

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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Christianity in the Japanese Empire:  
Nationalism, Conscience, and Faith  
in Meiji and Taisho Japan

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy  
in History

by

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2010

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While the question of the relationship between Christianity and the Japanese empire occurred to me more recently, two separate questions—the state of Christianity in Japan and the nature of the Japanese empire—have been with me most of my life. As the grandchild of a woman who was forced into an ill-advised marriage because of the lack of marriageable men in wartime Japan, and whose divorce partly contributed to my own mother's decision to marry a foreigner, I was always faintly aware that the Japanese empire had a lot to answer for. Educated in a school in Tokyo for the children of American Christian missionaries, I was often curious about the tenuous presence of Christianity in Japan. However, it was not until Mark Mullins gave a presentation on Japanese Christianity to my high school senior class that I first wondered about the nature of Japanese Christianity, something which struck me as distinct and perhaps more interesting than the stifled efforts of the parents of my classmates. Little did he or I know that this brief introduction would spark an interest in what would become this project. More recently, he has become a good friend and I thank him for his willingness to share his knowledge and enthusiasm with what must have seemed to be uninterested teenagers, and for his continued support of my research.

My interest in history and my approach were first formed and shaped during my years in the curatorial department of the Japanese American National Museum in Los Angeles. I am eternally indebted to Eiichiro Azuma, who not only helped me with my first attempts at translating handwritten Japanese documents, and patiently answered my

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Christianity in the Japanese Empire:  
Nationalism, Conscience, and Faith  
in Meiji and Taisho Japan

by

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Professor Fred G. Notehelfer, Chair

This dissertation explores the relationship between Christianity and the rise of the Japanese empire, especially from the 1880s to the 1930s. A preoccupation with the empire, and the relationship between Japan and Asia, deeply informed how Japanese Christians—both those who supported and opposed imperialism—formulated specifically Japanese forms of Christianity in Meiji and Taisho Japan. Existing Western scholarship on Japanese Christianity has tended to emphasize the relationship between Japanese converts and the missionaries who converted them. These works often limit their study of Japanese Christians to their role in debates on issues narrowly defined as

domestic concerns. Such studies do not engage with the degree to which the question of empire permeated every level of Japanese social, intellectual, and cultural life.

Given the diversity of experiences, activities, and beliefs among Japanese Christians, my aim is not to write a comprehensive history of Japanese Christianity in this period; instead, I focus on members of one denomination, the Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai, or Japanese Congregational Church, because this denomination's decentralized administrative structure resulted in a wider range of theological positions and approaches to ministry than that of the other mainline Protestant denominations. By conducting a close reading of Japanese Christian theological arguments and social critique, I hope to expand on the understanding of how some Japanese Christians developed and adapted Christianity in a way that reconciled Christian belief with newly constructed notions of Japanese identity and empire, as well as how others developed theologically based critiques of imperialism and militarism.

My dissertation explores the intersection of Japanese Protestantism and imperialism in three distinct settings. The first, which focuses on the urban church, includes a study of important debates among Japanese Protestants such as how (and perhaps whether or not) Christians could demonstrate their loyalty to the Japanese state, and different ways that church leaders and their congregations responded to significant social and political events, such as Japan's entry into war with Russia. The second section, on the colonies, addresses the Kumiai Kyōkai's fascination with Korea—culminating in a ten-year long attempt to establish a mission there following Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910—and the extension of this mission into Manchuria and

Shanghai in the 1920s following anti-Japanese protests in Korea and China in 1919. The final section, on the rural church, focuses on the Annaka church in Gunma Prefecture, one of the oldest Kumiai Kyōkai churches, and its minister Kashiwagi Gien, to consider the impact of imperialism on Japan's countryside, and how Kashiwagi's experiences as a rural minister informed his unusual critique of the state and imperial expansion.

## INTRODUCTION

The town of Annaka in Gunma Prefecture is nestled among the low hills at the base of Haruna and Myōgi, two imposing mountains bordering the northwestern edge of the Kantō plains, and is one of the last towns along the old Nakasendō, the major road that connected Edo (now Tokyo) to Kyoto, before it makes its way into the mountainous interior of Honshū. Annaka is no longer on a main highway: the bullet train stops there, but Annaka-Haruna station is the second-least frequented station nationwide.<sup>1</sup> But Annaka and nearby towns are sites of some of the oldest Protestant churches in Japan.

On a cold January day in 1884, a twenty-four year old schoolteacher named Kashiwagi Gien was baptized by Ebina Danjō, the minister of a church in Annaka. For Kashiwagi, this was the culmination of a four-year long flirtation with Christianity, and marked the beginning of a long and devoted life as a Christian educator and minister. This was also the beginning of his intimate relationship with the Annaka church, where he later served as minister for thirty-eight years until his retirement in 1935, shortly before his death in 1938.

Ebina was one of the earliest converts to Protestant Christianity after it was introduced to Japan in 1859, among the first to graduate from Dōshisha—the first Japanese Christian school—and was a rising minister in the newly formed Nihon

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<sup>1</sup> For instance in 2008, only 275 people used Annaka-Haruna station. Karuizawa station, the next station on the way to Nagano, was used by 2624 passengers. Only the Iwate-Numakunai station in Iwate Prefecture has fewer users (119 in 2008). Wikipedia, “Jōetsu shinkansen,” <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/上越新幹線> and “Tōhoku shinkansen,” <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/東北新幹線> (accessed 24 June 2010).

Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai, or Japanese Congregational Church. While still a student at Dōshisha he visited Annaka as an evangelist, and upon graduating became the first minister of Annaka church. The gradual spread of Christianity in this regional town, as represented by Kashiwagi's conversion and baptism, was no doubt satisfying and encouraging to him. The two men had first become acquainted in 1880, when Kashiwagi was invited by a friend to attend a talk given by Ebina on Christianity. Thus, the baptism of this promising, but yet tentative, young man, had personal significance for Ebina as well.<sup>2</sup>

Despite their close relationship, these two men soon became bitter ideological opponents, rigorously disagreeing on theology, the role of Christianity in society, and the appropriate response of Christians to Japan's growing empire and increasingly aggressive imperialism towards its Asian neighbors. The issues that divided Ebina and Kashiwagi, as well as their contemporaries, were issues central to the development of ideas of Japanese identity, the perception of Japan's position in the world, and the link between Japanese living in the *naichi* (Japan proper) and Japanese and "colonial subjects" living in the *gaichi* (colonies). Most importantly, each of the issues over which Ebina and Kashiwagi, and others like them, disagreed, whether issues of Christology and perceptions of sin, to ideas of appropriate methods of ministry and social engagement, to opinions about the legitimacy of Japanese expansionism, were inextricably linked to the question of empire.

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<sup>2</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien: Tennōsei to Kirisutokyō* (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1993), 18, 40-42.

This relationship between Christianity and the rise of the Japanese empire, particularly from the 1880s to the 1930s, is the focus of this dissertation. The history of Christianity in modern Japan has often been presented as one chapter of Japan's abrupt and unsettling confrontation with the West following a long period of self-imposed isolation. As such, existing scholarship has emphasized the relationship between American missionaries and the Japanese they converted. Further, it has characterized the ascent and decline of interest in Christianity as parallel to a more general embrace, and subsequent rejection, of all things Western, from the 1870s through the 1880s. In the scholarship, the history of Christians is thus treated as peripheral to the efforts of nationalists and the state in creating, promoting, and reinforcing a national ideology to serve as the foundation of a new Japan, one that would be acknowledged and recognized by western powers as an equal, with the right to assert its interests abroad. In this narrative, Christians were of course increasingly marginalized, accused of being not quite Japanese in a nation that demanded an absolute loyalty defined by a narrowly construed understanding of the individual's relationship to the state. In this story of foreordained decline and retrenchment, Christians were forced into obscurity, and by the 1930s, as the Japanese state and society in general grew increasingly militaristic and intolerant of difference, their activities were impossibly compromised by a nation that enforced, often through violence, a religious allegiance to state and emperor.

Christians in pre-World War II Japan were neither merely a curiosity, however, nor a group of Japanese enthralled with the West and estranged from their own society. In terms of numbers, Christians were a small minority, never exceeding one percent of

the population. However, this statistic belies the extent of their influence and importance in this period. Their limited numbers notwithstanding, Christians were at the forefront of social reform efforts such as temperance, the abolition of prostitution, and social welfare institutions for the rapidly growing populations of urban poor.<sup>3</sup> They were instrumental in introducing and interpreting socialism.<sup>4</sup> Others, idiosyncratic and even iconoclastic like Uchimura Kanzō, Nitobe Inazō, and Kagawa Toyohiko, gained national and international fame (or notoriety) as theologians, thinkers, and reformers.<sup>5</sup> Even more crucially, Christians were key contenders and interlocutors in the very process of crafting the meaning of national identity and loyalty in Japan. These Christians developed their theology and practice as vital players within Japan's emergence as a modern nation-state and colonial empire. From the 1880s to the 1930s, the period upon which I focus, Japanese Christians forcefully claimed a place for themselves in the Japanese empire.

Not simply passive and embattled, Christians asserted and insisted on a diverse range of alternative visions for a Christian Japan. These ranged from claims of the superiority of Christian belief for the new empire to bold denunciations of empire in the name of a moral nation. They also labored tirelessly to develop ministries that were

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<sup>3</sup> See for example Rumi Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism: The United States, Japan, and Japanese Immigrant Communities in California, 1859-1920* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); and Fujime Yuki, "The Licensed Prostitution System and the Prostitution Abolition Movement in Modern Japan," *positions* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 135-170.

<sup>4</sup> See for example F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971); and Nobuya Bamba and John F. Howes, editors, *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition* (Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> See for example John F. Howes, *Japan's Modern Prophet: Uchimura Kanzo, 1861-1930* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); and George B. Bikle, Jr., *The New Jerusalem: Aspects of Utopianism in the Thought of Kagawa Toyohiko* (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1976).

intended to transform these visions into reality, which they often characterized as the realization of God's kingdom on earth through a Christian Japan. And reflecting the imperial and transnational (or trans-Pacific) reach of Japan itself in this period, these Christians extended their vision beyond the cities and villages of Japan to include colonized subjects and Japanese settlers in colonies, and communities of Japanese immigrants abroad.

Examining the role of Christianity in the unfolding of Japan's national and imperial identity in this period also engages the powerful but ambiguous relationship between empire and religion, and the potential within religion for both complicity with and critique of empire. The Japanese empire skillfully and deliberately deployed religion—its symbols and rituals and mystery—to bolster the ideological system which served as its source, while also insisting that it was a secular modern state.<sup>6</sup> It was not the only one to do so. It is possible to argue that all modern empires, even those maintaining a secular ideology, have used religion, or been supported by religion, to justify their claims of domination and rule over others by dictating the limits and contours of *acceptable* belief.<sup>7</sup> However, the Japanese empire has often been distinguished from others in its policies, methods, brutality, and of course, its use of

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<sup>6</sup> See for example T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 12-13; Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State: 1868-1988* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. 86-96; and Sung-Gun Kim, "The Shinto Shrine Issue in Korean Christianity Under Japanese Colonialism," *Journal of Church and State* 39, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 503-521.

<sup>7</sup> For evocative studies of the tensions inherent in the handling of religious belief by secular states that nonetheless assert a particular understanding of religious practice in the name of tolerance, see Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

religion as a central aspect of its ideology.<sup>8</sup> Certainly state Shinto—which turned emperor reverence into a form of civic religion—served as a critical part of the ideological apparatus that legitimized the state. As the Japanese empire increasingly demanded that its subjects exhibit certain behaviors anchored in particular sanctioned beliefs, other forms of belief—whether Christianity or other religions or other beliefs such as socialism—posed a significant challenge. Thus the state subjected belief to scrutiny and regulation, arrogating to itself the authority to dictate the parameters of acceptable beliefs, even as religionists attempted to expand these same boundaries.<sup>9</sup>

## Literature Review and Research Problematic

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<sup>8</sup> See for example Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, editors, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6-8, 24-25. Also Iinuma Jirō, a prominent scholar of Japanese Christianity and agricultural history, argues that for Japanese Christians, nationalism—as well as reverence for the emperor—was natural, and that what made demands like enforced Shinto shrine worship in the colonies oppressive was the fact it was being imposed on foreign populations. Iinuma Jirō, *Tennōsei to Kirisutosha* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan shuppankyoku, 1991), 96.

<sup>9</sup> For an in-depth study of the process by which the early Meiji state developed its official policy towards both religion and its own putative secular basis, see Trent Maxey, “The Greatest Problem: Religion in the Politics and Diplomacy of Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1884” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2005). Christians were not the only religionists whose belief was regulated by the state. In *Of Heretics and Martyrs: Buddhism and its Persecution*, James Ketelaar traces the way in which Buddhism was targeted as inherently foreign and undesirable by nativist scholars serving as advisors to the early Meiji state. Further, he argues that the Meiji state targeted not only Buddhism, but through the *shinbutsu bunri* (separation of Buddhism and Shinto) policy implemented in the first years of Meiji, it sought to define and clearly demarcate Buddhism and Shinto as separate entities. He demonstrates that through this process, the state attempted to regulate religion and incorporate it—through the co-option of ritual and the content of teaching—into the state’s ideological dissemination apparatus. In other words, the way in which Christians and Christianity were targeted and attacked in the early 1890s should not be separated from the way in which religious institutions—regardless of denomination or sect—were controlled and regulated by the state, or from the way that religionists attempted to negotiate among themselves and with the state to re-establish their position in society, often by presenting themselves as the legitimate moral foundation of the empire.

In my research, I am integrating two sub-fields—the study of Japanese empire and the study of Japanese Christianity—that have, so far, remained largely segregated in English-language scholarship. I believe that this integrated approach is vital to probe the study of imperialism beyond political, economic, and even social factors, to include the crucial role played by religious belief, symbols, and practice in articulating and defining the Japanese nation, the rights and obligations of Japanese imperial subjects, and the nature of empire. Since I am building on both recently emerging scholarship on Japanese imperialism and earlier works on Japanese Christianity, this section will provide a discussion of the major themes and frameworks in existing studies from each of these sub-fields, along with an overview of how my research problematique and research lie at the intersection of these two fields.

### Japanese Empire

Until the mid-1980s, most English-language scholarship on modern Japan limited its focus to Japan proper.<sup>10</sup> This was partially remedied with the publication of Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie's edited volume, *Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (1984); Myers, Peattie, and Peter Duus' edited volumes *Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937* (1989), and *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (1996); and Peter Duus' *Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*

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<sup>10</sup> This reflects the development of the field of Japan studies, which first emerged in the context of the U.S.'s impending conflict with Japan, as part of an effort to "understand" what was perceived as an inherently alien and inscrutable enemy nation. Following World War II, the focus shifted to Japan's impressive emergence from defeat under the direction of the U.S. and its role as an important regional ally to the U.S. in the Cold War. The predominant concern during these periods was Japan's relationship with the West, and as a result, Japan's relationship to the rest of Asia was largely ignored, and treated as an incidental concern.

(1995). However, these works on imperial Japan tend to focus on political, economic, and administrative aspects of Japanese empire building, and ignore the impact of imperialism on Japan itself.

In the introduction to *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, Mark Peattie begins by arguing that the Japanese empire represents a form of imperialism distinct from that of Western countries engaged in imperialistic competition in the nineteenth century. The most significant difference, according to Peattie, was that unlike Western powers that colonized peoples geographically distant and clearly alien from them, Japan colonized countries “whose inhabitants were racially akin to their Japanese rulers [and] with whom they shared a common heritage.”<sup>11</sup> Further, Peattie presents a framework for analyzing the Japanese empire that assumes the inherent value of modernization—something he argues was one positive contribution Japan made to the countries it colonized—and through which he and the other contributors to the volume attempt to evaluate the *quality* of the Japanese form of imperialism. Aside from the intellectually and politically problematic nature of this framework, the authors do not question several assumptions: that as a non-Western country, Japan engaged in a unique form of imperialism; that Japan and the countries it colonized were, in Peattie’s words, “racially akin”; that Japan had successfully achieved modernization and then exported wholesale its version of modernization to its colonies; and that the Japanese empire’s failures were not in its approach, but in the intensity of its methods. As the earliest of these works,

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<sup>11</sup> Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, eds. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 7.

this volume in many ways established a baseline for how subsequent scholars approached the study of the Japanese empire.<sup>12</sup>

In a review article, Andre Schmid argues that these works particularly reify two perspectives: a Eurocentric or Western-centric view of history, where the significant point of reference is how a non-Western nation relates to the West, and the Japanese colonial apologists' argument that Japanese imperialism was a reactive and inevitable result of Japan's desire to attain equal position with the West in an unequal and racialized global system. Furthermore, he argues that by positioning the history of empire as an external/foreign history—as opposed to internal/domestic history—these works fail to address how for many Japanese during this period, Japan's pursuit of Asian colonies influenced and permeated every level of Japanese social, cultural, and intellectual life.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For instance, Peter Duus, whose work is the first to focus specifically on the Japanese colonization of Korea, shares many of the assumptions established by Peattie. Central to Duus's argument is the concept of mimesis; he asserts that the idea of imperialistic overseas expansion had no intellectual or cultural tradition in Japan, but was imported wholesale along with other Western ideas and technologies when Japan ended its seclusion and jumped into the global imperialistic power struggle. He also places Japan's nascent imperialism within the larger global context of the rise of a more aggressive and state-driven form of Western imperialism that equated the accumulation of colonies with national honor and greater economic opportunity. Expansionism in general, and Japan's interest in Korea in particular, are characterized as the result of Japan's attempt to regain national honor and achieve parity with Western powers, using the same strategies and policies already being used by Western nations to divvy up weaker non-Western countries. He also argues that the Japanese government in particular was motivated by a misplaced altruism; in other words, he maintains that Japanese government officials—Ito Hirobumi in particular—viewed Japanese interference in Korean domestic affairs as part of Japan's civilizing mission in Asia, and that Japan's eventual control of Korea—first by making it a protectorate, and then through annexation—was largely due to Koreans' inability to actualize these civilizing reforms on their own. *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 2, 14, 51.

<sup>13</sup> Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 4 (November 2000): 955.

More recently, several works have appeared that extend beyond an analysis of formal government structures and policies, and critically engage with the ideological foundation of the empire. For instance, Louise Young's *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (1998) addresses the political, economic, and sociocultural impact that Japan's pursuit of Manchuria had on the Japanese government, military, businesses, and people in both urban and rural areas. Young demonstrates the extent to which Manchuria—as the premier symbol of imperial Japan's colonial possessions by the 1930s—influenced government policy decisions, shaped business decisions, colored the production of popular culture, and altered community life, especially through the state-sponsored drive for migration of rural farmers to Manchukuo.<sup>14</sup>

Further, she also assesses how Manchuria, and then Manchukuo, represented a site of opportunity for diverse Japanese groups, often with competing or conflicting interests. For government militarists and the Guandong Army, it was the site from which further military expansion into the rest of China could be achieved; for businessmen, it was a market that represented greater opportunities than Japan itself because they could count on state control to further their economic interests; for social reformers and urban planners, Manchuria's cities provided them with the opportunity to attempt utopian reform plans impossible in Japan where competing interests thwarted

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<sup>14</sup> Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 14-15.

their ambitions.<sup>15</sup> However, one group she fails to address are religionists—Christian, Buddhist, and members of myriad newer religions—who like these others saw in the colonies opportunities for evangelism or the creation of utopian spiritual communities that they had failed to establish in Japan itself.

Another work which questions earlier assumptions about the ideological foundations of the Japanese empire and the impact this had on policies in the colonies, is Leo Ching's *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (2001). In particular, Ching focuses on the Japanese policies of assimilation (*dōka*) and imperialization (*kōminka*), as implemented in colonial Taiwan, to question assumptions that scholars who study Japan and those who study the experiences of the colonized have about the mechanisms of Japanese imperial rule. His careful analysis of the significance of these two policies—and the shift from the former to the latter—demonstrates that the colonies represented a difficult problem—what he calls the “predicament of Japanese colonialism”—for Japanese politicians, ideologues, and intellectuals of different leanings. His work not only seeks to address the problems, or predicament, that resulted from Japanese colonialism during this period, but also “the positions and politics of such analyses [of the problematic of identity formations] in the so-called post-colonial condition.”<sup>16</sup>

This is particularly important because of the way that Japanese colonial policy has been considered by scholars who focus on the experience of the colonized,

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<sup>15</sup> Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 12.

<sup>16</sup> Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 11.

especially those who focus on the colonial Korean experience. In an effort to expose the oppressive nature of Japanese colonial rule, scholars of colonial Korean history have often made reductionist or essentialist arguments to explain the nature and extent of the Japanese Government General's policies in Korea, including the *dōka* policy. In other words, they assume that emperor-centered ideology and the definition of the proper imperial subject were acceptable or natural in Japan, and that *dōka* was oppressive precisely because it was an effort to eclipse Korean (or Taiwanese) cultural identity with Japanese culture and an (albeit subordinate) national identity.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, Leo Ching, in *Becoming "Japanese"*, argues that, "the nativist discourse of deprivation is unknowingly in complicity with colonial discourse in equally reifying the category of Japanese, or Japaneseness, and is thereby unable to confront the

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<sup>17</sup> For instance, Hyun Ok Park describes Japan's vision for expansion as "territorial osmosis," through which Japan attempted to "disseminate [its] sovereignty across the borders in Asia" through a "sequence of conquests." Further, she argues that, "under these circumstances Japan envisaged the imaginary of sameness through racial and bodily unity rather than the conception of difference between colonizer and colonized, between self and other." While this "fictive unity" was an important part of Japan's imperialist ideology, her assumption that this vision drove Japan's expansionism reifies Peattie's claims that Japan's imperialism was distinct from that of Western countries because, in Park's words, "sameness was the mode of rule in the Japanese empire." Hyun Ok Park, "Korean Manchuria: The Racial Politics of Territorial Osmosis," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 193-215. Also, Wan-yao Chou argues that, "the *kōminka* movement was a movement aimed at shaping the colonized in the image and likeness of the colonizer. In this sense, it can be regarded as an 'assimilation' movement, but in an extreme form." Again, Chou does not question the historically constituted nature of the *colonizer's* identity in his analysis of the *kōminka* policy. Wan-yao Chou, "The *Kominka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, 41. In contrast, Komagome Takeshi, in an article on the enforcement of Shinto shrine worship in colonial Taiwan, argues that practices generally considered traditional by Japanese themselves—such as the now ubiquitous practice of worshipping at Shinto shrines on New Year's Day—were rituals introduced and encouraged by the state in 1873 in order to inculcate in average Japanese a sense of belonging to the nation through "national" rituals. Like Ching, Komagome argues for the need to reconsider the historically constituted nature of practices, rituals, and attitudes associated with Japaneseness as part of studying the Japanese empire. "Shokuminchi ni okeru jinja sampai," in *Seikatsu no naka no shokuminchi shugi*, ed. Mizuno Naoki, 107-111 (Kyoto: Jinbun shoin, 2004).

very historicity and contradiction within the categories themselves.”<sup>18</sup> This does not negate the oppressive nature of Japanese imperialism—as constitutive of the category itself—but a careful reexamination of the historical development of the ideas that served as the ideological basis for Japanese imperialism offers a more nuanced understanding of the nature of imperialism and the centrality of the empire to Japan during this period. As I will argue in this dissertation, Christians and Christianity were critical to the development of not only the concepts that served as the foundation of imperial ideology, but also the very process by which Christians and others negotiated their acceptability in society developed in relation to *dōka*, and later *kōminka* policies, in the colonies.

### Japanese Christianity

Schmid’s critique is especially relevant to English-language scholarship on Japanese Christianity. There are only a few historical studies of Christianity in modern Japan, most of which were published in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Ernest Best’s *Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis: The Japanese Case* (1966), Irwin Scheiner’s *Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan* (1970), and Carlo Caldarola’s *Christianity: The Japanese Way* (1979). These earlier works made significant contributions by providing detailed analyses of the initial circumstances of conversion and converts’ relationships with American missionaries. They also made available the theological writings and social commentary of a select group of important Japanese Christian intellectuals, and situated the first converts within the larger political and

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<sup>18</sup> Leo Ching, *Becoming “Japanese”*, 7.

social turmoil that characterized Meiji Japan. However, this scholarship on Japanese Christianity overemphasizes the West as the significant point of reference, source of anxiety, and influence for Japanese Christians. While it is indisputable that Christianity was introduced as a Western religion, and its popularity was linked to shifting opinion towards the West, limiting the impact and influence of Christianity to the part it played in Japan's westernization process minimizes the agency of Japanese converts as well as the significance of religious experience in developing and solidifying social and political positions within the realities of the empire.<sup>19</sup>

Japanese scholarship on Christianity is much more extensive, and includes numerous biographies, denominational histories, works on theology, and surveys of important movements. Most relevant to my own research are the scholars whose works address the relationship between Christianity and the empire and emperor-centered ideology (*tennōsei*). Prominent among this group are those who are members of the Kirisutokyō shakai mondai kenkyūkai (Christianity and social issues study group) at

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<sup>19</sup> There are several works that purport to explore Japanese Christianity and empire, such as Jon Thares Davidann, *A World of Crisis and Progress: the American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930* (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: Lehigh University Press, 1998) and Hamish A. Ion, *The Cross and the Rising Sun, The British Protestant missionary movement in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 1865-1945* (Waterloo, Ont., Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990-1999). However, these works address empire in a cursory manner, and do not provide an in-depth analysis. Ion, in particular, considers empire only as a geographic space in which western missionaries conducted their evangelism, and does not explicitly address the activities of Japanese Christians in this same space. Two recent dissertations pursue the link between Christianity and imperialism further: Gregory Allan Vanderbilt, "'The Kingdom of God is a Mustard Seed': Evangelizing Modernity Between Japan and the United States, 1905-1948" (PhD diss., UCLA, 2005) and Yosuke Nirei, "The Ethics of Empire: Protestant Thought, Moral Culture, and Imperialism in Meiji Japan" (PhD diss., UC Berkeley, 2004). Vanderbilt's dissertation focuses on the work of Merrill Vories (later Hitotsuyanagi Meriru) and the Ōmi Brotherhood; Nirei addresses the vision for social reform presented by Meiji Christians such as Ebina, Tokutomi Sohō, and Uchimura, among others. While Nirei includes empire within his framework, he does not actually address the reality of the empire (i.e. Japan's colonies and Christians' views and visions for these colonies), but only considers it as an ideological category.

Doshisha University. In addition to articles published in their journal, *Kirisutokyō shakai mondai kenkyū*, this group has also produced works such as *Kindai tennōsei to kirisutokyō* (Modern emperor-ideology and Christianity). Another Japanese scholar who has made Christianity and empire the basis of his work is Iinuma Jirō, who in works such as *Nihon teikokushugika no Chōsen dendō: Norimatsu Masayasu, Watase Tsuneyoshi, Oda Naraji, Nishida Shōichi* (Evangelism in Korea Under Japanese Imperialism: Norimatsu Masayasu, Watase Tsuneyoshi, Oda Naraji, Nishida Shōichi) and *Tennōsei to Kirisutosha* (Imperial ideology and Christians), explores the ways in which Christians living in the Japanese empire accepted imperial ideology and conducted their own ministries in a way that supported the emperor-based state and expansionist policies abroad. Katano Masako, whose work focuses on Kashiwagi Gien, is also among these scholars.

What characterizes the Japanese scholars who have done work on this subject is their explicitly expressed ethical stance towards the relationship between Christianity and empire. In general, they begin with the assumption that the two are irreconcilable, and that Christians' acceptance of Japanese imperialism represents a fundamental failure on their part. Therefore, they conduct their research in part to indict the behavior and beliefs of these Christians.<sup>20</sup> Conversely, the scholars who focus on Christians

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<sup>20</sup> For instance, Iinuma begins *Tennōsei to Kirisutosha* with a biblical interpretation of what he calls "minzoku egoizumu," or ethnic egoism. He argues that this ethnic egoism, which served as the basis for Japanese expansionism, parallels Jewish ethno-nationalism under the Roman Empire, which he claims led to the crucifixion of Christ because the Jews failed to appreciate the universal and transcendent aspects of Christ's teachings. Thus, he asserts that Japanese imperialism was irreconcilable with the universal and humanitarian teachings of Christ, and that Japanese Christians' acceptance, in whatever form, of Japanese imperialism based on ethno-nationalism represented a fundamental failure on their part to comprehend the central principles of Christianity (39). Further, Kim Mun-gil writes that the treatment of Ebina in

categorized as pacifists or those opposed to imperial ideology, characterize their subjects as exemplars of Christian living. Since these scholars are concerned with evaluating the beliefs and practices of these Christians according to a predetermined ideal of Christianity, they often do not critically examine how these Christians developed their beliefs and practices in relation to the state and the empire. Therefore, while these scholars have contributed an extensive amount of research on this period, and have culled through an impressive amount of archival material, their ideological commitment limits the range and extent of their inquiry.

No legitimate attempt to study Japanese Christians can divorce them from the specific historical context in which they lived, nor should it minimize the impact that imperialist ideology, nationalism, and the complex system of material and ideological support for imperialism, had on the lives of Japanese living during this period.

Imperialism in Japan was not uniform, for its advocates and critics were diverse and often disagreed over the exact nature of the state, the role of the emperor, and the form, extent and function of the empire.<sup>21</sup> Further, Christians participated in this discourse,

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particular by postwar Japanese scholars of Christianity has been shaped by the fact that “postwar scholars have been motivated by the ethical desire to critique the Shinto-like Japanese Christianity espoused by Ebina, and to criticize the prewar church’s cooperation with Showa fascism.” Kim Mun-gil, *Kindai Nihon kirisutokyō to Chōsen: Ebina Danjō no shisō to kōdō* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1998), 24.

<sup>21</sup> Prasenjit Duara argues that in order to fully understand nationalism, it is necessary to acknowledge that, “Nationalism is rarely the nationalism of the nation, but rather marks the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.” *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Modern Narratives of China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 8. Further, he argues that “nationalism and imperialism have been historically and functionally interconnected in the pursuit of dominance and survival in a competitive capitalist world; second, the systematic attributes underlying this relationship and transnational conditions—the circulatory conceptions, practices, and techniques—of nationality and sovereignty formation were misrecognized as immanent phenomena.” The immanent conception, based upon a deep history of a people, could only be sustained by a symbolic regime of authenticity that in turn created the possibility of a morally absolute, unilateralist, and

and some offered their own theologically based justification for Japanese imperial expansion. Others actively opposed parts or all of this expansion. The ideas offered to support various aspects of imperialism differed and changed over time, as did Christian responses and suggestions.

Given the range of experiences, activities, and beliefs among Japanese Christians, this dissertation is not meant as a comprehensive history or chronological overview of Japanese Christianity in this period. Instead, I focus particularly on the intersection of Christianity with imperialism broadly defined—in its ideological, social, and geographic manifestations. Thus, this dissertation takes as its subject events, debates, or ministries, as well as the individuals involved in them, where imperialism played a crucial role in determining contours of activities, shaping ideas and interpretations, and ultimately, defining how the participants understood their place in their nation.

The people on whom I focus were public figures who published extensively and were prominent members of the communities in which they lived beyond their churches and ministries. These men wrote about and debated on a diverse array of issues, many of which naturally fall outside the scope of this dissertation. Given the subject of my research, I will focus on subjects they explicitly addressed within the space of their churches or in the other Christian ministries in which they participated, where theological concerns intersect with issues of citizenship, nation, and empire. Ultimately, these men were ministers whose primary responsibility and concern was with their

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imperialist nationalism.” *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 33.

church congregations. Church services and networks were the principle sites through which they disseminated their ideas, interpretations of Christianity, and explicated what they believed to be ideal Japanese Christian conduct. In short, churches served as the crucible in which ideas about Christian belief and practice were distilled and forged. Thus, this dissertation explores how these ideas were developed and disseminated in church and ministry settings. I will examine debates and controversies in which interpreting Christianity was inextricably intertwined with debates about Japanese imperialism.

Specifically, I focus on members of one denomination, the Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai, or the Japanese Congregational Church, because this denomination's decentralized administrative structure resulted in a wider range of theological positions and approaches to ministry than that of the other mainline Protestant denominations. Furthermore, members of this denomination more than any other were most involved in attempting to integrate—both directly and through dissent—their understanding of Christianity with the realities of living in a colonial empire. By conducting a close reading of Japanese Christian theological arguments and social critique, I hope to expand on the understanding of how some Japanese Christians developed and adapted Christianity in a way that reconciled Christian belief with newly constructed notions of Japanese identity and empire, as well as how some Christians developed theologically based critiques of imperialism and militarism.

My dissertation explores the intersection of Japanese Protestantism and imperialism in three distinct settings to consider the multiple valences of the intersection

between Christianity and imperialism. The first section, which focuses on the urban church, includes a study of important debates among Japanese Protestants such as how (and perhaps whether or not) Christians could demonstrate their loyalty to the Japanese state, and different ways that church leaders and their congregations responded to significant social and political events, such as Japan's entry into war with Russia. The second section, on the colonies, addresses the Kumiai Kyōkai's fascination with Korea—culminating in a ten-year long attempt to establish a mission there following Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910—and the extension of this mission into Manchuria and Shanghai in the 1920s following anti-Japanese protests in Korea and China in 1919. Central to this attempt to establish a mission in areas under Japanese rule and influence was Watase Tsuneyoshi, who served as the principal ideologue and the director of the Korea mission. The final section, on the rural church, focuses on the Annaka church in Gunma Prefecture, one of the oldest Kumiai Kyōkai churches, and its minister Kashiwagi Gien, to consider the impact of imperialism on Japan's countryside, and how Kashiwagi's experiences as a rural minister informed his unusual critique of the state and imperial expansion.

### **Christianity Returns to Japan: The Historical Context**

This dissertation is not meant to be a denominational history, or the history of a specific church. Nonetheless, the founding of the Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai and the Annaka church are significant to the figures and events that are the focus of this dissertation. Therefore, in this introduction, I will address the founding of the

denomination, its key members, as well as the Annaka church, to provide necessary context.

At the time of Kashiwagi's conversion, Protestant Christianity had been in Japan for a little over two decades. Although Christianity had been introduced by Portuguese Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century and enjoyed a brief period of popularity, the Tokugawa government that came to power at the start of the seventeenth century outlawed it, persecuting followers and driving the few remaining believers underground for the following two centuries.<sup>22</sup> During this same period, the Tokugawa shogunate strictly controlled what little contact Japanese had with foreigners. Limited foreign trade continued with the Dutch and Chinese, but their formal contact with Japanese was confined to the small man-made island of Deshima next to the port of Nagasaki. All Japanese travel abroad was strictly forbidden. This self-imposed isolation was abruptly halted in 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry succeeded in forcing contact with the Tokugawa shogunate. In 1859, Japan signed a treaty with America that effectively ended this isolation and allowed the entry of Americans to live and work in designated treaty ports. Soon other western powers signed similar treaties as well. A combination of internal unrest and the shock of western intrusion led to the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate. A civil war led by Chōshū and Satsuma, two powerful southwestern domains hostile to the ruling Tokugawa family, succeeded, and in 1868, the Tokugawa clan's nearly 250-year reign over Japan ended. The victorious forces

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<sup>22</sup> See George Elison, *Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); and Nam-lin Hur, *Death and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the Danka System* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007).

instated the teenage emperor, Meiji, as the new legitimate ruler, and began the process of transforming Japan into a modern nation-state.

Meanwhile, the opening of Japan coincided with an explosive growth in American interest in foreign missions, and Japan's continued ban on Christianity and recent isolation made it an intriguing destination for many missionaries. The first American missionaries arrived in 1860, but were confined to the treaty ports and while allowed under extraterritoriality to hold their own church services, forbidden to propagate among Japanese.<sup>23</sup> Christianity continued to be proscribed for Japanese subjects until 1873. In addition to formal missionaries, there were other Americans and Europeans who went to Japan as educators who also saw converting Japanese to Christianity as a critical part of their role as modernizers of this "backwards" nation.

The first converts to Christianity came from samurai families, and were exposed to Christianity at schools or medical clinics established by these foreign Christians. Three groups of converts in particular have been the focus of previous studies. The first, known as the Kumamoto Band, included Ebina, and was a group of young men who attended the Kumamoto Yōgakkō, or School for Western Learning, where they converted through the influence of an American educator, Leroy Lansing Janes. Another group, known as the Yokohama Band, included men such as Uemura Masahisa and Ibuka Kajinosuke, and were also young men from samurai families who traveled to

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<sup>23</sup> The first Western missionaries to arrive were British, and arrived in 1859 coinciding with the signing of the commercial treaties that allowed the residence of foreigners in designated treaty ports. On the rise of American interest in foreign missions, see William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Wilbert R. Shenk, editor, *North American Foreign Mission, 1810-1914: Theology, Theory, and Policy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004).

Yokohama to study with Presbyterian missionaries S.R. Brown and James Ballagh. The last group, known as the Sapporo Band, included Uchimura Kanzō and Nitobe Inazō, and were young men who attended Sapporo Agricultural College, which had been established under the direction of William S. Clark.<sup>24</sup>

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), the mission board affiliated with the Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai, first sent missionaries to Japan in 1869, and was the fourth main-line missionary organization to enter Japan in the early Meiji period.<sup>25</sup> Presbyterian and Reformed missionaries had settled in the treaty port of Yokohama and already founded a church there. In order to avoid competition for converts, the ABCFM missionaries decided to make Kobe, the treaty port near Osaka and Kyoto, their primary base. Four years after their arrival, in 1873, the newly formed Japanese government under pressure from Western nations removed the anti-Christian signboards that had been placed along the beaches for centuries, reluctantly acquiescing to the propagation of Christianity.

From Kobe, the first ABCFM missionaries—D.C. Greene, O.H. Guelick, J.C. Berry, and M.L. Gordon, among others—worked their way to Osaka and Kyoto, and began establishing churches.<sup>26</sup> By 1878, nine churches had been founded in the Kobe-

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<sup>24</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai: Captain L.L. Janes and Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Irwin Scheiner, *Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970); and Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto kirisutokyō shi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 2004).

<sup>25</sup> The ABCFM was preceded by Methodist, Presbyterian, and Dutch Reformed missions. Takamichi Motoi, “Kumamoto bando to shoki Dōshisha,” in *Kumamoto bando kenkyū*, ed. Dōshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1965), 236.

<sup>26</sup> Takamichi Motoi, “Kumamoto bando to shoki Doshisha,” 236.

Osaka-Kyoto area. These early churches were affiliated with the mission but were not organized as part of a distinct denomination yet.

The founding of the Kumiai Kyōkai followed a more circuitous route than that of the other mainline denominations due to a set of unusual circumstances. The Japanese converts who founded the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, affiliated with the Presbyterian missionaries, had all attended schools operated by Presbyterian and Reformed missionaries. In contrast, the Kumiai Kyōkai's most prominent leaders were first introduced to Christianity not by formal missionaries but by Captain Leroy Lansing Janes at the Kumamoto Yōgakkō, or School for Western Learning.

In 1871, only a few years after the Meiji Restoration, and at the precise moment when domains were being reconfigured as prefectures, Kumamoto officials invited Captain L.L. Janes, an American Civil War veteran, to start the Kumamoto Yōgakkō. Anxious about the prefecture's position in the frenetic power struggle over which former domains would direct the future of the newly constituted Japanese state, these officials hoped that youth educated in western knowledge and technology would elevate the region's prominence in national politics. Janes, who had been educated at West Point, instituted a rigorous curriculum patterned after that of his alma mater. Anti-sectarian in disposition and out of sensitivity to the ongoing prohibition of Christianity, he indirectly taught Christianity by presenting it as the basis of western civilization and the Christian God as the author of natural laws.

Even after the prohibition had been lifted Janes remained sensitive to continuing distrust and animosity to Christianity and refrained from introducing religious

curriculum in the classroom. When he finally did teach directly about Christianity in 1875—through a series of Bible studies initiated by a group of his students—the school underwent a religious revival. A group of about forty students swore an oath together—the Hanaoka Oath—declaring their dedication to their faith and to transforming their nation through it. Janes’s success as an evangelist led to the downfall of the school: horrified by the mass conversion of students, the prefectural authorities closed the school in 1876.

Students who converted included Ebina Danjō, Yokoi Tokio, Kozaki Hiromichi, and Miyagawa Tsuneteru, and many others who eventually became important ministers, thinkers, and intellectuals.<sup>27</sup> Tokutomi Sohō also signed the oath but later recanted and dismissed his participation as an act of ignorance and reacting to pressure from upperclassmen.<sup>28</sup> Although the school was short-lived, Janes’s rigorous and exacting teaching style and exhortation that his students adopt strict self-discipline left an indelible mark on them. Equally important, the fact that they were introduced to Christianity not by missionaries intimately linked to a denomination and dependent on ecclesiastical structures but by an educator himself suspicious of denominationalism influenced the attitude members of the Kumamoto Band held towards church structure, theological uniformity, and missionary authority.

After graduating from Kumamoto Yōgakkō, the members of the Kumamoto Band mostly went to Dōshisha, the Christian school Niijima had recently founded in Kyoto

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<sup>27</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 196-197.

<sup>28</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 202-203.

using funds he received from the ABCFM. This confluence of events thus pushed the eclectic group of students who had studied with Janes into the drastically different world of missionaries and Niijima Jō.

Niijima was born into the family of a retainer of the Annaka domain in what was then the region of Kōzuke, and came of age during the tumultuous last days of the Tokugawa shogunate's rule. As a young man Niijima, who at the time was living in Edo in the employment of the domain lord, became enthralled with the United States and curious about Christianity upon reading Chinese translations of books about the U.S. and an abridged Bible. He fled Edo for Hakodate, a treaty port located on the northern island of Hokkaidō. Despite the long-standing prohibition against travel abroad, he stowed away aboard an American ship. He eventually made his way to Boston where he found a patron who helped him enroll in Phillips Academy in Andover, then Amherst College, then Andover Theological Seminary. Niijima had converted to Christianity during this period and joined the ABCFM, which ordained him as an evangelist.

During Niijima's absence, the law banning Japanese travel abroad was rescinded. Declaring that his own unique calling was to establish a Christian school that would nurture young Christian leaders to transform Japan, Niijima left Boston in 1874 with nearly 5000 dollars he had raised through the ABCFM in hand to found his school.<sup>29</sup>

At Dōshisha, the group from Kumamoto, having grown accustomed to Janes's rigorous teaching style, was initially discontented with what they considered the lax and

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<sup>29</sup> This account taken from Rev. J.D. Davis, D.D., *A Maker of New Japan: Rev. Joseph Hardy Neesima* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1894).

inadequate instruction they found at their new school.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, they had been exposed to an unorthodox and iconoclastic Christianity under Janes: unlike the ABCFM missionaries who taught at Dōshisha, Janes accepted evolutionary theory and taught his students science and technology. The students threatened to leave Dōshisha for Tokyo but Janes urged that they stay and propose reforms so that the school would be more to their liking—in short, more like the Yōgakkō. Niijima welcomed their suggestions, and Ebina and the other Kumamoto Band students eventually accepted Niijima's leadership.<sup>31</sup>

At the same time that the Kumamoto students were becoming accustomed to Niijima and Dōshisha, a new missionary organization was established: the Japan Missionary Society (Nihon Kirisuto Dendōgaisha) was founded in 1878 as a subsidiary of the ABCFM through the initiative of Japanese converts. In 1886, members of the Japan Missionary Society voted to form their own denomination, the Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai based on a Congregationalist governing structure with the goal of achieving full financial independence from the ABCFM. Churches that had been founded prior to 1886 and affiliated with the ABCFM or the Japan Missionary Society

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<sup>30</sup> Takamichi Motoi, "Kumamoto bando to shoki Doshisha," 238-240; and F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 211.

<sup>31</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 211-212. In the 1880s, when the Kumiai Kyōkai and Nihon Kirisuto Icchi Kyōkai discussed forming a single Japanese Protestant denomination, members of the Kumamoto Band broke with Niijima, who remained committed to Congregationalism as the ideal ecclesiastical system of organization because of its emphasis in self-governance at the congregational level. Niijima was disheartened by what he viewed as a betrayal by his former students. Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 57-59.

mostly switched their affiliation to the Kumiai Kyōkai.<sup>32</sup> Prior to this, the actual missions work conducted by the Society primarily consisted of sending Dōshisha theology students to the countryside during their summer breaks to do evangelism. Some were sent to Okayama, Hikone, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Kochi; Ebina went to Annaka.<sup>33</sup>

### Annaka Church

Within this context, Annaka served as an important node in an array of networks of early Meiji Japanese Christianity. Founded in 1878 by a group of local elites who had recently converted to Christianity, the Annaka church also holds a unique position in Japanese Protestant history. Whereas nearly all other early churches were founded in treaty ports where missionaries were allowed to live before the mixed residence ban was lifted, the Annaka church was founded by Christians who were introduced to Christianity through Annaka's prodigal son, Niijima Jō.

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<sup>32</sup> Shiono Kazuo, "Nihon kumiai kirisuto kyōkai shi," in *Nihon purotesutanto shokyōha shi no kenkyū*, ed. Dōshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1997), 125-126. As early as 1880, some Kumiai-affiliated ministers, Sawayama Paul in particular, insisted that Japanese churches should conduct evangelism without the financial assistance of American mission organizations. Specifically, they advocated administering, financing, and evangelizing without the help of missionaries. With the death of Sawayama, this movement within Kumiai-affiliated churches declined and did not reemerge until the late 1890s. According to Shigeru Yoshiki, the second push for independence was not motivated by faith, as was the case with Sawayama (Sawayama argued for financial independence because he believed it more accurately followed models of evangelism in the New Testament), but came from a new fixation with denominational distinctiveness and nationalism that sought to cast off foreign influence in order to demonstrate the maturity of the Japanese church. A thorough summary of the process by which the Japan Missionary Society gained independence from the American Board and the different debates surrounding this issue can be found in Shigeru Yoshiki, "Nihon Kirisuto dendōgaisha no dokuritsu to Ebina Danjō," *Kirisutokyō shakaimondai kenkyū* 24 (March 1976): 83-132.

<sup>33</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Ebina Danjō sensei* (Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1938), 141.

Upon arriving in Japan and before going to Kyoto, Niijima promptly traveled to Annaka to visit his elderly parents. The approximately sixty-mile journey from Tokyo took about twelve hours by rickshaw. His arrival drew the curiosity of residents of not only Annaka but of surrounding villages. Taking advantage of the curiosity he generated, Niijima preached to these residents. He even borrowed a local Buddhist temple sanctuary to give sermons, drawing audiences of over 100 people at a time.<sup>34</sup> After three weeks, Niijima left Annaka for Kyoto to begin his principal task of starting a Christian school for boys. The link between Annaka and Kyoto, begun by Niijima, was further cemented through Ebina Danjō.

As soon as Ebina graduated from Dōshisha, he was appointed the minister of the Annaka church. Niijima, Matsuyama Kokichi, and missionaries D.C. Green, John DeForest and John Atkinson accompanied Ebina to Annaka, where they examined him and formally ordained him.<sup>35</sup> Once established at Annaka, Ebina embarked on an ambitious schedule evangelizing in Annaka and the rest of Usui-gun, the county in which it was situated, as well as towns and villages in North and South Kanra-gun, including Haraichi, Matsuida, Shinbori, Gokanmura, Hijishiomura, Isobe, Tomioka, Takase, Fujiki, and Ainoda.

In 1883, Ebina received a request to support evangelism in Maebashi, the prefectural capital. Deciding to move the center of Gunma ministry from Annaka to Maebashi, Ebina invited a recent graduate of Dōshisha theological school to Annaka,

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<sup>34</sup> Takamichi Hajime, “Annaka kyōkai no sōritsu,” in *Annaka kyōkai shi: sōritsu kara hyakunen made* (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1988), 23-24.

<sup>35</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Ebina Danjō sensei*, 156.

and moved to Maebashi to head up ministry there.<sup>36</sup> He left the Gunma area in 1886 to found a mission station near the Imperial University in Tokyo.

### **Familial Foundations**


The most important set of relationships within the Kumiai Kyōkai were those linked through the Kumamoto Band. Although my dissertation primarily focuses on people who were peripherally associated with this group, and not the group itself, nonetheless, the larger context of the networks created by the Band played a significant role.

Therefore I will briefly outline how this group helped to shape the denomination. The central figures, due to marital, familial and teacher-student relationships, were members of the extended Yokoi and Tokutomi families. The role played by the Yokoi and Tokutomi families in the networks at the core of this dissertation are represented in the diagram below:

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<sup>36</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Ebina Danjo sensei*, 174-175.

**Diagram 1: Yokoi-Tokutomi Extended Family<sup>37</sup>**



The Kumamoto Yōgakkō, where the members of the Band were first introduced to Christianity, had been established largely through the initiative of Tokutomi Ikkei and Takezaki Sadō, both disciples of Yokoi Shōnan, an influential ideologue in Kumamoto who had been assassinated in 1869.<sup>39</sup> Yokoi and Tokutomi were further joined through

<sup>37</sup> Based on information provided by Ōshimo Michi, widow of Ebina Danjō's grandson.

<sup>38</sup> Ōkubo Shinjirō was a member of the Kumamoto Band and later served as the minister of the Takasaki church in Gunma Prefecture, and worked with Kashiwagi Gien on the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*. He left Gunma for Hawai'i where he briefly worked as a missionary, and then moved to Oakland where he established the Oakland Independent Church and evangelized among Japanese immigrants living in nearby rural areas.

marriage: their wives were sisters. Yokoi and Tokutomi's children—including, incredibly, their daughters—attended the Yōgakkō and converted to Christianity there.<sup>40</sup>

The significance of the Tokutomi brothers is not immediately apparent since neither became ministers and the elder brother Ichirō (Sohō) later renounced his faith. But they serve as critical nodes in this network nonetheless. Sohō briefly founded a school in Kumamoto, the Ōe Gijuku, before moving to Tokyo where he became a prominent journalist and the editor of *Kokumin no tomo* (Nation's Friend).<sup>41</sup> When Japan colonized Korea, he went to Seoul to serve as the editor of the Government General-sponsored newspaper, *Keijō nippō* (Keijō daily).<sup>42</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, who figures largely in this dissertation, was a native of Yatsushiro in Kumamoto, and attended Ōe Gijuku. When Tokutomi closed the school and moved to Tokyo in 1887 to begin his career as a journalist, Watase went with him. It was through Tokutomi that Watase became acquainted with Ebina Danjō, by then the minister of the Hongō church.

Kenjirō (Roka), the younger brother, became a popular novelist and caused a stir in 1906 when he traveled all the way to the Russian countryside to visit Leo Tolstoy

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<sup>39</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 99-101. Takezaki Sadō was also married to a Yajima sister, Junko. When Yokoi Tokio converted, Junko visited his mother (her sister) and “told her to her face that she should commit suicide to atone for her son's conduct.” F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 201. The fourth Yajima sister, Kajiko, founded the Japanese branch of the WCTU and spearheaded temperance and anti-prostitution movements in the Meiji period.

<sup>40</sup> The Kumamoto Yōgakkō was exclusively a boy's school but Captain Janes allowed Yokoi Miya and Tokutomi Hatsu to enter as students despite the objections of the male students, including Ebina, who later married Miya. F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 131.

<sup>41</sup> On the Ōe Gijuku, see John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 90-124.

<sup>42</sup> John D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō*, 298.

who he particularly admired.<sup>43</sup> Roka was a close friend and classmate of Kashiwagi's at Dōshisha, and a frequent visitor to Ikaho, a popular Gunma hot spring resort, which he discovered while visiting his sister Otowa who had married the then-minister of the Takasaki church, Ōkubo Shinjirō. Otowa had been introduced to Ōkubo by her brother Sohō; Sohō also introduced his other sister Hatsuko to Yuasa Jirō, whose younger brother had been a classmate of his at Dōshisha. Thus family relationships were reinforced by marriage, and marital ties reinforced friendships even as they complicated ideological and theological differences.

Familial relationships were reinforced in more oblique ways as well. Kashiwagi Gien's relationship to Ebina Danjō, despite their ideological and methodological differences, was complicated by the fact that his widowed elder sister Abe Muro served as the Ebina family's housekeeper for many years.

On one hand, this dissertation is about a small group of (mostly male) Christians who were born at the end of Tokugawa or beginning of Meiji, who for a variety of reasons converted to Christianity in their teens and twenties, and lived out their lives in conjunction with Japan's rise to power in Asia under an increasingly demanding and oppressive government and expanding empire. Although they were all associated with the Kumiai Kyōkai, these Christians represented a diverse range of beliefs and practices. At the same time, they were connected to one another in a dizzying network of family, marital, and regional ties, so that seemingly theological disagreements often masked

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<sup>43</sup> For a full account of Roka's visit, See Laurence Kominz, "Pilgrimage to Tolstoy: Tokutomi Roka's *Junrei Kikō*," *Monumenta Nipponica* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 51-101.

personal squabbles, and bitter ideological foes were, at the end of the day, members of the same family for whom familial ties were ultimately the most important. The conflation of denominational and familial ties was as significant as the dynamic and profound political and social changes that punctuated their daily ministries.

### **Chapter Divisions**

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part one, which focuses on events and debates that primarily occurred in Tokyo at the turn of the twentieth century, explores controversies fundamental to establishing the central issues that continued to affect the shape of Christian belief and practice. Chapter one examines the impact of the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education on attitudes towards Christianity, and explores how Christians responded to the charge that they were not good imperial subjects while simultaneously debating what constituted proper Christian belief.

Chapter two focuses on Hongō church, a prominent if unusual church located near Tokyo University during Ebina Danjō's tenure as its minister, to explore two critical issues to emerge at the turn of the twentieth century: 1) the use of the church setting to promote and establish a particular view of Christian belief and its relation to the nation and 2) how Christians understood and interpreted their role during the Russo-Japanese War.

Part two extends inquiry to Kumiai Kyōkai attitudes and ministries abroad in colonial Korea, Chinese areas under Japanese influence and control, and communities of Japanese immigrants in the United States. Chapter three focuses on Ebina Danjō's

visits to Japanese immigrant/settler communities in the U.S. and in areas of Asia under Japanese rule or influence to explore how Ebina arrogated to himself the prerogative of evaluating the morality of these far-flung communities. Chapter four explores the Kumiai Kyōkai's ten-year evangelistic effort in colonial Korea. I focus on the methods by which these Japanese missionaries intended to transform Koreans into proper Japanese (and Christian) subjects, their often diverse views on Koreans, and ultimately the gulf that existed between the missionaries' vision and the reality of colonialism in Korea. Chapter five examines Kumiai Kyōkai efforts to plant churches in Shanghai and Fengtian immediately following the March First movement to explore how Japanese Christians understood their role as moral leaders and reformers in the empire, and the unique role they assigned to themselves to support state efforts to address the so-called "Korean problem" in areas just beyond Japanese control.

Part three returns to the Annaka church in Gunma to consider how the realities of living in a colonial empire affected rural Christians. Chapter six considers the regional particularities of Kashiwagi Gien's ministry. Unlike Ebina Danjō and many of the other ministers and evangelists who figure prominently in this dissertation, Kashiwagi was the minister of a rural—albeit important—church. In particular, I focus on the nature of Kashiwagi's ministry, and the network of churches in Gunma, to examine how geography and region shaped the practices and understandings of Christians in this particular countryside. In chapter seven I examine in detail Christian critiques of empire and its impact on Japanese in Japan and both Japanese and colonized peoples in the colonies by focusing on the writings of Kashiwagi Gien. In particular, I

address the theological basis for Kashiwagi's opposition to the state and Japan's aggressive expansion abroad, and how this same theological base informed the specific form his own ministry took among his rural congregants.

The dissertation concludes with an epilogue that briefly summarizes what became of the Protestant community in the 1930s and 1940s, and considers the larger implications of some of the issues raised through the dissertation.

## CHAPTER ONE

### Nationalism, the Imperial Rescript on Education, and the Quandary of Japanese Christians

In January 1892, a scandal erupted at a private Christian school in Kumamoto prefecture, located in Kyūshū, the southernmost of Japan's main islands. On 12 January, the Kumamoto Eigakkō (English School) welcomed its new headmaster, Kurahara Korehiro. At the ceremony, Okumura Teijirō was asked to speak on behalf of the school's instructors, and he used this public occasion to make a startling claim about the school's purpose:

The direction of our school's policy is not based on Japan-ism (*Nihon-shugi*), Asia-ism (*Ajia-shugi*), or West-ism (*Ōbei-shugi*), but is to nurture global human beings through a humanitarian internationalism (*hakuai sekaishugi*). Therefore, we do not recognize nations (*ganchū ni kokka naku*) or foreigners (*gaijin*).<sup>1</sup>

A local newspaper, *Kyūshū nichichi shinbun* (Kyushu daily), condemned Okumura for advocating a humanitarian internationalism that disregarded the nation and accused him of being unqualified to teach the nation's youth. This caught the attention of the Kumamoto governor and sparked a debate among prefectural officials, the Ministry of Education, and school officials. At the heart of the debate was the relationship between Japanese subjects and the nation. Okumura's assertion that the nation could be neglected in favor of a humanitarian internationalism, according to Governor Matsudaira Masanao, smacked at the very least of being "in conflict with the Imperial

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in *Kyūshū nichichi shinbun*, 12 January 1892, quoted in Inoue Tetsujirō, *Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu* (Tokyo: Keigyōsha, 1893), 41-42.

Rescript on Education,” the Meiji emperor’s 1890 pronouncement that served as the ideological foundation for the emperor-centered nation-state (*tennōsei kokka*).<sup>2</sup> Judging that a schoolteacher who espoused such dangerous ideas could not be entrusted with the important work of educating the nation’s youth, Governor Matsudaira ordered Kumamoto Eigakkō to fire Okumura.<sup>3</sup>

Members of the school’s faculty, incensed at the governor’s interference, demanded further explanation for why Okumura should be fired. Transporting this local conflict to the national center, Watase Tsuneyoshi, one of the school’s other teachers, traveled to Tokyo to plead Okumura’s case with the Ministry of Education. However, apparently because Watase agreed with the Education Minister’s claim that a teacher who claimed “not to recognize the nation” was unsuitable, Watase eventually withdrew his objection, and Okumura was summarily fired.<sup>4</sup> This touched off further controversy: an article in *Kokumin no tomo* (Nation’s friend), the influential Tokyo-based journal founded by Tokutomi Sohō, criticized the Kumamoto governor for ordering Okumura’s termination based on the accusations of the “conservative *Kyūshū nichichi shinbun*.” Further, the *Kokumin no tomo* author questioned the governor’s authority over a private

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<sup>2</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien: Tennōsei to Kirisutokyō* (Shinkyō shuppansha, 1993), 70.

<sup>3</sup> I am basing my narration of the Okumura incident on Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 66-79.

<sup>4</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 71. Katano bases her interpretation on Kamigawa Kazuyoshi, “Kumamoto ni okeru kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu,” *Kumamoto kindaiishi kenkyūkai, Kindai Kumamoto* 17 (1976).

school, arguing that if this interference was allowed, then “teachers at private schools could not spend a day in peace.”<sup>5</sup>

A small group at the school, led by Kashiwagi Gien, who had served as acting headmaster until Kurahara’s appointment, continued to decry Okumura’s termination. In a declaration published in February 1892 in *Kirisutokyō shinbun* (Christian news, later *Kirisutokyō sekai*, Christian world), *Jogaku zasshi* (Girl’s education), and a number of other newspapers, Kashiwagi narrowed the focus of the controversy to one critical issue: whether or not Okumura’s words had been in conflict with the Imperial Rescript on Education.<sup>6</sup> He insisted that the reason he and others still objected to Okumura’s termination was that they could not accept the governor’s order until the governor made his reasons for issuing such an order absolutely explicit. If, as had been speculated, the reason was that Okumura had violated the intent of the Imperial Rescript, the governor must state explicitly how this was so. Finally, Kashiwagi warned that for the prefectural governor to interfere with the administration of a private school over the notion of “international humanitarianism” cast a long shadow on the future of private schools, and educational policy, in general.

It was no accident that the Kumamoto Eigakkō became embroiled in a conflict concerning Christianity, education, and the nation. Though located in a remote corner of the southernmost island of Japan, the school was a crossroads for prominent and promising young Christian educators. This in turn resulted from a series of accidents

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<sup>5</sup> *Kokumin no tomo* (13 February 1892): 48.

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 73-74.

and coincidences that had transformed Kumamoto into one of several “birthplaces” of Japanese Protestant Christianity. The founding of Kumamoto Eigakkō, as well as many of the participants in the Okumura incident, can be traced back to the Kumamoto Band. In particular, Ebina Danjō, while not a direct participant in the incident, served as a critical node. Ebina helped to found Kumamoto Eigakkō, served as its first headmaster, and when he left Kumamoto for Kyoto to serve as the president of the Kumiai Kyōkai’s affiliated mission agency in 1890, invited Kashiwagi Gien, whom he had baptized, to serve as interim headmaster. Ebina had also invited Watase to teach at the school. The Okumura incident drew together, even as it divided, Ebina, Watase, and Kashiwagi and other members of the Kumiai Kyōkai. More significantly, it marked the moment when they first intimately confronted the newly defined image of the imperial subject and were forced to address the fundamental challenge it posed to Christian belief.

Viewed in isolation, the Okumura incident may appear curious—perhaps the result of an overly zealous prefectural governor far from the national center. However, Okumura’s termination was but one of many public incidents in which Christians were accused of harboring sentiments in direct conflict with the state. More specifically, these incidents resulted from allegations that Christians refused to participate in public rituals linked to the emperor or exhibited behavior considered disrespectful, and therefore treasonous towards the emperor. At the center of these incidents was the Imperial Rescript on Education, an official pronouncement on the purpose of education promulgated in 1890, which, along with the imperial portrait, occupied a revered place in every school across the country. Beginning in the 1890s, as the Meiji state heightened

its efforts to manage and normalize the meaning of loyalty and patriotism (*chūkun aikoku*) to the new Meiji state, Christians increasingly came to be accused of disloyalty, even incompatibility with being loyal imperial subjects.

In the 1890s, schools became the principle site through which Christians were relegated to the position of potential subversives who could undermine the integrity of the Japanese state. As Carol Gluck and Takashi Fujitani have effectively demonstrated, the Meiji state actively used the education system to introduce a new ethics education (*shūshin kyōiku*) intended to cultivate loyal imperial subjects, as well as a new calendar of imperial rituals that would unify subjects across the nation and instill in them a new sense of belonging to the emperor-centered state. Although the rituals that imparted the “proper” relationship between subjects and emperor were of recent vintage, Meiji ideologues tended to couch them in the language of tradition. Further, it was crucial that these new imperial subjects be convinced of not only these rituals’ timelessness, but also of their relevance, if they were to take root in Japanese society.<sup>7</sup> As important sites of nationalization, schools were the earliest and most immediate places where Japanese encountered this elaborate ideological structure.<sup>8</sup>

Public questioning of, even disregard for, rituals and the ideas expressed in ethics education threatened to undermine this project of cultivating a unified nation of loyal imperial subjects. Though not the only ones to counter the narrowly construed

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<sup>7</sup> See for example Komagome Takeshi, “Shokuminchi ni okeru jinja sanpai,” in *Seikatsu no naka no shokuminchi shugi*, ed. Mizuno Naoki (Kyoto: Jinbunshoin, 2004), 103-129.

<sup>8</sup> Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 120; and Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 92.

definition of loyalty and nationalism, Christians nonetheless became the principal target of nationalist ideologues. The bitter debates between nationalist ideologues and Christians, and the fissures that formed within the Christian community over the question of Christian loyalty to the nation, emerged in this period and continued to shape and inform the place of Christians in the Japanese empire long after.

Christianity had only been a legal religious practice for Japanese subjects since 1873, when the Meiji government lifted the Tokugawa-era ban on it, partly as a reaction to the refusal of Western nations to renegotiate terms of unequal treaties as long as the state could prosecute (and persecute) Christian converts. Nonetheless, Christianity quickly became influential for at least two reasons. First, it was perceived by early proponents of westernization as a critical foundation of Western strength: Christianity was viewed as a force that unified the peoples of Western nations and motivated them to work towards a common, national cause.<sup>9</sup> Second, while a small group, early converts often came from influential social groups, and were among the earliest to receive a western-style education. As such, both Christianity as a belief system and Christian converts—who were coming of age and gaining some prominence—were considered a force to be reckoned with.

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<sup>9</sup> As early as 1825, Aizawa Seishisai argued that western powers derived their strength from the unifying power of Christianity; since all of their subjects believed in the same religion, they could be exhorted to work together. Aizawa warned that Christianity could divide Japan, since the ignorant masses could be convinced to side with their western converters over their fellow countrymen. Nonetheless, Aizawa urged that Japan adapt a national religion similar to Christianity in function, if not in beliefs. He selected Shinto, specifically a Shinto focused on emperor worship and defined by an emperor-centered mythology and ritual practices, as the most effective and appropriate unifying religion. See Bob Takashi Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: "The New Theses" of 1825* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

Forced open after over two centuries of self-imposed isolation by American gunboat diplomacy in 1853, Japan was well aware of its tenuous position in a global order where Western imperialist powers were engaged in aggressive competition to colonize non-Western countries. The re-introduction of Christianity in Japan occurred in this context, and both its dissemination and reception were inextricably linked to the larger context of imperialistic competition. Following a brief period of popularity in the 1880s, Christian influence was soon perceived as suspect and potentially injurious to Japan's efforts to assert its place in this global order. The vilification of Christians was in turn one important part of evaluating Japanese people as subjects of an emperor-centered nation-state. Through this process, Christian belief and attendant rituals were singled out as being in fundamental conflict with national cohesion. Whether or not Christians acknowledged or accepted the accusations directed towards them, this perceived problem continued to inform and shape Christian discourse, practice, and belief thereafter. The Imperial Rescript on Education, and the rituals developed to reinforce its contents, served as the focal point of this conflict.

### **The Imperial Rescript on Education**

Shortly after the Meiji emperor "bestowed" the Constitution on his subjects in 1889, a second imperial pronouncement, the Imperial Rescript on Education, was presented to all Japanese schools in October 1890. Copies of this pronouncement, paired with an official photograph of a portrait of the emperor, occupied a prominent position in schools across the country, serving as powerful surrogates for the emperor himself. As

both the basis for ethics education and the focus of public ritual that tied schoolchildren to the imperial state, the Imperial Rescript was arguably the most immediate point of contact that the Japanese people had with the emperor and the ideological apparatus used to prop up the modern Japanese emperor-centered nation-state.<sup>10</sup> It was also intended to reinforce a particular view of the relationship between sovereign and subjects. Echoing select language from the Meiji Constitution, which emphasized the obligations and responsibilities of imperial subjects over that of their rights, the Imperial Rescript used Confucian language to emphasize seemingly “natural” roles and relationships that needed to be maintained in order to preserve order and defend the nation.<sup>11</sup> However, at the time of its promulgation, due to the vague and general language used in the Imperial Rescript itself, there was little agreement on what the exact nature of this relationship should be. Therefore, the leaders of the Japanese state made a concerted effort to contain diverse interpretations of the ideas presented in the Imperial Rescript. The Ministry of Education commissioned Inoue Tetsujirō, who had recently returned from a six-year stay in Berlin and who served as the first full professor of philosophy at Tokyo (Imperial) University, to write a commentary on the Imperial

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<sup>10</sup> Fujitani suggests that the distribution of the official imperial portrait, soon followed by official copies of the Imperial Rescript on Education, was part of the state’s efforts to make the emperor immediate and visible without requiring the costly and cumbersome imperial visits into the countryside. T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy*, 84.

<sup>11</sup> Gluck argues that political elites urged the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education, which codified a certain notion of obligation and duty of imperial subjects to the state and emperor, precisely because they were concerned that the Constitution made too great an allowance for freedom and rights, which could prove to be harmful to national cohesion. Carol Gluck, *Japan’s Modern Myths*, 120.

Rescript, which was distributed to schools and used as the basis for a compulsory ethics curriculum.<sup>12</sup>

Through the commentary, *Chokugo engi*, completed in 1891, Inoue offered a forceful line-by-line interpretation of the Imperial Rescript. Giving meat to the vague and innocuous language of the original, Inoue argued that the central purpose of the Imperial Rescript was, in short, to establish a *collective patriotism* (*kyōdō aikokushugi*) that would serve as the foundation of a unified nation of Japanese imperial subjects linked to the emperor as part of a “family state” (*kokka*), which Inoue also rendered as *ikkoku ikka*, or “one nation, one family.”<sup>13</sup> He evoked the emperor’s supposed descent from the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami to argue that the emperor represented the racial unity of the Japanese people and physically embodied Japan’s divine destiny.

Inoue took great pains to dismiss any notion that his commentary was rooted in a simple xenophobic isolationism, for he deployed his recently acquired knowledge of German philosophy and contemporary European intellectual trends, including social Darwinism, to construct his argument. By presenting a list of Asian countries that had

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<sup>12</sup> Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 128-129. Educated in Confucian classics in his youth, introduced to Hegel and Spencer by the American educator Ernest Fenellosa as a student at Tokyo University, and exposed to not only philosophy but society in Germany during his time abroad (where he studied with Wilhelm Wundt and Fischer), Inoue in many ways typified emerging Japanese intellectuals in the 1890s. In addition to his work for the government, Inoue published widely on a range of subjects, from ethics and national morality to his vision for a specifically Japanese philosophy that would represent the synthesis, and therefore transcendence of, previous Western and Eastern philosophies. He was also responsible for classifying Tokugawa Confucian schools according to three groupings, a categorization which, like his vision for Japanese philosophy, was influenced by Hegelian dialectics, and was instrumental in shaping the nature and approach of subsequent studies of Tokugawa Confucianism. See Wai-Ming Ng, “Civil Morality in the Life and Thought of Inoue Tetsujirō,” *B.C. Asian Review* 9 (Winter 1995/1996): 221; and John A. Tucker, *Ogyu Sorai's Philosophical Masterworks* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 11, 103.

<sup>13</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Inoue Tetsujirō shū* vol. 1, *Chokugo engi* (Tokyo: Kuresu shuppan, 2003), 1, 16.

been compromised or colonized by stronger Western powers, Inoue emphasized the pragmatic necessity of national unity. As Inoue stated, “The strength or weakness of a nation is primarily based on the degree to which the subjects’ hearts are unified.”<sup>14</sup> Anything that threatened this unity was unacceptable and treasonous. Inoue’s interpretation of the Imperial Rescript, as well as the form nationalism should take, set the stage for Christians’ conflict with the state.

### **Imperial Rescript and Ritual: The Problem with Christians**

In January 1891, about a year before Okumura made his controversial statement concerning the nation at the Kumamoto Eigakkō, the Imperial Rescript on Education was unveiled at the Tokyo First Higher Preparatory School. Present were all of the teachers and students, who were expected to perform deep bows, or *keirei*, to demonstrate their undivided allegiance to the emperor and respect for the words of wisdom expressed in the Rescript. However, one of the teachers, Uchimura Kanzō, hesitated, then merely nodded his head instead of bowing. The teachers and students around him reacted with rage. Uchimura was accused of *lèse majesté*, and soon resigned from his position.<sup>15</sup>

Uchimura, a Christian and avowed nationalist, was torn over the religious significance that the act of bowing symbolized; thus, his hesitation and diminutive gesture reflected his own confusion over how he, as a Christian and a patriot, should

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<sup>14</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Chokugo engi*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Dohi Akio, *Nihon Purotesutanto Kirisutokyōshi*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 2004), 112-113.

conduct himself before the imperial visage.<sup>16</sup> This *lèse majesté* incident (*fukei jiken*), though the most notorious, was not the only incident involving Christians in the years following the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript. Just as significant is the fact that while each incident in isolation may have remained limited in its impact, through journalistic outlets, they were assigned new meanings, so that by 1893, they were narrated as components of a much larger problem: the potential disloyalty of Christian converts to the newly emerging emperor-centered nation-state. The most important and hostile critic of Christian converts was Inoue Tetsujirō.

In November 1892, a pair of reporters from *Kyōiku jiron*, a leading education journal, visited Inoue in order to solicit his opinion on the so-called Christian problem. Significantly, Okumura's declaration in Kumamoto, not Uchimura's *lèse majesté* incident in Tokyo, prompted their visit. The reporters especially focused on the compatibility of Christianity and the Imperial Rescript: could Christians be entrusted with the job of educating the nation's children? Inoue's response was transcribed and published under the title "Shūkyō to kyōiku no kankei ni tsuki Inoue Tetsujirō-shi no danwa" (A conversation with Inoue Tetsujiro concerning the relationship between

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<sup>16</sup> Uchimura's *fukei jiken* is commonly cited as the most public event through which Christians were labeled anti-nationalistic, and appears in numerous works as the single incident that elicited attacks on Christians as potential subversives. Scholars have interpreted his actions and the significance of the incident in various ways. Rather than singling out Uchimura, as others have done, I have chosen to include his among the other incidents that Inoue introduced through his article. It is clear from the introduction to the *Kyōiku jiron* article that the reporters visited Inoue and inquired about the position of Christianity in schools after the Okumura incident, and not the Uchimura incident, thus demonstrating that in popular opinion at the time, Uchimura's may have been considered as but one—albeit one involving a prominent school—among many. Uchimura rose to international prominence in the years following the incident, and it is likely that his latter prominence has had as much to do with the singular attention which has been directed towards his incident as it does with the significance of his incident in comparison to others at the time.

religion and education). In this short piece, Inoue insisted that unlike “fanatics” (he used the English word) who attacked Christians out of irrational xenophobia, he was only interested in a rational, objective evaluation of the compatibility between the principles of the Rescript and Christianity. He focused his criticism on four aspects of Christianity he deemed most incompatible with the spirit of the Rescript: 1) the fact that “when one glanced through the entire Bible one would see that” Jesus made no mention of the nation nor recognized differences among nations; 2) the Christian preoccupation with heaven with little regard for this world “except as a gateway to the next”; 3) the indiscriminate love of Christianity that made no distinction between family and others or self and others; and 4) the lack of concern for loyalty and filial piety, the two pillars of Confucianism and Japanese traditional morality.<sup>17</sup> Regarding this last point, Inoue argued that Jesus himself demonstrated contempt for filial piety through “a cold indifference towards his parents.”<sup>18</sup> Christianity, at least as Inoue perceived it, was offensive to Japanese sensibilities and morals as encapsulated in the Imperial Rescript.

When asked by the reporters if Christianity should be banned due to its harmful effect on the nation’s morals, Inoue responded that since religious belief was a freedom granted by the new Constitution, such measures were unnecessary. Nonetheless, as long as Christianity remained the same—that is a-national (*mukokka-teki*) in nature—it would never be compatible with Japanese values.<sup>19</sup> For a moment, Inoue almost seemed

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<sup>17</sup> “Shūkyō to kyōiku to no kankei ni tsuki Inoue Tetsujirō shi no danwa,” in *Inoue hakushi to Kirisutokyōto* vol. 1, ed. Seki Kōsaku (Tokyo: Tetsugakushoin, 1893; Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1988), 3-4.

<sup>18</sup> “Inoue Tetsujirō shi no danwa,” 4.

<sup>19</sup> “Inoue Tetsujirō shi no danwa,” 3.

to concede that if Christianity could somehow be “assimilated” (*dōka*) into the Japanese national character (*kokusei*), it might eventually contribute to the nation, as Buddhism and Confucianism had done before it. Inoue even praised a “certain minister” who had taken up displaying the Rescript in his church’s sanctuary and incorporating it into sermons.<sup>20</sup> Ultimately, Inoue dismissed even this gesture because Japan had no need for Christianity; for him, Buddhism and Confucianism provided all the moral guidance necessary.

### **Christianity for this World**

A number of Christian intellectuals took up Inoue’s challenge. It can be argued that their response, which partly prompted Inoue’s better known second treatise, “*Shūkyō to kyōiku no shōtotsu*” (The Clash Between Religion and Education), played an active role in shaping the nature of the debate concerning Christians, as well as inciting the rising ire of nationalist ideologues such as Inoue. It was also through challenges like Inoue’s that Christians were forced to develop a coherent apologetic for Christian belief and practice in Japan which was in turn shaped by the particulars of the challenges from nationalists like Inoue.

Among the handful of Christians who responded to Inoue were the Kumiai Kyōkai ministers Yokoi Tokio and Kashiwagi Gien, writing in *Rikugō zasshi* (Cosmos) and *Dōshisha bungaku* (Doshisha Literature) respectively.<sup>21</sup> Yokoi Tokio, the first to

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<sup>20</sup> “Inoue Tetsujirō shi no danwa,” 7.

<sup>21</sup> In addition to these two men, other Christians representing other main denominations responded as well. These included prominent Methodist minister and educator Honda Yōitsu (“Inoue-shi no danwa wo

respond, was a member of the Kumamoto Band, Sohō's cousin and Ebina's brother-in-law, and was serving at the time as the minister of Hongō church, recently established near Tokyo Imperial University. Writing in *Rikugō zasshi*, a prominent intellectual journal affiliated with the YMCA, Yokoi challenged the legitimacy of Inoue's criticisms in "an age of progress."<sup>22</sup> Asserting his belief in "the God of progress," Yokoi issued a point-by-point refutation of Inoue's critique. In response to Inoue's charge that Christianity advocated an indiscriminate love that failed to acknowledge a difference among nations, something Inoue claimed contradicted "traditional" Japanese morality, Yokoi argued that the purpose of Christianity was to endow people with a love and sincerity towards other people and heaven, which would facilitate justice and happiness for all people. Therefore, Yokoi maintained, he preached Christianity precisely because it would "foster the healthy development of such a spiritual life among our people."<sup>23</sup> Only Christianity would transform Japan from a stagnant barbaric past to a modern civilized future.

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yomu," *Kyōiku jiron*); leader of the Nihon Kirisutokyōkai Uemura Masahisa ("Kyō no shūkyōron oyobi tokuikuron," *Nihon hyōron*); philosophy professor Ōnishi Hajime ("Kyōiku chokugo to rinrisetsu," *Kyōiku jiron*). An unattributed piece in *Jogaku zasshi* was most likely written by Iwamoto Yoshiharu, a prominent educator of girls and editor of the magazine. For more on Ōnishi's critique of Inoue's arguments based on the weakness of Inoue's philosophical argument (Ōnishi, who died at the age of 35 in 1900, studied in Jena and Leipzig and was considered the foremost scholar of Kant), see Sharon H. Nolte, "National Morality and Universal Ethics: Onishi Hajime and the Imperial Rescript on Education," *Monumenta Nipponica* 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1983): 283-294.

<sup>22</sup> *Rikugō zasshi* was founded in 1880 by a group of Christians affiliated with the newly established Japanese YMCA, including Kozaki Hiromichi, Uemura Masahisa, and Tamura Naomi. It became a leading intellectual journal that included articles on philosophy and politics in addition to religion. Other contributors included Uchimura Kanzō, Tsuda Sen, Tokutomi Sohō, Ōnishi Hajime, Ukita Kazutami, and Katō Hiroyuki.

<sup>23</sup> Yokoi Tokio, "Tokuiku ni kansuru jiron to Kirisutokyō," *Rikugō zasshi* 144 (December 1892), reprinted in *Inoue hakushi to Kirisutokyōto*, vol. 1, 23.

Using examples of historic Japanese heroes and even Confucian masters who, like Jesus, chose a calling over obeying their parents, Yokoi disputed Inoue's claim that Christianity undermined loyalty and filial piety and that Jesus himself was a selfish unfilial son. What Inoue interpreted as signs of Jesus' selfish pursuit of his own interests over that of his parents, Yokoi countered, resulted from a misunderstanding, since after all, "It is just that there arise moments in a person's life when the dictates of truth supercede the wishes of parents."<sup>24</sup>

Remarkably, Yokoi acknowledged Inoue's warning that Christianity could endanger Japanese society. Unlike Inoue, who condemned Christianity outright without making distinctions among Christian denominations or theologies, Yokoi asserted that it was of ultimate importance what *type* of Christianity took root in Japan. He made a crucial theological argument, which was not only intended as a response to Inoue, but as an assertion of one type of Protestantism over others:

It is hard to fault Inoue for coming to the conclusion that [Christianity] turns its back on this world and hopes for the next, for there were many who preached this. However, this is not the true spirit of Christianity. When Christ preached about heaven, he did so for the sake of *this* world. When Christ urged loyalty to God, he meant for people to do so in this world for the sake of people in society, for doing work for mankind was work for God. In fact, in contemporary Europe, the most sound and influential religious thought has separated itself from the corrupt pessimistic and apocalyptic thought of the middle ages, and is just now returning to the belief in *the kingdom of God in this world* that was so clearly Christ's message.<sup>25</sup> (emphasis added)

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<sup>24</sup> Yokoi Tokio, "Tokuiku," 25.

<sup>25</sup> Yokoi Tokio, "Tokuiku," 27.

In other words, Yokoi agreed with Inoue that if Christianity was as Inoue described, it should be feared. But the Christianity Inoue described was a thing of the past, a superstitious and backwards set of beliefs contrary to the spirit of Christ's teachings. The new Christianity—to which Yokoi aligned himself—was both a return to the origins and a leap forward, the crucial catalyst of modern progress. No longer mired in a pessimistic eschatology, the new Christianity was focused on the ills and injustices of *this* world, as Christ had “intended.” As such, it not only posed no threat to Japanese society, but it would also provide the spiritual driving force behind strengthening and righting the new Japanese society about which Inoue expressed so much concern.

Kashiwagi Gien, who had led the Kumamoto Eigakkō's protest of the prefectural governor's order to fire Okumura in 1892, also responded to Inoue but disagreed with Yokoi's assessment of the relationship between Christianity and the state. Having returned to Dōshisha Preparatory School in Kyoto following the Okumura incident, Kashiwagi published a brief rebuttal in *Dōshisha bungaku*, a journal edited by Dōshisha students. Kashiwagi primarily questioned Inoue's insistence that Christians were incapable of loyalty because of their allegiance to a transcendent god by arguing that there was nothing inherent in Christianity that would threaten the nation:

What can there be that is a-nationalistic in the general moral principles of honoring god and loving others, which are valuable in establishing any nation—whether a monarchy or a democracy? How can you claim that anyone who treasures God's providence would not also treasure the nation, which is under God's providence? How can you argue that those who love others would not love [their] nation, which is a collective of others?<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Chokugo to Kirisutokyō (Inoue hakushi no iken wo hyōsu),” *Dōshisha bungaku* 59 (November 1892), reprinted in *Inoue hakushi to kirisutokyōto*, vol. 1, 35.

In addition to thus defending the compatibility between basic Christian principles and love for one's nation, Kashiwagi also made a more controversial claim: that the emperor deserved no more respect than any other head of state. He described the emperor as the "head of the nation" and the "monarch of a constitutional nation" who was obligated to instruct his subjects in ethics. This, however, did not in any way imply that there was an inherent contradiction between these instructions—as delineated in the Imperial Rescript on Education—and Christian belief.<sup>27</sup> Ultimately, this was a moot point, for as far as Kashiwagi was concerned, religious practice was protected under the newly promulgated Meiji Constitution: "If the Imperial Rescript was promulgated to encourage morality, there should be nothing about religion—which is granted freedom under the Constitution—that interferes with its principles."<sup>28</sup>

### **The Confrontation**

Dissatisfied with the reaction of others, and apparently concerned that the editors of *Kyōiku jiron* had misinterpreted or misconstrued his words, Inoue published a second treatise, *Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu* (The Clash of Education and Religion), in 1893, to clarify his earlier points and to launch a more focused attack on Christians, including rebutting the points made by Yokoi, Kashiwagi, and others. In this piece Inoue more forcefully accused Japanese Christians of being inherently unassimilable as imperial subjects. If Christianity was compatible with the Imperial Rescript, there would be no

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<sup>27</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Chokugo to Kirisutokyō," 36-37.

<sup>28</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Chokugo to Kirisutokyō," 43.

need for Christians to assimilate “our nation’s traditions” in the first place.<sup>29</sup> If there was any lingering doubt, Uchimura Kanzō had effectively proved this point; Christians had been the only religionists to provoke any incidents at the time of the Imperial Rescript’s unveiling at schools.<sup>30</sup> Inoue began by singling out Uchimura, the most notorious Christian to cause such an incident, but did not limit his attack to him. By compiling a list of similar incidents instigated by Christian students or teachers around the country that had been reported by regional news sources, he insinuated that Christians were not trustworthy as imperial subjects. This litany redefined localized incidents as components of a larger narrative, making them part of a “national” problem that Christianity posed to the national cohesion and unity that the Imperial Rescript was intended to instill.

**Table 1: Christian incidents in *Kyōiku to Shūkyō no shōtotsu*<sup>31</sup>**  
(In the order they appear in the treatise)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Incident</b>
November 1890	(Aichi Prefecture) Nagoya	The flag of a certain country is placed over the portrait of his majesty; culprits encouraged to do this by foreign missionaries
29 August 1892	Higo (Kumamoto Prefecture) Yatsushiro	Students of a certain elementary school exclaimed “Nanda!” (a derisive term) towards the divine image, and declared that missionaries

<sup>29</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu*, 4-5.

<sup>30</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 4-5.

<sup>31</sup> Table compiled from descriptions in Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 10, 17-18, 23-24, 27-30, 41-43.

		they knew told them there is no one greater than God
(no date)	(Yamaguchi Prefecture) Yamaguchi City	A minister named Hattori Shōzō was unfilial towards his mother, a devout believer in Shinshu Buddhism
June 1892	Kumamoto Prefecture Yokote-mura	The governor gathered the local leaders and told them “there are two things schoolteachers are forbidden to engage in: one is politics, the other is believing in Christianity. Christianity is a foreign religion, and should not be believed.”
July 1892	Kumamoto Prefecture Yamaga	At the Kōtō shōgakkō (First higher school?), 4 students who had converted to Christianity began evangelizing fellow students and resisted their teachers’ admonitions
12 January 1892	Kumamoto Prefecture Kumamoto	At Kumamoto Eigakkō, Okumura Teijirō tells other teachers that the school’s policy is to raise up students according to compassionate love that doesn’t recognize nation or foreigners; fired on the order of Kumamoto governor
3 November 1889	Kyoto	At Dōshisha, on Tenchōsetsu (emperor’s birthday, which during Meiji fell on November 3), the only people who demonstrated a worshipful attitude were a few students, and among the teachers, there were none who demonstrated a worshipful attitude
23 Sept 1889	Tokyo	At Meiji Gakuin [school affiliated with the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai], teachers decide to close the school in observance of Tenchōsetsu and Kigensetsu (national foundation day, February 11) only [but not on other major ritual days]
17 Oct 1889	Ishikawa Prefecture Kanazawa	After learning that the Kanazawa Jogakkō (Girl’s School, now Hokuriku Gakuin) was holding classes on Shinto ritual days, an education official urged the school to

		close for <i>Taisai shukujitsu</i> (major rituals and national holidays), but the school refused to comply
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By presenting these events one after the other, Inoue established a common link among them: that Christians in Japanese schools did not conform to the behavior of good imperial subjects as defined by the Imperial Rescript. Inoue did not list these events in chronological order. By re-ordering these events, Inoue managed to heighten the sense of chaos and disorder that resulted from Christian educators or students who refused the admonitions of school and prefectural officials to respect and observe imperial rituals, or to refrain from infusing the classroom with Christian teachings.

Each of the incidents captured some aspect of Christian behavior considered incongruous with that of imperial subjects: disrespectful behavior towards the emperor's portrait, disregard for established imperial observances and ritual days, and most importantly, the apparent evocation of the first three biblical commandments—to not have other gods, create graven images, or worship such images—as the reason for disregarding these rituals.

By cataloging the disruptive behavior of Christian instructors and students, Inoue portrayed Christians as a dangerous group who could undermine the effort to unify the nation in the face of foreign threat. Though he focused on outward *behavior*, he ultimately argued that no amount of outward conformity would make Christians any less suspect. And this was crucial. According to Inoue, what made Christians a threat to the internal cohesion of the nation was their *belief* in the type of sentiment expressed by Okumura: they did not recognize the nation, or even the emperor, as the ultimate

authority, but instead appealed to a transcendent God and extended a humanitarian compassion to all.

The problems with Christians were legion, but Inoue emphasized several in particular. One was their education: having been educated from an early age by Western missionaries, Christian converts had only minimal knowledge of “Japanese and Chinese” (*Wakan*) learning. After all, Inoue chided, no one with a substantial knowledge of Japanese and Chinese philosophy and learning would have any interest in “transferring” (*wataru*) allegiance to Christianity.<sup>32</sup> As a result of their peculiar education, Christian converts would “feel greater allegiance towards England and America (*Eibei*) than our nation, and as a result, we have this incident where a foreign nation’s flag was placed over the portrait of our nation’s emperor.”<sup>33</sup> More troubling was Christians’ evocation of the new Meiji Constitution, specifically its provision for religious freedom, as justification for refusing to participate in emperor-centered public rituals. But such a claim, Inoue argued, further betrayed the degree to which Christians failed to fulfill their duty as imperial subjects. As Inoue explained, the obligations of subjects to the emperor and safety and protocols of society—both critical to national cohesion and thus superceding any rights imperial subjects might have—necessarily limited the constitutional provision for freedom of belief. Showing the emperor

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<sup>32</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 13-14.

<sup>33</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 13-14.

appropriate respect and veneration was a fundamental obligation of imperial subjects, and it was unacceptable to refuse to do so because of religious beliefs.<sup>34</sup>

In a damning conclusion, Inoue declared that Christianity was not only a-nationalistic (*mu-kokkashugi*), but also even anti-nationalistic (*hi-kokkashugi*).<sup>35</sup> Unduly influenced by Western missionaries nearly from birth, swearing their allegiance to a foreign god whose authority transcended that of the Japanese emperor himself, Christians were beyond assimilating into good imperial subjects. This point proved to be most difficult for Christians to respond to: no matter how they behaved—even if they performed each ritual and observance to perfection—their belief in the Christian God made them irredeemably suspect and a potent threat to the nation.

Inoue also attempted to portray his virulent dislike of Christianity as rational and commensurate with the latest intellectual trends in the West and not a manifestation of hostility towards the West. In a sweeping and somewhat dramatic demonstration of his knowledge of Western philosophy, Inoue turned his attack on Christianity in Japan into an overview of the “latest Western” condemnations of religion. The proof of Christianity’s irrelevance, even harm, could be seen in the conditions of Europe’s largest cities. Despite the long legacy of Christianity in cities like Paris and London, they were not beacons of morality, but characterized by poverty, vice, and squalor. He even mentioned the “White Chapel murders”—a reference to the sensational “Jack the Ripper” killings—as evidence.

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<sup>34</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 31.

<sup>35</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 34-35, 40.

Moral degeneracy proved Christianity's ineffectiveness; Western scholars had revealed the harm such beliefs could pose to national cohesion: "The anti-nationalistic aspect of Christianity is not the opinion of just one person, but is something that scholars in Christian nations say as well."<sup>36</sup> This list of "scholars from Christian nations" included Pierre Bayle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ernest Renan, Herbert Spencer, and Hegel, among others. More specifically, he used these European scholars' words to strengthen his own indictment of Christianity, providing a litany of brief statements in which these scholars specifically portrayed Christianity as harmful to national unity.<sup>37</sup> Inoue concluded by pointing to these "Western scholars'" opinions as legitimating his own critique: "That Western scholars agree with me that Christianity is distant from nationalistic sentiment is no accident, but is based on historical evidence. Christians in our country defend (*bengo*) Christianity [by claiming that] it is not opposed to nationalism (*kokka shugi*), but they are trying to conceal this fact."<sup>38</sup> He went as far as to insinuate that Japanese Christians' refusal to acknowledge the declining status of religion in the West betrayed their ignorance and naivete; if they had spent time in Europe as Inoue had, they would realize the error of their ways.

Inoue's attack on Christianity focused on the religion's incommensurability with the Japanese nation, but the rhetoric he employed emphasized the inherently backwards and "irrational" nature of such religious belief in general. In other words, he objected to Christianity not simply because it was not native to Japan, but because this religion

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<sup>36</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 44-45.

<sup>37</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 45-46.

<sup>38</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 48.

placed greater emphasis on allegiance to “an imaginary heaven” than to “the nation on this earth, even our Great Japanese Empire.”<sup>39</sup> This belief “in a merely imaginary heaven is in no way compatible with the sentiments expressed in the Imperial Rescript.”<sup>40</sup>

Numbering over 80 pages, Inoue’s polemical attack on Christianity gave weight and the formidable veneer of official legitimacy—given Inoue’s role as author of *Chokugo engi*—to the more localized objections to Christians voiced by such people as the Kumamoto governor. The Kumamoto governor’s assertion that Okumura’s statement that “we do not recognize nations” violated the principles of the Imperial Rescript were further echoed by Inoue and characterized as an illogical, even “backwards” belief in an imaginary heaven and an obsolete deity. By couching his attack in terms of progress and rationality, Inoue undermined claims by Christians that their belief represented an adoption of the ideas that under-girded Western progress. However, progress was not the only focus of this debate. The intricate relationship between belief, behavior, and the nation was further complicated by Christians who took issue with Inoue’s accusation that Japanese Christians could not be good imperial subjects.

### **Religion for a “Nation in Progress”**

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<sup>39</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 49.

<sup>40</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 49.

Inoue's attack, and similar criticisms by other public figures, created a fundamental problem for Japanese Christians because it defined inner belief, not outward behavior, as the salient issue. In turn, Christians attempted to redirect the controversy through expanding the definition of loyalty to the nation. At the same time, these attacks came at a moment when Christians were themselves questioning their relationship to the state, to the missionaries who had converted them, and to one another. From the very beginning, Christian responses to the accusations of nationalist ideologues were inextricably linked to problems of theology, independence from mission boards, and personal disputes, and each informed the other. But the issue of Christians' relationship to the state was a central cue: the fissures created by different responses to these accusations continued to influence the Japanese Protestant community long after the 1890s.

In the months following Inoue's polemic, leading ministers and lay members of multiple denominations attempted to legitimize their religious belief and their suitability as imperial subjects; significantly, no one outright rejected the assumption that they needed to demonstrate that they could be "good" imperial subjects. Katano Masako has categorized Christian responses to attacks by nationalist ideologues like Inoue following Uchimura's treason incident in three ways. Some, including members of the Russian Orthodox Church, declared their allegiance to the state by insisting that performing expected rituals presented no conflict with their religious belief.<sup>41</sup> Others, such as

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<sup>41</sup> The Russian Orthodox Church, or Harisutosu (Khristos) Sei Kyōkai, had a small presence in Japan, with its main church in the Kanda area of Tokyo. Katano cites Morita Ryō's "Fukei jiken wo ronjite waga Sei Kyōkai no shugi wo akiraka ni su" which appeared in the 15 February 1891 edition of the denominational paper, *Seikyō shinpō*, as an example of this position. Morita was highly critical of Uchimura, and considered his act to be *fukei*, or *lèse majesté*. Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 80.

Uemura Masahisa of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai (Church of Christ in Japan), a denomination affiliated with the Presbyterian and Reformed churches, defended Christians' right to act according to their faith based on the Constitution and thus refrain from participating in rituals.<sup>42</sup> Still others proposed what can be described as a religious relativism, through which they attempted to circumvent the apparent contradiction inherent in the practice of “worshipping” the emperor.<sup>43</sup> Yet the differences in their attempts to resolve this problem revealed divisions forming within the Christian community, each reflecting the disagreements among members over the relationship between the church and state.

Just as in the case of Inoue's first article, Yokoi was the most prominent Kumiai Kyōkai minister to publish a response. Again, Yokoi issued his challenge to Inoue in *Rikugō zasshi*, this time titled “Shōtotsu osoruru ni tarasu” (Conflict/collision not something to be feared). In his second response to Inoue, Yokoi acknowledged that Christianity potentially could be in conflict with the Imperial Rescript, but he rejected the very notion that conflict (or collision) required resolution: “The thirty-year history of New Japan is a history of conflicts.... The God of progress is always with mankind, never leaving its side; therefore, conflict is one aspect of progress, a constant

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<sup>42</sup> Included within this group were Uchimura himself, Uemura Masahisa of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, and Kashiwagi. The heart of Uemura's argument was that worshipping the Imperial Rescript and imperial portrait was uncivilized, and therefore unbecoming imperial subjects, regardless of their religious beliefs. He published his critique, “Fukei han to Kirisutokyō” in *Fukuin shūhō* (later *shinpō*), 20 February 1891; the newspaper was temporarily suspended for violating the Publications Regulations due to this piece. Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto Kirisutokyō shi*, 115.

<sup>43</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 80; Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto Kirisutokyō shi*, 116-118.

companion that should never leave [mankind's side].”<sup>44</sup> Thus, Yokoi dismissed the thrust of Inoue's argument, suggesting instead that conflict—which seemed to trouble Inoue so much—was a vital catalyst for progress. Those who decried Christianity as anti-nationalistic misunderstood the purpose of national education as well as the central meaning of the Imperial Rescript for, if strengthening and unifying the nation was indeed the purpose, the stimulation Christianity offered—even through controversies—could only further this larger goal.<sup>45</sup>

In a move echoing his earlier attempt to counter Inoue's dismissal of Christianity by insisting that not all religions were made the same, Yokoi proposed a dichotomous taxonomy of religions: national (*kokkateki*) vs. humanistic (*jinruiteki*). “National religions”—a lower form based on common ethnic origins or community and thus arcane—included the religions of ancient Greece and Rome, as well as Judaism of the Old Testament. “Humanistic religions,” such as Christianity, were higher religions, and Christianity—because of its relevance to all of humanity—was greatest among these and best suited as the moral foundation for a civilizing nation.<sup>46</sup> The very aspects of Christianity Inoue condemned, its “transcendental” and “inclusive” nature, were in fact evidence that Christianity was an advanced form of religion suitable for an advancing nation.

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<sup>44</sup> Yokoi Tokio, “Shōtotsu osoruru ni tarasu,” *Rikugō zasshi* 147 (March 1893), reprinted in *Inoue hakushi to Kirisutokyōto*, vol.1, 255.

<sup>45</sup> Yokoi Tokio, “Shōtotsu osoruru ni tarasu,” 259.

<sup>46</sup> Yokoi Tokio, “Shōtotsu osoruru ni tarasu,” 262.

Kashiwagi Gien, who had consistently participated in this debate since the Okumura incident, similarly published a second article following the publication of *Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu*. In it, he engaged in a point-by-point refutation of Inoue's specific accusations, and while similarly dismissive of Inoue's criticisms, he came to significantly different conclusions from Yokoi.

Kashiwagi first quibbled with Inoue's list of Christian incidents in schools. According to Kashiwagi, Inoue had selectively chosen accounts from conservative news sources while ignoring more moderate ones, thus promoting already inflammatory accounts. In particular, Kashiwagi, who had been involved in or familiar with the details of the events in Kumamoto and Dōshisha, claimed that some of the so-called incidents had been fabricated.<sup>47</sup> Second, Kashiwagi refuted Inoue's claim that European philosophers no longer considered Christianity an asset to the nation by arguing that the type of Christianity to which these philosophers referred was exclusively Roman Catholicism.<sup>48</sup> Without identifying specific philosophers or scholars, Kashiwagi insisted that, "Not only are there scholars who maintain that Christianity is necessary to a republican government structure (*kyōwa seiji*), but there are scholars who argue that Christianity is the religion best suited to constitutional monarchies. Is this something that has not reached the professor's ears?"<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Futatabi Inoue Tetsujirō shi ni tadasu," *Dōshisha bungaku* 64 (April 1893), reprinted in *Inoue hakushi to Kirisutokyōto*, vol. 1, 371.

<sup>48</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Futatabi," 371.

<sup>49</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Futatabi," 372.

Ultimately, Kashiwagi questioned Inoue's understanding of fundamental aspects of Christianity. No doubt to demonstrate that he was intimately familiar with Christian teaching and thus qualified to refute its claims, Inoue had quoted select verses from the New Testament to substantiate his characterization of Christianity and to discredit Christians' nationalism.<sup>50</sup> Apparently intended to show that Christians were not concerned with earthly matters but only looked forward to an "imaginary heaven," Inoue quoted Mark 14:25—"Verily I say unto you, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day that I drink it new in the kingdom of God." His aim was to "expose" Christians' lack of concern for this world. Curiously, Kashiwagi did not argue with Inoue's claim that Christians were preoccupied with the next world. Instead, he re-framed the issue, choosing to engage in a bit of exegetical battle. Quoting among other verses I Corinthians 15: 19 ("If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable") and 32 ("If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink; for to morrow we die"), Kashiwagi warned of the dangers of being only concerned with this world. A lack of concern with what Inoue called "an imaginary heaven" resulted in little more than hedonism. Furthermore, Kashiwagi accused Inoue of suffering from a limited understanding of what Christians meant by heaven and the kingdom of God; the concept of heaven was not limited to another world but could also be used to mean a figurative one created through the efforts of Christians on this earth.

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<sup>50</sup> Since all of these authors quoted from a Chinese translation of the Bible, then the most common translation of the Bible in circulation, I will quote from the King James Version English translation rather than attempt to render an English translation of the version they were quoting from.

Kashiwagi also responded to Inoue's charge that Christians were a threat to national unity because of their allegiance to a transcendent god and were committed to humanitarian love (*hakuai*) for others regardless of national affiliation. Inoue had quoted portions of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount as proof: "But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also"; and "But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you." According to Inoue, such sentiments made Christians ineffective soldiers who could not be depended upon to defend the nation. Ultimately, according to Inoue, these teachings were proof that Jesus had felt little loyalty to Judea, and moreover, such sentiments would impoverish the nation.<sup>51</sup> Kashiwagi responded with a pointed rebuke, claiming that Inoue obviously was ignorant about Judean history. The government to which Jesus showed a lack of loyalty was not, of course, that of an independent Judea, but that of Herod, the ruler of Palestine put in place by the Roman Empire. In other words, the Jews in the New Testament were zealous loyalists resistant to Roman rule, desperately awaiting the coming of the prophesied Messiah who would liberate them and establish an independent Judea.

Kashiwagi's rejection of Inoue's accusations that Christians were disloyal, or politically apathetic, may have solved one problem, but it also created a double-edged sword. According to Kashiwagi's description of Jews under Roman rule, it was up to each *minzoku*, or ethnic nation, to determine to whom it owed its allegiance. The

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<sup>51</sup> Inoue Tetsujirō, *Shōtotsu*, 69. Here Inoue quotes from Matthew 5: 39 and 44.

temporal authority, whether an invading power or traditional authority, could be challenged if a group claimed a separate authority was legitimate. Though Kashiwagi argued that Jews under Roman rule had every right to object to Roman rule precisely because their rightful allegiance was to the awaited Messiah, such an argument was only several steps away from the very logic Inoue feared Christians could follow in ignoring their responsibilities to the state.

The aspects of Christianity Kashiwagi defended were precisely those related to notions of spiritual authority, ethics, and the afterlife. However, the manner in which Kashiwagi defended Christianity did little to alleviate Inoue's concerns. Kashiwagi did assert that Inoue misunderstood or willfully misinterpreted central aspects of Christian teaching. But in his defense of these teachings, Kashiwagi did not deny the general characterizations but instead insisted that these did not threaten the cohesion of the state. At the same time, Kashiwagi offered little on the central issue of ritual participation. Aside from questioning Inoue's list of Christian incidents, Kashiwagi neither defended the right of Christians to refrain from participating in such rituals, nor did he claim that these rituals were civic demonstrations of respect as others had done.

### **A Scientific Critique of Christianity**

In the years following the Education and Religion controversy, attacks by nationalist ideologues and counter-attacks by Christians continued unabated. At the same time, Japan's position in the global competition among world powers had changed. Shortly after Inoue issued his first attack, in 1894, Japan entered a war with Qing China over

which empire would control Chosŏn Korea. Although Japan's influence over Korea suffered a setback following the war, its victory nonetheless made it a colonial empire: as part of its war indemnity, China ceded the island of Taiwan to Japan. Japan's subsequent war with Russia in 1904, again stemming from a regional dispute over which power would control Korea, and to a lesser extent Manchuria, transformed Japan from a non-western country anxiously attempting to ward off the possibility of being colonized to a full-fledged regional power. In 1905, Japan successfully imposed a protectorate treaty on the Chosŏn court. By defeating Russia, Japan became the first non-western nation to defeat a western one through modern warfare. In demonstrating that such a victory was possible, Japan not only gained the admiration of people in non-western countries and racial minorities in western countries, but also achieved recognition, even admiration, from the leaders of western powers.<sup>52</sup> These dramatic changes may have altered Japan's place in the global competition among world powers, thus seeming to alleviate the urgent need for national unity necessary for survival; however, they did not erase concerns within Japan over the potential of Christianity to undermine national unity.

### **The Irrationality of (Christian) Belief**

In 1907, Katō Hiroyuki published a book titled *Waga Kokutai to Kirisutokyō* (Our nation and Christianity). Katō had been a member of the elite intellectual group

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<sup>52</sup> See for example Joseph M. Henning, "White Mongols? The war and American discourses on race and religion," and T.R. Sareen, "India and the war," in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 153-166, 239-250.

Meirokusha, the president of Tokyo Imperial University, and was a leading proponent of social Darwinism. Katō had expressed contempt for religion, including Christianity, from an earlier period, and had published a series of articles in the late 1890s in which he claimed to expose the weaknesses of Christianity and Buddhism.<sup>53</sup> In 1907, at a July meeting of Gakushi'in, an organization comprised of important scholars, Katō continued his attack in a lecture in which he argued that “science” proved that Christianity would harm the nation. Following this meeting, he developed his ideas further, and published them together in this treatise. As a proponent of social Darwinism and scientific rationality, Katō presented his case as the conflict between “enlightened” reason and “backward” superstition.

First, Katō characterized Christianity as nothing more than empty superstition concocted in part to cover up Mary’s pregnancy by another man, one that demanded belief in a ghost (*obake*), and that kept the uneducated masses in a state of ignorance. Such a religion was harmful to the nation precisely because by filling the minds of the ignorant masses with superstitions, it would impede progress, which could only come through the rational truth of science. In his argument, such teachings may have had their place in less advanced times, when superstition was useful in managing and controlling people, but in the present time of progress and enlightenment, such superstition would only impede the process of educating ignorant masses and transforming them into true imperial subjects.

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<sup>53</sup> The first article, titled “Bu-Ki ryōkyō no kyūsho wo tsuku” (Taking a jab at the main points of Buddhism and Christianity) appeared in the journal *Taiyō* in September 1900. Kashiwagi Gien, among others, published responses to Katō’s first challenge to Christianity.

Superstition was not the only problem with Christianity, however. Katō put forth an important argument concerning the nature of the foundation of Japanese “civilization” and religion. According to Katō, all “world religions” originated as “folk religions” (*minzokukyō*) that had evolved from their parochial beginnings to include other peoples. Nonetheless, even these more inclusive “world” religions—because of their universal quality—posed a threat to national cohesion:

The nation must be the highest and most respected. If not, genuine unity cannot be achieved. However, since these world religions teach that in addition to being controlled by the nation, a nation’s subjects must be under the authority of the world religion as well, it is inevitable that there are two powers with authority. This harms the nation.... Since most religious authority (*kyōken*) and political authority (*seiken*) fall under the command of separate people, the nation is greatly harmed.<sup>54</sup>

Katō, using similar reasoning as Inoue, argued that religions that transcended national boundaries were harmful because adherents refused to acknowledge the distinction between their nation (*jikoku*), which originated from a natural organic unit (*yūkitai*), and other nations (*takoku*). As a result, “Since these world religions do not acknowledge this basic ethical principle and only recognize all peoples and do not recognize the nation, they are a detriment to the nation.”<sup>55</sup> Katō further linked this problem to recent events, reminding his readers that there were a few Christians who opposed the Russo-Japanese War on religious grounds. As long as there were even a few who faithfully practiced their religion, it was inevitable that a conflict between religious beliefs and the nation would result.

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<sup>54</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō* (Tokyo: Kōwandō, 1907), 22.

<sup>55</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 28.

But what about religions with long traditions in Japan? Katō acknowledged that various religions had played an important part in Japanese civilization, chief among them Buddhism. But Buddhism had, according to Katō, also wreaked its own havoc, misleading the people through false superstitions. But one “religion” made Japan truly unique in the world: the veneration of the imperial household. Katō distinguished between the folk manifestations of Shinto such as the worship of nature and village deities—which he dismissed as a primitive form of worship—and ancestor worship epitomized by veneration for the emperor. He carefully distinguished emperor veneration from religious worship, and even criticized contemporary attempts to turn the emperor into a deity and Shinto into a “proper” religion. Instead, he characterized emperor veneration as the central practice of the “system of rule by clan head” (*zokufu tōchi*).<sup>56</sup>

This system of rule by clan head was, according to Katō, the central defining feature of the Japanese nation. As such, maintaining and defending this structure was critical to fostering national unity and preserving the nation itself. And Christianity threatened to destroy this system: “Because Japan possesses the world’s exclusive system of rule by clan head, there is nothing that should be worshipped above the emperor and the imperial household. It is unforgivable for the nation (*kokutai*) to allow the elevation of an exclusive deity above the place of the emperor.”<sup>57</sup> Christianity and the fundamental system of rule in Japan were thus seen as incompatible: “Christianity

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<sup>56</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 45.

<sup>57</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 56.

will never be able to become assimilated into the Japanese national essence (*kokutai*).”<sup>58</sup> Even recent attempts by Christian schools to conform to the state’s dictates to acknowledge and recite the Imperial Rescript on Education, according to Katō, were mere performances that “did not come from the heart.”<sup>59</sup> Just as Christianity and the fundamental Japanese structure were incompatible, Christian principles and the Imperial Rescript were incompatible since the Imperial Rescript made no mention of a heavenly father. No faithful Christian would be able to accept the Imperial Rescript; accepting this ideology would constitute a form of compromise unfathomable with a religion that demanded absolute allegiance to one god.<sup>60</sup>

The Imperial Rescript, Katō argued, encapsulated the unique nature of Japanese loyalty and patriotism, qualities for which Japan had been acknowledged and praised by foreign observers following the Russo-Japanese war. Katō quoted extensively from a translation of an article that had originally appeared in the British newspaper the *Standard*, as well as an article that appeared in the *Hōchi shinbun* penned by a Russian scholar, each expressing admiration for Japanese patriotism.<sup>61</sup> Why, he asked, did Japanese Christians not recognize or value what foreigners could discern in the unique culture and history of Japan?

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<sup>58</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 61.

<sup>59</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 62.

<sup>60</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 64.

<sup>61</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 76-85.

Katō concluded his treatise by positing a “scientific” justification for emperor worship. His proof depended on his characterization of the roots of the system of rule by clan head, and how this particular system as it existed in Japan was somehow unique in the world. Originally, the natural organic body, which served as the origins of the Japanese people, coalesced as a result of the natural struggle for survival. It was not the result of some kind of social contract, but instead, began as a simple cohesion of a small group of the ethnic people (*minshū*), which through a struggle against external forces, evolved to form the nation (*kokka*). This process, while itself not unique, was characterized by one crucial element in Japan’s case: the ruling clan, which succeeded in unifying the nation into a “natural” whole, had always remained in place. In other words, the ruling bloodline had never been interrupted or replaced by a succeeding competing dynasty. Only Japan, according to Katō, had accomplished this feat, and this had remained unchanged even after the promulgation of the constitution in 1889.<sup>62</sup> Ultimately, Katō argued that based on natural law and the unchanging reality of rule by clan head, it was only rational that the emperor be the ultimate object of veneration. Christians, on the other hand, held up a ghost as the ultimate object of worship.<sup>63</sup> Ultimately, the worship of the emperor was based on “scientific fact,” not backwards superstition. If Christians continued to multiply, they would hinder the nation’s progress.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 90-91.

<sup>63</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 92.

<sup>64</sup> Katō Hiroyuki, *Waga kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 95.

Katō Hiroyuki's criticism of Christianity was not the only one to follow Inoue Tetsujirō's earlier attacks. According to Carol Gluck, at least 76 books and 493 articles published between 1891 and 1893 argued for and against the possibility of Christians' loyalty to the state; those opposing it were written by a diverse range of people including leading intellectuals, Buddhist apologists, and nationalist ideologues.<sup>65</sup> However, Katō managed to elicit responses from Christians, several of whom had participated in the earlier debate prompted by Inoue Tetsujirō's treatise against Christians. The publication of this work, thus, presented certain Christians with the opportunity to further articulate their understanding of the relationship between Christian belief and the Japanese nation. Among the first to respond was Kashiwagi Gien, who in his earlier position as an instructor at Kumamoto Eigakkō had adamantly defended Okumura Teijirō and later, as a contributor to *Dōshisha bungaku*, defended Christian religious practice to Inoue. In the intervening years, Kashiwagi had been appointed the head minister of Annaka church in Gunma, and in addition to his numerous duties as minister, published *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (Jōmō Christian monthly). This monthly paper not only contained news about congregations in the Gunma area, but also functioned as Kashiwagi's primary outlet for participation in more heady intellectual and theological discussions. In October, roughly two months after the publication of Katō's work, Kashiwagi published a brief but pointed response with the simple title, "Katō hakushi no 'waga kokutai to kirisutokyō' wo yomu" (On reading Professor Katō's 'Christianity and our nation').

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<sup>65</sup> Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths*, 133.

Though brief in length, Kashiwagi's retort to Katō contained a critical argument. In fact, the brevity of the piece reflected Kashiwagi's dismissal of Katō's key points, which Kashiwagi reduced to the ramblings of an aging man who had not realized that "though such arguments [accusing Christians of acts of treason and disrespect towards the emperor] were once popular, in this day and age, our society has outgrown (Kashiwagi used the English word) such rigid adherence to nationalism (*kokutairon*)."<sup>66</sup> But more important to Kashiwagi was the role religion should occupy in relationship to the state. He denounced those who "excitedly spoke of the collision between religion and the state" as people out of touch and those who, "claiming there is no conflict, busily work for their reconciliation," as crass. In other words, the predominant focus on whether or not there existed conflict between religion and the state was misplaced. Instead, Kashiwagi insisted,

A true religion is something that should confidently lead the nation, and is not something that should listen to every demand placed on it by the state, thus serving as [the state's] lantern bearer. Additionally, a religion that tries to curry favor with the government and is only concerned with aligning itself [with the state's policies] is only a buffoonish counterfeit religion. A nation that cannot accept a religion unless it is servile in this way lacks the qualifications to stand among the nations in the twentieth century.<sup>67</sup>

Thus Kashiwagi dismissed the significance of the conflict debate, because conflict in and of itself was not a problem. And he issued a veiled criticism of other Christians, including many of his Kumiai Kyōkai colleagues (including Watase whose response to Katō will be taken up next) who busied themselves with lengthy responses

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<sup>66</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Katō hakushi no 'waga kokutai to kirisutokyō' wo yomu," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1907): 1.

<sup>67</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Katō hakushi," 1.

demonstrating Christianity's compatibility with the nation. This effort, however, Kashiwagi characterized as a buffoonish attempt to curry favor with the government. Just as he had maintained nearly fifteen years earlier, Kashiwagi focused on the need for religion to stand apart from the state, to operate as a "shining light that would guide the nation" rather than the state's lantern bearer.<sup>68</sup> Perhaps more significantly, Kashiwagi appealed to an "international" (i.e. West-centered) standard of the nation; the refusal of some like Katō to accept differing opinions and religious traditions hindered Japan's chances of being fully accepted by western powers. Thus, Kashiwagi turned Katō's entire argument on its head: Christianity was not an arcane superstition as Katō had insisted, nor was Katō's "scientific" critique a reflection of the progress that the Japanese intellectual world had undergone in the preceding years. Instead, Katō's intolerance of Christianity was itself outmoded, the ramblings of an old man who had failed to recognize the changes occurring around him.

Despite the forcefulness of Kashiwagi's rebuttal, his was a minority position among Kumiai Kyōkai ministers. In December 1907, Watase Tsuneyoshi published a book-length point-by-point response to Katō's work. Watase, who had been in Kumamoto at the time of the Okumura incident, had spent the years between 1899 and 1907 in Korea as the headmaster of Keijō Gakudō, a school established by Japanese Christians in order to educate and "civilize" Korean boys and young men. When the Japanese government imposed its second protectorate treaty on Korea in 1907, effectively seizing control of not only Korea's diplomacy but also its domestic affairs

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<sup>68</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Katō hakushi," 1.

including educational policy, the Residency-General shut down Watase's school, forcing him to return to Japan. He was immediately appointed the head minister of one of the Kumiai Kyōkai's most prestigious churches, in Kobe. In addition to this new role, he continued to contribute to such publications as *Kirisutokyō sekai* (Christian world), *Rikugō zasshi* and *Shinjin* (The New Man), the latter two both journals with Christian ties that were also recognized as prestigious intellectual publications. Only months after returning from Korea, Watase published *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō: Katō hakushi no shoron wo bakusu* (Christianity and the national essence: an expose of Mr. Katō's opinion) through Keiseisha, a leading Christian publishing house. Ebina Danjō, who had replaced Yokoi as the minister of the prominent Hongō church and served as a mentor to Watase, contributed a preface ridiculing Katō's arguments against Christianity. Thus, this work in many ways represented the opinions of a dominant and influential segment of the Kumiai Kyōkai.

### **A Rational Christianity for a Modern Japan**

At the heart of Watase's response was a challenge to Katō's assumption that Christians held the exclusivity of the Christian God absolutely sacred. In short, Watase questioned Katō's characterization of Christianity; he argued that Katō was ignorant of the true nature of Christianity, particularly Christianity in its modern, advanced form. What Katō had criticized was an arcane form, hindered by superstition and ignorance, rigid in its dogmatic insistence on irrational beliefs and its intolerance of other religions. The new Christianity, according to Watase, was informed by the latest scholarship in

comparative religion and guided by a more enlightened theology based on Biblical criticism or new scholarship of the Bible. These new, enlightened Christians acknowledged the contributions of other religions and accepted that as a result of its dependence on rigid beliefs, the Christian church had been responsible in the past for great harm. Thus, Watase denied outright that Christians any longer claimed the virgin birth or Christ's literal resurrection, two ideas Katō had characterized as the worst sort of superstition intended to mislead uneducated and ignorant people. In fact, Watase maintained, it had been demonstrated through comparative religious studies and higher criticism, among others, that these ideas were little more than legend and while, "There are interesting elements of these legends that reveal something, historically, of the psychology of a people (*minzoku*), in this day and age, how many are there who actually believe that these legends are historical fact?"<sup>69</sup> The usefulness of these legends lay not in whether or not they were true, but in that through them, "it is possible to understand something of how people in that society thought, as well as the spirit of that era.... Through their study, it is possible to discover true facts of history."<sup>70</sup>

Facts did not include ghosts or apparitions, as Katō had claimed. Whereas Katō had ridiculed Christians for placing their faith in a ghost (*bakemono*) whose existence could never be proved or substantiated, Watase chided Katō, calling his fixation with ghosts a sign of his superficial understanding of religion. Furthermore, Watase also accused Katō of misconstruing the true nature of faith. While Katō had criticized

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<sup>69</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō: Katō hakushi no shoron wo bakusu* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1907), 7.

<sup>70</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 8.

Christians for placing their faith in something before having any knowledge of it, Watase countered by claiming that often faith came before knowledge could be acquired. For instance, babies had faith that they would be cared for by their parents before having adequate knowledge that this would be the case. Likewise, subjects of a nation believed in their nation—often expressing this faith through acts of sacrifice—without knowing in any concrete way why their nation was worthy of such loyalty and patriotism.<sup>71</sup> Knowledge resulted from faith, not as Katō had insisted, the other way around. By characterizing Christians' faith in God as superstitious belief in a ghost, Watase argued, Katō had denigrated the most venerated thinkers of western civilization: "If the true God of Christianity is nothing more than a ghost or apparition, then it must be concluded that Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, and Schiller are among the most famous believers in ghosts and apparitions."<sup>72</sup> Katō's characterization of the Christian God as nothing more than a ghost betrayed his inadequate understanding of Christian teaching: "God expresses the reality of the universe, and is certainly not some being that hangs suspended in mid-air."<sup>73</sup>

What then was the Christian God, according to Watase? Of equal significance, who was Christ?

Paul said your body is the temple of God. He pointed to the divine holy spirit of humans and equated it with God's spirit. That is to say God fills the great universe, and exists as the actual fulfillment of mankind and is [in turn] fulfilled. Christ teaches that this [being] should be worshipped

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<sup>71</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 15-16.

<sup>72</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 23.

<sup>73</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 23.

and loved as God the Father. This is not some supposition of Christ's, but reflects the highest consciousness of humanity through the unification of self and universe.<sup>74</sup>

In Watase's formulation, God the Father was not the personified deity of conventional Christianity but represented and reflected something at once more amorphous and diffused, something that consisted of spirit but without definitive structure or form. Likewise, Watase's understanding of Christ followed similar logic: "Christ merely represents the ultimate consciousness of humanity."<sup>75</sup> Watase's definition of God and Christ circumvented Katō's criticism, for this was a Christianity that made no explicit claims of exclusivity based on the notion that its principal deity was supreme and yet still asserted its superiority because it represented the "ultimate consciousness of humanity." This was the crucial point: belief, and more importantly faithful obedience to teaching, was not predicated on following "arcane laws" as Watase characterized them. Instead, belief and practice could be more loosely construed, since following Christ's example as the representative of the ultimate consciousness, as opposed to believing in the exclusivity of Christianity, determined faithfulness. Rituals and acts of worship had no bearing on the sincerity of Christian faith.

Watase's contempt for Katō's characterization of Christianity extended to the question of how so-called world religions were to be understood as well. Central to Watase's response was the commonly held perceptions that allegiance to the Christian God and allegiance to the nation were mutually exclusive, and that as a result of their

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<sup>74</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 23.

<sup>75</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 23.

adherence to a transcendent religion, Christians myopically neglected to recognize their nation as separate, distinct, and of greater importance than other nations. The universal nature of Christianity did not mean that Japanese Christians would forsake their duties to their own nation; Christians in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany could simultaneously fulfill their duties as subjects and remain faithful to their religion.<sup>76</sup> The universal nature of Christianity instead implied that if there were sufficient resources and energy remaining once their duty to nation was accomplished, Christians would turn their attention to assisting other nations. Furthermore, such concern for others could be sufficiently performed while remaining firmly in Japan and did not require literally leaving—and thus abandoning—the nation.<sup>77</sup> Ultimately, “‘Universal’ is not something associated with a person’s personal opinion, but instead refers to an insistence on the publicly held truth under heaven. ‘Universal’ is the great path that is commonly held by all people.”<sup>78</sup>

The desire to prove that Christians would recognize their nation above others preoccupied Watase’s response to Katō. Drawing both on Protestant and Japanese prejudices, Watase attributed past conflicts between the Christian church and states to the doings of the Roman Catholic Church in particular; this church, Watase claimed, espoused, “tired ideas that are no longer paid any notice.”<sup>79</sup> Pointing instead to Biblical examples, Watase insisted that Christ himself had made distinctions among his

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<sup>76</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 29.

<sup>77</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 32.

<sup>78</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 33.

<sup>79</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 37.

disciples, for he had favored Peter, James, and John above the others. Not only did Christ discriminate among his disciples, but he had also demonstrated an intense interest in nation:

It is not difficult for anyone with a familiarity with the era in which Christ lived to understand that the question of how to restore the nation of Judea, which had already fallen, was of utmost importance. What accounts for the spirit (*seishin*) of Christ who, emerging at this time, commanded his disciples to go to the wandering sheep of the house of Israel, and not to go to another country (*ihō*)?<sup>80</sup>

Thus, Watase interpreted Christ's command to find lost sheep—a passage conventionally interpreted as a description of God's concern for all people—as national allegory, not spiritual metaphor.

This is not to say that Watase denied “universal” aspects of Christianity, for he argued:

While Christianity is aware of individual nations and individual peoples (*jinrui*), it inspires the spirit (*seishin*) common throughout the world, displaying the great path of mutual love among peoples, enriching sympathy and understanding among the nations of the world, deepening a feeling of international peace and amity, and enabling the happiness and prosperity of all peoples. Therefore, if it did not shine its light on the nation, world history would give evidence of this.<sup>81</sup>

History itself was ample proof that Christianity, far from being harmful to the nation, had enabled prosperity and peace. It achieved this, not through claims on exclusivity or allegiance to a singular deity, but through emphasizing and bringing to the fore universally held values, thus facilitating peace and understanding among nations and within nations. Though men like Katō assumed Christians obstinately held onto notions

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<sup>80</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 44.

<sup>81</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 48.

of Christian exclusivity, Watase retorted, they sorely misunderstood the true nature of Christian belief.

Christians today, including myself, do not think that we must absolutely revere every statement attributed to Christ. This is not limited to me; this includes the vast majority of Christians today. There are not a few sayings attributed to Christ that are suspect, and there is room for such suspicious sayings to be examined. Even with sayings that are demonstrated to have been said by Christ, these must be interrogated to determine whether or not these were relevant to a specific period, or whether or not they apply absolutely.... Among the things I believe are absolute teachings of Christ are things such as the teaching to love God absolutely, and to love others, or as God is perfect, be perfect.<sup>82</sup>

Ultimately, Watase pointed to recent history as proof of the contributions Christians had made to Japan. Over forty years since Christianity had been (re-)introduced to Japan, there were now over 200,000 adherents, all of whom were faithful imperial subjects. The nature of Christianity itself was changing as well. Initially introduced by western missionaries, Japanese converts had made it their own. Some Japanese ministers even rigorously debated points of theology with western theologians.<sup>83</sup>

Watase concluded by announcing the successful “indigenization” of Christianity. Not only had Japanese Christians adopted the most advanced forms of thought from the West, but they had also combined this with the uniqueness of the Japanese people and the “profound penetrating consciousness of the East, thus grasping the essence of Christianity and nurturing the foundation of the morals of Japanese subjects (*kokumin*).”<sup>84</sup> Christianity as it was now manifested in Japan was in fact

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<sup>82</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 50.

<sup>83</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 55-56.

Japanese: “The meaning of Japanization (*Nihonka*) is that the Jewish and Western wrapping that enveloped this truth is now transformed into a Japanese one. In other words, there is no truth to the claim that conflict exists.”<sup>85</sup> This transformed Christianity, now reflecting putative Japanese traditional qualities and morals, could also be taught to Chinese and Koreans; in fact, according to Watase, “there is no place among the nations not suited for this [Japanized Christianity].”<sup>86</sup>

For Watase, this advanced and now indigenized form of Christianity culminated in heaven, but a very different one from what Katō characterized as the Christian heaven. Indeed, heaven was not something that existed in the afterlife, nor was it something that Christians yearned for as they withdrew from and disregarded this world. It was instead something to be built in this life, through this world’s nations:

What then does it mean to build heaven in this world?... In fact, bringing about heaven in this world is to imbue this nation, this society, with God’s will, that is with love, justice, peace, generosity, diligence, and purity. In other words, when I say ‘building heaven’ I am speaking of the hope that I have that things will be brought even closer to the ideal beyond what they are today.<sup>87</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The controversy surrounding Christians and the Imperial Rescript did not dominate the news continuously. The two wars in which Japan engaged superceded it in the popular

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<sup>84</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 56.

<sup>85</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 57.

<sup>86</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 57.

<sup>87</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Kokutai to Kirisutokyō*, 74.

imagination, and eventually, other more pressing concerns relegated it to the background. This is not to say that the issue was resolved. Indeed, the terms of the debate—as established by Inoue—prevented resolution. As far as people like Inoue and Katō were concerned, Christians were inherently suspect. Their allegiance to a foreign god prevented them from possessing undivided loyalty, which was vital to the nation's survival. The peculiar mixture of social Darwinism and emperor veneration they espoused made undivided loyalty both a pragmatic necessity and an expression of proper Japanese-ness. As such, Christian belief represented a security risk and something unnatural. Though the furor that erupted over Uchimura's *lèse majesté* incident and Okumura's declaration died down into an uncomfortable compromise, doubts surrounding Christians did not entirely disappear. In fact, the prescription of absolute loyalty to the Japanese empire came to form the often unstated challenge against which Christians continued to justify their practices and theological positions.

In the case of the Kumiai Kyōkai, the debates following Inoue's articles, as well as Katō's treatise, revealed fundamental differences among ministers concerning views of God, Christ's divinity, and the proper relationship between Christian subjects and the state. The dominant position, articulated most explicitly by Yokoi and Watase, insisted on the compatibility of Christian belief and allegiance to the state and more importantly, the emperor. This was not out of a desire to defend their position in the face of criticism, or a form of inevitable compromise with the imposing force of public opinion and censure. Rather, the confidence with which Yokoi and Watase asserted their position demonstrates that their insistence of legitimacy stemmed from a particular theological

position. This is not an insignificant point. What from one perspective may have appeared a weakness of faith—as it surely did to some of the American missionaries who bemoaned the Japanese converts’ submission to state educational policy—was, in fact, a declaration of the maturation of the church. As Watase had insisted, Japanese Christians were developing a faith of their own. This faith, at least according to Watase and Yokoi, was skeptical, prided itself in its intellectual sophistication, and valued its service to the nation. Theirs was a Christianity that was not at the beck and call of Western powers, but a Christianity that pledged its service to the Japanese emperor-centered nation-state.

In sharp contrast to the liberal theology and state-focused pronouncements of Watase and Yokoi, Kashiwagi Gien asserted an alternative position. No less concerned with the nation—for Kashiwagi never failed to make the nation a central focus—Kashiwagi nonetheless presented a challenge to the state’s definition of the nation. Asserting the constitutional principle of religious freedom, and insisting that any worthy religion must lead, rather than follow, the state, Kashiwagi proposed a form of Christian nationalism that operated as the moral conscience of the nation. This is not to say that Yokoi and Watase, and others in agreement with them, denied this role for Christianity. They likewise insisted that Christianity could serve as a worthy ally to the state. The differences between these two groups lay in fundamental understandings of Christianity itself. These differences were in turn, forced into relief as a result of the suspicions cast on Christianity. Though yet subtle in the 1890s-1900s, the implications of these differences were made more distinct as the Japanese empire grew in confidence and

size, and as Christians continued to consider the exact nature of their belief and practices in relation to the state.

## CHAPTER TWO

### **Cultivating ‘The New Man’: Christianity for a Twentieth Century Empire**

*The old man [person] takes up the old, but the new person collects new things. I must become a new man of the twentieth century. There is no need to walk alongside the old man. The new man of the twentieth century must receive his knowledge from God, and must follow truth. Whether a politician, an educator, a philosopher, or a poet—all must follow knowledge and truth and stand in this new twentieth century.*

--*Shinjin* (The New Man), 1900

As the twentieth century dawned, the minister and members of the Hongō church in Tokyo embraced a new sense of mission and vision for what they could accomplish for both God and country. Located a stone’s throw away from the grand “red gate” (*akamon*) of Tokyo Imperial University, the Hongō church occupied a unique position among Kumiai churches in the Kantō region. Rivalled in scale only by the denomination’s older and more established Osaka and Kobe churches and counting among its members many accomplished and ambitious Tokyo Imperial University students, the Hongō church was as influential as it was unusual. With a self-conscious awareness of the church’s uniqueness and a sense of responsibility, the editors penned their declaration of a need for a “new man” for the new century in the inaugural issue of *Shinjin*, the journal associated with the church.

Though atypical in many ways, the Hongō church is also an ideal site through which to explore how Japanese Christians, and members of the Kumiai Kyōkai in particular, embraced the rise of Japanese imperialism. Focusing on Hongō church

during Ebina Danjō's tenure as its minister, and occasionally expanding out to examine the denomination as a whole, this chapter explores how members of the Kumiai Kyōkai actively engaged with the predominant issues during the first decade of the twentieth century. In particular, this chapter will examine two critical issues for Japanese Protestants: the emergence of conflicting characterizations of proper Christian belief, and how the wide-reaching effects of Japan's entry into war with Russia shaped the Kumiai Kyōkai's ministries and self-perception. These two issues, one rooted in theological disagreement, the other in a national (and international) crisis, might appear unrelated, joined only through temporal coincidence. But as Japanese Protestants undertook the formidable task of evaluating and questioning fundamental beliefs as they repeatedly declared, with varying degrees of success, the independence of the Japanese Church, their belief was shaped, even defined, by the disconcerting and disorienting changes occurring around them. As such, theological points were refined and articulated through direct engagement with political and social concerns, just as interpretations of critical events were filtered through varied, even contradictory theological lenses.

Through church sermons, church activities and ministries, and contributions to *Shinjin* (The New Man), the journal published by members of the church, Christians associated with the Hongō church expressed their support for imperial expansion, the validity of Japan's war with Russia, and a unique role for Japanese Christians in the world, and established theological justifications for each. Imperialism broadly defined was not the sole concern of Christians in this period. Nonetheless the state's actions, and

the implications that these held for Japanese imperial subjects, provided the context within which the nascent Protestant community established itself.

The period under examination was a fraught one: in the years following its first victory in a modern war, the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan engaged in a series of international military campaigns ranging from participation in the multi-nation intervention in Beijing to end the Boxer uprising, to the Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905, and the forcible establishment of Korea as a protectorate. Domestically, the impact of industrialization and other disruptive changes associated with modernization led to new forms of anxiety, expressed through public displays of unrest and violence, and decried by commentators who bemoaned the moral and ethical costs of Japan's efforts to attain parity with western imperial powers. By the late Meiji period, the Japanese state, as well as Japanese society generally, was no longer simply preoccupied with staving off colonization or "informal colonization" by a western nation. With the markings of a modern nation-state firmly in place, including compulsory education, conscription, the standardization of time, and industrialization, the new challenges to Japanese society were perceived as more complex and subtle, and thus perhaps more insidious.<sup>1</sup>

This climate of excitement mixed with apprehension colored the development of the nascent Christian community, as Japanese converts affiliated with different denominations began examining and asserting new roles for Christians in Japanese society, and questioning the very form Japanese Christianity should take. No longer

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<sup>1</sup> See for example David R. Ambaras, *Bad Youth: Juvenile Delinquency and the Politics of Everyday Life in Modern Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 32-33.

content to remain under the supervision and influence of foreign missionaries, and even exploring alternative ideas and theologies not sanctioned by missionaries, many Japanese ministers began to claim that the Japanese Christian Church had come into its own, no longer requiring the financial assistance of foreign missions, and thus no longer accountable to missionaries for their understanding of fundamental aspects of Christian doctrine and practice.

In 1886, in order to demonstrate the uniqueness and unity of Japanese Christianity, the Kumiai Kyōkai and the then-Nihon Icchi Kyōkai (later Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, Church of Christ in Japan) attempted to form one “denomination,” the Nihon Kirisuto Kōkai (United Church of Christ in Japan). After years of negotiating over which governing structure the united church would take, Kumiai Kyōkai members, who adhered to a Congregationalist structure, grew increasingly wary of the Icchi Kyōkai’s preference for Presbyterian governance, and they abandoned this effort in 1890.<sup>2</sup> Initiated in part to demonstrate the unity of Japanese Protestantism and to resolve practical material and human limitations, the inability of these two groups to overcome differences exposed divisions among Japanese Protestants, and made clear that Japanese converts were just as incapable of resolving the differences that plagued western Protestantism. The two denominations were left to ask their respective members to take on the critical challenge of financially supporting their churches and associated ministries and increase members of *their* denominations. Underlying this failed effort, and subsequent efforts undertaken by the Kumiai Kyōkai, was the considerable anxiety

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<sup>2</sup> Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto Kirisutokyō shi*, 65.

resulting from Japanese Protestants' failure to successfully develop a mature and self-reliant Japanese church. The anxiety over achieving independence, while not always explicitly stated as a motivating factor, consistently colored the activities and claims of Japanese Christians.

By the turn of the twentieth century, the Kumiai Kyōkai had asserted itself as a distinct denomination fully differentiated from others and had begun taking the first steps towards achieving independence from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the American missions agency with which it was affiliated. Independence, however, required substantial financial resources, churches with congregations of sufficient means, and ministers who could take on the role of leading and guiding the denomination. Ebina Danjō, from his pulpit at Hongō church, claimed this role for himself and his congregation.

## **Part I**

### **Hongō Church: A Church for the New Man**

Originally founded in 1886 by Ebina Danjō as a mission station targeting Tokyo Imperial University students, the Hongō church was established relatively late in the Kanto region. The Annaka church in Gunma Prefecture, founded in 1878, was the first to be established in the region; the first Tokyo church, Reinanzaka, had been founded by Kozaki Hiromichi in the Akasaka ward of Tokyo in 1879. Nonetheless, by 1900, Hongō commanded considerable attention. Its proximity to Tokyo Imperial University gave it a

youthful, energetic, and cerebral atmosphere.<sup>3</sup> In a time and region where average Sunday services might be considered successful if they could attract over fifty people, Hongō church enjoyed an attendance ranging from around 200 in the summer months to between 400 and 500 during the academic year.<sup>4</sup> The church's outreach events, such as evening services and speaking events, occasionally attracted as many as 200 people.

The disproportionate influence of Hongō church in general and Ebina Danjō in particular also extended beyond the Protestant community, largely through the journal *Shinjin* (The New Man). Initially students attending the church sought to publish a simple newsletter so that members who had graduated and left the Tokyo area could remain informed about the church's activities. The first editorial board decided to

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<sup>3</sup> For instance according to a study of church members published in a 1905 issue of *Shinjin*, of the church's 380 members, 285 lived in the area, and 197 were between the ages of 19 and 28. Among students, at least twenty-three were Tokyo University students. Many of the female students attended Tōkyō Shikan Gakkō, or normal school. Statistics compiled in Ōta Masao, "Hongō kyōkai no hitobito: Kaiin genbo wo chūshin ni," in "*Shinjin*" "*Shinjokai*" no kenkyū: nijūseiki shotō Kirisutokyō jānarizumu, ed. Dōshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo (Kyoto: Jinbunshoin, 1999), 203.

<sup>4</sup> The available statistics for church attendance can be misleading. In the Kumiai Kyōkai's annual reports, membership—as opposed to Sunday service average attendance numbers—were submitted until the mid-1910s. Since church members often retained membership to one church while attending the services at another, the membership numbers do not directly correlate to average Sunday service figures. For instance the Annaka church membership averaged around 150 throughout the 1910s but roughly 20-25 regularly attended Sunday services. Additionally annual averages for a church like Hongō can also be misleading. Due to its large student membership, the Sunday service numbers dropped significantly over the summer—particularly in August—while students were away from school and when more affluent members of Tokyo society sought refuge from the summer heat in mountain retreat towns. Therefore, while the annual average for its Sunday services were closer to 250, this was because the low attendance in the month of August lowered the average.

For instance, from 1911-1915 (1911 being the first year actual average attendance figures were reported annually), the attendance (membership) statistics for these churches are as follows: Hongō: 250 (788), 192 (853), 212 (897), 202 (1002), 210 (1078); Osaka: 208 (935), 215 (979), 252 (1010), 260 (957), 259 (1019); Kobe: 219 (977), 220 (1005), 212 (1037), 239 (1148), 223 (1174). In this same period, the average attendance at Annaka fluctuated between 19 and 23; Kozaki's Reinanzaka church's average attendance increased from 76 to 117.

instead firmly establish the church as a site for intellectual discussion and debate through publishing this provocatively titled journal.<sup>5</sup>

Beginning with its inaugural issue in July 1900, *Shinjin* included a transcription of at least one of Ebina's sermons in each issue, thus circulating his sermons beyond the reaches of the sanctuary. In addition to sermons, Ebina and other church (and denominational) leaders, as well as prominent non-Christian public intellectuals, published editorials and commentaries, including debates about contemporary politics, social issues, and theology. Each issue also included detailed information about the church's activities, from the number of people who attended each Sunday service to news from members studying abroad. From an initial 34-page format with a print run of 600, by 1905 the journal had expanded to 64-pages with a print run of 2000.<sup>6</sup> It was financed through subscriptions and advertisements taken out by publishing houses—both Christian and secular—and multiple Christian-owned companies such as Lion Toothpaste and Kao Soap. Until the mid-1920s when the editorial board was dominated by students more influenced by socialism than Christianity, the journal served to link

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<sup>5</sup> Ōta Masao, "Hongō kyōkai no hitobito: kaiin genbo wo chūshin ni," 209-210. Though technically a periodical, in order to avoid having to pay the prohibitively expensive bond required of all publications regulated by the Press Law—that is, all newspapers and magazines that addressed current events—*Shinjin* was defined by its editors as a journal that did not directly address politics so that it would fall under the Publications Law. Though this negated the need for the bond, it also constrained the way in which current events could be addressed in the journal. Tanaka Masato, "'Shinjin' no igi to seikaku," 13; Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals: Writers and the Meiji State* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 23.

<sup>6</sup> Yumichō Hongō kyōkai hyakunenshi iinkai, editor, *Yumichō Hongō kyōkai hyakunenshi* (Tokyo: Nihon kirisutokyōdan, 1986), 280.

together this church's daily activities to critical intellectual and theological debates, contemporary issues, and even the world beyond Japan.<sup>7</sup>

Hongō church's prominence was not simply due to its unusual membership or the journal associated with it, but was nurtured and cultivated by Ebina Danjō, its senior minister. By 1900 Ebina had established himself as a dedicated minister and evangelist intimately involved in the Kumiai Kyōkai's efforts to distinguish itself among the many Protestant denominations in Japan. After founding the Hongō mission station, Ebina left temporarily to expand the ministry in Kumamoto, leaving the church in the care of his brother-in-law, Yokoi Tokio. In the meantime, members of the Japan Missionary Society began urging financial independence from the ABCFM. While the Society had initially been able to support its own activities, by the 1880s, the American Board subsidized on average seventy percent of the Society's work. At the Kumiai Kyōkai's annual conference in 1895, the Society passed a resolution to finally establish independence. In 1896, Ebina was appointed the second director of this newly independent Japan Missionary Society and moved to Kyoto.<sup>8</sup> Though poor health forced him to resign after only one year, Ebina's brief tenure as the Japan Missionary Society director, precisely when this organization was attempting to assert itself as an evangelistic body by and for Japanese, certainly influenced his attitude towards church governance, the relationship between Japanese converts and foreign missionaries, the

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<sup>7</sup> *Shinjin* ceased publication in 1926 after it was fined and suspended on several occasions for violating the Publications Law.

<sup>8</sup> Shigeru Yoshiki, "Nihon Kirisuto dendōgaisha no dokuritsu to Ebina Danjō," *Kirisutokyō shakaimondai kenkyū* 24 (March 1976): 83-132.

material and symbolic significance of Japanese Christianity's independence from foreign missionaries, and most importantly, what Japanese Christians should strive for and accomplish in a new era. After briefly serving as the minister of the Kobe church, Ebina returned to Hongō in 1897. Until he was appointed President of Dōshisha University in 1920, Ebina served as Hongō's senior minister, developing into a prominent public figure and a lightning rod within the denomination.<sup>9</sup>

### **Becoming Ebina Danjō, Emerging Leader**

Ebina used his pulpit and the editorial pages of *Shinjin* to instill in his congregants specific understandings of God, Christ, and Christian behavior. Declaring himself a prophetic voice, Ebina linked sophisticated theology, unorthodox biblical exegesis, and social commentary to urge his congregants to embrace a lofty calling: to transform Japan through their faith. Ebina certainly was not unique in charging Japanese Christians with the task of reforming their nation, but he invested considerable energy in defining what *kind* of Christianity was necessary for this task. In the January 1901 issue of *Shinjin*, Ebina published an editorial titled "Christianity in the Twentieth Century" in which he outlined his vision for a dynamic and powerful church. Through this brief editorial, Ebina also forcefully claimed a theological lineage distinct from that of the ABCFM missionaries associated with the Kumiai Kyōkai. This editorial served as more

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<sup>9</sup> In fact, when Ebina returned to Hongō, several families that had joined the church during Yokoi's tenure left, citing various reasons, such as finding it hard to nurture "their family's faith with Ebina as minister," or due to theological disagreements with him. The families that left Hongō at this time basically cut all ties with the church. *Hongō kyōkai sōritsu gojūnen shi*, 29, cited in Yoshinare Akiko, *Ebina Danjō no seiji shisō* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1982), 68.

than a mere call to faith; this was, in fact, a declaration that Ebina, through Hongō, was creating a new type of belief for Japan. In it, he not only presented his understanding of Christianity's significance in world history, but also implicitly criticized "orthodox" Protestant doctrine.

Christianity, Ebina proclaimed, had brought about civilization; from European to less "developed" nations, the introduction of Christianity had always ushered in the dawn of a "civilized era." Along with asserting an inextricable link between Christianity and "civilization," Ebina also argued that Christianity, to remain effective, had to constantly change and also, ironically, most closely resemble its original form. Ebina implied through this claim that "orthodox" Christianity, or at least conventional doctrine upheld by many mainline denominations and characterized by a belief in Christ's divinity, the trinity, the inerrancy of scripture, original sin, and eternal life, was stagnant and detrimental to progress. Instead, Ebina praised what he considered new "scientific" approaches to the study of the Bible and their ability to "return" to a more accurate picture of the historical Jesus. Commonly referred to as biblical criticism, this approach, which had originated in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century and generated substantial controversy, treated the Christian Bible as a historical document rather than God's inerrant word. Due to the concerted efforts in previous centuries of primarily German theologians and philosophers to return to the origins of Christianity, Japanese Christians could now aspire to a return to these pure origins, which were at once "true" and dynamic in a way the distorted teachings introduced by such figures as the Apostles

Peter, John and Paul, and theologians like Augustine, Wesley, or Luther were not.<sup>10</sup> The religion of Jesus that emerged, through what Ebina considered the dismantling of subsequent distortions as a result of this “scientific” approach to the study of Christian scripture, was “one that moved at the level of human character.”<sup>11</sup>

This new image of Christ served as the model Japanese Christians needed to follow. Not the divine Son of God as had been taught by these “distortions,” Jesus was, nonetheless, unique and exceptional. Though the principles of Christianity (which he did not explain in greater detail in this editorial) had existed before Jesus, Ebina explained, Jesus had been the first person to express them in concrete terms and to demonstrate them through his actions. Central among these was Jesus’ attitude towards God, which Ebina described as “*shiai*,” literally thought-love. Through this “thought-love” Jesus achieved unity with God, not encumbered by logic or theology, even scripture. Thus, Ebina identified experience and a profound intimacy with God as the ultimate Christian goal rather than arriving at proper theology or doctrine. Furthermore, he argued that Jesus’ “religious consciousness” overflowed with love, so much so that he could not but help to be with his “*dōhō*”—a word usually reserved for national compatriots, but which in this case Ebina used to describe fellow human beings. Put differently, beginning with Christ, and through following his example, Ebina declared, “*Humanity* (English in original) flows from a *divine* (divinity, English in original) spring, and is irrepressible, overflowing everywhere.”<sup>12</sup> According to this interpretation,

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<sup>10</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ronsetsu: Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” *Shinjin* 1, no. 7 (January 1901): 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” 3.

Christianity—now defined as following Christ’s example—was critical because it enabled humanity to embrace its divinely ordained purpose of becoming an irrepressible, ever-expansive force.

Returning to the principle question of a Christianity for the twentieth century, Ebina questioned the prevailing notion that Western societies were Christian and therefore civilized: “Look at today’s Christian societies in the West. How do they feel towards humanity? Do they indeed treat Jews, or blacks, or Indians (ie South Asians), or Asians as though they were the same people (*dōhō jinrui*)?”<sup>13</sup> In contrast, he contended, Jesus made no distinctions of race, religion, or denomination. He was simply the Son of Man. Having veered far from the example set by Christ, Western societies were an unreliable guide for Japanese Christians to follow if they were to embrace Christ’s example. Ebina concluded his editorial by exhorting his readers: “But readers, now readers, rid your minds of the thought that Christ is a mysterious person, leave the idea that he is [just] a Jew, [for] Christ’s life (*seimei*) is the life we must lead.”<sup>14</sup>

In short, Ebina urged his readers to adopt this “Christ-like spirit” (*Kirisuto-teki damashii*) because this spirit was crucial if Japanese Christians were to embrace their “calling” to be the moral guides for their nation in the twentieth century. The characteristics that made such a spirit of particular value were its intimate and experiential relationship with God unmediated by theology or doctrine, and its inclusiveness that made no distinction among people, including those who adhered to

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<sup>12</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” 3.

<sup>13</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” 4.

<sup>14</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” 5.

different religions.<sup>15</sup> And instead of being hampered by the distortions and misunderstandings that had accrued from centuries of Christian practice in Europe, with the advantages of the new “scientific” approach to biblical scholarship, Japanese Christians could now look directly to an unmediated (or what Ebina interpreted as the unmediated) image of Christ as their example.

Ebina was a dedicated minister; despite having the luxury of evangelists and assistant ministers to assist him—something not available to most ministers of smaller congregations—Ebina rarely rested from Sunday services. With a few exceptions, such as when the occasional reoccurrence of a chronic eye condition that made it difficult for him to read forced him to rest, or when he was absent to evangelize in other regions, Ebina preached every Sunday.<sup>16</sup> At the pulpit of Hongō, Ebina generally preached on broad topics such as “The power of world equality,” “Religion and morality” and “The three strands of the new man.” Astonishingly, he also introduced the biographies and theological arguments of those giants of Christian theology or philosophy whom he particularly admired, including Johann Fichte, Gotthold Lessing, Johann Gottfried von Herder, and especially Friedrich Schleiermacher, whose ideas Ebina also introduced in separate commentaries in *Shinjin*. Through the unusual inclusion of these German theologians and philosophers in his sermons, Ebina claimed a separate theological lineage from what most American missionaries in Japan advocated. In a sermon titled

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<sup>15</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Dai nijūseiki no kirisutokyō,” 4.

<sup>16</sup> Between September 1902, when *Shinjin* began publishing the previous month’s sermon titles and attendance statistics, and the end of 1905, other ministers preached 31 times. Of these, Ebina was absent due to summer holiday or travel except for 12 Sundays.

“The religious thought of Lessing,” Ebina explained why he included these thinkers in his sermons:

Recently, I have regularly spoken of Schleiermacher, Herder, and Lessing, and made them the topic of my sermons. Some have asked why I study these men. It is true that I have made a study of them, but I have not simply learned of their ideas, for I cannot help but feel a sympathy in thought and feeling with them.... Lately when I glance at their images, it is as though I am looking into a mirror, and I feel an indescribable joy inside me.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, Ebina continued, these men were “prophets of modern thought,” and as such, he felt compelled to share their ideas with his congregation. Christianity in Japan, Ebina declared, was in crisis. Stilted by an overdependence on theology and literal interpretations of scripture, Christians who one day proclaimed their fervent devotion to God were gone the next. It was imperative that a new understanding of religious experience be introduced—one unencumbered by rigid theology or dogma—if the Japanese church was to fulfill its calling. Ebina found, in the likes of Lessing, Herder, and Schleiermacher, thinkers who had made “prophetic” interventions in similar circumstances, and who, liberated from the constraints of ritual and dogma, developed a different understanding of how Christians should relate to God and to one another.<sup>18</sup>

In a separate sermon on Schleiermacher given in the same period, Ebina traced the theologian’s struggle to reconcile his doubts concerning religion with his emotional experiences of God. In Ebina’s portrayal, Schleiermacher was born in an age when religion was divided between a “Prussian” preoccupation with ritual “objectivity” and

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<sup>17</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Resshingu no shūkyō shisō,” *Shinjin* 1, no. 10 (April 1901): 9.

<sup>18</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Resshingu no shūkyō shisō,” 9-10.

theology and a Pietist focus on spiritual experience. Educated at a Moravian school, Schleiermacher grew distressed at his inability to accept Christ's divinity and the specter of eternal damnation.<sup>19</sup> Undaunted by this spiritual crisis, Schleiermacher developed a new theology that "discovered that religion was the ultimate expression of human emotion." By preaching the need to return to the gospel as it existed before Luther or Calvin, Schleiermacher, according to Ebina, inspired and influenced numerous students in Berlin.<sup>20</sup>

In his sermons on Schleiermacher, Ebina praised not only his vision, but also his loyalty to Prussia. Ebina applauded Schleiermacher's use of his pulpit to patriotically call for overthrowing the French and inspire many students to rebuild their nation.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Ebina used his pulpit to instill in his young congregants an understanding of Christian belief inextricably linked to the nation. In a sermon given in late 1900, Ebina argued that Japan had remained independent because its people possessed a unified spirit. In turn, a "proper" spirit was defined by its adherence to morals (*dōgishin*), which was the result of human progress. A higher morality, and its transformation into a "national spirit," distinguished nations in a state of forward progress from those in danger of being colonized. Historically, this moral spirit had been perfected in the person of Christ. Christ's spirit became the spirit of humanity and the example all nations should follow. In Japan, Ebina continued, this moral spirit had been manifested

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<sup>19</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Shiden: Shuraierumahheru," *Shinjin* 1, no. 8 (February 1901): 18-20.

<sup>20</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Shiden: Shuraierumahheru," 19-20.

<sup>21</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Shiden: Shuraierumahheru," 17.

in *Yamato damashii*, or the Japanese spirit.<sup>22</sup> According to Ebina's formulation, Christ represented the ideal model for humanity.<sup>23</sup> By embracing Christianity, Japanese would perfect the moral spirit they already possessed, thus transforming the nation. For Ebina, transforming Japan through Christianity also had global implications, for a new Japan would be able to bring about God's kingdom on earth.

Ebina had declared his sympathy with and affinity to Lessing and Schleiermacher. These men, according to Ebina, had challenged conventional religious practices and unquestioned teachings concerning fundamental aspects of Christian doctrine. They were men of influence—prophets—whose innovative and visionary ideas enabled progress. Not only did he teach his congregations about these men and their ideas, but in describing learning about them as similar to “looking in the mirror,” Ebina also declared himself a similar prophetic voice, but one who spoke for Japan and whose vision was specifically rooted in Japan and its people. Thus, through such sermons that narrated the lives of these European philosophers and theologians, Ebina carefully constructed and nurtured a particular notion of Christian belief and practice influenced by mid-nineteenth century principally German theology and characterized by a postmillennialist belief in the possibility of establishing God's kingdom on earth in *this* world through *this* world's institutions.

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<sup>22</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Kyōdan: Ware ikeru kami,” *Shinjin* 1, no. 6 (December 1900): 10. Ebina wrote extensively on the correlation between Christianity and the “Japanese spirit” and “Japanese culture” as well as Japanese religion. However, since I am focusing on Ebina's ideas as they were expressed through sermons and other forms of teaching before church congregations, I will not address these other strands of his thought in a comprehensive way.

<sup>23</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Kyōdan: Ware ikeru kami,” 11-13.

Ebina's careful articulation of his vision for a new Japanese Christian community, which eventually would usher in God's kingdom on earth, was not wholeheartedly welcomed by other Christians. Soon after the turn of the twentieth century, his notion of Christian practice and belief was called into question by Uemura Masahisa, a leading minister of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai (Church of Christ in Japan). The public debate between these two leading ministers emerged out of a conflict over evangelism and what precisely ministers were evangelizing and attempting to convert people to. Through this debate, Ebina further cemented his position as a controversial but important leader.

**“God Became Man” or Did He?:  
The Ebina-Uemura Theology Debate**

In April 1900, members of the interdenominational Fukuin dōmeikai, or the Japanese Evangelical Alliance, began meeting to discuss the possibility of initiating a nationwide mass evangelistic campaign.<sup>24</sup> Called the “*taikyo dendō*,” or “Twentieth Century Forward Movement,” this campaign, “with the object of bringing the gospel to all the millions of that Empire during the first year of the twentieth century,” drew upon the

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<sup>24</sup> The Fukuin dōmeikai, or the Japanese branch of the Evangelical Alliance, was founded in 1885 at a national meeting of Christians held in Kyoto in part so they could join the World Evangelical Alliance. At the organization's tenth annual meeting held in April, the Fukuin dōmeikai decided to initiate a massive evangelistic campaign, in part to usher in the new century, in part out of a response to evangelistic efforts ongoing in America and England. Dohi Akio, *Nihon puotesutanto Kirisutokyō shi*, 163-164.

In October 1900, the members of the Fukuin dōmeikai attending the meeting of missionaries in Japan invited foreign missionaries to participate in the movement as well. B.C. Haworth, “The Recent Revival in Japan,” in *World-wide Evangelization: The Urgent Business of the Church, addresses delivered before the fourth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Toronto, Canada, February 26-March 2, 1902* (Ontario: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions International Convention, 1902), 390.

combined resources of most Protestant denominations—numbering over twenty—in Japan.<sup>25</sup> In preparation, ministers, evangelists, lay leaders, Bible women, and students engaged in an intensive effort to publicize the campaign through street preaching, house-to-house visitations, and the distribution of leaflets as well as “Large colored posters, very attractive in appearance...posted up here and there in the most public places, including, for instance, all the bath houses, in which crowds gather daily.”<sup>26</sup> As part of the *taikyo dendō*, prominent ministers traveled to other regions and into the countryside to preach at small rural churches in the hopes that through this collective effort the Japanese Protestant community would increase its numbers. Beginning with a “revival” that began during prayer meetings held at churches in the Kyōbashi district of Tokyo, similar “revivals” spread throughout the country, with churches from Sendai to Osaka reporting unprecedented numbers of “inquirers” visiting their churches, and either expressing interest or converting outright. Estimates of these “inquirers” ranged from 6000 in the Tokyo area alone to as many as roughly 18,000 nationwide by the end of 1901.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> B.C. Haworth, “The Recent Revival in Japan,” 390. Contemporary English-language missionary literature used different variations of this name to describe the “taikyo dendō”: “Twentieth Century Forward Movement” (Clement 1905, 176); “Twentieth Century Movement” (Albrecht 1902, 65); “Union Evangelistic Movement” (ABCFM Annual Survey Japan 1902, 465); “Evangelical Alliance Movement” (Haworth 1901, 342); and “Twentieth Century Union Evangelical Movement” (Haworth 1902, 390).

<sup>26</sup> Ernest Wilson Clement, *Christianity in Modern Japan* (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1905), 176. The “systematic and organized” nature of these preparatory efforts were extensively commented on in missionary reports; see B.C. Haworth, “The Recent Revival in Japan,” 391-392; “Annual Survey: Japan,” *The Missionary Herald containing The Proceedings of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions with a View of Other Benevolent Operations* vol. 98 (Boston: Beacon Press, Thomas Todd, 1902), 465; B.C. Haworth, “Two Weeks of Revival Work in Japan,” *The Assembly Herald* (September 1901): 343-346.

Amidst the excitement over such unexpected success, a serious problem developed. In September it became known that in the process of preparing for the evangelistic campaign for the Kyōbashi district of Tokyo, a certain “faction” within the Fukuin dōmeikai had demanded the expulsion of another group of ministers, Ebina among them.<sup>28</sup> The group charged that ministers such as Ebina did not adhere to *fukuin shugi*, or evangelicalism, and as such, should not be allowed to participate in Fukuin dōmeikai-initiated events or preach in the name of the Alliance.<sup>29</sup>

In the 11 September 1901 issue of *Fukuin shinpō* (Gospel news), the newspaper associated with the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, an article appeared (with no formal

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<sup>27</sup> In an October speech before a missionary conference held in Osaka, George Albrecht reported that according to a pamphlet published by the Fukuin dōmeikai, there had been 6000 seekers from the meetings in Tokyo, that some Christian newspapers listed 8000 as the number of Tokyo-area seekers, and that “to put the figure at ten thousand for the whole empire would be a moderate estimate.” Albrecht, “The Taikyo Dendo, or Twentieth Century Movement in Japan,” 66. Haworth reports that in a December 1901 report, the number of inquirers had reached 17,939, but that most likely there were others who had not been officially accounted for. Haworth, “The Recent Revival in Japan,” 393. The ABCFM’s publication’s annual survey of Japan claimed that approximately 20,000 had signed cards—with names and addresses for later follow up—as inquirers. *The Missionary Herald* (1902), 465.

<sup>28</sup> According to Ebina’s biography, this charge was led by Tamura Naoomi, the minister of the Ginza Independent Church. Tamura himself had been forced out of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai in 1894 following his publication of a book in English titled *The Japanese Bride*. Nonetheless, he accused Ebina of heresy and insisted that the *taikyo dendō* should not include ministers who did not adhere to trinitarianism. Ebina and other ministers were expelled from the *taikyo dendō* movement at a meeting held on April 21. Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Ebina Danjo sensei*, 240. It is unclear why it took until September for Ebina’s expulsion to be mentioned in *Fukuin shinpō*. For more on Tamura’s conflict with the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, see Emily Anderson, “Tamura Naoomi’s *The Japanese Bride*: Christianity, Nationalism, and Family in Meiji Japan,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 34, no. 1 (2007): 203-228.

<sup>29</sup> Perhaps due to enthusiasm for the apparent success of the evangelistic campaign, foreign missionaries emphasized the cooperative and united nature of the campaign. In fact, the only missions-related publication to even mention the exclusion of so-called liberal churches was the ABCFM’s *The Missionary Herald*. In the 1902 issue, an address given by George Albrecht at the missionary conference of central Japan was published, which included the following brief mention of this controversy: “In Tokyo the so-called liberal churches were excluded from this movement, while both there and in some other cities some congregations of the ‘Seikokwai’ [Episcopal Church (English)] declined to cooperate. Aside from these exceptions, there has been everywhere hearty cooperation. Pulpits have been freely exchanged and denominational lines forgotten.” George E. Albrecht, “The Taikyo Dendo or Twentieth Century Movement in Japan,” *The Missionary Herald* vol. 98 (1902): 66.

attribution but assumed to be by Uemura Masahisa) that in a polemical and even sarcastic tone, suggested that as long as the Fukuin dōmeikai failed to define what it meant by *fukuin shugi*—that is, to develop a clearly defined statement of faith—it had no grounds to exclude anyone, from Ebina to Unitarians. Having already benefited from Ebina’s evangelistic work in the countryside, the article continued to say, the Alliance was acting unethically by barring Ebina from participating in evangelistic work in Tokyo, a much more prominent and important site. Thus, it was the Alliance’s own failure to be explicit in its beliefs and practices that required resolution. While criticizing the Alliance, the author also implicitly questioned the legitimacy of Ebina’s participation. It was not because the author agreed with Ebina, but rather because the author was so disappointed in the Fukuin dōmeikai’s “spinelessness” that he denounced the Alliance’s attempt to exclude Ebina from its activities.<sup>30</sup>

This controversy over discrepancies in the nature of the Christianity being preached, particularly the insistence on evangelicalism, sparked a critical theological debate within the Japanese Protestant community.<sup>31</sup> What began as a disagreement about who should be allowed to participate in what was meant to be an ecumenical

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<sup>30</sup> “Fukuin dōmeikai to taikyo dendō,” *Fukuin shinpō* (11 September 1901): 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> Uemura’s insistence that the taikyo dendō follow a very particular understanding of theology also caught the attention of foreign missionaries in Japan. In an opinion piece published two weeks after Uemura’s, a Presbyterian missionary named T.T. Alexander (1850-1902) in Kyoto urged caution, stating that while he understood many of the sentiments expressed in the earlier piece, in a time of great harvest, it was imprudent to stifle evangelistic efforts as a result of choosing doctrinal conflicts over “saving souls.” He quoted from Mark 9, in which Jesus states that whoever is for us cannot be against us, to urge Japanese Christians to not allow denominational or even theological differences to stand in the way of evangelism. T. T. Alexander, “Taikyo dendo ni tsuite,” *Fukuin shinpō* (25 September 1901): 11-12. Alexander’s gentle critique is particularly interesting considering that in his obituary published in the Presbyterian magazine *The Assembly Herald*, the author writes that Alexander “did a great deal at the time when the liberal movement was strong in Japan to help many to find solid standing ground.” “The Rev. T. T. Alexander,” *The Assembly Herald* (February 1903): 54.

evangelistic campaign soon erupted into a furor. Between August 1901 and April 1902 in their respective publications, Ebina and Uemura Masahisa rigorously debated fundamental aspects of Christian doctrine, including Christ's divinity, the inerrancy of scripture, and the notion of the Trinity.<sup>32</sup> The stakes of this debate extended beyond "mere" issues of theology. By 1901 the Japanese Protestant community was still young, and the effort to embark on a collective evangelistic campaign was in part yet another attempt by different denominations to join forces and take advantage of greater numbers and resources. Just as the earlier debates concerning the Imperial Rescript on Education had revealed a significant rift among Christians concerning their views on the relationship between individuals and the state, the effort to create a common understanding of faith as the basis for joint evangelism brought into relief critical disagreements over fundamental aspects of what constituted Christian belief. And if "proper" Christian belief was necessary for Japanese Christians to serve as the moral guides for the Japanese empire, then defining and defending the right sort of belief determined the viability of the empire itself.

Even before the publication of the *Fukuin shinpō* article, Ebina expressed grave concerns about what he considered the proprietary nature of the sort of evangelism advocated by the Fukuin dōmeikai. Ebina decried the infiltration of -isms into evangelism: "This award [of evangelizing] should not be given to one person, it should not depend on a dogmatic article of faith, does not reside in conservatism or

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<sup>32</sup> For a different interpretation of the significance of this debate, see Yosuke Nirei, "The Ethics of Empire: Protestant Thought, Moral Culture, and Imperialism in Meiji Japan," (PhD diss., UC Berkeley, 2004), especially chapter 4.

progressivism, but the award should properly be given to a religious life. Jesus' life and God's spirit should not be claimed by an individual, or one denomination, or conservatism or liberalism."<sup>33</sup> Instead, Ebina argued, Christians should preach Christ and be satisfied in Christ alone.

Upon reading Uemura's acerbic critique of the Fukuin dōmeikai's inability to articulate a specific logic for *fukuin shugi*, Ebina, in a commentary that appeared in the October 1901 issue of *Shinjin*, redirected the focus of his objections to Uemura's insistence that an explicit confession of faith (*hyōhaku*) was necessary for all Christians. At the heart of Ebina's critique was one seemingly innocuous line in Uemura's piece: "God became man" (*kami, hito to nari*).<sup>34</sup> Encapsulated in this brief phrase was a concept crystallized by the fourth century Church through the Nicene Creed: that Jesus was God incarnate, of "one substance" with God the Father. The adoption of the Creed, and the subsequent suppression of Arianism, eliminated the until-then competing notion that Jesus, or the Son, was subordinate to or distinct in substance with God the Father.<sup>35</sup> Though officially resolved in perhaps the first "ecumenical" conflict over theology, this notion was called into question in earnest by the late eighteenth century, and particularly by the mid-nineteenth century, not only by philosophers skeptical of religion, but also by the very theologians and scholars who Ebina admired and introduced in his sermons. Through the new schools of biblical criticism and liberal theology, Jesus' divinity came to be questioned and even denied as a fabrication concocted by early church scholars

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<sup>33</sup> [Ebina Danjō], "Fukuin dōmeikai taikyo dendō," *Shinjin* 2, no. 1 (August 1901): 2.

<sup>34</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Fukuin shinpō kisha ni atauru no sho," *Shinjin* 2, no. 3 (October 1901): 2.

<sup>35</sup> Henry Chadwick, *The Early Church* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1967), 130-151.

who distorted Jesus' teachings and his life into a divine object of worship. Such questioning struck at the heart of orthodox Christianity, for the divinity of Christ—and by extension the doctrine of the trinity—formed the foundation for orthodox Christian doctrine and practice.

Ebina singled out this one phrase, “God became man,” precisely because this phrase encapsulated the type of Christian belief Ebina considered archaic and potentially harmful. Through attacking the logic behind this notion, and the concept of the trinity implied by it, Ebina insinuated that Uemura's formulation relied on “unscientific” and therefore irrational beliefs. For instance, Ebina inquired how, if God was immutable as was assumed, he could be transformed into a man, who was substantively different. Even if this transformation was possible, Ebina then questioned, how could God continue to exist as God while also existing as man. In particular, following the logic of evolution—a process that could only move in a forward trajectory, for apes evolved into humans but had not reverted back to apes—Ebina argued that if God had indeed become man it did not make sense that this man could be transformed into God again. Rather, Ebina stressed, it made more sense that once God became a “true man” (*makoto no hito*) he would substantively remain a man from that point onward. In conclusion, Ebina challenged Uemura to admit that what he was truly advocating was trinitarianism (*sanmi ittairon*), which Ebina concluded was really tritheism, an irrational concept in direct conflict with Christian monotheism.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Fukuin shinpō kisha ni atauru no sho,” 2.

Uemura's response, again published in *Fukuin shinpō*, accused Ebina of launching a theological war. Uemura expressed apprehension at Ebina's language, remarking that his "warrior-like expressions like 'outbreak of war' and 'sharpened spear' were extremely entertaining, but I neither want to swagger like a warrior (*musha buri*) nor see someone else do so."<sup>37</sup> Yet, Uemura continued, in the name of pursuing truth, "I will take up this spiritual battle with the utmost seriousness." Again returning to the singular phrase, "God became man," Uemura expressed great surprise at Ebina's reluctance to accept the simple statement. Whereas Ebina had questioned the logic and validity of this statement, Uemura insisted on the indispensability of this concept in fundamental Christian doctrine, arguing, "this was a historical expression of faith, and is in no way different from what Christians from the very beginning have accepted [about Christ]."<sup>38</sup> Baffled that Ebina had "suddenly made this a difficult problem (*nandai*)," Uemura implicitly accused Ebina of heresy. He concluded by challenging Ebina: "By all means, oppose this, and whether it be through Arianism or Ritschl's teachings or some other new teaching, please present these."<sup>39</sup> By associating Ebina with Arianism,

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<sup>37</sup> Uemura Masahisa, "Ebina Danjō kun ni kotau," *Fukuin shinpō* (9 October 1901): 4.

<sup>38</sup> Uemura Masahisa, "Ebina Danjo kun ni kotau," 4.

<sup>39</sup> Uemura Masahisa, "Ebina Danjō kun ni kotau," 4. An American Presbyterian missionary in Hiroshima, Harvey Brokaw, took issue with Ebina's theological pronouncements, and praised Uemura's handling of the issues being debated: "It is true that now a controversy is waging in regard to the divinity of our Lord. Rev. Danjo Ebina, in his influential position near the Imperial University, in a series of articles in the Tokyo Maishu Shinshi [sic], a newspaper connected with the Congregational body, has attacked the orthodox position, and being a man of power and influence, has in no small way affected current theological thought. But our Rev. Uemura, in his Fukuin Shimpō, the organ of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyokwai, the church with which Presbyterian and Reformed missionaries co-operate, has strenuously defended the orthodox opinion in a series of articles in reply. And he, also, being a man of insight and power, has succored the faith of many." Harvey Brokaw, "Condition in Japan," *The Assembly Herald* (Sept 1902): 361. Despite his rather pithy summary of the debate the errors he makes—for instance Ebina

the very heresy that had led to the adoption of the Nicean Creed, and Albrecht Ritschl, a nineteenth century German theologian loosely associated with biblical criticism, Uemura challenged the very substance of Ebina's faith in the Christian God.

In response to Uemura's rebuttal, Ebina expressed disappointment and even disdain, incredulous that instead of sincerely responding to Ebina's challenge—offered in love and mutual faith—Uemura had declared spiritual battle (*reikai no jissen*), and rather than addressing Ebina's questions, chose to discount any need to explicate his original confession of faith, and merely reiterated his earlier points as “truths acknowledged throughout history by the church.”<sup>40</sup> “Is Mr. Uemura genuinely (*majime ni*) interested in presenting (*hakki*) the truth of Christianity?”<sup>41</sup> Ebina dismissed Uemura's response as a simplistic Calvinism common to the Reformed tradition as practiced by Uemura's denomination: “Rather than addressing aspects related to exposing the meaning of faith (*shinkō naiyō no hakki*), all he says is ‘whether I believe this or I do not believe that’ or ‘whether I acknowledge him or do not acknowledge him’; it is as though he is someone seeking baptism answering questions to a membership examination.”<sup>42</sup> Ultimately, according to Ebina, Uemura was not interested in pursuing truth, and it was pointless to debate these issues with such a person:

“Historical Christianity is something that can be understood by studying history, and

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never published any of his responses in the Tokyo Maishu Shinshi—suggests that he was told about the debate by Japanese Christians with whom he associated, but he himself—possibly due to his distance from Tokyo or due to language problems—did not directly keep abreast of the debate.

<sup>40</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Uemura-shi no tosho wo yomu,” *Shinjin* 2, no. 4 (November 1901): 3.

<sup>41</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Uemura-shi no tosho wo yomu,” 4.

<sup>42</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Uemura-shi no tosho wo yomu,” 4.

there is really no need to engage in debate and trouble Mr. Uemura.”<sup>43</sup> Finally, Ebina objected to Uemura’s apparent demand that Ebina himself make a declaration of faith. Remarking that he had never questioned Uemura’s faith—rather he just desired more explication on the contents of his declaration—Ebina found Uemura’s demands dogmatic (*dokudanteki*).<sup>44</sup>

In the January 1902 issue of *Shinjin*, Ebina presented a lengthy critique of trinitarianism. Though grappling with theological concepts, Ebina also used this piece to respond to Uemura’s skepticism about the sincerity of his faith. This critique of trinitarianism was Ebina’s pointed response to Uemura’s claim that belief in a God “who became man” was both a sufficient and necessary component of Christian faith. Titled “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yo ga shūkyōteki ishiki” (The teaching of the trinity and my religious consciousness), the commentary presented an evaluation of the historical development of the notion of the “trinity,” and argued that while this concept had served an important philosophical function for the early church, it was no longer relevant. “Thinking from that era” could be summed up in one word and idea: “Logos,” who was both God and with God. Logos, or the Word, as described at the beginning of the Gospel of John was, according to Ebina, a device employed by early Christians to reconcile the worship of the supernatural (*chōshizen shinkyō*), as in Judaism, with the worship of the “natural world” (*banyū shinkyō*), as in accordance with common contemporaneous religious practices, “Also called the second god, the son of God, part

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<sup>43</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Uemura-shi no tosho wo yomu,” 4.

<sup>44</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Uemura-shi no tosho wo yomu,” 4.

creator, reason and logic, but the word most commonly used [to describe him] is Logos. This alter ego of God who lived on earth, Logos had the power to join together God and creation, or put differently, transcendent gods and natural gods, that is Judaism and the other religions (*ikyō*).”<sup>45</sup>

Ebina reasoned that with the acceptance of the idea that God, who transcended creation, and the Son, who dwelt among creation, were of one substance (*isshin dōtai*), an understanding of divinity particular to Christianity developed, one that was neither the strict monotheism of Judaism nor the polytheism of other religions. Yet, early Christians held to monotheism, while simultaneously also believing in worshipping Christ. The concept of Logos was thus introduced in order to resolve the apparent discrepancy between monotheism and the simultaneous worship of God and Christ. Despite its usefulness to the early church in reconciling seemingly disparate and conflicting ideas, “as long as Logos was an invented thing, it was impossible [for it] to fully satisfy Christian understanding.”<sup>46</sup>

For Ebina, this concept of “Logos” merely reflected the concerns of the early church and was a concept developed out of contemporaneous, primarily Hellenistic philosophical trends in order to resolve contemporary philosophical questions. He pointed out that it was not until the early fourth century, at the Council of Nicea, that the idea that Jesus of Nazareth was indeed this Logos and that Logos was “the eternal God’s alter ego” came to be accepted.<sup>47</sup> In other words, Christianity came before the

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<sup>45</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” *Shinjin* 2, no. 6 (January 1902): 9.

<sup>46</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” 11.

concept of the trinity and not the other way around.<sup>48</sup> At best, the notions of Christ's divinity and the trinity as encapsulated in the Nicene Creed reflected the "consciousness of Christians at the time" but nothing more. Furthermore, the Creed reflected old, even ancient ideas, no longer suitable for an age of progress or for a nation in progress. A new era called for a "new consciousness" (*shin ishiki*), and Ebina believed it was his responsibility to develop a new understanding of the nature of faith and the person of Christ.

Who then did Ebina believe Christ to be? If he dismissed the trinity as an arcane concept that was logically inconsistent and defied belief, how did he resolve the problem that had led to the calling of the Council of Nicea: was Jesus of one substance with God or while worthy of exultation, subordinate to God? Ebina confessed that despite much study and struggle he had failed to resolve this question for himself, and he had turned to Christ, determining that just as his religious consciousness came from Christ, so should his understanding of this difficult problem.<sup>49</sup>

In contrast to dogmatic, stifling, and tainting theology, Ebina argued, Christians should embrace what he considered the two fundamental aspects of Christ's teaching (as opposed to teachings *about* Christ) that he found most influential: infinite love and compassion that extended even to one's enemies (*kagirinaki dōjō, dōkan*) and love for one's neighbors as one's compatriots and brothers (*rinjin ha dōhō, kyōdai*).<sup>50</sup> It was

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<sup>47</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki," 12.

<sup>48</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki," 13.

<sup>49</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki," 13.

through “Jesus of Nazareth,” Ebina continued, “that I was able to catch a glimpse of *God’s heart* (English in original)...Through Christ’s character God demonstrated his true heart (*chūjō*). Through Christ I can truly see God’s heart. If the God that is in Christ is the lord of all of heaven and earth and all creation, this heaven and earth are now revealing the light of infinite love and grace. It is through Christ that I am able to come close to (*sessuru*) God.”<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, “there are two sides to Christ. That is, to God he is a man, to man he is God. It is the presence (his use of?) these two sides that reveals the truth (the true nature?) of the true son of God.”<sup>52</sup>

The portrait of Christ Ebina was attempting to construct was of a “godly” man, who in a spiritual sense was indeed God’s son and whose teachings and practices showed others the way to God.<sup>53</sup> In this sense, he appeared like God to men. However, before God, he remained subordinate; his character and even essence brought him into an intimate relationship with God, but he remained distinct “in substance” with God. This conclusion, which also revealed Ebina’s indebtedness to Schleiermacher’s interpretation of Christ’s relationship to the Christian God, fundamentally altered the substance of Christian belief. For, as Ebina explained,

If we are born into an era that is witnessing the progress of mankind (*ningen shinka*) as ordered by heaven (*zensoku*), it is not simply that such a model [like Christ] has existed since the dawn of time, but is something

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<sup>50</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” 14.

<sup>51</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” 15.

<sup>52</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” 15.

<sup>53</sup> “Christ, in his consciousness, possessed the knowledge that in an ethical sense, he and God were like father and son. The reason for this is that through his character the metaphysical nature of his relationship with God was like that of father and son.” Ebina Danjō, “Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki,” 14.

I think that is made evident through history. ...If the transformation of Logos is something that stopped at a particular point, the coming together of man and God is something that happened through accident, and cannot be considered something eternal. In that case, the salvation offered by Christianity is also something accidental, and also cannot be considered of eternal duration.<sup>54</sup>

For Ebina then, in a new age requiring new men, antiquated dogmatic approaches based on stagnant beliefs about the person of Christ were not only outdated but something that threatened to impede further progress. In fact, based on Ebina's interpretation, the very concept of an immutable Logos, and by extension the trinity, fundamentally contradicted and diminished Christianity's relevance for a world in progress.

Just as Japan was progressing towards a new civilization in a new era, Christianity also needed to be reinterpreted and reconsidered in a way matching the demands of this time. In order to do this, following the model of the theologian Schleiermacher who he most admired, Ebina argued for a return to the origins of Christianity before the crystallization of philosophical ideas in the creeds had taken place, to an image of Christ the "ideal man" whose image was yet untainted or distorted by the concerns of the early church. At the same time, Ebina made no claims of discovering an authentic Christ, but rather admitted that "I too am a child of this age, and while I have no choice but to follow the path of understanding according to my own religious consciousness through the knowledge of this era, my understanding itself must

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<sup>54</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki," 15.

be Christ's understanding, my spirit must be like Christ's spirit. Will it be Christ's spirit, will it be Christ's consciousness?"<sup>55</sup>

The theological debate between Ebina and Uemura continued with less intensity through the end of 1902.<sup>56</sup> Ebina himself published his last response in April, and others—primarily Watase Tsuneyoshi—took up his side, publishing their own critiques of so-called orthodox theology.<sup>57</sup> The result of these collective efforts was the expulsion of Hongō church from the Evangelical Alliance.<sup>58</sup> But for Ebina, the debate served to solidify what distinguished him and his interpretation of what it meant to be a Christian in a new Japan from that of his contemporaries such as Uemura. And while he was temporarily ostracized by his Christian contemporaries—he and Hongō were reinstated in the reconstituted Evangelical Alliance in 1906—his church did not seem to suffer any

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<sup>55</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sanmi ittai no kyōgi to yō ga shūkyōteki ishiki," 19.

<sup>56</sup> The antagonistic tone of Ebina and Uemura's responses to one another drew criticism from some Christians. For instance Kashiwagi Gien, in the November 1901 issue of *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, remarked, "I feel not a little regret at the tone of both men.... It is easy to ask questions and difficult to answer. They both take the position of the questioner and avoid taking the position of the answerer... Do these questions truly have the character of those who seek truth?" "Ebina-shi tai Uemura-shi," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1901): 4.

<sup>57</sup> Watase, who at the time was serving as the warden of Keijō Gakudō in Seoul, contributed three articles to the debate: "Uemura-shi ippa no Kirisutoron wo hyōsu," *Rikugō zasshi* 253 (January 1902); "Futatabi Fukuin shinpō kisha no Kirisutoron wo hyōsu," *Shinjin* 3, no. 3 (October 1902); and "Fukuin shinpō kisha no Kirisutoron wo hyōsu," *Shinjin* 4, no. 2 (February 1903). Others who contributed articles were Minami Hajime, "Fukuin shinpō kisha no Kirisutoron," *Shinjin* 2, no. 8 (March 1902); and Nishiuchi Fujio, "Uemura-shi wo hyōshite Kumiai kyōkai no taisei ni oyobu," *Shinjin* 2, no. 11 (June 1902). For a summary of Watase's arguments, see Inuma Jirō, "Shoki 'Shinjin' ni okeru Ebina to Watase," *Kirisutokyō shakaimondai kenkyū* 24 (March 1976): 18-49.

<sup>58</sup> At the eleventh annual meeting of the Fukuin dōmeikai, held in April 1902, a resolution was introduced to establish a statement fixing, once and for all, an evangelical understanding of faith as the shared standard for the Alliance. When the vote did not produce a two-thirds majority in favor, a group of ministers, including Honda and Uemura, instead forced through their statement, with the additional stipulation that ministers and churches that did not agree with it should be forbidden to participate in the Alliance. Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto Kirisutokyo shi*, 165-166.

ill effects.<sup>59</sup> Rather than discouraging new converts and members, Hongō continued to attract even more people, many of whom were drawn to Ebina's charismatic and provocative character.

In 1904, an ABCFM missionary visited a Sunday Service at Hongō and was impressed by the size of the congregation, over 400, consisting mostly of students, approximately a quarter of which were women. He also offered this glowing report in *Mission News*, the periodical of the ABCFM in Japan:

The sermon by Mr. Ebina was most impressive. ...Mr. Ebina gave his conception of divine revelation. It would not have pleased some people, but I think most of the constituents of the American Board would have felt, as the writer did, that it was a most thoughtful treatment of a most inspiring theme. To gather such a congregation and hold it as Mr. Ebina does is no small achievement especially in these days. A considerable proportion are students of the Imperial University, men who will carry the impressions received from Mr. Ebina into positions of wide influence.<sup>60</sup>

Undaunted by his temporary ostracism from the Fukuin dōmeikai or by his developing reputation as a controversial, even heretical, leader, Ebina continued to preach his vision for a new kind of Christianity in Japan that would usher in God's kingdom on earth. With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Ebina and other ministers found a new mission for themselves and a new opportunity to advance their mission of transforming Japan into a Christian empire.

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<sup>59</sup> At the Alliance's 1906 annual meeting, the organization's name was changed to the Nihon Kirisuto kyōkai dōmei, and Ebina's name is listed among the newly constituted organization's members. Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto Kirisutokyo shi*, 166-167.

<sup>60</sup> "Notes," *Mission News* 8, no. 3 (24 December 1904): 41.

## Part II

### The Russo-Japanese War as Holy War

The Russo-Japanese War, perhaps more than any other event, galvanized Japanese society in the first decade of the twentieth century.<sup>61</sup> It was the second time in a decade that Japan had engaged in war over Korea. Unlike the previous war against China, however, this one was with a “western” imperial power and was immediately interpreted as the first significant conflict between a “white western” empire and a “yellow non-western” one. Not only in Japan and Russia, but also across the world, the war generated energetic debates, for the outcome of the war was understood to have far greater significance for understandings of race and power than for immediate diplomatic and security stakes for the warring parties.<sup>62</sup> For Japan’s Christians, the common perception that Russia was a *Christian* empire created a unique challenge. From members of Hongō to those who attended other churches across the nation, Christians worked tirelessly to prove that their Christianity was not only distinct from that practiced under the authority of the Russian Tsar, but also that Christianity was indispensable to Japan’s war effort.

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<sup>61</sup> Sandra Wilson, “The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory,” *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05*, eds. David Wells and Sandra Wilson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 161.

<sup>62</sup> For more on how “race” was reinterpreted through the Russo-Japanese War, see Joseph M. Henning, “White Mongols? The War and American Discourses on Race and Religion,” in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (New York: Routledge, 2007), 153-166.

It would be fair to say that all Christians—at least those who published their opinions—had whole-heartedly supported the First Sino-Japanese War. For instance, Uchimura Kanzō, the prominent Christian writer and intellectual, published an English-language editorial in the *Japan Daily Mail* defending the war with China as a righteous war fought to liberate Korea from the uncivilized and corrupting influence of Qing China: “We interfere with Korea because her independence is in jeopardy, because the world’s most backward nation is grasping it in her benumbing coils, and savagery and inhumanity reign there when light and civilization are at her very doors.”<sup>63</sup> But when the cost of that war had become clear and some began to question the state’s claim that it had been fought to free Korea from Qing control, attitudes towards warfare underwent a slight but perceptible shift.<sup>64</sup> Most notably Uchimura, along with socialists Sakai Toshihiko and Kōtoku Shūsui, resigned from their positions with *Yorozu Chōhō*, then the widest circulating daily newspaper, when the editor, Kuroiwa Ruikō, decided to adopt a pro-war editorial policy at the end of 1903, just prior to the outbreak of war. The three men founded their own newspaper, *Heimin shinbun* (The Commoner News), to promote a distinctly socialist and anti-war perspective. Over the following year until the newspaper was found to be in violation of the Press Laws and forced to shut down, contributors to the paper criticized the war as an act of aggression that was immoral and

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<sup>63</sup> Kanzō Uchimura, “Justification for the Korean War,” *The Japan Daily Mail*, reprinted in *The Japan Evangelist* 2, no. 1 (October 1894): 10.

<sup>64</sup> See Nobuya Bamba and John Howes, editors, *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition* (Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1978), 91-123; F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 88-108. Kashiwagi Gien, whose critique of the war I address in chapter seven, began advocating pacifism as early as 1903.

detrimental to the welfare of the average Japanese. Nonetheless, aside from contributors to the *Heimin shinbun* and a few other notable exceptions (including Kashiwagi Gien whose objections will be taken up in a subsequent chapter), Christian ministers and lay members expressed their support for the war and discussed how this monumental national crisis might be considered a critical opportunity to allow the Japanese Christian community to emerge as the moral guide for the nation.

Diverging momentarily from a focus on the Hongō church and Ebina, the following section will examine the wider context of Christian responses to the outbreak of war. Imminent war, then full-scale mobilization, occupied sermon topics and outreach events as many Kumiai and other denominations' churches underwent their own mobilization in service of the war. Editorials, sermons, new types of evangelistic activities, efforts to offer soldiers and their families spiritual and material comfort—these were all conducted in direct and immediate response to the war. In turn, these were performed with an uneasy earnestness; even as the Japanese Imperial Navy launched its attack to start the war, Honda Yōitsu, a prominent Methodist minister, requested an audience with Prime Minister Katsura Tarō, asking for state protection for the nation's Christians out of fear that war with a “western Christian nation” might lead some overzealous Japanese to target Japanese Christians.<sup>65</sup> Yet these activities can also be seen as efforts to mend the rifts created by the marred evangelistic campaigns and theological disagreements that had plagued the wider Protestant community only a few years earlier. War, with its violence, destruction, and tragedy, served as an

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<sup>65</sup> [Report of Honda's meeting with Prime Minister Katsura], *Kirisutokyō sekai* (5 May 1904): 11.

unprecedented opportunity for renewed efforts at ecumenism and demonstrations of Christianity's efficacy as the source of moral guidance for a nation in crisis.

For members of the Kumiai Kyōkai, the denominational weekly *Kirisutokyō sekai* (Christian world), and the Hongō-affiliated journal, *Shinjin* (The New Man), offered various justifications for war and spiritual meaning for the conflict.<sup>66</sup> They also reported how church congregations and other organizations enthusiastically volunteered to offer uniquely Christian comfort to soldiers and their families. As a decentralized denomination, the Kumiai Kyōkai was not unified in its response. Geographic location, the presence and proximity of other denomination's churches, and the attitudes of ministers, all shaped specific responses. Nonetheless, as the official weekly of the Kumiai Kyōkai, the *Kirisutokyō sekai* encapsulated an interpretation of the war and its implications sanctioned by the denominational leadership, who were primarily ministers of the largest and most influential churches. Outright opposition to the war was kept out of the paper. But even support for the war as articulated and reported in the paper revealed the complexity of coming to terms with the scale and costs—and moral and ethical ambiguity—of modern warfare.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> The *Kirisutokyō sekai* was the fourth version of a newspaper first founded in 1883 by Keiseisha, one of the earliest Christian publishing houses, under the editorship of Kozaki Hiromichi. First titled *Tōkyō maishū shinpō*, it was renamed *Kirisutokyō shinbun* the following year. Tomeoka Kōsuke took over as editor until 1900, when Kozaki was again asked to serve as editor; he renamed the weekly *Tōkyō maishū shinshi* and oversaw its production in his own home. In 1902, the *Tōkyō maishū shinshi* was transferred to the Kumiai Kyōkai, and was soon renamed *Kirisutokyō sekai*. Kozaki Hiromichi, *Shichijūnen no kaiko* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1927), 63, 160-161.

<sup>67</sup> In fact, soon after the outbreak of war, a group of religious leaders—which included Ebina, Kozaki, Ibuka Kajinosuke, and Honda Yōitsu—issued a declaration titled “Dai-Nippon shūkyōka taikai kaisai shūisho,” stating this position in response to coverage in news media in Russia and France that

Even before the outbreak of war, editorials began to appear in *Kirisutokyō sekai* proclaiming that the war would be waged to defend Christian civilization. In the 14 January 1904 issue, an unattributed editorial titled “Sensō to Kirisutokyō” (War and Christianity) argued for the legitimacy of wars fought for the sake of peace. The author built a case, based on biblical and historical precedents, that such wars best reflected Christ’s teaching and spirit.<sup>68</sup> In particular, the author took issue with Russian author Leo Tolstoy, whose advocacy of pacifism became a favorite target for those Japanese Christians who supported the war.<sup>69</sup> Questioning Tolstoy’s understanding of Christianity—calling him an advocate of a simple gospel that misunderstood Christ’s teachings—the author continued, “Christ said when an enemy strikes your cheek turn the other as well and pacifists such as Tolstoy use this as their golden rule, but look at the context in which Christ said these words. He denounced revenge, revenge is not an accepted law in the Christian world.” But, the author continued, this did not mean that Christians were to remain passive. Pointing to the apostle Paul’s exhortation to the Ephesians to “put on the armor of God” to engage in spiritual battle, this author argued that Christians were to consider taking up arms in the name of justice an extension of spiritual battle. As further examples, the author listed historical wars that he argued were also fought for just causes: the American civil war and the United States’ war with

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characterized the war as a conflict between different races and different religions. “Nihon shūkyōka taikai,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (5 May 1904): 8.

<sup>68</sup> “Sensō to Kirisutokyō,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (14 January 1904): 1.

<sup>69</sup> Tolstoy published an anti-war pamphlet, “Bethink Yourselves!”, in June 1904 in London. It was translated into Japanese by Kōtoku Shūsui and Sakai Toyohiko and published in the *Heimin Shinbun*, which sold its entire print run of the issue. For a discussion of Tolstoy’s treatise, see chapter seven.

Spain to aide in Cuba's fight for independence. Ultimately, the author proclaimed, "Offering up your life by fighting evil follows the spirit of Christ's sacrifice."<sup>70</sup>

War with a "western Christian" nation presented Japanese Christians with a unique quandary.<sup>71</sup> This issue was taken up in an editorial published in the 18 February 1904 issue of *Kirisutokyō sekai*, only ten days after the Japanese imperial navy launched its attack at Port Arthur at the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula, to start the war. In the lead editorial, titled "Teikoku no shimei" (The empire's mission), the author declared that the war presented Japan with the opportunity to emerge as the "bringer of peace to the East, the preserver of civilization [that will] inspire humanitarianism; in other words, our nation's victory must be a victory for justice, a victory for humanity."<sup>72</sup> This victory was all the more urgent because of the barbarism perpetrated by Russia. The author continued, "[Russia is called a Christian nation] in name only, for its political system is that of a despotic monarchy (*kunshu dokusai*), there is no freedom of belief or expression, and the people are subjected to harsh treatment, as can be seen by the oppression of Jews in Kishinev last year."<sup>73</sup> They say they have the Orthodox

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<sup>70</sup> "Sensō to Kirisutokyō," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (14 January 1904): 1.

<sup>71</sup> For a discussion of ways in which Japan and Russia were compared, often using "civilization" as the point of comparison, (including Japan's treatment of Russian POWs as a way of demonstrating Japan's state of civilization), see Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory, and the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), especially 157-176.

<sup>72</sup> "Teikoku no shimei," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (18 February 1904): 1.

<sup>73</sup> This is a reference to the Kishinev pogrom, which occurred on April 6-7, 1903, in what was then the capital of Bessarabia province (now the capital of Moldova). Over three days, nearly 120 Jews were killed or severely injured, over 500 wounded, and over 700 houses were destroyed.

Church, but this is overrun with ritual and empty formality, and its clergy's corruption is unbearable."<sup>74</sup>

In contrast, the author maintained, Japan had successfully absorbed the government, laws, and education of "the spirit of Anglo-Saxon civilization," and was acknowledged among westerners as a nation worthy of being considered among the Christian nations. The author concluded with a dramatic flourish: "We fully acknowledge that our nation must further deepen its spiritual reform (*seishinteki kakushin*) and that our current civilization is due to Christian influence is a truth no one can deny. Our empire's mission is still not absolutely clear, but [I declare] that it is the God-ordained destiny (*tenshoku*) of our empire to lead the East into humanitarian civilization (*jindōteki bunmei*), and all that is left is to deflect Russia's aggression and rescue China and Korea and in doing so usher in (*kaidō*) our national destiny and aid the progress of the kingdom of God."<sup>75</sup>

According to this author, then, the Russo-Japanese War was a holy war and a moment of reckoning for the nascent Japanese empire. Disregarding the military and economic motivations that overwhelmingly contributed to the government's decision to go to war, the author insisted that the war had been initiated by Japan to defend China and Korea from Russian aggression and to protect the East from the despotic barbarism of the Russian empire. In declaring war, Japan was answering God's call to claim its destiny as the moral leader in the region and to take up its rightful place as the bearer of

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<sup>74</sup> "Teikoku no shimei," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (18 February 1904): 1.

<sup>75</sup> "Teikoku no shimei," 1.

civilization in the East. More importantly, Japanese Christians faced the great responsibility of serving as moral and spiritual guides for the nation. It was imperative that Christians exhort their compatriots to recognize the spiritual implications and stakes of the conflict. In short, the war was being fought between a “true” Christian nation representing a genuine manifestation of God’s spirit and a “false” Christian nation whose disregard for its own subjects and for justice generally betrayed a corrupt and decayed national church.

Editorials were not the only means by which *Kirisutokyō sekai* contributors depicted the conflict as a sacred war. Beginning in April, two months after the outbreak of hostilities, the *Kirisutokyō sekai* began publishing on a regular basis reports from the front, thus establishing a more intimate link between Christians at home with soldiers abroad. These reports, appearing in a column titled “Senshi itsuwa” (stories of soldiers [at the front]), by or about Christian soldiers who risked death for God and country, followed similar themes: their fealty to nation, their upright and ethical conduct in battle as becoming faithful Christian soldiers, and the honorable last moments of Christian soldiers who praised God and expressed gratitude for the opportunity to give their lives for their nation as they anticipated entering heaven. In marked contrast to the evangelism controversy from a few years earlier, these stories emphasized basic conversion narratives and Christian qualities, rather than potentially divisive complex points of doctrine. With titles like “Religion and the late Major Takayanagi,” “The faith of the late Narimatsu Hidetarō,” and “Dying in battle while longing for the Bible,” these

brief pieces valorized Christian military service and sacralized these soldiers' deaths as offerings to God.<sup>76</sup>

The importance of Christian ministry for providing comfort and relief to soldiers was emphasized in one narrative with the melodramatic title, "A Courageous End."<sup>77</sup> Submitted by Sergeant Matsubara as he recuperated from injuries sustained while fighting in the Nanshan offensive, this story recounted the conversion of a certain Ishikawa, one of Matsubara's subordinates, and his eventual glorious death on the battlefield. When Matsubara first met Ishikawa, he was a dissolute rogue who resisted (*hankō*) whenever Matsubara praised the name of Christ. While in Hiroshima awaiting deployment to the front, Matsubara attended a local Episcopal church whose minister, Murata, "disregarding the disdain of non-believers, visited [him] from time to time at [his] billet." Together, Matsubara and Murata organized a series of informal meetings with some of the other soldiers in the barracks, and several, including Ishikawa, began to express interest in Christianity: "One day, Ishikawa also came to hear the gospel with great earnestness. From that moment his attitude changed completely, so that he always desired to hear the teachings of the lord. I was filled with joy and gratitude and prayed that he might be saved and return to the lord."<sup>78</sup> Soon after, Matsubara's division was deployed and took part in the Nanshan offensive. During the battle both he and Ishikawa were wounded, Ishikawa fatally. Dismayed that his comrade had been

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<sup>76</sup> "Senshi itsuwa: kyū Takayanagi shōsa to shūkyō/ kyū Narimatsu Hidetarō-shi no shinkō," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (26 May 1904): 7; and "Seisho wo natsukashinde senshisu," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (30 June 1904): 4.

<sup>77</sup> "Senshi itsuwa: Takumashiki rinju," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (28 July 1904): 4.

<sup>78</sup> "Senshi itsuwa: Takumashiki rinju," 4.

wounded, Matsubara quoted Psalm 23 to comfort him. Matsubara described Ishikawa's final moments: "Hearing these words, he smiled and with bloodied lips replied [quoting II Corinthians], 'For which cause we faint not; but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory' and just as he finished, he was struck with another bullet" and breathed his last.<sup>79</sup>

Matsubara's letter encapsulated a uniquely Christian perspective on the war and demonstrated the ideals that Christian soldiers should abide by. Each aspect of his story about Ishikawa's conversion and death served as both encouragement and exhortation to the readers of *Kirisutokyō sekai*. Matsubara exemplified the ideal Christian soldier: rather than concealing his faith, he shared his faith with his subordinates despite their skepticism and derision. The minister Murata also exhibited the ideal behavior of those who wished to support the troops. Rather than avoiding soldiers, he visited barracks, initially to see his temporary parishioner Matsubara, but also to evangelize the "non-believers" who were stationed with him. Matsubara and Murata together demonstrated what was possible when Christians labored together to evangelize those around them: the conversion of soldiers about to face death on the front. Ishikawa's conversion and death, narrated as a beautiful and pure event rather than a brutal and painful end, emerged as the goal and reward for evangelism. It also denoted the urgency of evangelism: in a time of war, soldiers' lives were tenuous at best. Each story narrating the beautiful death of a Japanese Christian soldier brought home the urgency of

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<sup>79</sup> "Senshi itsuwa: Takumashiki rinju," 4-5. Ishikawa quotes II Corinthians 4: 16-17 (rather than translating the verses as rendered in Japanese, I am quoting the King James Version).

evangelism. Ishikawa's Christian death, while beautiful, highlighted the need for concentrated evangelism among soldiers who could be killed at any moment.

### **From War to Fields Ready for Harvest**

The war also seemed to offer a fractured Protestant community with the impetus to overcome the recent interdenominational conflict that had pitted Ebina and other so-called theological liberals against Uemura and other more orthodox ministers. Coming so soon after the Fukuin dōmeikai's controversial and tainted mass evangelistic campaign of 1901-1902, the Russo-Japanese War presented an opportunity to renew efforts towards joint evangelism on a national scale. In this sense, the nation could serve as the unifying factor needed to overcome theological differences, and momentarily silence the earlier demands for an explication of *what* precisely people were to be converted to. It also enabled the Protestant community to dramatically display its support for the state and troops.

Soon after the outbreak of war, the Fukuin dōmeikai announced that it and the YMCA would initiate a "wartime evangelism and relief" (*senji fukyō imon hi kifukin*) campaign.<sup>80</sup> Ambitious in scope, this campaign included three components: to deploy people to evangelize and encourage soldiers; to focus evangelistic efforts in those regions where soldiers were stationed while awaiting deployment; and to publish small booklets and send them to soldiers, both at home and at the battlefield. It included a call to "fellow believers in Christ" to support this work through donating money. Proposing

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<sup>80</sup> The statement was published in all Christian newspapers. "Kōkaijo: Nihon kirisutokyōto no kyōdōteki hōkō jigyō ni suite gekisu," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (11 March 1904): 7.

that the intended work would entail a budget of 3,000 yen, the organizing committee included a detailed list of recommended donation amounts based on the size of church congregations. It also asked for donations from individual benefactors.<sup>81</sup>

This new effort, while announced with great fanfare, unintentionally revealed further weaknesses in the nascent Christian community. Between March and June 1904, the Fukuin dōmeikai published a running total of money collected from individuals and churches to support this campaign. Despite initial enthusiasm, the financial reports reveal that the Fukuin dōmeikai woefully overestimated its ability to garner support. The first report listed donations from thirty-nine sources, in amounts ranging from .50 yen (Hagi Baptist Church) to 200 yen (Kanda evangelistic mission station), for a total of 456.34 yen.<sup>82</sup> Interestingly, with each report, the subtotal (difference between the current and previous reports) decreased: the second report (dated May 5) listed a total of 184.19 yen, the third report (dated May 31) listed a total of 73.515 yen, and the final report (dated June 3) listed a total of 74.04 yen.<sup>83</sup> The final total, 783.185 yen, fell far short of the 3,000 yen the committee had set out to raise.<sup>84</sup> Whether this vast

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<sup>81</sup> “Kōkaijo: Nihon kirisutokyōto no kyōdōteki hōkō jigyō ni tsuite gekisu,” 7.

<sup>82</sup> “Senji fukyō imonhi kifukin dai-ikkai kōkoku,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (7 April 1904): 11.

<sup>83</sup> “Senji fukyō imon hi kifukin kōkoku (dai-nikai),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (16 June 1904): 7; “Senji fukyō imon hi kifukin kōkoku (dai-sankai),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (14 July 1904): 7; “Senji fukyō imon hi kifukin kōkoku dai-yonkai,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (28 July 1904): 8. Interestingly, the third report for the “Chōsen dendō kifukin” (Korea mission donation) appeared alongside the wartime evangelism final report, suggesting that in part the wartime effort was competing with other interests within the community.

<sup>84</sup> “Gunjin irō seinenkai tenmaku kaisetsu kifukin boshū shūi,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (15 September 1904): 8; “Zai-rokoku Nihon gunjin furyō imon kifukin boshū shūshisho,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (1 June 1905): 11. The Japanese YMCA also initiated a separate donation campaign in August to support the visit of its members to the front to offer comfort through performances and evangelism. The Kansai Christian Women’s Alliance (Kansai rengō kirisutokyōto fujinkai) initiated a similar campaign in May 1905 to support its

discrepancy was due to a lack of interest among Christians or simply due to insufficient resources is unclear. With general financial independence of Japanese churches an ongoing challenge, this ecumenical campaign inadvertently revealed the limitation of using the war as motivation to focus the resources of church congregations.

Even with insufficient resources, the Fukuin dōmeikai nonetheless sponsored a series of visits by prominent ministers and evangelists to military deployment areas and hospitals. The purpose of evangelism was twofold: as mentioned earlier, the most obvious was conversion, with the conversion of soldiers being viewed as an integral part of what was hoped to be a new wave of revivals in a time of national crisis. Underlying this, however, was a concern for the moral character of these soldiers.

As suggested by Matsubara's characterization of Ishikawa's roguish behavior before converting to Christianity, the conduct of soldiers away from the front was a matter of great concern.<sup>85</sup> Far from home and from societal constraints that might have restrained their behavior, soldiers were often accused of dissipated and unbecoming conduct, a grave concern and regular topic of the news just as much as their valor and patriotism in battle.<sup>86</sup> As moral leaders, Christians believed, they were uniquely

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own activities to offer comfort and moral guidance to soldiers. For more on the YMCA's efforts during the Russo-Japanese War, see Jon Thares Davidann, *A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930*, 112-117; Nara Tsunegorō, *Nihon YMCA shi* (Tokyo: Nihon YMCA Dōmei, 1959), 120-128.

<sup>85</sup> Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 38.

<sup>86</sup> Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 38. For example, in the February 1905 issue of the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* it is reported that Kashiwagi Gien spoke on the unfortunate moral conduct of soldiers on the front at a regional church gathering. After commenting on news of brothels and the circulation of "picture postcards" showing the carnage of war (another marker of immorality) among the soldiers, Kashiwagi urged his audience to embrace the critical task of imbuing in the soldiers pure hearts and souls (as their contribution to the war effort). "Jōmō ni okeru sengensho undō," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (February 1905): 9.

equipped to reform the behavior of soldiers, asserting that Christianity would best transform unruly young men into disciplined and honorable soldiers worthy of service to the nation.

Through sponsored events, ministers asserted their role as moral instructors for the nation. On April 16 Kozaki Hiromichi, as president of the Fukuin dōmeikai, traveled to Hiroshima for an event for soldiers organized by local churches. The *Kirisutokyō sekai* reported that over 1500 people attended the event and were treated to musical and theatrical performances before Kozaki addressed the soldiers, exhorting them to “go forth pure (*kenzen*) in the grace of God” and “he spoke to them of God’s providence and his words encouraged and inspired great morale among the attendees.” In addition, Kozaki also visited over 400 soldiers in a nearby hospital, a third of whom were being treated for venereal disease (*karyūbyō*): the result, according to the report, of “[these soldiers] not being sufficiently careful at first.” Interestingly, “since the [hospital] director was a dignified (*ogosaka*) man, he did not show [Kozaki] these patients.”<sup>87</sup> Nonetheless, mention of soldiers infected with venereal disease, though hidden from view during Kozaki’s visit, no doubt brought home to readers of *Kirisutokyō sekai* the additional importance of Christian influence and evangelism among soldiers during the war.

The evangelization of soldiers, while significant, was not the sole purpose of these campaigns. On February 22, only two weeks following the outbreak of war, the Kumiai Kyōkai issued a joint declaration with the Japan Missionary Society, its

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<sup>87</sup> “Fukuin dōmeikai to guntai imon,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (5 May 1904): 8.

affiliated missionary organization, concerning domestic evangelism. Signed by Miyagawa Tsuneteru and Harada Tasuku, the heads of the respective organizations, the declaration proclaimed: “war ultimately will be won, not through military maneuvers or the management of economic resources, but through morals (*dōgi*).” In order to do its part to support the empire’s destiny, the Kumiai Kyōkai declared its intent to put even greater effort into its evangelistic work. In addition to launching a mission in Korea (the subject of a subsequent chapter), the mission affiliated with the church would begin a nationwide evangelistic campaign: “This year, the Kumiai Kyōkai plans to divide up the whole nation and send out evangelists to each area to support the evangelistic work of our churches.” These evangelists included prominent ministers such as Ebina, Furuki Torasaburō, Kozaki, Osada Tokiyuki, Miyagawa Tsuneteru, and Harada Tasuku.<sup>88</sup>

Noting that in the previous year there had been many seekers and baptisms, the declaration urged members to recognize that “this year is a year of great harvest” and “in any case this is a perfect time for harvest.” In another declaration, published in November, the author urged Christians to see the war as an opportunity for revival, “just as the American Civil War had led to a great spiritual revival.”<sup>89</sup>

This renewed enthusiasm for evangelism and hopes for revival reflected not only a straightforward interest in conversion, but was also a result of the latest Kumiai Kyōkai effort to assert, once and for all, its independence from foreign missionary support. Beginning in late 1904 following its General Conference, the Kumiai Kyōkai

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<sup>88</sup> “[Kumiai kyōkai shō ani ane ni teisuru],” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 March 1904): 10. Furuki is probably Furuki Torasaburō, who helped to found the Osaka YMCA with Miyagawa Tsuneteru.

<sup>89</sup> “Kakuchi no dōshi ni tsugu,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 November 1904): 9.

had shifted its priorities to encourage and support the financial independence of its churches, a critical step towards demonstrating full independence. This necessitated larger congregations with means that would be able and willing to financially support their churches. Successful evangelism, likewise, would demonstrate to American missionaries that the Japanese church had attained sufficient maturity to manage its own growth, thus making foreign missionaries superfluous. In addition to demonstrating that they were loyal imperial subjects, the intensification of Kumiai Kyōkai evangelism was intended to increase members. The war, it was hoped, would cause people to seek out churches as a source of comfort and moral guidance in a time of uncertainty and turmoil. As the church's declaration made explicit, war led to anxiety and fear, conditions which made people more amenable to religious teachings. The war, they hoped, would provide fields ready for harvest.

### **Keeping the Home Fires Burning: Supporting the Troops**

The Protestant community took up the call to explicitly support the war in myriad ways.<sup>90</sup> As the official newspaper of the Kumiai Kyōkai, the *Kirisituokyō sekai* published reports of the efforts of congregations, other Christian organizations, and

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<sup>90</sup> The mobilization of the general population for the war—particularly in offering “comfort” to soldiers through the collection and distribution of small gifts and the visitation of wounded soldiers—was not limited to Christians of course. What is more significant in this case is not that Christians engaged in a unique set of activities, but that they defined and described their activities as somehow inflected with Christian belief. In other words, the uniqueness lay in their self-narration of these activities, not in the activities themselves. Following the centennial of the war, several works have been published that explore the cultural and social impact of the war on the general population at home. See for example Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*; Rotem Kowner, editor, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*; and Wells and Wilson, editors, *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-1905*.

individuals, and in doing so, served to reinforce the urgency of serving the nation through offering uniquely Christian assistance. Though not every church or minister supported the war, the *Kirisutokyō sekai* gave the impression that each congregation across the nation offered unwavering support. But to say that most Christians supported the war says little about what they actually supported or how they understood their role. Reports in *Kirisutokyō sekai* were not limited to activities of Kumiai churches but included those of other denominations and groups, thus also creating the impression that Christians were unified in this moment of national crisis. These reports, while often brief, reveal a great deal about what kind of “service” church congregations and other groups considered appropriate for Christians.<sup>91</sup>

It is impossible to catalogue all of the activities undertaken by different churches and organizations during the Russo-Japanese War, but it is possible to make a few general comments about the work.<sup>92</sup> The types of contributions different churches or groups made were partially dictated by location, proximity to the front, and the availability of both human and financial resources. Additionally, while some groups

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<sup>91</sup> This impression of unity was not limited to the Christian community, but was common in media portrayals of domestic support of the war during the duration of the war. With a few notable exceptions, such as the *Heimin shinbun*, the media portrayed the nation as united in its support of the war. This portrayal belied a more ambivalent attitude towards the war shared by many, as Naoko Shimazu writes, “On balance, my view is that the society was war-weary and ambivalent, as the kokumin showed exhaustion from a continuous state of military preparedness, not to mention actual military engagements, undertaken by the Meiji state.” Naoko Shimazu, 53.

<sup>92</sup> Relief for soldiers and their families was generally delegated to local authorities, supplemented by volunteer and private organizations. Nonetheless, soldiers’ families were often left in a state of poverty without their breadwinners, and there were instances where soldiers committed suicide from the guilt of having left behind their families, or of wives who despaired of being able to care for their children without their husbands. Naoko Shimazu, 39-40. For an overview of relief services provided more generally for soldiers and their families, see Tsuchiya Yoshifuru, “The Role of the Home Front in the Russo-Japanese War,” in *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05*, vol. 2, *The Nichinan Papers*, eds. John W. M. Chapman and Inaba Chiharu (Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2007), 225-228.

exclusively focused their efforts on supporting troops, others embraced the war as an event that created circumstances advantageous for evangelism. These two approaches were certainly not opposed to each other, but were often perceived to be complementary in a time of national crisis.

Churches located in areas near military bases or naval ports were most directly affected as their cities were transformed into military staging areas. They “mobilized” their congregations to provide soldiers awaiting deployment with wholesome entertainment and edifying activities before they were sent to the front. In Hiroshima, one of the principal ports from which soldiers were deployed, local churches formed the Senji Kirisutokyō gunji irōkai (Wartime Christian Soldier Support Association) and members busied themselves distributing Christian literature, including 24,000 Bibles donated by the London Bible Society, and visiting soldiers’ families and eventually, the wounded.<sup>93</sup> This organization also held a party to send off soldiers called up for the front at the Hiroshima Girl’s School. Ministers exhorted soldiers to behave with integrity and honor, and the school’s students entertained the troops by singing patriotic songs.<sup>94</sup>

Churches further removed from full-scale military mobilization, not to be outdone, quickly organized new associations and committees to discuss and determine what they could do to contribute to the war effort. Through these practical efforts, they asserted Christianity’s unparalleled effectiveness as a source of spiritual and wholesome

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<sup>93</sup> “Hiroshima tsūshin,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 4 (April 1904): 47. It is not clear from the report if the donated Bibles were in English or Japanese.

<sup>94</sup> “Gunjin irōkai,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (17 March 1904): 6.

material comfort. Most congregations focused their efforts on two groups: local families of soldiers left destitute from losing a male member of the household (and soon bereaved families) and wounded soldiers recuperating from wounds sustained in battle in local hospitals. With churches often working with neighbor churches of other denominations or enlisting the assistance of larger, ecumenical organizations, this type of service provided congregations with the opportunity to foster an atmosphere of interdenominational cooperation. For example, churches of different denominations located in the Shitaya ward of Tokyo (now part of Taitō ward) gathered together and decided to ease the difficulties of families of soldiers called up from their ward by collecting weekly donations. One fifth of the donations were to be given to the families of those killed in action. They planned to continue collecting donations for at least a six-month period.<sup>95</sup>

Once the war was underway and wounded were brought back to Japan to recuperate in Reserve Hospitals across the country, church congregations and associated organizations expanded their activities to include visiting wounded soldiers and raising money to purchase practical gifts to help make the soldiers' stays more comfortable. For example, the women affiliated with the Reinanzaka Church in Tokyo, under the leadership of the minister's wife Kozaki Chiyoko, collected 128 bonsai to place at the bedsides of soldiers recuperating at the Tokyo Reserve Hospital.<sup>96</sup> In another instance, in July, the Fukuin dōmeikai called upon Tokyo area churches to donate enough money

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<sup>95</sup> "Shitayakunai kakukyōkai," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 March 1904): 8.

<sup>96</sup> "Fujinkai imon," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (14 July 1904): 5.

to purchase 3000 hand-held fans for soldiers recuperating in the Tokyo Reserve Hospital, undoubtedly to help ease the sweltering conditions of the Tokyo summer.<sup>97</sup> Also in July, churches in the Osaka area decided to join together to evangelize at the two Reserve Hospitals in the city. After first gathering at one church, they split into two groups to visit both hospitals, and decided to continue to visit every Monday.<sup>98</sup>

One particularly significant way that church organizations made indirect contact with soldiers was through making and sending *imon bukuro* (comfort bags), or state-approved care packages. Though anyone could donate funds necessary to purchase supplies for the packages, women exclusively provided the labor. The Japanese Women's Christian Temperance Union, or Kyōfūkai, was assigned by the state the responsibility of collecting, inspecting, and sending the packages, and it relied on different women's groups, including ecumenical Christian organizations, church women's associations, and the student bodies of Christian girl's schools, to create the bags and their contents.<sup>99</sup> In short, the creation of *imon bukuro* provided women not only with a specific and important task only they could perform, but through the state's acknowledgement of the Kyōfūkai as the official organization in charge of regulating the bags' contents, this process gave Christian women a unique role in wartime mobilization.

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<sup>97</sup> "Fukuin dōmeikai no shōbyōkei iseki," *Kirisutokyo sekai* (14 July 1904): 5.

<sup>98</sup> "Yobi byōin hōmon," *Kirisutokyo sekai* (14 July 1904): 5.

<sup>99</sup> Rumi Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism*, 95-98.

In some cities, such as Kyoto and Osaka, Christian wartime service committees not only organized events to emphasize how Christianity provided practical means of comfort for deploying soldiers and their families, but they also hosted special events for regular residents in order to offer a Christian explanation of the war's spiritual significance, and to demonstrate Christian contributions towards the war effort. The organizers hoped that the people who attended such events would subsequently show an interest in Christianity itself. Not only did these committees invest a great deal of time and resources into these events, but they served as centerpieces in reports in *Kirisutokyō sekai* to further reinforce to Christians how their fellow believers were influencing people around them. For example, one such event in Kyoto, attended by over 1000 people, was described in *Kirisutokyō sekai* as being for the purpose of “making clear the claims of Christians [concerning the Russo-Japanese War] and to open the eyes (*keisei*) of the public.”<sup>100</sup> The event lasted over two and a half hours and featured four prominent ministers: Makino Toraji (Kyoto Church) on “A Great Plan for a time of emergency”; Nimuro Kametarō on “Our Nation's Divine Destiny”; Yuasa Kichirō on “The Jews”; and Kozaki Hiromichi (Reinanzaka Church) on “Christianity and the Russo-Japanese War.” The report ended with a dramatic flourish, giving the impression that the event was not only timely, but even divinely ordained: just as Kozaki finished his speech, someone entered the hall with an extra edition of a newspaper announcing the Japanese Navy's successful takeover of the port of Lüshun. Upon hearing this news, everyone in the hall stood up and erupted in calls of “banzai” to finish out the

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<sup>100</sup> “Kokumin keisei daienzetsukai,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (17 March 1904): 5.

evening.<sup>101</sup> Thus, as retold in the newspaper, a gathering initiated to provide moral Christian guidance to other Japanese was transformed into a patriotic celebration.

### **Hongō Church and the Russo-Japanese War**

At Hongō church, the predominant presence of university students who were temporarily exempt from conscription meant that the war had a less direct effect than on churches near areas of military deployment. Nonetheless, the outbreak of war significantly altered the tone of Sunday services and evangelistic meetings as well as the tone and content of its affiliated journal, *Shinjin*. The editors of *Shinjin* made an overt effort to demonstrate the journal's support of soldiers by producing a special "comfort" issue in August 1905 featuring commentaries, brief soldier memoirs, and works of literature. As had been done by other organizations, the editorial board used this issue as a means of expressing support for soldiers. It printed a total of 10,000 copies, five times the regular print run, and called on subscribers to purchase extra copies at a discount and then send them to soldiers stationed at the front, soldiers recuperating in hospitals, and bereaved families.<sup>102</sup> This offered those connected with the church the opportunity to use the church itself as a conduit between themselves and soldiers abroad.

*Shinjin*, which had been founded to provide a place for intellectual debate and discussion, became a vehicle for many of the young ambitious men associated with Hongō to develop and articulate their ideas during the war. This included Tokyo

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<sup>101</sup> "Kokumin keisei daienzetsukai," 5.

<sup>102</sup> Tanaka Masato, "'Shinjin' no igi to seikaku," 17.

Imperial University students like Yoshino Sakuzō, who later became an important political philosopher, and Koyama Tōsuke, who later became a politician.<sup>103</sup> Not limited to “spiritual” concerns, these editorials also justified the material and strategic gains Japan would acquire through a victory. Through editorials with titles such as “The truth about Russia’s occupation of Manchuria,” “Russia’s closed-door Manchuria policy,” and “Russia’s defeat is the basis of world peace,” Yoshino portrayed Russia’s occupation of Manchuria—which he warned would extend to Korea next—as not only self-interested and harmful to Japan’s regional interests, but a threat to world peace.<sup>104</sup> Koyama, in a slightly different vein, cautioned readers against unthinking exuberance at the prospect of military victory. Unlike in the past when great Japanese men were generally military men, Koyama argued, in this “civilized” era, great men were men of thought and finance. More important than military victory, Koyama concluded, was for the Japanese people to develop greatness (*idaisei*), something which was not guaranteed by a military victory.<sup>105</sup>

Ebina’s sermons published during the war also reflected a preoccupation with the war, and more significantly, what the war meant for Christians. Ebina maintained a

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<sup>103</sup> Koyama Tōsuke (1879-1919), like Yoshino Sakuzō, was born in Miyagi prefecture in northeastern Japan. He entered the philosophy department of Tokyo Imperial University, and was baptized by Ebina at Hongō in 1902. In 1912, he transferred from Hongo to a Unitarian church founded by his friend Uchigasaki Sakusaburo. After briefly working at *Mainichi shinbun*, he taught at Waseda and Kansei Gakuin. In 1915, he ran for and was elected to the lower house of the Diet as a representative of Miyagi. He died of illness in 1919.

<sup>104</sup> Shōtensei [Yoshino Sakuzō], “Jihyō: Rokoku no Manshū senryō no shinsō; Rokoku no Manshū heisa shugi; Seiro no mokuteki; Rokoku no haiboku ha sekai heiwa no moto ya,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 3 (March 1904): 22-26.

<sup>105</sup> Koyama Tosuke, “Chō sensō kan,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 3 (March 1904): 35-37.

rigorous travel schedule during the war, which included brief evangelistic trips to the Kansai area (April and October 1904, January, June, July 1905), Gunma and Niigata (May 1904), Sendai (April 1905) and Kyūshū (including to Hiroshima, January-February 1905). His frequent travels took him away from Hongō more than in the previous few years, but when he did preside over Sunday services, his sermons touched on current events and their spiritual valence. Now Christian service to the nation, previously presented in the vague terms of morally transforming the nation into God's kingdom on earth, could be sharpened and focused through the crucible of war. Even in the case of sermons on general subjects such as "My view of God," Ebina related the primary focus of the sermon—God's character—to the war. God's justice, he maintained, would be evident and upheld in the present war. Victory depended on Japan's willingness and determination to abide by Christian conduct and justice. Thus, the outcome of the war would indicate which nation possessed the greater genuine devotion to God.<sup>106</sup> While such an interpretation might not appear noteworthy, it reveals a tension in Ebina's thinking concerning fundamental aspects of God's character. Ebina, who had dismissed the divinity of Christ, the acceptability of the Trinity, and the inerrancy of scripture, most likely would have similarly dismissed the notion of an interventionist God—divine intervention in history, after all, contradicted the very "rational" laws Ebina praised. Yet, in a time of war, Ebina seemed to embrace such a notion. His language was vague and certainly left room for a less supernatural interpretation—perhaps he merely intended to imply the inevitability of victory of the

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<sup>106</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Waga shinkan," *Shinjin* 5, no. 4 (April 1904): 24.

party closest to God precisely because devotion to God fostered qualities necessary for victory. Whether intentionally implying an interventionist God or not, such interpretations suggest Ebina's struggle with giving spiritual meaning to war.

Ebina's sermons that explicitly addressed the ongoing war reveal even more convincingly the complexity, even ambivalence, of Christian attitudes towards armed conflict. This can be observed in a sermon titled "Sensō no bi" (The beauty of war) which Ebina preached at Hongō in July 1904. In it, Ebina offered a philosophical evaluation of the *moral* benefits of warfare. Avoiding the actual human and material costs of war, something which he seemed to dismiss as an unfortunate inevitability in history, Ebina instead presented war as a moral purifier, and the hardships it created as serving a greater good. Ultimately, Ebina declared, war could be beautiful precisely because it was a moment (or period) of suffering and trial. Despite the suffering brought on by war, war also brought out the most "beautiful" aspects of people, such as courage and justice. While decrying war itself as deplorable, Ebina also insisted that without it, "The great character of the people (*kokumin*) cannot be cultivated. Through this war the people are being cultivated into [a people with] a truly beautiful, pure, and noble character, a character even more beautiful than Fuji as its snow-tipped peak ascends into the sky. This must be developed. If this is not possible, then certainly this war should be abandoned."<sup>107</sup> This new noble character, according to Ebina, was specifically expressed through a new form of patriotism (*aikokushin*). Unlike the "old patriotism" of Tokugawa Japan, which was ideally expressed by a samurai's loyalty to his immediate

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<sup>107</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Sensō no bi," *Shinjin* 5, no. 8 (August 1904): 20.

lord in exchange for monetary rewards, this new “modern” patriotism was given willingly and freely, out of the people’s desire to sacrifice for their nation. Furthermore, in the current war, *all* Japanese subjects sacrificed for the nation; thus war served as the catalyst for a unified nation. It was in these acts of sacrifice—soldiers who answered the call of their nation to go to the battlefield, wives and parents who sent off husbands and sons—that the national character was being tested and cultivated.<sup>108</sup>

One significant change in sermon content occurred at Hongō’s evangelistic services, usually held on Sunday nights under the co-sponsorship of the Meidōkai, the church’s young men’s group. Though it is unclear why, unlike at regular services where Ebina and others only occasionally explicitly addressed the war, at the Sunday night meetings, Ebina in particular overwhelmingly focused on war. While some of the other speakers focused on other current topics (socialism, for example), Ebina consistently preached on the war and what he considered to be the proper conduct of Christians.

From February to the beginning of May, Ebina spoke at nine events and focused on Christianity and the war at five. Of these, the transcript of one—given on February 28 soon after these evening services began—was printed in *Shinjin*. Titled “Seisho no sensō shugi” (The Bible’s advocacy of war), this lengthy overview of both Old Testament and New Testament treatments of war and conflict offers an interesting view of both Ebina’s attempt to insist that the war make spiritual sense, and his complicated relationship to scripture and its use as the basis for moral behavior.

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<sup>108</sup> Ebina Danjo, “Sensō no bi,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 8 (August 1904): 20-21.

The impetus for this sermon, at least according to the introduction, was the use of Christian doctrine as the basis for pacifism by Christians critical of the war. This in itself is curious since as already mentioned, Christian pacifism, while existing, was overwhelmingly a minority and often marginalized position. Ebina nonetheless declared that in response to those who “confidently promoted pacifism,” particularly Christians who did so, it fell upon him to examine whether or not Christianity was truly a pacifist religion by investigating how warfare and conflicts were treated in the Bible. Although this sermon primarily addressed the way war and conflict were treated in the New Testament, Ebina also presented a methodical overview of war in the Old Testament through examining war in relation to Israelite history and the founding of the nation of Israel. Not only was war not condemned, Ebina argued, both defensive and offensive wars were condoned and encouraged, since these were necessary to found a nation. Since the literal nation of Israel—both its founding and its preservation—were the central concern of the Old Testament, it stood to reason, Ebina maintained, that God would condone the use of weapons to defend and maintain this literal nation. This outright acceptance of warfare became tenuous once the Israelites lost their nation, and their survival as a people (*minzoku*) came to depend on their preservation of a spiritual sense of nation: that is, nation as a religious entity.<sup>109</sup>

Ebina admitted that in contrast to the Old Testament’s unambiguous acceptance of warfare, the opinions on conflict in the New Testament presented a quandary. On one hand, Jesus and the disciples appeared to tacitly accept the use of force: for example,

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<sup>109</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Seisho no sensō shugi,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 4 (April 1904): 6.

neither John the Baptist nor Jesus attempted to convince soldiers who came to them for help to leave the military. At the same time, Jesus' teaching included certain ideas—such as turning the other cheek and loving one's enemies—that seemed to take pacifism to the extreme. How was this seeming contradiction to be resolved? Ebina's solution was to make a distinction between the literal nation of Israel of the Old Testament, and the “spiritual” community of a nationless people of the New Testament. According to Ebina, Jesus—who accepted his calling as the Messiah—realized that political independence was impossible, and therefore sought to create a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God. This kingdom transcended political borders and peoples, thus making the use of weapons and force irrelevant. As a spiritual kingdom based on love, righteousness, and truth, it was also inconsistent with the nature of this kingdom to engage in wars of defense or conquest. Thus, Christ preached turning the other cheek and loving one's enemies—these teachings were based on the conviction that love, righteousness, and truth were the only weapons necessary to build and then spread the kingdom of God.<sup>110</sup>

On the whole, Ebina's examination of the New Testament's treatment of war and conflict appeared to support pacifism. Despite meticulously establishing the nonviolent nature of Christ's teachings, however, Ebina refused to advocate pacifism. Without presenting a biblical basis for Christian participation in war, he nonetheless called soldiers who fought and died in battle heroic martyrs similar to early Christian martyrs who refused to take up arms against the Roman Empire but accepted their

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<sup>110</sup> Ebina, “Seisho no sensō shugi,” 8.

executions as an expression of their faith. Likewise, according to Ebina, soldiers who went to war, and the families that sent them off, expressed the most ideal and beautiful form of this “martyr-like spirit.”<sup>111</sup> Martyrdom on the battlefield (though, significantly, not as protest against war itself) offered the means by which to reconcile Christ’s command to turn the other cheek with the implicit assumption that sacrificial patriotism expressed yet another Christian ideal. Ultimately, Ebina cautioned, the nation—and by extension, the kingdom of God—could not be established through warfare alone, since a spiritual kingdom could only be built through love and faith. This, in short, was the principle of war as expressed in the Bible: a historical inevitability that was also insufficient to accomplish the ultimate purpose of establishing God’s kingdom on earth. Nonetheless, Ebina insisted, this fact alone did not justify the call of Christian pacifists who claimed that Christians were obligated to protest the war or prohibited by their faith from participating in warfare. By drawing a fine line between the benevolence of Christianity and the beautiful martyrdom of soldiers on the battlefield, Ebina preached an understanding of war, and service to the nation, that made both patriotism and martyrdom beautiful offerings to God.

**Hibiya Riots:  
A Chaotic End to a “Holy” War**

War continued, on land and at sea, until August 1905. Following the Japanese Imperial Navy’s defeat of Russia’s western fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, American President

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<sup>111</sup> Ebina, “Seisho no sensō shugi,” 11.

Theodore Roosevelt, who had secretly been offering to mediate between the belligerents for some time, organized a meeting at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, which officially ended the war, were in actuality advantageous to Japan. The total mobilization of its entire nation had left Japan at a breaking point; the protraction of hostilities would have been disastrous. Through the treaty, Russia agreed to acknowledge Japan's rights and interests in Korea, accept the military evacuation of Manchuria on both sides, and cede Port Arthur and control of the South Manchurian Railway to Japan.<sup>112</sup> In a compromise, Russia also ceded the southern half of Sakhalin but retained the northern part. However, one condition that the Japanese representative had initially insisted on was denied: financial reparations.

When news of the treaty's details were reported in Japan, the failure of the Japanese representative to secure a war indemnity led to outrage. On September 5, an anti-treaty rally in Hibiya Park in Tokyo devolved into a full-scale riot. Lasting for three days up until martial law was declared, chaos reigned as order broke down and mobs destroyed police boxes, newspaper offices, and streetcars. They also destroyed twelve churches and one minister's residence. Beginning around three o'clock on September 6, a mob first attacked the Mifu (Methodist) Church in Asakusa ward (now a part of Taitō ward) and ransacked the sanctuary, throwing furnishings and objects out into the street before setting it on fire. From there, the mob moved on to other churches in the same area, then moved on to Honjo ward (now a part of Sumida ward), Nihonbashi ward, and Shitaya ward. By eleven that evening, the mob had burned to the ground the twelve

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<sup>112</sup> Sandra Wilson and David Wells, "Introduction," in *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective*, 13.

churches, an affiliated school, a parsonage, and the home of a member of one of the churches. The mob did not discriminate among denominations, and destroyed Methodist, Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai, Salvation Army, and Roman Catholic buildings.<sup>113</sup>

In the following weeks as the Tokyo Christian community attempted to come to terms with this mob violence that had singled out Christian churches among its targets, an explanation emerged that dismissed an overt conflation of Christianity with foreign influence as the cause—the initial understanding—and instead laid the blame on a single event. In a brief note titled “On the cause of the attack on the churches,” printed in the 21 September issue of *Kirisutokyō sekai*, the author stated that the mob had been incited by a group of theologically conservative street evangelists. On that day, a group of theology students who worked with Nakada Jyūji at his Gospel Hall (Fukuin dendōkan) in Asakusa had gathered at the Asakusa Park to preach to local residents about destroying household idols. Having preached there the previous day under police guard, they returned on the sixth assuming that things would go as they had the day before, despite the fact that with rioting in full effect there were no police to be found. Their preaching incited the gathering mob, which chased after the preaching students and began their rampage against the churches. The report continued that Nakada Jyūji himself had acknowledged the role played by these students and apologized at an emergency meeting called by the Fukuin dōmeikai soon after.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Shakai mondai shiryō kenkyūkai, editor, *Iwayuru Hibiya yakiuchi jiken no kenkyū* (Tōyō bunkasha, 1974), 67-69.

<sup>114</sup> “Sho kyōkai boshu no gen’in nit suite,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (21 September 1905): 3.

The effort to discover a rational explanation for the destruction of these churches belied the Christian community's dismay and bewilderment that they had been particularly singled out by the mob. Even if not all of the congregations of the destroyed churches had made a concerted effort to support the war, the ones in Shitaya had, and two of the targeted churches were in this ward. The placement of blame on markedly conservative street evangelists also reveals how in this moment, theological differences were evoked to distinguish Christians who could offer moral guidance to the nation (the author of the article) from well-meaning but misguided Christians who would undermine Christian efforts, and ultimately, national cohesion (the street evangelists).

Over a series of emergency meetings, the Fukuin dōmeikai grappled with the aftermath of the riots: in addition to the psychological shock, there was the material damage—estimated at 60,000 yen—to be considered.<sup>115</sup> Initially, the Fukuin dōmeikai considered organizing a donation campaign to raise funds necessary to rebuild the destroyed churches. It appears that the Fukuin dōmeikai, to prevent the perpetuation of the assumption that Christian churches were subordinate to foreign missions, urged the affected congregations to agree to not sue for damages, but instead to rely on the dōmeikai for aid. Three representatives were selected to visit the churches to assess the extent of damages, but in their visits, the representatives also urged the churches to agree to the dōmeikai's guidance in addressing the costly rebuilding efforts. Amidst these discussions, the Fukuin dōmeikai issued a statement imploring the public to recognize that Japanese Christians were not a threat to the nation:

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<sup>115</sup> “Tōkyō no higai kyōkai to sono zengosaku,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (21 September 1905): 3.

We would like to take this opportunity to appeal to the people (*ippan kokumin*) that Christianity is by no means harmful to the nation, but is something that has emerged from the people. The recent attacks on Christian churches will certainly adversely affect the opinion of people in the West, but we declare that [this event] in no way reflects the spirit of the average Japanese but is a momentary (*ichiji teki*) act of violence perpetrated by a small unruly mob.<sup>116</sup>

Despite this gesture, the act of violence itself had made clear that at least in a moment of chaos when “the people” were seeking out a scapegoat, Christian churches were easily conflated with foreign powers. Further, though the Fukuin dōmeikai had urged the churches to rely on the generosity of the Christian community, ultimately, the effort to raise donations failed before it began as it soon became apparent that already stretched to meet their own budgets, the other Christian churches were in no position to rebuild the destroyed sanctuaries and residences.<sup>117</sup>

The Hongō church was spared in this spate of violence; it had been protected by the military guard that had been requested by members of the Christian community following the attacks on the night of the sixth.<sup>118</sup> On the 17<sup>th</sup>, the second Sunday following the riots, Ebina offered his own interpretation of these events in a sermon titled “Ima ha inori no toki nari” (Now is a time for prayer). Dismayed at the eruption of domestic unrest in a moment that should have been a time for national unity and celebration, Ebina exhorted his congregation to repent before God, for, he lamented, the

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<sup>116</sup> “Tōkyō no higai kyokai to sono zengosaku,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (21 September 1905): 3.

<sup>117</sup> Dohi Akio, “Kindai tennōsei to Kirisutokyō: Hibiya yakiuchi jiken kara Toranomom jiken made,” in *Taishō demokurashii, tennōsei, Kirisutokyō* (Tomizaka Kirisutokyō senta, 2001), 289-290.

<sup>118</sup> “Hongō kyōkai kiji,” *Shinjin* 6, no. 10 (October 1905): 64; Dohi, “Kindai tennōsei to Kirisutokyō,” 289.

violence was an expression of the degree of social corruption and decay for which all were responsible. He found fault with the government for its lack of respect for the people's will and its pathetic fixation with how it was viewed by western powers. For this, the government was culpable, not only before the people, but also before God.<sup>119</sup>

Ebina did not condone the actions of the rioters, but cautioned his audience against dismissing them as “heathens, or barbarians whipped up by xenophobia.”<sup>120</sup> Instead, he stated that: “Recent events emerged from a shadow that lurked in the hearts of our compatriots.” It was crucial that his audience embrace this point; they needed to acknowledge that these people who had displayed such violence “were not their enemies, but their compatriots.”<sup>121</sup>

Ebina had few generous words for the comportment of Christian ministers during the riots. Recounting rumors he had heard—that some ministers had flown “white flags” in surrender, tried to discourage looters by saying that their church was English (and therefore that of an ally), even some who had apologized for preaching a foreign religion—Ebina condemned the spinelessness of these ministers and their willingness to resort to all sorts of deceit and cowardice to save their buildings.<sup>122</sup>

The arrogance of the government, the lawlessness of the mobs, even the cowardice of Christian ministers, were all seen as evidence of the corrupt state of

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<sup>119</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” *Shinjin* 6, no. 10 (October 1905): 13.

<sup>120</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” 16.

<sup>121</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” 16.

<sup>122</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” 16.

society: “However, the corruption (*fuhai*) of society is like the air. If society becomes corrupt, then it cannot be helped that it will permeate all aspects of society, whether it be the army, navy, government, or religious institutions. It is impossible to stand among these and hope to alone remain pure.”<sup>123</sup> Thus, Ebina exhorted, rather than rejoicing at the praise being lavished on Japan by western powers, it was imperative that all Japanese examine themselves and prostrate themselves before God in repentance. In short, Ebina stated, “Now is a time for prayer.” In a final exhortation, Ebina urged, “My hope is that you will awaken your consciences and become earnest true people (*makoto no jinbutsu*) of the twentieth century.”<sup>124</sup>

Ebina’s earnest pleas to his congregation marked the inauspicious end to the Hongō church and other Kumiai churches’ efforts to demonstrate their ability to serve as the moral guides for an emerging empire. Despite his impassioned sermons exhorting his congregants to become “new men” capable of leading Japan in a new century, Japan had not become a Christian nation, nor had Christianity been embraced by the Japanese public as the source of moral guidance and reform. This moment of failure, as disappointing as it was, also appeared to present itself as an opportunity for reflection and repentance. Amidst the shortcomings and missed opportunities to take advantage of “fields ripe for harvest,” Ebina and others like him who embraced Japan’s emergence as a colonial empire turned their gaze to Korea as a new “field ripe for harvest.”

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<sup>123</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” 16.

<sup>124</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ima ha inori no toki nari,” 17.

## CHAPTER THREE

### **Ebina's Travels Abroad: Managing the Overseas Church**

*My friends, by no means consider this to be a foreign land. For isn't any land under our heavenly father's dominion your homeland? One with a meek heart is at home anywhere. Do not speak about how there are boycotts in this land. For isn't it true that in our homeland there are boycotts among compatriots? Difficulties exist on both sides of the ocean, and surely working conditions are even harsher in Japan. My friends, with meekness and hard work, realize that this land is your homeland.*

--Ebina Danjō, sermon given at the Berkeley Japanese Christian Church, 1908

#### **Introduction**

Ebina Danjō, the influential and charismatic minister of Hongō church in Tokyo, did not limit his ministry to his church, or even to the *naichi* (home islands) of the Japanese empire. From 1908 to 1919, Ebina traveled abroad eight times, making three trips to the U.S. (and on occasion continuing on to Europe), four to Korea, including two forays to Manchuria, and one to Taiwan. These trips ranged in duration from as short as a couple of weeks to nearly one year. His responsibilities to his own church, the frequency with which he was absent from Japan, as well as the considerable financial cost of such trips, suggests the significance these overseas communities held for Ebina, and for the Japanese Protestant community as a whole.

By the turn of the twentieth century, due to a variety of political and economic factors, Japanese began to immigrate abroad in significant numbers—first to the Territory of Hawai'i and the continental U.S., and then to areas of Asia under Japanese influence, then dominance. As communities of Japanese immigrants began to develop,

particularly in the U.S., the Protestant community in Japan grew increasingly concerned with the morality of these far-flung groups, and how this might reflect back on the perceived morality—and hence level of civilization attained—in the home islands. At the same time, some immigrants who were Christian, even as they formed proto-church groups assisted by American missions targeting immigrants, began to request support and guidance from Japan. Slightly later, as Japanese settlements formed in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, Ebina and other ministers turned their gaze to Asia as well. In addition to the formal mission established in Korea to evangelize Koreans, the Kumiai Kyōkai maintained constant connections with communities abroad. Despite his rigorous responsibilities as the minister of a major metropolitan church, Ebina played a prominent role in these efforts and invested significant time, effort, and expense to travel abroad to minister to these Japanese abroad.

The scholarship on the complex history of the development of overseas Japanese communities is situated within distinct historiographies. Work on the formation of Japanese immigrant communities in Hawai'i and the continental U.S. has generally been addressed by scholars of American history who situate this history as part of the history of the development of a distinctly Japanese American (and by extension Asian American) identity; as such, only recently has such scholarship attempted to address the transnational aspects of Japanese American history, including the ways that Japanese immigrants, and their American-born children, maintained and nurtured ties with Japan. The limits placed on the scope of inquiry are largely the result of the politics of the emergence of the study of so-called ethnic American communities and a concern with

asserting the importance of incorporating more recent immigrant and non-white populations within the purview of American history. In the case of Japanese American history, the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II and its legacy have largely informed the insistence on a putative “American-ness” of Japanese in America.<sup>1</sup>

The treatment of Japanese expatriate communities in Korea—both during the Taehan Empire period (1897-1910) and under Japanese colonial rule—is distinct in that in Korea, unlike in the U.S., Japanese expatriates were members of the colonizing empire. Thus, the terms used to describe them, and the political and economic structures that shaped their experiences, were markedly different. While Japanese in the U.S. were described as “*imin*” (immigrants), Japanese in Korea were referred to as “*shokumin*” (literally colonists, usually rendered as migrants). Japanese immigrating to the U.S. were subject to increasingly repressive U.S. immigration laws, racial laws that constrained their economic opportunities such as a series of land laws, and anti-miscegenation laws that defined even the legality of their relationships. The travel of Japanese to Korea, on the other hand, was not considered travel “abroad” but as travel within the empire, albeit to a separate realm within it. Korea was a prized region of the *gaichi*, or outer areas, of Japan, and there was no need to obtain visas or passports to

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<sup>1</sup> Some recent works address the transnational aspect of the Japanese American experience; see in particular Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). For a succinct overview of the artificial boundary between the study of Japanese American and Japanese history, see Azuma, “‘Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development’: Japanese American History and the Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial Japan,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 4 (November 2008): especially 1189-1194. Japanese scholars, less encumbered by the putative political implications of drawing links between the Japanese American community and Imperial Japan in the pre-World War II period, have also written extensively on this topic.

cross the ocean westward to the Korean peninsula. Thus, the study of Japanese expatriates in Korea, when considered at all, has generally been framed within the study of the Japanese empire.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the vast political, even ideological, gaps that separate the studies of these two communities, for men like Ebina living in the Japanese empire, such a distinction was often less obvious, even irrelevant, and boundaries porous and conditional. These two overseas communities should not be conflated, since that would obscure the very real differences in condition and experience of the members of these communities themselves. This chapter explores the ways in which Ebina, through his travels to these two regions, demonstrated how for members of the Japanese Protestant community in the *naichi*, these two communities represented similar pitfalls and threats, but also promised new possibilities for the Japanese church. The very fact of his frequent visits to these areas suggests the gravity with which Ebina and others like him viewed the moral condition of these communities, and the responsibility they felt for influencing and guiding them.

Reports of Ebina's travels were eagerly awaited by his congregation and frequently published in *Shinjin*, the journal associated with the Hongō church, in his absence. In addition to news of former congregants who had moved to these areas, such reports also helped to form a narrative to understand and interpret the larger significance of immigration and mobility. It is also important to consider that Ebina's wife Miya

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<sup>2</sup> Recent English-language studies of the Japanese community in colonial Korea include Jun Uchida, "'Brokers of Empire': Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1910-1937," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005); and Nicole Leah Cohen, "Children of Empire: Growing Up Japanese in Colonial Korea, 1876-1945," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2006).

accompanied him on several of these trips: through their joint—albeit gendered—activities, the Ebinas demonstrated, to the communities they visited and to the Hongō congregation at home, a model for Christian influence and leadership that transcended national and racial boundaries. In his journeys to both regions, Ebina (and when his wife accompanied him, she as well) used these visits to Japanese communities to meet with prominent and powerful people of dominant society. In the U.S., he preached before “white” congregations and attended Congregational conferences and meetings, while in Korea, he visited with Government General officials and noted Korean Christians such as Yun Ch’iho.

This chapter will explore the frequent and often detailed reports of Ebina’s travels to these areas to consider the transnational nature of the Japanese church. Given the complex and often controversial history of each of the overseas communities, this chapter will be limited in scope primarily to how Ebina understood and interpreted the experiences of these communities and his responsibility to them. Secondly, it will also explore the specific members of the communities who considered visits by Ebina an important addition to their own attempts to reform and shape these communities according to their own vision. Given the ways in which the relationship of *naichi* Japanese to these communities has conventionally been considered separately, this chapter will proceed chronologically in order to emphasize the way in which each of Ebina’s visits influenced and altered subsequent visits to each region.

**To See Japan from a Different Perspective:  
Ebina’s 1908 Trip to Northern California**

The formation of Japanese American churches occurred at the intersection of efforts by American missionary organizations newly focused on the growing populations of immigrants from countries to which missionaries were often sent, and interest among immigrants, particularly Christian ones, to establish their own churches in their new communities. The relationship between these two groups was an unstable and contingent one, and as the immigrant population shifted, the initiative for establishing churches and conducting evangelism often shifted between these groups. Several denominations—particularly those that had already established missions in Japan—created “missions to Japanese in America.”

The earliest “Japanese immigrant missions” were established in the (Kingdom, then) Territory of Hawai`i, which was also the first destination of immigrant laborers from Japan. Japanese also began traveling to the continental U.S. by the 1870s, the earliest immigrants being students who found work as houseboys or other menial work while they attended English-language schools, high schools, and occasionally, universities and seminaries. Groups of young students were often drawn into churches through the offer of cheap room and board or English classes, and after conversion, these groups formed Bible studies conducted in Japanese. Such groups also often included immigrants who had converted to Christianity in Japan. While initially considered groups operating under the authority of mainstream churches, by the turn of the twentieth century, many of these groups of Japanese Christians broke away from the “white” churches with which they were affiliated, and either by forming independent

churches or by applying to the denomination for permission to form separate so-called ethnic churches, began building distinctly Japanese American churches.<sup>3</sup>

To support these nascent Japanese American churches, and to “encourage” the burgeoning Japanese American communities in general, Japanese ministers began traveling to the Territory of Hawai`i and the west coast of the continental U.S. before the turn of the twentieth century. These visits increased in frequency in the first decades of the twentieth century, in conjunction with a rise in Japanese immigration. Even during the Russo-Japanese War, as war between Russia and Japan continued to rage in Manchuria, Kozaki Hiromichi, the minister of the prominent Reinanzaka church in Tokyo, traveled to the American west coast to visit communities of Japanese immigrants.<sup>4</sup> In addition to Kozaki, the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai leader Uemura Masahisa and the Osaka Kumiai church’s senior minister Miyagawa Tsuneteru visited west coast communities as well.<sup>5</sup> In 1908, Ebina decided to attend the Edinburgh Conference of

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<sup>3</sup> Yoshida Ryō, “Karifornia no Nihonjin to Kirisutokyō,” in *Hokubei Nihonjin Kirisutokyō undoshi*, ed. Dōshisha daigaku jinbunkagaku kenkyūjo (Tokyo: PMC Shuppan, 1991), particularly 151-210.

<sup>4</sup> Kozaki had made several trips to the Territory of Hawai`i, U.S. and Europe by this time, including as a Japanese representative to the Columbian Exposition’s World’s Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893. Kozaki Hiromichi, *Shichijūnen no kaiko* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1927), 115-153, 175-181, 192-212, 246-271, 298-332.

<sup>5</sup> Miyagawa Tsuneteru, the minister of the Osaka Kumiai church, visited Seattle and the Los Angeles area in 1909. Furuya Magojirō (who will be covered more substantially in chapter five) hosted him, a difficult task, as Miyagawa objected to what he considered to be the rather primitive conditions of Los Angeles. The members of the Los Angeles Japanese Congregational Church met him at Union Station with a horse-drawn buggy and took him around to see local sites; when they arrived at the church they served him and the rest of the congregation ice cream. Miyagawa apparently considered both an insult until Furuya reasoned with him by telling him that they had done these things to be hospitable. Uemura visited the Los Angeles and Orange County areas in 1910. Furuya had a similar experience with him; when the minister introduced him at a meeting of area Japanese ministers by describing the topic of his sermon “Reverend Uemura’s specialty,” Uemura initially refused to stand, and again Furuya was forced to convince him that the description was not intended as an insult. These episodes suggest the perceived status differences between the ministers coming from Japan and Japanese immigrants in the U.S. Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon*

Congregational Churches, and elected to travel to Scotland via the U.S., the first of multiple trips to the United States. In addition to frequent reports to his congregation published in *Shinjin* detailing his experiences, Ebina recorded his thoughts and observations in a diary. While overtly unrelated to activities ongoing in Japan proper, an examination of Ebina's visit demonstrates how for the Japanese Protestant community—and the Hongō church in particular—the Japanese immigrant communities in the U.S. were simultaneously a source of anxiety along with offering heady optimism for the further expansion of the Japanese church. It also provided leaders like Ebina, who because of their unique educational experience were bilingual, with the opportunity to demonstrate to American audiences the new face of Japanese Christianity.

Speaking tours by Japanese ministers in the U.S. were usually initiated and coordinated by elite members of Japanese immigrant communities. This was predominantly owing to the elites' concern about what they perceived as the immoral or base behavior of their compatriots. At the same time, visiting ministers often had overlapping, though occasionally conflicting sets of motives and expectations that demonstrated competing expectations each group had for the other. In 1908, Abiko Kyūtarō, the editor of the Japanese vernacular newspaper, *Nichibei* (Japanese-American News), and Chiba Toyoji, the editor of the leading Japanese agricultural journal in the U.S., learned of Ebina's plans to travel through the U.S. on his way to Edinburgh. Both were Christians and prominent members of the San Francisco Japanese immigrant community. They immediately contacted Ebina and asked him to make an extended

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*no shimei to kirisutokyō* (Tokyo: Fujiya shobō, 1934), 21-23; Nankashū Nihonjin nanajūnenshi iinkai, editor, *Nankashū Nihonjin nanajūnenshi*, 216.

visit to speak to Japanese immigrants in San Francisco and neighboring areas.<sup>6</sup> Chiba had been a member of Ebina's church while a student at Waseda University, and had been a member of Hongō's youth organization, the Meidōkai. He coordinated all arrangements, and mobilized Japanese immigrant communities from Seattle to Fresno to welcome the important minister from Japan.

Before departing, Ebina relayed his expectations for this trip in the lead article of an issue of *Shinjin*. About to embark on his first overseas trip, he admitted that it seemed imprudent for someone like himself who was already middle-aged and possessed no professional expertise or qualifications to travel abroad, but that he felt that it was necessary for him so that he could witness and experience firsthand several things. First, he hoped to see Japan in a new light by gaining intimate knowledge of another country. He also believed that by going to the U.S., he would gain a better sense of how much Japan needed to change in order to survive within the global struggle for survival. He also believed he would find "Christ's spirit" in the West, and looked forward to making new friends. Ultimately, he wrote, it was with "Christ's spirit" alone that friendship between the U.S. and Japan was possible; he was going in this spirit to develop relationships that transcended national boundaries.<sup>7</sup> Sent off by a large group of Hongō church members and friends at the Shinbashi train station—some going as far

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<sup>6</sup> Abiko Kyūtarō was among the most influential members of the San Francisco Japanese community as the editor of the main Japanese-language daily, *Nichibei Shimbun*. For more on the role of intellectual elites in the pre-World War II Japanese American community, see Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, Chapter 2.

<sup>7</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Gaiyū hattō no ji," *Shinjin* 9 no 6 (June 1908): 2-4.

with him as Yokohama where his ship departed—Ebina set sail for the U.S. in the end of May.

Ebina's ship took him to Seattle, a principle port of entry for Japanese immigrants, and Chiba—taking with him a group of local Japanese immigrants—traveled there to meet him. Chiba reported in a letter to *Shinjin* how excited he was to catch sight of Ebina's "impressive beard" among passengers on the boat's deck.<sup>8</sup> During his four days in Seattle, Ebina was welcomed like a celebrity by the local Japanese immigrant community. In between sightseeing he was taken on a whirlwind tour of Japanese immigrant churches, prefectural associations (*kenjinkai*), the YMCA, and English-speaking churches. At each place, as a celebrated visitor from abroad, he was asked to give sermons or speeches. On the one Sunday during his brief visit in Seattle, he was asked to give a total of four sermons, two each in English and Japanese, something, Ebina remarked in a letter to Hongō, he had never done even in Japan. While visiting Japanese immigrant communities was the principal reason for his visit, Ebina was nonetheless concerned with his English-language performances before "white" audiences. In a letter reprinted in *Shinjin*, he shared his evaluation of the quality of one of his English-language sermons: "I would say that my *pronunciation* and *elocution* (English in original) were fine, only I could not get away from the written text, if I could only get away from the text it would be perfect."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Chiba Toyoji, "Beikoku tsūshin (Ebina bokushi katsudō shohō)," *Shinjin* 9, no 7 (July 1908): 57.

<sup>9</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Ebina Danjō shuhitsu tsūshin," *Shinjin* 9, no 7 (July 1908): 56.

In addition to reflecting on his English oratorical skills, Ebina also used these occasions to observe what he considered to be certain superior aspects of American Christianity. Ebina's admiration for the American "white" churches he visited reveals the complex, even tortured nature of his relationship with America, its missionaries, and how he perceived Japan and Japanese Christianity's relationship with the West. Despite his self-assured and confident dismissals of the theology preached by many American missionaries in Japan, his embrace of American Christians and their theology and practice—at the expense of Japanese Christian beliefs and practice—reveals an underlying anxiety. For instance, in describing his experience preaching before the Plymouth First Congregational Church, he remarked, "I did not expect to be so welcomed by whites (*hakujin*). I really pushed things to the extreme, but *Congregational people* (English in original) are really *intelligent* (English in original). They are quite advanced [in their thinking] in how they listen to a minister's sermons. Japanese are no comparison."<sup>10</sup> Having recently faced censure and opposition from members of the Japanese Protestant community for his theological views, Ebina was no doubt sensitive to how American Protestants would respond to his sermons. Pleased by their acceptance of his theological points, Ebina interpreted this as a manifestation of their advanced thinking, and by extension, greater degree of civilization. By conflating acceptance of his theology with higher civilization, Ebina implied that the resistance he had recently faced in Japan was a result of "backwards" thinking and attachment to antiquated ideas. Likewise, this congregation's acceptance of him seemed to signify, to

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<sup>10</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Ebina Danjō shuhitsu tsūshin," 56.

Ebina at least, that an advanced degree of civilization could be conflated with openness to others, and conversely, that a reluctance to embrace others was a sign that a people still lagged behind in terms of progress.

His praise for Americans (at the expense of his own countrymen) did not end there. While aboard the train on his way from Portland to San Francisco, he also made observations about his fellow passengers, including a group he assumed to be laborers:

When I see [American] laborers working along the road, [I notice] that they carry themselves in the manner of rural samurai (*inaka bushi*). That is, there is something proper about their appearance. Just as rural samurai wear proper clothing at formal events...the way that these laborers on Sundays go out wearing snow-white clothing properly pressed and neat is something that elicits respect. But Japanese laborers are such bumpkins (*tsuchi kusai*), their clothing and everything else is vulgar (*iyashige*). American laborers are like the difference between heaven and earth [in comparison]. The Japanese living here [in America] are now learning from them.... The future Japan will become like this frontier (*shokuminchi*); I realized that it must become like this.<sup>11</sup>

Aside from the striking comparison he made between American laborers and rural samurai—which suggests a certain class and status commitment in Ebina’s thinking reflective of his own background—the characteristics he praised in American laborers revolved around propriety and appearance, characteristics he specifically associated with samurai. As he had declared before his departure, Ebina meant to gain new insights on Japan through visiting the U.S. He thus used his new vantage point to express

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<sup>11</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Ebina Danjō shuhitsu tsūshin,” 56. In Chiba’s separate letter to *Shinjin*, he describes an incident while he and Ebina were aboard the train from Portland to San Francisco, when several Americans entered their car and Ebina inquired what type of men they were. When Chiba told him that they were laborers, Ebina said to him that they seemed very gentlemanly and reminded him of rural samurai on their way to odd jobs. Chiba Toyoji, “Beikoku tsūshin,” *Shinjin* 9 no. 8 (August 1908): 62. During his visit to the San Francisco area, Ebina visited Captain Janes, his former teacher, who was living in San Jose. He was shocked by Janes’s disheveled appearance for his teacher had always been impeccably dressed while teaching in Japan, and had served as a model of just the sort of “American rural samurai” that Ebina identified in the American countryside. F.G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai*, 266-268.

anxieties about the state of Japan's progress. More specifically, he expressed concern with how Japanese immigrants exposed the shortcomings of Japan's progress to the West through their lack of propriety and manners. By favorably comparing American laborers with rural samurai, he seemed to suggest that Japanese immigrants—most of whom were *heimin* (commoners) and not *shizoku* (former samurai)—needed to adopt characteristics that were at once those of American laborers and samurai, an interesting conflation in itself.

After briefly stopping in Portland, Ebina made his way to San Francisco, where he spent most of his time during his first visit to the west coast. Between June 3 and 13 Ebina visited the extensive Japanese immigrant community in San Francisco, Oakland, and farming communities in San Joaquin County. He was met at the San Francisco station by Ōkubo Shinjirō, the minister of the Oakland Japanese Independent Church, and his wife Otowa. Ōkubo had been the minister of the Takasaki church in Gunma before going first to Hawai`i, then to the San Francisco area in order to become a missionary among the many small communities of Japanese laborers in nearby orchards and farms. Just as in Seattle, Ebina's time in San Francisco was like a whirlwind: between sightseeing, visiting local Japanese elites such as Ushijima Kinji (known as the Potato King) and Abiko Kyūtarō, important American scholars of theology or ministers of noted churches, and giving numerous lectures and sermons, he was given very little time to himself or to relax and reflect on his experiences.

Chiba took on the role of reporting to Japanese in Japan what he considered to be the resounding success of Ebina's visit. In a series of reports published in *Shinjin*,

Chiba recounted in detail each of Ebina's sermons and talks, who he visited, how he was received, and the general impact Ebina's visit had on the local Japanese immigrant community as well as the favorable impression he made on "white" Americans. Ebina, for his part, also recorded his impressions through a series of letters to *Shinjin*, but these were much briefer, and reflected the hurried and intense nature of his trip. In a separate diary he kept while traveling however, he recorded more intimate details of his trip as well as impressions and observations about the people he encountered, the new sites he visited, and what these suggested to him about both the challenges and potentials still facing Japan in general and the Japanese Christian community in particular.

In a series of massive gatherings of the local Japanese American community, Ebina preached to his compatriots in America about what they should do for both God and nation. But through these sermons, Ebina also presented a new understanding of Christian behavior and loyalty to the nation specific to the immigrant experience. At a gathering held at the Oakland First Methodist Episcopal Church, with over 700 Japanese immigrants from surrounding areas in attendance, Ebina gave a sermon entitled "Kirisutokyō no shimei" (the calling of Christianity). After sharing his impressions of Japanese immigrants since his arrival in Seattle, Ebina exhorted his audience to take up their unique calling as Japanese and Christians by recounting both the ethics of *bushidō* and the weaknesses of western Christianity. In short, Ebina urged:

A people (*kokumin*) without religion cannot expect to be great. Japan, through religion, possesses ethics (*dōtoku*). What Japan has to offer the world is an ethics through Christianity that builds on the ethics of *bushidō*, that is, the highest ethics in this world.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Chiba Toyoji, "Hokubei tsūshin," *Shinjin* 9, no. 8 (August 1908): 36.

Just as he had in his observations of the “rural samurai-like” laborers aboard the train, in this sermon, Ebina associated so-called samurai qualities with the ultimate form of ethics. By claiming that the introduction of *bushidō*, albeit inflected with Christianity, was the greatest contribution Japanese immigrants could make to American society, Ebina implored his audience to realize their full potential, one rooted in their ancestral roots. Through embodying *bushidō*, now available to all classes (that is no longer limited to the samurai class), Japanese immigrants would be transformed, and thus demonstrate the universal contributions Japanese civilization could make. In his report to *Shinjin*, Chiba praised Ebina’s words, remarking that the large crowd was overwhelmed by divine inspiration at Ebina’s exhortation to embrace the true spirit of Japanese Christianity.<sup>13</sup>

Ebina identified a unique place for Japanese immigrants in his conception of what Japanese Christianity could contribute to the world. In a sermon he gave before a gathering organized by the Japanese YMCA in Berkeley titled “Shin’i no jōtai to kirisutokyō” (Christianity and the soul/spirit), Ebina more specifically located the site in which Japanese immigrants were to pursue their calling: “My friends, by no means consider this to be a foreign land. For isn’t any land under our heavenly father’s dominion your homeland? One with a meek heart is at home anywhere. Do not speak about how there are boycotts in this land. For isn’t it true that in our homeland there are boycotts among compatriots? Difficulties exist on both sides of the ocean, and surely

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<sup>13</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Hokubei tsūshin,” 36.

working conditions are even harsher in Japan. My friends, with meekness and hard work, realize that this land is your homeland.”<sup>14</sup>

For Japanese immigrants in the San Francisco area, 1908 marked a particularly critical and troubling moment. Resistance to and discrimination towards the nascent Japanese immigrant community reached a crisis when anti-Japanese groups virulently opposed the enrollment of Japanese students in San Francisco-area public schools. The Japanese government soon intervened on behalf of the Japanese immigrants—citing Japan’s burgeoning global prominence as among the reasons why such a movement was insulting and unnecessary—turning this local conflict into a potentially explosive international diplomatic issue. In order to diffuse the international nature of the conflict, President Roosevelt convinced the San Francisco-area groups to desist in exchange for promising to pressure the Japanese government into agreeing to limit the types of visas it issued to its subjects to merchants and students seeking higher education. The Japanese government, equally concerned that undisciplined and unsavory laborers were sullyng Japan’s reputation in the U.S., willingly acquiesced to the agreement.<sup>15</sup> Known as the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907-1908, this unofficial agreement between the U.S. and Japan, instigated by a local struggle over the rising prominence of Japanese

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<sup>14</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Hokubei tsūshin,” 37.

<sup>15</sup> The specific classes to which the visas were to be newly issued reflected concerns in both Japan and among the Japanese immigrant elite that anti-Japanese agitation was due to the unseemly behavior of lower class immigrants whose presence violated the sense of priority of Americans and whose willingness to work for low wages threatened American laborers. Nonetheless, for the Japanese immigrant elite, immigrant laborers provided them with their livelihood (since many of the elite were involved in journalism, business, and professional occupations, new immigrants were an important part of their businesses), and this compromise between the U.S. and Japanese governments was a serious blow. Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 30, 41.

immigrants and their American-born (and American citizen) children, signaled to Japanese immigrants that there were limits to the extent to which the Japanese government would intervene on their behalf. Limitations on visas issued to Japanese seeking to emigrate created a dire problem for Japanese already in the U.S. because it severely constrained the future growth of the community.

In this context, Ebina's sermons to his "compatriots" in California, along with his observations about these Japanese immigrants, take on new valences. Urging Japanese immigrants to embrace America as their new homeland had graver implications than simply establishing roots in a new country. Ebina was, in short, demanding that Japanese immigrants interpret the ongoing diplomatic negotiations and anti-Japanese agitation in spiritual terms, and to consider discouragement and demoralization spiritual shortcomings unbecoming their illustrious "ancestral" and spiritual lineages.

If working conditions and other hardships were no different in Japan, why did Ebina insist that these Japanese immigrants adopt the U.S. as a new homeland? What was at stake for a Japanese minister like Ebina in seeing that the Japanese immigrant community continued to expand and prosper, despite increasing pressure discouraging such growth? In a sermon he gave to a gathering of San Francisco-area Japanese immigrants held at the Post Street Second Congregational Church, with over 1200 in the audience (which Chiba estimated represented roughly one-tenth of the Japanese population in the area), Ebina reiterated his earlier theme, the long-term or permanent residence of Japanese abroad (*dōhō no kaigai eijyū*), but added a significant point: "By

making your home in this land, and displaying the beautiful morals and values of the Japanese race, this will eventually bring about the salvation of Japan.”<sup>16</sup> It is important to keep in mind that Japanese immigrants themselves often had their own view of their place in American society or hopes for what they could accomplish. But for Ebina, and for his hosts, Japanese immigrants were meant to play a crucial role in “saving” Japan: the struggles inherent in living in a foreign country, often in the face of hostility, could transform these Japanese in a way that remaining in Japan could not. In short, this was a new formulation for how a *new man* could be produced. Through this transformation, Japanese immigrants could elevate Japanese civilization, broadly conceived; according to this schema, “Japan” was no longer bounded by the geographical space of the empire but was an entity that transcended it, with its members firmly rooted in distant lands being as vital to its existence as those living within the formal spatial frontiers of Japan itself. This move, which Ebina would elaborate upon further in subsequent visits to both the U.S. and Korea, posited a new definition of the nation and more significantly, a radical conception of the scope and range of the Japanese Christian Church.

**Evangelizing Settlers:  
Visiting Korea on the Eve of Colonization**

By the first decade of the twentieth century, significant Japanese settlements had formed in major Korean cities. Emerging concurrently with Japan’s increasing political and economic interests with Korea, these communities formed parallel to the rise of

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<sup>16</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Hokubei tsūshin,” 38. This is an idea Ebina elaborates upon in greater detail in subsequent visits to the west coast.

imperialism and accompanying unequal treaties, influence, and eventually, outright colonization. First in Pusan, where a group of Japanese (Tsushima) merchants had maintained a trading post since the Tokugawa period, these communities spread to Seoul, the neighboring port town of Inchŏn, and P'yŏngyang. With the onset of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government imposed a protectorate treaty on Korea, and used the peninsula as its major staging area for deploying troops to Manchuria, where most of the land battles occurred. The long-term stationing of Japanese troops made Korea a lucrative destination for Japanese merchants, peddlers, and prostitutes. The war also re-established Korea as the foremost diplomatic, economic, and cultural concern, as pundits and public intellectuals declared Japan's role as Korea's "rightful" protector and civilizer. As the Kumiai Kyōkai began discussing the possibility of establishing a mission in Korea to evangelize Koreans (to be taken up in Chapter Four), it also expressed considerable concern for the spiritual condition of the newly established Japanese settler communities.

Amidst the chaos of the Russo-Japanese War, the Kumiai Kyōkai announced the establishment of a mission to Korea in the 26 May 1904 issue of *Kirisutokyō sekai*. The brief announcement named a missionary, Kenmochi Keigo, who would be sent immediately, in addition to a proposed budget of 700 yen, of which 100 yen would be raised by Christians living in Korea, and the balance raised from among churches in Japan proper. There was no mention of who would be the target of this mission, or what the scope of the mission would be. But the announcement also made clear that the ongoing war with Russia created the impetus for the mission: "It goes without saying

that one reason for the current war with Russia is the liberation of Korea, and one deep foundation of such liberation lies in directing their hearts.”<sup>17</sup> Thus, a fundamental purpose for this mission was the reform and moral guidance of Koreans; nonetheless, before the establishment of a Korean-focused mission in 1911, the actual work of Japanese missionaries—along with ministers visiting from Japan—was directed towards the Japanese settler community.

Ebina was an early proponent of the mission in Korea, along with Miyagawa Tsuneteru and other important leaders within the denomination. The Korea mission immediately formed connections with the few Christian members of the settler community, some of whom were already conducting a form of Christian ministry through operating private schools for Koreans. Among these, Watase Tsuneyoshi, who served as the warden of Keijō Gakudō (Keijō academy), a Japanese-run boy’s school, from 1899-1907, later emerged as the principle Kumiai Kyōkai figure associated with Korea through his role as the director of the Kumiai mission. Kenmochi, the first minister selected to begin the mission, worked closely with Watase upon his arrival to establish what was in effect a “home church” among Japanese settlers. At a morning prayer meeting held soon after Kenmochi’s arrival, seventeen settler Christians gathered together; later that day, they again gathered at the home of Okue Seinosuke, to discuss the name of their new church—Keijō Kirisuto Kyōkai (Keijō Christian Church)—and select officers to serve as the church’s formal leadership.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> “Chōsen dendō kaishi ni tsuite,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (26 May 1904): 6.

<sup>18</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Keijō shōsoku,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (23 June 1904): 7.

For Christians in Japan, the Japanese settler community in Korea was seen as an extension of Japan itself, and the dearth of Christians within this community—Kenmochi reported that of the estimated 4000 Japanese in Keijō, only 20 were Christian—put the fate of this important Japanese interest, and by extension Japan itself, in jeopardy. Kenmochi’s first report to readers of the *Kirisutokyō sekai* reflected the abysmal prospects of a mission even among the settler community: with housing in short supply, the small congregation intended to meet in the newspaper office associated with Keijō Gakudō. Kenmochi had heard that of the 10,000 Japanese in nearby Inchōn, roughly 20 were Christian. Despite the fact that the journey to Inchōn required a two-hour train ride each way, he hoped to regularly visit this town and organize a congregation. At the point of his first report, however, he had nothing more substantive to relay. In closing, he asked his readers to forward him the names of any Japanese Christians or “seekers” who might be migrating to Korea.<sup>19</sup> Unlike the Japanese American community in which immigrants themselves often initiated the founding of Japanese ethnic churches and eagerly invited prominent Japanese ministers, the Korean Japanese settler community frustrated Kenmochi, and disinterest towards Christianity was interpreted to be a sign that this community was in desperate need of externally generated moral reform.

### **Opening the Korea Mission**

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<sup>19</sup> Kenmochi Keigo, “Keijō dayori,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (14 July 1904): 7.

By 1910 the Japanese churches in Korea had grown to just two, one each in Keijō and P'yōngyang. However, the Kumiai Kyōkai determined that the time had come to more actively evangelize Koreans—in short, the Korea mission would now be for Koreans as well. Nonetheless, the Japanese settler community, and the behavior and beliefs of expatriate Japanese, continued to preoccupy *naichi* ministers. In 1910, in anticipation of beginning the Korea mission, Ebina, Osada Tokiyuki, the president of the Japan Missionary Society, and Watase, the newly appointed director of the Korea mission, traveled to Korea for a speaking tour including stops in Keijō, Inchōn, Taegu, and P'yōngyang, where they delivered sermons before crowds of mostly resident Japanese at existing Kumiai Kyōkai-affiliated churches and resident Japanese organizations.<sup>20</sup> The ministers' attentiveness to the expatriate community was noticed by the local Japanese press; a reporter for the Taegu Japanese-language paper decried the moral degeneracy among resident Japanese, and expressed hope that the ministers' visit would discourage resident Japanese from engaging in illicit activities.<sup>21</sup> He praised Ebina in particular for reflecting both a Japanese spirit (*Yamato damashii*) and Christ-like spirit (*Kirisuto damashii*).<sup>22</sup> This reporter apparently shared Ebina's concerns and expressed a tentative hope for what this Japanese Christian presence could do to elevate the spiritual condition of resident Japanese who were not living up to the standards of proper

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<sup>20</sup> Osada Tokiyuki (26 July 1860 – 18 August 1939) was the director of the Japan Missionary Society (Nihon Kirisutokyō dendō gaisha) and minister of the Tenma church, near the Osaka castle grounds in downtown Osaka at the time of this visit. In 1913, he resigned from the Tenma church due to illness, then transferred to the Niigata church the following year.

<sup>21</sup> “Meiji yōnju-yo'nen shichigatsu Ebina Danjō-shi kuru” *Taegu Minpō* (July 1911).

<sup>22</sup> “Meiji yōnju-yo'nen shichigatsu Ebina Danjō-shi kuru” *Taegu Minpō* (July 1911).

imperial subjects charged with spreading Japanese civilization to the rest of Asia, as they were with the spiritual conditions of their new “compatriots.”

In his sermons to these Japanese audiences, Ebina presented a particular image of Christianity, one that joined putative Japanese (and East Asian) traditions with universal Christian principles. First, as was reported in the Taegu Japanese-language paper, Ebina advocated a *Japanese* Christianity (Nihon-teki Kirisutokyō) through which Japanese would direct their own spiritual growth, without depending on the guidance of western missionaries.<sup>23</sup> He further specified what such a Christianity might entail in Inchōn, where he preached that Christianity represented the ultimate form of loyalty and filial piety. Both these qualities, he argued, were central to Japanese and Korean tradition, and a shared heritage that would help bring the two peoples together.<sup>24</sup> And further, in P’yōngyang, he argued that Christianity served as the foundation for a new kind of national morality (*kokumin dōtoku*) that was anchored in but also transcended the nation. This morality—the same morality outlined in the Imperial Rescript on Education—was, according to Ebina, a deep and abiding love for the nation that ultimately manifested itself in a benevolent love for all others. Thus, universal love was the basis for patriotism, even filial piety. As such, cultivating and practicing such universal love was critical to true moral development. Most remarkably, Ebina told his audience in P’yōngyang that while Japanese had few opportunities to practice such benevolent love in Japan, there were numerous opportunities abroad in Korea (and

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<sup>23</sup> “Meiji yōnju-yonen shichigatsu Ebina Danjō-shi kuru” *Taegu Minpō*, (July 1911).

<sup>24</sup> “Chūkō to Kirisutokyō,” *Chōsen shinbun* (July 1911).

Manchuria).<sup>25</sup> Therefore, in order for Japanese to develop a mature morality, they needed to place themselves in an environment where they would be pressed to express a more universal love than what they might be expected to in Japan. According to Ebina's interpretation, imperialism, and colonial rule, were a means by which to encourage Japanese to love others.

### **From Korea to Manchuria: Exploring New Frontiers**

This time accompanied by his wife Miya, Ebina returned to Korea in June 1915, again visiting Kumiai churches throughout the peninsula. By 1915 the Kumiai Kyōkai had made significant gains in Korea: three Japanese churches and sixty-seven Korean churches. Coming also in the early years of Japanese rule, as the Government General was still attempting to impose its rule through often brutal and autocratic means, Ebina arrived declaring his intentions to facilitate the peaceful union of Japanese and Koreans. At an event jointly organized by the five Kumiai Kyōkai-affiliated churches in Keijō, Ebina preached in front of a crowd of over 2000 people, both Koreans and Japanese, something which the author of the report took to be indication of Koreans' growing acceptance of Japanese rule.<sup>26</sup> In Keijō, he was also introduced to Cho Chung-ung, who had served in the pro-Japanese cabinet before the protectorate treaty was forced on Korea, and Yun Ch'ihō, a Korean Christian educator and intellectual with an

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<sup>25</sup> "Kokumin dōtoku no kontei," *Heijō nippō* (July 1911).

<sup>26</sup> Nanyō gakujin [Watase Tsuneyoshi], "Ebina Danjō to Chōsen," *Shinjin* 16, no. 7 (July 1915): 103.

international reputation.<sup>27</sup> The Ebina next traveled to P'yŏngyang, where Ebina preached before the Korean Kumiai church congregation, and Miya spoke on issues faced by Korean and Japanese women, such as how to create and maintain a “proper” Christian household in a remote and potentially hostile environment, at a gathering of the Korea branch of the Aikoku fujinkai (Japanese Patriotic Women’s Association).<sup>28</sup>

The Kumiai Kyōkai’s Korea mission published a collection of Ebina’s sermon transcripts from this and his earlier trips titled *Uchū no seimei* (Life of the universe), thus providing the settler community with a material reminder of the *naichi* church’s “concern” for them. Through these sermons, Ebina exhorted Japanese in Korea to recognize their own particular mission as settlers in Japan’s *gaichi*. In one sermon titled “Yo ga Kirisuto kan” (My view of Christ) given at the Keijō Hotel in June 1915, Ebina offered a comparative analysis of colonial development: in the case of Great Britain, he explained, those who traveled to the colonies did so because they possessed grand visions they could not realize if they remained in their own country. These visions were manifested in the settlement of new countries based on lofty ideals, such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia. In these countries, Ebina continued, peace and order were maintained without the use of military enforcement, a sure sign of the degree of

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<sup>27</sup> Nanyō gakujin [Watase Tsuneyoshi], “Ebina Danjō to Chōsen,” *Shinjin* 16, no. 7 (July 1915): 103. For an in-depth study of Yun Ch’iho, see Kenneth Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990).

<sup>28</sup> Nanyō gakujin [Watase Tsuenyoshi], “Ebina Danjō to Chōsen,” *Shinjin* 16, no. 7 (July 1915): 106. For more on the Aikoku fujinkai, see Sharon L. Sievers, *Flowers in the Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983).

civilization achieved in these places.<sup>29</sup> Absent from this account was any acknowledgment of the considerable bloodshed and violence through which these so-called ideal countries were established.

Korea offered the same potential for Japanese settlers: in this new colony, Japanese could accomplish a kind of progress unattainable in the *naichi*. However, Ebina lamented that many who migrated to Korea were impoverished and lacking in ideals. Nonetheless, he insisted that the *Yamato minzoku*, or the Japanese people, had much in common with the British: just as British settlers had created new, idealistic societies in distant lands, Japanese would be able to realize a new society (*shin shakai*) in Korea not possible in Japan itself. In order for this to occur, however, Ebina cautioned, “All subjects must develop the resolve (*kakugo*) to accomplish these ideals.”<sup>30</sup>

Within this new site for what Ebina succinctly called the advancement of the Japanese people (*Nihon minzoku hatten*), Christianity offered a vital link. In addition to viewing Korea as a fruitful place for evangelism—an opinion not entirely rooted in reality—Ebina maintained that Korea provided Japanese with the opportunity to exercise a Christ-like empathy and compassion for others. This would deepen their own emulation of Christ, which in turn would lead to greater moral progress for Japanese as a whole. According to Ebina, a central and fundamental aspect of Christ’s teaching was

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<sup>29</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Yo ga Kirisuto kan,” in *Ebina Danjō sensei kōen: Uchu no seimei*, ed. Matsumoto Masatarō (Keijō [Seoul]: Chōsen kirisutokyō jihōsha, 1915), 20-21.

<sup>30</sup> Ebina Danjo, “Yo ga Kirisuto kan,” 23.

“the critical importance of getting people to recognize the kingdom of God.”<sup>31</sup> Through this realization, all people would transcend national and racial boundaries, viewing each other as brothers and sisters connected through Christ’s example, which was defined by a compassion that dismissed differences in race or class. Thus, through the equalizing compassion of Christ, Japanese should embrace Koreans as their new compatriots (*dōhō*), and in doing so, achieve progress not possible in the *naichi*. Absent in Ebina’s idealistic assessment of Korea’s role as a site of Japanese moral progress was any consideration for the reality of colonization, a reality dominated by violence and despite lofty declarations to the contrary, through the effacement of Korean concerns and determination to remain an independent sovereign nation.

The Ebinas next traveled to China to the Guandong Leased Territory. First speaking to a group of expatriate Japanese in Andong—the Manchurian city immediately across the border with Korea—the Ebinas next visited Fushun, where one of the South Manchurian Railway’s coal mines was located. In Fushun, they were hosted by Yamaoka Nobuo, a former member of Ebina’s Hongō church, and an employee of the Railway’s Fushun mine.<sup>32</sup> They also visited Fengtian, one of the major cities along the South Manchurian Railway, where Ebina gave a sermon before a group of both Chinese and expatriate Japanese. Though he recorded only mundane details of this visit in a brief report in *Shinjin*, Ebina also made a remarkable claim. After enjoying

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<sup>31</sup> Ebina Danjo, “Yo ga Kirisuto kan,” 35.

<sup>32</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Sen-Man dendō ryokō,” *Shinjin* 16, no. 7 (July 1915): 123. Yamaoka kept in contact with Ebina after he moved to Manchuria—there is one postcard from Yamaoka in Fushun to Ebina in Tokyo dated 13 September 1913 in which he describes his new life in Manchuria. Cd Y-63, Ebina Danjō Papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

a good night's rest at the Yamato Hotel in Fengtian, Ebina declared, "Here in Fengtian I did not miss Japan. I can say that for the first time I was witnessing the sudden rise of Japan."<sup>33</sup> Ebina's excitement—albeit for what he considered a distinctly "Japanese" modernity transplanted and expanded in Manchuria—encapsulated the confluence of Japanese imperial expansion (and its stated goals of civilizing and modernizing) and the theological claims of some in the Kumiai Kyōkai who claimed that their form of Christianity was the most advanced, and would aid in the advancement of others.

Ebina's observations about the Japanese community in Manchuria were much like his observations of the Japanese community in colonial Korea. Despite his lavish praise for the great progress already achieved in cities like Fengtian, Ebina bemoaned that this progress had been achieved at the hands of a few, extraordinary people. He described most Japanese in Manchuria as the sewage (*gesui*) of the *naichi*, which had "flowed" to Manchuria, people without vision or ideals only in search of quick economic gain.<sup>34</sup> Nonetheless, he hoped that the few exceptional people responsible for progress would be able to influence the "dregs" of Japanese society. And again, such influence was best performed through religion. Unfortunately, Ebina lamented, Christians represented such a small group among Japanese that they were as yet unable to serve as the spirit and life of the people of the nation (*kokumin zentai no seishin seimei*). Thus, it was imperative that not only more Christians make their way to Manchuria, but that Christians already residing there influence other Japanese around

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<sup>33</sup> Ebina, "Sen-Man dendō," 124.

<sup>34</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Minzoku hatten no risō," *Shinjin* 16, no. 8 (August 1915): 18-19.

them. The future of Japan's progress, Ebina declared, was inextricably linked to its ability to advance in Manchuria; therefore, Christian influence of Japanese in Manchuria was vital to advancing civilization in Manchuria, and by extension, all of Japan.<sup>35</sup>

Despite Ebina's enthusiastic words to his compatriots in Korea, urging them to accept a vision and mission particular to them, as well as his praise for the putative progress he observed in areas of Manchuria under Japanese control, his evaluation of their condition and role underwent a drastic change when he described them to communities of Japanese immigrants in the U.S. only a month later.

### **The Campaign for Education: Ebina's return to California**

The 26 July 1915 issue of the *Nichibei* (The Japanese American News), the leading Japanese vernacular newspaper in San Francisco, opened with the headline, "Welcoming Mr. Ebina." Appearing above news of ongoing war on the Russian front, the article informed readers of the importance and timeliness of Ebina's imminent arrival: in a word, "influencing the character" (*jinkaku no kanka*) of Japanese in America.<sup>36</sup> The Kumiai minister Nukaga Kajinosuke, who had arrived in San Francisco

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<sup>35</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Minzoku hatten no risō," *Shinjin* 16, no. 8 (August 1915): 20-22. Ebina also singles out the role of women—particularly Christian women—to raise up proper households that would in turn influence the rest of Japanese society in Manchuria. By explicitly pointing out that there were more and more "good and upright" women arriving in Manchuria, he was implicitly criticizing the ubiquitous presence of "bad" women (i.e. prostitutes) in Manchuria.

<sup>36</sup> "Kangei Ebina shi," *Nichibei* (26 July 1915): 1. The *Nichibei* was owned and operated by Abiko Kyūtarō, who had helped to host Ebina on his previous visit to San Francisco, and who was among the most influential members of the San Francisco Japanese community.

only three months earlier, offered his own endorsement of Ebina in the *Nichibei*: “Of late, new ideas and faith have been arising in [Ebina]. Having been influenced by the Great War in Europe, he has unique opinions concerning civilization, religion, and politics, and I think it is important that he fully express these to us.”<sup>37</sup>

While Ebina was still in Seoul, he received a request to travel immediately to the American west coast to participate in a “campaign for education” (*keihatsu undō*) among the Japanese communities along the coast. The intervening years had been particularly challenging for Japanese immigrants in California. In addition to the Gentleman’s Agreement, they were now subject to a series of so-called Alien Land Laws that prohibited them purchasing property, and faced increasingly belligerent anti-Japanese political movements, both in California and other western states. For a community with a large number of farmers, such legislation severely limited the ability of immigrants to forge deeper roots in their new homeland, or to simply secure economic stability. Chiba Toyoji, who served as one of the members of the committee that invited Ebina, explained that the decision to invite Ebina was partly due to the general demoralization of the Japanese community. It was hoped that a lengthy visit from a charismatic speaker from Japan would lift the spirits of the community, and inspire them to persevere in the face of racial discrimination and other hardships.<sup>38</sup>

Miya, Ebina’s wife, accompanied him to the U.S.

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<sup>37</sup> Nukaga [Kajinosuke], “Ebina sensei no to-Bei ni saishite,” *Nichibei* (25 July 1915): 11.

<sup>38</sup> The Ebinas were the first of three sets of visitors from Japan for the *keihatsu undō*. Kanamori Tsurin and Yamamuro Gunpei (of the Salvation Army) also participated, the former arriving in September 1915, the latter in August 1917.

Over the following two and a half months, Ebina and his wife Miya visited Japanese immigrant communities in cities like San Francisco, Oakland, and Sacramento, and smaller farming communities like Vacaville, Walnut Grove, Loomis, and Salinas. He also visited Southern California, where he traveled from Los Angeles to San Diego (with a brief foray to Tijuana in Mexico), and as far as San Bernardino to the east. From within church sanctuaries of recently completed Japanese churches to fruit orchards, the Ebinas exhorted their overseas “compatriots” to embrace their unique calling in what they considered a foreign and often hostile place.

The Ebinas’ itinerary was selected by the *keihatsu undō* committee, which consisted of members of the Zaibei Nihonjinkai (Japanese Association of America), a group organized by elites and representatives of prominent businesses for the purpose of “managing” (what they deemed) their less educated and sophisticated compatriots.<sup>39</sup> To encourage local Japanese to attend the Ebinas’ events, brief announcements were placed in vernacular newspapers. Not satisfied with this alone, members of the campaign committee also urged readers to encourage everyone they knew to attend Ebina’s so that no one would miss the opportunity to hear him; in some locations, committee members also distributed printed material to publicize Ebina’s arrival.<sup>40</sup> The details of Ebina’s visits were reported with great enthusiasm on both sides of the Pacific in nearly daily reports in the *Nichibei*, and in monthly reports by Ebina and Chiba in *Shinjin*.

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<sup>39</sup> For a more in-depth study of the Japanese Association of America, see Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, especially 43-48, 50-53. The members of the campaign committee were Uchida, Hirota Yoshirō, Nakabayashi Masaoto, Ninomiya Risaku, and Chiba Toyoji.

<sup>40</sup> *Nichibei* (27 July 1915): 7; *Nichibei* (4 August 1915): 6.

The diversity of the locations at which Ebina spoke was in marked contrast with the consistency of the content of his speeches. Whether before a group of over 1000 gathered at the sanctuary of the San Francisco Reformed Church, or before thirty migrant laborers gathered under trees in an apple orchard in Suisun, Ebina drove home the same points. In keeping with the larger goals of the campaign for education—resolving tension between Japanese immigrants and mainstream American “white” society—Ebina presented his solution to this problem while also exhorting his audiences to consider their unique role in promoting Japanese progress, and the central role Christianity was meant to play for both of these problems.

In his first address given before a Japanese immigrant audience, at the Post Street Reformed Church in San Francisco, Ebina combined observations of his recent visit to Korea and Manchuria with those of the Japanese communities in the United States and what these reflected on the nature of the “Japanese race.” Declaring that Japanese—wherever they lived—were responsible for furthering Japanese civilization, Ebina offered an analysis of the specific contributions overseas Japanese could make. The contributions of Japanese outside of Japan were an extension of the “remarkable progress” accomplished through the initiative of so-called commoners (*heimin*), as opposed to the former samurai class, previously responsible for leading Japan.<sup>41</sup> In areas that were being “pioneered” (*kaitaku*) by Japanese settlers, it was the commoners, again, who demonstrated the greatest initiative and activity. However, in the most popular “frontiers,” settlers were aided by powerful organizations: in the northern island of

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<sup>41</sup> Ebina also uses the compound “*nō-kō-shō*,” or peasant-artisan-merchant, to describe this group.

Hokkaido, settlements were supported by the Hokkaido Development Office; in the colony of Korea, settlers enjoyed the support of the Government-General and the leadership of men such as the financier, Itō Hirobumi, and Governor-General Terauchi Masatake; in Manchuria, the Southern Manchurian Railway's formidable capital and the leadership of Gotō Shinpei created an environment amenable to the development of Japanese settlements.<sup>42</sup> In sharp contrast, Japanese immigrants in the U.S. enjoyed no such advantages: they were pioneers in a true sense, forging their own lives out of nothing in a friendless frontier.

Despite acknowledging the unique challenges Japanese immigrants in the United States faced, Ebina considered these to be of secondary importance. In fact, he insisted, the greatest challenge faced by Japanese immigrants was not, as they believed, the hostility they were facing in the form of alien land laws and anti-Japanese agitation. Rather, the challenge this community faced was overcoming the greatest weakness of the "Japanese race": the lack of a sense of individuality, or the inability to excel as well as individuals as they were able to as part of organized groups.<sup>43</sup> As long as immigrants continued to locate their "sense of self" (*jiko no sonzai*) through their relationships to parents, family, and ancestral home, they lacked individual self-awareness. But the advantage Japanese in America possessed over their "compatriots" in Japan, or even in the colonies, was that the act of immigration was an individual act, and their experience upon immigrating was defined by relentless individualized competition. In short,

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<sup>42</sup> Chiba Toyoji, "Keihatsu undō dai-ichi hō," *Shinjin* 16 (September 1915): 96-97. An identical transcription of this address appears as "Ebina Danjō shi dai-ikkai no kōen," *Nichibei* (29 July 1915): 2.

<sup>43</sup> Chiba Toyoji, "Keihatsu undō dai-ichi hō," 97.

Indeed, this new land of North America can be considered a great testing ground for the Japanese people (*Nihon minzoku*). If [immigrants] succeed in advancing in this land, eventually they will bring new honor to the Japanese people (*Nihon kokumin*).<sup>44</sup>

The role Ebina assigned to his audience, then, was to stand at the vanguard of the advancing Japanese race. Rather than consider their current hardships as a misfortune, he exhorted, they should view them as an integral part of their own development. Faced with hostility and hardship, far from the support of powerful Japanese institutions, Japanese immigrants in the U.S. were in fact *best* positioned to be transformed into “new men and women” who would educate and lead their compatriots. Unlike Japanese in the empire, Japanese in America were being tested, and through such testing would have the weaknesses inherent to the Japanese race removed from them, transforming them into people with the ability to advance as individuals, who in turn could lead the nation.

Ebina preached this message, with slight variations, before groups of Japanese immigrants in Oakland, Berkeley, Alameda, Monterey, Salinas, Walnut Grove, Watsonville, Vacaville, and other farming towns in Northern California. At times Ebina emphasized a certain form of internationalism in his addresses, such as when he delivered an address titled “The calling of Christians on the coast” which he gave before an ecumenical group of Japanese Protestants in San Francisco. In this address, Ebina stressed how Christianity served as a point of commonality among Japanese immigrants

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<sup>44</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Keihatsu undō dai-ichi hō,” 98.

and Americans. Thus the hardships Japanese immigrants were facing in California could be resolved through the equalizing influence of Christianity.<sup>45</sup>

At other moments, Ebina emphasized what he considered the discrepancy in civilization between American mainstream society and Japan (and its overseas extension, the Japanese immigrant community). In a talk before a crowd of 300 in the farming community of Watsonville, Ebina presented a historical analysis, comparing the (in his opinion) unsuccessful attempt at expansion undertaken by Chinese with the superior and successful attempts of Anglo-Saxons, exemplified by the founding and subsequent expansion of the United States. The greatest distinguishing feature, according to Ebina, was ideals—absent in the former, but valued by the latter. Given the importance placed on ideals in the U.S., Ebina argued, Japanese would refine their own ideals by living in America. Further, Japanese would thrive in the “free and democratic” environment in America.<sup>46</sup>

In Vacaville, Ebina preached in the local Buddhist church’s sanctuary. He informed his audience that the purpose of his visit was to encourage the global advancement of the Japanese people (*Nihon minzoku sekai hatten*). As he had in earlier talks, Ebina contextualized the experiences of Japanese in America by comparing their experiences with those of Japanese who were “pioneering” other areas:

The people of Japan advanced from Kyūshū in the west, eventually moving eastward, developing (*kaitaku*) Hokkaido, and finally advancing into Korea, Manchuria, and China. However, each place is one step below [Japan] and furthermore, they have settled under the protection of

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<sup>45</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Keihatsu undō dai-san hō,” *Shinjin* 16, no. 10 (October 1915): 132.

<sup>46</sup> Chiba Toyoji, “Keihatsu undō dai-san hō,” 132-133.

the government. But the situation here in the fields of North America is utterly different. In other words, there are certainly difficulties [for Japanese immigrants] because this country is more advanced. But there is great meaning to the advancement of the Japanese people here in the United States.<sup>47</sup>

There are many methods of bringing this about, but first of all people must possess strong resolve. They must have the commitment (*kakugo*) to stay here even if it means death.<sup>48</sup>

The content of Ebina's sermons were reported by Chiba, who dutifully submitted reports to *Shinjin* and the *Nichibei*. Ebina himself submitted separate observations to *Shinjin*, mostly subjective observations of his experiences during the trip, and expressed admiration for how San Francisco had been transformed since his previous visit. No longer devastated from the earthquake, he remarked, San Francisco reflected the degree to which American civilization was above that of Japan's.<sup>49</sup> In contrast, when he attended the Panama-Pacific International Exposition being held at Golden Gate Park, he lamented what he considered to be the almost "school boy-like imitations" in the Japanese exhibit and the lackluster Golden Pavilion and great Buddha replicas.<sup>50</sup> The sorry state of the Japanese exhibit, he continued, only further accentuated the gulf between progress in America with that in Japan.

In the farming town of Suisun, Ebina met with a group of about thirty Japanese laborers in an apple orchard. Observing their working environment, Ebina remarked that their lives there were enjoyable (*tanoshii*). He also commented on how some of those

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<sup>47</sup> Chiba Toyoji, "Keihatsu undō dai-san hō," 136.

<sup>48</sup> "[Vacaville] Ebina shi keihatsu kōen," *Nichibei* (15 August 1915): 6.

<sup>49</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Chihō kōen no bōchū kara," *Shinjin* 16, no. 10 (October 1915): 128.

<sup>50</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Chihō kōen no bōchū kara," 130.

who met him traveled several miles by horse-drawn cart, bringing their families with them. He found their efforts charming, a pastoral image of Japanese immigrant laborers who accepted their work in orchards without complaint. With no consideration or reflection upon the drudgery of this work, or the economic and legal limitations that confined these immigrants to this type of labor, Ebina embraced them and what he interpreted as their almost childlike enthusiasm to hear him. While he continuously stressed a unique role for Japanese immigrants in America, and distinguished them from Japanese in the colonies (and presumably colonial subjects), he nonetheless arrogated to himself the privileged role of interpreting and categorizing these immigrants' labor and experiences, and in doing so, drew a distinct line between himself and them. They were meant to offer their labor and lives to Japan, and contribute towards building the Japanese kingdom of God, but they themselves were not meant to determine what role they were to play.

Despite his expressions of sympathy and compassion, Ebina's remarkable indifference towards the realities of Japanese immigrant life can be clearly seen in his interpretation of why Japanese were now subjected to discriminatory land laws. In his report to the readers of *Shinjin* Ebina explained that among Japanese immigrants there were those who owned land and others who farmed land owned by others, and that the difference in their stations paralleled that of samurai and tenant farmers in the Tokugawa period. He ascribed the status of Japanese immigrants to their unwillingness to commit to living in the U.S., remarking that, "because they lack the commitment to stay here, they are overtaken by Italians, so that [Italians] became landowners while

they remained tenant farmers. While they were doing this, the land law was issued, so that now they are at a disadvantage, which is truly unfortunate.”<sup>51</sup>

Ebina’s almost callous disregard for the harsh conditions under which many Japanese laborers worked in the orchards and farms of California’s Central Valley reveal a dissonance between his understanding of the place of immigrant communities and the realities faced by these communities. As far as Ebina was concerned, the Japanese immigrant community in the U.S. was accountable to Japan even as it put down roots in a foreign land. By extension, Japanese immigrant Christians were responsible for the moral reform of the immigrant community. In other words, immigrant Christians were faced with the double burden of enduring material hardships as a form of spiritual trial while also shouldering the task of elevating the moral condition of their compatriots. Ebina, who was invited by community elites to help “reform” Japanese immigrants in order to improve the community’s circumstances amidst increasing hostility and tension, conflated the behavior of immigrants with the more general status of Japan. Though he urged immigrants to consider the difficulties they faced as a means by which to be transformed into hardy individuals, he simultaneously charged them with the weighty responsibility of representing Japan. The apparent contradiction here did not seem to trouble Ebina. Only individuals could perform the task of transforming Japan; at the same time, each individual needed to embrace the ultimate goal of transforming Japan. Thus individuals were to remain

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<sup>51</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Chihō kōen no bōchū kara,” 127.

individuals only so long as it gave them greater strength of character and initiative to work collectively towards transforming the nation.

**Hope for a New World:  
Ebina's 1919 Visit**

In February 1919, the Ebina family departed for an extended journey to Europe and the United States. Ebina's main reason for this trip was to "observe" the birth of the League of Nations. Convinced that the League of Nations was the manifestation of how far human civilization had progressed, Ebina declared his desire to go, "merely as a representative of the people," to "witness the birth of this League."<sup>52</sup> His enthusiasm for the League lay in his belief that through the League, international diplomacy would proceed according to Christian principles: in short, the League represented the dawning of God's kingdom of earth.<sup>53</sup> The decision that his wife would accompany him was based on his belief that women were crucial to bringing about this new age.<sup>54</sup> After making a brief stop in Shanghai, they made their way to London and then to Paris, where over a ten-month period, the Ebina family visited local sites, attended religious conferences, and met with important political and religious figures. Ebina also engrossed himself in reading newspaper reports of the progress at the Paris Peace Conference and the first meetings of the League of Nations.<sup>55</sup> In November, they left Europe for the U.S. and returned to

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<sup>52</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Waga to-Ō no kan," *Shinjin* 20, no. 2 (February 1919): 7.

<sup>53</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Waga to-Ō no kan," 8.

<sup>54</sup> Ebina Danjō, "Waga to-Ō no kan," 10.

the west coast where they stayed for over a month, visiting many of the same churches and communities they had visited in 1915.

This was also a critical moment in Ebina's career. After serving as the head minister of Hongō church for over twenty years, he was offered a new position while still in London: president of Dōshisha University. He postponed his formal resignation from his position at Hongō until returning to Japan, but entered into negotiations with Dōshisha while still abroad. Fascinated with the spiritual potential of the League of Nations, excited by the prospect that this international body dedicated to peace might become the manifestation of God's kingdom on earth, and about to embark on a new role in his own career, Ebina arrived in the U.S. eager for new possibilities and brimming with idealistic optimism.

During their month-long stay in California, the Ebinas followed a rigorous schedule, speaking before both English- and Japanese-speaking audiences in San Francisco, Livingston, Fresno, Sacramento, Oakland, Berkeley, Salinas, Watsonville, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, and Pasadena.<sup>55</sup> In both his English- and Japanese-language addresses, Ebina enthusiastically preached on Japan's new role in "the reconstruction of the world" following World War I. To his Japanese immigrant audiences, he more specifically pressed them on the role Japanese in America had for transforming their ancestral homeland.

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<sup>55</sup> The Ebina Danjō Papers housed at Doshisha University includes an extensive set of clippings taken from London newspapers on the establishment of the League of Nations and the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference.

<sup>56</sup> Interestingly, there are no reports of this trip to California in *Shinjin*; the only reports appeared in *Hongō kyōkai geppō*, the Hongō church's monthly newsletter.

Chiba Toyoji, still in San Francisco, published one of Ebina's English-language addresses in the form of a pamphlet. Titled "The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan," the address was presented as "a message to the American people, at the close of the world war."<sup>57</sup> After presenting a brief overview of Japan's many successes and accomplishments since it was forced open by Commodore Perry in 1853, Ebina pleaded with his audience to embrace the new internationalism that had emerged with the end of the war as the best fulfillment of Christian ideals. Nationalism, the previous ideal, was an imperfect, even dangerous ideal to aspire to. But the criticism of a nation for nationalism by other countries pursuing only national interests, such as the criticism leveled at Japan over its occupation of Shandong province, was nothing more than "the conflict of self-interest against self-interest, capitalism against capitalism, and nationalism against nationalism, which will finally lead nations to war."<sup>58</sup> The best solution for Japan and America, Ebina declared, was for both nations to adopt internationalism.

Not only did internationalism resolve the problem of modern wars, but it was also closest to an ideal Christian world:

Was not the selfish ambition of German imperialism beaten down by the higher ideal of humanity and the international interest of the Allies? If we have faith in reason, and in the progress of humanity, and above all in God, we cannot but hope in the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. Is not international brotherhood nearer to the Kingdom of God than national brotherhood? No nation can enter God's kingdom unless it be born anew and become international and supernational.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., "The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan," (San Francisco: T. Chiba, 1919), 1.

<sup>58</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., "The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan," 4.

And, according to Ebina, the League of Nations was the beginning of the fulfillment of this ideal: “Nothing less than such a gigantic and sublime scheme as the League of Nations can satisfy the requirement of the Christian consciousness. Whether it be perfect or imperfect, it must be viewed as the beginning of a new age.”<sup>60</sup> Ebina was not merely concerned with the League of Nations in general, but also expressed his concern for how Japan would fare in this “new age.”

Ebina had other reasons for sharing his newfound enthusiasm for the League of Nations with his American audience. Amidst his expressions of expectation and anticipation for what this new internationalism could accomplish, Ebina also cautioned against American hostility towards Japan:

I am sorry to say that some of your representative statesmen have been driving Japan more and more to Prussianism. Are not some Americans becoming more and more nationalistic and reactionary? I believe that tendency is only in appearance. But it has, I frankly tell you, been casting a dark shadow upon the mind of the Japanese. The American influence that Japan will not be able to resist must come from another and higher source.<sup>61</sup>

Internationalism, as manifested in the League of Nations, represented for Ebina a solution for multiple concerns. As long as nations adhered to this ideal, there would be no more conflicts that would lead to wars like the one that had just concluded. In order for nations to adhere to this principle, the people in these nations also had to embrace these ideals. For this to happen, individuals needed to embrace the morality upon which

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<sup>59</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., “The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan,” 4.

<sup>60</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., “The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan,” 4.

<sup>61</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., “The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan,” 6.

this utopian internationalism was based: Christianity. Ebina compared the adoption of internationalism with the process of conversion, and urged his American audience to consider encouraging Japan to enter this “international brotherhood” just as important a goal as the work of converting individuals: “This moral influence accelerates the process of Japan’s conversion from national brotherhood to international brotherhood. You know how to deal with an individual to convert him to Christianity. In the same spirit the conversion of the nation must be brought about.”<sup>62</sup> Ultimately, Ebina found in the notion of “international brotherhood” a system that would enable Japan to achieve its full potential as “a new democratic, international” nation and be equal to other nations, all united through a Christian international brotherhood.<sup>63</sup> And Japanese immigrants, and their American-born children, could look forward to playing a critical role in enabling this lofty goal to become a reality.

## **Conclusion**

As the minister of a prominent Tokyo church, Ebina Danjō claimed for himself the role of moral reformer, civilizer, and visionary. Not content with limiting his activities to preaching and evangelizing in Japan, and concerned with the nature of overseas Japanese communities, Ebina made numerous trips to the U.S. and Asia to observe, preach, and influence. But during the course of these visits, Ebina also sought out in these locations new possibilities for progress and reform he believed were unattainable

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<sup>62</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., “The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan,” 6-7.

<sup>63</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., “The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan,” 8.

in Japan. In his exhortations to communities of overseas Japanese in such disparate locations as San Francisco, Salinas, Watsonville, Seoul, P'yŏngyang, or Andong, Ebina reinterpreted local difficulties and outright hostility as spiritual trials necessary for greater progress.

Ebina's interactions with the communities abroad were constrained by busy schedules devised by local elites, and his interpretation of what he observed were filtered through his own assumptions based on an elite bias and lofty visions. Rather than recognizing the poverty and limited opportunities in the *naichi* that had compelled these Japanese to seek out new lives abroad, or the economic inequalities and racial laws that constricted immigrants' and settlers' lives once there, Ebina looked for and found in these places a different training ground for the new man.

In the address published by Chiba, Ebina explained to his American audience why Christianity and internationalism together were integral to Japan's continued progress: "Anglo-American religious influence...has given [Japan] a new ideal, a new sentiment, a new aspiration, a new energy, a new consciousness...." The result was the emergence of the *new man*: "This new man contradicts his environment, political, social and individual. He is struggling and travailing in pain to redeem Japan from her old conditions, and to break the hard shell of nationalism and militarism."<sup>64</sup> While Ebina no doubt placed particular emphasis on the "Anglo-American" nature of this influence because of the composition of his audience, nonetheless, the sentiments he expressed here dovetailed with his sermons to Japanese American communities. Ebina considered

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<sup>64</sup> Rev. D. Ebina, D.D., "The Influence of America on the Reconstruction of Japan," 5.

what he acknowledged to be an often harsh and friendless environment to be the crucible necessary to remove the taints that were preventing the emergence of the new man necessary to bring about God's kingdom on earth in a new Japan.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### **Making Koreans Japanese: A Gospel for Japan's New Colonial Subjects**

*The first [western] evangelists wore Korean clothes and spoke Korean, and we can imagine the difficulties these missionaries underwent. However, because of this, Koreans became Christians, but this was in religious terms only, for in other things they remained as Korean as ever. Christians in the West lead their fields, but this is not true in Korea. In Japan as well, Christians are the vanguard of change, but in Korea [Christians] are conservative (bound to tradition), and Korean Christians know nothing about applying Christianity to their entire lives.<sup>1</sup>*

--Watase Tsuneyoshi

*If we always remain subordinate to the foreign missions agencies, how can we demonstrate to [Korean Christians] a faith that is founded on independent self-governance? The many denominations in Japan do not have the credentials to civilize Koreans, and have no qualifications to lead the 300,000 Korean Christians. As long as we lack these qualifications, with what reason can we demand to have transferred the right to civilize Koreans from foreign missionaries to ourselves?<sup>2</sup>*

--Ebina Danjō

From 1911 to 1921, the Kumiai Kyōkai operated a mission in colonial Korea. Though short-lived, the mission is significant because it was the denomination's most direct attempt to align its activities with Japan's expansion abroad. It was also a formidable task; the Kumiai Kyōkai had been in existence for only twenty-five years, and it lacked the administrative and financial infrastructure that supported major

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<sup>1</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, "Chōsen Kirisutokyōto no kakusei," *Shinjin* 14 no. 3 (March 1913): 57-58.

<sup>2</sup> Ebina Danjō, *Kokumin dōtoku to Kirisutokyō* (Tokyo: Hokubunkan, 1912), 113.

western missions agencies. The denomination had only recently declared nominal independence from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the American missions agency with which it was associated, and it was still dependent on financial support from the American Board to maintain its fledgling domestic churches.<sup>3</sup> Yet, in June 1911, in an editorial in the denominational newspaper *Kirisutokyō sekai*, the Osaka church's minister, Miyagawa Tsuneteru, declared: "Our Kumiai Kyōkai has 20,000 members, and now that we have become an independent and self-governing organization, we have the good fortune to be presented with the opportunity to evangelize in Korea. It is still unknown what kind of work we can accomplish, or what work awaits us in the future, but we will do it, because this is something we are meant to do."<sup>4</sup> The denominational leadership enthusiastically supported the mission's inception, and over the following ten years, at least six ministers moved to Korea to work as missionaries. The Government-General of Korea also demonstrated its support through an annual contribution of six thousand yen, a substantial amount without which the mission could not continue its work.

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<sup>3</sup> In 1895, the Kumiai Kyōkai passed a resolution declaring the independence of its evangelistic work from the ABCFM at its annual conference. However, in reality, the Kumiai Kyōkai was still dependent on financial support from the ABCFM. In 1905, the Kumiai Kyōkai and ABCFM missionaries passed an additional resolution that designated foreign missionaries as supporters of the church, and included a provision establishing the full financial independence of Kumiai Kyōkai churches from the ABCFM. However, even after this resolution, the Kumiai Kyōkai continued to receive money from the American Board. As a result, during the subsequent period, the Kumiai Kyōkai re-organized its evangelistic priorities from establishing new churches to encouraging existing churches to become fully self-supporting. Shiono Kazuo, "Nihon Kumiai Kirisutokyōkai shi," in *Nihon Purotesutanto sho kyōha shi no kenkyū*, ed. Dōshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1997), 121-147, especially 123-133.

<sup>4</sup> Miyagawa Tsuneteru, "Shasetsu: Shin dōhō no kyōka," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (22 June 1911): 1.

The Kumiai Kyōkai's partnership with the Government General, though advantageous at the time, has led Japanese scholars to dismiss the mission outright as a blatant attempt by the Kumiai Kyōkai to curry favor with the Japanese government.<sup>5</sup> There is no question that the mission was conceived in part to support the Government General's policy of assimilating Koreans in order to transform them into imperial subjects (*dōka seisaku*).<sup>6</sup> At the same time, Japanese missionaries were also motivated by other concerns, both at home and in Korea, that they hoped could be resolved most effectively through successfully evangelizing and transforming Koreans.

Why did members of the Kumiai Kyōkai feel compelled to operate a costly mission in Korea? And what does the mission—from its activities to how it was perceived at home—contribute to an understanding of the relationship between Japanese

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<sup>5</sup> The first scholar who studied the Kumiai Kyōkai's Korea mission and criticized it for its cooperation with Japanese government policy in Korea was Matsuo Takayoshi; his articles on the mission were translated into English: S. Takiguchi, translator, "The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part I: The Missionary of the Japanese Congregational Church in Korea" and "The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part II: The 1<sup>st</sup> March Movement and the Japanese Christians," *Modern Asian Studies* 13 no. 3, 4 (1979). Though only a few Japanese scholars who study Christianity have addressed the Korea mission, two in particular, Han Sokki and Iinuma Jirō, have published several works. Each of these scholars follow a similar argument, and criticize the Kumiai Kyōkai for collaborating with the Japanese government at the expense of sharing "true Christian values" with Koreans.

<sup>6</sup> The Japanese government's assimilation policy in its colonies is a central issue in the study of Japanese imperialism, and is far too complex and broad for me to address here in a comprehensive way. It was not implemented uniformly across colonies or over time; for instance, the Government General of Taiwan's approach was different from that of the Government General of Korea. And even in the case of Korea, the areas targeted for assimilation—language, names, registration status, to name a few—were treated differently during different periods. At the most basic level, the assimilation policy was based on the assumption that traits that distinguished colonized peoples from Japanese—such as language—should be erased, and it was implemented based on the claims that Koreans and Taiwanese could be transformed into imperial subjects. However, this "potential" to become imperial subjects continued to be illusory; colonized subjects were expected to perform the duties and responsibilities of imperial subjects, but were denied for most of the colonial period any avenue to direct participation in governance. Even when limited participation was allowed in the 1920s, a clear distinction between colonized subjects and Japanese imperial subjects remained firmly in place in reality, though government rhetoric continued to maintain that transformation into imperial subjects was something possible, and desirable, for colonized subjects.

Christians and the Japanese empire? In this chapter, I will focus on the Korea mission to address how members of the Kumiai Kyōkai attempted to implement their belief that their own divine calling, as they perceived it, converged with the future of the Japanese empire. Due to the denomination's decentralized administrative structure, detailed reports of the mission's activities are sparse.<sup>7</sup> Occasional reports appeared in the denominational newspaper, *Kirisutokyō sekai*, as well as in *Shinjin* (The New Man), the monthly journal associated with Ebina Danjō's Hongō church in Tokyo. Watase Tsuneyoshi, who served as the director for the duration of the mission, published treatises, travelogues, and pamphlets, which mostly focused on his own activities. The first years of the mission are described in great detail in several different sources, whereas there are few reports after 1915. Watase's activities are best documented, but the activities of other missionaries—and even more so the Koreans who joined the mission—are much harder to reconstruct. Within the limitations imposed by these sources, I will address three major themes. First, I will consider the mission's position within the larger social and political context through a careful reconstruction of the mission's early activities, from the establishment of the headquarters to the incorporation of the first Korean churches. I will also consider regional differences in the mission's approaches and strategies. Second, I will re-examine the relationship between Japanese missionaries and the Government General by focusing on the first

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, according to annual conference reports, the mission published a monthly newsletter, *Kirisutokyō geppō*, possibly in Korean, and another newsletter, *Chōsen Kirisutokyō jihō*, in Japanese, but neither is extant. Of course, in addition to the denomination's administrative structure, the fact that Korea suffered catastrophic damage during the Korean War, and that many of the Korean ministers and evangelists associated with the mission are considered pro-Japanese collaborators in Korea, have probably contributed to the dearth of materials associated with the mission.

annual conference of the Korea mission, held in 1913. Last, I will address the tenuous position of the mission within the larger context of the Japanese domestic church by exploring the mission's continuous struggle to raise sufficient financial support despite its claims of phenomenal success.

**Background:  
Joining the Korea Mission Field**

In July 1911, Watase Tsuneyoshi, the newly appointed director of the Kumiai Kyōkai's mission in colonial Korea, began setting up shop in Keijō (colonial Seoul).<sup>8</sup> After a brief search, he located a suitable Korean-style residence. He found it to be shockingly unhygienic (a comment he often made about Koreans and Korean homes) and infested with lice, so he put his Korean helpers to work, and occupied his time by visiting with Government General officials and other prominent members of the expatriate Japanese community. During his absence, his Korean assistants cleared the room of grime and vermin, and soon after, the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission headquarters was unveiled to Keijō residents.<sup>9</sup> Having spent nearly ten years, from 1899-1907, in Keijō, as the warden of a Japanese school, Keijō Gakudō, prior to the Japanese empire's colonization of Korea, Watase was familiar with Korea, committed to a broadly defined program of education and moral reform for Japan's new colonial subjects, and a rising leader in the

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<sup>8</sup> In all existing English-language scholarship, this name has been Romanized as Watase. However, upon confirming with surviving relatives, I have discovered that the proper Romanization is Wataze. I have decided to keep the Romanization as Watase for now, to maintain consistency with existing scholarship.

<sup>9</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, "Chōsen dendō kaishi no ki," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (27 July 1911): 4.

Kumiai Kyōkai.<sup>10</sup> Watase was not alone. There were already two Japanese ministers in Korea: Yonezawa Naozō, at the resident Japanese church in Keijō, and Takahashi Yōzō, recently appointed minister of the resident Japanese church in P'yōngyang.<sup>11</sup> Yamamoto Tadayoshi replaced Yonezawa soon after. Watase, Yamamoto, and Takahashi formed the Japanese core of the Korea mission.

These men were not, of course, the only Christian missionaries in Korea.<sup>12</sup> The Chosŏn court resisted foreign intrusion, and outlawed Christianity, partly out of fear that Korean Christian converts would enable western countries to infiltrate and undermine its authority. However, following the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, an unequal treaty that Japan forced onto the Chosŏn court through its own deployment of gunboat diplomacy, western nations soon signed their own unequal treaties with Korea. Though the Chosŏn court did not immediately lift its ban on Christianity, nonetheless, American

missionaries arrived soon after: in 1884, Horace N. Allen of the American Presbyterian

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<sup>10</sup> Keijō Gakudō was founded by a Christian educational organization, Dai Nihon Kaigai Kyōikukai (the Great Japanese Overseas educational association) headed by Methodist minister Honda Yōitsu, one of a handful of parochial organizations that claimed for themselves the responsibility of educating Koreans in a way that would “civilize” them—that is, make them amenable to Japanese influence—prior to outright colonization. The curriculum included Japanese language instruction as well as instruction in several basic subjects, and the students ranged from traditional-aged to more mature students. When the Japanese empire coerced Korea into becoming its protectorate in 1905, the government slowly took over existing private Japanese educational institutions. Keijō Gakudō was closed down in 1907, at which point Watase returned to Japan and was appointed minister of Kobe church, the oldest and one of the most prestigious Kumiai Kyōkai churches.

<sup>11</sup> The Keijō church was established during Miyagawa Tsuneteru’s visit in 1904. The P’yōngyang church was established by Yamada Heikichi in 1907.

<sup>12</sup> Neither were they the only Japanese missionaries in Korea. In addition to Kumai Kyōkai missionaries, there were missionaries from the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai and Japanese Methodist Church, though they focused on evangelizing the resident Japanese population. In addition to Christian missionaries, there were also missionaries from several of the main Buddhist sects in Korea by this time; additionally, there were members of new Japanese religions, such as Konkokyō and Tenrikyō, who also evangelized among resident Japanese and Koreans. For the most comprehensive study on the Japanese Buddhist missionaries, see Micah L. Auerback, “Japanese Buddhism in an Age of Empire: Mission and Reform in Colonial Korea, 1877-1931,” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2007).

Church (Northern) arrived, followed in 1885 by Horace G. Underwood—also of the Presbyterian Church—and Henry G. Appenzeller of the Methodist Episcopal Church (Northern).

Korea was one of the last Asian countries to be penetrated by Protestant missionaries; as a result, the missionaries in Korea were able to benefit from the experiences of colleagues who had gone to other countries, such as China and Japan, and implemented policies and practices that had already been tested elsewhere. The foremost example of these was the Nevius method, a system for starting native churches based on the assumption that native churches would best be sustained if they were self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating from their inception. Initially attempted, though unsuccessfully, by Presbyterian missionaries in China, the Nevius method became a central part of Presbyterian missions policy in Korea, and it was considered a significant factor in the relatively rapid spread of Christianity on the Korean peninsula.<sup>13</sup> Also, Protestant denominations—which by 1910 included Canadian

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<sup>13</sup> For more on the Nevius method, see Charles Clark, *The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1930), and Harry Rhodes, editor, "Initial Methods and Policies," *History of the Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 1884-1934* (Seoul: Chosen Mission Presbyterian Church, 1934), 80-94. It should be noted that though missionaries often attributed their apparent successes to their use of the Nevius method, other factors could have been just as significant in the rapid increase of Christian converts, especially in the northern regions, where most of the conversions were concentrated. For instance, compared to the area around Seoul, the northern region was less densely populated, and on average, people were better educated while also excluded from reaching the highest levels of government bureaucracy due to favoritism shown to applicants from the south. In other words, the northern region—where churches were more likely to be self-supporting and self-propagating—was socially and politically better positioned for the implementation of the Nevius method in the first place. The Methodists, who were more concentrated around Seoul and the agrarian villages in provinces south of Seoul, had a much more difficult time in encouraging self-support and self-propagation, and consequently financially subsidized more churches than the Presbyterians did. See Roy E. Shearer, "How Did the Fire in the Northwest Spread?," *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea* (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1966). However, regardless of whether or not the Nevius method was as effective as missionaries claimed, it nonetheless figured largely in their own reports as a central reason for the rapid increase in Korean converts.

and Australian Presbyterians, Anglicans, American Episcopalians, the Salvation Army, and several other smaller denominations—agreed to segregate their respective activities by region, to avoid inter-denominational competition over potential Korean converts. In just a little over twenty years, at least according to western missionaries, Korea had emerged as one of the most promising sites for Christian evangelism. Around one percent of the population had converted to either Roman Catholicism or Protestant Christianity, missionaries ran numerous schools and several hospitals, many prominent Korean intellectuals were converts, and a combination of itinerating foreign missionaries and Korean interpreters, colporteurs selling Christian tracts and Bibles, and Bible women, were making significant inroads into the countryside.<sup>14</sup>

If converting Koreans had been the Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries' primary objective, they may have been content entrusting evangelizing Koreans to American missionaries, who were better supported and more established, at least until the Kumiai Kyōkai had become more stable. However, this was not the case. Though leaders such as Watase, Ebina Danjō and Miyagawa Tsuneteru maintained that their primary motive was to “rescue” Koreans from “spiritual deprivation” through Christian conversion, the mission was also viewed by these Christians as a significant opportunity to prove the legitimacy of the Japanese Christian church to two important audiences: other Japanese,

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<sup>14</sup> In a 1909 report, Canadian YMCA missionary James Gale stated, “Each new year’s statistics from Korea seems more remarkable than the last. The first converts were baptized in the summer of 1886. By 1890 the number of converts connected with all missions was somewhat over 100. As compared with many other fields, this is a rapid growth. Dr. Beach’s *Geography and Atlas of Protestant Missions* gives the figures at the end of the year 1900 as follows: ‘All Protestant missionaries including wives, 141; stations, 26; outstations, 354; communicants, 8,288. The latest statistics available read: missionaries, 248; stations, 37; outstations, 1,149; communicants, 50,089; adherents, 111,379. ...Already the country is waking up and a new era is dawning.’” James Gale, *Korea in Transition* (New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1909), 227-228.

and American missionaries. These Christians hoped to demonstrate to other Japanese that they too were worthy imperial subjects despite their adherence to a foreign religion, through securing the allegiance of colonized Koreans by converting them to a specifically Japanese form of Christianity. They also needed to establish, once and for all, their full independence from the American Board. If they could successfully evangelize others, they would prove their maturity as Christians; if they could support and sustain a foreign mission, they could also achieve the financial independence that had so far eluded them. Additionally, the successful conversion and assimilation of Koreans would be proof to the outside (i.e. Western) world that Japan was a fully civilized and progressive empire. Only through successfully spreading its civilization abroad could it prove that it had succeeded at home as well. But the hopes of these missionaries that the mission would demonstrate the validity of their claims belied a vague anxiety. These Christians' optimism for the potential success of the mission was interspersed with a continuous anxiety over whether or not Japan was, in fact, as civilized and advanced as they hoped. In other words, these Christian leaders perceived in the behavior and practices of their compatriots, unnerving continuities with a distasteful past. It was hoped that through the very act of "reforming" Koreans, Japanese missionaries—and by extension, other Japanese, as they were exposed to the successes of the mission—would eradicate the vestiges of the pre-Meiji past from themselves as well.

The Korea mission marked the Kumiai Kyōkai's first overseas evangelistic effort. Prior to this, Kumiai Kyōkai ministers had been serving in communities outside

of Japan proper, such as Japanese immigrant communities in Hawai'i and along the U.S. west coast, as well as in Korea, but their focus had been on overseas Japanese. Unlike these previous efforts, the Korea mission focused on a foreign population: Koreans who were now under the rule of the Japanese empire. However, even this first effort to evangelize “foreigners” was initiated because they were, under Japanese colonial rule, new compatriots, and under the “benevolent rule” of the Japanese emperor, fellow imperial subjects. In this sense, the Kumiai Kyōkai's overseas missions are unusual; while the American and European missionaries—including those who had converted the Japanese—set out to distant countries and evangelized people they viewed as very different from themselves, Japanese Christians evangelized, almost exclusively, those they believed were the same, or had the potential to become the same, as themselves.<sup>15</sup> Though not the only missionaries to identify sameness—or some kind of historical unity or familial linkage—as the basis for evangelism, these missionaries' self-conscious fixation with family unity and imagined kinship as a legitimate basis for evangelism distinguished their approach from that of the American missionaries who had converted them.

What made these Japanese missionaries quite similar to the American missionaries who had gone to Japan—and most American missionaries traversing the globe—was their belief that their work in Korea was God-ordained, and that Japan's

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<sup>15</sup> Of course, evangelizing those perceived as different, both racially and culturally, was a relatively new phenomenon among Protestants, and enthusiasm for going to distant countries to convert “heathen” developed in conjunction with the rise of imperialism in the nineteenth century. In this sense, foreign missions—at least in the West—was a part of (though not necessarily subordinate to) nationalism and imperialism, which in turn had a significant impact on Japan in this same period.

successful political and economic intrusion and eventual control of Korea was a sign that God had blessed the Japanese empire. The exponential growth of the American foreign missions movement likewise followed American expansion, and its members also believed that “God had given his signs in the new winds of Western technology and power, in the timely debilitation of rival religions, and in the opening of treaty ports through which religion could flow along with commerce.”<sup>16</sup> Much of their rhetoric similarly emphasized the responsibility of Americans, with their superior culture and technology, to save less civilized peoples. Finally, western missionaries were also chauvinistic, often claiming that God had called not just any missionaries, but specifically missionaries from their nation, to go out into the world.<sup>17</sup>

One unique feature of Japanese missionary objectives was that from the outset, the Kumiai Kyōkai mission focused as much on Koreans who were already Christian as it did on Koreans who were not. This is partly because the Kumiai Kyōkai members interested in a mission in Korea also espoused a more liberal theology than did the American missionaries who were working among Koreans at the time. As is clear from Watase’s statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Watase, and others invested

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<sup>16</sup> William Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 8.

<sup>17</sup> “While the New Divinity deconstructed the national covenant, by the early nineteenth century they asserted that America (read: New England) was providentially favored to carry the gospel overseas. Theirs was a spiritual noblesse oblige linked inextricably to a developing American nationalism wherein God raised up the United States as a beacon of gospel light to the world...the admixture of this enlarged sense of obligation and the necessity of the new birth became a potent prescription for global missions.” David W. Kling, “The New Divinity and the Origins of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions,” in *North American Foreign Missions, 1810-1914*, ed. Wilbert R. Shenk (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004), 20-21.

in the mission to Korea, questioned the quality of Christianity among Koreans. At issue was not only theology in a strict sense, but perhaps more significantly, Korean Christians' attitude towards Japanese rule. Whether justified or not, the Japanese colonial government considered Christians to be the driving force behind the continued resistance to and resentment towards Japanese rule, and argued that these Korean Christians were incited by American missionaries.<sup>18</sup> And according to Watase, such resistance among Korean Christians towards Japanese rule signified a lack of understanding and internalization of Christian love, since as brothers and sisters in Christ (and now compatriots of the same empire), Korean Christians should welcome Japanese colonialists rather than resent their presence. Thus, a central aim of the Korea mission was to persuade Korean Christians that their distrust of Japanese rule arose from an inadequate or marred understanding of Christian teaching. By reshaping Koreans' perception of what it meant to be a Christian, Japanese missionaries hoped they would be able to lessen the presumably harmful influence of the American missionaries, and transform these Korean Christians into fully assimilated imperial subjects.<sup>19</sup> Nonetheless, this central message, which from the beginning asserted the

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<sup>18</sup> Though the Government General considered American missionaries a potential threat to its efforts to establish control over the Korean population, many American missionaries advocated neutrality towards or outright support of Japan's colonization of Korea. In fact, immediately after Korea was colonized, American missionaries actively discouraged Koreans from protesting Japanese rule, and removed those involved in political activities from "responsible positions in the Church." Wi Jo Kang, "Church and State Relations in the Japanese Colonial Period," in *Christianity in Korea*, eds. Robert E. Buswell and Timothy S. Lee (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 98.

<sup>19</sup> Although the Kumiai Kyōkai made it apparent in Japanese-language media that the transformation of Korean Christians was one of their principal aims, it appears that they were not as forthcoming when communicating their intentions to the American missionaries in Korea. In an article in *The Korea Mission Field*, the main missionary journal reporting on American missionary activities in Korea, the Kumiai Kyōkai's activities are described as "a movement for the conversion of unconverted Koreans" and not

mutually constituted and reinforcing goals of Christian conversion and (Japanese) civilization, shifted uncomfortably between the assertion that Christianity was necessary to “save” the Korean people from centuries of deprivation and unjust rule, and the claim that Christianity—at least as preached by western missionaries—was insufficient for achieving full spiritual transformation.

### Part I.1

*The current work [of transforming our new compatriots] is even more important than our achievement of self-governance and independence last year, and this great work of our church requires much prayer and fasting if we are to attain even the least of our goals. Seen in one way, our church’s independence was simply preparation for our current task. For if internal growth is not the foundation for expanding abroad, what use is it?<sup>20</sup>*

#### **The Mission Begins: Starting a Community in Keijō**

The Kumiai Kyōkai had already established two churches in Korea by 1910—one each in Keijō and P’yōngyang—but these were Japanese congregations with Japanese ministers who preached in Japanese, and they were not ideal as bases out of which to evangelize to Koreans.<sup>21</sup> Language proved to be an immediate barrier; though Watase

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directed towards “churches already existing.” F.H. Smith, “How Can the Korean and Japanese Churches Help Each Other?” *The Korea Mission Field* 8, no. 6 (June 1917): 147.

<sup>20</sup> “Shasetsu: Chōsen dendō kitōbi,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (8 June 1911): 1.

<sup>21</sup> Takahashi Yōzō wrote that on the first Sunday after he arrived at the P’yōngyang church, there were five or six Koreans in attendance. Apparently, these Koreans attended despite not understanding Japanese. After a month had past, there were enough Koreans present that preaching through an interpreter became

had spent nearly ten years in Korea prior to this as an educator, he had taught in Japanese, and had not learned Korean. Takahashi Yōzō, the minister at the P'yōngyang church, expressed a desire to learn Korean so that he could directly evangelize Koreans as quickly as possible, but when Watase arrived, Takahashi had only been in P'yōngyang for ten months. It became imperative that Japanese missionaries enlist the help of Koreans who were also fluent in Japanese.

When Watase arrived in Keijō in July 1911, he called upon two of his former students from Keijō Gakudō, Yu Il-sŏn and Hong Pyōng-sŏn. Though the exact details are unknown, both Yu and Hong had spent some of the intervening years between the closure of Keijō Gakudō and Japan's colonization of Korea in Japan; Yu attended an agricultural college in Tokyo, while Hong studied at the school of theology at Doshisha University in Kyoto. Watase appointed Yu an assistant director of the mission, and relied upon Hong as his principal interpreter and assistant. The dynamics of the relationship between Watase and his Korean assistants can be observed from Watase's account of preparations for the first event held for a Korean audience; this event preceded the official start of the mission, and was one of several Watase organized with the assistance of two other Japanese ministers, Ebina Danjō and Osada Tokiyuki, who traveled to Korea to help him inaugurate the mission.<sup>22</sup> Hong was asked to write up

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impractical, and he decided to try to hire a Korean evangelist and start a mission station in the Korean part of Pyongyang (or outside of the Japanese section). It is unclear if he was able to go ahead with his plans. In December 1910, Watase visited him to communicate the mission's plans, and it was decided that Takahashi would focus on the Japanese congregation and that Watase would take over responsibility for outreach to Koreans. Takahashi Yōzō, "Chōsen dendō ni tsuite," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 November 1910): 7; "Heijō kyōkai," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (12 January 1911): 11.

flyers and post them throughout the neighborhood, as well as advertise in newspapers. Watase apparently was not particularly confident in Hong's abilities, for he expressed surprise when the event attracted several hundred people. Since Watase, Ebina, and Osada could not speak Korean, Hong and Yu were also enlisted to interpret their sermons during the event. From the beginning, Watase and the other Japanese ministers depended on Korean evangelists to perform day-to-day menial tasks necessary to draw attention to the mission, and communicate with Koreans who showed interest, yet they were ultimately skeptical about the Koreans' abilities. Korean participants were critical to the mission's work, but they were not equal partners.

On July 16, Watase held a meeting with a small group of supporters in the cramped rooms of the mission headquarters. In attendance were three Japanese—including one woman, Fuchizawa Noeko—and five Koreans.<sup>23</sup> The small group discussed how they were going to begin their ministry to Koreans in Keijō. According

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<sup>22</sup> The three men traveled to Keijō, Inchōn, Taegu, and P'yōngyang, speaking at Japanese churches and other resident Japanese organizations. In Keijō, they also held several meetings at the homes of prominent resident Japanese. Their visit was covered in the Japanese-language newspapers in each of the cities they visited. Osada Tokiyuki (1860-1939) was born in Okayama City, attended Tsukiji College in Tokyo until it closed, and continued on to James Ballah's school in Yokohama. In 1883, he served temporarily as the minister of the Reinanzaka church in Tokyo, after which he attended the school of theology at Doshisha University in Kyoto. In 1890, he traveled to the U.S., where he attended the Chicago Theological Seminary. After returning to Japan, he was appointed the director of the Japan Missionary Society. When he visited Korea in 1910, he was the minister of the Tenma church in Osaka, and headmaster of the Baika Jogakkō, or girl's school, also located in the Osaka area.

<sup>23</sup> The one woman in attendance, Fuchizawa Noeko, was the headmistress of the Shukumei Higher School for Girls in Keijō, and provided Watase with temporary lodgings when his move into the headquarters was delayed by the lice infestation. She had had experience teaching in Kumamoto Prefecture, and with the support of Watase, among others, she helped to establish the Korean branch of the Women's Patriotic Association (Aikoku fujinkai Kankoku shibu) and the Korea-Japan women's association (Kan-Nichi fujinkai) in 1906. Apparently, she was criticized by members of the Keijō Women's Association (Keijō fujinkai) for starting a women's association for both Japanese and Koreans. In May 1906, she founded Shinmei Jogakkō, a girl's school, where all instruction was given in Japanese. Takasaki Sōji, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin* (Iwanami shinsho, 2002), 101.

to Watase's report, the meeting was held in both Korean and Japanese. Hong led the group in a Korean hymn, Yu read I Corinthians 13, and also gave a prayer of thanksgiving in Korean. In Japanese, Watase read a portion of "The Sermon on the Mount," Hong commented on Paul's early ministry, and Yu gave a "thought-provoking" rendering of the account of Jesus quieting the storm on the Sea of Galilee. Over sweets that Fuchizawa Noeko had prepared for the occasion, they concluded their meeting by renaming the mission headquarters the Hanyang (J: Kanyō) church.<sup>24</sup>

On November 12, the Hanyang church welcomed forty-seven people to its first service.<sup>25</sup> By the third service, there were over one hundred people in attendance.<sup>26</sup> Watase did not mention whether or not these people were already Christians. Having determined that his first efforts at planting a church had been successful, Watase next decided to open a theology study group—as the precursor to a theology school—and invited students to apply. There is no further mention of this theology study group, however, and it is unknown the extent to which these students contributed to the mission, or if the group continued to meet after the initial meeting. Regardless, much to

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<sup>24</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, "Chōsen dendō kaishi no ki," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (27 July 1911): 4.

<sup>25</sup> The date of the first church service is somewhat confusing. In Watase's July 1911 article detailing the first weeks of the mission, he makes it clear that the mission began in July. However in the December 1911 article that describes the first services, he mentions that he arrived in Korea on November 5. According to a separate *Kirisutokyō sekai* article by Takahashi Yōzō, it is clear that Watase traveled to Korea in December 1910, and met with Takahashi at that time to solidify mission policies and strategies. While this discrepancy in dates may suggest that the November 5 arrival date mentioned was in 1910, not 1911, there is no article or report that suggests that Watase remained in Korea at this time. It appears that he briefly returned to Japan, and then returned to Korea in July 1911, accompanied by Ebina and Osada. Though these reports are somewhat contradictory, I am choosing to interpret that the first church service was held in 1911.

<sup>26</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, "Sōkai go ni okeru Chōsen dendō," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (28 December 1911): 6.

Watase's surprise and delight, twenty-seven men initially applied to be a part of the study group; he enthusiastically reported to supporters in Japan through *Kirisutokyō sekai* that if all went well, these applicants would eventually serve as the foundation of the mission as evangelists and ministers.<sup>27</sup> At about the same time, a Korean congregation, Kyesōng (J: Kijō) church, was started in P'yōngyang as well, and the mission appeared to be making significant progress.<sup>28</sup>

**“Discovering” Korea:  
Watase's Trip Through the Countryside**

In order to expand the scope of the mission's activities beyond the two major cities of Keijō and P'yōngyang, Watase depended on Korean Christians in positions of influence over existing Korean congregations. Watase left no record of how he originally planned to proceed after establishing the first churches, but a series of events unrelated to the founding of the mission helped to decide this for him. Beginning in November 1911, he was visited by several Korean Christian leaders, each of whom had broken ties with different American missionary organizations or been fired, who had heard about the Kumiai Kyōkai mission and sought out Watase in Keijō to discuss the possibility of affiliating churches under their influence with the mission. In this section, I will trace a

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<sup>27</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Sōkai go ni okeru Chōsen dendō,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (28 December 1911): 6.

<sup>28</sup> The Kijō church was established on July 23. Watase traveled to P'yōngyang to formalize the church's founding. Around 55 people attended the first service. Murakami Tadakichi—a Government General official—was appointed deacon, two Koreans—including Na Il-bong, who continued to work with Takahashi at least until 1917—were appointed evangelists, and Sonu Sun—later the head evangelist for Kijō church—was appointed treasurer. Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Pyonyan (Heijō) ni okeru waga kyōkai no setsuritsu,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 August 1911): 7.

number of trips Watase took to the Korean countryside in 1912, in order to examine the relationship between Watase and these Korean Christian leaders, the exact nature of the type of ministry Watase conducted in these areas, and what these interactions suggest about the position of the mission during the early years of colonization.

Between January and April 1912, nearly twenty Korean churches in the southwestern provinces of North and South Chōlla and South Ch'ungch'ōng joined the Kumiai Kyōkai mission. At first glance, this might seem impressive, but the rapid addition of these churches resulted as much from conflict between American missionaries and Korean converts as it did from Watase's direct efforts. The process by which the churches from Chōlla joined the mission aptly illustrates this point. In November 1911, Reverend Ch'a Hag-yōn, who had until recently been a leader in the Presbyterian church in Kanggye in North P'yōngan province, visited Watase in Keijō as he was traveling to Chōlla. By the time Ch'a visited Watase, he had left the Presbyterian Church and founded his own church—the Free Church—in Kanggye.<sup>29</sup> Ch'a was on his

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<sup>29</sup> Technically, Ch'a Hag-yōn had been designated a leader, or helper, not an ordained minister, in the Presbyterian Church. However, since Watase refers to him as *bokushi*, or minister, I will use that title for him as well. The Presbyterian Church's account of this chain of events is as follows: "This church [Kanggye] has had its ups and downs in regard to leadership, with disastrous results. A rivalry existed between Mr. Yi Hak Myun, the first Christian, and Mr. Cha Hak Yun (sic), the first local preacher (helper), who came from Euiju (sic). Both were students in the theological seminary in Pyengyang (sic) for three months each year. Finally Yi was asked to move to Euiwon (sic) where he was the paid helper of the churches of that county, while Cha remained in Kangkei (sic). Opposition to Cha developed, until in 1911 the missionary pastors were presented with a petition signed by one hundred and thirty-five baptized members and catechumens asking that Cha be released. The decision to ask for Cha's resignation caused him to lead out his half-hundred friends, of whom half were baptized, and form an independent church. Not only so but they seized the old church property on the theory that they were entitled to it, since the main congregation had the new building. Cha called to his assistance a deposed pastor, Choi, from the southern part of Korea. One country group also joined the ranks of the independents. ...Finally the officials ordered the independents to release the church property which had been seized. The independence party finally joined the Congregational church, erected a building, and still carry on their

way from North P'yŏngan to South Chŏlla to visit other Free Churches, which had been founded by Ch'oe Chung-jin. Ch'oe was one of the first Koreans to be ordained by the Presbyterian Church, but he had broken ties with American missionaries and started his own churches.<sup>30</sup> At the time of Ch'a's visit, Ch'oe was in prison.

Ch'a visited Watase a second time in December, at which time he expressed interest in affiliating the churches in Chŏlla, which he was now helping to supervise, with the Kumiai Kyōkai mission. This was a fortuitous development for Watase, who had not been aware of these independent Korean churches, or of men like Ch'a and Ch'oe, who led them. A special ceremony commemorating the affiliation was planned for January 7, 1912, and Watase, accompanied by Hong Pyōng-sŏn and Ch'a Hag-yŏn, traveled from Keijō to Chŏlla to visit these churches.<sup>31</sup>

In order to provide his supporters in Japan with an intimate account of his experiences in the new colony, Watase wrote reports in *Kirisutokyō sekai* and *Shinjin*, and published several booklets and pamphlets. He also compiled a travelogue, *Hizume no ato: Chōsen dendō ryokōki* (an account of an evangelism trip in Korea), in which he described his trips to Chŏlla and Ch'ungch'ōng provinces.<sup>32</sup> Though the primary

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church organization.” Harry A. Rhodes, editor, *History of the Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 1884-1934* (Seoul: Chosen Mission Presbyterian Church, 1934), 331-332.

<sup>30</sup> Ch'oe apparently disagreed with missionaries' demands on Korean congregants in order to maintain the three “self” principles. He submitted a statement requesting that the missionaries, among other things, be less strict in disciplining Korean believers, and build a secondary school in this particular missionary district. However, the missionaries criticized Ch'oe and questioned his character. In response, Ch'oe declared his independence from these missionaries. *Kankoku kirisutokyō rekishi kenkyūjo, Kankoku Kirisutokyō no junan to teikō: Kankoku Kirisutokyō shi 1919-1945*, trans. Han Sokhi and Kurata Masahiko (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1995), 201-202.

<sup>31</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato: Chōsen dendō ryokōki* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1914), 3-7.

purpose of the trips was to visit churches interested in affiliation, Watase was also curious about conditions in the mostly agrarian countryside, and his accounts fluctuated between observations about Korean lifestyle and environment, and reports about the nature and quality of the churches that were joining the mission. In particular, he recounted his impressions of how Koreans in the countryside lived, what their religious lives were like, and how the Kumiai Kyōkai was supposedly transforming Korean churches through its ministry (*kyōka*).

This was not only an important evangelism trip, but it was also an adventure into what Watase perceived to be an uncivilized, yet occasionally pastoral, world. The trajectory of their journey, at least according to Watase, took them from the city most transformed as a result of Japanese rule, to areas that appeared to be untouched by Japan's modernizing influence. As Watase's narrative unfolds, what is striking is his perception that the further he and his companions traveled from Keijō, the less convenient, hygienic, and civilized their experiences became. For instance, Watase and his companions began their journey at the Nandaemun (Great South Gate) train depot, and though the depot itself had been built during the last years of the Great Han Empire's rule, the train line had been built by Japanese investors after Japan forced the Chosŏn court to relinquish its rights over train line construction in 1894.<sup>33</sup> They were able to travel aboard these trains for part of their journey, but because their destination

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<sup>32</sup> The travelogue, *Hizume no ato: Chōsen dendō ryokōki*, was published in 1914, but portions first appeared in *Kirisutokyō sekai*. See for example "Nan-Sen junhō shokan," parts one and two, 16 and 23 January 1912.

<sup>33</sup> The transfer of train line construction rights was one of several "agreements" Japan extracted from Korea leading up to the formal protectorate agreement, signed in 1905. Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 81.

was a number of remote villages far from any train line, they were forced to switch partway to horseback. Watase, while finding the slow pace a nuisance, also found this new experience thrilling. At the end of the first day, they stayed at a traditional Korean inn, a place that further reinforced Watase's perception that he was entering an unfamiliar and "uncivilized" world:

I will confess that in the nine years [that I previously lived] in Korea, I had not traveled to the countryside even once, and so this was my first experience of a Korean inn, as well as my first experience filling my belly with their food. What surprised me was how unhygienic the room was, and the surroundings were a good match for it since they were even more unhygienic. I wondered if it was at all possible to sleep in such a place, but since there was nothing I could do at this point, I reminded myself that I had decided to do this already and resolved myself, and the three of us shared a blanket and summer sleeping mat and went to bed. Thanks to the warmth of the heated floor it wasn't cold, but I just nodded off and in the end, did not sleep at all.<sup>34</sup>

In the morning, he was served a breakfast where every item was covered with red chili peppers that burned his mouth; he found this food spicy and smelly and rather than eat the food that he was served, he opted for canned food he had brought with him, and soon the group continued on their way through the Chōlla countryside.<sup>35</sup>

From the form of transportation to the dimly lit rooms and meager accommodations to the distasteful food, Watase associated the conditions in the Korean countryside with conditions from Japan's past. In describing his stay the following night at another Korean inn, Watase wrote, with a touch of nostalgia, "It was as though I had

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<sup>34</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 8.

<sup>35</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 8-9.

gone forty to fifty years back into the past.”<sup>36</sup> In expressing surprise and dismay at the conditions of the inn—and the apparent lack of concern that Koreans seemed to have for these conditions—Watase also implied that in Japan, inns were clean and well-ventilated, rooms were filled with all of the accoutrements of comfort expected of such establishments, and that food was not only filling but varied and certainly not covered in red spicy peppers. Leaving aside for the moment the very legitimate question of whether or not Japanese inns were more “modern” than their Korean counterparts, the implication of Watase’s vivid descriptions of his initial experiences of the Korean countryside—as yet un-penetrated by his ministry—was that without Japanese influence, the Korean countryside and its residents would remain fixed and unchanged, as the Japan of forty to fifty years ago appeared in his imagination.

In Watase’s eyes, the small independent churches also appeared to be arrested in the past, and in his account of his visits to these churches, he portrayed himself as a bearer of good news, encouragement, and above all, progress. When Watase, Hong, and Ch’a arrived at the first of the villages on their itinerary on the third morning of their journey, they met with Yi Kūn-hong, the evangelist who had taken over after Ch’oe’s arrest. From a peak of around sixty members, the church had shrunk in size to a little

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<sup>36</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 10. Though I do not do this here, Watase’s travel narrative should also be considered as part of the genre of Japanese travel literature of Korea. Japanese colonial travel literature was a genre unto itself, and was an important means by which travel to, investment in, and migration to the colonies were encouraged through popular forms. This travel writing also helped to construct popular images of Korea and Koreans in Japan. See for example Todd A. Henry, “Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 64, no. 3 (August 2005); Sonia Ryang, “Japanese Travelers’ Accounts of Korea,” *East Asian History* 13-14 (1997): 133-152.

over a dozen, and these remaining congregants held their services in a house around twenty-mats (jō) in size. Watase described this church and its congregation:

The meeting room [of the congregation] in [this village] was located at the highest place in the town, and was a thatch-roofed house of around 20-mats in size. Reverend Ch'oe's old residence was located on the grounds. I stayed in a room in his residence. On the walls were photographs of Reverend Ch'oe as well as of his friends. The squalor of this place is something that cannot even be imagined in Japan (*naichi*). Eventually, people living in the area came over, and I sat in this room with around ten or so people, and we talked. We each gave thanks to God for his blessings and expressed our joy at the events that led to us being able to sit and hold hands together....As I comforted them, we ate *that* food, and then I encouraged believers in [this village] and nearby areas to come by. Since it was rather short notice, only around twenty were able to gather in the sanctuary, but together with Reverend Ch'a, I was able to speak with the group that gathered.<sup>37</sup>

Watase emphasized aspects of the church, and the village in which it was situated, that reinforced his own assumptions about Korea: the “squalor” of the thatch-roofed sanctuary and adjoining parsonage, and the lonely remnant of a once thriving congregation. And though his presence only attracted a small group of local residents, he nonetheless portrayed his arrival to the village as a gesture of goodwill, and a comfort to what was left of the congregation. This church appeared helpless and, at least in Watase's estimation, in dire need of the encouragement and support that the Kumiai Kyōkai could offer.

Two days later, Watase and his companions arrived at the most important church about to affiliate, located in Paekchi, a small village near the regional center of Kwangju. The largest of Ch'oe's previous churches with over one hundred members, the Paekchi church was now under the supervision of Kim Ki-ch'an, who now was also supervising

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<sup>37</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 10-11.

all of the Free Churches in Chōlla.<sup>38</sup> In the morning of January 7, Watase, Ch'a, and Hong conducted a ceremony inducting the Chōlla churches into the Kumiai Kyōkai. The ceremony was held in an old dilapidated building, which, according to Watase, in a village without even a schoolhouse, was the only place suitable for something resembling a sacred atmosphere. With around fifty Koreans in attendance, Ch'a officiated the ceremony. He opened with prayer and scripture reading, and reported to the gathered group the sequence of events that had led to the ceremony. A vote was taken, and no one voiced opposition to the union. Watase also addressed the group—presumably with the help of Hong's interpretation—with an account of the Kumiai Kyōkai's history and its intentions to evangelize and influence Koreans. As the final step, Watase—with Ch'a's assistance—ordained Kim Ki-ch'an, and appointed Yi Kūnhong as an evangelist.<sup>39</sup> With all discussions safely concluded, the Free Gospel churches in Chōlla—eleven in total—officially transitioned from being independent of foreign control to falling under the authority of the Kumiai Kyōkai's Korea mission.<sup>40</sup>

In February of the same year, Watase received another visitor, a Korean evangelist named Kim Sang-bae, from South Ch'ungch'ōng province. Several years earlier, Kim had been fired by American Methodist missionaries; some of the other Korean converts in the area found the missionaries' actions excessive, and decided to

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<sup>38</sup> There appears to be a discrepancy between what Watase records Ch'a telling him about Ch'a's responsibility for the Chōlla churches, and this later statement that Kim Ki-ch'an was supervising the Chōlla churches.

<sup>39</sup> Watase, *Hizume no ato*, 17-18.

<sup>40</sup> Watase, *Hizume no ato*, 19, 25.

continue to support Kim Sang-bae despite missionary opposition. Conflict between Korean converts and American missionaries over Kim's termination continued to the point where the American missionaries temporarily shuttered their station. Kim continued to evangelize, and established several churches; however, with little financial support and no established infrastructure to depend on, these churches were struggling to continue to hold services. After learning that the Kumiai Kyōkai had established a mission, Kim visited Watase to discuss the possibility of affiliating the independent churches in South Ch'ungch'ōng province with the Kumiai Kyōkai.<sup>41</sup> So in April 1912, Watase, again accompanied by Hong, left Keijō for several small villages in South Ch'ungch'ōng province.

Again, Watase's account emphasized the successive decline and disrepair of the environment as he traveled from Keijō to the villages in South Ch'ungch'ōng. They again began their journey at the Namdaemun train depot, and traveled along the Keijō-Pusan train line. Again, they were forced to leave the comfort of the train, this time transferring to shabby rickshaws pulled by "inconsiderate drivers" along poorly maintained roads. On the fourth afternoon after they departed from Keijō, Watase and Hong arrived at their first destination, a small village situated on the west coast of the peninsula. This area had once been an important port, but over the previous two decades, residents and businesses had left, so that now only a handful of shops—and the now

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<sup>41</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 27-28.

ubiquitous Japanese police station—remained. This shell of a once thriving port town fascinated Watase:

Great stone pillars, so big that a person could not throw his arms around them, jutted out from the coast, lying in all directions on top of the cliffs. Reminders of the past, the ruins of old mansions, and their crumbling stone walls, have become indiscriminately covered by the new buds of ivy vines. It gives one the impression of visiting the ruins of a town in Judea. There are women carrying water jars on their heads as well—it is impossible not to be reminded of Judea. I have often been struck by the feeling that Korea is like Judea, though without the Israelite spirit or its history and literature. On this day, this impression deepened further.<sup>42</sup>

Earlier, while describing his experiences in Chōlla, Watase compared Korea to Japan of forty or fifty years earlier. Now, he drew parallels between the sites and conditions in this coastal Korean village with Judea from an unspecified time. Of course, Watase had never traveled outside of Asia, and had no first-hand experience of Palestine. The Judea in his imagination was no doubt the Judea of the Christian Bible, or what he expected remained of the towns described in the Bible. By conflating this Korean village with the romanticized ruins of Judea, Watase stripped the village—as well as its residents—of any sense of contemporaneous existence or familiarity, with himself, and by extension, Japan. Though physically occupying the same space, Watase distanced himself from these Koreans, who were surrounded by ancient and unfamiliar ruins. They lived in a distant past, with only crumbling stones and mysterious stone pillars remaining as evidence of a once prosperous city.

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<sup>42</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 35. Watase's use of Judea as a parallel for Korea was a recurring trope—Watase himself (as well as many American missionaries in various ways) compared Koreans with Jews on a number of occasions.

In the next sentence, Watase made an abrupt shift, turning from this exotic past to a dynamic future:

However, this place has now been designated as a port for Nippon Yūsen Kaisha [ships], and the value of land is increasing. And people are coming here from all directions. There are plans to build new roads, and the people are overjoyed, saying that this new prosperity will exceed what they had experienced before. This place is a central point along the coast, and it is not unthinkable that it will become indispensable, and an [important] place for evangelism.<sup>43</sup>

While Watase did not explicitly identify the catalyst for these harbingers of prosperity, it is clear that it is the Japanese colonial government. Each of the changes that he identified—from the opening of the port to road construction—were areas under the authority of the Government General. In the previous passage, Watase characterized the area as ancient and unfamiliar, the inert ruins testifying to a time of prosperity firmly embedded in the past. This distinctly Korean past, at least according to Watase's narrative, was now in the process of being transformed into a new place of importance and prosperity by Japan, with all the necessary structures and symbols of a modern city. Further, he associated the potential successes of the Kumiai Kyōkai in this area with these structural changes. The increased modernization and prosperity of the coastal areas of South Ch'ungch'ōng promised, at least for Watase, a more fertile ground for his ministry.

The actual churches in this area still needed to be transformed through their affiliation with the Kumiai Kyōkai. On the first night, one of Kim Sang-bae's supporters, Pak Kae-hong, organized a meeting of church members so they could meet Watase.

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<sup>43</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 35.

Around thirty-five people gathered at Pak's home, and over tea and sweets, Watase—again, through Hong's interpretation—spoke with the group for over an hour. The actual induction ceremony for this and the other congregations was to be held at the neighboring town of Hagung, where Kim Sang-bae lived. Watase and Hong arrived in Hagung on the fifth day of their trip. On the night of his arrival, a party was held in Watase's honor at Kim's home, with about fifty people in attendance. Watase gave a sermon at this party, and also baptized about a dozen people.<sup>44</sup> On the following morning, the South Ch'ungch'ŏng churches were inducted into the Kumiai Kyōkai. A second baptism ceremony was held, and twenty-five more people were baptized. Kim Sang-bae, the evangelist who had been let go by American Methodist missionaries, was ordained by Watase. Pak Kae-hong was appointed an evangelist, and six others were selected as elders. They also decided to start churches in three towns, and another was selected as a site for evangelism. Overall, two hundred Koreans in South Ch'ungch'ŏng affiliated with the Kumiai Kyōkai on this trip.

**Bearing “Fruit”:  
Signs of “Civilization” in the New Congregations**

In his account of his first visits to the rural areas of Korea, Watase did not explain what affiliating with the Kumiai Kyōkai actually meant: what would change in terms of church identity, the content of teaching and preaching, and the flow of church rituals and practices, not to mention how these changes would affect other aspects of these

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<sup>44</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 37.

rural Korean residents' lives. For these, it is necessary to turn to the second trip Watase and Hong made to the Chōlla churches.

In December 1912, Watase and Hong returned to several of the newly affiliated churches in North and South Chōlla in order to observe the progress these churches had made over the course of the year. His account of this trip provides a better picture of how he envisioned his own role as a missionary in Korea, how he viewed Korean Christians, and what he hoped to change by influencing them. Over a two-week period, the two men visited seven churches, preaching, and in the case of Maegye, holding a five-day scripture class.

Watase was most concerned with congregants' behavior during church services. In Maegye, one of the last places he had visited on his earlier trip, he organized a series of scripture classes in the morning, covering "the great meaning of the gospel," "the sermon on the Mount," and "Peter and Paul." During lunch, he held meetings for women, and gave sermons each night. Around twenty men attended the Bible classes, and fifteen women came to the noontime meetings. However, rather than comment on the participants' grasp of Biblical passages or their interest in his sermons, he fixated on their outward behavior. He reported that during the services, people sat in all sorts of positions—kneeling, or with their legs crossed, some even lying down on their sides. They sat up straight during prayer, but resumed their casual position afterwards. He remarked that while he first found this practice strange and off-putting, he eventually found it rather humorous, even endearing. He concluded, "Considering all of this, seeing these innocent folk studying scripture [in this way], I felt like the [Swiss educator

Johann Heinrich] Pestalozzi, and felt like I had naturally experienced something similar to what Christ had as he preached on the shores of the Sea of Galilee.”<sup>45</sup> Again, Watase conflated Koreans with inhabitants of New Testament Palestine; only this time, he likened himself to Christ. Koreans, at least in Watase’s report to his fellow countrymen, were simple and uncivilized, but innocent and naïve, and primed for the program of reform Watase had in mind.

In contrast to the Maegye church, Kim Ki-ch’an’s church in Paekchi elicited Watase’s praise. There, “The sanctuary was spotless (swept with a broom from corner to corner) and purified, and the congregants sat properly in neat rows. This orderly appearance exceeded anything usually seen in Korea, and was only a step behind, and quickly catching up with, churches in Japan (*naichi*)—I could not help but feel a great deal of pleasure rising up within me.”<sup>46</sup> In other words, above all else, order and cleanliness distinguished the Japanese churches from their Korean counterparts. The Paekchi congregation had managed to transform its church from a dilapidated shack made of recycled lumber into a tidy sanctuary “worthy” of the *naichi* itself.

A second concern that Watase reiterated as he visited these churches was the behavior, character and position of female congregants. For instance, he commented more than once that “they usually brought their children along with them. And it appeared that they all had many children.”<sup>47</sup> Apparently, in Watase’s mind, the number of children a woman bore was directly correlated to how civilized and advanced she

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<sup>45</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 47.

<sup>46</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 59.

<sup>47</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 47.

was. But he also suggested that these women were more advanced than their non-Christian sisters: “Among [these women] were a few who exhibited refinement rare in a country village. I concluded that this must be the result of Christian influence.”<sup>48</sup> More than the number of children or refinement, Watase was most concerned with the continued segregation of congregations. It was common practice in Korean churches to place a curtain or partition in the middle of the sanctuary so that men and women congregants would be visible to the minister but not to each other. The Maegye church, where Watase conducted the Bible classes, followed this practice. Watase saw this as yet another vestige of the harmful Korean traditions that were to blame for the despair and hopelessness that he perceived among the general Korean populace. At the neat and tidy Paekchi church, Watase encouraged Reverend Kim’s daughter and wife to challenge the use of the partition. During the Sunday church service held at the end of Watase’s visit, Kim’s wife, despite being told by her husband that the church was not ready for such a dramatic change, slipped in on the male side of the sanctuary. The male congregants were initially startled, but they maintained order; Watase partly attributed this to their interest in his sermon. He praised Mrs. Kim’s courage and progressive attitude, and called her and several of the other women at the church “new women” (*atarashii onna*) who would continue to work towards removing such barriers to progress.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 47.

<sup>49</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 66.

What is missing from his account is a more detailed description of the religious practices of these congregants. Whether in the poor and dilapidated churches filled with ill-behaved congregants, or in the neat and proper church in Paekchi, what drew Watase's attention was not the nature of prayer, the rigor of Biblical discussions, or the successes (or lack thereof) of appointed evangelists and ministers in gaining new members or conversions, but whether or not these congregants' outward behaviors had been reformed. He found the informality of these church congregants strange and amusing, leveled veiled criticisms at the number of children born to rural Korean families, condemned gender inequalities evident in the seating arrangements in most churches, and praised those who were clean and tidy and reserved. He considered these outward behaviors, rather than the form of religious expression, markers of a distinctly Japanese Christian civilization. He did not deny the earnestness of these Korean Christians, but he was dismissive of their approach to scripture or prayer, and used these as further proof of their innocence, naïveté, and simple folkways.

In concluding his observations about his second trip to these churches, he commented:

It has now been three years since we annexed Korea, but when I travel through the countryside [I notice] that people's hearts are not soft. There is an atmosphere of fear, and if you are not especially careful, when you try to speak with people, you will be immediately turned away. This is observable from the way that even heresy will not catch on without the appearance of political relevance. However, church members are different, for you can speak with them openly from the heart. There is no need to be cautious.

Since military police (*kenpei*) and policemen are stationed everywhere, there is no need to feel anxious, but in order for there to be a union of hearts, there is still a need for great effort.<sup>50</sup>

Despite his enthusiastic account of the successful incorporation of the Korean churches, his concluding remarks betray a less optimistic reality. His conflation of Japanese military police with safety and security demonstrates Watase's—and the Kumiai Kyōkai's—position in Korea. Though he recognized “an atmosphere of fear” during his travels, he nonetheless sought safety in the Japanese police presence, thus obliquely associating instability and potential violence with the Korean population, who the Japanese police presence was intended to pacify and contain. Watase also attempted to resolve this disjuncture between the “atmosphere of fear,” and the comfort he derived from the Japanese police presence, through the figure of Korean Christians, who he claimed were the only Koreans with whom he could “speak openly from the heart.” Watase insinuated that through his ministry, this atmosphere of fear—and the potential for violence that it harbored—could be resolved. But he also made it apparent that he aligned himself with the brute force of Japanese control as manifested in the presence of the military police.

## Part I.2

### **The Mission in the North**

In 1909, while visiting P'yōngyang, Japanese journalist Fukagawa Genji remarked,

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<sup>50</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 70-71.

Of the 30,000 (sic) Koreans in P'yŏngyang, it is said that half have converted to Christianity. The day I visited happened to be a Sunday, and the clanging of church bells resounded throughout the town. Young people walking through the streets all carried Bibles under their arms.... In fact, P'yŏngyang is the dominion of American missionaries.<sup>51</sup>

While exaggerated, Fukagawa's observations nonetheless captured an important feature of Korean Christianity: the claims that American missionaries made about their successes in Korea were, in actuality, only applicable to P'yŏngyang and the surrounding areas of North and South P'yŏngan and Hwanghae provinces.<sup>52</sup> The center of American Presbyterian work, the site of the first theological seminary in Korea, and home to 246 meeting places, 14,800 communicants, and 31,400 adherents in 1914 in the Presbyterian church alone, P'yŏngyang was the capital of Korean Christianity.<sup>53</sup>

The north's reputation as the center of Korean Christianity had also made it the focus of the Japanese colonial government's persecution of Christians immediately following colonization. This persecution became the subject of international censure following the so-called 1911 Conspiracy Case. Following Governor General Terauchi Masatake's visit to Sŏnch'ŏn, in North P'yŏngan province, the Japanese colonial government rounded up hundreds of Christians—including several American missionaries, though they were later released—and accused them of plotting to assassinate Terauchi. In the end, 105 men—of whom 102 were Christians—were convicted and sentenced to prison. The colonial government's treatment of Christians drew criticism from western imperial powers, and it has been demonstrated that the

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<sup>51</sup> Fukagawa Genji, *Nihon to sekai kenbutsu* (Tokyo: Seibundō, 1918), 409-410.

<sup>52</sup> Roy E. Shearer, *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 103.

<sup>53</sup> Rhodes, *History of the Korea Mission*, 155.

charges leveled against the Korean Christians were without foundation.<sup>54</sup> Nonetheless, as a result of this and other persecutions, many Christians in the north fled to the parts of Manchuria, West and North Kando (C: Jiandao), which bordered the northern boundaries of the Korean peninsula.

The unique conditions of the northern provinces should have made them, and P'yŏngyang in particular, a central focus for Kumiai Kyōkai mission strategy. From suspicions cast on area Christians by the Government General, to the sheer number of Korean converts in the area, the inhabitants of this area, more than any other, represented the type of Korean Christians who seemed to require the transformation Watase offered if they were to become assimilated as cooperative and willing imperial subjects. But the Korean mission headquarters was in Keijō, a half-day's journey by train from P'yŏngyang, and close to the center of the Japanese expatriate community and colonial government. This did not mean that the mission entirely neglected the northern provinces. Watase presented himself as the driving force behind the mission, and tended to focus on his own activities when reporting back to supporters in Japan, but he was by no means the only Kumiai Kyōkai missionary. In fact, Watase was often absent—as much as half of the year—spending much of his time in Japan in order to raise money for the mission, and Yamamoto Tadayoshi, the assistant director and minister of the Keijō church, was left in charge in his absence.<sup>55</sup> In P'yŏngyang, a

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<sup>54</sup> Wi Jo Kang, "Church and State Relations in the Japanese Colonial Period," 98-101. For a more in-depth analysis of the actual trial, see Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005).

number of missionaries served as both ministers and evangelists; some worked among Koreans, while others focused on the Japanese population. Though never in disagreement with the basic suppositions of the imperialist logic that legitimized their presence in the first place, these other missionaries present an interesting contrast to Watase.

The first Japanese minister in P'yŏngyang, Takahashi Yōzō, was asked by Miyagawa Tsuneteru to go to Korea in August 1910. Initially, Takahashi was not given any instructions, but told to simply await Watase's arrival. Unlike Watase, who found little redeeming in Korean culture and made no attempt to learn Korean, Takahashi expressed an interest in learning to speak Korean from the beginning, and met with Korean Christians and American missionaries in the area to learn about the people to whom he would be evangelizing. He viewed his appointment to the Japanese church as temporary, and set about learning Korean from one of the Koreans attending the church, since he considered fluency a basic necessity for effective evangelism. He was gratified on his first Sunday in P'yŏngyang to see five or six Koreans in attendance even though the sermon was in Japanese. There were also a number of Koreans in his congregation who were well educated and spoke both Japanese and English; he hoped that with their help, he would be able to start a separate ministry for Koreans. It appears that for the first month, Takahashi gave sermons in Japanese with someone providing Korean interpretation, but during this time, the number of Koreans in the congregation had grown to the point where this was no longer practical. He hoped to hire a Korean

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<sup>55</sup> Yamamoto Tadayoshi, *Yamamoto Tadayoshi sensei tsuitōroku* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan Nakameguro kyōkai yūshi, 1965), 11.

evangelist to start a separate mission station dedicated to evangelizing Koreans, but this plan was cut short when Watase arrived. Watase assumed full authority over the ministry to Koreans, and Takahashi was asked to focus on the Japanese congregation while the mission sought out someone who could focus on the Korean ministry.<sup>56</sup>

Takahashi's reports in the *Kirisutokyō sekai* include brief accounts of encounters with Koreans in and around P'yōngyang. On one occasion, after hearing of a famous Confucian scholar in the northern part of the province, he paid the man a visit, accompanied by an interpreter. He introduced himself to the scholar, a man who he found to be "calm and of impressive character," and explained why he was in P'yōngyang. The two men soon began to discuss religion, and the scholar expressed his reservations about Christianity: "The Christianity I have observed in Korea is ritualistic and since it does not discipline the soul, I have witnessed much harm [as a result]. I do not think it is good to evangelize." Hearing this, Takahashi seemed to think he had found a worthy opponent, and the two men continued to debate the merits of religion. In the end, the Confucian scholar told him that Takahashi's Christianity sounded different from the Christianity already practiced in the area. A few days later, the Confucian scholar paid Takahashi a visit, and as their conversation became more involved, the scholar resorted to writing down his thoughts in Chinese—a language they could both read—since conversing through the interpreter was too cumbersome.<sup>57</sup> It appears that neither man was able to convince the other to change his mind, but at the very least they

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<sup>56</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, "Chōsen dendō ni tsuite," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (3 November 1910): 7.

<sup>57</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, "Rōjusha to kataru," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (12 January 1911): 7.

parted ways impressed with each another. Takahashi went so far as to compare the man to the British missionary David Livingstone.

In April 1914, Takahashi was placed in charge of the Korean ministry in P'yŏngyang. He was replaced as the minister of the Japanese church by Kurihara Yōtarō, who had abandoned plans to study in the United States, and decided to go to Korea instead, after hearing Watase speak at the Reinanzaka church in Tokyo in 1913.<sup>58</sup> By this time, Takahashi had attained at least basic fluency in Korean, wore traditional Korean attire part of the time, and had begun writing religious booklets in a mixed script of Chinese and Hangul.<sup>59</sup>

Although Kurihara and Takahashi worked with different congregations, they shared a similar attitude towards their perceived calling as missionaries in Korea. In particular, both men expressed concern with the way that resident Japanese behaved towards Koreans. For instance, Kurihara criticized Japanese who referred to well-dressed Koreans as “*shin dōhō*” (new compatriots), yet used the pejorative “*yobo*” when speaking to lower-class Koreans. He remarked that the term “*yobo*” was a derogatory word, similar to what a master might use when speaking to his slave, and that “the way that Japanese selectively choose between these two terms reveals the contradiction inherent in Japanese attitudes towards Koreans.”<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Kurihara Yōtarō, *Tarō monogatari: Aru inaka bokushi no shōgai*, ed. Egawa Sakae (Shibukawa: Kurihara Sō, 1973), 55.

<sup>59</sup> For example, Takahashi Yōzō, *Yaso den kenkyū* (Keijō: Kirisutokyō geppōsha, 1915). This text was published under Takahashi's name, but it appears that it was in fact a translation by a Korean assistant of a speech Takahashi had given in Japanese (information provided by Sung Deuk Oak).

Takahashi also expressed his anger towards Japanese colonists who mistreated Koreans, as well as frustration with those who insisted that Koreans could not be properly “influenced” and “led” towards civilization. Takahashi pressed this point further, arguing that a more relevant question—than whether or not Koreans could be influenced or assimilated—was whether or not there were Japanese who “felt a calling” and were qualified to influence Koreans.<sup>61</sup>

Takahashi and Kurihara’s concern for the poor relationship between Japanese colonists and Koreans did not derive from a simple humanitarian sympathy, but was rooted in their investment in imperialistic assimilation. As Kurihara pointed out, the use of the inflammatory pejorative, “*yobo*,” by resident Japanese, exacerbated Korean animosity towards Japanese rule, and, he believed, interfered with the potential for Koreans to fully assimilate and become imperial subjects.<sup>62</sup> In other words, Takahashi and Kurihara subscribed to the same general set of ideas upon which the entire mission was based: the belief that Koreans, now as new imperial subjects and compatriots, should be influenced and “Japanized.” Further, they believed that this complete unity between Koreans and Japanese—a unity that should happen at an unspecified but profound level—was possible. Leaving aside the very real question of whether or not such sameness or unity was desirable, Takahashi and Kurihara insisted that sameness, or the erasure of difference, was possible, if only enough Japanese with humanitarian benevolence (*hakuai*) and the proper skills would dedicate themselves to the task.

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<sup>60</sup> Kurihara Yōtarō, “Kokumin-teki shirenchi to shite no Chōsen,” *Shinjin* 15, no. 10 (October 1914): 62.

<sup>61</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, “Chōsen no inaka dendō saku,” *Shinjin* 15, no. 10 (October 1914): 58.

<sup>62</sup> Kurihara Yōtarō, “Kokumin-teki shirenchi to shite no Chōsen,” 63.

Kurihara and Takahashi were also unwilling to completely condemn Korean lifestyles and practices. First, unlike Watase, who had ridiculed Korean residences, food, and general practices as primitive and decidedly un-modern, both Takahashi and Kurihara advocated adopting at least some Korean practices. As mentioned earlier, Takahashi occasionally wore traditional Korean attire, and did not urge his church members to adopt more modern (i.e. western) dress. Kurihara, as well, suggested that Japanese living in P'yŏngyang should wear Korean clothing, build Korean-style houses, and eat Korean food, to avoid the poor health that seemed to plague them, despite being of equal or greater financial means than the Korean residents. It was his opinion that the poor health that seemed disproportionately prevalent among Japanese residents was a result of their insistence on living as though they were in Japan when these things—clothing, houses, and food—were ill-suited to the foreign Korean environment.<sup>63</sup>

Reconstructing Takahashi's ministry is difficult; unlike Watase, Takahashi did not leave treatises or travelogues, and he rarely attended general conference meetings in Japan to give reports on his own activities. All that remain are a handful of reports published in *Kirisutokyō sekai* and *Shinjin*. While based in P'yŏngyang, his main concern was to evangelize in the neighboring countryside. In 1913, even before he had been formally assigned to the Korean ministry, Takahashi, accompanied by Na Il-bong, one of the evangelists associated with the Kyesŏng church, traveled to Chunghwa in South P'yŏngan twice a month.

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<sup>63</sup> Kurihara Yōtarō, "Kokumin-teki shirenchi to shite no Chōsen," 65.

After he was formally assigned to the Korean ministry, Takahashi continued to make short trips to small towns and villages near P'yŏngyang. For instance, in January 1915, he returned to Chunghwa, this time with Sonu Sun, the evangelist responsible for the Kyesŏng church, to conduct a Bible class over a ten-day period. Since most of those who attended were merchants, the classes were held early in the morning and in the evenings to accommodate the merchants' shop hours. The Christians associated with the Kumiai Kyōkai were, according to Takahashi, "fervent" believers, but there was as yet no Kumiai Kyōkai church in this town, so the classes were held in a room in one of the member's homes.

Over the following two months, Takahashi conducted classes in other towns as well. In a small town near Ŭiju, in North P'yongan, he held both Bible classes and agricultural demonstrations over a two-week period. These classes were conducted with the full support of the Government General; before going to the town, Takahashi first stopped in Ŭiju to meet with regional Government General officials to discuss the particulars of the classes. Even though Takahashi was an evangelist, he devoted most of his time on this occasion to lecturing on and demonstrating agricultural techniques: Bible classes started at eleven, but the agricultural demonstrations lasted from one to four in the afternoon. Between 30 and 80 people attended the courses each day. The practice of combining Bible classes with more practical demonstrations such as new farming techniques was not unique to Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries, but was a common strategy among western missionaries as well. However, for Japanese missionaries, these agricultural demonstrations were intimately tied to Government General and Japanese

state policy. Even before annexation, the Japanese state encouraged Japanese farmers to migrate en masse to the Korean peninsula. This was in part to counteract growing Japanese rural unrest by presenting migration to Korea as an alternative means of making a living. But the state also claimed that these migrant farmers would further the empire's work of reforming Korea; it was hoped that the presence of Japanese farmers, with their "superior" agricultural techniques and work ethic, would influence Korean farmers.<sup>64</sup> By combining Bible classes with agricultural demonstrations, Takahashi conformed his ministry techniques to Government General policy.

By 1917, Takahashi also started making inroads into Hwanghae province, to the immediate south of South P'yŏngan. Hwanghae had one of the largest populations of Christians on the Korean peninsula, second only to the P'yŏngan area. However, the Kumiai Kyōkai's attempt to establish churches in Hwanghae ended with mediocre results. In October 1917, Takahashi spent three days in Haeju, the provincial capital. Though he found the city comfortable (*kokochiyoi*) due to the large population of Japanese living among the Koreans, he was disappointed by the apparent lack of enthusiasm in his visit, from both resident Japanese and Koreans. Among the resident Japanese population, there were only 30 Christians. He reported in *Kirisutokyō sekai* that those who attended the four meetings "seemed to lack interest," and that "there were few officials who came to listen, or supporters, and the faith [of those who attended] seemed weak." He described the Kumiai Kyōkai in Haeju as "a feeble

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<sup>64</sup> Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword*, 301-312.

organization,” and seemed to place little faith in the local Korean evangelist, a medical student, who held church services at his home.

These brief sketches of Takahashi’s itinerating trips convey little about the actual nature of his work, or how his attitudes towards Koreans may have been altered by these successive forays into the northern countryside. This is unfortunate, because more than evangelizing in P’yŏngyang, Takahashi believed that, “My whole life had been preparation for doing ministry in rural Korea....I was born into this world in order to work in rural Korea.”<sup>65</sup> Takahashi did write one detailed account of a trip to one of these northern towns. Through this account, it is possible to see how, despite his efforts to conform to Korean customs and appearance to facilitate his work, and his exhortations to his fellow countrymen to treat Koreans with respect, he ultimately reinforced imperialist policies.

During the summer of 1914, he spent one month in a village about *seventy-ri* (280 km) north of P’yŏngyang. His attitude towards these villagers was not without its prejudices—for instance, he likened his experience to evangelizing “savages” in Africa. And just as Watase had, Takahashi emphasized the behaviors of these villagers that marked their “primitiveness” and “simplicity”: they did not wash their faces in the morning, they walked indoors with dirty feet, and in church, not even women knew how to sit properly. In his opinion, it was pointless to teach original sin or eternal judgment to people who lived in such a state, and he focused instead on teaching them about

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<sup>65</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, “Chōsen no inaka dendō saku,” *Shinjin* 15 no 10 (October 1914): 57.

blessings from God. He preached a “simple gospel” (*tanjun naru fukuin*) instead of complicated theological concepts.

At the same time, Takahashi advocated the eventual independence of the Korean churches. His approach was to choose a trusted well-educated member of a village to whom he would impart general theology and principles of evangelism. By selecting a well-respected member of a village, he hoped that the rest of the village would trust him, and that the leadership of the church could be left to him. All that would be left for the Japanese missionary would be to visit the village once or twice a year to hold a meeting with local believers, encouraging them in the faith. This system, remarkably similar to the Nevius method practiced by American Presbyterian missionaries, was meant to help Christianity grow in the countryside, and would be more economical.

However, Takahashi’s assessment of the state of Christianity in the Korean countryside exposes an interesting set of contradictions between assumptions about proper Christian practice, what constitutes civilization, and what, ultimately, should characterize the Korean church. In describing churches in the countryside, he criticized their adherence to rigid and literal interpretations of what constituted faithful Christian practice. Specifically, he lamented that while they held the Sabbath absolutely holy, memorized scripture, believed in Christ’s resurrection and his second coming, their faith was “disconnected from everyday life. As a result, young people were turning to other sources for inspiration.” This, he declared, was proof that “the present Christianity in Korea has not yet absorbed the *national* character of Korea” (emphasis added).<sup>66</sup> In

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<sup>66</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, “Chōsen no inaka dendō saku,” 59.

order to resolve this situation, he proposed that he (or others) should conduct intensive teaching sessions and Bible studies in the agricultural off-season, through which they would emphasize the “unity of faith and everyday life.”<sup>67</sup> In other words, Takahashi—despite being critical and condescending towards the way these Koreans in the countryside lived their everyday lives—advocated preaching a specifically Korean Christianity, something that was rooted in the place in which they lived, that would appear relevant to the everyday lives of these Koreans, including youth, who were being enticed by other ideas (presumably communism) and had lost all interest in Christianity.

Despite Takahashi’s sympathetic approach to evangelism in Korea, he nonetheless reinforced and complemented Japanese rule. His advocacy of a specifically Korean Christianity—which on the surface, differed from Watase’s attempt to erase difference from Korean churches—did not include any allowances for Korean independence from Japan. More importantly, by insisting on an inherent difference between Korean and Japanese Christianity—as demonstrated by his complaint that Korean Christianity had not yet absorbed the national character of Korea—Takahashi inadvertently acknowledged the irresolvable contradiction of the Japanese colonial government’s assimilation policy. On one hand, he maintained that the assimilation of Korean colonial subjects was not only possible, but also desirable. But on the other hand, he also insisted on encouraging a particularized Christianity in the hinterlands of northern Korea. But this kind of particularization contradicted the logic of assimilation espoused by the colonial government, and the Kumiai Kyōkai’s mission policy in

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<sup>67</sup> Takahashi Yōzō, “Chōsen no inaka dendō saku,” 60.

Korea. The purpose of the mission, after all, was to transform Korean Christians into Japanese imperial subjects, undifferentiated (at least in theory) from their counterparts in the *naichi*. The uneasy contradiction between Takahashi's ideological support of assimilation, and his actual evangelistic approach, reflected the internal contradiction of the assimilation policy itself. Though the assimilation policy asserted the eventual erasure of difference between Koreans and Japanese, in reality, the very condition of colonization preserved the difference that assimilation was supposed to eradicate.

## Part II

### **Partnering with the Government General: The Kumiai Kyōkai Korea Mission First Annual Conference**

To commemorate the mission's first successes, Watase organized a conference in August 1913. The event—held concurrently at the different Kumiai Kyōkai-affiliated churches in Keijō over a five-day period—was intended to satisfy several ends. First, it was meant to be a celebration of the mission's successes, from the new churches it had established in Keijō and P'yōngyang, to the affiliation of smaller churches in the countryside. Second, it was intended to impress upon Korean ministers and evangelists, who would be the main participants, the grandeur of Keijō, and more specifically, the influence and importance of the Kumiai Kyōkai, both of which were meant to symbolize Japanese civilization and progress. Finally, it was used as a vehicle to connect Korean Christians and Japanese officials and prominent community leaders, thus further encouraging the assimilation of Koreans into proper imperial subjects.

To prepare for this grand event, Watase first organized a series of prayer vigils at two of the Keijō churches. His characterization of both what and how people prayed demonstrates the goals of the general conference itself: “I heard the sound of people thanking God for the labor of brothers and sisters in the *naichi*, as well as those fervently asking God for the unity of Koreans and Japanese (*naisen ittai*), and there was an exchange of sympathy that transcended ethnic and racial rule; it was a truly joyous meeting.”<sup>68</sup> He commented that in the past, it was usually difficult for Koreans to pray on behalf of Japanese, but on these nights, the wall between Koreans and Japanese came down. And in the midst of these preparations for the annual meeting, Watase also held a memorial service for the Meiji emperor at Hanyang church, with 240 people, both Japanese and Korean, in attendance. At this service, Watase spoke on how “the last emperor had greatly desired *naisen ittai*.” On this night as well, at least according to Watase, the sanctuary was filled with tearful prayers, which Watase took to be further proof that Korean members’ hearts were softening towards Japanese as they grew in their love for God.<sup>69</sup>

This use of ritual to reinforce *naisen ittai*, or Japanese-Korean union (or Japanese domination), was carried through at the general meeting as well. The participants included representatives from outlying churches, representatives from the Keijō Korean churches as well as resident Japanese congregations, and a number of guests from Japan. The events themselves were held primarily at the Keijō church’s

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<sup>68</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 74-75.

<sup>69</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 75.

newly built, appropriately modern sanctuary. Red and white fabric was used to decorate the outdoor gate—the same colors used in the Japanese flag—and a Japanese flag was placed behind the pulpit. Several bonsai were used to decorate the area around the pulpit. These were not mere decorations, but powerful symbols that marked the Keijō church, and services held in it, as distinctly Japanese.

The Korea mission's general meeting opened on August 1, and over the course of five days, the 300 people who attended were presented with a combination of the Kumiai Kyōkai's most impressive churches, and the areas around Keijō that had undergone the greatest changes as a result of Japanese rule. For the opening ceremony and keynote address, the 300 participants were seated in segregated sections: Korean church members on the left, representatives from outlying churches in the center, and Japanese church members and visitors on the right. The selection of speakers—a combination of leading Japanese and Korean ministers and evangelists—reflected the mission's intent to promote *naisen ittai*: Reverend Yamamoto, the minister of the Keijō Japanese church and assistant director of the Korea mission, officiated; a Korean evangelist associated with Hanyang church read scripture; Matsumoto Masatarō, a Keijō church member, reported on the Kumiai Kyōkai's evangelism efforts; and Yamamoto and Hong gave words of welcome in Japanese and Korean, respectively. Tsunajima Kakichi, the minister of the Banchō church in Tokyo, had traveled especially from Japan to speak at the conference. As usual, Hong Pyōng-sŏn interpreted his speech for the Koreans in the audience. Tsunajima continued to reinforce the ideal of *naisen ittai* in his speech, “congratulating the mission on its ability to progress to the point

where it was able to hold the general meeting, and further reiterating that there was no path to strengthening the human spirit aside from religion, and there was no path to this aside from depending on the spiritual power of Christ...*Naisen ittai* will greatly further this spiritual union.”<sup>70</sup>

The general meeting was not only intended to bring together Japanese and Korean Christians. It was also intended to impress upon Koreans—particularly those traveling from more remote areas—the blessings of Japanese rule. To this end, Watase arranged a tour for the Korean representatives to the most important institutions associated with Japanese rule. The tour included a visit to the Government General headquarters; Governor General Terauchi was in Japan at the time, so they were welcomed instead by Vice Governor General Yamagata, who was also an important supporter of the mission.<sup>71</sup> They also visited the offices of *Keijō nippō*, the Government General’s official Japanese-language newspaper, where they were taken on a tour of the facilities, as well as the zoo and exposition spaces, both of which had been built on the grounds of one of the old Korean royal palaces.

The importance of *naisen ittai* was reiterated over the course of the general meeting. In addition to attending religious services and organizational meetings held at the Keijō churches, participants also attended speeches by Government General officials. Watase called these additional speeches “the most important and noteworthy speeches given during the general meeting” because they “demonstrated...the

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<sup>70</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 79.

<sup>71</sup> Yamagata contributed an article to the October 1914 *Shinjin* special issue on the Korea mission, in which Kurihara and Takahashi’s reports also appeared.

beginnings of a partnership between religionists and [colonial] administrators.”<sup>72</sup> For instance, one official focused on the introduction of the Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education to Korean schools. Another official, Imamura, recounted a story about a Korean village where a village leader successfully rebuilt a house that had been lost in a fire by encouraging everyone in the village to hand over their tobacco pipes; using money saved from not buying tobacco, he was able to raise enough money for the house. Imamura used this tale as an object lesson to encourage his audience to engage in similar moral reform.

On the third day of the conference, a joint worship service was held, and again, Tsunajima gave the main sermon. Titled “Christ’s compatriot-ism,” the sermon drove home to the audience of Korean and Japanese Christians the central message and vision of the Kumiai Kyōkai’s mission. According to Tsunajima, since Christ called his disciples his brothers and sisters, Christianity was something that transcended ethnicity, culture, and language. In other words, all people under Christ were compatriots, and this union of different peoples would bring about world peace and happiness. *Nissen-ittai* (or *naisen-ittai*), the unification of Korea and Japan, was a manifestation of this truth.”<sup>73</sup>

Throughout the course of the general conference, the Korean representatives of Kumiai Kyōkai churches were introduced to prominent members of the Japanese community in Keijō, as well as to Kumiai Kyōkai leaders from Japan. They attended services held in sanctuaries decorated with the Japanese flag, told to pray for the

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<sup>72</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 83-84.

<sup>73</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, *Hizume no ato*, 90-91.

emperor and reflect on the memory of the recently deceased Meiji emperor and his dedication to “the unification of Korea and Japan,” and encouraged to be inspired by Christ’s selfless love for humanity, as the model for how Koreans should feel towards Japanese, now their brothers and sisters in Christ and fellow compatriots in the empire. The general conference was intended to epitomize the mission’s dual message of Christian salvation and Japanification (*dōka*). Affiliation with the Kumiai Kyōkai opened up access to other prominent members of the Japanese community, including high officials of the Government General. And not just converting to Christianity, but joining the Kumiai Kyōkai in particular, was intended to bring Koreans one step closer to an ideal manifestation of Christ’s love, since acceptance of Japanese rule was an expression of Christian love. Conversely, resistance to Japanese rule reflected a lack of understanding of Christ’s example.

The general conference was also the culmination of the early efforts of the mission. By gathering Korean evangelists and prominent members from affiliated churches in one place, Watase and the other mission leadership could reflect on their successes, while reminding the gathered members of their duty to both God and the Japanese empire. Further, by introducing this group of Korean Christians affiliated with the Kumiai Kyōkai to the Government General, the *Keijō nippō*, and other prominent institutions in the colonial city, they could also impress upon Japanese colonial leadership the important inroads the denomination was making towards achieving assimilation through Christian evangelism. In this sense, the general conference was a performance put on for the benefit of two audiences: Korean Christians, so they would

see the benefits of accepting Japanese rule, and Japanese colonizers, so they would recognize the important role that Japanese Christians could play in bringing about the great ideal of Korean-Japanese unification.

### **Part III**

Part I and II reflect, not an unmediated objective recounting of Kumiai Kyōkai missionary work, but the subjective narrative of Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries. In turn, these narratives were directed towards a Japanese audience in the *naichi*—they were intended to raise awareness of the supposed successes of the mission, and more importantly, increase enthusiasm for the mission. Ultimately, these were standard missionary narratives intended to first encourage, and then urge, much needed financial support. Though missionaries provided the labor, money was the lifeblood of the mission. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the source of financial support for the Korea mission was intimately linked to the problem of establishing the financial independence of domestic churches from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. With so few self-sustaining domestic churches, the Kumiai Kyōkai was gambling on the ability of domestic churches to attain financial independence over a short period of time, as well as develop sufficient awareness of and enthusiasm towards the overseas mission, so that they would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices to sustain two major projects: domestic independence and overseas ministry.

As important as the colonial context was to the establishment of the Korea mission, this domestic context—the uneasy relationship between Japanese churches and American missionaries—was just as critical, at least in the way that hopes for domestic financial independence were invested in the mission. The hoped-for successes of the mission were in this sense not at all about transforming Koreans, but about proving the maturity and deserved independence of the *Japanese* Kumiai Kyōkai. And the issue of independence, at its root, was about money.

How the Kumiai Kyōkai obtained necessary funds to begin its mission has been the focus of controversy and censure. To address this, it is necessary to return to the mission's inception. Though the actual sequence of events is unclear, according to Kashiwagi Gien, who vehemently opposed the mission, soon after the Government General had been established, it began considering the possibility of enlisting the aid of Japanese Christians—through active evangelizing—as a way of countering the influence of American missionaries over Korean converts. According to Kashiwagi's account, immediately following annexation, Governor General Terauchi Masatake first approached Uemura Masahisa, the leader of the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai (Church of Christ in Japan), with an offer of annual financial support if he would agree to establish a mission for Koreans. Uemura, however, declined the offer, stating as his reason that since there were already American Presbyterian missionaries in Korea, it would be impolitic for Japanese affiliated with the Presbyterian church to go to Korea as well. Governor General Terauchi next approached Ebina, and he gladly accepted the offer. The Kumiai Kyōkai was promised between three and six thousand yen per annum in

support of their mission.<sup>74</sup> However, during that year's general conference, the source of this large sum of money was suppressed, and was attributed only to an anonymous donor. But word had gotten out that the anonymous donor was in fact the Governor General, and a heated discussion ensued. Yuasa Jirō strongly objected to accepting the money, arguing that the mission would be obligated to subordinate its own interests to those of the colonial government.<sup>75</sup> He went so far as to offer an equal amount out of his own pockets; his offer was declined, however, and until the mission closed its doors in 1921, it was largely dependent on the Government General's financial support.

The Kumiai Kyōkai's acceptance of Government General money was controversial, but since the leadership intended to support colonial government policies, they probably did not believe that they were compromising the mission's goals. Therefore, a more important question is: why the Kumiai Kyōkai did not depend on its own congregations—and later, Korean congregations—for funds necessary to sustain the mission. According to Watase's reports, the mission was a resounding success; each year, the number of churches and congregants increased exponentially. But over this

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<sup>74</sup> This narrative describing how the Kumiai Kyōkai formalized its financial relationship with the Governor General has become accepted as fact in existing Japanese-language scholarship on the Korea mission. However, the first mention of this particular narrative of events did not appear until 1931 in an article written by Kashiwagi Gien in the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*.

<sup>75</sup> Letter from Kashiwagi Gien to Kashiwagi Hayao, 10 November 1910, Kashiwagi Gien Papers, Institute for the Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University. In this letter, which Kashiwagi wrote to his eldest son who was studying at Oberlin College at the time, he said, "This year, a major problem in the Kumiai Kyōkai is the issue of a mission in Korea...The Governor General is giving the Kumiai Kyōkai six thousand yen per year for evangelizing Koreans, with three thousand yen for this year. In response, Yuasa Jiro strongly objected as did I. The reason was first, the Kumiai Kyōkai for many years has maintained a tradition of independence...Finally Yuasa said 'I will provide the three thousand yen the Governor General is offering.'" Based on this account, it appears that the disagreement over the Government General's offer of funding took place at the Kumiai Kyōkai's annual conference, always held in October.

same period, Watase's, and other leaders', pleas for more donations reached a shrill level. In short, Japanese congregations were unable to provide the necessary financial support for the mission. In this section, I will examine several different fundraising campaigns organized by the leadership of the Kumiai Kyōkai to consider how Watase's optimistic reports about the mission concealed a more tenuous and vulnerable reality.

### **The Korea Mission in Crisis: The Elusive Search for Financial Support**

Immediately after the Kumiai Kyōkai announced in June 1911 that it was establishing a mission in Korea, it designated June 18 as "Korea mission prayer day." All ministers were instructed to "join their voices in unison from pulpits across the nation, declaring the purpose of the Korea mission, joining together the hearts of our 20,000 believers in prayer for the success of the mission."<sup>76</sup> Hearts joined together in support of the mission also meant, or was supposed to mean, purses (or wallets) in support of the mission. The Government General's annual contribution of 6000 yen was substantial, but was not sufficient to support all of the mission's activities.<sup>77</sup> And as Ebina and other leaders had pointed out, it was not in the Kumiai Kyōkai's best interests to remain dependent on external support; self-governance and self-support were two remaining but elusive goals that the successful establishment of the Korea mission was partially supposed to demonstrate. With the Governor General's 6000 yen as a necessary base, the Kumiai Kyōkai leadership set out to encourage domestic church members to accept sacrifice as

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<sup>76</sup> "Shasetsu: Chōsen dendō kitōbi," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (8 June 1911): 1.

<sup>77</sup> For instance, in 1915, Watase's salary alone was over 1400 yen.

an important necessity and give liberally to the mission fund. A group of prominent ministers formed the “Korea mission fundraising committee” to establish a general mission fund, and set a goal of 30,000 yen, to be raised over three years.

Despite the Kumiai Kyōkai leadership’s enthusiasm for the Korea mission and energetic calls to its congregations to provide financial support, the mission soon ran into financial difficulty, and over the following several years, the mission’s fundraising committee issued a series of pamphlets, organized events, and reiterated to its congregations the importance of this new ministry. In between these requests for donations, Watase sent out his own reports, pleading his case by insisting on the mission’s success. These contradictory reports present a puzzle. How did the Kumiai Kyōkai in general, and Watase in particular, define success? And if, in their opinion, the mission was so successful, why was it so desperate for money? And why, despite the leadership’s interest in the mission, were members of Japanese congregations apparently reluctant to share that interest by offering the necessary financial support? It is in these reports, and the gaps and contradictions they attempt to obscure, that the tenuous position of the Korea mission becomes more apparent.

By the 1912 general conference, church leaders began to express concern about the financial state of the mission. Of the 30,000 yen proposed mission fund, only 12,000 yen had been pledged, with an even smaller amount actually donated. At this general conference, the Korea mission fundraising committee proposed a new strategy, to approach as many church members and other supporters as possible, and to urge them to

donate no less than 3 yen each. It was hoped that through these efforts, they would be able to raise the full 30,000 yen over the next three years.

At the 1914 general conference, reports were just as pessimistic. The mission was outspending its budget, with a deficit of 3900 yen. This was despite two major efforts by the Korea mission fundraising committee—in January, and again over May and June—to encourage Kumiai Kyōkai church members to donate. In January 1914, the fundraising committee had met in Osaka to discuss the apparent lack of interest among Kumiai Kyōkai church members to give to the mission fund. In order to increase visibility for the mission, they appointed Kimura Seimatsu, the minister of the Rakuyō church in Kyoto, as the new chair of the committee, and he visited churches in the Osaka and Kyoto area to urge church members to donate.<sup>78</sup> Additionally, the committee published a pamphlet describing the mission's successes, which it distributed to churches nationwide. None of these efforts were effective; at least 396 people donated a total of 1853.92 yen, but “overall, there were no where near as many donations as hoped for.”<sup>79</sup>

Though ultimately ineffective, the pamphlet produced by the fundraising committee, when read against the grain, reveals a different picture of the realities of the Korea mission. The one-page pamphlet, titled “On the Sunday commemorating the

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<sup>78</sup> Kimura Seimatsu (1874-1958) was born in Niigata, and was baptized at a Kumiai church in Niigata. He went to the U.S. in 1894, and studied at the Pacific School of Religion (now Graduate Theological Union) in Berkeley, and Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. He returned to Japan in 1902, and served as the minister of the Rakuyo church in Kyoto from 1908-1914. In 1916, he returned to Niigata, and founded a church in his hometown. During this same period, he also worked as an itinerating evangelist for the Kumiai Kyokai, traveling to Korea, Shanghai, Manchuria, and the United States.

<sup>79</sup> “Nihon Kumiai Kyōkai dai sanjukkai sōkai Chōsen dendō genkyō hōkoku,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (8 October 1914): 7.

Korea mission,” consisted of a set of descriptions of, and clarifications about, the Korea mission, and was intended to provide Kumiai Kyōkai ministers with information about the mission that they could use in their sermons for the March 8 service, which had been designated as “Korea mission commemoration day.” Distributed by Kimura, along with instructions on how members could submit their donations, the contents were penned by Watase, who, in an apparent effort to emphasize his frenetic schedule, signed his name, “aboard a train somewhere [in Korea].” The first part of the pamphlet merely reiterated the basic “facts” of the mission: when the mission was established, how and where the mission had grown, and how many churches (45) and church members (4000) the mission had managed to gain by the time of the pamphlet’s publication. It also recounted the “spirit of the mission”: to “rescue our compatriots on the peninsula through the gospel” and to promote “the joining of the people of the *naichi* with our brethren in Korea” in order to promote further growth and progress.

The pamphlet also included “examples of faith and harmony,” no doubt intended to demonstrate the potential of the mission to assuage Korean suspicions towards Japanese rule, thus making it worthy of financial support. For example, Watase explained that “when [Koreans] did not believe in God, these people lashed out at Japanese with their spite, suspicion, and dissatisfaction, but now that they share the same faith, they are becoming aware that Japanese are also children of God, so that those who were rabidly anti-Japanese, after conversion, are now exhibiting pro-Japanese sympathies.” Also, “While before, Korean women were reluctant to approach Japanese, after converting, they feel more comfortable and now come to us” and, “While before, it

was difficult for them to pray with Japanese, let alone pray for Japanese, now there are those who do this.” In other words, success, according to Watase, was the gradual transformation of Koreans from angry, resentful and suspicious colonized subjects, to complacent, welcoming, even sympathetic compatriots, who “acknowledged that it was only through partnering with Japanese that they had hope for progress.”<sup>80</sup>

The most curious section is titled “responses to questions,” a list of “clarifications” about the nature of the mission. The presence of this section itself suggests that others in the denomination had challenged some of Watase’s claims of success. Based on the information in the pamphlet, the mission was a resounding success, at least in terms of church growth. Starting from a meeting of less than ten people in July 1911 in the cramped rooms of the mission headquarters in Keijō, only eighteen months later, it had grown to forty-five churches with a total of 4000 members. Further, of the churches in outlying regions such as Chōlla and Ch’ungch’ōng where Watase had gone in the first months of the mission, many, he insisted, were self-supporting. Already, at this point, there is a contradiction. If, as Watase claimed, the mission was so successful, and especially if many of the newer churches had already achieved financial independence, why was it necessary to raise additional funds?

Watase’s attempt to demonstrate the Korean churches’ financial independence further exposes this contradiction. He attempted to make the numerical growth of the church more impressive by stating, “Though some pay a fixed amount each month for

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<sup>80</sup> “Chōsen dendō kinen nichiyō ni tsuite,” Yuasa Yozō Papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

their tithe, many give what little they can [like the widow did].<sup>81</sup> But when a call is made for special contributions, at least seven- to eight-tenths of church members respond, and in the outlying areas, many churches are self-governing and self-supporting.” Based on this statement, though many of the church members were poor and had little money, they were willing to sacrifice what little they had to support the church. Furthermore, according to Watase, the outlying churches had achieved financial independence, and were also self-governing.

Perhaps the mission was not nearly as successful as Watase claimed. Of the forty-five Korean churches that were a part of the Kumiai Kyōkai in 1913, only five were actually planted by the mission. The other forty were pre-existing churches that affiliated with the mission. Four of the churches had congregations of more than three hundred—three of these were located in Keijō, with one in North P’yōngan. Of the remaining forty-one churches, seven had congregations numbering more than one hundred. Of the remaining thirty-five churches, twenty-seven had fewer than fifty members (and four had less than ten). In other words, out of forty-five churches, nearly two-thirds had fewer than fifty members. This included the churches in the outlying areas that Watase claimed were self-governing and self-supporting.

Further, a closer examination of the distribution of ministers and evangelists reveals an interesting pattern. All but one church had an assigned minister or evangelist. However, there were only seven churches with dedicated ministers, of whom only three

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<sup>81</sup> Watase used “reputa,” the Japanese phoneticization of *lepta*, the denomination of currency used by the widow in Mark 12:42, who gave two copper coins, and was praised by Jesus for giving all she had.

were ordained. The remaining four were either evangelists or assistant evangelists. Of course, these dedicated ministers were assigned to the larger churches. The other ministers and evangelists were responsible for multiple churches across large regions. In North P'yöngan, Ch'a Hag-yön was responsible for four churches; in North Chölla, Yi Kün-hong oversaw fifteen churches, mostly with congregations between twenty to thirty members; in South Chölla, Reverend Kim Ki-ch'an oversaw seven churches with an average of fifteen members each; and another evangelist oversaw seven churches in Kyönggi and North Ch'ungch'öng provinces.

In other words, though there were indeed forty-five churches and nearly 4000 members affiliated with the Kumiai Kyökai by 1913, two-thirds of the churches were very small, with fewer than fifty members, and these same churches were supervised by evangelists simultaneously responsible for anywhere from four to fifteen congregations. With so many, it was obviously impossible for these evangelists to preach at each church on a regular basis. Watase does not discuss what occurred at these churches when the supervising evangelists were not available. Given these circumstances, it is hardly likely that these congregations—the same congregations in outlying areas—would have had the necessary infrastructure or financial core to be self-governing or self-financing. Indeed, with only eight or fifteen members, it is unclear how such congregations conducted Sunday services, if they were able to hold regular services at all.

There is another curious statement in the pamphlet, concerning the method by which Watase compiled membership statistics for the Korean churches: “In Japan,

membership is granted upon baptism, but in Korea, membership is granted upon a confession of faith. In churches in Korea, there are both baptized and non-baptized members.” This suggests that among the nearly 4000 members who belonged to these forty-five churches, there were a significant enough number of non-baptized members that Watase had been questioned on this point. However, despite his explanation justifying the practice of counting non-baptized believers as church members, this was not an accurate reflection of common practice among Korean churches during this period. At least among Korean Presbyterians, church membership was predicated upon a year probationary period during which the new convert was expected to learn and absorb basic theological teachings. Membership was conferred after the convert’s moral standing was considered satisfactory, and his or her understanding of theology was tested and deemed adequate. To claim the contrary—that membership was easier to obtain in Korea than in Japan—suggests either that Watase was ignorant of common Korean (and American missionary) practices, or more likely, that he was pushed to account for membership statistics that some suspected were inflated.

What does this report suggest about the state of the mission, and why is this important? More than anything, the gap between Watase’s enthusiasm and optimism and the more uneven reality, reveals an anxiety, and with it, the beginnings of desperation. The mission was founded with the assumption that Koreans would adopt a Japanese form of Christianity. Watase and the other supporters of the mission also seem to have assumed that assimilation—both facilitated by evangelism, and aiding conversion itself—would happen with little resistance. But eighteen months after the

mission had begun, they were gaining converts and more importantly, the affiliation of existing Korean churches, but the process of assimilation was not going as expected. Even worse, the mission was suffering from a consistent shortage of money, despite the fact that it was guaranteed 6000 yen annually from the Government General. The final piece of the puzzle presented by this flyer is the question of money. Why was the mission operating on a deficit?

Included in the pamphlet, in the section titled “response to questions,” Watase addressed the problem of money in the domestic Kumiai Kyōkai: “Some people say that it is presumptuous for the Kumiai Kyōkai to evangelize other races when it is difficult to even evangelize in Japan, but our battle of faith over the last forty years has surely prepared us to lead the Korean church. Just as the British Empire manages a vast empire despite being a small country, it might be difficult at first, but eventually, it will be beneficial to our homeland. Of course, I am anxious about having enough money for the future; however, as long as this work is God’s divine calling, there is no doubt that God will provide the money.”<sup>82</sup>

In the way that Watase phrased his statements in this pamphlet, one can infer that he not only faced difficulty raising money, but that the legitimacy of the mission itself, as well as his claims about the successes of the mission, were also being challenged. Though couched in positive and congratulatory language, his statements that Koreans did not necessarily need to be baptized to be counted as church members, that many of the rural churches were self-supporting, and that starting a mission abroad

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<sup>82</sup> “Chōsen dendō kinen nichiyō ni tsuite,” Yuasa Yozō Papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

when the church at home was far from stable was merely following God's calling, each suggest an underlying anxiety about whether or not there was support for the mission. Further, these statements call into question how Watase's activities were perceived by others in a position to provide the necessary support.

**New Supporters, Expanding Visions:  
In Bed with the *Zaibatsu***

The main Korea mission fundraising committee's efforts resulted in disappointment. Even Watase's explanations and clarifications—penned aboard a Korean train—were insufficient to help meet the committee's 30,000 yen goal, let alone to reduce the 3900 yen deficit. But in 1914, the Kumiai Kyōkai organized a separate fundraising committee, for the expansion of Korean missionary work, with stunning results. The relationship between these two committees, or the difference in how these two funds were used, is not clear. The expansion committee was able to raise 32,922.15 yen from 91 donors. What is even more astounding is that due to logistical constraints, the committee chose to focus its efforts on the Tokyo area rather than solicit funds nationwide. However, these 91 donors were not ordinary people. Governor General Terauchi Masatake and Baron Shibusawa Ei'ichi, the founder of the Dai-ichi Bank and an important investor in Korea, took a personal interest in raising funds for the mission. During a visit to Tokyo, Terauchi invited prominent Tokyo businessmen to a meeting, and shared with them the successes of the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission, as well as the importance of supporting the mission through financial assistance. Baron Shibusawa took it upon himself to write to other businessmen and friends to encourage them to

donate as well. Through these efforts, several *zaibatsu*, including Mitsubishi (Iwasaki) and Mitsui, gave substantial donations.<sup>83</sup>

Kurihara Yōtarō, who replaced Takahashi as the minister of the Japanese P'yōngyang church, participated in the expansion fundraising committee's solicitation campaign, and in his memoir, provided an intimate account of their efforts. He had decided to join the Korea mission at around this time, and was enlisted to assist with soliciting donations before moving to Korea. He recounted later that the committee met on a weekly basis in the offices of the Christian publishing house, Keiseisha, and contacted the heads of *zaibatsu* and other wealthy families. In addition to Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which each donated 10,000 yen, a total 30,000 yen was collected from donors who gave at least 1000 yen each, and a remaining 13,000 yen was collected from donors who gave small amounts.<sup>84</sup>

The expansion fund appears to have been intended for a discrete, second phase of ministry, and not as part of the original general fund, since reports of both funds continued to appear in Kumiai Kyōkai general conference summaries. The goal for this expansion fund was set at 100,000 yen; while the amount they raised was significant, it was still a far cry from the pre-determined goal. Meanwhile, given the continuing deficit with the general fund, as soon as the expansion fund was established, some of the mission expenses were drawn from the expansion fund to relieve some of the burden on the general fund. For instance, in a draft of the committee's report to the general

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<sup>83</sup> "Nihon Kumiai Kyōkai dai-sanjukkai Chōsen dendō genkyō hōkoku," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (8 October 1914): 8.

<sup>84</sup> Kurihara Yōtarō, *Tarō monogatari*, 58.

conference, it is mentioned that Takahashi's salary would now be paid out of the "special" fund, while Watase's would continue to be paid out of the regular fund.<sup>85</sup> This was in part due to the church's inability to reduce the mission's deficit despite their best efforts. Watase may have been enthusiastic about the mission, and emphasized its successes, but the committee responsible for producing the funds necessary to support the mission voiced growing concern and anxiety.

The mission continued to be beset with financial difficulties. Watase still published pamphlets to encourage more support, including two in 1917, but without success. The mission did grow, however, and by 1919, it counted 146 churches with nearly 14,000 members. What these numbers do not reveal are the problems the mission experienced. For instance, of the ten Koreans who joined the mission as ministers and evangelists at the beginning of the mission, five were no longer with the mission. This included Hong Pyōng-sōn, who had served as Watase's assistant and interpreter; Kim Ki-ch'an, the minister who Watase had ordained in South Chōlla; and Kim Sang-bae, the evangelist in South Ch'ungch'ōng, who had approached Watase about affiliating his churches in 1912. Hong had left the Kumiai Kyōkai in 1914, and joined the Southern Methodist church instead.<sup>86</sup> I have not been able to trace Kim Ki-ch'an or Kim Sang-bae after they left the Korea mission. Nine of the churches also dropped off of the

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<sup>85</sup> "Taishō yo-nen-do Chōsen dendō futsū kaikei," Cd K-216, Ebina Danjō Papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

<sup>86</sup> Hong later became involved in the YMCA's efforts to establish agrarian communities based on Danish models in the 1920s-1930s. See Albert Park, "Vision of the Nation: Religion and Ideology in 1920s and 1930s Rural Korea," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2007).

Kumiai Kyōkai rolls. Several were absorbed by other churches, but others simply disappeared from the records.

The mission was neither a resounding success, nor an abysmal failure. Its director was driven and ambitious, and the other missionaries were also committed to their work. Nonetheless, the mission suffered from an insurmountable problem: the reality of Japanese rule in Korea. Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to uncover disagreements or conflicts between Japanese missionaries and Korean Kumiai Kyōkai members because the only extant sources are Watase's reports, the defection or loss of ministers and evangelists, as well as the disappearance of churches from the rolls, suggests that there were difficulties, and that church congregations were not as healthy as Watase tried to claim. Further, despite the attention the mission received from church leadership in the early years, by 1917, only a handful of articles on the Korea mission appeared in either *Kirisutokyō sekai* or *Shinjin*. Apparently, interest in the mission had waned—though it is unclear if this was because Kumiai Kyōkai members were distracted by other concerns, or if there was growing skepticism about Watase's claims. Until 1919, however, the mission continued to expand and establish additional churches; the last church, in Hwanghae province, was founded in February 1919. But in March 1919, when Korean resentment towards Japanese rule—fueled by American President Wilson's declaration of national self-determination—erupted in a powerful peninsula-wide protest demanding Korean independence, the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission was dealt a death blow.

### **The Failure of Dōka: The March First Movement**

The March First Movement, as the protests are known, was led by Korean Christians and members of Ch'ōndogyo, a new Korean religion.<sup>87</sup> Korean Christians also joined in the protests in huge numbers. The Japanese colonial government's response was brutal and swift; though the demonstrators had initially adopted non-violence as a tactic, the colonial government responded with brute force. The Government General had never entirely abandoned its suspicions of Korean Christians; the overwhelming presence of Christians among the demonstrators merely confirmed its suspicions. The Government General's suppression of Christian protestors was particularly harsh; in one infamous incident, Japanese military police rounded up all male Christians in the village of Cheamni, near Suwōn, in Kyōnggi province, fired on them with their rifles, trapped them in their church, and then set fire to the church.

As news of the Government General's violent suppression of these protests reached the rest of the world, mainly through reports sent out by American missionaries to their colleagues and mission boards, Christians in Japan demanded to know what had actually happened. In July 1919, Satō Shigehiko, a Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai minister, published an article in the denominational newspaper *Fukuin Shinpō*, condemning the Kumiai Kyōkai's mission policies, and more particularly, the conduct of its missionaries during the independence movement. He began by expressing dismay over hearing that Murakami Tadakichi, an evangelist associated with the Korea mission, had been

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<sup>87</sup> There were also two Buddhists among those who signed the Declaration of Independence on March First that sparked the protests.

conducting espionage among Korean political exiles in Shanghai. Simultaneous to the independence protests, Koreans who had sought refuge in foreign concessions in Shanghai, formed a provisional government to serve as the “legitimate” governing body of Korea. Satō decried Murakami’s activities as “unbecoming a religionist, regardless of his motives.” He also wrote,

I once met a certain missionary of the Kumiai Kyōkai...who appeared to have lost all sympathy towards Koreans, and instead adopted an attitude towards Koreans similar to how government bureaucrats treat regular subjects. I have heard rumors that during the protests, Japanese military police and constables told Koreans that if you believe in Christianity, go to the Kumiai Kyōkai churches. As another Japanese, and someone of the same faith, it is impossible for me to harbor malice towards [the missionaries], but I am pained and disappointed to see that these Japanese Christians in Korea—who should have led with integrity and used their good judgment to criticize—have instead allowed themselves to be criticized and pressured in this way....

The [western] missionaries who came to Japan loved Japan, and loved the Japanese people. In the same way, [western] missionaries who went to Korea loved Korea, and loved the Korean people....But what about the Japanese who evangelized Koreans? Can it be said that they feel the same love towards the Korean people as the [western] missionaries?<sup>88</sup>

Satō’s condemnation, while powerful, did not deter Watase, who published a rebuttal article in *Kirisutokyō sekai* three months later. In it, he simply denied all of Satō’s accusations. While there was growing concern within the Japanese Protestant community over the Kumiai Kyōkai’s conduct during the protests, Christian criticisms alone could not stop the mission. But the predominant participation of Korean Christians proved to be a more serious problem for the Government General.

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<sup>88</sup> Satō Shigehiko, “Senjin dendō no kiki,” *Fukuin shinpō* (17 July 1919), reprinted in *Nikkan Kirisutokyō kankei shi shiryō 1876-1922*, eds. Ogawa Keiji and Chi Myong Koan (Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha), 72-73.

Over the previous ten years, the Government General had provided the mission with an annual contribution of 6000 yen because it hoped that these Japanese missionaries could, through religious coercion, dissuade Korean Christians from continuing to resist Japanese rule. The March First Movement convincingly demonstrated that the mission had failed to accomplish this task. In 1921, the Government General ceased its contributions; at the general conference in October, an announcement was made that in order to “encourage the Korean churches to be more independent,” these churches were being separated from the Kumiai Kyōkai, and were going to be incorporated as the “Chōsen kaishū Kirisuto kyōkai,” or Korean Congregational Church. Watase returned to Japan, and started his own church in Shizuoka. Takahashi, who unlike Watase had visited Korean youth jailed during the independence movement, had decided to start a school for Korean youth. In 1923, while visiting Kyoto in order to raise funds for his school, he collapsed and died of a stroke. Kurihara had left Korea in 1918, and returned to his hometown of Shibukawa, in Gunma Prefecture, and used the experience he had gained in Korea to evangelize among Japanese farmers. Kurihara had been replaced by Watanabe Morishige at the Japanese P’yōngyang church. After the March First Movement, Watanabe relocated to Fengtian, Manchuria, where he served as the minister of the Fengtian Kumiai Kyōkai, which included, from its inception, a mission to resident Koreans.

The Kumiai Kyōkai did not abandon its attempts to evangelize colonial subjects with the failure of the Korea mission, however. It shifted its focus to the numerous Korean refugees and migrants in Shanghai and major cities in Manchuria. The focus of

Kumiai Kyōkai overseas missionary policies merely shifted from Koreans on the Korean peninsula, to Koreans living just outside of the formal boundaries of the Japanese empire.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### After the March First Movement: The “Korean Problem” in Shanghai and Fengtian

*In March 1919, when, due to the outbreak of the independence disturbance incident in all Korean provinces, Japanese officials made the problem of Koreans in Manchuria a priority, and attention was paid to our Kumiai church's Korean ministry, so that public opinion held great expectations for our church to influence Koreans living in Manchuria.*<sup>1</sup>

--Fengtian Kumiai Church History, 1924

*As you well know, behind the anti-Japanese movement in China, and the independence movement in Korea, are Western missionaries. This is not because missionaries particularly harbor animosity towards Japan, or resent us, but just as parents love their children, with these missionaries, who have given their entire lives to these people, when these people come to them with cries of injustice, they are sympathetic. They comfort them by saying, “I see, so the Japanese have injured you, that is unforgivable.” Also, from these people's point of view, they think, “perhaps if we can gain the sympathy of western countries, we can achieve independence,” and other such ridiculous things.*<sup>2</sup>

--Furuya Magojirō, Chū-Nichi Kōri Church, Shanghai, 1935

Soon after the end of World War I, Shimazu Misaki, the director of the Japanese YMCA in Chicago, knocked on the door of a nearby boardinghouse for Korean immigrants and offered them assistance.<sup>3</sup> Japanese students in Chicago under Shimazu's

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<sup>1</sup> Hōten kumiai kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen* (privately published, 1924), 6.

<sup>2</sup> Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, *Shimazu Misaki Furuya Magojirō ryōshi noberu: Shanhai ni okeru Chōsenjin no jitsujō* (Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 1935), 18.

<sup>3</sup> Shimazu Misaki (1877-1975) was born in Yonezawa, Yamagata Prefecture, and was first introduced to Christianity by Canadian Methodists in Nagano; he became the first person baptized at the Nagano mission station in 1891. He received his education at Tōyō Eiwa Gakkō in Tokyo. He left Japan in 1904,

care had been suffering the effects of the post-war recession and assuming that Koreans in the boardinghouse were similarly affected, he told them, “I am someone who looks after Japanese youth. I’m sure that you are also having a hard time. If you are in trouble, please come to my place.”<sup>4</sup> He was initially rebuffed—the student at the door merely grunted before shutting the door—but several days later, a couple of the boarders visited him and asked if he would be able to help them find employment. What makes this incident significant, and not simply curious, is what happened shortly after.

In 1921, the Washington Conference was convened by the United States, with Great Britain, Japan, and six other nations participating, to establish new armament limits among countries with interests in the Pacific and East Asia.<sup>5</sup> Several high-level officials of the Government-General of Korea traveled to Washington D.C. to attend, and stopped in Chicago on their way. They met with Shimazu, who relayed how he was

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and became the minister of a Japanese church in Riverside, California. In 1905, he went to Chicago to attend Chicago Theological Seminary, and was part of a group that established a ministry to Japanese students in Chicago. He transferred to Union Theological Seminary and graduated from there in 1908. He returned to Chicago, where he served as the director of the Chicago Japanese YMCA until 1934, at which time he went to Shanghai to serve as the director of the Japanese YMCA there. The Chicago Japanese YMCA was founded in 1908 to serve the Japanese student population in Chicago (unlike the American west coast and the territory of Hawai’i, Chicago was not a popular destination for Japanese immigrant laborers but did attract a small number of students). The main building was built in 1918 with 30,000 yen in donations; the building included 24 boarding rooms, meeting rooms, a dining room, common areas, a library, and printing room. *Beikoku Shikago Nihonjin Kirisutokyō seinenkai raihōsha meibo* (Shikago Nihonjin kirisutokyō seinenkai kōenkai, 1932), 4-7.

<sup>4</sup> Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 8-9.

<sup>5</sup> The Washington Conference, also called the Washington Naval Conference, held from November 1921 to February 1922, was an important de-armament meeting among nations with interests in the Pacific and East Asia. The U.S. (under the Harding administration) was primarily concerned with limiting Japan’s naval powers and constraining its attempts to further expansion in Asia. The U.S. was also interested in ending the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a treaty signed in 1902, which had supported and legitimated Japan’s position in Asia. On the importance of the Anglo-Japanese relationship to Japan’s diplomacy, see Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Intervention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).

“deeply troubled by the Korean problem.” To this, the Government-General officials responded, “Well, since you seem to understand the Korean problem, and are helping to take care of [them], we will speak to the consulate and see if there’s something that can be done.”<sup>6</sup> Shimazu then met with Consul General Kuwajima, who asked him, “What should be done in order to get these people to calm down?” Shimazu’s solution was to provide them with money: Shimazu reasoned that since Korean immigrants—most likely students—were destitute and struggling to pay even the cheap boardinghouse rent, if they were to receive money from Japanese beneficiaries, they would soon recognize Japan’s good intentions and cease their anti-Japanese activities. As a result, the consulate provided Shimazu with funds to give to Koreans in his neighborhood.<sup>7</sup>

Why was a Japanese minister in Chicago so concerned with Koreans? Why did members of the Government-General identify a “Korean problem” in Chicago? And why did the Japanese consulate provide the director of the Japanese YMCA with money to offer Korean residents, all for the purpose of “pacifying” Koreans and softening their attitude towards Japan? The answers to these questions lie in the historical context—the immediate aftermath of World War I—and the implications of Japanese imperial ideology that extended beyond the boundaries of the formal Japanese empire. While

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<sup>6</sup> Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 9-10.

<sup>7</sup> Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 10. This account appears in a pamphlet published by the Chūō Chōsen kyōkai (Central Korea association), a group in Japan that supported Japanese interests in colonial Korea. Shimazu and Furuya Magojirō (minister of the Chū-Nichi Kōri Church in Shanghai) were invited by this group to speak on the “current conditions of Koreans in Shanghai” in 1935. Shimazu recounted his experiences with Koreans before his move to Shanghai, and this series of encounters in Chicago was among several experiences he had with Koreans in the U.S. Given the context of the talk, as well as the group publishing this pamphlet, it is unclear how closely his narrative conforms to the actual encounters.

Chicago was a curious location for these issues to emerge, they had much graver and urgent implications in the parts of China contiguous with the Japanese empire.

For the Japanese empire 1919 was a critical year. In its prize colony Korea, colonial subjects who should have been absorbing the principle of Japanese-Korean unification (*naisen ittai*) expressed their anger and resentment towards Japanese rule in a powerful peninsula-wide protest. In China, protests—known as the May Fourth movement—erupted as well. During the Paris Peace Conference, despite strenuous Chinese objection, western powers had acknowledged Japan’s claim on Shandong province—previously a German concession—which the Japanese military had occupied soon after the outbreak of war in Europe.<sup>8</sup> Through mass demonstrations, boycotts of Japanese goods and businesses, and attacks on Japanese expatriates and Chinese officials in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese expressed their frustration with the nascent Chinese republican government’s inability to rebuff increasingly aggressive Japanese encroachment into China.<sup>9</sup> Further, around the world—from Manchuria to

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<sup>8</sup> In addition to Shandong, Japanese forces also occupied islands in the south Pacific colonized by Germany; these military maneuvers were presented as Japan’s good faith effort to support Britain—with which it had an important alliance—in its conflict with Germany. However, Japan’s occupation of German concessions was viewed by many—both in the West and in Asia—as an excuse for Japan to consolidate and increase its interests in a wider area of Asia during a time when European colonial powers were distracted by war in Europe. On Japan’s role in World War I, the Paris Peace Conference, and the formation of the League of Nations, see Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention* and Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), especially 1-28.

<sup>9</sup> Japan’s occupation of Shandong was only the latest of a series of demands Japan made of China. The Twenty-one Demands that Japan made on China in 1915 (also issued when European countries and the U.S. were distracted by war in Europe) encapsulated increasing Japanese aggression in China. The “demands” included the acknowledgment of Japan’s acquisition of Shandong, extension of the South Manchurian Railroad zone lease and expansion of the territory under Japanese influence, and Japan as the only power to receive further concessions (thus barring western powers from expanding their interests in China). The new republican government’s inability to adequately respond to these demands, as well as the Shandong problem, led to the May Fourth protests.

Hawai'i to San Francisco to Chicago to Vladivostok—Korean exiles attempted to organize independent political parties and provisional governments to challenge Japan's claims to legitimate rule over Korea. On the cusp of gaining acceptance from western imperialist powers and expanding its territories into China and the South Pacific, the Japanese empire found its legitimacy challenged by other Asians.

In this climate of heady imperial possibility and political instability, the Kumiai Kyōkai attempted to prove yet again that its form of Christianity would not only legitimate and support the empire, but also serve as the necessary bridge to pacify and assimilate the “angry Asians” challenging it from within and from along its periphery. Its efforts to once again convince Koreans, and now Chinese, of Japan's good intentions and rightful rule over Korea, and now expansion into China, began on the Korean peninsula. Following the March First movement in Korea, however, the Kumiai Kyōkai's efforts extended into areas just beyond the borders of the Japanese empire.

As the Japanese state, military, and various businesses and individual entrepreneurs deepened their stakes in areas of China such as Shanghai and Manchuria, Koreans—eager to find better economic opportunities or seeking refuge from Japanese political suppression—began migrating in large numbers to these same areas.<sup>10</sup>

Shanghai, with its large foreign population, and Manchuria, overrun by warlords, were

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<sup>10</sup> According to Foreign Ministry estimates, by 1920, 488,656 Koreans resided in parts of Manchuria bordering Korea; it also estimated that an even greater number resided in the interior regions bordering Mongolia. Approximately half of this population lived in the Jiandao (Kando) area of Manchuria, directly across the Tumen River from the Korean peninsula, and not in the southern Manchurian area where Japan had concessions due to its control of the South Manchurian Railroad. Statistics cited in Barbara J. Brooks, “Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion,” *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy 1900-1930*, ed. Sharon A. Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 29.

two areas where political jurisdictions were fuzzy and constantly shifting, with competing state and business interests vying for power. In these borderlands on the peripheries of the Japanese empire, the Kumiai Kyōkai attempted to make its mark by establishing churches focused on facilitating so-called “Japanese-Korean unification” (*naisen ittai*) and “Japanese-Chinese reconciliation” (*ni-chū yūwa*).

Just as the Japanese empire was extending its reach beyond its formal boundaries by extracting new concessions in China, the Kumiai Kyōkai was no longer content to limit its activities to areas under formal Japanese control. While it had already made a few half-hearted efforts in Manchuria, following the March First movement in Korea, the Kumiai Kyōkai combined its existing investment in the Japanese colonial government’s *naisen ittai* ideal with a new sense of urgency to pacify what it considered recalcitrant and ignorant Koreans who opposed Japanese rule, many of whom had fled to Manchuria and Shanghai. In engaging in ministry and evangelism in areas beyond complete Japanese control, however, the Kumiai Kyōkai also entered into a complex world where legal jurisdictions were poorly defined or in constant shift, and where both Japanese and Korean settlers lived as semi-colonialists in a weakened but still sovereign nation.<sup>11</sup> Further, western missionaries had been evangelizing in these areas for several decades: Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries had to compete with already

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<sup>11</sup> For more on Koreans in Manchuria, see Barbara Brooks, “Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion,” *Japan’s Competing Modernities*: 25-44; Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). For the ideological significance of Manchuria (as part of the putative ancient “complete Korea”) for Korean nationalists, see Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), especially 224-236. On Korean economic expansion into Manchuria in a later period, see Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), especially 127-187.

established missions with differing theologies, practices, and interpretations of regional politics.<sup>12</sup> This was in many ways a transnational environment made possible by both Japanese and western imperialism that provided new opportunities and posed interesting challenges for the Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries, distinct from conditions in both the *naichi* and the formal colonies.

This new environment and constantly changing dynamics demanded not only different ministerial strategies, but also different missionaries. Situated within a rapidly expanding empire, the Kumiai Kyōkai also extended beyond the border of the home islands. In addition to the Korea mission, there were Kumiai Kyōkai churches in Japanese immigrant communities along the American west coast and Hawai`i, and many aspiring ministers attended seminaries in America or Europe before returning to Japan. The mobility that the empire provided meant that members of the Kumiai Kyōkai resided in major cities bordering the Pacific Ocean, and often traversed the ocean in pursuit of better opportunities or new sites of ministry. These mobile ministers and lay

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<sup>12</sup> Shanghai was an important base for western missionaries—as one of five treaty ports China “granted” Great Britain with the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), Shanghai was one of the first cities with an official mission station in China. By 1877, in addition to the more established Roman Catholic missions, there were 29 organized Protestant missionary societies in China. Samuel Hugh Moffett, *A History of Christianity in Asia*, vol. 2, 1500-1900 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005), 297, 472. Western missionaries—mainly Scottish and Irish Presbyterians—had also begun evangelizing in Manchuria by the 1870s. The first Koreans to be baptized were introduced to Christianity in Manchuria in 1879. American missionaries in Korea had also begun extending their ministry to Koreans in Manchuria by around 1917. For instance, the Presbyterian Mission (Northern) in Korea began discussing establishing a mission station for Koreans in Manchuria at their annual meeting in October 1916. This coincided with the mission’s first itinerating trip to “Syon Chyun” in Manchuria, where missionaries observed that there were over 300,000 Koreans in southern Manchuria, many of whom were Christians, “and as they go they preach. As a result there are already about six thousand believers scattered over a great territory.” “Annual Meeting of the Presbyterian Mission, North,” *Korea Mission Field* 12, no. 11 (November 1916): 296-297. T.S. Soltare, in an article in the March 1917 issue of the *Korea Mission Field*, declared, “Manchuria is to-day the strategic point in the Orient, lying as it does between the two great empires of China and Japan and from it flow streams of influence in all directions.” T.S. Soltare, “Between Two Empires – God’s Chance,” *Korea Mission Field* 13, no. 3 (March 1917): 72.

members created a massive transnational network linking Japanese immigrant communities in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Honolulu, Korea, Taiwan, and by the 1920s, major cities under Japanese influence in Manchuria like Fengtian, Dalian, and Harbin, and Chinese cities with Japanese concessions like Shanghai and Tianjin.<sup>13</sup> In turn, many members of this network consciously and conspicuously acted to support ideals espoused by the empire, which they in turn interpreted to correspond with their own Christian understanding of the potential that a Christianized empire held for transforming the world.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1919 independence movement in Korea, the so-called “Korean problem,” or *Chōsenjin mondai*, outside of the Korean peninsula itself, came to preoccupy Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries. Watase Tsuneyoshi, the Korea mission director, wrote soon after the March First movement that “It is completely natural that evangelism to Koreans should spread from the peninsula to Manchuria; this is something that cannot be stopped by anyone.... It is only natural that evangelism to Koreans should extend to the places where Koreans are.”<sup>14</sup> What Watase failed to explain is why continuing evangelism to Koreans was necessary, especially in areas outside of the empire, when the mission in Korea had failed to achieve its goals, and why Koreans—as opposed to Chinese and other Manchurian residents—should be the primary focus of continuing Kumiai Kyōkai missionary work. In this chapter, I will consider why Koreans living outside of the Japanese empire became such a

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<sup>13</sup> On Japanese Christian missions in other cities in China, see Han Sokhi, *Nihon no Manshū shihai to Manshū dendōkai* (Nihon kirisutokyōdan shuppankyoku, 1999); Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Manshū’ ni okeru ‘karayuki’ kyūsai jigyo,” *Kirisutokyō shakaimondai kenkyū* 57 (December 2008): 123-155, among others.

<sup>14</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Chōsen dendō no isshin tenki (ge),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (17 June 1920): 2.

preoccupation for the Kumiai Kyōkai by tracing Japanese missionary activity that came as a direct response to the challenges posed to Japanese rule—and the claims of Japanese rule—by the March First movement on the peninsula, and continuing independence activities at the fringes of Japan’s reach. Thus, this story begins in Korea, but continues on to two Chinese cities, Shanghai and Fengtian, that became the focus of Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries who continued to fixate on Koreans wherever they were. This chapter will focus on the period immediately following the March First movement on the Korean peninsula to explore the confluence of new ministry strategies aimed at Koreans living outside of the boundaries of the empire with the presence of a growing group of ministers whose past experiences in numerous places made them suited for the task.

As cities located in China, but under the partial or complete political and legal jurisdiction of outside powers, Shanghai and Fengtian present interesting cases to explore how Japanese missionaries conceived of their role as evangelists and cultural imperialists just outside the boundaries of the formal Japanese empire. Extant sources for the churches in Shanghai and Fengtian are even sparser than those for the Korea mission. Missionaries in these areas reported their activities to supporters in Japan through the denominational paper, *Kirisutokyō sekai*, and some recorded their experiences in memoirs. However, both cities were ravaged by the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and ministers fled when Japan was defeated without time or resources to salvage the material evidence of their work. Also, it appears that the churches in these cities did not elicit the same enthusiastic interest or support that the

Korea mission enjoyed in its early years. Though the material is limited, I nonetheless believe that an investigation of these churches, to the extent possible, is a necessary part of the larger project of examining the relationship between Japanese Christianity and the expansion of the Japanese empire.

Shanghai and Fengtian were two cities in China critical to Japan's attempts to expand beyond its formal colonies. They were also two very different places, but places which were in many ways shaped by the same series of events: the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War—and the Russians' signing over of its important railroad concession on the Liaodong peninsula to Japan—and subsequent treaties and agreements between China and Japan, as well as on-going political turmoil in China. Likewise, Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries approached the churches in these two sites in strikingly similar ways. Whereas in the previous chapter, I focused as much as possible on the actual activities of missionaries, since the sources available for these two sites do not include similar detail, I will use a different approach, and focus on the network of missionaries that made the missions in these two sites possible. For one of the most interesting aspects of the Kumiai Kyōkai's work in these cities is the *type* of men selected as missionaries. The type of work they engaged in was made possible because there existed an extensive, transnational network of Kumiai Kyōkai ministers, whose exposure to multiple places, countries, and ideas, gave them a particular and unique set of skills and qualifications for work in an area outside of Japanese control. Thus, this chapter will proceed on two levels: one, an exploration of the human network that included missionaries in Shanghai and Manchuria, and two, the actual establishment

and development of the Kumiai churches in Shanghai and Fengtian as a reaction to Korean protests on the peninsula.

## Part I

### **Espionage for God and Nation: The March First Movement and the Yō Un-hyōng Incident**

The March First movement was a profound expression of Korean anger and resentment towards Japanese rule.<sup>15</sup> It was also sobering proof that despite the Japanese government's—and Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries'—claims that Japanese rule was beneficial for Koreans, this sentiment was not shared by Korean colonial subjects. Though the protests were cut short by brute force, they nonetheless sent shockwaves through the Government-General.<sup>16</sup> Governor General Hasegawa—who had succeeded Terauchi Masatake—was replaced by Saitō Makoto, and under Saitō's command, the Government-General implemented new reforms. On the surface, these promised a more flexible and tolerant form of rule that acknowledged previously banned expressions of Korean culture, such as the publication of newspapers and journals, and the establishment of “nationalist” associations, as long as these did not overtly challenge Japan's rule over Korea.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, the Government-General also dramatically

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<sup>15</sup> Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 3.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea*, 3-4.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea*, 4.

increased the number of police and gendarmes stationed in the colony, thereby complementing cultural “tolerance” with a more intrusive and visible police force.<sup>18</sup>

Many Japanese Christians were particularly troubled by the mass involvement of Korean Christians during the protests. The March First movement was most significant for Koreans, for the hopes that it embodied, as well as the disappointment that its violent end evoked. But at the same time, this movement had a significant impact on how Japanese Christians, at least those who supported a form of overseas evangelism that paralleled imperial expansion, envisioned their role in the empire as well as the geographical extent of that role. Their gaze now extended beyond the boundaries of the empire itself to the areas of China with large populations of both overseas Japanese and Koreans.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, as soon as reports of the Government-General’s brutal tactics during its suppression of the March First movement reached Japanese in the home islands, Christians of different denominations demanded to know if these reports were indeed true. Members of the Greater Japan Peace Association, made up of both American missionaries and Japanese, traveled to Korea in May 1919. The association’s director, an American Quaker named Gilbert Bowles, initiated the visit because he was troubled by disagreements between American missionaries and

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<sup>18</sup> Michael Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea*, 4. In many ways, this seemingly contradictory policy of greater tolerance coupled with heightened police visibility paralleled an important shift in governmental policies in the home islands. In 1925, the Japanese government reformed its election laws, expanding suffrage to include all males above the age of twenty. This gesture towards greater representative government was accompanied by a series of laws restricting socialist activities (for instance, criticism of private property ownership were forbidden by law) and greater censorship of publications.

Japanese Christians over the actual nature of the March First movement and its suppression. During their visit, members of the association visited major cities and interviewed American missionaries, resident Japanese, and a few Koreans.<sup>19</sup> Ishizaka Kameji, a Methodist member of the group, published a detailed account of the group's visit in serialized form in the main denominational newspapers, including *Kirisutokyō sekai*. In its report, the association recorded troubling statements made by both Koreans and Americans that raised questions about Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries' conduct during the protests. American missionaries in P'yōngyang complained about Kumiai Kyōkai missionary policies that they found to be a nuisance (*meiwaku*); an itinerating Korean evangelist accused the Kumiai missionaries of allowing gendarmes to use their churches during the protests, an accusation which the American missionaries in P'yōngyang also included in their complaints.<sup>20</sup>

Watase, quick to respond to accusations leveled at the Government-General and his mission, offered his own detailed explanation for the "true" motives of those who had participated in the uprising. Unlike others who expressed dismay at the Government-General's brutal tactics, Watase condemned the mass participation of Korean Christians in their protests. After accusing Korean agitators living abroad in exile of taking advantage of the post-World War I "global enthusiasm for democracy"

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<sup>19</sup> "Dai Nihon heiwa kyōkai ni yoru chōsa hōkoku," reprinted in *Gendai shi shiryō*, vol. 26, *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 3.1 *undō* (Misuzu shobō, 1967), 446-447.

<sup>20</sup> "Dai Nihon heiwa kyōkai ni yoru chōsa hōkoku," reprinted in *Gendai shi shiryō*, vol. 26, *Chōsen*, vol. 2, 3.1 *undō*, 460, 463. The report was also published under Ishizaka Kameji's name as "Chōsen sōjōchi junkai nisshi," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (July – September 1919). The report does not contain any elaboration of what exactly was a nuisance about the Kumiai Kyōkai's mission policies.

and the emotional turmoil surrounding former King Kojong's death, Watase next placed responsibility on the "backwards" theology of Korean Presbyterians and Methodists:

As far as I am concerned, Christianity in Korea has not grasped the true spirit of Christianity. Its theology is conservative, its obstinate practices formalistic, lacking in a spirit of freedom, placing emphasis on the Ten Commandments, but Christ's tolerance, humility, service, and dedication are not complete in the average believer. In other words, [their Christianity] is steeped in the color of Judaism, but faint in the color of Christianity. Furthermore, they apply the apocalyptic Scriptures to Korea, teaching people to seek comfort through distancing themselves from this world and hoping to reach heaven as soon as possible, instead of giving them hope that through great effort, they can change this world and bring about heaven [on earth].... If the true spirit of Christ was active among these people, it would be impossible for them to have participated in the current disturbance. It is obvious from this point just how Christianity in Korea is incomplete, and how far they are from Christ's true spirit.<sup>21</sup>

In short, Watase refused to acknowledge the many Korean grievances against Japanese rule, and used the principle of "loving one's enemy" as the measure by which he evaluated the quality of Korean Christians' faith. Since the Korean Presbyterians and Methodists who participated in the uprising turned against their Japanese rulers, instead of embracing them with selfless love, they had failed to truly grasp the essence of Christ's teachings. As far as he was concerned, it was their Christian duty to accept Japanese rule as an expression of Christian love; their participation in the uprising was a betrayal of their faith. Additionally, by making the curious distinction between the Korean believers' "Jewish"—that is, incomplete—Christianity, and the presumably complete Christianity of Japanese believers, Watase attempted to distinguish between Korean and Japanese Christians. To emphasize this distinction, he criticized Koreans for

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<sup>21</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, "Chōsen sōjō jiken no shinsō to sono zengosaku," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (10 April 1919): 3.

espousing an otherworldly, even millenarian view, something which he considered backwards, conservative, and ultimately unproductive. By contrasting this supposed spiritual isolationism with a Christianity that preached that establishing heaven on this earth was possible, he implied that the work of the Kumiai Kyōkai was a part of this grander scheme to create the kingdom of God on earth, even in the Japanese empire. Despite the seeming contradiction evident here—for those who he accused of being otherworldly were the same people who had participated in the very this-worldly uprising—Watase made clear the stakes for the Kumiai Kyōkai in the aftermath of the March First movement. By attacking the quality of the Christianity espoused by Korean Christians who participated in the uprising, he denied that the Christian participants were associated with himself, his ministry in Korea, and by extension, the church in the home islands.

There were nearly 20,000 Korean members of the Kumiai Kyōkai mission in 1919. Watase praised them—in clear contrast to the “American missionary-led” Korean Christians—and lauded their behavior as exemplary “true” Christian conduct in a time of political turmoil and crisis:

Although they too are Christians, our Kumiai Kyōkai members showed a completely different attitude. Some might think that since [these Koreans] evangelize in cooperation with Japanese, it is only natural that they would not participate in this incident, but they are no different from other Koreans in their love for Korea, and they are not necessarily opposed to independence. The fact that despite these things they did not run to join in is because their understanding of Christianity itself is completely different. In other words, they understand the true spirit of Christ, and they have transcended the Jewish position. That is, they

possess the spirit of going two miles when asked to go one mile, and the magnanimity to pray for their enemies.<sup>22</sup>

In an interesting move, Watase did not claim that the Kumiai Kyōkai churches were loyal to Japan, or fully appreciated the principle of unifying Japan and Korea (*naisen ittai*), but instead, insisted that their refusal to participate in the uprising was due to their appreciation and understanding of “true” Christianity. Again, he defined the manifestation of “true” Christianity—at least in relation to the uprising—as loving one’s enemies. By making faith and not loyalty the critical issue, Watase asserted the dependability of Christians to support the authority and leadership of the Japanese state and colonial governments, as long as the Christianity in question was taught by Japanese like himself who adhered to the most advanced and progressive doctrine.

The Kumiai Kyōkai did not limit its involvement in the aftermath of the March First movement to exhorting Koreans to embrace Japanese rule, however. As mentioned in chapter four, Satō Shigehiko, a Methodist minister of a Japanese church in Korea, had accused a Japanese evangelist of engaging in espionage. Astonishingly, Murakami Tadakichi, the evangelist in question and an elder of the P’yōngyang Kumiai church, had boasted of his espionage activities in the Osaka edition of the Asahi newspaper.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Chōsen sōjō jiken no shinsō to sono zengosaku (part 2),” *Kirisutokyō seikai* (17 April 1919): 4.

<sup>23</sup> I have not been able to find much information about Murakami. He was in Korea by at least 1911, and was already fluent in Korean by this time. Watase stayed at his home on at least two occasions while visiting P’yōngyang in 1911, and Murakami served as interpreter for Watase, Ebina, and Osada during their July 1911 speaking tour through Korea. Murakami also served as the interpreter for a group of Korean ministers when they visited Japan in 1911 through the sponsorship of the Japanese YMCA. In 1913, he was a temporary employee of the Korea Government General’s Ministry of Home Affairs

In 1919, soon after the March First movement erupted, Murakami traveled to Shanghai and infiltrated a group of Korean political exiles that had found asylum in the French concession.<sup>24</sup> Despite Japanese government protest, the French forbade the Japanese consulate in the neighboring International Settlement from arresting Koreans who lived within the French concession.<sup>25</sup> Murakami, who gained access to the group by telling them that due to his sympathies for Korean independence he had become a wanted man in Japan, made careful notes about the different members of this group, and promptly departed for Japan, where he met with then Army General Tanaka Giichi to report his findings. He also reported his findings to the Government-General.<sup>26</sup>

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(Chōsen sōtokufu shokutaku naimubu chihōkyoku). Business card given to Ebina Danjō in 1913, Ebina Danjō papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

<sup>24</sup> The event that I address here, often referred to as the “Yō Unhyōng incident,” has been described in detail in several Japanese sources. My summary is based primarily on the account given in Kang Dok-sang, *Yo Unyon: Chōsen san-ichi dokuritsu undō* (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2002). It also appears in Iinuma Jirō and Han Sokhi, “Nihon Kumiai Kyōkai no Chōsen dendō,” *Nihon teikoku shugi ka no Chōsen dendō* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan, 1985); Nishihara Ki’ichirō, “Nihon Kumiai Kyōkai kaigai dendō no hikari to kage (1): Kumiai Kyōkai Chōsen dendō-bu to Yo Unyon jiken,” *Kirisutokyō Kenkyū* 50 no. 2 (1989): 159-204; and Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*. A slightly different version is recounted in Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji: Shanhai Nihonjin YMCA yonjū-nen shi* (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1995). The main difference between Ikeda’s account and the others is that Ikeda disputes the claim that Furuya was involved in the incident, arguing that Furuya arrived in Shanghai in December, and could not have been present to assist Fujita and Kimura in their attempts to persuade Yō to go to Japan. His account is otherwise consistent with the others.

<sup>25</sup> In 1919, the Japanese consulate had issued arrest warrants for two members of the provisional government, but the French authorities protested, forbidding them from arresting any other Korean exiles. Iinuma and Han, *Nihon teikoku shugi ka no Chōsen dendō*, 126.

<sup>26</sup> There are numerous entries in the diary of Army General Utsunomiya Tarō—then commander of the Japanese army in Korea—of Murakami’s visits with Government General officials to discuss how he should go about infiltrating the Shanghai group, including references to how Murakami’s position as a Christian would be invaluable in gaining the trust of Korean political exiles. There is also some indication that Murakami received a significant amount of money to aid his efforts. Utsunomiya Tarō kankei shiryō kenkyūkai, editor, *Nihon rikugun to Ajia seisaku: Rikugun taishō Utsunomiya Tarō nikki* vol. 3 (Iwanami shoten, 2007), especially 242-302.

The Government-General of Korea had successfully quelled the March First movement on the peninsula, but it was concerned with the activities of Korean political exiles in Shanghai, Manchuria, Siberia, the United States, and even Japan. Of these groups, the ones in Shanghai proved to be most problematic. Unlike the other sites, where Japan either had political authority or where Japan had the cooperation of the local government, the French concession in Shanghai served as an asylum for Korean political exiles, among others. Soon after protests erupted on the peninsula, groups of Korean exiles in Vladivostok, the Jiandao region of Manchuria, and the United States, joined with other exiles in Shanghai. Together, these groups declared the formation of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Shanghai Provisional Government), which they claimed was the legitimate government of Korea in exile while the Korean peninsula remained under Japanese rule.<sup>27</sup> One of the participating groups, the Korean Christian Youth Party, consisted of Korean Christians who lived in the French concession to avoid arrest by the Japanese authorities. It was this group that Murakami infiltrated.

Having been rebuffed by the French authorities in its attempts to arrest members of the provisional government, the Japanese government decided to undermine the provisional government's efforts through more insidious means. This new plan involved top-level bureaucrats and may have even been approved by the prime minister himself.<sup>28</sup> Murakami's information was invaluable for this new approach: in his weeks

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<sup>27</sup> Kang Man-gil, *A History of Contemporary Korea*, trans. John Duncan (Kent, UK: Global Oriental Press, 2005), 30-31.

with the members of the provisional government, he had discovered that certain of its members were less convinced of the possibility or prudence of immediately attaining Korea's political independence. Murakami suggested to General Tanaka that in particular, Yō Un-hyōng, a founding member of the Korean Christian Youth Party and an elected representative of the newly formed provisional government assembly who held a position equivalent to under secretary of foreign affairs, might be persuaded that Japanese rule was good for Korea, if he was only provided with enough encouragement and evidence.<sup>29</sup> General Tanaka, along with high-level officials in the government, developed a plan to convince Yō Un-hyōng to denounce Korean independence, and thus undermine the Shanghai Provisional Government's legitimacy without the use of direct force.

The plan to turn Yō against the rest of the provisional government, hatched through the conspicuous meddling of a member of the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission, also depended on the cooperation of a network of Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries. The Japanese government's plan hinged on convincing Yō to travel to Japan. But since Yō

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<sup>28</sup> Furuya Magojirō, in his speech before the Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, claimed that then-Army Field General Tanaka Giichi was the high level official who asked the members of the Japanese YMCA in Shanghai—using military attaches of the consulate (*chūzai bukan*) as intermediaries—to take a part in this plan to convince Koreans that Korean independence was impossible. Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 18.

<sup>29</sup> Yō Un-hyōng was an important figure in Korean independence. In addition to his role in this incident, he became a key figure in the socialist wing of Korean political exiles in the 1920s in Shanghai. He is also known for instigating a seemingly insignificant yet symbolically charged incident: during the 1936 Berlin Olympics, a Korean man representing Japan took first place in the marathon. At the time, Yō was working as the editor of the *Chungang Daily News*; he doctored the photo of the man crossing the finish line by replacing the red circle—the emblem of the Japanese flag—with the yin yang symbol used in the Korean flag. Immediately after “liberation,” Yō headed up one of the Korean groups preparing for complete independence. He was assassinated by a member of a group led by Syngman Rhee, who eventually became the first president of South Korea through American support, because Rhee considered Yō a political threat.

Un-hyōng was a political exile who avoided arrest by remaining in the French concession, it was first necessary to convince him that he would not be immediately arrested upon arrival. According to Furuya Magojirō, who was transferred to Shanghai in the midst of this event, members of the government also reasoned that Japanese Christians would be more effective at convincing Korean political exiles because in its hyperbolic and nearly hysterical assessment, “There are approximately 3000 Koreans in Shanghai, and while of course some of these are children, apparently they are all Christians. And as for the leaders of the independence movement, most are ministers.”<sup>30</sup> Fujita Kyūkō, the director of the Japanese YMCA in Shanghai, and who was friendly with Yō, was enlisted by Koga, a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, to approach Yō and convince him of the Japanese government’s good faith. Fujita had been responsible for introducing Murakami to Yō in the first place. Fujita approached George Fitch, the secretary of the Shanghai YMCA and a close friend of Yō, to mediate with Yō on his behalf. Fujita also called upon Furuya Magojirō and another Japanese minister, Kimura Seimatsu, to reason with Yō.

Kimura Seimatsu, who had at one time chaired the Korea fundraising committee, was now working as an itinerating evangelist for the Kumiai Kyōkai. At the time, Kimura was in Fengtian, one of the major cities along the South Manchurian Railway under Japanese control, to help raise funds for a Kumiai church in the city. Traveling to Shanghai, where he also attempted to raise funds for a church planned there, he apparently took the opportunity to send reports on the Korean provisional

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<sup>30</sup> Chūō Chōsen kyōkai, 18. In this passage, Furuya seems to conflate all Korean residents in Shanghai with members of the independence movement.

government to General Tanaka. Furuya, who had most recently served as the minister of the Los Angeles Japanese Congregational church (Rafu Nihonjin Kumiai Kyōkai), had recently arrived in Shanghai at the behest of Kumiai Kyōkai leadership to assist with the new Shanghai church. These three ministers, Fujita, Furuya, and Kimura, convinced Yō Un-hyōng that he would remain safe in Japan. Yō, for his part, no doubt viewed this trip as a prime opportunity to declare his support for Korean independence in the colonial metropole.<sup>31</sup>

Yō, accompanied by Fujita and Chang Tōksu, another member of the provisional government whom Yō asked to serve as an interpreter, left for Japan in November 1919.<sup>32</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi and Yu Il-sōn also accompanied them on their trip, despite Yō's strong objections. Yō considered Yu Il-sōn—who at the time was still assistant director of the Korea mission—a traitor to the cause of Korean independence.<sup>33</sup> Despite the government's promises that Yō would not be detained, a confidential communication from the Japanese consulate general in Shanghai suggests that it was not taking chances; the consulate requested that Yō be placed under surveillance—although with the stipulation that it be discreet so as not to be detected—during his time in

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<sup>31</sup> The Shanghai Provisional Government's reaction to the Japanese government's invitation to Yō to visit Japan was mixed. A few members encouraged Yō to go, arguing that it would give him the opportunity to plead for the case of Korean independence. Others attempted to dissuade him, afraid that he would be turned into a collaborator by the government.

<sup>32</sup> Chang Tōksu (1895-1947) was a founding member, along with Yō Un-hyōng and Kim Gyushik, of the Korean Christian Youth Party. He attended Waseda, and so would have been an able interpreter for Yō.

<sup>33</sup> It appears that the provisional government compiled a list of fellow Koreans who they considered traitors, and should be assassinated for betraying their nation. Of the seven people on this list, two—Yu Il-sōn and Sonu Sun—were associated with the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission. Nishihara Ki'ichirō, "Nihon Kumiai Kyōkai kaigai dendō no hikari to kage (1): Kumiai Kyōkai Chōsen dendō-bu to Yo Unyon jiken," 175.

Japan.<sup>34</sup> The group was met by Kimura and Murakami as soon as they arrived in Japan. Over the course of several weeks, Yō was taken to meet with various government officials, to view noted sites, and to be told about the benefits of Japanese rule in Korea. At the end of his trip, a press conference was arranged for him at the Imperial Hotel. The government officials who sponsored the visit assumed that Yō had been sufficiently indoctrinated and would denounce the Korean independence movement. Despite the organizers' expectations, Yō declared his support for Korea's independence in front of dozens of Japanese reporters. During his visit, Yō had been taken to an imperial garden usually closed off to common visitors. His insistence on Korean independence turned into a *lèse majesté* incident, with politicians accusing the prime minister of committing treason for allowing such a "disloyal" Korean to visit grounds associated with the imperial family.

The Japanese government's attempt to turn Yō into a collaborator ended in failure, and the Kumiai Kyōkai ministers who had participated in this attempt were greatly embarrassed due to their inability—once again—to successfully "convert" a Korean to the notion that Japanese rule was in the best interest of Koreans. In fact, Japanese scholars who have written on the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission have generally agreed that these missionaries' failure to "convert" Yō, more than a shift in Government General policy, led the Japanese government to withdraw its financial support, which effectively forced the Korea mission to shut its doors.<sup>35</sup> However, since

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<sup>34</sup> Shanghai Consul General Yamazaki confidential communication, 14 November 1919, Gaimushō, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, accessed 24 July 2007.

there is no extant evidence to support or refute this claim, this is only speculation. Nonetheless, the complicity of these missionaries in the feeble attempt to undermine what was in actuality a small and ineffective group reveals the logical extension of the Kumiai Kyōkai's dual focus of conversion and assimilation when confronted with Korean demands for independence.

My purpose in recounting this rather curious incident is not simply to point out missionary complicity with Japanese political intrigue—however alarming this might be—but rather to demonstrate how in 1919, the pro-independence activities of Koreans “in exile”—regardless of how effective they actually were—were a significant preoccupation for the Japanese government as well as imperialistically minded missionaries like Watase. Furthermore, this incident reveals that there existed an impressive network of Kumiai Kyōkai ministers who worked beyond the borders of the formal Japanese empire, and who were inextricably linked to the complicated politics of Japanese involvement in China. The ministers entangled in the Yō Un-hyōng incident included two men who had spent considerable time in the U.S. before working in Shanghai (Fujita and Furuya), an itinerating evangelist whose involvement in these events remains somewhat nebulous (Kimura), and Japanese missionaries in Korea who were also keeping one eye on the activities of Koreans who had managed to flee the peninsula (Watase and Murakami). The Yō Un-hyōng incident also demonstrates how Japanese imperial expansion had an impact beyond the borders of formal empire. Koreans on the peninsula had been subjugated, but Koreans who had migrated for

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<sup>35</sup> See for example Matsuo, 289-293; Iinuma and Han, 143-146; and Katano, 228-229.

economic opportunities or fled for political reasons to other places presented an interesting problem. Since the ideology underpinning Japan's expansion—and justifying its assimilationist policies—asserted the primacy of the “familial” relationship between Koreans and Japanese, all Koreans regardless of where they lived were potentially subject to Japanese control. In other words, the Japanese government laid claim to all Koreans—whether they lived in Los Angeles, Chicago, Fengtian, or Shanghai—because by familial right, all Koreans were subject to Japanese rule.

As has been demonstrated elsewhere, this rhetorical move was not due to an abstract ideal, but was closely linked to several practical issues. For instance, Manchuria was home to the largest number of Koreans outside of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, making a claim on Koreans—regardless of whether or not they resided within the formal boundaries of the empire—enabled the Japanese government to claim authority over a sizable population of “imperial subjects” in Manchuria, a place of profound interest for the Japanese government, businesses, and military.<sup>36</sup> Shanghai was also an important site of Japanese business: by 1915, Japanese residents outnumbered British expatriates in the International Settlement of Shanghai.<sup>37</sup> It was the point of entry for

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<sup>36</sup> Hyun Ok Park has described Japan's claims on Koreans in Manchuria as an effort to assert political authority in Manchuria prior to its outright control of this area—through the establishment of the puppet state Manchukuo in 1932—through a process she describes as “the politics of osmosis.” Using the biological trope of osmosis, she argues that the Japanese state treated Korean bodies as “cells” that had permeated the membrane of the political border between colonial Korea and Northeastern China, and once Koreans had settled in areas of Manchuria bordering Korea, laid claim to those Korean bodies—evoking their responsibility to protect the rights of these “imperial subjects”—as a way of claiming political authority through the presence of the bodies of its imperial subjects. Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 24-64 in particular.

<sup>37</sup> In 1910, there were 3361 Japanese in Shanghai, compared to 4465 British residents. By 1915, Japanese residents outnumbered British, 7169 to 4822 respectively. By 1925, the Japanese population had soared to

Japanese trade with China, and a popular destination for Japanese immigrants.<sup>38</sup> The large presence of Korean exiles who sought refuge in the French concession made it equally troublesome to the Japanese government and Korea Government General, who continued to maintain a vigilant eye out for Korean independence fighters who refused to give up even after the brutal crackdown of the March First movement.<sup>39</sup> By claiming that Koreans in Shanghai were Japanese subjects—whether or not they were residing in Korea at the time of colonization—the Japanese state could enforce its laws on those Koreans in the International Settlement, and appeal to international law to gain the cooperation of other foreign powers with extraterritorial rights in Shanghai.

Manchuria—specifically the major cities along the South Manchurian Railway—and Shanghai became the focus of Kumiai Kyōkai missionary work following the March First movement as well. The relationship between events on the Korean peninsula in the spring of 1919 and the extension of Kumiai Kyōkai missionary work soon after is clear, and yet, the actual policies of the churches in Shanghai and Fengtian often reveal confusion and indecision, with the focus of ministry as asserted by Kumiai Kyōkai leadership often working at cross-purposes with the actual work

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13,804, compared to only 5879 British residents. In this same period, American residents never rose about 2000. Japanese residents outnumbered all other foreign residents combined in the International Settlement. Takahashi Kōsuke and Furumaya Tadao, editors, *Shanghai shi: Kyodai toshi no keisei to hitobito no itonami* (Tōhō shoten, 1995), 99.

<sup>38</sup> This was particularly true of Japanese from the southwestern areas, for whom Shanghai was a closer—and certainly more cosmopolitan—metropole than Tokyo. Takahashi Kōsuke and Furumaya Tadao, *Shanghai shi*, 122.

<sup>39</sup> According to official statistics, there were only 53 Koreans in Shanghai in 1915, but 700 by 1920. However, these figures are the official Japanese consulate statistics, and do not include Koreans in the French concession, where Japanese authority did not extend. Nihon Shanghai shi kenkyūkai, editor, *Shanghai jinbutsushi* (Tōhō shoten, 1997), 67-70.

engaged in by the church ministers themselves. The ministers who worked in Shanghai and Fengtian both departed from previous work in Korea, and continued the work, in significant ways. Though not the only sites of ministry outside of the colonial metropole in this period, Shanghai and Fengtian are especially significant because of the ways in which these ministries explicitly asserted continuities with the failed Korean mission from the previous decade.

## **Part II**

### **The First Fengtian Church: Starting a Mission in Warlord Territory**

The Kumiai Kyōkai's growing interest in China's northeastern provinces, also known as Manchuria, grew out of its mission in Korea, and paralleled that of other Japanese institutions—ranging from the government to the special military garrison stationed there, to large-scale businesses—that had established themselves in the Guandong Leased Territory following the Russo-Japanese war. Sandwiched between Russia's southern border and Korea's northern border, Manchuria was geographically removed from the political and economic centers of Beijing, Shanghai, or Nanjing. It also held a unique position for the Qing dynasty; seeking to “preserve” their ancestral homeland, the Manchu rulers of Qing China had attempted to discourage—though

unsuccessfully—Han Chinese from migrating north of the Great Wall.<sup>40</sup> From a Russian and Japanese strategic perspective, Manchuria was critical territory.

Japan's interest in Manchuria dated back to the end of the First Sino-Japanese war, when Japan received the Liaodong Peninsula, located at the southern tip of Manchuria, from China as part of its war indemnity. Through the Triple Intervention, organized by France, Germany, and Russia, Japan was forced to return the Liaodong Peninsula, and Russia eventually asserted control over this territory. From 1895 until 1905, when Russia was defeated by Japan, Russia began building a major railroad, the China East Railroad; the north-south branch of the railroad extended from Port Arthur (C: Lüshun, J: Ryojun), an ice-free port at the southern tip, northward through Fengtian, etc, eventually terminating at Harbin, where it connected to the east-west trunk line of the railroad, which in turn connected with the grand Trans-Siberian Railroad.<sup>41</sup> After its defeat, Russia agreed to cede its claims to the peninsula to Japan, as well as its rights to the portion of the railroad south of Changchun.<sup>42</sup> To oversee this new colonial acquisition, the South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu) was incorporated with the

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<sup>40</sup> The Manchu rulers of Qing China attempted to preserve “Manchu heritage unspoiled by Chinese or other foreign immigration” by restricting migration into the area north of the Great Wall. However, by the nineteenth century, this isolation policy was a failure, and the northwestern provinces were fully integrated into the rest of China (though this was contested by Russians and Japanese). In 1902, the migration ban was completely rescinded, in part to counteract Russian and Japanese interests in the region. Between 1890 and 1942, Manchuria was the most popular site of migration, with an average of half a million migrants and sojourners relocating there per year. Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 41-44.

<sup>41</sup> Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 28-29.

<sup>42</sup> Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 25.

Japanese government as majority shareholder, to operate the railroad and to explore other means by which Japan could profit from its newly acquired territory.<sup>43</sup>

Not an official colony, the Liaodong peninsula—called the Guandong Leased Territory under Japanese control—was rather a leased territory, and Japan was granted a narrow strip of land bordering the railroad—known as the railroad zone—as a further concession. Thus, the existing major cities along the railroad—which were further developed with the aid of company capital and were intended to support the railroad and encourage subsequent Japanese migration—functioned as islands of Japanese influence and political control, surrounded by territory that was internationally acknowledged as Chinese.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, Chinese dissatisfaction with Qing handling of western and Japanese intrusion had led to massive political unrest, culminating in the overthrow of the Qing and the establishment of the republican government under Sun Yatsen, then Yuan Shikai, in 1911.<sup>45</sup> Manchuria became the province of competing bands of warlords, including some who made cities along this railroad corridor their strongholds. The Japanese government, businessmen, idealistically-minded urban planners, and the military, each expected great things from Manchuria. But it was also politically

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<sup>43</sup> Louise Young describes Japan's expansion into Manchuria in this period as "rel[ying] on using a combination of threat and bribery to extract ever more concessions from the local Chinese leadership. Equally important, such negotiations were never simply between Japan and China, but were embroiled in the multilateral intricacies of China diplomacy." Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 25.

<sup>44</sup> According to Young, "As the result of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, the Kwantung Leased Territory and the Japanese sections of the railway towns became effective colonial possessions, administered as part of Japan's growing formal empire. The rest of Manchuria, however, remained under Chinese government jurisdiction; Japanese influence was informal and their control indirect." Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 25.

<sup>45</sup> Although Sun Yatsen had been the leader of the movement that overthrew the Qing, he ceded leadership to Yuan Shikai soon after, and by 1919 was living in a state of semi-exile in Shanghai.

unstable, and situated within the boundaries of China. Nonetheless, the Kumiai Kyōkai chose Manchuria as the next site of its ministry abroad.<sup>46</sup>

In June 1917, a group of prominent Kumiai ministers—including Watase Tsuneyoshi, Ebina Danjō, and Makino Toraji—visited Fengtian to accompany Shimizu Yasuzō, who was about to become the first Kumiai missionary in Manchuria. This group of Japanese missionaries, hosted by Inoue Hatsunosuke, a resident of Fengtian, first visited Zhang Zuolin, the powerful local warlord who was in an uneasy but advantageous relationship with local Japanese elites.<sup>47</sup> During this meeting, Ebina announced to Zhang the Kumiai Kyōkai's intentions to begin a church in Fengtian, and introduced Shimizu as the missionary who would be stationed there.<sup>48</sup> Shimizu himself recounted in his memoir that Ebina introduced him by saying, “This is the bride that Japan offers China.”<sup>49</sup> Incredibly, Ebina asked Zhang to consider supporting the church.<sup>50</sup> After also meeting with some English missionaries in Fengtian, the group

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<sup>46</sup> On Japan's pre-1932 expansion into Manchuria, see Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1906-1933,” *Japan's Informal Empire in China*, 101-132; Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, especially 3-52; Tsukase Susumu, *Manshū no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa, 2004).

<sup>47</sup> Zhang Zuolin controlled the area around Fengtian, and Japanese groups—particularly the Kwantung army, or military garrison in Kwantung—entered into an uneasy relationship with him through most of the 1920s. In 1928, the Kwantung army decided that he had outlived his usefulness to them, and was becoming too belligerent, and assassinated him, but staged his murder in such a way as to make it appear that Chinese revolutionaries had killed him. They hoped that the appearance of increased unrest in the area would lead the Japanese government to give the garrison permission to extend outside of the territory, thus beginning a whole-scale occupation of Manchuria. However, the plan failed when the government showed restraint.

<sup>48</sup> Hōten kumiai kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 1.

<sup>49</sup> Shimizu Yasuzō, *Chōyo mon gai* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbun sha, 1939), 80.

departed, leaving Shimizu behind to begin the work. During this period, Shimizu and Makino also managed to secure land for a church from the South Manchurian Railway. The land was promised assuming that the full amount for the land would be paid within a two-year period.

The account above, taken from the Fengtian Kumiai church's own history, suggests several characteristics of the originally planted church. Though with some apparent overlap with the ongoing mission to the south in Korea—as suggested by Watase's participation—the original church in Fengtian was intended as a church primarily focused on evangelizing to Chinese. The missionary selected for this work had volunteered out of a particular desire to evangelize to Chinese.<sup>51</sup> Further, the curious visit to Zhang Zuolin indicates the instability of the local political environment, as well as the relative powerlessness of Japanese authority in the area. It also suggests that the Kumiai Kyōkai was willing to seek support from whomever the local authority was, even a Manchurian warlord, if such support was useful or necessary. What is more important, in the period immediately *preceding* the March First movement in Korea, Manchuria represented a site of infinite possibility for these missionaries, who were

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<sup>50</sup> Hōten kumiai kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Shimizu was a member of the Ōmi Brotherhood, a group started by an American, Merrell Vories, who first arrived in Japan in 1904 as a YMCA missionary. Vories took up a position as an English teacher in the town of Ōmi Hachiman, located on the shores of Lake Biwa to the southeast of Kyoto, and invited his students to his home, where he conducted Bible Studies. His proselytizing activities led the school to fire him, but he stayed on in Ōmi, and formed the Ōmi Brotherhood. Vories, who had studied architecture in college, began an architecture firm out of the Ōmi Brotherhood, and infused in his designs a belief that in order to live a proper Christian life, people needed to be surrounded by an appropriately Christian space that was open, hygienic, and conducive to a modern and spiritual lifestyle. Vories designed numerous churches in Japan, as well as other buildings, and his firm also designed churches and other structures in the empire, including the Fengtian Kumiai church, built in 1920. For more on Vories and the Ōmi Brotherhood, see Greg Vanderbilt, "'The Kingdom of God is Like a Mustard Seed': Evangelizing Modernity Between the United States and Japan, 1905-1948," (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 2005).

most concerned with what their form of Christianity could do to further Japanese “progress” in what they viewed as a blank and desolate space.

Shimizu Yasuzō, the young missionary, recalled in his memoir that he was “only allowed to speak for five minutes” during a prominent speaking event that the ministers organized in Fengtian; no doubt most of the time was reserved for Ebina, Makino, and Watase, who were prominent leaders in the Kumiai Kyōkai. Nonetheless, during the brief time allotted him, Shimizu described his expectations for Manchuria: “In Manchuria, Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and Russians must all work together to build an America in Asia. In order to do this, the leaders—who are the Japanese—must have the faith of sacred believers. As long as a glorious civilization can be developed in Manchuria, the whole continent of China can be moved as well.”<sup>52</sup> Similarly, on this same visit, Ebina expressed enthusiasm for what could be accomplished in Manchuria: “A new civilization can be developed in Manchuria. In the old Japan, such cultivation is impossible. I am sure that Manchuria will be able to offer something for a new civilization. However, if we ignore this, and insist on spreading the old civilization, is it really possible for us to care for the Chinese? Manchuria is far greater prepared for planting a new civilization than Korea.”<sup>53</sup>

Deploying a lofty rhetoric similar to that used to justify evangelism in colonial Korea, Ebina, as well as Shimizu, argued that Manchuria was both a place of great civilizing potential, and a place that required Japanese tutelage in order for it to fulfill

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<sup>52</sup> Shimizu Yasuzō, *Chōyo mon gai*, 79.

<sup>53</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Manshū hoku Shi ni okeru kansō,” *Shinjin* 18 no 8 (August 1917): 60.

this potential. Before the March First movement, the Chinese in China were the principal object of Japanese Christian interest in Fengtian, as well as other major cities along the railroad like Dalian, though it is important to note that this interest was subdued in comparison to Kumiai Kyōkai interests in Korea. In fact, after only six months, the Fengtian church was closed; it had been unable to raise sufficient funds to sustain its work. Shimizu stayed on, and moved in with a resident Japanese family. Services were continued for the small group of Japanese Kumiai members in Fengtian in the home of Nakae Hiroshi, an employee of the South Manchurian Railroad.<sup>54</sup> However, less than a year later, at the Kumiai Kyōkai general conference, a motion was passed to establish a ministry to Japanese living in Manchuria, including Fengtian.

The Kumiai Kyōkai's inconsistent and confused Manchuria policy underwent a dramatic shift following the March First movement in colonial Korea. The defunct Fengtian Kumiai church was resurrected, with funding provided by the foremost Japanese colonial institutions. This shift, and the newly found focus of the Kumiai church's policy in China, is important for understanding how the Kumiai Kyōkai envisioned its role in supporting imperial policies.

**To Help Deal with the “Korea Problem”:  
Kimura Seimatsu and the “re”-founding of the Fengtian church**

The Fengtian Kumiai church history explained the reasons for the reconstitution of the church in no uncertain terms:

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<sup>54</sup> Hōten kumiai kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 4.

In March 1919, when due to the outbreak of the independence disturbance incident in all Korean provinces, Japanese officials made the problem of Koreans in Manchuria a priority, and attention was paid to our Kumiai church's Korean ministry, so that public opinion held great expectations for our church to influence Koreans living in Manchuria. As a result, the elders, beginning with Reverend Kimura, dissolved the Shinyō (C: Shenyang) church which had been founded to evangelize Chinese, and decided to establish a church for Japanese that would also conduct Korean evangelism.<sup>55</sup>

This was a remarkable decision. After all, Fengtian and surrounding areas were overwhelmingly inhabited by Chinese. By choosing to not only supplement but also replace the Chinese ministry with a Korean ministry, the Kumiai Kyōkai clearly demonstrated its commitment to the Japanese empire's policies towards what was deemed a recalcitrant and defiant Korean population abroad. It was also a financially prudent decision. As mentioned earlier, soon after Shimizu arrived in Fengtian, he had tentatively secured a plot of land from the South Manchurian Railroad on which to build a church. In the intervening years, due to the church's financial difficulties, he had not been able to raise the funds that had been a condition of the complete ownership of this plot. By transforming the Fengtian church from one focused on Chinese to one focused on Koreans, the Kumiai church was able to leverage Japanese government and quasi-public colonial institutions' concerns with Korean agitation to generate sufficient donations to serve as the financial foundation for the new mission.

On 4 May 1919, Kimura Seimatsu arrived in Fengtian. Kimura, formerly the minister of the Rakuyō church in Kyoto as well as the chair of the Korea mission fundraising committee, was now serving as an official itinerating evangelist for the

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<sup>55</sup> Hōten kumiai kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 6.

Kumiai Kyōkai, traveling throughout Japan, as well as to Kumiai church congregations in the United States and Korea, lending support where deemed necessary. He is a puzzling figure. He was born in Niigata Prefecture in 1874, and was baptized at the Niigata Kumiai church when he was seventeen. He left for the United States in 1894, attending both the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California, and Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, where he met Dwight L. Moody, the renowned American evangelist. According to his biographer, when Kimura first met Moody, he declared to him, “I have come to study in your country in order to evangelize, not just in Japan, but in all of the East (*Tōyō*). I did not come to make money, or for academic study. I came so that I might learn the deep, deep path of Christ.”<sup>56</sup> Despite his claims to be motivated by a pure desire to pursue the “path of Christ,” as will become clear, Kimura also seemed to always be present when the Kumiai Kyōkai was involved in dubious political dealings in the colonies, or just beyond the boundaries of the empire.

When Kimura arrived in Fengtian, the church was in shambles. Though still officially considered a church, it had not reopened its doors since it was closed in December 1917, and Shimizu, the only missionary, was on his way to Beijing to study Chinese. According to the church’s history, Kimura was instrumental in the decision to transform the church into one that simultaneously focused on two populations, overseas Japanese and Koreans. Before this ministry could even be started, however, it was necessary to resolve the problem of the unpaid-for plot of land.

In Kimura’s biography, Kimura’s role is recounted in this way:

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<sup>56</sup> Iwamura Shinshirō, *Kirisuto ni towareshi Seimatsu* (Tokyo: Megumi shuppanbu, 1934), 157.

In Fengtian, in Manchuria, there was a humble Kumiai church where S-kun [Shimizu] served as minister. Earlier, through Rev. M [Makino], 450 tsubo of land had been acquired from Mantetsu [South Manchurian Railroad], with the promise that a church would be built within two years of this date. However, collecting donations did not go smoothly, and [Kimura] arrived in May 1919 just a month before the end of this two-year deadline... There were around 30 church members at first, but when they heard Seimatsu's plan for building the church, one left, then two left, and soon there were only five remaining, and in the end, the only person remaining was Mr. N [Nakae], in whose home Seimatsu was staying. While on a trip, N insisted on the impossibility [of building the church] while he had a few minutes during a stop at the Fengtian station, and took off. Now, Seimatsu was the only one left.<sup>57</sup>

In his moment of despair and desolation, Kimura—according to the biography—turned to scripture, and regained his resolve: “As he gazed after the train that had left Seimatsu behind in a cloud of smoke, he stomped on the concrete [platform] and wept. He returned to the inn and took up the Bible on the desk and read through it again. ‘Mark 11:24, Believe that you have already received what you prayed for, and then you will receive.’—these sacred words came alive, and seemed to speak to him. That instant, he resolved himself, saying, ‘Yes! I will do it!’” What Kimura chose to do, in response to these words from Mark, in a strategy similar to those of the Korea mission, was to request donations from the large semi-public colonial institutions invested in Korea and Manchuria. As a result, he received 10,000 yen from the South Manchurian Railway, 6000 yen from the Chōsen Bank, 5000 yen each from the [Manshu] Government General (or Consulate?), the Tōyō Takushoku gaisha (Oriental Development Company), and Manshū Takushoku gaisha (Manchuria Development Company).<sup>58</sup> To explain why

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<sup>57</sup> Iwamura Shinshirō, *Kirisuto ni towareshi Seimatsu*, 257.

<sup>58</sup> Manshū takushoku gaisha (Mantaku) was a quasi-public colonial development company modeled after the Oriental Development Company (Tōyō takushoku gaisha). According to Young, “Mantaku was

he chose *these* colonial institutions, Kimura's biographer simply stated, "The time was June 5, 1919, and the slogan was Japan-Korea unification (*naisen ittai*). Seimatsu worked with singular focus down this path."<sup>59</sup>

Kimura's reports submitted to the denominational newspaper *Kirisutokyō sekai* flesh out this picture. Before arriving in Fengtian, Kimura first stopped in Keijō, where he met with Watase Tsuneyoshi from whom he was "able to learn the truth concerning the 'disturbances.'" He also held a brief meeting with Governor General Hosokawa—who had succeeded Terauchi—at the Government-General headquarters.<sup>60</sup> Immediately after arriving in Fengtian, he met with Consul General Akatsuka, "and exchanged many opinions concerning problems with Korea and Manchuria (Sen-Man)."<sup>61</sup> He "learned" from Akatsuka that "There are at least 300,000 Koreans in the area around Fengtian, and around 1,000,000 in all of China; all of these people are anti-Japanese...in the area under Consul General Akatsuka's control alone, there are four or five groups that have created self-governing independent Korean states. These have presidents, and

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created to act as a general intermediary between Japanese immigrants and the society into which they moved.... As banker as well as purchaser and sales agent, Mantaku acted as a buffer that protected the settlers from having to deal directly with the Manchurian market." Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 356.

<sup>59</sup> Iwamura Shinshirō, *Kirisuto ni towareshi Seimatsu*, 258. There is some disagreement among sources concerning the companies Kimura turned to for donations. Iwamura implies that the Korea Government General provided a large donation. However, in Watanabe Morishige's memoir, he states that this donation was from the Manshū Government General. Since Watanabe was the Fengtian church's minister, he is likely the more reliable source than Kimura's biographer. Nonetheless, the fact that Iwamura chose to characterize Kimura's activities in Manchuria as facilitating *naisen ittai* suggests that this emphasis on Koreans abroad had resonance within the Christian community.

<sup>60</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, "Hōten dendōki," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (8 May 1919): 8.

<sup>61</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, "Hōten dendōki (sono san)," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (22 May 1919): 12.

diplomats, and judges, and lawyers, and post offices—I was truly astonished.”<sup>62</sup> In between visiting the South Manchurian Railway-affiliated hospital and school, western missionaries working among resident Koreans, and presiding over the humble Japanese-language services still being held at Nakae’s home, Kimura also visited the Korean Presbyterian church on several occasions, and enjoyed eating Chinese food with a small group of Korean ministers and evangelists.<sup>63</sup> These visits were no doubt intended to forge ties with Koreans who he hoped would be sympathetic to the Kumiai mission, and who would serve as valuable partners in the proposed work in Fengtian.

Watanabe Morishige, who had been serving as the minister of the resident Japanese P’yōngyang church since 1916, was transferred to Fengtian in 1919 to serve as the Japanese minister. Watanabe was born in Hokkaido to a former samurai family that had migrated there, destitute, because their domain had sided with the Tokugawa government during the Meiji Restoration. Several Christian families in Sapporo, the largest city in Hokkaido, befriended the young Watanabe. These included Nakae Hiroshi and his wife, Tome; Nakae was the minister of the Sapporo Independent Church in the early 1900s, but had taken a job with the social research division of the South Manchurian Railway. He was the person who had hosted the Fengtian Japanese congregation when the church closed, allowed Kimura to stay during his three-month

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<sup>62</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, “Dendō manpitsu,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (5 June 1919): 7.

<sup>63</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, “Hōten dendōki (san shin),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (22 May 1919): 12; “Hōten dendōki (yon shin),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (29 May 1919): 8.

stay, and also played an instrumental role in Watanabe's transfer to Fengtian.<sup>64</sup> Kim Lin, a former secretary of the Korea YMCA who had broken ties with the American administrators of the Korea YMCA in 1914 and joined the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission, was selected to head up the Korean ministry.<sup>65</sup> Soon after, Kim returned to Keijō, and Watanabe—who had attained basic fluency in Korean during his time in P'yōngyang—took over the Korean ministry with the help of a Korean evangelist named Ahn.<sup>66</sup> In other words, the Fengtian church was founded by relying on the colonial infrastructure in Korea as well as the human capital that the Kumiai Kyōkai had nurtured during its ten-year tenure in Korea. With money from the largest quasi-governmental colonial institutions, and Watanabe's newly gained language skills, the Fengtian church set out to tackle the Manchurian "Korea problem" through Christian

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<sup>64</sup> Endō Atsuko and others, *Hoshi no yōni: Watanabe Morishige bokushi shoden* (privately published, 1985), 1, 6, 20.

<sup>65</sup> Hōten Kumiai Kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 7. Frank Brockman, the general secretary of the Korea YMCA, complained about Kim Lin's activities to John Mott, director of the YMCA, in a letter dated 10 September 1913: "There has arisen a rather complicated situation in regard to the membership of the Seoul Association. As you know our membership has greatly suffered--during the past year--so that at present we have but 640 members 175 of whom are active members. In the meantime our former Korean secretary, Kim Im [sic] has organized a new church which I understand from Mr. Niwa [the secretary of the Japanese YMCA in Korea], is Congregational in denomination. Mr. Kim was given full authority as the founder of this church by the Congregational authorities in Tokyo. This church has already gathered around it all of those belonging to the so-called Reform Society in addition to a number of malcontents from other churches. The Koreans also report that this church receives Y200 per month as a subsidy from the government." Frank M. Brockman papers, YMCA Archives.

<sup>66</sup> Hōten Kumiai Kirisuto kyōkai, *Kyō no yūen*, 7. Though the wording is ambiguous, it appears that the church experienced difficulty raising sufficient money to support a separate Korean minister. The history first states that Kim Lin found it necessary to return to Keijō, and appointed Ahn as an evangelist. However, it next states that due to the cessation (*tozetsu*) of funds for Korean evangelism, Kim was let go, but the church decided to continue this work through their own efforts (*dokuryoku*), and Watanabe took over responsibility with the assistance of Ahn. The history mentions one more curious thing: Ahn initially moved into the parsonage for the Korean minister—which the history stresses was built with the same budget and according to the same specifications as the Japanese minister's parsonage—but because this parsonage "did not suit the Korean lifestyle" Ahn moved to a different house in fall 1921, and the vacant parsonage was rented out, with the collected rent directed towards the Korean ministry.

means. Watase, now in Japan and spending his time visiting existing churches until he decided where his next ministry would be, offered this commentary: “In and around Fengtian are a great many of our Korean compatriots. Also, there are 1,500,000 Koreans in Kando (Jiandao) and along the East China Railroad.... There are many problems in Manchuria, but among these, the question of how to stabilize the Korean problem is considered the most important problem.... As common culture progresses, Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese will shine like a light as they develop a modern culture in the fields of Manchuria. I am confident that this will become a reality.”<sup>67</sup>

In 1921, after nearly a year delay to accommodate Kimura’s travel schedule, a dedication ceremony was held for the new sanctuary of the Fengtian church. Designed by the Japan-based Christian firm Vories and Architects, the church was a domineering gothic structure, which Kimura declared was “the most impressive building in Korea and Manchuria.” The interior was heated with *pechkas*, or Russian-style heaters. Next to the sanctuary, the congregation built two parsonages, identical to each other, one each to house the Japanese and Korean ministers, to reflect the intentions of the church to evangelize to both Japanese and Koreans in the city.<sup>68</sup> A plaque was placed on the church exterior which read: “This church was built through tearful prayers to preach God’s blessings and the gospel of Jesus’ cross through the power of the Holy Spirit, and to bring about the reality of the unification of Japan and Korea (*naisen ittai*).”<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Chōsen dendō no isshin tenki (jō),” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (10 June 1920): 3.

<sup>68</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, “Hōten Kumiai kyōkai dendōki,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (2 June 1921): 7.

<sup>69</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, “Hōten Kumiai kyōkai dendōki,” 8.

### Part III

#### **In the Aftermath of the Yō Un-hyōng Incident: The founding of the Shanghai church**

In 1919, almost simultaneous to the Yō Un-hyōng incident, Fujita Kyūkō, the secretary of the Japanese YMCA in Shanghai, founded the Chū-Nichi Kōri Kirisuto Kyōkai, or Shanghai Chinese-Japanese Christian Church, in the International Settlement area of Shanghai.<sup>70</sup> Though the founding of this church most likely was tied up with the Yō Un-hyōng incident itself, and Kumiai Kyōkai leadership asserted that Koreans would be an eventual focus of ministry, the uneven nature of this church's commitment to addressing the so-called "Korean problem" in Shanghai reveals interesting tensions and inconsistencies between Kumiai Kyōkai leadership and missionaries on the periphery of the empire when it came to the question of how (and perhaps whether or not) to actively pursue a Christian approach to the goal of *naisen ittai*, or Japanese-Korean unification. Just as in the case of the mission in Korea, where local missionary practices occasionally varied from, and even contradicted, the official policies set forth by the director Watase, in the case of the Shanghai church, actual practices and ministries often veered from official Kumiai Kyōkai statements made to the Japanese government that promised that the church intended to promote imperial interests—in this case, countering anti-Japanese activities—through Christian means. This is not to say that the

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<sup>70</sup> There was another Japanese church in Shanghai already, an interdenominational church called the Shanghai Kirisuto Kyōkai (Christian Church).

church's minister and other staff disagreed with the notion that their work was intimately tied to Japanese imperial interests in China; rather, the concerns of the church's minister, and the central ministries of the church, disregarded the preoccupation with the "Korean problem" that anchored official reports and statements during this period. The central leadership of the Kumiai Kyōkai articulated a familiar vision for this church—namely that the church would facilitate goodwill between Japanese and Chinese, and encourage the unification of Koreans and Japanese. Nonetheless, this focus was not maintained in Shanghai.

Shanghai was transformed into one of the world's most important ports and cosmopolitan cities in the late nineteenth century, partly as a result of western (primarily British) imperialism. Designated as a treaty port, Shanghai was favored by western trading companies because of the favorable conditions of the harbor adjacent to it. Foreign settlements formed just outside of the walls that demarcated the original boundaries of the city and within which the majority of the Chinese population resided. The French established their own, separate concession, but other foreigners—including the British, Americans, and Japanese—co-habited in the area known as the International Settlement. Each foreign legation, through unequal treaties imposed on China, claimed political and legal authority over its own subjects and citizens. Though situated in China, Shanghai was crisscrossed by multiple competing authorities, a place that thrived on the diversity of its residents as well as the political and legal ambiguity that enabled a culture of corruption and the marriage of uneasy bedfellows to thrive.

Japanese in Shanghai were afforded a certain degree of autonomy, and many indeed traveled there to seek out opportunities (and vices) unavailable in Japan. Significantly, unlike the other foreign residents, who were mainly representatives of large-scale trading companies and firms, maintained segregated clubs and recreational spaces from which Chinese were banned, and who employed large numbers of Chinese to provide menial services, the Japanese community in Shanghai represented a more diverse cross-section of Japanese society. Japanese in Shanghai also included not just wealthy and elite representatives of large corporations and financial institutions, but also independent immigrants seeking economic opportunities unavailable in Japan, and who provided most of the support services to their compatriots. Under the watchful eye of the Japanese consulate, which was concerned with the behavior of its subjects, Japanese in Shanghai lived in a world mostly isolated from China and Chinese, but were still vulnerable to the political unrest that characterized China in this period. Japan's entitlement to a part of the International Settlement cemented its claim to being one of the leading imperial powers in Asia; for immigrants, Shanghai's proximity to Japan afforded them with a convenient destination to seek out new economic opportunities.<sup>71</sup>

Prior to 1919, the main focus of Japanese evangelism in Shanghai had been resident Japanese, whose behavior—particularly frequenting gambling halls and

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<sup>71</sup> On Japanese in Shanghai, see Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937," *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937*, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 166-209; Joshua A. Fogel, "Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese Communities of Shanghai and Harbin," *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy 1900-1930*, ed. Sharon A. Minichiello (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 45-69; Takahashi Kosuke, editor, *Shanghai shi: kyodai toshi no keisei to hitobito no itonami* (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1995); and Nihon Shanhai shi kenkyūkai, *Shanghai jinbutsushi* (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 1997).

brothels—was not considered in keeping with the idealized image of Japanese as leaders of civilization in the East. A combination of western and Japanese missionaries had been working among Japanese residents in Shanghai for some time. The Japanese YMCA took over the ministry started in 1889 by Edward Evans, his wife, and sister-in-law, when they started English-language Bible studies for young Japanese men who began arriving in Shanghai in search of work and vice. They eventually invited a Dōshisha theology school graduate, Ueda, to preach to this group of young men, which had grown to about 40 by the start of the First Sino-Japanese war.<sup>72</sup> Though their work was disrupted by the repatriation of many Japanese residents due to the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese war (and subsequent Russo-Japanese war), it slowly grew.<sup>73</sup> The Evans's returned to the U.S., and in 1904 C.M. Myers, who had been a missionary in Nagasaki, took their place as the head of the Evans Bible Study group. In addition to this, there was one other Christian group for Japanese in Shanghai: at the Tōa Dōbun Shoin, a school that specialized in producing Japanese with specialized knowledge of China, Shanghai Chinese YMCA director Hunnex organized Bible Studies in English.<sup>74</sup> In 1907, the Japanese YMCA was established in the Hongkou district of the International Settlement, where the greatest number of Japanese resided.

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<sup>72</sup> Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji: Shanhai nihonjin YMCA yonjūnen-shi* (Tokyo: Kyōkunkan, 1995), 5-6.

<sup>73</sup> During the Russo-Japanese War, under the direction of the Japanese consulate, the group at Tōa Dōbun Shoin visited Japanese soldiers and collected goods for care packages to soldiers at the front. Ikeda, *Kumoribi no niji*, 10.

<sup>74</sup> The Tōa Dōbun Shoin was partially subsidized by the Japanese Foreign Ministry because “its training and intelligence activities” expanded Japanese knowledge on China. *The Japanese Informal Empire in China*, 163-164. The singing of hymns and prayer were initially forbidden within school grounds, but after arguing that prayer was indispensable to Bible study, the school relented. Ikeda, 10.

In 1919, Fujita Kyūkō was serving as the secretary of the Japanese YMCA. A native of Fukushima Prefecture, Fujita had gone to the United States in 1904, and first attended Moody Bible Institute, and then served as the minister of the Watsonville Japanese Congregational Church in central California. He also briefly attended Harvard, then returned to California where he lived in Pasadena and served as the minister of the Japanese Congregational Church in nearby Santa Anita.<sup>75</sup> He also married, and then divorced, during this period.<sup>76</sup> After returning to Japan in 1916, Fujita's first appointment was to the church in Gosen, in Niigata, Kimura Seimatsu's hometown. Kimura had founded the church, and invited Fujita to serve as its first minister. Fujita stayed in Gosen for only a little over a year, and accepted an invitation from the Shanghai Japanese YMCA in September 1917.<sup>77</sup> In September 1919, Fujita resigned from his position with the YMCA and in November, founded the Chū-Nichi Kōri church, to foster goodwill between Chinese and Japanese through the Christian gospel.<sup>78</sup>

Fujita was the person enlisted by Kimura and others to approach Yō Un-hyōng in the incident mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Though the relationship between the Yō Un-hyōng incident and the founding of the Shanghai church is unclear,

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<sup>75</sup> Ikeda writes that Fujita was the minister of a church in Santa Ana, but describes the location of his church as near Pasadena where he lived. I am assuming that he meant Santa Anita, not Santa Ana, since Santa Anita is close to Pasadena, and there were significant numbers of Japanese immigrants in the then farming communities to the northeast of Los Angeles such as Pasadena, Monrovia, Arcadia, and Santa Anita.

<sup>76</sup> Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji*, 64-67.

<sup>77</sup> Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji*, 64-68.

<sup>78</sup> According to Ikeda, Fujita was involved in persuading Yō Un-hyōng to go to Japan from July, and spent all of August in Tokyo and Keijō, possibly to raise funds (although it is not clear what this would have been for). Ikeda, 98-99.

there appears to be some correlation. The Chū-Nichi church's incorporation papers were written in mid-October 1919, and received by the Japanese consulate on November 15, 1919, one day after Fujita and Yō left for Japan. Uchiyama Kanzō, a Japanese Christian who had moved to Shanghai in 1913 as the marketing representative for a Japanese eye drop company, and who stayed on after the company withdrew to operate a Christian bookstore with his wife, speculated many years later on the relationship between Fujita's role in the Yō Un-hyōng incident and the founding of the church: "I do not know who orchestrated [Yō Un-hyōng's visit to Japan], but considering that Japanese YMCA secretary Fujita went along on the trip, and that afterwards, Fujita resigned from the YMCA and founded a church called the Chū-Nichi Kōri Kyokai with his own resources (*dokuryoku*), and that Furuya Magojirō was assigned as the minister, and that Fujita attended [a university in] Nanjing, it is not hard to imagine that Fujita played some kind of role."<sup>79</sup> Fujita's own son claimed in an interview with the Shanghai Japanese YMCA historian that his father had received a sizable payment from the Japanese government for his role in coaxing Yō to travel to Japan, and had used at least

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<sup>79</sup> Uchiyama Kanzō, *Kakōroku* (Iwanami shoten, 1960), 111. Uchiyama Kanzō (1885-1959) was born in Okayama prefecture, and moved to Osaka as a teenager to apprentice in a merchant's home. After working for a series of textile firms in Osaka and Kyoto, he began attending Makino Toraji's Kyoto Kumiai church, and converted to Christianity. In 1913, Makino approached him to see if he would be interested in joining a company selling eye drops as the marketing representative in Shanghai. He joined immediately, and moved to Shanghai soon after. He attended the Shanghai Kirisuto kyōkai, the interdenominational Japanese congregation in Shanghai. A few years later, he married Inoue Miki, a former geisha who had converted to Christianity at Makino's church; Makino arranged the marriage. In 1917, Uchiyama decided to open a side business importing Christian books—he and his wife opened the Uchiyama bookstore, and his wife operated it until Uchiyama's employer withdrew its office from Shanghai. Uchiyama believed that the bookstore's popularity was due to the fact that "Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans could come as customers without being treated differently" (113). Uchiyama was a key community figure, not just among Japanese but among Chinese as well, and is well known for protecting the Chinese writer Lu Xun in his home when Lu was being sought for by police in 1932. Takahashi, 132.

half of this amount to establish the Shanghai Kumiai church.<sup>80</sup> Whether or not this is accurate, the incorporation papers, submitted to the Japanese consulate in Shanghai, suggested that Fujita's primary intent was not associated with Yō Un-hyōng or evangelism to Koreans, but was instead focused on fostering goodwill between Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai, in order to develop a distinctly East Asian civilization that could stand in direct opposition to western imperialism in Asia. For instance, the founding statement included a list of Asian countries that had been colonized or subjugated by western countries in the previous fifty years, and argued that without Japanese-Chinese cooperation, East Asia was in danger. Furthermore, this cooperation could only be achieved through Christians: "If we desire goodwill between China and Japan to be a reality, there is no way aside from Christians, and this is the reason for establishing the Kōri kyōkai now."<sup>81</sup> In other words, according to the church's founder, it was Chinese animosity towards Japanese—not the Korean exile population in Shanghai—that was of principal concern. The protests collectively referred to as the May Fourth movement began in Beijing, but spread to Shanghai soon after, and angry Chinese mobs enforced—through threat of force to those who failed to comply—boycotts of Japanese stores and products in Shanghai.<sup>82</sup> For Japanese residents, the May Fourth movement was a jarring wake-up call of Chinese animosity to Japanese attempts

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<sup>80</sup> Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji*, 103.

<sup>81</sup> "Ni-Shi Kirisutokyō kōri kyōkai sengensho," Zai-Shanghai Chū-Nichi kōri kirisuto kyōkai Papers, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records.

<sup>82</sup> In Shanghai the protests turned from antigovernment to anti-Japanese actions, including attacks on Japanese businesses and boycotts of Japanese goods and businesses. Peter Zarrow, *China in War and Revolution 1895-1949* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 153.

to exert influence in China. As much as the presence of Korean political exiles in Shanghai concerned the Japanese government and the Kumiai Kyōkai's leadership in Japan, anti-Japanese movements initiated by Chinese were possibly of greater concern to Japanese actually living in Shanghai. However, as soon as the Chū-Nichi church was founded, the central leadership of the Kumiai Kyōkai—including Watase Tsuneyoshi and Kimura Seimatsu—rallied around it by putting forward an alternative vision that explicitly identified Koreans as a central focus of the church.

Almost as soon as Fujita founded the Chū-Nichi church, Watase Tsuneyoshi, along with Reinanzaka church minister Kozaki Hiromichi, asked Furuya Magojirō, a minister who had recently returned to Japan from over 20 years in the United States, to go to Shanghai to assist Fujita. Furuya and Fujita had crossed paths in California in the 1910s: while Fujita was in Pasadena, Furuya was the minister of the Los Angeles Japanese Congregational Church. Originally, Kozaki had asked Furuya to head up a new mission in the South Pacific. Japan had occupied German colonies in the South Pacific as part of Allied seizure of German territories following World War I, and the Kumiai Kyōkai immediately sent an investigative team to explore the possibility of establishing a mission in these islands.<sup>83</sup> Furuya led the investigative team, and was set to be appointed as the director of the new mission when he was asked to go to Shanghai instead. In his autobiography, Furuya recounted, “Right when the Nanyō [South Pacific] evangelism group was established, and I was about to be appointed its secretary, I was

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<sup>83</sup> On the South Pacific Islands mission, see Nishihara Ki'ichiro, “Nihon Kumiai kyōkai kaigai dendō no hikari to kage (2): Nanyō dendōdan ni tsuite,” *Kirisutokyō kenkyū* 51, no. 1 (1989): 64-146.

ordered to go to Shanghai to evangelize in order to facilitate international goodwill.... Kozaki and Watase both urged me to go. So I decided to go for a year or two, intending to assist the new work that my friend Fujita was about to begin.”<sup>84</sup> Furuya left for Shanghai in late 1919, arriving around the time that the Yō Un-hyōng incident was underway.

Furuya, like Fujita, possessed certain qualities and skills that made him an ideal minister in the international city of Shanghai. In 1900, at the age of twenty-one, Furuya left Japan for San Francisco, only one of many young men who sought education or better opportunities along the American west coast. Like many other young Japanese men in the burgeoning cities along the west coast, Furuya found employment as a houseboy—a live-in servant in exchange for room and board. From San Francisco, he went to Bakersfield, then Fresno, and after working for a time on a railroad crew, he eventually made his way to Los Angeles. He started attending an English language school operated by Alice Elizabeth Howard, who had been a missionary in Japan. In June 1902, Furuya was baptized by Reverend William Day of the Los Angeles First Congregational Church, and immediately began assisting with the Pacific American Missionary Association, of which Reverend Day was a part, a ministry that focused on the growing Japanese immigrant community in Southern California. Furuya had managed to develop a successful chain of stores in the Los Angeles area, but he decided to give up business for Christian ministry, and left Los Angeles in 1905 for Chicago Theological Seminary. Upon graduation in 1908, he returned to Los Angeles, and

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<sup>84</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō* (Tokyo: Fujiya shobō, 1934), 43.

became the minister of the Los Angeles Japanese Congregational Church. Around 1918, three Los Angeles Japanese churches—including Furuya’s—began discussing the possibility of forming a joint congregation. During these discussions, some accused Furuya of harboring ambitions of taking over; as a result, he resigned his position and transferred to the Pasadena Japanese Congregational Church. His wife, whom he had married only a year earlier, passed away from illness in 1919, and he returned to Japan just as Kozaki was organizing the exploratory trip to the South Pacific.

In his autobiography, Furuya himself suggested that his transfer to Shanghai was not accidental, but the culmination of ministry interests that had begun to form in Los Angeles. In 1912, soon after he returned to Los Angeles, he helped found a curiously titled group, the Tōyō Kyōkadan, or the Association for the Influencing the East, at the Los Angeles Japanese Congregational Church. Included in a list of supporters was Fujita Kyūkō, with whom Furuya was reunited in Shanghai, as well as Kimura Seimatsu, the itinerating evangelist.<sup>85</sup> The intended purpose and activities of this group remain obscure, but in his autobiography, Furuya gestured towards a relationship between his work with the Tōyō Kyōkadan and his later work in Shanghai: “It is perhaps because I was the founder of the Tōyō Kyōkadan that curiously I came to work here in Shanghai.”<sup>86</sup>

On October 22, 1919, even before Furuya’s arrival, Kimura Seimatsu also arrived in Shanghai. As he had in Fengtian, Kimura spent his time in Shanghai assisting

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<sup>85</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 28-29.

<sup>86</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 30.

with Fujita's burgeoning ministry by seeking out potential financial supporters among the Japanese expatriate community. He also visited various consulate officials, met with western missionaries, and also met with Koreans, who interestingly remained mostly nameless figures in his accounts. During Kimura's visit, on October 24, the Chū-Nichi church held its first meeting, at the Japan Club, with Kimura giving the main sermon.<sup>87</sup> Though Fujita did not mention the so-called Korean problem in the church's founding statement, Kimura emphasized in his own reports in the *Kirisutokyō sekai* that "*naisen ittai*"—even outside of the official boundaries of the empire—was an important aspect of the new church's ministry. He made a point to share that he even prayed with a group of Koreans who visited him one night for the realization of the reality of *naisen ittai*.<sup>88</sup>

In March 1920, a groundbreaking ceremony was held for the Shanghai Chū-Nichi (China-Japan) Kumiai Church, with nine members—including Fujita and Furuya—and three denominational leaders—Watase, Kimura, and Kozaki—in attendance. Kimura viewed himself a central figure in the founding of the church; in his biography, his involvement with the Shanghai church was pithily summarized: after "being involved with the Yō Un-hyōng incident, [he] next secured the donation of 30,000 yen and established the Shanghai Chū-Nichi Church."<sup>89</sup> Despite Kimura's bravado—at least as recorded by his biographer—Furuya's account contradicts Kimura's claim that the necessary money was in fact collected. When Furuya arrived in

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<sup>87</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, "Shanghai dendōki," *Kirisutokyō sekai* (6 November 1919): 8.

<sup>88</sup> Kimura Seimatsu, "Shanghai dendōki," 8.

<sup>89</sup> Iwahara Shinshirō, *Kirisuto ni towareshi Seimatsu*, 259.

Shanghai, he discovered that though the church had obtained land and two properties, only half of the 24,000 dollars had been paid, leaving a debt of 12,000 dollars. With four paid staff and other costs, he estimated that the church would need 4,500 dollars per annum to pay for costs and the interest on the existing debt.<sup>90</sup> Furuya recalled in his memoir that due to the post-World War I recession, the effort to collect funds failed; money that had been pledged to the church was never paid, and the church was soon left in a financial crisis.<sup>91</sup> Kimura decided to go to the United States, and left Shanghai without helping further. Watase initially agreed to take over, and submitted reports on the church's activities to the Shanghai Japanese consulate, presumably in the hopes that the consulate would provide the church with funds. His assistance was limited to this, however, and he was soon focused on his own work, a new church in Nagoya. This left the fledgling church in the hands of Furuya and Fujita. However, it soon became apparent that the church could not support two ministers. Furuya asked Watase to decide who should be appointed the sole minister. Watase selected Furuya, and Fujita left for Nanjing to study Chinese.<sup>92</sup>

The report that Watase submitted to the consulate is a curious document, and while brief, reveals a significant dissonance between his characterization (or perhaps hopes for) the Chū-Nichi church, and the Chū-Nichi church as it was founded by Fujita,

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<sup>90</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 44.

<sup>91</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 45.

<sup>92</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 45; Ikeda Akira, *Kumoribi no niji*, 100. After a few years, Fujita and his wife left Nanjing for Kanazawa. After returning to Japan, Fujita worked at several different jobs, including as the editor for the *Japan Advertiser's* Osaka branch. He apparently also fathered a child out of wedlock. He died at the age of 55 in 1938. Ikeda, 103.

then operated by Furuya. The report, titled “Shanghai oyobi Nankin ni okeru kyōka jigyo” (Influencing activities in Shanghai and Nanjing), marked classified by consulate officials, was dated June 17, 1920, and consisted of a brief overview of the Kumiai Kyōkai’s activities in Shanghai and Nanjing, and continued on to a list of specific targets for its influencing (*kyōka*) activities. First to be listed were Japanese and Chinese—so that through Christianity, these two peoples would be reconciled, and in the future, pioneer and lead the Chinese intellectual community. Second, significantly, were Koreans: “To influence Koreans in Shanghai to act as a remedy for lawless organizations.” Watase then explained that in order to accomplish these two tasks, the Kumiai church intended “to unite all Japanese believers, then extend [this union] to Chinese and Koreans.” However, as was often the case, there was the problem of money. In the following section, Watase confessed that though the church has been established the previous November with the intention of carrying out these activities, due to a lack of funds, only the church was in operation. While “the church had not had the full opportunity to engage Koreans at the church, in the future,” he continued, “there was no doubt that there would be ample opportunity to do this.”<sup>93</sup>

Despite the claims made in Watase’s report to the Shanghai Japanese Consulate that the Chū-Nichi Kyōkai intended to extend its ministry to Koreans living in Shanghai, there is no evidence that this ever happened. Instead, according to Furuya’s autobiography, the church initiated a series of ministries intended to address perceived

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<sup>93</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Shanghai oyobi Nankin ni okeru kyōka jigyo,” confidential report submitted to the Japanese consulate in Shanghai, 17 June 1920. Zai-Shanghai Chū-Nichi kōri kirisuto kyōkai papers, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records.

Chinese needs, while also attempting to engage with resident Japanese, in order to facilitate better Chinese-Japanese relations. For Furuya, anti-Japanese activities instigated by Chinese in Shanghai were of far greater concern than the “Korean problem” that preoccupied Watase, Kimura and other Kumiai Kyōkai leaders in 1919.

Furuya perhaps best expresses this in his recollection of a conversation he had with the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yatsen. Furuya was introduced to Sun through a mutual friend, and spent about two hours with Sun at his home in Shanghai discussing the so-called “*Tōyō mondai*” (East Asia problem). According to Furuya, Sun expressed his belief that in order for there to be peace in East Asia, Japan and China needed to work together, and had a divine duty (*shinsei na gimu*) to do so. However, Japan’s actions towards Korea had filled Chinese with despair (*shitsubō*) and skepticism (*kaigishin*). Furthermore, “That Japan thrust the 21 Demands [on China] forces us to conclude that behind Japan’s actions is a territorial ambition (*ryōdoteki yashin*) where [Japan] will not be satisfied until it collects all of East Asia under its rule.”<sup>94</sup> Furuya connected Sun’s criticisms of Japan with the Korean exiles in Shanghai: “it was no wonder” Furuya explained, “that Koreans involved in the independence movement welcome this man” as a supporter for their cause. Furuya quickly dismissed Sun’s skepticism: “I felt that this Sun Yatsen is a man who dreams big, but is ignorant (*utoi*) when it comes to such issues.”<sup>95</sup> Finally Furuya concluded that Chinese such as Sun embraced Koreans because they served as a useful “advertisement” (*kanban*) for anti-

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<sup>94</sup> Chūō Chōsen Kyokai, 20-21.

<sup>95</sup> Chūō Chōsen Kyokai, 22.

Japanese activities; Chinese were even more aware than Japanese that Japanese were superior, but because they did not trust Japan, were engaging in anti-Japanese activities to create trouble for Japan. Thus, the boycotts and violence during the May Fourth protests, while futile, were done with the utmost seriousness (*are ha jōdan demo nandemo arimasen. Shinken nandesu*).<sup>96</sup> Furuya did not take even Sun Yatsen's criticisms seriously, but dismissed them as ignorance. Nonetheless, he still maintained that such criticisms, and the anti-Japanese violence, needed to be taken seriously, if only as manifestations of Chinese distrust of Japan's motives. While baseless—at least according to Furuya—this distrust threatened to undermine Japan's presumably benevolent motives in East Asia.

The actual ministries that the church engaged in involved more practical concerns. For instance, despite financial difficulties, Furuya opened an elementary school for impoverished Chinese children, and with the cooperation of two Japanese doctors, opened hospitals in Shanghai and Nanjing. In order to alleviate the financial burden of these ministries, the church also built an apartment building, and used the collected rent to offset ministry costs.<sup>97</sup>

In an article published in *Kirisutokyō sekai* in March 1920, Furuya announced the church's intention to start an elementary school for impoverished Chinese children. Furuya explained to his readers that through educating these children, and interacting with their families, he hoped to lead these Chinese families to Christ, and through this,

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<sup>96</sup> Chūō Chōsen Kyokai, 22.

<sup>97</sup> Furuya Magojirō, *Nihon no shimei to Kirisutokyō*, 46-47.

to work towards resolving the animosity between Japanese and Chinese. In the same article, Furuya repeated what Fujita—in the church’s incorporation papers—and Watase—in the confidential report—had stated: that through first converting resident Japanese, and then Chinese, he hoped that Japanese and Chinese Christians could work to counteract the “unjust and immoral activities” taking place in Shanghai.<sup>98</sup> Following the debacle involving Kimura’s attempts at raising money for the church, Furuya apparently turned to more mundane tactics. To raise money for the church’s “Shinajin dendō” or Chinese ministry, the church’s *fujinkai* or women’s group organized a concert and raised 1000 dollars. With the help of this money, they were able to open the elementary school on May 1, 1921.<sup>99</sup> The Chū-Nichi church also appealed to supporters in Japan for help; in a pamphlet published in January 1922 and directed towards supporters in the homeland (*bokoku*), the church listed its different ministries, and reiterated the church’s desire to facilitate more amicable relations between Japanese and Chinese, which in turn would lead to greater progress and peace in the Far East.<sup>100</sup>

Through these efforts, the school welcomed fifty students its first year, and 92 students its second year. The hospital in Shanghai was also partially paid for with money raised through concerts organized by church members.<sup>101</sup> To say that this church sought to evangelize Chinese in Shanghai, including through what would be

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<sup>98</sup> Furuya Magojirō, “Shanghai tsūshin,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (4 March 1920): 9.

<sup>99</sup> Furuya Magojirō, “Shanghai tsūshin,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (5 May 1921): 9.

<sup>100</sup> “Aete bokoku yūshisha ni uttau” Shanghai Chū-Nichi Kirisutokyō kumiai kyōkai Papers, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records.

<sup>101</sup> MF sei [Furuya Magojirō], “Shanghai Chūnichu kumiai kyōkai,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (22 June 1922): 7-8.

characterized as social services intended to initiate relationships that would result in conversion, is to make a commonsensical statement. However, this subtle shift in the church's mission is an important turning point marking a diminishing concern with and interest in the so-called "Korean problem." Just as the Kumiai Kyōkai seemed to lose interest in the Korean churches formerly associated with its mission, the Shanghai church under Furuya's leadership appeared to ignore the promises made by Kimura and Watase that the Chū-Nichi church would eventually be as invested in achieving the ideal of *naisen ittai* within its walls. Given the limited information available on the Chū-Nichi church, it is not impossible that Furuya engaged in limited outreach to Koreans in Shanghai. But Chinese—the majority population of course—were a more obvious and natural target of evangelism, if indeed evangelizing those besides resident Japanese was to be a focus.

### **Conclusion**

The Kumiai Kyōkai's expansion into Shanghai and Manchuria on the heels of the March First movement on the Korean peninsula marked both a turning point and a withdrawal of Kumiai Kyōkai interest abroad. I have focused on the two churches in a limited timeframe: the years immediately following their inception. In the tumultuous year of 1919, the "Korean problem" appeared to the Kumiai Kyōkai leadership as a critical issue requiring their full cooperation and support. Furthermore, it provided them with the opportunity to demonstrate not only their loyalty to the state, but their importance to the state, through infiltrating Korean exile groups and orchestrating the

potential “conversion” of one of the principal members. It also gave them the opportunity to make their mark through planting churches in areas newly identified by the Japanese empire as sites of potential expansion and addressing the most potent threat to this expansion.

Despite the efforts of missionaries like Watanabe, Fujita, and Furuya, and the hopes of denominational leaders like Watase and Kimura, there is little extant evidence to suggest that the churches had significant congregations of Japanese expatriates, let alone Koreans or Chinese. Both sites were identified by missionaries as places of potential influence and importance, with a great deal of enthusiasm for what could be gained through successful ministry. At least initially, the Kumiai Kyōkai leadership moved talented and experienced ministers to these two churches, and made grandiose claims of the financial support they could raise, and what they could accomplish for the empire through these churches. But interest in these churches diminished almost immediately after they were dedicated; after the initial anticipation over their founding, the Kumiai community in Japan seemed to lose interest. Both churches continued their ministries until the end of World War II, but news about these congregations fell mostly silent by the mid-1920s. Despite the initial concern, even hysteria, over the March First movement and the activities of Korean political exiles in China (and even other places such as Chicago), once the protests had been successfully quashed, and order restored, there no longer seemed much purpose for the activities of these churches.

## CHAPTER SIX

### Faith in Everyday Practice: Christianity in Gunma

#### Introduction: Prophetic Disaster

In August 1910, Gunma Prefecture was struck by a succession of powerful typhoons. Rivers swollen from torrential rains flooded fields of mulberry trees necessary for raising silkworms and damaged or destroyed homes, silk filatures, and the local electrical plant. Landslides struck villages in the mountains to the north. Three-hundred-and-six people were killed or unaccounted for, another 142 injured.<sup>1</sup>

The typhoon devastated many of the members of the twelve Kumiai Kyōkai churches in the area.<sup>2</sup> In the pages of the September issue of the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (Gunma Christian World Monthly), the usually mundane church news became a list of personal tragedies and tales of dramatic escapes. Many of the members who owned farms or cultivated mulberry groves for their silkworms suffered severe damage; others lost their homes. Still others witnessed the death of their neighbors. A Midono church member and her husband managed to escape the rising flood waters by clinging to bamboo and willow branches in the dark of night, only to discover that their one-month

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<sup>1</sup> Gunma kenshi hensan iinkai, editor, *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 7 (Gunma Ken: 1983), 436-438.

<sup>2</sup> The churches were Annaka, Haraichi, Kanra, Takasaki, Maebashi, Midono (Fujioka), Numata, Sukawa, Agatsuma, and Ashikaga; Sano and Nakuta were mission stations. There are no reports from the Sukawa church so it is possible that it was no longer holding regular services at this time.

old daughter who the husband had tied to his back had slipped out of her sling and fallen into the waters below.<sup>3</sup>

Even as members of different churches recounted their harrowing escapes and loss of property and home, most also used the disaster and their personal experiences to reflect on God's mercy and providence in the midst of loss.<sup>4</sup> One member who had only recently moved to Tokyo and thus escaped the effects of the typhoon, while commenting on how the timeliness of his move demonstrated God's mercy, remarked, "Does it not seem that the occurrence of this natural disaster coming so soon after Japan's annexation of Korea is some kind of omen (*anji*)?"<sup>5</sup>

Kashiwagi Gien, the minister of the Annaka church, was similarly troubled by these two unrelated events. As residents of Annaka and surrounding towns and villages began rebuilding their lives following the floods, Kashiwagi published his own reflections on the significance of the flood in the October issue of the *geppō* titled "Tensai no keikoku" (A warning through natural disaster). Kashiwagi declared the flood and Japan's "annexation" of Korea the two "great events" of the year. Of these, the flood, he argued, was an important reminder of the limits of human knowledge and power in an age when the state and people had grown complacent in their mistaken reliance on the advances of science and technology. In short, "This [flood] is the manifestation of the infinite and immeasurable will that lies behind nature."<sup>6</sup> But the

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<sup>3</sup> "Suisai higaisha no kansō," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1910): 9.

<sup>4</sup> "Kyōhō," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1910): 9-12.

<sup>5</sup> "Annaka kyōkai: kojīn shōsoku," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1910): 11.

flood, Kashiwagi cautioned, was not merely the result of the power of nature, impersonal in its destruction. The flood was intended as a warning, a call to repentance, and a reminder of the frailty and fallibility of humanity. And this warning, he continued, was directly linked to Japan's emergence as a colonial empire.

Disturbed by the enthusiasm expressed for Japan's increasing efforts at expansion, most recently manifested in its takeover of Korea, Kashiwagi interpreted this enthusiasm as a sign that Japanese—while fearing the Mandate of Heaven and the words of sages and saints—failed to fear God.<sup>7</sup> Asking how a nation of such people could possibly prosper, he argued that the mindless celebration of territorial expansion only masked continuous government corruption. The victims of the flood, he reasoned, were a sacrifice meant to warn fellow compatriots of God's judgment. Now in the wake of the flood, Christians faced the grave responsibility of interceding to God on behalf of their nation.<sup>8</sup>

This “warning,” echoing the language of Old Testament prophets issuing similar warnings to Israel, appears out of place in the twentieth century. And his conclusion that the flood victims, mostly farmers and laborers or town residents in the countryside, were a sacrifice intended to elicit national repentance and expiation seems callous. But for Kashiwagi, there existed a logical correlation between a flood that devastated a

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<sup>6</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Tensai no keikoku,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1910): 2.

<sup>7</sup> Here Kashiwagi is referring to Neo-Confucian ideals of justice, authority, and wisdom. The Mandate of Heaven generally referred to the blessing to rule granted to earthly rulers by a higher authority. When natural disasters coincided with governmental corruption, it was often argued that the earthly ruler had lost the Mandate of Heaven and the disasters were indication that the ruler could be dethroned without violating the Confucian dictate to honor and obey authorities.

<sup>8</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Tensai no keikoku,” 2.

farming area half a day's journey from the colonial metropole and the belligerent actions of the state. This piece reflects Kashiwagi's conviction that the responsibility for the direction the nation should take lay in the hands of its people, regardless of their status or power. Moreover, as the minister of a small church in this area but constantly aware of wider events, Kashiwagi considered the experiences and decisions of his rural community to be inextricably linked to the state's actions.

There were literal connections between the floods and Japan's colonization of Korea. With their farms destroyed, some farmers gave up their ancestral lands and struck out for new opportunities. Some migrated to Hokkaido, the northernmost island newly incorporated into Japan proper.<sup>9</sup> Others migrated to the newly acquired colony of Korea to seek better opportunities as settler colonialists.<sup>10</sup> Thus this local tragedy pushed residents directly into networks made possible by Japanese expansionism. But as far as Kashiwagi was concerned, these events were not beyond the control of local residents. Imperialism was not a force beyond their concern, and the mundane daily activities of the farmers and merchants in the area were linked—literally or “spiritually”—to the nation.

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<sup>9</sup> There had been an outpost on Hokkaido—then known as Ezo—during the Tokugawa period, but the entire island was not incorporated into Japan proper until the Meiji period. Although Hokkaido was considered, along with Okinawa, to be part of the *naichi* and not a colony, it was treated as a frontier space. The government even hired Americans with experience with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to develop a plan for “pioneering” the area.

<sup>10</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 7, 439. In October 1910, twenty-five families from Yahata village near Takasaki applied to go to Korea through the Oriental Development Company. While the ODC preferred to have them migrate the following Spring, fourteen families (51 people total) migrated immediately due to severe hardships following the floods. They were employed as laborers for Japanese-run farms and government-run businesses.

Kashiwagi's concerted efforts to both associate this local event with Japan's expansionism and to find spiritual meaning in it also reflects his attitude towards his ministry. He served as the senior minister of the Kumiai church in Annaka, Gunma, from 1897 until 1935, when his congregation forced him to retire out of fear that his continued criticism of the state in both the monthly and his sermons would result in his imprisonment. It might be tempting to dismiss Kashiwagi as a minority voice, only the minister of a small rural congregation who was merely a lone voice in the wilderness. However, this would be a mistake: Kashiwagi was an important link in a network of Kumiai Kyōkai ministers, and his placement at the Annaka church, along with his continued involvement in denominational activities, suggests not only his continual relevance, but also the importance of small rural congregations for the denomination as a whole.

Kashiwagi's conversion to Christianity resulted from a series of chance encounters. He was born in 1860 near Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture, into a samurai family that had served as the keepers of a Shinshū Ōtani-ha Buddhist temple for eight generations. After suffering through a number of severe tutors (including his brother-in-law), Kashiwagi entered the Niigata Prefectural Normal School and then transferred to the Tokyo Normal School, where he completed training to become an elementary school teacher. Through his sister Muro whose husband served as the headmaster of the Maebashi Middle School, Kashiwagi found employment in Gunma Prefecture as the headmaster of a small village elementary school in 1878, the same year that the Annaka church was founded.

Soon after his move to Gunma Prefecture, Kashiwagi became acquainted with several men who had converted to Christianity through the influence of Niijima Jō, and they invited him to attend an evangelistic event organized by the Annaka church. There he was introduced to Ebina. From 1880 until he was baptized in 1884, Kashiwagi tentatively pursued Christianity. He even enrolled at Dōshisha English School in Kyoto (where he was befriended by Niijima) but was forced to withdraw when he could no longer afford to pay tuition. He returned again to Gunma, resumed teaching at a local elementary school, and continued to attend Annaka church. His moment of conversion, according to a piece he wrote many years later, came when Ebina invited non-believers to believe in Christ during a church service on 4 November 1883. Kashiwagi accepted the invitation, and was baptized the following January by Ebina.

Kashiwagi returned to Dōshisha, this time successfully graduating. Soon after, he went to Kumamoto Eigakkō (English School) at Ebina's invitation to serve as the interim headmaster following Ebina's resignation—it was there that he became embroiled in the Okumura affair (see chapter one). From Kumamoto, Kashiwagi returned to Dōshisha, this time as a teacher. Calling down his widowed mother who had remained in Niigata, Kashiwagi mentored students as his mother opened up their home to students. Included among these students was Takahashi Yōzō, who later became a missionary in P'yōngyang.<sup>11</sup> He also married Hirase Kayako, from a Methodist family on Awaji Island near Kobe, in this period.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Letter from Takahashi Yōzō to Kashiwagi Gien, 2 April 1908, Kashiwagi Gien Papers, Institute for Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

<sup>12</sup> Biographical details based on Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 19-43, 79.

***Jōmō kyōkai geppō:***  
**Reporting the Gunma Christian World**

Kashiwagi's ministry was inextricably linked to the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, the unique publication he edited while he served as the minister of the Annaka church. Most churches produced newsletters that were distributed to congregants and supporters, and some churches, such as Hongō in Tokyo, produced affiliated journals with a much wider mission and audience. *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* was neither of these, but was instead a monthly that primarily focused on the churches in the local Gunma area. The term *Jōmō*, a regional appellation for Gunma, marked the *geppō* as a uniquely regional publication. As such, the paper diligently reported the activities of all of the prefecture's churches. The newspaper's regional identity was more than a convenient organizing device, for the contents emphasized the specific challenges and difficulties faced by rural and agricultural areas like Gunma.

As the editor of the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, Kashiwagi gave the impression of a forceful, passionate commentator who protested the misconduct or arrogance of authority—whether in his own denomination or the state itself—and insisted on his right to dissent (see chapter seven). But this side of his work coexisted with a laborious, mundane, and mostly uneventful ministry at the Annaka church. On the surface, his church and the region in which it was situated were similarly non-descript. By 1900 the Annaka church rarely had more than thirty attendees at Sunday worship services, and Gunma Prefecture was often considered a dull and not particularly attractive region on the northern edge of the Kantō Plains. But such appearances can be deceptive. In this

chapter I will focus on Kashiwagi's ministry in Annaka, and the other Kumiai Kyōkai churches in the Gunma area more generally, to consider the nature of Christian ministry and practice in the countryside.

## **Part I:**

### **Gunma: The Mighty Silkworm and Feisty Farmers**

Gunma, a landlocked prefecture located in the center of Honshū, the main island of Japan, might appear off the beaten track. It certainly seemed as though little occurred there: the economy was dominated by sericulture, farming, and logging, and most of the population was dispersed among isolated mountain hamlets, farming villages, or in a handful of towns in the low-lying areas. However, its seeming isolation did not prevent Gunma from being actually involved in a series of much broader—even global—networks, including imperial ones. Not only did events and experiences in Gunma reflect the rapid changes continuing across the nation at the turn of the twentieth century, but also these provided the crucible for reconceptualizing global events.

The forcible opening of treaty ports by the United States in 1859 had direct consequences for the regional economy of Gunma. The local soil and climate was ill-suited for growing rice, but could support other grains and more importantly mulberry trees, the principle food for silkworms. Sericulture had long dominated the local economy and its importance was reflected in the predominance of Gunma

sericulturalists in the development of technical innovations in the Tokugawa period.<sup>13</sup> Most households, including those that primarily cultivated grains, raised silkworms or engaged in one of the steps involved in silk production for supplemental income. Silkworms required constant attention and were particularly susceptible to fluctuations in temperature and humidity, and all members of the household were expected to assist in the work.<sup>14</sup> These silk producers were drawn into the global economy in the 1860s due to a fortuitous coincidence when pébrine struck and devastated Italian silkworms just as the U.S. pressured Japan into signing an unequal commercial treaty: overnight, Japanese silk became a lucrative commodity. Japan's entry into the global market transformed the Gunma economy.<sup>15</sup>

By 1880, most silk in Gunma was produced for export.<sup>16</sup> In 1872, the government decided to build a modern silk filature and chose Tomioka, a town in southwestern Gunma, for the site. Soon factory girls joined the regional labor force, competing against family-operated silk reelers.<sup>17</sup> Most silk continued to be produced by families, however; since at least half of the households were engaged in one part of silk production by the 1880s, the silk market directly or indirectly affected the lives of

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<sup>13</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 8, 29.

<sup>14</sup> For more on Japanese sericultural technology and technique as Japan opened its ports, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Sericulture and the Origins of Japanese Industrialization," *Technology and Culture* 33, no. 1 (January 1992): 101-121.

<sup>15</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 8, 27.

<sup>16</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 8, 29.

<sup>17</sup> For more on Tomioka Silk Filature and continuing family-based silk spinning mills in Gunma, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), especially 25-46.

prefectural residents. Once the European silk market rebounded, however, Japanese silk producers found themselves at the mercy of a fluctuating global silk market.<sup>18</sup>

The topography of the prefecture further shaped the lives of Gunma residents. Mountains lay to the west and north, separating the populations in these areas from the low-lying areas to the south. Mountain villages were often isolated from one another, located where elevation and steep terrain severely limited the type of crops that could be grown, and mainly accessible by mountain trails even after the turn of the twentieth century. Towns in the southern part of the prefecture, such as Annaka, Maebashi, and Takasaki, had long been connected to Tokyo via the Nakasendō that connected Tokyo to Kyoto across mountain passes in Gunma and Nagano. The journey from Annaka to Tokyo, which in the 1870s took approximately twelve hours by post horse and rickshaw, was considerably shortened in 1884 with the introduction of the Takasaki Line connecting Takasaki to Ueno station in Tokyo.

Despite its relative isolation, the plains and mountains of Gunma stood at a crossroads between the Kantō Plains, dominated by Tokyo, and numerous highways that connected Tokyo to other parts of the country. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, itinerant tutors, doctors, and intellectuals traveled through the region.<sup>19</sup> In the 1870s, at the height of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement, residents, far from

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<sup>18</sup> Kären Wigen's book-length study of silk producers in neighboring Nagano prefecture demonstrates the degree to which the local economy was at the mercy of fluctuations in the global silk market. Although there were most likely some differences in the effects on Nagano and Gunma due to local variances, Wigen's arguments generally apply to Gunma sericulture as well. See Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), especially 137-266.

<sup>19</sup> See for example Ellen Gardner Nakamura, *Practical Pursuits: Takano Chōei, Takahashi Keisaku, and Western Medicine in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).

being docile farmers, mobilized to form local political assemblies and demand other political rights. When the government cracked down on these local popular political movements in the 1880s, Gunma residents instigated several uprisings, culminating in the “Gunma incident” in 1884.<sup>20</sup> While such movements were successfully suppressed by the government, when socialism was introduced to Japan, it too developed a following in Gunma. According to the meticulous notes taken by the special police who compiled reports on all suspected political radicals, Gunma had the third highest number of subscribers to the socialist newspaper, *Heimin shinbun* (included among these was Kashiwagi) and the fifth highest number of suspected socialists in the nation. Nearly half were Christian.<sup>21</sup>

Certainly some of the conditions in Gunma proved conducive to the acceptance of Christianity. But Gunma was not unique—other rural regions were similarly affected by the rapid changes due to modernization and industrialization, and populations in other areas were as politically engaged or unruly as the residents of Gunma. Regardless, this wider context—geographic, economic, and political—influenced the nature of Christian ministry in this region.

### **Local Roots:**

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<sup>20</sup> In May 1884 members of the Freedom and Popular Rights movement, enraged at the effects of economic policies that led to drastic deflation (the so-called Matsukata deflation) gathered local farmers at the foot of Mount Myogi to protest. They were immediately stopped by the police. See Iwane Tsugunari, *Gunma jiken no kōzō: Jōmō no jiyū minken undō* (Maebashi: Jōmō shinbunsha, 2004).

<sup>21</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 7, 416. Of the 75 suspected socialists in Gunma, 14 were residents of Isezaki, 9 each in Maebashi and Haramachi, 8 in Annaka, and 7 in Tatebayashi. According to these same records, 32 of these suspected socialists were also Christian.

## **The Founding of the Annaka Church**

The thirty-nine years Kashiwagi spent as the minister in Annaka far exceeded the tenure of any of his contemporaries at a single church. His life and ministry were inextricably linked to this idiosyncratic church and its remarkable congregants.

The founding of the Annaka church has often been described as evidence of Nijijima Jō's influence. Nijijima certainly played a pivotal part: he introduced Christianity to the area when he returned to his ancestral home for a few weeks in 1874 following a ten-year sojourn in the United States. But the unique characteristics of the region's churches—financial self-sufficiency, independence from the denominational mainstream, and strong regional identity—derived from the early conversion of several important and influential families and the demands of sericulture.

Nijijima's brief initial visit produced no immediate conversions, but thirty Annaka residents retained an active interest in exploring Christianity. Left without a minister or evangelist to teach them, several of the residents took the initiative to continue to study the Bible on their own.<sup>22</sup> In particular, Yuasa Jirō, the scion of Aritaya—a soy sauce and miso maker—used his family's considerable wealth to compile a substantial library that he named the Binransha. The collection consisted of 3000 Japanese-, Chinese-, and English-language volumes, was housed in the first floor of a family building used for raising silkworms, and was made available to local

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<sup>22</sup> "Annaka Kirisuto kyōkai rokuji," reprinted in *Gunma Ken shi, shiryō hen*, vol. 22, 880.

residents. Not only did this foster local curiosity about Christianity, but the Binransha was also among the first modern libraries established in Japan.<sup>23</sup>

Between 1874 and 1878, Yuasa and a handful of others labored to maintain some semblance of Christian worship together. In addition to studying the Bible, they also held simple Sunday services. In 1877, Ebina Danjō arrived to evangelize and support the “seekers” in Annaka. Ebina was among the first students to study at the school Niijima had established in Kyoto, and Niijima sent him to Annaka during a summer recess. Ebina worked closely with Yuasa and the two men kept the Sabbath together; only five or six others regularly joined them.<sup>24</sup>

In March 1878, Niijima and Ebina again traveled to Annaka, this time to formally establish a church. This was partly to capture the momentum gained from Ebina’s visit the previous year, but it was also to clarify a denominational issue. Soon after Ebina returned to Kyoto to resume his studies, residents of Annaka who were interested in Christianity sought out American Presbyterian missionaries during a visit to Yokohama for business, and asked that someone be sent to Annaka to continue evangelism. As a courtesy, these missionaries contacted Niijima: Niijima was affiliated with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), and the Presbyterian and ABCFM missionaries had agreed to avoid competing in the same areas for converts. The Annaka residents’ unfamiliarity with the complex denominational

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<sup>23</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 9, 552. Rental libraries existed in Japan for several centuries but Yuasa’s Binransha is distinct in that he did not charge for use of the library. On these earlier rental libraries, see Peter Kornicki, *The Book in Japan: A Cultural History from the Beginnings to the Nineteenth Century* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 391-397.

<sup>24</sup> “Annaka Kirisuto kyokai rokuji,” 880.

politics of missionaries and the conflicting purposes of these residents, American missionaries, and Nijjima and Ebina seemed to present a problem even before a church had been established. Thus, Nijjima and Ebina rushed to Annaka to formally establish a church and baptize those who had retained an interest in Christianity to cement Annaka as a mission site for the ABCFM. As soon as he completed his studies at Doshisha, Ebina was ordained by ABCFM missionaries and appointed minister of the church.

In 1878, there were only eight Kumiai churches nationwide, all in the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area in western Japan where most of the ABCFM missionaries worked. Annaka was the first ABCFM-affiliated church in eastern Japan. It was also arguably the first church, nationally, to be built through resources supplied by local believers in a period when foreign missionary organizations provided funds and ministers for churches. This fact, which was instrumental in giving Gunma-area churches a distinctly independent character, was made possible by the presence of patrons like the Yuasa family.

The appointment of an ordained minister offered Annaka Christians the guidance and legitimacy they had been seeking. During the previous years, the handful of “seekers” had been pursuing Christianity on their own initiative. Once the church was founded, lay members continued to play a crucial role in nurturing the nascent Christian community. In particular, Yuasa Jirō put the weight of his family’s wealth and influence behind the development of Christianity in Annaka. The financial assistance he provided was crucial: when the Annaka church was finally founded in 1878, Yuasa offered the upstairs loft of the building in which the Binransha was housed for a temporary

sanctuary. According to a demographic study of early members of the church, of the first thirty converts, at least twenty-five were formerly lower-level samurai who had particularly suffered economic hardship when the state ceased paying samurai stipends.<sup>25</sup> In order to help provide for these families, Yuasa created a sericultural cooperative. Houses used for sericulture included an oversized well-ventilated loft space where the silkworms were kept, and the second floor of the Binransha, now the sanctuary, was such a space. Thus, the sanctuary doubled as the site for the cooperative. Yuasa also provided mulberry leaves from his own property with which to feed the silkworms. The cooperative lasted for three years, and during this time all profits were divided equally among the participating families.<sup>26</sup>

The Yuasa family's influence was not merely financial. Jirō's mother Moyo, who was one of the first converts and the matriarch of the Aritaya, used her well-established influence among local residents to gain new converts. The significance of existing relationships in successful evangelism can be observed in an anecdote relayed by Tanaka Giichi, a native of Gokanmura who later became a missionary in Hawai'i and Los Angeles. In his memoir, he reflected on his conversion "process," including the role that Yuasa Moyo played.

This Omoyo-san would visit my village with a clerk carrying silkworm egg cards in tow, and stopped by my home from time to time. Each time, she would little by little share how Christianity was a noble (*tōtoi*) religion with us. On one occasion, witnessing how her character shined through as she spoke these few words, I felt very grateful. In this

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<sup>25</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, editor, *Chihō shōtoshi ni okeru Kirisuto kyōkai no keisei: Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki* (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan senkyō kenkyūjo, 1959), 11.

<sup>26</sup> *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 9, 544-545, 571.

moment I thought to myself, I want to become a follower of this Christianity.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to Moyo, Jirō also made use of his business ties in neighboring towns. On occasion he took Ebina along when he was going to meet with customers to take soy sauce and miso orders, and introduced the minister to his customers. He also used his relationship with influential families in local villages to encourage them to organize evangelistic events, getting them to agree to finance such events by arranging for venues and the cost of lodging and meals for the speaker.<sup>28</sup>

### **Spawning New Churches**

Beginning with the Annaka church, other churches soon sprang up in neighboring towns and villages through the efforts of the founding members in Annaka and with the financial support of a number of influential wealthy families. A group in the town of Tomioka and neighboring villages, located about five miles south of Annaka, had been traveling over a mountain pass to attend services at the Annaka church for some time. In 1883, this group gathered their resources together to found the Kanra Daiichi church. The thirty-five founding members had first been exposed to Christianity through a local merchant who evangelized as he conducted his business in the area.<sup>29</sup> Unlike in Annaka where the first converts were primarily former samurai, the first members of the Kanra church were almost entirely farmers or charcoal makers. Significantly the church was

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<sup>27</sup> Tanaka Giichi, *Shiren no rutsubo* (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1925), 8.

<sup>28</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 16.

<sup>29</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 27.

located about 100 yards from the Tomioka Silk Filature, the first state-sponsored modern silk filature built in 1872 with over 400 female employees.<sup>30</sup> These young factory workers soon became an important focus for the church's evangelism.<sup>31</sup>

In 1886, yet another church grew out of the Annaka congregation. Ninety-six members who lived in neighboring Haraichi, and the villages of Gokan and Isobe, separated from the Annaka church in order to found their own church in Haraichi. Handa Uheiji, a successful merchant who owned several dry goods stores, donated a large sum towards building the Haraichi sanctuary.<sup>32</sup> Like Yuasa, Handa used his familial and commercial ties to encourage others to convert to Christianity. As the family head of a large extended family, he wielded considerable influence and once he converted, the branch families of the Handa clan soon followed suite.<sup>33</sup>

Although the founding of the Haraichi church reflected the growth of the Christian community in the area, for the Annaka church, it also marked the beginning of growing pains. Further, the opening of the railway linking Takasaki to Ueno station in Tokyo permanently displaced Annaka's regional importance.<sup>34</sup> Annaka had been an

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<sup>30</sup> For more on the Tomioka Silk Filature, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Factory Girls*, especially 25-102.

<sup>31</sup> For example in 1887 three American women missionaries who were teachers at the Tokyo Women's Normal School visited the Kanra church and also visited the Tomioka Silk Filature where they spoke to the factory workers. In the report published in the *Kirisutokyō shinbun*, the author held great promise for the potential of the five or six Christian factory workers to evangelize among the others. "Jōmō Kanra kyōkai," *Kirisutokyō shinbun* 219 (5 October 1887), reprinted in *Gunma Ken shi, shiryō hen*, vol. 22, 1058.

<sup>32</sup> *Haraichi Kyōkai kyōkai kiji*, 15, Gunma Prefectural Archives; *Gunma Ken shi, tsūshi hen*, vol. 9, 552.

<sup>33</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 28.

<sup>34</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 29.

important commercial and cultural center as a post station along the Nakasendō during the Tokugawa period. With Takasaki as the terminus for the railway to Tokyo, Annaka ceased to be central to regional life. Nonetheless, Annaka was the starting point for Christianity in Gunma and continued to be considered significant among Christians in the Kantō region.

Between 1884 and 1886, five churches were established in Gunma: Takasaki (1884), Kanra (1884), Maebashi (1886), Sukawa (1886), and Haraichi (1886).<sup>35</sup> Between 1883 and 1887 a series of revivals helped to dramatically increase the number of converts in the area.<sup>36</sup> In 1883 reports of revivals sweeping through Tokyo churches reached Christians in Gunma. This news was shared at church services and soon congregations organized prayer meetings and calls for repentance. Intense prayer meetings were transformed into spiritual drama: congregants described being “anointed by the spirit,” people speaking in tongues, wrenching moments of experiencing the weight of their own sin with the relief of understanding God’s mercy and benevolence, and a general sense of peace descending upon them. Revivals spread across Gunma as well: members of the first church rushed to nearby churches to spread the news, sparking a similarly dramatic event at the next church.<sup>37</sup> Energized by these

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<sup>35</sup> I have not been able to locate any information on the Sukawa church. A Russian Orthodox Church was established in Sukawa in 1886, but it is doubtful that the Kumiai Kyokai would list this church among the churches in the area. It is possible that a Kumiai church was in existence for only a brief period and its members eventually joined other churches.

<sup>36</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 18.

<sup>37</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 18-19; “Jōmō chihō kaku kyōkai shinki no shohō,” *Kirisutokyō shinbun* (14 December 1887), reprinted in *Gunma Ken shi, shiryō hen*, vol. 22, 1060-1062.

experiences, ministers and lay members exerted even more effort into evangelizing in their communities and to encourage “lapsed” believers to rekindle their faith. In 1883 alone, there were 92 baptisms at the Annaka church.<sup>38</sup> The rise and establishment of Christian ministry in Gunma was remarkable, but efforts to evangelize in the area were also met with resistance, ridicule, and at times even violence. Incidents ranged from mere nuisances such as church members having rocks thrown at them on their way to church to more severe acts of violence such as arson and mob attacks on churches.<sup>39</sup>

## PART II

### **An Uneventful Ministry in Annaka**

Kashiwagi Gien was himself the fruit of the efforts of lay members of the Annaka church. Baptized in early 1884, his own conversion process was prompted by an invitation by Annaka church members who invited him to evangelistic events and Sunday services. When Kashiwagi returned to Gunma in 1897 to serve as the minister, the church had eased into a steady rhythm. During the 1880s when the region experienced a wave of revivals, there had been numerous baptisms. Even in the years immediately following the revivals, there had been 24, 21, and 29 baptisms in 1888, 1889, and 1890, respectively. The number of baptisms dropped drastically in 1891 to

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<sup>38</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 18-19.

<sup>39</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 33-34; “Jōmō Takasaki no hakugai,” *Kirisutokyō shinbun* 246 (11 April 1888), reprinted in *Gunma Ken shi, shiryō hen*, vol. 22, 1046.

three, and there continued to only be a trickle of baptisms to the year when Kashiwagi returned.<sup>40</sup> Average Sunday service attendance had declined to around twenty. The church congregation, which had originally consisted mostly of destitute former samurai, by Kashiwagi's return, had become mostly farmers and townspeople. In addition to reports of marriages, births, and deaths, the monthly church news occasionally reported significant changes: young men were conscripted into the Army for deployment abroad, students emigrated to the United States to study or to pursue new opportunities. Natural disasters such as the 1910 flood, fluctuations in the silk market, or simple curiosity and dreams of better opportunities, drove some to other regions, to urban areas, or even to the colonies.

Kashiwagi's energetic and even aggressive commentaries in the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* were anchored in a plain and mostly uneventful ministry in Annaka. Unlike more prominent ministers like Ebina Danjō or even Watase Tsuneyoshi, Kashiwagi rarely traveled far from Gunma Prefecture except to attend regional or national denominational meetings. Aside from frequent trips to Tokyo, he spent most of his time in Annaka and surrounding towns and villages. One significant reason for Kashiwagi's limited travel was his family. He and his wife Kayako had nine children born between 1893 and 1913. Kayako was often ill, leaving Kashiwagi the primary caregiver. Family troubles and tragedy also demanded much of Kashiwagi's attention. When their third son died at the age of three in 1901, they sent their fourth son Daishirō to live with his maternal grandparents in western Japan for a brief period. When he returned to live with

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<sup>40</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 43.

the family he had trouble readjusting and was a source of worry to his parents. Kayako, who despite her frequent illnesses assisted Kashiwagi's work with women in the area, passed away in 1918, leaving Kashiwagi alone to care for their children. In 1920, their second son died of a protracted illness while attending medical school. In between preparing sermons, writing commentaries for the *geppō*, and visiting parishioners of his church and neighboring churches, Kashiwagi devoted much of his time to mundane household tasks such as laundry and preparing food for his family. He often ran church errands with one of his younger children in tow.<sup>41</sup>

His family responsibilities certainly affected Kashiwagi's ability to travel, but his reluctance to go far from Annaka also reflected his dedication to his pastoral duties. The average Sunday service attendance rarely rose above twenty-five, and there were numerous families who maintained membership at the church whose farm duties prevented them from regularly attending services or who lived too far from the church to make it practical to attend. The unique characteristics of his congregation, in turn shaped by the distinct regional economy and topography, required that Kashiwagi invest considerable time and energy into traveling through the surrounding countryside just to encourage this small group of congregants to remain a part of the church.

Silkworms dictated the rhythm of church life: attendance at church services and general ministry activities followed the demands of the silkworms' lifecycle. In the summer months, when the cycle reached its most intensive period, activities at all of the Gunma churches except for Sunday services went on hiatus. At the smaller churches

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<sup>41</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 116-144.

where regular church attendance rarely exceeded fifteen people, even these services were occasionally canceled.<sup>42</sup>

Services were also physically shaped by the regional economy. Local farmhouses featured large loft spaces with ventilation slits where the silkworms were kept. As mentioned earlier, the first space in which the Annaka church held services was the loft of the sericultural cooperative that Yuasa created for early church members.<sup>43</sup> These large lofts also served as convenient meeting spaces for the Bible Studies, prayer meetings, and social gatherings that congregations held during the sericultural off-season. The congregations lived among silkworms, organized the structure and schedule of church life around silkworms, and depended for their livelihood on the vitality of the silk export market.

The distinct Gunma topography shaped the relationship of ministers like Kashiwagi to their parishioners and other Christians in the area. By 1888 the Annaka church expanded its ministries into the nearby villages of Itahana, Murota, and Ainoda, among others. Church members in each of these areas formed their own associations and held regular meetings in addition to attending services at Annaka church.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> For example, in the 1910 June and July issues of the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, the Annaka, Haraichi, Midono, Kanra, and Numata churches all reported a dramatic decrease in Sunday service attendance due to the peak of the sericultural season. “Annaka kyōkai” and “Haraichi kyōkai,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1910): 9-10; “Midono kyōkai,” “Kanra kyōkai,” and “Numata kyōkai,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (July 1910): 10.

<sup>43</sup> Yuasa’s recollections of the early years of the Annaka church as told at Ryōmō dendōkai iinkai as recorded in “Ryōmō dendōkai iinkai to kyōyakushakai,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (March 1912): 8.

<sup>44</sup> Morioka Kiyomi, *Jōshū Annaka kyōkai no kōzō bunseki*, 50. According to the study conducted in 1959, of the 129 households with family members registered as members of the Annaka church, 54 resided in Annaka, 35 in areas considered formal ministry sites, and 40 in other areas including the rest of Gunma or Saitama and Tokyo Prefectures.

Kashiwagi frequently visited parishioners in these outlying areas, some of which were only accessible from Annaka on foot via paths through the mountains. Murota, the farthest away, was five miles on the other side of a mountain pass. Even in the winter when the temperature was often below freezing, Kashiwagi—who continued to wear traditional Japanese dress and wore wooden sandals—walked to these villages to meet and pray with church families.<sup>45</sup>

Kashiwagi also frequently visited the other churches in the area. Two in particular, Nakuta (founded 1887) and Agatsuma (founded 1890), located in the mountainous northwest along the Agatsuma River gorge, were often without a minister and found it difficult to consistently hold simple services. Ministers took turns traveling to this area to perform Sunday services and encourage parishioners. The trip from Annaka was tedious: the first leg of the journey by train to Shibukawa, then horse or car from there up the river valley to the towns of Haramachi and Nakanojō. In the winter, heavy snowfall in the area made the journey even more difficult.<sup>46</sup> Such efforts wielded few quantitative results: on typical visits, only about fifteen or so residents attended sermons given by the itinerant ministers.

Members of other churches also visited Christians and “seekers” in the more remote mountainous areas to the north and west of the major towns. Each of these visits required traveling through difficult terrain. For instance, in 1898, a group from the

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<sup>45</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 116.

<sup>46</sup> Hilton Pedley, an ABCFM missionary based in the area, described a particularly difficult journey through deep snowdrifts on horseback to Nakuta and Agatsuma. “Agatsuma gun junkai no ki,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppo* (March 1903): 9.

Kanra church visited families on Mirobayama, thirty miles from Tomioka (where the church was located). The group had to walk along a mountain trail through tall brush to reach the hamlet where the families lived. As they reported in the *geppō*, “even deep in the mountains the seeds of [Christianity] are growing, for there are eleven believers living there (some still living in huts with dirt floors).”<sup>47</sup>

At times such trips were partly undertaken in order to impress upon more privileged or sheltered members of a church the hardships faced by impoverished residents in these mountainous areas. When a group from the Kanra church visited the Mirobayama Christians in 1900, two members of the group were young women. According to the report submitted to the *geppō*, the minister invited the women to join them “so that these young ladies could witness the actual lifestyle of these mountain laborers.”<sup>48</sup>

### **Teaching Christ in the Countryside**

Unlike Ebina who regularly published transcripts of his sermons in the journal associated with his church, Kashiwagi did not publish his sermons in *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* or leave a systematic record of what he preached. This makes it difficult to ascertain *what* he preached to his small congregation or to farm families in isolated hamlets. But he did publish a series of studies on Christ in the *geppō* that provide an overview of his theology and a sense of the kind of teaching he offered his congregants.

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<sup>47</sup> “Kanra daiichi kyōkai hō,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (December 1898): 2.

<sup>48</sup> “Kanra kyōkai,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1900): 7.

The first series, titled “Kirisuto ha darezo” (Who is Christ), appeared over a four-month period in 1902. From the timing of its publication and the theme, it is apparent that Kashiwagi meant this as his response to the contentious theological debate that occurred the previous year between Ebina Danjō and Uemura Masahisa, two prominent Tokyo ministers (see chapter two). Kashiwagi’s physically limited range of activities did not prevent him from actively engaging in broader intellectual and theological discussions. But rather than presenting his commentary in the denominational weekly where others had participated in the ongoing debate, he published his series in the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*. Thus, Kashiwagi used the notorious contest as an opportunity to share his own understanding of Christ to Christians in his region. By presenting an evaluation of these issues to his immediate audience, he also drew his local congregation into larger discussions about core theological doctrines and Christian conceptions of proper nation building.

Kashiwagi argued that the answer to the question, “Who is Christ?” was inseparable from the development of modern civilization. The answer, he continued, centered on the problem of sin. Unlike Ebina or Watase who considered a preoccupation with sin an artifact of antiquated Christianity (see chapters one and two), Kashiwagi adhered to the belief that all human beings were sinful; Christ alone was blameless and without sin.<sup>49</sup> The greatest proof of this was Christ’s absolute submission to God for, as Kashiwagi reasoned, a person with sin was incapable of such submission. Nonetheless, Kashiwagi pondered the absence of any admission of sin or guilt on the part of Christ,

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<sup>49</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisuto ha darezo (1),” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (January 1902): 2.

even while he had offered himself as a sacrifice on behalf of mankind. Who, Kashiwagi asked, was this man who while imploring others to confess their sins made no admission of his own?<sup>50</sup>

Before answering this question, however, Kashiwagi digressed to explain Christ's significance for humanity. He proposed that, "humankind has the right to make an absolute demand on humankind. It is only when this absolute demand is applied to society that it becomes possible for a true nation to be established, society to live up to its ideals, peace to descend on the land, humankind to gain eternal life, and homes (households) transformed."<sup>51</sup> Christ was the catalyst necessary for this radical transformation of society to take place, initiated through this absolute demand humanity made of itself.

Returning to the issue of who Christ was, Kashiwagi concluded that everything Christ did, including suffering crucifixion on a cross, derived from his absolute submission to God.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, "It was only when Christ the man attained divinity that he became a model of the ideal human being; it was only when Christ the divine attained humanity that he was able to make apparent (*arawasu*) God's infinite love [for humanity]."<sup>53</sup> In other words, according to Kashiwagi, Christ was both divine and human, a model for humanity precisely because of his obedience to God, even in the

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<sup>50</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kirisuto ha darezo (1)," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (January 1902): 3-4.

<sup>51</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kirisuto ha darezo (2)," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (February 1902): 2.

<sup>52</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kirisuto ha darezo (4)," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1902): 2.

<sup>53</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kirisuto ha darezo (4)," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1902): 3.

face of extreme suffering. Furthermore, this suffering resulted from living among and experiencing the life of the poor—becoming God incarnate—which he did in order to impart on people God’s infinite love for them.<sup>54</sup>

This portrait of Christ is not particularly unusual and follows a typically orthodox theology, particularly in its acceptance of Christ’s divinity and an emphasis on sin as a fundamental aspect of the human condition. But through characterizing Christ’s compassion—distinctly manifested through living life among the poor—the defining feature of Christianity as well as an expression of obedience to God, Kashiwagi asserted an understanding of Christianity that had particular relevance for his rural congregation in two significant ways. Christ had expressed God’s love by living among the poor, through experiencing the common everyday hardships of people. Thus the divine could be found in the seemingly insignificant acts of everyday life, and more importantly, communion with God could be attained in the mostly uneventful countryside. But, and this was perhaps of greater significance as far as Kashiwagi was concerned, Christianity was not only meant to provide comfort. It was meant to give guidance, to fundamentally define and defend truth even if insisting on truth led to suffering. In other words, Christ as the Son who expressed God’s love for humanity through acting in absolute obedience to God’s will demonstrated ideal humanity. And the struggle to declare and defend this fundamental truth as reflected in Christ was necessary in the countryside just as it was in centers of power and direct national and international influence.

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<sup>54</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisuto ha darezo (4),” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1902): 3.

Kashiwagi also espoused the exclusivity of Christianity. In a series of articles in 1903-1904, and again in 1910, Kashiwagi compared Christianity to Buddhism, Confucianism, and science to claim the superiority of Christianity. In making this argument, Kashiwagi returned to Christ, particularly what he called “the historical fact of Christ’s existence.”<sup>55</sup> That God became incarnate through Christ was the defining and distinguishing feature of Christianity. In other words, Christ was not a mere philosopher, but “as the Son of God revealed God through his body, and is also the one who revealed the deep secrets of the divine to humanity...this is where the difference between philosophy that reveals God and religion lies. One is speculation, the other is truth.”<sup>56</sup> In other words, through revealing the mysteries of the divine, and thus making God knowable, Christianity was superior to other religions or philosophies that merely studied the divine.

In addition to insisting on Christianity’s superiority, Kashiwagi cautioned against attempting to find points of comparison or commonality among religions. Ridiculing the notion that “in the future the ideal religion will be based on common aspects of all religions,” Kashiwagi insisted that, “the manifestation of difference is progress.”<sup>57</sup> Emphasizing similarities only led to regression. The very fact of Christ’s existence—itsself an extraordinary event—demonstrated this: “The manifestation of a person, that is Christ, with nothing in common with common man—this is namely Christianity.” Likewise, Christianity was itself defined by its uniqueness as the

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<sup>55</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisutokyō honron,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1903): 2.

<sup>56</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisutokyō honron,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1903): 3.

<sup>57</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kyōtsūten ka tokuiten ka,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1910): 6.

revelation of God through the person of Christ.<sup>58</sup> Thus, attempting to identify some point of commonality or similarity between Christianity and other religions—or by extension denying the uniqueness of Christianity—diminished its significance.

Kashiwagi may have insisted on the unique exclusivity of Christianity, but he was ambivalent when it came to the question of eternal salvation. Again, unlike Ebina or Watase, Kashiwagi subscribed to an orthodox understanding of eternal salvation as the final outcome of Christian belief. Yet he was reluctant to concede that not believing in Christianity resulted in eternal damnation. Kashiwagi lost his mother Yō in 1908. The Kashiwagi family had been the hereditary caretakers of a True Pure Land Buddhist temple in Niigata, and when she was widowed soon after Kashiwagi's birth, Yō continued to serve the temple in her late husband's place. She eventually left Niigata to live with Kashiwagi and Kayako, first in Kyoto (where Kashiwagi taught at Doshisha University) and then in Annaka. Even after the family moved to Annaka, Kashiwagi's mother continued to actively participate in Buddhist rituals and practices and regularly attended a local temple. At the same time, she also assisted her son's ministry by joining the church's women's group and generally serving as a hostess together with her daughter-in-law. Despite never being baptized or professing faith, Kashiwagi's mother invested her last years into nurturing the Annaka Christian community.

On the third anniversary of Yō's passing, Kashiwagi struggled to resolve his mother's death with God's compassion as he understood it. He remarked, "My deceased mother believed in the Buddha and while she respected Christ's teaching and listened to

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<sup>58</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kyōtsūten ka tokuiten ka," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1910): 6.

it joyfully she passed from this world before becoming a Christian.” Although he conceded that she had never converted, he continued, “I believe that our heavenly father in his infinite love will not disregard this, but if on the day that I arrive in God’s kingdom I am unable to meet the spirit of my mother how regrettable this would be. I feel how crucial it is to evangelize while people are still alive.”<sup>59</sup> This ambivalent conclusion, refusing to condemn his mother or guarantee her salvation, reveals the limits of theological certainty and Kashiwagi’s grappling with understanding the full implications of his own beliefs.

### Part III

#### **Local Confrontations: A Minister on Trial**

Kashiwagi was accustomed to mild harassment from the local police and prosecutor for his opinionated editorials in the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*. But when he criticized the law of the land and the prefectural governor and defended the innocence of a group of men arrested in Annaka for what he considered unreasonable charges, the law brought its full weight against him. This instance of confrontation offers the opportunity to explore how local politics spawned a discussion about the political character of the Japanese state, of the universal freedoms that individuals possessed, and of how religion served as an ethical corrective to political institutions veering towards authoritarianism.

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<sup>59</sup> [Kashiwagi Gien], “Horobi to eisei,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1911): 5.

In the early hours of July 15, 1909, ten politicians (including the town mayor) and thirty businessmen (including the local postmaster, and heads of the electrical plant and bank) were arrested by the Annaka police. This distinguished group had gathered the previous night for a dinner honoring a local political candidate running in the upcoming election. While there is some question as to the real reason, the police claimed that they were arrested for leaving the gathering without paying for their dinner.<sup>60</sup> News of these arrests shocked the town and Kashiwagi himself wondered what outrageous crime they had committed to provoke such a response.<sup>61</sup> The men, who were transferred from Annaka to Takasaki to Maebashi prisons, underwent rigorous interrogations and were held without charges being filed.<sup>62</sup> Upon hearing about these arrests and the harsh treatment the men endured, Kashiwagi penned a private letter to the prefectural governor denouncing the conduct of the police and pleading leniency for the arrested men.

On the 24<sup>th</sup>, Kashiwagi was ordered to appear at the local police station. The prefectural governor had turned over his letter to the police and they questioned him, insinuating that he was somehow involved with the group that had been arrested. They threatened to charge him with libel for criticizing the governor and then even “attempted to earnestly explain the police’s actions.”<sup>63</sup> Initially taken by their

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<sup>60</sup> Although I have not been able to confirm this (since I have not been able to find other accounts of this incident) it is most likely that the men were arrested as part of governmental pressure to influence the outcome of the upcoming election.

<sup>61</sup> “Annaka jiken,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1909): 4.

<sup>62</sup> “Annaka jiken,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1909): 4-5.

explanation and sympathetic to the challenges they faced, Kashiwagi considered the possibility that he had misunderstood the situation. As he continued to inquire about the circumstances of these arrests, he concluded that while some of the rumors he had heard were unsubstantiated, there was also reason to question the police's explanation. Convinced "that there were grounds to suspect that the authorities and police had acted in an irresponsible and inconsiderate manner," Kashiwagi wrote a lengthy article disclosing the manner in which the arrested officials and businessmen were treated and criticizing the Japanese legal system.<sup>64</sup> The crux of his criticism, which became the focus of the trial, centered upon the relationship between the law and the rights of subjects:

I am sure it is fine if the executor of the law summarily executes the law regardless of what the people think, but those who are in the position to govern the people are obligated to pay particular attention to the feelings of the common people. Furthermore, for those with even a little pluck, if they were to [come into contact with] England where there is a love of freedom and respect for rights, the people would all be stirred up...Are the English a willful people who do not fear the authorities, or are the Japanese subservient? ...In other words, it is certainly possible that there is nothing noteworthy about the Annaka incident from a legal perspective, but from the perspective of freedom, rights, and the laws of humanity (*jiyū jinken no mondai, jindō no mondai*), it is certainly worth considering.<sup>65</sup>

Kashiwagi's objections centered on the conduct of the police and the law's considerable reach. Granting for a moment the police's rather dubious claim that these illustrious members of Annaka society had been rounded up in the middle of the night for failing

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<sup>63</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken to keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 5.

<sup>64</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken to keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 5.

<sup>65</sup> "Annaka jiken," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1909): 4-5.

to pay a dinner bill, he considered the police's activities in the context of freedom and an ideal notion of rights. Unconcerned with the nature of the alleged charges, Kashiwagi instead insisted that the intrusive and relentless actions of the police prevented the people from trusting them.<sup>66</sup> Having thus penned his objections to the legal system, and implicitly questioned the legitimacy of the arrests, Kashiwagi published this issue on August 15<sup>th</sup>.<sup>67</sup>

On August 16<sup>th</sup>, the Gunma police acted with lightning speed to round up Kashiwagi and all parties associated with the *geppō*. They first went to the *geppō* printer in Maebashi and questioned him. That night, the Annaka police went to the home of Ōta Kunohachi, the Haraichi church minister, confiscated more copies of the *geppō*, and pulled him in for further questioning. At ten p.m., police arrived at Kashiwagi's house where they confiscated manuscripts of the *geppō*. The following morning the Tomioka police questioned Okabe Tarō, the minister of the Kanra church and listed publisher, who assisted with distribution.<sup>68</sup>

Kashiwagi and Okabe were indicted and tried in the prefectural court in Takasaki in September. Kashiwagi was charged with violating Article 21 of the Press Regulations that forbade publishing opinions excusing violations of the criminal code or actively supporting convicted criminals. Okabe was charged with violating Article 11 of

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<sup>66</sup> “Annaka jiken,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1909): 5.

<sup>67</sup> “Honsha hikoku jiken no keika,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 5.

<sup>68</sup> “Honsha hikoku jiken no keika,” 5. Many periodicals that tended to publish opinions that could potentially be found to violate the ambiguous and extensive censorship laws listed an “official” publisher in addition to the editor to diffuse responsibility.

the Press Regulations because of the specific timing of the *geppō*'s distribution: by distributing the *geppō* on a Sunday, the police charged, Okabe had circumvented the censorship regulations that required immediate submission of all publications to the local police, prosecutor, and Home Ministry in Tokyo for review. Convicted by the court, Kashiwagi and Okabe appealed, transforming this rather bizarre incident into a very public and visible challenge to the state by two otherwise modest and quiet men.<sup>69</sup>

Local newspapers described the appeals court proceedings in great detail.<sup>70</sup> The papers meticulously described Kashiwagi's demeanor and appearance—that he wore a suit, his hair and moustache were speckled with gray, his glasses on his round face gave him a humble appearance—and noted the disproportionately large presence of Christians who had traveled from throughout the prefecture to observe the proceedings. Although the crime for which Kashiwagi was being tried was unrelated—at least superficially—to his role as a Christian minister, these newspapers paid special attention to this fact. The public trial of a Christian minister, particularly for allegedly sympathizing with convicted criminals, made for a provocative public local scandal.

Kashiwagi had given the court plenty of material to object to: criticizing the police, unfavorably comparing Japan's legal system to that of Britain, urging consideration for the men who had been arrested. According to the ambiguously worded expansive libel laws, Kashiwagi's disclosure of writing to the governor could have been

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<sup>69</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken no keika," 6.

<sup>70</sup> The *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* article recounting the appeals court proceedings quoted extensively from coverage in the *Jōmō shinbun*, the *Jōmō shinpō*, and the *Gunma shinbun*.

construed as a violation as well (as the police had originally threatened).<sup>71</sup> So it is curious that the issue that the prosecutor emphasized in this second court proceeding was Kashiwagi's supposed defense (*higo*) of the arrested men. However, to first take up Kashiwagi's statement given before the court, he objected to the claim that his primary purpose for writing the article was to defend the men who had been arrested. He declared,

I [did this] out of a higher motive [than to defend these men]. In other words, because the prefectural officials are hostile to the people (*jinmin*) and show an utter disregard for their rights, I decided that it was my responsibility as a religionist to bring [the police's conduct] to the public's attention so that [the authorities] would realize [their wrongdoing]....In regards to [what I consider] the necessity to write [this piece] critical of the authorities' actions, I did this fully mindful of the law.<sup>72</sup>

Testifying before the court and a full audience, Kashiwagi defined his role as a Christian and pastor: to expose wrongdoing and misconduct and call the offenders to repentance. While the prefectural authorities attempted to associate him with the original group of men arrested, Kashiwagi directed his moral accusations back to the authorities. No longer concerned with the original confusing and obfuscated charges that had instigated his own scandal, Kashiwagi imposed a superior ethical code onto the police. By formally appealing his original conviction he also demonstrated his assumption that his act of publicly criticizing those in authority should be supported by the law.

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<sup>71</sup> Richard H. Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 49-50.

<sup>72</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken no keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 7. Quoted in *Jōmō shinpō* coverage of trial reprinted in *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*.

The local prosecutor painted a radically different picture of Kashiwagi's actions.

Dismissing Kashiwagi's claim outright, the prosecutor simply stated,

This case is based on the simple fact of whether or not in the article, the defendant wrote something that can be clearly interpreted as a defense of criminals. The purpose of the author is irrelevant; all that matters is whether or not the author wrote something defending criminals. If he did this intentionally, this constitutes proof of guilt (or a criminal act).<sup>73</sup>

According to the prosecutor's statement, on legal grounds Kashiwagi's intent had no bearing on the case. The prosecutor did address Kashiwagi's defense, namely that the legal system did not adequately protect people's rights. Far from being convinced of Kashiwagi's moral justification for his actions, the prosecutor accused him of being in violation of Article 41 of the Criminal Code: making statements injurious to public peace and order. The only reason he was not adding this to the list of charges, he maintained, was out of consideration for Kashiwagi's profession and character.<sup>74</sup>

In response, Kashiwagi's defense lawyers, also Christian, argued Kashiwagi had a legal right to profess his beliefs in the *geppō*. In particular, one lawyer argued, "There are few things more dangerous than law that does not consider morality. *Furthermore, religion is something that insists on the authority of the individual.* The police use the authority of an organization as a shield to interrogate individuals, and the police's reckless suppression of individuality ignores the spirit of the constitution"<sup>75</sup> (emphasis added). The lawyer's argument, while framing the case in terms of the spirit of the

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<sup>73</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken no keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 6. Quoted in *Jōmō shinbun* coverage of trial, reprinted in *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*.

<sup>74</sup> "Honsha hikoku jiken no keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 6.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted in *Jōmō shinbun* coverage of Kashiwagi trial, quoted in "Honsha hikoku jiken to keika," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1909): 7.

constitution, also implied that Kashiwagi's criticism of the local authorities was an expression of his religious convictions *and* that religious expression should be protected under the constitution. Asserting that his public words were protected by the constitution launched a substantial challenge to the state's considerably circumscribed interpretation of the concept of "religious freedom." This was a legal defense turned offense, the transformation of a prefectural court into the site of a presumptuous attack of the very definition of what constituted religious belief and the extent of constitutional protection and conversely, the limits of state interference.

Despite this appeal to the spirit of the constitution and the lawyer's attempt to characterize Kashiwagi's criticism as a means by which to hold the local police accountable, the court upheld the earlier decision. Kashiwagi was fined seventy yen (or a prison sentence of forty days if he could not pay the fine). The church congregation gathered donations in order to pay Kashiwagi's fine to prevent his imprisonment.

The curious court case and Kashiwagi's inevitable conviction revealed the limitations—imposed by the state—to his insistence that as a Christian and minister, he was obligated to uphold truth. The trial was triggered by a local scandal and exacerbated by the prefectural governor's objections to (or indignation with) being "advised" by the minister of a Christian church. Galvanizing the local residents, the original arrests and Kashiwagi's subsequent trial had no bearing on events or people in Tokyo. But through this very public trial, Kashiwagi declared that this localized confrontation served as a critical opportunity through which to challenge the state's increasing encroachment into the lives of its subjects. He offered his congregants and other Christians in Gunma an

example of what he believed constituted obedience to God, despite the possible consequences.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### **An Upside Down Society: Kashiwagi Gien's Critique of the State**

*The two great ideas that are now moving as the undercurrent of society are Christianity and Socialism. One seeks to reconstruct (kaizō) the spirit, the other, revolutionize systems and institutions. Socialism without Christianity is a body without a soul. Christianity without socialism is a soul without a body. When these two great ideas embrace each other rationally and peacefully, truly God's kingdom will come on this earth.<sup>1</sup>*

--Kashiwagi Gien, 1924

In the weeks following the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake that devastated most of Tokyo, Yokohama, and surrounding areas, troubling news reports gradually emerged: the socialist Ōsugi Sakae, his partner Itō Noe, and his six-year-old nephew, had been murdered by a group of *kenpei*, or military police, under cover of the chaos following the earthquake. Along with this unofficially sanctioned act of violence, the widespread massacre of Korean residents by vigilante mobs further marked the earthquake as a moment of horrific violence, compounding the already unspeakable violence and destruction wrought by the earthquake. Kashiwagi Gien, the minister of Annaka church in Gunma, unleashed his rage and indignation in the pages of *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (Gunma Christian world monthly), the monthly newspaper that he edited. Decrying the calls to dismiss charges against Captain Amakasu, the *kenpei* who had authorized Ōsugi and Itō's murders, Kashiwagi declared that such extra-legal violence perpetrated by

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<sup>1</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Sekai no nidai shisō," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1924): 2.

representatives of the state was far more dangerous to the nation than socialism or even anarchism.

Kashiwagi's indignation at the violent aftermath of the earthquake marked the culmination of his decades-long grappling with the social and economic structures, and political decisions, that shaped his own, and his congregants' experiences of the emerging Japanese empire. Through the pages of the monthly he edited, Kashiwagi regularly questioned and examined the effects of capitalism, militarism, and imperialism. By the 1920s he had arrived at the conclusion that these were driven by the same forces and actors and together oppressed and constrained the Japanese people, inhibiting their ability to live peacefully with one another as well as with other peoples. Christianity—but Christianity rooted in an empathetic and compassionate concern for the least—he determined, was the only salvation from the evils of the material temptations of the twentieth-century world.

In this chapter, I will trace the development of Kashiwagi's radical Christian critique of the state and society by focusing on his newspaper, *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (Gunma Christian world monthly). Kashiwagi's idiosyncratic character guided and defined the contents of the newspaper, but it would be inaccurate to characterize the monthly as merely his mouthpiece. Through his editorial eye, readers were introduced to the works of important and controversial socialist (and anarchist) writers such as Kōtoku Shūsui, the writings of prominent ministers and Christians such as Ebina Danjō and Uchimura Kanzō, and reports from former church members abroad. Through its pages, Kashiwagi fostered an awareness of domestic, imperial, and global events, and

challenged his readers to consider their own experiences in a broader context. Other regional ministers and church members contributed their ideas and commentaries on local, national, and global events, thus making *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* an important nexus of ideas and a window into how peripheral Japanese Christians remained intimately linked to the world around them.

Kashiwagi did not enjoy as pronounced a public reputation as Ebina, Kozaki, or the other members of the Kumamoto Band who served as the core of the Kumiai Kyōkai, but he counted these men and other prominent members of the denomination among his closest friends. Watase Tsuneyoshi, who he had worked with at the Kumamoto Eigakkō, soon became a theological and ideological foe. Yuasa Jirō, the wealthy Annaka merchant who was among the first converts in Annaka, became one of Kashiwagi's most trusted confidants. Yuasa used his considerable personal fortune to finance a number of Christian ministries. As a lay leader in the Kumiai Kyōkai, he also attended annual conferences and was recognized as an important supporter. He also supported Kashiwagi's protests against certain denominational decisions and policies such as the establishment and perpetuation of the Korea mission.

Although he was located on the periphery of the larger Tokyo area, Kashiwagi was still closely linked—physically through the already extensive railroad network and intellectually through numerous Christian publications—to important networks and was an acknowledged regular participant in critical debates. Again, as with the debates over the Imperial Rescript on Education (see chapter one), the centrality of evangelicalism as a fundamental principle of Christian belief (chapter two), and efforts to support Japan's

engagement in war and imperialism, the debates that Kashiwagi participated in were at once about the actual event or issue being discussed and more fundamental understandings of Christian belief and associated practices. The significance of Kashiwagi's developing critique, and the fact of his participation in debates from his peripheral position in Gunma, is doubly important. First, his participation demonstrates the extent to which ministers (and their congregations) on the periphery still maintained a presence at the center. Second, the exact nature of his critique demonstrates the possibility of *alternative* understandings of the world rooted in a common Christian foundation with those with whom he strenuously disagreed, but which reflected a radically different understanding of fundamental aspects of Christian belief.

The newspaper provided Kashiwagi with an outlet to participate in significant intellectual and social debates and to propound his interpretation of controversies. In fact, it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that Kashiwagi exerted as much energy towards his role as editor of the *geppō* as he did towards his extensive activities as pastor to his church. Through the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, Kashiwagi created a venue for social critique and views different from those of more prominent ministers such as Ebina Danjō. And while the primary focus of the *geppō* was certainly the immediate Jōmō area, the readership extended to Tokyo and Kyoto, and even abroad to the United States.<sup>2</sup> With an average print run of 600 the *geppō* never had the circulation of Hōngō's *Shinjin*, but Kashiwagi helped to circulate it himself by mailing copies to friends and

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<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Kashiwagi, Matsui Shichirō, who was living in San Francisco at the time, confided to Kashiwagi that he was dissatisfied with the churches in America and relied for his spiritual growth on the *geppō*. Matsui Shichirō to Kashiwagi Gien, 15 January 1913, C-2-449, Kashiwagi Gien Papers, Institute for the Study of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doshisha University.

supporters abroad and in far-flung parts of Japan.<sup>3</sup> A diverse audience—ranging from local farmers to Yoshino Sakuzō, an important political philosopher—regularly read and commented on its contents, either through letters to the editor or directly to Kashiwagi. The regional focus of the *geppō* thus belies its significance as a source of alternative opinion and a radical Christian critique of key contemporary events.

### **A Ministry Under Surveillance: Introducing Controversy to Gunma**

Kashiwagi, who had criticized the Kumamoto governor during the Okumura incident in 1892 (introduced in chapter one), certainly never shied away from controversy. The vagaries of the Japanese Press and Publications Regulations made Kashiwagi's determination to expand his readers' world a perilous and potentially costly task. The *Jomo kyokai geppo* was registered as a newspaper regulated by the Press Regulations, and Kashiwagi and the designated publisher were required to submit copies of each issue to the local police, prosecutor, and Home Ministry. Violating the onerous Press Regulations and libel ordinances could lead to suspension of the paper, fines levied on the publisher and editor, and in the most extreme case, imprisonment of the publisher or editor.<sup>4</sup> At times, simply receiving the *geppō* was perceived as potentially subversive: a church member who had been conscripted into the Army cancelled his subscription upon orders from his superiors because they objected to its contents.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Itani Ryūichi, *Hisen no shisō: dochaku Kirisutoshu Kashiwagi Gien* (Kinokuniya shinsho, 1967), 108.

<sup>4</sup> Jay Rubin, *Injurious to the Public Morals: Writers and the Meiji State* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 16, 21.

In June 1900, Kashiwagi received his first summons to meet with the local police for publishing a seemingly innocuous editorial titled “Chifu to jinsei” (Life and amassing wealth). The police did not find it innocuous and the police station chief informed Kashiwagi that the *geppō* had violated the Press Regulations and promptly fined him. Members of the Annaka church donated money to help pay the fine.<sup>6</sup> This incident marked the start of a long relationship between Kashiwagi and the local police (and at times, prosecutor’s office). By 1910, he received regular visits from local policemen, who often warned him against writing on certain contemporary topics. Rather than feeling threatened, however, Kashiwagi found these intrusions an irksome nuisance, and often recorded in his diary his irritation with the government for using its resources to pester people, chastising it for its failure to respect individual rights of expression and dissent.<sup>7</sup>

## **Part I: Militarism**

### **Embracing Controversy, Becoming a Pacifist: Following Kōtoku Shūsui**

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<sup>5</sup> 25 March 1913, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, eds. Inuma Jirō and Katano Masako (Ōtsu: Kōrōsha, 1998), 138-139.

<sup>6</sup> 4 June 1900, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 20.

<sup>7</sup> 8 October 1910, 29 May 1911, 12 September 1912, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 82, 102, 130. It would be inaccurate to characterize Kashiwagi’s relationship with the local police as strictly antagonistic, however. Both the minister and the police were members of the same community, and this social relationship often superseded the contentious relationship of a potential dissident with law enforcement. Policemen would visit the church during New Years to bring gifts, or borrow from Kashiwagi’s library. Some even attended his services, although Kashiwagi himself was unsure if they were there out of curiosity or out of their duty to observe his activities. 5 October 1910, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 82.

A constant bone of contention between the diligent local police and Kashiwagi in the first decade of the twentieth century centered upon the latter's interest in the writings of Kōtoku Shūsui. Kōtoku gained notoriety for his outspoken condemnation of the Russo-Japanese War, his growing embrace of anarchism, and ultimately, as one of twelve executed for his apparent (though later refuted) role in a conspiracy to assassinate the Meiji emperor in 1911. But in 1900, Kōtoku was still working as a writer for the *Yorozu chōhō*, the widest circulating daily newspaper at the time. In 1901, Kōtoku published a critique of imperialism, *Nijū-seiki no kaibutsu teikoku shugi* (Imperialism: The monster [or specter] of the twentieth century), first in serialized form in several newspapers, then as a book. Compelled to write this critique in response to the Japanese army's participation in the suppression of the Boxer uprising, Kōtoku attacked the moral implications of capitalism tied to militarism and the toll of war on the common people.<sup>8</sup> In August 1901, Kashiwagi published a review of the work in the *geppō*. By quoting long portions of the original text, Kashiwagi provided his readers who may not have had access to the work the opportunity to read it for themselves. Further, through his accompanying commentary of the text, in which he explained that this work had influenced his own thinking concerning the consequences of imperialism, Kashiwagi offered his readers a particular understanding of the text and the author's significance as well as his own endorsement of its content.

Kashiwagi concluded that Kōtoku's work helped to expose the "sickly patriotism" that was being nurtured through a misguided education system intended to

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<sup>8</sup> See F.G. Notehelfer, *Kotoku Shusui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 82-85.

create Japanese subjects who promoted “not justice in the world but who considered justice to be defined by the prosperity and strength of Japan.”<sup>9</sup> Central to Kōtoku’s critique of the “monster of the twentieth century,” and something which Kashiwagi introduced at length in *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, was the consequences to society of a nation’s commitment to amassing a military arsenal and supporting a formidable military in service of an expansionist and belligerent empire. Kashiwagi quoted at length Kōtoku’s analysis of militarism and military buildup (*gunbi kakuchō*) to decry the financial cost of militarism and the human cost to the soldiers conscripted to fight in the army.

Offering his own analysis of the issues raised by Kōtoku, Kashiwagi protested,

What contributions could be made towards the happiness of the world’s people if the great financial expense and healthy youth were all diverted towards cultural production (*seisanteki bunmei jigyō*)! Is it not a great delusion of people that these are used for the purposes of building a military? Is this not madness? Is this not foolishness? Is this not cruel? It is said that the public is frightened, as if by a snake, by socialism, which has at its root world peace. I truly believe that this military expansion (*gunbi kakuchō*) is the true great threat to the nation.<sup>10</sup>

Written in the years between the First Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars, Kashiwagi’s denunciation of military buildup appeared resolute and uncompromising. And yet, during the first decade of the twentieth century, Kashiwagi simultaneously grappled with the possibility that imperialism, in certain forms, could somehow promote a greater good.

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<sup>9</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “*Teikoku shugi wo shōkaisu* (1),” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (May 1901): 4.

<sup>10</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “*Rondan: Kōtoku shi no hi-teikoku shugi*,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1901): 7-8.

In August 1903, only months before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, Kashiwagi presented an ambivalent treatise denouncing war titled “Hisenron, Kokuzeron” (Anti-warism, *raison d’Etat*-ism). In a meandering, noncommittal way, he weighed the costs and benefits of imperialism. He initially protested, “I am not someone who completely discounts [the benefits] of imperialism, but neither am I one who admits the necessity of imperialism for the nation.”<sup>11</sup> To explain his meaning, Kashiwagi argued that the Russian empire, which used brute force to subjugate others for its own material gain, represented the wrong kind of imperialism. The United States and Great Britain, on the other hand, had received a divine calling to spread civilization. Theirs was a “spiritual imperialism” (*seishinteki teikokushugi*), something Kashiwagi (at this moment) enthusiastically praised. This spiritual imperialism did not require brute force or violence, but could be spread through the power of civilization. Spiritual imperialism, in short, was evangelism.

In a sermon he gave before the Maebashi church’s youth group in September 1903, Kashiwagi continued to explain his position on militarism. The distinction Kashiwagi made between “spiritual imperialism” and violent imperialism was in the use and expansion of military strength. Insisting that, “[promoting] the strength of a nation is not the only measure of patriotism,” Kashiwagi urged his audience to transform Japan into a “small country” that cultivated the freedom, peace, and happiness of its subjects. Offering as examples Switzerland, Denmark, and New Zealand, and their social welfare policies to care for the elderly and poor, Kashiwagi reasoned that these nations, rather

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<sup>11</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Hisenron, Kokuzeron,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1903): 2.

than those with military strength, were the ones whose example Japan should follow.<sup>12</sup> Military strength required the funneling of resources away from the welfare of the people and towards the military. And, as Kashiwagi explained, “In order to become a strong nation, the weak become a nuisance. It comes to seem that it would be best if orphans and the elderly would kick the bucket as soon as possible.” He admonished, “Rather than become a strong nation, our country must strive to be a nation that considers the happiness of its subjects. Rather than [becoming] like Russia, we must become like Switzerland.”<sup>13</sup>

Setting aside for the moment Kashiwagi’s characterizations of Russian and Swiss degrees of concern for their subjects, the idealized characteristics of the type of nation Kashiwagi believed Japan should become reflects his understanding of what an ideal society should be. Furthermore, as he developed his critique, he linked this strong imperialism with a belligerent stance antithetical to fundamental Christian belief. In short, strong imperialism, with the strong militaries that supported and sustained state action, flew in the face of Christ’s command to love one’s enemies.

### **Point of Departure: The Russo-Japanese War**

With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Kashiwagi’s interest in Kōtoku and his intellectual colleagues grew as he began to question the legitimacy of the war and ponder whose interests the war was intended to serve. As *Kirisutokyō sekai* (Christian world) and other prominent Christian denominational newspapers declared their support

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<sup>12</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kokuze kettei no kiki,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1903): 2.

<sup>13</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kokuze kettei no kiki,” 4.

for the war and offered uniquely Christian forms of comfort and guidance to a nation in crisis, Kashiwagi sought out and introduced different models of pacifism to his readers. Pacifism was not his only interest, however: in introducing different examples of pacifism, Kashiwagi also introduced socialism and his own fascination with what socialists had to offer to a nation at war.

Kashiwagi was exposed to socialism primarily through the *Heimin shinbun* (The Commoner News), the weekly newspaper founded by Kōtoku Shūsui and Sakai Toshihiko, both formerly reporters with *Yorozu chōhō*. The two men had resigned from the paper when it adopted an explicitly pro-war stance at the end of 1903. Along with a group of others that included Christians like Kinoshita Naoe and Abe Isō who had been part of a failed effort to found a Japanese socialist party, they founded the *Heimin shinbun*. Other regular contributors also included Uchimura Kanzō, Katayama Sen, Ishikawa Sanshirō, Nishikawa Kōjirō, Itō Ginsuke, Taoka Reiun, Murai Tomoyoshi, Koizumi Sanshin, and Saitō Ryoku'u.<sup>14</sup> Founded in direct response to growing hostilities with Russia and promoting socialism, the *Heimin shinbun* attracted the unwanted attention of the censors from its inception. It received its first suspension for an editorial that appeared in its twentieth issue, and Sakai Toshihiko, the official editor, received a brief prison sentence.<sup>15</sup>

Kashiwagi found in this newspaper a powerful alternative to the passive acceptance of the war espoused in Christian periodicals such as *Kirisutokyō sekai* and

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<sup>14</sup> F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui*, 93-94.

<sup>15</sup> Arahata Kanson, *Heiminsha jidai: Nihon shakaishugi undō no yōran* (Chūōkōronsha, 1973), 117.

*Shinjin*. Not content to read this weekly on his own, Kashiwagi advertised the *Heimin shinbun*'s office address and subscription information in the *geppō*. He went so far as to urge his readers to read this socialist newspaper for, "In our country it is our nation's socialists who, while surrounded by foes on all sides, proclaim pacifism."<sup>16</sup> On at least one occasion, he visited the offices of *Heimin shinbun*, delivering an issue of the *geppō*.<sup>17</sup> He also gave copies of *Heimin shinbun* to members of his congregation.<sup>18</sup> Embracing an already targeted newspaper and its promotion of socialism, particularly in a time of war, Kashiwagi became even more a favorite subject of the local police.<sup>19</sup>

The Heiminsha, the parent organization of the *Heimin shinbun*, not only published the weekly, but also published short booklets such as "Shakai shugi nyūmon" (an introduction to socialism), "Chijyō no risōkoku: Suisu" (Switzerland: the ideal nation on earth), and translations of books such as Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward 2000-1887*. The members of the Heiminsha transformed the physical office of the newspaper into a site of public education by providing access to other serials (including Christian ones such as *Kirisutokyō sekai*, *Fukuin shinpō*, and *Shinjin*), hosting presentations and talks about socialism, and organizing study groups on socialism and related topics. Kashiwagi made use of these services, and during one visit

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<sup>16</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Zatsuroku: Hisenshugisha," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (March 1904): 11.

<sup>17</sup> 4 April 1904, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 27.

<sup>18</sup> 18 April 1904, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 27.

<sup>19</sup> Over six years later, in September 1910, one of Kashiwagi's parishioners explained to him that one reason he was under constant police surveillance was because he had subscribed to the short-lived *Heimin shinbun*. 13 September 1910, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 79.

to the office, obtained several copies of the translation of Bellamy's book to distribute to parishioners.

In the September 1904 issue of the *geppō*, Kashiwagi published an editorial urging his readers to explore socialism. Appearing amidst full-scale war and followed by a particularly enthusiastic endorsement of *Heimin shinbun*, the editorial implicitly associated capitalism with the war and thus a critique of capitalism with a critique of the causes of war. This piece marked the intersection of Kashiwagi's growing alarm with militarism with an existing concern with the socio-economic disparities that plagued modern Japanese society. Most likely drawing from overviews of socialism provided in the *Heimin shinbun* and associated publications, the editorial first presented a rudimentary overview of a socialist understanding of the problem of labor and material distribution.<sup>20</sup> Describing the “great factory of the world today” as a place that reduced human beings to animals, nuisances, and mere machines, he reasoned that economic gain in a capitalist economy required a cold, calculating indifference. In other words, humanitarianism and profit, and morality and commerce, were irreconcilably opposed; socialism provided the solution to re-shift the balance away from a cold rational obsession with profit towards a compassionate humanitarian society.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> It is difficult to determine where Kashiwagi first learned about socialism. According to his diary, he was visiting the Heiminsha office by at least April 1904, and was already familiar with that organization's “Introduction to socialism” by that time. According to his diary, Kashiwagi was reading Friedrich Engels, Thomas Kirkup, and Richard Ely by October 1904 (18 October 1904, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 28). According to Notehelfer, Kōtoku was more influenced by Albert E. Schaffle, Richard Ely, and Thomas Kirkup than Marx and Engels. See F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui*, 76-80.

<sup>21</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Shakaishugi kenkyū no hitsuyō,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1904): 3.

Further expanding on the problem of labor, Kashiwagi reasoned that there were now only two classes, capitalists (employers) and laborers (employed). He counted among laborers not just manual laborers, but anyone whose labor could be bought through wages, that is, white-collar employees as well. This problem of the division of labor extended to the alienation of laborers from the product of their labor: farmers did not enjoy their own produce, while those who ate in abundance took no part in the production of food. This situation was further exacerbated by the continual introduction of new types of machinery intended to rationalize production and increase efficiency, further devaluing labor itself and reducing wages.<sup>22</sup>

The solution to the extreme inequalities that plagued modern society was a massive transformation of society itself, from a two-tiered system to one where no one was either rich or poor but where all people were middle-class. Otherwise those without power were vulnerable to every natural calamity or economic disaster, at the mercy of the wealthy who would sweep in and abscond with what little they had at the first opportunity. And Kashiwagi further associated this type of theft with the state's accumulation of power: "The way that today's so-called culturally advanced nations accumulate their wealth is through this small number of wealthy people."<sup>23</sup> Ultimately, such theft was inextricably linked to warfare, for, as Kōtoku had proposed in his critique of imperialism, the state's obsession with building a strong military—inevitably to wage war—at the expense of the people's interests worked in tandem with the selfish interests

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<sup>22</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Shakaishugi kenkyū no hitsuyō," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1904): 4.

<sup>23</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Shakaishugi kenkyū no hitsuyō," 4.

of “capitalists” who profited from the production and sale of military weapons and the exploitation of colonized territories.

In August 1904, *Heimin shinbun* published a translation of Leo Tolstoy’s “Bethink Yourselves!,” a treatise opposing the Russo-Japanese War that first appeared in *The Times* in London in June 1904.<sup>24</sup> The weekly sold out of its 8000-copy print run, and the piece galvanized Christians and non-Christians alike.<sup>25</sup> For instance, Ebina, in *Shinjin*, admonished what he considered Tolstoy’s naïve Christianity, while Kōtoku, in the following issue of *Heimin shinbun*, questioned Tolstoy’s reliance on Christian theology as his justification for opposing warfare.<sup>26</sup> Kashiwagi, who had already been drawn to Tolstoy’s espousal of an agrarian Christian society, embraced Tolstoy’s denunciation of war. “Bethink Yourselves!” can be characterized as a rejection of not only warfare, but of the collusion of the Church and state in “hypnotizing” poor subjects into believing that war is inevitable, their participation in it a necessary demonstration of their patriotism to nation and love of God, and the death of soldiers—and their murder of enemy soldiers—a regrettable but necessary sacrifice.

Tolstoy used the occasion of the war to further develop and articulate his scathing critique of the Church (as opposed to religion) that he had put forth in his 1902 “What is religion and of what does its essence consist?” In this earlier piece, Tolstoy had denounced the use of religion to coerce and legitimize the submission of the people

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<sup>24</sup> “Torusutoi-o no Nichi-Rō sensōron: nanjira kuiaratameyo,” *Heimin shinbun* (7 August 1904): 1-6.

<sup>25</sup> Arahata Kanson, *Heiminsha jidai*, 166.

<sup>26</sup> Ebina Danjō, “Torusutoi no Nichi-Rō senron wo yomu,” *Shinjin* 5, no. 9 (September 1904): 4-9; Kōtoku Shūsui, “Torusutoi-o no hisenron wo hyōsu,” *Heimin shinbun* (14 August 1904): 1.

to the exploitative dominance of the authorities (in his opinion, this included the Church). In short, Tolstoy argued, the purpose of all religions was to teach and establish the equality of all peoples. However, those whose position in life and livelihoods relied on the perpetuation of inequalities distorted religious teaching and enlisted the aide of priests and other church authorities, using the mystery of religious rites and impenetrable dogma to convince the people that inequality was proper and submission a sign of obedience to God. Thus, the Church (and in this case, Tolstoy was referring specifically to the Orthodox Church) committed the gross crime of legitimizing precisely what it was intended to subvert.<sup>27</sup>

“Bethink Yourselves!” drew upon this previous denunciation of the Church’s complicity in the continued inequalities of society but linked this complicity to war. In other words, Tolstoy identified warfare—specifically the state imploring its subjects to fight, the priests’ sacralization of war, and the journalists’ enthusiastic jingoism—as one method by which the hypnosis that alienated people from their divinely ordained purpose was accomplished. He demanded that his audience “bethink themselves”—to repent—and consider if this particular war (or any war for that matter) was in keeping with their destiny as ordained by God, if it would facilitate their religious consciousness.<sup>28</sup> The mistaken belief that war was inevitable would lead to the destruction of the human race; all that was needed for people to realize that war was fundamentally unnecessary was for each person to stop and ask what his or her destiny

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<sup>27</sup> Leo Tolstoy, “What is Religion and of what does its essence consist?,” *A Confession and Other Religious Writings* (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 93, 95.

<sup>28</sup> Tolstoy (or more accurately, his translator) quotes two verses from the gospels—Mark 1: 15 and Luke 13:5—and use “bethink yourselves!” where “repent” is used in the King James Version.

was. This self-inquiry and reflection would lead to comprehensive social transformation: “And the moment the head of the State will cease to direct war, the soldier to fight, the minister to prepare means for war, the journalist to incite threats— then, without any new institutions, adaptations, balance of power, tribunals, there will of itself be destroyed that hopeless position in which men have placed themselves, not only in relation to war, but also to all other calamities which they themselves inflict on themselves.”<sup>29</sup>

Tolstoy identified religious myopia, or a religious hypnotic state, as the cause of war, and conversely, proper religious consciousness as the solution to ridding the world of all armed conflict. Ebina and Kōtoku both criticized Tolstoy for reducing warfare to spiritual causes, though the two men (obviously) found different faults with the argument. In his own review of Tolstoy’s treatise, Kashiwagi defended Tolstoy, specifically framing his commentary on Tolstoy’s work as an analysis of the response of other Japanese religionists to Tolstoy. Kashiwagi likewise condemned religionists who used religion to legitimize war and the territorial expansion that resulted from it. In response to Japanese religionists (based on the timing this was probably meant as a veiled rebuttal of Ebina’s response to Tolstoy) who dismissed Tolstoy, saying that it was directed at Russians and did not concern Japanese, Kashiwagi implored them to use scripture to evaluate the validity of Tolstoy’s arguments. Regardless of what others thought, Kashiwagi found solace and encouragement in Tolstoy’s assessment that warfare resulted from misguided or stunted religious consciousness. Tolstoy, Kashiwagi

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<sup>29</sup> Leo Tolstoy, “Bethink Yourselves!” *The [London] Times*, reprinted by Ginn and Company (Boston, 1904), 19.

declared, was “a champion of pacifism and not simply a prophet for Russia but truly a prophet for the whole world.”<sup>30</sup>

Kashiwagi’s enthusiasm for Tolstoy’s treatise was rooted in his own tussles about what role Christians should adopt in a time of war. Any attempt to legitimize or justify war as an inevitable symptom of the human condition defied logic: “Blood cannot be washed away with blood. That which causes sin is sin. Murder is already a sin. The contradiction that sin can be erased with another sin should not be accepted.”<sup>31</sup> Non-violence, he reasoned, even through extreme sacrifice, possessed a power far greater than mere military force. By evoking scriptural examples, such as the martyr death of Stephen and the crucifixion of Christ himself, Kashiwagi proclaimed the power of non-violence to spread influence through transforming people’s hearts and minds.<sup>32</sup>

From warnings to his compatriots in general, Kashiwagi now directed his attention to his fellow religionists: “The world’s religionists should earnestly honor Christ’s sacred teaching, ‘love your enemies,’ and, following Count Tolstoy’s example, denounce war; otherwise world peace will remain an empty hope.”<sup>33</sup> The greatest insult to Christianity by those who insisted that war could be fought for a greater good was that it reduced a fundamentally peaceful religion to a tool to legitimize war.

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<sup>30</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Torusutoi-haku no sensōron to Nihon no shūkyōka,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (September 1904): 8.

<sup>31</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Hisenshugi wo senmei suru ha shūkyō no tenshoku ya,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1904): 2.

<sup>32</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Hisenshugi wo senmei suru ha shūkyō no tenshoku ya,” 2.

<sup>33</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Hisenshugi wo senmei suru ha shūkyō no tenshoku ya,” 2.

## **Bidding Kōtoku Farewell**

There is a coda to Kashiwagi's embrace of socialism during the Russo-Japanese War. While he had welcomed the pacifism the socialists propounded, as some of these same socialists grew increasingly radical and embraced anarchism, Kashiwagi decried their acceptance of violence in the name of social transformation. Central among these figures was Kōtoku Shūsui, whose career Kashiwagi had eagerly followed since Kōtoku's days as a reporter for *Yorozu chōhō*. In summer 1910, the authorities investigated and arrested hundreds of men and women, including Kōtoku, based on a claim that they had uncovered a radical plot to assassinate the Meiji emperor. Although Kōtoku's role in the conspiracy has since been disproved, his prominence as the leading proponent of anarchism was perhaps considered sufficient evidence to include him among the co-conspirators. Ultimately twenty-six people were tried for high treason, and twenty-four, including Kōtoku, were convicted and sentenced to death. Kōtoku busied himself in prison by completing an incoherent but energetic text, *Kirisuto massatsuron* (On obliterating Christianity), a secular denunciation of Christianity, which he had begun writing in May.<sup>34</sup>

This conspiracy case, or at least the few details that were made available under stringent censorship, captivated the public even as it demoralized the political left, driving other political radicals underground. The notoriety of the case mobilized the censors, who strenuously labored to keep all but the most mundane and sanitized details

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<sup>34</sup> See F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui*, 183.

of the trial out of the press.<sup>35</sup> The censor's diligent eye reached to Annaka as well: on November 8, two days before the twenty-six "conspirators" were arrested, the local police ordered Okabe Tarō, the *geppō*'s named publisher, to report to the local station the following day.<sup>36</sup> When Okabe and Kashiwagi learned of the arrests on November 10, they surmised that this order was directly associated with the arrests.<sup>37</sup> Tokutomi Roka, the popular novelist, Christian, and close friend of Kashiwagi's, made a public plea to the emperor while giving an address at the First Higher School in Tokyo to denounce the executions of the co-conspirators.<sup>38</sup> In Annaka, Kashiwagi received a visit from the local policeman who warned him against writing about Roka's public plea in the pages of the *geppō*.<sup>39</sup> When Kashiwagi had first learned that twenty-four of twenty-six of the conspirators were sentenced to death (half of these were later commuted to life sentences), he had described them in his diary as "a certain kind of martyr who must have some kind of impact."<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless he reassured the policeman that he had no

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<sup>35</sup> The records of the closed trial's proceedings were lost, according to the government at least, so what occurred during the actual proceedings remains unknown. F.G. Notehelfer, *Kōtoku Shūsui*, 185-186.

<sup>36</sup> 8 November 1910, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 85.

<sup>37</sup> 10 November 1910, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 85.

<sup>38</sup> Roka had first intended to submit this plea to the emperor privately, but when he discovered that the group had already been executed, he decided to make his plea public. Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals*, 170-175.

<sup>39</sup> 7 February 1911, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 93.

<sup>40</sup> 19 January 1911, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 91. Kashiwagi goes on to say, "so it is to be unnatural after all," an implicit reference to Kōtoku's death, revealing his ambivalent feelings about Kōtoku despite his disillusionment with Kōtoku's anarchism.

intension of doing so, but instead had decided to write about Kōtoku's frenzied attack of Christianity in *Kirisuto massatsuron*.<sup>41</sup>

Part denunciation, part elegy, the two pieces Kashiwagi published on Kōtoku following the latter's execution deplored Kōtoku's self-destructive embrace of the violence of anarchism. The first, written immediately following news of the execution and before Kashiwagi had even read *Kirisuto massatsuron*, implicitly denounced the senselessness of Kōtoku's "unnatural death" and the anarchist disregard for the preciousness of life. Life, at least to those with no appreciation for the eternity of life, Kashiwagi lamented, was treated too cheaply. He continued, these same people brashly declared their self-sufficiency as they ridiculed the notion that God or a spiritual world existed. But such an attitude eventually—logically, Kashiwagi contended—led to violence, and with this violence, destruction. To Kashiwagi, this turn marked a betrayal of the pacifism espoused by the socialists that had first drawn him to them.<sup>42</sup> Further, Kashiwagi lamented the unfulfilled potential of Kōtoku, asking what might have been possible had Kōtoku acknowledged God and the spiritual world: "These violent anarchists are all atheistic materialists. Kōtoku was educated and possessed a quick temper, and an unshakeable focus (could not be bent by difficulties), but apparently he had no fear of death. But I am certain that had he acknowledged God he would not have

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<sup>41</sup> There is some speculation that Kōtoku's actual target was the emperor (thus rendering the title "Annihilating the emperor") and not Christianity. Christianity made for an easier target to get passed the censors.

<sup>42</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kōtoku Shūsui no hi-shūkyōkan," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (February 1911): 5.

turned to violence. This is truly a pity. What turned him astray is nothing other than his atheistic-materialist point of view.”<sup>43</sup>

In an interesting move, Kashiwagi contrasted Kōtoku’s prison writings—which he had not yet read—with those of the Apostle Paul who, in his epistle to the Philippians, confessed his desire to move on to the next life:

For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better: Nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide and continue with you all for your furtherance and joy of faith; That your rejoicing may be more abundant in Jesus Christ for me by my coming to you again.<sup>44</sup>

This, Kashiwagi explained, was Paul’s view of life and death. Unlike Kōtoku who seemed to have little regard even for his own life, Paul—despite yearning to be in heaven—resolved to stay as long in this world as possible in order to save as many people as he could. As much as Kashiwagi had admired Kōtoku’s critiques of the state and his courage in opposing the state, he was distressed at Kōtoku’s turn towards violence as the solution to righting the inequities in Japanese society.

Prohibited by the local police from directly addressing Kōtoku’s execution, Kashiwagi ended his ambivalent comments on Kōtoku’s death through a review of Kōtoku’s final publication, *Kirisuto massatsuron*. After dismissing each of Kōtoku’s objections to Christianity, Kashiwagi concluded by offering Tolstoy as a viable alternative.<sup>45</sup> Tolstoy, Kashiwagi maintained, had exposed the fundamentally “unnatural

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<sup>43</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kōtoku Shūsui no hi-shūkyōkan,” 5.

<sup>44</sup> Philippians 1: 23-26 (KJV).

and unsound” (*fushizen fukenzen*) nature of any nation that depended on military strength and police surveillance (strength) to survive. Such a nation, stripped of its brute strength, would eventually disintegrate.<sup>46</sup> And Kashiwagi concluded, Japan, having embraced war and reliant on oppressive policing at home, was perilously heading down this path.

## Part II: Capitalism

### Storing Up Treasures in Heaven

As is apparent from Kashiwagi’s embrace of socialism in his espousal of pacifism during the Russo-Japanese War, his denunciation of militarism was inextricably linked to his growing alarm about the effects of capitalism. By 1901, Kashiwagi had begun to confront the dramatic changes that resulted from Japan’s efforts to be acknowledged as a world power and its entry into the global capitalist market. His early assessment of these effects, compared with his later editorials, demonstrate an attempt to offer theological meaning to the extremes of poverty and wealth in Japanese society.

In 1901, Kashiwagi penned “Fusha no keikai, hinsha no isha” (A warning to the wealthy, comfort for the poor). Rooted in Jesus’ exhortation in the Sermon on the Mount to store up treasures in heaven rather than treasures that could rot or be destroyed

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<sup>45</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisuto massatsuron wo yomu,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1911): 2.

<sup>46</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kirisuto massatsuron wo yomu,” 2.

(Matthew 6: 19-21), this piece primarily addressed those who struggled to earn their daily wage and who might be tempted to envy the wealthy. Acknowledging that Jesus' words might sound hollow to those who had no means of amassing wealth, Kashiwagi stressed that the leisure and luxury wealthy people enjoyed did not lead to happiness, but only to a sense of dissatisfaction and ennui. Rather than envy the wealthy and scorn their own condition, Kashiwagi urged the poor to find solace in their labor: "Labor is sacred and noble. I strongly condemn those who make a habit of finding labor tiresome (boring) and feel pity for the misfortune of the lazy who do not endure labor. Happiness and misfortune in life is not based on wealth or poverty, but depends on what moves (*katsudō*) the mind and soul."<sup>47</sup> As the ultimate example of this, Kashiwagi offered his readers the example of Tolstoy who, finding his own wealth amidst overwhelming poverty hypocritical, chose the life of a peasant.

By 1904, Kashiwagi began denouncing the excesses of capitalism, reasoning that the extreme poverty that resulted from the parasitic gains of "capitalists" were the exact conditions that led to the emergence of socialism.<sup>48</sup> In a commentary published that year titled "Shakaishugi to Kirisutokyō: Jinsei no daimondai" (Socialism and Christianity: The great problem of life), Kashiwagi introduced Edward Bellamy's utopian novel, *Looking Backward: 2000-1887*.<sup>49</sup> Again quoting extensively from the

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<sup>47</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Fusha no keikai, hinsha no isha," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1901): 2.

<sup>48</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Shakaishugi to Kirisutokyō: Jinsei no daimondai," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1904): 3.

<sup>49</sup> This work was originally translated into Japanese and published under the title *Hyakunengo no shakai* by Keiseisha, and this is the version which Kashiwagi quotes. A year later, Sakai Toshihiko published an

novel—particularly a section describing the wealthy sitting idle on a vehicle driven by the backbreaking labor of many—Kashiwagi denounced not only the oppression of the poor but also the degradation of labor itself in the modern era. Published amidst the Russo-Japanese War, this piece also argued that imperialism and socialism were the emerging movements in the future that needed to be reckoned with. But Kashiwagi was most concerned with what role Christianity could play in the face of the issues that catalyzed the emergence of socialism.

In answer to his own question, what the relationship between Christianity and socialism was, Kashiwagi quoted I Peter 2: 18 and Philippians 4:11, both of which emphasized the responsibility of Christians to submit to employers and to find contentment regardless of condition.<sup>50</sup> At least at this point, Kashiwagi urged laborers to rely on Christianity to reconceptualize their hardships as a temporary state that would be replaced and fulfilled by eternal salvation. Nonetheless, he concluded by considering the possibility that socialism, inflected with Christianity, could become the new social structure necessary to diminish the harm inflicted by “capitalists” and restore the health of society.<sup>51</sup>

Kashiwagi continued to rely on Matthew 6:19-20 to attempt to make spiritual meaning of poverty. In 1910, he also introduced another parable, the rich man and

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abridged version with considerable changes to the text to make it more accessible to Japanese readers through Heimin bunko, the publishing arm of Heiminsha.

<sup>50</sup> The two verses read in full: (I Peter 2: 18) “Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the forward; (Philippians 4: 11) “Not that I speak in respect of want: for I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content.”

<sup>51</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Shakai shugi to Kirisutokyō,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1904): 4.

Lazarus, to further interpret the spiritual significance of labor, poverty, and the alternative hope that Christianity was meant to offer. In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16: 19-31), Jesus described the lives and deaths of two men whose paths crossed every day. The rich man passed by Lazarus, a beggar who lay sick and enfeebled in the road outside of the rich man's gate and never acknowledged or helped him. When both men died, Lazarus was taken by angels to "Abraham's bosom," whereas the rich man was condemned to an eternity in the fires of hell. In his misery, the rich man begged Abraham to allow Lazarus to at least give him water on his fingertips. When this was denied, he then pleaded that Abraham allow Lazarus to return to the world of the living to warn his friends and relations of the perils of living without considering eternal consequences. In response, Abraham chided, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." Appearing in the Gospel of Luke immediately following the better-known passage, "Ye cannot serve God and mammon," this parable condemned the indifference of the wealthy, but seemed to elevate the suffering of the poor.

In his commentary, "Hinsha no fukuin" (the gospel of the poor), Kashiwagi stressed the need for the poor to adopt an alternative perspective on their toil: to recognize eternal rewards as superior to the fleeting rewards of material gains in this world. Thus, his use of "the rich man and Lazarus" parable was intended to stress Lazarus' triumph in the end, despite his miserable condition in life, but not to condemn the rich man's indifference to Lazarus. To further emphasize this point, Kashiwagi also quoted II Corinthians: "For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for

us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.”<sup>52</sup>

In this period, Kashiwagi focused his attention on the attitude and perspective of those who labored—the farmers who tilled the fields or raised the silkworms in the areas around his church and urban laborers who toiled in hazardous conditions. He placed his emphasis on exhorting them to not be taken in by the allure of wealth but to strive to attain rewards that were unseen and eternal: in short, to consider Lazarus’s ultimate end, not his earthly misery. Implicit in these urgings was an admonition to the wealthy to follow Tolstoy’s example of voluntarily foregoing the benefits of wealth to live the life of the poor.

Kashiwagi’s ultimate example of abandoning privilege and wealth for poverty was Christ: “Christ is the one who through incarnation submitted himself to poverty in order to teach that those who are the object of praise are not those with wealth but those who possess something much greater. Human worth is not determined through wealth. Furthermore, by laboring himself, he...made apparent the sacredness of work.”<sup>53</sup> Christ, by performing menial labor, sacralized labor; by humbling himself to the position of the laborer, he showed his empathy and compassion for the vast majority of people who were poor laborers as well. Thus, poor laborers, Kashiwagi urged, should find solace in

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<sup>52</sup> II Corinthians 4: 17-18.

<sup>53</sup> Kashiwagi, “Hinsha no fukuin,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (February 1910): 3.

Christ's sympathy in the knowledge that "those who suffered with Christ would also thrive (*sakaeru*) with Christ."<sup>54</sup>

Kashiwagi's concern for the poor was conflated with a concern for the effects of industrialization and modernization on rural areas like Gunma. He also associated the more localized effects to a global phenomenon of urbanization, concomitant rural depression, and resulting social problems. According to Kashiwagi, rural poverty was inextricably linked not only to urbanization, but also to the seductive material benefits of a new modernizing industrializing world: "The luxuries and vanities of new urban life are sweeping through the countryside like a foul wind, convincing young people that their lives in the countryside are intolerable and that they need to run to the city. And then there are those who point to their wealth to claim that they are accountable to no one."<sup>55</sup> The temptations of the city were dangerous, not just because of the uncertainty of success, but because through the rapid changes ongoing in the city, the very nature of work and labor—and morality as well— were being redefined and diminished.

The intrinsic value of labor, something determined by God before the fall, not only needed to be honored but also deterred the seduction of the city that drew in misguided youth from the countryside. Kashiwagi reasoned,

Those who believe in having a vocation (*tenshoku*) and enjoy the sacredness of labor disregard as insignificant the economic value [of their work]. In particular, if you add the joys of nature to this, it is natural that a rural life would be particularly enjoyable, and [such people] will

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<sup>54</sup> Kashiwagi, "Hinsha no fukuin," 3.

<sup>55</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Inaka kyōkai no shimei," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1910): 5.

find nothing attractive about an urban life. In other words, the dusty wind of the city should be rebuffed by the pure air of the countryside, thus purifying the moral air of the city.<sup>56</sup>

By ascribing a prelapsarian quality to labor, specifically labor performed in the countryside, Kashiwagi presented an idealized potential for rural life. He proposed these as correctives to the corrosive effects of urban life and the immorality he believed it represented and fostered. In marked contrast to the views of his fellow denominationalists such as Ebina who envisioned a forward-moving (and implicitly urban) progress as the sign of Christian society, Kashiwagi proposed a pastoral agrarian foundation for an idealized Christian society that, through its example, could transform society as a whole.

### **The Rich Man and Lazarus, Revisited**

In 1919, Kashiwagi revisited the parable of the rich man and Lazarus in an editorial titled “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tentō” (The inversion of the fate of the rich and poor). Unlike his previous exegesis, which emphasized the delayed reward the poor could look forward to, in this commentary, Kashiwagi unleashed his rage on the wealthy. Commenting on the parable’s end, Kashiwagi declared, “This is certainly a remarkable contrast. But in the contemporary world along with the advances of material culture (*buhhitsuteki bunmei*), this is even more remarkable.”<sup>57</sup> To explain why the rich man was dealt his damning fate, Kashiwagi offered three reasons. First, the wealthy enjoyed the fruits of the labor of others, creating a world where those who labored were

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<sup>56</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Inaka kyōkai no shimei,” 5.

<sup>57</sup> Kashiwagi, “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tentō,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1919): 2.

denied this joy of work.<sup>58</sup> Second, “This world is the place where God is to build his kingdom. It is a place where God’s children are to be educated. Those who treat this place as though it is a place for their own enjoyment, a place of debauchery, believing that their money gives them freedom, arrogantly ignoring (*mushi*) God—what kind of insolence is this?”<sup>59</sup> Third, and most damning, Kashiwagi admonished, “You wealthy, what worth is your soul... what remains of you [when you are reduced to yourself]?”<sup>60</sup>

The answer, or the exact nature of the sin for which the rich man was condemned, Kashiwagi explained, was misunderstanding his purpose as a child of God:

God had planted in both the rich man and Lazarus the seed to grow, eternally and without limit (*eikyū mugen ni*), into children of God. But the rich man’s seed atrophied in vain, until he passed into the depths into which one should not go, and no amount of regret was of any use. Those who are blinded by the successes of this world should very seriously reconsider this.<sup>61</sup>

Kashiwagi no longer focused his energies on the poor, but made the wealthy the target of his indignation. The accumulation of wealth and all it represented—the appropriation of the results of the labor of others, the misuse of God’s earth, the veneer of success concealing emptiness—was equated with seeds that fell on barren soil. This shift from offering comfort to the poor to condemning the wealthy occurred concurrently with Kashiwagi’s increasing discomfort and denunciation of war, the rising militarism that fueled jingoism, and the imperialism that these things enabled.

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<sup>58</sup> Kashiwagi, “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tentō,” 2.

<sup>59</sup> Kashiwagi, “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tentō,” 3.

<sup>60</sup> Kashiwagi, “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tentō,” 3.

<sup>61</sup> Kashiwagi, “Fusha to haisha no unmei no tento,” 3.

### Part III: Colonialism

#### Contesting the Mission in Korea

Kashiwagi's abstract objections to imperialism and militarism found a close and concrete target in 1913: Watase Tsuneyoshi's Korea mission. During the 1910s, Kashiwagi emerged as the most persistent and vocal critic of Watase's mission and the dual objectives upon which it was based. Kashiwagi also served as a spokesperson for a minority within the denomination that had begun to question the mission's purpose, as well as the denomination's association with the colonial government in Korea and what that relationship implied about the relationship between Christianity and imperialism. Perhaps just as important, the nature of Kashiwagi's objections demonstrate the circular relationship between theology and social critique, for Kashiwagi's objections began with fundamental disagreement over the appropriate nature of evangelism, but also presumed to present a spiritual judgment of Japan's expansion abroad.

Kashiwagi began to express doubts about the validity of the mission at the 1913 Kumiai Kyōkai Annual Conference. At one of the meetings, Yuasa Jirō protested the Korea mission's acceptance of donations from sources outside of the church.<sup>62</sup> The largest source of financial support had been attributed to an unnamed source, but it was soon revealed that the Government General of Korea was providing this support. The following month, Yuasa gave Kashiwagi a copy of Watase Tsuneyoshi's *Chōsen kyōka*

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<sup>62</sup> 7 October 1913, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 140-141.

*no kyūmu* (The urgent task of influencing Korea), the treatise explaining and legitimizing the Kumiai Kyōkai's mission in Korea.<sup>63</sup> At the denomination's Kantō-area regional conference held in March 1914, Yuasa again attempted to raise his concerns with the Korea mission but was prevented from doing so by Noguchi Suehiko, a close associate of Watase, who spontaneously imposed theme and time limitations for the speakers during the meeting. Kashiwagi was appalled, describing Noguchi and Ebina's behavior at the meeting as ridiculous (*kudaranai*) in his diary.<sup>64</sup> Yuasa and Kashiwagi subsequently agreed that Kashiwagi should compose a critique of the Korea mission and publish it in the pages of the *geppō*.<sup>65</sup>

Kashiwagi chose to frame his critique as a lengthy review of Watase's book, which he published in the April 1914 issue of *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*. The piece was not merely a book review, but a treatise in its own right meant to expose the hypocrisy of the Korea mission and the contradictory motives that drove the mission. In composing its contents, Kashiwagi enlisted the assistance of Yuasa, to whom he sent a draft of the review before publication.<sup>66</sup> In over three pages, Kashiwagi attacked the motives, methods, and associations of the mission, denouncing its efforts and questioning Watase's claims of success. Through this review, Kashiwagi asserted a different understanding of evangelism, not one based on a competing notion of what people were

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<sup>63</sup> 17 November 1913, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 142.

<sup>64</sup> 11 March 1914, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 150.

<sup>65</sup> 12 March 1914, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 150.

<sup>66</sup> 24 March 1914, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 152.

to be converted to, but one which focused on the attitude and beliefs of missionaries themselves. But through questioning the type of evangelism with which his fellow denominationalists were engaged in the colony, he also created a critique of Japan's colonization of Korea and any Christian complicity with the colonial government, as well.

First, Kashiwagi seemed to distinguish between a blanket objection to Japan's colonization of Korea—which he denied was his intent—and a more narrowly focused objection to Christian participation in an affair that he considered to be strictly political. Comparing Koreans to Jews under Roman rule (a common comparison), Kashiwagi acknowledged that evangelizing Koreans, and thus facilitating their transformation into children of God, was the best means by which to save “this race.” However, and here lies the critical difference, he stated: “I have never heard that Christ certainly, or even Paul for that matter, promoted the Romanization of Jews as a part of evangelism.”<sup>67</sup> Leaving aside the larger issue of the legitimacy of Japan's political domination of Korea, Kashiwagi fundamentally called into question the legitimacy of Watase's mission with its dual motives.

In response to Watase's proclamation of two equally critical motives for the mission—evangelism (*dendō*) and assimilation (*dōka*)—Kashiwagi objected, “Proclaiming the gospel is proclaiming the gospel. There is no second part to Christ's gospel.”<sup>68</sup> And again, “The purpose of preaching (evangelizing) Christianity is simply

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<sup>67</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu wo yomu*,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (April 1914): 3.

to proclaim Christ's gospel and nothing besides [nurturing] the redemption of people into children of God. If this results in the birth of loyal subjects, filial children, and chaste women, this is a natural by-product [of their conversion]."<sup>69</sup> What Kashiwagi objected to was Watase's politicization of evangelism. Missionaries were obligated to and responsible for preaching the gospel and nothing more. But political concerns—which is what Kashiwagi considered the colonial government's assimilation efforts to be—were beyond the purview of missionaries. As he concluded, "I am sure that there are others who of their own volition will nurture in Japanese and Koreans the realization that they are Japanese subjects and promote amity between them—but this is not something that our gospel should be concerned with."<sup>70</sup>

What on the surface appears as an apolitical stance, and even a tacit acceptance of Japan's assimilationist policy, Kashiwagi made clear, was not merely that; he continued, assisting with the state's efforts in Korea through promoting an assimilationist evangelism was at odds with the purposes of Christian evangelism: "The ideal of the Japanese empire is imperialism... what possible relationship can there be between imperialism and preaching the gospel?"<sup>71</sup> In other words, not only were Christians not meant to actively participate in political concerns because these were irrelevant to the purpose of evangelism, but also political concerns were contradictory to or in conflict with the ends of Christian evangelism.

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<sup>68</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 3.

<sup>69</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 3.

<sup>70</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 4.

<sup>71</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 4.

In addition to objecting to the blurring of lines between the political and evangelical, Kashiwagi also protested the arrogance of Japanese missionaries who presumed to influence Koreans when they had failed to Christianize Japan itself. He argued,

Isn't it far more urgent and necessary to Christianize Japan than to Christianize Koreans? As long as Japanese aren't truly Christianized I am sure that it will be difficult for Japanese to respect (or devote themselves to) Koreans. The Kumiai Kyōkai has called its Korea mission a nationalistic movement (*kokuminteki undō*), and attempts to act as representatives of the Japanese people in leading the Korean people despite having very little to show in a spiritual way. But I am having a difficult time understanding what significance [their ministry] has.<sup>72</sup>

Thus, the danger posed by the Korea mission lay in its arrogant conceit in claiming to lead and guide the spiritual growth of others when that same work had not been accomplished in Japan. The Korea mission was a distraction, a diversion from the more critical work of Christianizing Japan, work which should be the primary focus of Japan's Christians rather than the dramatic and alluring but inappropriate work of evangelizing abroad.

Having dismissed or questioned the motives and purpose of the Korea mission, Kashiwagi next addressed the ongoing problem of the source of financial support for the mission, and what this, along with the mission's close relationship with the Government General of Korea, implied about the true purpose of the mission. In short, Kashiwagi accused the mission—Watase in particular—of insisting on the mission's dual focus precisely to attract donors who would find the mission's dedication to the colonial ideal

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<sup>72</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 4.

of *naisen ittai* appealing, even if they were uninterested in simple Christian evangelism.

In Kashiwagi's words,

The main purpose of [Watase's] book is to argue, in no uncertain terms, that the Kumiai Kyōkai's Korea mission is to Japanize (*Nihon kokuminka*) Koreans and in so doing, diminish Koreans' rebellious spirit (*hankōteki shinjotai*) and give up their yearning for independent rule, thus reaching a state of Japanese-Korean unification (*nissen ittai*). But it appears that they proclaim that evangelism conducted by foreign (i.e. American) missionaries cannot accomplish this on the pretense that only Japanese evangelism can accomplish this, thus appealing to those Japanese who have no interest in the evangelism of the simple gospel, to get them to provide material support [to the mission].<sup>73</sup>

The problem of the source of financial support, and Watase's willingness to compromise fundamental evangelism in order to attain such support, was implicitly associated with the mission's cozy relationship with the Government General of Korea. For the principle source of financial support from non-Christians was the Government General itself. But it was not only the financial association that bothered Kashiwagi but also the very association, he reasoned, threatened to tarnish Christian evangelism.

During its first decade of rule, the Government General implemented a form of military rule (*budan seiji*), using brute force to dominate the Korean population even as it rooted out and eliminated the last remnants of Korean armed opposition to Japanese rule and accused and imprisoned numerous others on often trumped up charges of conspiracies to undermine Japanese rule. Reflecting on the contemporary situation in Korea, Kashiwagi declared, "It appears that there is not a little criticism that can be made of the current Government General's rule. That the author [Watase] praises the Government General's rule and relies on this to sell his type of evangelism will only

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<sup>73</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu," 4.

lead to the misunderstanding that ours is a religion at the service of the state, with the danger that Christ's name will be sullied.”<sup>74</sup> Beginning with his critique of Katō Hiroyuki's attack on Christianity in 1907 when he declared that it was the purpose of religion to lead and not follow the state, Kashiwagi challenged missionaries who turned a blind eye to the oppressive tactics of a colonial government and used their association with this same government as proof that their mission was legitimate and successful.

At the heart of Kashiwagi's growing questioning of the Korea mission, and Japan's imperial expansion abroad more generally was the inherent contradiction in Japanese claims of the legitimacy of its rule of Korea. Kashiwagi reminded his readers that Japan had always insisted that the true reason for Japan's interference in Korean affairs was to assist Korea in attaining independence. “I hear that Korean students in Japan with even the least bit of spirit will not acknowledge Korea's independence as long as there is a political merger. Do you not think that they would be displeased that even serious Christians are professing assimilation (*kokumin dōka*) as part of their evangelism? It is clear that Japan declared to the world numerous times that its true motive was to impose Korea's independence.”<sup>75</sup> Kashiwagi had tentatively supported Japan's “annexation” of Korea, arguing that Korea needed Japan's aide to progress sufficiently to attain a defensible independence. But the reality of colonization betrayed these lofty if patronizing promises. Demanding that Japan remain accountable to its original claims for why it was interfering in Korean affairs, Kashiwagi charged that

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<sup>74</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu,” 5.

<sup>75</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Watase-shi no *Chōsen kyōka no kyūmu* wo yomu,” 4.

Kumiai Kyōkai support for and cooperation with the colonial government legitimized and sacralized this fundamental betrayal of an entire nation.

The publication of this critique of Watase's book and the Korea mission marked Kashiwagi as a dissenting voice within the denomination. It also drew to him others who were likewise growing dissatisfied with or suspicious of Watase's dual focus in Korea. As is also suggested by Yuasa's involvement in the creation of this critique, even while Kashiwagi listed himself sole author of the piece, it was a joint effort and meant to represent a dissenting minority who saw themselves as the denomination's moral conscience. But as made apparent by Noguchi's high-handed refusal to allow Yuasa to publicly question the legitimacy of the Korea mission, Kashiwagi or Yuasa's attempt to criticize the mission was met with resistance and censure within the denomination.

### **The March First Movement**

Kashiwagi revisited his critique of Watase's treatise and the Kumiai Kyōkai's Korea mission in the months following the March First movement, the peninsula-wide protest against Japanese rule that began on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1919. Reminding his readers that he had been opposed to Watase's mission, he again attacked Watase, declaring that his mission did not reflect well on evangelism. Following the March First movement, Kashiwagi refocused his criticism to accuse Watase of unethical behavior for defending the Government General's conduct and laying the blame for the violent suppression of the protest on "Ch'ōndogyo followers and foreign missionaries rather than addressing in any way the true causes such as the failed policies of the Government General or the

misconduct of [resident] Japanese.”<sup>76</sup> Writing in response to Watase’s “interpretation” of the cause of the March First protests in the 10 April 1919 issue of *Kirisutokyō sekai* (addressed in chapter five), Kashiwagi dismissed Watase’s claim that the Kumiai Kyōkai-affiliated Korean Christians’ refusal to participate in the protests was itself proof that the mission had succeeded in accomplishing its dual task of converting Koreans to both Christianity and becoming loyal imperial subjects. Kashiwagi countered, “It appears that Watase considers the non-participation of the nearly 20,000 Korean members of the Kumiai Kyōkai in the protests something to be proud of, but is this something to feel proud about? It is just as possible that there were none [among these members] who had any fighting spirit.”<sup>77</sup>

The problem, according to Kashiwagi, was not only what he considered Watase’s dubious support of the Government General’s conduct but how such views might reflect on the moral legitimacy of the denomination as a whole: “I cannot help but feel deep regret on behalf of our Kumiai Kyōkai that it is being claimed that not one believer associated with our denomination had anything to do [with the protests], eliciting further trust from the Governor General, thus enabling evangelistic work to expand even more.”<sup>78</sup> In other words, what Watase had offered as evidence of the mission’s success, Kashiwagi considered a sign of not only failure but also an intolerable *moral compromise*.

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<sup>76</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kumiai [kyō]kai no Chōsenjin dendō ni tsuite,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (August 1919): 3.

<sup>77</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kumiai [kyō]kai no Chōsenjin dendō ni tsuite,” 3.

<sup>78</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Kumiai [kyō]kai no Chōsenjin dendō ni tsuite,” 3.

Kashiwagi lamented the mission's apparent support of the Government General despite news of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in their suppression of the protests—the murder of Korean Christian villagers near Suwŏn particularly caught Japanese Christians' attention—but of even greater concern were rumors of explicit missionary complicity in Japanese efforts to undermine the efforts of Korean independence activists. Methodist minister Satō Shigehiko's article (introduced in chapters four and five) decrying the apparent espionage activities of Murakami Tadakichi, a Kumiai Kyōkai evangelist in P'yŏngyang, had appeared in the *Fukuin shinpō* on 17 July 1919. Watase wrote a swift refutation of this report in the following issue of *Kirisutokyō sekai*, denying any knowledge of the alleged espionage activities. But Kashiwagi refused to believe Watase's claims. Arguing that it was unimaginable that Watase had been ignorant of Murakami's interference, Kashiwagi condemned the mission and issued an ultimatum: "I believe that from this moment the Korea mission must dramatically rethink its policies. I cannot stop hoping that the leadership of the Kumiai Kyōkai will issue a wise and resolute decision."<sup>79</sup>

Rather than accept Kashiwagi's challenge, the Kumiai Kyōkai issued a statement at that year's annual conference dismissing the protests as the act of ignorant Koreans who were whipped into a frenzy by Korean dissidents living in exile. Undeterred, Kashiwagi repeated his earlier challenge to the denomination in the November issue of the *geppō*, timed as a direct reaction to the annual conference statement. In this editorial, titled "Aete Kumiai Kyōkai no eidan wo nozomu" (Again,

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<sup>79</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kumiai [kyō]kai no Chōsenjin dendō ni tsuite," 4.

hoping for a wise decision from the Kumiai Kyōkai), Kashiwagi issued a three-part challenge: 1) The mission should refuse all financial support from the Government General of Korea; 2) Beginning with Watase, the missionaries associated with the ministry should issue a statement making clear their intent to amend (*aratamaru*) their mission policies; and 3) If not, the Kumiai Kyōkai should resolve to sever all ties with Watase and his ministry.<sup>80</sup> To explain his demands, Kashiwagi continued, “Isn’t the Kumiai Kyōkai’s Korea mission mostly Watase’s project? Watase raised the money on his own, Watase developed the policies on his own and then implemented them. He has established these Korean churches on his own in a colony that [he claims] requires different handling, and [the churches under his supervision] are ‘Congregational churches’ in name only. The Kumiai Kyōkai has given its name to this work, but is this something that it should be proud of?”<sup>81</sup>

The denominational leadership ignored Kashiwagi’s challenge, and Watase responded to Kashiwagi’s demands in the pages of *Kirisutokyō sekai*, denying or dismissing all of his accusations as the result of misunderstandings or ignorance.<sup>82</sup>

### **In the Aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake**

The Great Kantō Earthquake that struck just before noon on September 1, 1923, devastated Tokyo, Yokohama, and surrounding areas, leveling most structures to piles

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<sup>80</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Aete Kumiai Kyōkai no eidan wo nozomu,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1919): 8.

<sup>81</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Aete Kumiai Kyōkai no eidan wo nozomu,” 8.

<sup>82</sup> Watase Tsuneyoshi, “Chōsen dendō ni tsuite: Kashiwagi-kun ni kotau,” *Kirisutokyō sekai* (4 March 1920): 1-2.

of rubble and causing the deaths of over 100,000 residents. Strong tremors were felt as far north as Gunma, where Kashiwagi recorded in his diary that the earthquake was the strongest he had ever experienced. Soon, in Annaka, clouds of smoke were spotted on the horizon beyond the mountains to the south, and rumors began to spread that it was smoke as Bukōsan in the Chichibu mountains, and Hachijōjima, a volcanic island to the south, were collapsing. This apocalyptic rumor was soon silenced as newspaper extra editions made clear that the smoke was in fact rising from Tokyo: it was now a city of fire.<sup>83</sup>

On 3 September, Kashiwagi traveled to Karuizawa, a missionary resort town to the northwest in neighboring Nagano prefecture, to attend a regional denominational conference. The train, considerably delayed, was crowded with refugees fleeing from the disaster; Kashiwagi overheard these refugees tell of “arsons and bombings by Koreans and the invasion of mobs.”<sup>84</sup> When Kashiwagi returned to Annaka two days later, he discovered that refugees had made their way there as well and were being tended to by students from area girls schools and the YWCA. He also heard more rumors about Koreans—no longer rumors of atrocities committed by Koreans, but for the first time, about mobs of youths and young men targeting and attacking Koreans. In his diary, he recorded his determination to publish something about these vigilantes attacking Koreans in the next issue of the *geppō*.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> 1 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 304.

<sup>84</sup> 3 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 305.

<sup>85</sup> 5 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 305.

In the following days, as people with ties to the Annaka area began arriving from the Tokyo area, Kashiwagi continued to hear disturbing news of vigilante mobs and even more unsettling to him, the eager acceptance of rumors that Koreans and socialists were plotting to overthrow the government from people with whom he was closely acquainted.<sup>86</sup> Reports began to trickle in of vigilante mobs attacking and killing Koreans not only in Tokyo, but also in adjacent areas such as neighboring Saitama prefecture. This mob violence struck close to home as well, when vigilantes targeted Korean laborers in Fujioka, a Gunma town to the south of Annaka. But even as he spent his day visiting friends and neighbors gathering more information about the attacks on Koreans, he received a visit from the local prosecutor. Preempting Kashiwagi's intention to publicly condemn these acts of mob violence, the prosecutor warned Kashiwagi not to mention either the Fujioka incident or the other massacres of Koreans in the *geppō*.<sup>87</sup> The following day, he was summoned to the police station by the local police constable, who repeated the prosecutor's warning that he was not to write anything about the massacre of Koreans in the *geppō*.<sup>88</sup> Having thus received repeated

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<sup>86</sup> 6 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 305. Rumors of rioting by Koreans, as well as the poisoning of wells and arson, began circulating almost immediately after the earthquake. Vigilante mobs began organizing almost immediately as well. For more on the massacre of Koreans following the earthquake, see Michael Weiner, "Myth and Reality: The Great Kanto Earthquake," *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 164-200.

<sup>87</sup> 6 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 305. The Martial Law Command imposed complete control over coverage of the attack on Koreans from early September to October 20. On other reactions to the massacre of Koreans, see Weiner, 188-192. This prohibition on reporting about the massacre of Koreans was so all-encompassing that the state imposed a temporary ban on travel of Koreans to and from the peninsula to prevent rumors of the massacres from leading to unrest in the peninsula as well. See Michael Weiner, *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923*, 184-185.

<sup>88</sup> 7 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 306.

warnings, Kashiwagi relented temporarily. In the October issue of the *geppō*, he wrote a vague piece calling those who believed malicious rumors stupid and through evoking the example of Nero's witch hunt of Christians following the great fire in Rome offered a thinly veiled condemnation of vigilante mobs who were easily whipped up into a violent frenzy, decrying this as one of the consequences of the atmosphere of militarism that pervaded the nation.<sup>89</sup>

During the following month, unable to write publicly about the Korean massacre and under the constant surveillance of local police, Kashiwagi nonetheless continued to gather information from private sources in an attempt to ascertain the scope and scale of violence against Koreans in the aftermath of the earthquake. One of his friends also called to his attention the disappearance and murder of the socialist Ōsugi Sakae and pleaded with him to address this in the *geppō*.<sup>90</sup> What particularly distressed his friend, in addition to the actual assassination, was news that many (including a member of the city assembly of Takasaki) were calling for the dismissal of all charges against the police who were charged with the murders, with some even calling for them to be declared national heroes for ridding the country of these socialists.<sup>91</sup>

Determined to protest despite the frequent warnings from the police and local prosecutor, Kashiwagi published a condemnation of the Ōsugi and Itō murders in November, followed by a lengthy declaration in December condemning the post-

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<sup>89</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Kodomo ga ayamatte hashira ni," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (October 1923): 6, 9.

<sup>90</sup> 26 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 307.

<sup>91</sup> 28 October 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 309.

earthquake violence and linking it to the pro-war and militaristic atmosphere fostered by the expansionist policies of the Japanese empire. The publication of the second piece appeared to be in jeopardy. On the night before the issue was to be distributed, Kashiwagi was visited by the local policeman who informed Kashiwagi that his monthly might be suspended for violating the Press Regulations and asked him not to distribute the issue, just in case. Kashiwagi received no further word from the authorities, however, and the issue was distributed a few days later.<sup>92</sup>

As horrific as the destruction wrought by the earthquake itself had been, the spree of vigilante violence that led to the murder of over several thousand Korean and hundreds of Chinese residents, together with the selective state assassinations of political dissidents, seemed to Kashiwagi to portend of a dark and troubling future for Japan.<sup>93</sup> He now identified a logical correlation between the Korea mission's complicity with the Government General's brutal tactics and suppression of Korean independence, the state's tacit approval of vigilante violence towards Koreans in Japan, and the Japanese empire's increasingly expansionist activities abroad coupled with repressive policies at home.

At the root of all of these, Kashiwagi reasoned, was violence: both that perpetrated explicitly by the state and that approved of by the state and used to suppress

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<sup>92</sup> 19 December and 21 December 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 313.

<sup>93</sup> The estimate of the actual number of victims of the post-earthquake violence remains controversial and varies drastically depending on the tabulator. Official state estimates claimed only 231 Koreans were killed. Other sources estimated that the number of Korean victims was as high as 6000. Yoshino Sakuzō, the political philosopher and proponent of the notion of *minpon shugi*, conducted his own investigation and came up with a number of 2600 Koreans dead in the Kanto region. More recently one scholar has argued that the total was 20 times as many. Michael Weiner, *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan*, 181-182.

difference and dissent. He was also taking considerable risks by forcefully condemning the police and state for assassinating the socialists and turning a blind eye to the massacre of Koreans; the newspapers that had first reported on Ōsugi's and Itō's disappearance and then reported the circumstances of their murders had been suspended by the police for violating the Press Regulations. But, as Kashiwagi explained, the stakes involved made the risk irrelevant.

Kashiwagi unleashed a tirade against the state and its condoning of violence—both by its own representatives and by vigilante mobs—as a far greater threat to the nation than socialism or even anarchism.<sup>94</sup> He even went as far as to claim that anarchy could potentially be non-violent (offering Tolstoy as an example), while the state's actions left no room for peaceful discussion and debate. No matter how subversive, no idea should be countered with violence; it was the state's obligation to expose the illogic or harm of an ideology through offering a superior ideology.<sup>95</sup> The silencing of dissent through murder and the scapegoating of defenseless Korean laborers exposed a state-sanctioned moral indifference that imperiled Japan's future to become a civilized and conscientious nation.

This moral indifference was not an accident or some kind of essential cultural trait, Kashiwagi explained, but was carefully and systematically nurtured by the state through national education policies and universal conscription. Through the poisonous effects of military indoctrination, intolerance bred by nationalistic compulsory

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<sup>94</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Gūzō hakai: Amakasu Masahiko ron," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (November 1923): 2.

<sup>95</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Gūzō hakai: Amakasu Masahiko ron," 3.

education, and fanned by the general atmosphere of militarism, the Japanese people were being shaped into an intolerant jingoistic nation without conscience or empathy for others.<sup>96</sup> Citing the recently reported words of the perpetrators intended to justify their actions, Kashiwagi lamented the deplorable state of the moral condition of the Japanese people:

Defendants of the recent massacre say, 'I didn't kill them for me, but I did it for the nation,' or, 'I did it thinking of the world so really you should be praising me,' or among those who were rounded up [there are those who] say because the deed was done while they were caught up in the chaos [in the earthquake's aftermath] they should be given the benefit of the doubt, and admit that perhaps they shouldn't have done something like this. But no one seems to be moved by their own moral conscience to truly repent for having taken the lives of innocent people. Japanese people do not appreciate the preciousness of human life, but this must be considered a great defect of national education, of the national character.<sup>97</sup>

Kashiwagi refused to dismiss both the recent acts of violence and the calls to dismiss charges against vigilantes or the police who had assassinated the political dissidents as the regrettable but inevitable result of bad governance. The perpetrators had violated God's law, he argued, something which Christians were obligated to uphold and to proclaim as absolute.

The senseless violence in the aftermath of the earthquake, which echoed to Kashiwagi the brutality of the Japanese suppression of Korean independence only four years earlier, was deplorable and lamentable precisely because it violated a fundamental aspect of God's law. Kashiwagi maintained that this failure implicated Christians who

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<sup>96</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Korosu nakare," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (December 1923): 2.

<sup>97</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Korosu nakare," 2.

were charged with proclaiming God’s law regardless of whether or not it came into conflict with their state’s policies. He reserved his most incendiary language for his fellow Christians and their seemingly passive acceptance of the state’s coercive tactics and willing suppression of those deemed subversive or undesirable. As far as he was concerned, “thou shalt not kill” was an absolute, precise, and unambiguous command: “‘Thou shalt not kill’ means thou shalt not kill, and is clear as fire; there should be no cause for doubt (or questioning). There are no conditions, only ‘thou shalt not kill.’ There should be no reason to [consider any other interpretation] than that this is a divine command absolutely forbidding the killing of others.”<sup>98</sup> Despite the clarity of this simple command, Kashiwagi lamented, Christians had eagerly sought various conditions and qualifications, attempting to marshal spiritual justification for different types of murder. Thus, he continued, “Some now claim that killing in the name of religion was unacceptable while killing in the name of the nation was, even for Christians.”<sup>99</sup> While Kashiwagi attacked any form of killing in this piece—including self-defense and legalized executions—of greatest significance in the context of the earthquake’s aftermath was the justification of murder through war.

Kashiwagi dismissed from the outset the argument that wars were unfortunate but inevitable and ridiculed the claim that amassing and sustaining a formidable army and weapons arsenal was a means of maintaining peace through displaying power. Rather than maintaining peace, “Military buildup always leads to an arms race, and in

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<sup>98</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Korosu nakare,” 2.

<sup>99</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Korosu nakare,” 2.

order to convince a nation's subjects that such military buildup is necessary, [the government] points to virtual (made up) enemies and must then claim that an invasion is imminent...Military buildup necessarily leads to war."<sup>100</sup> In other words, Kashiwagi identified a circular logic linking militarism, territorial expansion, and wartime economic interests that made each seem inevitable.

War, according to Kashiwagi, only appeared inevitable, even necessary, because of the mutually beneficial interests of militarists, and capitalists making their fortunes through the sale of weapons. The solution to ending war and all that it entailed was "simply for the government and subjects of a nation to decide that war was something not to be engaged in. If today's society breeds war, then we should resolve (*omoikitte*) to transform (*kaizō*) this society. War is most certainly not necessary."<sup>101</sup> What remained was the resolve and foundation necessary to accomplish such societal transformation: in short, the Christian teaching, "thou shalt not kill," and Christians determined to transform their society.<sup>102</sup>

In considering the latter point, Kashiwagi denounced his own denomination's unwillingness or inability to emerge as the voice of conscience in the aftermath of the earthquake. Kashiwagi declared that since the Kumiai Kyōkai had been the only denomination to establish a mission in Korea, he had assumed it would issue a public statement specifically condemning the massacre of Korean residents following the

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<sup>100</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Korosu nakare," 2.

<sup>101</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Korosu nakare," 2.

<sup>102</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Korosu nakare," 4.

earthquake. However, all it had issued was a shrill appeal for more humanitarianism. But, Kashiwagi retorted, “there is no need to declare something that no one particularly objects to. If they are going to make a bold declaration, they should publicly express their indignation on behalf of Koreans; and why did they not explicitly proclaim the sacred command ‘thou shalt not kill’ that cannot be compromised for war or national law?”<sup>103</sup>

Kashiwagi, through this editorial, offered a spiritual interpretation of the aftermath of the earthquake. The unwillingness of people—and more critically, Christians—to embrace the command, “thou shalt not kill,” had created the atmosphere and conditions necessary for the massacre of Koreans and the assassinations of socialists to take place.

Kashiwagi’s decision to publish his treatise on absolute non-violence soon after the Great Kantō Earthquake might appear obvious, and yet, it was contingent on another more private drama concurrently underway. Although he did not reveal this to his readers at the time, he admitted his secondary motive two years later. On 20 September, only three weeks after the earthquake, a young man associated with the church named Suda Seiki approached Yuasa Jirō to discuss his intention to publicly declare his objection to the conscription law based on religious conscience.<sup>104</sup> Over the following weeks Suda crafted a detailed statement of separation from the military register, and by 22 October, had resolved to send this statement to the Army Ministry, willing to accept

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<sup>103</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Korosu nakare,” 4.

<sup>104</sup> 20 September 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 307.

whatever consequence this would bring.<sup>105</sup> Kashiwagi was moved by Suda's determination but troubled by his decision, fearing that the young man would face greater consequences than he was prepared for. To show the church community's support for Suda's decision, Kashiwagi published Suda's declaration in the December 1923 issue of the *geppō*. He decided to publish his non-violence treatise, "Korosu nakare," in the same issue in part to offer Suda greater comfort and support and to offer theological legitimacy to his decision.<sup>106</sup>

Suda Seiki's feverish and abrupt decision to declare himself a conscientious objector, even before he had been conscripted into the army, was published in the same issue of the *geppō* and provided an eloquent counterpoint to Kashiwagi's impassioned denunciation of violence. Suda's statement as it appears in the *geppō* is a curious document; it is part autobiography, part confession, part declaration. Its potentially subversive nature is marked by the frequent use of *fuseji*, or space-fillers used in the place of words that would draw the attention of censors. This commonly used device prevented the censors from objecting to the contents (since the actual words were never printed) while also signaling to readers—who could usually guess the missing words—the politically sensitive and exciting nature of the content.<sup>107</sup>

In this declaration, Suda described a childhood influenced by Christianity—he had been raised in a Christian home—but during which he harbored no doubts about his

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<sup>105</sup> 22 October 1923, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 308.

<sup>106</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, editor's note, "zatsuroku: ware ha tatakau," *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (March 1925): 5.

<sup>107</sup> Jay Rubin, *Injurious to Public Morals*, 29.

obligations to serve the state through military service. He had been drafted once before and willingly joined the military as an act of loyalty to the nation and emperor.<sup>108</sup> His term in the military, however, exhausted him, physically and emotionally, and it was upon his release that he developed a renewed interest in “following Christ.” He left Gunma for Tokyo in order to study the Bible further and was also inspired by Tolstoy’s religious writings. Through his studies, he came to the conviction that “Placing myself in the service of the military, even if I did not personally kill anyone, was to make myself an accomplice to murder, and for that I would be culpable before God.”<sup>109</sup> In order to live according to his conscience and follow the “path of justice,” Suda decided that he could no longer serve in the military.<sup>110</sup>

Suda’s dramatic renunciation of the military, and his declaration of becoming a conscientious objector, concluded, unexpectedly, with his rejection of this stance only a few years later. In the March 1925 issue of the *geppō*, Kashiwagi announced that Suda had renounced his earlier position and decided that it would not violate his conscience or his Christian faith to make himself available for military service. Now serving as a missionary in Taiwan, Suda wrote to the *geppō* of his change of heart. He declared that while war itself was evil, “true world peace cannot be accomplished without war. God

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<sup>108</sup> Suda Seiki was drafted into the Takasaki Fifteenth Infantry Battalion in November 1914. The Annaka church held a farewell party for him and another church member who was drafted into a different battalion on 22 November 1914. Suda was baptized at the Annaka church the same month. “Annaka kyōkai,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (December 1914): 9-10.

<sup>109</sup> [Suda Seiki], “‘Korosu nakare’ no kaimei ni kangeki shite okotta ichi-seinen,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (December 1923): 10.

<sup>110</sup> [Suda Seiki], “‘Korosu nakare’ no kaimei ni kangeki shite okotta ichi-seinen,” 10.

throws human beings into this crucible of war to refine them. War is not something to be avoided; it is something that should be joyfully embraced.”<sup>111</sup> In his editorial note to Suda’s renewed embrace of war as a means to a greater good, Kashiwagi declared his own unflinching commitment to absolute non-violence.

### **The 1924 United States Immigration Act as “Hai-Nichi Iminho”: Concluding Comments on a Nation in Peril**

In 1924, the United States Congress passed the Immigration Act. Abolishing all immigration from Asian countries and substantially limiting immigration from Europe, this all-encompassing act fulfilled a series of previous immigration restrictions that had increasingly hampered Japanese immigration to the U.S. While the scope of the law extended to all Asians, in Japan, it was termed the “Anti-Japanese immigration act” or Hai-Nichi iminhō. Unconcerned with limitations placed on others, many Japanese interpreted the Act as a slap in the face of Japanese in particular.

Following the passage of the law, pundits and public intellectuals, including many Christian ministers, energetically denounced the law as an insult to the Japanese people and interpreted it as evidence of American racism (which it indeed was) and the injustice of western nations in the face of Japan’s legitimate efforts to be accepted as an equal power. Amidst the rampant anti-Americanism that characterized these critiques, Kashiwagi offered his own analysis. He was no longer enamored with American “spiritual imperialism,” as he had been in the early 1900s. There was no longer any room in his thinking for “just” imperialism; he also ceased to consider American

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<sup>111</sup> Suda Seiki, “Ware ha arasou,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (March 1925): 6.

diplomacy or actions the height of a civilized nation, as he once had. But his evaluation of the Immigration Act, even as it condemned American racial policies as a betrayal of Christian values, was tempered with a stern assessment of what he considered the justifiable rejection of Japanese immigrants because of the actions of the Japanese state in general.

Kashiwagi first acknowledged that the passage of this act would adversely affect world peace because it would harm U.S.-Japan relations. He also accepted that in a nation like the U.S., with a substantial laborer population and a well-developed labor movement, the influx of immigrant laborers willing to work for lower wages would create a serious social problem. But Kashiwagi shifted the terms of the debate from why the U.S. was unjustly excluding Japanese immigrants to why Japanese immigrants were being excluded from so many different countries.

Reframing the problem posed by the U.S. law, Kashiwagi questioned the assumptions of these others by asking, “Is there not something for which our nation must deeply and fundamentally repent (*hansei*)? In particular, at the International Labor Conference, Japan insisted that it was a special nation and confined Japanese laborers to a humble station (*iyashiki tokoro*). And isn’t it true that Japan itself has excluded the entry of Chinese laborers?”<sup>112</sup> Thus Kashiwagi accused those Japanese who objected to the U.S.’s treatment of Japan as hypocritical.

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<sup>112</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Gojin no Nichi-Bei mondai kan,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (June 1924): 2.

More central to Kashiwagi's analysis was the problem of the assimilability of Japanese immigrants in the U.S. This point, ambivalent as it was, also pointed to a more general problem Kashiwagi identified in Japan:

Put in one way, Japanese immigrants are perhaps people who are most difficult to assimilate in the United States. In truth, the Japanese education system particularly creates a people with this characteristic....Hiding behind this strange (*myō*) term "special" (*tokushu*), the Japanese education system conducts unnatural education (*fushizen no kyōiku*). How can people who, through this education that brandishes this specialness have their heads strangely hardened, be assimilated when they travel abroad? In addition to this, Japanese religion is such a religion that it further prevents such assimilation.<sup>113</sup>

Further, Kashiwagi cautioned that since Japanese were raised in a militaristic, expansionist nation, they were not considered trustworthy in other countries. In fact—and this point inadvertently cohered with the most alarmist claims of anti-Japanese groups—if war between the U.S. and Japan were to break out, the Japanese in California would most likely side with Japan.<sup>114</sup>

According to Kashiwagi, Japan's belligerent diplomacy, atrocities committed by its colonial police, and oppressive tactics targeting its own subjects, provoked legislation like the U.S. anti-immigration law. The outrage expressed by Japanese intellectuals, pundits, and even ministers was hypocritical because Japan was engaging in all the same unequal or racial policies for which these people were attacking the United States. Further, Kashiwagi ridiculed those who proposed establishing an Asian or "yellow" alliance to counter the "white" West: "For the sake of world peace and

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<sup>113</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Gojin no Nichi-Bei mondai kan," 2.

<sup>114</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Gojin no Nichi-Bei mondai kan," 2.

civilization such an idea must be done away with.”<sup>115</sup> Any Japanese attempt at revenge or retaliation against the U.S., such as increased tariffs or boycotts, would only harm Japan. Ultimately, Japan was in danger of losing its national conscience: where, Kashiwagi implored, had the national conscience been when Japan imposed the twenty-one demands on China, the brutal suppression of the Korean independence movement, or the massacre of Koreans during the earthquake?<sup>116</sup> It was this failure of the national conscience, not western racism, that had led to the Immigration Act.

Through commenting on the diplomatic and political controversy spurred by the U.S. Immigration Act, Kashiwagi recapitulated his comprehensive attack of the Japanese state’s policies and what he perceived as a general state of complacency and willful ignorance among the populace that enabled the state to impose its form of repressive and coercive rule. Just as he had questioned the claims of those who had participated in the massacre of Korean residents after the earthquake that they were not responsible for their actions, Kashiwagi called on those who denounced American racism to consider their own culpability in how Japan was perceived abroad. Central to each of Kashiwagi’s critiques was a concern for the establishment of a “true” moral conscience, grounded in a Christianity characterized by compassion, not one with global aspirations willing to wed itself to an imperialist state to accomplish its goals.

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<sup>115</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Gojin no Nichi-Bei mondai kan,” 3.

<sup>116</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Gojin no Nichi-Bei mondai kan,” 4.

## EPILOGUE

### Colonial Observations

In April 1925, Kashiwagi Gien made his first and only trip abroad, to Korea and Manchuria. Over three weeks, Kashiwagi visited Seoul, Inchŏn, P'yŏngyang, and Andong. Eager to take in everything he could, Kashiwagi visited prominent members of the expatriate community such as Tokutomi Sohō, Niwa Seijirō (director of the Japanese YMCA), and Yamagata Teizaburō, a Government General official who had been a classmate of his at the Tokyo Normal School. He also visited Christian schools and churches, and struck up conversations with fellow train passengers and even a Chinese police officer in Andong.

Kashiwagi was particularly interested to hear from Japanese living in Seoul about Watase's reputation there. What he learned only confirmed his suspicions: from a Reverend Hasegawa to Matsumoto Masatarō, a long-time resident and active member of the expatriate Christian community, Japanese Christians still in colonial Korea hinted to Kashiwagi that Watase and his mission had been viewed with suspicion and mistrust by not only other Christians but even by the Government General.<sup>1</sup> Hasegawa was especially critical of Watase's treatment of Yu Il-sŏn, who had served as the faithful assistant director of the mission and when the Kumiai Kyōkai withdrew from Korea, had become the head of the nominally independent Korean Congregationalist Church.

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<sup>1</sup> 2 May 1925, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 359.

Kashiwagi visited Yu and discovered that he was in dire straits: he was barely able to keep the kindergarten he was operating open, the printing press once affiliated with the mission hardly had any business, and according to Hasegawa, Yu even had trouble keeping food on his table.<sup>2</sup> In his diary, Kashiwagi remarked, “I learned many things. There is reason to be sympathetic [to Yu’s situation]; for one thing Watase and the Kumiai Kyōkai made many mistakes.”<sup>3</sup> When he published an account of his trip in the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* in May, he lashed out at Watase, accusing him of giving Koreans the impression that the Kumiai Kyōkai was nothing more than a denomination at the beck and call of the colonial government. He also expressed his sympathies for Yu, and blamed Yu’s difficulties “entirely on a certain someone who had erred as to the starting point for the Kumiai Kyōkai Korea mission.”<sup>4</sup>

Despite his concern for Koreans who endured colonial rule and its attendant brutalities and mundane insults, Kashiwagi nonetheless was ambivalent about granting Koreans independence from Japan. He criticized the behavior of Japanese bureaucrats who reinforced a system of inequalities that prevented Koreans from living freely or even succeeding in basic areas like education and business. But he urged sympathy for the Korean condition, compassion for the sources of Korean rage and suspicion directed towards Japan, to enable a “natural assimilation” to take place.<sup>5</sup> While he objected to the

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<sup>2</sup> 20 April 1925, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 357; 2 May 1925, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 359.

<sup>3</sup> 20 April 1925, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 357. When Kashiwagi learned of Yu’s death on 25 April 1937, he lamented not “opening his heart” to Yu when he and Watase had visited him church. 25 April 1937, *Kashiwagi Gien nikki*, 516.

<sup>4</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, “Chōsen wo mizaru no ki,” *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* (May 1925): 11.

Government General's oppressive use of power, just as he denounced similar conduct by the Japanese state at home, he nonetheless acceded to the claim that Koreans required Japanese assistance on some level if they were to attain the self-reliance necessary for national independence.

In many ways, Kashiwagi's trip to Korea marked a high point in his career. His suspicions justified and with the benefit of first-hand observation, Kashiwagi mused on the conditions of Japanese colonialism. The imperial reality that governed the lives of Japanese subjects in both the home islands and colonies stirred his interest and his sense of justice and indignation. The struggles of Korean laborers, the honest efforts of a handful of Japanese Christian educators and ministers and even Government General officials amidst an inherently unequal system that structured the lives of Koreans and Japanese settlers seemed, no doubt, a reflection of conditions in Japan itself. His brief visit to Korea provided him with a deeper perspective on the conditions in Japan that troubled him, even as it offered him more reason to criticize and caution against the conduct of the state and its extension in the colonies. In 1925, such ideas were still possible, and asserting the elevation of conscience over and against the material and political interests of the state however tenuous, still tenable.

### **Ebina Danjō: Leading Dōshisha**

For Ebina as well, the late 1920s marked what seemed to be the culmination of his already illustrious career. In 1920, he was appointed the eighth president of his alma

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<sup>5</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Chōsen wo mizaru no ki," 9.

mater, Dōshisha. The same year, Dōshisha became the first Christian school to be granted the designation of university (from preparatory school). Ebina busied himself with transforming the university into an even more prestigious and respectable educational institution. This included creating a dormitory for the American-born children of Japanese emigrants so they could receive a “proper” Japanese education. The number of students enrolled in the university and affiliated high schools steadily increased, and under Ebina’s leadership, the university added new buildings to its campus and purchased property in other parts of Kyoto for further expansion.<sup>6</sup>

Amidst the successes and growth that Ebina oversaw at Dōshisha, an unforeseeable incident abruptly ended his tenure. Late on the night of November 23, 1928, a school building caught fire. Dōshisha was located across a major boulevard from the historic Kyoto imperial palace; the recently ascended Shōwa emperor was about to hold his enthronement ceremony at this palace. Dismayed that their school had come close to endangering the emperor, students and teachers gathered in front of the theology department building and offered a three-minute long deep bow in the direction of the palace as a sign of contrition and reverence. Nonetheless, Ebina and the entire board of the university resigned, taking responsibility for allowing something as dangerous and inauspicious as a fire to occur on the eve of the new emperor’s enthronement ceremony.<sup>7</sup> Ebina moved to Tokyo, and while he formally retired, he

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<sup>6</sup> Dōshisha shashi shiryō henshūjo, editors, *Dōshisha kyūjūnen shoshi* (Kyoto: Gakkōhōjin Dōshisha, 1965), 110-111.

<sup>7</sup> *Dōshisha kyūjūnen shoshi*, 112. Interestingly, Watase completely elides this incident in his biography of Ebina and skips from Ebina’s successes as the president of Dōshisha to his death in 1937, mentioning nothing of the intervening nine years.

continued to visit churches in the area, and even made several trips to Korea and China, to support other ministries.<sup>8</sup>

By 1931, the range of opinions espoused by Ebina (and Watase) on one hand and Kashiwagi on the other, all of which despite critical conflicts and disagreements attempted to imagine a Japan transformed through Christianity, were silenced. Until this moment, the existing limits placed on expression and dissent had been flexible and implemented in an ad hoc manner, and widely divergent visions for the nation could publicly co-exist. With its invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese empire began its long but definite path towards total war, and this drastically transformed the rules that governed the world in which these men, and all Japanese subjects, lived.

### **From Manchuria to Total War**

In September 1931, the Guandong Army—the Japanese Army garrison stationed in the Guandong Leased Territory in Manchuria—provoked armed conflict with Chinese troops by staging a “terrorist attack” (which they blamed on Chinese guerillas) near the Fengtian station on the South Manchurian Railway. The initial skirmish devolved into full-scale battle, and soon the Guandong Army occupied all of the provinces in northeastern China. Recognizing that blatant colonization would now incite international censure, the garrison and other conspirators, in a diplomatic and political

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<sup>8</sup> Ōshimo Aya, *Chichi Ebina Danjō* (Fujin no tomo sha, 1975), 144.

sleight of hand, declared the formation of an “independent state” they named Manchukuo.<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese government tacitly approved the rogue actions of the garrison: Manchuria had long been an area of interest to the empire and its complete occupation by the Guandong Army secured its place within the Japanese sphere of influence.<sup>10</sup> In order to defend the actions of the garrison and foster the impression that the Japanese nation was unified in a moment of crisis, the state instituted a new set of censorship regulations focused on two types of information: anything related to the imperial family, and the military. Criticizing either, or depicting either in the remotest negative light, was considered “injurious to public morals and peace.”<sup>11</sup> According to these parameters, pacifism of any kind was considered practically seditious because of its implicit rejection of the military’s actions and the state’s decisions.

Recognizing the “Manchurian Incident” for what it was—an act of military aggression and thinly veiled territorial expansion—Kashiwagi took up his pen to denounce the Army’s tactics and the government’s failure to reign in this unruly garrison stationed abroad. Between October and December 1931, he repeatedly questioned the official account of the “terrorist attack” near Fengtian and condemned Japan’s occupation of territory in a sovereign nation. He had criticized the government and the military, and denounced acts of colonial aggression numerous times before. But

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<sup>9</sup> Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 40.

<sup>10</sup> Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 40.

<sup>11</sup> Richard H. Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, 261-262.

for questioning Japan's expansion into Manchuria, Kashiwagi finally was handed the *geppō*'s first suspension in December 1931.<sup>12</sup>

Over the following five years, the *geppō* was suspended eleven times for editorials that criticized the state or commented on controversial events. In addition to the "Manchurian Incident," Kashiwagi decried what he considered the alarming popular support for a series of failed coups d'états (May 15 incident in 1932 and February 26 incident in 1936) during which the perpetrators assassinated prime ministers, cabinet members, and prominent business tycoons.<sup>13</sup> Kashiwagi also objected to the increasing encroachment of Shintō into the "private" lives of imperial subjects. Concurrent with the rise in violence—both abroad and at home—was an increased emphasis on Shintō as the spiritual basis for national unity. No longer content with the loose set of rituals and guidelines that tied the imperial household to the nation through mythology, the state began to more directly enforce ritual practices meant to give spiritual weight to the tie between the imperial household and its subjects. This "spiritualization" of the nation invested a spiritual legitimacy to Japan's very physical and material aggression abroad and oppressive policies at home.

The controversies that had plagued Christian schools since the Imperial Rescript debates in the 1890s only intensified with total mobilization for war. The same logic that drove the new censorship regulations intruded into spaces of education: it was no longer permissible for students (along with the reading public) to question the purity

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<sup>12</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 293-295.

<sup>13</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 317-319, 326-327.

and magnanimity of the imperial household, or the honor of the military. The state renewed its efforts to impose patriotic and militaristic curricula, now even in Christian schools that thus far had managed to avoid such pressure. And now as the state more strenuously pushed Shintō as the spiritual source of national unity under the emperor, Christian schools such as Dōshisha began making a series of compromises they had hitherto refused, allowing the installation of powerful symbols of imperial rule tied to Shintō. But these new intrusions were not solely due to state pressure: students, parents, and even some alumni also pressured schools into displaying the imperial portrait and explicitly incorporating patriotic and nationalistic ideas into the curriculum.<sup>14</sup>

The acceptance of imperial intrusion into the “Christian space” of Dōshisha occurred under Ebina’s leadership: Dōshisha became the first Christian school to display the official portraits of the emperor and empress, the same portraits whose veneration had sparked the Imperial Rescript controversy in the 1890s.<sup>15</sup> In 1935, some members of the Dōshisha-affiliated Commercial High School’s kendō club spontaneously and without school permission installed a *kami dana* (god shelf), or Shintō altar, in their clubhouse. Teachers convinced the students to temporarily remove the shelf, but soon the Army’s Divisional Headquarters intervened and eventually the faculty acquiesced to re-installing the shelf. A local newspaper even reported that the new president of the university, Yuasa Hachirō, declared his intention to worship before

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<sup>14</sup> Dohi Akio, *Nihon purotesutanto kirisutokyō shi* (Shinkyō shuppansha, 1980), 368.

<sup>15</sup> Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 310; Komagome Takeshi, “‘Goshin’ei’ wo meguru Kirisutokyō-kei gakkō no dōkō: Tennō shinkakuka to Kirisutokyō shugi no hazama,” in *Jūgonen sensōki no tennōsei to kirisutokyō*, ed. Tomisaka Kirisutokyō sentā (Shinkyō shuppansha, 2007), 570.

the altar.<sup>16</sup> This decision dismayed Kashiwagi who believed this constituted an unacceptable conflict with Christian worship. His discussion of this incident, which included a denunciation of the coercive intrusion of Shintō into Christian schools, prompted yet another suspension of the *geppō*.<sup>17</sup>

The changes in censorship regulations were manifested in greater intrusions into Kashiwagi's life. Aggressive visits by the police rose in frequency, and he was regularly called in for police interrogations as well. The frequent suspensions of the *geppō*, and complementary visits by the police, irritated Kashiwagi, but caused his family and church members considerable concern. Of greater consequence was the loss of Yuasa Jirō, who passed away in June 1932. Yuasa's death dealt Kashiwagi a particularly grievous blow: not only had he relied on Yuasa for friendship, but Yuasa had been his closest sympathizer. Coming amidst the first wave of suspensions of the *geppō*, Yuasa's death seemed to signal an ominous shift in the possibilities of Christian dissent.

The members of the church and Kashiwagi's eldest son Hayao (now the minister of the Haraichi church) grew concerned for Kashiwagi's welfare, and possibly also anxious about the reputation of the church amidst intensifying state surveillance of Christian institutions, decided to ask Kashiwagi to retire as pastor of the Annaka church in 1935. The following year—during which the *geppō* was suspended three times—

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<sup>16</sup> Yuasa Hachirō was the eighth son of Yuasa Jirō and served as the tenth president of Dōshisha. He traveled to California in 1939—where he had spent some time when he was younger—to try to encourage better relations between Americans and Japanese. Rather than return to Japan on an exchange ship following the Japanese Imperial Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor, he chose to be interned in a WRA internment camp along with the nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans who were incarcerated during the war. After World War II, he returned to Japan and served as the president of the newly founded International Christian University in Tokyo.

<sup>17</sup> *Dōshisha kyūjūnen shoshi*, 118; Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 325-326.

Hayao and other contributors to the *geppō* met with the local police and agreed to a compromise. It has been speculated that the police agreed to allow them to continue the *geppō* under a new name—*Shin seimei* (New Life)—as long as Kashiwagi agreed to cease writing any more editorials.<sup>18</sup> In short, the members of the church sacrificed their elderly minister (with his consent) to preserve their ability to continue to operate as a congregation. Lacking political bite, the newly launched *Shin seimei* failed to command the attention or influence the *Jōmō kyōkai geppō* had under Kashiwagi's guidance. It was now merely a Christian church newsletter reporting the mundane details of the lives and activities of Gunma congregations with only veiled ambivalent references to the increasing tensions and hardships that a state of war had brought to the countryside.

On May 22, 1937, Ebina Danjō passed away at the age of eighty-two, surrounded by family and friends, in his home in the Kōenji neighborhood of Tokyo. The previous November he and his wife were traveling to another church in Tokyo when their car was struck by a truck. Miya was unhurt but Ebina suffered internal injuries and never fully recovered. When Kashiwagi received news that Ebina had taken a turn for the worse, he and four other Gunma church members rushed to visit him: they left Haraichi at three a.m. and drove to Tokyo, arriving at Ebina's home at seven a.m. When they arrived Ebina was sleeping; Kashiwagi looked in on him but was unable to speak to him.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Itani Ryūichi, "Senjika no Jōmō no Kirisutoshatachi," *Kaiki to yūfun* (Kokubunsha, 1971), 88, cited in Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 333. Under its new title *Shin seimei*, the *geppō* continued publication until June 1941, when the state "encouraged" all Christian denominations to form one Japanese denomination, the Nihon Kirisutokyōdan. After this, the *geppō* continued under the title *Gunma kyōdan* until October 1943. Katano Masako, *Kofun no hito Kashiwagi Gien*, 331.

Three days later, Kashiwagi again traveled from his home in Annaka to Tokyo to attend Ebina's funeral. More than fifty years had passed since Ebina baptized Kashiwagi at the Annaka church. In the intervening years, the two men once united through the intimate bond of minister and seeker had parted intellectual and theological ways. In the June 1937 issue of the *Shin seimei*, Kashiwagi wrote a curious eulogy. More self-reflection than tribute to Ebina, Kashiwagi's musings on his relationship with Ebina took him back to his moment of conversion, his brief tenure at the Kumamoto Eigakkō (through Ebina's introduction), and the Okumura controversy. He also lingered on the Korea mission and Ebina's role in supporting and legitimizing it. Ultimately, Kashiwagi concluded, "Personally I am indebted to Ebina in many ways, but in terms of public ministry there were many issues where I found it difficult to agree with him. But truly it was [Ebina] who not only established the foundation for ministry in Jōshū but who also secured a great number [for the church]. Christians of Jōshū should not forget [Ebina]." <sup>20</sup> On January 8, 1938, a year after his *geppō* and church had been taken from him, Kashiwagi passed away at the age of seventy-nine, surrounded by some of his children and grandchildren who were visiting to celebrate the New Year.

### **The Conclusion of Imperial Evangelism**

Ebina and Kashiwagi were spared experiencing Japan's protracted war in Asia. Watase Tsuneyoshi outlived both men by over seven years. After leaving Korea in 1921, he had

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<sup>19</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Ebina sensei rinjū no byōshō wo hōmon shite," *Shin seimei* (June 1937): 7.

<sup>20</sup> Kashiwagi Gien, "Ebina Danjō sensei wo omou," *Shin seimei* (June 1937): 6.

founded a church in Shizuoka prefecture. He also dedicated himself to identifying points of commonality between the Bible and ancient Japanese texts such as the *Kojiki* in order to argue that ancient Japanese mythology—itsself only recently “rediscovered” and marshaled to legitimize the Japanese state—expressed the same truths as the Christian Bible.<sup>21</sup> In 1934, Watase resigned from his position as minister of his church, leaving it in the hands of his son-in-law, and moved to Manchuria. In the newly established puppet-state Manchukuo, he attempted to begin a mission in its capital city, Xinjing. He had originally intended to stay for three years but the mission ended in failure and he returned to Japan after only two.<sup>22</sup> In 1940, Watase founded a seminary in Tokyo where he hoped to raise up “missionaries who were not enthralled with the West.”<sup>23</sup> In January 1944, Watase suddenly rushed off to Seoul to help with efforts to unify all Protestant denominations in Korea—this followed the state-coerced unification of all denominations into a national denomination in Japan proper. In October, he collapsed in the street of a stroke and died a week later at the age of seventy-eight.<sup>24</sup>

Watanabe Morishige and Furuya Magojirō, the Kumiai Kyōkai missionaries who had moved to China as missionaries in 1919, survived the war and were stranded in China along with other Japanese settler colonists. Watanabe, who was in Fengtian, faced, as did other Japanese settlers in the area, the harsh realities of being abandoned by the Japanese Army as it fled the full-scale assault of the Soviet Army. He hid local

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<sup>21</sup> Han Sokhi and Iinuma Jirō, *Nihon teikokushugika no Chōsen dendō*, 151.

<sup>22</sup> Han and Iinuma, *Nihon teikokushugika no Chōsen dendō*, 159.

<sup>23</sup> Han and Iinuma, *Nihon teikokushugika no Chōsen dendō*, 162.

<sup>24</sup> Han and Iinuma, *Nihon teikokushugika no Chōsen dendō*, 170.

Japanese in the cellar of his church to protect them and finally fled with them in 1946, leaving behind all material evidence of the ministry he had built there.<sup>25</sup> With the end of the war and the dissolution of the Japanese empire, the Kumiai Kyōkai's attempt to unite Japanese imperialism with Christian evangelism failed, and the few who remained returned to Japan, living out the rest of their lives as ministers of churches in a very different nation.

### **Final Thoughts: Returning to the Annaka Church**

In December 2007, I attended a Sunday service at the Annaka church. The building itself, a quaint stone structure reminiscent of a parish church in the English countryside, was built in the Taishō period through the efforts of members of the church. The sanctuary was full, with about eighty members in attendance, including a newlywed couple. But this couple was among the few young members—the congregation was mostly elderly, and included Kashiwagi Gien's grandson Kan'ichi, a retired physician, and the eldest member, Kuboniwa Mitsu, whose mother as a high school student often passed by “Kashiwagi-sensei” on her way to the train station. According to Mitsu, he was usually clothed in a kimono, wore *geta* (wooden sandals), and his insistence on stopping and greeting her mother with a respectful bow flustered her since was often about to be late for school.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Endo Junko and others, editors, *Hoshi no yōni: Watanabe Morishige bokushi shoden* (privately printed, 1985), 33-34.

<sup>26</sup> Conversation with Kuboniwa Mitsu, 27 July 2008.

Most striking about the sanctuary are the portraits that grace the front area surrounding the pulpit. Behind the pulpit are large portraits of Niijima Jō and Ebina Danjō, considered the founding fathers of the church. To each side are smaller portraits of Yuasa Jirō and Kashiwagi Gien, the men responsible for guiding the church in its early years. On this particular day, the current pastor Gomi Hajime reported on the church's preparations for its 130<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration.

The congregation had raised funds to build a columbarium on the church premises: since most Japanese cremate the remains of the deceased and store urns beneath gravestones in plots attached to Buddhist temples, caring for the remains of deceased relatives presents a unique challenge for Japanese Christians. By building its own columbarium, the Annaka church was offering its members not only an alternative to burying their dead in a Buddhist temple graveyard, but it also was providing a space where their loved ones would be looked after by the church. The church had also decided to place a physical and symbolic reminder of the church's beginnings in the columbarium: they had contacted the families of Niijima, Ebina, and Yuasa to request dirt from their burial plots to place in the columbarium.

The portraits of Niijima, Ebina, Yuasa, and Kashiwagi, and the church's efforts to collect material evidence of Niijima, Ebina, and Yuasa (but oddly enough not Kashiwagi) to link them in perpetuity to the church demonstrates something striking and poignant about the legacies of these men. For the Annaka church, each of these men played significant roles in creating and sustaining the church in its early years. Despite the differences that separated them, they nonetheless have an equal place of honor for

this congregation. Their legacy, at least in the town of Annaka, is the founding of a Christian community that continues to exist. But the erasure of difference, while it acknowledges the important roles each man played in nurturing Christianity in Gunma, also elides the significance of the differences that marked these men's thought and practice in a period fraught with controversy, colonial expansion, emperor-centered ideology, and the intrusive actions of the state.

To be precise, what is lacking in these portraits is a sense of the history that shaped the beliefs and ministries of these four men. Their depictions—Nijjima and Ebina are pictured in suits whereas Yuasa and Kashiwagi wear traditional Japanese dress—reflect the transitional nature of the period in which they lived. But there is no indication of the realities of imperialism, its political, ideological, and geographic manifestations, that formed the crucible in which these men developed their faith and then envisioned dramatically different notions of a Christian Japan. This is not to say that the congregation itself is ignorant of this reality or that it somehow attempts to deny the context of the church's founding. Particularly for the elderly members, this history is one they themselves experienced, and Kashiwagi's legacy as a stubborn pacifist in a nation that appeared inexplicably driven towards war provides them with a sense of their church's historical significance.

The presentation of Nijjima, Ebina, Yuasa, and Kashiwagi as equal founders of this one church, and by extension, equal leaders of the early years of Japanese Protestantism, makes Christianity, in its most general and distilled sense, the common thread that united them. Certainly it is indisputable that these four men were joined in a

common mission to Christianize Japan. But as this dissertation has demonstrated, such a mission was by no means uniform. Differences in theology resulted in drastically divergent interpretations of how Christians should relate to the state and the role Christians should play in their church communities as well as the communities in which they lived and worked. And different understandings of Japan's place in the world led to nearly mutually exclusive conclusions about what a Christian Japan should be. Reducing such differences to an undifferentiated Christianity, without acknowledging the often grave implications of the diverse positions these men maintained, creates an inadequate and impoverished portrait of pre-World War II Christianity in Japan.

Despite all of the government's claims to ethnic homogeneity and national unity, the reality was that the people who lived in the Japanese empire were diverse, with divergent beliefs and hopes, even nationalisms and critiques of the nation. The power of totalitarian rule is its ability to obscure all shades of gray, all variations and even skeptical believers, let alone the few lone voices in the wilderness. So by turning my attention to this small group of Christians, with their conflicting beliefs, and troubled thoughts on war, colonialism, censorship, and what an appropriate Christian response might be, I hope to undo some of the violence of empire and war which have succeeded in erasing their diversity, vitality, and efforts to make sense of belief in an ostensibly foreign God and a rapidly changing nation that demanded absolute loyalty from them.

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