 23.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/78 FOR Desp.#291 to Legation
FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED June 4, 1934.
70/// NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations with Japan: It is hard to distinguish reports which reflect apprehension of a Japanese forward movement in South China from those which represent propaganda designed to discredit the Nanking Government. Effect of reports of resumption of postal and railway communication with "Manchukuo". There have been disquieting reports of a secret agreement between the Central Government and Japan, whereby Japan would be granted important concessions in Fukien in return for military assistance in subjugating Kwangtung.

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 2. Relations with Japan:

It is somewhat hard to distinguish reports which reflect genuine apprehension of a Japanese forward movement in South China from those which represent propaganda designed to discredit the Nanking Government. Probably there is an element of both in most of the reports. Not only have the reports of the resumption of postal and railway communication with Manchukuo been the occasion for renewed outbursts against the non-resistance policy of the Nanking Government, but there have also been circulated disquieting reports of a secret agreement between the Central Government and Japan, whereby the latter would be granted important concessions in Fukien in return for military assistance in subjugating Kwangtung. Among the concessions which have been mentioned were the granting to Japanese subjects of the right to purchase land, the construction of air-dromes and

and even the lease of Amoy. One day there was a report here that 1,000 Japanese troops had been landed in that city.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/69 FOR #9502

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 4, 1934
TO NAME 1-1157 ***

REGARDING: Comments of Mr.A.Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister to China, after his return from Japan on general subject of Sino-Japanese relations and in particular in regard to through traffic and postal problems in North China.

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b. Relations with other countries:

Relations with Japan: Mr. S. Miyoshi, the

Japanese Minister to China, returned to Shanghai from Tokyo on May 30th after an absence of approximately a month. In a press interview following his arrival the Japanese Minister stated that as a result of many discussions in Japan with leaders in various walks of life, including the military, he felt that a better understanding between China and Japan is desired by them and, even to some extent, already attained. He is reported to have said:

"Japan is prepared to improve her relations with China and has many concrete plans to promote this friendship based on a realization of the interdependence of both countries, but we must wait for the time when China in turn will come to a similar realization. No remarkable change in the Japanese policy vis-a-vis China can be expected on the ground that I have just come from Tokyo. I have not received any new instructions as yet."

Mr. Miyoshi, when asked regarding the through traffic and postal problems in North China, is reported to have said that this was not Japan's business but China's and they will have to be settled eventually between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese northern authorities, as they are local in nature. In regard to a revision of the Chinese tariff, the Japanese Minister inferred that representations on this subject had already been made, as he is reported to have stated:

"We will not make any new representations to China but will wait calmly for her answer as China must have considered the matter by this time."

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There have been numerous reports regarding the conclusion of an agreement providing for the resumption of through traffic between Peiping and Mukden. The conclusion of such an agreement has been denied by Chinese officials in Hanking and elsewhere but reports persist that this question has been settled and that an international travel service to be known as the Peiping-Mukden Tourist Bureau will handle this through traffic. This Bureau, it is stated, will be jointly financed by the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and the South Manchuria Railway Company. These reports are strengthened by the fact that Mr. Yin Tung (殷同), Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, was in Shanghai for some time, and it is stated that he has discussed the question of traffic arrangements with General Huang Fu and others.

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Amoy/81 FOR #12
FROM Amoy (Dick) DATED June 5, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Alleged Japanese designs on port of Amoy and province of
Fukien. Incidents during month to support contentions.

793.94/6754
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b. Relations with other countries.

743.92
 Reports persisted early in May that the Japanese would seize and occupy Amoy with the object of eventually annexing the Province of Fukien, but no confirmation of such action was produced.

The fears of the local Chinese were increased by the prolonged absence in Japan of Mr. Tsukamoto, Japanese Consul, and by the publicly announced conference of Consuls stationed in South China, called by the Governor of Formosa to formulate policies.

The conference has been postponed and the Japanese Consul has returned to his post. He has made no statement regarding his trip.

A rumor was also current that Japan, among other requirements for the direct settlement of outstanding issues, had demanded a 99-year lease of the port of Amoy and for Sino-Japanese technical cooperation as a means of blocking other foreign aid here.

Japan evidently desires to try to acquire Amoy by means of peaceful penetration by colonizing the city with Formosans, for it appears that the Formosan Government has waived passport requirements for its subjects proceeding to Amoy.

Since May 15th, Formosan immigrants began to arrive in large numbers. They claim now a population of 60,000 in this vicinity whereas two or three years ago there were but 20,000.

These

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These Formosans constitute a thorn in the flesh of the local Chinese authorities for they take advantage of their extraterritoriality by recklessly breaking all the Chinese laws. It is said that over 400 opium dens, about 200 gambling joints, and innumerable houses of ill repute are openly operated by them. Japanese sign boards protect them from Chinese police raids and the Japanese police seem to raid only when requested by the local authorities.

They are also the chief smugglers into Amoy waters where the Customs cruisers actively endeavor to prevent them.

The cruisers have been operating so successfully against smuggling that a bomb was thrown into the Custom House by unknown persons. Its explosion did little damage. Warnings have also been received at the Customs.

The tough elements among the Formosans could easily and quickly create an incident leading to the Japanese landing a force, but it is doubtful if an occupation is desired so soon after the declaration of the Hands Off Policy.

Yet a Japanese, accompanied by a Formosan, were arrested, and liberated, for taking photographs of the Hu Li Shan (胡里山) fort and of the naval aerodrome. A Japanese teacher in the Hsu Yin (旭瀛) Japanese School in Amoy took photographs of the site at U-Shih P'u (烏石浦), where a large aviation field is contemplated. His films were confiscated by the Naval Marine Headquarters

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quarters.

Visit of Li Chai Yi.

Mr. Li Chai Yi (李擇一), advisor of the Nanking Government, visited Amoy from May 15 to 21, from Foochow. The press reports regarding his secret visit to the Japanese Consulate err for he made no call there at all. He did, however, see his personal friend, Rear Admiral K. K. Lin (林國慶).

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 602.00 P.H. 71 FOR 12765

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 8, 1934
TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations during April including issuance of statement on 17th by Japanese and subsequent statements by both Chinese and Japanese. Negotiations for settlement of through rail traffic and postal communications between China and Manchuria.

793.94/6756
6756

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2. Japan:

a. Japanese statement of April 17th:

1939 ✓
On April 17, 1934, the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office made a statement to Japanese newspaper men to the effect that Japan looked with disapproval on international technical assistance for China lest it be used for political purposes; and further, that Japan opposed the sale of war materials and airplanes to China and the employment of military advisers as endangering the peace of the Far East.

3

Official Chinese reaction to this now famous statement was remarkably mild when one considers the implication of that statement for China, but this is not surprising when one recalls the persistent threats of further Japanese aggression, particularly in North China. The statement came as a surprise to the Chinese, nevertheless, and they were filled with consternation at what they considered a very audacious challenge by Japan to China and to the powers.

The rejoinder of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on April 19, 1934,⁴ was restrained in tone and went so far as to offer explanations of the foreign loans, technical assistance and military

equipment

3. Legation's telegram No. 193, April 4, 4 p.m.

4. Legation's despatch No. 2609, April 26, 1934, to the Department (enclosing Hankow's despatch of April 20, 1934, to the Legation).

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equipment obtained from abroad.

There then appeared in the press in China many reports of explanations by Japanese representatives abroad and by the Japanese Foreign Office itself. These explanations, however, did not remove the anxiety of the Chinese Government or of Chinese and foreign nationals with interests in China.

In response primarily to these so-called explanations, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁵ issued a second statement on April 26th, in which it was pointed out that the various explanations given by the Japanese had either been more pretentious than the statement itself or contradictory to it, and, furthermore, that the original statement of April 17th had not been repudiated. It was indicated that China would make a supreme diplomatic effort to enlist the support of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty in opposing the Japanese "pretensions".

A declaration on the subject, issued by the Southwest Political Council at Canton on April 27, 1934,⁶ was less restrained than the two statements of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It maintained that the Japanese statement of April 17th

threatened

5. Legation's despatch No. 2703, May 1, 1934 (enclosing Nanking's despatch No. 259 Diplomatic, April 26, 1934, to the Legation).
6. Canton's despatch No. 260, April 30, 1934, to the Legation.

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threatened the independence of China, and the peace of the Far East, and called upon the League of Nations and the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty to discharge their obligations under existing engagements aimed at the preservation of international peace.

Sir John Simon's statement in the House of Commons on April 30th, in which he reaffirmed Great Britain's adherence to the Nine Power Treaty, contained the following remark as reported in the press:

"..... the principle of equal rights in China was guaranteed very explicitly by the Nine Power Pact to which Japan is a party, and that the British Government must continue to enjoy all rights in China which are common to all signatories except insofar as such rights are restricted by agreement, for example the Consortium agreement, or insofar as Japan has special rights recognized by the other Powers."

The reference to "special rights" enjoyed by Japan in China and "recognized by the other Powers" created a stir in Chinese Government circles, and later prompted the Chinese Minister in London to request an explanation of the remark. Apparently the unfortunate reference has since been a source of embarrassment to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The aide memoire presented to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador in Tokyo at the end of the month created a

satisfactory

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satisfactory impression in China where it was well received, although, of course, it does not meet the desire of those who wish that the United States take an aggressive attitude towards Japan in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

It is difficult for one to escape the conviction that the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman on April 17th, wittingly or unwittingly, announced to the world the policy that will in the future be followed by the Japanese Government. He hinted at this policy on April 9th, when he is reported by Reuters to have made the following statement in explanation of Japan's opposition to international assistance for China:

"Tokyo, April 9. - Questioned today regarding Japan's reported opposition to international assistance for China, the Foreign Office spokesman explained that this opposition was based upon a number of factors including:

- (1) The difficulty of ensuring a division between technical and political assistance;
- (2) Taking previous attempts as precedents, successful outcome is extremely unlikely;
- (3) Western nations being far distant can afford the risk of failure but Japan cannot.

The spokesman also intimated that the Government is not yet certain whether the talk of international assistance for China can be taken at its face value or is merely propaganda."

This report appears to have provoked no serious foreign comment; a fact which may in some measure explain the greater boldness of the Foreign Office spokesman in his statement on April 17th.

Notwithstanding

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Notwithstanding the gestures toward toning down the April 17th statement, even to the extent of declaring it "officially non-existent", it is to be noted that there has been no retreat by Japan from the position of opposition to any assistance to China that would, in Japan's opinion, "endanger the peace" of the Far East.

Whether the April 17th statement was a bungling error or a deliberate manoeuvre, it has accomplished the purpose of carving notice to the world of a Japanese assertion of hegemony in Eastern Asia and a general opposition to foreign and international assistance to China not participated in by Japan.

b. Japanese activity in North China-"Manchukuo"
problems?

Increasing Japanese pressure for the settlement of outstanding North China-"Manchukuo" problems was evident early in April. Matters advanced for prompt settlement are understood to have included (1) through rail traffic and (2) the restoration of postal communications with "Manchukuo".

General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Branch Political Council, departed for Manchang on April 3rd for the purpose of consulting General Chiang Kai-shek

and

7. Legation's telegram No. 164, April 11, 8 p.m.
 Legation's telegram No. 180, April 18, 7 p.m.
 Legation's despatch No. 927, May 25, 1934.
 Legation's despatch No. 2688, April 26, 1934.

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and of conferring with the National Government officials at Nanking. It was reported that the pressure on General Huang Fu had become so great as to dictate his obtaining an understanding with the National Government for some compromise settlement of immediately pressing questions with the Japanese, failing which General Huang has no alternative but to resign his peiping post.

At the close of the month he apparently had not been able to reach a definite understanding with the National Government authorities; but he had not yet insisted upon resigning his post.

Toward the end of April it was reported that a settlement of the through rail traffic question would be left to local arrangement on the basis of the setting up of a foreign travel service agency. While the report was denied by the Department of Political Affairs of the Executive Yuan, and there were indications of hesitation on the part of even the most influential persons in the Government openly to countenance or approve any settlement with the Japanese, there was a general feeling of confidence in Peiping that a settlement would eventually be reached as a matter of necessity.

While for the moment a policy of "diplomatic" action for the adjustment of problems concerning North China and "Manchukuo" has been substituted

for

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for direct military action, there is evidence of continuing military threat in support of the pressure for what the Japanese are reported to consider the implementing of oral assurances allegedly given by the Chinese at the time of the Tangku armistice arrangement.

The problems of through rail traffic and resumption of postal relations are emphasized as requiring immediate settlement, but these matters do not stand alone on the agenda of Sino-Japanese questions in North China, and their settlement, it is expected, will but lead to the presentation for discussion of further questions as Japan proceeds with its plans in the "Manchukuo"-North China areas.

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NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./78 FOR #823

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED June 12, 1934
TO NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Reaction
of Japan to Mr. Hull's Aide Memoire of April
29, 1934: Comment was quite restrained, considering
the fact that the American statement was clearly
in conflict with Japanese policy toward China.-----
Improving Relations; Policy Statement; Foreign
Aid.

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I. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

(a) The Reaction in Japan to Mr. Hull's Aide Memoire of April 29th.

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 As reported in the Embassy's despatch No. 792 of May 18, 1934, the American statement of policy set forth in the aide memoire of April 29th brought forth little comment in the Japanese press. Most of the comment that appeared was of a restrained nature, considering the fact that the American statement was clearly in conflict with Japanese policy toward China as expressed in the "unofficial" Amai statement issued on April 20th and in the Foreign Minister's subsequent statement of April 26th. Even the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whose approval Amai's statement had been given to the press, spoke in favorable terms of the American aide memoire. Apparently the Foreign Office and the Japanese newspapers, whatever their inward opinion may be on the matter, have now resorted to assuming the public attitude that Mr. Hull's aide memoire is not entirely inconsistent with Japan's intentions toward China. Such an attitude is obviously incompatible with the fact that the Foreign Office has not disavowed the policy defined in Amai's original statement, although Mr. Hirota's subsequent statement was less truculent in tone. Furthermore, the Japanese Government has not expressed any intention of disavowing that policy.*

* Embassy's despatch No. 792 of May 18, 1934.

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Although the Foreign Minister stated to the Ambassador on April 19th, the day on which the aide memoire was delivered, that he would reply in due course,* no reply has been issued nor is there any indication that the Foreign Office is considering making a reply. During the early part of the month under review there were conflicting reports in the Japanese newspapers as to whether the Foreign Office would draft a reply or let the matter drop, but during the latter half of the month there was little or no comment in the press concerning a possible reply. The TOKYO NICHU NICHU of May 3rd made the assertion that the Foreign Office had already started the drafting of a reply which would emphasize the freedom of interpretation by Japan of treaties in which China is concerned. The NIPPON DEMPO of May 3rd reported that there was a consensus of opinion among Foreign Office officials against a reply to the American aide memoire, since the American statement did not call for a reply. The TOKYO NICHU NICHU of May 6th stated that the Foreign Minister, after a conference with the Minister of War, had definitely decided to issue a counter memorandum. On May 7th the Foreign Office spokesman denied the press reports that a reply to the American statement was being drafted and emphatically denied the TOKYO NICHU NICHU story that the Foreign Minister had conferred with the Minister of War on this purely diplomatic matter.

* Embassy's despatch No. 771 of May 4, 1934.

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b. China - Improving Relations; Policy Statement;
Foreign Aid.

While relations between Japan and China seem to be
 a little easier at present, now that the repercussions
 caused by Japan's announcement of its China policy* have

* Embassy's despatch No. 771, of May 4, 1934.

somewhat

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somewhat subsided, there is apparently still keen resentment felt by certain groups in China toward Japan's proprietary attitude. Japanese Minister to China Akira Ariyoshi, who has just returned to Nanking from a short visit to Tokyo, attempted to banish fears of serious unfriendly feeling resulting, but at the same time he was reported to be somewhat concerned over the situation that had developed in China. As Mr. K. Yoshizawa, former Foreign Minister is quoted as saying, the resulting anti-Japanese boycotts and economic blockade in China have resulted in serious damage to Japanese trade. But at the same time Chinese business men have also suffered considerably owing to their loss of business, and internal political strife has been aggravated by conflicting sympathies. Mr. Ariyoshi is of the opinion, says the TIMES, that the solution of bettering relations with China lies in improving and smoothing out economic relations between the two countries. China needs money badly. There are foreign financiers that are interested in making loans to China, but he fears that because of the chaotic political and economic situation within the country, aggravated by lack of good police control, there would be the same difficulty of repaying the loans as there has been in the case of the many Japanese loans, still unpaid.

After his conference with the Foreign Office, Mr. Ariyoshi returned to China with certain definite instructions. His aim is to try to improve relations with China, and the press admits that his task is a difficult one.

It

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It is two-fold, according to the ADVERTISER of May 25th: He must attempt to settle certain concrete issues, such as the establishment of through traffic and regular postal service between northern China and "Manchukuo" -- two very important questions, and he must present in the most acceptable form an interpretation of the now-famous April 17th statement of Japan's China policy. Naturally success in allaying the Nanking Government's fears over the statement will contribute to his success in settling the concrete matters. The editorial believes that Mr. Ariyoshi will first try to convince the Chinese leaders that it is possible for them to stand on their own feet, to better their own internal financial and economic conditions without the customary help from outside. Of course he will have to allow that some help from Japan is indicated because of its greater interest.

Mr. Ariyoshi's instructions to try to have the train and postal services in Northern China improved, to effect a lowering of China's high import tariff, which has not increased revenues, and to work for some readjustment and settlement of China's large outstanding loans owed to Japan, were reported by the NICHU NICHU of May 23rd to be based on the following policy points:

1. Japan is ready to extend all assistance possible to China if it will abandon the policy of pitting one country against another and will not deal with third countries in its economic rehabilitation campaign, and provided it will deal with Japan alone or with an international group in which

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which Japan has a major part.

2. In view of the fundamental spirit with which Japan withdrew from the League, Japan cannot but oppose the "reckless" policy of third countries-- excluding Japan -- or the League assisting China in economic or political fields.

3. Regarding the specific problems between the two countries such as tariff revision, readjustment of debts and solution of the through train and through postal services, Japan will respond to China's proposals to negotiate provided China sincerely intends to conclude an agreement.

4. Japan may not always wait for China's initiative, but may make proposals to China from the mutual interest standpoint. Japan will maintain a fair and just attitude toward all problems, and if China responds with sincere good will then Japan will consent to open diplomatic negotiations looking toward solving the problems one by one. If China adopts an unfriendly attitude as heretofore, Japan will give up negotiations immediately and wait without anger until such time as China reconsiders its attitude. If the wait results in improving relations Japan will not mind.

5. If China fails to recognize Japan's position as a power responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Orient, and invites third powers' political and economic aid, and pursues a policy calculated to disturb the prosperity and maintenance of peace and order in the East, Japan will inform China that it will not hesitate to take the most effective
measures

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measures for bringing those efforts to naught.

Japan's problem of stimulating better accord with China has now been made more difficult with the reported organization of the Grand-Anti-Japanese Union in Shanghai. It is composed chiefly of students from the Whangpoa Military Academy, the Anti-Japanese Blood and Iron Party and six other groups and its aim is to interfere with plans to settle issues between Japan, "Manchukuo" and China, that affect Northern China. Students in Hankow and Kwantung are supposed to support the new organization. In spite of its manifest purpose, some observers believe that the new society really represents an anti-China movement, headed by the wife of former Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, while still others opine that it is fundamentally an anti-communist defense move. At any rate it is another discordant note in the political chorus of China, and is not calculated to ease Mr. Ariyoshi's task.

There were no outstanding developments during the month with regard to further action concerning the Japanese statement of China policy.* While the leading nations have voiced protests of varying degree, expressing their hopes that Japan will not violate any of the existing China treaties, the Foreign Office has merely reiterated its stand, elaborating upon certain points. It is believed that no further statement will be issued for the present. The Foreign Minister took occasion at the convention of Prefectural Governors to explain Japan's policy toward China, and while he stood firm on all the previous utterances, he attempted to show why no other nations should be offended and how Japan had no

* Embassy despatch No. 791 of May 18, 1934.

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other course to pursue. He repeated that of course Japan would not violate any of its obligations to third Powers, but that it could not sit idly by while action of a third country complicated Sino-Japanese relations. With probable reference to the suggestion for revision of the Nine Power Treaty, Mr. Hirota stated significantly at the convention: "We have no objection whatever to exchanging views if necessary with each individual Power regarding treaty rights and interests but in view of the fact that on questions of East Asia our views were rejected by the Powers in the meeting at Geneva of the League of Nations which forced our decision to withdraw from the League, it would surely be unwise to reproduce a situation such as was encountered at the League meeting."

There is a great deal of newspaper comment upon Japan's objection to foreign aid to China, and regarding what constitutes detrimental aid, what might be termed military assistance and why on the sole basis of its statement of policy, Japan can object to proper financial aid. Japan is reported to be railing against foreign firms selling airplanes, guns and other military supplies to China, and one paper comments that in these days it is very difficult to say whether a given commodity could not always be termed of military value. According to the press, the Powers agreed not to sell arms to China and to refrain from dumping obsolete war materials there, but they did not agree not to sell articles that have a perfectly good civilian use. Japan naturally does not want China to go further into debt, as it would diminish Japan's chances

of

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of collecting any of the ¥ 900,000,000 debt owed it by China, which has been building up over a period of thirty years, Mr. Jean Monnet, former Director of the Economic Department of the League of Nations, is attempting to organize an international syndicate to supply money for the economic and industrial development of China. His plan was opposed by the Japanese Government on the grounds that it was not consistent with Japan's plans for China's development. However, Mr. Monnet later invited Japan to have the largest share in the consortium, thus giving it a chance to reconsider. According to the ASAHI the Foreign Office's views on third party loans to China are as follows: "Japan is convinced that the most urgent course for China to take is to lay down a sound financial program by arranging for a redemption of her debts, and thorough financial readjustment. For the Powers to attempt to aid China financially or economically in the existing circumstances tends only to defer China's unification, integrity and prosperity. It even threatens to pave the way for the creation of spheres of influence, and the international control of China." The CHRONICLE, commenting upon the foregoing sees no basis for the statement in either Mr. Monnet's financial plan or in the League's able work in China under Dr. Rajchman. His technical report has been a good influence and shows that China has learned something of self development. Further, it continues, there seems to be no reason against additional loans to China for fear of further indebtedness, as long

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as the loans are well secured and are destined for sensible rehabilitation of the country. It should be easy to prove to Japan that loans properly made would not find their way into the coffers of political leaders who have only their own interests at heart.

MNH.

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NOTE

SEE ORR. 2411 Konoe, Fuminaro/30 FOR Despatch #842

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED June 15, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Statement in Japanese press contributed to Mr. Thomas W. Lamont
concerning Prince Konoe's visit and Chinese-Japanese relations.

(see attached copy of despatch and press clippings.)..

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Tokyo, June 15, 1934.

No. 842.

SUBJECT: Press Comments on Visit of Prince
Konoye to the United States.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that there has been little published in the vernacular press concerning the present visit to the United States of Prince Konoye. Beyond reporting the fact of his meeting with the President at the White House luncheon on June 8 and his meeting on June 9 with Mr. Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company, only two brief editorial comments have appeared, one in the YOMIURI of June 10 and one in the FUKUOKA NICHI NICHI of June 14. Clippings from the JAPAN ADVERTISER giving translations

of

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of these two editorials are enclosed herewith.

The gist of the comment is to the effect that while no immediate results of the meeting may be looked for, it is earnestly to be hoped that Prince Konoye's interpretation of Japanese problems to the President will lead to an improvement in Japanese-American relations which, the YOMIURI says, "have not been very satisfactory since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair."

In connection with the meeting with Mr. Thomas Lamont, the ASAHI SHIMBUN of June 7 attributes the following statement to Mr. Lamont:

"The Powers have given tacit understanding to Japan's action in Manchuria. In substance the problem has been settled. What is being desired of Japan at this time is that Japan should maintain a cautious attitude so that she may not invite the Powers' misunderstanding of Japan being aggressive in the Far East.

"Sino-Japanese problems now awaiting solution should be set led between Japan and China, but for the internal improvement of China the Powers' co-operation is rather wanted and that will bring about better results for Japan."


Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosures:

1 & 2: Clippings from
 The JAPAN ADVERTISER.

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Reference No. 1 to despatch
 No 642 of June 13, 1934 from the
 Embassy at Tokyo.

The Yomiuri.

Translated by the Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Tuesday, June 12, 1934.

Roosevelt Sees Konoe YOMIURI

President Roosevelt was host to Prince Fumimaro Konoe, President of the House of Peers, at a reception given at the White House on Friday. The conversation between the guest and the host was most cordial. We do not think that the meeting will have any immediate effects on relations between Japan and the United States, but there is not the slightest doubt of the great significance of the meeting in view of the present state of relations between the two countries.

The relations between Japan and the United States have not been very satisfactory since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair. The advent of the Roosevelt Administration has led to an improvement in the situation but there remains much antagonism. Japan and the United States are closely related economically. This makes all the more regrettable their tendency to regard each other with feelings of hostility.

It is up to the two governments to try to remove obstacles to closer friendship. For the past several years, the authorities of the Japanese Foreign Office have been neglectful of cultivating relations with the United States. This should end. Every opportunity should be utilized to remove misunderstanding in the United States regarding this country. There is the greater need for the diplomatic authorities to make special efforts to promote understanding of Japan on the part of the Americans in view of the naval conference scheduled for next year. Friday's meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoe may have been a matter of formality, but it is impossible to make light of it in view of the possible aid it will be to better understanding between Japan and the United States.

The Powers are apparently determined to shut out all Japanese goods from their markets. They are now checking the import of canned tuna, tennis rackets and similar articles from Japan. It seems that they hate every commodity produced in this country.

The drive against Japanese goods has spread throughout the five continents. It may not be too much to say that Japan is besieged by its enemy in the economic war. If Japan retreats, the enemy will close in, and Japan will go down. The Netherlands-Japanese trade conference, which is going on in Batavia, may be regarded as a clash between the sentries of Japan and its enemy in the economic war. We do not want the Japanese delegation to the conference to adopt an unnecessarily firm attitude, but we want it to remember that a concession may lead to the defeat of Japan in its economic struggle with the rest of the Powers.

Premier Saito is proceeding cautiously in dealing with the crisis brought about by the arrest of officials of the Finance Ministry on charges of corruption. In a recent press interview, he said that he could not act in connection with the case without considering the possible consequences. It is easy to understand the Premier's position. He evidently thinks that as the case is being examined by the judicial authorities he must wait until the case develops further. It may be that the case will not be found so serious that the Cabinet will be necessitated to resign as a gesture of responsibility. But if politics should follow the highest morality, the Cabinet cannot hope to escape responsibility for the arrest of the officials, even on suspicion of corruption. The argument that the Cabinet may wait pending the outcome of the examination of the officials may appeal to the legal mind. To those who are more concerned about the moral implications of the case than about the legal, such an argument is powerless. As for the report that the Cabinet is hesitating to step down because it is not sure that the next Cabinet will be formed by a capable of shouldering the responsibilities of State, we hope that it is without foundation. To believe it is to imply breaches of political morality in the Cabinet.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2 to despatch
No 842 of June 15, 1934 from the
Embassy at Tokyo.

The Fukuoka Nichi Nichi

Translated by the Japan Advertiser.

Tokyo, Friday, June 15, 1934.

Konoe Suited for Mission
FUKUOKA NICHU NICHU
Prince Fumimaro Konoe, President of House of Peers, is visiting in the United States, where he has met President Roosevelt and other leaders and exchanged views with them on Japanese-American relations. We hope the Japanese nation will support him in his mission. It is desirable that his visit stimulate the Roosevelt Administration to start a movement for Japanese-American peace. On the shoulders of the two great nations rests the burden of maintaining peace. To talk of war between them is a downright crime, and sound opinion here is absolutely against it. When relations become strained, the two governments try to adjust them, but their efforts are likely to be formal. The peoples of the two countries must endeavor to alleviate tension, and a man like Prince Konoe is most suited for this kind of work.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Hankow/85 FOR #460

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED June 9, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese designs on Fukien, the Yangtze Valley and Szechuan.

793.94/6758

6758

esp

056

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1937
JAPAN. On the coast the Japanese are laying heavy emphasis on the importance of Fukien to Japan, and the Southwest fears that it may have been selected to bear the brunt of the next Japanese advance. There is also some evidence that Dai Nippon is very much interested in the Yangtze Valley and Szechuan as well.** They seem optimistic concerning the probable fruits of their efforts:

"Kotiro Iwai, of the commerce staff of the Japanese Consulate-General of Shanghai, in an interview reported in the Osaka Mainichi May 11 said that the disappearance of the anti-Japanese campaign in the Yangtze Valley impressed him most in a recent trip to that region. Consul Iwai found that Japanese merchandise is being imported steadily, but that the Chinese public chooses to buy such goods at Chinese shops because they would rather avoid being seen buying Japanese goods at Japanese stores. 'It has been reported that finances in Szechuan Province are on the verge of bankruptcy,' he went on. 'I have found,

however,

*HANKOW HERALD, My. 6, 1934.

**Cf. Political Report for April 1934, p. 16, for evidence of increasing Japanese commerce on the Yangtze River.

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however, that this is not the case. In Szechuan they have an established income from opium, which is not affected by the slump of other agricultural produce. The purchasing power in this province is the strongest in the Yangtze Valley.' British merchants, among others, have already taken note of this fact and are actively reinforcing their commercial organs in this district, according to Consul Iwai. He thinks that the revival in the future of Japanese trade in the Yangtze district depends much on the promotion of business in Szechuan Province. As regards the general outlook of Japan's trade in the Yangtze Valley, Consul Iwai entertains optimistic views, on the basis of the disappearance of the anti-Japanese maneuvers, and also on the strong purchasing power in Szechuan province."*

In view of the fact that the population of Szechuan is, by unbiased report, poverty-stricken almost to the point of complete collapse, it seems probable that Japan's interest in Szechuan is partly political even as in Fukien. The Japanese still speak of the danger that a Red belt reaching from Soviet Russia to the shore opposite Formosa, via Sinkiang, Kansu, Shensi, Szechuan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Fukien, will be hewn out by the Chinese Soviets. It is possible that they contemplate taking measures, with or without the cooperation of Chiang Kai-shek, to meet this threat to their continental program.

One local report has it that Yen Hsi-shan (閻錫山), Han Fu-ch'u, and Sung Che-yuan, are prepared, in the event that the Southwest gives indications of bowing before the Japanese threat instead of resisting, to protect their position by being the first to throw in their lot with the Japanese. The country evidently will
 require

*"The China Weekly Review", My. 26, 1934, pp. 492-3.

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require more than the present sort of "New Life"*
if there is to be achieved, through intelligent
constructive administration of China, sufficient
national strength to resist the plan of Japan to
establish its leadership over Asia.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 702.9493/86 Confidential File FOR Despatch #2784

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 19, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 000

REGARDING:

Disappearance June 8 at Nanking of Hideaki Kuramoto, Japanese
Vice Consul; report relative thereto; clippings transmitted.

793.94/6759
6759

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6760
5760

SEE 702.9493/85 FOR #9527

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED June 21, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Disappearance and return of Japanese
Vice Consul, Kuramoto, of the Japanese
Consulate General at Nanking. Advises of
the press reaction in China regarding same,
and encloses editorial from the British
owned NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./82 FOR 12725

FROM China (Johnson) DATED June 26, 1934
TO NAME 1-1157 ***

REGARDING: discussion of Japan's "diplomatic" advances into China and
her determination to gain absolute control over all of
North China.

793.94/6761
6761

esp

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a. Japan's "diplomatic" advance into China:

793.9-1

It was difficult to estimate the degree of progress of Japanese endeavors to obtain objectives in China by "diplomatic" means, reenforced by the presence of the Japanese army north of the Great Wall. General Huang Pu's failure to return to Peiping (it was understood he would return only if he were given increased authority in attempting to solve outstanding Sino-Japanese issues affecting North China) indicated that the Chinese concerned continued in disagreement on what should be conceded to Japan and what would be, following concession, an adequate device for "saving face". Near the close of the month observers were confident that final agreement had been reached between the Central Government and Japanese authorities with regard to the re-establishment of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden railway but that suddenly renewed opposition in Chinese circles caused postponement of public announcement.

With regard to the question of resumption of postal facilities between Manchuria and China proper, the action on May 16 of the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on the matter of postal relations

between

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between "Manchukuo" and members of the League was regarded hopefully as making easier for the Chinese a solution of this problem. Settlement of both questions within a period of weeks, in a manner satisfactory to Japan, appeared to be inevitable.

Japanese activities were by no means confined to the two questions referred to above; and during the month under review the scope of their efforts became increasingly clear. Representations were made during May, for example, by Japanese officials for a downward revision of tariff items which the Japanese regarded as intentionally prejudicial to their interests. Attempts were made looking toward a solution satisfactory to Japan of Chinese indebtedness to Japanese. There was progress in adjusting certain unidentified loans extended to Mitsui interests. Agreement was reached (April 25) for refinancing the two loans (December 7, 1918, and April 18, 1921) secured on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, which originally totaled Yen 6,000,000 but had been reduced to Yen 5,200,000. It was believed that the accrued interest on these loans was reduced by the new agreement to \$5,200,000, on which no more interest is to be paid, and that interest on the original loans was fixed at six per cent.

There were a number of other developments which were interpreted in China as more direct evidence of Japan's intention to attempt to obtain eventual political dominance of North China through financial and economic

penetration

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1. Legation's despatch 2722 of May 15.

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penetration rather than by military invasion. Mr. Wang I-tang, a member of the Peiping Branch Political Affairs Readjustment Committee and an influential member of the old pro-Japanese Anfu Clique, was in Tokyo allegedly to discuss the reestablishment of the Exchange Bank of China, the organization through which the Anfu Clique obtained in 1918 some of those advances from Japan now described as the Nishihara loans. (The Japanese Minister to China was reliably reported to have said that efforts toward this reestablishment were being made but that a successful outcome would be difficult to achieve.) According to the Consul at Tsinan,² there was reason to believe that pressure was being brought to bear on authorities of Shantung Province to grant a concession to Japanese cotton interests by which the latter hoped to produce in Shantung "a considerable portion of her raw cotton needs which are now being filled by the United States and India".³ The Consul General at Tientsin stated that there were "many reports current in May indicating activities on the part of the Japanese in the direction of economic expansion" in North China.

To foreigners resident in China and to Chinese it seemed that Japan was attempting to free herself from dependence on foreign countries for raw materials by turning to North China where she can make agreements

satisfactory

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2. Tsinan's despatch to Legation 84 of June 5.
 3. Tientsin's despatch to Legation 682 of June 2.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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satisfactory to herself, in part because of the presence of the Japanese military north of the Great Wall.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gluskin NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 026 Foreign Relations/711 FOR Inst. #1410

~~FROM~~ (Johnson) DATED July 16, 1934
TO China NAME I-1127 ***

REGARDING:

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1920.
Requests to obtain permission to publish
in -, certain correspondence on file number
793.94/1091

793.94/6762
6762

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0572

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 19, 1934.



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 30 1934

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. HIROSI SATO.

The Japanese Ambassador called and promptly drew out an elaborate telegram which he said was from Foreign Minister Hirota in Tokyo to him. He first remarked that Hirota desired to extend his appreciation of the friendly spirit in which I sent the statement to him on April 28, 1934, and which was delivered by United States Ambassador Grew. He added that Ambassador Grew had stated to Minister Hirota at the time that the United States Government did not expect any reply. The Japanese Ambassador then proceeded practically to read the telegram, although appearing more or less to be speaking orally. He retained the telegram which was in his language. At its conclusion, I inquired if it was virtually a restatement of the statement during the latter part of April of his Government to Sir John Simon in the London Foreign Office. He replied that it was. I then stated that I had kept perfectly quiet while

CONFIDENTIAL - YES

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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while Japanese officials all the way from Tokyo to Geneva on April 17th, and for many days following, were reported as giving out to the press the views and policies of the Japanese Government touching certain international phases relating to the Orient; that at the conclusion of these different statements I felt, in order not to be misunderstood here or anywhere, that I should in a respectful and friendly spirit offer a succinct but comprehensive restatement of rights, interests, and obligations as they related to my country primarily and as they related to all countries signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and international law as the same applied to the Orient.

I then inquired whether the Japanese Government differed with any of the fundamental phases of the statement I sent to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the 28th day of April, 1934? The Ambassador replied that it did not differ, that his Government did agree to the fundamentals of my note or statement, but that his Government did feel that it had a special interest in preserving peace and order in China. He then repeated the same formula that his government had been

putting

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THE SECRETARY

putting out for some weeks about the superior duty or function of his government to preserve peace and of its special interests in the peace situation in - to quote his words - "Eastern Asia". I remarked that, as ~~Saito~~ ^{Hirota} wrote me, I saw no reason whatever why our two countries should not, in the most friendly and satisfactory way to each, solve every question or condition that existed now or that might arise in the future. I then said that, in my opinion, his country could conduct its affairs in such a way that it would live by itself during the coming generations, or that it might conduct its affairs even more profitably and at the same time retain the perfect understanding and the friendship of all civilized nations in particular; that my hope and prayer was that all the civilized nations of the world, including Japan, should work together and in a perfectly friendly and understanding way so as to promote to the fullest extent the welfare of their respective peoples and at the same time meet their duties to civilization and to the more backward populations of the world; and that my Government would always be ready and desirous of meeting his Government fully half-way in pursuing these latter objectives.

I then

2/25/72
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Collection (FE)
S.R.P. (R.P.)

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THE SECRETARY

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I then remarked that I would be entirely frank by saying that just now there was considerable inquiry everywhere as to just why his government singled out the clause or formula about Japan's claiming superior and special interests in the peace situation in "Eastern Asia" and her superior rights or duties in connection with the preservation of peace there; and that many were wondering whether this phrase or formula had ulterior or ultimate implications partaking of the nature of an overlordship of the Orient or a definite purpose to secure preferential trade rights as rapidly as possible in the Orient or "Eastern Asia" - to use the Japanese expression. The Ambassador commenced protesting that this was not the meaning contemplated or intended. I said it would be much simpler and easier if when the national of any other government engaged in some act in the Orient which Japan might reasonably feel would affect her unsatisfactorily, to bring up the individual circumstance to the proper government, instead of issuing a blanket formula which would cause nations everywhere to inquire or surmise whether it did not contemplate an overlordship of the Orient

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Orient and an attempt at trade preferences as soon as possible. The Ambassador again said that this so-called formula about the superior interests of Japan in preserving peace, etc., did not contemplate the interference or domination or overlordship such as I had referred to.

I stated that to-day there was universal talk and plans about armaments on a steadily increasing scale and that Japan and Germany were the two countries considered chiefly responsible for that talk; that, of course, if the world understood the absence of any overlordship intentions or other unwarranted interference by his government, as the Ambassador stated them to me, his country would not be the occasion for armament discussion in so many parts of the world; and that this illustrated what I had said at the beginning of our conversation that nations should make it a special point to understand each other, and the statesmen of each country should be ready at all times to correct or explain any trouble-making rumors or irresponsible or inaccurate statements calculated to breed distrust and misunderstanding and lukewarmness between nations. I went on to say that it was never so important for the few existing civilized countries

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countries of the world to work whole-heartedly together; and that this action of course would, more fully than any other, promote the welfare of the people of each and also would best preserve civilization. I emphasized again that it would be the height of folly for any of the civilized nations to pursue any line of utterances or professed policies that would engender a feeling of unfairness or treaty violation or other unsatisfactory reaction in the important nations who might have both rights and obligations in a given part of the world such as the Orient. I said that in this awful crisis through which the world was passing, debtors everywhere were not keeping faith with creditors in many instances; that sanctity of treaties, in Western Europe especially, was being ignored and violated; that this was peculiarly a time when our civilized countries should be especially vigilant to observe and to preserve both legal and moral obligations; and that my country especially felt that way, not only on its own account but for the sake of preserving the better and the higher standards of both individual and national conduct everywhere.

I remarked that my Government, apart from its general treaty obligations, was only interested in the equality

of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of trade rights in the Orient as in every part of the world and also its obligations and rights under the law of nations; that what little trade we had in the Orient we naturally desired to conduct on this basis of equality, even though it might be less in the future than now. Then I remarked that if these treaties which imposed special obligations on my government in the Orient were not in existence that, while interested in peace in all parts of the world, my government would also be interested in equality of trade rights.

I inquired whether his government had any disposition to denounce and get rid of these treaties in whole or in part, and said that to ignore or violate them would be embarrassing to my government, and that this would relieve it of any possibilities of such embarrassment. I said that I was not remotely suggesting in the matter. He replied that his government was not disposed to denounce and abrogate these treaties. He said that they felt obliged to get out of the League of Nations on account of certain considerations which their membership created. I then inquired of him whether his government abandoned membership on account of difficulties arising from the fact that Japan was a member of the League or whether it

was

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was due to Japan being a signatory to the Versailles Treaty. I did not get a complete answer to this.

The Ambassador then stated that in any preliminary naval conversations that might soon take place, his government would be opposed to discussing any Far Eastern political or similar questions or conditions and that only the purely naval side should be taken up. He said that political and all other phases of the subject were discussed at the Washington Conference and his government was opposed to a repetition of this. I offered no comment.

C.H.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

May 24, 1934.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Dear Mr. President:-

I herewith enclose memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, with an attached memorandum handed to me by the Ambassador during this conversation.

2. Memorandum of conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on May 19, attached to which is memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern Division, dated May 16, for use in connection with the conversation with the Ambassador on May 19.

3. Promiscuous current data on the Japanese question, including a general memorandum prepared by the Far Eastern Division under date of April 20, copy of 793.94 which you may have seen.

I shall be ready and glad at any time to confer with you touching any point or points which may arise in your mind after reading the enclosed data.

793.94/6763


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C.H.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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AM RECD



Washington, D. C., July 27th. 1934.

Hon Cordell Hull,
 U. S. Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

JUL 30 34

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

JUL 30 1934

Department of State

August 4 1934.

Dear Mr. Hull,

I am taking the liberty of sending you a copy of a letter I have lately sent to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Sec. American Council, Institute Pacific Relations. The letter is devoted to some comments on a book which Mr. Barnes has edited, and for which he has furnished one article. The book - CHINA IN THE EAST - is a symposium dealing chiefly with considerations concerned with the Manchurian problem, about which I have taken the liberty of writing you several times.

The most important of the articles, according to my point of view, is the one by Mr. Owen Lattimore - China and the Barbarians. In this article he shows clearly a fact which I have been for some while endeavoring to bring to ~~my~~ attention, that Manchuria ^{AUG 6 1934} never been part of China.. He shows further that the policies Western Governments have developed on the basis of the unwarranted assumption that China and the Manchu Empire were identical, are endangering the integrity of China, the peace of the Far East and the world.

I am not sure from the article whether Mr. Lattimore recognizes the implications of the facts he has so clearly shown. They seem so very obvious that perhaps he prefers to leave them to point their own way to action necessary and desirable to offset the dangers the policies founded on misconceptions so palpably shown.

793.94/6764

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Perhaps you have already seen the book. If not I should like respectfully to commend to your attention especially Mr. Lattimore's article. Also I hope that your sympathetic attention may be given to that part of my letter to Mr. Barnes in which I indicate what seem to me important considerations for the recognition by our Government of the restored ^{U.} REPUBLIC OF CHINA TI KUO.

I believe that the restoration deserves recognition on its own merits. In addition to that the effects and reactions of a favorable nature which may reasonably be expected to result, make recognition, I believe of paramount importance. Not the least of these is the degree of sympathetic understanding which would be established between America and Japan. Such an understanding would be the strongest possible guarantee against the many fears and suspicions which the present attitude of our people toward Japan is so unfortunately fostering.

Mr. Peffer's article has value as showing the effect of acting on the misconceptions which Mr. Lattimore so clearly shows, and is a strong argument for correcting the misconceptions. I am doubtful whether Mr. Peffer recognizes this fact. The course of his article indeed indicates that he does not. Recognition of the misconception offers ^{and abundant} a clear justification for a reversal of our Government's attitude as expressed in Mr. Stimson's unfortunate and ill considered pronouncement.

May I again solicit your sympathetic attention, as also your acceptance of my apologies for intruding again on your notice.

Yours respectfully,

From

T. J. Coague,
 114 Buist Ave.,
 Greenville S.C.

Enclosure

J. J. Coague

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Greenville S. C., July 24th. 1934.

Mr. Joseph Barnes,
 Sec. American Council, Institute Pacific Relations,
 New York N. Y.

Dear Mr. Barnes,

I have just read the book "Empire IN THE East", and am taking the liberty of commenting somewhat on that, and also offering some suggestions based on considerations which I hope may engage your sympathetic attention.

As prefatory to what I shall say, it may be helpful to give a brief outline of my experiences and opportunities for understanding the developments in China which have produced the situation which is causing so much of concern.

I lived in China in a variety of relations from 1889 to 1923, the time being spent in Shantung and Chili Provinces, except a short hiatus in Shanghai. This period as you will see, covers what we may call the modern period of Sino-Japanese-Western relations and developments. These were brought to a focus by the war between China and Japan over the Korean complications which introduced Japan into Manchurian affairs through the treaty made with the Manchu rulers of China, giving Japan a substantial share in the Commercial and industrial development of that territory.

I had the rare good fortune to live for some years next door to the Ancestral home of Chao Er Shun, the last Viceroy of Manchuria before the Manchu abdication. Mr. Chao belonged to that class of Chinese known as "Bannermen", a term I take it with which you are sufficiently familiar. He was not at home very much but a younger brother, Chao Er T'sui, was there during practically

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the whole period of my residence, and I had the good fortune of much personal contact of a most enjoyable and informative order. The Chao family were broadminded men, keenly alive to the course of international developments, and estimating with a high degree of understanding the effects produced on China and Chinese interests. I also spent seven years just prior to the European war, at the German leased port of Tsingtau. While there I had a good deal to do with the representatives of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, and so obtained a fair degree of contact with Japanese points of view. That was an exceedingly informative period, what with German, Russian, French, British, Japanese interests competing for the good will of the Chinese, who by the very weight of teeming population, dominated the situation, and reaped the greatest material rewards. I speak Chinese freely, and so of course association and intercourse with them was greatly facilitated.

So much for that. Now as to the book EMPIRE IN THE EAST, I shall devote my attention to two of the articles, as these concern most the part of developments of immediate concern. These are the first, Mr. Lattimore's "CHINA AND THE BARBARIANS", and Mr. Peffer's "PEACE OR WAR", the last. Two other chapters - "SOVIET SIBERIA", and "CHANGING MARKETS", offer valuable information for the benefit of future intercourse, but the other two offer comments on a matter of immediate and supreme concern, and I must confine my comments to these.

Mr. Lattimore has made an invaluable contribution to the possibility of understanding the present situation, and I hope that it may be given the widest possible publicity. The kernel of it is contained in a paragraph on page 11 - the last whole paragraph on that page. I quote partially - "The West built up its

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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its China policy on the assumption that "China" and the "Manchu Empire" were the same thing. From this MISCONCEPTION (emphasis mine) there sprang a series of badly geared policies which now threaten to wreck the Republic of China, the peace of the Far East and the world". Here is the nub of the whole situation. The simple fact is that Manchuria has never at any time been a part of China, and consequently China has not been despoiled of anything, her integrity has not been violated, consequently the Kellogg Pact has not been infringed, the Stimson Pronouncement was made on a totally mistaken conception which renders the reversal of that Pronouncement entirely justifiable, and I hope to show you altogether advisable.

So far as I have been able to discover, Mr. Lattimore is the only writer on the Manchurian problem who recognizes the above fact. I am sure you must see the implications of that fact. If only our Government in Washington can be brought to see that and act on it, there is I believe much more than even chance that the danger which Mr. Lattimore points out to the Chinese Republic, the peace of the Far East and ~~to~~ the world, may be obviated. I refer to the idea of recognition by our Government of Manchu Ti Kuo. Let's look for a moment at the points.

Mr. Lattimore has shown that the action taken was based on an unwarranted assumption, and a consequent misconception. This is quite sufficient ground for a reversal on the part of our Government of its support of Mr. Stimson's Pronouncement. Our present Government has made on its own account no analysis of the case or the evidence of it. It has only endorsed in principle Mr. Stimson's academic declaration (that is all it was) of non recognition of territories obtained by force which violate the integri-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ty of National boundaries. There has been no violation, consequently the principle does not apply to any part of the matter under consideration.

Now what effects may reasonably be expected to follow recognition. Japan's declaration of purpose to restore the Manchu rule for Manchuria is accepted at its face value. This not only establishes a friendly relation with Japan, it also puts Japan on notice that her declaration will be expected to result in full realization. Recognition gives a most desirable degree of standing to the restored Manchu rule, and stands as a quite definite deterrent to subversion of that rule by Japan or any other power. On the part of China it offsets the policy so clearly outlined by Mr. Lattimore of "I chih i", (using barbarians to control barbarians). With this prospect eliminated the Chinese would be much more inclined to give their attention to the important matter of setting their own house in order. As to Russia, the removal of so important a barrier to sympathetic understanding between America and Japan would be an added reason, to say the least, for living at peace with Japan.

So much for the international aspect. Now what of commerce. It is manifest that Japan dominates the situation from the standpoint of ~~geographical~~ location, and also from a superior ability (or that perhaps more later) to obtain a good degree of physical well-being from available resources. America therefore stands a far better chance of sharing profitably in commerce with a friendly Japan than from a hostile Japan. I agree that this is not a very exalted argument, but the melancholy fact is we are in no very exalted material situation. I will however give you a much better argument. Japan is deserving of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

a very definite degree of genuine ^Asympathetic understanding from America. For forty years in my own knowledge Japan has been living next door to a veritable volcano of no mean proportions. That she has not made more serious mistakes and blunders is the remarkable fact. By comparison, as to interests involved, and other items which your own mind will readily supply, our war with Spain to end the disorders of rebellion against her rule, had small justification. From every point of view, from international reactions, from commercial interests, from moral and ^hethical principles recognition of Manch Ti Kou by our Government is desirable. It would remove instantly and definitely, and as nearly permanently as can be anticipated, any cause for suspicion and mutual antagonisms between the only stable governments on the shores of the Northern Pacific.

There does not seem to be any reason to anticipate serious reactions from European nations, for obvious considerations, so I will not take your time to go into that.

I had intended to go somewhat in detail into Mr. Peffer's article, but what I have already said applies equally to that. Let this suffice. Mr. Peffer says-"The United States refuses to recognize the separation of Manchuria from China - - ". (See page 304) The plain fact is Manchuria could not be separated from that to which she was never united. Mr. Peffer's sole argument is based on a palpable misconception, and therefore not applicable to situation only in so far as it supports Mr. Lattimore's assertion that the policies ^hbuilt on the misconception are endangering the peace of the world. I mean no disrespect whatever to Mr. Peffer. I have greatly admired the penetration shown by articles on the Chinese which he has written as a result of his experiences during

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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his periods of residence in China. He has simply accepted without question the general assumption of the identity of China and the Manchu Empire, which Mr. Lattimore so clearly shows to be total misconception.

I will ask your permission to send you a copy of an article I prepared about eighteen months ago which I call The Case for Japan. Without going into the matter in detail, my main point was that Manchuria has never been a part of China, and so its restoration under the lineal descendant of the Manchu Emperors was logical in itself, and justified as a measure of protection for the Japanese interests developed in Manchuria in accordance with treaty agreements with the Manchu rulers of China.

I am profoundly convinced that the importance and potential value of American recognition of Manch^u Ti Kuo can hardly be overstated.

I made a somewhat leisurely trip from Tsingtau Via Tientsin, Mukden, Harbin to Moscow in the early spring of 1914. I do not speak Russian and so missed much in the way of understanding things seen. However it was even so a quite informative experience.

Hoping I may have the pleasure of hearing from you,

Yours very sincerely,

Signe J. League

From
 T. J. League,
 114 Buist Ave.,
 Greenville S. C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
 FE - 793.94/6764.

August 4 1934.

Mr. T. J. League,
 230 Buist Avenue,
 Greenville, South Carolina.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
 July 27, 1934, enclosing a copy of a letter which you
 sent to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Secretary of the American
 Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, commenting on
 a book entitled "Empire in the East."

The views expressed in your letter have been noted
 with care and your courtesy in furnishing the Department
 with a copy of your letter to Mr. Barnes is appreciated.


Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. Hamilton
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Acting Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

e.g.c.
 FE: 260

VIII-3-34



793.94/6764

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500.A 15 a 5/159 ^{Confidential File} FOR MEMO

FROM State Department (Hornbeck) DATED May 24, 1934.
&&& Division of Far Eastern NAME 1-1127 ...
TO Affairs

REGARDING:

Relations between China and Japan. Comments relative to U. S. position,
as of today, in connection with -.

795.946765
6765

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

SPECIAL GRAY


FROM

Peiping via H. R.

Dated August 3, 1934

Rec'd 12:14 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



#338, August 3, 4 p. m.

793.94

The First Secretary in charge of the Japanese Legation here informed an officer of this Legation this morning in confidence that he has been officially informed by Japanese authorities in Central China that General Huang Fu, who has been absent in Central China since early April, has decided not to resign and will resume his duties at Peiping by the latter part of this month. Japanese Secretary of Legation stated that Huang's decision to return was largely influenced by the outcome of recent informal Sino-Japanese conversations at Dairen, which dealt only with questions of administration of the demilitarized zone and which resulted in settlement satisfactory to both sides as follows:

One, replacement by Chinese police of Manchukuo forces now guarding the Manchu tombs near Malanyu; two, control of undesirable Japanese and Koreans in the demilitarized zone by a system of permits of residence and,

793.94/6766

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F/V

AUG 7 - 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Queiroz NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#338, From Peiping, Aug. 3, 4 p.m.

and, three, promise of Japanese to withdraw their forces remaining south of the Great Wall as soon as quarters north of it are ready. Those questions which remain unsolved include, one, the number and arms of Chinese police to be permitted in the demilitarized area and, two, the disposal of certain renegade Chinese forces in Chahar.

Although the concessions made by the Japanese military are slight, they have apparently helped (together with the urgings of Chiang Kai Shek and Wang Ching Wei) to convince Huang Fu that his return to Peiping may improve Sino-Japanese relations. The leniency of the Japanese military would seem to arise from the belief that minor concessions will so improve the feeling of the Chinese that subsequent agreement with regard to questions of a more important character will be facilitated. Huang Fu's return should do much to maintain the present calm in Sino-Japanese relations.

Tokyo informed by mail.

JOHNSON

KLP

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug. 9, 1934.

~~RCM:~~

~~MMH:~~

I think that this entire
despatch in regard to Sino-
Japanese relations in the
Yangtze valley is worth
reading. f.e.f.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 470

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, July 6, 1954.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 7 - 1934

Department of State

Subject: Japanese Attitude in the Yangtze Valley.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on June 29, 1954, an American business man who had just returned to Hankow from Changsha reported in a somewhat excited manner that a group of Japanese destroyers had arrived in Changsha, had landed armed forces, and had forced shops in Changsha to purchase stocks of Japanese merchandise which the landing parties took with them.

On top of this on July 5, 1954, there appeared in the Chinese Government owned HANKOW HERALD (evidently from the same source as my information) the following item:

"Changsha Stores Said Forced To Buy Japanese Products.

"Chekiat Agency learns from a foreigner who has arrived here from Changsha, provincial capital of Hunan, that a group of Japanese from their gunboats there was seen to have forced several Chinese stores to buy Japanese goods which they had brought from Hankow, while a detachment of landing parties from the gunboats, fully armed stood by ready for any eventualities.

"Sometime ago (about the 15th of June), according to the same foreigner, a party of Japanese officers from the Japanese destroyers called on General Ho

Chien

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AUG 10 1934
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Chien, Chairman of Hunan, and demanded the disbandment of the Anti-Japanese Boycott Association in Changsha. The Association was promptly disbanded but later re-organized under the name of "Association for the Protection of Native Products."

Immediately upon receiving the report first referred to above I wrote to a responsible American business man in Changsha who replied as follows:

"Referring to your letter No. 800-WAA of June 29th I can assure you that the news you have heard is very exaggerated and that while it is quite probable that threats were made that action such as you have noted would be taken, nothing so drastic was done.

"From Mr. Heinrichsohn, whom you may know is very closely in touch with the Governor and other officials, I hear that Chinese consignees who had contracted for Japanese goods have been coerced into taking these, but this coercion came from the local government who is affording police protection for all Chinese shops which have had to take delivery.

"The local Japanese Consul has been very much upset because of the boycott and I know that he has delivered at least one ultimatum to the Governor. Vice Admiral Imanura came in here with three destroyers and a couple of gunboats some two weeks ago and just previous to his arrival I believe the Consul again took the matter of the boycott up with the officials. Last week three more destroyers arrived here but were here for a day only.

"No Japanese sailors were landed in a naval sense of the word though a few may have visited the city. And I can assure you that no guns were trained on the city.

"It is quite certain that the local officials are taking definite action to curb the enthusiasm of the boycott organization, which action undoubtedly is the result of threats made by the Japanese Consul.

"I understand that drugs and dyes are the main goods of which consignees took delivery but I have not been able to secure shop names.

"It may be of interest to you to know that our local advices are that the Governor has been entirely successful in Canton and has secured the guarantee of the Southwestern Provinces that they not only will

not

159

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


-3-

not interfere with the National Government's bandit suppression campaign but also that they will assist in it. There always has been some doubt in our minds as to whether the Governor was entirely loyal to the National Government, it now appears that he definitely has come out on their side."

I surmise that the above letter gives the correct version of Japanese tactics in Changsha because these same tactics were employed very successfully in Hankow in killing the boycott of Japanese goods here.

I may add that since Japanese trade began to move more smoothly in the Wuhan area there have been no evidences of an aggressive attitude on the part of the Japanese officials here.

Respectfully yours,



Walter A. Adams,
American Consul General.

In quintuplicate to the Department,
In duplicate to the Legation,
Copy to Nanking.

800

WAA:BG

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 583

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 10, 1934.

793.94

SUBJECT:
 1-1403 ...

Retrocession of Malanyu.


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 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

AM 1100



AUG 6 1934

Copy in FE.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 AUG 7 - 1934
 Department of State

By	Check	Yes	No
For	M		
In U.S.A.	Ward		

ONI-M.I.D.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
 my despatch No. 713 of today's date, addressed to the
 Legation, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson
 George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

✓
 Enclosure:

1. To Legation, July 11, 1934.

800
 RSW:sf

Original and four copies to Department.

only

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AUG 10 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 713

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 10, 1934.

Subject: Retrocession of Malanyu.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

793.94/6565

I have the honor to refer to Mr. Lockhart's despatch no. 583 of February 12, 1934, with reference to the retrocession of the passes along the Great Wall, and to inform the Legation that in a conversation this morning with a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate General, Vice Consul Ward of this office was informed that the Japanese garrison at Malanyu has been busy for some time in the construction of proper quarters just beyond the Great Wall, and that when those quarters are complete the troops now at Malanyu will be moved into them.

Mr. Ward's informant indicated on a wall-map the
spot

0595

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

spot where the new barracks are being constructed, and from its proximity to Malanyu it is evident that the "retrocession" here contemplated is like in nature to those which have preceded it; it is to be effected in such a way that the military control of the pass remains in Japanese hands. The member of the Japanese consular staff referred to was unable to say when the new barracks would be completed, but he doubted that they would be ready by July 15, the date set in various reports in the local English and vernacular press as having been agreed upon for the evacuation.

Respectfully yours,


George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1. To Department, July 11, 1954.

800
ADW:af

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department under cover
of despatch No. 583 of July 11, 1954.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, August 1, 1934.

RECEIVED
DIV. COM. & REC.

AUG 1 34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
H/MS SEP 10 1934
L. DIV. OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 13 1934
Department of State

793.94
SPECIAL REPORT
(No. W.D. 1436)

Mr. Secretary of State	Mr. Tolson	Mr. Clegg	Mr. Glavin	Mr. Ladd	Mr. Nichols	Mr. Rosen	Mr. Tracy	Mr. Carson	Mr. Egan	Mr. Gurnea	Mr. Harbo	Mr. Hendon	Mr. Jones	Mr. Quinn	Mr. Nease	Mr. Gandy

ON
MID

To the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
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The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Special
Report No. W. D. 1436, dated August 1, 1934.

793.94/6769

SEP 10 1934

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F/B

WD/drs

WD.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, August 1, 1934.

Serial No. W. D. 1436.

SPECIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The French Press and
Far Eastern Questions

Writing in LE TEMPS of July 26, 1934, André Duboscq, Foreign Editor of this paper, discussed "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and the United States."

He began by discussing the prospects for the Naval Conference next year, saying that the news from Japan on the subject was not very encouraging, since the Japanese considered the Conference from the point of view of the Pacific, and the American attitude was very much the same. Duboscq went on to quote W. Morton Fullerton as having written:

"The problem of the persistent collaboration of the American people with Mr. Roosevelt is not so much that of the relative value of the dollar,

or that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

or that of the stability of the purchase power of money. This problem is in the function of the far-reaching ideas of the Under Secretary of State for the Navy. In a word, the problem is simply that of the Pacific, and unless I am mistaken, the next move is up to Japan."

Dubosq goes on to say that Fullerton, recently quoting these lines of his own, added:

"This remark may have been difficult to understand when I made it a year ago. At the present moment it is certainly very clear. The President of the United States is proceeding to Hawaii aboard a war-ship."

In connection with the journalistic activities of W. Morton Fullerton, please see Confidential Report No. W. D. 1429 of July 18, 1934.

In his conclusion, Dubosq remarks:

"This Sino-Japanese policy (of rapprochement) does not please the Americans, that is certain. Nevertheless, it will not necessarily lead to immediate consequences of a redoubtable nature. It will merely recall to those who might forget it, that the political relations and the diplomatic methods in use between the Chinese and the Japanese cannot be judged in the light of our European experience alone. It will also recall

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the fact that the problem of the Pacific is neither more nor less than the problem of China. The Americans and the Japanese are inwardly convinced of this, and it is this conviction which will decide their attitude at the 1935 Naval Conference.

"In a very interesting and instructive book called "Japan 1934," recently published by the N.R.F.Co., Maurice Lachin closes a chapter on the Naval question in Japan by saying: 'In Tokyo, all eyes are focussed on Washington without thought for Moscow. For it is believed in Japan that the immediate future of peace in the Far East will depend on the policy of the United States.'"

Dubosq considers that this should be put side by side with Morton Fullerton's opinion, asking:

"If Tokyo fixes its eyes on Washington alone, in what direction is Washington looking?"

The original of the article quoted is enclosed.

Very respectfully,

Warrington Dawson

Warrington Dawson,
 Special Assistant.

Enclosure:

1. Extract from LE TEMPS of July 26, 1934.

In quintuplicate

851.9111/6a

WD/drs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Encl. to Special Report #WD 1436, of August 1, 1934.
 From the Embassy, Paris.
 Extract from LE TEMPS July 26, 1934.

LE RAPPROCHEMENT SINO-JAPONAIS et les Etats-Unis

On a déjà beaucoup parlé de la conférence navale qui doit avoir lieu l'an prochain et l'on en parlera bien davantage encore d'ici là. Du Japon, en particulier, sont parvenus à ce sujet des télégrammes qui témoignent de peu d'enthousiasme ou qui expriment certaines opinions ou même posent certaines conditions peu encourageantes sinon peu rassurantes.

Les Japonais voient la conférence navale sous l'angle du problème du Pacifique; les Américains ne la voient d'ailleurs pas autrement. L'indépendance accordée aux Philippines et le voyage du président Roosevelt aux îles Hawaï sont à cet égard assez significatifs. Notre distingué confrère M. W. Morton Fullerton rappelait hier les lignes suivantes qu'il écrivait l'année dernière: « Le problème de la persistante collaboration du peuple américain avec M. Roosevelt n'est pas tant celui de la valeur relative du dollar, ni celui de la stabilité du pouvoir d'achat de la monnaie. Ce problème est fonction des vastes pensées de l'ancien sous-secrétaire à la marine. En un mot, le problème est tout simplement celui du Pacifique... Si je ne me trompe, la parole est au Japon. » Et il ajoutait avec raison: « Voilà une remarque qui fut inintelligible peut-être, lorsque je l'ai faite il y a un an. A l'heure qu'il est, elle devient assurément fort claire. Le président des Etats-Unis vogue vers Hawaï à bord d'un bâtiment de guerre. »

En somme, les Américains ne s'illusionnent pas; ils savent que la conférence de Washington, l'Immigration Act de 1924, le départ du Japon de Genève et enfin leur reconnaissance du gouvernement de Moscou au moment où celui-ci pouvait se croire menacé, n'ont été, de la part de leurs gouvernements, que des expédients qui, par définition, ne devaient apporter aucune solution et ne pouvaient même rien changer au fond du problème du Pacifique, lequel reste entier.

Dans son rapport annuel sur les problèmes économiques mondiaux pendant l'année 1933, le département du commerce de Washington fait ressortir un accroissement considérable des exportations japonaises à destination de l'Amérique latine, des Philippines, des Indes néerlandaises, de l'Australie, de certains pays d'Afrique, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Espagne, de la Norvège et de la Suède aux dépens des exportations américaines. En Chine seulement les Etats-Unis ont maintenu leur position et même les exportations japonaises y sont tombées de 13,95 pour cent à 9,71 pour cent du fait du boycottage.

La concurrence est toujours à l'arrière-plan des faits et gestes américains et japonais en Chine, et sous couleur d'aider celle-ci d'une manière quelconque Américains et Japonais n'ont jamais songé qu'à s'y faire concurrence. C'est pourquoi, bien que l'Amérique ait refusé de se joindre à la Société des nations, des experts américains sont tout de même envoyés en Chine en vue de la réorganisation du pays; c'est pourquoi aussi le rapprochement sino-japonais actuel n'est pas fait pour plaire à Washington. La cessation même momentanée du boycottage peut permettre aux Japonais de se rattraper et même de prendre de l'avance sur leurs concurrents.

Un mot sur ce rapprochement. Nous l'attendions depuis la fin du conflit de 1931-1933 parce qu'il est, avons-nous écrit souvent, dans l'ordre de la politique sino-japonaise. Tokio et Nankin le poursuivaient depuis longtemps et il se serait fait plus tôt sans les empêchements systématiquement créés par la politique négative des chefs du Sud-Ouest. Il se fait sans bruit, sans éclat, à la chinoise. Les dépêches du Japon l'ont mentionné avec la discrétion qu'il fallait. Les Chinois, pour éviter qu'il ne fût interprété au dehors comme une reconnaissance du Mandchoukouo, l'ont fait pour ainsi dire par personne interposée.

Il devait essentiellement se traduire par la reprise du trafic ferroviaire direct entre Pékin et Moukden. Or au lieu que le gouvernement chinois parût dans le nouveau règlement, ce fut une entreprise chinoise privée qui assumait la charge du trafic.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ments systématiquement créés par la politique négative des chefs du Sud-Ouest. Il se fait sans bruit, sans éclat, à la chinoise. Les dépêches du Japon l'ont mentionné avec la discrétion qu'il fallait. Les Chinois, pour éviter qu'il ne fût interprété au dehors comme une reconnaissance du Mandchoukouo, l'ont fait pour ainsi dire par personne interposée.

Il devait essentiellement se traduire par la reprise du trafic ferroviaire direct entre Pékin et Moukden. Or au lieu que le gouvernement chinois parût dans le nouveau règlement, ce fut une entreprise chinoise privée qui assumait la charge du trafic.

Les Japonais ne soulevèrent aucune difficulté pour les modifications qu'apporta au règlement le ministère chinois des chemins de fer. En revanche, jusqu'au dernier moment les Chinois discutèrent entre eux avec véhémence, dit-on, sur l'opportunité de l'accord même. Le président du Yuan exécutif fit très sagement remarquer qu'il fallait éviter de nouvelles difficultés entre la Chine et le Japon et finit par emporter le vote de l'accord, ce qui, pendant quelques jours, compromit fortement sa situation. Il fut question d'une crise ministérielle.

Toutefois les autorités de Canton demandent des compensations. Une dépêche datée de Shanghai le 12 juillet dit :

« Afin de réduire l'opposition de M. Hou Han Min, à la suite de la réconciliation entre Canton et Nankin, le maréchal Tchang Kai Chek a accepté l'envoi de M. Hou Han Min en Europe avec une mission de propagande du Kouomintang.

» Le maréchal Tchang Kai Chek a demandé au chef dissident du Sud-Ouest, qui réside à Hong-Kong, de venir à Shanghai afin de s'entretenir avec lui des éléments de sa mission. »

Une autre dépêche de Shanghai, du 13 juillet celle-là, laisse prévoir « la fin de l'état provisoire créé, l'an dernier, par l'armistice de Tang-Kéou » grâce aux efforts tout particuliers du président de la commission politique du Nord, M. Houang Fou, qui, dès le principe, déploya une grande activité dans le sens du rapprochement.

Que cette politique sino-japonaise ne soit pas du goût des Américains, ce n'est pas douteux; toutefois, ce n'est pas une raison pour qu'elle ait des conséquences redoutables immédiates. Elle doit seulement rappeler à ceux qui pourraient l'oublier que les relations politiques et les méthodes diplomatiques entre Chinois et Japonais ne sauraient être jugées à la seule lumière de notre expérience d'Européens. Elle doit aussi leur rappeler le problème du Pacifique qui n'est autre que le problème de la Chine, ce dont les Américains et les Japonais sont intimement convaincus; aussi faut-il s'attendre, nous le répétons, que cette conviction commandera leur attitude à la conférence navale de 1935.

Dans un livre très intéressant et fort instructif, intitulé *Japon 1934* (N.R.F.), qui vient de paraître, l'auteur, M. Maurice Lachin, termine un chapitre sur la question navale au Japon par ces lignes : « A Tokio, on ne regarde pour le moment que du côté de Washington, sans se soucier de Moscou. Car c'est de la politique des Etats-Unis, pense-t-on au Japon, que dépendra dans l'avenir immédiat la paix en Extrême-Orient. »

Le rapprochement entre cette opinion japonaise et celle que nous avons citée plus haut d'un Américain qui pense, M. W. Morton Fullerton, ne se fait-il pas de soi-même? Si à Tokio l'on ne regarde que du côté de Washington, de quel côté, à Washington, regarde-t-on?

ANDRÉ DUBOSCO.

EXEMPLES DE L'UNION ET DE LA COOPERATION
 L'UNION ET LA COOPERATION
 L'UNION ET LA COOPERATION

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

6770

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 PR-Tientsin/73 FOR despatch #573

FROM Tientsin (atcheson) DATED July 2, 1934
TO NAME 1-1187

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

793.94/6770

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b. Relations with other countries.

793,94

Japan. The most important item in the relations between China and Japan during the month was the successful conclusion of the negotiations which have been going on actively for over a month to reestablish through railway traffic between Tientsin and Mukden. It would now appear that the conference held during the course of May at Shanhaikuan, reported in this Consulate General's despatch No. 667 of May 17, 1934, drew up an agreement to effect through traffic which was accepted at a meeting of the Central Political Council on May 30, and although Wang Ching-wei was for political reasons obliged to deny the existence of such an agreement, orders in accordance with its terms were issued to the technical staff of the railway on June 18; a conference attended by Yin T'ung, General Shibayama, and Ch'en Hsiang-t'ao, the head of the

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of the China Travel Service, was held in Tientsin on the 25th and 26th of June, and on June 28 the following official summary of the terms of the agreement was issued by the Japanese Legation at Peiping:

- (1) As the result of careful consideration by the Japanese and Chinese Authorities on the pending question of through train traffic, a decision was reached to operate one train daily from the Peiping and Mukden ends respectively, commencing on July 1st, under the management of the Eastern Tourist Bureau, which is to be organized at Shanhaikwan.
- (2) All matters concerning the through traffic shall be dealt with by the Eastern Tourist Bureau.
- (3) Details as to time-tables, composition of trains, handling of passengers' baggage, sales of railway tickets, etc., shall be published by the railway authorities.

A NIP ON DEMPO despatch, published in the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES of June 29, listed the following ten points as forming the agreement itself:

- (1) From the viewpoint of connecting international communications and facilitating travel to and from Europe the parties concerned shall organize a third party in the name of Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh (Oriental Tourist Agency) to handle business affairs for through railway traffic between Mukden and Peiping.
- (2) Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh shall be capitalized at \$1,000,000. Its capitalization shall be subscribed equally by the parties concerned.
- (3) Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh shall have one general manager and one assistant manager.
- (4) Mr. Chang Mu-chi, Assistant Manager of the China Tourist Bureau, is appointed General Manager, and Mr. Sedanari Hirayama, a Nipponese citizen, is appointed Assistant Manager.
- (5) Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh shall have its head office at Shanhaikuan with branches at necessary points.
- (6) The parties concerned shall conclude an agreement in the same form with Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh. Tung Fang Li Ying Sheh shall prepare four trains and run one train each from both directions.

(7)

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- (7) Through railway traffic shall be limited to between Peiping and Mukden. By-laws for through railway traffic shall be decided separately.
- (8) Conductors and other employees accompanying trains shall be changed at Shanhaikuan.
- (9) Trains shall not carry any labels nor shall they hoist any national flags.
- (10) Trains shall be run from July 1st of 23rd year of Minkuo.

As reported in my despatch to the Legation No. 701 of June 29, 1934, provision has been made for customs examination of the baggage of through passengers at Shanhaikuan and for the formal imposition of duties there by the Chinese Maritime Customs. Chinese customs offices are also to be established at five of the passes along the wall - Lengkow, Iyunkow, Kupehkow, Chiehlingkow, and Hsifengkow.

The successful conclusion of these negotiations will, as reported in my despatch to the Legation No. 697 dated June 25, 1934, very probably be followed by the settlement of the question of postal communications, and it is believed to be the hope of Chinese here that with these questions disposed of, it may be possible to secure the abolition of the Tangku Truce.

The Chinese desire for the abolition of this Truce Agreement is believed to arise from the general apprehension felt here concerning the purposes of the Japanese military in the de-militarized zone. Vernacular press reports of June 7 stated that the Japanese garrisons at Malanyu and Hsifengkow had both been reinforced since June 1 by as many as 1,000 men each,

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men each, and that additional troops had been sent to all other places along the wall. The Chinese press of June 11 carried a story to the effect that Japanese customs barriers and tax offices had been set up at Dolonor and that the Japanese troops there had been greatly increased. The I SHIH PAO (Chinese) of that date reported that the Japanese were now planning to seize Chahar and Suiyuan and to organize a "Mohammedan Nation" to include the Provinces of Ninghsia, Shansi, Kansu, and Ch'inghai. This report may possibly owe its birth to the attention recently given the Mohammedans in the local Japanese propaganda sheets.

The vernacular press of June 13 reported the setting up at Malanyu by the Chinese authorities of an Administrative Supervisor's Office, with Yin T'i-hsin as its Chief. While this office was being established, the various Japanese divisional and regimental commanders in Jehol were holding a conference at Ch'engteh, at which Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Military Attache, was present. A responsible foreign official in the service of the Chinese Government informed a member of the staff of this office that this conference was being held to determine the future course of the Japanese military in Hopei, and that one of the commanders under General Li Chi-ch'un had informed him that he expected to become the head of the Bureau of Public Safety of Tientsin under General Li's chairmanship of Hopei.

According

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According to the official quoted, it is generally accepted that the Japanese would welcome the removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung from the Chairmanship of Hopei.

On June 14, at 5 in the morning, the withdrawal of the "Manchukuo" police stationed at Nant'ienmen (a few miles south of Kupehkou Pass) was effected, the Hopei Provincial Government having paid, through the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin, the sum of \$7,000. The "Manchukuo" police at Kupehkou are reported to be still stationed there.

Consul Tanaka, of the Japanese Consulate General in Tientsin, was reported in the foreign press of June 12 to be undertaking a tour of the demilitarized zone north of Peiping.

A report, subsequently vigorously denied by the Japanese Information Bureau, appeared in the I SHIH PAO of June 17 to the effect that on June 14 30 Japanese soldiers under the command of a captain called on Mr. Liang Yu-li, Chief of the Ch'angli Hsien Government, and demanded, under a threat of violence, that money fined and opium confiscated from dope dealers in the district be returned. The magistrate is said to have offended through his zeal in the suppression of opium-smoking.

Negotiations on the despatch into the demilitarized zone of a new police force are reported to have been deadlocked throughout the month on the Japanese refusal to permit the new force to be equipped with machine guns or field pieces.

The

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The fulminations of Japanese propaganda sheets against the examination by the local officials of the Chinese Customs of the baggage of Japanese disembarking at Tientsin continued intermittently during the month, and were on June 19 made piquant by the charge that on June 16, in the course of a search of the passengers alighting from the TIENTSIN MARU, the Customs officials took five Japanese women into a latrine and stripped them. In its issue of June 26, the TIENTSIN NIP ONSEI NEWS AGENCY repeated this charge, stating ^{that} on June 23, after the mooring of the CHOMEI MARU, customs officials again attempted "an outrageous search" after gathering all the Japanese women on board into the first class saloon. This attempt, the report stated, was frustrated by members of the Japanese "Youth Alliance in China". (See despatch No. 682 of June 2, 1934.)

During the current month unconfirmed reports were again current in local Chinese circles that the Japanese planned an extension of their concession area to the southwest of its present boundaries and the erection of an aerodrome near Nankai.

The disappearance from Nanking on June 8 of the Japanese Vice Consul Kuramoto produced a profound impression in Tientsin, and it was freely predicted among well placed Chinese that the incident would be used as the pretext for armed intervention in Nanking and the presentation of a new series of demands.

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demands. A strong suspicion existed that the incident had been pre-arranged by the Japanese. The attitude of the Japanese authorities, expressed in semi-official statements to the press, and echoes of the press campaign in Japan which was evidently aimed at whipping up feeling over the incident, lent support to this view. The subsequent discovery of Kuramoto, apparently in a state of mental derangement in the Ming Tombs, and his confession that he had been attempting to end his own life left the Japanese in a position bordering on the ludicrous. The local vernacular press reflected the consequent loss of Japanese prestige, as did the Japanese authorities themselves in their relative quiescence at the time of the piracy of the SHUNTEN. (See despatch No. 692 of June 21, 1934; to the Department No. 567 of identic date.)

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 PR-Foochow/788 FOR despatch #477

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED July 5, 1934
TO NAME 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

793.94/6771

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1. Japanese:

a. General:

793.94
 Despite official denials, rumors concerning Japanese activities in South China continued to circulate throughout the month under review. Mr. Li Tse-i (李擇一), personal representative of General Chiang Kai-shek and high advisor to the Fukien Provincial Government, visited Santuao (三都), Fukien, on June 1, 1934, shortly after his return from Amoy. His reticence about the Sino-Japanese situation, as a result of these visits, has aroused suspicion in Chinese circles. Rumors from Chinese sources have it that the Japanese first desired the lease of Amoy; but that they hesitated to take drastic steps, fearing that if they went too far, they might come into conflict with the interests of other Powers. Chinese sources further state that, for this reason, the Japanese have now changed their policy and are endeavoring to induce the Fukien Provincial Government to permit the construction of a Japanese airdrome at Santuao. (Note: The American manager of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company here informed the writer that, while talking with the American Commissioner of Customs at Santuao during a recent visit to that

port

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port, the American Commissioner of Customs stated to him that he had no knowledge of any negotiations concerning the establishment of a Japanese airdrome at Santuao.) According to the local vernacular press, the Japanese are contemplating the establishment of an air line from Formosa to Fukien, in order to connect with the proposed air line from Fukuoka, Japan, to Shanghai.

Another of the numerous rumors which have been going the rounds of Chinese circles has it that Japanese fishing boats have been found surveying along the sea coast, and that a number of pirates in Hsiap'u (霞浦) and Santuao, when pursued, discarded their insignia, bearing the Chinese characters, "Flying Patrol of the Hua Nan Kuo" (華南國游擊隊). This is another puppet government which Chinese sources allege that the Japanese are planning to create in this Province.

Mr. Uzuhiko Usami, Consul General for Japan here, stated, in a recent conversation with the writer, that the Japanese Government had no territorial ambitions in Fukien.

b. Formosans in Foochow:

There are believed to be between 1200 and 1400 Formosans residing in Foochow. This is nothing like as large a number as reside in Amoy. There has been a slight increase noticeable in the number of Formosans who have come to Foochow in recent months. Unbiased Chinese sources state that this is due to the fact

that

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that living conditions have become easier here for Formosans, since the dying-down of anti-Japanese feeling. Many of these Formosans engage themselves in smuggling, the keeping of opium dens and gambling houses, and other unlawful practices. Chinese sources assert that the Formosans instigate some of the Chinese ex-bandits to change their nationality; and that when these ex-bandits fail in their plots against the Government, these Formosans either afford them a haven of refuge or assist them to escape.

c. Japanese in Foochow:

There are believed to be 300 Japanese proper residing in Foochow. Like the Formosans, these Japanese residents have organized themselves into an armed group, known as the "Japanese Youths' Corps" (日僑青年團). Their announced purpose is that of self-protection.

Although anti-Japanese agitation has long since subsided in Foochow, still the following placards appeared in Nantai (南台), Foochow, on June 18, 1934, following the clearing up in Nanking of the Kuramoto mystery:

1. "Mr. Kuramoto has been discovered; perhaps it is not necessary for Japan to take drastic measures now."
2. "Tears welled up into Mr. Kuramoto's eyes. This suffices to prove that some Japanese are conscience-stricken."
3. "Should Mr. Kuramoto have died, we are sure that another 'September 18th incident' would have taken place in Nanking."

These posters were soon removed by the police authorities.

(Note:

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(Note: Some Chinese seem to overlook the fact that cases of foreigners being carried off by the Chinese authorities or by bandits, resulted in the total disappearance of the foreigners or in their being held captive for a long time. Witness the so-called Thornton case which happened in Shanghai a few years ago. If the Kuramoto case does not prove anything else, it does prove that the Chinese authorities can find "their man" when they really desire to do so, or when sufficient pressure is brought to bear upon them.)

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NOTE

SEE 893.00 PR-Amoy/82 FOR despatch #16

FROM Amoy (Dick) DATED July 6, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1187 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

793.94/6772

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

b. Relations with other countries.

793.94
 Rumors concerning the Japanese occupation of Amoy have practically ceased but an air of uneasiness and apprehension prevails. Tension exists between the local officials and the Formosans, whose numbers include many bad characters such as smugglers, proprietors of brothels and opium dens, and "bouncers." This tough element seeks protection from the Japanese Police and are immune from arrest by the Chinese Police. Naturally, this constitutes a source of constant friction.

At present the Japanese Police operate only in Amoy but the Japanese Consul desires to extend his police powers by detailing uniformed police to duty in the International Settlement of Kulangsu to protect his nationals residing on the island. His efforts and pressure, so far, have been successfully resisted.

It is a peculiar coincidence that efforts to establish these police on Kulangsu were made at a time when several Formosans were caught endeavoring to smuggle small sampans loads of salt, sugar, and fertilizer ashore at Chan Bay, just under the residence of the Commissioner of Customs.

Furthermore, on the night of June 27th, five trunks, presumably bombs, were landed at the same beach, despite police intervention, from a Japanese

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Japanese destroyer. The trunks were carried into the home of a clerk in the Japanese Consulate and the contents announced as "sake."

On the Amoy side Formosans created further incidents by tossing a jar of nitric acid, landed from the HOZAN MARU on June 4th, into the face of an official of the Tax Bureau who was endeavoring to collect the taxes due.

On June 22nd, a bomb was thrown from the Tung Nan Hotel (Formosan owned), injuring six coolies. It appears that the Chinese Police, accompanied by Japanese police, endeavored to close this notorious den of iniquity and the bomb was thrown as a warning. Gambling, opium, and prostitution in the hotel ceased for a few days.

The local press reported that three Formosans, accused of spying at Changchow (漳州), have been executed at Lungyen (龍巖).

Formosans continue to arrive as immigrants and their numbers are increased to a small extent by various Chinese born in Amoy taking out Formosan papers.

The Japanese Consul will be absent about two weeks in mid-July, attending the conference in Formosa, when it is understood that a policy will be adopted regarding possible action in Amoy and in Fukien.

The future is uncertain.

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NOTE

SEE 893.71 Manchuria/69 FOR Despatch # 582.

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED July 10, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1157 ...

REGARDING: Impression received that Japanese authorities
have no intention of permitting the abrogation
of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

793.94/6773

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Tientsin, China, July 10, 1934.

Resumption of postal communications and
the abrogation of the British Trade.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of my
 despatch No. 718 of today's date, addressed to the Legation,
 on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

Enclosure:

1. To Legation, July 10, 1934.

800

RMW:af

Original and four copies to Department.

A true copy of
 the original
 is being
 filed

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 712

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 10, 1934.

Subject: Resumption of Postal Communications and
the abrogation of the Tangku Truce.

The Honorable

Wilson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 710 of yesterday's date in connection with through postal communication, and to state that according to information supplied yesterday to Vice Consul Ward of the staff of this office by a well-informed Japanese attached to the Imperial Japanese Army in Tientsin, and separately by a member of the staff of the local Japanese Consulate General, there are no longer at present any formal conferences being held on the question of through postal communication, Mr. Ward's informant being under the impression that the Nanking Government is as yet unwilling or unable to yield to the Japanese desires that postal communication be fully re-established.

questioned as to the reports current that the abrogation
 of the

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of the Tangku Truce Agreement will be effected following the resumption of postal communications, both informants stated emphatically that the Japanese authorities had at present no intention of permitting the abrogation of the agreement, but that they were aware that certain influential Chinese were very much interested in securing its abrogation. One of the informants stated that he was certain that the Chinese Government was not in a position to carry out the promises which it was the definite intention of the Japanese authorities to exact as conditions to the abrogations of the agreement.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson Jr.,
 American Consul.

SGC
 RAS:af

Original and two copies to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover
 of despatch No. 582 of July 10, 1934.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 PR-Shanghai/70 FOR despatch #9549

FROM Shanghai (Josselyn) DATED July 10, 1934
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1137 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese relations.

793.94/6774

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b. Relations with other countries:

792.74
Relations with Japan: THE CHINA TIMES, one of the leading vernacular dailies, in an editorial on June 1 regarding Sino-Japanese affairs in the North, takes the position that the Manchurian issue must be settled first of all; that it is ridiculous to divide Sino-Japanese issues into several categories - those to be settled by the Government, those to be partially settled, and those to be settled locally. This paper doubts whether Minister Ariyoshi is able to represent the Japanese militarists. It states that the Chinese people all demand the abolition of "Manchukuo" while Japan demands recognition for "Manchukuo." Since these two views are diametrically opposed it is very difficult for any negotiations to be successful. The editor asks why should China be anxious to resume through traffic and postal arrangements with "Manchukuo" since these are really matters of secondary importance, and states that if this is done it will merely mean that the Chinese Government has fallen into a Japanese trap.

The conclusion of an agreement for through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway, which had been under discussion for several weeks, was finally reached at the end of June. Under this agreement through railway service was commenced on July 1. All matters connected with the handling of this traffic was put under the direction of a tourist bureau, which in turn

was

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was organized by the China Travel Service and the Japan Tourist Bureau. The head office of the China Travel Service in Shanghai issued a statement on June 29 in which it declared that it had been invited by the Ministry of Railways to participate in handling the through traffic and although it had at first been reluctant to accept the position, it had finally decided to do so from patriotic reasons, although it fully realized that the 5 per cent commission allowed to the Tourist Bureau (the joint Sino-Japanese organization) will not be sufficient to cover expenses. The Director of the China Travel Service, Mr. Chang Shui-chi (張水淇), has been appointed General Manager of the joint Sino-Japanese agency, with a Japanese as Assistant Manager.


Following the announcement that the China Travel service had accepted the Government agency certain damage was done to the head office of the company in Shanghai by persons believed to have been opposed to the China Travel Service taking part in the through traffic arrangements.

Following the return of the Japanese Minister, Mr. Ariyoshi, to Shanghai from Japan at the end of May, he left for Hanking on June 6 for a few days, and again on June 25. At the latter visit he was reported to have had an interview with General Chiang Kai-shek and also with Mr. Wang Ching-wei. He declared upon his return to Shanghai, however, that his interview with Chiang Kai-shek was without political significance.

c. Relations

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Greenville S. C., Aug. 21st. 1934

1934 AUG 23 AM 10 46

Hon. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Acting Chief, Far Eastern Affairs Division,
Washington D. C. DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Aus'd

Dear Sir,

I acknowledge with appreciation your favor of the 4th.
Inst., referring to receipt of copy of my letter to Mr. Joseph
Barnes, Editor of the book "Empire of the East".

In a letter to Hon. J. J. McSwain, date of Aug. 26th. 1934,
The Acting Secretary suggested that if I should be in Washington
some responsible member of the Department would offer me the op-
portunity of discussing the Manchurian problem. This is to say
that there now seems a probability of my being in Washington dur-
ing the latter half of September next, and I hope that the sugges-
tion as above may still apply. It will be an opportunity great-
ly appreciated.

Should there be any particular date more convenient than an-
other I will adjust my movements accordingly.

Mr. McSwain is now engaged in a very strenuous campaign for
reelection, with two contestants in the district, and is not
available at the moment. I trust however that the correspon-
dence already had on the subject may be considered sufficient.

Yours respectfully,

J. Gustafson

From
F. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

793.94/6775

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AUG 27 1934

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 27 1934.

In reply refer to
FE - 793.94/6775.

Mr. T. J. League,
114 Buist Avenue,
Greenville, South Carolina.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 21, 1934, stating that you expect to be in Washington during the latter part of September and expressing a desire to discuss with an officer of the Department the situation in Manchuria.

If you will call at the Division of Far Eastern Affairs during your visit in Washington, an officer of that division will be glad to receive you and to talk with you in regard to the subject in which you are interested.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

E. G. C.
FE:EGC

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 5, 1934

~~JBH~~
~~EBB~~
~~MCH~~

Tientsin's despatch No. 596 under date July 25, 1934, reports that according to local newspapers a conference is (July 25) being held at Dairen between Chinese and Japanese representatives for the purpose of discussing the withdrawal of the Kwantung army to beyond the Wall, the establishment of postal communications and plans for the maintenance of peace and order in "Hwapei". The Japanese are said to be unwilling to abolish the T'angku Truce agreement without (1) a previous settlement of the question of losses arising out of the Shanghai affair and (2) the formal recognition of "Manchoukuo".

E. W.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 596

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 25, 1934.

AUG 25 34

SUBJECT:

1-1403

Conference in Dairen on Pending
Questions in the De-militarized Zone.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For Distribution-Check		Yes
Grade	M	To field
For	ward	In U.S.A.
ONI		MID

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 27 1934

Department of State

WASHINGTON, D.C.
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SIR:

A-C/G

SEP 7 - 1934

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
my Respatch No. 726 of today's date, addressed to the
Legation, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

To Legation, No. 726, July 25, 1934.

800

RSW:sf

Original and four copies to Department.

793.94/6776

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SEP 10 1934

F/S

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 726

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, July 25, 1934.

Subject: Conference in Dairen on Pending
Questions in the De-militarized Zone.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, according to news despatches appearing in the local English and vernacular press, a conference between Major General Okamura, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Military Attache in Peiping, Colonel Kita of the Kwantung Army, representing the Japanese on the one hand, and Mr. Yin T'ung, Managing Director of the Peining Railway, representing the Chinese, opened yesterday morning in Dairen, and was continued at a second meeting this morning.

According to an account published in the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

I CHIN PAO (Chinese) of today's date the first formal conference lasted slightly over two hours, and touched upon inter alia: (1) the withdrawal of the troops of the Kwantung Army to beyond the Wall; (2) the establishment of postal communications; and (3) plans for the maintenance of peace and order in "Heipei". Other important questions are also reported to have been discussed.

A later despatch printed in the same issue of the I CHIN PAO states that, acting as the representative of Hwang Fu, Mr. Yin F'ung ventured to give expression to General Hwang's hope that there might take place an unembarrassed exchange of views on the question of the measures of reconstruction to be taken in the so-militarized zone; but that, as regards the question of the abolition of the T'angku Truce Agreement, the representatives of the Kwantung Army adopted an unyielding attitude. This account states that the Japanese are reported to have set forth two demands as conditions precedent to the abolition of the agreement, the first being that a settlement be reached on the question of the losses suffered by Japanese, Chinese, and the nationals of other countries during the Shanghai affair, and the second being the formal recognition of "Manchukuo" by the Chinese Government.

The Japanese are represented as having stated that unless these two conditions are accepted by the Chinese

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese Government, the T'angku Truce Agreement most definitely cannot be abrogated. The article concludes with the observation that "in fact the requests of the Chinese delegate were booted out with a single kick", and it predicts the dissolution of the conference today.

A well-informed member of the local Chinese official circles, questioned about the conference day before yesterday, when certain sections of the vernacular press were still issuing denials that a conference was to take place, stated that a meeting of the sort then about to be held had been under consideration for some months, and that the object of the Chinese delegate was to discover if possible on what terms the Japanese would agree to the abrogation of the T'angku Truce. In connection with this abrogation proposal the informant stated that General Huang Fu desires to return to a situation more definitely clarified both within the province and vis-a-vis "Manchukuo" and Japan than that which he left, and he is said to feel that his own position in the north would be greatly strengthened by such a definition of the situation. From information gained from other sources it would appear most unlikely that the Japanese authorities will consent to the abrogation of the Truce Agreement at this time.

It is perhaps also pertinent to remark here that this conference, if the press reports on it are to be accepted

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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accepted as being in the main true, serves chiefly to bring into clearer relief the outlines of Japanese dominance in this province. General Hwang, it appears now, will probably not return to the North until, among other things, he has come to some understanding with the Japanese; Yin T'ung, recently in Hankow and Kiangchow conferring with members of the Hankow regime and with Hwang, is sent as his representative to Dairen where he is met by Major General Okamura and Colonel Miyazawa fresh from Ch'angch'un conferences; and in the discussions which ensue, plans for the maintenance of peace and order in Shapeli (an area presumably not restricted to the de-militarized zone) is one of the several topics touched upon. (1) These facts speak for themselves.

Further developments in connection with this conference will be reported to the Legation as they come to the knowledge of this Consulate General.

Respectfully yours,


George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

(1) See despatch No. 723, July 23, 1934.

800

Re:at

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department under cover
of despatch No. 596 of July 23, 1934.




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



August 27 1934

Greenville S. C., Aug. 23rd. 1934.



Hon. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Acting Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir,

I am venturing to send enclosed copies of two letters of late date, one written to Mr. Owen Lattimore and one to Mr. Nathaniel Peffer. These two men have written quite extensively on Chinese questions, and their opinions and attitude offer a fair sample of the current American conceptions. I hope you may be interested in the points of view which I present in contrast to theirs. I suggest that the difference is largely the result of the fact that they have failed to look at the prevailing conditions through the perspective of the consecutive historical events which developed the situation. That I am sure you will realize is a fatal defect.

I hope you will read Mr. Peffer's article in the August issue of Harper's Magazine, at least so much of it as refers to what he considers Japan's violation of the Kellogg Pact. It begins in the second paragraph on page 260. Note particularly the virulence of the parenthesis at the top of page 261. I regard that as totally unjustified by the evidence of events which have created the situation to be dealt with.

Yours respectfully,

From
T. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

T. J. League

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AUG 28 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Greenville S. C., Aug. 18th. 1904.

Dear Mr. Lattimore,

I am very pleased to have your letter of the 6th. Inst., which seems to have been delayed in transmission to me. I shall express to Mr. Barnes my appreciation of his passing to you my letter to him.

I confess to no small disappointment that you do not approve of the idea of recognition by our Government of Manchukuo. You call the idea my "assumption". I should say it ^{is} not an assumption but an opinion, the reasons for which form the chief consideration. I presented very briefly ^{some of} the reasons for my opinion on page four of the letter to Mr. Barnes, and I hope you will refer to that again and try to visualize the probable effect of recognition on the basis of the reasons offered being valid.

I believe you will see that the reasons offered are the essential implications of the splendid characterizations of the various impacts of outside forces on China, and China's reactions to these.

I understand clearly what has happened in Manchuria ^{the} in ^{the} last few years as to increases of Chinese population, the growth of international interests, development of industries and so on. I think that certain apparent effects of these have had an influence on international conceptions, and particularly on American public opinion, out of all proportion to their real import. The result is an almost complete misunderstanding on the part of our people of the issues involved.

You speak of Manchukuo as a "fiction". I should like to suggest a very different conception, namely that of an entirely

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justified and reasonably hopeful restoration. The very successful and efficient government that the Manchu Emperors gave to China for by far the greater part of the period of their control, offers reasonable hope for a repetition of this for Manchuria. True they seemed to lose much of their vigor, and had become so involved in the far greater interests of China than of their own Manchuria, that they were in no position to resume their rightful heritage at the time of the abdication, and needed the protection of Japan whose interests developed, through a period of about three decades, would make for the logical reliance.

Chinese are interested first of all in a sense of security and reasonable freedom from interference in their personal and commercial concerns. Their presence in ever increasing numbers under the influence of Japanese, as also of other western provisions for their advantage, sufficiently attests their reactions. In spite of periodic manifestations of evanescent discontent with conditions under which they find themselves, they are little likely to create any serious problem of control so long as living conditions are reasonably favorable.

I believe, for reason which must be obvious to your understanding, that Japan desires a united and peaceful China, and as a corollary of that, has no designs on the integrity of that nation. A peaceful and prosperous China will be of far more value to Japan than could ever be obtained through any attempt at political subversion and control. The chances of China undertaking to control Manchuria are sufficiently remote to allow Manchuria ample time to develop into the strong nation she historically deserves to attain which is also the objective of the Japanese representations. The acceptance of these representations at their face value, by U. S. recognition of Manchukuo would add much to the probability of

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realization. The anti-Japanese propaganda which has attained in America to such wide proportions would be a serious handicap to recognition, but the various reactions reasonably to be expected will eventually counteract this.

The Chinese would quickly grasp the implications of such recognition, which coupled with their facility for accepting the inevitable, would produce a favorable result. No one knows better than they the lack of any real claim for the control of Manchuria by the Chinese Republic.

Of course Japan will hold, as I think she deserves to do, the preeminence in share of the commercial and industrial development of Manchuria and China. We shall, I fear accept that with a bad grace, but it will be an obvious application of the law which you so aptly refer to of the "sins of the fathers". If in addition to that she succeeds in invading some of the preserves of the rest of the world including ourselves - well, the only remedy for that is to mend our ways, and our very inadequate economic conceptions, which have played hob with our social conditions.

I shall enclose herewith a copy of an article I prepared some eighteen months ago, which I call "The Case for Japan". It will add nothing new to what you know, but it will present some matters from a different point of view, which is sometimes of a degree of value.

I am hoping to be in New York in the early Autumn, and hope to have the pleasure of seeing you and having some conversations with you, on this important interest.

Thanking you for your letter,

Yours very truly,

From
 T. J. League,
 114 Buist Ave.
 Greenville S.C.

Greenville S. C., Aug. 23rd. 1934.

Mr. Nathaniel Peffer,

... ..
... ..

...the policy of neutral nations has been

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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based on the unwarranted assumption that China and the Manchu Empire were identical" - - " - the results of this misperception (italics mine) are not only endangering the existence of the Chinese Republic but the peace of the far East and of the world".
 (End of quotation)

I do not at all anticipate that there is any serious danger / to the integrity of China, whether as a republic or otherwise, but the rest of it meets my approval. I wrote Mr. Barnes some comments on three articles in the book, first Mr. Lattimore's, then on "Changing Markets" and also on your article, the last in the book. Mr. Barnes passed my letter to Mr. Lattimore, and to my surprise Mr. Lattimore in a letter to me entirely repudiates the implications of his most excellent article. He shows quite clearly that China never at any time had any claim, political or otherwise, north of the great wall. I am pretty sure that no fact in history is more clearly demonstrable, or more easily established than that.

The implications of that should also be entirely clear. The grandiose pronouncement of Mr. Stimson, was a mere academic argument for respecting national boundaries, and had no application whatever to the case it was supposed to affect. As Manchuria clearly has never been part of China, even had Japan appropriated it, which I do not at all admit, there would have been no violation of China's integrity and consequently no offense against the Kellogg Pact. Consequently all the fulminations which have been hurled at Japan by a scandalized and misinformed American press, have been so many gratuitous affronts. The real wonder in the case is that the Japanese people have exhibited so large degree of restraint.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Before going further I may say I was in China from 1889 to 1923, with much more than ordinary opportunities for observing the development of practically the whole of what may be called the modern phase of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. These came into notice with the negotiations over Korean problems, Korea at that time still being regarded as a Chinese dependency. The negotiations culminated with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, the terms of settlement of which, gave Japan concessions for the development of commercial, and industrial interests in Manchuria. How Russia interrupted that and how it was regained by Japan you are of course familiar with.

I may say that an interested observance of the developments of more than forty years, from a point of view entirely friendly to China and the Chinese people, whom I greatly admire, in contact with and living in China during most of that time, I see nothing in the whole of that development which offers any credible reason for supposing that Japan has any designs on the integrity of China.

I have seen the Japanese make some serious tactical blunders, such as some features of the "twenty one demands", the Shanghai episode - to mention no others. When these are compared with the blunders of governments far more versed in the conditions and problems of modern diplomacy, the cumulated significance of all of (Japan's blunders) them is greatly modified.

That Japan is greatly desirous of reaping the benefits of her situation on the Western shores of the Pacific, and is bending her efforts in that direction is nothing to be disturbed about. Who among the nations of the world is not actuated by the same motives in their own environment! Many of them entirely out of it!

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There is however I believe no sufficient evidence to ~~think~~ ^{think} that Japan does not realize that a united, stable and prosperous China will be of far more value to Japan than could be obtained by any attempt ^{to} subdue and control China.

Further I think we have no sufficient reason to impugn the motives of Japan in the restoration of Manchu rule to Manchuria. The insulting epithets of "puppet kingdom", "annexation of Manchuria" constantly applied to Japan by a manifestly unfriendly American press, have no real justification in the developments of the last forty years, and particularly in the course of Japanese operations in Manchuria, first under the empire and later during the independent control of Manchuria under Chang Tso Lin.

I recognize the fact that China, under the terms of the Manchukuo abdication and a presumptive claim on Manchuria on the ground of a tenuous conception of conquest. China was however totally unable to make even this slight claim good, and after the repudiation of the conditions guaranteed by the terms of abdication to the Manchukuo clan, the restoration of Manchu rule to Manchuria was an entirely logical proceeding in itself, and Japan's protection of that restoration sufficiently justified as a means for protecting interests developed in accordance with established treaties.

From my point of view recognition of Manchuria by our Government would be productive of most favorable and beneficial reactions in every direction concerned. To accept at its face value the representations of Japan with regard to the restoration of Manchuria would put Japan on notice of the necessity of making good her representations. It would remove much of the irritation existing as a consequence of the unfriendly attitude of the American people and so materially facilitate commercial relations, and allay the

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the unfortunate suspicions of Japan's ulterior designs. A friendly Japan will be, to put on the lowest ground, a vastly more profitable commercial asset than one constantly irritated by unwarranted suspicions. The effect on China would be also eminently desirable. You know how quickly the Chinese drop an unfavorable proposition when it is demonstrated that it cannot be attained. I know from evidence I could easily furnish you, that China's dearest wish has been for a long time to involve America and Japan in hostilities. The dissipation of that hope would have a very wholesome effect in turning them to the setting of their own house in order, and pulling their own chestnuts out of the fire. The effect on Russia would be to make them much less disposed to try conclusions with Japan with the danger of involving America against Japan eliminated. Russia had Dalny and Port Arthur once. She wants them now more than she ever did. Russian propaganda is rife. Any idea that Japan is seeking an occasion against Russia is to absurd for comment.

Reverting to the recognized Chinese presumptive claim on Manchuria after the abdication, the evidence is that had China taken the steps to make that good, Japan would have acquiesced. The course of Japan from 1911 to 1929 give reasonable evidence for this opinion. When it became evident that Chang Tso Lin's son would probably join forces with a Chinese faction for the control of Manchuria, the case was entirely different. China had already displayed such a degree of disunity and such capacity for misgovernment, with a consequent disruption of commercial and industrial interests that no hope was left of any other result from her control of Manchuria. She had squandered away her day of grace.

Please do not misunderstand me. I have no anti-Chinese

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sentiments - quite the contrary. My relations with the Chinese were always of the pleasantest. I yield to none in my admiration, and I will say also my affection, for them as a great people. They have been misled. I will not go into that.

I am planning to be in New York toward the end of September next. May I anticipate the pleasure of an opportunity of some conversation with you? I hope it may be possible to see you. I do not know your present address, hence my sending C/o Harper's.

Hoping I may hear from you favorably to an interview,

Yours very sincerely,

From

E. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

August 27 1934.

In reply refer to
 FE -

Mr. T. J. League,
 114 Buist Avenue,
 Greenville, South Carolina.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged with thanks of your letter of August 23, 1934, enclosing copies of letters which you have written recently to Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Nathaniel Peffer in regard to the situation in the Far East.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


M. M. Hamilton
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Assistant Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

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AUG 28 1934




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By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1934 AUG 30 AM 10 31

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS



Hon. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Acting Chief,
Division Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir,

In the August issue of the North American Review there is a quite interesting discussion of the subject - China and World Peace by Mr. Alfred Sze. This man is no doubt well known to you, as he has been before the public for some time. He is probably one of the best known of the western educated Chinese, and his discussion will naturally present the most favorable features of the Chinese contentions.

It takes the form of a criticism of Japan's course. In doing this Mr. Sze attacks all the popular conceptions of the case, as one would naturally expect. His discussion is commendable from the degree of moderation exhibited, and if the assumptions were admissible, it would be a strong case. If our American press admits all his assumptions, his argument is likely to be effective.

Mr. Sze stated they are (1) that Japan has "sized and controls vast areas of Chinese territory. (2) that Japan plans to dominate the political affairs of all the Far Eastern countries, and possibly incorporate them as well.

These propositions are supported by reference to a number of actions by Japan, such as the invasion of Manchuria, the "twenty one demands, Japanese occupation of Shantung, attitude toward the

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

League of Nations, quotations from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hornbeck - in a word a quite skillful summing up of all the arguments with which we are all familiar.

In regard to assumption of Japanese control of Chinese territory, I have already offered credible evidence that such is not the case and will not repeat that.

The second, that Japan means to dominate the political affairs of China, and probably incorporate it, I have already dealt with that, and will only now refer again to the unsettled condition of Chinese domestic affairs as offering ample reason for Japan making efforts to compose the resulting confusion.

The danger to Chinese integrity, or to partition I consider as a myth. All the interests concerned recognize that any such course would develop conditions inimical ^{to} adequate control which would nullify such advantages as might be apparently possible. Every one concerned recognizes that fact that a stable government in a united China presents the best prospect for commercial profits, which of course is the ultimate interest in the country. Japan realizes that as clearly as anyone. I have already shown that the course of Japanese action in the past forty years during which time the prevailing conditions have developed, all give evidence that they recognize the value of stable conditions in China.

Mr. Sze of course plays up all the popular assumptions. His reference to the "Japanese occupation of Shantung" is a case in point. There never was any such thing. Japan took over the administration of the German Leased port of Tsingtao, and the German owned and operated Shantung Railway, after their capture of the German forces as a part of the European war. They placed military guards along the Railway, but they had no more control of

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Shantung Province than America has over the political affairs of Panama. The Japanese surrender of the German lease of the commercial port, and the Railway, was an exhibition of consideration for international opinion of no small proportions. They had every right to hold those German interests.

Mr. Sze refers to China's part in the European War in a totally misleading way. China was overwhelmingly pro-German all through the conflict, and it was only at the last moment when the issue of the war was clearly manifest, that China made a most undignified scramble to join the "Allies", and began a most undignified deportation of German subjects, continuing it after the Armistice. These facts are of course well known to Mr. Sze.

The quotations from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hornbeck, as I have pointed out, are statements of an entirely academic nature, which in consequence of their misconceptions of the real relations of Manchuria to China had no factual application.

The Japanese have made a number of tactical blunders, which under the circumstances is readily understandable. Some of the features of the "twenty one demands", the Shanghai episode, are samples of that. I remember my own reaction to the twenty one demands as being distinctly anti-Japanese, but when I considered the matter in its entirety and its relation to the confused and disorganized state of China, it resolved itself into nothing more than an insufficiently considered attempt to restore order sadly needed to Chinese affairs. Obtaining ~~essse~~ through the lapse of time and the adjustment of events, a better perspective, I saw that my anti-Japanese prejudices were not well founded.

I think Mr. Sze has made about the best case for China that

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can be made, and I wish to say that I admire his restraint under the exceedingly high state of tension the Chinese have developed. In the absence of such tension Mr. Sze would not, I am sure, have strained the incident such as what he calls the "Occupation of Shantung", "China's entry into the world war". He knows quite well that Japan never "occupied Shantung", and that China ^{assented} never willingly to even a declaration of acceptance of the principle of disapproval of German war objectives. The best they did was an undignified scramble at the last minute of the last hour of the war, manifestly with the hope of gaining some advantage in the peace terms which they recognized would be imposed by the Allies.

I repeat that I have a very high regard for the Chinese people, but in international affairs they have for so long a time attempted to play off one nation's interest against another's with the hope of getting what they wanted out of the misunderstandings and conflicts precipitated, that they are utterly - that is the men who are attempting to play the political game in China - incapacitated for playing a straight game.

I should like for you, keeping in mind the implications of the established historical facts, to read Mr. Sze's article - North American Review, August.

Yours respectfully,

FROM
T. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

J. Guay

*Envelope
att. G.P.D.*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 7, 1934

~~JES~~
~~RFD~~
~~MCH~~


Nanking's despatch under date August 10, 1934, encloses and adequately summarizes a translation from a vernacular paper in regard to the situation in North China.

E.W.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking Office, August 10, 1934.



FE
H/HS

793.94

Subject: Japanese Threat to North China

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	M	To field	
	Reck	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 10 1934
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

I have the honor to enclose herewith a REUTER trans-
mission of an editorial from the CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, a
paper published in Nanking which has close connection
with the National Government. The editorial bears the
significant caption "Dangers in North China".

The writer admits that with the capture by the
Japanese of Manchuria, Jehol and the Great Wall, North
China can be penetrated by the Japanese whenever they
choose. He then goes on to explain, in a remarkably
frank manner, that there is an internal danger greater
than the external one, arising from disunity in China
(an obvious thrust at Canton), and from corrupt and
vicious administration in North China itself. He states
that similar conditions assisted Japan in getting control
of Manchuria, although the conquest was part of Japan's
"Continental Policy".

Occidental opinion will probably coincide with that
expressed by the writer in his closing words:

"When a country is invaded by a foreign Power it
can still resist. But when corruption develops
from within it is a hopeless case."

Other

793.94/6779

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SEP 13 1934


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Other Chinese have pointed out, however, that even if a condition of inefficient, and even lawless, administration in China be admitted, this does not justify a foreign nation in using intrigue and armed force to dispossess China of its territory, with the object of increasing the military strength and economic well-being of the invading Nation. There are other ways to meet the problem.

Respectfully yours,


Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

✓ Enclosure:

1/ As described.

In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to the Legation at Peiping.

WRP:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Department of Willys R. Peck, Counselor of Legation, Nanking Office, China, dated August 10, 1934, entitled "Japanese Threat to North China".

REUTER'S TRANSLATION SERVICE, July 21, 1934.

CHINESE PRESS EDITORIALS (LOCAL)

Central China Daily News:

DANGERS IN NORTH CHINA

"Whenever anyone talks about North China he would unquestionably realize the future grave possibilities in that region. Since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the capture of the Great Wall, Japan has been holding a key position in North China. The Great Wall is no longer a protection for the North. The loss of Jehol has deprived China of her defences in the north altogether. The entire region between the Yellow River and the Great Wall is now open for invasion. The Japanese can penetrate into North China any time they choose.

"But all these are external threats. There is a thing which threatens China more than this foreign aggression. That is the lack of unity among Chinese leaders and the fact that certain leaders remain idle. They are shouting about the precarious situation in North China and yet they lay the responsibility on their political opponents while themselves keep as far away as possible. This attitude further aggravates the situation. Therefore, while it is important to relieve North China of its external threats it is the more necessary for the so-called national leaders to realize their blunders. If the leaders can pull together and present a united front, China's position will be considerably strengthened.

"Let

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"Let us look at the present situation in North China. North China has been under the tyrannical rule of the militarists for many years and its administration is regarded as the most corrupt in the whole country. Although many a ruler attempted to introduce reforms into the administration in the North, he failed because of the unfavourable surrounding. The irregular taxation and levies, coupled with the oppression of corrupt officials, have sent thousands into bankruptcy. The people are apparently at a loss to know what to do and how to save themselves from certain ruin. The unsettled conditions have compelled many to turn into bandits. The recent sino-Japanese tangle has encouraged many to turn into traitors. Naturally if the people can conduct a comfortable living they will not care to risk their lives by turning into outlaws or traitors, which are regarded as public enemies. They are compelled to go to extremes because they can no longer stand the oppression. The recent murder of the American missionary in the Western Hills and the piracy of the British ship 'Shuntien' in the Pohai Gulf indicate the prevalence of banditry and outlawry in the North. This is an eloquent reflection on the political situation in North China, where lies the real danger in the North.

"It is true that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Jehol is a part of Japan's Continental Policy, but if the North-east were better governed and the people were not so bitter against the administration the result would not have been so discouraging. The people would find more chances to oppose their aggressors. But due to their dissatisfaction with the administration the people did

not

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

not offer much opposition to the Japanese. On the contrary many have turned into traitors and acted as guards for the Japanese. Are these Chinese crazy? Apart from a very few who really want to please the Japanese the others are compelled to do so by circumstances. They cannot stand the heavy taxation and the oppression of the authorities. This is the main reason for the easy capture of Manchuria by the Japanese. Now the administration in North China is no better than that in Manchuria before the Japanese occupation. If we want to save North China we must see that the corrupt administration which was prevalent in Manchuria is removed from North China. When a country is invaded by a foreign Power it can still resist. But when corruption develops from within it is a hopeless case."

1654
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 8, 1934.

JEF

EHD

MMH


To note Tientsin's brief despatch
No. 602 under date July 31, 1934,
in regard to the Sino-Japanese
situation in North China.

Z.W.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 602

PM RECD



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,


Tientsin, China, July 31, 1934.

SEP - 4 34

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 5 - 1934

Department of State



Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues; the Tangku
Truce and General Huang Fu.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
	IN		
	In U.S.A.		
	CNI		

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.B.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 731 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. 731, July 31, 1934.

800
GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

793.94/6780

FILED

SEP 13 1934

F/Hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 731

Enclosure Number _____ in Despatch
 No. 602 Dated July 31, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, July 31, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues; the Tangku
Truce and General Huang Pu.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that during a conversation yesterday afternoon with the Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, General Yu Hsueh-chung stated that he thought General Huang Pu would return to Peiping in August providing the Japanese permitted the fulfillment by the Chinese of Article 4 of the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, relating to the maintenance of peace and order in the area by Chinese police.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The Chairman indicated that General Huang's "face" was deeply involved in the refusal of the Japanese to permit the 9,000 special police organized for that purpose to take over police control of the area and stated that General Huang could not return to North China unless the negotiations on this point should be successful.

General Yu went on to say that he did not believe that the Japanese were at this time planning any further military aggression in North China. He felt that the status of Russo-Japanese relations was such that the Japanese were not now desirous of extending their lines. He stated, however, without actually mentioning the alleged hopes of the Japanese to contrive the establishment of a new Chinese regime in North China, that the activities of a Japanese-inspired organization sometimes called the Pan-Asiatic Society, with headquarters in the Japanese Concession, had recently become more pronounced and that he would not be surprised at trouble from that quarter.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

000
 GAjr:JB

Original and two copies to Legation.
 Five copies to Department under cover of despatch
 No. 602 of July 31, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 JLB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 8, 1934.

~~JEJ~~
MJH


Tientsin's despatch No. 609 under date August 7, 1934, states that recent local ~~press~~ reports to the effect that a British soldier was killed in a fight between British and Japanese troops at Shanhaikuan have proven to be false.

E.W.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. 609



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SEP 5 - 1934

Department of State

SEP - 4 34 Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	M		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	Atcheson		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		To field	
		In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 737 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson
George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. 737, August 7, 1934.

800
GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

793.94/6781

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SEP 11 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 737

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 609, Dated August 7, 1934
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent press reports of an alleged incident at Shanhaikuan in which, according to Chinese news services, a British soldier was killed as a result of a fight between British and Japanese troops at that place.

While the Legation has doubtless already received official information concerning the falsity of the news articles in question, I venture to report, as of possible interest, that inquiries

made

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

made here through American army sources of both the Japanese and British military indicate that there was no foundation whatsoever for the story. I may add, for what it may be worth in this connection, that the Japanese Information Bureau's bulletin No. 704 of today's date lays the blame for the story on over zealous Chinese journalists, professing that "many Chinese who are anti-Japanese in character might have wanted to see such an incident occur and such an incident--which it is impossible to imagine--should it really take place would be taken as a journalistic scoop for these Chinese propagandists, because they are always anxious to see that Japan should be isolated from other foreign countries and thus the situation would be more favorable to China".

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

800
 GAjr:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department with despatch No. 609,
 August 7, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 JB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 609

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 737 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. 737, August 7, 1934.

800
GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

True copy of
signed orig:
JB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 737

Enclosure Number 1 in Despatch
 No. 609, Dated August 7, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

800
 GAjr:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department with despatch No. 600,
 August 7, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed origi-
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 609

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 737 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atchison, jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. 737, August 7, 1934.

800

GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal
215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
 No. 609, Dated August 7, 1934
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

No. 737

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent press reports of an alleged incident at Shanhaikuan in which, according to Chinese news services, a British soldier was killed as a result of a fight between British and Japanese troops at that place.

While the Legation has doubtless already received official information concerning the falsity of the news articles in question, I venture to report, as of possible interest, that inquiries

made

1611

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

made here through American army sources of both the Japanese and British military indicate that there was no foundation whatsoever for the story. I may add, for what it may be worth in this connection, that the Japanese Information Bureau's bulletin No. 704 of today's date lays the blame for the story on over zealous Chinese journalists, professing that "many Chinese who are anti-Japanese in character might have wanted to see such an incident occur and such an incident--which it is impossible to imagine--should it really take place would be taken as a journalistic scoop for these Chinese propagandists, because they are always anxious to see that Japan should be isolated from other foreign countries and thus the situation would be more favorable to China".

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

800
GAjr:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department with despatch No. 609,
August 7, 1934.

A true copy of the signed original. JB
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 609

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 737 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. 737, August 7, 1934.

600

GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal JB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 737

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 609, Dated August 7, 1934
From the Legation, Legation General
at Tientsin, China.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Tientsin, China, August 7, 1934.

Subject: False Press Reports of Death of
British Soldier as Result of Alleged
Fight between British and Japanese
Troops at Shanhaikuan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent press reports of an alleged incident at Shanhaikuan in which, according to Chinese news services, a British soldier was killed as a result of a fight between British and Japanese troops at that place.

While the Legation has doubtless already received official information concerning the falsity of the news articles in question, I venture to report, as of possible interest, that inquiries

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- - -

made here through American army sources of both the Japanese and British military indicate that there was no foundation whatsoever for the story. I may add, for what it may be worth in this connection, that the Japanese Information Bureau's bulletin No. 764 of today's date lays the blame for the story on over zealous Chinese journalists, professing that "Many Chinese who are anti-Japanese in character might have wanted to see such an incident occur and such an incident--which it is impossible to imagine--should it really take place would be taken as a journalistic scoop for these Chinese propagandists, because they are always anxious to see that Japan should be isolated from other foreign countries and thus the situation would be more favorable to China".

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.,
 American Consul.

800
 GAjr:JB

Original and one copy to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department with despatch No. 609,
 August 7, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original.
 913

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 11, 1934

~~RCM~~
~~WCH~~
~~ERD~~
~~SCH~~
~~SKH~~

415

Peiping's No. 2911 of
August 17, 1934.

This is a very good
despatch prepared by Mr. Salis-
bury in regard to the demil-
itarized area in North China
which now seems to be known
as "Huapei". This despatch is
sufficiently interesting and
informative to be read in full.

J. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2911

Peiping, August 17, 1934.

Subject: The Demilitarized Area in North China.

PM REC'D



SEP - 8 34

793.94

2 Copies
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 11 1934
Department of State

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
	In U.S.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ONI-M.D.			

793.94/6782

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C..

Sir:

I have the honor to describe the present situation with regard to the administration of the demilitarized area which was created by the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, in northern Hopei and south-eastern Chahar Province. I refer to my telegram No. 338 of August 3, 4 p.m., 1934, in which was reported the results of Sino-Japanese conversations at Dairen the latter part of July, conversations which dealt, according to a responsible Japanese

official.

FILED
SEP 25 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

official, only with questions of administration of the demilitarized area. These questions will be treated herein at more length than was desirable in the telegram. Political questions relating to the demilitarized area are being discussed in a separate despatch.

I. Problems of administration of the demilitarized area:

a. Japanese troops and Chinese police:

According to the terms of the Tangku Truce, the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the demilitarized area was to be followed by the withdrawal of Japanese forces to the north of the Great Wall, the area subsequently to be kept in order by Chinese police. There are still Japanese forces south of the Great Wall, not taking into consideration those at Shanhaikwan and other places along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, which the Japanese claim to regard as there under the terms of the Protocol of 1901 rather than under the Tangku Truce. These forces in Hopei are small in number, those at Kupeikou (at the Wall) being reported as about 400 by a Chinese official who was recently there. In Chahar there are, according to a responsible Chinese official, one Japanese division and one "Manchukuo" division, these troops being stationed between Dolonor and Kuyuan, in the extreme eastern part of the province. Recent American visitors to Dolonor saw no Japanese troops at that place.

The

- 3 -

The reason for non-withdrawal advanced by the Japanese for many months was that the Chinese police could not deal adequately with the disturbed conditions existing in the demilitarized zone. In recent months the Japanese have claimed - and lately gave the Chinese renewed assurance - that their troops will be withdrawn as soon as the construction of quarters north of the Great Wall is completed. (It is doubtful if these assurances apply to the troops said to be in Chahar.) As several months have passed since construction of barracks presumably started, observers place little confidence in this assurance. It would seem that the Japanese do not wish to withdraw these troops until the Japanese are assured that the Chinese will concede to Japan those things which the Japanese desire. The Japanese military is aware that their forces south of the Wall are a constant reminder to the Chinese of the power which lies behind Japan's proposals and are also strategically well-placed in case the Japanese military should decide that China can only be dealt with effectively through further military action.

The inadequacy of the Chinese police force in the demilitarized area, referred to by the Japanese, has in some degree been the result of restrictions insisted upon by the latter with respect to the number of the Chinese police force and the type of arms. According to both Japanese and Chinese officials, the former want the number limited to 6,000, while the

Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Chinese claim that 9,000 are necessary for efficient policing. The Japanese want them to carry only light arms, while the Chinese state that for effectiveness both machine guns and light artillery are requisite. The Chinese also wish to substitute more efficient personnel for some of the police already in service, the latter being undesirable as they were members of renegade forces which created disturbances in the area following the conclusion of the Tangku Truce. These questions have not yet been settled. But until an adequate Chinese police force is present in the area, peace and absence of alarms and disturbing rumors cannot be anticipated, as there are in the area various bands of Chinese desperadoes preying on the country side.

b. Undesirable Japanese and Koreans:

There are a number of undesirable Japanese and Koreans in the demilitarized area, especially in the eastern part, between the Great Wall and the Luan River, whose activities are subversive to the peace. (According to one local Chinese official, they number about 3,000, a probably conservative estimate.)

These undesirables are said to be engaged in smuggling, sale of narcotics, and other illegal activities.

Some of them are thought to be persons who are attempting to persuade the Chinese of the area that they would be happier under "Manchukuo" rule than Chinese rule, the objective being the ultimate

absorption

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

absorption by "Manchukuo" of territory south of the Great Wall by peaceful means. They may also be instigators to activity of bands of renegade Chinese in the area.

Both Chinese and Japanese officials have recently informed the Legation that an agreement looking toward the elimination of these undesirable Japanese and Koreans was arrived at during the above-mentioned conversations at Dairen. According to this agreement the Japanese authorities are to issue passes, a kind of good character card, without which Japanese and Koreans cannot enter the demilitarized area and cannot, if already there, remain in the area. The efficacy of this plan will depend upon the sincerity of the Japanese administrators.

c. Guards of the Eastern Tombs:

Both Chinese and Japanese authorities state that agreement has been reached for the removal of "Manchukuo" forces now guarding the Eastern (Manchu) Tombs, near Malanyu, south of the Great Wall, as soon as Chinese police arrive there to take over that duty.

d. Tranquilization of Chahar:

The situation in Chahar is obscure, but it is believed that, as the Chinese central authorities and their representatives at Peiping have only a tenuous control there, there exist numbers of bodies of Chinese troops inimical to the peace of the area. One such

body

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

body is that of 2,000 men under the command of Li Shou-sin, a renegade. The Chinese have been requesting the Japanese to permit him and his men to enter "Manchukuo", the object being to eliminate this particular source of danger to the tranquility of Chahar. As yet, the Japanese military refuse to permit Li and his men to enter "Manchukuo".

e. The Great East (Ta Tung) Company:

The Great East Company is said to be composed of Japanese and renegade Chinese who collect a fee of twenty cents from each Chinese who passes through Shanhaikwan into "Manchukuo". According to a Chinese official, the purpose of this charge is, in addition to revenue, to create the impression that those who pay the amount are pro-"Manchukuo"; the Japanese have been requested to put an end to the procedure; but so far the situation has not been remedied.

If there are other questions of an administrative nature which have been the subject of negotiations recently between Chinese and Japanese, I am not informed with regard to them. There are of course other problems of this character which might well be discussed by representatives of the two countries, as, for example, the alleged transportation of opium from Jehol to Hopei by Japanese owned busses, the Sakata Company, which is the only line of rapid transportation between Jehol City and Peiping.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

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LES-SC

Copy to American Embassy,
Tokyo, Japan.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 11, 1934

~~RCM~~
~~MMH~~
~~EHD~~
~~SWH~~

Peiping's No. 2906, August 16, 1934.

This is an excellent report by Mr. Salisbury on Japan's intentions toward North China. The report is based largely on a conversation between Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Hagiwara, one of the officers of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Japanese Foreign Office, who has recently made a 45-day tour of Manchuria and North and Central China and who, Mr. Salisbury states, is a young man of "above-average intelligence".

I believe that this despatch is sufficiently interesting and informative to be read in full.

J. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


No. 2906

Peiping, August 16, 1934.


Subject: Japan's Intentions toward North China.

793.94

Strictly Confidential.



SEP - 8 34



For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade			
For	X		
	To field In U.S.A.		

793.94/6783

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report the substance of a conversation which a member of my staff informs me he had on August 13, 1934, with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office with regard to Japanese intentions toward North China. The comments of this official impress me as the frankest (and at the same time as a responsible) exposition of Japan's aims in this regard which has come to my attention for some time.

The

FILED
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The official is Mr. Hagiwara, one of the five officers of that section of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Japanese Foreign Office which deals with questions relating to China Proper. I am told that Mr. Hagiwara is a young man of above-average intelligence who is intensely interested in and has a thorough knowledge of conditions in the Far East. He left Tokyo on July 17 for a 45 day tour of Manchuria and North and Central China, in connection with his official duties.

Mr. Hagiwara stated that two plans with regard to the future of North China are at present the subject of deep discussion between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Ministry of War, the primary object of either plan being the safeguarding of the existence of "Manchukuo". The plan which the military are in favor of envisages a North China which would be practically independent but which would be nominally under the control of Nanking. (Mr. Hagiwara insisted that it would be more than "nominally" under Nanking, but was unable to make clear in what respects it would be so.) Under this plan, according to Mr. Hagiwara, a situation would be created in North China which would be similar to that suggested solution of the Manchurian situation which foreign powers at one time urged following Japanese occupation of that area. Through this regime in North China, the Japanese would attain their ends with respect to China. The other plan (which inferentially may be considered as looked upon favorably by the Foreign Office) is to have North China come as effectively

under

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

under the authority of the Nanking Government as is the territory in the Yangtze Valley. It is presumed that, if this were successfully carried out, the Japanese anticipate that, in return for their assistance in rendering it effective, the Nanking Government would give to the Japanese what they want.

Mr. Hagiwara stated that the aims of the Japanese with respect to North China are to obtain favorable settlement of such questions as through postal facilities via Shanhaikuan and the establishment of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation in North China, the latter including the development of cotton production and the building of two railways, namely one from Taku, below Tientsin, to Shihkiachwang, on the Peiping-Hankow line (which would render easier access to the Shansi coal fields) and one from Tsinan, the terminus of the Tsingtao-Tsinan line, westward to Shunteh on the Peiping-Hankow line. He stated emphatically that the Japanese were not at all interested in a westward extension of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, such an extension being regarded as unprofitable. They would, however, like to have air communication established between North China and "Manchukuo". Mr. Hagiwara said that the economic penetration of North China desired by Japan was no more than that described above, and that no Government in Japan could satisfy the people of Japan with anything less than that. He added that an area one or two miles in width along the "Manchukuo"-China border, where troops would not be permitted, would also be necessary and

that,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

that, in case the second plan were put into effect, there would have to be some agreement with Nanking as to the number of Chinese troops which might be stationed in North China.

It was evident that Mr. Hagiwara regards the question of economic penetration into North China as of vital importance. With regard to what Japan expects to gain from "Manchukuo", he was pessimistic, saying that all that the Japanese hope to gain is enough to pay for the upkeep of the army there.

Mr. Hagiwara stated that the Japanese authorities would welcome the cooperation of foreign capital in the development of North China. When it was suggested to him that foreigners might hesitate about investing, believing that North China might go the way of "Manchukuo", he replied that that would not occur, that the Japanese Government would guarantee that its ambitions with respect to North China were not political. When it was recalled to him that the Japanese Government had given similar guarantees at times during the period when the Japanese army was radiating outward from the Manchuria Railway Zone toward the boundaries of what is now known as "Manchukuo" but that those guarantees had failed, he admitted, with regret, that that was so, but insisted that in those instances the Government should have never given such guarantees as they could not be upheld, whereas now such guarantees could be safely given because the military was satisfied that

"Manchukuo"

Correct

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

"Manchukuo's" boundaries should not be extended south of the Great Wall.

When questioned with regard to his opinion as to whether the Nanking Government could give the Japanese what they want and survive, he replied that, if Japan does not receive what it wants (meaning the matters outlined above), then "we do not know what our navy will do. We do not control the navy."

He admitted that the collapse of the Nanking Government as a result of Japanese pressure would very likely result in a chaotic situation seriously adverse to Japan's economic relations with China; but apparently he regarded this as less important than the effect in Japan of a failure to put through the Japanese program. He was emphatic in stating that political control of North China by Japan was not desired and in this connection said that at present the high positions in the Japanese Army are held by conservative military officers, the reactionary officers having been gradually replaced as a result of transfers effected during recent months. It was his opinion, however, that if neither of the above-mentioned plans were to succeed, then that part of the Japanese military - now a small minority - which would like to see North China a completely independent state might be able to make its desire effective.

Throughout the conversation Mr. Hagiwara exhibited a sincere desire to see the relations of Japan with China and of Japan with the United States improve.

But

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

But it was evident that, regarding Japan's future as absolutely dependent upon Japan's "economic" expansion, he could not approve of any measures to improve those relations at the expense of what he regards as Japan's legitimate and necessary expansion. It was also evident that he was honestly unable to regard as reasonable the attitude of the United States toward Japanese expansion, a view which, as Mr. Hagiwara is an intelligent man, may be regarded as being shared by many other intelligent Japanese.

Before concluding this despatch, I should like to refer to the Legation's despatch No. 2557 of February 22, 1934, in which was given information obtained from a well-informed Chinese source to the effect that the Japanese authorities had made one proposal and two threats to a "personal representative" of General Huang Fu. The proposal was that Japan would support Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Huang Fu in all ways necessary in return for certain concessions, and the threats were that, failing Chinese compliance with this proposal, the Japanese would attempt to put North China under the nominal control of a North China general and that, failing this, more strenuous action would be taken. The two plans and the possible alternative described by Mr. Hagiwara follow in general lines the proposal and two threats referred to. The fact that the Japanese Ministry of War is at present in favor of a North

China

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

China only nominally under Nanking's control would seem to indicate that the Japanese military is becoming, or has become, convinced that a policy of cooperation with the Nanking Government will not bring about the desired results.

In view of what Mr. Hagiwara has said, it would seem probable that the conversations, which have been in progress at Kuling during the past few days between such high officials as General Chiang Kai-shek, General Huang Fu, and Dr. H. H. Kung, have been concerned, at least in part, with the attitude which the Nanking Government should adopt toward these plans. It would also seem probable that Japan's future course with respect to China will be considerably influenced by the outcome of these conversations.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1025

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 11, 1934

~~RM~~
~~MMH~~
~~CHD~~
~~SKH~~

Tientsin's No. 616, August 10, 1934.

This despatch recites some of the Sino-Japanese issues at Tientsin and concludes with this forceful paragraph:

"Meanwhile every move on either side brings into sharper relief the gradual increase of Japanese influence in Huapei and this area begins to assume in many respects the character of what in polite terms might be said to resemble something very much like a Japanese protectorate."

P. E. J.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. 616

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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~1934 SEP 10 PM 1-23~~
MARSHALL ISLANDS CONSULATE GENERAL,

793.94
Tientsin, China, August 10, 1934.
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

Copy in FB
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 11 1934
Department of State
lib

Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues; the
Situation in North China.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
General	<i>G</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
In U.S.A.	<i>Atcheson</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

ON I-MID

793.94/6784

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 740 of August 9, 1934, addressed
to the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.
American Consul.

FILED
SEP 25 1934

✓ Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, August 9, 1934.

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GAjr:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

169

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 740

Enclosed in Despatch
No. 616, D. August 10, 1934
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, August 9, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues; the
Situation in North China.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch
No. 736 of August 6, 1934, and previous reports,
on the above subject.

In spite of announcements of further conferences in connection with North China issues and the generally optimistic tone of the Chinese press, it is difficult, from such view of the situation as may be had at Tientsin, not to come to the opinion that the various Sino-Japanese issues affecting this area have reached something like a stalemate.

Two

069

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Two new conferences have been reported in the past few days: one that will shortly be or is already being held between Mr. Yin Tung and the Japanese Military Attache, and a meeting scheduled for August 10 at Kuling at which General Huang Fu will confer with General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Lin Sen, and other prominent Chinese Government leaders. In connection with the latter, Nippon Dempo (Nanking, August 7) states that Huang has suggested "restraint on General Yu Hsueh-chung's interference in political affairs" and has "demanded a definite reply of the Central Government". This demand is patently an attempt to force the issue with Nanking on the North China questions and can be accepted as strong evidence that local negotiations have come to naught in solving the problems which for so long have threatened to destroy the superficial tranquility of this area.

It is possible, of course, that the Dairen Conference (July 24 and 25) was not intended to accomplish anything in the way of actually settling even the problems of the demilitarized zone which are hidebound by the Tangku Truce agreement of May 31, 1933. Some observers think it was designed, at least from the point of view of the Chinese at whose behest it was held, to feel out the Japanese as to the conditions on which they might consent

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to the abrogation of the truce. Others are of the opinion that the Chinese hoped to obtain definite concessions in respect to the policing of the zone by the 9,000 Pao An Tui which they have organized for that purpose pursuant to (they contend) Article 4 of the truce agreement.

Whether the Japanese outlined conditions for the abrogation of the truce is not known. They may have expressed willingness to enter into negotiations on this question but it is not to be assumed that they held out much hope for success unless the Chinese should first proceed in a satisfactory manner in connection with the matters which from the Japanese point of view constitute the important issues. Certainly no immediate progress was made as regards the 9,000 special police, and in general the Japanese seem to have adopted the Chinese art of moving as slowly as possible toward the point of agreement at which their divergent purposes must, by force or otherwise, ultimately meet. As regards the demilitarized zone, one opinion of some plausibility holds that the Japanese desire the zone to remain in its present somewhat disordered and uncertain state so that, if they should later decide to take direct action with a view to forcing the main issues, their way will not be hindered by a large body of well-equipped constabulary.

This

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

This possibility of Japanese direct action remains a constant menace to North China and holds, I believe, a danger which is reflected in a feeling of undiminished apprehension current here in some Chinese and foreign circles and which is not to be confused with sporadic fears experienced by the Chinese in the past that the Japanese might undertake a military occupation of this area.

The return of General Huang Fu to North China, if and when it occurs, may of course turn out to be a forerunner of definite developments in the outstanding Sino-Japanese questions. But it is also possible that Huang Fu may for some time remain as much at sea as when he departed and that he will not be in position to accomplish much here unless General Chiang Kai-shek becomes President in October or the Generalissimo otherwise further consolidates his personal power in the National Government.

Huang himself has little real strength in North China. He must to a great extent depend upon General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, and this dependence upon Yu and the Northeastern military remnants is not a happy one.

Until some local Chinese authority is given real powers and backing it is not likely that any definite progress will be made. The new Customs stations will be established along the Wall

(apparently

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

(apparently with the consent of the Japanese) and the Chinese Postal Administration may even, without any formal agreement, begin later on to accept mails destined to Europe for transmission on the through trains across Manchuria as it now accepts inward mails from the "Manchukuo" postal agents at Shanhaikuan. But the real issues show every prospect of remaining the same until the tension is definitely broken - until the Chinese give in to Japanese pressure or the pressure is harshly increased.

Meanwhile every move on either side brings into sharper relief the gradual increase of Japanese influence in Huapei and this area begins to assume in many respects the character of what in polite terms might be said to resemble something very much like a Japanese protectorate.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, jr.,
 American Consul.

800
 GAjr:JB

Original and two copies to the Legation.
 In quintuplicate to the Department under cover of despatch No. 616, August 10, 1934.

A true copy of
 the original
 1/5

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Sept. 4, 1934.

~~MEMO~~ H:

You may find this of
interest. It reports the
failure of the Chinese to
bring about at a conference
in Peking the abrogation
of the Tangshan Truce.



J. E. J.

3700
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for Department

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Dairen, Manchuria, August 2, 1934.



SUBJECT: Dairen Conference between Kwantung Army and Yin Tung (Chinese delegate) concerning Tangku Truce and Related Matters.

The Honorable

Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo, Japan.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

AUG -8 1934

TOKYO, JAPAN

793.94/6785

193.94
Sir:

I have the honor to refer the Embassy to the conference held in Dairen on July 23-25 between Yin Tung, President of the "Peiping-Shanhaikwan" Railway and representative of the Chinese Government on the one hand and officers of the Kwantung Army on the other.

Several days ago a foreign newspaper correspondent, who had interviewed Yin Tung after the conclusion of the conference, informed me that Yin Tung was disappointed over his failure to accomplish anything towards the abrogation or modification of the Tangku Truce. Yin Tung, it appears, is a personal friend and advisor of Huang Fu and also, in this instance, acted as a representative of Wang Ching-wei. It was my informant's opinion that Yin would not have come to Dairen on this occasion had he realized his request for revision of the Tangku Truce would be dismissed so preemptorily by the Kwantung Army officers with whom he conferred, and from

this

SEP 7 1934

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0700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

this he deduces that the Chinese must have received some encouragement from the Japanese before deciding to send Yin to Dairen, the false encouragement being given because the Kwantung Army wishes it to appear that the Chinese are moving nearer to the desired goal of direct Sino-Japanese negotiation over the Manchurian issue. Yin Tung informed the correspondent that the attitude of the Army officers attending the conference (Major General Okamura, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant Colonel Shibayama, Military Attache to the Japanese Legation, Peiping, and Colonel Kita of the Kwantung Army Headquarters) made negotiations impossible. Their proposal was that the Tangku Truce could be considered on only one condition, that is, that the subject be connected with the question of Chinese recognition of "Manchukuo". The Army officers did not insist that actual recognition should be proposed by the conference but that any new or substitute agreement replacing the Tangku Truce should show definite progress in that direction. This Yin Tung was not empowered to do.

There is enclosed a news report and an editorial on the subject which appeared in the July 25 issue of the MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS.

Respectfully yours,

800
JCV:L

John Carter Vincent
American Consul.

2 copies to Department
1 copy to Legation, Peiping
1 copy to Consulate General, Tokyo
1 copy to Consulate General, Mukden
1 copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

1 copy of
the signed origi-
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch from American Consul at Dairen, dated August 2, 1934, to the American Embassy at Tokyo on the subject Dairen Conference between Kwantung Army and Yin Tung (Chinese delegate) concerning Tangku Truce and Related Matters.

From the MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS of July 25, 1934.

FIRMNESS OF JAPANESE ON NON-SURRENDER OF
TANGKU TRUCE UNOFFICIALLY CONVEYED
TO NANKING GOVERNMENT

With the failure of the Dairen conference between representatives of China and Japan to suspend the Tangku Truce, because of Japanese firmness on the point that a new agreement was necessary to take its place, the parties have gone their respective ways. Kwantung Army officers have returned to Hsinking. Mr. Yin Tung, the Chinese envoy, has begun discussions on railway matters, and is holidaying at Hoshigaura. Face-saving is achieved by the statements of both sides that no important international issue was raised. Mr. Yin Tung's inability to convince the Japanese that they should cancel the Tangku Truce, and return to China the demilitarized zone, already is known to Nanking, and some concern is being felt for the disturbed political situation in Peking. Independents in the north are reported active.

Railway Meeting

A meeting is to be held here among Mr. Yin Tung, President of the Peking-Shanhaikwan line, Mr. Kanji Usami, General Director of the State Railways, Mukden, who arrived here this morning, and the president and Vice-president of the Oriental Travel Company, Mr. Chang Shuihan and Mr. Sadanari Hirayama.

The Oriental Travel Company was established to manage Peking-Mukden through railway traffic.

The meeting is to arrange business routine. Mr. Hirayama said, when interviewed, that a consultation on business technicalities was arranged on Wednesday and nothing important would be considered.

Truce Talk End

Yesterday morning's conversations ended the Hoshinoya meeting between representatives of the Kwantung Army and

Mr. Yin

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Mr. Yin Tung, president of the Peking-Shanhaikwan line.

Major-General Okamura, Vice Chief of Staff, and Colonel Kita of the Army Headquarters, left here by the 4:20 p.m. express train for Hsinking yesterday.

Lieut.-Colonel Shibayama, military attache to the Japanese Legation in Peking, sailed today aboard the S.S. Tientsin Maru en route to his Peking post.

Mr. Yin Tung proposes to stay a few days longer.

Notes Compared

While the statement given by Major-General Okamura, following yesterday's conversations, did not reveal details considered at the meeting, the Dairen event was not without results.

The first point is said to have been in the comparison of the Japanese and Chinese attitudes towards the Tangku truce agreement. It has been made clear as a result of the Hoshinoya conversations the Kwantung Army is not in a position to modify, or to cancel the existing agreement.

As an instance of modification of the agreement, Mr. Yin Tung is understood to have hoped for the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the line of the Great Wall. The Kwantung Army is explicit, in the absence of the intention to modify the agreement and professes that there is no reason to alter the status in the demilitarised zone at present.

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Enclosure No. 2 to despatch from American Consul at Dairen, dated August 2, 1934, to the American Embassy at Tokyo on the subject Dairen Conference between Kwantung Army and Yin Tung (Chinese delegate) concerning Tangku Truce and Related Matters.

Editorial from the MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS of July 25, 1934.

TRUCE TALKS

The Dairen Conference between Yin Tung, representative of Nanking and Peking political groups did not achieve what the Chinese expected, or rather hoped for - the cancellation of the Tangku Truce. The Kwantung Army flatly refused to vacate the existing machinery for maintaining the peace along the Manchoukuo frontier. Of course the army was acting in full accord with the Japanese foreign office and had the confidence and understanding of the Manchoukuo government.

But the conference - there were two meetings at the Hoshinoya Restaurant in Hoshigaura - had one good result, and that is the resumption of informal negotiations between the two countries over Manchuria. China had abandoned its strict policy of non-discussion except through the League of Nations. No other interpretation can be placed on the several complementary actions of China and Japan in the past six months, culminating in the railway agreement and the despatch of Yin Tung to Dairen.

China possibly sensed in the atmosphere of international relations a possibility of Japanese softening. The approach of the naval conference, the economic row with Great Britain and the Soviet military threat possibly convinced Nanking politicians that here was a good time to strike for terms. The Japanese answer has been to refuse the abrogation of the Tangku Truce until a larger agreement is available between the two countries. Yin Tung no doubt was ready with a substitute agreement in order to save the face of each side. Even this the Japanese declined to accept on the grounds that it failed to achieve any substantial change from the present position.

So the matter now rests this way: Officially there have been no conferences between Japan and China over Manchuria. Mr. Yin Tung has been here on a holiday. While on the spot he was able to take up certain technical railway matters with the Japanese authorities. No diplomatic issues did not arise. For verisimilitude he will remain at the beach resort for several days.

In reality the Chinese and Japanese have drawn closer together to the extent of discussions. The Chinese public will hear about the meeting and their reactions will be tested. Approval will impel the two closer together, or rather China more towards Japan. Tokyo all along has offered direct negotiations.

Actually

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Actually the negotiations here have weakened China's position, for now the north will be restless at the non-return of Huang Fu and the absence of that stable government he was endeavoring to achieve. The independents will be more active than ever and some interesting developments in Peking and Tientsin may be expected.

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6786

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 793.94/74 FOR Desp.#610

FROM Tientsán (Atcheson) DATED Aug. 7, 1934
hdt NAME 1-1127 ***

793.94/ 6786

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Gives accounts
of happenings having a bearing on --.

fp8

b. Relations with other countries.

193.94
(8.5-12)

Japan. Despite the lyric optimism of the
Hiroshima (radio) despatch from Beijing of July 1 (3),
the opening of the Beijing-Shanghai through train
service did not inaugurate a new era of good feel-
ing between Japan and China: the bombing outrage
which wrecked a third class coach on the north-
bound train as it was drawing into Ch'atien station,
and which cost six Chinese lives, serves rather to
illustrate the tension which exists in North China
and the thorough confusion of motives at play here.

The

- (1) To Legation, No. 714, July 12, 1934 (No. 535
of identic date to Department).
- (2) To Legation, No. 724, July 23, 1934 (No. 593
of identic date to Department).
- (3) To Legation, No. 704, July 3, 1934 (No. 574
of identic date to Department).

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The fact that there were Japanese guards on the bombed train gave opportunity to some Chinese circles to hint that the bombing had been arranged by Japanese as a pretext for their increased and continuance, but the fact that these guards were withdrawn on July 8 would seem to belie such an explanation. Some Japanese sources deny the suggestion that General Chiang's "bluecoats" had laid the bomb, but the idea appeared so insane on the face of it that it was disregarded. No trace has as yet been found of the perpetrator of the crime, and there is in fact little evidence that any effort is being made to find one, although the Peking-Hankow Railway's offer of \$5,000 for the apprehension of the culprit is apparently still good.

The Managing Director of the railway, Mr. Yin Chung, promptly telegraphed his resignation to the Ministry of Railways, as did his two assistant directors, Hsu Wen-hao and Cheng Hsi-ching. In a statement made in Peking on the night of July 1 Mr. Yin appears to assume that the act was one of some Chinese opposed to the opening of through railway communication.

Whether this impression affected the progress of negotiations for the resumption of postal communications with Manchukuo is not known, but it is fairly clear that those negotiations

were

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were broken off sometime during the first week in July, and although in fact Siberian and Japanese (railway zone) mail is coming to Hainan on the through train under a modus vivendi permitting the partial resumption of postal relations, there has been no agreement to effect a complete and formal resumption of them and the Chinese postal administration is not yet accepting even mail destined for Europe for transportation through Manchuria.

More progress was made, however, in the Chinese Government's plan voluntarily to establish customs stations at the various passes along the Great Wall⁽⁴⁾. The TUNG KAO (Chinese) of July 11 reported that the Commissioner of Customs at Ch'ingwangtao had gone to Manchuria to confer with the Japanese military authorities there on the question of the establishment of such stations. The TUNG KAO (Chinese) of July 18 reported the Ministry of Finance to be engaged in hurried preparations looking to the establishment of such stations, the object being to check the flood of smuggled goods which the article stated was moving from Hsien and Hsuehwan over the Pei-P'iao and Chin-Ch'ao Railways through the Hoifeng, Kupei, Iyuen, Changchun and other passes, whence it continued over the motor-truck routes to Peiping,

and

(4) To Legation, No. 701, June 19, 1934 (No. 572 of identical date to Department).

0711

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and thence to Hsientai. The apprehension felt in official circles here in connection with the smuggling of arms through these same passes is believed also to have influenced the decision to establish the stations without further delay⁽⁵⁾.

An inspection of Taipei's preliminary to the establishment of a station there was completed on July 25 by Mr. Chang Tung-nien, Deputy Commissioner of Customs (who, for the purpose of administering the new stations along the Hsi, has opened a Customs office in Taipei separate from that of the regular Commissioner stationed there), and Mr. Kao Tzu-chi, Superintendent of Customs; and the opening of that station was at the end of the month under review believed to be a matter of days. It is expected that stations will have been established at each of the principle passes in the Great Wall before the end of August. The new Taipei office is under the immediate jurisdiction of the Hsientai Customs.

A report appearing in the TAIPEI SUN of July 5, 1934, stated that as a result of recent meetings between officers of the Administrative Supervisor's Office of the Chi-Mi Area and representatives of the Japanese military at Hankow, the retrocession of Hsienyu by a date not later than the 15th of the month had been agreed upon, but

(5) To Legation, No. 727, July 25, 1934 (No. 397 of identical date to Department).

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but information obtained from other sources indicated that the retrocession referred to would not take place until some later date, and it was in fact not effected during the month under review⁽⁶⁾.

On July 10 Mr. Yin T'ung left Peiping, where he had been in conference with Colonel Shibayama, Military Attache of the Japanese Legation, for Hankow. Intending, he is reported to have said, to press for the acceptance of his resignation. Once in the south, however, Mr. Yin went into conference with Mr. T'ang Yu-jen and General Kwang Fu at Kokenan-shan, about 80 kilometers to the north of Hangchow, and rumors at once became current that these conferences looked toward negotiations with the Japanese authorities for the abolition of the Tanghai Truce.

After denying explicitly that any such negotiations had been considered, Yin T'ung left Shanghai on July 21 for Nanchang. A conference, participated in by Major General Okamura, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kuangtung Army, Colonel Shibayama, Colonel Hite of the Kuangtung Army, and Mr. Yin T'ung, took place on July 22 and 23.⁽⁷⁾

From

(6) To Legation, No. 713, July 10, 1934 (No. 533 of identic date to Department).

(7) To Legation, No. 716, July 23, 1934 (No. 536 of identic date to Department).

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From information available here, and from the general circumstances of this conference, it seems reasonably clear that its participants were concerned principally with (1) the terms on which Japan would consider the abrogation of the Tangku Truce, and (2) the assurances required by General Huang before he would consent to return to North China.

Notover the outcome of these discussions may have been (and it is not believed that any real progress was made), it is apparent that they have brought appreciably closer the date of General Huang's return to his post in Peiping.

Renews continued rife during the month as to the activities of Chiang's "Bluecoats" and of various male and female spies in the demilitarized zone. Those insinuating nefarious motives to the Chinese issued of course from Japanese propaganda sources, and vice versa.

A report in the TUNG PAO of July 18 states that the authorities of the Kwantung Army had issued a warning against military training by the Autonomous Mongolian Government Frontier Defense Army. Japanese agents were also stated to have been despatched to Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningheia. Although this particular report may be without foundation, it is not improbable that the Japanese are carrying on an extensive propaganda campaign

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campaign among the Mongols resident in these provinces. Nippon aspo reports issued on July 17 picture the masses belonging to the various banners of Chahar as being anxious to join "Manchukuo", while the Outer Mongolians are said to be anxious to throw off the Russian yoke.

The Lanchow News, who returned from Hankow to Tsiping on July 11, is reported in the LANCHOW NEWS of August 1 to have stated in a press interview on July 31 that he knew of no movement on the part of Mongolian princes in the north-east aiming at the establishment of a Mongol empire to include Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Mongolia. He is said to have stated that the Mongolian princes are friendly to China, and that the Mongols in "Manchukuo" are the victims of circumstances, having no real desire to separate from China. The Lanchow News is reported to have no definite plans concerning his return to Tibet.

An interesting report was released on July 26 in Tokyo by the Nippon aspo, to the effect that, following the restoration of peace and order in North China, a joint industrial organization, called the North China Raw Cotton Association, had been formed through the participation of Chinese, Japanese, and "Manchukuo" representatives. The object of the association is stated to be the subsidizing

0714

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subsidizing of the cotton-growing industry in Hopei and Shantung for the production of cotton for the Japanese market. Seeds will be distributed, the cultivation of the cotton guided, and for the first year the amount contributed to the subsidy by the Japanese and "Manchukuo" members of the association is reported to be Yen 50,000.

The Japanese Consul General, Mr. who Furuhara, has been appointed First Chief of the newly established Investigation Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office. On July 30 (the day before his departure) the Japanese community in Tientsin tendered a large banquet in his honor.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 29, 1934.

~~JEI~~
~~ROM~~
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U. F. L. two pages

Nanking's confidential despatch of August 28, 1934 transmitting a memorandum of an interview had by Professor Hillis Lory, of Stanford University, with Dr. Wang Ching-wei regarding China's attitude toward a Russo-Japanese war and the Manchurian question. This despatch gives a good resume of the memorandum and is sufficiently interesting and informative to be read in full.

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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Banking Office, Nanking, China
August 28, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL
DIVISION OF STATE
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 11 1934
SEP 24 34
SEP 25 1934
Department of State

Subject: China's Attitude toward a Russo-Japanese War and the Manchurian Question. Interview with Dr. Wang Ching-wei.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

For Distribution-Check	
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In U.S.A.	
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Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum on an interview had by Mr. Hillis Lox, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University, California, with Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of China.

Speaking in strict confidence and not for publication, Dr. Wang stated that in event of war between Soviet Russia and Japan, China will not support either Power. Since taking over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, both the Japanese and the Soviet Russians have approached Dr. Wang with proposals for Chinese support in event of a Russo-Japanese conflict, but he has turned a deaf ear to all such suggestions. China realizes that a Russo-Japanese war would again be fought principally on "Chinese soil" and would bring great hardship and difficulty, particularly in the North, but there would be nothing to gain from supporting either side. A victorious Japan would but continue its encroachment in China. Soviet Russia can

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OCT 29 1934

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best demonstrate its good intentions toward China by restoring Outer Mongolia and terminating Communist influence in Kiangsi Province.

Dr. Wang stated that he and General Chiang Kai-shek are definitely in complete accord on the policy of refraining from support of either Power in event of a Russo-Japanese war.

Questioned as to whether there has been any change in the Chinese attitude toward Japan on the Manchurian problem, Dr. Wang illustrated the Chinese position by stating that when a man with a sore arm is struck a heavy blow by an antagonist he may have to fold his arms for the time being but that this does not mean that he intends to suffer the injury indefinitely.

In reply to the suggestion that Japan's aggression in Manchuria may not be essentially different from the imperialist expansion of other Powers in the past at the expense of weaker States, Dr. Wang pointed out that Manchuria is Chinese territory with a Chinese population of 25,000,000 out of a total of 30,000,000, that there is no question of "race" involved in the Manchurian question, that the people of China are not content to allow Japan to seize a large area of Chinese territory, that Japanese ambitions do not extend alone to Manchuria but to all of China where Japan seeks domination similar to British domination in India, and that the Chinese do not wish to become "Indian Chinese".

Asked whether he shares the opinion held in some quarters that there has come about in the United States a change of attitude in reference to Japan and the Manchurian question, Dr. Wang asserted that he does not

share

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share any such opinion, that the United States may not feel that Japan's bad manners toward China should be corrected by resort to war, but that it does not follow that because the United States has failed by peaceful means to obtain a modification of Japan's aggressive attitude and a solution of the problems of the Pacific, the United States is disposed to acquiesce in Japan's aggression.

On the subject of the Communists in Kiangsi, Dr. Wang stated that recent military successes assure the termination of this menace. He added that he regards the situation with satisfaction also from the point of view that the Communist movement is collapsing of its own weakness. The problem of the National Government is now one principally of reconstruction for the rehabilitation of the distressed people of the province.

892.00 As to relations between the National Government and the so-called "Canton faction", Dr. Wang asserted that Kwangtung and Kwangsi do not possess sufficient military strength and resources to attack the National Government; that, while the National Government might be certain of the subjugation of the two provinces by military force, he is unalterably opposed to any such measure and it will not be taken while he remains a member of the National Government; that he believes that the opposition to Nanking in the southwestern provinces can be overcome in time by demonstrating the success, ability and good intentions of the National Government in territory under its control; and that military expeditions for the suppression of rebellious factions have not been permanently successful


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in the past, hence his preference for peaceful measures
for the solution of the problem of the Southwest.

Respectfully yours,


C. E. Gauss,
Counselor of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:
1/ Memorandum

In triplicate to the Department.
Two copies to the Legation.

CEG:HC

2- PP

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum.

August 27, 1934.

Interview of Professor Hillis Lory of Stanford University, California, with Dr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan and Acting Foreign Minister.

Note. Professor Lory arrived at Nanking on August 25th with a note of introduction from Minister Johnson, who stated that Mr. Lory desired an interview with Dr. Wang Ching-wei. Request for the interview was made to the Foreign Office and an appointment resulted for 4 p.m. August 27th. As Professor Lory did not bear a letter of introduction to Mr. Wang Ching-wei, the Foreign Office suggested that I accompany Mr. Lory and present him to Dr. Wang. I did so, and was present during the interview.

After the usual preliminary greetings, Mr. Lory inquired whether he might ask Dr. Wang a few questions with the understanding that Dr. Wang would not hesitate to decline to reply to them if he saw fit. Dr. Wang indicated his willingness to consider Mr. Lory's questions.

1. Mr. Lory asked what attitude China would take in event of a war between Soviet Russia and Japan, the possibilities of which are now being so much discussed.

Dr. Wang stated that he would speak, in strict confidence, and not for publication. He pointed out that both Soviet Russia and Japan have set up "puppet states" on Chinese territory - in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria; that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was fought on Chinese territory; that China of course knows that if war comes again between these countries it will be fought principally on "Chinese soil"; that there have been proposals that China should support Japan in such a war against Soviet Russia with the promise that if Japan is successful China will receive certain privileges and benefits; that China

knows

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knows full well that if Japan were successful in a war with Soviet Russia, Japan would continue encroachment in China; that there have been suggestions that Soviet Russia should be supported against Japan, but China knows full well that nothing can be gained by such action; that if Soviet Russia wishes to show goodwill toward China it would restore Outer Mongolia and terminate the Communist activities in Kiangsi Province; that China will support neither Japan nor Soviet Russia in event of a Russo-Japanese war; that it is realized that such a war would bring much difficulty for China, and, particularly in North China, would result in disorders and a general disruption of Chinese affairs, but that China nevertheless is resolved not to support either Soviet Russia or Japan. Dr. Wang went on to make the positive statement that since assuming the portfolio of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs he has been approached from both Soviet Russia and Japan for Chinese support in event of war between those two countries and that he had turned a deaf ear to both sides. He stated that the Chinese attitude would be not to support either Russia or Japan, that this policy was discussed with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek when Dr. Wang visited him recently in Kiangsi, and that the Generalissimo is completely in accord with the view of Dr. Wang on the subject.

2. Mr. Lory inquired whether there has been any change in the Chinese Government attitude toward Japan over the Manchurian question.

Dr. Wang replied that there can be no alteration in the Chinese position toward the Manchurian question, but said that he might illustrate the present attitude by pointing out that when a man has a sore arm and it is struck

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a heavy blow by an antagonist he may have to fold his arms for the time being but this does not mean that he intends to suffer the affront and injury indefinitely.

3. Mr. Lory asked whether Dr. Wang shares the opinion held in certain quarters that there has come about a change of attitude in the United States with reference to Japan and the Manchurian question.

Dr. Wang replied that he does not share any such opinion; that the United States is a peace-loving country, that it has endeavored by peaceful means to correct Japan's bad manners toward China, that the United States may feel that it should not resort to war with Japan, but that it does not follow that, having failed to obtain a modification of Japan's attitude and a solution of the problems of the Pacific, the United States is disposed to acquiesce in Japan's aggression.

Mr. Lory explained to Dr. Wang that in asking the question he had had in mind the propaganda which Japan has been disseminating in the United States on the subject of the Manchurian question, the encouragement of visits of American students to Japan and Manchuria, and other measures.

Dr. Wang remarked that Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, has repeatedly expressed himself to the effect that Japan's international problems can be solved without resort to war, and that the press propaganda and other measures mentioned by Mr. Lory apparently represent the implementing of Mr. Hirota's plans as so expressed.

4. Mr. Lory asked whether the Chinese people are changing their attitude toward the Manchurian question, feeling, perhaps, that Japan's aggression in Manchuria is not essentially different from the imperialist expansion of other Nations in the past at the expense of weaker States.

Dr.

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Dr. Wang replied that the Chinese are not modifying their attitude on the subject. Manchuria, he pointed out, has a population of 25,000,000 Chinese out of a total 30,000,000 people in the area. There is no question of "race" in the Manchurian problem. Manchuria is overwhelmingly Chinese. It is an integral part of China. The Chinese can not be content to allow Japan to come in and take for itself this large Chinese territory with its millions of Chinese inhabitants. Further, Japan's ambitions do not extend to Manchuria alone; Japan plans domination of all China, as Britain dominates India. The Chinese do not wish to become "Indian Chinese".

5. Mr. Lory inquired whether the Government is confident that the Communist problem will soon be solved.

Dr. Wang pointed out that the recent successes of the Government troops give proof that the situation will soon be solved from the military standpoint; but he said that the situation is also regarded with satisfaction from the point of view that the Communist movement is breaking down of its own weakness. The Communists had tried various plans and theories but they have not been successful. The problem of the National Government is one of rehabilitation of the people of Kiangsi and improvement of means of communication; in short, reconstruction. The Government is bending its energies toward this end.

6. Mr. Lory asked whether there has been any recent improvement in the relations between the National Government and the faction at Canton.

Dr. Wang replied that the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi for some time have not been in accord with the central government. They are not prepared, however, to

attack

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attack the central government; their military strength and resources are limited. On the other hand the central government could feel practically 100% certain that if military measures were undertaken against these two provinces they would be successful. But he (Dr. Wang Ching-wei) wished to state emphatically that so long as he remains in his present post or as a member of the central government, military force will not be used for the subjugation of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. He prefers rather to overcome the opposition to the central government in those provinces by proof of the success, ability and good intentions of the National Government in the development of the territory under its control. The Government is bending its energies toward constructive measures. The evidence of its accomplishments in that direction will eventually and effectively overcome the opposition in Kwangtung and Kwangsi to the complete unification of the country. Meanwhile, those provinces have limited military strength and resources; they could not successfully attack the National Government; about all they can do is from time to time to issue telegrams to foreign governments attacking the policies and actions of the National Government, but even such measures have been abandoned as the malcontents in the South have come to realize that they are without effect or benefit. Dr. Wang stated the government has repeatedly sent military expeditions to suppress rebellious factions in the Provinces, but such measures have never been permanently successful, and Dr. Wang prefers peaceful measures for the solution of the problem of the Southwest.

In terminating the interview, Dr. Wang Ching-wei again

repeated

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repeated that he was speaking in strict confidence and not for publication. Mr. Lory thanked Dr. Wang for his frank confidence.

C. E. Gauss.


CEG:HC

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 741.61/432 FOR Tel. #320.9am

FROM U.S.S.R. (Bullitt) DATED Sept. 24, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Relations between Japan and China. Desirable to have the Japanese firmly planted between the Soviet Union and China as a bar to Soviet advance and to have the eyes of the Japanese directed toward the continent of Asia rather than toward the Southern Pacific.

rc

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handwritten: Not returned
BC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (B)

Moscow

Dated September 24, 1934.

Received 3:50 PM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

320 September 24, 9 a.m. *1432*

The British Charge d'affaires informed me this
morning that the first fruits of the political rapproche-
ment between England and the Soviet Union would be a
payment by the Soviet Government of three million pounds
in settlement of the Lena Goldfields claim. He added that
the British Government had refused to talk about loans or
credits in England until this claim had been settled and
said that the Soviet Government was most anxious to obtain a
long term loan in England.

I asked him if he had the Lena Goldfields settlement
money in hand or the contract with regard to it already
on paper. He replied that he had not but that the
promises of the Foreign Office were explicit and that the
definite agreement would be signed this week. *42*

In discussing British policy in the Far East
the British Charge d'Affaires said that the Foreign Office
now felt that a great mistake had been made in the
policy

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policy pursued with regard to Manchuria and now favored acquiescence in Japan's possession of Manchuria and in addition encouragement to Japan to occupy inner and outer Mongolia. He asserted that his government believed that it was desirable to have the Japanese firmly planted between the Soviet Union and China as a bar to Soviet advance and to have the eyes of the Japanese directed toward the continent of Asia rather than toward the Southern Pacific. He insisted that Great Britain would oppose further southward advances of the Japanese in China. As the British Charge d'Affaires has just returned from a long visit to London I believe that his remarks may describe accurately the point of view of his government.

BULLITT

WSB CSB



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1006 Political

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AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Geneva, Switzerland, September 14, 1934



SUBJECT: Transmitting Pamphlet of the Geneva
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"Manchukuo".

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SIR:

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I have the honor to forward herewith three copies of
1/ a pamphlet entitled "The League and 'Manchukuo'", Geneva
Special Studies, Volume 5, No. 3, published by the Geneva
Research Center.

As I have previously explained in transmitting publi-
cations of this organization, the Geneva Research Center
is a private American group which prepares reports and
studies on various activities of the League. Although much
of its information is undoubtedly derived from informal
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connection with the League and the latter assumes no respon-
sibility for its work or any statements appearing in its
reports.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
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Enclosure No 1
with No 1006 BR. 62
Sept. 14, 1934

THE LEAGUE AND "MANCHUKUO"

The Sixth Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict

January 1, 1933—August 1, 1934

GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES

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THE LEAGUE AND "MANCHUKUO"

The Sixth Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict

January 1, 1933-August 1, 1934

IN Manchuria, China and Japan have been at grips over a long period for command of one of the last great undeveloped regions of the earth. To be understood, the question needs to be seen in terms of population and its pressure upon natural resources. How rapidly the population of China may be increasing, probably no one knows to any great degree of exactness; but the migration of Chinese into Manchuria in the 20th century at a rate estimated to have brought their total above 25 millions is one measure of its momentum. Across the China Sea in Japan, the indicator as to numbers of people is mounting at the rate of a million a year—faster than in any other nation. Returns issued by the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics for 1932 showed a figure for births of 2,182,743, the largest ever recorded for Japan, almost 33 per 1000, and a figure for deaths of 1,174,875, under 18 per 1000, the lowest rate ever recorded—or a natural gain of 1,007,868, over 15 per 1000. At the beginning of this century, the growth of Japanese population was about 500,000 a year. Now, according to the Tokyo correspondent of the London "Times",¹ the working population of the ages between 15 and 59 is greater by 400,000 to 500,000 each year; and since half of these are young men work must be found for at least 250,000 additional persons and probably more. The Cabinet Bureau of Statistics announced on Nov. 14, 1933, that the population of Japan proper was 66,238,000, an increase of 942,600 over the computed figures for 1932—959 inha-

bitants to the square kilometre of cultivated land, a more crowded country than any in Europe. Whatever the gauge of population pressure for future years, the actual problem of more mouths to feed and more employment to find remains for the new millions already born. And the London "Times" correspondent concludes:

A poor, proud, heavily-armed nation can hardly be expected, as a Japanese writer has said, to "starve in saintly submission in its own back yard."

The Stakes in "Manchukuo"

EVIDENCE of the issues at stake in the contest for Manchuria is contained in the investigations that have been made as to Oriental reserves of coal and iron—the essential materials for developing industrial production and trade. So far as the area included in the Japanese-created state of "Manchukuo" is concerned, in relation to China and Japan, expert surveys have revealed the following significant situation:¹

It has been indicated that the study of the iron ores of the Far East has proved especially disappointing in view of the expectations that had been previously held. The iron ore reserves of China, as to which excellent data are available, have been reviewed in particular detail. Tegengren

¹ Dec. 8, 1933.

¹ *Ores and Industry in the Far East*. H. FOSTER BAIN. Council on Foreign Relations. New York. Revised and enlarged edition, 1933. Chapter on "Manchuria and Jehol". P. 211 ff.

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in his final summary credited the country with 396,000,000 tons of "actual" ore containing 166,000,000 tons of iron, and 555,700,000 tons of "potential" ore containing 202,200,000 tons of iron. The larger part of this reserve is, however, in the Archean: 295,000,000 tons of "actual" ore with 110,000,000 tons of iron and 477,000,000 of "potential", with 159,000,000 tons of iron. The Archean ore is found mainly in Manchuria, all but some 10,000,000 tons of the potential metallic iron being credited to deposits in Fengtien. If for the moment Manchuria be regarded as separate from China, there would remain but little more than 500,000,000 tons of known or potential iron ore for China with a content of less than 200,000,000 tons of metallic iron. Such a reserve is obviously inadequate to any large-scale building up of the heavy industries on the basis of local ores.

In Japan, the situation is no better. The iron ore resources of Japan proper are quite definitely limited, a total reserve of 80,000,000 tons of ore being the estimate of the Geological Survey and its commercial value being in part doubtful. . . . To this it may be added that the domestic source of coke is almost equally deficient. It is, therefore, not only as a strategic frontier, a source of food, and a possible field for colonization, that Manchuria is important to Japan as well as to China, but for Japan it is the most available local source of supply of coking coal and iron ore. To a limited and minor extent other mineral resources in the territory are important; but coal and iron, the two great work horses of modern industry, are the most vital. . . .

Manchuria has long been one of the great dependencies of China proper. . . . Exact surveys had not been extended over Manchuria but the area is estimated to contain about 385,000 square miles. . . . In the heart of this country is a great prairie plain very similar in appearance and character to our Iowa-Minnesota country and roughly 600 miles from north to south and 400 miles from east to west. . . . The central plain is agricultural, forming one of the world's great granaries and is adapted to raising wheat, corn, beans and many other foods. In the mountains around this plain, and especially on their lower slopes, a variety of mineral deposits occur and in a topographically unimportant but geologically significant belt of older rocks stretching across the southern portion of the area from Chosen into Chihli, are iron and other ores. . . .

The total coal reserve of Manchuria was estimated by Hsieh at 2,950 million tons. In Wong's estimate of 1924 Mukden and Kirin were credited with 1,145 million tons and no estimate made of the remainder. Engineers of the South Manchuria Railway credit the country with a reserve of the order of 1,700 million tons. Whatever the exact figure may finally prove to be, it is clear that the region is adequately supplied with coal for all probable needs and, what is of particular importance, has important reserves of coking coal. At present the annual output is about 9,000,000 tons, of which about half is exported as coal or coke.

Aside from coal the mineral which has attracted most attention is iron. . . . Tegengren estimated that in Manchuria the iron range as a whole contains a probable tonnage of 740,000,000; but this is material which can not be used without beneficiation. Of the high grade, or workable natural ore. Tegengren credits the district with a total tonnage of 6,300,000. No great iron industry could be built up on any such limited supply and the Japanese engineers have properly made valiant efforts to develop a beneficiation process which will render a portion at least of the remainder of the iron-bearing material available for furnace use. . . .

Despite what has been said as to the handicap the low grade of the iron ore in Manchuria offers to the development of a local steel industry, it is to be remembered that the ores, such as they are, exist in large quantities and are so situated as to be cheaply mined. It is technically feasible to beneficiate them, though at a price. They constitute the largest source of supply near or under the control of Japan and such a supply is vital to the further industrialization of that country. The Japanese are to be credited with marked enterprise and heavy expenditure in their persistent efforts to develop these ores and have every inducement to continue. . . .

Jehol was long famous among the Chinese for its silver mines which have been described by A. S. Wheler, H. C. Hoover, and others. . . . Gold, as well as lead, are said to have been found near Pingchuan, and tungsten has been reported. . . .

In the eastern part of the province there are coal fields yielding both anthracite and bituminous and a part of the latter, at least, is of coking grade. Hsieh credits the province with a reserve of 660,000,000 tons of coal, and W. H. Wong estimates it at 930,000,000. Modern collieries have

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been opened in both the Tayokow and Pei Pao fields. These are connected by rail with the Peking-Mukden line at Chinchow and the latter in turn with the port at Hulutao. It was proposed to link these various projects together in such fashion as to secure, to the Chinese, a wholly independent coal and transportation unit between the Japanese-dominated enterprises to the east and the Kailan Mining Administration to the west, in which there is a large Belgian-British interest. It has been suggested that the insistence of the Japanese military authorities on occupying Chinchow was in part due to the desire to head off this source of future commercial competition. . . .

In view of the shortage of material for steel manufacture faced by both Chinese

and Japanese. . . . it is inevitable that the mineral resources of Manchuria and Jehol should attract their competitive efforts. . . . In proportion to population. . . . the resources of the region are relatively more abundant than in either Japan or China within the Wall. Before the recent extension of their power outside the leased territory and the railway zone, the Japanese had. . . . already in their control, the larger part of the local deposits of significance from the point of view of manufacture of pig iron. Reaching out for the remainder of the territory must find its economic justification in other directions or in the desire to establish a monopoly over the coking coal of the region.

JAPAN BREAKS WITH THE LEAGUE AND TAKES JEHOI

AGAINST this background of contest for access to food supplies and control of raw materials, events continued to move rapidly during the first part of 1933. The opening months of the year saw the climax of efforts in Geneva for a conciliatory settlement of the dispute between China and Japan, and the consolidation of Japanese plans for the new vassal state of "Manchukuo" by the annexation of Jehol Province. When Japan refused the basis of agreement advocated by the League Assembly Committee of 19, charged to follow the affair, the League of Nations turned to the method of recommendations regardless of the disputants' votes. This led to Japan's rejection of the Assembly report and notification of her intent to withdraw from the League. In the period following this announcement, League activities centered largely about endeavors to give practical effect to the principle of refusal to recognize "Manchukuo" and about measures to be taken in carrying out certain of the Lytton Commission's proposals, particularly those related to aid for reconstruction in China.

Japan inaugurated the year by moving her forces on Shanhaikwan, a seaport at the border between "Manchukuo" and China proper, on January 1st, occupying the city the next day. This proved to prepare for a fresh campaign in the Province of Jehol and for its incorporation in the new state. Action

was developing decisively towards the clear break which the League Powers had been striving to avoid.

In Geneva, the League Assembly Committee of 19 resumed sessions. It had, on December 15, 1932, presented to the disputants the texts of resolutions providing for conciliation and a "Statement of Reasons" to explain the exact position that its members were taking.¹ During the interval, M. Matsuoka,² the Japanese delegate, had been endeavoring, by conferences

¹ See *The League and the Lytton Report*. Geneva Special Studies. Vol. III, No. 10, p. 34 ff.

² Mr. Yusoke Matsuoka (age 52) was taken by his parents at the age of 10 to the United States, where he grew up, took his primary schooling, and later went to the University of Oregon from which he was graduated with the degrees A.B. and L.L.B. In 1900, he returned to Japan and engaged in the study of law at Meijo University. He entered the diplomatic and consular service in 1904, and was appointed to the Japanese delegation at Paris in 1919. Later he became assistant chief of the Bureau of Intelligence in the Japanese Foreign Office, and served in the London and Washington embassies.

In 1921 he was appointed director of the South Manchurian Railway, which post he held until 1926, and in 1927 was elected vice-president. A member of the Seiyu party (Seiyukai), he was elected to the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet in 1930 and re-elected in January, 1932. He was also a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in Kyoto in 1930, where he took a very active part.

He was sent to Shanghai at the time of the incident there in 1932, to negotiate with the Chinese Government, and in October of 1932 was named first delegate of the Japanese delegation to the special League Assembly.

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arranged through the Japanese Under-Secretary of the League, M. Sugimura, with the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, to arrive at some compromise formula. To this Dr. Yen, the Chinese delegate, objected that he was uninformed.

Beginning on Monday, January 16, the Committee moved in four subsequent meetings during that week from a breakdown of attempts at conciliation to the preparation of a report under Paragraph 4 of Article XV of the League Covenant, providing for action without reference to the votes of parties in a dispute.

When the Committee met on the 16th, after its adjournment of almost a month to allow the Geneva delegates of the parties to consult their Governments, information from Mr. Matsuoka indicated that certain fresh proposals were coming from Tokyo but could not be transmitted before a lapse of 48 hours. Based on suggestions from the Japanese delegate in Geneva, these were understood to call for decisions by the Cabinet and possibly by the Emperor. The members of the Committee, not in a mood for further delays,

¹ These texts, with Chinese and Japanese amendments submitted, were reported as follows:

Texts drafted by the Committee of 19 and communicated to the Chinese and Japanese Delegations, December 15, 1932.)

Draft Resolution No. 1.

The Assembly,

Recognising that, according to the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, its first duty is to endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and that consequently it is not at present called upon to draw up a report stating the facts of the dispute and its recommendations in regard thereto;

Considering that by its resolution of the 11th March, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute;

Affirms that in such a settlement the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty must be respected;

Decides to set up a Committee whose duty will be to conduct, in conjunction with the Parties, the negotiations with a view to a settlement, on the basis of the principles set out in Chapter IX of the report of the Commission of Enquiry, and having regard to the suggestions made in Chapter X of that report;

Chinese Amendment suggested:

Decides to set up a committee whose duty will be to conduct, in conjunction with the parties, the negotiations with a view to settlement, guided by the findings of essential facts set out in the first eight chapters of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, and on the basis of the principles laid down in its aforesaid Resolution of March 11th, 1932, and those set out in Chapter 9 of the said Report, taking

expressed freely their opinion that conciliation no longer held out any hope of success. Sir John Simon, the British representative, on this occasion, exhibited marked discontent and urged that the Committee prepare for its report and recommendations as called for by the Covenant. These, he intimated, should be short and simple, and should include outright acceptance of the Lytton Report which the Assembly might adopt as its own. M. Massigli, for France, supported him, as did Dr. Lange of Norway, Mr. Unden of Sweden, and Mr. Motta of Switzerland. From London, press reports said that the American Ambassador there had represented the position of the United States as unaltering.*

The Committee decided to await Japan's proposals; but on the 18th these were seen to fall so far short of agreement with the proposed resolutions and "Statement of Reasons" of December 15, as to offer no reconciliation.¹

* The incoming and outgoing Secretaries of State kept in close consultation from the time when President-elect Roosevelt nominated Senator Cordell Hull until his induction into office.

(Amendments proposed by the Japanese Government, January 18, 1933.)

Draft Resolution No. 1.

The Assembly,

1. Recognising that, according to the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, its first duty is to endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and that consequently it is not at present called upon to draw up a report stating the facts of the dispute and its recommendations in regard thereto;

2. Considering that by its resolution of the 11th March, 1932, it laid down the principles determining the attitude of the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute;

3. Considering that the principles set out in chapter IX of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry present a useful basis for effecting such a settlement;

4. Considering that it is within its competence, in the paramount interest of world peace, to define to what extent the above principles may be applied to the developments of the situation in the Far East;

5. Decides that, for this practical work of settlement, the Special Committee of Nineteen will appoint among its members a small Committee which will be entrusted with the task of helping the two Parties to reach a final and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between them;

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The Committee of 19 wished, however, to clarify the issue between itself and Japan by causing any break to take place on a question of principle rather than one of procedure. So, since the Japanese objected to the inclusion of non-member states in the conciliation body and also to numerous points of principle in the Committee's resolution, such as mention of the Covenant, Pact of Paris, and Nine Power Treaty and reference to the refusal of recognition to "Manchukuo", the Committee put this question to Japan: If the Committee yielded on the point of inviting non-member states to the conciliation body, would Japan accept the remainder of the resolution?

special note that the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria cannot be regarded as a solution.

Appoints, to form a Committee, the Members of the League represented on the Special Committee of 19;

Considering it desirable that the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. should consent to take part in the negotiations, entrusts to the above-mentioned Committee the duty of inviting the Governments of the United States of America and U.S.S.R. to take part in these negotiations;

(The Japanese proposed deletion of this paragraph.)

Authorises it to take such measures as it may deem necessary for the successful execution of its mission;

Requests the Committee to report on its work before the 1st March, 1933.

The Committee will have power to fix in agreement with the two Parties the time-limit referred to in the Assembly resolution of the 1st July, 1932; should the two Parties fail to agree on the duration of such a time-limit the Committee will, simultaneously with the presentation of its report, submit proposals to the Assembly on the subject.

Chinese Amendment suggested:

The Committee will have power to fix in agreement with the two parties the time-limit referred to in the Assembly Resolution of July 1st, 1932; should the two parties fail to agree on the duration of such a time-limit the Committee, simultaneously with the presentation of its Report, or the Special Committee of 19, will submit proposals to the Assembly for a time-limit which, if it is necessary to make a report as provided for under paragraph 4 of article 15 of the Covenant, shall not exceed one month from the date of such submission.

The Assembly shall remain in session, and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

Draft Resolution No. 2.

The Assembly thanks the Commission of Enquiry appointed in virtue of the Council's resolution of the 10th December, 1931, for the valuable assistance it has afforded to the League of Nations and declares that its report will stand as an example of conscientious and impartial work.

Japanese Amendment suggested:

The Assembly thanks the Commission of Enquiry appointed in virtue of the Council's Resolution of the 10th

It decided to wait two days for a reply. Mr. Matsuoka was pursuing meanwhile his efforts through Mr. Sugimura to draft a counter-suggestion, in conference with Sir Eric Drummond. The Japanese answer, when it came on the second day, was equivocal, in effect returning to the basic position by reversing the question thus: If Japan yielded on the inclusion of non-member states, would the Committee modify other parts of its resolution? The parts concerned were understood to be particularly mention of The Nine Power Treaty on China and of refusal to recognize "Manchukuo."

The Committee was neither able nor disposed

6. Authorises the above-mentioned small Committee to take such measures as it may deem necessary for the successful execution of its mission;

7. Requests the said Committee to keep the Special Committee of Nineteen informed of its work, so as to enable the latter to report to the Assembly before the 1st of March, 1933.

8. The Special Committee of Nineteen will have power to fix in agreement with the two Parties the time-limit referred to in the Assembly Resolution of the 1st July, 1932; should the two Parties fail to agree on the duration of such a time-limit the Committee will submit proposals to the Assembly on the subject simultaneously with the presentation of its final report concerning the task entrusted to it by the Assembly under paragraph 3 of Article 15.

9. The Assembly shall remain in session, and its President may convene it as soon as he may deem this necessary.

Draft Resolution No. 2.

(Amendment proposed by the Japanese Government same as given opposite for December.)

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to alter the principles for the resolution of the special Assembly. With full appreciation of the gravity of turning from conciliation to independent recommendations, it agreed that this choice had become inevitable, and decided to inform the Chinese as to the course of the negotiations. Waiting until a meeting on the following day, the 21st, the Committee then learned that Japan still refused to accept substantially its resolution, and moved on towards consideration of a report drafted by the Secretariat in advance.

Voices of Japan and France

COUNT Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, delivered on that same day an address at the opening of the Diet in Tokyo in which he

December, 1931, for the valuable assistance it has afforded to the League of Nations, and declares that its Report constitutes an invaluable contribution to the efforts of the League for the maintenance of peace.

Statement of Reasons.

The Assembly, in its resolution of the 9th December, 1932, requested its Special Committee:

- " 1. To study the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the observations of the parties, and the opinions and suggestions expressed in the Assembly, in whatever form they were submitted;
- " 2. To draw up proposals with a view to the settlement of the dispute brought before it under the Council Resolution dated the 19th February, 1932;
- " 3. To submit these proposals to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment."

If the Committee had had to lay before the Assembly a picture of events and an appreciation of the general situation it would have found all the elements necessary for such a statement in the first eight chapters of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, which in its opinion constitute a balanced, impartial and complete statement of the principal facts.

But the time has not come for such a statement. In accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the Assembly must first of all endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute by conciliation, and if such efforts are successful, it shall publish a statement giving such facts as it may deem appropriate. If it fails, it is its duty, in virtue of paragraph 4 of the same article, to make a statement of the facts of the dispute and recommendations in regard thereto.

So long as the efforts on the basis of Article 15, paragraph 3, are continued, a sense of the responsibilities placed on the Assembly in the various contingencies provided for in the Covenant obliges it to maintain a particular reserve. Hence, the Committee has confined itself, in the draft resolution which it is to-day submitting to the Assembly, to making proposals with a view to conciliation.

By the Assembly's resolution of the 11th March, the Special Committee was instructed to endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with

recalled the Protocol of September 15, 1933, recognizing "Manchukuo" and providing for its joint defence, and said in regard to Jehol:

... Viewed historically, there is no room for doubt as to the fact that the Great Wall marks the boundary separating China from Manchuria and Mongolia. Particularly in the light of circumstances leading to the establishment of Manchukuo, it is evident that the province of Jehol constitutes an integral part of the new state. However, manoeuvres for creating disturbances in that province have of late been notoriously rife and some contingents of regular troops under Chang Hsueh-liang have crossed the border into the province. While the so-called Jehol question is purely a domestic affair for Manchukuo, Japan is of course bound by the recent protocol to join forces with that country in the task of

Statement of Reasons.

(Suggested for the President of the Committee of Nineteen.)

1. The Assembly, in its resolution of December 9th, 1932, requested its Special Committee:

- " (1) To study the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the observations of the parties, and the opinions and suggestions expressed in the Assembly, in whatever form they were submitted;
- " (2) To draw up proposals with a view to the settlement of the dispute brought before it under the Council Resolution dated February 19th, 1932;
- " (3) To submit these proposals to the Assembly at the earliest possible moment."

2. If the Committee had had to lay before the Assembly a picture of events and an appreciation of the general situation it would have found all the elements necessary for such a statement in the first eight chapters of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry.

3. But the time has not come for such a statement. In accordance with Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the Assembly must first of all endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute by conciliation, and if such efforts are successful, it shall publish a statement giving such facts as it may deem appropriate.

4. So long as the efforts on the basis of Article 15, paragraph 3, are continued, a sense of the responsibilities placed on the Assembly in the various contingencies provided for in the Covenant obliges it to maintain a particular reserve. Hence, the Committee has confined itself, in the draft resolution which it is to-day submitting to the Assembly, to making proposals with a view to the settlement of the dispute.

5. By the Assembly's resolution of March 11th, the Special Committee was instructed to endeavour to prepare the settlement of the dispute in agreement with the parties.

maintaining peace and order throughout its territory. The question, therefore, in view of this treaty obligation, is a matter of serious concern to the Government of Japan.

Significantly, concerning the League and the Lytton Report, he continued later:

The report of what has come to be called the Lytton Commission on the Sino-Japanese question was submitted to the Council of the League of Nations in October last and the observations of the Japanese Government on the same report were submitted in November to the same body. . . . Our observations are simply an elaboration from different angles of the fundamental view of the Japanese Government that the

parties. Since on the other hand it is desirable that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. should join in the efforts made in collaboration with the representatives of the parties, it is proposed that the Governments of these two countries should be invited to take part in the negotiations.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, and to make it plain that what is contemplated at the present stage with the co-operation of two countries not Members of the League is solely the negotiation of a settlement by conciliation, the Special Committee suggests that it should be regarded for this purpose as a new Committee responsible for conducting negotiations and should be authorised in this capacity to invite the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to take part in its meetings.

The Negotiations Committee will have all the powers necessary for the execution of its mission. In particular it may consult experts. It may, if it thinks fit, delegate part of its powers to one or more sub-committees, or to one or more particularly qualified persons.

The Members of the Negotiations Committee will be guided as regards matters of law by Parts I and II of the Assembly resolution of the 11th March, 1932, and as regards matters of fact by the findings set out in the first eight chapters of the report of the Commission of Enquiry. As regards the solutions to be considered, they will seek them on the basis of the principles set out in Chapter IX of the report of the Commission of Enquiry and having regard to the suggestions made in Chapter X of the said report.

In this connection the Committee of Nineteen considers that, in the special circumstances which characterise the dispute, a mere return to the *(de facto)* conditions previous to September 1931, would not suffice to ensure a durable settlement, and that the maintenance and recognition of the present régime in Manchuria could not be regarded as a solution.

(The Japanese proposed deletion of this paragraph.)

Chinese Amendment suggested:

In this connection the Committee of Nineteen considers that, in the special circumstances which characterise the dispute, while fully respecting the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, a mere return to the *de facto* condition previous to September 1931 would not suffice to ensure a durable settlement, and that the maintenance and recognition of the present régime in Manchuria could not be regarded as a solution.

— 9 —

peace of the Far East can be secured only by recognizing Manchukuo and assisting it to achieve a healthy growth. Our Government have seized every occasion at the Council and the Assembly of the League and in the course of negotiations with other governments to expound this thesis of our observations with the utmost care and thoroughness. We will persist in our endeavours not only as regards the special Committee of Nineteen, which resumed its discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute on January 16, but at various meetings of the League and at every possible opportunity until the above thesis is thoroughly elucidated and understood.

... The League of Nations Covenant very wisely provides that regional understandings shall be respected. In this sense,

6. For the practical work of settlement, it is proposed that the Special Committee should appoint among its members a small Committee which will be entrusted with the task of helping the two Parties to reach a final and fundamental solution of the question at issue between them.

7. The small Committee will have all the powers necessary for the execution of its mission. In particular it may consult and make use of the services of experts.

8. The Members of the small Committee will be guided as regards matters of law by the principles of the Assembly resolution of March 11th, 1932, and as regards matters of fact, account being taken of the observations of the Parties, by the findings set out in the first eight chapters of the report of the Commission of Enquiry. As regards the solutions to be considered, they will seek them, as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Resolution, on the basis of the principles set out in Chapter IX of the report of the Commission of Enquiry.

9. The report of the Special Committee of Nineteen will be submitted to the Assembly which will take such decision as may be appropriate thereto. Further, in order that the settlement of the dispute may not be made more difficult, the Committee firmly expects, and I feel sure that the Assembly will agree, that no Member of the League will take action which is not in conformity with the principles contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, its own resolution of March 11th, and the present Resolution.

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our Government believe that any plan for an erecting edifice of peace in the Far East should be based upon the recognition that the constructive force of Japan is the mainstay of tranquility in this part of the world.

M. Herriot of France contributed on the 22nd an article to the "Excelsior" of Paris, in which he put these contrasting views:

Since the beginning of this year, the situation has become decidedly worse in the Far East, on account of the Jehol affair. While memoranda were being exchanged in Geneva on the Chinese Japanese dispute, the military authorities of the Kwantung Army (Japanese) forbade Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to allow his troops to enter into the Jehol Province, considered (by the Japanese) as a part of Manchukuo. Then, suddenly on the 2nd of January, the Japanese bombarded and occupied Shan-Hai-Kwan.

Simultaneously, in Tokyo, Count Uchida made public the intentions of Japan, not only in regard to Manchuria, but also Mongolia, stating their desire to exploit these two regions . . .

All that can be said is that an impartial judge of the facts would come to the conclusion that this enterprise could have been foreseen. On the 29th of September, 1931, Tang Yu-lin, First Commissioner of the Jehol Province, declared his independence, and notified the Nanking Government of his decision. But Chang Hsueh-liang, stationed at Chinchow, had compelled him to disclaim this attitude. The despatch sent from Chang-chun, on the 12th of March, 1932, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo to different countries, among them being the United States, stated that Jehol was to belong to the State of Manchuria. We were, therefore, forewarned.

It will be difficult, we believe, to reach the truth concerning recent events which caused the bombardment of Shan-Hai-Kwan. It is stated in Tokyo that the Japanese troops has asked in vain that the Chinese fortifications of the Nan-Kwan neighbourhood be destroyed. This demand was certainly difficult to accept, if it could not be explained by exceptional reasons. It is a demand which is not conducive to a successful termination of the negotiations begun in Geneva on the 16th of January, by the Committee of Nineteen. It is a demand which can hardly be favourable to concilia-

tion wished by all sensible people and nations . . .

Viewed from a distance, and on first information, the affair of Jehol seems to us to be another episode in the development of an historical process, carried through with great determination and cold-bloodedness . . .

For my part, I should be much surprised if this Shan-Hai-Kwan incident, which I am trying above all to examine and understand, is not in miniature a fresh scene of that great historical drama, in whose name the Empire of the Rising Sun intends to subject China to her rule . . .

The League of Nations has been entrusted with the tremendous task of opposing this ardent on-rush of determination and youth by the laws of justice. This is a very noble task. But the least that can be said of it, is that to carry through this task, to seek solutions (solutions of conciliation, firstly, and if possible a solution of justice, if conciliation does not succeed), the absence of the United States at Geneva is an irreparable lacuna. I mention this as one who loves truth: this absence places upon Europe a responsibility too heavy for her to bear. This is what we must think over, and Japan knows this fact full well. And a friend of the United States raises his voice to say so, at a time when the Shan-Hai-Kwan incident is making the question of Manchukuo, already formidable enough, more complicated. If the League of Nations is left comparatively powerless, the disastrous consequences will be seen in the future . . .

The Breaking-Point of Conciliation

THE Committee of 19 considered on Monday, the 23rd, the broad lines of the Secretariat draft report conceived in four parts: 1, an account of the failure of conciliation; 2, the development of the dispute both in Geneva and the Far East, constituting essentially the first eight chapters of the Lytton Report; 3, conclusions to be drawn; and 4, recommendations. Having rejected the British contention for a Committee discussion of a possible short and simple statement, it decided to set a drafting group composed of delegates of the Great Powers, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Spain and Switzerland to work on the first three parts, which they were to submit on February 4th to the full

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Committee. In the deliberations on drafting, the indication that American policy had not altered and would not alter with the change of administration on March 4 was understood to have an influence. ¹

The Japanese delegation issued an official press communiqué on the 24th, explaining its position in the crisis and asserting its desire for conciliation. Intense activity was reported in governmental circles in Japan, meanwhile; consultations went on between the Emperor, Count Uchida and elder statesmen. The Cabinet met to forward final instructions to delegation in Geneva, which were understood to have been received on February 2, to hold a firm position and insist that no concession could be made in regard to "Manchukuo". The issue turned on the question of inserting in the Committee's report the principle of refusing recognition. Meanwhile the possibility of conciliation remained technically open.

Repeated meetings of the Committee of Nineteen were held throughout the month preparatory to the notable gathering of the Assembly on February 21. Hitler came into power in Germany, meanwhile, and Europe was in a ferment of political uncertainty. Japan continued to the last to insist that she would make no compromise regarding the independence of "Manchukuo", and it was on this point that the break at last came.

Mr. Matsuoka was finally trying to get the Committee to leave recognition of "Manchukuo" as an open question, without taking definite position, and also to recommend that a League Committee of Conciliation should "assist" rather than "conduct" negotiations between China and Japan. ² On February 9, the Committee asked Japan by letter whether she accepted, as a part of the basis of conciliation, principle 7 in Chapter 9 of the Lytton Report, regarding the establishment in Manchuria of a measure of autonomy consistent with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China. The Japanese delegation replied

on February 14th¹ that its Government was convinced that the maintenance and recognition of the independence of "Manchukuo" were the only guarantee of peace in the Far East and that the whole question would eventually be solved between Japan and China on that basis. That ended the attempts at conciliation. The Committee adopted its report and the accompanying recommendations; and convoked the Assembly for the 21st.

Article XV and Article XVI

DURING this period, the question of a link between Article XV of the League Covenant, under which the Committee was proceeding, and Article XVI, providing for economic and military means of pressure upon a recalcitrant state, began to come up. It was known to have been discussed particularly at the meeting of the 4th, on the initiative of M. Motta of Switzerland, and again on the 6th. In regard to the suggestion that, once the resources of Article XV were exhausted, Article XVI would come into action automatically, the Secretary-General was understood to have held on advice from his legal counsellors that all the Articles of the Covenant were distinct and separate and that no one automatically brought another into effect.

In the Committee debates, despite divergencies, this view apparently tended to rally majority support. M. Massigli, the French delegate, was understood to have argued, in this connection, that any recommendations for measures to be taken should be examined, before presentation to the Assembly, not only with the United States but also with the Soviet Union. Other members of the Committee agreed, feeling that otherwise the League would risk making ineffectual pronouncements,² since the collaboration of these Powers would be decisive in the application of any proposals.

¹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement. No. 112. Annex 5, p. 82.

² As in October-November, 1931, when the United States did not endorse the Council's fixing of a time limit for the withdrawal of Japanese troops in Manchuria. See *The League and Manchuria*. Geneva Special Studies, Vol. II, No. 12, December 1931, p. 18.

¹ See p. 6.

² See contrasting texts, footnote p. 7-9. The principle was in fact stated in this form in the final recommendations, See footnote, p. 18.

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By the 17th, the Committee had completed its draft report which was circulated to States members and non-members of the League and to the press. In order to permit overseas Governments time to study this important document before a decision should be taken by the Assembly, the whole text of the Report, some 15,000 words, was transmitted by radio-telegraph from the League's wireless station. This unprecedented action enabled the Governments at Washington, Buenos Aires, Nanking, Sidney, Australia, and particularly such newspapers as the "New York Times" or any others equipped to receive it, to be in possession of the full text.¹ The Japanese delegation, however, chose to transmit the report by cable, saving a few hours at an expense estimated at about \$12,000.

The League and Japan Part Ways

A short meeting of the Assembly was held on Tuesday, February 21st, at which the President, Mr. Hymans, alone made a short and solemn statement reporting the breakdown of conciliation and the imminent necessity of a decision on the report.² At this gathering the atmosphere was that of a court in which the presiding judge had brought in a preliminary report and opinion. There was no discussion, and silence on the part of all delegates accentuated the gravity of the statement made by the President.

Three days later, when the Assembly met again to adopt its report,³ the President announced that all the members of the Committee of Nineteen, which had prepared the report, had decided not to speak, their views being expressed in the document itself. This had, in fact, been decided upon in committee as the best procedure. The Chinese and Japanese delegates then spoke. Three other delegates—one from Venezuela, one from Canada, and one from Lithuania—each for

¹ The League's transmission was estimated to cost a nominal sum.

² *Official Journal. Ibid.*, Annex 4, pp. 12-13.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14 ff.

particular reasons spoke supporting the report, none being members of the Committee.¹

Yen Voices China's Thanks

Dr. Yen for China expressed his gratification to the Assembly for bringing in a report which condemned "the violation of the Covenant even by an important member state of the League." He considered that the cause and policy of his country had been upheld and vindicated and the sufferings of his people during the last 17 months "against the most wanton aggression" had not been in vain. By rendering such a courageous verdict, he considered that the League had emerged a stronger instrument in the cause of justice. Although his delegation regretted certain omissions in the report, his Government nevertheless believed in third party judgment as the basis of justice. China, he said, would welcome the coöperation of friendly States in her work of national reconstruction. He was glad to see that the report fully supported the Chinese view that the state of "Manchukuo" had not been a spontaneous and independent creation, and that it called upon all states to refuse recognition *de jure* or *de facto* of this puppet Government. He announced that the Chinese Government would vote for the report.

Matsuoka Protests for Japan

Mr. Matsuoka, dignified and defiant, mounted the tribune to announce that the Japanese Government disagreed with the report and could not possibly accept it. He dwelt at length on the "appalling condition of China" which he said was not fully realized or taken into

¹ The Venezuelan delegate appeared to be calling the attention of his fellow countrymen on the Latin-American continent to the importance of the Assembly report being applied to another area of the world. The Canadian delegate appeared to wish to reverse an impression of dissent made by his colleague during the sessions in December. The Lithuanian delegate recalled that, in the case of Vilna, the League had once before rendered a report but had not followed it up with what he considered appropriate action; he hoped such an eventuality would not result from the action about to be taken.

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The Assembly Votes

AFTER the three short declarations by other states, the Assembly then passed to the vote by roll call. Of the 57 League members, 44 were present and voted¹—42 of them for the report, including all the members of the Council except Japan. Japan voted "No." Siam abstained. So one year, on the day, after the famous letter of Secretary Stimson of the Department of State to Senator Borah of the Foreign Relations Committee reaffirming the policy of the United States in the conflict between China and Japan, the Special Assembly of the League of Nations took the unprecedented position of adopting a report, as provided for in Article XV of its Covenant, exonerating China of blame for the development of events and recommending a settlement of the dispute on the lines laid down by the Lytton Commission of Enquiry. Every effort at conciliation by the League having broken down, the Assembly unanimously declared a judgment against Japan.

After the vote was announced M. Hymans made a brief statement calling attention to the juridical and political consequence of the vote just recorded. Juridically he pointed out that the Covenant required states in no case to resort to war until three months after the adoption of a report² (and not at all according to the Pact of Paris) and that League members were bound not to wage war against the party accepting the report.³ He then pleaded with both parties to do nothing irreparable, and, visibly moved, he declared that amidst the tumult of passion the League would continue its mission of assuring peace.

Mr. Matsuoka came once more to the tribune and, with a brief written statement, expressed profound regret at the vote which had just been taken. Japan, he said, was proud to have been associated with the League from the very days of drafting its Covenant. Then with a staccato

account by the Committee of 19, or by the Assembly. He then described the importance which Japan attached to an independent "Manchukuo" as a buffer State in an area where her interests were so vast. He called upon the Powers to cease dealing in "fictions" regarding China. It was necessary, he said, to take a realistic attitude towards the Far Eastern problem. The League, he believed, was committing a grave error in adopting a report which could only give China more encouragement and thus prolong the disorder.

Since the Assembly Report was based largely upon the Lytton Report, Mr. Matsuoka took occasion once more to argue that the Lytton Report was full of errors. He then stressed point 10, Chapter 9, of the Report, referring to the necessity of international assistance to China and asked the States members of the League if they were prepared to give the amount of assistance called for to establish a strong central government in China. He warned that League members should not be misled by the thought or hope that China could be changed by the mere sending of technical commissions to aid the harassed Government with advice regarding sanitation, education, railway, financial and other administrations, and argued that so much more than this was needed that "no Great Power or group of them would be willing to undertake the task". He questioned whether the Chinese Government was really prepared to accept recommendations envisaging the imposition of an international control in one form or another.¹

As to Jehol, he believed that the attitude of the League had encouraged the defiant attitude of the former Manchurian administration and the Nanking Government in regard to the conflict. The adoption of the report would give the impression to the Chinese that they had been exonerated from all responsibility and "that they could continue to defy Japan with impunity". Japan alone, he said, was capable of establishing peace throughout the region of eastern Asia. He asked for rejection of the Assembly Committee's report.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹ Those not present were: Argentine, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Iraq, Liberia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Salvador. Of these, Chile, Cuba, Peru and Salvador had been present and voted for the Assembly Resolution of March 11, 1932, embodying like principles.

² League Covenant, Article XII, paragraph 2.

³ *Ibid.*, Article XIII, paragraph 4.

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emphasis he said that Japan had "now reached the limit of endeavors to cooperate with the League regarding the Sino-Japanese dispute." He made no statement concerning Japan's juridical withdrawal from the League, but reports from Tokyo indicated that such a decision was likely to follow within a few weeks. Mr. Matsuoka then thanked League members for their efforts, walked firmly down the center aisle, beckoned to his colleagues and assistants—numbering 30—who immediately followed him out of the room.

There was complete silence in the Assembly, watching a break whose consequences might, it was felt, assume the gravest character. At the same time there appeared to be a feeling a moral relief that members had done their duty in pronouncing an ethical and juridical judgment,¹ which public opinion generally was almost certain to approve.

¹ In view of the importance of the report adopted by the Assembly, the conclusions are given here textually. The report is in four parts: Part I is a simple adoption of the first eight chapters of the Lytton Report, giving the facts of the dispute, with which the Assembly associated itself. Part II treats of the development of the dispute before the League and the action taken in the preceding 17 months by the Council and the Assembly. Part III gives the conclusions; and Part IV the recommendations made by the Assembly. Parts III and IV follow:

PART III.

CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPUTE.

It will be seen from this review that for more than sixteen months the Council or Assembly has continuously tried to find a solution for the Sino-Japanese dispute. Numerous resolutions have been adopted based on various articles of the Covenant and other international agreements. The complexity, to which reference has already been made, of the historical background of the events; the special legal situation of Manchuria, where Japan, as will be noted later, exercised within Chinese territory extensive rights; finally, the involved and delicate relations existing in fact between the Chinese and Japanese authorities in certain parts of Manchuria justified and rendered necessary the prolonged efforts of negotiation and enquiry made by the League. However, the hopes entertained by the Council and the Assembly of an improvement in the situation, arising from the declarations of the parties and the resolutions adopted with their participation, were disappointed. The situation, on the contrary, tended to grow constantly worse. In Manchuria, or other parts of the territory of a Member of the League, military operations, which the report of the Commission of Enquiry has described as "war in disguise", continued and still continue.

Having considered the principal features of the dispute, the Assembly has reached, in particular, the following conclusions and noted the following facts:

The Assembly Goes On under Article III

AFTER the Japanese had left, the Assembly proceeded—in accordance with a program which had been discussed in advance by the Committee of 19—to vote in favor of following the dispute under Paragraph 3, Article III, of the Covenant expressing the League's concern with matters affecting the peace of the world. This not only confirmed the opinion previously upheld in the Committee that Article XV did not lead automatically and necessarily to Article XVI; but it also made it possible, as had been considered convenient and expedient despite objections from some of the smaller states, to constitute a new consultative committee independent of the obligations resting upon the Committee of 19 and to invite the United States and the Soviet Union to name representatives to sit with it.

1. The dispute between China and Japan which is submitted to the Assembly originated in Manchuria, which China and foreign Powers have always regarded as an integral part of China under Chinese sovereignty. In its observations on the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Japanese Government contests the argument that the rights conferred on Russia and subsequently acquired by Japan "in the extremely limited area known as the Southern Manchuria Railway zone" conflict with Chinese sovereignty. "They were, on the contrary, derived from the sovereignty of China."

The rights conferred by China on Russia and subsequently on Japan derive from the sovereignty of China. Under the Treaty of Peking in 1905, "the Imperial Chinese Government consented to all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan" under the Treaty of Portsmouth. In 1915, it was to China that Japan addressed demands for the extension of her rights in Manchuria and it was with the Government of the Chinese Republic that, following on these demands, the Treaty of May 25th, 1915, was concluded concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. At the Washington Conference, the Japanese delegation stated, on February 2nd, 1922, that Japan renounced certain preferential rights in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and explained that, "in coming to this decision, Japan had been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity." The Nine-Power Treaty, concluded at the Washington Conference, applies to Manchuria as to every other part of China. Finally, during the first phase of the present conflict, Japan never argued that Manchuria was not an integral part of China.

2. Past experience shows that those who control Manchuria exercise a considerable influence on the affairs of the rest of China—at least of North China—and possess unquestionable strategic and political advantages. To cut off these provinces from the rest of China cannot but create a serious irredentist problem likely to endanger peace.

3. The Assembly, in noting these facts, is not un-

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Immediately after the Assembly on the 24th, the Secretary-General despatched letters to the Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union informing them of "the Assembly's hope that they will associate themselves with the views expressed in the report and that they will, if necessary, concert

mindful of the tradition of autonomy existing in Manchuria. That tradition, in one extreme case, and in a period of particular weakness on the part of the Central Government of China, made it possible, for instance, for the plenipotentiaries of Marshal Chang Tso-lin to conclude, in the name of the "Government of the autonomous three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China", the agreement of September 20th, 1924, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, navigation, the delimitation of frontiers, etc. It is obvious from the provisions of that agreement, however, that the Government of the autonomous three Eastern Provinces did not regard itself as the Government of a State independent of China, but believed that it might itself negotiate with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on questions affecting the interests of China in the three provinces, though the Central Government had, a few months previously, concluded an agreement on these questions with the selfsame Power.

This autonomy of Manchuria was also shown by the fact that, first, Marshal Chang Tso-lin and later Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang were the heads both of the civil and military administration and exercised the effective power in the three provinces through their armies and their officials. The independence proclaimed by Marshal Chang Tso-lin at different times never meant that either he or the people of Manchuria wished to be separated from China. His armies did not invade China as if it were a foreign country but merely as participants in the civil war. Through all its wars and periods of "independence", Manchuria remained an integral part of China. Further, since 1928, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has recognised the authority of the Chinese National Government.

4. During the quarter of a century ending in September 1931, the political and economic ties uniting Manchuria with the rest of China grew stronger, while, at the same time, the interests of Japan in Manchuria did not cease to develop. Under the Chinese Republic, the "three Eastern Provinces" constituting Manchuria were thrown wide to the immigration of Chinese from the other provinces who, by taking possession of the land, have made Manchuria in many respects a simple extension of China north of the Great Wall. In a population of about 30 millions, it is estimated that the Chinese or assimilated Manchus number 28 millions. Moreover, under the administration of Marshals Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese population and Chinese interests have played a much more important part than formerly in the development and organisation of the economic resources of Manchuria.

On the other hand, Japan had acquired or claimed in Manchuria rights the effect of which was to restrict the exercise of sovereignty by China in a manner and to a degree quite exceptional. Japan governed the leased territory of Kwantung, exercising therein what amounted in practice to full sovereignty. Through the medium of the South Manchuria Railway, she administered the railway zones, including several towns and important parts of populous cities, such as Mukden and Changchun. In these areas, she had control of the

their action and their attitude with those of the Members of the League." League communications to Soviet Russia before this were limited to a suggestion from the Secretary-General to M. Litvinov that the Soviet Government assist the Lytton Commission in obtaining information.¹ This was flatly refused by the

police, taxes, education and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in certain parts of the country: the army of Kwantung in the leased territory; railway guards in the railway zones; consular police in the various districts. Such a state of affairs might perhaps have continued without leading to complications and incessant disputes if it had been freely desired or accepted by both parties and if it had been the expression and manifestation of a well-understood policy of close economic and political co-operation. But, in the absence of such conditions, it was bound to lead to mutual misunderstandings and conflicts. The interconnection of respective rights, the uncertainty at times of the legal situation, the increasing opposition between the conception held by the Japanese of their "special position" in Manchuria and the claims of Chinese nationalism were a further source of numerous incidents and disputes.

5. Before September 18th, 1931, each of the two parties had legitimate grievances against the other in Manchuria, Japan taking advantage of rights open to question and the Chinese authorities putting obstacles in the way of the exercise of rights which could not be contested. During the period immediately preceding the events of September 18th, various efforts were made to settle the questions outstanding between the two parties by the normal method of diplomatic negotiations and pacific means, and these means had not been exhausted. Nevertheless, the tension between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria increased and a movement of opinion in Japan advocated the settlement of all outstanding questions — if necessary, by force.

6. The present period of transition and national reconstruction in China, despite the efforts of the Central Government and the considerable progress already achieved, necessarily involves political disturbances, social disorder and disruptive tendencies inseparable from a state of transition. It calls for the employment of a policy of international co-operation. One of the methods of that policy would be that the League of Nations would continue to afford China the technical assistance in modernising her institutions which her Government might request with a view to enabling the Chinese people to re-organise and consolidate the Chinese State.

The full application of the policy of international co-operation initiated at the Washington Conference, the principles of which are still valid, has been delayed, chiefly by the violence of the anti-foreign propaganda carried on in China from time to time. In two respects — the use of the economic boycott and anti-foreign teaching in schools — this propaganda has been pushed to such lengths that it has contributed to creating the atmosphere in which the present dispute broke out.

7. The use of the boycott by the Chinese previous to the events of September 18th, 1931, to express their indignation at certain incidents or to support certain claims could not fail to make a situation which was already tense still more tense.

¹ *The Soviets at Geneva*. Kathryn W. DAVIS. Librairie Kundig, Geneva 1934, p. 108-9.

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Soviet Government. Information on this correspondence was held by the League Secretariat as confidential.

The Far Eastern Advisory Committee appointed to follow the Sino-Japanese dispute, to assist the Assembly in performing its duties under paragraph 3, Article 3,¹ of the League

The use of the boycott by China, subsequent to the events of September 18th, 1931, falls under the category of reprisals.

8. The object of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding the settlement of disputes is to prevent the tension between nations becoming such that a rupture appears to be inevitable. The Commission of Enquiry found that each of the issues between China and Japan was in itself capable of settlement by arbitral procedure. It is precisely because the accumulation of these issues increased the tension between the two nations that it was incumbent on the nation which regarded itself as injured to draw the attention of the League of Nations to the situation when diplomatic negotiations were unduly protracted.

Article 12 of the Covenant contains formal obligations as regards the pacific settlement of disputes.

9. Without excluding the possibility that, on the night of September 18th-19th, 1931, the Japanese officers on the spot may have believed that they were acting in self-defence, the Assembly cannot regard as measures of self-defence the military operations carried out on that night by the Japanese troops at Mukden and other places in Manchuria. Nor can the military measures of Japan as a whole, developed in the course of the dispute, be regarded as measures of self-defence. Moreover, the adoption of measures of self-defence does not exempt a State from complying with the provisions of Article 12 of the Covenant.

10. Since September 18th, 1931, the activities of the Japanese military authorities, in civil as well as in military matters, have been marked by essentially political considerations. The progressive military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces removed in succession all the important towns in Manchuria from the control of the Chinese authorities, and, following each occupation, the civil administration was re-organised. A group of Japanese civil and military officials conceived, organised and carried through the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18th, and, with this object, made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals and took advantage of certain minorities and native communities that had grievances against the Chinese administration. This movement, which rapidly received assistance and direction from the Japanese General Staff, could only be carried through owing to the presence of the Japanese troops. It cannot be considered as a spontaneous and genuine independence movement.

11. The main political and administrative power in the "Government" of "Manchukuo", the result of the movement described in the previous paragraph, rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers, who are in a position actually to direct and control the administration; in general, the Chinese in Manchuria, who, as already mentioned, form the vast majority of the

¹ This paragraph reads: "The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world".

Covenant, and to aid the Members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude amongst themselves and with the non-Member States, met on the 25th under the presidency of M. Hymans of Belgium. It consisted of the preceding Assembly Committee of 19 with the addition of Holland and Canada. Discussion

population, do not support this "Government" and regard it as an instrument of the Japanese. It should also be noted that, after the Commission of Enquiry completed its report and before the report was considered by the Council and the Assembly, "Manchukuo" was recognised by Japan. It has not been recognised by any other State, the Members of the League in particular being of opinion that such recognition was incompatible with the spirit of the resolution of March 11th, 1932.

* * *

The situation which led up to the events of September 18th, 1931, presents certain special features. It was subsequently aggravated by the development of the Japanese military operations, the creation of the "Manchukuo Government" and the recognition of that "Government" by Japan. Undoubtedly the present case is not that of a country which has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations; neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country, because in Manchuria, as shown by the circumstances noted above, there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world. It is, however, indisputable that, without any declaration of war, a large part of Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by Japanese troops and that, in consequence of this operation, it has been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China.

The Council, in its resolution of September 30th, 1931, noted the declaration of the Japanese representative that his Government would continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which had already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively ensured, and that it hoped to carry out this intention in full as speedily as might be. Further, in its resolution of December 10th, 1931, the Council, re-affirming its resolution of September 30th, noted the undertaking of the two parties to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which might lead to further fighting and loss of life.

It should be pointed out in connection with these events that, under Article 10 of the Covenant, the Members of the League undertake to respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

Lastly, under Article 12 of the Covenant, the Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council.

While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before September 18th, 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since September 18th, 1931.

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concerned the question as to what action Governments should take in dealing with the arms traffic to the Far East.

In the absence of two important States invited to consult—the United States and the Soviet Union—it was agreed that decisions should be deferred and that the British Government, which had already been in touch with the principal arms-exporting states, should be

PART IV.

STATEMENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS.

This part sets forth the recommendations which the Assembly deems just and proper in regard to the dispute.

Section I.

The recommendations of the Assembly take into account the very special circumstances of this case and are based on the following principles, conditions and considerations:

(a) The settlement of the dispute should observe the provisions of the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington.

Article 10 of the Covenant of the League provides that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League".

According to Article 11 of the Pact of Paris, "the High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature, or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means".

According to Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, "the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China".

(b) The settlement of the dispute should observe the provisions of Parts I and II of the Assembly resolution of March 11th, 1932.

In that resolution, which has already been quoted in this report, the Assembly considered that the provisions of the Covenant were entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as regards:

(1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;

(2) The undertaking entered into by Members of the League of Nations to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the Members of the League;

(3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for peaceful settlement.

The Assembly has adopted the principles laid down by the President-in-Office of the Council in his declaration of December 10th, 1931, and has recalled the fact that twelve Members of the Council had again invoked those principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16th, 1932, when they declared that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of Article 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognised as valid and effectual by Members of the League.

asked to keep the Committee in touch with developments. Invitations had been sent to both the United States and the Soviet Union not only asking them to approve the recommendations but also to coöperate with the Advisory Committee.

The same day the Japanese delegation left Geneva; and upon taking the train Mr. Matsuoka issued to the press a final

The Assembly has stated its opinion that the principles governing international relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris. Pending the steps which it might ultimately take for the settlement of the dispute which had been referred to it, it has proclaimed the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to above and declared that it was incumbent upon the Members of the League not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

Lastly, the Assembly has affirmed that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the part of either party, and has recalled the resolutions adopted by the Council on September 30th and December 10th, 1931, in agreement with the parties.

(c) In order that a lasting understanding may be established between China and Japan on the basis of respect for the international undertakings mentioned above, the settlement of the dispute must conform to the principles and conditions laid down by the Commission of Enquiry in the following terms:

(Here were quoted the ten principles of Chapter 9 of its Report.)

Section II.

The provisions of this section constitute the recommendations of the Assembly under Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

Having defined the principles, conditions and considerations applicable to the settlement of the dispute, The Assembly recommends as follows:

1. Whereas the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China,

A. Considering that the presence of Japanese troops outside the zone of the South Manchuria Railway and their operations outside this zone are incompatible with the legal principles which should govern the settlement of the dispute, and that it is necessary to establish as soon as possible a situation consistent with these principles,

The Assembly recommends the evacuation of these troops. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the first object of the negotiations recommended hereinafter should be to organise this evacuation and to determine the methods, stages and time-limits thereof.

B. Having regard to the local conditions special to Manchuria, the particular rights and interests possessed by Japan therein, and the rights and interests of third States,

The Assembly recommends the establishment in Manchuria, within a reasonable period, of an organisation under the sovereignty of, and compatible with the administrative integrity of, China. This organisation should provide a wide measure of autonomy, should be in harmony with local conditions and should take

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statement in which he expressed sadness "not for Japan, but for League for taking such precipitate action. Time will show that it hurts the League more than Japan." The decision of the League, he said, would only galvanize the Japanese to a more determined risk to achieve their end. "I am still hoping," he said, "that some day Japan will be understood. I am leaving Geneva with the prayer that the members of the League may be enabled to see light and with ardent wishes for the success of the League."

Although some minor members of the Japanese delegation remained in Geneva, it was

account of the multilateral treaties in force, the particular rights and interests of Japan, the rights and interests of third States, and, in general, the principles and conditions reproduced in Section I (c) above; the determination of the respective powers of and relations between the Chinese Central Government and the local authorities should be made the subject of a Declaration by the Chinese Government having the force of an international undertaking.

2. Whereas, in addition to the questions dealt with in the two recommendations 1 A and 1 B, the report of the Commission of Enquiry mentions in the principles and conditions for a settlement of the dispute set out in Section I (c) above certain other questions affecting the good understanding between China and Japan, on which peace in the Far East depends.

The Assembly recommends the parties to settle these questions on the basis of the said principles and conditions.

3. Whereas the negotiations necessary for giving effect to the foregoing recommendations should be carried on by means of a suitable organ,

The Assembly recommends the opening of negotiations between the two parties in accordance with the method specified hereinafter.

Each of the parties is invited to inform the Secretary-General whether it accepts, so far as it is concerned, the recommendations of the Assembly, subject to the sole condition that the other party also accepts them.

The negotiations between the parties should take place with the assistance of a Committee set up by the Assembly as follows: The Assembly hereby invites the Governments of . . . each to appoint a member of the Committee as soon as the Secretary-General shall have informed them that the two parties accept the Assembly's recommendations. The Secretary-General shall also notify the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of this acceptance and invite each of them to appoint a member of the Committee should it so desire. Within one month after having been informed of the acceptance of the two parties, the Secretary-General shall take all suitable steps for the opening of negotiations.

In order to enable the Members of the League, after the opening of negotiations, to judge whether each of the parties is acting in conformity with the Assembly's recommendations:

(a) The Committee will, whenever it thinks fit, report on the state of the negotiations, and particularly on the negotiations with regard to the carrying out of recommendations 1 A and 1 B above; as regards recommendation 1 A, the Committee will in any case

understood that no one would occupy Japan's seat at the Council table in the following week.

Reports from Manchuria had indicated that the Japanese offensive against the Chinese forces in Jehol Province, begun on January 1, was gathering greater strength. Repeated warnings had been given by the Assembly Committee of 19 during the month of February, to the Japanese Government, to the effect that another military movement would frustrate every effort at conciliation, still technically open until the Assembly voted, and would show that Japan was wilfully defying the public opinion of the world. The Japanese delegation had replied

report within three months of the opening of negotiations. These reports shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Members of the League and to the non-member States represented on the Committee;

(b) The Committee may submit to the Assembly all questions relating to the interpretation of Section II of Part IV of the present report. The Assembly shall give this interpretation in the same conditions as those in which the present report is adopted, in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 10, of the Covenant.

Section III.

In view of the special circumstances of the case, the recommendations made do not provide for a mere return to the *status quo* existing before September 1931. They likewise exclude the maintenance and recognition of the existing regime in Manchuria, such maintenance and recognition being incompatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations and with the good understanding between the two countries on which peace in the Far East depends.

It follows that, in adopting the present report, the Members of the League intend to abstain, particularly as regards the existing regime in Manchuria, from any act which might prejudice or delay the carrying out of the recommendations of the said report. They will continue not to recognise this regime either *de jure* or *de facto*. They intend to abstain from taking any isolated action with regard to the situation in Manchuria and to continue to concert their action among themselves as well as with the interested States not members of the League. As regards the Members of the League who are signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, it may be recalled that, in accordance with the provisions of that Treaty: "Whenever a situation arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting Powers concerned."

In order to facilitate as far as possible the establishment in the Far East of a situation in conformity with the recommendations of the present report, the Secretary-General is instructed to communicate a copy of this report to the States non-members of the League who are signatories of the Pact of Paris or of the Nine-Power Treaty, informing them of the Assembly's hope that they will associate themselves with the views expressed in the report, and that they will, if necessary, concert their action and their attitude with the Members of the League.

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that Jehol was a part of "Manchukuo" and that she was bound by her protocol with the new state to take active measures against so-called Chinese irregulars.

The Assembly, on the other hand, in its report had categorically asserted that "the sovereignty of Manchuria belongs to China" and consequently "the presence of Japanese troops outside the zone of the South Manchurian railway" was incompatible with the legal principles which should govern the settlement of the dispute. The Assembly went further, and in spite of the Japanese offensive in Jehol recommended the evacuation of all Japanese troops outside the treaty zones.

The United States Supports the League

THE United States informed the League on the next day, the 26th, of its general endorsement of the principles recommended by the Assembly. Its note¹ emphasized that "in their affirmations respectively of the principle of non-recognition and the attitude in regard thereto, the League and the United States are on common ground." Thus it recorded a final alignment in regard to the Japanese-sponsored separate state in Manchuria and attempts for its expansion.

The reply came after conference between the incoming and outgoing Secretaries of State. The press statement issued at the same time, which was regarded as very friendly and which reflected a continuing policy on the part of the United States Government, was couched in the following terms:

In the situation which has developed out of the controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of the United States had coincided in general with that of the League of Nations, the common objective being maintenance of peace and settlement of international disputes by pacific means. In pursuance of that objective, while the League of Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a controversy between two of its members, the Government of the United States has endeavored to give support, reserving to itself independence of judgment with regard to method and scope, to the efforts of the League on behalf of peace.

¹ League Doc. A.Extr.35.

The findings of fact arrived at by the League and the understanding of the facts derived by the American Government from reports made to it by its own representatives are in substantial accord. In the light of its findings of fact the Assembly of the League has formulated a measured statement of conclusions. With those conclusions the American Government is in general accord. In their affirmations, respectively of the principle of non-recognition and their attitude in regard thereto, the League and the United States are on common ground. The League has recommended principles of settlement. In so far as appropriate under the treaties to which it is a party, the American Government expresses its general endorsement of the principles thus recommended.

The American Government earnestly hopes that the two nations now engaged in controversy, both of which have long been in friendly relationship with our own and other peoples, may find it possible in the light of world opinion to conform their policies to the need and the desire of the family of nations that disputes between nations shall be settled by none but pacific means.

A British Move for an Arms Embargo

ON February 27, the British Government announced in the House of Commons, through Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, that pending an international agreement on the matter Great Britain would put an embargo on the export of arms to both Japan and China. Mr. Lansbury, leader of the Opposition, opposed the Government's decision to apply the embargo to both governments; and even Sir Austen Chamberlain did not think that equal justice was being done by a double embargo, although this might be necessary until an international agreement was reached.¹

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*—Commons, Vol. 275, February 27-March 17, 1933. "Debate in Supply Committee", Feb. 27.

British activity to secure international agreement. (Sir John Simon): The British Government lost no time in trying to find out what could be done in the direction of international agreement when it saw that the Report of the Committee of Nineteen would be adopted by the League and refused by Japan. "We communicated with some half dozen of the principal arms producing countries in the world." Those inquiries have in no case received final answers.

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Since other countries were not in a position immediately to declare an embargo on shipments of arms, the British Government about two weeks later revoked its decision.

America, Russia, and League Cooperation

WASHINGTON was reported on February 28, to favor cooperation with the League's Far Eastern Advisory Committee; but action was held up pending the entry into office on March 4 of the new Administration.

The Soviet Union gave its answer on March 7¹ regarding both the Assembly report and cooperation with the Advisory Committee. The reply stated that the Soviet Union could neither unreservedly support the League nor, for several special reasons, participate in the Advisory Committee. The Soviet Government wrote:

The decisions of the League of Nations and the report of the Committee of Nineteen are based on the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Washington Nine-Power Treaty and the Treaty of Paris (Briand-Kellogg Pact). The Soviet Union does not figure among the countries participating in the first two but it acceded to the last of these Pacts. Since the origins of the Soviet State, it has proclaimed as an essential principle of its policy the right of all peoples to self-determination in conditions of freedom to manifest their desires and in the absence of all external pressure; it has pronounced in the most decisive fashion against annexations and

In the discussions at Geneva the British representative was instructed to raise this matter before the Advisory Committee on Far Eastern Affairs. To-day or tomorrow the question will be before the Committee. The British Government has therefore been as energetic and active about it as any government could be.

Difficulty of differentiating between the combatants.
... The question now is: Is there any action which can be taken by this country by itself? On this I have two propositions to put to the Committee. The first is, that when you have passed from the sort of action which the League of Nations, or which a great International Conference, including America, might take to the sort of action which an individual country might take, you manifestly are moving into a very different atmosphere, and, for practical and conclusive reasons, very different considerations apply. I therefore lay down this proposition from which we shall not budge. It is impracticable for a single country like our own acting alone to differentiate between one combatant and another. . . . (p. 57-58.)

¹ Document A. extr. 38.

exactions as a result of military conquest or of occupation by violence. These principles logically lead to absolute respect for the territorial integrity and for the political, social, economic and administrative independence of all States, to the inadmissibility of the settlement of international conflicts by any non-peaceful means, and in the clearest possible manner to the obligation to respect strictly the international agreements which embody these principles. . . . In so far as the starting points of the decisions taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict are to some extent in keeping with the principles of the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, a certain concordance may be observed between these starting points and the views of the Soviet Union.

The report of the Committee of Nineteen adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations nevertheless contains, as regards the application of the starting points of the League's decisions, which I have just indicated, to the Sino-Japanese conflict, certain recommendations which are not entirely compatible with these starting points and permit of a departure therefrom on a whole series of serious questions.

The Advisory Committee created in the same spirit by a decision of the Assembly constitutes an organ of the League of Nations for the purpose *inter alia* of assisting the Assembly in the execution of its obligations and has to submit its proposals to the Assembly, on whose decisions the Soviet Union, not being a Member of the League, can exercise no influence.

Again the Advisory Committee has to help the Members of the League of Nations to coordinate their activities among themselves and with the States not Members of the League. But the majority of the States which belong or will belong to the Advisory Committee, to be exact 13 out of 22, maintain no relations with the Soviet Union and consequently show hostile dispositions towards it. It would clearly be difficult for a Committee thus constituted to cope with this task of coordination as regards the Soviet Union, which is deprived of the possibility of having any contact with the majority of its members and individually with those whose interests are most likely to coincide with its own.

It may also be doubted whether the States in this category can really take into account the interests of the Soviet Union which are mentioned in the recommendations of the report.

Owing to the circumstances which I have just indicated the Soviet Government does not consider it possible to accept the decisions taken by the Assembly of the League or to take part at present in the Advisory Committee.

From the outset of the Sino-Japanese conflict the Soviet Government, wishing as far as lay in its power to prevent a further expansion of the armed conflict which might eventually give rise to a fresh world conflagration, took up an attitude of strict neutrality. In accordance with this attitude the Soviet Government, faithful to its policy of peace, will always associate itself with any action and any proposal emanating from international bodies or individual Governments and aiming at the speediest and most equitable settlement of the conflict and at the consolidation of peace in the Far East.

The United States, on March 11, replied favorably to the Assembly's invitation to consult with the Advisory Committee.¹ This first communication received by the League from the new Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, indicated a cooperative attitude, without any restriction as to the subject matter to be discussed. It pointed out that the American representative would not vote, since the American Government, not being bound by the Covenant, would have to retain independence of judgment with regard to proposals made or action recommended. Secretary Hull explained:

In reply I am happy to inform you that the American Government is prepared to co-operate with the Advisory Committee in such manner as may be found appropriate and feasible. As it is necessary that the American Government exercise independence of judgment with regard to proposals which may be made and or action which the Advisory Committee may recommend, it would seem that appointment by it of a representative to function as a member of the Committee would not be feasible. However, believing that participation by a representative of this Government in the deliberations of the Committee would be helpful, I am instructing the American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, to be prepared to participate, but without right to vote, if such participation is desired.

¹ Document A. extr. 39.

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The Advisory Committee Sets to Work

THE Advisory Committee accordingly met on March 15th under the presidency of Dr. Christian Lange of Norway, replacing M. Hymans who had resigned, and first considered the replies of the Soviet Union and of the United States. The Committee noted in the Soviet reply that the Government did not feel it possible to take part in its work "at the present moment"—a phrase considered by the Committee to indicate a possibility of Soviet co-operation later. After a reading of the affirmative reply from the United States, the Committee adjourned for a few minutes to enable the American representative to take his seat.

The Advisory Committee, now numbering 22, immediately took up the question raised at its previous meeting in regard to the arms embargo. The whole problem was seen to be exceedingly complicated in view of the lack of legislation in many countries permitting their governments to take immediate action. It was decided, therefore, to appoint a sub-committee on Exportation of Arms to the Far East, which would study the whole problem and report at a later meeting. The states named as members of this sub-committee were: United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.

The Advisory Committee then considered the implications of section 3¹ of the Assembly report, by which the members of the League undertook to abstain, particularly in regard to the existing régime in Manchuria, from any act which would hamper or delay the carrying out of the recommendations of the report or from taking isolated action in regard to the situation in Manchuria. Certain administrative questions were brought up for immediate attention, such as Manchukuo's relation to the Universal Postal Union, to the International Telegraphic Union, and the recognition of passports. It was decided also to create a sub-committee on these questions, in order to co-ordinate the action which governments

¹ See footnote, pp. 14 ff.

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might take and to avoid any possibility of invalidating the policy of refusing recognition as a result of small administrative concessions in these spheres. The sub-committee on non-recognition was composed of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Irish Free State, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.

Japan Takes Jehol and Quits the League

DURING the month of March, Japan was not only pursuing her active military policy, by driving out the Chinese forces and adding Jehol as a fourth province to "Manchukuo", but she also gave notice to the Disarmament Conference¹ that she intended to reconsider Empire defences in relation to her new obligations to "Manchukuo." Consultations were also taking place in the Cabinet, in the Privy Council, with the elder statesman Prince Saionji, and with the Emperor, looking towards resignation from the League of Nations. On March 27, the Secretary-General of the League received a telegram from the Japanese Government indicating its decision to withdraw from the League.²

The Japanese Government believe that the national policy of Japan, which has for its aim to ensure the peace of the Orient and thereby to contribute to the cause of peace throughout the world, is identical in spirit with the mission of the League of Nations, which is to achieve international peace and security. It has always been with pleasure, therefore, that this country has for thirteen years past, as an original member of the League and a permanent member of its Council, extended a full measure of co-operation with her fellow-members towards the attainment of its high purpose. It is indeed a matter of historical fact that Japan has continuously participated in the various activities of the League with a zeal not inferior to that exhibited by any other nation. At the same time, it is and has always been the conviction of the Japanese Government that in order to render possible the maintenance of peace in various regions of the

world, it is necessary in existing circumstances to allow the operation of the Covenant of the League to vary in accordance with the actual conditions prevailing in each of those regions. Only by acting on this just and equitable principle can the League fulfil its mission and increase its influence.

Acting on this conviction, the Japanese Government, ever since the Sino-Japanese dispute was, in September, 1931, submitted to the League, have, at meetings of the League and on other occasions, continually set forward a consistent view. This was, that if the League was to settle the issue fairly and equitably, and to make a real contribution to the promotion of peace in the Orient, and thus enhance its prestige, it should acquire a complete grasp of the actual conditions in this quarter of the globe and apply the Covenant of the League in accordance with these conditions. They have repeatedly emphasised and insisted upon the absolute necessity of taking into consideration the fact that China is not an organised State,—that its internal conditions and external relations are characterised by extreme confusion and complexity and by many abnormal and exceptional features,—and that, accordingly, the general principles and usages of international law which govern the ordinary relations between nations are found to be considerably modified in their operation so far as China is concerned, resulting in the quite abnormal and unique international practices which actually prevail in that country.

However, the majority of the members of the League evinced in the course of its deliberations during the past seventeen months a failure either to grasp these realities or else to face them and take them into proper account. Moreover, it has frequently been made manifest in these deliberations that there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan and these Powers concerning the application and even the interpretation of various international engagements and obligations including the Covenant of the League and the principles of international law. As a result, the report adopted by the Assembly at the Special Session of 24 February last, entirely misapprehending the spirit of Japan, pervaded as it is by no other desire than the maintenance of peace in the Orient, contains gross errors both in the ascertainment of facts and in the conclusions deduced. In asserting that the action of the Japanese army at the time of the incident of September 18 and subsequently did not fall within the just limits of self-defence, the

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report assigned no reasons and came to an arbitrary conclusion, and in ignoring alike the state of tension preceded, and the various aggravations which succeeded, the incident—for all of which the full responsibility is incumbent upon China—the report creates a source of fresh conflict in the political area of the Orient. By refusing to acknowledge the actual circumstances that led to the foundation of Manchukuo, and by attempting to challenge the position taken up by Japan in recognising the new State, it cuts away the ground for the stabilisation of the Far Eastern situation. Nor can the terms laid down in its recommendations—as was fully explained in the statement issued by this Government on 25 February last—ever be of any possible service in securing enduring peace in these regions.

The conclusion must be that in seeking a solution of the question the majority of the League have attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulae than to the real task of assuring peace, and higher value to the vindication of academic theses than to the eradication of the sources of future conflict. For these reasons, and because of the profound differences of opinion existing between Japan and the majority of the League in their interpretation of the Covenant and of other treaties, the Japanese Government have been led to realise the existence of an irreconcilable divergence of views, dividing Japan and the League on policies of peace, and especially as regards the fundamental principles to be followed in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East. The Japanese Government, believing that in these circumstances there remains no room for further co-operation, hereby give notice, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, of the intention of Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations.

On the same day that Japan's note of withdrawal was received, the Secretary-General acknowledged the communication, and added the following remarks:¹

At the conclusion of that telegram the Japanese Government gives notice of the intention of Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Covenant, which runs as follows:

"Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal."

The Secretary-General will not fail to communicate immediately the telegram from the Japanese Government together with his reply to the Members of the League.

What Is "Fulfillment of Obligations" ?

A difference of view was at once apparent between Tokyo and Geneva as to what constituted the fulfilment of international obligations alluded to in Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. According to despatches from Tokyo, Japan apparently considered that her obligation would be fulfilled by the payment of her dues for two succeeding years. Legal and official opinion in Geneva, as far as it could be ascertained, did not share this view, but considered that the obligations to be fulfilled included more than fiscal obligations and that Japan could not juridically set aside her obligations to the League until she had fulfilled her duties not only under the Covenant but also under the Assembly's resolutions and recommendations ever since the beginning of the dispute. In any case, it was remarked, the League is in a position to take action under Article 17 of the Covenant even against a non-member state when the peace of the world is being threatened.

Speculation developed in many quarters as to the future of the mandated islands in the Pacific—the Caroline, Ladrone and Marshall groups, between Hawaii and the Philippines—in case Japan's resignation from the League were eventually given effect. Great interest in this subjects was several times expressed in governmental circles in Washington, owing to the strategic importance of these islands. In Geneva, numerous enquiries were addressed to mandates authorities for an opinion as to the legal effect of Japan's resignation from the League upon her future position as mandatory. In Tokyo, following instructions from Baron Matsuda, Governor of the South Sea mandated islands, a proclamation informed the inhabitants of these islands that Japan's

¹ See p. 25.

² League Doc. C.211.M.103.1933.VII.

¹ C.211.M.103.1933.VII.

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position would not be affected by her withdrawal from the League.

The Emperor of Japan issued an edict on March 27 simultaneously with the notification of Japan's withdrawal from the League, emphasising that the recognition of the independence of Manchukuo would form the foundation for lasting peace not only in the Far East but in the world. He further urged the Japanese nation "to the united and to tread the path of righteousness and the golden mean".

China Charges Peace Repudiation

THE Chinese Government, through a statement issued in Geneva by Mr. Wellington Koo on March 28, indicating the view of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, stated that the step taken by the Japanese Government in withdrawing from the League at a time when the latter was making the most serious effort to settle the Sino-Japanese problem, was nothing less than a deliberate attempt to impair the post-war machinery for the preservation of the peace of the world.¹ It was also tantamount to an open declaration rejecting the pacific settlement of an international dispute of the first magnitude and commanding China to accept what terms and conditions Japan might choose to dictate. The statement, referring to Japan's obligations under the Covenant, said:

As applied to Japan's announced withdrawal, it means that all the resolutions adopted by the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations ever since the League was seized of the Sino-Japanese dispute are still binding on her and that equally binding on her will be all decisions or resolutions which may be adopted by the League in this matter at any time before her secession may be regarded as a fact in law. It also means that Japan is not entitled to the right to withdraw from the League unless and until she has carried out not only all the resolutions and decisions of the League of Nations in respect to the present dispute and the

other obligations under the Covenant but also all obligations under those international agreements, the provisions of which have also been proclaimed by the League as guiding principles for the settlement of the dispute. In short, if Japan claims the right to withdraw from the League, it is her duty to implement all the provisions of the Paris Pact and the Nine Power Treaty as well as those of the Covenant within the two years after she has notified her withdrawal to the League of Nations. If she fails to do so she remains a member of the League and will be as much subject to its authority as every other Member State. The just and equitable settlement of the Sino-Japanese question by the League is, therefore, in no way prejudiced by the step which the Japanese Government has taken.

On the other hand, Japan's announced withdrawal, instead of weakening the authority of the League of Nations, as she may fondly believe, will enable the League to deal all the more effectively and expeditiously with the Sino-Japanese dispute. The Japanese delegate to the League has repeatedly threatened that Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations. But the fact that the League ignored his threats and unanimously adopted the Assembly report is a clear evidence of its firm determination to settle the dispute according to its own principles. And since it is the purpose of the League to maintain its authority, the attempted secession of a recalcitrant Member who has persistently and deliberately violated the provisions of the Covenant as well as the Resolutions of the League Council and Assembly, will only enable it to perform its great task with greater freedom. It is therefore the belief and conviction of the Chinese Government that the League, with its strengthened position and its firm determination, will not fail to take immediate and effectual steps to deal with the new situation that has arisen.

Now that Japan has announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations she is confronted with the opposition of all the countries which give their hearty support to the Covenant as well as to the principle of justice and the cause of peace. The Chinese Government is convinced that the ideals for which the League stands will ultimately triumph and that the Sino-Japanese dispute will receive just and equitable settlement while the aggressor will suffer in due course the inevitable consequences of its open defiance of the civilised conscience of the post-war world.

¹ A. extr. 42.

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The Advisory Committee met again in Geneva on March 28, under the chairmanship of Dr. Lange, to consider the situation created by Japan's announcement to withdraw from the League, and also to hear reports from its sub-committees. It decided not to reply in detail to the Japanese statement supporting her withdrawal, since all those points had been fully dealt with in the Assembly report.

Receiving a preliminary report from its sub-committee on non-recognition, regarding

THE POWERS AND CHINA, JAPAN AND "MANCHUKUO"

WHILE Japan was extending the area of her military operations into China proper, in the direction of Peiping and Tientsin, and while her relations with the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly strained over the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway, during the month of April, the formation of policy regarding "Manchukuo" by the League Powers and by the United States was in part interrupted by the preoccupations, especially in America, with such immediately pressing domestic questions as the banking and financial crisis.

The relation of the Japanese claims to disarmament became at once apparent when the General Commission of the Conference resumed its labors in Geneva toward the end of April. The Japanese delegation had in March submitted a communication¹ calling attention to the new policy of the Japanese Government, which was "an inevitable consequence of the incompatibility existing between their own point of view and that of the majority of the League of Nations respecting the Sino-Japanese affair". In this connection they announced their intention "to effect various important modifications in the national defence of the Empire in view of the new situation entailed by the changed conditions in the Far East". It was also reported that "Manchukuo" would make claims for a certain number of naval units—a claim which would inevitably threaten the Washington and London Naval Agreements,

¹ Conf. D. 155.

application by "Manchukuo" for membership of international unions, passport questions, currency and other questions, the Committee decided that these studies should be pursued expeditiously. It also considered again the problem of export of arms and requested the delegates on the Advisory Committee to consult their governments so that the principle as to shipment of arms could be determined as soon as possible.

incorporated as part of the new disarmament plan sponsored by Great Britain.

The same issue arose in connection with the number of military effectives which were to be allotted to the different nations according to the British proposal. The Soviet Union felt obliged to make its figures contingent upon the figures for Japan. The effect of this was to cause other countries to make their figures contingent upon those of Soviet Russia. In this way, the Disarmament Conference was confronted more than ever with the uncertainties arising from the unsettlement in the Far East.

Trouble Develops with the Soviet Union

TOWARDS the end of the month, tension between Japan and Russia in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway caused large Japanese troop movements to be made suddenly northward, and as the month ended an ultimatum by "Manchukuo" authorities to Soviet Russia for the return of railway rolling stock heightened the conflict with the Soviet Union.

On April 25, the Soviet Vice-President of the Chinese Eastern Railway protested against the placing of serious obstacles in the way of the proper operation of the railway. It was charged that "Manchukuo" authorities were hindering the expedition of through traffic between Manchuli and Vladivostock and were causing material damage to the interests of the Soviet Union. Replying to the "Manchukuo" contention that rolling stock belonging to the road had been transferred to the Siberian Railway,

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the Soviet official pointed out that his Government held proprietorship in the line which, despite that fact, was operated jointly by the Soviet Union and "Manchukuo." It was reported that the Soviet Union had offered the Chinese Eastern Railway for sale, but that its offer was declined by Japan because of the price which was asked. China's Government shortly challenged the Soviet Government's right to sell the railway, in which it held a partnership.

Matsuoka Returns to Japan

MEANWHILE, Yusoke Matsuoka had completed his journey from Geneva to Japan, arriving there on April 27 after having visited France, England and the United States, where he spoke in the interest of Japan and also visited a number of munitions factories with which it was believed important orders were placed.

In a speech in Chicago on April 2, Mr. Matsuoka had declared that Japan had a duty to perform and, having done it, wanted to come to terms with the Chinese. He thought they could come to such terms if there were "no further interference from Europe and America". In his farewell address in San Francisco, broadcasted throughout the United States, he had denied that Japan was at war with China, and asserted: "We have been doing only some essential police work just as Britain, America and others were called upon to do at times in China". The United States, he believed, felt no anxiety over the situation across the Pacific; if it had, he thought it would not plan to withdraw from the Philippines and would be building up the navy to full treaty strength.

Mr. Matsuoka was received in Japan with an elaborate official welcome, but the fact that he had been unable to convince the League of the justice of Japan's actions in China was held, according to the United Press correspondent in Tokio, to prove his mission a failure.¹

According to a Rengo Agency dispatch, Mr. Matsuoka, shortly after his return to Tokio, made a radio broadcast in which he

declared that not all the Great Powers were opposed to the attitude of Japan during the special League Assembly in Geneva. Great Britain, which had exercised a predominant influence in the Assembly, suddenly changed her attitude because of the anti-British boycott which had been begun in Middle and Eastern China. It was this change of attitude on the part of Great Britain, he was reported to have said, which obliged Japan to leave the League of Nations. It was understood that Mr. Matsuoka had made the same declaration before a meeting of the Cabinet.

International Aid for China

At least one of the Lytton Commission's recommendations for China was going practically into effect at the same time through the initiative of the League of Nations—the tenth proposal¹ that there should be "international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen." A widespread program of expert assistance and cooperation was developing steadily; and while not directly a result of the League action in the Far Eastern dispute, it nonetheless constituted an extension of League aid to China in the emergency due to civil disorganization, famine and flood, and invasion.

The scheme of general aid had been inaugurated in May, 1931. Its purpose was to enable the Chinese Government to secure, through the technical organizations of the League, the experts and special knowledge required in carrying out its program of national restoration. Funds were to come out of the League budget to an amount about equal to payments from China every year as arrears on contributions due for membership in the League. The former Peking Government took part in the Paris Peace Conference and brought China into the League; but it did not pay China's share of dues. When the Nationalist Government at Nanking obtained international recognition, it assumed the obligations of the old Government; and it had undertaken to pay

¹ Report of the Commission of Enquiry, C.663.M.320. 1932.VII, p. 131. See p. 36.

¹ New York Herald Tribune, April 14, 1933.

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to the League the arrears, in twenty annual instalments.

The Council of the League, including Japan, agreed in 1931 to the plan of technical cooperation, considering it of first importance for the peace and prosperity of the Orient and of the whole world that the Chinese Government should obtain the facilities needed to carry through the modernization and organization of the country. The Lytton Report stressed the difficulties encountered in undertaking this task, and also the desire of the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen to draw freely upon the knowledge of other nations in its accomplishment. Finally, the Report recognized the interest of all peoples in the outcome of the Chinese struggle for recovery and reorganization. These observations served to emphasize the reasons for which the members of the League Council approved the Chinese Government's request for cooperation, and for which the members of the Assembly also approved it unanimously in September, 1931—when they chose China for just before, the conflict between China and Japan broke out.

In its application to the League in May, 1931, the Chinese Government mentioned that it had set up a National Economic Council to devise and direct a three year plan for reconstruction, and asked that the League technical organizations—the Economic and Financial Organizations, the Communications and Transit Organization, and the Health Organization—should be continuously available for advice. The ways in which the Chinese Government proposed to utilize these organizations were:

First, a general liaison officer, capable of giving information on the technical organizations and the manner in which they could be brought into service, should be stationed in China.

Second, experts, officers or representatives were to be proposed and sent by the League at the request of the Chinese Government to carry through particular schemes.

Third, the League technical committees might, at the request of the Government, help to frame or improve plans.

Fourth, the League was to help in training Chinese officers required for reconstruction.

Fifth, educational experts were to be put at the disposal of the Government in order

to help in developing the system of teaching and to facilitate contacts and exchanges between China and other countries.

Despite the complications caused by the Chinese-Japanese warfare and the depression throughout the world, China and the League held to this plan of cooperation. Dr. Rajchman, Director of the Health Organization, was the first general liaison officer to be sent out to China. M. Haas, Director of the Transit Organization, who succeeded him, subsequently became the Secretary-General of the Lytton Commission.

The Health Organization sent to China a number of experts on temporary missions, including a survey of medical education.

The Organization for Intellectual Cooperation sent a mission of European educational experts to report on the situation in China as a contribution to the framing of a plan of educational reforms.¹ In pursuance of this plan, Chinese educational experts visited a number of European countries under the auspices of the League. The work did not at the time include studies in the United States.

The Transit Organization first investigated questions of land reclamation, flood control, and harbor improvements at Shanghai. Several engineers of various nationalities were sent out; and a liaison officer, M. Okencki (Polish), and an assistant liaison officer, M. Bourdrez (Dutch), both civil engineers, were stationed in China to develop a plan of roadbuilding in which several thousand miles were completed and more were underway. Their work included assistance in setting up and conducting a higher training center for Chinese engineers.

The Economic Organisation had sent out M. Dragoni (Italian), an expert on agrarian legislation, rural credits, cooperation and similar questions, also put M. Mari (Italian), an expert in the rearing of silkworms and the production of raw silk at the disposal of the Government.

M. Charron, of the League Financial Section, spent six weeks in China, from March on, discussing problems connected with the preparatory work for the Monetary and Economic Conference and, in response to the request

¹ See p. 40.

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of the National Economic Council, coordinating the activities of the various League specialists.

Early in April, despite a good deal of opposition in the Japanese press, Dr. Rajchman started quietly back for the Far East to resume his general supervision of League technical work in China.

The Situation of "Manchukuo"

In the Far East the "Manchukuo" administration attempted during May to consolidate its position and to obtain recognition by other states, in this connection announcing that the "open door" policy would be practised only with countries who entered into reciprocal relations with "Manchukuo".

In Geneva, a sub-committee of the League Far Eastern Advisory Committee was studying problems of administrative regulation, to guard against infraction of that part of the Assembly report providing for the non-recognition of "Manchukuo". The American representative, it was understood, played a passive part in the work.

On May 10, it considered a Secretariat report based on earlier discussions, which was referred back for final redrafting.

After receiving information from a group of legal experts, the Advisory Committee on June 7 adopted a report¹ concerning the crucial question of giving practical application to the refusal to recognize "Manchukuo". This report, which was circulated to all governments, made recommendations in order to secure uniform action by the several States and to avoid prejudicing the principle of non-recognition by commitments on a series of small administrative details which collectively might be very important.

The problems on which the Advisory Committee made recommendations were the following:

- (1) The question of the participation of the present government of "Manchukuo" in international conventions;
- (2) The recognition of postal services and "Manchukuo" stamps;

¹ C.L.117.1933.

- (3) The question of the international non-recognition of the currency of "Manchukuo";
- (4) Problems arising from the acceptance by foreigners of concessions or appointments in Manchuria;
- (5) The question of passports and visas;
- (6) The position of consuls in that area;
- (7) The application of the import and export certificate system under the Geneva Opium Convention of 1925, and the Opium Limitation Convention of 1931.

The provisions of a large number of international conventions were carefully studied from the point of view of depriving "Manchukuo" of the right to accede or to adhere to them. Recommendations were made which would exclude "Manchukuo" from such privileges and from the right to participate in international commissions or associations set up by such conventions. The Committee considered that as regards all League Conventions, the Secretary-General of the League could not receive any accession from "Manchukuo", and in the case of conventions setting up a public authority which included delegations of private associations, it was considered desirable that States Members of the League should take "all steps in their power to avoid the participation of representatives of 'Manchukuo'".

Reports from the Far East, however, indicated that to deny "Manchukuo" the right of adherence to international conventions might in fact work to the advantage of Japan. For example, if "Manchukuo" were not allowed to be bound by a future Disarmament Convention, it would be possible for that "state" to acquire warships.

As regards postal services and stamps, the Committee considered it sufficient to remind Members of the League that "Manchukuo" was not a member of the Universal Postal Union, and that negative action would be taken if the question of her accession to the Postal Convention should arise.

Regarding currency, it was considered desirable that governments take any measures necessary to exclude official quotations in "Manchukuo" currency on their foreign exchange markets.

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The Committee decided to leave it to the Members of the League themselves whether or not it would be desirable to call the attention of their nationals to the special risks attendant upon the acceptance of concessions or appointments in Manchuria. The difficulties of protecting such nationals was pointed out and also the probable attitude of China in regard to the ultimate validity of any concessions granted in "Manchukuo".

In the Committee's opinion, a government which did not recognise the existing régime in "Manchukuo" either *de jure* or *de facto* could not regard as a passport a document issued by authorities dependent on the "Manchukuo" government, and could not, therefore, allow any of its agents to visa such a document. The Committee believed, however, that an identity card might be admitted in the case of residents in "Manchukuo" who might find it necessary to travel abroad.

In regard to the replacement of consuls in Manchuria, the Committee believed that States Members of the League could, without infringing the report adopted by the Assembly, make provision for such replacement, particularly since the appointment of consuls to a State had never been regarded as equivalent to recognition of a State, and also because consuls were usually appointed in order to keep their own governments informed. Governments were urged to remind their consuls, however, that in all their duties they should do nothing which could be interpreted expressly or by implication that they regarded the authorities now established in Manchuria as the proper government of the country.

Finally, the difficult question of applying the Geneva Opium Convention of 1925 was considered and, for purposes of suppressing the world-wide traffic, it was recommended that applications for the export to "Manchukuo" of opium or other dangerous drugs should not be granted unless the applicant should produce an import certificate in accordance with the Convention.¹ In such cases a copy of the export authorisation

¹ This part of the recommendations led to difficulties later, in the Advisory Committee on Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, when the American member made a protest in connection with it. See p. 31.

should accompany the consignment, but governments were urged to refrain from forwarding a second copy of the authorisation to "Manchukuo", since such action might be interpreted as a *de facto* recognition.

The Answers of Governments on Non-Recognition

In a covering letter to those governments which took part in the Advisory Committee work, the Secretary-General pointed out that the Committee presumed that, unless they informed it to the contrary, they would adopt the measures recommended in the report. Certain governments subsequently replied: In acknowledging receipt of the communication on July 13, the United Kingdom Government merely noted two omissions in the list of Open Conventions referred to in the report. The Mexican reply of July 19 signified concurrence.

The United States Minister, Mr. Hugh Wilson, advised the Secretary-General that the views of the American Government in regard to the principle of non-recognition remained unchanged, that the American Government concurred except in a few particulars, in the conclusions arrived at by the Advisory Committee, and that the procedure followed by the American Government was in substance in accordance except in a few particulars,¹ with the procedure recommended by the Advisory Committee.

Of the governments not represented on the Advisory Committee, Cuba, Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia signified that they had taken note of the report and were considering it; the Indian Government answered that it would associate itself with the British Government's attitude. The Siamese Government replied on September 27 that as there were no relations between Siam and Manchuria, the Siamese Government was not directly concerned with the measures in question. Among states non-members of the League to which the report has been sent, Egypt on August 22 notified full concurrence.

Almost a year after the Far Eastern Advisory Committee's report was circulated, Mr. Welling-

¹ Some of these proved later to concern application of the rules concerning the opium traffic. See p. 31.

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ton Koo informed the Secretary-General that the Chinese Government appreciated the intent and purpose of the measures proposed and generally associated itself with the Committee in stressing the desirability of their being undertaken. He stated very positively that

in connection with the subject matter of Paragraph IV of the circular, the Chinese Government considers and will consider as null and void all appointments, concessions and contracts which have been, or may be made, by the present régime in Manchuria.

Japan Blocks China, Bargains with Russia

AN armistice, which was signed in June at Tangku, brought to an end the Japanese incursion into North China after the overrunning of Jehol. It provided, among other matters, for a demilitarized zone in Chinese territory and Japanese withdrawal to beyond the Great Wall. At the time it was stated to contain no political conditions, having been negotiated by one of the northern Chinese Generals, Huang Fu.

Soon afterwards, on June 25, negotiations were reported to have opened in Tokyo between representatives of Soviet Russia and "Manchukuo" reviving the question of sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japanese officials disclaimed responsibility on the ground that Japan was not a party to the transactions. Against the background of the Chinese objections, the conversations dragged along inconclusively, deadlocked by the great disparity between the prices asked and bid—the former understood to be about five times the latter.

Meanwhile, according to accounts from the railway region, the utility and value of the Chinese Eastern line to the Soviet Union were declining steadily¹ because of the construction of intersecting and parallel lines by Japanese initiative in northern "Manchukuo".

American Relations with Plans for China

ON June 28th, the Chinese Government communicated with the League,² informing it that China had decided to proceed actively in plans

of national reconstruction, in certain Chinese provinces which would be selected as models, with a view to securing more continuous cooperation between the League and the National Economic Council in China. The Government further asked that the League should appoint a technical agent who would be accredited to the National Government and to the National Economic Council in order to ensure the necessary contacts between the League and China. The Chinese representative said that his Government attached the greatest importance to this collaboration and hoped that his request would be responded to in the shortest possible time.¹

The Council accordingly appointed a committee to deal with the Chinese request, which met in Paris on July 18th. It was composed of representatives from Great Britain, Spain, Norway, Italy, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and China.

The United States Government was this time informed by the League of the program to be undertaken, and was invited to be represented. Accordingly, Mr. Theodore Marriner, Counsellor of the United States Embassy in Paris, was designated by the Government in Washington to assist the committee in the role of an observer.²

The committee considered that the nature of the co-operation between the League and China necessitated an expert who would co-ordinate this work through a single channel and serve as agent for the League. It was agreed that the collaboration should be entirely technical, impartial and non-political, and administered on the broadest international basis. The committee was unanimous in appointing Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, Director of the Health Section of the League, long connected with the League's work in China, to serve for one year in the capacity of liaison agent attached to the National Economic Council.

¹ Official Journal, 14th year, No. 7 (Part I): Minutes of 74th Council Session, p. 1059.

² At meetings later in Geneva, Mr. Ferdinand Mayer, Counsellor of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, attended in the same capacity.

¹ Times, London, July 24, 1933.
² C.407.1933.

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Developments to the End of the Year

WITH fighting over in the Far East, matters settled down through the latter part of 1933, to a test of the refusal to recognize "Manchukuo", in practice, and to endeavors by its administration under Japanese guidance to consolidate the economic and political conquests made. The United States was in the full course of its experiment for national recovery. Europe was absorbed in watching developments in Germany and in disarmament negotiations, that led in October to stalemate and to the German rupture of relations with the Disarmament Conference, the League and the International Labour Organization—including all their institutions such as the Opium Central Board and the Mandates Commission in which questions related to the controversy over "Manchukuo" were involved.

Nevertheless, the issue in the Orient had come before the League Assembly in September when the Chinese delegate called particular attention to the disturbed outlook in the Far East. The failure of the League to act upon the principles which it had itself asserted in its report following the Chinese-Japanese conflict was leaving a state of uncertainty in the Pacific, which had already jeopardized the success of the Disarmament and Economic Conferences and which would threaten the whole system of treaties and of organized international life. He asserted:

If the Covenant is a dead letter east of Suez, it could not be applied effectively in Europe.

The moot question of the islands in the Pacific under Japanese mandate, arose in course of the twenty-fourth session of the Mandates Commission,¹ from October 23 to November 4, under the presidency of the Marquis Theodoli of Italy, with added importance.

As the representative of the mandatory Power, M. Ito took the occasion to explain once more to the Commission the purposes for which harbor improvements were being made in

several of the islands. Under sharp questioning, he insisted that the objects were purely commercial and that press rumors of naval purposes were without foundation.

"Manchukuo" and Opium

THE League Far Eastern Advisory Committee's recommendations dealing with an import and export certificate system for opium shipments in Manchurian territory (Paragraph VII) was the subject of lively discussion during November in the Seventeenth Session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. When the relation between the refusal to recognize "Manchukuo" and the application of Opium Conventions was under consideration, Mr. Stuart J. Fuller, of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State in Washington, stated¹ that from the point of view of opium control, the Far Eastern Advisory Committee report left very much to be desired since conditions existed in "Manchukuo" which threatened to flood the whole of China and the Far East with opiates.

In a significant statement² he argued that the large scale of the "Manchukuo" monopoly constituted a world menace, that the report suggested a procedure permitting opium shipments for the Manchurian provinces based solely on the Geneva Convention of 1925, to which neither China nor the United States were parties,³ and contrary to the Hague Opium

¹ Minutes, 17th Session Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other dangerous drugs, Third Meeting, November 2, 1933, pp. 15-16.

² "As long", said Mr. Fuller, "as the sovereignty of China over Manchuria is recognized by the Powers, the proposal to facilitate the shipment of raw opium to Manchuria, where its import is prohibited by Chinese law, would seem to be plainly in derogation of Articles 3 and 15 of the Hague Convention. Article 3 obliges the contracting Powers to take measures to prevent the export of raw opium to countries which have prohibited its entry. Under Article 15, the contracting Powers which have treaties with China, shall in conjunction with the Chinese Government, take the necessary measures to prevent the smuggling into Chinese territory of opium and other dangerous drugs."

³ "In view of the menace to the United States which would result from the accumulation in Manchuria of opium of high morphine content . . . I desire to protest against the evasion of the obligations of the Hague Convention of 1912 which appears to be contemplated by the proposals made by the Advisory Committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict in respect of the so called 'Manchukuo' import certificates."

¹ This had been considered also in the sessions of the Commission a year before.

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Convention of 1912 to which all concerned were parties. It would, in addition, assist the exploitation of trade in Persian opium which the Geneva agreement had been designed to prevent.

At the next meeting M. Vasconcellos (Portugal), said he had been surprised to hear Mr. Fuller protest against the recommendation, since his Government had been represented at the meetings of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee when the recommendations were adopted. To this Mr. Fuller replied that the United States Government had participated in the work of the Committee with the understanding that silence would not be construed as acquiescence.

While the American reply to the circular report of recommendations expressed general concurrence, it did note that the United States Government took exception¹ as to a few particulars. This left the way open for Mr. Fuller to take a definite stand on the specific question of the recommended system of opium certificates in a technical committee where opposition to the Advisory Committee's recommendation on this subject did not risk interpretation as an indication of political policy.

In the complicated debate on this recommendation, the Chinese delegate supported the American delegate, while the Japanese delegate refrained from comment. It was finally agreed that the governments should obtain the views of the Opium Advisory Committee before exporting drugs to Manchuria and Jehol.

The Chinese Government's continued fear of an inadequately controlled opium traffic to and from "Manchukuo" has been evidenced by Chinese efforts to have certain points included in the Council's report on the work of the Advisory Commission on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs during its 17th Session. The reporter to the Council did as a result state.

It is understood that, in accordance with Articles 3, 8, and 15 of the Hague Convention of 1912, exports of opium (raw and prepared) to the territory in question cannot be authorized.

¹ See p. 29.

Mention has already been made of the letter from Mr. Wellington Koo to the Secretary-General on May 1st, 1934,¹ in which he said that "except as hereinafter explained", his Government generally associated itself with the Committee in stressing the desirability of the measures provided for in the Advisory Committee's report being undertaken. There followed a rather full explanation of the Chinese Government's apprehension lest the procedure recommended in Paragraph VII of the Committee's report

for dealing with applications for the export to Manchuria and Jehol of opium or other dangerous drugs is liable to be misconstrued and consequently to prejudice the principle of non-recognition of the present régime in Manchuria and to work detriment to the cause of combating the evil of narcotics . . . The Chinese Government is therefore persuaded that no import certificate issued by the present régime in Manchuria should be accepted.

The problems inherent in the attempt to control drug traffic in a territory under an administration not party to any convention, particularly when any step that might involve its political recognition must be avoided, have proven extremely far-reaching; and in spite of various suggestions made for means of collecting information concerning the situation in "Manchukuo" most of the difficulties have remained.

The Chinese Government followed up the work of the committee on League aid to China with a request in December to the Secretary-General to send an expert to Nanking competent to form plans on the basis of the proposals made by the educational experts' mission to China and of the Chinese educationists' mission to Europe.² M. Fernand Maurette, Assistant Director of the International Labour Office, was charged with the task in connection with a visit which he was to make to the Orient.

Approaches by the Soviet Union to the League, understood to be inspired by the

¹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 15th year, No. 2 (Part I), Minutes of 78th Council Session, p. 159.
² See pp. 29-30.

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development of the Japanese plans in "Manchukuo" and a possible threat to Soviet Siberia as well as by unfriendliness in National Socialist Germany¹, began to be indicated by speeches

¹ See *The Soviet Union and the League of Nations*, 1919-1933. Geneva Special Studies, Vol. V, No. 1, 1934, p. 3, 23.

JAPAN CONSOLIDATES THE POSITION IN "MANCHUKUO"

ALMOST exactly a year from the day of the address by Count Uchida, Mr. Hirota, who had become Foreign Minister in a new national Cabinet under Premier Saito, delivered a speech on January 23, 1934, to the Diet in Tokyo, in the course of which he said:

The Japanese Government were obliged to serve notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations last year because the Manchurian incident and questions regarding the State of Manchukuo showed that there was no agreement between Japan and the League on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. At the time when the decisive step was taken the Emperor issued a rescript pointing out clearly and precisely the path this nation should henceforth pursue, in the course of which it was stated that:

By leaving the League and embarking on a course of its own, our Empire does not mean that it will stand aloof in the Far East nor that it will isolate itself thereby from the fraternity of nations. It is our desire to promote mutual confidence between our Empire and all other Powers and to make known the justice of its cause throughout the world.

I am convinced that if we all unite in our endeavours to act in accordance with the wishes of our august Sovereign the world will surely come to realize the fairness and justice of Japan's position, and bright will be the future of our Empire. Personally speaking, in obedience to the Imperial message, I am determined to use every ounce of my energy to carry out our national policy by diplomatic means in the interests of world peace. Fortunately to-day, after our withdrawal from the League, commercial as well as diplomatic relations between Japan and friendly Powers in general have become even more close and more cordial than before.

In a reference to "Manchukuo" and China, Mr. Hirota said:

of Premier Molotov and Foreign Minister Litvinov to the annual Soviet Congress and by an interview given on Christmas Day by Stalin, Secretary-General of the Communist party and controlling leader in the Soviet Union.

Manchukuo, thanks to the tireless efforts of the Regent and of Government authorities, and also to the wholehearted assistance and collaboration extended to her by this country, true to the spirit of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, has been making steady progress along all the lines of her constructive work. Moreover, a decision is about to be made on the establishment of the monarchical régime which has been eagerly awaited by all her people and which will go far to solidify the foundations of Manchukuo as a young independent nation. This is a matter of congratulation not for Manchukuo alone but for the peace of the Orient and the peace of the world.

The Japanese Government have serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and have a firm resolve in that regard. What is more essential in the matter is the stabilization of China herself. Our Government sincerely hope for the political and economic rehabilitation of China. They hope that she will be enabled to unite with Japan in performing the obvious mission of both Japan and China to contribute through mutual aid and cooperation to the peaceful development of their part of the globe.

Unfortunately the actual situation of present-day China belies all such hopes, and it has been reported that of late the Chinese Government, realizing the mistake of persisting in their anti-Japanese attitude, have decided to take steps looking towards the rectification of Sino-Japanese relations. But so far no concrete evidence has come to our notice to confirm the truth of the report. Should China appreciate our true motives and give tangible signs of sincerity on her part, Japan would be glad to reciprocate and meet her more than half-way in a spirit of good will.

It is gratifying to note that North China, under the control of the Peiping Political Committee, remains comparatively quiet. Japan expects China to see to it that nothing will happen that may bring chaos to that area.

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Mr. Hirota spoke as follows with regard to Japanese relations with the Soviet Union:

Recently the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Japan seems to have undergone a change of some sort. It is most surprising and regrettable that the Soviet Union should now take to broadcasting at home and abroad through press and other channels unwarranted criticism directed against Japan, and should circulate exaggerated stories about aggravations of this or that situation for political and diplomatic purposes which such rumours are calculated to serve.

Japan has consistently preserved her fair and equitable attitude towards the Soviet Union, and has sought the solution of all questions by pacific means. Especially since the establishment of Manchukuo, the Japanese Government have been acting solely on their conviction that the proper adjustment of the tripartite relationship between Japan, Manchukuo, and the Soviet Union was of paramount importance for the tranquillity of East Asia.

Japan is certainly not setting up any new military establishments along the Manchukuo-Soviet frontiers, Moscow propaganda notwithstanding. Indeed, it is only as part of the above-mentioned friendly policy that Japan has undertaken since last June to act as intermediary between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union in their negotiations on the proposed transfer of the North Manchurian Railway.

"Manchukuo" Becomes an Empire

THE forecast of changes in "Manchukuo" began to be confirmed in the course of February, when press reports¹ indicated that on March 1, the anniversary of the foundation of the state, its ruler, Henry Pu-yi, the former Emperor of China, would be enthroned with the title of Emperor. Meanwhile, as a gesture, relations with China were somewhat eased by the retrocession on February 10 of the port town of Shanhaikwan, which the Japanese had occupied a little more than a year before. Communications and customs offices, however, as well as the frontier police post, remained in Japanese hands.

The assumption of sovereignty by Pu-yi, as the Emperor Kang Teh, duly took place in the

¹ *Times*, London, Feb. 15, 1934.

presence of Japanese and "Manchukuo" officials.¹ Four days later, on March 4, control of the Koupeikou pass into northern China was returned to the Chinese; but again it was noted that a "Manchukuo" police post was maintained and that the Japanese continued to station troops along the pass.

Mr. Hirota's references to improving relations with friendly Powers were emphasized by reports from London to "The New York Times" of March 5 that events might force Great Britain to reconsider its attitude towards "Manchukuo", and from Tokyo to "The New York Herald Tribune" of the same day that the French National Association for Economic Expansion had signed a contract for enterprises in Manchuria, and that Belgian, German and Polish commercial agents were on the ground to investigate possibilities.

Japanese-Russian tension was growing meanwhile, each charging the other with provocations in Manchuria and plots to control Inner Mongolia. Soviet anxieties were understood to relate particularly to the building of strategic railways, roads and aerodromes in northern Manchuria, towards the Siberian frontiers; and Red Army troops, munitions and airplanes were reported to be moving in strength into the Far Eastern Soviet territories.

"Manchukuo" and Postal Relations

COINCIDENTLY with the change in rank of the "Manchukuo" ruler, the Secretary-General of the League at Geneva summoned the Far Eastern Advisory Committee for May 14 to consider a new problem. The occasion was that Norway had ceased to be a member of the

¹ The Chinese attitude toward this step in Manchuria was expressed in a message from Mr. Wang Ching Wei, President of the Executive Yuan, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 19, forwarded to the Secretary-General of the League. He maintained that the enthronement of Pu-yi was another act of high treason against the Chinese Republic. . . . "China's attitude toward the puppet's régime has always been the same and shall remain so, notwithstanding any change in the appearance of the puppet. The same may be said of European and American Powers with whom the principle of non-recognition of 'Manchukuo' has become an ironclad law of international morality, and deviation from, or violation of, which will reflect on the international personality of the state concerned." (C.131. M.31.1934.VII.)

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Council, and consequently her delegate, Dr. Lange, could no longer serve as Chairman of the Committee and must be replaced. At the same time, the note stated that the British Government had asked for advice requiring the judgment of the whole Committee: On January 8 it had sent to the Secretary-General a copy of a formal request to the General Post Office in London from the "Manchukuo" Department of Communications for statistics in accordance with the Convention of the Universal Postal Union with a view to clearance of charges for transfers of mail. The British Government asked that the matter be brought before the sub-committee of the Far Eastern Advisory Committee, for a definition of relations between the postal administrations which might be authorized without implying recognition of the Manchurian state.

China, shortly afterwards, reasserted her sovereignty over the region and her refusal to admit the existence of "Manchukuo" by publishing in mid-March a final draft Constitution for the Republic, which made specific provisions for the administration of the three Manchurian Provinces and of Jehol as well.

At the end of the month, Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops were reported massing on the Jehol frontier, preparatory to a settlement of issues in northern China. Japanese commanders of troops occupying territory across the Jehol border had issued proclamations at the end of the year, according to United Press reports¹ to which little attention had been paid at the time, that all territory outside the Great Wall, including Mongolia, must be considered as part of "Manchukuo".

Japan Claims Arbitership in China

OPPOSITION to the League plans for aid to China, in Japanese quarters, began in early April to reappear sharply. This was known to involve questions as to the activities of Dr. Rajchman, chief agent, shortly to return to Geneva to present a report, who was charged in the Japanese press with political motives, and as well as general questions concerning the

influence of western advisers in China. In particular, there was dislike of foreign loans that had been made to China; and a Foreign Office spokesman on April 10 objected to projects for an international loan, which Arthur Salter of Great Britain and M. Jean Monnet, both former League financial advisers, were reported to have outlined in Shanghai.

Coincidentally, press reports from Tokyo¹ indicated plans for reciprocal tariff and trade treaties between Japan and "Manchukuo" on the lines of the British Empire preference accords. German industrialists secured, against American bidders, a contract with the South Manchuria Railway Company for large quantities of railway supplies; and in connection with an offer to buy an agreed amount of soya beans for Germany from "Manchukuo" in exchange for German machinery, the commercial secretary of the German Embassy in Tokyo was reported to have hinted at possible recognition of Japan's vassal state².

The gathering difficulties took form on the 18th, when Japan issued through a Foreign Office interview a new challenge to the League of Nations and all the Great Powers, in a warning that she would oppose international schemes in China or any form of action by the governments or nationals of other Powers likely in Japanese judgment to menace Oriental peace. This doctrine of an Asiatic order for Asiatics, directed from Tokyo, not only created disquiet in London, Moscow, Paris, Rome and Washington; it also, and still more, aroused alarm among Chinese in Canton, Nanking and Shanghai. From China's National Government, struggling for unity between the quarrelling provinces of center, north and south, came repudiation of Japan's claim as a dangerous extension of her notorious "21 Demands" of 1915. American, English and French inquiries, and explanations by Japanese envoys, ended in further statements from Tokyo that the Japanese Government respected the Nine Power Treaty concerning China and the "Open Door" policy. These the other Powers accepted. There, for the moment, matters

¹ *Times*, New York, April 6; *Times*, London, April 7.

² *Herald Tribune*, New York, April 9.

¹ *Herald Tribune*, New York, Dec. 28, 1933.

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rested, but with a note delivered on April 30 in Japan from the United States—the clearest and firmest declaration on behalf of any other Power—in which Secretary Hull insisted on these points and on the worldwide Pact of Paris, outlawing war, as the means for adjusting all differences.

Apart from various individual activities—such as, for example, an American cotton loan to China of which part was alleged to have been diverted for airplane purchases, or assistance by Americans, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians and Russians in the development of Chinese aviation and military training—Japan's move was evidently calculated to check the evolution of League aid to China. An interview given by the Japanese Consul on April 21 at Geneva to journalists, and also another interview given on the 25th by the Chinese delegate to the League, tended to set this fact in relief—the first questioning and the second supporting the League technical work. So did an inquiry by the Japanese Consul to the Secretary-General of the League as to the character and scope of the report to be made by its chief agent of technical work in China. Consequently this program—supervised by a Committee to which the United States had appointed an observer—became a key question at the time of the mid-May meeting of the League Council. At the same time, the Far Eastern Advisory Committee was due to discuss problems of the opium traffic as well as of postal relations with "Manchukuo". Decisions in these affairs were foreseen as revealing tests of intention and will, in regard both to interests in the Far East and to the League as an agency of international life.

Japan, meanwhile, made a payment of two million Swiss francs (about \$660,000) to the League for her dues while still legally a member before her notice of resignation should come up in March, 1935.

Japan against the League in China

TOGETHER with publication of the report on China¹ by the chief agent of League reconstruction services, on May 10, came news from

¹ C.157.M.66.1934.

Tokyo that Japan would oppose its recommendations, particularly if League plans should extend to financial assistance for the Government at Nanking. One argument advanced was that existing Chinese debts, of which Japan is a large holder, must be adjusted before the making of any new loans. Hints were also given that the Japanese Government considered Dr. Rajchman to have exceeded his instructions for technical work. The continuation of his appointment was one decision to test the League Powers' will to carry on the projects or their readiness to drop them in the face of Japanese warnings.

China, on the other hand, was understood to be prepared to hold that abandonment of the plans would be equal to disregarding the Assembly's adoption of the Lytton Report last year, with its proposals for international cooperation in China as a means to promote Far Eastern peace which was called "an international concern".

Dr. Rajchman's report was a comprehensive account of the initiation of League work in China before the Chinese-Japanese conflict broke out, and of achievements by the National Economic Council, in agriculture, in the cotton and silk industries, in waterworks and roadbuilding, in health improvement, in education, and in general governmental undertakings including aviation, navigation, and telegraph and telephone services.

His conclusion showed the value of collaboration between Chinese experts and advisers sent by the League, in these fields, and suggested a larger utilization of credits appropriated in its budget for development of these contacts. In an important passage, he said:¹

One of the most hopeful prospects for the success of reconstruction in China lies in the manifold activities of a large number of its citizens specialized in many fields of technical work who carry on their work steadily, away from the limelight of publicity, in a spirit of public service and guided by the interest of accomplishment. These men, having known the disillusionments attendant on changes of political programmes and political régimes and having passed through

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

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bitter experience of calamity and war at home and of the ineffectiveness of measures of international collaboration on major issues, have now attached themselves resolutely to positive development work, and some of them to the task of planning how best to build up their own country in all the present circumstances.

Their background of solid technical knowledge was acquired partly in China, partly abroad. Having given a good deal of thought to the study of the working of the economic machinery of leading countries in the world, many of them have gained a remarkable—and perhaps generally unsuspected—insight into Western practice in fields of public endeavour—financial, economic, industrial, and agricultural—and often also into the philosophy underlying public policy in foreign lands. In short, China can count to-day on men with the requisite expert knowledge and clear understanding of their own technical needs and of the type of reform or improvement required.

The constitution and technical organization of the League, he pointed out, are so supple that its service can be adapted and perfected to suit the situation. He continued:

Greater emphasis should be laid on visits of Chinese specialists abroad then has hitherto been the case. At present, contacts abroad are limited mainly to diplomatists and such eminent intellectuals as are fully conversant with foreign languages. Technical contacts between men holding responsible positions in economic and public life should be multiplied and placed on an organized basis. There is available in the Secretariat of the League and at the International Labour Office a wealth of unique material and a very special technical experience accumulated during 14 years of intense economic, social, and political readaptation of the world to new conditions during this period of transition from the pre-War economic and political order to that still in process of active evolution.

Finally he recommended, as forms of association between the League and China in reconstruction and reorganization:

1. Systematic use of the League and Labour Office archives.
2. Similar arrangements with the Bank for International Settlements and with national economic councils and institutions in Europe and the United States.

3. Engagement of Chinese in the technical work of the League and the Labour Office.

4. Experimental researches into Chinese questions by foreign specialists.

5. Technical training of Chinese abroad in various branches of public service.

6. Development of intellectual coöperation in the education of Chinese students.

7. Extension of advice and assistance to the National Economic Council in China, in the evolution of technical services.

8. Consideration of the recent Salter Report for the National Economic Council, in connection with a policy for economic and financial progress.

This report was examined by the Council Committee on Technical Cooperation between the League of Nations and China, on May 17, at which time Dr. Rajchman, made a short statement on the development of the technical coöperation between the League of Nations and China.

He was followed by Mr. Wellington Koo, who conveyed to the Committee the Chinese Government's appreciation of the services rendered by the technical agent, and pointed out the value attached by it to effecting technical coöperation with all states through the intermediary of the League of Nations.

The Committee observed that the cooperation between the League of Nations and China was being carried out under conditions conforming to the resolutions of the Council and the Committee, and found that the methods of coöperation provided for under these resolutions were calculated to render useful service in the task of Chinese reconstruction.¹

The Committee requested the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the technical agent to the Technical Organisations of the League, and invited him to give them all requisite complementary information—thus entirely supported Dr. Rajchman.

"Manchukuo" Mails and Opium Traffic

WITH Minister Hugh Wilson of the United States as a consultant, the Far Eastern Advisory Committee set up by the League Special Assembly considered on May 14 and 17 Great

¹ Information Section, Communiqué No. 6937.

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Britain's inquiry as to the extent to which relations might be permitted between foreign postal authorities and the Communications Department of "Manchukuo", without involving the principle of recognition. The Committee concluded that: (1) in its relations with postal administrations of countries members of the Universal Postal Union, the "Manchukuo" Communications Department could not appeal to the provisions of the Union; (2) the postal administrations of nations in the League might take temporary measures to forward mail through Manchuria; (3) if these involved relations between postal administrations of League members and that of "Manchukuo", they would be regarded only as relations between one postal administration and another, not as between states or Governments, and so not amounting to recognition.

The Committee considered also the delicate question of the export of opium and other drugs to "Manchukuo" territory. It decided to consult the Opium Advisory Committee on the possibility of modifying the system for control of imports of narcotics into Manchuria and Jehol,¹ by means of import licenses issued through consular representatives.

Salvador Recognizes "Manchukuo"

THE only nation to quit the League line-up in refusal to recognize "Manchukuo" has been Salvador in Central America. Communications were exchanged between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of "Manchukuo" and Salvador on March 1 and 3 regarding the enthronement of Pu-yi on March 1, and discussing the cultivation of friendly relations between the two. Official recognition was confirmed on April 26 by a telegram from Salvador.²

The action was interesting from many points of view: A member of the League, Salvador is not a party to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris, and did not take part in the Assembly vote to deny recognition. A delegate of Salvador was present at the March, 1932, Assembly on the Chinese-Japanese dispute³ and in the discussions adopted the same attitude as other Latin

American delegates.¹ Salvador also voted for the resolution of March 11, 1932 holding members bound not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement acquired by means contrary to the League Covenant, or the Pact of Paris.² The Government of Salvador sent no word that it would not take part in the Assembly of February, 1933,³ but no representative was there when it voted on February 24 for the final report and recommendations including the declaration that members would continue not to recognize the Manchurian administration.⁴ Salvador did not answer the circular letter of June 14,⁵ sent out by the Secretary-General on measures resulting from the refusal to recognize "Manchukuo" and requesting governments to take the appropriate steps and also to reply. The summary of replies⁶ was sent to Salvador as well as to other members of the League.

The Consul-General of Salvador at Tokyo issued on May 24 a statement reading as follows:

In regard to the recognition of a Government there is explicit provision in the Constitution of my country. It is one of our sovereign rights which can not be restricted by any treaty or agreement. The bureaucratic policy of the League of Nations is influenced by the representatives of a few States, whose attitude was animated by the desire of satisfying their personal vanity. Therefore it has been prejudiced into an irrational and unjust attitude towards China. The recognition of Manchukuo by my country is the exercise of our sovereign rights, of which we can not be deprived by the fact that my country is a member of the League of Nations.

At the time the news of Salvador's recognition appeared in the press, trade advantages and, more specifically, anticipated coffee sales were mentioned as motives. It is, however, possible that another factor also entered in: Salvador, for years not recognized by the United States,⁷ perhaps was not inclined to favor the policy.

¹ *Idem*, p. 70.

² League Members not voting on the resolution were: Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

³ *Idem*, Sup. No. 112, p. 9.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 76.

⁵ C.L. 417.

⁶ Doc. C.630.M.298.

⁷ A General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed by the Republics of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,

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Japan Organizes and Pushes On

Japan saw the end of the nationalist Cabinet under Premier Saito, in June, and the formation of a more nationalist Cabinet under Admiral Okada concentrating the influences and policies of the army, navy and treasury.

Chinese-Japanese agreement to start rail traffic again between "Manchukuo" and north China marked the gaining of another objective persistently sought by Japan.

A firm intention to insist upon the status of "Manchukuo" again appeared in difficulties that arose, on July 22, in connection with the practice of British troops from Tientsin, during their summer camp at Shanhaikwan, to proceed outside the Great Wall for training.¹ For 33 years, under the Boxer Protocol of Peking, of September 7, 1901, they had so utilized grounds specially suitable for the purpose. Now the Kwantung (Japanese) Army, in preventing the exercises, took the stand that foreign troops must be excluded from it.

The British Legation at Peiping took up the question with the Japanese authorities; and French and Italian rights were also understood to be affected. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, a Foreign Office spokesman said, in connection with the refusal of the British commander at Tientsin to inform the Japanese authorities of the projected exercises, that it was necessary for the Governments of Japan and "Manchukuo" to improve the international standing of the vassal state.²

The Foreign Office spokesman pointed out that when incidents affecting foreign

Nicaragua and Salvador on February 7, 1923, provided that "The Governments of the Contracting Parties will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five Republics through a coup d'état or a revolution against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country."

Shortly afterwards the United States adopted this policy of non-recognition and at a later date refused, on this basis, to recognize a government set up in Salvador. This stand was only abandoned when, on January 26, 1934, the President, in view of the previous denunciations of the Treaty by the Contracting Parties, instructed the American Chargé d'Affaires to inform the Salvador Government of recognition by the United States.

¹ *Times*, London, July 23.

² *Idem*.

rights occurred in "Manchukuo" the foreign Powers complained to the authorities at its capital or in Tokyo; this attitude was contradictory, he argued, and in view of formal recognition of "Manchukuo" by Japan and Salvador the territory could not be considered part of China. The next day, another Foreign Office interview indicated that the Tokyo Government did not take a serious view of the actual incident between the British and Kwantung commanders, but that its implications prompted steps for the betterment of "Manchukuo's" international position. These were understood to refer to abolition of extra-territorial rights for foreigners and perhaps of the "open door" commercial policy in "Manchukuo". The ground indicated was that this could be done unilaterally, so far as nations other than Japan were concerned, since the assurance to respect treaties contracted by China¹ was also unilateral.

"Manchukuo", the Soviets, and the League

BARGAINING about the transfer of the Chinese-Eastern Railway to "Manchukuo" by the Soviet Union, which had been begun again during May in Tokyo, was meanwhile coming to another decisive point in the latter part of July; but the prospect was that it would probably break down, despite an increased Japanese offer,² because of the difference between the asked and bid prices.

During all this period, moves to associate the Soviet Union with the League were taking shape. Ambassador Maisky of the Soviet Union, speaking at Birmingham, England, on June 25, to the National Peace Congress, said significantly that invitations had been extended to his Government at Moscow by several states, and that it would make its decision "solely and exclusively according to the measure in which the League of Nations, in present conditions, can play the part of a real factor in reinforcing peace".³

¹ Note to Powers, March 12, 1932. See also p. 17.

² *Idem*, July 26.

³ *Peace*. National Peace Council, London. Vol. II, Nos. 4-5, July-August, 1934, p. 22.

¹ See p. 32.

² C.301.M.132.1934.VII.

³ *Official Journal*, Sup. No. 101, p. 15.

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Japan vs. the League on Mandates

AMONG the broader issues growing out of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, the question of Japan's claim to the mandated islands in the Pacific took a new turn with the forwarding from Tokyo, on July 24, of the annual report on administration of the South Seas Mandate. It was said to state that Japan maintains no military or naval forces or equipment in the islands, that no military instruction is given to natives, and that order is maintained by police solely. The *Jiji Shimpō* added the information that the Japanese Consul-General had been instructed to say to the Mandates Commission, when presenting the report at its autumn session: ¹

(a) That as the islands covered by the Mandate were entrusted to Japan under Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles by the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and not by the League of Nations, Japan will not surrender them, even if called upon to do so by the League, when her withdrawal from that body takes full effect.

(b) That Japan intends to continue to work in the same spirit as that of the League for the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of the islands under her mandate; and

(c) Japan will continue to render annual reports on the administration of the islands to the League as a non-member State.

The Far Eastern Issue in Intellectual Cooperation

EVEN in the quiet meetings of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, held in Geneva during July, the issue between China and Japan over "Manchukuo" raised its head. During a discussion on moral disarmament and the revision of textbooks, the Japanese representative assured his colleagues that textbooks in Japan could be considered objective and non-partisan because they had to be approved by the Government. This argument the Chinese representative challenged, noting as an example that the color given in the Japanese textbooks to the provinces of Manchuria and Jehol had been changed.

For aid to China in educational reforms and technical training, new positive results were

reached. The League Commission, composed of Europeans, which visited China to study this problem, had made a report which in some portions reflected unfavorably and inaccurately on American educational methods and their suitability for China; and this had caused resentments in the United States. The League had later been asked by the Chinese Government to name an officer for technical studies, to aid Chinese educationists and students in Europe, to suggest advisory experts on reforms, and to assist Chinese students abroad.¹

The Chinese Ministry of Education proposed to establish a governmental bureau under the Ministries of Education, Industry, Interior, and Communications and Railways, for guidance of intellectual and technical workers. A Bureau in Geneva, under a Chinese Director, was to be set up to assist. In these plans, the United States had not been definitely included, although a mention was made of considering American cooperation. Obviously, a situation had arisen which might have led to difficulties. After a frank exchange of views in a sub-committee, the misunderstanding was cleared up; and the idea of American cooperation was stressed.

On the initiative of Sir Frank Heath of Great Britain, a committee was envisaged to aid the Bureau Director in Geneva; while on the initiative of Dr. Rajehman, the agent of League technical work in China, the Chinese Minister of Education cabled from Nanking inviting American cooperation specifically. To this Dr. J. T. Shotwell responded with agreement. In the final resolution, support voted in principle for the Bureau in Geneva was related definitely to assistance in training Chinese students "in Europe or the United States", and the committee was composed of Sir Frank Heath (Chairman), Dr. Langevin (France), M. Maurette (Secretary), Sig. Peitromarchi (Italy), Dr. Shotwell (United States), and Dr. Yuan (China).

So a possible conflict of interests disappeared in arrangements for American help with another enterprise under League auspices, in a field of critical importance to all concerned and of keen interest to the United States.

¹ *Times*, London, July 26.

¹ See p. 27.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./84 FOR Desp.#2933

FROM China (Johnson) DATED Aug. 24, 1934.
17911 NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Discusses main
problems in connection with -.

fpg

793.94/6790

6790

B. Relations with other countries:

1. Japan:

There continued to be evidence that the principal problem confronting the Chinese officials concerned in the conduct of relations with Japan was how to yield to Japan's desires slowly enough to avoid bringing on themselves the opprobrium of important factions in China and yet rapidly enough to keep Japan's restive military satisfied. At the same time, the Japanese authorities concerned appeared not yet to be in agreement as to the method of procedure which would best obtain Chinese compliance with their desires.

Through passenger traffic between Peiping and Mukden was established on July 1st and ran satisfactorily thereafter, except that the explosion of a bomb on the first north-bound train resulted in several casualties.² Definite progress in settling other outstanding Sino-Japanese problems was slight, but some advance was made

in

2. Legation's despatch 2831 of July 10.

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in the settlement of questions of administration of the demilitarized area and the establishment of Chinese customs houses along the Great Wall.

a. Administration of the demilitarized area:³

Mr. Yin Tung, Managing Director of the Peiping-Mukden Railway and experienced negotiator with the Japanese military, met certain Japanese military officers at Dairen during the latter part of July. According to responsible Japanese and Chinese sources, the subject of their conversations was the administration of the demilitarized area. It is understood that the outcome was as follows: (1) The Japanese agreed to the withdrawal of the "Manchukuo" forces now guarding the Eastern (Manchu) Tombs, near Malanyu, south of the Great Wall, as soon as Chinese police should arrive to replace them. (2) It was agreed that the subversive activities in the demilitarized area by undesirable Japanese and Koreans should be checked by the issuance by the Japanese authorities of passes (a kind of good character card) without which Japanese and Koreans could not enter the demilitarized area and could not, if already there, remain in the area. (3) The Japanese military (again) promised to withdraw their forces from south of the

Great

3. Logation's telegram 338, August 3, 4 p.m. and despatch 2911 of August 17.

- 4 -

Great Wall as soon as quarters north of it were ready.

(4) No solution was reached with regard to the question of the number of Chinese police and the type of their arms which should be permitted in the demilitarized area, the Chinese claiming that efficient administration required 9,000 police with heavy arms and the Japanese insisting that there should be only 6,000 police with light arms.

(4) The Japanese military did not accede to the Chinese request that a renegade Chinese leader, Li Shou-sin, with 2,000 troops, stationed near Dolonor, be taken over by "Manchukuo" in order that his threat to the peace of Chahar might be eliminated. (5) The Chinese failed to obtain an amelioration of the situation created by the Great East (Ta Tung) Company which is said to collect twenty cents from every third class Chinese passenger who enters "Manchukuo" by way of Shanhaikwan, with the object not only of obtaining revenue but of creating an impression that those who pay are pro-"Manchukuo".

Although the concessions made by the Japanese military were slight, it was thought that they might help to persuade General Huang to resume his duties at Peiping. It was also thought that the more or less lenient attitude of the Japanese military in the Dairen negotiations issued from their belief that agreement in questions of an important character might be facilitated by improving Chinese feeling through minor concessions.

b.

- 5 -

b. Establishment of customs houses along
the Great Wall:⁴

Although the question of the establishment of Chinese customs houses at passes of the Great Wall is publicly referred to as an internal Chinese matter, there is little doubt that the Japanese have been involved in the decisions reached. Mr. Chang Yung-nien, Deputy Inspector of Customs of the Inspectorate General of Customs at Shanghai, detailed to Peiping to establish an Office in Charge of Branch Stations at Passes of the Great Wall in the Tientsin Customs District, visited Kupeikow (near the Great Wall) during July. The Legation was authoritatively informed that a Chinese customs office would be opened about the middle of August at Kupeikow and that subsequently preparations would be made for the opening of customs houses at Yiyuankow, Chichlingkou, Lengkow, and Hsifengkow, also passes in the Great Wall. It was understood that the primary purpose of the establishment of customs houses was to prevent smuggling, as it was thought that revenues would be unimportant because poor transportation facilities render commerce difficult through the passes of the Great Wall, with the exception of Shanhaikwan. The Legation was informed that import duty would be levied only on goods not of Manchurian origin, the purpose being to indicate that Manchuria is still a part of China, and that no export duty would be levied.

C.

4. Legation's telegram 345 of August 7, 4 p.m.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 11, 1934.

~~MEMO~~
~~10/11/34~~
~~STG:~~

Tientsin's, No. 630 of September 2, 1934.

No action required.

The despatch summarizes a conversation between a responsible and well-informed local Chinese government official and an officer of the staff of the Consulate General with regard to the National political situation and the return of Hwang Fu.

The principal points brought out in the despatch are:

(a) Hwang Fu is fast losing the support of the Japanese as he has been unable to make good his numerous oral promises with regard to North China.

(b) The Japanese are now turning to Wang Ching-wei who appears to have been influenced by T'ang Yu Jen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is the leading advocate of a conciliatory policy towards Japan.

(c) The Japanese bestowal of confidence upon Wang Ching-wei is an expression of exasperation with Hwang Fu and the opening

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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of an offensive against Chiang K'ai Shek who was originally responsible for Hwang Fu's appointment to his present post but who has tended to move further and further away from his former pro-Japanese position.

(d) General Chiang's apparent change of front coupled with such activities as the New Life Movement, appears to be winning for Chiang the support of large numbers of Chinese who were originally opposed to him.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 630

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, September 2, 1934.

SUBJECT: 1-1403

Sino-Japanese Issues: National
Political Situation and the Re-
turn of Hwang Fu.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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RS. Ward		ON	MID

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 767 of today's date, addressed to the
Legation, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

George Acheson, Jr.
George Acheson, Jr.,
American Consul.

Enclosure
To Legation, No. 767, September 2, 1934.

800
RSW:sf

Original and four copies to Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 767

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, September 2, 1934.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues: National
Political Situation and the Re-
turn of Hwang Fu.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

693.0023/61

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 746, dated August 17, 1934 and, in connection with the above subject, to report here the gist of the remarks made by a responsible and well-informed local Chinese government official in the course of a private conversation with a member of the staff of this office yesterday evening.

The official quoted has recently returned from a series of conferences in Nanking to which he had been invited by the National Government, and in the course of which he had an opportunity to meet and talk

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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talk to Wang Ching-wei and other National leaders.

He states Hwang Fu's position to be essentially this: Hwang was appointed to the Chairmanship of the Political Readjustment Council because of his pro-Japanese leanings, and as an earnest of his friendliness to Japan, and under the stress of circumstances, he was led to make oral promises to the Japanese in North China which the National Government now feels itself unable to carry out. Hwang therefore first sought the authority to make his own arrangements in the North, but that having been denied, he has been driven to take a defensive position and to an attempt to explain the concessions already made. This circumstance is costing him the only support he has ever really had, namely, that of the Japanese, who are, the informant asserts, now turning to Wang Ching-wei. This latter leader has made the Japanese no promises, and yet he appears in fact to be pursuing a policy which takes account of what the Japanese consider the necessity of Chinese subservience to Japan.

This drift toward an acceptance of Japanese domination on Wang's part the informant attributes to the influence which T'ang Yu Jen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, now wields in the councils of the Ministry. The Vice Minister is a leading advocate of a conciliatory policy toward Japan, and
 that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that fact, coupled with the sop to his personal ambitions in the form of Japanese support, has, it is said, strongly influenced Wang Ching-wei's recent attitude on Sino-Japanese issues.

But in the opinion of the informant the action of the Japanese in passing over Hwang to bestow their confidence upon Wang Ching-wei is an expression of more than their exasperation with the former's failure to procure the consent of the Government to his policies in the North; it is in effect the opening of an offensive against Chiang K'ai Shek, whose growing power the Japanese have come to fear.

On the other hand, General Chiang, who is supposed to have originally been responsible for Hwang Fu's appointment to his present post, has tended to move further and further away from his former pro-Japanese position, and he is credited with having checked Hwang Fu's efforts to gain control of the Chinese foreign policy vis a vis Japan in North China. He is also said to be responsible for the anti-Japanese tenor of the decisions reached at the recent Kuling Conference*. The informant quoted represents this new orientation as having caused a cleavage between Chiang and many of his former henchmen,

*See Monthly Political Report for August.

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men, Yang, his adviser, Chang Ch'un (張羣), Chairman of Hupeh, and Ch'en Kuo-Fu (陳果夫), Chairman of Kiangsu, being among their number.

This apparent change of front on Chiang's part is represented as having won him new accussions of support among the literate Chinese, who as a class have in the past looked down upon him. The informant states that the fear which Chiang's growing power has inspired among the Chinese themselves is tending to disappear in the face of indications that he would use this power for national purposes if opportunity afforded. Patriotic Chinese are now confident that Chiang, faced with eventualities, would attempt to defend the State, and they therefore are willing to support him. Meanwhile the New Life Movement is proving a happy political device in reconciling to Chiang's leadership those who, schooled in the classics, despised the man whom they believe to have once been a gangster, whom they allege is even now a member of the notorious Ch'ing Fong secret society, and who is known to have been the organizer of the so-called Blue Coats, a clique of Shanghai gunmen.

In the opinion of the official who outlined these circumstances, their effect on the present political situation in North China lies in the resultant weakening of Hwang Fu's position here. He

states

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states that if the latter returns to North China at all he will do so empowered to sign certain agreements with the Japanese touching the de-militarized zone, but he gives it as his personal opinion that the expectations of those who look for any real clarification of Sino-Japanese relations to follow Wang's return North will be disappointed. Wang, u, he states, after having effected the first part of his mission, which was to make a truce with the Japanese which would save Hopei for China without involving the recognition by China of "Manchukuo", went South with certain well-defined objectives; he has not only failed to obtain these, but has been caught up in the current of national politics, losing therein what strength the situation in the North had lent him.

In connection with the informant's statements concerning General Chiang, it may be of interest to observe that he asserts positively that Chiang has for many days been in Fukien directing the anti-communist campaign there, no paper reports to the contrary notwithstanding. He also repeated, without, of course, crediting it, a rumor current in the last twenty four hours that in the fighting in Fukien Chiang had either been killed or seriously wounded.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, jr.,
 American Consul.

800
 RS:iaf

Original and two copies to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover
 of despatch No. 630 of September 2, 1934.

A true copy of
 the signed original
 vol. 88

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 16, 1934.

U:
Mr. Phillips.

SA.

The attached despatch from Peiping of September 13 in regard to Japanese policy toward China is important. The despatch indicates that the Japanese Government has decided to deal with China regionally and pursuant thereto to support Chinese leaders -- at times by rendering assistance through the supply of military advisers and munitions -- in each particular area. The Legation states that the Japanese "policy is one which intends to check the growing influence of General Chiang Kai-shek and the present tendency toward Chinese political unity".

If the information which has reached the Legation on this subject is correct, Japan has decided again to adopt tactics, which it has used often in the past, designed to prevent the development of any strong central authority in China.

M. M. H.

MMH/REK

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 12, 1934.

~~MSM~~
~~LDS~~
~~MBT~~
SAH:

Peiping's, No. 2972 of September 13, 1934, in regard to Japanese policy toward China.

No action required.

The despatch is based on information obtained from the head of the Shanghai office of the Rengo News Agency who is considered to be in close touch with the Japanese authorities, particularly the Japanese Assistant Military Attache at Peking, who is regarded as the most influential Japanese military figure in China Proper.

Briefly, the despatch points out that ^{the} Japanese authorities have decided on a policy of dealing with China regionally which means that the Japanese will support Huang Fu in North China and will lend assistance to the military leaders in South China through supplying military advisers and munitions. This policy will tend to check the growing influence of General Chiang Kai-shek and the present tendency towards Chinese political unity. What policy will be adopted in North China in the event that Huang Fu does not return

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return there is at present unknown.

There is enclosed with the despatch
a copy of a report credited by a Japanese
News Agency to a Japanese military officer
at Shanghai which accuses General Huang Fu
of insincerity in dealing with Sino-Japanese
problems and ignorance of the world situation.

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FE:EW:LB

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2972

Received
Peking, China, September 13, 1934.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Japanese policy toward China.

1934 OCT 6 AM 11 31

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DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

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[Handwritten signatures and initials]

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793.94/6792

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, according to a Japanese source, the Japanese authorities have at last reached agreement with respect to what their policy toward China shall be. The Legation hopes to obtain within the next few days from Chinese sources substantiation or refutation of the accuracy of this information. Meanwhile, this despatch is submitted to indicate what is at least going on in the Japanese mind.

The Japanese informant is Mr. Shigeharu Matsumoto, well-known to a member of my staff who tells me that in the past Mr. Matsumoto's statements have been worthy of

credence.

Strictly
Confidential

OCT 25 1934

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credence. Mr. Matsumoto is at present head of the Shanghai office of the Rengo News Agency and is believed to be in the confidence of the Japanese authorities. Twice during the past year he has been offered an important position in the "Manchukuo" government, and has twice refused. In July and August of this year Mr. Matsumoto visited Tokyo, the principal cities of Manchuria, and Peiping, and in each place had conversations with leading Japanese civilian and military officers. His information with regard to Japanese policy is believed to have come primarily from Lieutenant-Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping, who is regarded as the most influential Japanese military figure in China Proper.

I reported to the Department in my despatch No. 2906 of August 15, 1934, that an official of the Japanese Foreign Office had informed the Legation that the authorities in Tokyo were at that time still in disagreement with regard to Japanese policy toward China and that there were two plans under consideration, one, favored by the War Department, envisaging a substantially independent North China in order to attain Japanese ends in that area and the other calling for support of the National Government to attain those same ends. According to Mr. Matsumoto, the Japanese authorities have now decided definitely upon a policy similar to that advocated by the War Department. This policy in general is one of dealing with China regionally, which conversely is a policy of limiting the power of General Chiang Kai-shek (or

of

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the National Government). In particular, it means with regard to North China that the Japanese will support General Huang Fu but will not support General Chiang Kai-shek's influence in this area. In South China it means assistance to the military leaders there through the supply of military advisers and munitions. In short, this policy is one which intends to check the growing influence of General Chiang Kai-shek and the present tendency toward Chinese political unity. Mr. Matsumoto stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Shibayama had informed him that, in order to obtain the concurrence of the Japanese military to a policy of support of General Huang Fu, he had had to assure them very definitely that such a policy would not mean support of General Chiang Kai-shek nor an extension of his influence northward. That at least some of the Japanese military were opposed to Japanese support of General Huang Fu was indicated early this month by an extraordinary statement credited by the Nippon Dempo, a Japanese news agency, to Lieutenant-Colonel Kagasa, a Japanese military officer at Shanghai. According to this report, a copy of which is enclosed, Lieutenant-Colonel Kagasa made a statement accusing General Huang Fu of insincerity, lack of authority in dealing with Sino-Japanese problems, and ignorance of "the world situation" and expressing the hope that "some capable person who could negotiate with sincerity for the welfare of the masses in North China will be appointed" to treat with the Japanese authorities.

1/

The difficulty in putting this policy into effect in North China would seem to be possible objection

on

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on the part of General Huang Fu. Having neither military nor financial strength of his own and being close to General Chiang Kai-shek, he might not wish to return to North China under the conditions outlined above. General Huang Fu left Peiping for Central China early in April of this year for discussions with the principal political figures there. He was definitely expected by his subordinates here to return to Peiping in July, then in August, and now during the present month. But General Huang Fu continues to linger in Central China, and, according to one of his trusted subordinates, there is a possibility that he may not return. What the Japanese might do in such an eventuality is not known, but it would seem to imply the necessity of finding some more complaisant Chinese to become the figurehead in North China to give the Japanese what they want.

With regard to the Japanese attitude toward South China, the Legation has little information. The Consul General at Canton has recently commented on the appearance in Canton of Japanese whose actions have given rise to suspicion, and a responsible official in the Peiping Branch Political Affairs Readjustment Council informed the Legation that it has received information that there has recently been an influx into Canton of Japanese. In his opinion the primary purpose is so to intimidate the authorities of the Southwest that they will not effect any genuine rapprochement with the National Government.

If it is true that this policy has been agreed upon by the Japanese authorities, it is a victory for the re-

actionary

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actionary elements and a defeat of those more liberal elements who view as the best solution of Sino-Japanese relations support of the National Government, Chinese unity, and friendlier relations.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson

* Carbon Copies

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

A.H.C.

Enclosure ✓

1. Copy of Nippon Dempo news item, dated Shanghai, August 30.

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LES-SC

HUANG FU'S RETURN

Japanese Legation Official Issues Statement

Nanking's Attitude and Policy Incomprehensible

JAPAN AWAITS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH

SHANGHAI, AUGUST 30.

Owing to the report that General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Readjustment Council, who conferred with General Chiang Kai-shih and Mr. Wang Ching-wei, will return to North China the situation there is focusing attention of various circles, in connection with which Lieut.-Colonel Kagasa, attached to the Nippon Legation, said in substance as follows:

"General Huang Fu merely settled the through railway traffic issue during the past one year. It could not be expected that the negotiations for the settlement of the North China problems will make a new development whatever plan General Huang Fu, who is not vested with any special authority, carries with him to North China.

Although more or less General Huang Fu has been sincere in the past, before the Autonomous Association in Shanghai he said:

"Although China is now menaced by a shark,
if it is lured to a shoal with a good bait it
could be easily stricken."

It could be understood from the above that General Huang Fu does not know the world situation very well and that he possesses incorrect views.

The following fundamental policy was decided upon for the North China problems at the recent Kuling Conference:

- (1) To refuse the demands of the Nippon Authorities, for Nippon could not extend her influence southward on account of strained relations with the Soviet Union.
- (2) To oppose Nippon's economic advance to North China.
- (3) To negotiate as much as possible with the Foreign Office Authorities rather than with the Kwangtung Army Authorities.
- (4) To settle questions in the demilitarized zone technically and partially.

The attitude of the Nanking Government, which decided to adopt the above policy, is incomprehensible. Even if General Huang Fu, who outwardly shows a friendly attitude toward Nippon, returns to North China it is unbelievable that he will negotiate with the Nippon Authorities with sincerity for the welfare of the masses there. Consequently his return to North China will be absolutely meaningless.

It

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It is hoped that some capable person, who could negotiate with sincerity as representative of the masses in North China, will be appointed.

If General Huang Fu knows that he will lose his face immediately upon the arrival in North China due to the temporizing and insincere policy he may not return to his post." -- Nippon Dempo.

(Copied by SC)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 15, 1934

~~MSM~~
~~RCM~~
~~JAM~~
~~SKH~~

Peiping's No. 2975 under date
September 14, 1934.

No action required.

The despatch outlines Mr. Salisbury's
views on Japan's policy vis-a-vis China
with particular reference to the effect
of this policy on the future of Japan.

Briefly, the despatch points out:

- A - Japan's policy toward China has
vacillated from an extreme of concilia-
tion (Shidehara policy) to an extreme
of aggression (21 demands and seizure
of Manchuria).
- B - During the last year there has been
evidence that Mr. Hirota has been en-
deavoring to guide Japan toward a
policy of conciliation with China,
but recent reports indicate that the
Japanese military have succeeded in
obtaining the acceptance of a policy
of dealing regionally with China

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and of non-support of General Chiang Kai-shek outside of the Yangtze Valley which appears to be a swing of the pendulum again toward the extreme of aggression.

- C - A conciliation policy resulting in Sino-Japanese friendship would ~~have~~ opened up to Japan China's sources of supply of raw materials and her vast market for Japanese manufactures, thus making possible the industrialization of Japan to a degree which would solve the problems of population and economy.
- D - The seizure of Manchuria (as recommended by the Japanese military who are influenced by European theories of the late 19th century) added to previous wrongs committed against China has now, however, created a situation which makes it impossible for Japan to gain the friendship of China.
- E - Looking to the future, Mr. Salisbury appears convinced that:
 - (1) China will eventually become a great power.
 - (2) Japan, which has in a few decades risen from feudalism to the position of a first rank power, seems now definitely embarked on a course which can end eventually in a decline into unimportance.

(Comment - Although I personally do not agree with Mr. Salisbury's views that Sino-Japanese friendship is now impossible and that such friendship would solve Japan's population and economic problems, I think his despatch is well worth noting particularly in view of his Japan training.)

E.W.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2975

Peiping, China, September 14, 1934.

Subject: The failure of Japanese policy toward China.

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793.94/6793

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 2972 of September 13, 1934, and previous despatches with regard to Japanese policy toward China and to comment on the seeming inability of the Japanese authorities to initiate and sustain any given policy in their relations with this country.

As the Department knows, Japanese policy with regard to China has vacillated during the past several decades between an extreme of conciliation as exempli-

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fied by the so-called Shidehara policy and an extreme of aggression as evidenced by the so-called Twenty-one Demands of 1915 and the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. These vacillations have been the outcome of differing points of view among the authorities in Japan with regard to the method of solving Japan's population and economic problems. The one view, which has had as its principal supporters Japanese militarists, regards political domination of China in part or in entirety as the solution; the other, which has had as its principal supporters certain modern-minded liberals, sees friendship with China as the solution. The liberals have believed that a friendly China would result for Japan in the opening up of sources of supply of raw materials and the development of markets for Japanese manufactures and that these would make possible the industrialization of Japan to a degree which would solve the problems of population and economy. The militaristic group, still influenced by European theories of the latter part of the 19th century, has believed that these problems could best be solved by empire.

Following the Twenty-one Demands and the immediate years thereafter which were characterized by efforts to ensnare the Chinese through unsound loans, the Japanese military went into an eclipse for a period and liberal civilian statesmen came into prominence. A policy of friendship for China was followed. This failed however to rouse sufficiently reciprocal friendliness on the part of the Chinese, in part because this policy of friendship

had

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had characteristics of the aggressive policy. The Chinese failed to realize the wisdom of being satisfied with a part of what they wanted from Japan; so, holding out for all, the Chinese lost the four northeastern provinces.

Although one has sympathy for China, in the long view (and the Chinese think in decades and centuries instead of in years as do the Japanese), it seems inevitable that China will eventually become a great nation, though decades may pass before that is accomplished. The real tragedy, however, is Japan. Rising in a few decades from feudalism to a position of first rank among the nations, Japan now seems embarked definitely on a course which can end - though it may be decades hence - in a decline into unimportance. Brought to astonishing heights by its rapid adoption of Western methods, it has begun a descent from those heights by a continued employment of those methods which within a few years of their adoption had become obsolete.

It is, in my opinion, essential that Japan, if she is to continue to be a great power, must solve satisfactorily her relations with China in order to solve her own problems of population and economy. These relations can be solved satisfactorily only through gaining the friendship of China. It is possible that, given opportunity for a few more years, the liberals who were in power in Japan prior to the Manchurian incident might have brought about a situation through which Japan would have found in China great sources of

materials

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materials for her factories and great markets for the produce of her factories, thereby industrializing Japan to the point of solving her population and economic problems. Japan, after all, had little to lose by adhering to a policy of trying to be friends with China. There was no military expense involved; anti-Japanese feeling in China would have gradually died away, notwithstanding temporary setbacks because of the inability of the Chinese to treat with any country with consistency and honesty. Until September, 1931, Japan had a chance to attain the role of China's paramount buyer and seller, a position which no other power could have assailed because of geographical proximity.

The Japanese military, or a part of them, for various reasons already well-known, decided that a policy of conciliation had too many disadvantages, both for Japan and for themselves. So they began on September 18, 1931, an action which resulted in the wresting from China of the four northeastern provinces.

This seizure was completed in the spring of 1933. Since that time there have been indications that the pendulum was swinging again, this time away from military aggression toward a kind of conciliation. It appeared that some of the Japanese in authority were in favor of establishing a policy through which their ends in China (limited on the surface at least to economic penetration) would be gained by "diplomacy". This was said to be a policy of support of General Chiang Kai-shek (or the National Government), as a result of which China would achieve greater unity and increased stability and Japan would obtain

greater

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greater markets and increased sources of raw materials. The resignation of General Araki from the post of Minister of War and the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs were two of the developments which were regarded as earnestness of change in the direction of an enlightened policy, although it seemed inevitable that the new policy must fall far short of that policy which was followed by Shidehara. The successful establishment of such a policy depended (1) on Chinese acquiescence and (2) on the conviction of the reactionary Japanese elements that such a policy would succeed and would be best for Japan's interests. The institution on July 1, 1934, of through traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway without embarrassment to the National Government from any part of China indicated that the first point had, for the time being at least, been attained. That the second point may not have been attained is indicated by the recent report (my despatch No. 2972 of September 13, 1934) that the military have succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of the Japanese authorities of a policy of dealing regionally with China and of non-support of General Chiang Kai-shek outside of the Yangtze Valley.

Whether or not this report of a policy of conciliation again being quashed is true, I doubt whether it is a fundamentally vital factor in the situation. I cannot but feel that the Japanese have committed during the past three years so many wrongs against China that these, when added to the wrongs committed prior to the Manchurian incident, have created a situation which makes it impossible for Japan to gain the friendship of

China

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China through any policy, regardless of its degree of liberality. It is perhaps possible that a complete reversal of Japanese policy, including a return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty, might have its effect, but it is doubtful if a situation will develop within Japan whereby a Japanese government could do this and survive.

In other words, Japan seems now to have reached a point in its relations with China where there is no policy which Japan can adopt which holds out promise of bringing to Japan what is requisite if she is to continue as a first class power. So it scarcely matters whether the reactionary military forms Japan's policy toward China or whether the so-called liberals do.

It is easy to understand the opposition of the Japanese military to a policy of conciliation of China. During recent months the Japanese have seen indications of an extension of the power of General Chiang Kai-shek, of efforts toward economic rehabilitation, of effective increases in military strength. The Japanese have reason to believe that if these developments are allowed to continue, China will eventually attempt to liquidate her problems in foreign relations, primarily the problem of Japanese aggression. It is not surprising, therefore, that at least a part of the Japanese military would prefer a disunited and militarily weak China, even though Japanese liberals may point out that this will mean disturbed conditions which will adversely affect Japan's economic future. A Japanese military, which thought the seizure of Manchuria would solve Japan's population and economic problems, now sees

that

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that they were mistaken. This does not prevent them from believing that the solution lies in sinister activities in China south of the Great Wall. During the past few months they have apparently given "diplomacy" its chance, and the results have been few.

When the military took Manchuria they created a situation from which there seems to be little possibility of turning back without dire consequences to Japan and from which there seems to be little possibility of going forward without dire consequences to Japan. There was only one policy which could have solved Japan's internal problems, and that was friendship with China. The action of the Japanese military in Manchuria brought that policy to an end and has made impossible a genuine and effective return to it.

Respectfully yours,



Nelson Trusler Johnson.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tientsin/75 FOR Desp.#632

FROM Tientsin (Atcheson) DATED Sept.7,1934.
//19// NAME 1-1137 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese issues in the North: Little progress
made toward a settlement of --. Conferences held
and decisions arrived at, in this connection.

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b. Relations with other countries.

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Japan. Little progress toward the settlement of outstanding Sino-Japanese issues in North China was made during August. The continued failure of General Huang Ku, Chairman of the Political Readjustment Council, to return to Peiping, and the fact (which that failure would appear to indicate more or less clearly) that Huang had not been successful

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successful in his mission to the South threw a cloud over the political situation in Hwapei.

A series of conferences, held at Kuling (in the Lushan, near Kiukiang) and participated in by K'ung Hsiang-hsi, The Minister of Finance, Wang Ching-wei, the President of the Executive Yuan, Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, and other leaders, was begun by General Chiang Kai-shek on about August 10 to determine, among other things, the policy to be adopted vis a vis Japan in North China.

At these conferences Huang Pu is believed to have urged (1) that the powers of the Peiping Political Readjustment Council be enlarged; and (2) that General Yu Hsueh-chung's interference in the political affairs of North China be curtailed. ⁽¹⁾ Various Nippon Dempo press despatches and articles appearing in Chinese newspapers reflected the general expectation that at least the first of these demands would be granted and that Huang Pu would return to Peiping shortly after the middle of August.

A Nippon Dempo report from Newchwang, dated August 25, recounts almost gleefully the alleged efforts of Yen Hui-ch'ing (顏惠慶), Sung Tzu-wen (宋子文), Ku Wei-chun (顧維鈞), and Hu Chih-tse (胡世澤), members of the
pro-European

(1) Nippon Dempo despatch, August 7.

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pro-European and pro-American clique, to reorganize the opposition to what has elsewhere been called the "fu ts'ung Jih Pen"⁽²⁾ group, and closes with the statement, "Consequently all efforts exerted hitherto by the pro-European and American clique have resulted in failure".

What influence the views of the group named above may have had on the decisions of the Kuling Conference is not known here, but Japanese complacency apparently received something of a shock when, on August 30, it was reported that that Conference had reached four important decisions in connection with North China:

- (1) To refuse the demands of the Japanese authorities, because Japan could not extend her influence southward on account of strained relations with the Soviet Union;
- (2) To oppose Japan's economic advance in North China;
- (3) To negotiate as much as possible with the Foreign Office authorities rather than with the Kwantung Army authorities;
- (4) To settle questions in the demilitarized zone technically and partially.

The statement above given of these terms was first released in a Nippon Dempo despatch from Shanghai dated August 30 quoting a certain Lieutenant Colonel Kagasa, an attache to the Japanese Legation, but inquiries made here of well-informed members of local government circles would tend to indicate that

the

(2) "Fu ts'ung", to submit to; "Jih Pen", Japan.

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the decisions reached at Kuling Conference with reference to North China policy were close to those given.

Assuming that some such decisions were actually reached, it remains to be seen how successfully they may be carried out. The press report quoted above also credits Lieutenant Colonel Kagasa with the statement that at a recent meeting of the Autonomous Association in Shanghai, Huang Fu said, "Although China is menaced by a shark, if it is lured to a shoal with a good bait it could be easily stricken". Lieutenant Colonel Kagasa is also quoted as remarking, "If General Huang Fu knows that he will lose his face immediately upon the arrival in North China due to the temporizing and insincere policy he may not return to his post".

There is in the meanwhile nothing to indicate that the powers of General Yu Hsueh-chung, with whom Huang is not in accord, have been in any way curtailed, and with many indications of a withdrawal of Japanese confidence from him, Huang Fu now faces a return to the North with a considerably lessened, rather than an enhanced, prestige. It may be that in such circumstances he will not return at all.

However, on August 29 Yin T'ung, Managing Director of the Peiping Liaoning Railway, returned from Nanking to Peiping, and on August 30 entered

into

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into conversations with Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Military Attache, which were to have been followed by conferences between Yin and Yin Ju-kong (殷汝耕) and T'ao Shang-ming (陶尚銘), Special Administrators for the Chi-Mi and Luan-Yu Districts, respectively.

Yin T'ung is quoted as having said that Huang had remained in Kuling to give lectures to the officer's training camp there, and would return to Peiping before September 10. He is also said to have asserted that Malanyu would shortly be returned; that no serious difficulties would confront the despatch by the Chinese authorities of 9,000 "special police" (really Pao An Tui) into the demilitarized zone; and that the one question which might require further consideration was that of the carrying of heavy guns into that zone by those police, but he indicated that this problem also was susceptible of solution. He was further quoted as having said that the return of Dolonor to Chinese control was being carefully considered.⁽³⁾

On August 22 a station of the Chinese Maritime Customs was opened at Kupeik'ou, putting into effect arrangements made in July⁽⁴⁾. Mr. Peng Ta-nien (彭大年) is its director, under the supervision of Mr. Chang Yung-nien, Vice-

Commissioner

(3) PEIPING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, August 31.

(4) See despatch No. 751 to Legation, August 21 (No. 625 to Department).

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Commissioner of Customs, stationed in Pei ing in general control of the stations along the wall under the Tientsin Customs. Foreign goods passing through these stations are taxed at the regular rate, while goods of Manchurian origin are free of duty. A second station was opened on August 24 at Iyuant'ou, and it was expected that the opening of others at Hsifengk'ou, Leng'ou, and Chiehling'ou would follow in the next two or three weeks.

Mr. Hsiao Cheng-ying, a member of the Administrative Council of Chahar, returned from Kalgan on August 27 to report to General Ho Ying-ch'in on the situation in Inner Mongolia, and is quoted as bearing the assurances of the Teh Wang, with whom he conferred at Panchiang in Chahar, that so long as the Central Government had a definite policy in Inner Mongolia and took appropriate measures to help that region, the Mongols would not change their loyalty from China to "Manchukuo"⁽⁵⁾.

A local Japanese propaganda bulletin reported on August 18 that a party of three Koreans from Lanchow had on August 8 been attacked by Chinese at a village named Fushansu in Ch'ienanhsien, whence they had gone to dispose of merchandise which they were carrying, stated to be valued at more than Yuan \$1,000. It is said that only one of the Koreans escaped from this attack, the other

two

(5) PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES, August 29.

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two, and the merchandise, disappearing. The account states that on August 11 seven other Koreans set out from Luanchow to locate their countrymen, but that they also were set upon, five of their number being killed. A responsible Japanese official in Tientsin informed a member of the staff of this office that this account is credited by the Japanese authorities. Mr. Kageuchi, Chancellor of the Tientsin Consulate General, accompanied by several Japanese consular police, was reported as having left Tientsin on August 25 to investigate this alleged "massacre". The results of this investigation are not yet known.

The Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo is reported to have requested funds from the Japanese Treasury for the erection of a new Legation building in Nanking⁽⁶⁾.

The fourteen different Mongol Banners in Jehol, comprising over 540,000 Mongols, are reported to have been put under a single administrative organ.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/71 FOR Desp.#9640

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Sept.10,1934
NAME 1-1127 ***
1771

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Efforts to
obtain the abolition of the Tangku Truce Agreement.
Other significant facts in connection with relations
between the two countries.

fp6

793.94/6795

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. Foreign Relations:

a. Relations with the United States:

Nothing to report.

b. Relations with other countries:

Relations with Japan: General Huang Pu,

Chairman of the Peiping Political Council, and Yin Tung, Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, who are the leading personalities on the Chinese side in the negotiations of Sino-Japanese questions, spent considerable time in Shanghai, Yokohama, and Hongkong during the months of July and August. After the resumption of through traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway, Yin Tung returned to Hankow from the North and from there proceeded to Yokohama on July 18, where he had a conference with General Huang Pu, and also with Tang Yu-jen, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yin Tung then returned to Shanghai and embarked on a Japanese boat for Yokohama on July 21. It was reported that he had been instructed by Huang Pu to try and obtain from the commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army the abolition of the Tangku Truce Agreement. It appears, however, that Yin Tung's conference at Yokohama with the Japanese officials was a very short and informal affair and that he did not in fact see the commander of the Kwantung Army but only certain members of his staff and Colonel Shibayama, the Assistant Military Attaché of the Japanese Legation at Peiping. Yin Tung returned to Shanghai on July 27, having spent only two days in Yokohama. In a statement given to the press on his arrival here he said that the

discussions

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discussions had been entirely informal and that they had included questions regarding the suppression of the illegal activities of Japanese and Koreans in the Luantung area, the reorganization of the Peace Preservation Corps, the retrocession of the Eastern Tombs, the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Luantung, and the restoration of Dolonor in Eastern Charhar to Chinese control. He also stated that the discussions had included the suppression of the activities of the Ta Tung Company, which is reported to have been engaged in opium and other illegal traffic along the Great Wall. Other information received was to the effect that when Yin Tung brought up the question of the abolition of the Tangku Truce Agreement, the Japanese told him that they were not willing to abolish it unless Japan were given certain concessions in lieu thereof, and suggested an agreement concerning the maintenance of peace and order, communication and transportation facilities between North China and "Manchukuo," and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Following his return to Shanghai, Yin Tung left for Mokanshan and reported the result of his conference to Huang Fu. Some stir was caused locally by the report that two of his trunks containing valuable and secret papers were stolen from him at the Shanghai North Station. From Mokanshan, Yin Tung, together with Huang Fu, proceeded to Kiangsi to interview Chiang Kai-shek, and remained there the greater part of the month of August. He then returned to Peiping, and according to recent telegrams has resumed discussions with the Japanese Military Attaché there.

As

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As indicated in the foregoing, General Huang Fu has remained in the South and, although he apparently had not actually resigned, it is believed that he regards the prospects of a satisfactory solution of pending Sino-Japanese issues as very gloomy. On the other hand, the Japanese are reported to be anxious to have him return to North China. In connection with the possible resumption of his duties by General Huang Fu, it is significant that the Japanese Minister, Mr. Ariyoshi, is reported to have called on him in Shanghai recently and to have informed Japanese press men that he (Ariyoshi) is expecting to visit Tientsin and Peiping in the near future.

A fact of considerable significance in view of the present relations between Japan and China, is that the Japanese are rendering technical and possibly other assistance in connection with the construction at the Kiangnan Naval Dock, Shanghai, of the S.S. NINGHAI, the largest warship to be built in Shanghai. On August 30 a group of 18 Japanese workmen and technical experts, headed by Mr. Tochio Jimbo, who is stated to be one of the leading experts on ship building construction in Japan, arrived in Shanghai from the Marima Shipbuilding and Engineering Company near Kobe. These are stated to be the first of a group of fifty who will arrive. According to information received, the PINCHAI is to be a sister ship of the NINGHAI which was constructed at the Marima Dock and delivered in 1932. The cost of construction of the new cruiser is said to be \$8,000,000 local currency, and it is reported to be 360 feet long, 39 feet beam, and will have a speed of 25 knots. Its

armament

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armament, it is stated, will consist of three 14-centimeter twin turret guns, six 8-centimeter anti-aircraft guns, four machine guns, and two double tube torpedo mountings. The guns and equipment will be imported from Japan, and it is stated will be the exact counterpart and transferable with the armament on the HANGCHAI. Considerable comment has appeared in the local press regarding this new development in naval construction. It is intimated that these vessels are in fact potential additions to the Japanese Navy in case of need, and also that the funds for their construction are in all probability coming from Japan. A report also appeared to the effect that the Chinese Government had invited the Japanese Navy to recommend an instructor to be attached to the Naval Academy at Ansochaw, which offer had been accepted.

During the past few weeks a number of Chinese deportees have arrived in Shanghai from Japan. These are reported to be for the most part manual laborers and the reasons for their deportation are presumably economic.

On the night of August 20, the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Shanghai engaged in extensive maneuvers in various parts of the International Settlement.

While these maneuvers are stated to be merely part of the ordinary military routine, yet the effect on the Chinese and foreign population of the Settlement is far from reassuring and the fact that the maneuvers take place in the Settlement serves to bring the Shanghai Municipal Council a certain amount of criticism and loss of prestige. Incidentally, it may be of interest

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to state that many of the operations were carried on
 in the defense sector allotted to the United States
 Fourth Marines.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 27, 1934.

~~MSM:~~

~~MMH:~~

~~SKH~~ Tientsin's No. 639 of September 19,
1934, --

No action required.

This despatch reports in regard to an incident in which seven Koreans were murdered in Hopei Province and states that the Japanese Consul General has demanded (a) personal and public apology from the provincial chairman; (b) Mex\$2,000 indemnity per person killed; (c) that the provincial government shall promise that no such incident shall ever occur again; (d) dismissal of the local magistrate; and (e) that the severest penalties of the law be meted out to the guilty Chinese.

According to the Japanese version of the affair, three peaceful Korean traders were set upon by Chinese villagers and two were killed. When seven other Koreans arrived to investigate the case, five of these were also killed. The Chinese version describes the original three Koreans as heroin peddlers, the remaining seven Koreans as worthless characters and absolve to a large

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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extent the Chinese authorities from any blame in the matter.

It is believed that the provincial government expects to be able to effect some modification of the original demands before taking further action in the matter.

ew
EW/VDM

NO. 639

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, September 19, 1934.

SUBJECT: ...
1-1403

Sino-Japanese Issues: Japanese
Demands in re Murder of Koreans.

LEGAL ADVISER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
	G		
	Ward		
To be filed in U.S.A.			

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
despatch No. 778 of today's date, addressed to the
Legation, on the above-mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1. To Legation, September 19, 1934.

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RSW:sf

Original and four copies to Department.

793.94/6796

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 778

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, September 19, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Sino-Japanese Issues: Japanese
Demands in re Murder of Koreans.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to page 9 of the monthly political review of this consular district for August, in the third paragraph of which reference is made to the above subject, and to inform the Legation that the Consulate General has received authoritative information to the effect that, in the course of an interview with General Yu Haueh-chung on the afternoon of September 15, the Japanese Consul presented the following five demands as embodying the minimum conditions essential to the satisfactory settlement of the Fushanshih incident:

1.

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1. That Chairman Yu Hsueh-chung personally and publicly apologize for the incident;
2. That a compensation of Yuan \$2,000 be paid for each of the Koreans (there were allegedly seven) who had been killed;
3. That the Hopei Provincial Government give its solemn undertaking that no such incident should ever occur again;
4. That the Magistrate of Ch'ienan Hsien be dismissed from his post;
5. That the severest penalties of the law be meted out to the T'uen cheng and other Chinese allegedly guilty of the "massacre".

The Japanese are also reported to have insisted on the acceptance of their version of the affair, which differs radically from that of the Chinese. The informant quoted gave the following as the Japanese version of the affair: On August 8, three Koreans, who were proceeding peacefully from Luan-chou to Ch'ienan city, in the prosecution of their legitimate business enterprises, were set upon at Fushenshih by certain Chinese villagers, who did two of them to death, and carried off their merchandise, the assault having been altogether unprovoked. Seven other Koreans, according to this version, set out to discover the fate of their nationals, and of them five were killed and their bodies burned. The Chinese authorities, the official quoted states, admit the killing of the Koreans, but allege that it was attended by a set of circumstances which go far in extenuation of the crime.

According

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According to this version, two Koreans and a Japanese, peddlers of heroin, were stopped at Fushanshih in Ch'ienan Hsien by the local T'uan Chang, who seized their heroin - they were said to be carrying only a small quantity-and threw it on the ground before them. The three then gathered a crowd of ruffians and proceeded to the office of the t'uan chang to insist on being paid a sum of Yuan \$4,000 for the goods destroyed. With this demand the Chinese refused to comply, and, one word leading to another, a conflict ensued in which one Chinese and one Korean were killed. Both sides then dispersed, the Chinese for their part attempting to cover up all trace of the incident. Some days later, however, seven more Koreans appeared, and after futile parleying set about burning the village of Fushanshih. The village gong was then sounded, and in the words of my informant, the villagers came running from everywhere and killed the Koreans.

It is the Chinese view that if any of the parties interested had informed the Chinese authorities of the first incident when it occurred, steps could have been taken to apprehend those involved and sift the matter to the bottom, but that in attempting to take the law into their own hands, the

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the Koreans were inviting trouble. The official quoted stated that the men killed were all worthless characters of the "carpet-bagger" type.

General Yu Hsueh-chung accepted the demands when they were presented, but the Provincial Government is understood to entertain strong objections to the first demand on the ground that the apology should be made by T'ao Shang-ming and not by the Chairman, to the third demand on the ground that the Provincial Government can give no assurance in the face of the present situation in Luantung that such incidents will not occur again, and to the fifth demand on the ground that it would involve the punishment of the whole village of Fushanshih for an act which the villagers conceived to be in defence of their homes. It is believed that the Provincial Government expects to be able to effect some modification of the original demands to meet at least partially the objections given above.

At the time of the presentation of these demands the Japanese threatened, according to the official quoted, to increase their severity if there was any delay in their acceptance, and indicated that if necessary they would resort to more vigorous measures to secure the satisfaction demanded.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

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 RSW:sf

Original and two copies to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover of
 despatch No. 639 of September 19, 1934.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
October 27, 1934.

~~MMH:~~
~~RCM:~~
~~MMH:~~

Tientsin's 641 of September 20,
1934, --

No action required.

The despatch states that according to press reports a Japanese military mission has been or is about to be established at Kalgan. The Japanese authorities have also, according to an apparently reliable informant, been looking into the matter of establishing a supply of gasoline at Kalgan.

The despatch also states, as having possible connection with the above, that prior to the resumption of through rail traffic between Peiping and Mukden a vague story was current to the effect that the chief interest of the Japanese in the resumption of through traffic was to provide traffic facilities in case of necessity for the rapid transportation of troops from Manchuria to the Peiping-Suiyuan railway before the penetration of Chahar from this direction.

ew It is interesting to note the attached
EW/VDM copy of Peiping's telegram No 482 of
October 23, 4 p.m. in connection with
the above.

7800

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 641

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, September 20, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Japanese Military Mission at Kelgen.

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1/ 934 OCT 22 AM 11:34
The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 779 of to-day's date, addressed to
the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/ To Legation, No. 779, September 20, 1934.

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GAjr:hk

Original and four copies to Department.

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OCT 31 1934

OCT 31 1934

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 779

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
 No. 641, Dated Sept. 20, 1934.
 From the American Consulate General
 at Tientsin, China.

Tientsin, China, September 20, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Japanese Military Mission at Kalgan.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to recent press reports of the establishment, or planned establishment, of a "Japanese military mission" at Kalgan. One report, a Reuter despatch dated at Peiping September 18, 1934, and published in the English language papers at Tientsin on September 17, stated that a certain Colonel Matsui, head of "the special Japanese military mission in Jehol", had arrived at Kalgan in the guise of a traveler but instead of departing "after he had completed his travels" had taken a house and apparently intended to stay. This despatch was based on an article appearing in the Tientsin TA KUNG PAO on September 16.

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A member of my staff has now been informed by a reliable person in a position to know that one of the large foreign oil companies has been approached by one of its Japanese agents, acting also on behalf of the Japanese military Headquarters in Tientsin, with a request for information as to what supplies of gasoline were on hand and available for quick purchase and how long it would take to deliver a quantity to Kalgan. According to the same informant, another Japanese agent of the firm who maintains a business in Jehol (Chengtehfu) and Peiping, had come to Tientsin with a view to advising the firm that he had received a contract for a large amount of military supplies to be furnished the Japanese at Kalgan, including 200 motor trucks, and that he was planning to open a branch office in Kalgan and another branch in Tientsin for the purpose of handling this new business for the Japanese military.

In this connection there comes to mind a somewhat vague story which circulated here prior to the resumption on July 1 of through railway traffic between Peiping and Mukden that, beyond the seeming furtherance of the question of recognition of "Manchukuo" by China which might be involved, the chief interest of the Japanese in the resumption, was to provide themselves through traffic facilities, "in case of necessity", for the rapid transportation

of

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of troops from Manchuria to the Peiping-Suiyuan Rail-
way for the penetration of Chahar from this direction.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800
GAjr:hk

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department under
cover of despatch NO. 641 of
September 20, 1934.



A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. *SKK*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 24, 1934.



Mr. T. J. League, Greenville, South Carolina,
and Mr. Hamilton.

Subject: Manchuria and "Manchukuo".

Mr. T. J. League called, the appointment having been
arranged by Congressman McSwain's office.

Mr. League resided for a number of years in China,
leaving that country in 1923. During the past year the
Department has received numerous letters from him in regard
to the Manchuria situation. The point of view expressed by
Mr. League in his letters has been to the effect that
Manchuria has never been an integral part of China; that
the Japanese, since September 18, 1931, have been endeavoring
to restore the control of Manchuria to the Manchus; that
Japan's acts have been logical and warranted and designed
to further the peace of the Far East; and that the American
Government should recognize "Manchukuo".

During Mr. League's call upon Mr. Hamilton, Mr. League
set forth orally his thesis as outlined above.

Mr. League said that in his opinion the recognition of
"Manchukuo" by the American Government would have generally
beneficial results. In respect to Japan, such recognition
would

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F/G

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would be viewed favorably and the resultant clarifying of the present atmosphere existing in relations between the United States and Japan would improve trade relations between the two countries. (Mr. Hamilton inquired whether trade between the United States and Japan was not being carried on in substantial amount and without any unusual impediments. To this Mr. League replied in the affirmative but said that he thought existing trade relations would be improved if the American Government would recognize "Manchukuo"). In respect to Manchuria, Mr. League said that recognition of "Manchukuo" by the American Government would assist the Manchus in gaining effective control of Manchuria. (Mr. Hamilton remarked that some observers were of the opinion that "Manchukuo" exists by reason of the support of Japanese military forces and Mr. Hamilton inquired whether Mr. League thought that the Manchus were in effective control of Manchuria. Mr. League replied that it was probably true that the "Manchukuo" régime would collapse were Japanese military support withdrawn but that the Japanese were making an effort to restore Manchuria to the Manchus. To take Japan's word that Japan was so endeavoring would tend, according to Mr. League, to make more certain fulfillment of Japanese announcements that Manchuria was being restored to Manchu control). In respect to China Mr. League thought that American recognition of

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of "Manchukuo" would be beneficial in that it would be a realistic move and would tend to prevent the Chinese from employing their age-old tactics of playing one foreign country against another to the ultimate advantage of China. (Mr. Hamilton remarked that Mr. League had previously cited the harmful effects upon Japan of anti-Japanese boycotts in China and Mr. Hamilton inquired whether in Mr. League's opinion an anti-American boycott might occur in China in the event that the United States should recognize "Manchukuo". To this Mr. League replied that although it was possible that such a boycott would break out, he did not think that it would last very long or be serious in its consequences to American trade). In respect to the United States, Mr. League said that American recognition of "Manchukuo" would at the outset be disturbing to some elements in the United States but would ultimately be beneficial because it would represent a realistic move. In respect to the world in general and the peace movement, Mr. League said that American recognition of "Manchukuo" would have a beneficial effect. He said that he was certain that all of the nations would immediately follow the American lead, thus demonstrating their readiness to accept "Manchukuo". (Mr. Hamilton commented that Mr. League's statement did not, in his mind, answer the question in regard to what effect American recognition of "Manchukuo" would have upon the peace movement and the peace machinery

in

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in the world. To this Mr. League replied that the rules of the game as applied to the Manchuria situation needed to be changed).

Referring again to Mr. League's statement that "Manchukuo" could probably not exist without support of the Japanese troops, Mr. Hamilton said that in considering the question of recognition one of course had to scrutinize whether the régime in question had the usual primary attributes of a sovereign state.

In reply to Mr. Hamilton's inquiry, Mr. League said that it was his opinion that some 60% of the population of Manchuria consisted of Chinese. He said, however, that other people placed the percentage at a much higher figure. Mr. Hamilton then said that granting that the Chinese in Manchuria formed the bulk of the population, did Mr. League think that the Manchus, constituting a minority of the population, should be placed in control of the area. Mr. League replied that the political facts were infinitely more important than facts in regard to population and that he therefore did think that the Manchus should be recognized as the rulers of "Manchukuo".

During the conversation Mr. Hamilton made no definite statements in regard to the attitude of the American Government other than to give to Mr. League copies of pertinent public documents on the subject, some of which Mr. League said

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said that he had not seen.

Mr. League stated that the point of view held by him was contrary to that held by an overwhelming majority of the American people. He emphasized that he liked and admired the Chinese people.

During the conversation Mr. League communicated no information not already in the possession of the Department.

Mr. League said that he would not make any public use of the fact that he had called at the Department or of any of the statements made during this call.

After Mr. League had spent an hour and a half in Mr. Hamilton's office, Mr. Hamilton took Mr. League in to see Mr. Hornbeck.

MMH/REK
mm.H.

SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

September 24, 1934.

OCT 22 1934

Conversation. DIVISION OF

Mr. T. W. League, Greenville, South Carolina,
and Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Manchuria and "Manchukuo"

793.94

Mr. Hamilton brought Mr. League to Mr. Hornbeck, and
Mr. League talked with Mr. Hornbeck for approximately an
hour and a half.

Mr. League made substantially the same statements as
those which he had made to Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hornbeck
traversed, in reply, substantially the same ground as that
which had been traversed by Mr. Hamilton. Mr. League stated
over and over that Manchuria had never been a part of China.
Mr. Hornbeck stated that the question is a disputed one and
there has been a great deal of writing and talking on both
sides of it; it happens to be a fact that there are on record
statements by responsible Japanese officials wherein there
appears the affirmation by such officials that Manchuria is
a part of China; but, the question is more a matter of
academic interest than of practical political import.

Mr. League at several points expressed his appreciation
of the replies which the Department had made to his letters
and of the courtesy of officials of the Department in
receiving him and talking with him at length. Mr. Hornbeck
said that we are at all times glad to have information from

and

793.94/6799

F/G

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and the views of American citizens and that it is our wish
as well as our business to give thoughtful consideration to
all such matters.

SKH

See Mr. Hamilton's Memo.

SKH

SKH/REK

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/12843 FOR 9656
FROM Shanghai Cunningham DATED Sept. 18, 1934.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: A discussion with General Li Tu as to the Political Situation,
particularly as regards the negotiations then going on with the
Japanese concerning through traffic, et cetera.

F/Fg.

793.94/6800

7 8 1

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9656

Shanghai, China, September 18, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Li Tu and the Council of the
Chinese People for Armed Self Defense.

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of a confidential self-explanatory despatch No. 8087
of this date, with enclosures, from this Consulate
General to the American Legation at Peiping in regard
to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's
despatch No. 8087, with enclosures,
dated September 18, 1934.

800
P&J:NLH

In quintuplicate

No. 8087

AMERICAN CONSULATE SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, September 18, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: General Li Tu and the Council
of the Chinese People for Armed
Self Defense.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to state that in June last I was invited to meet General Li Tu (李杜), the retired commander of the Kirin Self Defense Force. It will be recalled that General Li's name is usually associated with that of General Ma Chan-shan (馬占山). General Li, together with Ma Chan-shan, sought refuge in Russia after the collapse of their opposition to the Japanese, and returned to Shanghai about a year ago. At the time I met General Li he discussed the political situation, particularly as regards the negotiations then going on with the Japanese concerning through traffic, et cetera, but he gave no information which appeared to be worth reporting to the Legation. At that time he handed me a memorandum asking for the economic assistance of the United States to China. This memorandum was couched in very general terms and

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no copy is enclosed.

about the beginning of August, General Li announced through the press that a preparatory committee of the Council of the Chinese People for Armed self defense had been formed, the aim of which was ultimately to throw off the Japanese yoke in China. He stated that various influential persons were interested in this movement, among them Ma Siang-pei (馬湘伯), Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, Mrs. Liao Chung-kai (廖仲愷夫人), Dr. C. T. Chang (張世鑒), and others. Clippings from the HARBOR-CHINA DAILY NEWS (British) of August 2 and August 7, 1954, giving an account of the manifesto issued by the committee and an interview with General Li Yu are enclosed herewith.

1/2/

On August 16 I received a call from General Li, who handed me a memorandum addressed to the President of the United States, which he requested me to forward. This, I stated, I must decline to do, and suggested that it be forwarded through the Chinese Minister at Washington. Whether or not he did so, I do not know. However, I obtained a copy which is enclosed herewith. The communication is in the form of a manifesto from the Diplomatic Commission of the Chinese National Alliance (which I take to be the same as the association above mentioned) to the President, Government, and People of the United States. It is in the usual form of documents of this character, of which the Legation and Department have doubtless received many. It begins by referring to Japan as the enemy to world peace, states that the United States is the best and

most

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most disinterested friend that China has, gives a brief history of the Chinese National Alliance, which it claims is the outgrowth of the Hung-men-hui (洪門會), founded in 1650 (sic), which had for its object the overthrow of the Manchus. (No doubt what is meant is the Society of the Taiping rebels founded about 1850.) The manifesto then states that after the Mukden incident the Chinese Government was powerless to resist Japan openly, and the Hung-men-hui sent out a secret call for the discussion of a program of national preparation; that a great meeting was attended by most of the leading figures in China, at which a policy of resistance to Japan was decided on. (No mention is made of when this meeting was held nor who were some of the personalities attending.) After a few paragraphs devoted to the evil designs of Japan, the manifesto states that China is short of everything, save man power, necessary for the prosecution of war, and that it is useless to rely on other countries, for in the event of war China would be cut off from the sea routes; that, therefore, China must build up the necessary industries in China, but to do this China needs loans in capital and equipment. An appeal is made to the President of the United States, and through him to the American people, to grant financial and technical assistance to build up iron and steel plants, machinery manufacturing establishments, chemical works, et cetera.

I inquired of General Li whether he had approached any other country in this same manner, and he informed me that he had also approached the Soviet Ambassador and handed him a somewhat similar memorandum or manifesto. At my request he later sent me a copy thereof,

and

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- 4/ and a translation made by this office is enclosed herewith.

- 5/ General Li Tu also left with me a pencil memorandum entitled "Quarrels among the Officials of the Nanking Government over the Diplomatic Issues between China and Japan." A translation of this memorandum made by this Consulate General is enclosed herewith. The memorandum is interesting and purports to give the inside story of what took place at various conferences and meetings of officials in the last two or three years. According to this memorandum there are two factions in the Nanking Government, one in favor of and one opposed to direct negotiations with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek is stated to have fallen in with the views of the pro-Japanese group consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Huang Fu, and others. The memorandum gives an account of the meeting at Nanchang in April, 1934, when it was decided to accept the Japanese demands and commence direct negotiations. It is stated that when opposition was made in the Central Political Council to the principles of through traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway, a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek was read stating that China cannot but accept the Japanese demands, settle the issues that have been pending for years, and carry into effect the plan of through traffic, postal communications, and customs establishments. It is stated also that the recent agitation against Ku Meng-yu, Minister of Railways, was an attempt on the part of the so-called American group to bring about the downfall of Wang Ching-wei as a result of the victory of the pro-Japanese faction to which he belonged.

The

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The memorandum goes on to state that Chiang Kai-shek's plans for his dictatorship are dependent on his having the support of a "certain imperialistic country" from whence he can obtain money and supplies, and thus proceed with the unification of the country. It makes mention of the attitude of Wang Ching-wei towards Chiang's unification scheme and the attempt of Wang Ching-wei to have Chang Kuoh-liang ousted.

The most interesting part of the memorandum is the alleged statement of Chiang Kai-shek to the Nanchang Conference on April 13, 1934, in regard to his plans for unification with the South-west and the North. His statement will be found on pages 9, 10 and 11 of the translation.

Whether or not there is anything serious in all the foregoing, I feel that it is better to reserve judgment. The tone of these various manifestoes, et cetera, sounds somewhat fantastic, not to say childish. I have not yet learned that the Association has created any particular discussion in Chinese circles, and the Chinese local press has made no reference to it. It is probably merely the visionary effort of one man to try to make himself a leader of what he hopes will be a popular movement, but the fact that General Li Tu is, or at least was, a man of considerable prominence, may make the movement of some importance. If there are any further developments they will be reported.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
 American Consul General.

Enclosures

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Enclosures:

- 1/- News article from New York China Daily (British) of August 7, 1934.
- 2/- News article from New York China Daily (British) of August 7, 1934.
- 3/- Copy of Manifesto submitted by the Diplomatic Commission of the Chinese National Alliance to the President and through him to the Government and People of the United States of America (undated).
- 4/- Copy of translation of letter from the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Great Confederation of the Chinese People to the Soviet Government and People, dated August 18, 1934.
- 5/- Copy of translation of memorandum entitled "Warrels among the rank and file of the Nanking Government over the diplomatic issues between China and Japan (undated).

800

PRJ:MLM

HN

Original to Legation
In quintuplicate to Department
1st despatch No.
dated September 18, 1934.
Copy to Counselor of Legation, Nanking.

1824

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to confidential despatch No. 8087 from
John L. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai,
China, dated September 18, 1934, on the subject "General
Li Pu and the Council of the Chinese People for Armed
Self Defense."

NOT: NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
August 8, 1934. (British
daily newspaper).

HOLY WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Fiery Manifesto Issued by
New Body

AUG 2 - 1934 *N.C.D.*

SIX POINT PROGRAMME DRAWN UP

A manifesto urging the Chinese people to rise and take things out of the hands of the Government and oppose the Japanese, whom it describes as planning to enslave the whole of China, has been issued by the "Preparatory Committee of the Council of the Chinese People for Armed Self Defence." The Council—composed, according to the letter accompanying the manifesto, of Mr. Ma Siang-pei, nonagenarian civic leader; Mrs. Liao Chung-kai, widow of the famous revolutionary leader and Minister of Finance in the Canton Government who was assassinated there; Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese revolution; Dr. S. L. Chang; Mr. Pei Yuan-ti, a former member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; and Prof. Chen Chi, educationist and former statesman, with a backing of thousands of men and women from every walk of life—launches with this document "The Holy War of the Chinese People against Japan For Ever," and a "Campaign for the Liberation of Greater China For Ever."

Commencing with a graphic picture of the sufferings of the Chinese people at the hands of the Japanese and the failure of the Kuomintang and its government to do anything to resist the Japanese invasion, the appeal urges the Chinese people to cease their trust in the League of Nations and foreign Powers and to take up arms in their own defence. A programme for waging war against the Japanese is outlined at some length. Many aspersions are cast upon the efficiency and gallantry of the Chinese army in the engagements already fought with the so-called invaders.

The programme can be briefly summarized under six headings. The first is the mobilization of the whole of China's fighting forces, on sea, land, and in the air. The second is the mobilization of the people of the nation. The third is the arming of the whole body of the people. The fourth deals with methods of financing the campaign, which include the confiscation of all Japanese owned property in China, the seizure of the property of all "traitors," the devoting of all the national revenue to the war against Japan, and the reliance on contributions from sympathizers of China against foreign oppression. The fifth concerns the formation of a National Council of the Chinese People, to be composed of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants. The sixth urges alliances with the "enemies of Japan."

This item in the programme contains the words: "In this regard we must first of all ally ourselves with the Koreans, Formosans, Mongols, natives of the islands under Japanese rule and all other nationalities oppressed by Japanese imperialism. In the same way we must join hands with the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals of Japan who carry on a heroic struggle against the Mikado (sic) and Japanese imperialism, to the end that we may crush them."

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composed of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants. The sixth urges alliances with the "enemies of Japan."

This item in the programme contains the words: "In this regard we must first of all ally ourselves with the Koreans, Formosans, Mongols, natives of the islands under Japanese rule and all other nationalities oppressed by Japanese imperialism. In the same way we must join hands with the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals of Japan who carry on a heroic struggle against the Nikado (sic) and Japanese imperialism, to the end that we may crush our common enemy by concerted action."

This phrase, it was pointed out to the "North-China Daily News" by well-informed Japanese, is reminiscent of propaganda circulated in Japan in recent months by the Comintern. This propaganda changed from a general attack upon the economic system of the Japanese empire into a personal campaign for the overthrow of the emperor himself some time last summer.

DIXWELL POLICE

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FBI - NEW YORK

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Enclosure o. 2 to confidential despatch no. 8087 from
Edwin A. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai,
China, dated September 19, 1934, on the subject "General
Li Tu and the Council of the Chinese People for Armed
Self Defense."

SOURCE: NORTH-CHINA DAILY NEWS
August 8, 1934. (British
daily newspaper).

CHINA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

General Li Tu Outlines the
New Movement
AUG 7 - 1934 *N.C.D.N.*
EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE
PRESENT POLICY

"A world war by 1936, and with its advent the rising of united China against Japan." Such was the gist of the interview given by General Li Tu, former commander-in-chief of the anti-Japanese volunteer corps in the north-east during the Manchoukuo trouble, at a luncheon party at the Palace Hotel yesterday. General Li Tu is one of the "Preparatory Committee of the Council of the Chinese People for Armed Self Defence," the recent manifesto of which, urging Chinese people to rise against the present policy of the Government and oppose Japan and Japanese interests in China, was published in last Thursday's "North-China Daily News."

General Li Tu, explained through an interpreter that the ultimate aims of the movement were to throw off the Japanese yoke in China, but at the present time, the movement is in its infancy. He said that a number of influential people throughout China were interested in the movement, including members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, industrialists, bankers, military officers, lawyers, professors, authors and other persons well known in Chinese circles. The original proposers of the organization were members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang.

Branches Established

Branches of the organization have now been established in the principal cities of China. From these branches it is proposed to influence the masses of China's population, and gradually win the wholehearted support of the country against Japan. At the same time influential persons at the Central Government will do their best to sway those in authority in favour of the movement. In this manner the organization hopes to gain the Central Government's confidence peacefully and not forcibly.

General Li Tu mentioned some of the organizers of the council of the "Preparatory Committee of the Council of the Chinese People for Armed Self Defence," which he at first wished to be kept secret, but the names mentioned were published with the manifesto, when it appeared last Thursday. The Council includes the following persons: Mr. Ma Siang-pei, nonagenarian civic leader; Mrs. Liao Chung-kai, widow of the famous revolutionary leader and Minister of Finance in the Canton Government, who was assassinated there; Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese revolution; Dr. S. L. Chang; Mr. Pei Yuan-ti, a former member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; and Prof. Chen Chi, educationalist and former statesman.

General Li Tu is quite certain that the movement will have the backing of the entire Chinese nation once the peasants, who make up the greater portion of China, have grasped the wrong Japan has done to China. Even now country folk when asked if they knew anything about Japan, would reply that that was the country

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who was assassinated there; Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese revolution; Dr. S. L. Chang; Mr. Pei Yuan-ti, a former member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; and Prof. Chen Chi, educationalist and former statesman.

General Li Tu is quite certain that the movement will have the backing of the entire Chinese nation once the peasants, who make up the greater portion of China, have grasped the wrong Japan has done to China. Even now country folk when asked if they knew anything about Japan, would reply that that was the country which annexed part of China. General Li Tu was all for making war on Japan right away but he was unable to get sufficient support in this idea.

Six Main Points

There are six main categories into which the manifesto, which was termed "The Holy War of the Chinese people against Japan For Ever," and also a "Campaign for the Liberation of Greater China For Ever," can be divided. The programme starts with the mobilization of the whole of China's fighting forces, on Sea, land, and in the air. Then comes the mobilization of the people of the nation. Thirdly, the arming of the whole body of the people. Fourthly, methods of confiscation of all Japanese owned property in China, the seizure of the property of all "traitors," the revenue from which will be devoted in financing the war against Japan. The fifth category concerns the formation of a National Council of Chinese people, and the last, urges alliances with the "enemies of Japan."

Regarding the financing of the movement, General Li Tu said that besides the confiscation of Japanese property, those interested in the aims of the movement would contribute sums of money towards it.

General Li Tu could not say when sufficient support would have been gained by the organization for them to strike, but he based his plans on the start of the next world war, which he thought would take place in the near future, commencing in the Far East and involving the whole world.

TO-DAY'S ENTERTAINMENT

Auditorium, 7:30 p.m.
Cathay Hotel, Entertainment
Hongkong Public Hall, Band Concert
Canton: We're Not Dying - 8:30 p.m.
Cathay: Once Upon a Time Woman 7:30 p.m.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding dates. The names are: "John Doe", "Jane Smith", "Bob Johnson", "Alice Brown", "Charlie White", "David Green", "Eve Black", "Frank Gray", "Grace Pink", "Henry Blue", "Ivy Yellow", "Jack Purple", "Karen Red", "Leo Orange", "Mia Silver", "Noah Gold", "Olivia Bronze", "Peter Copper", "Quinn Iron", "Rachel Steel", "Sam Tin", "Tina Lead", "Uma Zinc", "Victor Nickel", "Wendy Platinum", "Xavier Silver", "Yara Gold", "Zoe Bronze". The dates are: "1990-01-01", "1990-02-01", "1990-03-01", "1990-04-01", "1990-05-01", "1990-06-01", "1990-07-01", "1990-08-01", "1990-09-01", "1990-10-01", "1990-11-01", "1990-12-01", "1991-01-01", "1991-02-01", "1991-03-01", "1991-04-01", "1991-05-01", "1991-06-01", "1991-07-01", "1991-08-01", "1991-09-01", "1991-10-01", "1991-11-01", "1991-12-01", "1992-01-01", "1992-02-01", "1992-03-01", "1992-04-01", "1992-05-01", "1992-06-01", "1992-07-01", "1992-08-01", "1992-09-01", "1992-10-01", "1992-11-01", "1992-12-01".

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confidential
 Enclosure No. 3 to/Despatch No. 8087 from Edwin S.
 Cunningham, American Consul General, Shanghai, China,
 dated September 13, 1934, on the subject "General Li Fu
 and the Council of the Chinese People for Armed Self
 Defense."

SECRET

MANIFESTO

Submitted by the DIPLOMATIC COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE
 NATIONAL ALLIANCE to the PRESIDENT and through him to
 the GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Mr. President,

we, the Diplomatic Committee of the Chinese National
 Alliance have the honour to submit the following for
 your distinguished consideration.

- (1) The international enemy to world peace is the Empire
 of Japan. By her policy of aggression and her
 constant disturbance of peace in the Far East she
 has brought about a condition of affairs which will
 inevitably lead her into war with Russia. Should
 such a war break out, it will almost certainly
 supply the spark to light an international con-
 flagration. China, which has suffered most from
 Japanese aggression, realizes that she must prepare
 in order that she may be able to play her part in
 the stormy times that lie ahead. Her first act
 must be to turn to those nations who by virtue
 of community of political and moral principles
 are her sympathizers in all that she has suffered
 at the hands of the aggressor.

The Diplomatic Committee of the Chinese National
 Alliance is convinced that the most disinterested
 friend that China possesses today is the Country,
 Mr. of which you have the honour of being the
 President. This Committee further recognizes
 that Russia, while not having the same disinterested
 motives, is haunted by the same fears of aggression
 that are now disturbing China, and that consequently
 the Republic of China can expect her friendship
 and support.

- (2) Before proceeding further with this Manifesto, we
 would like to take the liberty, Mr. President,
 of giving you a brief history of the origin of
 the Chinese National Alliance.

The Chinese National Alliance, or, to give it
 its Chinese name, The Hung-Men Association,
 was founded in the year A.D. 1890. Its
 principal aim was to overthrow the Ching Dynasty
 which at that time had succeeded in conquering
 China.

Although not immediately successful, the Associa-
 tion secretly extended its activities always
 with the same end in view. Just prior to the

revolution

-2-

Revolution which overthrew the Ching dynasty it numbered some 80,000,000 members scattered all over China and abroad.

The Kuomintang (the ruling party in China) was created by the Tung-Men Association. The noted Chinese revolutionary leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Sun Chung-shan) was a member of the Association and it was solely due to the support it gave him that he was able to effect the Ching dynasty from the Imperial Throne.

Coming to more modern times, the Tientsin Incident of September 18th, 1901, the seizure of Manchuria, the subsequent incidents in Tientsin and finally the utterly unprovoked attack on Shanghai, convinced the leaders of the Tung-Men Association not only of the great peril in which China stood by virtue of the Japanese aggression, but also of her utter unpreparedness to meet this menace on anything like equal terms.

The Government of the Republic being powerless to effect any open resistance, the Association resolved that secret means must be used to prepare the nation for effective resistance against the Japanese.

To that end a secret call was issued to all leaders of the Tung-Men Association to attend a great meeting at which these affairs would be discussed and a program of national preparation launched. This meeting was attended by most of the leading figures of modern China - Governors of provinces, Generals, politicians, lawyers, educators, all hastened to obey the call of the Tung-men. At this meeting a policy of uncompromising resistance to Japan was decided on, and a Representative Committee was elected to carry this program into effect. Each member of the Tung-men has sworn to implicitly obey all commands issued by this Committee.

- (8) The Committee is convinced that one of its greatest tasks is to unmask to the world, and especially to those nations which are sympathetic to China, the true aims and purposes of the Japanese Empire.

The first and principal purpose of Japan is to make China her colony. It can truly be said that to Japanese militarism it is a case of Manchuria today, China to-morrow, and then the Philippines and the Straits Settlements will follow. The famous Open Door in the three eastern provinces is already practically shut. Is the same fate awaiting China proper? What have been the principles of Japanese policy during the last two decades? They have been:-

(a)

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- (a) an extensive system of intrigue, bribery, and corruption of the lower elements amongst the Chinese in order to keep China disunited and weak. Almost every civil disturbance in China since the outbreak of the Great War can be directly attributed to Japanese intrigue.
- (b) The fostering of an intensely militaristic spirit amongst her own people. The Japanese are taught by their leaders that it is Japan's destiny to fight a war every ten years, and that in each war that she has fought in the past she has been uniformly successful.
- (c) The building up of their navy to the very limits allowed under the treaties despite the fact that the U.S.A. and Great Britain have actually reduced their naval strength.
- (d) The concentration of all political power in the hands of the Army and Navy.
- (e) The complete mobilization of her industries for warlike purposes.

In contradistinction to this picture of Japan, what picture does China present to the world. She is a nation is peace loving and desires nothing better than to be allowed to work out her destiny in peace. She is dependant on outside nations for the supply of all warlike materials. In fact, save that she has an abundant supply of man power, she is utterly unprepared for war.

- (4) It has become abundantly clear during the past few years that Japan regards treaties as nothing more than "scraps of paper". She has violated the Washington Treaties both in the letter and the spirit. Her action towards China has been and is a direct violation of such treaties as the Nine Power Treaty, and the Paris Peace Pact. So far, to use a common expression she has "got away with it", but the question arises as to how long the Nations are going to allow this state of affairs to continue. Sooner or later the world will have to decide whether it can afford to allow Japan to continue in her role of international freebooter, ignoring all the solemn obligations undertaken by her under Treaty, and ruthlessly subjugating those countries the possession of which she considers necessary to her as stepping stones in her march towards world dominance. There can be little doubt what that decision will be, for unless the principles of International law and respect for treaties are upheld, the world must relapse into barbarism with the stronger nations gobbling up the weaker until eventually the whole of civilization is destroyed. We are confident that the world will eventually come to a realization of the necessity of compelling respect for inter-

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national obligations, but we are only afraid that this realization may come too late.

While the world is hesitating, Japan is going ahead with her prepared plans. Her imperialistic program started with the Liu Chiu Islands affair (1871-1874), continued with the loss of Formosa (1875-1895) and the loss of Korea, and found its latest expression in the occupation of Manchuria and the military dominance over North China.

- (3) Sir, the United States of America, as one of the greatest States in the world, has a moral obligation to stand by the weak and the oppressed. It has shown in the past that it is not unmindful of this duty, and this encourages us to make an appeal on behalf of our distressed country. We are of the opinion that nothing short of a miracle can prevent the outbreak of war in the Far East, and in that war China must play her part for her very destiny will be at stake.

But China is short of everything (save man power) necessary for the prosecution of war. It is useless for her to rely on other countries to supply this need, for in the event of war she will be cut off from the sea routes.

Therefore she must build up the necessary industries in China, but to do this she needs loans in capital and equipment, for she herself has not the necessary financial resources.

Therefore, Mr. President, we appeal to you, and through you to the great American People. If your country will grant us financial and technical assistance to build up iron works, machinery works, chemical works, electric works and other similar enterprises, she will not only be helping China to prepare for the inevitable war, but also will secure for her people a large share in the economic development of China in the days when peace shall once more reign.

Mr. President, we have stated our case to the best of our ability, and we pray that our appeal will not fall on deaf ears. The battle for Justice must be fought if civilization is to be saved. China has already been marked out by Japan as the next victim to her imperialistic lust for power. We beg, beseech, and pray the great American People to help us to help ourselves.

THE MILITARY AND

THE DIPLOMATIC COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE NATIONAL ALLIANCE

Signed: Li Tu (General).

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Inclosure No. 4 to confidential despatch No. 8087
 from Edwin A. Cunningham, American Consul General,
 Shanghai, China, dated September 18, 1954, on the
 subject General Li Yu and the Council of the Chinese
 People for Armed Self Defense.

FOUR

TRANSLATION

A letter from the Committee of Foreign Relations of the
 Great Confederation of the Chinese People to
 the Soviet Government and People.

To the

Charished Government and People of the Union
 of Socialist Soviet Republics.

While Japanese imperialists are occupying North
 China and making active preparations for an attack upon
 your country, I beg sincerely and enthusiastically to
 voice at this critical moment the anti-Japanese feelings
 and aspirations of the 60,000,000 members of the Great
 Confederation of the Chinese People by presenting this
 letter in the hope that you may accept it and come to
 the aid of the Confederation by joining us on the
 battle line.

The Committee of Foreign Relations is commissioned
 by the Board of Directors of the Great Confederation of
 the Chinese People "to eliminate with all its might the
 Japanese imperialism which the Great Confederation has
 finally taken to be the only menace to the Chinese
 people" and to do all in its power "to develop the
 people's anti-Japanese diplomacy, to come in contact
 with anti-Japanese races and to form a battle array
 against Japan." The Committee has also taken the
 people of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as
 one of the associated anti-Japanese battle-lines with
 which the Great Confederation ought to unite in the
 first place.

It is true that the "Great Confederation of the
 Chinese People" whereby the Committee was given the above
 commission is a brand-new organization but its mother
 is the "Hungmen Union of China." The Hungmen (Hui) is
 a secret society which was founded about 1650 and whose
 membership is composed of five principal ramifications
 with as many as 60,000,000 persons located in the southern
 and northern provinces of China as well as in all countries
 in which Chinese reside. The motive underlying the
 creation of this society was the offering of resistance
 to the Manchurian tribe which occupied China three hundred
 years ago and the history of the society abounds in
 records of wars with Manchus. Notwithstanding the
 fact that about 1912 the society cooperated with Sun
 Chung-shan (San Yat-sen), the leader of the Chinese
 revolution, and assisted him in the overthrow of the
 Manchu regime and the establishment of the Chinese
 Republic in its place, the status of the society itself

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as an organic whole remains unchanged. In 1931 when Japan occupied the three Northeastern Provinces, in 1932 when she attacked Shanghai and in 1933 when she seized Jehol and advanced against the Great Wall to which the line of battle was extended, the society realized that the Chinese national crisis had reached the climax and that it cannot but offer unreservedly and unconditionally its strong organization and history of warfare to the Chinese people as a whole and make itself ready to fight against Japanese imperialists with all its might so that the life of the Chinese nation may be indefinitely prolonged. Having come to this momentous decision, the society called a conference of the leaders of the five principal ramifications in and out of China in October, 1933, when it was resolved that steps shall be taken to organize the "Hungmen Union of China" and to elect directors to undertake the responsibility for administration of all its affairs. The Board of Directors has now resolved that, on the basis of the original groundwork, the "Great Confederation of the Chinese People" shall be formed and all warlike members of the fraternity known as Hungmenhui shall simultaneously become members of the Great Confederation prepared to commence that holy and arduous struggle with Japan.

Judging from the fact that China is positively enslaved by quasi-imperialists during the political and economic crisis throughout the world and particularly by Japanese imperialists who have relentlessly invaded this country, dear sirs, one would naturally come to the conclusion that the latter are not only desirous of colonizing China but also ambitious enough to disintegrate your territory which is one-sixth of the world. It is for this very reason that, after their occupancy of Manchuria is strengthened or confirmed, Japanese imperialists will doubtless initiate an attempt to invade your territory in the Far East. From 1913 to 1920, they headed an international expedition and penetrated the above mentioned territory under the camouflage of anti-communist colors. On the pretext of the so-called Hsi Harbor incident, they sent an army of 180,000 strong to occupy strategic points in the Far East until 1925. Your people are no doubt able to recall these historic events from which they have personally suffered. Japanese imperialists have now taken Manchuria from the grasp of China and are using it as the basis of military operations against the Far East. There, they are rubbing fists and wiping palms and are eager to make a test. Moreover, by a stretch of evil heads, they mean to go straight to Pootow from Mukden via the Peiping-Liaoning and Peiping-Tsuiyuan Railways, to peep at Kulun from Belonnor, and to extend to Kansu and Sinkiang whence, along the boundaries between your country and mine, they will launch an attack right upon Central Russia in order to sever the connection between East and West Russia. These circumstances have precipitated your nation and mine into the same destiny and brought us to a crisis where we must live or perish together. Under such an exigency, it is a matter of course that, without awaiting external help, the Chinese people should exert itself to

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the utmost to drive all Japanese "captives" from the Chinese territory so as to contend for the independence of China. But, having already seized Mukden, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol which consist of 4,000,000 square miles and having created the so-called Manchoukei State, the enemy is prepared to show the eleven feet in Honai, Chebar and Suiyuan and to proceed to Ningxia, Kansu and Sinkiang where no defense measures whatsoever have been instituted and where it is likely that the intruders will be allowed to do what they please and create a reign of terror as if they were in an uninhabited land. This being the case, time is not distant when the enemy (Japan) will use the frontier of China which is several thousand miles in length as the basis of military operations against my beloved neighbor. What a heart-breaking event will this prove to your country!

We have seriously considered the problem of international interests and have come to the conclusion that nothing short of a thorough alignment of the anti-Japanese battle lines in your country and mine will suffice to safeguard the existence and prosperity of our respective nations and to secure the Far Eastern and world peace. Representing in good faith the Great Confederation of the Chinese people as a whole and believing in the theory just outlined, I offer most enthusiastically to go with your government and people to the battle field to fulfill a colossal mission in the history of the world.

We have also seriously thought of the lack of military stores and the absence of national defensive measures on account of which we shall experience the greatest difficulty in time of war. We can console ourselves only with the facts that we are in possession of 60,000,000 warriors deeply imbued with nationalism and having a long history of warfare; that we shall not shrink for want of military supplies or national defensive measures nor shall we act rashly because of our superiority in strength; and that we are determined to accept the responsibility for a war with Japan, to hasten to make up military defects at the same time and to discharge our obligations in the hope that the government and people of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics whose interests are likewise affected may render us zealous, sympathetic and substantial aid.

I believe, dear sirs, that, in planning to deal with any enemy force which may launch an offensive against the Soviet government and people, you must have been deeply concerned about the inability of the Chinese nation to cooperate with you and you must have carefully studied into and estimated the difficulties on our part. I wish now to inform you that the warlike members of our Manchukuo are prepared to mix their blood and spirit with your (fighting) materials as a sacrifice to this holy war. In the meantime, they hope that you may accept our blood and spirit and blend them with your materials so that the mixture may constitute a valuable offering to the sacred warfare.

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I wish further to inform the beloved people of the Union of Soviet Republics that we are speedily going on with (1st) the training of the Kuomintang members to the art of fighting, (2nd) the establishment of industrial enterprises for the manufacture of military stores, and (3rd) the organization of military units from the four Northeastern provinces right to Sinkiang. Under the present environments, however, our military training work can be done only in the form of vocational education or for the purpose of local defense and our manufacture of military supplies carried on merely in the name of ordinary commercial enterprises while our military units are organized as volunteers in the four Northeastern provinces and under the name of the government from Chahar to Sinkiang. Our program is one which should meet with the approval of the government and the people at home and which should not disturb peace now reigning abroad.

I may add that we are prepared to establish vocational schools on a large scale so that vocational education may be given in a universal manner while we are calling upon the members of the Confederation to redouble their efforts to organize military units for self-defense. We would gather together industrialists of repute and standing on the one hand to establish, nominally for profit-making purposes, commercial enterprises that may be engaged in mining, metallurgy, and manufacture of motorcars and airplanes as well as in chemical production and would decide upon Chahar and vicinity and the entire province of Sinkiang on the other and as the two principal bases of military organizations.

I wonder how the beloved worthies of Soviet Russia would think of our plans, but it is most earnestly hoped that you may give us an effective and definite answer under the principles whereby oppressed races should be succored and commonweal established in the world.

Respectfully submitted with compliments of

Li Tu
 Chairman of the National Committee of
 Foreign Relations and Chairman of the
 Military Council of the Great Confederation
 of the Chinese People.

Dated the 13th day of August, 1934, or the 23rd
 year of the Chinese Republic.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to confidential despatch No. 2087 from Edwin C. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated September 18, 1934, on the subject "General Li Fu and the Council of the Chinese People for Armed Self Defense."

C O P Y

TRANSLATION

barrels among the rank and file of the Nanking Government over the diplomatic issues between China and Japan.

Appropos of the diplomatic relations with Japan, there sprang up two factions within the Nanking Government immediately after the September 18th incident; namely, those in favor of direct negotiations and those who are opposed thereto. Advocates of direct negotiations believe that, so long as China is under the duress of Japan, she had better come to an understanding with Japan for the sake of temporary peace than invoke the aid of America or the League of Nations which might lead to further perplexities, while non-advocates of direct negotiations advance the theory that, unlike Japan which would take an ell if we give her an inch, and which is ambitious enough to make the whole of this nation a second Korea or Annam, America and the League of Nations would do nothing to the detriment of China as an independent state however aggressive they may be from an economic standpoint. Irreconcilable to each other, both schools of thought have gone to extremities. The former describes the latter as pro-American while the latter calls the former pro-Japanese. The former exploits Japanese military force as a threat to China, while the latter makes American loans instrumental to the purpose of manipulation. The former scolds the latter for international control, while the latter curses the former with loss of country. Each contending party would take, however, Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence or non-concurrence in its principle as the exponent of success or failure. For reasons of personal interests, Chiang Kai-shek fell in entirely with the views of the pro-Japanese faction which consists of Tang Ching-wei, Huang Fu and others who are finally able to rely upon the Japanese support. Thereupon, the activities of the pro-American group ended in a fiasco.

The pro-Japanese faction having reported a victory, Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Ching-wei, Huang Fu and others met at Nanchang on April 14, 1934, when they decided to accept the Japanese demands and commence direct negotiations. Following their confab at Nanchang, they detailed Yin Tung to attend the Dairen Conference so that negotiations for through traffic, et cetera, may be conducted with Japan. This action was openly approved by the Central Political Council at Nanking on May 30th (but kept secret to the outer world). The resolution adopted on that date by the Central Political Council is based wholly upon an

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outline of the nine rules decided upon by Yin Tung with Japanese in the Dairen Conference. Then Chang Ching-wei referred the nine rules to the Central Political Council, Chang Chi, Chiao I-t'ang and others who are among the so-called non-advocates of direct negotiations (namely: persons described as pro-American by the pro-Japanese group) staged a serious opposition. In order to abate antagonism on the part of the oppositionists, Chang Ching-wei opened the meeting by reading the following telegram purported to have been addressed to himself and others by Chiang Kai-shek:

"Under the present circumstances and with a view to eradication of communist-bandits, extermination of remnant warlords and unification of the Southwest and the North, China cannot but accept the Japanese demands, settle the issues that have been pending for years and carry into effect the plans of through traffic, postal relations and customs establishment."

The telegram goes on to say that these matters shall receive attention of Mr. Tang, President of the Executive Yuan, who is responsible for the disposition thereof with full power and in cooperation with the proper controlling organs. Then Tang was through with the telegram, Chang Chi and Chiao I-t'ang rose from their seats and protested against the measure. The contention they advanced is as follows:

"To agree to the proposition of through traffic with Manchouko is virtually to recognize that pseudo state which implies not only final surrender of Mukden, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, but careless delivery to Japanese of the right to control military affairs in North China. Japan is again presenting most dramatic demands to Fukien and, if such a policy of non-resistance is continued, not only the Chinese inhabitants of Manchuria, Jehol and North China but those of South China might become countryless slaves. Under no term whatsoever shall we be able to fall in with the suggestion made today."

Seeing that Chang Chi, Chiao I-t'ang and others are unanimously opposed to the proposal, Chang Ching-wei cast many significant glances at Ch'en Chao-ying and other pro-Japanese elements who, thereupon, stood up and insisted upon its adoption. They retorted thus:

"Through traffic or absence of through traffic is irrelevant to the question of Manchouko. As a matter of fact, Mukden, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol are already parts of that pseudo state. If you consent to the Japanese proposal for through traffic, peace may be secured in North China for the time being at least. If not, Japan would rush troops to North China and occupy the whole of this country at once. Those views should then be held as those of countryless slaves?"

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As a result of the prior arrangements made by Chang Ching-wei and others, the oppositionists were utterly defeated at length.

When Chang Ching-wei referred the nine rules of through traffic in outline to the Central Political Council, it was his desire to bring up simultaneously the five principles concerning which Huang Yu and T'ang Yu-jen had negotiated at Peiping with Secretary Chiba-ura of the Japanese Legation because, as soon as these principles are approved by the Council, the Tangku Agreement would be nothing more than a dead letter and Chang Ching-wei and his associates could spread the news as propaganda to hoax their nationals. In view of the difficulty of securing the consent of Chang Chi and others to these five principles when they were strongly opposed even to the proposition of through traffic, Chang Ching-wei finally refrained from bringing them up. The following is an outline of the nine rules then discussed:

- (1) Use shall be made of the locomotives of the South Manchurian Railway for through traffic purposes;
- (2) The Peiping and Mukden stations shall sell tickets good only for travel to points not farther than Shanhaikuan;
- (3) An international travel agency shall be organized to manage matters pertaining to passenger tickets, freight and luggage;
- (4) The number of times which the through traffic may run shall be determined upon by a technical commission;
- (5) The cars on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and those on the Mukden-Shanhaikuan Railway shall be interchangeable;
- (6) In order that they may be settled by both parties, the through traffic accounts shall bear separate entries showing the number of tickets sold;
- (7) No flags shall be displayed by the through trains nor proclamations posted thereon;
- (8) Different railway guards shall be organized for the Peiping-Shanhaikuan and Mukden-Shanhaikuan sections;
- (9) Chinese and Japanese experts shall be employed by the International Travel Agency, the head office of which is to be established at Shanhaikuan and the branch offices at Tientsin and Mukden.

That Chang Ching-wei and his confederates forcibly passed the above in the Central Political Council on May 30th resulted in the final victory of the so-called pro-Japanese faction in favor of direct negotiations, but the complete failure of the pro-American group which is opposed thereto. Thereupon, the pro-American

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group came round to the belief that they are unable to cope with their opponents who are backed by Chiang Kai-shek with the force of arms. Using as a subterfuge the illegality of the action of Lu Heng-yu, Minister of Railways, in secretly borrowing French money to the extent of 50,000,000 francs for the Cheng-Tai Railway, the pro-American group then embarked upon an agitation for the overthrow of Wang Ching-wei. In case the anti-Fang program should materialize, the Executive Yuan could be reorganized, the pro-Japanese party deprived of support and the outcome of the direct negotiations between China and Japan fundamentally destroyed. Accordingly, in connection with the Cheng-Tai Railway Loan, Lu Heng-yu was impeached by Liu Lou-wu and other members of the Control Yuan, which decided to recommend to the National Government that Lu be dismissed and otherwise dealt with upon investigation. As President of the Executive Yuan, Wang Ching-wei not only ignored the recommendations but strictly forbade all newspapers in Nanking and Shanghai to publish the facts of the case. Charging Fang and Lu with treacherous surrender to Japan in matters involving foreign relations and with use of railway loans for personal purposes, Yu Yu-jen, the President of the Control Yuan, and all other members thereof, resolved that the Control Yuan shall not hold any session so long as Fang and Lu remain in office. Lu and other legislators who considered it their duty to do so joined hands with the Control Yuan and made up their minds to carry on or to retire at the same time. Accordingly, Yu Yu-jen left for Shanghai on the plea of illness. Realizing that the situation had been aggravated and that, if it is allowed to go unchecked, there would be a possibility of the entire nation joining the movement to the utter ruin of his prestige, Wang Ching-wei telegraphically requested Chiang Kai-shek to return to Nanking and act as a mediator. He said:

"The impeachment of Lu Heng-yu by the Control Yuan is completely a scheme of the pro-American party to set aside the arrangements already concluded with Japan. If the Executive Yuan is suddenly shaken, the diplomatic relations with Japan would be radically upset and North China plunged into a hopeless predicament."

This accounts for the recent visit of Chiang Kai-shek to Nanking, where, upon arrival, he urged Yu Yu-jen by telegraph to return to the capital. Yu remained adamant during his interview with Chiang Kai-shek but Chiang promised to transfer Lu Heng-yu to another place after a short while. Subsequent to the victory in their agitation against Lu Heng-yu, the pro-American party or the non-advocates of direct negotiations contemplated enlarging their activities so that the leaders of the pro-Japanese faction, namely, Wang Ching-wei and Huang Fu, may be overthrown.

The concentration of energies on foreign relations and China's unification has so far been held as a prerequisite to Chiang Kai-shek's scheme for materialization

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of dictatorship. His concentration of energies on foreign relations is meant therewith of efforts to arrive at an understanding with a particular imperialistic country because it is only then an imperialistic country is behind him that supplies may be obtained of the money and munitions of war required for the subversion of the oppositionists and it is only when such money and military stores are in hand that his plan of unification may be realized and his aim of establishing a dictatorship accomplished. This integral scheme is the only secret plan of Chiang Kai-shek and except a few of his henchmen in the persons of Yang Ying-tai, Chiang Wei-hui, Ho Chung-han, and Yang Sen-i, none has ever participated in the execution of the plan as a whole since other persons are only partially concerned therein. (For instance; persons handling American loans talk only of American affairs and those who run between the North and the Southwest confine their remarks to the subject of strange and or manipulation while commanders of different route armies speak of nothing other than their stratagems.) This is Chiang Kai-shek's usual tactics which he has applied not only to the evolution of the scheme above mentioned.

Ever since his assumption of the presidency of the Executive Yuan, Wang Ching-wei has been aware of the fact that his position cannot be strengthened unless he participates in the carrying out of Chiang Kai-shek's secret plan. Wang Ching-wei had no means, however, of familiarizing himself with the inner workings of Chiang Kai-shek's secret scheme. He thought that Chiang must be anxious to unify China and to get rid of the military leader whose position corresponds to his and of the troops under his command. Looking around China, Wang found Chang Hsueh-liang as the only man possessing such qualifications and being hated by fellow-countrymen because Chang retained a high position at Peiping although he was to blame for loss of Chinese territory (after the coup of September 18th). Wang Ching-wei consulted, therefore, with Chiang Kai-shek about the ousting of Chang Hsueh-liang on the plea of national crisis and the (strained) foreign relations. As a matter of coincidence, Chiang Kai-shek was endeavoring to form an alliance with the United States and the League of Nations through H. V. Hoang and Wellington Koo. Since Chang Hsueh-liang is pro-American and is persona grata to H. V. Hoang and Wellington Koo, Chiang Kai-shek considered the proposal for his elimination premature although he was anxious to do away with Chang Hsueh-liang. He made no objection nor did he approve of Wang Ching-wei's idea. He merely stated "I wish Mr. Wang would take the matter into serious consideration." Construing this reply to mean that time is ripe for him (Wang) to participate in the execution of Chiang Kai-shek's secret plan, Wang left for Shanghai under the pretext of Chang Hsueh-liang's having demanded large sums of money from the Executive Yuan for defrayal of military expenses. On the following day, namely August 6, 1932, he tendered to the Central Executive Committee, Hankow, and to Lin Sen, Chairman of National Government, Poyang, his resignation

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tion from all posts, substantive as well as concurrent, and telegraphically requested Chang Tsueh-liang to retire at the same time by way of apology to the nation. Yang was rather jubilant over the concoction of this plan which, in his opinion, would enable him not only to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek in the carrying out of the latter's secret scheme but also to gratify Chinese nationalists. Contrary to all expectations, Chiang Kai-shek remained reticent with the result that, except for the change of his title from Commissioner of Pacification to Chairman of Military Council, the position of Chang Tsueh-liang remained intact. Following his failure, Tang Ching-wei pleaded illness in Shanghai and would feel ashamed to resume official duties. In the days of depression that ensued, he recalled that it is the money and munitions of war from imperialistic countries upon which Chiang Kai-shek depends for his endeavor to unify China and that it is for their ability to maneuver between the United States and the League of Nations that T. T. Soong and Wellington Koo are in Chiang Kai-shek's good books. Yang believed that there would be no question about his being able to participate in the execution of Chiang Kai-shek's secret plan of unifying China if he could purport to be the latter's secret diplomacy; namely, on the latter's secret scheme for conclusion of loans and purchase of munitions from the abroad. Yang was fully aware of the fact that Chiang's plan of unification could never be carried into effect without such loans and military stores. Consequently, he asked for three months' leave of absence to visit Europe for recuperative purposes when his idea was to attend the League's meetings in his capacity as President of the Executive Yuan and to direct Wellington Koo and T. T. Yen in establishing closer contact with the United States and the League while he himself assumes the leadership of the pro-American clique. In that event, he would have the power to take a part in the negotiations which T. T. Soong had been conducting with Europe and America for financial aid and military supplies and to manipulate the so-called secret plan of unification when he is in a position to control the secret diplomacy of Chiang Kai-shek.

Due to the fact, however, that the pro-American coterie including T. T. Soong, Wellington Koo, and T. T. Yen was difficult of access when Yang himself had too little knowledge of Europe and America to permit of his establishing closer relations therewith, Tang Ching-wei returned to China without having accomplished anything during his sojourn in Europe for some months. Some time after his return, Tang Ching-wei incidentally talked over with Tang Yu-jen and Ku Meng-yu the latter of coming into closer touch with America or Japan. Tang Yu-jen, who knew well about the cause of Yang's failure in Europe, eloquently made the following remarks:

"On no account should we cooperate with the pro-American group nor do we have the ways and means of cooperating with them. They do not take any stand in politics nor do they carry out

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any definite program in foreign relations. Depending upon their knowledge of spoken foreign languages, they respect nothing other than foreigners' will and have no one besides foreigners. If they (C. C. Kung, Wellington Koo and others) would sincerely cooperate with us under your leadership, Mr. Wang, they should have disclosed to you their arrangements with America and the League of Nations while you were in Europe. Their failure to do so is conclusive evidence of the fact that we cannot cooperate and have no want of cooperating with the pro-American clique. Furthermore, so far as China's present condition is concerned, it is better to cooperate thoroughly with Japan in order to preserve momentary peace than to ally with America or Soviet or to make the League of Nations instrumental to the purpose of curbing Japanese activities. It is true that Japan means to invade China but, since she has seized Manchuria as the only object of invasion, what she desires cannot be anything other than an adjustment of the questions of through traffic, postal facilities, customs barriers, tariff, commercial treaties and other pending issues. Could Japan not insist upon their settlement because of the effort of the pro-American group to affect a rapprochement with the United States or Russia or to exploit the League of Nations? I do not think so. I believe that the result of their work could only lead to international control of China by America and Europe. Huang Ying-pai (Huang Yu) has once told Mr. Wang and myself that the pro-American party can be overcome only through the instrumentality of an alliance with Japan. He has further stated:

'Mr. Chiang Kai-shek is not besieged by the pro-American clique. He can be brought to fold immediately when Japan shows him what a formidable power she is.'

I believe that Ying-pai is correct and I am sure that Mr. Chiang will come to us if we thoroughly cooperate with Japan. With Japan as our support, Mr. Chiang will find it necessary to settle the Japanese issues when a certain time comes. He cannot but reveal then his plan of unification to us. According to Ying-pai, when you were at Yokohama last year (1932) he told you personally that Yang Ying-tai, Hsiung T'ien-i (Hsiung Shih-hui) and Cheng Yueh-chun (Chang Chun) would place themselves under your leadership if you are willing to act along the indicated lines. But, as a prerequisite, you should act concurrently as the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

Ku Heng-yu who happened to be with them when Yang Yu-jen remonstrated with Yang Ching-wei was pleased with the exposition. Thereupon, Yang Ching-wei decided upon a pro-Japanese policy in order to curb the activities of

Chiang

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Chiang Kai-shek and, meanwhile, Huang Yu, Yen Ting-tai, Hsiung Shih-hui and Chang Chun came to Wang's aid. It is the use of the pro-Japanese tactics against Chiang Kai-shek that made Wang Chiang-wei head of the Kuai Chiao Lu, and Hu-jen a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Huang Yu the Chairman of the Foreign Political Council. In the pursuit of this policy, Wang Chiang-wei and Huang Yu have been passive instead of active. Take, for instance, the question of through traffic. They said absolutely nothing beforehand. Not until Japan had presented drastic demands rendering it necessary for Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the proposition of through traffic did they intervene in order to effect a settlement upon a certain basis saying that it is Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's idea in which they have to concur in view of the national crisis. It is a means of the Japanese protests or demands that they defeated the pro-American group and made Chiang Kai-shek fall into their hands. They claimed no credit for the work and so Chiang Kai-shek was unwittingly caused to fall in their power.

Notwithstanding the defeat of the pro-American faction and the triumph of the pro-Japanese diplomacy, Wang Chiang-wei was never able to take a part in the execution of Chiang Kai-shek's secret plan of unification of the South-west and the North. Then the Nanchang Conference was to be held (by Chiang Kai-shek with Wang Chiang-wei and Huang Yu) on the 13th of April last, Wang and Huang, having been previously given to understand that Chiang was determined to accept the Japanese demands, agreed to cause Chiang to disclose completely his secret plan of unification prior to the opening of the conference. Accordingly, Wang Chiang-wei addressed Chiang Kai-shek as follows:

"We are going to accept most ignominiously all Japanese demands for the sake of unification of the South-west and the North. Before we commence the discussion of the Japanese issues, it behooves us to review the work done during the previous year toward unification and to estimate the value of the plan for the future. If we believe that there is as yet no prospect of early unification, the endeavor to readjust our relations with Japan would be a waste of effort because no sacrifice is justifiable unless it is worth making. In the absence of any plan or prospect of unification, who would accept the responsibility for such a serious disgrace as would have to be incurred in the making of a worthless sacrifice?"

Realizing that there would be no way of proceeding with the settlement of the Japanese issues unless the plan of unification be made known to Wang and Huang, Chiang Kai-shek sent for Yen Ting-tai, Hsiung Shih-hui, Teng Wen-i and Ho Chung-han and talked over the matter with them. Teng Wen-i and Ho Chung-han were rather opposed to the idea of discussing the plan of unification with Huang and Wang but, after explanations were made by Chiang Kai-shek and Hsiung, a meeting was held in the

Nanchang

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Nanchang Headquarters in the evening of April 13th when Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Ching-wei, Huang Pu, Yang King-tai, Hsiung Shih-hui, Peng Wen-i and Ho Chung-han were present. Chiang Kai-shek acted as chairman and Peng Wen-i as secretary. In opening the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek declared:

"We are here today to ventilate the question of unification which is closely related with diplomacy. Never can unification be accomplished when diplomatic issues cannot be settled. Messrs. Tang and Huang are directly responsible for diplomatic issues and so we would give as the subject of unification with them before we discuss foreign affairs."

Chiang Kai-shek was followed by Tang Ching-wei who stated:

"Mr. Chiang has just definitely explained how closely unification is related with diplomacy. As we undertake the responsibility for diplomatic affairs under Mr. Chiang's leadership, we would naturally insist upon what he advocates. Maintenance of secrecy is the only way of handling China's foreign affairs because China has a large population and numerous parties which would immediately spoil your diplomatic program, however admirable it may be, if you released it before success is assured. While last inquiring of me about the status of foreign affairs in North China, Chang P'u-sh'uan (Chang Chi) followed me from the Central Political Council to the Executive Yuan and would not let me off until I gave him the desired information. I told him that I could only explain or report the facts to the military authorities and that I would rather start with my head than divulge them to any one else. If we desire to unify China, we must straighten up foreign affairs and keep the diplomatic secrecy. Our failure to handle diplomatic affairs properly may hinder the progress of the unification work for which Mr. Chiang is responsible. I wish, therefore to emphasize the importance of diplomatic secrecy before the question of unification is discussed."

Disclosing his unification plan and referring to the conditions in the Southwest and the North, Chiang Kai-shek then made the following statement:

"Ancient the question of unification, I may speak separately of the North and the Southwest although the latter is comparatively important. Because of the communist activities rendering it impossible for the unification work in the Southwest to proceed without a hitch, I have divided the time required for the completion of the task into three different periods subject to increase or decrease of communist influences.

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Let me talk of the first period first. During the first period when Tsai Ting-kai and his associates were still in Fukien, the troops of the central government had no way of coming in contact with the Southwest. The tactics adopted for that period was to make the Southwestern leaders opposed to each other and to win over their officers of middle and lower grades. The agglomeration of the Southwestern provinces is the greatest obstacle to the unity of China and so we took advantage of the conflicts between Kwangtung and Fukien, between Kwangsi and Kwangtung, between Yunnan and Kweichow and between advocates of peace and advocates of force. In winning over their subordinate officers, we availed ourselves of their personal relations of which the friendship between Chen Chang and Yu Han-mou is a case in point.

Coming to the second period when the central government troops had occupied Fukien, I threatened them with the use of military force and availed myself of the antagonism among the Southwestern leaders. Meanwhile, preparations were made for the third period because time will be ripe for the unification of China by force of arms as soon as the land is cleared of communists. That I mean by threatening them with the use of force during the first and second periods is this. Apart from those besieging the communists in North Fukien and preserving order in Fukien Province, the central government troops I dispatched to Fukien as a punitive expedition against the 19th Route Army consisted of ten divisions quartered in South Fukien. spacious aerodromes have been built at Changchow, Lungyen, Koochow and Moy and the construction of aerodromes at different parts of Hunan will be started in near future. Strictly speaking, Ho Chien is but another Tsai Ting-kai who would rebel against the central government as soon as any trouble should break out in the Southwest. I am having Ho Chien's troops concentrated in Hunan for communist suppression purposes and am placing in their rear other Chinese armies not under his command. To these armies are added fifty thousand or more Manchurian soldiers of Chang Tsueh-liang and four divisions of the central government troops. With these heavy forces pressing Ho Chien close in the rear and being in a position to establish liaisons with the central government troops in Kwangsi and Fukien in order to watch Kwangtung and Kwangsi, it is not likely that he (Ho Chien) will work in collusion with the two provinces last named. In Yunnan and Kweichow, I am causing Yun Lung (of Yunnan) to watch laterally the movements of Yang Chia-lich (of Kweichow) who has established connections with Kwangsi. Kwangsi is now most closely connected with France which I understand has promised that province financial aid and munitions of war. As France and Germany are antagonistic to each other in the extreme, I have had Yun Lung enter into a contract with Germany for the establishment of an airplane factory so that no vexation may be caused by Kwangsi. Following the occupation of Fukien by

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the central government troops, Chen Shi-tang who was benched thereby established close relations with Kwangsi and repeatedly asked Li Tsung-jen to come to Kwangtung. He ceased taking interest in Li Tsung-jen when I threatened to tackle with the Kwangsi problem first. Ku Han-min and Chen Shi-tang were rather intimate friends but Sun Yo's proposal for Ku Han-min to come to Hankin caused them immediately to change their attitude toward each other. In short, prior to the conclusion of the communist suppression campaign, we have to prevent by all manner of means sudden outbreak of hostilities in the Southwest against the central government; otherwise it would be impossible to have the situation well in hand at both fronts. Not until the communist suppression campaign is terminated shall we come to the third period when unification may be accomplished by force of arms as above explained.

As much for the Northwest, not as to the North concerning which I may speak separately of Northwest China and North China. The time for execution of the unification plan in Northwest China and North China may also be divided into three periods. In Northwest China of which I will speak first, the first period was the time when advantage was taken of the antagonism among the Northwestern leaders and when the central government troops were sent to the Northwest. Kansu has now fallen into the hands of the central government troops and the greater part of Shensi is placed under control of the central authorities. These are the fruits of our labor during the first period. In the second period, we continued to avail ourselves of their opposition to each other. For instance, Sun Tsi-ju is opposed to Yu Tsu-cheng and Lu Tsu-chang to Tung Yao-shan when, in collusion with Sun Tsi-ju's subordinates, Lu Tsu-chang stages an opposition against Sun Tsi-ju. Upon the arrival of the third period when the Northwest will have been unified, the unification of Shensi may be effected by a single mandate.

The conditions in the North are more complicated and intricate than in the Northwest. In North China were formerly Chang Hsueh-liang of Manchuria, Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, and Han Fu-chu of Shantung. Naturally, Chang Hsueh-liang was the most important of the trio in those days. It is by diplomatic means that I disposed of Chang Hsueh-liang in the first period. During the second period which extended from the time of Chang Hsueh-liang's departure from North China up to the present moment, I availed myself also of their opposition to each other. Sun Che-yuan came in the wake of Chang Hsueh-liang and it is also through diplomatic channels that I settled the cases of Sun Che-yuan and Han Fu-chu. Han Fu-chu's direct connection with Japan has been severed by the central authori-

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ties out he is using the relations between
 Chih Yu-shan and Japan as a shield. I wish
 that Messrs. Yang and Kuang would bear the
 matter in mind and impose a condition covering
 that point when they negotiate with Japan for a
 settlement of the outstanding issues. The best
 thing to do about Yen Hsi-shan and Lung Che-yuan
 is to cause them to fall into loggerheads and
 to have Lung Che-yuan's men withdraw to Kansai
 when the Japanese troops advance against Chahar.
 In that event, Yen Hsi-shan and Lung Che-yuan
 are bound to repeat the Lun-ya tragedy and a
 serious drawback to the unification work in
 North China would be removed when the central
 government forces set in to dispose of the warring
 generals after their energies are exhausted.
 This question being settled, the other problems
 may be solved also by a mandate when the unifica-
 tion of the Southwest has become an accomplished
 fact.

What I have said is a result of my plan of
 unification but, since unification depends upon
 readjustment of foreign relations such as the
 relations between Kwangtung and Britain, between
 Kwangsi and France, between Chantung or Lung-Yen
 and Japan, to which Mr. Yang's attention is
 particularly invited.

The above was followed by the speeches of Yang, Hsiung,
 Yang and Hsiung which, being of no importance, are not
 quoted.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Hankow/89 FOR Desp.#505

FROM Hankow (Stanton) DATED Sept.13,1934
NAME 1-1127 ...

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REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Activities of
Huang Fu, in connection with --Kuling Conference
and decisions arrived at by the Conference.

fpg

793.94/ 6801

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b. Relations with Other Countries.

993.94 JAPAN. Although Huang Fu (黄 部), since his
arrival in central China from the North in April, has
consistently

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consistently been reported in the columns of the press as "soon to return to Peiping", this imminent departure has now been delayed for the past half year the while Huang Fu has met the leaders of the Nanking Government in conference after conference. It seems evident that the Nanking Government, torn between the desire to conciliate Japan with concessions and hope of avoiding stirring up more opposition to its rule than already exists, has thus far refused to commit itself definitely to the action Huang Fu feels is the irreducible minimum for the establishment of friendly relations with China's powerful neighbor. Canton's telegram of April 14 voicing strong opposition to conciliation at the expense of China* was taken by Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his followers as a warning to go slowly against the tide of nationalism, and every effort has been made since then to avoid the appearance of submission to Japan. But it has been obvious to everyone that temporization can not be carried on indefinitely in the field of international relations in the face of Japan's demand that a basis for understanding and cooperation be reached.

Another conference at the Kuling capital was therefore called for mid-August, the chief figures (as in April) being Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛), and Huang Fu; Ch'en Shao-kuan (陳紹寬 - Minister of the Navy), Tseng Chung-ming (曾仲鳴 - Vice-Minister of Railways), H. H. K'ung (孔祥熙 - Minister of Finance), Yin T'ung (殷同 - Managing-Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway), Hsiung Shin-hui (熊式輝 - Kiangsi Chairman),

*Cf. Despatch No. 453, My. 18, 1934.

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Chairman), Huang Shao-hsiung (黃紹竑 - Minister of the Interior) and Chang Ch'un (張羣 - Hupoh Chairman) were also present. According to a NIPPON DEMPO despatch issued while the leaders were gathering, Wang Ching-wei was to make a report on political affairs, after which the conference would enter upon the discussion of two demands made by Huang Fu as prerequisites for his return to Peiping, namely: 1) the extension of the powers of the Peiping Political Council of which Huang is Chairman, and 2) the restraining of Yu Hsueh-chung (于學忠), Hopei Chairman, from "interference in political affairs".* At the same time, it was reported that T. V. Soong (宋子文), Wellington Koo (顧維鈞), and L. W. Yen (顏惠慶) as the result of joint discussions planned to proceed to the conference to propose: 1) maintenance of a balance between the several powers in China, 2) study of the principles of the open door and territorial sovereignty, and 3) an international settlement of the Manchurian question.**

The discussions began on August 10, and on the 12th it was reported by NIPPON DEMPO that a definite decision concerning policies in the North had been reached on the basis of Huang Fu's recommendations, and by CENTRAL NEWS (Nanking's agency) that "General Huang has definitely consented to withdraw his resignation and will return to Peiping in a few days time to resume his duties..."***

Wang

*PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, Aug. 9, 1934.

**ibid., Aug. 10, 1934.

***ibid., Aug. 15, 1934.

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Chang Ching-wei returned to Nanking on August 15, and kindly gave out a statement to the press:

'The purpose of my visit to Kuling was to speak before the Officers' Training Camp. As General Chiang Kai-shek was fatigued, important issues and the question of calling the 5th Kuomintang Conference were not touched upon. Mr. Huang Fu, who has not yet completed his discussions with General Chiang Kai-shek, will remain in Kuling for a few days. Moreover, Mr. Huang Fu will visit Nanking and Shanghai before returning to his post in North China.'

On the 16th, Huang Fu at Kuling stated that he had never really resigned, so that there was no question of his withdrawing his resignation, and that he would be prepared to consider returning to the North "in case he might receive further instructions from the Central authorities for future service to the local government in the North..."** NIPPON DEMPO expressed itself as sanguine concerning the question of Huang Fu's return to the North, believing that

"....the efforts on the part of Chinese politicians anti-Japanese in sentiment, including Dr. W. J. Yen, Lo Wen-kan (羅文幹), Alfred Sze (施肇基), Dr. Wellington Koo, Guo Tai-chi (郭泰祺), Sun Foh (孫科), T. V. Soong, etc., to place obstacles in the way of an early settlement of the North China problems, seem to have failed."

At the same time, apparently experiencing a slight nervousness, the Japanese agency went on to warn Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Ching-wei that the early restoration of peace in North China, together with the suppression of the Chinese Communists, is one of the most urgent of China's problems pressing for solution, "so as to enable them to push forward to their final goal of a united China"; and, contrariwise, any attempt on the part of China to enlist the support of Soviet Russia would be most dangerous.**

Wellington

*PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, Aug. 16 (?), 1934.
 **ibid., Aug. 18, 1934.
 ***ibid.

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Wellington Koo (Minister to France) and W. W. Yen (Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.) arrived in Puling on or about August 30, and on the same day NIPPON DEMPO reported that the Kuling conference had resulted in the following decisions:

"(1) To refuse the demands of the Nippon Authorities, for Nippon could not extend her influence southward on account of strained relations with the Soviet Union.

"(2) To oppose Nippon's economic advance to (sic) North China.

"(3) To negotiate as much as possible with the Foreign Office Authorities rather than with the Kwantung Army Authorities.

"(4) To settle questions in the demilitarised zone technically and partially."*

The Japanese organ professed to find the Nanking Government's attitude incomprehensible, and predicted that, inasmuch as Huang Pu's return under such conditions would be meaningless, he would be replaced in the North by another negotiator. In this connection, it is possibly not without significance that Yin T'ung, who represented Japan at the Pairen Conference, returned to Peiping on August 29 and conferred with Colonel Shibayama of the Japanese Legation on the following day, it being agreed that a preliminary conference should be held shortly in Peiping for the settlement of outstanding problems concerning the Demilitarized Zone. Perhaps Chiang Kei-shek has decided definitely to reverse the policy of submission hitherto followed, but it seems more likely that Yin T'ung will fill the role formerly played by Huang Pu in a series of rear-guard actions designed to convince the Japanese that they are getting what they wanted, and the Chinese

*PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, Sept. 1, 1934.

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Chinese people that nothing is being given away. It is quite obvious that this pretence must be kept up at least until the Fifth Plenary Kuomintang Conference is held, if the Generalissimo is to realize his project of becoming the new dictatorial President of China, but Lincoln once had a very pungent thing to say about the advisability of trying "to fool all of the people all of the time". Eventually, a clean-cut decision will have to be made.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

Sept. 25, 1934

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Secretary, General Staff
G-1
G-3
G-4
War Plans Division
Statistics Branch
Budget & Legislative Pl. Br.
Adjutant General's Dept.
Army Industrial College
Army War College
Air Corps (Liaison Officer)
Cavalry
Chemical Warfare Service
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Corps of Engineers
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
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China:

Nanking between Two Fires -

793.94

A Sino--Japanese conference of particular interest took place in Dairen on July 22 and 23 last -- of particular interest because it afforded a perfect example of the type of negotiation which is accomplishing what little progress there is in the settlement of the various questions at issue between China and Japan. The delegates were Yin-tung, Managing Director of the Peiping--Liaoning Railway -- that is, the Chinese section of it -- on the one hand, and on the Japanese side, Major General Okamura, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Colonel Kita of the same army, and Lieutenant Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Military Attache at Peiping. The questions discussed were of considerable importance, the kind that would require diplomatic representatives of high standing in most Western countries, yet there the conferees were a railroad man turned diplomat (not for the first time, however) and army officers whose duties ordinarily are supposed to lie outside the diplomatic field. The situation is rightly interpreted as meaning that, in China, no important Government official can afford to risk his position -- if not his life -- by being a factor in decisions leading to further humiliation for China. For Japan, it means that the military faction, and the Kwantung Army, in particular, is usurping many of the functions belonging to an accredited diplomat.

793.94/6802

The subjects taken up at the conference primarily had to do with the demilitarized zone adjacent to, and south of, the Great Wall, one of the results of the Tangku Truce which ended the fighting between the Japanese and Chinese in North China in the spring of 1933. The Chinese fulfilled their part of the truce many months ago, but the restrictions placed around them by the Japanese, even beyond the scope contemplated at the time of the armistice, have rendered them helpless to handle the disorders and injustices that have arisen in the demilitarized area.

According to the truce, the Chinese are permitted to patrol the zone only with lightly armed police, and some of these were recruited from among the irregulars whom the Japanese had encouraged prior to, and just after, the armistice in the hope that their activities would result in the formation of an independent buffer state south of the Wall. These renegade troops, whose leader had indubitably sold out to the Japanese, created such serious disorders that a Sino--Japanese conference finally agreed to disband all but 4,000 of them. These men of doubtful loyalty form two-thirds of the police force allowed in the demilitarized zone. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese now wish to substitute a specially trained corps of police, provided with machine guns and light artillery, and totaling 9,000, which number they claim is necessary for the preservation of order and the control of the bandit gangs still infesting the area. It is conceivable, however, that the Japanese are not eager to have their possible future direct action hindered by numerous and well equipped constabulary.

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One of the clauses of the Tangku Truce provided for withdrawal of Japanese troops north of the Great Wall following Chinese compliance with the armistice terms. The Chinese scrupulously fulfilled their part of the agreement long ago, yet Japanese troops still remain south of the Wall -- not many, to be sure, at any one place within the demilitarized zone, but a Manchoukuo division and certain Japanese detachments are reported in the extreme eastern part of Chahar Province, probably on the outside of a long narrow salient between the Great Wall and the Chahar--Jehol border which the Japanese are claiming for Jehol. The excuse for the presence of these troops at the various points has been the inability of the Chinese to preserve order, also that the barracks for their accommodation north of the Wall, now many months under construction, are not completed. This latter excuse probably does not apply to the troops in Chahar.

The real reason for the nonwithdrawal of the troops is the pressure that thereby can be exerted upon the Chinese at opportune moments, as in the Chihhsien incident of last May. A small and allegedly unarmed group of Japanese soldiers was proceeding on a routine mission within the demilitarized zone between Peiping and Hsifengkow, one of the important passes through the Great Wall, when it was fired upon by the local police. Thereupon, some Japanese soldiers belonging to the Jehol garrison marched through the Wall, occupied Chihhsien, and disarmed the local police, much to the astonishment of the villagers who were unaware of the offenses charged against them. The occupation was terminated in about a week, following extensive negotiations and a severe warning. The Japanese commander had taken pains to propitiate the villagers, however, and to spread a little judicious propaganda to the effect that China should be an empire like its neighbors, Manchoukuo and Japan, and that the yellow races should combine against the whites. In view of Chinese hesitation over important issues being pressed by the Japanese at that time, the incident was clearly one of coercion, as well as a hint of what might happen in the future.

The Dairen discussion of the question of Japanese troops within the Great Wall was undoubtedly linked with the problem of the retrocession of Malanyu and the nearby Eastern Tombs where are buried some of the ancestors of Emperor Kang Teh (Pu Yi) of "Manchoukuo." Malanyu is the only one of the passes which has not been retroceded to China, although the return of some of the others has been more in form than in actual fact. Near Malanyu and south of the Wall, the Japanese have an aviation landing field which, obviously, they do not wish to give up. At one time it was thought the Japanese were retaining the pass because of the intended pilgrimage of Emperor Kang Teh to his ancestral tombs, but this visit appears to have been abandoned.

Other subjects considered at Dairen were the regulation of undesirable Japanese and Koreans within the demilitarized zone; restriction of the activities of the Ta Tung Kung Ssu, a motor transportation company operating through the Wall and said to be composed of Japanese and renegade Chinese; and the rehabilitation of Luantung, an area in the eastern end of the demilitarized zone and adjacent to Shanhaikwan. The undesirables mentioned have been engaged in smuggling, sale of narcotics, and other illegal activities, and a plan for their control appears to have been arranged. It is believed that the real mission of some of them has been to spread subversive ideas among the Chinese. The

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

transportation company has been collecting a fee from each Chinese passing through Shanhaikwan, for the purpose, it is said, of creating the impression that the payer is pro-Manchoukuo. It was the Luantung area that the Japanese attempted to make into an independent buffer state and in which some of the severest disorders took place last year.

If definite agreements were reached on the most important questions outlined, they have not yet been put into execution, probably because the Chinese have not agreed to the Japanese terms brought back from Dairen by Yin Tung, which probably included such demands as greater economic concessions, the substitution of Japanese for the American and European advisers and instructors now employed by Nanking, and the recognition of Manchoukuo. The Chinese also ardently desire the abrogation of the Tangku Truce, but Japanese control of the demilitarized zone is plainly too useful a lever to relinquish except for a good bargain. It is also conceivable that the Japanese have adopted Nanking's dilatory diplomatic tactics, that is, of moving as slowly as possible toward a point at which the divergent purposes of the two nations must be reconciled by some means or other. It is certain that Japanese concessions have been sparingly given, but always have saved Nanking's "face" in a crisis. There are signs, moreover, that henceforth Tokyo will use conciliation rather than force wherever the situation will permit, but this signifies no lessening of Japanese determination to win the desired objectives.

The Japanese, nevertheless, have two recent diplomatic victories to their credit, and another seems to be in the process of accomplishment even more indirectly, or perhaps, more accurately, by attrition.

The first victory is the reopening of through railway traffic between Peiping and Mukden, disrupted since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria began in September, 1931. The versatile Yin Tung was the chief Chinese intermediary in this instance -- and more properly so, in view of his railway position -- and his success may have led to his appointment as a delegate to the Dairen conference. The traffic resumption, which began on July 1, was arranged through the device of a tourist travel bureau with headquarters at Shanhaikwan, under a Chinese manager and Japanese assistant manager. The trains stop at Shanhaikwan about one hour while locomotives and crews are changed and customs examination of passengers' baggage is made. The first northbound trip was marred by a bomb explosion in one of the cars, presumably as a protest by some disgruntled Chinese, but since then the service has proceeded smoothly.

The announcement of the new Chinese tariff, effective July 1, aroused both astonishment and protest, because it raised the duties on practically every item except cotton goods, fresh fish, and sugar, which come chiefly from Japan and Formosa. This was Japan's second victory. The preliminaries to the changed tariff were kept secret and the new schedule was approved by the all-powerful Central Political Council as an "emergency measure" instead of by the Legislative Yuan in the usual manner. Hence the new tariff has been attacked by the vernacular press as illegal as well as ruinous to the struggling Chinese cotton manufacturing industry. British cotton goods competition, needless to say, has been practically eliminated, and several articles of American production will suffer; but the Japanese have achieved a goal for which they began to agitate last fall.

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The third item in the Japanese agenda, now in process of accomplishment, is the restoration of mail service between China and Manchuria. Refusal of postal relations with the puppet Manchoukuo was one of the measures recommended to its members by the League of Nations. This double-edged weapon was modified last May, however, when the League Advisory Committee on Manchoukuo decided that mail transit through Manchuria could be handled as a commercial proposition without legally recognizing the new state. It has been impossible as yet for Nanking to make an open agreement with Japan on this issue, but the postal authorities in North China are now accepting incoming mails from Europe via Manchuria, and many expect that before long mail destined for Europe will be dispatched through Manchuria as in pre-occupation years, and without much ado about it.

Nanking's procrastination in dealing with Japan has not been merely Oriental apathy and evasiveness. The Central Government has indeed been between two fires. On the one hand, it has had to bear the steady, unrelenting pressure exerted diplomatically and militarily by Japan; and, on the other, it has had to face the turbulent tide of Chinese public opinion -- that of the Cantonese faction, in particular.

Canton's antagonism toward Nanking's acts is no new thing, as all observers of the Chinese political scene are aware. First of all, there are the sectional differences of speech and temperament, encouraged throughout long centuries of difficult communication, and which may breed discord long after the Japanese menace has been removed. Added to these, are the natural enmity of the "Outs" for the "Ins" and the very real and justifiable personal grievances held by two or three of the southern leaders toward General Chiang Kai-shek. The course of Cantonese hatred and jealousy of Nanking in general and the Generalissimo in particular dates back several years and is much too detailed to be recited here. Actual open conflict was averted, probably, as much by the "silver bullets" expended by Nanking as by anything else until Chiang Kai-shek's speedy victory over the Fukien rebels last January and the subsequent massing of Government troops south of the Yangtze made the Cantonese and their allies realize that a military adventure against Nanking was inadvisable, at least at present.

The Cantonese faction includes numerous individuals who have at one time or another been actively associated with Kuomintang governmental and party affairs at Nanking. Prominent among these are Li Tsung-jen, leading militarist of Kwangsi, and his chief lieutenant, Pai Chung-hsi. Both men of ability, they are doing an exceptionally good job of making something out of a poor province possessing only limited resources. Naturally, such men are eager for a wider scope of action. For the present, they must content themselves with an alliance with General Chen Chi-tang, technically commander of the First Group of Armies with headquarters at Canton, but in reality arbiter of the fortunes of the Southwest. A man in his early forties, who has seen little if any duty outside his native Kwangtung Province, he rose out of relative obscurity to his present position. He and his subordinates are likewise making commendable progress in developing and modernizing their province, and Canton in particular, but at heavy cost to the people owing to the generous "squeeze" exacted for themselves. Chen, because of his control of Canton, the dominating gateway to a vast hinterland, and hence of the rich resources of Kwangtung Province itself, has

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been receiving a large subsidy from Nanking for several years. By judicious use of all this power he has been able to maintain a grip on southwestern affairs which he has not jeopardized by openly opposing Nanking as many of his subordinates and associates have urged.

Cantonese opposition to Nanking has been voiced chiefly by the Southwest Political Council and the Southwest Branch of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, both organizations formed over Nanking's protest. One or the other of these bodies has protested furiously against every concession made to the Japanese and has even appealed to the League of Nations and the powers over the Central Government's head on several occasions. These protests are doubtless inspired in large part by the "Long Gowns," or civilian Kuomintang members, so called because of their adherence to the old-fashioned Chinese dress, who include some of the elder statesmen of the party. The chief of these is Hu Han-min, whom Chiang Kai-shek ousted from Nanking a few years ago, although he is still technically a member of the powerful Central Political Council. Living in guarded seclusion in Hongkong, Hu is a very real thorn in Nanking's side because of the bitter denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government which he issues from time to time. His known patriotism and ability, coupled with his justifiable grievance against Chiang, give Hu's manifestoes a barb too sharp for Nanking's comfort. It is no wonder that the Central Government has been trying for some time, but without success, to induce him to go abroad.

The Southwest Political Council was organized by representatives of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Kweichow Provinces; and Fu'dien before it came under Nanking's definite control may have lent sympathy and cooperation. Yunnan Province, remote and independent in the far southwest, has given lip service to Nanking, but in a conflict would undoubtedly side with Canton if thus its best interests seemed to be served. Of late, General Ho Chien, mediocre chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government, has been conferring at Canton. He has become restive, perhaps because of the transfer of several divisions of former Manchurian troops to the middle Yangtze Valley and the appointment of their commander, Chang Hsueh-liang, former Manchurian governor, as Deputy Commissioner of Bandit Suppression for Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei Provinces, with headquarters at Hankow. With some cause, Ho is probably trying to forestall the day when he will be displaced by one of Chang Hsueh-liang's men, while Nanking views with apprehension the possibility of a coalition against itself, composed of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Hunan, and perhaps Yunnan.

The southern recalcitrance plus the dubious loyalty of other provinces, notably Shansi and Shantung, has aroused Chiang Kai-shek to greater political astuteness. He has sent mediators to Canton and into Kwangsi Province, with what inducements it is not known, but at least the leading southern militarists are now professing loyalty to Nanking, and are giving some cooperation in the anticommunist campaign. Of course, he has been aided by the fact that Kwangtung and Kwangsi are friendly only in outward form, as well as by the aggressive gestures Japan has made toward South China during the past six months or so. There is not the least doubt that Chiang is determined to bring the Southwest more effectively under Nanking's control as soon as he is able, but he has wisely refrained from taking positive military steps to that end while the communists are yet unsubdued. He has declared the

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campaign against the radicals will be completed this year, but the outlook is not entirely promising.

Then, there has been a succession of prominent visitors from North China to Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, first at Nanchang and later at Kuling. These provincial leaders doubtless have been suitably honored and consulted and have returned home with a more cordial feeling toward the central authorities. Yet again, Chiang has been personally conducting the second officers' regimental training camp at Kuling this summer, at which numerous northern commanders have been in attendance. It is clear Chiang feels the necessity of strengthening North China against the Japanese menace, even while he has been following what the Cantonese call a pro-Japanese policy.

Although Nanking has yielded on several of the Japanese demands, the Government's reluctance to do this caused General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Readjustment Commission, to leave his post last April for a stay in Central China which has not yet ended. A former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Nanking Government, General Huang Fu obtained his military education in Tokyo and is very personable with the Japanese. He assumed his difficult duty in Peiping right after the Tangku Truce was signed and has shown unusual diplomatic ability in handling Sino-Japanese problems. His resignation was refused by Nanking, but it is known he has declined to return to North China until he is given a freer hand in dealing with Japan. Partly because of his absence, Yin Tung, also a returned Japanese student, has been delegated to diplomatic tasks. Other former students in Japan, as well as members of the old pro-Japanese Anfu clique, have come into prominence in North China during the last year and are urging greater cooperation with Japan. Opposed to them are returned students from Western countries, who favor continued cooperation with the West.

While Nanking has been struggling between the intransigence of the Southwest on the one hand and Japanese demands on the other, the Japanese have gone steadily forward in gaining economic advantages in China. Numerous objectives have already been won, and the anti-Japanese boycott is practically dead. It is reported that General Huang Fu will shortly return to his Peiping post, which means that the Central Government will be prepared to accede to more of Japan's wishes. While neutral observers are wondering how much longer the League of Nations and other Western technical aid will be continued, the certainty looms that a new era of Japanese economic hegemony in China is at hand.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./85 FOR Desp.#3002

FROM China (Cause) DATED Sept. 27, 1934.
/1911 NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Progress in settlement of Sino-Japanese
Questions: Reports -.

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2. Japan:

a. Progress in settlement of Sino-Japanese questions:

793.94 There was during August apparently slight progress toward solution of questions pending between Japan and China.

Problems of administration of the demilitarized area in North China having been discussed the latter part of July at Tientsin by a Chinese representative and Japanese military officers,⁴ further developments seemed to await the return to Peking of General Huang Pu, China's principal negotiator with Japan. His failure to return created a feeling of uncertainty, as did varying reports with regard to what may have transpired during conversations of leading Chinese figures at Peking, China's "center of itself" on the Yangtze River. The veracity, however, of reports from Japanese sources to the effect that these leaders had decided to adopt a stiffer attitude toward Japanese encroachment was doubted for the reason that there was nothing to indicate that China was in a position to do other than continue to conciliate Japan by slow acquiescence in her desires.

There was evidence that some progress in this direction was being made in secret. (For example, the Legation learned from a reliable source that the head of a well-known Chinese bank was attempting to persuade the Chinese authorities concerned to borrow money from his bank for certain railway construction desired in North China by the Japanese, the money in

question

4. Legation's monthly report for July.

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question to be obtained by the bank from Japanese sources.) The only concrete steps, of which the public was informed, toward improving relations was the establishment by the Chinese of customs houses at three passes of the Great Wall: at Kupeik'ou on August 22; at Iyuan'ou on August 24; and at Langk'ou on August 30.

b. Japan's policy toward China:

The vacillation of the Japanese authorities with respect to the fixing of a definite policy toward China was reported by a usually reliable Japanese source to have ended in August with a victory for the Japanese military.⁵ The report has not yet, however, been substantiated. According to information available, the policy finally decided upon was one of treating with China regionally, that is, a policy which will in effect curtail the influence of General Chiang Kai-shek. The policy which was decided against was reportedly one of support of General Chiang Kai-shek. The object of both policies was the same to the extent that both envisaged Japanese economic recovery through economic penetration in North China, but differed in that the policy advocated by the military looks toward a disunited China which cannot become a military threat to Japan.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Greenville S. C., Oct. 31st. 1934.

Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief, Division Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington D. C.



Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

The reason for my apparent neglect to acknowledge my appreciation of your very courteous reception is, that I have only just now returned home. Washington was the beginning of a rather extended itinerary for the purpose of seeing Chinese art collections in a number of museums in New York, Boston and other places.

I have had no opportunity of digesting the points of the interview which you set forth, but I shall do so now that I have time to settle down. I got from the Carnegie Endowment the booklet which gives the proceeds of the negotiations of the four power loan to China, and after I have had time to analyze the contents I shall, with your permission, write some comments.

I have received lately from Mr. Hamilton a copy of some excerpts from the proceedings of the Japanese Lower House of Feb. 1st., 1926. I hope soon to be able to acknowledge receipt of this and to offer some reflections on the subject of the excerpt.

Again thanking you for your very courteous interview,

Yours respectfully,

J. League

From
T. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON

Confidential

30 October 1934.

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
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CSD letter, May 3, 1973

By [signature] NARS Date 3/19/73

MEMORANDUM

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA



1. The following incidents and circumstances, when considered separately, may be of slight significance, nevertheless when related they are of sufficient importance to warrant attention. Although such a possibility is unlikely, they may conceivably presage renewed Japanese action in North China.

(a) Establishment of a Japanese Military Mission at Kalgan (capital of Chahar province). A Colonel Matsui has taken up his residence in Kalgan and opened an office in that city, styling himself as Assistant Military Attache. One of the large foreign oil companies in Kalgan has been approached with a request for information as to the amount of gasoline on hand, and the time required to deliver a quantity in that city to Japanese agents. Inquiries were also made as to the possibility of delivering 200 motor trucks to the Japanese in Kalgan for military usage.

(b) Several parties of Japanese have recently made a series of "investigation tours" along the Paiping-Suiyuan Railway (the line running from Peiping to Patou out through the northwest into the fringes of the Mongol country and commanding the caravan routes into Sovietized Outer Mongolia).

(c) Recent publication of an alleged official Japanese map which included the province of Chahar within the geographical limits of Manchoukuo.

(d) Recent participation of the 13th Brigade Commander, 7th Division Japanese Army, together with Regimental and Battalion commanders in a "staff ride" in the vicinity of Shanhaikuan. (This Brigade is stationed in Jehol province). Coincident with this tactical exercise the Chief-

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of-Staff of the Japanese Army in North China (Tientsin) visited the same area.

(e) Unexpected arrival in Peiping on 24 October of Chiang-Kai-shek by airplane.

(f) Recrudescence of Japanese activity among the Mongol tribes in Inner Mongolia, of which the bulk of Chehar province is an integral part.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Shanghai/72 FOR Desp.#9681

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Oct.6, 1934.
//H// NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: The Chinese vernacular press took occasion on the third anniversary of the Mukden incident to comment editorially upon the trend of Sino-Japanese affairs during the last three years. Summary of comment.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

b. Relations with Other Countries:

Relations with Japan: The Chinese vernacular

press of Shanghai took occasion on the third anniversary of the Mukden incident to comment editorially upon the trend of Sino-Japanese affairs during the past three years. THE CHEN PAO believes that China has learned three lessons from the occupation of Manchuria by Japan: first, China must rely on its own capabilities and not on other nations, since both the League of Nations and the United States have failed to fulfil their obligations under international agreements in respect to Manchuria; second, the experience of the past three years has imposed on China the necessity of improving her military equipment by modern and scientific weapons of warfare; and third, there must be unity and cooperation within China itself in order effectively to resist foreign aggression. This is also the view expressed by other vernacular papers.

The possibility of a closer relationship between Great Britain and Japan, as indicated by the sending of the British Industrial Mission to "Manchukuo," is regarded with some apprehension in certain Chinese circles.

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Greenville S. C., Nov. 13th. 1934.

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Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Asst. Chief, Division Far Eastern Affairs,
Washington D. C.



Dear Mr. Hamilton,

Copy of excerpts from proceedings of Japanese Lower House of Feb. 1st. 1926 which you sent me, I found waiting me on our return from a rather long itinerary. I wish to express my sincere appreciation of your thought, and at the same time offer some comments of the excerpts themselves.

My first observation is that expressions used in debate in a Parliamentary discussion in which divergencies of opinion exist, do not, in the nature of the case, necessarily express the national conception or attitude of the Government on all phases of the subject under discussion.

I may say that in examining the Japanese presentation of their case to the "League", I have been surprised that they do not seem to have made use of the feature which seems to me the key to the whole problem. I wanted very much to come in contact with some Japanese internationally minded, who could speak English sufficiently well to discuss this phase of the matter and get their point of view. So far I have failed. I called at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in New York, but beyond a few stereotyped expressions, such as you can easily formulate, there was little to be obtained. Doubtless too, they would be chary of discussing international affairs with a stranger. However I am still hoping I may have the good fortune to find something approaching what I wish.

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I can see some reasons for the avoidance of that feature of the case during the negotiations of the Four Power Loan to China. To put forward that point would have precipitated a situation which would have completely blocked the loan negotiations till the point was settled, and the settling would have put everyone concerned in a radically different relation to the whole proposition.

What seems sufficiently manifest is that had China, even at the late date of 1930, been able to show a dependable state of stability, and had been able to adequately govern Manchuria and guarantee Japanese interests, the whole question would not have arisen. Japan would have accepted Chinese occupation of Manchuria on the basis of conquered territory. I think so much may be reconed as clearly implied. Certainly this fair implication is legitimate contributory evidence of Japan's good faith, and should be so accepted.

With the possibility of that outcome, it is understandable that the facts of the political status of Manchuria under the Empire were better left in abeyance. Such was not the case however after it became apparent that China was not within any reasonable prospect of stability for her domestic interests, and consequently any hope that she would be able to properly administer Manchuria, and safeguard the legitimate interests of all concerned was entirely without foundation. Under such circumstances, for Japan, the only stable government in the Far East, to permit Manchuria to become a part of the disrupted and hopelessly chaotic entity called China, was unthinkable.

It is still unthinkable. I cannot believe that the "League" ever had any expectation ^{that} ~~of~~ their recommendation of the return of Manchuria to China would or could be more than a useless gesture.

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About the political status of Manchuria during the whole period of Manchu control of China, there can be no doubt, and the proper presentation of this feature would have gone far to clarify the whole situation. Manchuria never having^{been} incorporated as a political division of China, the restoration of Manchu rule violated neither the Kellogg Pact nor the Pact of Paris. Consequently neither China nor any other nation had any legitimate grounds for complaint or objection .

Mr. Matsuoka did, after his return to Japan from Geneva, in an American Magazine article, bring forward just that point, and argued it quite convincingly. As I see it, that is the key to the whole problem, and offers a clear and sufficient opportunity for settling the whole question

Mr. Hornbeck asked me a question which there was not time to go into, as I had already consumed a large portion of time. I am in process of formulating a reply to that. The question was: "What American interest will^{be} enhanced by recognition of Manchukuo"? I think several important American interests will be enhanced, and I hope soon to be able to present my reasons for the belief.

Again thanking you for the excerpts,

Yours respectfully,
T. J. League

From
T. J. League,
114 Buist Ave.,
Greenville S. C.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 November 27, 1934.

~~MSH:~~
~~WPH:~~

To note Shanghai's despatch No. 9704 of October 25, 1934, which encloses and briefly summarizes a press article setting forth the government's reply to a statement accredited to General Tsai Ting-kai while he was in the United States to the effect that General Chiang Kai-shek did not reinforce the 19th Route Army during its defense of Shanghai in 1932.

No action required.

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 EW/VDM

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No. 9704


Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 20 1934

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, October 25, 1934.

Subject: 19th Route Army: Sino-Japanese
Trouble 1932: Tsai Ting-kai's
Statement refuted by Spokesman
of Chiang Kai-shek.



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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

To be filled in by		Yes	No
Grade	M		
For	CNI		

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1/ I have the honor to transmit an article emanating
from Hankow on October 22, 1934, distributed by REUTER.
and published in THE CHINA PRESS (Chinese independent)
of October 25, 1934, under the heading "Chiang Spokes-
man Denies Troops Not Sent Here In '32." This
article has been published in all the local foreign
language newspapers today.

The particular reason for the publication of
the article is the fact that General Tsai Ting-kai
is reported to have stated in the United States that
General Chiang Kai-shek did not send troops to
reinforce the 19th Route Army at Shanghai in 1932.
The statement was issued from General Chiang Kai-
shek's headquarters by the spokesman, and it is stated
that it was issued with his full knowledge.

The facts will never be definitely known as to
whether General Chiang Kai-shek, either as an official

or

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or as a private citizen with powerful influence, gave that support to the 19th Route Army which might have been expected by an integral part of the army of defense. General Chiang's spokesman emphasizes that the General was then in private life, having been forced from the National Government, and that the Cantonese were in charge of affairs; that as a private citizen General Chiang used his influence to have reinforcements sent to the 19th Route Army but not with entire success. He emphasizes also that General Chiang was in constant touch with General Chiang Kwang-ngai and General Tsai Ting-kai and had urged them to defend Liuho, among other things, and then he cites their failure to do so as illustrating the futility of General Chiang Kai-shek giving them the benefit of his advice.

This article is transmitted realizing that probably it is of slight interest to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Article from THE CHINA PRESS
of October 25, 1934.

800
ESC:NLH

In quintuplicate
Copy to Legation
Copy to Nanking Office of Legation

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 4704 from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October 25, 1934, on the subject "19th Route Army: Sino-Japanese Trouble 1932: Tsai Ting-Kai's Statement refuted by Spokesman of Chiang Kai-shek."

SOURCE: THE CHINA PRESS, of October 25, 1934.
(Chinese independent daily newspaper published in English). Article distributed by REUTERS.

NEWS ARTICLE

Chiang Spokesman Denies Troops Not Sent Here In '32

OCT 25 1934 ~~China Press~~

Statements Made By Tsai Ting-kai In America
Refuted By Inside Story Proving General Gave
Orders To Wait For Opportune Time To Strike,
Did Best To Support Anti-Japanese Battle

HANKOW, Oct. 22.—(Reuters)—The recent speeches in America by General Tsai Ting-kai in which he is alleged to have denounced General Chiang Kai-shek for the part he played in the Shanghai war in 1932, has led a spokesman of General Chiang's headquarters to issue a contradictory statement which reveals some interesting and hitherto secret history concerning the 1932 war.

The spokesman was in Hankow in connection with the tour of the Generalissimo and it is understood that he made the statement with the full knowledge of General Chiang.

Briefly, General Tsai Ting-kai is alleged to have accused General Chiang Kai-shek "of a series of machinations to destroy the 19th Route Army as the spear-head of Chinese resistance to Japan," and that "the so-called government... did not send a single soldier to reinforce us at Shanghai, and stopped necessary supplies."

The spokesman here says:

"Perhaps General Tsai Ting-kai may feel justified in attacking General Chiang Kai-shek because of Tsai's defeat by the forces of the central government when he raised the flag of revolt in Fukien Province, but even so, it is hard to conceive that he would tell a bold lie, notwithstanding that the 'so-called government' he alludes to was at that time composed of members of his own party, and that the Generalissimo had no power in it. General Tsai does not speak English, but on his return to China he will be given an opportunity to state the exact nature of the words he used in Chinese, the published translation of which is so inconsistent with the truth."

Not The 19th Alone

"In the first place, it was not the 19th Route Army alone that defended Shanghai. The troops which had been personally trained by the Generalissimo, the 87th and 88th Divisions—his crack troops, known as the 1st Route Army—really bore the brunt of the fighting, and the result was that fully one-third of them were killed."

"Apart from this, during the defense of Shanghai General Chiang Kai-shek was in daily touch with General Chiang Kwang-ngai and General Tsai Ting-kai in spite of the fact that the Generalissimo at that time was in the position of a private citizen, his resignation having been forced and accepted on December 20, 1931, as will be remembered, or may be verified by perusal of the newspapers of that

brought upon him to leave the country by getting his passports. While preparing to go abroad, scarce 10 days having elapsed since he left Nanking for his native home in Chekiang Province, telegrams, and representatives of the new Cabinet began again to bombard him, this time stating that as a patriot he must return and lend his support to the government by his personal influence in Nanking. It is remarkable here to note that as soon as the Generalissimo left Nanking and a new Cabinet took up the reins of office the authority of that Cabinet did not extend beyond Nanking, and that scarcely a minister remained in the national capital.

Chiang In Nanking

"The Generalissimo, after five years of strenuous activity, felt the need of a complete rest, but in the circumstances, when he saw the national government falling to pieces he submitted to the pressure then being exerted upon him, put aside his personal inclinations, and returned to the deserted capital."

"Thus, when the catastrophe began at Shanghai on the night of January 28, 1932, though the Generalissimo was in Nanking, he was out of office, bereft of power, and without any authority to issue orders to any government troops. All he could do was to use his personal influence in a private capacity, but recognizing the terrible nature of the calamity facing China, he endeavored time and again to place his military experience and his knowledge of the troops at the disposal of the country, only to have it clearly intimated to him that he was merely one of the members of the Military Council. Despite this rebuff he pleaded with the government and the generals at the front to allow him to go and stay at the front, saying that unless he went there personally it would, in the circumstances, be difficult for China to hold out for any length of

is private Ford plane.

A large gathering of government officials, including General Huang Fu, chairman of the Peiping Political Council, were present at the aviation field to greet them.

The general route from Nanyuan air field to the city was heavily guarded by troops and police.

General and Madame Chiang are staying with General Huang Fu in private house and the Generalissimo intends to enter the P.U.M.C. for treatment of his stomach trouble, which, however, is not serious. General Chiang last visited Pei-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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General and Madame Chiang are staying with General Huang Fu in a private house and the Generalissimo intends to enter the P.U.M.C. for treatment of his stomach trouble, which, however, is not serious.

General Chiang last visited Peiping in 1929 but he came to Paoingfu in spring last year.

General and Madame Chiang arrived at Tsinan at 11.30 this morning by air.

Upon landing at the airdrome were the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang were met by General Han Fu-chu, chairman of the Shantung provincial government.

The couple were entertained at luncheon by General Han and after a conference with him, took off for Peiping.

Generalissimo Leaves

KAIFENG, Oct. 24.—(Reuters).—General Chiang Kai-shek, who arrived here yesterday from Loyang following the completion of his 10-day inspection tour in the province of Shensi, left by airplane this morning for Tsinan. He was accompanied by Madame Chiang and Mr. D. H. Donald, adviser to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

While en route to Kaifeng, the Generalissimo stopped off at Chengchow where he held a conference with military and civil officials.

General Chiang, Madame Chiang and Mr. Donald arrived here at one o'clock yesterday afternoon and were greeted by Governor and Madame Liu Shih. A large delegation
 (Continued on Page 2, Col. 4.)

one-third of them were killed.

"Apart from this, during the defense of Shanghai General Chiang Kai-shek was in daily touch with General Chiang Kwang-ngai and General Tsai Ting-kai in spite of the fact that the Generalissimo at that time was in the position of a private citizen, his resignation having been forced and accepted on December 20, 1931, as will be remembered, or may be verified by perusal of the newspapers of that time. It may not be generally known that what the public understand as the "Canton faction," during the period between the end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932, insisted that as long as the Generalissimo remained in power there could be no unity in the country, that the Southwest would not enter the government fold, and that peace could not be effected unless he resigned. The Generalissimo, with a patriotism which seems somehow to have been forgotten, but which, nevertheless, was very real, resigned from all his offices, including the chairmanship of the government and as Generalissimo of the national forces. He responded to pressure

Peiping, North China Covered By Snow

PEIPING, Oct. 24.—(Kuomin)—Peiping was covered in a blanket of snow yesterday following a typically blinding dust-storm from the Gobi desert.

According to messages received here from Kalgan and Kweihsu, respectively, provincial capitals of Charhar and Suiyuan, heavy snowfalls also occurred in the two provinces yesterday.

he endeavored time and again to place his military experience and his knowledge of the troops at the disposal of the country, only to have it clearly intimated to him that he was merely one of the members of the Military Council. Despite this rebuff he pleaded with the government and the generals at the front to allow him to go and stay at the front, saying that unless he went there personally it would, in the circumstances, be difficult for China to hold out for any length of time.

Request Refused

"The leaders of the reactionary party, prompted either by jealousy of the Generalissimo or by fear that he would become politically stronger, curtly refused to comply with his urgent wish. He was thus placed in an equivocal position where he could be charged with the responsibility in the event of failure, without being allowed any power either to ensure success or avert failure.

"Persisting in his desire to go to the front, the Generalissimo was told that his presence there would not be welcomed, and, should he insist, the 19th Route Army, instigated by one of the reactionary party, a certain Chen—who later disgraced himself by participation in the scandalous China Merchant's Steamship Company's bribery case, and who is now in Hongkong, a fugitive from justice—might come into open conflict with the 5th Route Army. This, notwithstanding that the officers of the 5th Route Army had been emphatically instructed by the Generalissimo to give the fullest support to the 19th Route Army. 'No sacrifice is too great to make,' he said in one wire, 'in their support,' adding, 'the glory of the 19th Route Army is the glory of China.'

Advised Against Attack

"The Generalissimo, therefore, had to content himself with telegraphic advice to General Chiang Kwang-ngai and General Tsai Ting-kai. We have the telegrams to prove that the Generalissimo wired those two generals not to attack before a certain date because it was physically impossible to have reinforcements moved down to Shanghai before that time. Not being willing to sacrifice a single soldier needlessly, the Generalissimo advised them to adopt a defensive policy pending the arrival of support, because while the troops then at the front were amply sufficient for that purpose, they were not strong enough to launch an attack successfully.

"Anyone familiar with the topography of China is aware that the Yangtze River flows between Pukow and Nanking and it is known by all interested in the happenings of that time that Japanese warships were stationed along the Yangtze, so that it was most difficult for re-

(Continued on Page 2, Col. 1.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 23, 1934.

~~MEM:~~

~~ROM:~~

~~DPH:~~

Mukden's unnumbered despatch of
October 17, 1934.

No action required.

The despatch encloses a copy of a
letter from the "Northeastern Patriotic
Association" at Mukden, criticizing the
present "Manchukuo" regime. The Consul
was requested by the Association to
transmit the letter to the group of
American journalists who recently com-
pleted a visit to Manchuria. There is
no indication in the Consul's despatch
whether he did so or not.

rel

FE:EW:MCC:SS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
A-C/C

No. -----

193.94

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, October 17, 1934

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Receipt of Anonymous Communication
 1-1403 ..from a Pro-Chinese Organization.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 21 1934
 Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

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Bennett

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 1934 NOV 20 PM 1 38
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 971 to the Legation at Peiping, China, dated October 17, 1934, on the above subject.

793.94/6809

Respectfully yours,

A. S. Chase

A. S. Chase
 American Consul.

NOV 27 1934
 FILED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 A-C/C
 NOV 26 1934
 MARY

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 971
 to the Legation at Peiping.

F/FG

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 971.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, Manchuria, October 17, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL - For Staff Use Only.

SUBJECT: Receipt of Anonymous Communication
 from a Pro-Chinese Organization.

Clarence E. Gauss, Esquire,
 American Chargé d' Affaires, ad interim,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/-

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of an unsigned communication received at this office this morning, purportedly from the "Northeastern Patriotic Association" at Mukden, enclosing a letter which it is requested be transmitted to the American newspapermen who recently completed a visit to "Manchukuo".

This office has no knowledge of the organization or its present strength in this area. That it represents the sentiments of a considerable portion of the local inhabitants can, I think, be taken as almost axiomatic. The communication was left here early this morning, by a young Chinese, who was not seen by myself or any member of my staff.

It will be remembered that similar communications have been received by the Consulate General from time to time, particularly when the Lytton Commission was in Manchuria.


Respectfully

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Respectfully yours,

A. S. Chase,
American Consul.



Enclosure:

1/- Copy of letter, as stated.

Original to Legation.
Five copies sent to Department by despatch No. ---
dated October 17, 1934.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

HMB:mhp

800

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to enclosure of despatch No. 971 of A. S. Chase,
 American Consul, Mukden, Manchuria, dated October 17,
 1934, to the American Legation, Peiping, on the subject
 "Receipt of Anonymous Communication from a Pro-Chinese
 Organization."

(COPY)

Moukden, October 13, 1934.

To Newspapermen of the United States of America.

Dear Sirs:-

Being compelled with political condition and military affairs, we have long wanted to express plainly the sentiments of pressure put upon us to those peoples who act kindly and humanely, since the memorable incident burst on September 18th, 1930. But, we, being deprived of freedom on all sides, have been unable to speak or write even a single word to foreigners.

Now, you, representing influential newspapers in the United States of America, put steps into this point for the inspection of securing the real condition of the new foundation. We, with rendering you the heartiest welcome, beg to submit our complaint in which you will easily note that your observations both in Japan and here will be absolutely incorrect.

The following is the bitter complaint we utter from our heart:-

The Manchuria Incident The so (called) Manchoukuo was established in 1930 by some officials of the Kwantung Army and the S. M. R. Company. They have long planned and eagerly expected to invade the Northeastern part of China which was slightly attended to on account of the civil war in the proper part and the flood of Yangtze River as well as the Yellow River. At that time, General Chang Hsuo Liang who was in charge of this part of China was absent for Peiping for the National Council. So, the ambitious Japanese army, making use of the only and very chance, took these three provinces entirely on the night of September 18, 1930, without any defense of the Chinese army as instructed by General Chang from Peiping who thought that such barbarous action as Japan did would never be allowed by the League of Nations. But to our disappoint, nothing have been done about this case until now. Please refer to the Report of Lytton Commission which indicates in details.

Ambition of Japan It is our understanding that Japan is an unhumane and barbarous country, who knows nothing but enlarge her own nation. She does not understand what is "Peace" though she often speaks of it falsely. Korea has been under her arm, Manchuria in her hand, and the whole world will be conquered by her in the future, if she is not prevented from free-doing

by

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

by the almighty League of Nations.

Circumstances of Manchoukuo Should any one look upon Manchoukuo as an independent country, such would be a blindfolded inference in disregard of facts. On the contrary, Manchoukuo is executed by Japanese officers though the Emperor is a native with some assistants. Whatever is done must be shown to them, otherwise it is not permitted and is probably guilty of some crime. From these points, you will wisely see that the so-called Manchoukuo is a nation in appearance but a colony of Japan in fact.

Since the establishment of this country, every kind of Western business has become dull and dull, while that of Japan has grown dreadfully prosperous. It is apparently seen that Japan wants to shut all the foreign firms but make her own the only profession.

Sad to speak, thousand of Chinese have been killed on no purpose by the Japanese authorities. Some were killed on account of opposing their opinion, and some were killed as robbers. You can well imagine that there have been not so many robbers as they estimate in our beloved China. But the robbers have become more and more since the incident occurred; that is the fact. Besides every citizen loves his own country dearly. No one is fond of being controlled and pressed by others, I should assure. How sad pititions and unfortunate we Chinese have been!

In lieu of that you are the valued visitors to inspect the real condition of this country, we eagerly and heartily hope those facts to be accepted by you and informed to your home folks.

Best wishes to you all!

Northeastern Patriotic Association,
 MOUKDEN.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch No. 971 of A. S. Chase, American Consul, Mukden, Manchuria, dated October 17, 1934, to the American Legation, Peiping, China, on the subject "Receipt of Anonymous Communication from a Pro-Chinese Organization."

(COPY)

Moukden, October 15,

Dear Sir,

We beg your acceptance of the attached letter which we wrote to American Journalists who visited this city recently. We are very sorry that we could **not** hand it to them on time as they passed over so quickly.

However, We hope this letter will please you as well as the Journalists. If you are kind enough, please keep it secretly and forward same to the Journalists or to your country to let your home fellows know the real circumstances that Manchuria suffers.

Thank you ever so much for your kindness and secrecy.

Yours very truly,

Northeastern Patriotic Association,
 Moukden.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

EE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 23, 1934.

~~MSH:~~
~~MMH:~~

Tientsin's despatch No. 655 of
October 12, 1934.

No action required.

The despatch states that the new Hopei Provincial Stadium was opened on October 10 by elaborate ceremonies and an athletic meet. The stadium is stated to represent a fine piece of construction work and the opening ceremonies were well attended by high Chinese and foreign officials, including a number of Japanese. During the ceremonies a group of young Chinese Middle School students, by means of large squares of black and white cloth, were able to spell out in Chinese characters certain slogans, one of which was "Do not forget the North East: do not forget the nation's shame". The Japanese officials present took decided exception to this slogan and it is understood that the principal Chinese official present made some sort of apology. It is believed that the Japanese complaints were caused partly by the evidence of real progress in China as shown by the excellent stadium and partly by Japanese uneasiness over the impressive expression of patriotic fervor shown by the students.

FE:EW:MCC:SS

793.94/6810

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Copied by FBI
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1934
GENERAL
Department of State
October 12, 1934.

批答

Alleged "Anti-Japanese" demonstration
at ceremonies in celebration of open-
ing of the Hopei Provincial Stadium
and of 18th North China Athletic Meet.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy

795.94/6810

FILED
NOV 27 1934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A-C/C
NOV 24 1934
800
ENCLOSURE
A-C/C

1. To Legation, No. 793 of October 12, 1934.

Original and four copies to Department.

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 793

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, October 12, 1934.

Subject: Alleged "Anti-Japanese" demonstration
at ceremonies in celebration of open-
ing of the Hopei Provincial Stadium
and of 18th North China Athletic Meet.

C. E. Gauss, Esquire,

American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
 Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the inaugural ceremonies incident to the opening of the new Hopei Provincial Stadium and of the 18th North China Athletic Meet, which were held on Wednesday morning, October 10, before an audience estimated at 40,000 persons, were marked by certain demonstrations against which the Japanese authorities have unofficially protested.

The stadium referred to represents a fine piece of construction work, largely of reinforced concrete, and is beautifully arranged. It was begun on March 15, 1933, and completed on October 7, the Sunday before the scheduled opening. In the construction
 of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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of the stands and building it is stated that only three months time was consumed, the greater part of the period being required for the filling in of the marshy ground of the site. The work was carried on under the direction of a committee headed by General Yu Hsueh-chung and directed by Dr. Chang Po-ling (張伯苓), the President of the Nankai Middle School. Messrs Kwan Chu and Company were the architects and the Chen Hsing Cheng Company were the contractors. There is every indication that the task of the construction of the stadium was intelligently approached and efficiently executed.

The arrangements for the inauguration of the stadium and of the 18th North China Athletic Meet were also most carefully made. A special section seating 180 persons was reserved for the presiding officials and for certain specially invited guests, including members of the consular corps and high military officials of the various powers represented here. Lieutenant General Umetsu, Commander of the Japanese troops in North China, Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, Major Oka, Mr. S. Tanaka, Japanese Consul, and Mr. Wagai, Chief of the Japanese Consular Police, attended the inauguration. The consular and military establishments of other nations in Tientsin were also numerous represented at the opening.

A large group of influential Chinese leaders was present,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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present, including General Yu Hsueh-chung, the Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, Dr. C. T. Wang, Honorary President of the North China Athletic Federation, Dr. Chu Ming-i (褚民誼), representing Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛), President of the Executive Yuan, Ho Ch'i-kung (何其鞏), representing General Hwang-fu, Chairman of the Peiping Readjustment Council, Hao Keng-seng (郝更生) representing Wang Shih-chieh, (王士傑), Minister of Education, Chou Pin-lin (周炳琳), Commissioner of Education of the Province of Hopei and Dr. Chang Po-ling (張伯苓), the Chief Referee of the Meet.

The ceremonies were opened by a perfunctory performance of the usual bowing to the flag and the reading of the will of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. General Yu Hsueh-chung made a report of his stewardship of the project, and was answered for the people by Dr. C. T. Wang. A tape was then cut by Madam Yu Hsueh-chung, and the stadium was formally opened.

The ceremonies incident to the inauguration of the North China Athletic Meet were then begun. The athletes entered in the meet, representing the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Jehol, and the cities of Peiping, Harbin, and Tsingtao, paraded once around the track before a most enthusiastic audience, whose applause was especially

whole-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

whole-hearted when the banners of the "lost provinces" passed before them. The flag was then raised over the stadium and a series of speeches was begun. Of these only one was noteworthy: that made by Chou Ping-lin, Commissioner of Education of the Hopei Provincial Government. He spoke with a heat which might easily have aroused the feeling of his hearers had more of them been able to understand the language, which was rendered almost unintelligible by a heavy Chekiang accent. His remarks apparently passed unnoticed, however.

There followed a series of exercises by the children of the local public schools and other organizations, of which the most effective was a big-sword drill by a very well-trained squad of the local Pao An Tui. These exercises were carried out with precision and smoothness.

Throughout these interesting ceremonies the "La La Tui", a group of young men and women from Nankai Middle School, dressed in white and blue, and seated in a special section just opposite the section reserved for the guests of honor, carried out a series of cheers in the best tradition of an American collegiate cheering squad. By the use of large squares of cloth, each of which was white on one side and black on the other, they were able to form large and very legible Chinese characters. The difficulty

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

difficulty of this feat, and the adeptness with which it was done, caught the fancy of the crowd, who applauded loudly as they recognized each new character which appeared. They were especially attentive to the repeated spelling out of the slogans "Do not forget the North East: do not forget the nation's shame" (勿忘東北 勿忘國恥).

The repetition of this performance was obviously disturbing the equanimity of the Japanese representatives present, and Consul Tanaka finally called Ch'en Tung-sheng (陳東昇), one time Commissioner of the Third Special Area in Tientsin, and one of the Chinese ushers, and informally protested. Discussions in which the various Japanese officials expressed their views on the subject followed, accompanied by much scurrying about in the stands. When the morning's exercises were completed a luncheon was given, at which it is understood Dr. Chang Fo-ling was asked to apologize. He is understood to have done so, but with the heated comment that his Japanese friends could not expect Chinese to forget the loss of their provinces as readily as that. The following morning the Japanese Information Bureau gave out a despatch published in a local English language newspaper sharply criticising the performance. It is understood that the "La La Tui" was however, not withdrawn.

At

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
At a dinner on the evening of October 12, attended by influential members of both the Municipal and Provincial Governments, a member of the staff of this office was informed that it was the Chinese view that the protest was not against the "La La Tui", but rather the expression of the uneasiness which the Japanese feel at so striking an evidence of the real progress which is being made in this country. It is believed that there may quite possibly be some justification for the view although it is perhaps more likely that any disquietude felt by the Japanese present was due rather to the spontaneous and impressive expression of patriotic fervor which marked the ceremonies described.

Respectfully yours,

F. F. Lockhart,
 American Consul General.

800
 RSW:sf

Original and two copies to Legation.
 In quintuplicate to Department under cover
 of despatch No. 655 of October 12, 1934.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6811

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.94/9592 FOR MEMORandum

FROM State Department (.....) DATED May 12, 1934.
77 Far Eastern Div. NAME 1-1127 ...
(Dooman)

REGARDING: Relations with China: Japan's claim to supervise foreign
cooperation with China.

FRG.

793.94 / 6811

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huie NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
December 11, 1934.

~~MSM:~~
~~LDS:~~
~~MMT:~~
~~SMW:~~

Peiping's No. 3127 of November 9, 1934, in regard to possible future action of the Japanese military in north China.

No action required.

The despatch refers to recent despatches from the Consulate General at Mukden in regard to railway, highway and other Japanese activities in Jehol suggestive of possible future forward movements of the Japanese military into Chahar and Hopei provinces. The Legation's despatch points out that these activities may indicate a forward movement by the Japanese military or they may be merely acts on the part of Japan with a view to consolidating her position in "Manchukuo" or possibly preparing for a future conflict with Soviet Russia.

The Legation states that local Chinese and Japanese opinion does not foresee any forward action on the part of the Japanese military in the immediate future. However, in view of the ultra-reactionary junior officers of the Japanese military stationed in Jehol and

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

and at Tientsin it appears quite possible that the many incidents which continue to occur between Chinese and Japanese may arouse the anger of the Japanese military and cause a further movement westward which would imperil Chinese sovereignty of one or both provinces in question. (*Chahar and Hopei*)

The Legation's despatch then enumerates various recent Sino-Japanese incidents. These are, briefly:

(1) Chinese soldiers recently stopped several Japanese officials near Kalgan and injured a Japanese consular officer attached to the party who appears to have directed some strong language toward the Chinese soldiers. The Japanese military have demanded a settlement and the case is now under negotiation.

(2) Chinese authorities recently refused to permit a body of Japanese-"Manchukuo" troops to pass through Malanyu in pursuit of some bandits.

(3) The terms of the settlement of the previously reported case in which six Korean narcotic peddlers were killed were apparently not so severe as some of the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Chuska NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

the military desired. Likewise, the Japanese military were not satisfied with the outcome of the case involving the recent killing of a Japanese settler named Miyagoshi which was settled by an indemnity of \$10,000, dismissal of two magistrates and the punishment of the Chinese offender who, according to a recent unconfirmed report, was turned over to the Japanese.

(4) The Japanese military frankly criticize the conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese authorities of Lieutenant-Colonel Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping and principal Japanese figure in negotiations over problems in north China affecting both countries.

(5) Although General Yu Hsueh-chung, the Hopei provincial chairman, is not satisfactory to the Japanese military, it has recently been reported that the Japanese have agreed to allow him to retain his position largely because none of the possible successors are more satisfactory ~~from~~ the Japanese military viewpoint.

(6) The desire of the Japanese military to see Japanese interests develop in north China economically in order

that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that Japan may be helped financially is not being realized with any rapidity. The only important solutions reached are through passenger traffic on the railway, the establishment of the Chinese customs houses at the passes in the Great Wall and a report that an agreement has been reached for the reestablishment of postal communications between Manchuria and north China. Japanese efforts to persuade the Chinese authorities to use Japanese money for the construction of certain railways in north China are said to have been unavailing so far.

The Legation's despatch concludes that there is evidence to show that the Japanese military is discontented with the present situation and is in an irritable mood. Under these circumstances it is impossible to predict what action the Japanese military may take. Possibly it may decide to define the western boundary of Jehol province to its satisfaction, it may attempt to accelerate Japanese economic penetration into north China, or it may intend to bring within the boundaries of "Manchukuo" a part of Inner Mongolia and the part of Chahar which juts eastward into "Manchukuo". Furthermore, the situation
 in

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in Japan and Manchuria might conceivably inspire the military to action in order to arouse a patriotism at home which would defeat the activities of Japanese civilians desirous of limiting the powers of the military.

ew
EW/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3127

Peiping, November 9, 1934.

Subject: Possible future action of the
Japanese military in North China.

CONFIDENTIAL



793.94
note
893-01 Manchuria
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1934 DEC 1 AM 11 51
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

For Distribution-Check			
Grade		To file	Yes
For	X	In U.S.A.	No

793.94/6812

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to recent despatches* from the
Consulate General at Mukden containing information
with regard to railway construction and other Japa-
nese activities in Jehol Province suggestive of
possible future forward movements of the Japanese
military into Chahar or Hopei Provinces, I have the
honor to submit, with comment, information available
at Peiping in this regard.

JAN 7 1935

F/FG.
Prt-1

According

793.77 Manchuria / 72, 73

* Mukden's despatches to the Department Nos. 726
and 729 of October 20 and 25; and to the Lega-
tion, Nos. 972 and 973 of October 20.

- 2 -

According to the above-mentioned despatches, reports have been received to the following effect:

(1) The Railway approaching Chengteh (Jehol City) from the northeast will soon be completed as far as Hsiapancheng, which is 20 kilometres southeast of Chengteh. (2) A line is shortly to be constructed southwest from Hsiapancheng to Hsinlung, which is only 30 or 40 kilometres north of Malanyu (a pass in the Great Wall), which in turn is only slightly more than 100 kilometres from Peiping. (3) This line to Hsinlung is now referred to in Chengteh as "the main line", although Hsinlung is of no intrinsic importance unless the line be extended south of the Great Wall, while the line to be constructed from Hsiapancheng to Chengteh is now referred to in Chengteh as "a branch line" which is not to be completed for some time. (4) A railway is to be built from Chengteh to Dolonor, in eastern Chahar Province and a road, ostensibly a motor road but perhaps the road bed of a railway, is under rapid construction along the first quarter of the distance between the two cities. (5) Motor roads, which may also be the road beds of railways, are under construction north of Chengteh. These roads (or railways) will approach the Jehol-Chahar border considerably north of Dolonor. (6) Maps are on sale at Chengteh showing Dolonor and the immediate vicinity as part of "Manchukuo". (7) The Chief of the Japanese Military Mission at Chengteh has been transferred to Kalgan, the capital of Chahar Province. (8) The press in

Manchuria

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Manchuria publishes reports indicating, or intended to indicate, close relations between some of the Mongols of Chahar and "Manchukuo". (9) Gasoline has been ordered by Japanese for transportation to Dolonor and Kalgan. (10) General Doihara has recently visited Peiping and Tientsin.

The Legation concurs in the view that these developments indicate that a forward movement may be intended by the Japanese military. All of these developments, on the other hand, may have a quite different significance. The road work, for example, may be for the purpose of consolidating Japan's position within "Manchukuo" or may be preparation for a possible future conflict with Soviet Russia; the new military mission at Kalgan may be no more than a routine matter, as such missions are to be found in a number of Chinese cities; General Doihara is said by a liberal Japanese opposed to the Japanese military to have no longer the importance which he once had; the maps may be the work of patriots without influence; and some of these reports may be without foundation.

Nevertheless, the Legation feels that, whatever the significance of the foregoing developments, the Japanese military may make a move which will imperil Chinese sovereignty in one or both provinces in question. It is impossible to state whether such action may occur in the near or more distant future. It is doubtful whether the Japanese military itself could make an accurate forecast in this regard. If and when the Japanese do make such a move, at least some

of

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of the developments described in the despatches of the Consulate General at Mukden will naturally play a part.

Local Chinese and Japanese opinion does not foresee any forward action on the part of the Japanese military in the immediate future. Even they, however, cannot be certain of the intentions of the ultra-reactionary junior officers of the Japanese military stationed in Jehol Province and at Tientsin. There are, for example, factors in the situation which are known to be highly irritating to the Japanese military. Such irritation might easily develop into some sort of an outburst which would alter considerably the present superficial tranquility.

There continue to be incidents between Chinese and Japanese which arouse the anger of the Japanese military. The most recent is that of the Japanese chancellor, Ikeda, of the Japanese Consulate General at Tientsin, attached to the Japanese Consulate at Kalgan for duty. Ikeda started out on October 26 northward from Kalgan in the company of Lt.Col. Matsui, Chief of the Special Military Mission at Kalgan, and Major Yamaguchi of the Tokyo General Staff. They were stopped at Changpei (10 miles north of Kalgan) by 19 Chinese soldiers. Ikeda, who speaks Chinese very well, approached the Chinese soldiers and asked what they wanted. According to the Legation's informant, who obtained his information from a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate at Kalgan, Ikeda very probably used some impolite Chinese language.

At

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At any rate, one of the Chinese soldiers clouted him on the side of the head with a rifle, knocking him down and rupturing one of his eardrums. A Chinese officer appeared on the scene, the matter was temporarily adjusted, and the three Japanese proceeded on their trip. The Japanese military, however, have demanded a settlement, and the case is now under negotiation.

Another recent incident was the refusal of Chinese authorities to permit a body of Japanese-"Manchukuo" troops to pass through Malanyu, a pass in the Great Wall, in pursuit of some bandits who had fled southward through it. Although the Japanese concerned permitted themselves to be dissuaded from pursuit, this incident is said still to rankle in the minds of the Japanese military.

It is also understood that the settlements of the affair of the killing in August of this year by Chinese of six Koreans at Fushanssu and of the affair of the killing by a Chinese of Miyagoshi, a Japanese soldier to some of the Japanese troops in the demilitarized area (Legation's monthly report for September, 1934), were not so severe as some of the military desired. The terms appear severe enough to an observer. In the case of the Koreans, an indemnity of \$2,000 for each of the deceased was paid, although these Koreans, according to an official of the Japanese Legation, were probably undesirables, peddling narcotics. The terms of the settlement of the Miyagoshi incident were so severe that, according to reliable Japanese information, publication was with-

held

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held for three or four weeks at the request of the Chinese authorities. They have now been published with the exception, it is understood, of one of the clauses. They include an indemnity of \$10,000, the dismissal of two local magistrates, and provision for the punishment of the Chinese offender. (In this connection, information has been received from a Japanese source to the effect that the offender has been turned over to the Japanese for punishment. It is difficult to believe this report, but it cannot be entirely ruled out as impossible in view of the general temper of the Japanese military authorities in this area.) The unpublished condition will never, according to a statement made by the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché to a Japanese known to the Legation, be divulged as it would arouse too much indignation on the part of the Chinese people. The Legation has not yet learned what this condition is.

The flight of Japanese planes over Chahar on October 25 and the scattering over the town of Chihfeng of handbills which complained of "illegal acts" on the part of certain Chinese and which threatened retaliation is believed to have been caused by anger on the part of the military resulting from the accumulation of such incidents, as well as from their probable desire to remind General Chiang Kai-shek, who was at that time visiting Peiping, that the Japanese military is still a force to be reckoned with both north and south of the Great Wall.

The Legation has been informed by an unusually frank critic of the Japanese military, the representative of a Japanese news agency, that the Japanese military are very dissatisfied with the "conciliatory" attitude toward the Chinese authorities of Lt. Col. Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping

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Peiping and principal Japanese figure in negotiations over problems in North China affecting both countries. They feel that he gives in to the Chinese to such a degree that "he is rather an adviser to General Huang Fu than a Japanese military attaché". The civilian Japanese of Peiping regard Lt. Col. Shibayama as an exceptionally able and liberal Japanese military officer and believe that he is in frequent conflict with the Japanese military in Manchuria and at Tientsin. According to the press correspondent mentioned above, it is probable that the Japanese military will effect the transfer of Shibayama by the end of this year, having him replaced by a reactionary, ultra-patriotic officer.

The Japanese military are also dissatisfied with General Yu Hsueh-chung, the Hopei Provincial Chairman, and with some of his subordinates. I am now informed that the Japanese military have come to an agreement with the Chinese authorities by which General Yu will retain his position while some of his subordinates distasteful to the Japanese military will be removed. According to my informant, the Japanese agreed to the non-transfer of General Yu because none of the possible successors suggested by the Chinese authorities were as satisfactory in the Japanese viewpoint as General Yu, unsatisfactory though he is. Although the Japanese military may have agreed to the retention of General Yu, it is doubtful if they are pleased with the arrangement.

The

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 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The desire of the Japanese military to see Japanese interests develop North China economically in order that Japan may be helped financially is not being realized with any rapidity. As far as the Legation knows, the only important solutions reached in Sino-Japanese relations affecting North China have been the establishment of through passenger traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and the establishment of five Chinese customs houses and one sub-office at passes, other than Shanhaikuan, along the Great Wall. It is now understood that an agreement for the reestablishment of postal communications between Manchuria and North China will be made public in the near future. Japanese efforts to persuade the Chinese authorities concerned to use Japanese money for the construction of certain railways in North China (Legation's despatch No. 2906 of August 16, 1934) are said to have been unavailing so far. According to a usually reliable Japanese source, conversations in this regard are not now in progress as the Japanese have come to realize that the Chinese authorities cannot at present do anything definite in this regard without arousing such a clamor on the part of the Chinese people as to endanger the position of the Chinese authorities. The progress of Japanese economic penetration into North China does not appear, therefore, to be as yet very extensive.

Another indication of dissatisfaction with the situation is to be found in a Japanese daily newspaper published in Tientsin (TENSIN NIPPON), an organ of

the

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Japanese military. Complaints appear frequently in this paper of alleged anti-Japanese activities existing in North China.

From the foregoing it may be seen that, although there is no conclusive evidence that any action affecting Chahar and Hopei Provinces in the near future is contemplated by the Japanese military, there is evidence to show that the Japanese military is discontented with the present situation and is in an irritable mood. When the Japanese military is discontented, it is capable of taking matters into its own hands. One can only surmise what the purpose of possible future actions might be. For example, the military might wish to define the western boundary of Jehol Province to its satisfaction, as that boundary is at present in dispute and ill-defined; the military might wish to force the Chinese into agreements which would accelerate Japanese economic penetration into North China, possibly including the connecting of railways in Jehol with railways inside of the Great Wall; or the military might intend to bring within the boundaries of "Manchukuo" a part of Inner Mongolia, say, Dolonor and that part of Chahar Province which juts eastward into "Manchukuo", with Jehol on its south and Outer Mongolia on its north.

It is also possible that the Japanese military in Jehol and Tientsin, whatever the local factors were, might be influenced in future action by the situation in Japan and Manchuria; that is, they might conceivably be inspired to action in order to arouse a


patriotism

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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patriotism at home which would defeat the activities of Japanese civilians desirous of limiting the powers of the military.

Respectfully yours,



C. E. Gauss,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

710

LES-SC

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

Original and four copies to the Department.

4 FR
1 copy for note DCR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED
IOWA STATE COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AGRICULTURE AND MECHANIC ARTS
AMES, IOWA

1934 DEC 6 AM 9 34

HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

215 1/2 Lynn Ave.,
Ames, Iowa,
27 November 1934.

December 5 1934

793.94
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.



Gentlemen:

Will you kindly send me some of the diplomatic notes which have passed between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Japanese Empire relative to Manchukuo? Doubtless some of these exchanges are not available for public distribution. But such of those that are, I shall appreciate receiving. Will you also inform me as to the title of the supplement to MacIurray's compilation of Treaties regarding China. If my memory serves me correctly, this supplemental volume has been sponsored by the Department of State.

Thanking you for your assistance, I am

Very truly yours,

Geddes W. Rutherford
Geddes W. Rutherford

DEC 6 1934

FILED

F/FG.

793.94/6813

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 5 1934

In reply refer to
FE

Mr. Geddes W. Rutherford,
215-1/2 Lynn Avenue,
Ames, Iowa.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 27, 1934, requesting certain information in regard to "Manchukuo".

In reply there are enclosed a copy of Senate Document No. 55 entitled "Conditions in Manchuria", a copy of a letter, addressed on February 23, 1932, by the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, copies of certain statements, as listed below, given to the press by the Department of State, and copies of addresses delivered on October 18, 1932, and January 18, 1934, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of this Department.

In this connection it is suggested that you may find it of interest to consult the Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the League of Nations entitled "Manchuria" and the Report adopted on February 24, 1933, by the Assembly of
the

793.94/6813

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the League of Nations, entitled "Sino-Japanese Dispute",
 copies of which may be purchased from the Superintendent
 of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
 for seventy-five cents and twenty-five cents a copy, re-
 spectively.

In reply to your inquiry as to the title of the supple-
 ment to MacMurray's compilation of treaties concerning China,
 it may be stated that the title of this volume, which was
 published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
 Washington, is TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING
 CHINA 1919-1929.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
 Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Acting Chief,
 Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosures:


Senate Document No. 55;
 Letter to Senator Borah;
 Press statements of March 11, 1932 (2);
 February 25, March 13, 1933;
 March 20, April 30, 1934;
 Address delivered on October 18, 1932;
 Address delivered on January 18, 1934.

egc.
 FE:EGJ

FE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6814

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94/6814

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/77 FOR #D-667

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Nov. 6, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: relations between China and Japan.
Information regarding Miyagoshi incident, involving
murder of Japanese sutler.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6815

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE ~~893.6362/64~~ 893.6362/64 FOR #3100

FROM China (Gauss) DATED November 5, 1934,
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: The Kailan Mining Administration properties in the demilitarized zone and the Japanese.

China and "Manchukuo": In conversation with the Legation, Mr. E.J. Nathan, General Manager of the Kailan Mining Administration, expressed the belief that the Japanese were not prepared to permit this area to settle down to quiet and peace so long as there is no major settlement of relations between-

FRG.

793.94 / 6815

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 3100

Peiping, November 5, 1934.

Subject: The Kailan Mining Administration
properties in the demilitarized zone
and the Japanese.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest, a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had on October 29, 1934, with Mr. K. J. Nathan, General Manager of the Kailan Mining Administration, with regard to its properties in the demilitarized zone (in northern Hopei Province) in their relation to the Japanese.

Mr. Nathan stated that, although the Japanese would probably like to gain control of these mines, they had taken no steps toward this end and that they could not now gain control if they wished to because the British

and

- 2 -

and Chinese companies which form the Kailan Mining Administration had recently revised their agreement so that it is impossible for the Chinese company (which might conceivably wish to sell out to the Japanese) to buy the British interest without the assent of the British company. Mr. Nathan added that there has been no difficulty with the Japanese in the operation of the mines and the shipment of coal.

In referring to the undesirable Japanese and Koreans in the demilitarized zone and disturbed conditions there, Mr. Nathan expressed the belief that the Japanese were not prepared to permit this area to settle down to quiet and peace so long as there is no major settlement of relations between China and "Manchukuo". He apparently felt that this may not be so far distant as he said that he expects shortly to see something in the way of foreign recognition of "Manchukuo" although he could not disclose the basis of this expectation.

Respectfully yours,

G. S. Gauss,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.


Enclosure:

1. Copy of memorandum of conversation, Mr. L. J. Nathan and Mr. Gauss, October 29, 1954.

710

100-10

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.
Original and four copies to Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FIGURE NO. 1
SERIAL NO. 3100

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Peiping, October 29, 1934.

Subject: The Kailan Mining Administration properties in the Demilitarized Zone; Japanese ambitions; recognition of "Manchukuo".

Present: Mr. E. J. Nathan, General Manager of the Kailan Mining Administration.

Mr. C. E. Gauss.

During the course of a conversation when Mr. Nathan called on me to-day to discuss Hai Ho Conservancy problems at Tientsin (he being a member of the Conservancy Board of which I was at one time Chairman), reference was made to the apparent lack of interest on the part of the Japanese in the matter of conservancy works intended to improve port conditions at Tientsin, and from this subject the conversation led to Japanese interest in the demilitarized zone.

I asked Mr. Nathan how the Kailan Mining Administration was getting on in the demilitarized zone, and whether there was any truth in the rumors that Japan would like to get control of the Kailan mines.

Mr. Nathan said that Japan probably would like to get control of these mines but that no steps to that end had been reported and measures had recently been taken which would block any Japanese attempt to get control through the Chinese interests. That is, he explained, under the 1912 agreement between the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, Ltd. (British), and the Lanchow Mining Company (Chinese), these two companies formed an association known as the Kailan Mining Administration, and it was provided that after a period of ten years the Chinese interests should have the

right

- 2 -

right to purchase the entire property of the British company at a "just price" to be agreed upon between the two parties. This Chinese right to purchase had never been exercised, but it could have been exercised at any time, and so long as the British company received a "just price" for its properties, it would be under obligation to sell.

Realizing that the Japanese might at some time find in this situation an opportunity to gain control of the Kailan Mines through the Chinese company, the agreement has now been revised and the assent of the British company is now required to any proposal that the Chinese company buy out the British interest.

Mr. Nathan said that there had been no difficulty with the Japanese in connection with the operation of the mines and the shipment of coal. When the railway was interrupted during the fighting and military occupation early in 1933, coal shipments had been interrupted but as soon as the Japanese were able to reopen the railway to traffic, the movement of coal was resumed; coal traffic began along with Japanese military traffic, long before the line was opened to general passenger and freight traffic. The Japanese had demanded nothing in connection with such resumption of traffic. The Kailin Mining Administration settled its transportation account with the railway after the Chinese railway administration regained control of the line.

As to conditions in the demilitarized zone in the neighborhood of the mines, Mr. Nathan said that the presence of Japanese "ronin", narcotic peddlers, and keepers of dens of vice and iniquity, served to disturb the general peace and

quiet

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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quiet of the area, and, notwithstanding some recent reports of an improvement in this situation, he saw no indications of any substantial betterment of conditions.

He stated that he did not believe the Japanese were prepared to permit this area to settle down to quiet and peace so long as there is no major settlement of relations between China and "Manchukuo". Until China recognizes "Manchukuo", the Japanese will continue as they are and exclude all Chinese military forces from the area. The limited Chinese police and constabulary forces in the area, permitted by the Japanese, are not adequate to deal with the situation.

Mr. Nathan went on to say that he expected shortly to see something in the way of foreign recognition of "Manchukuo". When foreign recognition comes, then China can grant Chinese recognition and the liquidation of the situation in the demilitarized zone and the adjustment of differences between China and Japan ("Manchukuo") can readily be arranged.

Mr. Nathan seemed to look forward with some optimism toward foreign recognition of "Manchukuo" in the near future, but he avoided being led into any disclosure of the basis upon which he came to expect such a move.

(Initialed) C.E.G.

CEG/js

(Copied by SC)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
December 18, 1934.

~~MSM~~
MMH:

Hankow's despatch No. 521 of November 14, 1934, on the subject of the controversy between Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Tsai Ting-kai in regard to the responsibility for the defense of Shanghai against the Japanese.

No action required.

The despatch encloses a newspaper article containing General Chiang's refutation of the criticism alleged to have been levelled at him by General Tsai in speeches made by the latter during his recent tour of the United States. General Chiang's reply, which is understood to have been issued and drafted by Madame Chiang, brings out the following points:

1. General Chiang's 87th and 88th Divisions really bore the brunt of the fighting at Shanghai although most of the credit went to the 19th Route Army under General Tsai.

2. During the defense of Shanghai General Chiang was in the position of a private citizen as he had resigned his

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

important offices in order to permit the reestablishment of unity between Nanking and Canton.

3. During the period of fighting General Chiang begged to be allowed to go to the Shanghai front but the Nanking leaders refused his request on account of jealousy.


4. During the whole Shanghai incident Chiang kept in touch with the leaders of the 19th Route Army and advised them how to place their troops and when to expect reinforcements. His advice however was not followed and as a consequence Japanese troops landed at Luiho without opposition, forced the retreat of the 19th Route Army and inflicted great punishment on the Nanking troops which remained at their post.

EW
EW/VDM

0921

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 521.



FE
ACK

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hankow, China, November 14, 1934.

793.94



Subject: Controversy Between Chiang Kai-shek and Tsai Ting-kai Regarding Responsibility for the Defense of Shanghai Against the Japanese.

Grade	For	In U.S.A.
	M	

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND R.I.D.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of this Consulate General's despatch L. No. 600, of November 12, 1934, addressed to the American Legation, Peiping, entitled "Controversy Between Chiang Kai-shek and Tsai Ting-kai Regarding Responsibility for the Defense of Shanghai against the Japanese."

As the statement referred to in the enclosure may not have come to the Department's attention, a clipping from the HANKOW HERALD of October 26, 1934, identical with the text of the article published in the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS of October 25, 1934, is enclosed herewith.

Respectfully yours,

E. F. Stanton

E. F. Stanton,
American Consul.

2 ✓ Enclosures:

- 1/ Copy of despatch L. No. 600, of November 12, 1934, as stated.
- 2/ Clipping from the HANKOW HERALD, of October 26, 1934, as stated.

In quintuplicate.
800/CBC/MYH

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Received *elg 71*

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FILED

DEC 24 1934

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 521, of November 14, 1934, from
 American Consul, Hankow, to the Department of State, on the
 subject of Controversy Between Chiang Kai-shek and Tsai Ting-kai, etc.

L. No. 600.

CONFIDENTIAL.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Hankow, China, November 12, 1934.

Subject: Controversy Between Chiang Kai-shek and
Tsai Ting-kai Regarding Responsibility
for the Defense of Shanghai Against the
Japanese.

Clarence E. Gauss, Esquire,

American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to a statement by a
 "spokesman" of General Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters,
 purporting to refute the criticism alleged to have
 been leveled by General Tsai Ting-kai (蔡廷楷),
 of 19th Route Army fame, against the actions of the
 Generalissimo during the attack on Shanghai by the
 Japanese in 1932, which was released by Reuters under
 a Hankow date line of October 22, 1934, and published
 in the October 25, 1934 issue of the NORTH CHINA DAILY
 NEWS and in other periodicals. This article, appearing
 in the DAILY NEWS under the caption "TSAI TING-KAI
 'GIVEN THE LIE'" has doubtless already come to the
 Legation's attention, and no copy is therefore enclosed.

In view of the publicity which has attended this
 controversy, it may be of interest to report that
 officers of this Consulate General were informed by
 Reuters Hankow correspondent, who was responsible for

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the release of the article, that the Generalissimo's "spokesman" in this instance was none other than Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was said to have drafted the statement personally.

While this version of the Shanghai affair would appear to be of a partisan nature, certain of the statements contained therein are believed to be of more than passing interest from an historical standpoint.


Respectfully yours,

E. F. Stanton,
American Consul.

In duplicate to the American Legation, Peiping.
In quintuplicate to the Department of State.
Copy to the American Consulate General, Shanghai.
Copy to the American Consulate General, Nanking.

800

CBC/MYH



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 521, of November 14, 1934, from American Consul, Hankow, to the Department of State, on the subject of Controversy Between Chiang Kai-shek & Tsai Ting-kai, etc.

The Hankow Herald, October 26, 1934.

GENERALISSIMO'S SPOKESMAN REVEALS TRUE STORY OF SHANGHAI WAR IN ANSWER TO TSAI TING-KAI

Alleged Speeches Of Former 19th Route Army Chief Declared Groundless; Interesting, Unrecorded History Of 1932 Incident Revealed

The recent speeches in America by Gen. Tsai Ting-kai in which he is alleged to have denounced Gen. Chiang Kai-shek for the part he played in the Shanghai war in 1932 has led a spokesman of Gen. Chiang's headquarters to issue a contradictory statement which reveals some interesting and hitherto secret history concerning the 1932 war.

The spokesman was in Hankow in connection with the tour of the Generalissimo and it is understood that he made the statement with the full knowledge of Gen. Chiang.

Briefly, Gen. Tsai Ting-kai is alleged to have accused Gen. Chiang Kai-shek "of a series of machinations to destroy the 19th Route Army as the spear-head of Chinese resistance to 'Japan,' and that 'the so-called Government... did not send a single soldier to reinforce us at Shanghai, and stopped necessary supplies.'"

The spokesman here says:

"Perhaps Gen. Tsai Ting-kai may feel justified in attacking Gen. Chiang Kai-shek because of Tsai's defeat by the forces of the Central Government when he raised the flag of revolt in Fukien Province, but even so, it is hard to conceive that he would tell a bald lie, notwithstanding that the 'so-called Government' he alludes to was at that time composed of members of his own party, and that the Generalissimo had no power in it.

General Tsai does not speak English, but on his return to China he will be given an opportunity to state the exact nature of the words he used in Chinese, the published translation of which is so inconsistent with the truth.

Brunt Of The Fighting

"In the first place, it was not the 19th Route Army alone that defended Shanghai. The troops which had been personally trained by the Generalissimo, the 87th and 89th Divisions—his crack troops, known as the 5th Route Army—really bore the brunt of the fighting, and the results was that fully one-third of them were killed.

Apart from this, during the defence of Shanghai Gen. Chiang

Kai-shek was in daily touch with Gen. Chiang Kwang-ngai and Gen. Tsai Ting-kai in spite of the fact that the Generalissimo at that time was in the position of a private citizen, his resignation having been forced and accepted on December 20, 1931, as will be remembered, or may be verified by perusal of the newspapers of that time. It may not be generally known that what the public understand as the "Canton faction," during the period between the end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932, insisted that as long as the Generalissimo remained in power there could be no unity in the country, that the southwest would not enter the Government fold, and that peace could not be effected unless he resigned. The Generalissimo, with a patriotism which seems somehow to have been forgotten, but which nevertheless, was very real, resigned from all his offices, including the chairmanship of the Government and as Generalissimo of the National forces. He responded to pressure brought upon him to leave the country by getting his passports. While preparing to go abroad, scarce ten days having elapsed since he left Nanking for his native home in Chekiang Province, telegrams, and representatives of the new cabinet, began again to bombard him, this time stating that as a patriot he must return and lend his support to the Government by his personal influence in Nanking. It is remarkable here to note that as soon as the Generalissimo left Nanking and a new cabinet took up the reins of office the authority of that Cabinet did not extend beyond Nanking, and that scarcely a minister remained in the national capital.

Return To Capital

"The Generalissimo, after five years of strenuous activity, felt the need of a complete rest, but in the circumstances, when he saw the national government falling to pieces he submitted to the pressure then being exerted upon him, put aside his personal inclination, and returned to the deserted capital.

"Thus, when the catastrophe began at Shanghai on the night of

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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January 28, 1932, though the Generalissimo was in Nanking, he was out of office, bereft of power, and without any authority to issue orders to any Government troops. All he could do was to use his personal influence in a private capacity, but recognizing the terrible nature of the calamity facing China he endeavored time and again to place his military experience and his knowledge of the troops at the disposal of the country, only to have it clearly intimated to him that he was merely one of the members of the Military Council. Despite this rebuff he pleaded with the Government and the generals at the front to allow him to go and stay at the front, saying that unless he went there personally it would, in the circumstances, be difficult for China to hold out for any length of time.

"The leaders of the reactionary party, prompted either by jealousy of the Generalissimo or by fear that he would become politically stronger, curtly refused to comply with his urgent wish. He was thus placed in an equivocal position where he could be charged with the responsibility in the event of failure, without being allowed any power either to ensure success or avert failure.

Presence Not Welcomed

"Persisting in his desire to go to the front the Generalissimo was told that his presence there would not be welcomed, and, should he insist, the 19th Route Army, instigated by one of the reactionary party, a certain Chen—who later disgraced himself by participation in the scandalous China Merchant's Steamship Company's bribery case, and who is now in Hongkong a fugitive from justice—might come into open conflict with the 5th Route Army. This, notwithstanding that the officers of the 5th Route Army had been emphatically instructed by the Generalissimo to give the fullest support to the 19th Route Army. 'No sacrifice is too great to make,' he said in one wire, 'in their support, adding, the glory of the 19th Route Army is the glory of China.'

"The Generalissimo, therefore, had to content himself with telegraphic advice to Gen. Chiang Kwang-kai and General Tsai Ting-kai. We have the telegrams to prove that the Generalissimo wired those two generals not to attack before a certain date because it was physically impossible to have reinforcements move down to Shanghai before that time. Not being willing to sacrifice a single soldier needlessly the Generalissimo

advised them to adopt a defensive policy pending the arrival of support, because while the troops then at the front were amply sufficient for that purpose, they were not strong enough to launch an attack successfully.

"Anyone familiar with the topography of China is aware that the Yangtze River flows between Pukow and Nanking, and it is known by all interested in the happenings of that time that Japanese warships were stationed along the Yangtze, so that it was most difficult for reinforcements to be transported across the river in large numbers with speed, and, therefore, they had to be spirited over in small numbers requiring much more trouble, and taking much longer time."

Advice Ignored

The spokesman produced the telegrams which had been exchanged between the Generalissimo and Gen. Chiang Kwang-ngai and Gen. Tsai Ting-kai.

"They reveal," he said, "first, that the Generalissimo gave advice not to take the offensive till a certain date, when, he stated, reinforcements would arrive in Shanghai; secondly, that he urgently emphasized that the line of defence was weak because at Luiho, on the Yangtze, not a single soldier was stationed to prevent a possible landing by the Japanese troops, and he strongly advised that at least two regiments be placed there; thirdly, that in one telegram jointly signed by Gen. Chiang Kwang-nagi and Gen. Tsai Ting-kai, those generals agreed to abide by the advice of the Generalissimo.

"Despite the telegraphic acceptance of the advice they did not station the troops, as urged, at Luiho, so that when Japanese troops appeared there, as foreseen by the Generalissimo, they were able to land without opposition, and both Gens. Chiang Kwang-ngai and Tsai Ting-kai, without permission from the Government, and entirely upon their own responsibility, ordered the 19th Route Army to retreat and they abandoned their original position. Most unfortunately of all, when they did retire they did not tell the 5th Route Army anything of their intentions, and that force, being completely ignorant of what was happening during those fateful hours, continued fighting with their flank exposed all through the night, the result being that great numbers of them were killed.

Bombarded With Telegrams

"During the critical period under review condemnatory telegrams and

letters rained upon the Generalissimo from various quarters asking why he did not send reinforcements, the senders apparently having forgotten that as he had been forced out of all his offices, it was in every way impossible for him to do more than he was trying to do as a private citizen.

"In that capacity he did contrive to get reinforcements on the way to Shanghai, expecting that the advice he offered would, as agreed, be followed, and the vanguard of those reinforcements actually arrived in the vicinity of Shanghai on the appointed date, which was two days after Gen. Chiang Kwang-ngai and Tsai Ting-kai had taken the personal responsibility of bringing disaster upon the forces which had so gallantly stood their ground until that time.

"The irrefutable facts that have been related are a complete answer in themselves to the accusations made by Gen. Tsai Ting-kai, and it is, therefore, not necessary to traverse the other minor accusations that he has made in order to bolster up the falsehoods he is reported to be circulating.

"During the time of the Shanghai incident and after the defeat of our forces there, those around the Generalissimo who were cognizant of the true situation, pleaded to be allowed to publish the facts. The Generalissimo, however, emphatically refused permission.

Contemporary Evidence

"The Generalissimo at that time had sent Gen. Chang Tze-chung, of the 5th Route Army, to Gens. Chiang Kwang-nagi and Tsai Ting-kai and he conveyed to them the Generalissimo's idea that they should make public everything which had taken place. At that time those two generals promised that they would publish the true facts to the world, but when the fighting was over they kept silent, so that until to-day the outside world has been kept ignorant of the truth. Several times in the Shanghai Chinese newspapers, however, Gens. Chiang Kwang-ngai and Tsai Ting-kai stated that they had no fault to find with the Generalissimo regarding the operations, and stated clearly that the Government had supported them to the fullest extent with necessary supplies. This can be easily verified by reference to the Chinese newspapers.

"Therefore, in view of those statements, the world credited to Gen. Tsai Ting-kai by the American papers appear to be without foundation and the product of the propagandists of reactionary politicians."—Reuters.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 24, 1934.

~~NSM:~~
~~ROM:~~
~~WOM:~~
~~SKH:~~

Peiping's despatch No. 3149 of November 21, 1934, relating to Japanese activities in eastern Chahar.

This despatch refers to reports understood to have been sent out by the Havas news agency to the effect that the Japanese have already begun action to incorporate Chahar province as a part of "Manchukuo". The Charge d'Affaires states that reports were based on recent developments of minor importance and that no such large scale action has been initiated.

The reports, according to a statement of the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, were due to the removal at Japanese insistence of Chinese administrative officials stationed in that area lying east of the Great Wall which runs from north to south in eastern Chahar province and west of the administrative border of Jehol and Chahar provinces, which appears on Chinese maps.

A Chinese official stated that certain Japanese forces moved on
November 10

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

November 10 to a point fifteen miles west of Dolonor in eastern Chahar for the purpose of erecting barracks there but he does not regard the movement as important. He further stated that the reported removal of Chinese administrative officers has not taken place.

The Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese did not intend to take over all of Chahar. The Minister's statement may mean that the vicinity of Dolonor may be regarded by the Japanese as part of Jehol province, although there has been no official statement to that effect.

At present there is no evidence to substantiate the Havas reports that the Japanese intend to take over Chahar as part of "Manchukuo".

JBK/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3149


Peiping, November 21, 1934.

Subject: Japanese activities in eastern Chahar.

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893.01 Manchuria



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Grade	X		
For			
In U.S.A.		✓	
ON 11 MID			

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

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I have the honor to refer to recent reports, understood to have been sent out by the Havas news agency and which may have reached the Department, to the effect that Japanese were already initiating action looking toward the incorporation of Chahar Province as a part of "Manchukuo", and to report that, according to statements of local Chinese and Japanese authorities, the press reports were based on recent developments of minor importance and that there is no evidence to show that any such large-scale action has been begun.

The Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Shibayama, informed on November 20

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the local correspondent of the LONDON TIMES, in response to a question, that the reports mentioned above were due to the removal at Japanese instance of Chinese administrative officials stationed in that area which lies east of that part of the Great Wall which runs from north to south in eastern Chahar Province and west of the administrative border of Jehol and Chahar Provinces which appears on Chinese maps. This Japanese officer stated that the reason for the removal was that the Japanese authorities regard that section of the Great Wall as the boundary between "Manchukuo" and Chahar Province, a view which, as far as the Legation is aware, was first announced in December, 1933, and which was reported in the Legation's political report for that month.

A Chinese official, on the other hand, informed the Legation to-day that the alarming reports were presumably based on the fact that certain Japanese forces moved on about November 10 to a place some fifteen miles west of Dolonor, in eastern Chahar, for the purpose of erecting permanent barracks there. This official said that the Chinese officials concerned do not regard this development as important and believe it to have been made for the purpose of (1) extending the area occupied by the Japanese in the vicinity of Dolonor and (2) to make a demonstration which would have a "salutary" effect on the local Chinese officials. In commenting on the statement of the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, this official said that the removal of Chinese administrative officials from the area between the administrative border and the Great Wall had not yet been carried out and was at present only a plan.

In

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In this regard, it may be mentioned that, when the Japanese Minister was recently informed by a foreign press representative that there are maps in Jehol City which show Chahar Province as a part of "Manchukuo", the Japanese Minister replied that the Japanese had no intention of taking all of Chahar. This statement might, by implication, signify that the Japanese intend to take over a part of it. The view, expressed by the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché last December and reported in the Legation's political summary for that month, that Dolonor is in Chahar Province may have undergone a change since then. Indicative of such a change was a statement recently made by an official of the Japanese Legation to a member of this office to the effect that Dolonor is in reality in Jehol as Chinese troops in the vicinity of Dolonor are desirous of being under "Manchukuo" control. These troops, however, are probably those undesirable, renegade forces which were one of the subjects of the conversations held last July at Dairen between a Chinese official and Japanese military officers. As reported in the Legation's despatch No. ^{782.94/6782} 2911 of August 17, 1934, the Chinese representative requested the Japanese to allow the renegade Li Shou-sin and the 2,000 men under his command to leave the Dolonor area and enter "Manchukuo", a request which was refused. Considering the character of this force, their viewpoint would carry scarcely any weight as far as an impartial observer is concerned. It is a viewpoint, however, which may be made effective use of at some future time by the Japanese military.


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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It would seem, therefore, that there is no action at present in progress on the part of the Japanese military intended to incorporate all of Chahar Province in "Manchukuo" and that, as stated in the Legation's despatch No. 3127 of November 9, 1934, there is no conclusive evidence that such action is contemplated in the near future. It is impossible to say definitely at present, however, whether the Japanese military intend eventually to incorporate a part or all of Chahar Province in "Manchukuo" or intend only to establish a very close entente with the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in China or intend to use the threat of occupation of Chahar to obtain concessions from the Chinese authorities with respect to North China.

Respectfully yours,


 C. E. Gauss,
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

710

LES-SC

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

Original and four copies to Department.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 24, 1934.

~~MSM:~~
~~RCW:~~
~~LMH:~~
~~SKH:~~

Tientsin's strictly confidential despatch to the Legation No. D-671 of November 16, 1934, in regard to the rumored secret Sino-Japanese understanding effecting an extension of the area of the demilitarized zone.

This despatch reports a conversation between a member of the staff of the Consulate General and a responsible Chinese official to the effect that a secret agreement has been entered into between the Chinese and Japanese Governments, effecting an extension of the demilitarized zone to the west and south of the present area in Hopei province into which entry of Chinese troops will be prohibited. The Consulate General's informant stated that no Chinese troops will be stationed in the special municipal area of Peiping and Tientsin nor east or north of the line of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. No definite quid pro quo was given but it is understood that a virtual promise has been made by the Japanese that if the agreement is lived up to the Japanese will not assist any movement for autonomy in "Huapei" (Intramural North China).
 The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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The agreement was said to have been reached by General Chiang Kai-shek on November 4 at Kalgan in a brief conference with a representative of the Kuantung Army and details are known only to General Chiang, General Huang Fu, and the new Mayor of Tientsin and certain Japanese. General Yu Hsueh-chung does not know of the agreement but may suspect it. The rumor of the pact is widespread in Tientsin and the recent change of officials in China (see the Consulate General's despatch of November 7, 1934) gives some substance to the rumor.

The decision to make the cities of Tientsin and Peiping special administered areas and the proposal to extend greatly the areas of the Municipality of Peiping would add considerably to territory taken away from Hopei provincial control.

It is reported that at a meeting of the Central Political Council on November 14, at Nanking, the majority of the delegates present protested against any further concessions being made to the Japanese in north China.

The Consul General concludes that the recent shifts in the provincial and municipal government personnel have

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 3 -

considerably enhanced Japanese influence in north China and that it is probable that these shifts were made at the instance of the Japanese and to further strengthen their position in north China.


JBK/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. D-671



Peking, China, November 16, 1934.

DEC 17 34

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Rumored secret Sino-Japanese understanding
effecting extension of area of the
Demilitarized Zone.

For Distribution Check		Yes	No
Grade	For		
In U.S.A.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

RS Ward O.N.I. MID

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of my despatch No. L-821 of today's date, addressed
to the Legation on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:
1/, To Legation, No. D-671 of November 16, 1934.

800
RSW:JB

Original and four copies to Department.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. L-821

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 621, Dated Nov. 16, 1934
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, November 16, 1934.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Rumored secret Sino-Japanese understanding
effecting extension of area of the
Demilitarized Zone.

C. E. Gauss, Esquire,
American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
Peiping.

Sir:

793.101 Tientsin/17

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. L-810
of November 7, 1934, concerning the political situa-
tion in this Province, and further in that connection,
to report that information given yesterday to a
member of the staff of this Consulate General tends
strongly to indicate the existence of a secret agree-
ment or understanding between the Chinese and
Japanese Governments effecting in practice an expansion
to the west and south of the area into which no
Chinese troops shall be permitted to go.

The agreement referred to is stated to be in
substance that no Chinese troops will be stationed

(a) in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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(a) in the special municipal areas of Peiping and Tientsin, nor (b) east or north of the line of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway. The informant stated that no definite quid pro quo was assured the Chinese, but that a virtual promise was given by the Japanese that if the terms of this new agreement are observed, no assistance will be given by the Japanese to any movement for "autonomy" in "Huapei" (Intramural North China).

This agreement was reached, the informant asserts, by General Chiang K'ai-shek on November 4 at Kalgan, in a brief conference there with a representative of the Kwantung Army. The details of its terms are said to be known only to General Chiang, General Huang Fu, Mayor Chang T'ing-o of Tientsin, and certain Japanese. Yu Hsueh-chung himself has not, according to the statement quoted, been given positive information of the existence of the pact described, although he is understood to suspect its existence.

The member of the staff of this office to whom the above information was given states that there can be no doubt that the informant himself, a responsible and well informed official, believes it to be true. He is understood to have it from a close relative who is in Huang Fu's confidence and who some years ago held one of the highest posts in the

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in the Republic of China. Further to support his statements the informant quoted a passage from a confidential personal letter which he received day before yesterday from an official in Peiping which ran in substance, "I grieve that the city of Tientsin should so lightly be given away". It should be pointed out, however, that this sentence was so written as to make it possible that it referred only to the change of mayors which has just been effected. Other parts of the letter referred to were understood to have been written in terms so vague as to make any construction possible.

In connection with the statements of this informant it may be pertinent to note that later in the same conversation he made several remarks from which it might conceivably be inferred that the facts above set forth were being purposely conveyed rather to an American of an official status than to a personal friend. Twice during the conversation he asked that the matter be treated as strictly confidential.

However, the rumor that a pact such as the one described was recently made is very widespread in Tientsin, and circumstances apparently tending to indicate that the recent reshuffling of officials in North China predicates some substantial concession to the Japanese are not lacking.

One of

1935

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One of these is the presence in North China at this time of the Japanese Minister to China, Mr. Akira Ariyoshi, his reported meeting with Huang Fu, and the fact, information of which reached this office by telephone this afternoon after the drafting of this despatch had been begun, that the new Mayor of Tientsin, who was only this morning inducted into office, was in conference with him. The Mayor is also said to have called officially on the newly arrived Japanese Consul General. Chinese opinion is believed to view these latter circumstances as being more than coincidences. A personal friend of the new Mayor, however, has explained to the undersigned that the early call was due to the fact that the Japanese Minister was in the city for the day only and that the new Mayor wished to pay his respects to him while here and that he also called on the Consul General just before calling on the Minister.

The recent decision, referred to in this Consulate General's despatch of November 7, 1934, to make both Tientsin and Peiping specially administered areas, and the subsequent reports that it was intended to extend the Municipality of Peiping to T'unghsien on the east, An Tu on the south, Ment'oukou on the west, and Ch'ang P'ing on the north may have some relation to this general subject. This greatly enlarged municipal area would, if it became a reality, in itself add considerably to the territory in the Province now taken from the effective control of
the

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the Hopei Provincial Government.

A further indication that a decision of importance in Sino-Japanese relations in North China either has just been taken or is being considered was the appearance in the TA KUNG PAO (Chinese) of November 15 of an article recounting a discussion which took place at a meeting of the Central Political Council on November 14 in Nanking. This article states that the President of a certain Yuan (obviously President Wang Ching-wei of the Executive Yuan) and the head of a certain Ministry (it is clear from the text that the reference is to General Ho Ying-ch'in) made a detailed report to the Council of negotiations which the Chinese authorities had been carrying on for several months in North China with representatives of "a certain foreign power" over "a certain question".

The article cited goes on to state that at the close of this meeting the majority of the delegates there present rose one after the other to their feet and in great excitement gave expression to their unanimous feeling that the Chinese had already given way to their uttermost limit, and that no Government could be expected to accept responsibility for any further concessions. It was, according to the article, their opinion that the appropriate Chinese authorities should be instructed to firmly maintain their original position and to give their especial attention to a certain point at issue.

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If thereafter a break occurred, the responsibility for it would not lie with the Chinese. The excitement of the council subsided after an emphatic statement by the President of the Yuan referred to that the Chinese would most definitely not compromise on the question under debate.

This article created a furore in local Government circles, and it has been repeatedly mentioned by well informed Chinese in conversations with a member of the staff of this office. It is apparently interpreted by them as an indication that a demand has been made by the Japanese for the inclusion of Peiping and Tientsin within the so-called "Demilitarized Zone" and that that demand has not yet been granted. There have been many signs in recent months pointing towards a desire on the part of the Japanese to perpetuate the so-called "demilitarized zone".

In conclusion I desire to add that whether the reports above outlined have or have not any basis in fact, it is at least apparent that the recent shifts in the Provincial and Municipal government personnel have effected a considerable enhancement of Japanese influence in North China. It might even be said to be probable that they were made at the instance of the Japanese and were directed towards assuring a continuation of the dominant position

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By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

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position now held by the Japanese in this area.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800
RSW:JB

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department under cover of
despatch No. D-671 of November 16, 1934.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. *JB*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6819

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R./87 FOR #3150

FROM China (Gauss) DATED Nov 21, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: The temper of the Japanese military:
Japanese planes over Chahar.

793.94/
6819

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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II. Foreign relations:

A. Relations with the United States:

11.

B. Relations with other countries:

1. Japan:

a. The temper of the Japanese military: Japanese planes over Chahar:

793.94

The dissatisfaction of the Japanese military over the slow improvement in Sino-Japanese relations was indicated by a flight on October 25 of Japanese planes over the town of Chihfeng in eastern Chahar Province. These planes scattered handbills which complained of "illegal acts" on the part of "certain" Chinese and threatened retaliation in case such acts did not cease. It is presumed that this display of irritation was the result of various factors, including the visit of General Chiang Kai-shek to Peiping (Section III, subdivision 1 of this report), the non-removal from Pientsin of General Yu Tsueh-chung and his subordinates, dissatisfaction on the part of certain Japanese military with Lt. Col. Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping, an assault on a Japanese consular employee, refusal of passage through the Great Wall to certain Japanese troops, and the settlement of the Miyazaki and Wuchansu incidents.

The non-removal of General Yu
 Tsueh-chung and his subordinates:

The allegedly impending removal of General Yu
 Tsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government,

END

1. Legation's despatch No. 3127 of November 9.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and certain of his subordinates who are not sufficiently conciliatory toward the Japanese, was not effected during October. There was a report that General Yu would be retained, the Japanese being satisfied with the removal of the designated subordinates. There was a further report that the removal of the Governor would be accomplished by the diplomatic maneuver of transferring the seat of the provincial government from Tientsin to Paoting, which is some ninety miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow railway, a device which would spare General Yu too great a humiliation and at the same time render it geographically impossible for him to interfere effectively in the negotiations of General Huang Pu with the Japanese authorities for a solution of Sino-Japanese problems satisfactory to the Japanese.

Dissatisfaction with Lt.Col. Shibayama:

The Japanese military were described as being dissatisfied with the "conciliatory" attitude of Lt. Col. Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, in his negotiations with the Chinese over problems affecting North China. It was thought that this dissatisfaction might result before the end of the year in his being replaced by a more reactionary officer, a development which could scarcely be pleasing to the Chinese concerned.

Assault on K. Ikeda:

K. Ikeda, Chancellor of the Japanese Consulate General at Tientsin attached for duty to the Japanese Consulate at Kalgan, Chahar Province, was stopped by

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a group of Chinese soldiers on October 26, while he was traveling with two Japanese military officers from Kalgan toward Dolonor. One of the Chinese soldiers, according to Japanese report, struck Ikeda on the ear with a rifle, knocking him down and rupturing one of his ear drums. The incident was said to have been settled by an official apology by the Provincial Chairman through a representative.

Refusal of passage through Great Wall
 to Japanese troops:

A body of Japanese and "Manchukuo" forces attempted on October 17 to pursue through the pass of the Great Wall at Kupeik'ou some Chinese bandits fleeing from Jehol into Hopei Province. They were dissuaded from doing so by local Chinese officials. The incident was said to have displeased the Japanese military.

2

Student patriotism at Tientsin:

At the ceremony on October 10 which opened the 18th North China Athletic Meet and also the new Hopei Provincial Stadium at Tientsin, a group of students in the stands formed, in traditional college manner, by the use of large squares of cloth, legible characters which read, "Do not forget the Northeast: do not forget the nation's shame." This displeased the Japanese present and resulted in an unofficial apology.

The Miyagoshi incident:

The question of the killing on September 5 by a Chinese of a Japanese, Miyagoshi, sutler to certain

Japanese

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2. Tientsin's despatch to Legation No. 793 of October 12.

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Japanese troops in the demilitarized area, was settled in October. The terms of settlement were not as severe as some of the Japanese military desired. They were sufficiently severe, however, to cause the Chinese authorities to request postponement of their publication for a period of weeks and of one clause permanently. The known terms were an indemnity of \$10,000, dismissal of two local magistrates involved, and punishment of the alleged offender. The undivulged clause was rumored to be the removal of General Yu Hsueh-chung from Tientsin, a demand which would, if true, be disproportionate to the offense in view of the unimportance of the deceased and the uncertainty with regard to the circumstances of his death.

The Fushanssu incident:

The question of the killing in August by Chinese of 6 Koreans at Fushanssu, in the demilitarized area, was settled during October by the payment by the Chinese authorities of an indemnity of \$12,000. It was doubtful whether the Japanese military regarded the indemnity as adequate.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.101 Tientsin/16 FOR #3156

FROM China (Gauss) DATED Nov 24, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese Relations:

Certain changes in the Hopei Provincial Government and in the
Municipality of Tientsin, which are expected to affect -,

FRG.

793.94/ 6820

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quastgen NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 3156

Peiping, November 24, 1934.

Subject: Changes in the Hopei Provincial Govern-
ment and in the Municipality of Tientsin.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that certain changes, which are expected to affect Sino-Japanese relations, have occurred in the Hopei Provincial Government and in the Municipality of Tientsin. These changes include five new members and three new commissioners for the Provincial Government and a new mayor for Tientsin. (Details with regard to these appointments are given in an enclosure to this despatch.) It is also stated by local Chinese officials that the status of Tientsin

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 By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

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will be changed from that of a municipality under the Provincial Government to that of a special municipality under the direct control of the National Government and that the seat of the provincial government will be moved from Tientsin to Facting, which is about ninety miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

These changes are believed to be due (1) to Japanese dissatisfaction with General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, and with certain of his subordinates and (2) to the desire of General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Council and principal Chinese negotiator with the Japanese authorities over the questions affecting North China, to remove obstacles to those negotiations and to the smooth conduct of affairs in northern Hopei Province. By the appointment of new officials, those subordinates of General Yu Hsueh-chung whom the Japanese military did not like have presumably been removed. By the transfer of the provincial capital from Tientsin to Facting, General Yu Hsueh-chung will probably be effectively restrained from interference. By the change in the status of the Municipality of Tientsin, the officials of that city will enjoy a higher rank than heretofore, which will supposedly enable them to treat more effectively with the Japanese authorities. It may be mentioned that certain Chinese officials claim that General Huang Fu was more anxious for these changes to be made than were the Japanese, due to his desire to

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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enhance his prestige and his effectiveness in dealing with them. Whether this is true or not, it seems certain that these changes are, in general, in line with Japanese desires.

What the effect of these changes may be, except insofar as General Huang Pu's relations with the Japanese authorities are concerned, it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty. Notwithstanding the improvement of the position of General Huang Pu and his followers vis-a-vis the Japanese authorities, it would seem that any agreement of importance relating to matters affecting North China would presumably have to be approved by the National Government. A part of the National Government is still, however, opposed to further concession to the Japanese. For example, I was recently informed by the local foreign Postal Commissioner that the question of resumption of postal service between Manchuria and China Proper has reached a deadlock notwithstanding the fact that it was recently believed - and the Japanese Minister so stated - that through postal communications would be resumed by the end of 1934. According to Dr. Chiang Monlin, Chancellor of the National University of Peking, who is in close touch with leading politicians, this deadlock was the result of severe opposition which arose on November 14 at a meeting of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, a number of its members insisting that China should not yield another step to Japan.

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It is also too early as yet to attempt to foretell what effect the strengthened position of General Huang Fu will have on Japanese economic penetration in North China. The Legation is at present unable to obtain information with regard to progress in this respect. However, comment of Dr. Chiang Monlin on this subject may be of interest. Dr. Chiang expressed the opinion a day or two ago that such penetration - other than in the form of extension of trade - will probably await that time when the Japanese military decide that it is desirable to make a forward movement simultaneously in both North and South China for the purpose of (1) strengthening its prestige at home, (2) preparing for a conflict with Soviet Russia, or (3) trying to obtain financial and economic rewards from China proper. He does not believe that these forward movements will occur until after the conclusion of the London Naval Conference.

The changes reported above have caused, in conjunction with the visit to North China of General Chiang Kai-shek, a number of rumors to become current. One of these is that which was reported in despatch No. 821 of November 16 to the Legation from the Consulate General at Tientsin to the effect that a secret Sino-Japanese agreement had been reached by which the demilitarized area will be extended southward to include all the territory lying north of the Peiping-Lianning Railway and to include the municipalities of Tientsin and Peiping. The Legation has been unable

to

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to obtain any confirmation of this report, although it is given some support by certain southward movements of Chinese troops in North China, by reports that the limits of the municipality of Peiping may be extended until they reach the border of the demilitarized area, and by various Japanese press items. Other rumors are: (1) the non-return to North China of General Ho Ying-ch'in, Minister of War and Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council; (2) the coming to Peiping of General Yen Hsi-shan, warlord of Shansi Province, to take General Ho's place, a rumor now emphatically denied by various officials; and (3) an understanding by General Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese and the various Chinese militarists of North China which will leave him free to deal with the Southwest after the elimination of the buffer communist state in Kiangsi Province.

In short, recent developments in Hopei Province indicate a strengthening of the positions of the Japanese and of General Huang Fu and a weakening of the Chinese elements in the northern part of the province which are opposed to concessions to the Japanese. These developments have naturally given rise to a considerable number of rumors of doubtful reliability.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. Gauss,
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure as stated.

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Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

Original and four copies to Department.

1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 3156

CHANGES IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE HOPEI
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT:

New Commissioners:

Commissioner of Civil Affairs, Mr. Chang Yuan-wan.
Commissioner of Education, Mr. Cheng Tao-ju.
Commissioner of Reconstruction, Mr. Chang Li-sheng.

(Note: The post of Commissioner of Industry
has been abolished and its duties
transferred to that of Commissioner
of Reconstruction.)


New Members of the Government:

Mr. Cheng Tao-ju.
Mr. Chang Li-sheng.
Mr. Chang Yin-wu.
Mr. Cha Yueh.

New Mayor of Tientsin:

Mr. Chang Ting-ao.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Tientsin's No. D-677, November 28, 1934, forwarding copies of its confidential despatch No. L-831, November 28, in regard to alleged Chinese accession to Japanese demands and certain statements concerning the present political situation in north China.

The despatch reports that the information contained therein was obtained from well informed subordinate members of the local provincial and municipal governments and is reported for what it may be worth. The essential points are the following:

An agreement covering the restoration of through postal facilities with "Man-chukuo", the extension of through train service from Mukden to Paot'ou in Suiyuan, the establishment of some sort of military mission at Kalgan and probably concessions to the Japanese relating to industrial and trade expansion in north China has been reached after secret protracted negotiations extending over several months. This agreement is independent of the "voluntary" undertaking

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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undertaking on the part of the Chinese that no troops will be moved north or east of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway line between Tientsin and Peiping or of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway.

These informants also stated that Japanese officialdom in north China is highly organized for penetration purposes; that Japanese agents are spread throughout Inner Mongolia and Shansi; that intramural north China is being flooded with Jehol opium, morphine from beyond Shanhai-kwan and smuggled arms; that General Chiang Kai-shek's recent visit to north China was intended as a "rear guard" action to cover a withdrawal from north China; that Japanese interest in north China is strategic rather than territorial because of north China's importance to the Japanese in the event of a war with the Soviet Union which Japanese military authorities and many ranking Chinese officials regard as inevitable; that Chinese officials in north China regard the situation at present as being more precarious than was that of the Three Eastern Provinces in the summer of 1931; that the Chinese feel that the inevitable end of continuing Japanese encroachments in north China is war; that a growing majority among them believe that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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that General Chiang Kai-shek alone can give China the united rule necessary to the long and difficult preparation for war; that the Japanese party headed by T'ang Yu-jen (Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) who is virtually in complete control of foreign affairs in China, urged a diplomatic retreat, while the Anglo-American party which holds that no agreement with Japan is worth anything opposed it.

This despatch is worth reading in its entirety.

In this connection, the Legation's telegram No. 1 of January 1, noon (copy attached), reporting that mail service between China and "Manchukuo" will begin on January 10 and that parcel and money order service will be inaugurated February 1, is interesting.

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MSM/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-677

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, November 28, 1934.

Subject: Alleged Chinese accession to Japanese demands and certain statements concerning the present political situation in North China.

CONFIDENTIAL

For Distribution-Check		Yes	No
Grade	<i>9</i>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For	<i>hand</i>		
		<i>ONI + MID</i>	

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
my despatch No. L-831 of today's date, addressed
the Legation, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/, To Legation, No. L-831 of November 28, 1934.

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RSW:HK

Original and four copies to Department.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. L-831

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Enclosure No. 1 in Despatch
No. 622, Dated 12-28-34
From the American Consulate General
at Tientsin, China.

Tientsin, China, November 28, 1934.

Subject: Alleged Chinese accession to Japanese demands and certain statements concerning the present political situation in North China.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. E. Gauss, Esquire,

American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. L-821 of November 16, 1934, concerning rumored secret Sino-Japanese understanding effecting an extension of the area of the demilitarized zone, and further in connection with the political situation in North China, to report that statements made to a member of the staff of this Consulate General yesterday and the day before in conversations with well-informed subordinate members of the local Provincial and Municipal Governments, indicate that the Chinese have reached an accord with Japan on several long-pending issues affecting the political and military situation in North China. The more important of these statements of alleged fact and of opinion, all of which are here set down only for what they may be worth, may be summarized as follows:

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1. An agreement has been reached between the Japanese and Chinese authorities in North China, the Chinese acceding to all Japanese demands. The Japanese procured this agreement after continuous secret negotiations extending over several months, particularly sharp pressure being brought to bear on the Chinese during recent weeks and after General Chiang K'ai-shek's visit to "Huapei".

2. The agreement covers the restoration of through postal facilities with "Manchoukuo"; the extension of through train service from Mukden to Paot'ou in Suiyuan; the establishment of some sort of military mission at and of some kind of military supervision over Kalgan; and, it is believed, other concessions to the Japanese, some of which at least touch upon industrial and trade expansion in this area.

3. No "quid pro quo" was offered the Chinese.

4. The negotiations were carried on by the Chinese on this basis: in each case, the Chinese authorities sought to determine by discussions among themselves and with the Japanese upon which of the various Japanese demands it was the intent of the Japanese authorities to insist, and having determined them, Chinese assent was given.

5.

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5. The agreement reached is independent of the "voluntary" undertaking on the part of the Chinese that no troops will be moved north or east of the Peiping-Liaoning Railway Line between Tientsin and Peiping or of the Peiping-Suiyuan Road to the northwest of Peiping. This plan has been accepted by the Japanese. Troops now north and east of the lines laid down are gradually to be withdrawn.

6. The enlargement of the municipal areas of Peiping and Tientsin was ordered by General Chiang; the Japanese authorities approve of the project and are interested in its accomplishment⁽¹⁾.

7. Japanese officialdom, civil and military, in North China is highly organized, even the lowest ranking among them being charged with specific tasks in the penetration of North China. Many local Chinese officials are regularly approached by particular members of the Japanese military with propositions anent the necessity of closer and more harmonious relations between Japan and North China.

8. Japanese agents are spread throughout Inner Mongolia and Shansi. General Chiang had planned to visit Pailingmiao, the seat of the
Inner

(1) See also despatch No.
L-832 of November 28, 1934.

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Inner Mongolian Autonomous Council, and there meet the Te Wang on his own ground, but he desisted on the advice of Chinese and Mongolian representatives in Peiping, who told him that the influence in Pailingmiao of the Japanese agents and advisers there was so great that his visit would occasion embarrassment.

9. Intra-mural North China is being flooded with Jehol opium, morphine from beyond Shanhaikuan, and smuggled arms. The activities of Japanese agents and the steady inflow of Japanese money are contributing to the disorder in this disrupted area, and the maintenance of peace and order is becoming increasingly difficult.

10. General Chiang K'ai-shek's recent visit to North China was intended as a "rear-guard" action to cover a withdrawal from North China. It is his present object to avoid war at any cost: he realizes that he could not defeat Japan and it is believed to be his opinion that no action taken now could change the fact that sometime within the next three or four years Japan will occupy Hopei, Shansi, Charhar, and Suiyuan.

11. This belief is held to be a logical deduction from the present course of events.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huatelen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The interest of Japan in North China is strategic rather than territorial. If Japan sought territorial expansion only it would apply its whole energies to the pacification and absorption of "Manchoukuo" instead of continuing to aggravate world opinion by the attempt to add North China to the areas under its control. Japan seeks rather a hinterland from which to draw war materials and a direct route to Lake Baikal in a war with the Soviet Union, which the Japanese military authorities and many ranking Chinese officials, feel to be inevitable.

12. Japan's first act after the opening of this war would be to occupy all North China.

13. Chinese officials in this area quite generally view the present situation of Huapei to be much more precarious than was that of the Three Eastern Provinces before September 18, 1931.

14. They are also agreed in feeling that the only possible end to the continuing encroachments of the Japanese is war. If Japan is not destroyed in the coming Russo-Japanese War, or if that war is late in coming, then China herself must fight Japan.

15. A growing majority among them are
 agreed

- 6 -

agreed that General Chiang K'ai-shek alone can give China the united rule necessary to the long and difficult preparation for war. This view is bitterly opposed in Kwangtung and the Soviet areas, but it has recently won a very important supporter in the person of General Yen Hsi-shan.

16. If unity is essential, it is also absolutely necessary that a respite be gained. The fallen boxer must lie flat on the canvas, in the forlorn hope that he may find the strength to rise before the count is done. This is the view of Wang Ching-wei and of his followers, but they have split into two camps on the method through which the precious months and years of semi-security are to be gained.

17. The Jih P'ai (Japanese Party) urged a diplomatic retreat, while the Ying-Mei P'ai (Anglo-American Party) opposed it. The Japanese Party is now everywhere in the ascendant, and its able leader, T'ang Yu-jen, is virtually in complete control of the foreign affairs of China.

18. When even Huang Fu would not take the responsibility for the acceptance of Japanese demands, T'ang himself came on November 21 to Peiping "to see a sick uncle". After three days of negotiations he agreed to the
terms

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 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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terms laid down.

19. The Anglo-American Party has no program, and its only present tenet is that no agreement with the Japanese is worth anything; that even the recognition of "Manchoukuo" would avail nothing.

20. A member of that party has suggested that "Huapei" be put under the protection of the League of Nations, and policed by an international force; but he realizes that no power in the world today has the desire, or if it has the desire, the courage, to override the objections which Japan would raise to an arrangement so obviously to her disadvantage. Nor would it be possible to convince Southern China that the request itself was wise.

21. As this suggestion itself indicates, the effect of the conviction of the inevitableness of disaster upon the morale of Northern Chinese is marked.

In connection with the above, permit me to invite the attention of the Legation to the fact that it is believed to represent a faithful summary of the views of several usually well-informed members of the younger official set in Tientsin who have in the past proved to be reliable sources of information, but this Consulate General can accept no responsibility for the accuracy

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
accuracy or truth either of their information or
the soundness of the opinions expressed.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

800
RSW:HK

Original and two copies to Legation.
In quintuplicate to Department under cover
of despatch No. D-677 of November 28, 1934.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 8, 1935.

MMH:

Nanking's L-525 Diplomatic, December 4, 1934, to the Legation at Peiping, reporting the views of a Chinese news correspondent in regard to certain Sino-Japanese issues.

The informant, a western educated Chinese news correspondent at Nanking, stated, according to the despatch, that Chinese official circles were embarrassed by published pronouncements of the Japanese Military Attaché at Shanghai in regard to the apparent favor with which the Japanese regard the southwestern faction and that Chinese officials feel that the Japanese are contemplating some action in China as an antidote to the set-back they seem to have received in the naval conversations at London. While the informant does not believe that there will be Japanese aggression in the north he feels that the mission of Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui and Dr. Sun Fo to Canton may be adversely affected thereby. On the other hand, the informant pointed out that Japanese aims in north China are being achieved, e.g. the transfer of
 General

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

General Yu Hsueh-chung from Tientsin to
Paotingfu, the organization of Tientsin
as a special municipality, and the con-
clusion of the agreement for postal
relations between China and Manchuria.

lufy.
MEM/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Nanking Office, December 4, 1934.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 31 1934

Department of State

Subject: Reported Japanese Intrigues; Views
of a Chinese News Correspondent.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No.L-525 Diplomatic dated December 4,
1934, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject
"Reported Japanese Intrigues; Views of a Chinese
News Correspondent".

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosure:

1/ As described.

In quintuplicate.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 9 1935

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

L-525 Diplomatic

Nanking Office, December 4, 1934.

Subject: Reported Japanese Intrigues; Views
of a Chinese News Correspondent.

Clarence E. Gauss, Esquire,
American Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report, as of possible interest, the substance of various remarks concerning Sino-Japanese issues made to a member of my staff by a Western-educated Chinese news correspondent stationed in Nanking.

The informant stated that Chinese official circles in Nanking had become infected with a considerable nervousness because of recently published pronouncements of Lieutenant Y. Suzuki, Japanese Military Attaché in Shanghai, which gave the impression that the Japanese military distinctly favored the southwestern faction and had taken pains to indicate this, in order to cause embarrassment to the National Government. The feeling of many prominent Chinese Government officials is, the informant stated, that the Japanese are contemplating some forthright action in China, as an antidote to the set-backs they seem to have received at the naval conversations in London. While the informant himself does not believe that there will be any further aggression on the part of the Japanese military with a view to the extension of "Manchukuo"

territory.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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territory, the apparent favor being shown the Southwest, as described, leads him to feel pessimistic as to the outcome of the mission of Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui and Dr. Sun Fo to Canton mentioned in this office's despatch No. L-523 Diplomatic of December 1, 1934.

On the other hand, the informant pointed out, the Japanese have been shaping affairs in the North more or less in accordance with their aims. For example, he had it on good authority that a definite decision had been reached to transpose General Yu Hsueh-chung from Tientsin to Peotingiu by transferring the Hopei provincial capital to the latter place and making Tientsin a Special Municipality. This would place Tientsin directly under the National Government (i.e. through General Huang Fu), and would eliminate General Yu as an obstacle in the way of Japanese hegemony in North China. Elaborating upon this particular phase of affairs, the informant stated that General Huang Fu himself would be removed from the Northern scene and that General Wang Yi-tang (王揖唐) had been selected to replace General Huang.

(General Wang Yi-tang is an old Anfu party man whose biography is set out at length on pages 809-10 of the Third Edition of WHO'S WHO IN CHINA; the informant stated that General Wang had been concerned in the Nishihara loans, but this has not been verified in this office. It is known, however, that he recently went to Japan reportedly for the purpose of assisting in the revival of certain Sino-Japanese banking interests.)

The

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The informant went on to say that, also in accordance with Japanese aims, a definite agreement had just been signed to cover the complete resumption of postal relations between "Manchukuo" and the rest of China and that General Ho Ying-ch'in would not return to the North. Parenthetically, he stated that the situation in Szechuan had nothing to do with the decision concerning General Ho; another officer would be selected to proceed to Szechuan as the Generalissimo's representative there.

These advancements of Japanese aspiration, the informant stated, had been gained slowly, but nevertheless in accordance with a change from the former Chinese policy of an nei jang wai (安内攘外 -- "pacify the interior and resist the outer world") to one of jang nei an wai (攘内安外 --- "resist interior troubles and pacify the external"). In other words, the National Government had come to embark upon a program of suppressing the Communists and consolidating its authority in China on one hand and of attempting to conciliate the Japanese enemy on the other.


Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
Counselor of Legation.

Original and one copy to Legation, Peiping.
Five copies to Department under cover of despatch
dated December 4, 1934.

800

GAJr:MCL



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 032-Taiwan Industrial Mission/1 FOR #525

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Dec. 1, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Tour of Taiwan Industrial Mission, composed of twenty-five leaders in local Chinese governmental, commercial, and educational circles of China to ^{Formosa} Japan. It is expected that this course will bring about friendly intercourse between the Japanese and Chinese. Outline of the entertainment given them.

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QUINTUPLICATE

523

Foochow, China, December 1, 1934.

Taiwan Industrial Mission.

HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of an article appearing in the November 27, 1934 issue of THE STRAITS TIMES, an English-Chinese newspaper, published by Chinese at Amoy, Fukien. The article has to do with the Taiwan Industrial Mission (台灣實業考察團), which left Foochow for Formosa (Taiwan) on November 13, 1934, and returned to Foochow on November 29, 1934, via Amoy.

This party, headed by Mr. Chen Pi-ch'ang (陳體誠), Commissioner of Construction for Fukien, was composed of twenty-five leaders in local Chinese governmental, commercial, and educational circles. Mr. Li Chin-te (李進德), Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Provincial Capital of Fukien, was a member of this party. Of the educational leaders present was Mr.

James

-2-

James Ling (陳芝美), President of the Engl-Chinese College at Foochow, an institution run under the auspices of the American Methodist Episcopal Mission. James Ling is better described as Methodist Bishop John Cowdy's man, Friday. He is affectionately known among his co-workers as "Jimmy," and he is a power in local Methodist missionary circles.

Mr. U. Usami, my Japanese Colleague, happily informed me that the Taiwan Industrial Mission was the culmination of his efforts to bring about friendly intercourse between the Japanese and Chinese. The Mission had the endorsement of General CH'EN YI (陳儀), Chairman of the Fukien Provincial Government.

Prominent local Americans welcome this new era of friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese, because friendly Sino-Japanese relations, together with the "elimination" of the ever-present menace of a Red attack, will (unless something entirely different breaks loose) enable the "man-in-the-street" to give his undivided attention to the difficult task of earning his daily bread. Strange to relate even the less enlightened in American missionary circles were now less and less resentful and cynical when speaking of Sino-Japanese "better relations." However, they continue to speak of this subject with bated breath.

These messengers of good will were entertained at a tea party given by "Jimmy" in his lovely American furnished home on the day before their departure.

The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese Consul General, the Manager of the Bank of Taiwan, and the Manager of the MIN PAO (閩報), a local Japanese owned vernacular paper, were also present. The Japanese, who as a government or people are well known for their ameness, have set an excellent example. Friendly relations between the Japanese and Chinese cannot but be of mutual advantage to them, as Chinese officialdom can learn much from the right type of Japanese official.

Is it too much to expect that this Industrial Mission will usher in better days for the Foochow Consular District?

Respectfully yours,

Gordon L. Burke,
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

1/ article appearing in the November 27, 1934,
issue of THE FUKIEN TRIBUNE.

700
CLB/HCY

In quintuplicate.

Copy to American Legation, Peking, China.
Copy to American Consulate General in Hankow for the
files of the Legation in the capital.

3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 525 of Gordon L. Burke,
American vice consul at Foochow, China, dated December
1, 1934, on the subject "Taiwan Industrial Mission."

Article appearing in the November 27, 1934, issue of
THE FOREIGN TRIBUNE.
Amoy, China.

PARTY MARVEL AT PROGRESS OF FORMOSA

FORMOSA DURING PARTY ARRIVAL HERE

Impressed by Progress of Island

Local Officials Entertain

"I marvel at the progress of Formosa. The methods and equipment they use in their agriculture and factories particularly impress me." So said Mr. Ch'en Hsi-ch'eng (陳希誠), Reconstruction Commissioner of Fukien and leader of the Formosa Touring Party, in an interview to local newspapermen on his arrival here yesterday morning in company with a party of 22.

The party, which left Foochow on November 13, for Formosa on a tour of inspection, was welcomed here by prominent members of the community including Commissioner Wang. Customs authorities extended them the courtesies of the port.

From the a.s. S.S. TUNG MAO from which they landed, they were taken by the reception committee to the Thian Hian Hotel where rooms have previously been engaged for them. Many high government officials came to visit them in the hotel.

During the interview, Mr. Ch'en said their trip to Formosa has been both pleasant and beneficial. He was lavish in praising the officials of the Formosan Government in entertaining them and furnishing them guides throughout the island. He said that China is far behind Formosa in the development of agriculture and industry and that he is convinced even more now that what this country needs is more modern agricultural implements and technical assistance. Formosa, he said, has a strong government and this fact accounts in a large measure for the rapid advancement of the island. Many of the island's industries including mining enterprises are assisted by the government, so that even in times of depression or poor business, they are able to carry on.

Due to the energetic efforts of the government, they are able to export to other parts of the world all kinds of agricultural products. China, on the other hand, is compelled to import many of the primary necessities of life because the country does not produce enough. The supply of rice, for instance, is never adequate, so that in time of war, the country is faced with the problem of food supply. Concluding, he said that it is very

important

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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important that the people should cooperate with the government to the end that the latter may be able to help them.

The party was entertained by Commissioner ang at the Lasputo Temple yesterday noon where many notables were present.

In the afternoon between 5 and 6, they were guests at a tea party tendered by the Japanese Consul. Another party was given in their honor by the Long Distance Truck Co. following the Japanese Consul's party.

Copied by RCY *4*
Compared with *CF J.L.F.*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gluskin NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

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793.94/6824

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SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/74 FOR #9762

FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Dec. 7, 1934.
TO

NAME
1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese Agitation.

YRC.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dunlap NARS, Date 12-18-75

B. Relations with other Countries:

793.94
Anti-Japanese Agitation: A certain amount of anti-Japanese agitation was present in Shanghai during the month. The Hat Makers' Union No. 29 passed resolutions to check the usage of materials of Japanese origin. The Toothbrush Makers' Union No. 8 applied to the Shanghai Tangpu for permission to form an "enemy goods inspection committee of the toothbrush trade" to check the usage of materials of Japanese origin. Other agitation of a minor nature was also present.

Chinese Deportees: Small groups of Chinese deported from Japan continued to arrive in Shanghai during November, the total number being 84 for the month. The total for the past few months is

approximately

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.6363-Manchuria/122 FOR #1092
FROM Japan (Grew) DATED Dec. 11, 1934.
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Division of China into commercial spheres between Japan and Britain:
Conversation with Dutch Minister, who stated that Japanese Ambassador
to Italy, in a conversation, proposed -, as a basis for an Anglo-
Japanese rapprochement.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.71-Manchuria/77 FOR Tel.#1-noon

FROM China (Gauss) DATED Jan.1,1935
/TA/ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations between China and Japan: Situation
in North China still fraught with uncertainty,
despite the fact that, with the establishment of
postal relations between China and "Manchukuo",
three of the four secret clauses of the Tangku
Truce have been fulfilled.

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793.94/6826
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Chusoff NARS, Date 12-18-75

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MCG

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping

Dated January 1, 1935.

Rec'd 6:22 a.m.

note
893.71
793.94

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1, January 1, noon.

According to the press, an official of the Chinese Postal Administration (?) Assistant Military Attache at Peiping have announced that ordinary mail service between China and Manchukuo will be begun on January 10th and that parcel post and money order services will be inaugurated on February 1st. According to the Chinese statement, these services will be handled by "third parcel post offices" especially set up for that purpose. According to a usually reliable Japanese source however this report is for the purpose of ameliorating Chinese feeling and the services will be handled in the usual routine manner without any special organ. According to a report to both Chinese and Japanese sources, in order to meet Chinese wishes new stamps without the word Manchukuo on them will be issued for use on communications sent from Manchukuo to China. By the settlement of the postal question three of the allegedly secret clauses oral or written of the Tangku truce

893.71-Manchukuo/77

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 2

MCG

#1, January 1, 1935
 From Peiping.

truce of May 31, 1933 have been fulfilled the other two having been resumption of through passenger traffic on the Peiping-Lianing Railway and the establishment of Chinese customs houses along the Great Wall. According to a usually reliable Japanese source only one more important secret clause remains to be fulfilled, namely, the establishment of aerial communication.

Although the successful fulfillment of three of the clauses of the Tangku truce creates an appearance of tranquility in the situation in North China actually the future of this area is still fraught with uncertainty. Among the causes for this uncertainty are the following factors:

One. There is little reason to believe that the Japanese will be satisfied with the meager advantages which the conclusion of these three questions gives to them or to Manchukuo.

Two. There is little reason to believe that the Japanese military regard the proposal as other than stepping stones toward a substantial control of affairs in North China.

Three. Major Tan Takahashi, Japanese Assistant Military Attache at Nanking, has been ordered to replace

Lieutenant

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 3, #1 Jan. 1, 1935
From Peiping

Lieutenant Colonel Shi-(?)yat at Peiping (see page six of Legation's despatch 3127 of November 9, 1934). Takashi is said by a reliable Japanese to have been primarily responsible for the untoward developments of the Kycamu affair of last June and to be a reactionary ultra patriotic officer.

Four. General Huang Fuplans to go to Nanking within the next few days to assume the post of Minister of the Interior and there is uncertainty as to whether he will return, (?) as it is said that the military consider that he has fulfilled his mission in North China and no longer want him here.

GAUSS

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quatefen NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Harbin/72 FOR #53

FROM Harbin (Adams) DATED Nov. 22, 1934
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Japanese penetration into the interior.

FRG.

793.94/ 6827

6827

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2. Japan.

a. Japanese penetration into the interior.

793.94
 The penetration of Japanese influence into the outlying districts of north Manchuria is a process that continues from year to year, but during October 1934 the tendency was more than usually noticeable. This penetration is the most important development to be expected from the recent decision of the "Manchukuo" government (treated elsewhere in this summary) to abolish former provinces and set up more numerous administrative districts subordinated to the direct control of Hsinking. While the obvious result is to increase the local power of the central government, the more significant consequences is to strengthen the influence of Japanese officials of the "Manchukuo" regime in the conduct of local government. It can not be considered a mere coincidence that this change comes about at the time of a renewed effort on the part of the Japanese army to emphasize the wide scope of the economic reforms which it proposes. The reorganization of administrative areas in Manchuria plays a conspicuous part in Japan's plans for the development of this country.

The month witnessed also the arrival of some two hundred and fifty Japanese immigrants to form a new colony, this time at a point on a stream called the Koin, not far north of Suifu on the railway from Harbin north to Peian. The place chosen is apparently to be known as Peitakou.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Glavin NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Foochow/83 FOR #526

FROM Foochow (Burke) DATED Dec 4, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations with Japan: General.

FRG.

793.94/ 6828

6828

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2. Japanese:

a. General:

Nothing of note occurred to mar relations between

the

79394

-4-

the Chinese authorities and the Formosans during the month under report. The anti-Japanese boycott has long since subsided, and little or nothing is heard of an anti-Japanese nature in local Chinese circles. Even the more prejudiced in American missionary circles show less and less resentment and skepticism when speaking of Sino-Japanese "better relations." One American missionary spoke with considerable pride of a recent American missionary school function here at which Japan was represented.

With a generally recognized pro-Japanese group in authority here, it is to be expected that this group would not indulge in expressions of bitterness towards the Japanese. However, in times past when local Chinese officials expressed hatred for the Japanese, these expressions of hatred, while they could be interpreted as sincere in the light of Chinese officialdom's anti-foreign characteristics in general, were often for the consumption of the simple minded foreigner; for the most outspoken anti-Japanese Chinese officials have been known to scurry to Japanese protection when in danger, and to sell out their national interests for their private interests. An American or European of long residence in China out-ports or in the interior need get little satisfaction from these anti-Japanese expressions, because they more often than not remind him of the day that has been, or might come, when he finds himself similarly placed as the "hated Jap" of the present.

b.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

January 17, 1935.

REM:
MMH:

Peiping's No. 3218, December 22, 1934, in regard to alleged demands or proposals of the Japanese.

The Legation encloses a memorandum of a conversation which was had on December 17 with Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, Military Attaché, in regard to information which he had received from one of his most reliable sources to the effect that Japanese had recently made a series of three demands or proposals which were (1) extension of the demilitarized area in north China to the Peiping-Suiyuan and Peiping-Liaoning Railways; (2) "military cooperation" by the appointment of at least five Japanese military advisers to each of the coastal provinces; and (3) "economic cooperation" by a Japanese loan for projects in the Yangtze River Valley and another loan for projects in the northwest.

In commenting on this information, the Legation states that as the name of the informant was not revealed it is difficult to evaluate it; that for some time past rumors have been heard that the

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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Japanese desire an extension of the demilitarized area and that the decision to transfer the capital of Hopeh from Tientsin to Paoting and the transfer of several groups of troops formerly under General Chiang Hsueh-liang southward to Hupeh and Honan Provinces may be connected with such demilitarization. With regard to the alleged proposals for Japanese loans the Legation states, as already reported, that it has heard reports that the Japanese desire economic cooperation with Chinese in China proper, especially in north China, but that it has no definite knowledge of any progress that may have been made in this direction. The Legation states further that it has no information in regard to the alleged proposal relating to the appointment of Japanese military advisers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3218

Peiping, December 22, 1934.

Subject: Alleged demands or proposals of the
Japanese.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 11 1935

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum
1/ of a conversation which I had on December 17, 1934, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Walter S. Drysdale, Military Attaché,
when he informed me that, according to a man whom he
considers one of his best sources of information, the
Japanese had recently made a series of three demands or
proposals to the Chinese and that these proposals were:
(1) extension of the demilitarized area in North China

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- 2 -

to the Peiping-Suiyuan and Peiping-Liaoning Railways;
(2) "military cooperation" by the appointment of at least five Japanese military advisers to each of the coastal provinces; and (3) "economic cooperation" by a Japanese loan for projects in the Yangtze River Valley and another loan for projects in the Northwest.

As the Military Attaché was not inclined to reveal the name of his informant, it is difficult for the Legation to evaluate this report. There have been, however, for some time rumors that the Japanese desired an extension of the demilitarized area and it has been thought that such demilitarization might be one of the reasons for the recent decision to transfer the capital of Hopei Province, together with its Chairman, General Yu Hsueh-chung, from Tientsin to Paoting. There have also occurred some troop movements which support this report to some extent. During the past two months, 8,000 troops, stationed northwest of Peiping and just north of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, who were formerly under General Chang Hsueh-liang, were transferred to Hankow, Hupeh Province, and another 8,000 troops, stationed at Hwailai, Chahar Province, on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, who were also formerly under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, were transferred to Honan Province, while apparently no new Chinese troops have been sent into this area during the same period. With regard to the alleged proposal dealing with Japanese loans, the Legation, as it has already reported, has heard reports that the Japanese were desirous of "economic cooperation" with the Chinese in China Proper, especially in

North

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

North China. The Legation, however, has no exact knowledge of how this "economic cooperation" is progressing, although it is presumed that it will be accompanied with considerable use of Japanese money. With regard to the alleged proposal that Japanese military advisers be appointed to each of the coastal provinces, the Legation is without information.

Respectfully yours,




C. E. Gauss,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

✓
Enclosure:

1. Copy of a memorandum of conversation as stated.

710

LES/lm

4 Carbon Copies
Received 

Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.
Original and four copies to the Department.

Enclosure No. 1

Wesp. No. 3218

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Memorandum of Conversation.

December 17, 1934.

Subject: "Demands" of the Japanese on China.

Colonel Drysdale, Military Attaché.
Mr. Gauss.

Colonel Drysdale informed me this morning that he has had a conversation with a man whom he considers one of his best contacts. This man has recently come up from Shanghai. He stated, according to Colonel Drysdale, that the Japanese have recently made a series of three demands or proposals to the Chinese:

1. That the demilitarized zone in North China be extended to the line of the railways (Peiping-Suiyuan and Peiping-Liaoning Railways).
2. "Military cooperation" by the appointment of at least five Japanese military advisers to each of the coastal provinces.
3. "Economic cooperation" - by a Japanese loan of about \$15,000,000 for projects in the Yangtze Valley and about \$30,000,000 for projects in the Northwest.

The informant stated to Colonel Drysdale that a meeting was held at T. V. Soong's house at Nanking to discuss these "demands" or "proposals", those present being Chiang Kai-shek, H. H. Kung, Wang Ching-wei, and Hsu Mo; and that at this meeting it was decided to draft a note rejecting the Japanese "demands" or "proposals", this task being entrusted to Hsu Mo, the rejection to be worded carefully and politely so as not to be a blunt rejection but a suave turning aside of the proposals.

Colonel Drysdale says that he cannot, of course, vouch for the truth of this information; he can only repeat what has been told him, for what it may be worth.

Colonel

-2-

Colonel Drysdale asked his informant whether it might be possible for him to obtain a copy of the Japanese proposals or demands. His informant stated that it might be possible; but it would take a few days.

Colonel Drysdale asked his informant why the National Government did not make it a point to communicate to the American Government and perhaps the British Government, as parties to the Washington Agreements, such demands and proposals of the Japanese. He received the reply that the Chinese Government knows that the American Government and British Government would not help China in the matter, and that it would become known to the Japanese Government that their demands or proposals had been communicated to other powers and then China would have to "take it on the nose".

Colonel Drysdale did not inform me of the name of his "contact". He avoided doing so. I asked him whether perhaps his informant was Philip Fugh; we had had some experience with Mr. Philip Fugh (who is one of Colonel Drysdale's friends) which would lead us to discount any information he had to offer. Colonel Drysdale said that it was not Philip Fugh. I suggested that the weight which might be given to the information from his contact would depend in ^ameasure upon who that informant might be. But this did not elicit the information desired from the Military Attaché; and I dropped my inquiries.

I told Colonel Drysdale that as to point 1, the Legation had heard rumors of a Japanese demand or proposal that the demilitarized zone be extended to include the line of the railway from Peiping to Shanhaikwan (and to include Tientsin and Peiping), but that we had had no confirmation of the rumors from any responsible source.

As to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Huefner NARS, Date 12-18-75

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As to Point 2, we had had no reports or information.

As to Point 3, we had heard that the Japanese were making proposals to the Chinese for "economic cooperation" - and we had very recently received an unconfirmed rumor from Shanghai-Nanking (Nanking's recent despatch on a conversation with a foreign press representative from Shanghai) of Japanese loans to China, but we had nothing definite to confirm any loan proposals.

CEG/les

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

mm *January 18, 1934.*

The Embassy transmits a copy of the third edition of Dr. Hishida's pamphlet which contains certain writings of Dr. John Bassett Moore that relate to Japan's actions in China, with Dr. Hishida's comment.

The present edition has been expanded by the inclusion of another paper by Dr. Moore (on Boycotts) and by enlarging Dr. Hishida's comment.

The pamphlet need not be read.

L.H.D.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, December 17, 1934.



No. 1093.

Subject: "The Manchukuo Question in its wider aspects
with special reference to John Bassett Moore's
discussions of International Affairs".

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note
893.01 Manchuria

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1935 JAN 16 PM 1 28



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Grade	For		
In U S A			

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a
publication entitled "The Manchukuo Question in its wider
aspects with special reference to John Bassett Moore's
discussions of International Affairs", by Dr. Seiji
Hishida. In transmitting this copy to the Embassy Dr.
Hishida states that this monograph is a revised and
expanded edition of his former publication "Comments on
John Bassett Moore's discussion with reference to the
Manchurian Incident, Embargo, etc.", a copy of which was
transmitted to the Department with the Embassy's despatch
No. 615, dated December 15, 1933.

Enclosure:
1/ As stated above.

OZO/
ELN:g

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By MLL/C. Heston NARS, Date 7-2-88-73

The Manchoukuo Question

in its wider aspects

with special reference to

John Bassett Moore's

Discussions of

International Affairs

By Dr. SEIJI HOSHIDA

MARUZEN CO., LTD.

TOKYO

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

With the Compliments

Seiji Hishida
55 Tanchome,
Minamicho, Aoyama,
Tokyo

773.74/6838

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Manchoukuo Question
in its wider aspects
with special reference to
John Bassett Moore's
Discussions of
International Affairs

By

SEIJI HISHIDA, M.A., Ph. D.

Author of "The International Position of Japan as a Great Power,"
Compiler of "Annual Report on Reform and Progress in Korea" (1907-1917)
and of four series of "Reports on Progress in Manchuria" up to 1934.

TOKYO

November, 1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, 1891-1924; Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1921-1928; member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague since 1913; called from time to time by the United States Government to serve either in high and responsible office in the State Department as Assistant Secretary or Acting Secretary of the State or as special envoy or delegate to numerous international conferences; signally honored in many lands; possibly the best of living authorities on international law; Author of *A Digest of International Law* (8 volumes), *A History and Digest of International Arbitration* (6 volumes), *International Adjudications, Ancient and Modern* (6 volumes) and several others.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972

By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

[illegible]

John Barrett Moore

This portrait of Judge Moore is a reproduction of one given to the writer on his second visit to the United States in December 1917, when he was despatched by his Government as a member of the Finance Commission headed by Baron Megata.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hurler NARS, Date 12-18-75

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Writer's Remarks

My previous monograph, "Comments on John Bassett Moore's Discussion with reference to Manchurian Incident, Embargo and Neutrality, New Psychology, 'Aggressor,' Kellogg Pact, League, American Birthright, etc.", has been received with gratifying interest both in Japan and abroad. The present monograph is a revised and expanded edition containing comments on the question of "boycott" which Judge Moore treated in his article, *The New Isolation*, which appeared in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, and my own views with regard to Manchoukuo recognition and the evolution of universal peace from careful consolidation of regional peace. In approaching this task, I found Judge Moore's discussions so comprehensive, realistic, and informed by so much legal acumen, that I had considerable difficulty in selecting therefrom the essential points, and I fear lest I may possibly have given a misleading turn to the valuable contribution of the renowned jurist. I wish, therefore, to take full responsibility for any misinterpretation of Judge Moore's discussions or any error in citing the Judge's authoritative views, which may be found in these pages.

SEIJI HISHIDA

Aoyama, Tokyo,

November, 1934.

Foreword By Baron Sakatani

Perhaps I may be entitled to say that my zeal in the promotion of international peace is second to that of no worker in the movement throughout the world. When Japan joined the League of Nations, we founded the League of Nations' Association of Japan and I exerted my full energies for the peace movement as an active member and later honorary President of that body. Yet despite my past association with the League's work and my ever present enthusiasm for its ideals, it seems to me difficult to resist the conclusion that the Geneva body fails when attempting to deal with serious political questions, specially those concerned with a far distant region, as was exhibited in the handling of the unhappy Sino-Japanese conflict on the Manchurian question. I still feel that the maintenance of international peace through the League may be attainable with a further development of civilization among nations. But in this transition stage, I quite agree with the renowned international jurist, John Bassett Moore, when he states that "the true and only foundation of peace" among nations, as among men, can be attained only through the reconciliation of their conflicting views and their conflicting interests, and that although nations or men differ in race, in creed and in colour, they must remove the causes of their discontent, elevate their moral sentiment, inculcate a spirit of justice and toleration. In other words, I feel that if the League is ultimately to fulfil effectively the high purposes which animated its founders, a long period of preparation must be undergone by individual nations in

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reciprocal adjustment of differences when and where they arise, so that international solidarity may be a strong and natural growth rather than a legal and sometimes distressing fiction.

I am confident that the present monograph of Dr. Hishida, which is a revision and extension of his former comments on Judge Moore's discussions, with the addition of his own statements on regional peace and Manchoukuo recognition, will be read with interest by all students of international affairs, for it sheds considerable light on one of the most complicated international situations of recent years, and contains valuable and practical suggestions for the future adjustment of international problems.

Y. Sakatani

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By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Preface By Viscount Kaneko

Judge John Bassett Moore and myself have been, I may almost say life-long, colleagues in the *Institut de Droit International*. I enjoyed his acquaintance in particular during my visit to the United States at the time of the Russo-Japanese War which was happily ended through the mediation of the late President Roosevelt.

His recent discussions of the contemplated Arms Embargo measures on the part of the United States and his "An Appeal to Reason" referring to the Manchurian question, the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and other matters, though principally designed to safe-guard the American "Birthright," exhibited a welcome attitude at justice towards the Japanese policy in the Far East, with reference to the recent Manchurian incident. He also makes mention of the attitude of the United States during the Russo-Japanese War under the Administration of Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay—"the practice of courtesy, moderation, and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused," quite contrary to the constant talk in recent years in the United States of having "special sanctions," referring to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, the application of which to the actual case Moore declares to be difficult. I can express the confident opinion, after reading this world-celebrated jurist's discussion of recent international questions, that his statement must contribute to realistic and durable peace not only in the Pacific region, but throughout the world at large.

Dr. Seiji Hishida, who was a pupil of John Bassett Moore

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at the time of my visit to the United States during the Russo-Japanese War, and who was taken into the Civil Service in Korea by the late Prince Ito on my recommendation, has compiled this monograph reviewing the authoritative statement given to the public by his esteemed tutor. His monograph is readable and should prove interesting to the general reader, particularly to those in Japan and America who are closely following recent international developments.

Kuntaro Kaneko.

Preface By Mr. Matsuoka

In treating of the contemplated embargo measures by the United States, Mr. Stimson's "New Psychology," the Manchurian question, the Kellogg Pact, the League of Nations, the term "Aggressor," and the "Birthright" of the United States, John Bassett Moore, who has the world-wide respect as a great, if not the greatest, authority on International Law, discusses the matter from the realistic point of view for which I have repeatedly and emphatically contended as a representative of the Japanese Government at the time when the Lytton Report on the Sino-Japanese dispute was examined. While in Geneva, I endeavoured to invite the League to pave the way for a conciliatory settlement of the dispute, but I myself found in the atmosphere of the League exactly what this eminent jurist observes: namely the fundamental defect embodied in the warlike devices of the League Covenant which was loosely, excitedly and unavailingly applied in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Dr. Seiji Hishida has just produced a monograph reviewing Judge Moore's letter addressed to the House Committee on the contemplated Embargo Bill, and his article which appeared in "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" under the title of "An Appeal to Reason." I have found his monograph very readable and easy to follow, so that the average reader can easily understand the leading points set forth by that renowned jurist on the most complicated international questions of the day.

Finally, I am quite in accord with Judge Moore's solemn statement—"the true and only foundation of peace" among

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nations like individuals "can be attained only through the reconciliation of our conflicting views and our conflicting interests," not through "the warlike devices" of "the new psychology" and of the League.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Preface By Dr. Baty

Dr. Seiji Hishida's sound and accurate views on international affairs, which are so evident to all readers of his *International Position of Japan as a Great Power*, were formed under the direction of that eminent master of the Law of Nations, Doctor John Bassett Moore. He has now taken the opportunity of doing a great service to the student of political affairs, as well as of paying a compliment to his old teacher, by reproducing the remarkable utterances of the latter contained in his recent letter to Mr. Fish and in his article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Dr. Hishida has succeeded in giving a very clear and readable summary of what Dr. Moore has to say: the Author's elegant irony and allusive style must have made this by no means an easy task.

Dr. Moore is rightly impatient with the modern slovenliness of thought which prompts not a few publicists to throw to the winds the wisdom of Washington, Jefferson and John Adams, and, proclaiming that—

“They didn't know everything down in Judee!”—, to pin their faith to a supposed transformation of human nature contemporaneous with the Treaty of Versailles, and comparable with anything that was accomplished by Moses at Sinai or the Lord in Galilee. The only outcome of such irrational confidence must be catastrophe. Without realizing it, every nation will incur commitments which will plunge it in inevitable strife. The wide circulation of Dr. Moore's weighty indictment in such a convenient form as the present, is a real

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contribution towards averting such a catastrophe: and as such it cannot be too warmly welcomed.

Dr. Bassett Moore's opinions cannot be neglected. His long experience in the State Department in Washington, as an International Judge at the Hague, as the erudite compiler of International Law Digests, and as a teacher of law, make him a unique figure in the world. When legal acumen is added to a severely realistic and practical outlook, the result must command universal attention. Dr. Hishida's enterprise and industry have found an ideal objective.

V. Baty

Kasumigaseki, Tokio.

一、第一ははるき著述である。その中に文藝、歴史、地理、政治、経済、教育、宗教、科学、文学、音楽、美術、スポーツ、娯楽、社会、法律、医学、農学、工学、建築、交通、通信、情報、環境、エネルギー、宇宙、未来、など、あらゆる分野の知識が、平易で興味深い文筆で紹介されている。著者は、その豊富な知識と、読者の理解を助けるための工夫が、この著書に遺憾なく発揮されている。

二、第二は、著者の独自の視点と、鋭い批判精神である。著者は、単に知識を伝えるだけでなく、社会の現状や、人間の未来について、独自の視点から鋭い批判や提言を行っている。その視点と批判精神が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

三、第三は、著者の熱い情熱と、読者への強いメッセージである。著者は、社会の現状や、人間の未来について、強い情熱を持って語っており、読者に対して、強いメッセージを送っている。その情熱とメッセージが、この著書の最大の特徴である。

四、第四は、著者の豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明である。著者は、その豊富な知識と、読者の理解を助けるための工夫が、この著書に遺憾なく発揮されている。その豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

五、第五は、著者の平易で興味深い文筆である。著者は、平易で興味深い文筆で、読者の理解を助けている。その平易で興味深い文筆が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

六、第六は、著者の豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明である。著者は、その豊富な知識と、読者の理解を助けるための工夫が、この著書に遺憾なく発揮されている。その豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

七、第七は、著者の熱い情熱と、読者への強いメッセージである。著者は、社会の現状や、人間の未来について、強い情熱を持って語っており、読者に対して、強いメッセージを送っている。その情熱とメッセージが、この著書の最大の特徴である。

八、第八は、著者の豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明である。著者は、その豊富な知識と、読者の理解を助けるための工夫が、この著書に遺憾なく発揮されている。その豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

九、第九は、著者の平易で興味深い文筆である。著者は、平易で興味深い文筆で、読者の理解を助けている。その平易で興味深い文筆が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

十、第十は、著者の豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明である。著者は、その豊富な知識と、読者の理解を助けるための工夫が、この著書に遺憾なく発揮されている。その豊富な知識と、読者への丁寧な説明が、この著書の最大の特徴である。

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1. Introduction

Since the Manchurian Incident occurred in the autumn of 1931, a number of books and articles on the Sino-Japanese dispute have been published in Europe and America. Many of them were written in a tone rather adverse to the Japanese stand. Some of them even allowed themselves to call Japan, directly or by implication, an "aggressor" or violator of the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the so-called Nine-Power Treaty. At the League Assembly's discussion on the Sino-Japanese dispute, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Delegate, on December 8, 1932, said that even if public opinion was against Japan, as "humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth 2,000 years ago," "in a very few years" world opinion would be changed and Japan would "also be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth came to be."

There lies before the writer of this monograph a letter addressed, on February 29, 1933, by Judge John Bassett Moore to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs before its hearings on the proposed joint resolution with the Senate relating to the Arms Embargo. His article, entitled "*An Appeal to Reason*," also appeared in the July number of "FOREIGN AFFAIRS," eliciting a comment from Dr. Thomas Baty under the title "A Daniel Come to Judgment," in which the wisdom of the Judge's reasoning is described as epoch-making. He again discussed important international questions including boycotts in an article entitled "*The New Isolation*," which appeared in the October number of THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. The main purpose of the articles and letter was to give a solemn warning to the United States, in their best interests,

not to allow their people and Government to be misled by the "Pacifists," or by such ideas and measures as are advocated by certain people, namely, a new interpretation of the law of neutrality, "new psychology," "war to end war," and international "sanctions" or "boycotts." Subsequently, touching on affairs in the Far East, especially the Manchurian Incident, from a realistic point of view, he exhibits unusual justice and fairness, by pointing out certain conspicuous defects of the Lytton Report, the lack of "friendly and impartial good offices" on the part of the League Assembly in approving the report and recommendations on the Sino-Japanese dispute, the difficulties of application of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty, like those of any other treaty, to an actual case, and the recklessness of any armed intervention in Manchuria by a nation several thousands of miles away,—unless such action were undertaken in self-defence. The writer has found that many points made by Judge Moore in his discussion of the Manchurian question, the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact were incidentally similar to those put forward by the Japanese representative at the League as well as in statements made by the Japanese Government, in the form of Observations on the Lytton Report and of objections to the League Assembly's report and recommendations. Indeed, his judicious and equitable discussion of one of the most difficult and complicated questions of international affairs of the present day must serve to clarify the short-sighted views on these questions so often indulged in by certain statesmen, publicists and scholars of International Law.

The writer, as a loyal subject of the Emperor of Japan, and also as a pupil of Judge Moore for several years at Columbia University—he wrote a thesis, "*The International Position of Japan as a Great Power*" under the Judge's supervision

—prompted by the desire to renew his sincere attitude of reverence to his esteemed tutor, and in the belief that such a statement of justice as was made recently by that learned and experienced jurist on international affairs, involving an explicit reference to Japan in relation to Manchuria, would constitute a real contribution toward the traditional friendship between Japan and America, presents herewith a monograph expounding the Manchurian and related questions with special reference to Judge Moore's discussions which he reproduces as appendices.

Before the declaration of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the sinking of the English ship *Kowshing*, while transporting a hostile Chinese force to Korea, by the Japanese man-of-war *Naniwa* commanded by the late Fleet Admiral Marquis (then Captain) Heihachiro Togo, was justified by Professors Holland and Westlake, eminent English authorities on international law, and the ill-feeling subsequently raised among neutral powers disappeared. John Bassett Moore's legally precise and politically realistic study of the most complicated international questions of the present day may well have a similar effect, in averting such a catastrophe as might be occasioned by unwise application of the so-called international peace machinery.

2. The Manchurian Incident

John Bassett Moore writes books and articles very seldom. When he writes a book, it is exhaustive, comprehensive and authoritative—indeed an indisputable standard on international law and foreign affairs for jurists, administrators and scholars. When he deals with a contemporary question of international affairs, it is always in a fashion entirely realistic, instructive, dispassionate, sound and sustainable.

Judge Moore treats the Manchurian incident from realistic and judicious points of view in his article, "An Appeal to Reason." With respect to the Lytton Report, Judge Moore thinks that its chief defect is that at the outset it assigns to the improvement of modern means of communication the blame for having induced the flagrant acts of force by which the isolation of China was broken in upon and her ports opened to European trade, and he cannot share the common habit of thinking of 'isolation' as an antonym of speed, "even though Japan, by a deliberate self-development that embraced the assimilation of all speedy devices, induced her exemplars in speed to renounce their earlier privileges" (of extraterritoriality). Unless all these phases of the matter be fully weighed, says Judge Moore, no one can pass on the dealings between the West and East in such a manner as well to perceive whether the word "nationalism" which the report so often uses, predominantly denotes, in any particular instance, a real aspiration for national unity, or merely an anti-foreign sentiment, and concludes: "the divisions in China largely account for her present plight." He mentions that the Lytton Report in treating of Manchuria does not overlook Russia's progressive absorption not only of that province but also of Korea, which caused Japan, in concern for her own national life, to risk the war with Russia thirty years ago. But he points out that

"the measures suggested by the report for the adjustment of present conditions are exceedingly complicated and largely depend for their successful application on a cooperation between China and Japan such as the western nations have not shown respecting the limitation of armaments or the readjustment of the balance of power as between themselves, to say nothing of their continued refusal to relinquish their extra-territorial rights in China because their surrender would be premature."

As to the report and recommendations of the Committee

of the League Assembly, Judge Moore is of opinion that they cannot be highly commended; for

"Japan is not called an aggressor" in this report, "but this is strongly hinted; and references to provisions of the Covenant that contemplate the use of force are rather plentiful."

The Assembly adopted the report. Japan then protested and resigned her membership of the League. On this Judge Moore emphatically observes—

"Had the Assembly tendered friendly and impartial good offices, and, as a great Secretary of State of the United States once suggested to an offending government, used 'some kind words,' it might have contributed to the actual and amicable solution of the immense difficulties which the Lytton Report so clearly explained."

He mentions that Sir John Simon, on February 27, just four days after the League Assembly adopted the draft report on the Sino-Japanese dispute, "speaking for the British Government to the House of Commons concerning the armed struggle in Manchuria, had declared: 'under no circumstances will this Government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict.'"

Judge Moore then points out that while the British Government, which has vast interests in the Far East, and other European Governments as well, were inclined to refrain from becoming parties to the armed struggle in Manchuria, "cries for boycotts, arms embargoes" were heard in America, in contrast to the fact that the United States (during the Russo-Japanese war, when President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay were in office) "specially enjoined on all its officials, civil, military and naval, the practice of courtesy, moderation and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused."

As to the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, which was frequently mentioned in the course of the discussion

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of the Sino-Japanese dispute by the League and has been constantly spoken of as having special "sanctity" in America, Judge Moore plainly suggests the difficulty of its application, like that of other treaties, to an actual case, when he says that

"though a nation's faith (of a treaty) should ever be inviolable, the application of the terms of treaties to actual cases is often disputed and uncertain, and nations are inclined, especially when they are under pressure, to be tenacious of their own opinions."

He also referred to the example of France refusing the proposal of Great Britain—

"to refer the question of the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr to the Permanent Court of International Justice,"

and added that—

"the many references to arbitral boards show how often nations disagree on questions of interpretation."

With regard to the possibility of armed intervention in Manchuria, he observes:

"The thought of armed intervention by the United States in Manchuria, while glaringly inconsistent with the recent vote to abandon the Philippines, inevitably suggests the possible failure of its object as well as other serious consequences."

If the attempt to occupy the territory should be successful, an international government might be set up. Such an international government in a territory where no efficient government exists, Judge Moore says, is most unlikely to be successful, and he goes on to point out the total failure of the American experiment in international government even in little Samoa.

Regarding the Open Door policy, after stating that—

"the phrase 'open door' is often used in a fighting sense, although war might necessitate the door's temporary closure,"—he says "the 'open door' means trade"

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and gives simply the trade figures for 1932 as between the United States and Japan and China, which show that the trade of the United States with the former was more than three times as large as that with the latter.

With regard to Manchoukuo Judge Moore, without undertaking at present to suggest what the final attitude of the United States toward the new government of Manchoukuo should be, points out that—

"the proposal of permanent 'non-recognition' too vividly recalls the uncertainty and failure, and the disorder, local and international, which attended the recent trial of that futile and demoralizing process as a means of preventing revolution or other unconstitutional acts in other lands."

Possibly warning the Americans against the unwisdom of meddling with the politics of a far distant continent, he mentions the tri-partite treaty signed at Paris in 1919 to guarantee the eastern frontier of France, which President Wilson never submitted to the Senate for ratification, internal order being subsequently perfectly well maintained on both sides of the Rhine.

In conclusion, Judge Moore states that many examples, including the Russo-Japanese war and the unending conflicts which followed, exhibit

"what a quagmire Manchuria offers for the swallowing up of blood and treasure, without permanent and uncontested reward to those who take their chances in it."

And he observes:

"the much vaunted annihilation of space and time," [as the Lytton report describes the influence of communications,] "has not yet enabled a nation thousands of miles away to exert its military power as effectively as it may do at home or in its immediate environment. For a distant nation to take the chances of armed intervention in Manchuria, unless in pursuit or defense of a vital interest, would suggest a recklessness savoring of monomania."

3. Recognition of Manchoukuo

The non-recognition principle of any change of regime in Manchuria, initiated by Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the United States in the Hoover administration, which was subsequently adopted by the League of Nations, was not agreed to by such eminent authorities on public law in his own land as Judge John Bassett Moore, Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell, an emeritus President of Harvard University, and Prof. Edwin M. Borchard of the Yale Law School. Judge Moore, as already stated, refers to Mr. Stimson's non-recognition doctrine as a "futile and demoralizing process."*

Manchoukuo was founded as an independent State by the spontaneous movement of the local inhabitants, coupled with an ardent aspiration to restore the Manchu Dynasty in the land of its origin, advantage being taken of the downfall of Chang's oppressive military rule, which was brought about when the Japanese troops acted in self-defence for protection of Japan's interests after her railway was destroyed by Chinese troops on the night of September 18, 1931.

As Manchuria is a country in which Japan has heavy investments and in which one million of her nationals reside, the Japanese troops had to co-operate with those of the new State in maintaining peace and order, while Japanese consular officers had to have dealings with the local civil authorities. This military co-operation and official dealing, together with receiving an Envoy of Manchoukuo in Tokyo and sending a Japanese Ambassador to Hsinking, and acknowledging Manchoukuo's national flag, already constituted *de facto* recognition of the new State on the part of Japan without formal expression.

*See Page 7.

Several months later, the Japanese Government deeming that Manchoukuo had made steady development "into maturity as an independent State" and that it was "assured of a future full of promise," accorded formal or *de jure* recognition to the new State by the Manchoukuo-Japanese Protocol signed on September 15, 1932. Subsequently, the League of Nations, and the United States under the administration of President Hoover and Secretary Stimson, held that the independence of Manchoukuo and the Japanese action are inconsistent with the provisions of the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government maintained "that neither the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, nor the conclusion of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, is in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, or any other international treaties." Japan also held that respecting the independence of Manchoukuo and encouraging its healthy development are vital for the maintenance of an enduring peace in the Far East. A divergence of view in these respects between the League of Nations and Japan finally forced her to withdraw from the League.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its healthy development are now *faits accomplis*. In former times, the recognition of the independence of a new State, after separation from an existing State by revolution, was often denounced by European powers chiefly under the influence of political motives. But apart from political considerations, it became later the general rule "to accord recognition when a people has shown itself capable of administering and maintaining independent government," as stated by Judge Moore in one of his works. Some powers may hesitate to recognize Manchoukuo for political reasons. On the other hand, the new State has by

international law no right to demand recognition, "although in practice such recognition cannot in the long run be withheld, because without it there is no possibility of entering into intercourse with the new State," as declared by an eminent authority on international law, Dr. L. Oppenheim. Indeed the interests of the States withholding recognition may suffer as much as those of the new State. Should their nationals desire to commence or continue their trade in and with Manchoukuo, it would be much better for their Governments to recognize the new State. Business necessity must often modify political sentiment. The fact should also be remembered that business was regarded as of such paramount importance by the Western states in the middle of the nineteenth century that they established commercial and diplomatic intercourse with Japan and China by force.

Soviet Russia which borders on Manchoukuo territory and has railway interests therein tacitly recognized Manchoukuo by receiving Manchoukuo consular authorities at Blagoveshensk and Chita in her territory and by stationing her consular authorities at Harbin, Mukden, Manchuli and Heiho with their *exequatur* approved by the Manchoukuo Government. Furthermore, the Soviet Government entered into diplomatic negotiation with Manchoukuo on the questions of boundaries, navigation and railways. In May 1934, the Republic of Salvador sent to the Manchoukuo Government a memorandum recognizing the Manchoukuo State and granting permission for free entry of Manchoukuo subjects as immigrants to the Republic. Subsequently, it was reported that the recognition accorded by Salvador "was solely an economic move, since Salvador desires to sell sisal hemp, as well as coffee, to Manchoukuo." The League of Nations, though still maintaining the non-recognition principle, decided

on May 16 through its Advisory Committee that the Manchoukuo postal service may be recognized by the postal administrations of the Member States of the League, such relations to be regarded as existing between the postal offices of individual States, but not as between the States themselves.

There is a precedent for retaliation in case of refusal of recognition. When the Kingdom of Italy was established, certain German States persistently refused to recognize it. These States, however, accorded recognition soon after the Kingdom had withdrawn the *exequatur* of their consuls.* Contrary to this precedent, the Manchoukuo Government is reported to have "no necessity at present to seek perforce recognition from other nations nor does it wish to indulge in such childish play as to boycott or retaliate against countries which are withholding their recognition." Furthermore, the open door policy is extended even to nations not recognizing Manchoukuo in the same way as to those according recognition, as is already shown by the trade mark law and other regulations of the new Government.

4. Neutrality and Embargo

At the time when the League of Nations resumed its hearing on the Sino-Japanese dispute in relation to the Lytton Report, in the latter part of 1932, an embargo measure against the so-called "aggressor" was much discussed in Europe and America, and it was often hinted that this should be applied to Japan.

In the closing days of the Hoover Administration in February, 1933, the United States Senate passed a joint resolution on the question of an arms embargo, and submitted it to

* J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, V. I. p. 72.

the House of Representatives. This resolution was intended to afford the President an opportunity to pick out one nation as an "aggressor" and then, in combination with other powers, to strangle that particular nation in the name of peace by embargo measures. When the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House sat for hearings on the bill, Judge Moore submitted a letter addressed to the Hon. Hamilton Fish, one of the Committee, and Mr. Edwin M. Borchard, Professor of International Law at Yale, presenting himself as a witness at the same hearings, said that before introducing his own view, he would like to bring to the attention of the Committee "the views of John Bassett Moore, the greatest authority, bar none, on this subject," whose name itself is one to "conjure with in this country, and very few countries have available a mind such as his." In this letter Judge Moore began by stating that there are some 'pacifists,' possibly as the result of reaction to the Great European War, who are ready to espouse the shallow creed that international peace could best be assured by the use of force or threats of force, adopting the supposition that pre-existing international law had suddenly become obsolete, and that the world had entered upon a new era in which the general peace was to be maintained by 'sanctions,' by boycotts, and by war. He went on to say that the proposed resolution before the Committee was essentially based on "the supposition that the law of neutrality no longer exists, and that in future there will be no neutrals." "As a life-long student and administrator of international law," Judge Moore said, he did not hesitate "to declare the supposition that neutrality is a thing of the past to be unsound in theory and false in fact." Reviewing American diplomatic history, he pointed out that the maintenance and defence of neutral rights was the settled and historic policy of the United States. Relating to contraband

trade, he observes—"Neutrality, in the legal sense, embraces not only impartiality but also abstention from participation in the conflict," and that if a government bans the shipment of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to an armed conflict and permits it to the other, it "intervenes in the conflict in a military sense and makes itself a party to the war, whether declared or undeclared." Judge Moore very emphatically affirmed that the proposed joint resolution, if adopted, would be "opposed to the settled policy and the highest interests of the United States and also to the provisions of its Federal Constitution."

In conclusion he stated:

"If the real purpose back of the pending resolution is simply to prevent the United States from furnishing implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, non-partisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign power could complain."

Prof. Borchard, subsequently speaking on the question as to whether the League had adjudged Japan the aggressor, said:

"They were extremely careful not to use the word 'aggressor,' I believe. That was to avoid the necessity of invoking sanctions under Article XVI. Had the Committee of Nineteen denounced Japan as the 'aggressor' the Assembly or Council might have had to invoke the sanctions of Article XVI. I infer that they would much prefer to have us pull their chestnuts out of the fire. We ought to be on our guard against it. We should be through with the business of pulling others' chestnuts out of the fire, in the name of peace, or the Kellogg Pact, or any other phrase that might be invented to serve the occasion."

This resolution enables the President, at his own will, to pick out any foreign nation or nations he chooses and make a treaty or alliance with it or them to impose an embargo. That is an abdication of the powers of the Senate in treaty making."

After mentioning Britain's attitude on embargo measures, which was one of preserving neutrality, Prof. Borchard said

that the American embargo resolution invited the danger of a breach of neutrality. He construed it "as an attempt to have the United States apply article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations," which was one of the main objections to America's joining the League. In reply to a question from Representative Tinkham, another committee member, regarding "neutrality for the United States as an essential policy to keep us out of war," Prof. Borchard answered that he regarded "neutrality as the greatest gift that God has put in the hands of the American people" and added:

"Neutrality has been regarded as the last and highest achievement of international law, but now, forsooth, the very principle of neutrality is challenged and we are invited to take part in all foreign troubles, thus creating universal turmoil. This opportunity to keep out of foreign troubles, to keep out of other people's quarrels, is a precious one."

When Mr. Tinkham asked whether Japan would have "the right, under international law, to take measures, if an embargo were applied against (her)," Prof. Borchard simply answered "Yes, Sir." Mr. Tinkham went on to suggest that "those reprisals might involve the seizure of American ships, the occupation of the Philippines and ultimately even the engagement of the American fleet." Whereupon the Committee asked, "in fact it would be making war?" To this Prof. Borchard answered: "That is, in my opinion, true. If I may make a comment upon it, if that contingency happened, I believe you would find Great Britain neutral."

Finally, when he was asked by Commissioner Gellette how he would "suggest that an embargo could be placed by one or more countries so that it would not constitute a breach of neutrality," Prof. Borchard replied that the only way to preserve neutrality would be to place it against all the belligerents in a particular war, and not against one, and suggested that the word 'country' in the embargo bill should be taken out,

adding: "the word 'countries' would be right, accompanied by an amendment prohibiting a breach of neutrality."

On the question as to whether "an aggressor" can be defined in the present state of international law, Prof. Borchard said that he doubted whether it would ever be possible to do so, and whether "anything but confusion will ever come from the attempt to do so." He added that international law has progressed and developed through several hundred years. "Even common law, which has but little analogy to the system of independent States, makes allowance for self-defence and permits a lot of aggression if the motive is defensive."

Whether the contentions of Judge Moore and Prof. Borchard carried weight with the American Legislature or not, it is significant to note that the Senate reconsidered its position and unanimously adopted the resolution on February 28, 1934, with a fundamental amendment to the effect that the embargo was not to be applied against a single belligerent, but against both or all belligerents, so as to safeguard American neutrality, the necessity for which was so strongly urged by the above mentioned authorities on international law.

5. "Boycott"

As to China's measure of boycotting Japanese trade, a subject of considerable controversy in the League, the Japanese representative emphatically contended that the Chinese boycott accompanied by violent acts and resorted to as an instrument of national policy was unlawful and that such an action, if adopted as a retaliatory measure, would have established a dangerous principle in modern international life. The Chinese representative insisted that the boycott was "a form of reaction against a given course of external origin—a cause which

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is beyond China's control" or "a natural and spontaneous response in resistance to Japanese aggression." In its report and recommendation on the same subject, the League gave its verdict that the boycott "falls under the category of reprisals."

Judge Moore, writing in the October number of *The American Journal of International Law* on "The New Isolation," inquires into the true character and significance of the boycott. He declares that, "among those who, as I am compelled to believe, would, if they had their way, most effectively isolate us from peace, the most popular method of abolishing war appears to be the boycott." As one of the generation that saw the birth of the word "boycott," Judge Moore gives an account of the now historic Captain Boycott, the land agent in Ireland in the days of "agrarian crime." The action in respect of which that gentleman's name has come to assume such international notoriety was conceived and carried out in a spirit anything but peaceful.

"He evicted many tenants, and in retaliation his neighbors refused all intercourse with him and his family, would not work for him or trade with him, and would not allow others to do so. In self-defense, which is allowable even under the Kellogg Pact, he asked for and obtained military protection; and with the growth of passion on both sides Ireland came to wear the aspect of a seething cauldron of warlike activities."

The movement of which Captain Boycott was the "central figure and victim," "was never supposed to have a peaceful import. On the contrary, it was used to denote a type of irregular warfare." "The world," says Judge Moore, "did not then regard this as a step towards peace."

For a further exposition of the nature of the boycott, the eminent jurist refers to what Mr. Garrard Glenn, a member of the law faculty of the University of Virginia, wrote on a recent occasion. "He explains," says Judge Moore, "the meaning of the boycott with a dialectic force and wealth of illustration

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that demonstrate his comprehensive acquaintance with the records of human experience and expose the poverty of the 'new thought.' According to this writer, the national boycott, "by reason of employing methods of coercion which war itself employs, and by seeking the ends which war is designed to attain, in and of itself, is war." Then Judge Moore observes that

"from time immemorial, commercial non-intercourse has been regarded as a measure incompatible with friendly relations and provocative of war, and it consequently has often been adopted as an appropriate preliminary to a declaration of war. Nothing could be more inadvertent or more incongruous than the contemplation of it as a peaceful measure."

He then goes on to discuss another form which public sentiment may assume under certain conditions, namely "the non-national or non-governmental boycotts enforced by popular or concerted action." He regards this as "equally devoid of a peaceful character." "While their avowed object is coercive," he explains, "no forecast can be made of the methods they may employ, of the extent to which they may be carried, or of the pitch to which popular passions may be raised." For, "in the general loosening of salutary restraints, honest but reckless resentment and unscrupulous malevolence or greed might be found to unite in the overthrow of justice and order and the suppression of individual liberty." "It is by these conditions," he continues, "that governments have been and may yet again be put in peril in their external as well as in their internal relations." As an incident illustrative of this point, he mentions the case of a person known to himself, who, "when a sudden excitement arose over the conflict between China and Japan" and the boycott was being "publicly advised to be applied to the latter country," "went to a well-known shop to buy a piece of silk with no thought of

what its possible origin might be." But as he was about to make his purchase, there arose a sudden cry, "What! buying a piece of Japanese silk?" "There was suddenly staged a near-riot," says Judge Moore, "from which the innocent victim could only withdraw." "Considering the antecedents," he comments, "nothing could be more logical than such a scene; but it was moblike, disorderly, irresponsible and oppressive and such as even the laws of war do not tolerate."

In fine, John Bassett Moore regards the boycott as a warlike measure.

6. The New Psychology and Isolationism

In his article, "An Appeal to Reason," appearing in the July (1933) number of "*FOREIGN AFFAIRS*," Judge Moore begins by commenting on an article of Mr. Stimson, lately Secretary of State, in the April number of the same periodical, and treats more fully the questions of neutrality, arms embargoes, "aggressors," Manchuria, the Kellogg Pact, the American "Birthright," the League and other topics.

Under the heading of "New Psychology," Judge Moore humorously describes the two articles written by Mr. Stimson and Professor Taussig in the April number of "*Foreign Affairs*" as a conspicuous exhibition of telepathy, and declares:

"This was very appropriate, as international relations often depend not so much on knowledge, experience and wise maxims as on temporary psychological conditions caused by accident, by oratory, by confused impulses and by craft, against the effects of which statesmen should ever safeguard their countries by avoiding the nebulous commitments and legal uncertainties that so readily contribute to senseless and destructive wars."

He summarizes Mr. Stimson's assertion as being a declaration that—

"certain measures adopted since the so-called World War, chief among which are the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, prove the existence of a new psychology, a new will to peace such as the world has never known before."

Although the League Covenant provides for arbitration, judicial settlement, investigation, mediatorial offices and a Permanent Court of International Justice, Judge Moore remarks that the League Covenant "is associated in the public mind probably more with proposed 'sanctions' (Article 16 of Covenant) than with anything else"; and "this is," he ventures to think, "unfortunate," because "war is the dominant note" in the provisions of this Article.

The Kellogg Pact, renouncing war altogether as an instrument of national policy, has been criticized as providing no perfect sanction, contrary to the League Covenant. It has been said, on the other hand, that the Pact does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force, and rests upon the sanction of public opinion and the will to make it effective. Judge Moore points out that Mr. Stimson still holds that the efficacy of the Pact depends on public opinion and not on force and that "it is only when the sanctions of the Covenant and the alleged decisions of the League are invoked that he welcomes, as agencies of peace, the menaces and measures of war which the Covenant prescribes."

Judge Moore observes that he has no quarrel with Mr. Stimson but he distrusts those methods and measures, characteristic of a certain type of mind and thought, for which he is presenting himself as a spokesman. Praying modestly for peace in his own time, Judge Moore profoundly distrusts such a psychology and such measures because "they have no visible moorings on earth or in the sky," and also because "they have infected many of (his) countrymen with confused notions of

law and of conduct which, while they endanger most American vital interests, hold out hopes of partisan intervention that encourage European governments to defer the readjustments which only they can make and which are essential to peace and tranquility in that quarter."

There were certain statesmen and publicists, especially in the U. S., who shared Mr. Stimson's views and were ready to dub "as 'isolationists' all persons in the United States who were unable impulsively to accept certain plans and modes of action, by no means so untried as their proponents assumed them to be, as the instrumentalities of a new and peaceful world order" and to proclaim that international law, particularly the law of neutrality "became obsolete" after the late World War.

Judge Moore in his article, *The New Isolation*, referring to what Grotius sagely remarked, "it is easy to push things too far, and, by losing sight of what is fundamental, to go to extremes and assume untenable positions," declares that "in this way those who would, in the speed of their desire, leave others behind, may perchance find themselves in a state of isolation, with injury to the cause which all may wish to serve," and become themselves the new isolationists.

7. "Aggressor"

The word "aggressor" has persistently been heard at Geneva of late. There was no doubt that Japan was at the back of the minds of those who, in Judge Moore's words, "made many attempts to define an aggressor, but never with any success."

Dealing with this term "aggressor," Judge Moore says it is dangerous to allow a certain favorite fallacy, specially

relating to the recent agitation for the punishment of "aggressors," to pass unchallenged although its refutation is really superfluous to any thinking mind. Although the word "aggressor" does not appear in the Covenant, many attempts have been made at Geneva to define an "aggressor," as the word has been used "as the technical designation of the nation to which the warlike devices of the League of Nations were intended to apply." Weighing the views expressed on this question by M. Briand whose "delicate and fragmentary suggestions clearly indicate that he did not intend them to be taken seriously as a definition," Judge Moore observes that the "attempt to define aggression for practical purposes has always failed, because, as has been well said, it is impossible to specify beforehand the objective criteria on which the decision whether an act was overt would necessarily depend."

On the other hand, he says, "the taking of a forcible initiative may be in some cases the only means of safety," citing the Portuguese action against the combined forces of France and Spain, 1762, the case of the brig *General Armstrong* in 1814, the *Navarino* case of 1827, and the case of the *Kowshing* in 1894.* The writer of the present monograph may now point out the illuminating fact that whereas further provocation was caused and further hostilities carried on between Chinese and Japanese whilst the League was dealing with the Sino-Japanese dispute, yet since the truce was effected between the Japanese and Chinese military representatives on May 31, 1933 at Tangku, in northern China—by which the Japanese troops, which had marched very close to Peiping, promptly withdrew to beyond the Great Wall, the boundary of Manchoukuo, and the Chinese troops to the specified line—the Chinese have not only gradually ceased to give provoca-

*See Page 3.

tion, even in southern China, but are reported now to contemplate the despatch of goodwill emissaries to Japan.

Judge Moore then expresses the opinion that "experience has conclusively shown that the attempt to decide the question of the aggressor on first appearance is reckless of justice," and it "must rely on an impartial investigation of the facts unless its purpose is unholy." But he says it takes time, as is seen in the case of the League's examination of the Sino-Japanese dispute, which continued seventeen months without reaching a final conclusion.

Judge Moore says that "the opposite of self-defense is aggression." The word self-defence assumes particular importance, in consideration of the Kellogg Pact, which is acclaimed by Mr. Stimson as evincing a revolutionary change in world public opinion. The British Government, however, did not accept it until they had carefully reserved their perfect freedom of action as a matter of self-defence in regions that have never been precisely defined. And again it is on the same point of self-defence that the most enthusiastic sponsors of the Kellogg Pact have to be content with expressions that show that they stand on none too firm ground. Then Judge Moore proceeds to say that we are told, as is pointed out by Mr. Stimson, that "the only limitation" to the Pact's "broad covenant" against war is "the right of self-defense," a right, it is declared, "so inherent and universal that it was not deemed necessary even to insert it expressly in the treaty," and whose "limits are defined by countless precedents." But what are these "countless precedents"? We are never to know. "The attempt so to define self-defense," says the renowned jurist, "that its future application would be clear and practically automatic is just as futile as the attempt similarly to define aggression has been—and must continue to be."

8. The "Kellogg Pact"

As to the true character of the Kellogg Pact, which is invoked as the crowning proof of the "world's recent regeneration," Judge Moore reviews the circumstances under which it was made. The first attempt, though unsuccessful, was made in June 1927 when M. Briand proposed to make an exclusive pact between France and the United States renouncing war "as an instrument of their policy toward each other," and pledging the two countries to settle their disputes by pacific means. Six months later Mr. Kellogg suddenly proposed to France a renunciation and pledge in which all the principal governments of the world should unite. In the course of the ensuing negotiations, the British Government, in their note of May 19, 1928, concerning the proposed renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, declared that they would not "suffer" any outside interference in certain regions the protection of which against outside attack would be considered as "a measure of self-defence."

"The way for this position of the British Government," [says Judge Moore] "had indeed been thoughtfully paved by Mr. Kellogg himself in a public address three weeks before, in which he declared that nothing in the proposed treaty in any way restricted or impaired the 'right of self-defense.'"

This British reservation made on the principle of self-defence, together with other conditions, was mentioned in and attached to the circular note which the United States addressed on June 23, 1928, to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and other governments, formally inviting them to accept the Pact as thus explained, and the Pact was accordingly signed at Paris. Regarding the manner of concluding the Pact, Judge Moore declares:

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"As the signing of a contract with a mental reservation is both illegal and dishonest, no government can be supposed to have signed the Pact with an intention to deny or repudiate the recorded conditions on which it was accepted."

Those conditions, in Judge Moore's opinion, were quite satisfactory to France, because they embraced a concession to M. Briand's demand that the "later renunciation of war should never be asserted to interfere with the full application of the war-making provisions of the Covenant." It means in other words that the Pact carefully provides against interference with the Covenant as a war-making device, as well as against interference with self-defence, and the protection of regional interests.

Be the Pact what it may, Judge Moore says that one can only wish that the parties to it will observe their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and their promise to settle their differences peacefully. He, however, objects when he is told that the renunciation and the promise constitute an epoch in history, and denote on the part of the signatories a radical change in attitude toward war. For was this not what was first proclaimed by Moses, taught by later prophets and again preached by Jesus himself on the Mount? On their teachings great churches have been built, and untold millions still worship at their shrines. "Fundamentally, they all teach brotherly kindness, justice, and peace," says Moore, "and yet, the most heavily armed and most warlike of modern nations have been those that profess the Christian faith. It is these," he asserts, "that brought to the Far East the modern implements of war." He concludes by stating that he would not wish to "destroy the nimbus of the Kellogg Pact," but he cannot exhibit a credulity beyond the capacity of the common mind when he is asked to believe that—

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"the renunciation and the promise complete a moral revolution, said to have begun during the World War, more radical than the commands of the Almighty and the precepts of Christ had been able to effect."

Judge Moore also mentions that "the Kellogg Pact was for M. Briand, before all else, a means to draw the United States, the decisive factor in the allied victory, into the League of Nations," as M. Paul-Boncour, M. Briand's great friend, has authoritatively declared. This shows us why the European "Eagles" in the League Council and Assembly, when discussing the Sino-Japanese dispute, were so persistent in desiring the participation of the United States, in spite of constant objection on the part of Japan.

9. The American "Birthright" and the League

In concluding his article, Judge Moore, under the heading of "Our Birthright," makes mention of George Washington's Farewell Address and the neutrality policy sustained by subsequent statesmen. Giving his attention to those who have been talking of American leadership in international affairs as the duty of a "world power," Judge Moore sternly warns his countrymen against such a tendency. At the same time, he enumerates several cases where the United States had acted independently as a "world power," chiefly to safe-guard her neutrality and her interests against European politics or intervention, since the administration of President Washington. He thinks that the United States would be throwing away their birthright by joining such an association as the League of Nations which, he says, in the present state of the popular mind, is characterized by warlike devices. With all due respect for the useful work done by the League of Nations, he says that the League, in dealing with political matters, "suffers

from the radical defects of its charter." Then, in support of his opinion, he quotes Mr. Elihu Root, who as early as March 13, 1919, prophetically declared that unless the Covenant was very materially amended both in form and in substance, "the world will before very long wake up to realize that a great opportunity has been wasted in the doing of a futile thing." This view was proved to be true on the recent, and by no means rare occasions on which loose, excited and unfulfilled threats of employing the warlike devices of the Covenant have exposed the League to reproach if not to contempt. He does not hesitate to mention as an example—

"the unhappy conflict between China and Japan in which, while warlike words were heard from Geneva, the ministers for foreign affairs of powerful members of the League were disavowing in their capitals any intention to intervene in the armed strife in Manchuria."

The fundamental defect of the League, which, in Judge Moore's opinion, originally had the character of a political club, nations being permitted to enter it only by invitation, "was the creation of the warlike devices on the fantastic assumption that the members of the League would, in making use of those devices, divest themselves of their individual interests and prepossessions, of their historic and instinctive antagonisms, and altruistically unite in enforcing the ideal of impartial justice." This weakness is inherent in the League, and he compares it to that of the great Confederation of Europe, based on the treaties that ended the Napoleonic Wars and the Holy Alliance. Although the Confederation contained no elaboration of warlike devices for the preservation of peace, it was eventually wrecked because the attempt of subsequent conferences to employ united military action divided the powers. "Such a result," says Judge Moore, with an eye on the League of Nations, "may be regarded as inevitable."

By entangling themselves in the mesh of European politics, the American people would only be throwing away their birth-right. They should never emulate Esau who "sold his birth-right for a mess of pottage."

Finally, Judge Moore concludes in his "*Appeal to Reason*" that the ideal of "the true and only foundation of peace" among nations, as among men, can be attained only through the reconciliation of their conflicting views and their conflicting interests, and declares that although nations or men differ in race and in creed and in colour, they must remove the causes of their discontent, elevate their moral sentiment, inculcate a spirit of justice and toleration, and compose and settle their differences, if they want to keep the peace among themselves.

It may confidently be asserted that if the Nineteen Powers Committee of the League Assembly had observed and exercised the principles of justice, tolerance and reconciliation that this eminent jurist commends, before drafting their report and recommendations on the Sino-Japanese dispute, it would have paved the way toward the settlement of the most difficult and complicated question the League was ever called upon to face, and Japan would never have severed her connection with the League.

10. From Regional to Universal Peace

Can the international peace machinery of the League of Nations be applicable to all nations of different regions—Europe, the American Continents or the Far East—which still have politically different temperaments and geographically different features? Is the League Covenant free from defects, as its authors originally supposed, when it is applied to political question of a serious nature? Why did the United

States, in spite of the fact that President Wilson was one of the chief authors of the Covenant, refrain from joining the League? The wide divergence of view relating to the peace of the Far East between the League of Nations, on the one hand, and Japan which regards the independence of the new state of Manchoukuo and the encouragement of its healthy development as of vital importance for peace in this region, on the other, led Japan to withdraw from the League on March 27, 1933.

Although having withdrawn from the League, Japan is, as enunciated in the Imperial Rescript issued on the same day, maintaining international co-operation and peace as a member of the "family of nations," like the United States, Germany and others, in her commercial, diplomatic and social intercourse with all other countries. By quitting the League, Japan does not hold herself aloof in the Extreme Orient, nor will she isolate herself from the fraternity of nations. Indeed it has been Japan's fixed policy to maintain and promote friendship and peace with the rest of the world since she entered into diplomatic and commercial relations with the Western nations three quarters of a century ago. While the Western nations established their international relations with China and Japan by force, these two Asiatic powers originally entered into modern international relations in 1871 by a peaceful movement of diplomatic finesse.

In political questions which affect her vital interest or the general peace of the Far East, Japan, however, endeavoured to embark on her own course for direct negotiation with the party concerned, rejecting the interference of third powers, contrary to China's habitual practice of foreign intercession according to her well known maxim: "fight in co-operation with one foreign devil against another." With regard to the

Sino-Japanese controversy on the Loochoo question, while General Grant of the United States was on his journey round the world he was asked in China to act as a mediator by Prince Kung and Li Hung-Chang; but when he was later told by Count Ito and General Saigo of Japan's decision to undertake direct negotiation, he added that it would be very important for China and Japan not to give any opportunity for European intervention in the Loochoo question or other issues between them.* During and after the Sino-Japanese War, which had been brought about by the controversy on the question of Korean independence, China strenuously sought foreign intervention, while Japan persistently endeavoured to negotiate for peace directly. Japan's legitimate fruits of victory, cession of the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, though secured by the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty, were taken away by the intervention of three great European powers, Russia, Germany and France. This was the beginning of the intrusion of European powers into international politics in the Far East, which made the Far Eastern situation more complicated and victimized China herself on more than one occasion. It was a step toward establishing "leased territories" or "spheres of influence" in China by the great powers of Europe. Had China not invited European intervention, there would have been no Russo-Japanese War. In the recent Sino-Japanese dispute on the Manchurian Incident, Japan at the outset sought direct negotiations and asked the League to pave the way for such negotiations when China submitted the case to Geneva. But the failure of the League to assist a conciliatory settlement finally forced Japan to withdraw from this institution with the determination to embark on her own course and to bear her own responsibility for

*Hiratsuka, Prince Ito's secret memoirs V. II. p. 21.

maintaining peace and security in the Far East, although exposing herself by doing so to a politically isolated position so far as the League of Nations was concerned.

Being seriously concerned with maintenance of peace and security in East Asia, by reason of her peculiar position therein, Japan, though welcoming the co-operation of nations directly concerned, denounces undue interference from other countries; *vice versa* she declines to meddle with what does not properly concern her, more particularly with European or American politics. John Bassett Moore, referring to the "good ancestral justification" for England's "splendid isolation," observes that Great Britain avoided in the greater part of the 19th century participation in so-called world wars, such as had occurred in previous centuries, and thus contributed to the general peace in Europe. The writer of the present monograph would point out that although Great Britain made an alliance with Japan in the beginning of the 20th century, this was to give security to Japan against interference from the continental powers of Europe in her impending struggle with Russia, and also to enable Great Britain to concentrate her fleet in the North Sea in order to meet any emergency in Europe. It is said that Great Britain, when the war broke out in 1914, had no option but to participate, partly by reason of her guarantee of Belgian neutrality and partly on account of her undertaking to protect the northern coast of France against invasion. As already stated in the Manchurian section, Sir John Simon, British Secretary of State, declared on February 27, 1933, four days after the League Assembly had approved the draft report and recommendations on the recent Sino-Japanese dispute against Japan, that Great Britain would not be a party to the conflict under any circumstances.

The thirteen American colonies, although they secured

their independence a century and a half ago by aid of the French alliance, soon adopted the policy of "non-intervention" and "neutrality," and later the Monroe doctrine, in order to keep the New World out of European politics. The United States made every effort not to become involved in the general European war growing out of Napoleonic revolution, entering only in 1812, simply for "defence of neutral right and the freedom of the sea." On the other hand, even in the critical times of the civil war in 1861-5, the United States did not permit intervention by European powers. In the recent European War, the United States refrained from participation as long as possible, and only entered on April 6, 1917, after the brusque German declaration of January 31 had aroused American hostility, as it violated every right of the freedom of the seas for which the American nation had contended for centuries. At the Peace Congress at Paris, the League of Nations was created, in 1919, to lay the foundations of a new international peace among nations. The United States, however, refused to join the League, though its President, Woodrow Wilson, was one of the chief authors of the League Covenant, mainly on the ground that it implied "permanent entanglement in the affairs of a distracted Europe." The embargo bill initiated by President Hoover's administration, which was designed to make the United States a party to every dispute or conflict in any part of the world, was amended under the present Roosevelt administration by the Senate in such a way as to preserve the United States' long standing neutrality, as strongly urged by Judge Moore and Professor Borchard, and to avoid entanglement in foreign war as far as possible. It seems that the United States is still more likely in the future to refrain from meddling with foreign disturbances and thereby to stabilize

general peace in the western hemisphere in co-operation with her sister Republics.

Just as John Bassett Moore remarked, the thought of armed intervention in Manchuria by the United States several thousand miles off is the recklessness of monomania; so any intervention by Japan in affairs across the vast Pacific Ocean by establishing a coaling station in Magdalena Bay of Mexico, an unfounded rumour of which was frequently propagated in the United States, would be the valour of ignorance on our part. The writer ventures to suggest from a realistic point of view that in any armed intervention either by Japan or the United States across the Pacific, the one who crossed the international date line would lose the game, if they be adequately armed for their national security, no matter what might be the quota or equality at which the leading naval Powers, so seriously discussing these questions to-day, might eventually agree to keep their respective naval forces. And he doubts how "the possible war between Japan and the United States," of which we hear so often from irresponsible statesmen and rumour-mongers, can ever come.

To-day Japan and the United States are not members of the League of Nations. As the United States is endeavouring to assume responsibility for maintaining peace in the western hemisphere in co-operation with her fellow Republics, traditionally refraining from intervention in European affairs and persistently rejecting foreign interference from either Asia or Europe, so Japan, "serving as the only corner stone for the edifice of peace in East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities" in that region, as Mr. Hirota, our Foreign Minister, declared on January 24, 1934 in the Diet.

The League of Nations is undoubtedly a great institution for promoting international peace. But the fundamental de-

fect of the League, as already pointed out by Judge Moore, lies in the character peculiar to the warlike devices of the Covenant in dealing with political matters, as exhibited in the handling of the unhappy Sino-Japanese conflict on the Manchurian question. The League's weakness and ineffectiveness as an international peace machine, was once again exposed even in Europe, its own birth place. When Germany's ardent appeal for immediate recovery of equality in armament as a matter of national self-respect was made at the Disarmament Conference in October, 1933, at Geneva, and not supported by most of the members, she finally left the Conference and subsequently withdrew from the League itself. The maintenance of international peace through the League of Nations or any other similar institution may perhaps be attainable with a further development of civilization among nations. In this transition stage, however, the writer believes that international peace could be better secured through regional peace being stabilized primarily among the nations concerned, such as European peace, security of the western hemisphere or peace among the nations concerned in East Asia. These groups might then co-operate as such for the maintenance of world peace on a basis of rigid non-interference in the affairs of one another.

It has often been asserted by superficial observers in recent years that as the struggle for world supremacy has shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, so will it shift to the Pacific which will in time become a centre of conflict among the world powers. Undoubtedly, in the course of the past quarter century, Japan's emergence as a new world power, the consolidation of Great Britain with her commonwealth and colonies in the Pacific area, the growing interest of the United States in Far Eastern affairs as a result of her acquisition

of the Philippine Islands, Russian's resumption of activity on the Asiatic Continent under the Bolshevik regime, coupled with the chaotic condition of China for the stabilization of which the interested Powers were rendering their assistance—all have served to create a situation in the Pacific area as delicate as it is of vital international concern. Yet sensible statesmen or the nations they represent, bordering on the vast Pacific Ocean, would think of striving for the supremacy or overlordship in the Pacific on a basis of a mere repetition of the struggles for supremacy seen in the many wars waged among European Powers particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As guarantees of peace in the Pacific areas, there are the Nine Power Treaty, the naval limitation treaties signed at Washington and London, the Kellogg Pact and others, which might be adjusted to changed conditions. Yet, when an issue arises, the nations concerned may have divergent views or conflicting interests. If the powers concerned in these areas, however, sincerely understanding their own respective stands and refraining from undue meddling with one another's affairs, should collaborate in reconciliation of their conflicting views and interests, the peace of the Pacific, could be effectively maintained. "Collective sanctions" and the pressure by a combination of dominating naval powers for settlement of international conflict have been suggested in certain circles. But such sanctions or threats would rather give provocation and retard the peace movement among nations. Of the leading nations in the Pacific areas, Japan and the United States particularly have maintained an almost unbroken friendship and only for a time following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent Shanghai affairs, public opinion was aroused against Japan. But the Americans will soon appreciate the

actual conditions in East Asia and realize Japan's position as a stabilizing force in this part of the Pacific. Between the two nations, Foreign Minister Hirota declared at the Imperial Diet, "there exists no question intrinsically difficult of solution," and he expressed the hope that:

"the two great nations across the Pacific will, in view of their important relations, commercial and otherwise, continue to join forces in cultivating their historical friendship and good understanding so as to keep the ocean forever true to its name."

After her withdrawal from the League, Japan directed her foreign policy on a course of its own and Foreign Minister Hirota used every ounce of his energy to "carry out the national policy by diplomatic means in the interest of the world," as he declared at the last session of the Diet. Many forebodings of a possible war between Japan and the Soviet Union have prevailed for almost a year, specially in connection with the dead-lock in the negotiations for sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Soviet to Manchoukuo through Japanese mediation, the concentration of the Soviet air-force in the Asiatic continent along the Manchurian borders, and later the recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States and the Soviet's complete change of policy in joining the League. The tentative agreement for the sale of the railway, however, is well within sight, thanks to able exercise of Mr. Hirota's good offices and those pessimistic surmises with regard to Soviet-Japanese relations have been proved unfounded. The Foreign Minister has also ably handled issues arising from our commercial differences with other nations. Regarding Japan's trade with the British colonies in Asia, she generally purchased more than she sold, as she was especially the heaviest purchaser of Indian raw cotton. But her favourable trade balance in recent years with India gave rise to the British restriction on im-

ports of Japanese cotton goods by raising a high tariff, to be answered by the Japanese boycott of Indian raw cotton. A similar situation was brought about regarding the Japanese trade with the Dutch East Indies. As the trade agreement recently concluded in July 1934 between Japan and India, generally adopting the most favoured nation treatment and a modified quota system, has settled the Indo-Japanese conflict, so the tradal differences between the Dutch East Indies and Japan, which now form the subject of diplomatic negotiations at the Batavia Conference, will probably be brought to a satisfactory solution.

Japan's foreign policy is primarily to stabilize the general peace in East Asia, and this would be a great contribution, ultimately, toward world peace itself. Should she be faced with any untoward question or commercial difference with other powers, she will act with diplomatic finesse in the spirit of thorough reconciliation and understanding.

APPENDICES

1. Letter addressed to House Committee

By JOHN BASSETT MOORE

*Reprinted from Hearings before the U. S.
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, No.
H. J. Res. 93, pp. 14-17.*

2. "An Appeal to Reason"

By JOHN BASSETT MOORE

*Reprinted from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July,
1933, pp. 547-588.*

3. "The New Isolation"

By JOHN BASSETT MOORE

*Extracts with special reference to the boycott,
reprinted from The American Journal of
International Law, October, 1933, pp. 625-27.*

APPENDIX

1. Letter addressed to House Committee by John Bassett Moore

New York, N. Y., March 27, 1933.

The Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr.,

Member of Congress, Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Fish: Although I am unable to appear at the hearing on the so-called arms embargo resolution on March 28, I feel it to be my duty to write you a few lines on the subject. I will first state the objections to the proposed measure as it stands, and will then point out how it may readily be made to conform to international law.

It will soon be 20 years since the outbreak in Europe of what eventually became known as the "World War." Following that unfortunate event there developed, in the ordinary course of things, a war madness, manifested in the exaltation of force and the belittling of the enduring legal and moral obligations which lie at the foundation of civilized life. Peaceful processes fell into disrepute. We began to hear of the "war to end war"; and pacifists, enamored of this shibboleth, espoused the shallow creed that international peace could best be assured by the use of force or threats of force. We were told that preexisting international law had suddenly become obsolete and that the world had entered upon a new era in which the general tranquillity was to be maintained by "sanctions," by boycotts, and by war. But the final stage was reached in the spawning of the notion, now rampant, that peoples may with force and arms exterminate one another without breach of the peace so long as they do not call it war. This may appropriately be called the stage of bedlam. In all this, however, students of history will find nothing new. The development of such manias normally characterizes the progress of a great war, just as their decline marks the return to sanity.

To the final stage to which I have referred belongs the supposition that the law of neutrality no longer exists, and that in future there will be no more neutrals. It is on this theory that the proposed resolution is essentially based. It is true that the resolution does not in terms say so; and it is equally true that less is just now said about this phase of the subject than was said not long ago. But it is only

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on this theory that the sweeping terms of the resolution can be defended.

As a lifelong student and administrator of international law, I do not hesitate to declare the supposition that neutrality is a thing of the past to be unsound in theory and false in fact. There is not in the world today a single government that is acting upon such a supposition. Governments are acting upon the contrary supposition, and in so doing are merely recognizing the actual fact. In the winter of 1922-23, there was held at The Hague an international conference to make rules for the regulation of the activities of aircraft and radio in time of war. The parties to this conference were the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands.

I had the honor to represent the United States in the conference and to be chosen to preside over it. We were able in the end to reach a unanimous agreement, which was incorporated in a general report. An examination of this report will show that it was largely devoted to the definition of the rights and duties of belligerents and of neutrals in time of war, and that it treated as still existing the Land War Neutrality Convention, the Convention for Adaptation of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare, and the convention concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime Warfare, all made at The Hague in 1907. The conference by which the report was adopted took place more than two years after the making of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations; the various delegations, it should be needless to state, acted under the authority and instructions of their respective governments; and yet, the idea that the law of neutrality had become obsolete never was suggested. So far as I am aware, not a single party to the Versailles Treaty or a single member of the League of Nations has ever actually taken the position that the law of neutrality is a thing of the past. The principal powers in the League have on occasion taken precisely the opposite position.

The fact is notorious that, after the Greeks were egged on to make war on the Turks and war actually came, Great Britain decided to remain neutral in the conflict, into which Canada and perhaps some of the other self-governing dominions unequivocally announced that they would not be drawn without their consent. In other recent wars Great Britain has pursued a neutral course. Other governments have done the same thing. No government, so far as I am advised, has repealed its neutrality laws. Those of the United States still remain on the statute books; and, if they are to be repealed, it should be done directly and not by implication or by embarking on a lawless course in the name of peace.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

We hear much today of the duties of the United States as a "world power," and the supposition seems widely to prevail that we have only lately reached that eminence. I am too good an American to think so poorly of my country and its achievements. The United States has always been a world power. It acted as a world power when, on the outbreak of the wars growing out of the French Revolution, its first President, George Washington, with Thomas Jefferson as his Secretary of State, proclaimed our neutrality. It acted as a world power when, some years later, it suppressed the activities of the Barbary pirates.

It acted as a world power when, in 1812, it went to war in defense of neutral rights. It acted as a world power when it proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. It acted as a world power in extending its trade and opening up foreign countries to its commerce, as it so effectually did by peaceful processes during the presidency of Gen. Andrew Jackson. It acted as a world power when it refused to permit the intervention of foreign nations in our Civil War. It acted as a world power when it forbade the further maintenance of the European empire set up in Mexico by French arms during our Civil War. It acted as a world power when, in the administration of President Grant, with Hamilton Fish as his Secretary of State, it brought about, through the greatest of all international arbitrations, the amicable settlement of the Alabama claims, and in so doing made a signal contribution to the further development of the law of neutrality. It is useless to continue the specification of instances. Nations, like individuals, may increase their power by combining with a due attention to their own business the extension of their friendly offices to brethren in trouble, and by conserving their militant resources for occasions when their vital interests are at stake. A nation that undertakes to meddle with every foreign disturbance is bound to become an international nuisance, to its own detriment as well as to the annoyance of other countries. Power is neither gained nor kept by such methods.

It is obvious that certain recent agitations have been and still are carried on under radically erroneous impressions as to the legal significance of the supply of arms and munitions of war to the parties to armed conflicts. The statement is often made that the trade in contraband is lawful, and the statement is also often made that such trade is unlawful. These statements may seem to be conflicting; but, when properly understood, they are both correct. Because there is much dispute as to what the term "contraband" includes, and because it has so far been deemed proper to limit the burdens to which a neutral

power is subject, international law has not up to the present time required neutral governments to prevent their citizens from manufacturing, selling, and shipping contraband, including arms and munitions of war, in the regular course of commerce. Hence, in the sense that a neutral government is not obliged to suppress such trade, the trade is lawful. On the other hand, however, international law recognizes the right of a party to a war to prevent such articles from reaching its adversary, and, if it seizes them, to confiscate them. In other words, international law, treating the trade as being, in an international sense, intrinsically unneutral and unlawful, permits the parties to the struggle to inflict the penalty, and to this the trader's government cannot object. The trader conducts the business at his peril.

But, while a neutral government is not obliged to suppress the contraband trade of its citizens, it is forbidden itself to supply contraband to a belligerent, and particularly is forbidden itself either to sell or to give to him munitions of war. Neutrality, in the legal sense, embraces not only impartiality but also abstention from participation in the conflict (Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 7, sec. 1288, p. 863). The prohibition of the neutral government itself to supply arms and munitions of war is based upon the unquestionable fact that the supply of such articles to a fighting force is a direct contribution to its military resources, and as such is a participation in the war; and, if a government does this, it virtually commits an act of war. If it does this in behalf of one of the parties, it abandons its neutrality and is guilty of armed intervention; and if it does it for both parties, although it may be said to be impartial, it does what neither of the parties themselves can do, namely, fights for each against the other. It is not long since the United States became, through an inadvertent failure to observe these elementary principles, involved in an unfortunate incident affecting a great and friendly American country, the Republic of Brazil. Happily, the intervention quickly ended, as the government in behalf of which it was committed abruptly disappeared, and in a few days we duly recognized its successor, as 15 other governments promptly did.

From the elementary principles of international law above set forth it necessarily follows that, if a government bans the shipment of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to an armed conflict and permits it to the other, intervenes in the conflict in a military sense and makes itself a party to the war, whether declared or undeclared.

The pending resolution is, I do not hesitate to affirm, opposed to the settled policy and the highest interests of the United States and

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also to the provisions of our Federal Constitution. If adopted, it would enable the President (1) to make international engagements of the most far-reaching kind at his will, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and (2) to carry us into war without the prerequisite constitutional declaration of war by Congress. Perhaps it may be answered that by the proposed resolution the Senate would voluntarily abdicate its constitutional powers regarding international engagements, and that the Congress would likewise abdicate its constitutional powers regarding the declaration of war. This argument might be accepted if the Senate and the Congress could constitutionally divest themselves of their constitutional powers and commit everything to the Executive. But, as they were unwilling to do this during the so-called World War, when it was proposed to give the President complete dictatorial powers, I can only suppose that the present extraordinary agitation is due to the misleading and somewhat deafening clamor of those who, in the name of peace, would confer upon the President an unlimited right to engage in hostilities.

I refrain from saying an unlimited right to make war only out of deference to the profound and learned authorities who assure us that war can be abolished either by calling it peace or by refraining from calling it war. This is, I may remark, a favorite notion with those who demand that the Kellogg Pact shall be equipped with "teeth" in order that it may masticate alleged "aggressors," and otherwise benignantly bite and gnaw its way to universal peace and concord. Unfortunately, there are many who appear to have been infected with these confused notions, which have been so industriously propagated in the United States. But, judged by the course of the principal members of the League of Nations during the past 10 years, and by their attitude toward the hostilities lately in progress in the Far East and elsewhere, such notions appear never to have had any real charm for the responsible authorities of the countries which would have been required to make the chief sacrifices in blood, in treasure, and in tears. To say this is not to impeach their wisdom or their sincerity. It may merely indicate that, having had enough of war, they long for real peace and an opportunity to recuperate.

Should the proposed measure become a law, no gift of prophecy is required to foretell what will follow. Groups moved by interest or swayed, consciously or unconsciously, by propaganda will clamor at the White House and at the Department of State for the unneutral application of the ban in favor of those whom they like or approve and

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against those whom they dislike or disapprove. We are assured that we may trust our authorities to resist such importunities, and to refrain from doing things that would involve the country in trouble. In other words, we are told that our authorities may be relied upon to refuse to exercise the powers so sweepingly conferred upon them. This is indeed a singular argument. Couched in the language of irresponsibility, it is not only self-stultifying but also unjust. The burdens and cares resting, especially at the present juncture, upon those who administer our affairs, are already grave and harassing enough, without imposing upon them the pastime of playing with war. Within the terms of the pending resolution, our Government would be asked to set itself up in rash and arrogant judgment upon the acts of other nations and on the merits of their conflicts, with a view to give or to permit military aid to one as against another.

Before committing ourselves to this presumptuous program, spun of the wild and flimsy fantasy that, when nations fall out and fight, the question of the "aggressor," which still baffles students even of ancient wars, lies upon the surface of things, and may be readily, safely, and justly determined by outsiders, of whose freedom from individual interest or bias there is no guarantee, we should reflect upon the fact that, had such a notion heretofore prevailed, we might and in all probability should ourselves have been the victim of it. As a marshaling of all the incidents would unduly prolong this letter, I will call attention to only two.

During our Civil War we were more than once menaced with the possibility of intervention, and, had it taken place, no one can say how fateful would have been the consequences. But, as an American, I share with my fellow country-men, as members of a great and united people, the universal sense that it is well that we were not permanently divided.

On April 6, 1898, there assembled at the White House the diplomatic representatives of six great European powers, who made in behalf of their governments what was called "a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain." We need not question the motives of the governments by which this remonstrance against our armed intervention was made. The President of the United States did not question their motives in his answer; but, with the conscious dignity that became himself as well as his great office, he expressed the confident expectation that the remonstrating powers would equally

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appreciate the effort of the United States "to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable." Two weeks later the Congress of the United States adopted a resolution under which the Government intervened with arms. The governments that had remonstrated against this step evidently did not regard Spain as the aggressor in the unhappy controversy between that country and the United States. The implication was clearly and directly to the contrary; and, according to the theory on which the pending resolution rests, the remonstrants, when the United States forcibly intervened might appropriately have declared an embargo upon the shipment of arms and munitions to this country, while continuing to supply Spain with the implements of war.

All this might, on the new theory, have been done in the name of peace, and, if the United States had exhibited resentment, this might have been treated only as further proof of its malevolent and aggressive disposition. It is better to reflect on such things while the opportunity still exists. It would be inexcusably short-sighted to assume that what has happened before will never happen again. We might also remember that our war for independence was treated by the great majority of powers merely as an act of rebellion against lawful authority. We waged the War of 1812 in support of disputed claims of national right. Many of our own people, including General Grant, have condemned our war with Mexico as an unjust aggression; but I am not aware that any of them has taken the ground that the general interest or the cause of peace would have been advanced if the powers of the world, some of which were not then themselves above suspicion, had combined their forces to oppose or to crush us.

If the real purpose back of the pending resolution is simply to prevent the United States from furnishing implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, nonpartisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign power could complain. There are already various countries which, in accordance with their laws, impose such a ban. This is entirely proper under international law. Whether such an inhibition would, without the cooperation of all other neutral nations, tend to limit the area, the destructiveness or the duration of wars is a conjectural matter on which I do not now undertake to pass. Nor do I intend to discuss the question how far such a policy may

tend to render weaker nations, financially unable to maintain munitions factories of their own, incapable of asserting or of defending their rights against larger powers. Considerations such as these lie within the domain of policy. The general bans, where they exist, are based upon the belief that, as the supply of arms and munitions constitutes a military aid, it is better and safer to forbid it altogether. In imposing upon itself such a restriction a nation acts within its undoubted rights, and gives no just cause for reproach.

Sincerely yours,

John Bassett Moore.

2. "An Appeal to Reason" by John Bassett Moore

I. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

The April number of FOREIGN AFFAIRS was conspicuous for an exhibition of telepathy, given in its first and second articles. This was very appropriate, as international relations often depend not so much on knowledge, experience and wise maxims as on temporary psychological conditions caused by accident, by oratory, by confused impulses and by craft, against the effects of which statesmen should ever safeguard their countries by avoiding the nebulous commitments and legal uncertainties that so readily contribute to senseless and destructive wars.

The first article, written by Mr. Stimson, lately Secretary of State, says in substance that certain measures adopted since the so-called World War, chief among which are the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, prove the existence of a new psychology, a new will to peace such as the world has never known before; and this, in spite of the daily demonstration throughout the world of a frenzied state of mind rampantly manifested in armed hostilities and in a spirit of intolerance such as is rarely seen.

The second article, written by Professor Taussig, of Harvard, treats of changes which he deems to be necessary in our commercial policy in order that we may bear our proper part in promoting the world's peace and prosperity as well as our own. This article tells us that our tariffs ever since 1901 have dealt with foreign countries "simply and solely on the penalty basis—the threat basis, or, if you please, the holding up of a club;" that they "offered nothing in the way of

concession;" that the crowning demonstration of what may be called our emergence from "isolation" and our moral regeneration and will to peace—the Tariff Act of 1930—put into the hands of the President the still stronger weapon of the complete exclusion of the products of any country that was conceived to discriminate against us; and that, while flourishing the club with ever-increasing violence, we changed traditional interpretation and application of the most-favored-nation clause in such a manner as to breed "friction, animosity, commercial warfare," particularly among our allies in the late war, and especially with "our nearest neighbor, our best customer," Canada. This sentence of condemnation is the more impressive because it is accompanied with a confession by Professor Taussig of error and change of heart on his own part in certain particulars, and with the declaration that we should now "turn from economic threat and economic war to friendly offer and friendly intercourse." Accepting these statements just as they are made, I forbear to debate certain economic questions which they naturally raise, but will at once proceed to consider the nature of the proof of humanity's alleged rebirth.

Nothing could more convincingly betray the fustian texture of the new psychology and will to peace than the circumstance that among its postulates there is not one which is not contrary to palpable realities, to the teachings of history, and to the formulation, in universal legal principles, of the results of all human experience.

Fortunately, we are able to diagnose the supposedly new state of mind with unusual exactness. It is scientifically traced back to the radical change in human nature which, first manifested in calling the World War a "war to end war," led to the formation of the League of Nations. The League, it is said, has not only prevented war but has "developed, particularly among the nations of Europe, a community of spirit which can be evoked to prevent war." But this was only the first lurch. It was nine years later, we are assured, in 1928, that there was taken the "still more sweeping step," the culminant leap, in the signing of the "Pact of Paris," vicariously known as the Kellogg or Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which sixty-two nations are now parties.

Before this Pact, we are told, international law had largely been "a development of principles based upon the existence of war" and its "legality;" while the law of neutrality imposed upon neutrals the duty not only "to maintain impartiality" between the belligerents but even to refrain from passing "moral judgment" on the rightfulness or

wrongfulness of the cause of either party, "at least to the extent of translating such a judgment into action." Such is the scant presentment of that unlovely and suddenly obsolete thing known as international law, with its immoral element of neutrality that is now to be transmuted into war in the interest of peace.

But this is only a modest beginning. We are assured that the Kellogg Pact showed a change in "world public opinion toward former customs and doctrines" so revolutionary that many have not been able to grasp it; a "revolution in human thought born of the consciousness that unless some such step was taken modern civilization might be doomed;" a revolution so radical that "war has become illegal throughout practically the entire world." In consequence, war, it is said, is "no longer to be the source and subject of rights;" its very existence "makes one or both parties wrongdoers, to be denounced as lawbreakers;" and that so "many legal precedents" have in consequence been rendered "obsolete" as to impose "on the legal profession the task of reexamining codes and treatises." The Kellogg Pact would, indeed, seem to have overturned almost everything except the Versailles Treaty, which, with the gyroscopic aid of the League of Nations, has continued to ride on an even keel. But, even this proud ship may be facing a compulsory change of course, as Signor Mussolini, holding aloft the Pact as his sextant, is demanding a reckoning. Under all the circumstances, it is no wonder that any cold analysis of what the Pact really is should be deprecated as an attempt to reduce it to a mere gesture and to destroy the faith of the world in efforts for peace. We are therefore properly expected to be content with the information that "the only limitation" to the Pact's "broad covenant" against war is "the right of self-defense"—a right, it is declared, "so inherent and universal that it was not deemed necessary even to insert it expressly in the treaty." But, lest some doubting Thomas might suggest that an "inherent and universal" limitation might prove to be troublesome if not nullifying, we are summarily assured that it "does not weaken the treaty," since the "limits" of the limitation "have been clearly defined by countless precedents." Unsatisfied readers of this assurance have been trying to conjecture what these precedents may be.

But of the exposition of the radical and revolutionary nature of the Kellogg Pact something more yet remains to be told. The Covenant of the League of Nations is associated in the public mind probably more with its proposed "sanctions" than with anything else; and this

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is, I venture to think, unfortunate. The Covenant provides for "arbitration," for "judicial settlement," for investigation, for mediatorial offices, and for a Permanent Court of International Justice, which was established more than ten years ago. But such processes are too insipid. They excite less interest and receive less attention than current local scandals. The "sanctions," which are both economic and military, bulk more largely, as they point towards war, unless war has just now become obsolete. But it is not treated as obsolete by the Covenant. The Covenant is redolent of it. By Article 16 any member of the League resorting to "war" in disregard of certain provisions is deemed to have committed an "act of war" against all the other members, which are then to sever and prohibit all intercourse, financial or commercial, with the Covenant-breaking state, and to unite in military measures on land, on sea and in the air against it. It may also be expelled from the League.

To these provisions, in which "war" is the dominant note, the Kellogg Pact does present a perfect contrast. The Pact, as we are told, "provides no sanctions." But we are asked to tread on highly controversial ground when we are asked to believe that the Pact "does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of force" in case it is "violated;" to believe that, resting "upon the sanction of public opinion" and "the will.....to make it effective," "it will be irresistible" if the people of the world "desire to make it effective;" to believe that the "critics who scoff at it have not accurately appraised the evolution world opinion since the World War;" and to believe that the Hoover-McDonald declaration at Rapidan in October 1929 that their governments were resolved to accept the Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge, "marked an epoch." How a declaration of the parties to a pledge that they mean to keep it can be said to mark an epoch, we need not inquire. But the intimation that those who regard the Pact alone as practically futile are unfriendly scoffers can by no means be accepted; for, among those who now insistently demand that it be furnished with "teeth," with which to affright and bite aggressors, the most conspicuous are those who, before it was signed, acclaimed it as a self-enforcing device. Nothing has caused so much scoffing or suspicion as this change of front.

In order to ensure entire precision, I have explained the new psychology in the very words used by Mr. Stimson, its authoritative

exponent and sponsor, in two issues of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.¹ Mr. Stimson, just as might have been expected, has not changed front on the Kellogg Pact. He still says that its efficacy must depend on public opinion and not on force. It is only when the sanctions of the Covenant and the alleged "decisions" of the League are invoked that he welcomes, as agencies of peace, the menaces and measures of war which the Covenant prescribes. I have no quarrel with Mr. Stimson. He is present in my reflections only as the spokesman, and as a sincere spokesman, of a group identified with a certain type of mind and thought, and with a belief in methods and measures which I, who modestly pray for peace in my own time, profoundly distrust not only because they have no visible moorings on earth or in the sky, but also because they have infected many of my countrymen with confused notions of law and of conduct which, while they endanger our own most vital interests, hold out hopes of partisan intervention that encourage European governments to defer the readjustments which only they can make and which are essential to peace and tranquillity in that quarter. As long as we persist in our misguided rôle, so long will discussions of disarmament be dominated by thoughts of war rather than of peace.

II. THE KELLOGG PACT

As the Kellogg Pact is invoked as the crowning proof of the world's recent regeneration, I will now state just what it is. I give it the name of its putative author, as M. Briand neither proposed nor formulated the multilateral agreement that was eventually signed. From time immemorial treaties of amity and commerce have contained a declaration that there shall be "perpetual amity" or a "perfect, firm and inviolable peace" between the contracting parties. The Kellogg Pact does not go so far. Resolved into its elements, it comprises two things: first, a general renunciation of war "as an instrument of national policy;" and secondly, a general pledge to settle all differences by peaceful negotiation.

M. Briand on June 20, 1927, proposed an exclusive pact between France and the United States renouncing war "as an instrument of their policy towards each other," and pledging the two countries to settle their disputes by pacific means. There was also a florid preamble,

1) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Supplement, October 1932; and April 1933.

very loosely drawn, in which the proposed contractants were spoken of as "two nations that no war has ever divided," the formal and serious maritime war of 1798, which actively continued until September 30, 1800, having been overlooked. But, for reasons of domestic and of foreign policy which may be surmised, M. Briand's proposal of an exclusive renunciation and pledge was not acceptable. There was delay; and six months had elapsed when on December 28, 1927, Mr. Kellogg suddenly fluttered the Eagles in the European dovecotes by proposing to France a renunciation and pledge in which all the principal governments of the world should unite. The Eagles anxiously exchanged notes, but soon found common ground in the discovery that they all had national policies, no matter how divergent they might be. They also remembered that the United States had its Monroe Doctrine. Then there was the Lansing-Ishii agreement, which recognized the "special relations" resulting from "territorial propinquity" and the consequent "special interests" of Japan in China; and which, although formally cancelled in 1923, left a visible trail of implications. Nevertheless, the phrase "national policy" had a dubious history. Even the United States had been charged with having asserted the Monroe Doctrine brusquely, if not aggressively, on occasions which some of the Eagles could hardly have forgotten. It was important that the phrase should be muffled, and this the Eagles proceeded to do.

We need not go into all the notes that were exchanged. We need mention only the one which the British Government, speaking individually but with the loud acclaim of the Eagles, presented on May 19, 1928; a note which, after quoting "the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy," declared that there were "certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which" constituted "a special and vital interest" for that government's "peace and safety," and that, as their protection against attack was "a measure of self-defense," no "interference" with them could be "suffered." The regions, it will be observed, were not named; and complete liberty as to their future designation was thus reserved. Then, in order effectually to preclude subsequent challenge or quibble, there was added this unequivocal condition: "It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect." The way for this addition had indeed been thoughtfully paved by Mr. Kellogg himself in a public address three weeks before, in which he declared that nothing in the proposed treaty in

any way restricted or impaired "the right of self-defense;" that this right was "inherent in every sovereign state" and "implicit in every treaty;" and that each nation "alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

In thus assuring to belligerents, each of which has decided that it acted in self-defense, the right to fight out their differences in peace, the new and regenerated psychology is for once superior to the old. Should it be said that this reduces the Pact to a bare expression of a sentiment and a moral obligation to act upon it, Mr. Kellogg has, much to his credit, dealt with the matter with his usual candor and without evasion. I have always surmised that Senator Borah, as an advocate of the "outlawry of war," played in this transaction a larger part than is generally known, especially as I observed that in the national campaign of 1928 he did not abate his appeals for the maintenance of an effective navy—not, of course, for the purpose of providing the renunciation of war with "teeth," but for the purpose of enabling the United States to exercise the right of self-defense that had been so amply safeguarded.

The notes in which the interpretations and conditions of the signatories were expressed, including that of Great Britain of May 19, 1928, were mentioned in and annexed to the circular note which the United States addressed on June 23, 1928, to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and certain other governments, formally inviting them to accept the Pact as thus explained. It was accordingly signed at Paris on August 27, 1928. As the signing of a contract with a mental reservation is both illegal and dishonest, no government can be supposed to have signed the Pact with an intention to deny or to repudiate the recorded conditions on which it was accepted. By M. Briand those conditions were specially cherished because they embraced a concession to his demand that the later renunciation of war should never be asserted to interfere with the full application of the war-making provisions of the Covenant. This concession was more radical than that made to the demand for the recognition of local special interests. The recognition of such interests rests on a principle as old as mankind: the natural and instinctive principle that peoples are more deeply concerned in what directly affects them and takes place at their doors than in what is remote. The concession made to M. Briand tends to subvert that principle.

No one could do anything but wish the parties to the Kellogg Pact to observe their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy

and their promise peacefully to settle their differences. But when I am told that the renunciation and the promise constitute an epoch in history, and denote on the part of the signatories, or even of any of them, a radical change in attitude toward war and toward the use of the vast armaments which they continue to maintain and show so much reluctance to reduce, I can hardly be reproached for recalling the Law and the Prophets and the Sermon on the Mount. On these foundations great churches have been built, and untold millions still worship at their shrines. Fundamentally, they all teach brotherly kindness, justice, and peace; and yet, the most heavily armed and most warlike of modern nations have been those that profess the Christian faith. It is these that brought to the Far East the modern implements of war. I would not destroy the nimbus of the Kellogg Pact; but when I am asked to believe that the renunciation and the promise complete a moral revolution, said to have begun during the World War, more radical than the commands of the Almighty and the precepts of Christ had been able to effect, I am asked to exhibit a credulity beyond the capacity of common minds.

No wonder that, as M. Paul-Boncour, M. Briand's great friend, has authoritatively told us,²⁾ the Kellogg Pact was for M. Briand, before all else, a means to draw the United States, the decisive factor in Allied victory, into the League of Nations. For, asks the spokesman of M. Briand's thoughts, could it be imagined that when some "aggressor" had torn up the Covenant, and the sanctions of Article 16 were set in motion against him, the United States, the initiator of the Pact, would remain indifferent to its violation and would not "throw into the duel" for peace the weight of the power which, as France had not forgotten, nothing could resist? Evidently it never occurred to M. Briand that France could ever be voted an "aggressor," or that the United States could ever be so voted so long as she fought for France. This was both ingenuous and logical, and worthy of M. Briand's clear intelligence. But, when I reflect on his eagerness to draw permanently into the service of an organization which France and her political allies and sympathizers have so largely dominated the irresistible military power of the United States, I cannot limit my recollections of that great statesman to his efforts for several years before his untimely death to bring about a better understanding between France and Germany; nor does it detract from the merit of those efforts that they

2) The New York Times, April 10, 1932.

were no less in the interest of France than in that of Germany. M. Briand began his political career, as so many other French statesmen have done, as a Socialist; and, while Socialism in France is not just what the American people suppose Socialism to be, it is associated with the idea of benevolence. This quality M. Briand possessed. Nevertheless, I do not forget how, as a member of government in 1911, when diplomatic tension between France and another country suddenly developed, he emerged as a "man of iron," and, calling railway strikers to the colors, compelled them to man the trains. Nor is it conceivable that if called to choose between France, even though she might not be clearly in the right, and the rest of the world, he could for an instant have hesitated to follow the fortunes of his native land, which he loved and served so long and so well.

HL THE LETHAL BLOW OF FACTS

There can be no higher or more convincing proof of the purely imaginary character of the supposed united "will to peace" than that which is furnished by the statement made in Parliament on March 23 last by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, British Prime Minister, on the general European situation, his recent visit to Rome, and the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Mr. MacDonald cannot be charged with unfriendly bias. He believes in peace, and has made personal sacrifices to the cause. He therefore spoke as a friendly witness, and as one having authority, when he ascribed the slow progress and the unsatisfactory results of the Conference to the "extraordinary difficulty" caused by the "diverse interests, diverse points of view, and diverse needs in disarmament" of the many nations concerned; to the "tremendous differences" that separated "delegation from delegation and nation from nation;" and above all to the fact that "the last word in these matters is the political word." It was for these reasons, said Mr. MacDonald, that the British Government had at last submitted a draft of an international convention containing as its essential features "figures regarding various armaments" and a provision for "security."

This plan, apart from details as to armament, suggests the allotment to each of various European countries of an average daily effective armed land force. For Germany it proposes 200,000, for Bulgaria and for Hungary 60,000 each; if we add Austria's unmentioned 20,000 we have a total of 340,000 men for what is left of the former "enemy" countries. Among the victors, France is allowed 200,000 home forces

and 200,000 colonial, in all 400,000; Belgium, 60,000 home, and 15,000 colonial, in all 75,000; Italy, 200,000 home, 50,000 colonial, in all 250,000; Poland, 200,000; Rumania, 150,000; Czechoslovakia, 100,000; Yugoslavia, 100,000; Greece, 60,000. This would give to the victors, exclusive of Great Britain, for whom figures were not submitted, a comfortable total of 1,235,000 as against 340,000 to the vanquished. To Russia, which now stand aloof, it was proposed to allow 500,000. From these figures it would seem that "security" presupposes not equality, but an overwhelming superiority for the victors, even without the persistently sought for "consultative" cooperation of the United States.

But, after all, the question is not so simple as this. There may still be persons who innocently suppose that the victorious Powers, in their common ardor for the good of humanity, completely and forever sank, while waging war together, all national ambitions and all selfish interests. This view could hardly have been shared by those who knew the contents of the treaties (the existence of which was by no means so "secret" as it is often alleged to have been) for the division of the spoils of war; nor should such a view have been entertained by any sensible man. Conflicts of interest, of ambition and of sentiment between nations must continue to exist as long as they exist among the human beings of which nations are composed. No one, therefore, should be surprised at Mr. MacDonald's candid confession that the inability of the Disarmament Conference to agree was due to the fact that the national delegations were kept widely apart by "diverse interests" and "tremendous differences" in regard to which the last word must be the "political word." Equally creditable to Mr. MacDonald was his admission that another and special complication was the fact that they were pledged by the Versailles Treaty, made thirteen years ago, "to give equality to Germany," and that the time had gone by when by a combination of Powers "any European people" could, permanently and without even a gradual mitigation, be kept down by obligations which it regarded "as being inconsistent with its self-respect and its honor." Day after day at Geneva, said Mr. MacDonald, he felt that he was "looking upon a stage with something moving immediately behind the footlights,"—"an ominous background full of shadows and uncertainties." Europe was, he declared, very unsettled, in a very nervous condition; and, unfortunately, "the one thing" that could "save us all," "well-founded confidence in each other," was "more lacking today" than it had been "for a very long time." Referring, then, to recent "events" and "speeches," and, also any-

mously, to the peace treaties of which that of Versailles was the first, he said that they all had for months and months been conscious that certain acts done some years ago were coming to flower and fruit, and that on those now living fell "the responsibility of dealing with the ripened event." He then narrated his visit to Rome, made on the invitation of Signor Mussolini. The Italian Premier, he explained, felt that Article 19 of the Covenant, which provides for the consideration of international conditions the continuation of which may endanger the peace of the world, was not meant to become dormant; that, as the Covenant enforced respect for treaty obligations, it contemplated the possibility of a revision of treaties bearing upon such conditions; that, after the lapse of ten years, they had entered on the first period when there should be cooperation in revision; and that, if this view were adopted as an immediate aid to peace and to the solution of Europe's difficulties and dangers, the friendship engendered would have further beneficial consequences.

Mr. MacDonald did not mention the well-known fact that while Great Britain and Italy have no unsettled scores there are outstanding differences and rivalries between France and Italy which no doubt influenced Signor Mussolini in insisting that any reductions of armaments, and particularly of naval armaments, made by Italy should be fully reciprocated by her strongest neighbor. This also has a bearing on his proposal of the Four Power Pact; and if, as some have suggested, such a Pact denotes a rift in the League, the cause must be traced to the League's inability to bring about any substantial amelioration of the conditions of the peace treaties. President Wilson spoke of Article 10 guaranteeing existing territorial boundaries as the "heart" of the Covenant; and so it was. Perhaps Article 19 may be spoken of as the lungs; but, while one may live with only a part of a lung, one cannot live without his whole heart.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NEUTRALITY

But it is when we come to consider what is said by some of those who assume to administer or profess to teach international law that the utterances of the new psychology cause the gravest apprehension. International law is condemned for conceding to war "legality," while the part relating to neutrality is rejected as forbidding "moral judgments" and their translation into action. Neither of these assertions can be accepted. On the contrary, they betray not only a total lack of

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comprehension of the law of neutrality, but also a fundamental misconception of the nature and function of all law, whether national or international.

Law does not create human activities; it merely recognizes and regulates them. The law of husband and wife neither perpetuates nor increases the propensity to perpetuate the human race; it merely recognizes the fact that the failure legally to regulate such a relation would invite a demoralizing uncertainty and chaos, while a legal ban would be both futile and ridiculous.

The pert retort that war does not perpetuate human life but destroys it would cause me not the slightest embarrassment. Defining civilization as the development of human activities under the restraint of enduring conventions, we must admit that peoples called civilized have constantly sought to increase their own growth and prosperity by war on peoples called uncivilized. War is defined as a contention by force, and, whether it be waged with fists or with frigates, its existence is coeval with the history of man; and, whatever may be its merits and demerits, it has been believed to be to some extent inevitable. An individual who commits an act of violence can readily be subdued; but such is not the case with men in the mass. The teachings of Christ are pervasively peaceful; but those who profess to accept them have seldom exemplified the precept not to resist evil. The early Christian Church beyond all cavil effectively exerted a distinctly peaceful influence, and often prevented wars between the peoples over whose minds and hearts it held sway; but the so-called religious wars, by which the division of the Church was followed, are conspicuous for their fierce and relentless character. The ancient writers on international law and relations evidently were better acquainted with these things, or were more candid with themselves, than are the proponents of our latest philosophy.

Theodore Roosevelt once exclaimed that we must have "Utopia or Hell." But as a consistent advocate of preparedness he apparently remembered that the world had always had the second alternative but never the first. The fathers of ancient as well as of modern international law similarly recognized the preponderance of proof. More than three hundred years ago Grotius, treating as undesirable extremists those who would declare all bearing of arms unlawful and those who regarded all war as lawful, wisely observed that when men urged things too far their authority was apt to be slighted, and their capacity for good diminished or destroyed. Therefore, while denouncing the evils

of war, he did not suppose that he "legalized" it when he enjoined observance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the humane treatment of captives, the sparing of private property, the abolition of its confiscation, the enlargement of the bounds of commercial freedom, and the establishment of rules of decision by which grave disputes have in countless cases been determined and strife and passion allayed. He recognized conquest only so far as the reestablishment of peace made it inevitable. Not with the smallest foundation can he or his enlightened followers, who have formulated rules and treaties mitigating the practices of war, be held responsible for the late World War, or for the acts that have, in violation of their precepts, sown the seeds of future wars. Those who, holding international law in some measure responsible for the recurrence of international wars, would plunge the world into chaos by sanctions and outlawries, must in all charity be supposed to have overlooked the constant recurrence of civil wars, to whose appalling total, which recent years have greatly increased, the United States once made a contribution of the first magnitude. I have been wont to remark that international wars will cease when civil wars end. Within the state there is legal organization and sanction beyond anything yet proposed in the international sphere, while the very phrase "civil" implies that the war is outlawed. Nevertheless, when obliged to characterize the civil strife then raging in the United States, our Supreme Court, after observing that a civil war was "never solemnly declared," but became such "by its accidents—the number, power and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on," learnedly declared that "the laws of war, as established among nations, have their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate the cruelties and misery produced by the scourge of war," and that, in consequence, "the parties to a civil war usually concede to each other courtesies and rules common to public or national wars." And the Court then adopted from Vattel, renowned for his learning and humanity, this profoundly illuminating passage:

The common laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor—ought to be observed by both parties in every civil war. Should the sovereign conceive he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite party will make reprisals;.....should he burn and ravage, they will follow his example; the war will become cruel, horrible, and every day more destructive to the nation.³⁾

The results of an attempt to deal with insurgents in arms solely

3) The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635,666,667.

on the theory that their conduct is "illegal," and that they must unconditionally submit to force, were perfectly exemplified in the chaos and destruction which led the United States to intervene in Cuba in 1898.

In reality, the current delusion that international law "legalizes" war, and therefore must now yield to the war-tending and warlike processes prescribed by the Covenant, comprising "sanctions," boycotts, and war itself, is merely the legitimate offspring of the new and consoling theory that peoples may with force and arms peacefully exterminate one another, provided they do not call it war.

From the same anarchic womb springs the exultant cry that the law of neutrality, because it blocked the new channel to peace, has been torpedoed, and that the neutral owners gurgled approval as they drowned. This would be a sad tale, if it were true. But it is false. There is not in the world today a single government that is acting upon such a supposition. Governments are acting upon the contrary supposition, and in so doing are merely recognizing the actual fact.

In the winter of 1922-23 there was held at The Hague an international conference to make rules for the regulation of the activities of aircraft and radio in time of war. The parties to this conference, over which I had the honor to preside, were the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. The delegates acted under the instructions of their respective governments. An examination of our unanimous report will show that it was largely devoted to the definition of the rights and duties of belligerents and of neutrals in time of war, and that it treated as still existing the Land War Neutrality Convention, the Convention for the Adaptation of the Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare, and the Convention concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime Warfare, all made at The Hague in 1907. The idea that the law of neutrality had become obsolete never was broached.

So far as I am aware, not a single party to the Versailles Treaty or a single member of the League of Nations has ever taken the position that the law of neutrality is a thing of the past. The principal Powers in the League have no occasion taken precisely the opposite position. All the judges of the World Court, in the Kiel Canal case, unhesitatingly concurred in the view that the law of neutrality remained unmodified; no one thought of doubting its continuing force. Up to the time of my resignation from the Court in 1928 no such doubt had been whispered; nor am I aware that any has since been suggested. In the war between Greece and Turkey in 1922, Great Britain decided

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to remain neutral in the conflict, into which Canada and perhaps some of the other self-governing dominions unequivocally announced that they would not be drawn without their consent. In the statement made in the House of Commons by Sir John Simon, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on February 27, 1933, concerning the embargo (soon revoked) on the shipment of arms to China and Japan, Sir John expressly spoke of Great Britain as a "neutral government," and of the necessity, for that reason, of making the embargo apply to China and Japan alike. In other recent wars Great Britain has pursued a neutral course. France and other governments have done the same thing. On the recent declaration of war by Paraguay against Bolivia, the governments Argentina, Chile and Peru immediately issued declarations of neutrality, thus showing, as they intended to remain neutral, an intelligent respect for international law, to the literature of which some of their publicists have ably contributed.

Governments intending to remain neutral in a conflict do not, it is true, always issue proclamations. In the case of a small or distant conflict, a proclamation may seem to be needless; but the laws stand on the books and are enforced whenever the occasion may arise. Neutrality proclamations are only clarifying warnings. Neutrality always has had, as classical records show, the highly moral and expedient object of preventing the spread of war; and it furthermore prohibits the doing in time of peace of acts designed to contribute to the starting of wars abroad. In the days of the old psychology, before the crafty throat of war began to coo of peace, neutrality was chiefly offensive to war-mongers and war-profiteers. Today, however, and very naturally, it is even more detested by the devotees of the war-gospel of peace through force. But even they should be willing to reflect on the fact that its abolition would make every war potentially a world war, and that its individual repudiation by the United States would, whenever war anywhere broke out, immediately expose us to attack, as well as to claims for damages and to forcible measures of redress for any specific unneutral acts. It would also enable any Power or combination of Powers having an interest so to do to proceed against us as an enemy. Should little Costa Rica or Salvador enter upon the course now urged upon the United States, how long would they be permitted to remain on the map? And might not the United States demand precedence as Lord High Executioner? It is not logical for those who clamor for peace to cry out for measures the adoption of which only a nation commanding overwhelming force could hope to survive.

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It is argued that increased population, industrialism, and interdependence, and the increased variety and speed of communications, have made neutrality increasingly ineffective, and have also made it likely that war, when it starts in any part of the world, will envelop the whole. In reality, the better and speedier the means of communications the more effectively can a government enforce its neutrality. That the enforcement of neutrality by the United States became easier and more effective with improvement in communications is as notorious as it was natural. The supposition that the recent great war is entitled to preëminence as a world war, that improved means of communication caused it to become so, and that it shows that every local war is now likely to cover the earth, is remarkably unfounded. It did not begin as a local war, but embraced all the European Great Powers and some of the lesser. It did not exceed the spread of all previous wars, or equal that of some of them. Its extent in no sense resulted from improved means of communication. The numerous local wars that have since occurred, but have remained local, clearly demonstrate that the supposed greater likelihood of spread is fanciful. But, on the evidence before us, it must be admitted that the erroneous belief that every war is now likely to become a world war creates a passion to make it so.

The supposition that the law of neutrality imposes moral indifference to the merits of armed conflicts and makes any intervention in them unlawful, I can only call baseless. The law of neutrality does not require a neutral state to remain so. A neutral state may, should it so desire, enter the conflict; but it cannot be both in and out. The law of neutrality merely applies the rule of common honesty. Parties to an armed conflict are entitled to know who are in it and who are not. No matter how it is viewed, the demand that the law of neutrality shall be considered as obsolete is so visionary, so confused, so somnambulist that no concession to it can be rationally made.

V. ARMS EMBARGOES

Repugnance to the law of neutrality is justified only on the part of those who, as shown by the original draft of the recent Arms Embargo Resolution before Congress, wish public authorities not legally invested with the power to declare war to be able at any moment, either alone or in association with others, to involve the country in war. This repugnance naturally distinguished those who wish the United States to assist in enforcing the "decisions" of the League of

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Nations, pending the fulfillment of their desire that the United States become a member of the League. This object reverberates in the letter of Viscount Cecil, published in the *London Times* of February 21, 1933, on the "very important pronouncements" made by the "Democratic President-elect of the United States" on January 11, and by the "Republican Secretary of State," Mr. Stimson, a month later; pronouncements which, he says, "make it clear that both parties in the United States stand for participation in an arms embargo against an aggressor State," while "the *Republican* Secretary of State declares that in this connection a decision by the League as to which is the aggressor is for practical purposes conclusive!" In still cherishing, as we have seen they do, the law of neutrality, members of the League no doubt regard it as an assurance against becoming involved in the untold wars to which, though neither desired by themselves nor approved by the League, the chaos resulting from the abolition of neutrality would expose them, as well as all other nations.

The Arms Embargo Resolution, as presented to Congress during the late Administration, proposed to authorize the President of the United States, either alone or in association with other Powers, discriminately to prohibit the shipment or sale of arms and munitions of war to one of the parties to a war, while leaving unrestrained the shipment and sale to the other. In this form the resolution, unless deliberately designed to disregard existing international law, evidently proceeded upon a complete misconception of the legal significance of the supply of arms and munitions of war to the parties to armed conflicts. The statement is often made that the trade in contraband is lawful, and the statement is also often made that such trade is unlawful. These statements may seem to be conflicting; but, when properly understood, they are both correct. Because there is much dispute as to what the term contraband includes, and because it has so far been deemed proper to limit the burdens to which a neutral Power is subject, international law has not up to the present time required neutral governments to prevent their citizens from manufacturing, selling and shipping contraband, including arms and munitions of war, in the regular course of commerce. Hence, in the sense that a neutral government is not obliged to suppress such trade, the trade is lawful. On the other hand, however, international law recognizes the right of a party to a war to prevent such articles from reaching its adversary, and, if it seizes them, to confiscate them. This essential right we have ourselves always exercised in our wars; and we never should, I suppose,

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dream of giving it up. The trader carries on the business at his peril, and his government is forbidden to protect him. But as the supply of arms and ammunition to a fighting force is a direct contribution to its military resources, a neutral government cannot itself supply such articles to the parties to an armed conflict, or permit its citizens to supply them to one party but not to the other, without abandoning its neutrality and making itself a party to the conflict, whether war has or has not been declared. It would therefore be altogether indefensible, whether the resolution be limited to America or extended to the whole world, to pass it in a form that would enable the Executive alone to expose the United States to reprisals and justifiable war by other nations by doing things that in their nature carry a country into war.

Had it from the beginning been agreed that every war was to be treated as a universal war, the course of history might have been changed, but not for the better. Said Cromwell: "Put your trust in God; but mind to keep your powder dry." Napoleon, than whom there could be no higher authority on such a subject, said, "Providence is always on the side of the last reserve, and the truth of this saying was as clearly demonstrated in his final defeat at Waterloo as it was in his previous victories. Moralists now proposing to regenerate the world by violence, without regard to the consequences to their own country or to any other, might also reflect on Lowell's line: "Truth forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne." Dryden spoke of "Worth on foot and rascals in the coach." As our advanced moralists of course expect to ride in the coach, they might do well to consider how they might themselves be classified when the country came to pay the cost of their reckless superiority to law and to the lessons of history.

It is said that our authorities may be relied upon to refuse to exercise the powers so sweepingly conferred upon them. This is indeed a singular argument. Couched in the language of irresponsibility, it is not only self-stultifying but also unjust. The burdens and cares resting upon those who administer our affairs are already grave and harassing enough without imposing upon them the pastime of playing with war.

It is also said that the resolution as originally drafted would merely confer on the President the same power as that conferred on other heads of states, including that of Great Britain. But this statement wholly overlooks our constitutional limitations. The British Crown possesses the power to declare war and to make alliances; the Constitution of the United States denies to the President the power to

do either. On the contrary, the war-declaring power is vested in Congress, and the making of alliances requires the advice and consent of the Senate.

Should the United States desire to prohibit the furnishing of implements of war to those who are engaged in armed strife, this may readily be done by providing for a comprehensive, non-partisan embargo on the shipment of arms to all countries engaged in armed strife, whether international or civil. Such an embargo would naturally be announced and imposed by public proclamation. Of this no foreign Power could complain. There are already various countries which, in accordance with their laws, impose such a ban. That such an inhibition, without the coöperation of all other neutral nations, tends to limit the area, destructiveness or duration of war I do not now undertake to affirm. Some notably humane writers, such as Westlake, have urged that a total ban might render weaker nations, financially unable to maintain munitions factories of their own, incapable of asserting or of defending their rights against larger Powers. Considerations such as these lie within the domain of policy.

VI. THE AGGRESSOR

It is dangerous to allow a fallacy to pass unchallenged because its refutation should seem to be superfluous. Especially is this so when it may easily be imposed on uninformed or unreflecting minds by appeals to the sentiment of benevolence. These truths are perfectly exemplified by the spread of the recent agitation for the punishment of "aggressors."

The word "aggressor" does not occur in the Covenant, but it has been used as the technical designation of the nation to which the warlike devices of the League of Nations were intended to apply. For this reason many attempts have been made at Geneva to define an aggressor, but never with any success. Among these may be included the delphic effort of M. Briand. "A cannon shot," said M. Briand, "is a cannon shot;" and "you can hear it, and it often leaves its traces." Then, conjectures M. Briand, the League says "Cease fire;" and, "if one of the adversaries refuses, we can surely say that he is not really very anxious about peace." I have great respect for M. Briand, and if this was the best so able a man could do, the case must indeed be desperate. Certainly a cannon shot is a cannon shot. But if the adversary who ceased fire on Geneva's command should then be killed

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or disabled, he neither could nor would feel grateful, nor would his example inspire enthusiasm. Besides, even if Geneva had large military forces of her own in Europe, and they were not already preoccupied with exerting a peaceful influence in that quarter, it is a long way, for example, to Singapore; and decisive wars have often been of brief duration.

M. Briand's delicate and fragmentary suggestions clearly indicate that he did not intend them to be taken seriously as a definition. More serious in tone but equally futile is the suggestion made on the part of the United States at Geneva on May 22, 1932, that "the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties." Whether the framer of this definition was or was not thinking of Manchuria, he immediately impaled the sudden seizure and occupation of Vera Cruz by the United States in April 1914, in disregard of the treaty with Mexico of 1848, which expressly provided that neither party should resort to force before trying peaceful negotiation, and, if that should fail, arbitration. The excuse, should it be attempted, that there was no time for discussion, would merely puncture the definition. Moreover, were there no treaty, would an armed invasion cease to be an act of aggression? Might not such an invasion, even if a treaty were violated, be excused as an act of self-defense? In the celebrated case of McLeod, which nearly brought on a war, Great Britain excused her invasion of United States territory on that plea; but as the United States denied that the facts supported the plea, Great Britain made a soothing apology without admitting any wrong. Would, or would not, the new definition justify the landing of foreign troops to preserve order, as has often been done without the consent of the local government? Would it, for instance, make our military occupation of Nicaragua an act of aggression? Furthermore, will it be asserted that the answer to the question whether a treaty has been violated lies on the surface, and may not be a subject of honest difference of opinion, both on the facts and on the law, even among disinterested and impartial judges? Evidently, the draftsman of the definition was less prudent than the knowing M. Briand. It has also been suggested that the aggressor is he who fires the first shot; but the law does not require a man who believes himself to be in danger to assume that his adversary is a bad shot.

Probably it would be unfair to surmise that the persistent effort, after a decade of ghost dancing, to define the "aggressor," always

reflects the desire by means of some formula readily to obtain the military cooperation of the United States nominally in the righteous cause of peace. The thought of restraining aggressors is very ancient; but the attempt to define aggression for practical purposes has always failed, because, as has been well said,⁴⁾ it is impossible to specify beforehand the objective criteria on which the decision whether an act was overt would necessarily depend. Although nations when they go to war always profess to repel overt acts, yet they frequently do not go to war on account of them; but an assurance of associate force would necessarily increase their propensity to do so. Moreover, it is notorious that overt acts are sometimes craftily provoked for the purpose of justifying aggression; and it may be significant that the definition of the "aggressor" peculiarly preoccupies the minds of those who are best prepared to commit aggression.

On the other hand, the taking of a forcible initiative may be the only means of safety; and the importance of this principle is necessarily enhanced by the insistence of nations or groups of nations on maintaining preponderance of military power. Portugal acted on this principle when, in 1762, the combined forces of France and Spain were hovering on her frontier. In many instances the question of aggression remains indeterminate. The Hundred Years' War, which began in 1292, originated in a fist-fight between two sailors, the one Norman and the other English, in the port of Bayonne. In the battle of Navarino which, in 1827, resulted in the destruction of the Turkish fleet by the combined naval forces of England, France and Russia, the first actual shot was fired by the Turks; but English naval writers later candidly admitted that the Ottoman commander probably believed that he was repelling an attack. In the case of the destruction of the armed brig *General Armstrong* by a British squadron in the port of Fayal, Louis Napoleon, acting as arbitrator, held that the brig was the aggressor; but our Congress, believing this decision to be wrong, eventually compensated the brig's owners, officers and crew for their losses. When, in 1894, a Japanese cruiser before war with China was declared sank the British vessel *Kowshing*, carrying Chinese troops to Korea, an immediate outcry took place in England; but the excitement soon died down on the public justification of the cruiser's act by Holland and Westlake, two eminent English authorities on international law.

4) "The Slippery Aggressor," *The World Tomorrow*, June, 1930.

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As experience has conclusively shown that the attempt to decide the question of the aggressor on first appearance is reckless of justice, we must, unless our purposes are unholy, rely on an impartial investigation of the facts. But this takes time. The Assembly of the League of Nations assumed jurisdiction of the Sino-Japanese conflict on September 21, 1931; the report of the Lytton Commission was signed at Peiping, China, on September 4, 1932; the Assembly adopted the report of its own committee on February 17, 1933. The actual time covered by the proceedings was seventeen months, and even then a final conclusion was not reached. Decisive wars have ended in less time. Napoleon escaped from Elba in February 1815, and the decisive battle of Waterloo took place in the following June. The war over Schleswig-Holstein of 1864 was brief; the war between Prussia and Austria of 1866 lasted six weeks; the United States declared war against Spain in April 1898, and the peace protocol, which ended the military conflict and defined the basis of peace, was signed in the following August. These are only a few examples.

That intimations that a party to a dispute may be penalized as an aggressor may not have a deterrent effect has just been shown by the course of Peru in her recent dispute with Colombia. The hostilities continued until the sudden death of Peru's Chief Executive brought to the presidency a statesman who happened to have been a diplomatic colleague, at London, of the leader of the Colombian Liberal party. An exchange of personal messages and a journey by aeroplane to Lima resulted in the conclusion of a pact of peace. The friendly human touch quickly obtained what official admonitions had been unable to secure.

Had the principle of preventing aggression been applied one cannot say what might have been the results to the United States. Our War of Independence was generally regarded in Europe as an act of rebellion against lawful authority. In the war of 1812 we appeared as aggressive assertors of the freedom of the seas. General Grant pronounced our war with Mexico of 1846 an act of unjust aggression. The Government of the United States dealt with secession as an act of rebellion. In April 1898 the diplomatic representatives of six great European Powers assembled at the White House and in behalf of their governments made what was called "a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain." They evidently did not regard Spain as the aggressor. President McKinley in his reply

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expressed the confident expectation that the remonstrating Powers would appreciate our offer "to fulfil the duty of humanity by ending a situation, the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable." Had they, when we forcibly intervened, declared an embargo upon the shipment of arms and ammunition to the United States, while continuing to supply Spain with the implements of war, we should have resented in appropriate ways their partisan action.

Should we attempt to apply retrospectively the principle of staying or punishing the aggressor we should be obliged to determine the question whether the forcible creation of that great agency of law and civilization, the Roman Empire, or the forcible progress of any other great historic movement, should not have been prevented; whether the formation of the British Empire or the extension of France and her colonial empire should not have been opposed; whether the establishment of the Russian Empire should not have been resisted; whether the world should not have prevented the United States from becoming what it is; also, whether the forcible association in earlier times of the vast aggregation of states now known as China did not result from a neglect by other states of their duties and, perchance, their opportunities.

The opposite of self-defense is aggression. We have been told that the limits of self-defense "have been clearly defined by countless precedents." Students of this subject have remarked that it would be "interesting to know" what these "countless precedents" are, but their curiosity has not been gratified. It will not be. The attempt so to define self-defense that its future application would be clear and practically automatic is just as futile as the attempt similarly to define aggression has been—and must continue to be.

VII. CONSULTATIVE PACTS

In our last presidential campaign the platforms of both the major parties covetously leered towards a consultative pact. Normally, each platform views the other with alarm, and when they agree a general alarm is justified. One can only wonder whether freakish impulse or some cunning Mephistopheles caused the recent amorous accord.

The obtaining of a "consultative pact" has long been on the program of the conference so persistently staged at Geneva in the name of disarmament. To the uninitiated the word "consultative" seems to imply a friendly or platonic communion. Who would refuse to consult?

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Who would be so unneighborly as to refuse what is daily done as a mere act of civility? But no one should be deceived by this. Agreements are interpreted according to the subject matter. A reduction of armaments in consideration of a "consultative pact" would necessarily indicate as the subject of consultation the number of men, of ships and of aircraft that should be contributed in order to supply the place of what had been given up. In the present state of Europe, this would tend to increase rather than to diminish the existing tension and danger. While it would please certain countries, it would inflame others. Today Europe is divided into hostile camps. Why should we encourage any of them to strike while the iron is hot? A disinclination to strike might readily be converted into eagerness by reliance on our aid.

An innocent-looking clause in our treaty with the Samoan Islands of 1878 nearly got us into war, although it merely required the use of our "good offices" for the adjustment of differences between the Samoan and any other government. This clause was accepted by the United States in a spirit of pure benevolence, but there was no real Samoan government. One day, when the shadowy government seemed to be menaced, our consul at Apia ran up the American flag and declared a protectorate over the islands. This he was not authorized to do; but it precipitated a quarrelsome consultation which ended in the setting up of an international government that proved to be so calamitous that the United States eventually agreed to divide up the islands and have done with it.

The commitment of the United States to such a "consultative pact" as is desired at Geneva would, I believe, constitute the gravest danger to which the country has ever been exposed, a danger involving our very independence. It seems to be thought that we are an easy mark, and I say this not in any spirit of reproach. We all are human. Lambs are killed by men as well as by lions, but lambs are specially appetizing to the cultivated taste of the old and polished European nations. Younger peoples may act wisely in modestly avoiding banquets at which they may be obliged to consult others regarding what they shall eat or to take the risk of indiscriminate indulgence. It has been intimated that France might pay the overdue instalment on her debt to us if we would compensate her by a "consultative pact." The proposal made by us some weeks ago of a non-aggression agreement seemed to produce a general sense of disappointment, if not of disgust. But, should we enter into a consultative pact for the sake of a pay-

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ment due on an old account, we should remember that for every dollar paid us for our amiability we might have to return a million or two for war.

Of all conceivable devices the "consultative pact" is the most pernicious. It operates both as an incentive and as a lure. While it encourages the co-partner to do what he might otherwise refrain from doing, it fails, by reason of its indefiniteness, to deter the co-partner's antagonist from doing what he might not otherwise attempt. Numerous examples might be adduced to show this.

Such an understanding between Great Britain and France, called an *entente*, figures largely in the breaking out of the general war in Europe in 1914. This is clearly set forth by Lord Loreburn, formerly Lord Chancellor of England, in his "How the War Came." In this volume Lord Loreburn shows how, as the result of an agreement with France in the nature of a consultative pact, by which armed support was implied, the British people were brought into the war without previous knowledge of the danger in which they really stood. Acting under the secret understanding, Mr. Asquith, having obtained from Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law an undertaking to assist him in Parliament, gave to France on August 2, 1914, a definite promise of armed naval support against Germany that irrevocably pledged the country to war. Commenting on the settled policy which had had the support of England's greatest statesmen, Lord Loreburn well observes that if England was to abandon her habitual aloofness from "continental alliances," whether "formal or in the infinitely more dangerous guise of 'understandings,'" it was "clearly necessary" that the country also should have had "if not compulsory service, at all events a population trained to arms."

In the draft of a disarmament convention which the British Government, with a view to meet the persistent demands of France and other countries, submitted to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on March 16, 1933, the first part relates to "security;" and it is highly significant that the proposed parties to the convention are the parties to the Kellogg Pact. It is also worthy of notice that the occasion on which the parties are to consult is a breach or threatened breach of the Pact. But the British dominions, although parties to the Pact, are not among the Powers to be consulted. Probably this may be explained by the adverse and independent stand the dominions took in 1922 when it was suggested that they should support British intervention in the war between Greece and Turkey. The object of the conference, when

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called, is to agree on action respecting the threatened breach or, if a breach has occurred, "to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible." The word "aggressor" is not here used. The phrase "to be held responsible" denotes a purpose to hold somebody responsible and to allow the greatest possible latitude in the determination of that question, no matter what its nature may be, whether it involves considerations of fact, or of law, or of politics, or of power. Such latitude, it must be admitted, is essential where nations combine to regulate one another's affairs, or to control one another's conduct, or to penalize misconduct. The proposed convention, while candidly recognizing these facts, wisely requires the concurrence of a number of governments; but, while requiring unanimity on the part of the Great Powers, unless one or more of them should be parties to the dispute, it requires the concurrence of only a majority of the smaller Powers. Although it is easy to conceive of questions on which the judgment of the latter would be more likely to be impartial, the proposal savors of the hegemony of the Great Powers, of which so much was said before 1914, when the Great Powers themselves tumbled into an appalling Great War. Conferences may be useful and even necessary; but when nations come to determine, through their political authorities, questions of legality, morality and good faith raised by acts that have happened, or seem likely to happen, and to impose prohibitions or punishments it is idle to conceal from ourselves the fact that they are moving and breathing in an atmosphere of force and of war, and probably without the benefit of that calmness of mind and impartiality which judicial proceedings are intended to assure among nations as well as among individual men.

A commitment more contrary to the vital interests of the United States as heretofore understood could not be conceived of. It would destroy the last vestige of the power to control our own destiny that has heretofore been the most cherished part of our birthright.

In this connection we should not fail to consider the psychology of our own people. Although not military in the sense of keeping large armaments and preparing for war, they are ingenuous, adventurous and militant. They rose and threw off the colonial yoke, although it was milder than that of other countries—the mildest of the time. President Madison, quiet and gentle in spirit, was pressed into the War of 1812. In the Greek war for independence some of our public men warmly advocated our participation. In 1846 Congress declared the existence of war with Mexico without awaiting the printing of the

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diplomatic correspondence. In 1852 it required all the sober sense and self-control of our statesmen to resist the popular movement for intervention in Hungary. We drifted into the Civil War in 1861 on disputed points of constitutional law. In our war with Spain in 1898, most of the European Powers regarded our action as aggressive. After the impulse to enter the World War got its stride, President Wilson denounced Senators who opposed it as "willful men." Our demonstrated readiness to go to war, in spite of our impression that we are the most peaceful people in the world, makes it specially dangerous that we should commit ourselves to interested appeals to impulses better understood by others than by ourselves. Nor should we forget how suddenly and unexpectedly wars often break out and the trivial incidents which sometimes precipitate them. I would not abandon my fellow-countrymen to consultative shambles.

VIII. MANCHURIA

Having read the entire Lytton report, I am impressed with its comprehensiveness. The sincerity of its effort to ascertain the truth is shown by this paragraph:

It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.

The report's chief defect is, I think, the importance which at the outset it assigns to "the improvement of modern communication" as having induced the flagrant acts of force which extorted from China the Treaty of Nanking and the cession of Hongkong. Long accustomed to reflect on the trade rivalries and struggles for empire of European Powers in the Far East during preceding centuries, on the gain and loss of vast colonies, the truly world wars that were fought when ships were small and slow, and on the fact that what was done in 1841 only chiseled the margin of China's seclusion and did not break its spirit, I cannot share the common habit of thinking of "isolation" as an antonym of speed, even though Japan, by a deliberate self-development

that embraced the assimilation of all speedy devices, induced her exemplars in speed to renounce their earlier privileges. Only by taking all these things into account can the attitude of the east toward the west and of the west toward the east be so understood as to help the reader to perceive whether the word "nationalism," which the report so often uses, predominantly denotes, in a particular instance, an anti-foreign sentiment or an aspiration after national unity. The divisions in China largely account for her present plight. In treating of Manchuria, the report does not overlook Russia's progressive absorption not only of that province but also of Korea, which caused Japan, in concern for her own national life, to risk war with Russia thirty years ago. But measures suggested by the report for the adjustment of present conditions are exceedingly complicated and largely depend for their successful application on a cooperation between China and Japan such as the western nations have not shown respecting the limitation of armaments or the readjustment of the balance of power as between themselves, to say nothing of their continued refusal to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China because their surrender would be premature. The "conditions of a satisfactory solution" suggested by the report embrace compatibility with the interests of China and Japan, consideration of the interests of Russia, conformity to the provisions of the Covenant, of the Kellogg Pact and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the recognition of Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria and of her historical associations with the country, a conventional restatement of the respective rights, interests and responsibilities of both China and Japan in that quarter, provision for the prompt settlement of minor disputes, the adoption, consistently with China's sovereignty and administrative integrity, of measures of government and autonomy so drawn and executed "as to satisfy the essential requirements of good government," the establishment of a local gendarmerie effective for the purposes of internal order and security against external aggression, the conventional improvement of commercial and political relations, and, as these various conditions can hardly be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the establishment of a temporary international cooperation in the internal reconstruction of China. The report further says that, if an adequate *rapprochement* between China and Japan is not secured, no solution, no matter what its terms may be, can ever be fruitful. The suggestions also propose various declarations and treaties, the details of which are fully elaborated; but foreign cooperation and supervision largely figure in them.

The report of the Committee of the Assembly of the League, to which these suggestions were submitted, cannot be highly commended. Its tone is that of reproof. Japan is not called an "aggressor," but this is strongly hinted; and references to provisions of the Covenant that contemplate the use of force are rather plentiful. The Assembly adopted the report on February 17, 1933, together with recommendations some of which summarily stated definite conclusions; and acceptance of the recommendations as a whole was made a condition of representation of the parties on a special committee which it was proposed to appoint to assist them in their negotiations. Japan then protested and resigned from the League. Had the Assembly tendered friendly and impartial good offices, and, as a great Secretary of State of the United States once suggested to an offending government, used "some kind words," it might have contributed to the actual and amicable solution of the immense difficulties which the Lytton report so clearly explained. On February 27, 1933, Sir John Simon, speaking for the British Government to the House of Commons concerning the armed struggle in Manchuria, had declared: "Under no circumstances will this Government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict."

In view of Great Britain's vast interests in the Far East the foregoing statement is impressive. Other European governments have spoken in a similar sense, and the arms embargo by Great Britain, which was so soon revoked, stood alone. Strangely, it was chiefly in the United States that cries for boycotts, arms embargoes and other measures were heard. These cries reverberated internationally; and there was used in both countries, even in official statements, language that reflected the prevailing excitement. Diplomatic windows are peculiar. They automatically open to bouquets, but never to gravel. A single brick may shatter all the panes. Even a well-intended admonition, if the surface is rough and hard, may have a like effect. During the war between Russia and Japan in 1904, when Theodore Roosevelt was President and John Hay was Secretary of State, the United States specially enjoined on all its officials, civil, military and naval, the practice of courtesy, moderation and self-restraint, lest resentment might be aroused. The Nine-Power Treaty has constantly been mentioned, and references to it are altogether proper. It enunciates an old principle intended to avoid danger in situations which actual conditions complicate. The parties to it, besides the United States, China and Japan, are Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. In the United States it has constantly been

spoken of as having special "sanctity." No doubt, a nation's faith should ever be inviolable, whether pledged to other nations or to private individuals; nor should a pledge to the latter be less sacred because its violation may be less dangerous. But the application of the terms of treaties to actual cases is often disputed and uncertain, and nations are inclined, especially when they are under pressure, to be tenacious of their own opinions. France, for instance, in 1923 refused the proposal of Great Britain to refer the question of the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr to the Permanent Court of International Justice. On the other hand, the many references to arbitral boards show how often nations disagree on questions of interpretation.

The thought of armed intervention by the United States in Manchuria, while glaringly inconsistent with the recent vote to abandon the Philippines, inevitably suggests the possible failure of its object as well as other serious consequences. Should the attempt to occupy the territory be successful, the perplexing questions whether to hold and administer it, or to turn it over to China, as she would naturally wish, or to some other Power, or to set up an international government, would necessarily have to be determined. Article 35 of the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, relating to protectorates on the coast of Africa, recognized "the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them.....sufficient to protect existing rights, and, the case arising, freedom of trade and of transit on the conditions that they may have agreed upon," and this obligation was pronounced by the highest authorities to be based also on "the nature of the case." Where efficient local government does not exist, the total failure of our trial some years ago of international government in little Samoa indicates that of all kinds of government the international is the worst.

The phrase "open door" is often used in a fighting sense, although war might necessitate the door's temporary closure. The "open door" means trade, but, of course, not in the highly obnoxious sense of "free trade," although a very moderate conventional tariff has long been imposed on China. For 1932 the figures of United States trade with China and Japan are as follows: exports to China \$56,171,000, imports from China \$26,176,000; exports to Japan \$134,537,384, imports from Japan \$134,011,311. Without undertaking now to suggest what our final attitude towards the new state of Manchukuo should be, I am bound to say that the proposal of permanent "non-recognition" too vividly recalls the uncertainty and failure, and the disorder, local and

international, which attended the recent trial of that futile and demoralizing process as a means of preventing revolution or other unconstitutional acts in other lands.

In 1919 President Wilson did not submit to the Senate a tripartite treaty he had signed at Paris to guarantee the eastern frontier of France, although in the long run internal order is maintained on both sides of the Rhine. Many examples, including the war of thirty years ago between Russia and Japan and the unended conflicts that have since occurred, show what a quagmire Manchuria offers for the swallowing up of blood and treasure, without permanent and uncontested reward to those who take their chances in it. The much vaunted annihilation of space and time has not yet enabled a nation thousands of miles away to exert its military power as effectively as it may do at home or in its immediate environment. For a distant nation to take the chances of armed intervention in Manchuria, unless in pursuit or defense of a vital interest, would suggest a recklessness savoring of monomania.

IX. OUR BIRTHRIGHT

Washington, in his farewell address, said:

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.....The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connexion as possible.....Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our interests.....Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

The original draft of this admonition was made by Alexander Hamilton who, like Washington himself, was born a British subject; but their minds embraced the entire world.

Jefferson, not forgetting the Declaration of Independence which he drew, warned his countrymen that their form of government exposed them more than any other to "the insidious intrigues and pestilent influences of foreign nations," and that nothing but an inflexible neutrality could preserve us. Their mutual jealousies and their com-

plicated alliances were, he said, all foreign to us. They were nations of eternal war. His motto therefore was: "Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none."

Sagacious John Adams, who spent many years in Europe and signed our first treaty with Holland as well as the treaty with Great Britain acknowledging our independence, when a European diplomatist remarked that he seemed to be afraid of being made the tool of the Powers of Europe, exclaimed, "Indeed I am;" and when asked "What Powers?" replied "All of them." And he added:

It is obvious that all the Powers of Europe will be continually manoeuvring with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle; and that of all the Powers of Europe, not to desire us, or, perhaps, even to permit us, to interfere, if they can help it.

Nothing more profoundly true was ever said; and this was fully recognized by all our national administrations and by our greatest statesmen down to twenty years ago, when, to the disturbance of our interests and our happiness, we began to swing on the trapeze at international political performances and even to pay for the privilege of so doing.

Not long ago a callow stripling, when I mentioned the name of George Washington, curtly remarked that his ideas were out of date and unsuited to the modern world. This is an essential postulate of the shallow dupes who, prating of our having lately become a "World Power," urge that we blindly don an imported livery of "world service," to be paid for, on demand, in unestimated instalments of blood and treasure. But it is a sad day when the children of a nation are taught to prattle ignorant and perverted slights of the men who, with steady and skilful hands, laid the foundations of its greatness and prosperity; men to whom, by reason of their exemplary valor, integrity and wisdom, an understanding world has awarded the highest place among the immortals. Thomas Jefferson, who spoke with the authority of an intimate official association, and with an intelligence that embraced all times and all climes, declared that in elevation of character, in sureness of judgment, in firmness of purpose, in inflexible justice and in scrupulous obedience to the laws, civil and military, throughout his whole career, Washington furnished an example unparalleled in history. Jefferson himself stands before the world as a great political genius, whose ideas

still stir men's minds. Alexander Hamilton, soldier, jurist, great administrator, of whom Webster said that "he touched the dead corpse of Public Credit, and it sprung upon its feet," is still studied as a profound political theorist, at home and abroad. And what of Benjamin Franklin, discoverer, inventor, philosopher, consummate diplomatist, at home in all lands, of whom Charles Phillips eloquently said that his fame would revive the hopes of men in ages yet to come?

Such are the men whom our vaporers of current sublimities would shelve as fossils in our museums of natural history, on the hasty supposition that by various modern devices, by which men may more rapidly and more frequently communicate, and more quickly hurt or help one another, discordant races and people have been harmoniously united in thought and in action and in brotherly love. Where congeniality is lacking, propinquity does not tend to create affection; on the contrary, it tends to breed hatreds. Where are today the danger spots of the world? They are coterminous countries. The French and the Germans have for centuries lived side by side. No artificial device is needed to enable them quickly to come into contact. The thin line of their common frontier can instantly be strided. For ages they have crossed and re-crossed it in peace and in war; and yet, how much have they learned to love one another? Their recent fierce and desperate conflict, and the unappeased sorrows and resentments by which it was followed, will be accepted as a conclusive answer, except by those who would employ processes of peace that would cause the echoes of war daily to haunt the fireside. The time must be out of joint when a warlike ardor for peace depreciates the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome; when new and untried visions are held superior to the proved philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, of Cicero and Seneca, of Bacon and John Locke; and when the wisdom of great statesmen, heard with reverence only twenty years ago, is suddenly rejected as having no current value.

We hear much today of the duties of the United States as a "World Power," and the supposition seems widely to prevail that we have only lately reached that eminence. But the United States has always been a World Power. It acted as a World Power when, on the outbreak of the wars growing out of the French Revolution, its first President, George Washington, with Thomas Jefferson as his Secretary of States, proclaimed our neutrality. It acted as a World Power when, some years later, it suppressed the activities of the Barbary pirates. It acted as a World Power when, in 1812, it went to war in defense of

neutral rights and the freedom of the seas. It acted as a World Power when it proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. It acted as a World Power in extending its trade and opening up foreign countries to its commerce, as it so effectually did by peaceful processes during the presidency of General Andrew Jackson. It acted as a World Power when it refused to permit the intervention of foreign nations in our civil war. It acted as a World Power when it forbade the further maintenance of the European empire set up in Mexico by French arms during our civil war. It acted as a World Power when, in the administration of President Grant, with Hamilton Fish as his Secretary of State, it brought about, through the greatest of all international arbitrations, the amicable settlement of the Alabama Claims, and in so doing made a signal contribution to the further development of the law of neutrality.

It is useless to continue the specification of instances. Nations, like individuals, may increase their power by combining with a due attention to their own business the extension of their friendly offices to brethren in trouble, and by conserving their militant resources for occasions when their vital interests are at stake. A nation that undertakes to meddle with every foreign disturbance is bound to become an international nuisance, to its own detriment as well as to the annoyance of other countries. Power is neither gained nor kept by such methods. Although megalomania may be sincere, it is noted for its mistakes.

In the French National Convention which met on September 21, 1792, the dominant factor was called the Mountain. This group, comprising the most radical Jacobin element, of which Marat and Robespierre were the chief spokesmen, was always in a state of more or less delirious eruption. During the Reign of Terror, with which the group is identified, the French Government instructed its minister in the United States to bring about "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced." This appeal is similar to that which is constantly heard in the United States today, but it did not move the unfeeling statesmen who then guided our destinies.

Those who oppose our intermeddling with what does not properly concern us are dubbed "isolationists." We should not resent this; we have good ancestral justification. All through her history Great Britain has held aloof from continental alliances except so far as they might seem to be temporarily necessary for her safety. In the Thirty Years' War which convulsed the entire Continent she took no part. At the

close of the wars of the Spanish Succession she dropped her alliances and made her own peace. As is pointed out by Lord Loreburn in the volume heretofore quoted, every single Great Power on the Continent was, during the sixty years preceding 1914, repeatedly engaged in continental war; France thrice, Germany thrice, Russia twice, Austria three times and Italy four times. During the same sixty years Great Britain was involved in continental war only once, in 1854, when in alliance with France she backed Turkey against Russia and committed the mistake later described by Lord Salisbury as "putting her money on the wrong horse." One of Great Britain's reasons for abstention as declared by her statesmen was the prevalence of deadly animosities and conflicts of interest that still survived among the continental Powers. The British policy was to maintain good relations with all her continental neighbors not only with a view to exerting a friendly influence in composing their differences but also to avoid commitments which might compel a participation in foreign wars and deprive the country of its independent control of its own policy. But there was yet another reason; all the great continental Powers had adopted universal compulsory service. Great Britain's cardinal principle was to rely upon an overwhelming superiority at sea. It was these things that led Lord Salisbury, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs at the close of the last century, to boast of England's "splendid isolation." When an inheritor of the name of Elizabeth's great minister used this phrase it did not occur to Englishmen to reproach him for an abandonment of their "world leadership," or to wail over their neglect of their international duties. On the contrary, when Lord Salisbury spoke of "isolation," Great Britain was still tingling with memories of the Diamond Jubilee, when statesmen coming from the ends of the earth to pay homage to the Great Queen saw without dread the vast fleet that confidently rode the inviolate sea that washes England's shores. Here, the victims of the new psychology use the word "isolation" as a term of opprobrium. It would be as sensible to condemn as an "isolationist" a man who did not tie himself up with unnecessary contracts, and especially of the kind that were likely to impoverish or to ruin him, without benefit to himself and perhaps with injury to others. Such epithets serve only to exemplify the want of knowledge and of understanding of those who employ them.

Conspicuous in the lingo of the past decade is the plea for the continuance of the kind of "leadership" with which we began to bless the world less than twenty years ago. Some of our very eminent men

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have urged this plea. But I have often wished that those who use such language would reflect on how it may strike other peoples, in Europe and elsewhere. Why, for instance, should the British, the Dutch, the French, or the Italian people pant for our spiritual, our moral or our political guidance? Why should they regard as superior to them a people whom they benevolently associate with mass production, skyscrapers and prohibition? If they were to express their inmost thoughts would they not confess that such utterances sound to them somewhat boastful, somewhat neglectful of their great historic tradition? How should we ourselves now feel if the eminent foreign statesmen who lately responded to President Roosevelt's invitation to visit him, had, before leaving the United States, intimated that we needed their "leadership," and that any counsels or conditions they suggested should be accepted in that sense? Perhaps it is unfortunate for us that they did not say so. But, having had long experience in leadership, they can well afford to pay a polite deference to those who ingenuously profess to have usurped their ancient prerogative.

We also hear much of the "international mind." Would to God that we had more of it! But in devoutly expressing this wish I do not confine it to my own country, nor do I lack a definite conception of what an international mind ought to be. Having for many years been connected with the administration of foreign affairs, I can truthfully affirm that there is no nation towards which I cherish a feeling of enmity. I have always been a peace-maker; and, as an international judge, I am willing to stand on my record as one who strove to act without fear or favor. But I confess that of all countries I love my own the best. No international mind is, in my opinion, to be desired or to be trusted that is not built on a national foundation. The man who cannot sing his national anthem with a whole heart is not fit to be entrusted with negotiations with foreign Powers. No experienced diplomatist would trust out of his sight an adversary who did not seek to obtain for his own country a square deal. Only those who are disposed to maintain the rights and interests of their respective countries can treat with one another on the basis of mutual self-respect. The best diplomatists are those who are willing to give as well as to take; who can grasp and apply the equitable solution that assures to each that which is justly due; who, in leaving behind them no heartburnings and resentments, conserve the interests of all. It is a pleasure to remember the men of this type with whom I have dealt.

We are told that invention and trade and industrial organization

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cannot be reversed. But nobody wishes or proposes to reverse them. We are told that the world has become too dependent on comforts to be willing to give them up; but, although dependence on comforts is not a sign of strength, either physical or mental, no one is specially advocating their abandonment. But the culmination is reached when we are told that we cannot "retire within our own borders" and lead a life of "isolation." When have we ever done such a thing, or proposed to do it? The late Grand Duke Alexander of Russia, on revisiting the United States in 1928 after an absence of thirteen years, said that on his return the impression he got was that what he had admired as the robustness of American life "had given place to the sickening self-consciousness of an hysterical idealism," and had been superseded by the "same hodgepodge of badly digested ideas" as had characterized the Guards Barracks in St. Petersburg thirty years back. "So this," he exclaimed, "was the American share of the Versailles spoils! It seemed bewildering that any nation should send 2,000,000 men across the ocean, fight for something that did not concern it in the least, tear up the map of the world and lend billions of dollars to its competitors—all for the purpose of acquiring the worst traits of pre-war Europe."

And for what is our birthright to be thrown away? Among other things, for membership in an association which, although established in the name of peace, is in the present state of the popular mind chiefly characterized by warlike devices. I am not opposed to an association of nations for the purposes of peace, and would not disparage any useful work the League has done. But the League, in dealing with political matters, suffers from the radical defects of its charter. My first and consistent opinion of the Covenant fully accords with that so thoughtfully and prophetically expressed by Mr. Elihu Root as early as March 13, 1919, in these words: "The more I study it, the more satisfied I am that it has some very useful provisions, some very bad ones, some glaring deficiencies, and that if it is not very materially amended not merely in form but in substance, the world will before very long wake up to realize that a great opportunity has been wasted in the doing of a futile thing." Most fully has this profoundly prescient comment been justified by the recent and too frequent occasions on which loose, excited and unfulfilled threats of employing the warlike devices of the Covenant have exposed the League to reproach if not to contempt. Nor do I hesitate to mention as an example the unhappy conflict between China and Japan in which, while warlike

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words were heard from Geneva, the minister for foreign affairs of powerful members of the League were disavowing in their capitals any intention to intervene in the armed strife in Manchuria.

Originally, the League had the character of a political club which nations could enter only by invitation. To this phase Argentina long ago intelligently objected. There was a list of original members and a list of states invited to accede. No recent enemy state was on either list, although President Wilson, before going abroad, had declared that Germany would necessarily be admitted, for the purpose of controlling her if for nothing else. Mexico, although never an enemy state, was, because the United States did not then approve her, unbidden to the banquet of peace. Russia, in spite of her vast contribution in blood and in treasure to the Allied cause, had fallen from grace and entered upon courses that were not approved. With absences such as these it could not, even had the United States been present, have been truly said that the voice of the world was heard at Geneva.

But the most fundamental defect of the plan was the creation of the warlike devices on the fantastic assumption that the members of the League would, in making use of those devices, divest themselves of their individual interests and prepossessions, of their historic and instinctive antagonisms, and altruistically unite in enforcing the ideal of impartial justice. In the ordinary administration of the law, persons who have formed prejudgment are peremptorily excluded from the jury as being presumptively incapable of weighing the proofs and rendering a fair and just verdict. The members of the Council of the League of Nations are the delegates of governments; the members of the Assembly also represent governments. It cannot either justly or rationally be expected of such bodies to divest themselves of all prepossessions or consciousness of national interests, to say nothing of the fact that they must inevitably differ in opinion. It is for reasons such as these that where a conflict between nations occurs and the warlike devices of the Covenant are invoked they so readily excite apprehension and distrust. It is very significant that the professed friends of the League are the readiest to censure it for not hastening to employ the warlike devices. On the assumption that such persons accurately represent the spirit of Geneva and are influential in its deliberations, those who do not believe in war as the prime, or as the natural and appropriate, creator of peace cannot help reflecting upon the demonstrated fact that war may as readily be used for unjust as for just ends, for oppression as well as for liberty, for the crushing of some and the exaltation of

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others, and for evil as well as for good. No wonder that the League is visibly rocked and rent and the world disturbed and divided whenever an agitation arises for the use of the warlike devices which visionary men in an excited and unsettled time foisted upon those who were wiser and more modest in the estimation of what was practicable and desirable. It was on this rock that the great Confederation of Europe, based on the treaties that ended the Napoleonic War and the Holy Alliance, eventually was wrecked. Although it contained no elaboration of warlike devices for the preservation of peace, the attempt of subsequent conferences to employ united military action divided the Powers and brought to an end their association. Such a result may be regarded as inevitable.

Esau, thinking that he was about to die, sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; but the Bible censures him for having despised his birthright. What would have been the nature of the censure if he had thrown his birthright wantonly away, or had allowed himself to be cheated out of it? Europe is the victim of history, a seething mass of hereditary feuds. They exist in the western part as well as in the eastern, and they are peculiarly bitter in the southeastern, where the war in 1914 originated. The Balkan Peninsula may be likened to a Vesuvius, always in danger of an eruption. Once, when I asked an Albanian to meet a Serbian he did not know, he hissed in reply: "He i-s-s my en-ne-my!" The United States may, if it should unhappily see fit to do so, associate itself with these feuds and henceforth help to fight them out. It may embitter and help to perpetuate them, but it cannot end them.

In my early days I learned from great teachers the unity of human history. Human nature has not changed. Human propensities, human appetites and human passions have not changed. We come into the world in the same way, and our necessities are the same. The struggle for existence still continues and it will go on. As one long and intimately acquainted with men of arms, I may say that they do not share the new view that peace and tranquillity on earth may be promoted and stabilized by boycotts, by playing fast and loose with the law of neutrality, and by the extension of the area of wars. Wars are not brought about by the officers of our Army and our Navy; but wars have often been fomented by agitations recklessly conducted by persons who professed a special abhorrence of war. The motives and objects of war have been various; but, as war is a contention by force, it is waged for victory. The struggle, as it progresses, becomes more and

more intense. Each day brings its tale of death and of desolation. Grievances accumulate; the passions burn more fiercely; the hoarse cry of vengeance grows louder and more insistent; and the cases are rare in which the peace that is extorted does not by humiliating conditions sow the seeds of future wars.

The true and only foundation of peace among men is the concession to each of that which is due. No doubt perfect justice is unattainable in this world. But there is an ideal of justice towards which every nation, every people, every individual should aspire. This ideal can be attained only through the reconciliation of our conflicting views and our conflicting interests. We are not all alike. No two men and no two women are alike. No two nations are alike. We differ in race, we differ in creed, we differ in color; and all differences tend to provoke antagonism. If we would keep men and nations at peace, we must remove the causes of their discontent, elevate their moral sentiments, inculcate a spirit of justice and toleration, and compose and settle their differences.

Such is my message, on which I am prepared to stand before any future Seat of Judgment, in all confidence that no sudden reversal during the past twenty years of the ways of God to man will exclude me from the reward promised to good and faithful servants.

3. The New Isolation with reference to Boycott by John Bassett Moore

Among those who, as I am compelled to believe, would, if they had their way, most effectually isolate us from peace, the most popular method of abolishing war appears to be the boycott. It fell to my lot to live through the days when the word "boycott" had its origin, and I can personally assure those who are now enamored of it that it never was then supposed to have a peaceful import. On the contrary, it was used to denote a type of irregular warfare so exceptionally vicious that the only way adequately to describe it was to bestow on it the name of Captain Boycott, its central figure and victim. Captain Boycott was a land agent in Ireland in the era of the Land League, of "agrarian crime," of the imprisonment of Parnell, and of the Phoenix Park murders. He evicted many tenants, and in retaliation his neighbors refused all intercourse with him and his family, would not work for him or trade with him, and would not allow others to do so. In self-defense, which is allowable even under the Kellogg Pact, he asked for and obtained military protection; and with the growth of passion on both sides Ireland came to wear the aspect of a seething cauldron of warlike activities. The world did not then regard this as a step towards peace.

No better exposition of the nature of the boycott can be found than that which is made by my former colleague, Mr. Garrard Glenn, now a member of the law faculty of the University of Virginia, in a recent article entitled "War without Guns."* Setting out with Dr. Johnson's famous injunction, "Let us clear our minds of cant," and himself happily defining cant as the utterance of "an idealist who has ceased to analyze his own processes," he explains the meaning of the boycott with a dialectic force and wealth of illustration that demonstrate his comprehensive acquaintance with the records of human experience and expose the poverty of the "new thought." Recognizing the fact that trade itself may be and often is predatory, he reaches the conclusion that, by reason of employing methods of coercion which war itself employs, and by seeking the ends which war is designed to attain, "the national boycott, in and of itself, is war." He admits that this suggestion may be disagreeable if not offensive to some well-meaning

* The Virginia Quarterly Review, July, 1932, p. 388.

persons; but he supports his thesis with reasons that have not been answered. From time immemorial commercial non-intercourse has been regarded as a measure incompatible with friendly relations and provocative of war, and it consequently has often been adopted as an appropriate preliminary to a declaration of war. Nothing could be more inadvertent or more incongruous than the contemplation of it as a peaceful measure.

Equally devoid of a peaceful character is the non-national or non-governmental boycotts enforced by popular or concerted action, as was that in which the term originated. While their avowed object is coercive, no forecast can be made of the methods they may employ, of the extent to which they may be carried, or of the pitch to which popular passions may be raised. In a community thus divided against itself, no one could undertake to be answerable for the consequences. In the general loosening of salutary restraints, honest but reckless resentment and unscrupulous malevolence or greed might be found to unite in the overthrow of justice and order and the suppression of individual liberty. Where unregulated popular action is invoked to accomplish ends which the law either forbids or sanctions, no one who retains his balance is safe from the lynching which chartered spite and emotional virtue may administer. By such conditions governments have been and may yet again be put in peril in their external as well as in their internal relations. Some time ago, when a sudden excitement arose over the conflict between China and Japan, and eminent champions of the boycott as a peaceful measure publicly advised its application to the latter country, an active movement was conducted through the mails by a group of individuals for the institution of such a campaign. While this agitation was in progress a person whom I know went to a well-known shop to buy a small piece of silk, with no thought of what its possible origin might be. But, as this highly important transaction was about to be concluded, the cry reverberated, "What! buying a piece of Japanese silk?" and there was suddenly staged a near-riot, from which the innocent victim could only withdraw. Considering the antecedents, nothing could be more logical than such a scene; but it was moblike, disorderly irresponsible and oppressive, and such as even the laws of war do not tolerate.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Hueston NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
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FS

RECEIVED
JAN 19 1935
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 19, 1935

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

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not
13. 51

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 19 1935
Department of State

Division
OF EASTERN
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FEB 11 1935
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

30, January 19, 1 p.m.

The Consul General at Mukden has reported in telegram of January 18, 10 a.m. that he has been informed by Mukden military authorities that an ultimatum has been issued through the Kalgan Military Mission to Chinese forces in Western Jehol Province where they have been since the occupation of Jehol Province to withdraw into Chinese territory and that Japanese and Manchukuo troops have been sent to that area as reinforcements.

From Chinese official source at Peiping the Legation learns that some four days ago a Japanese ultimatum was sent to a Chinese General in command of two thousand troops to withdraw from a place (name unknown) southeast of Dolonor, where he has been stationed since the seizure of Jehol; that whether this area is a part of Jehol or Chahar is a question; that the Chinese General returned the ultimatum to the sender, a local

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FS 2-No. 30, January 19, 1935, from Peiping

Japanese Commander, stating that such a message should go through the proper channels; that the message was then delivered to Chairman of Chahar Province, who informed the Japanese that it should go to the National Government; and that the Japanese Assistant Military Attache will soon take the matter up with General Ho Ying Chin, Chairman of the Peiping branch of the military councils. This Chinese source is apprehensive that an incident of considerable proportions may develop if and when the Chinese troops withdraw.

It is possible that this incident is the beginning of efforts of Japanese military to define the entire Jehol-Chahar border.


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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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

Gray

Peiping via NR

Dated January 22, 1935

Received 7:26 AM

Secretary of State,
Washington.



32 January 22, 4 p.m.

My 30, January 19, 1 p.m. / 6831

793.94

The Legation is reliably informed that the question is being peacefully settled by the withdrawal of the Chinese forces concerned in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese military. The Chinese authorities are apparently endeavoring to minimize the importance in order to avoid criticism. As a result the de facto border of Manchukuo now seems definitely to be that part of the Great Wall which runs from south to north in southeast Chahar Province.

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JAN 28 1935

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


FROM Peiping (via N.R.)

Dated January 24, 1935

Recd. 6:15 a m

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



34, January 24, 2 p m.

Legation's 32, January 22, 4 p m. / 6832

According to Chinese official statement, either during

or after withdrawal of Chinese troops from disputed area,
 in accordance with the demand of the Japanese military,
 Japanese planes flew on January 23 over the area in dis-
 pute and dropped a few bombs at a place where there were
 no (repeat no) Chinese troops causing no (repeat no) casu-
 alties. An official of the Japanese Legation states that
 Chinese soldiers attacked on January 22 some Japanese sol-
 diers at a place southeast of Kuyuan and just east of the
 Great Wall causing minor casualties but that no information
 about occurrences of January 23 is yet available. However,
 Japanese Assistant Military Attache states that Japanese
 military occupied Kuyuan January 23 a place which has never
 been officially claimed as within Manchukuo boundary and
 that two Japanese have been killed so far and six injured.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3a from Peiping

In view of conflicting and inadequate information, it is too soon to determine whether Japanese action is a prelude to additional enlargement of Manchukuo at the expense of Chahar or is an independent action of local Japanese military relating only to the disputed area lying between the Great Wall and the Jehol-Chahar boundary. The Legation, however, inclines toward the latter view.

GAUSS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DELEGATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 16 1935
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 6 - 1934
Department of State

With the compliments of
Mr. Quo Tai-chi.

793.94

793.94/6834

JAN 16 1935
JAN 16 1935

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Quate NARS, Date 12-18-75

SPEECH OF H.E. MR. QUO TAI-CHI
AT THE XVTH ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
September 14th, 1934.

More than formal congratulations are due to the Secretary-General on this occasion of his first annual report since assuming his high office. He has dealt with the destinies of the League of Nations during its most critical year. He sees it emerge from that year with renewed prestige. The desperations that have led one nation and another to seek for solutions outside the League now make the whole world realise that only within the frame-work of the League can lie the sanity and safety of international comities. China subscribes to that renewed world sentiment without any reservations. In the name of one-fifth of the whole world's population, in the name of one of the Governments longest in power in national administration, in the name of the greatest potentiality in Asia, the Chinese Delegation welcomes the clear indications of restored League influence.

But China entertains no undue optimism even as she deprecates undue pessimism. In his opening speech to the Assembly M. Benes made a remarkable survey of the world situation today. I cannot aspire to M. Benes' wide knowledge and clarity of vision. But I shall endeavour to emulate his sober realism, and confine myself to those features of the world situation which most nearly concern the Far East and which in the view of the Chinese Government vitally affect the prospects of world peace.

In the course of his analysis M. Benes drew attention to the menace to peace in the Far East. "The situation obtaining between China and Japan", he said, "the prevailing tension between Japan and the Soviet Union - these are facts the exceptional gravity of which no one can dispute." It is on this situation that I wish to make some comments.

I wish to make clear at the outset that I am speaking, not primarily as a party to a dispute, but as what I might call

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by your tolerance the Far Eastern rapporteur of the League, on the basis of a report on the nature of and the responsibility for the present tension in the Far East that is accepted by all the loyal members of the League. That report lays upon the Assembly the duty to follow closely the development of events in the Far East. It is in order to help us here to discharge that duty that I am making this statement.

There are three principal points to which I desire to draw the Assembly's attention.

1. The first point is that the whole issue remains open. The fact that the puppet appointed by alien task-masters to do their bidding in China's North Eastern provinces now calls himself an Emperor does not alter the character of the Covenant-breaking military occupation which China endures only while she must. The whole League has passed final judgment on that occupation, and remains bound by its judgment.

The Chinese Delegate a year ago said on this annual occasion, "The Chinese Government views the situation in the Four Provinces as a standing violation of the treaties upon which the world is supposed to rely for security, disarmament and peace. It is determined steadfastly to maintain all its rights and claims, and not to recognise and acquiesce in the illegal accomplished fact. That accomplished fact will remain only so long as it is physically impossible for my country or politically impossible for the rest of the League to vindicate the sanctity of treaties. In maintaining this attitude, we consider that we are not only doing what lies in our unaided power to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence against Japanese aggression, but that, in so doing, we are resisting the attempt to convert the Covenant into a scrap of paper."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Since the Assembly adopted its unanimous report of February 24, 1933, China has unwaveringly observed the obligations contained in its findings and has hoped that the recommendations of the report could be enforced without delay. Particularly on the question of non-recognition of the puppet state China's attitude has remained adamant. She herself has not only upheld this principle of non-recognition, but considers that it devolves upon all State Members of the League and other States which have concurred in this principle to stand by it.

One remote State has, indeed, officially though obscurely, recognised the illegal organisation in the Northeast of China, even though the State itself has scarcely any direct contact with the affairs of Eastern Asia. The circumstances of that recognition, as I have said, remain obscure. From China's standpoint as a Member of the League, she considers such action inconsistent with the Covenant, a proper matter for League review and discipline, and believes that no other Member State will ever in like manner disregard international justice and violate the findings of a unanimous report and its own solemn obligations under that report. Treating this isolated instance as practically negligible, however theoretically serious, it is a very great thing that the judgment of the League has been kept inviolate, in the face of opportunistic invitations to act otherwise. We Chinese are not unaware of the efforts to encourage a certain vagueness and uncertainty here and there in maintaining that inviolability. Of late persistent attempts have been made to frighten States bound by the Assembly report through threatening them with economic penalties and trouble for their consuls in Manchuria if they do not recognise the illegal regime in that part of China, and by efforts to bribe them with specious offers of special economic advantages if they will succumb.

In this connection it may be recalled that the Assembly report contains not only the obligation to refrain de jure or

- 4 -

de facto recognition but from anything that might facilitate the maintenance of the present illegal regime. The Assembly Advisory Committee in interpreting this obligation pointed out that no protection could be afforded by Governments to their nationals seeking concessions at the hands of this illegal regime, which in international law is committing high treason in disposing of Chinese State property. Clearly no claim based on such acts of exploitation can be recognised by China or by any other State bound by the Assembly report. It is equally clear that holders of concessions/^{granted} by treaty-breaking authorities in Manchuria would render themselves liable to prosecution for damages by the Chinese Government before the courts of any country bound by the Assembly Report.

2. The second point I wish to make is that the League has a continuing responsibility in this matter. This responsibility is growing continually heavier with the increasing tension and menace to peace in the Far East. It cannot be affected by the refusal of any State to attend at Geneva. For the Covenant says that a State cannot cease to be a Member of the League until all its international obligations have been fulfilled. That is no accidental provision - it is a vital and fundamental obligation. The League as an instrument of peace would be a broken reed if a State could break the Covenant and then escape the consequences by withdrawing from the League. The Assembly has emphatically declared that the present military occupation of Manchuria is a violation of the Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Paris Pact. It is for the Assembly, as the guardian of the League's honour, to draw the obvious conclusion from its own declaration and from the provisions of the Covenant to which I have just alluded.

3. The third and most important point to which I wish to call your attention is the spreading consequences to the whole world of

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the continuance of treaty-breaking aggression in the Far East. In its report condemning and fixing the responsibility for that aggression, the Assembly pointed out that the continuance of the present regime in Manchuria was incompatible with the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

The Lytton Report pointed out that no regime that had not secured the willing co-operation of the Chinese population in Manchuria could restore order and prosperity to that part of China, and added that the population was resolutely hostile to what it rightly regarded as an alien military dictatorship established by fraud and aggression. Events have unhappily proved how right the Assembly was to adopt this view of the situation created by the occupation of our North Eastern provinces.

Far from having improved, the situation today has drifted farther away from what the League expected of it and decided in regard to it. In March of this year that illegal organisation actually declared itself an imperial state and its puppet styled himself Emperor. Although the character and status of this puppet state remain unaltered thereby, the illegality of the issue has assumed more menacing proportions.

When the Assembly adopted its Report eighteen months ago it had before it the findings of the Lytton Commission which drew a terrible picture of the conditions produced by the Japanese invasion, concluding with the statement that "Manchuria for a year past has been given over to strife and turmoil. The population of a large, fertile and rich country has been subjected to conditions and distress such as it has probably never experienced before." That the situation is worse today is attested from unimpeachable and independent sources.

"The Times" in London on August 23rd, less than a month ago, published a despatch from its Mukden correspondent which

- 6 -

states, "There have been two attacks by bandits daily on an average since August 6. A table issued by the 'Manchukuo' newspaper today also lists thirty-one bridges destroyed, sixteen overturnings of trains due to derailments, and ninety-one attacks on stations along the Eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Reports reaching the foreign authorities here indicate that danger from bandits to foreigners travelling outside the trunk system has increased." The next day, on August 24, "The Times" again published a cable as follows:

"The oft-repeated platitude, 'now that peace and order have been restored,' which prefaces many of the pronouncements concerning 'Manchukuo', is afforded little confirmation in the list of outrages by bandits in a single day's news. On Saturday thirty-three out of thirty-six Korean settlers in a village seventeen miles northwest of Chaohotze were slaughtered by bandits near the north mausoleum in Mukden; on Wednesday three Japanese workmen were killed by bandits on the Kirin-Tumen railway; on Tuesday an armoured train running between Hsiao-chiu and Mifeng stations, on the eastern section of the North Manchurian Railway, was attacked by bandits after the locomotive and four cars had been derailed.

As the lurid list of attacks and disorder just quoted refers to the trunk system, the conditions in the rest of Manchuria may be left to legitimate imagination.

Very recently the palace of the puppet Emperor in his so-called capital was set on fire, and one of the biggest Japanese aerodromes just outside the so-called capital was, at the second attempt, burned to the ground last April, at a loss of many millions of yen.

It is apparent that this is guerilla warfare on a wide-spread scale. A convenient name of spreading opprobrium is "banditry", and doubtless there is lawlessness in Manchuria with only such private motivation. But so far as the burning of palaces and of aerodromes and the wrecking of railways and the attacks on troops ~~and troops~~ and troop trains is a movement of protest and resistance by a downtrodden population against enormous illegal military oppression it is in a long and fine

- 7 -

tradition of causes that never conceive themselves hopeless and keep up sporadic warfare until the opportunity shall arise for final deliverance. Manchuria today still presents in essentials the same picture as it did when the occupation first started: namely, of a Japanese army on active service holding the main cities and the railway lines, and endeavouring to cow the population by incessant punitive expeditions. The idea that it is possible to restore law and order, let alone achieve prosperity, under an alien military occupation flies in the face of facts and flouts the lessons of history.

The repercussions of the treaty-breaking occupation of our Northeastern provinces are not limited to the Far East. All Europe, every nation anxious about its boundaries or its security, has suffered from what the nations of the League have failed as yet to do or have been faint in doing to support the judgment pronounced by the League.

But the spreading consequences have not been purely evil. The impending entry of the Soviet Union into the League and the ever closer co-operation between the League and the United States may be ascribed in part at least to the impact of events in the Far East. There is, too, a livelier and more widespread recognition of the growing importance of the Far East in world affairs. It might be exaggerated to say that the world's political centre of gravity is shifting from Europe to the Far East. It is only the melancholy truth that the Pacific is becoming the world's storm centre. Unhappily there is no doubt at all that the continued military occupation of our North Eastern Provinces already constitutes the most urgent danger in the world today of another great war. It is also becoming evident that the danger of war in the Far East is closely and inseparably linked with the prospects of peace in Europe.

At the Economic Conference the Chinese Delegate drew

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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attention to the potentialities of the Chinese market, and that the Chinese Government has for some time been applying a big program of national reconstruction with the technical co-operation of the League. That program as you see from the report of the League's Technical Agent, covers every field of national reconstruction, such as the building of roads, the improving of silk, tea and cotton culture, education, health, etc. At the present time there are only a few League experts in China, and their task is confined to investigation and planning of a technical character entirely dissociated from political issues. The development of air and rail transport, the vigorous campaign against the abuse of opium and drugs, and other aspects of reconstruction are being pursued by the Government apart from the technical co-operation of the League but within the same general plan of national reconstruction. As to the means of achieving the most beneficial results from this work, that is obviously and entirely a question of domestic policy to be determined and carried out by China in the exercise of her sovereign rights. No other State has any justification or right whatever to interfere with this policy. China is gratified that her position in this regard has the support of all the nations who are interested in the policy of co-operation between East and West, as testified by the action taken by the leading chancelleries after the declaration from Tokio last April.

The Chinese Government is still struggling with great difficulties and the work still to be accomplished is immense. But we feel that our feet are on firm ground, that we are advancing in the right direction and that time is on our side. If only international peace can be preserved we are confident that China's progress will be steady and rapid.

- 9 -

I have now put before you, as clearly and briefly as I could, and in a spirit of sober realism, what appear to the Government of China to be the salient features of the world situation in relation to Far Eastern problems and to the purpose of the League. China considers herself to be the Far Eastern outpost of the League and of the whole idea of co-operation between East and West. That feeling has been strengthened by the fact that, through circumstances which were not of our seeking and by which we are the chief sufferers, we have in the last eighteen months become the sole representatives of the Far East in the League Council. We wish to strengthen all the links that bind us to the League, both in the technical and political field, in order to help us to withstand the pressure of those who would compel us to turn our backs on the West and to enter some kind of exclusive and unequal partnership in the name of "Asia for the Asiatics". We do not believe that the world should be divided into water-tight compartments according to continents and races. We believe that peace can be preserved and civilization can flourish only through a League that is strong because it is universal and reflects in its organisation all the great geographical areas of the world. The people of China have always believed in international justice and that is why, in spite of all disappointments and reverses, we cling to our faith in the League and to our determination to do all in our power to uphold the Covenant and to cleave to the ways of peace.

I will conclude on a note of strength for the League and of hope for the future. If China is the foundation of Asia, as she is, Russia is the uniting arch of Europe and Asia. China warmly welcomes the prospect of her immediate entrance into the comity of the League of Nations. Russia's collaborative labours in the Disarmament Conference are a happy augury of her influence

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 10 -

now that she is about to enter the League membership. She has contributed the most clear and acute definition of the aggressor. China is Russia's neighbour over the longest stretch of continuous boundary anywhere in Asia or Europe. We have a common interest in the preservation of peace in the Far East and the Pacific, and we are glad that from now on our joint efforts for peace can be co-ordinated within the frame-work of the League.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tientsin/78 FOR #D-684

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Dec. 7, 1934.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Relations with Japan: North China Settlement of the more pressing Sino-Japanese issues.

FRG.

793.94/ 6835

6835-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SPECIAL GRAY

FROM

NANKING VIA NR

Dated January 25, 1935.

Received 1:30 p.m.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State



Washington.

12, January 25, 5 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Information is believed to be reliable has been

obtained that Chiang Kai Shek has been persuaded by the Japanese to adopt definitive policy of "cooperating" with Japan. This would indicate that reports of Japanese offers or demands for some kind of "pact" with China are basically true. Report continues relative to impossibility of expecting concrete assistance from the League of Nations and other countries including the United States, Chiang has decided to accept Japanese loan to be used for military and other purposes; that important changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and possibly other departments of Chinese Government may result; and that Chinese Government contemplates as part of Chiang's program action to take currency measures which may possibly involve a correlation of Chinese currency with currency system of Japan.

Two. According to this report Chiang's decision to accept Japanese financial assistance was announced to group of Chinese bankers at recent meeting in Shanghai during



793.94/6836

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6836

-2- CORRECTED COPY

No. 12, from Nanking, January 25, 1935.

during which Chiang pointed out that if China undertook war with Japan China would certainly meet with defeats during first three months even though able to continue resistance thereafter and that the Chinese Government, which had imbued the people of China with a certain sense of its leadership, might be unable to survive this strain and that since Japan was the only country willing and able to give needed financial assistance only feasible policy was to accept it.

Three. Same informant stated that Chiang has for some time been conversing with Japanese leaders through unknown intermediary possibly Wang I. Tang; that recently through this intermediary Chiang was asked by Japanese ^{spokesman}/whether in the event of war between Japan and Russia China would side with Japan and in that case whether China would be willing to organize three model divisions with Japanese advisers, instructors and equipment, that Chiang gave diplomatic negative to this proposal and was subsequently informed that Japan could not accept responsibility for anything which might happen in North China.

Four. Also understood that T V Soong was actually planning journey to United States but that it was canceled because of fear Japanese might think his trip for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- CORRECTED COPY

No. 12, from Nanking, January 25, 1935.

for purpose of obtaining American loan and therefore
"treacherous" in face of discussions of Japanese offers
or demands.

Repeated to the Department.

PECK

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

1-1236

FROM

SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via M. R.

Dated January 25, 1935

Rec'd 1:30 p. m.

793.94
Secretary of State, JAN 25 1935

Washington, DIVISION OF

12, January 25, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

One. Information which is Lockhart that is believed to be reliable has been obtained that Chiang Kai Shek has been persuaded by the Japanese to adopt definite policy of "coordination" with Japan. This would indicate that reports of Japanese offers or demands for some kind of concerts with China are basically true. Report continues relative to impossibility of expecting concrete assistance from the League of Nations and other countries including the United States, Chiang has decided to accept Japanese loan to be used for military and other purposes; that important changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and possibly other departments of Chinese Government may result; and that Chinese Government contemplates as part of Chiang's program action to take currency measures which may

possibly

793.94/6836

JAN 30 1935

F/G

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#12, From Nanking, Jan. 25, 5 p. m

possibly involve a correlation of Chinese currency with currency system of Japan.

Two. According to this report Chiang's decision to accept Japanese financial assistance was announced to group of Chinese bankers at recent meeting in Shanghai during which Chiang pointed out that if China undertook war with Japan China would certainly meet with defeats during first three months even though able to continue resistance thereabouts and that restores which had imbued the people of China with a certain sense of its leadership, might be unable to survive this strain and that since Japan was the only country willing and able to give needed (?) assistance only feasible policy was to accept it.

Three. Same (?) (?) Chiang (?) (?) been conversing with Japanese leaders through unknown intermediary possibly (?) itang; that recently through this (?) Chiang was asked by Japanese spokesman whether in the event of war between Japan and Russia China would side with Japan and in that case whether (?) would be willing to organize three model disturbed with Japanese advisers (?) instructors and equipment semi-official that Chiang gave diplomatic

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3-#12, From Nanking, Jan. 25, 5 p.m.

diplomatic negative to this proposal and was subsequently informed that Japan could not (?) responsibility for anything which might happen (?) not more than China (?).

Four (?) (?) (?)v Soong was actually (?) joint note to United States but that it was canceled because of fear Italy might think his trip for purpose of obtaining American loan and therefore " (?) " (?) (?) of discussions of Japanese offers or (?). Repeated to the Department.

PECK

WSB-CSB

Note: Repetition requested
from Nanking - Telegraph Room

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Quisenberry NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

ii. Foreign Relations.

A. Relations with the United States.

Nothing to report.

B. Relations with other countries.

1. Japan.

793.94

a. North China Settlement. It would appear to be a plausible assumption that a general settlement of the more pressing Sino-Japanese issues in North China was effected during the month of November. Negotiations, - in which the Chinese were represented by General Huang Fu (), Yin T'ung (), Managing Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Line, Yin Ju-keng (), Administrative Inspector of the Chi-Mi Area, and latterly T'ang Yu-jen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese by certain members of the Japanese Legation, including Colonel Shibayama, the Military Attache, a representative of the Kwantung Army, and later, it is alleged, Minister Ariyoshi himself, - were widely reported to be in progress throughout the month, having been given, according to the statements of responsible Chinese, a considerable impetus by the visit of General Chiang K'ai-shek to North China at the close of October. Several usually well-informed local officials have stated that the terms of the settlement itself include agreements touching postal communications, aeroplane and bus routes connecting points south of

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of the wall with points north of it, through train service from Mukden to Paot'ou (the latter seems extremely doubtful), and various other political and economic concessions demanded by the Japanese. (1)

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated January 25, 1935

COPIES SENT TO
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FROM

Rec'd 1:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RECEIVED
 JAN 25 1935
 DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 JAN 26 1935

36, January 25, 5 p. m.

Legation's telegram No. 34, January 24, 2 p. m.

Senior Secretary of Japanese Legation states that action reported as taking place on January 22 occurred on January 23 and was only important action on that day; that no information has been received with regard to press reports of bombing of Tushihkou, which lies within the Great Wall and south of Kuyuan; and that it is expected Chinese and Japanese military will confer for a settlement of the situation. All sources now claim that Kuyuan was not occupied. According to Chinese official sources, Japanese planes dropped 7 bombs January 24 on Tushihkou causing casualties and destroying 50 houses. Assistant Japanese Military Attache is reported to have said that this bombing has no significance.

It

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

CORRECTED SECOND PAGE

2-#36, From Peiping, Jan. 25, 5p.m.

It still appears that military action will presumably spread, but if a conference is inevitable it is not (repeat not) unlikely that the Japanese may make demands which will further affect Chinese sovereignty, such as a possible demand for establishment of a demilitarized zone along the Chahar Jehol boundary. The recent military activity may also be made use of to strengthen the Japanese diplomatically vis a vis China.

GAUSS

CSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#36, From Peiping, Jan. 25, 5 p. m.

It still appears that military activity will *presumably spread* *inevitable*
~~A 2-1-75~~, but if a conference is ~~held~~ it is not (repeat
not) unlikely that the Japanese may make demands which
will further affect Chinese sovereignty, such as a
possible demand for establishment of a demilitarized
zone along the Chahar Jehol boundary. The recent
military activity may also be made use of to strengthen
the Japanese (?) vis a vis China.

GAUSS

CSB

See correction Page 2
[Signature]

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Collect
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 OR
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Department of State
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

Naval Radio
Special Agent
 January 28, 1935.

1935 JAN 28 PM 1 27

28

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

DIVISION OF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 AND RECORDS

26

Your 36, January 25, 5 p. m., in regard to Jehol-Chahar
 situation and Nanking's January 25, 5 p. m., and January 26,
 1 p. m., in regard to Sino-Japanese relations.

Please repeat to Tokyo and keep Tokyo currently informed.

Hell

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OK
 Jan. 28 1935
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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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1-1280
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JAN 26 1935
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Special Telegram
Nanking via
Dated January 26, 1935
Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1935
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

14, January 26, 1 p.m.

A report from apparently reliable unofficial source states that on January 23 the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed a meeting of the Central Political Council that he had received a telegram direct from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing the desire of the latter to visit Nanking; also the Japanese Minister to China in a recent interview proposed an offensive and defensive alliance between China and Japan. The meeting decided to study both matters. I am endeavoring to confirm this report.

Two. Report that an alliance had been proposed as stated was first given me by the French Minister on January 5 who received it in Shanghai. Our subsequent investigations led us to regard it as unreliable but this independent confirmation lends some credibility. I will continue attempts at verification.

GW:WSB

PECK

793.94/6838

FILED

JAN 30 1935

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

Paraphrase of first paragraph sent to C.N.D. + M.G. HQ


GRAY AND SPECIAL GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated January 26, 1935

Rec'd 8:30 a. m.

1-1336



Secretary of State,

Washington.

13, January 26, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My January 25, 5 p. m. paragraphs 2 and 4.

(1)- The report which I quoted that Chiang announced to the Chinese bankers in Shanghai that he had decided to accept financial assistance from Japanese sources was heard Shanghai January 24 and I am informed that its credibility is regarded as doubtful by certain persons apparently qualified to judge. I will continue my attempts here to verify the report.

(2)- I am reliably informed from Shanghai that the Federal Reserve Bank made direct to the Central Bank of China (#) of a loan and expressed opinion that some representative other than T. V. Soong should go to the United States to negotiate. Chinese rumor in Nanking is that Soong decided not to go to the United States to negotiate financial assistance because he feared he would not be persona grata owing to the divergence of

793.94/6839

F.

793.94
 793.51
 893.51

Feb 26, to Nanking
 JAN 28 1935
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 Department of State

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2-#13, From Nanking, Jan. 26, noon

of wheat cotton credit proceeds from constructive to
military uses.

(3)- It would be most helpful to this office to
receive confidential information regarding any dis-
cussion relating to financial transactions such as
referred to above.

PECK

CSB

(#) Apparent omission

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A strictly confidential telegram (13) dated January 26, 1935, from the American Consul General at Nanking, reads in part substantially as follows:

According to information received by the Consul General, certain persons seemingly qualified to judge doubt the credibility of a report which was heard in Shanghai on January 24 to the effect that General Chiang Kai-shek had announced to Chinese bankers in Shanghai that he had decided to accept financial assistance from Japanese sources. The Consul General adds that he is trying in Nanking to verify the report.

793.94/6839

29C.
 FE:EGC

FE

m. H

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D

SPECIAL GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Nanking, via N. R.,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 28 1935
DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Dated January 28 1935,
FROM
Rec'd 7:40 A. M.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
in confidence

Tele
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1935
Department of State

793.94

16, January 28, 9 a. m.

by 12, January 25, 5 p. m. *6836*

Confidential. One. On January 26, 5 p. m., Mrs. Peck and I paid social call on the wife of General Chiang Kai Shek and in reply to questions she confirmed that an offensive and defensive alliance has recently been proposed to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Government but she was not definite in regard to the channel employed. She said the offer was rejected on the ground that until Manchuria is restored China cannot trust Japan. An offer to supply Japanese military advisers was rejected at the same time.

Two. Madam Chiang neither confirmed nor denied reported Japanese offer of financial assistance.

Three. She confirmed report that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had confidentially communicated to the Chinese authorities his desire to visit Nanking in person but said she understood this project had to be abandoned owing to complications caused by ^{premature} publicity.

Four. The tenor of replies made by Madam Chiang strongly implied that all offers of assistance including financial

793.94/6840

JAN 30 1935

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton D. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nanking/2, No. 16, Jan. 28, 9 a. m.

financial had been refused by her husband but certain statements resembled so closely those said to have been made to the Chinese bankers (see my January 25, 5 p. m., paragraph two, for brief summary) as to lend credibility to the report of that interview. For example, she said it is commonly reported that Japan has fourteen divisions of troops which could be utilized against China, or about 280,000 men; four divisions are in Manchuria while China has an equal number of effective troops; thus China would probably be defeated at the outset but would be able to continue the war because Japan would be hampered by disproportionate expense of operating away from base in an immense territory and by the danger inherent in sending its entire effective force to China. She pointed out that Manchuria is not yet subdued after three years effort.

PECK

WJC
CSB

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

27

